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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 21–499

															_________________

															CARLOS VEGA, PETITIONER v. TERENCE B.
TEKOH

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 23, 2022]

															Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															This case presents the question whether a
plaintiff may sue a police officer under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42
U. S. C. §1983, based on the allegedly improper admission
of an “un- Mirandized ”[ 1 ]
statement in a criminal prosecution. The case arose out of the
interrogation of respondent, Terence Tekoh, by petitioner, Los
Angeles County Sheriff ’s Deputy Carlos Vega. Deputy Vega
questioned Tekoh at his place of employment and did not give him a Miranda warning. Tekoh was prosecuted, and his confession
was admitted into evidence, but the jury returned a verdict of not
guilty. Tekoh then sued Vega under §1983, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of Tekoh’s
un- Mirandized statement provided a valid basis for a §1983
claim against Vega. We now reject this extension of our Miranda case law.

															I

															In March 2014, Tekoh was working as a
certified nursing assistant at a Los Angeles medical center. When a
female patient accused him of sexually assaulting her, the hospital
staff reported the accusation to the Los Angeles County
Sheriff ’s Department, and Deputy Vega responded. Vega
questioned Tekoh at length in the hospital, and Tekoh eventually
provided a written statement apologizing for inappropriately
touching the patient’s genitals. The parties dispute whether Vega
used coercive investigatory techniques to extract the statement,
but it is undisputed that he never informed Tekoh of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona , 384
U.S. 436 (1966), which held that during a custodial
interrogation police officers must inform a suspect that “he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning.” Id. , at 479.

															Tekoh was arrested and charged in California
state court with unlawful sexual penetration. At Tekoh’s first
trial, the judge held that Miranda had not been violated
because Tekoh was not in custody when he provided the statement,
but the trial resulted in a mistrial. When Tekoh was retried, a
second judge again denied his request to exclude the confession.
This trial resulted in acquittal, and Tekoh then brought this
action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against Vega and several
other defendants seeking damages for alleged violations of his
constitutional rights, including his Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination.

															When this §1983 case was first tried, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of Vega, but the judge concluded that
he had given an improper jury instruction and thus granted a new
trial. Before the second trial, Tekoh asked the court to instruct
the jury that it was required to find that Vega violated the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self- incrimination if it
determined that he took a statement from Tekoh in violation of Miranda and that the statement was then improperly used
against Tekoh at his criminal trial. The District Court declined,
reasoning that Miranda established a prophylactic rule and
that such a rule could not alone provide a ground for §1983
liability. Instead, the jury was asked to decide whether Tekoh’s
Fifth Amendment right had been violated. The court instructed the
jury to determine, based on “the totality of all the surrounding
circumstances,” whether Tekoh’s statement had been “improperly
coerced or compelled,” and the court explained that “[a] confession
is improperly coerced or compelled . . . if a police
officer uses physical or psychological force or threats not
permitted by law to undermine a person’s ability to exercise his or
her free will.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 119a. The jury found in
Vega’s favor, and Tekoh appealed.

															A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the
“use of an un- Mirandized statement against a defendant in a
criminal proceeding violates the Fifth Amendment and may support a
§1983 claim” against the officer who obtained the statement. Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles , 985 F.3d 713, 722
(2021). The panel acknowledged that this Court has repeatedly said
that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules designed to protect
against constitutional violations and that the decision did not
hold that the contravention of those rules necessarily constitutes
a constitutional violation. See 985 F. 3d, at 719–720. But the
panel thought that our decision in Dickerson v. United
States , 530 U.S.
428 (2000), “made clear that the right of a criminal defendant
against having an un- Mirandized statement introduced in the
prosecution’s case in chief is indeed a right secured by the
Constitution.” 985 F. 3d, at 720. Therefore the panel
concluded that Tekoh could establish a violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination simply by
showing that Miranda had been violated. See 985 F. 3d,
at 720. The panel thus remanded the case for a new trial.

															Vega’s petition for rehearing en banc was
denied, but Judge Bumatay, joined by six other judges, filed a
dissent from the denial of rehearing. Tekoh v. County of
Los Angeles , 997 F.3d 1260, 1261, 1264–1272 (CA9 2021). We then
granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ___ (2022).

															II

															Section 1983 provides a cause of action
against any person acting under color of state law who “subjects” a
person or “causes [a person] to be subjected . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” The question we must decide is whether a
violation of the Miranda rules provides a basis for a claim
under §1983. We hold that it does not.

															A

															If a Miranda violation were tantamount
to a violation of the Fifth Amendment, our answer would of course
be different. The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan , 378 U.S.
1 , 6 (1964), provides that “[n]o person . . . shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
This Clause “permits a person to refuse to testify against himself
at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant” and “also
‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any
other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal
proceedings.’ ” Minnesota v. Murphy , 465 U.S.
420 , 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley , 414 U.S.
70 , 77 (1973)). In addition, the right bars the introduction
against a criminal defendant of out-of-court statements obtained by
compulsion. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 , 565 (1897); Miranda , 384 U. S., at 466; Michigan v. Tucker , 417
U.S. 433 , 440–442 (1974).

															In Miranda , the Court concluded that
additional procedural protections were necessary to prevent the
violation of this important right when suspects who are in custody
are interrogated by the police. To afford this protection, the
Court required that custodial interrogation be preceded by the
now-familiar warnings mentioned above, and it directed that
statements obtained in violation of these new rules may not be used
by the prosecution in its case-in-chief. 384 U. S., at 444,
479.

															In this case, the Ninth Circuit held—and Tekoh
now argues, Brief for Respondent 20—that a violation of Miranda constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination, but that is wrong. Miranda itself and our subsequent cases make clear that Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules. Those rules, to
be sure, are “constitutionally based,” Dickerson , 530
U. S., at 440, but they are prophylactic rules
nonetheless.

															B Miranda itself was clear on this point. Miranda did not hold that a violation of the rules it
established necessarily constitute a Fifth Amendment violation, and
it is difficult to see how it could have held otherwise. For one
thing, it is easy to imagine many situations in which an un- Mirandized suspect in custody may make self- incriminating
statements without any hint of compulsion. In addition, the
warnings that the Court required included components, such as
notification of the right to have retained or appointed counsel
present during questioning, that do not concern self-incrimination per se but are instead plainly designed to safeguard that
right. And the same is true of Miranda ’s detailed rules
about the waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to an
attorney. 384 U. S., at 474–479.

															At no point in the opinion did the Court state
that a violation of its new rules constituted a violation of the
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
Instead, it claimed only that those rules were needed to safeguard
that right during custodial interrogation. See id ., at 439
(describing its rules as “procedures which assure that the
individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment”); id. , at 444 (describing rules as “procedural safeguards”); id ., at 457 (“appropriate safeguards”); id ., at 458
(“adequate protective devices”); id ., at 467
(“safeguards”).

															In accordance with this understanding of the
nature of the rules it imposed, the Miranda Court stated
quite clearly that the Constitution did not itself require
“adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions
of the interrogation process” and that its decision “in no way
create[d] a constitutional straitjacket.” Ibid . The opinion
added that its new rules might not be needed if Congress or the
States adopted “other procedures which are at least as effective,” ibid ., and the opinion suggested that there might not have
been any actual Fifth Amendment violations in the four cases that
were before the Court. See id ., at 457 (“In these cases, we
might not find the defendants’ statements to have been involuntary
in traditional terms”). The Court could not have said any of these
things if a violation of the Miranda rules necessarily
constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

															Since Miranda , the Court has repeatedly
described the rules it adopted as “prophylactic.” See Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S.
499 , 507 (2012); J. D. B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S.
261 , 269 (2011); Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S.
98 , 103 (2010); Montejo v. Louisiana , 556 U.S.
778 , 794 (2009); Davis v. United States , 512 U.S.
452 , 458 (1994); Brecht v. Abrahamson , 507 U.S.
619 , 629 (1993); Withrow v. Williams , 507
U.S. 680 , 691 (1993); McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S.
171 , 176 (1991); Michigan v. Harvey , 494 U.S.
344 , 350 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan , 492 U.S.
195 , 203 (1989); Arizona v. Roberson , 486 U.S.
675 , 681 (1988); Connecticut v. Barrett , 479 U.S.
523 , 528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad , 470
U.S. 298 , 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles , 467
U.S. 649 , 654 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S.
553 , 564, n. 15 (1983); United States v. Henry , 447 U.S.
264 , 274 (1980); North Carolina v. Butler , 441 U.S.
369 , 374 (1979); Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S.
590 , 600 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker , 417
U. S., at 439; and Michigan v. Payne , 412 U.S.
47 , 53 (1973).[ 2 ]

															C

															After Miranda was handed down, the
Court engaged in the process of charting the dimensions of these
new prophylactic rules. As we would later spell out, this process
entailed a weighing of the benefits and costs of any clarification
of the rules’ scope. See Shatzer , 559 U. S., at 106 (“A
judicially crafted rule is ‘justified only by reference to its
prophylactic purpose,’ . . . and applies only where its
benefits outweigh its costs”).

															Some post- Miranda decisions found that
the balance of interests justified restrictions that would not have
been possible if Miranda represented an explanation of the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set of rules
designed to protect that right. For example, in Harris v. New York , 401 U.S.
222 , 224–226 (1971), the Court held that a statement obtained
in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach the
testimony of a defendant, even though an involuntary statement
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment could not have been
employed in this way. See Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S.
385 , 398 (1978) (“[A]ny criminal trial use against a defendant
of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law”
(emphasis deleted)). Engaging in the process we described in Shatzer , the Harris Court considered the benefits of
forbidding impeachment but dismissed “the speculative possibility”
that this would discourage “impermissible police conduct,” and on
the other side of the scale, it feared that barring impeachment
would turn Miranda into “a license to use perjury by way of
a defense.” 401 U. S., at 225–226.

															A similar analysis was used in Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U.S. 443, 450–452, n. 26 (1974), where
the Court held that the “fruits” of an un- Mirandized statement can be admitted. The Court noted that “the ‘fruits’ of
police conduct which actually infringe[s]” a defendant’s
constitutional rights must be suppressed. Id ., at 445; see
also Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S.
471 (1963) (applying the rule in the context of a Fourth
Amendment violation). But the Court distinguished police conduct
that “abridge[s] [a person’s] constitutional privilege against
compulsory self- incrimination” from conduct that “depart[s] only
from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.” 417 U. S., at
445–446. Because there had been only a Miranda violation in
that case, the Wong Sun rule of automatic exclusion was
found to be inapplicable. See 417 U. S., at 445–446. Instead,
the Court asked whether the Miranda rules’ prophylactic
purposes justified the exclusion of the fruits of the violation,
and after “balancing the interests involved,” it held that
exclusion was not required. 417 U. S., at 447–452.

															In New York v. Quarles , 467
U.S. 649 , 654–657 (1984), the Court held that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda need not be suppressed when
the questioning is conducted to address an ongoing “public safety”
concern. The Court reasoned that Miranda warnings are
“ ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution’ ”
and that “the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to the public safety outweigh[ed] the need for the
prophylactic rule.” 467 U. S., at 654, 657.

															Finally, in Elstad , 470 U.S.
298 , the Court again distinguished between a constitutional
violation and a violation of Miranda . In that case, a
suspect in custody was initially questioned without receiving a Miranda warning, and the statements made at that time were
suppressed. 470 U. S., at 301–302. But the suspect was later
given Miranda warnings, chose to waive his Miranda rights, and signed a written confession. 470 U. S., at 301.
Asked to decide whether this confession was admissible, the Court
followed the reasoning in Tucker and again held that the
fruit-of-the- poisonous-tree rule that applies to constitutional
violations does not apply to violations of Miranda . 470
U. S., at 306–309, 318. The Court refused to exclude the
signed confession and emphasized that an officer’s error “in
administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures
. . . should not breed the same irremediable consequences
as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment
itself.” [ 3 ] Id., at 309.

															It is hard to see how these decisions could
stand if a violation of Miranda constituted a violation of
the Fifth Amendment.

															D

															While these decisions imposed limits on Miranda ’s prophylactic rules, other decisions found that the
balance of interests called for expansion. In Doyle v. Ohio , 426 U.S.
610 , 617–619 (1976), the Court held that silence following a Miranda warning cannot be used to impeach. The Court
acknowledged that Miranda warnings are “prophylactic,” 426
U. S., at 617, and it recognized the prosecution’s need to
test a defendant’s exculpatory story through cross- examination, id., at 616–618. But it found that allowing the use of
post-warning silence would undermine the warnings’ implicit promise
that silence would not be used to convict. Id., at 618.

															Similarly, in Roberson , 486 U. S.,
at 682, the Court held that a suspect’s post-warning request for
counsel with respect to one offense barred later interrogation
without counsel regarding a different offense. Describing the Miranda rules as “prophylactic protections,” 486 U. S.,
at 681, the Court concluded that both law enforcement and criminal
defendants would benefit from a bright-line, id., at
681–682.

															Finally, in Withrow v. Williams , 507 U.S.
680 , the Court rejected an attempt to restrict Miranda ’s
application in collateral proceedings based on the reasoning in Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S.
465 (1976). In Stone , the Court had held that a
defendant who has had a full and fair opportunity to seek
suppression of evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not obtain federal habeas relief on that ground, id ., at 494–495, and in Withrow , a state prison
warden argued that a similar rule should apply to a habeas
petitioner who had been given an opportunity to litigate a Miranda claim at trial, see 507 U. S., at 688–690. Once
again acknowledging that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules,
the Court balanced the competing interests and found that the costs
of adopting the warden’s argument outweighed any benefits. On the
cost side, the Court noted that enforcing Miranda “safeguards ‘a fundamental trial right” and furthers “the
correct ascertainment of guilt” at trial. 507 U. S. , at
691–692. And on the other side, the Court found that the adoption
of a Stone -like rule “would not significantly benefit the
federal courts in their exercise of habeas jurisdiction, or advance
the cause of federalism in any substantial way.” 507 U. S., at
693.

															Thus, all the post- Miranda cases we have
discussed acknowledged the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules and engaged in cost-benefit analysis to define
the scope of these prophylactic rules.

															E

															Contrary to the decision below and Tekoh’s
argument here, see Brief for Respondent 24, our decision in Dickerson , 530 U.S.
428 , did not upset the firmly established prior understanding
of Miranda as a prophylactic decision. Dickerson involved a federal statute, 18 U. S. C. §3501, that
effectively overruled Miranda by making the admissibility of
a statement given during custodial interrogation turn solely on
whether it was made voluntarily. 530 U. S., at 431–432. The
Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda by
statute because Miranda was a “constitutional decision” that
adopted a “constitutional rule,” 530 U. S., at 438–439, and
the Court noted that these rules could not have been made
applicable to the States if it did not have that status, see ibid .

															At the same time, however, the Court made it
clear that it was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with an outright Fifth Amendment violation. For one thing, it
reiterated Miranda ’s observation that “the Constitution
would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from the
prescribed Miranda warnings but which were ‘at least as
effective in apprising accused persons’ ” of their rights. 530
U. S., at 440 (quoting Miranda , 384 U. S., at
467).

															Even more to the point, the Court rejected the
dissent’s argument that §3501 could not be held unconstitutional
unless “ Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution,
in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy
constitutional requirements.” 530 U. S., at 442. The Court’s
answer, in substance, was that the Miranda rules, though not
an explication of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment right, are
rules that are necessary to protect that right (at least until a
better alternative is found and adopted). See 530 U. S., at
441–443. Thus, in the words of the Dickerson Court, the Miranda rules are “constitutionally based” and have
“constitutional underpinnings.” 530 U. S., at 440, and
n. 5. But the obvious point of these formulations was to avoid
saying that a Miranda violation is the same as a violation
of the Fifth Amendment right.

															What all this boils down to is basically as
follows. The Miranda rules are prophylactic rules that the
Court found to be necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination. In that sense, Miranda was a “constitutional decision” and it adopted a “constitutional
rule” because the decision was based on the Court’s judgment about
what is required to safeguard that constitutional right. And when
the Court adopts a constitutional prophylactic rule of this nature, Dickerson concluded, the rule has the status of a “La[w] of
the United States” that is binding on the States under the
Supremacy Clause [ 4 ] (as Miranda implicitly held, since three of the four decisions
it reversed came from state court, 384 U. S., at 491–494,
497–499), and the rule cannot be altered by ordinary
legislation.

															This was a bold and controversial claim of
authority,[ 5 ] but we do not
think that Dickerson can be understood any other way without
(1) taking the insupportable position that a Miranda violation is tantamount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment, (2)
calling into question the prior decisions that were predicated on
the proposition that a Miranda violation is not the same as
a constitutional violation, and (3) excising from the United States
Reports a mountain of statements describing the Miranda rules as prophylactic.

															Subsequent cases confirm that Dickerson did not upend the Court’s understanding of the Miranda rules
as prophylactic. See, e.g., supra, at 6–7 (collecting
post- Dickerson cases).

															In sum, a violation of Miranda does not
necessarily constitute a violation of the Constitution, and
therefore such a violation does not constitute “the deprivation of
[a] right . . . secured by the Constitution.” 42
U. S. C. §1983.

															III

															This conclusion does not necessarily dictate
reversal because a §1983 claim may also be based on “the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
. . . laws .” (Emphasis added.) It may thus be
argued that the Miranda rules constitute federal “law” and
that an abridgment of those rules can therefore provide the ground
for a §1983 claim. But whatever else may be said about this
argument,[ 6 ] it cannot succeed
unless Tekoh can persuade us that this “law” should be expanded to
include the right to sue for damages under §1983.

															As we have noted, “[a] judicially crafted”
prophylactic rule should apply “only where its benefits outweigh
its costs,” Shatzer , 559 U. S., at 106, and here, while
the benefits of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims
under §1983 would be slight, the costs would be substantial. Miranda rests on a pragmatic judgment
about what is needed to stop the violation at trial of the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. That
prophylactic purpose is served by the suppression at trial of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda and by the
application of that decision in other recognized contexts. Allowing
the victim of a Miranda violation to sue a police officer
for damages under §1983 would have little additional deterrent
value, and permitting such claims would cause many problems.

															Allowing a claim like Tekoh’s would disserve
“judicial economy,” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S.
322 , 326 (1979), by requiring a federal judge or jury to
adjudicate a factual question (whether Tekoh was in custody when
questioned) that had already been decided by a state court. This
re-adjudication would not only be wasteful; it would undercut the
“ ‘strong judicial policy against the creation of two
conflicting resolutions’ ” based on the same set of facts. Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S.
477 , 484 (1994). And it could produce “unnecessary friction”
between the federal and state court systems by requiring the
federal court entertaining the §1983 claim to pass judgment on
legal and factual issues already settled in state court. See Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S.
475 , 490–491 (1973).

															Allowing §1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also present many procedural issues, such as whether a
federal court considering a §1983 claim would owe any deference to
a trial court’s factual findings; whether forfeiture and plain
error rules carry over from the criminal trial; whether
harmless-error rules apply; and whether civil damages are available
in instances where the unwarned statement had no impact on the
outcome of the criminal case.

															We therefore refuse to extend Miranda in
the way Tekoh requests. Miranda , Dickerson , and the
other cases in that line provide sufficient protection for the
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. “The
identification of a Miranda violation and its consequences
. . . ought to be determined at trial.” Chavez v. Martinez , 538
U.S. 760 , 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). And except in unusual circumstances, the
“exclusion of unwarned statements” should be “a complete and
sufficient remedy.” Ibid. *  *  *

															Because a violation of Miranda is not
itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and because we see no
justification for expanding Miranda to confer a right to sue
under §1983, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S.
436 (1966). 2 Tekoh cites Orozco v. Texas , 394 U.S.
324 (1969), which characterized the admission of an unwarned
statement in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief as a “flat violation of
the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
construed in Miranda .” Id., at 326 (emphasis added);
Brief for Respondent 21, 29. But the Court made this assertion in a
three-paragraph opinion without any additional analysis, and did
not purport to go beyond Miranda , which, as we have
explained, does not support the proposition that a Miranda violation equates to a Fifth Amendment violation. See Orozco, 394 U. S., at 327 (“We do not . . .
expand or extend to the slightest extent our Miranda decision”). Likewise, the decision predates the subsequent case law
defining the scope of the Miranda rules. See infra ,
this page and 8–11. 3 Two other decisions fall
into this same category, but in both there was no opinion of the
Court. In Chavez v. Martinez , 538
U.S. 760 (2003), the suspect gave an un- Mirandized statement while in custody but was never charged with a crime. The
Court held that the suspect could not bring a 42 U. S. C.
§1983 claim against the officer who questioned him, and Justice
Souter, who cast the necessary fifth vote on the issue, reached
that conclusion based on “a realistic assessment of costs and
risks” of “expand[ing] protection of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination to the point of the civil liability”
at issue. 538 U. S., at 778–779 (opinion concurring in
judgment). In United States v. Patane , 542 U.S.
630 (2004), the Court once again held that Miranda does
not require the suppression of the fruits of a un- Mirandized statement made during custodial questioning, and two of the five
Justices in the majority engaged in the same type of balancing that
was used in Michigan v. Tucker , 417 U.S.
433 (1974), and Elstad . See Patane , 542
U. S., at 644–645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see
also id., at 641–644 (plurality opinion). 4 U. S. Const., Art.
VI, §2. 5 Whether this Court has
the authority to create constitutionally based prophylactic rules
that bind both federal and state courts has been the subject of
debate among jurists and commentators. See, e.g ., Dickerson , 530 U. S., at 445–446, 457–461 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., dissenting); D. Strauss, The Ubiquity of
Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190 (1988); J. Grano,
Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100 (1985); H. Monaghan, Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). But that is
what the Court did in Miranda , and we do not disturb that
decision in any way. Rather, we accept it on its own terms, and for
the purpose of deciding this case, we follow its
rationale. 6 “[Section] 1983 does not
provide an avenue for relief every time a state actor violates a
federal law.” Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams , 544 U.S.
113 , 119 (2005). If a §1983 plaintiff demonstrates that the
federal statute “creates an individually enforceable right in the
class of beneficiaries to which he belongs,” this gives rise to
“ ‘a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable
under §1983,’ ” and “[t]he defendant may defeat this
presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend that
remedy for a newly created right.” Id., at 120 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S.
329 , 341 (1997)). In this case, the “law” that could confer the
right in question is not a statute but judicially created
prophylactic rules. It could be argued that a judicially created
prophylactic rule cannot be the basis for a §1983 suit, but we need
not decide that question because, assuming that such rules can
provide the basis for a §1983 claim, we would be led back to a
question that is very much like the one discussed supra , at
7–11, namely, whether the benefits of allowing such a claim
outweigh the costs. The dissent, by contrast, would apparently hold
that a prophylactic rule crafted by the Judiciary to protect a
constitutional right, unlike a statute that confers a personal
right, is always cognizable under §1983. There is no sound reason
to give this preferred status to such prophylactic rules. The
dissent contends that the Miranda rules merit this special
treatment because they are “secured by” the Constitution, see post , at 5–6, but in fact, as we have shown, those rules
differ from the right secured by the Fifth Amendment and are
instead secured for prophylactic reasons by decisions of this
Court. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 21–499

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															CARLOS VEGA, PETITIONER v. TERENCE B.
TEKOH

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[June 23, 2022]

															Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Breyer and
Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.

															The Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S.
436 (1966), affords well-known protections to suspects who are
interrogated by police while in custody. Those protections derive
from the Constitution: Dickerson v. United States tells us in no uncertain terms that Miranda is a
“constitutional rule.” 530 U.S.
428 , 444 (2000). And that rule grants a corresponding right: If
police fail to provide the Miranda warnings to a suspect
before interrogating him, then he is generally entitled to have any
resulting confession excluded from his trial. See 384 U. S.,
at 478–479. From those facts, only one conclusion can follow—that Miranda ’s protections are a “right[ ]” “secured by the
Constitution” under the federal civil rights statute. Rev. Stat.
§1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Yet the Court today says
otherwise. It holds that Miranda is not a constitutional
right enforceable through a §1983 suit. And so it prevents
individuals from obtaining any redress when police violate their
rights under Miranda . I respectfully dissent. Miranda responded to problems stemming
from the interrogation of suspects “incommunicado” and “in a
police-dominated atmosphere.” Miranda , 384 U. S., at
445. In such an environment, Miranda said, there are
“pressures” which may “compel [a suspect] to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely.” Id. , at 467. And so Miranda found a “necessity for procedures which assure that
the individual is accorded his” Fifth Amendment privilege “not to
be compelled to incriminate himself.” Id. , at 439 . Miranda set out protocols (including the now-familiar
warnings) that would safeguard the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. See id. , at 478–479. And Miranda held that if police failed to follow those requirements (without
substituting equally effective ones), the prosecution could not use
at trial a statement obtained from the interrogation. See id. , at 479.

															The question in this case is whether Miranda ’s protections are a “right[ ]” that is “secured
by the Constitution” within the meaning of §1983. If the answer is
yes, then a person may sue a state actor who deprives him of the
right. In past cases, the Court has given a broad construction to
§1983’s broad language. See, e.g. , Dennis v. Higgins , 498 U.S.
439 , 443 (1991). Under §1983 (as elsewhere), a “right[ ]”
is anything that creates specific “obligations binding on [a]
governmental unit” that an individual may ask the judiciary to
enforce. Id. , at 449; see id. , at 447, and n. 7.
And the phrase “secured by the Constitution” also has a capacious
meaning. It refers to any right that is “protect[ed] or ma[de]
certain” by the country’s foundational charter. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization , 307 U.S.
496 , 527 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

															Begin with whether Miranda is “secured by
the Constitution.” We know that it is, because the Court’s decision
in Dickerson says so. Dickerson tells us again and
again that Miranda is a “constitutional rule.” 530
U. S., at 444. It is a “constitutional decision” that sets
forth “ ‘concrete constitutional guidelines.’ ” Id. , at 432, 435 (quoting Miranda , 384 U. S., at
442). Miranda “is constitutionally based”; or again, it has
a “constitutional basis.” 530 U. S., at 439, n. 3, 440.
It is “of constitutional origin”; it has “constitutional
underpinnings.” Id. , at 439, n. 3, 440, n. 5.
And—one more— Miranda sets a “constitutional minimum.” 530
U. S., at 442. Over and over, Dickerson labels Miranda a rule stemming from the Constitution. Dickerson also makes plain that Miranda has all the substance of a constitutional
rule—including that it cannot be “abrogate[d]” by any
“legislation.” Miranda , 384 U. S., at 491; see Dickerson , 530 U. S., at 437. In Dickerson , the
Court considered a federal statute whose obvious purpose was to
override Miranda . Dickerson held that Miranda is a “constitutional decision” that cannot be “overruled by” any
“Act of Congress.” 530 U. S., at 432. To be sure, Congress may
devise “legislative solutions that differ[ ] from the
prescribed Miranda warnings,” but only if those solutions
are “ ‘at least as effective.’ ” Id. , at 440
(quoting Miranda , 384 U. S., at 467). Dickerson therefore instructs (as noted above) that Miranda sets a
“constitutional minimum.” 530 U. S., at 442. No statute may
provide lesser protection than that baseline.[ 1 ]*

															And Dickerson makes clear that the
constitutional substance of Miranda does not end there.
Rules arising from “the United States Constitution” are applicable
in state-court proceedings, but non-constitutional rules are not.
See 530 U. S., at 438 (explaining that the Court “do[es] not
hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States”).
Too, constitutional rules are enforceable in federal-court habeas
proceedings, where a prisoner is entitled to claim he “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U. S. C.
§2254(a). Miranda checks both boxes. The Court has
“consistently applied Miranda ’s rule to prosecutions arising
in state courts.” Dickerson , 530 U. S., at 438. And
prisoners may claim Miranda violations in federal-court
habeas proceedings. See 530 U. S., at 439, n. 3; Thompson v. Keohane , 516 U.S.
99 , 107, n. 5 (1995). So Dickerson is unequivocal: Miranda is set in constitutional stone. Miranda ’s constitutional rule gives
suspects a correlative “right[ ].” §1983. Under Miranda , a suspect typically has a right to be tried without
the prosecutor using his un- Mirandized statement. And we
know how that right operates in the real world. Suppose a defendant
standing trial was able to show the court that he gave an
un- Mirandized confession during a custodial interrogation.
The court would have no choice but to exclude it from the
prosecutor’s case. As one judge below put it: “ Miranda indisputably creates individual legal rights that are judicially
enforceable. (Any prosecutor who doubts this can try to introduce
an un- Mirandized confession and then watch what happens.)” Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles , 997 F.3d 1260, 1263
(CA9 2021) (Miller, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en
banc).

															The majority basically agrees with everything
I’ve just explained. It concurs that, per Dickerson , Miranda “adopted a ‘constitutional rule.’ ” Ante , at 11 (quoting Dickerson , 530 U. S., at
439); see ante , at 12. How could it not? That Miranda is a constitutional rule is what Dickerson said (and said
and said). The majority also agrees that Miranda “directed
that statements obtained in violation of [its] rules may not be
used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief ”—which is simply
another way of saying that Miranda grants suspects a right
to the exclusion of those statements from the prosecutor’s case. Ante , at 5.

															So how does the majority hold that a violation
of Miranda is not a “deprivation of [a] right[ ]”
“secured by the Constitution”? §1983. How does it agree with my
premises, but not my conclusion? The majority’s argument is that “a
violation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a
violation of the Constitution,” because Miranda ’s rules are
“prophylactic.” Ante , at 13. The idea is that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the use only of statements obtained by
compulsion, whereas Miranda excludes non-compelled
statements too. See ante , at 4–5. That is why, the majority
says, the Court has been able to recognize exceptions permitting
certain uses of un- Mirandized statements at trial (when it
could not do so for compelled statements). See ante , at
7–9.

															But none of that helps the majority’s case.
Let’s assume, as the majority says, that Miranda extends
beyond—in order to safeguard—the Fifth Amendment’s core guarantee.
Still, Miranda is enforceable through §1983. It remains a
constitutional rule, as Dickerson held (and the majority
agrees). And it grants the defendant a legally enforceable
entitlement—in a word, a right—to have his confession excluded. So,
to refer back to the language of §1983, Miranda grants a
“right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution.” Whether that right
to have evidence excluded safeguards a yet deeper constitutional
commitment makes no difference to §1983. The majority has no
response to that point—except to repeat what our argument assumes
already. See ante , at 14, n. 6 (describing Miranda as
prophylactic).

															Compare the majority’s holding today to a prior
decision, in which the Court “rejected [an] attempt[ ] to
limit the types of constitutional rights that are encompassed
within ” §1983. Dennis , 498 U. S., at 445. There,
the Court held that a plaintiff could sue under §1983 for a
violation of the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, which
safeguards interstate commerce. To the Court, it did not matter
that the Commerce Clause might be viewed as “merely allocat[ing]
power between the Federal and State Governments” over interstate
commerce, rather than as “confer[ring] ‘rights.’ ” Id. ,
at 447. Nor did it matter that the dormant Commerce Clause’s
protection is only “implied” by the constitutional text. Ibid. , n. 7. The dormant Commerce Clause, the Court
said, still provides a “right”—in the “ordinary” sense of being
“ ‘[a] legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324
(6th ed. 1990)). That describes Miranda to a tee. And if a
right implied from Congress’s constitutional authority over
interstate commerce is enforceable under §1983, how could it be
that Miranda —which the Court has found necessary to
safeguard the personal protections of the Fifth Amendment—is not
also enforceable? The majority again has no answer.

															*  *  *

															Today, the Court strips individuals of the
ability to seek a remedy for violations of the right recognized in Miranda . The majority observes that defendants may still
seek “the suppression at trial of statements obtained” in violation
of Miranda ’s procedures. Ante , at 14–15. But
sometimes, such a statement will not be suppressed. And sometimes,
as a result, a defendant will be wrongly convicted and spend years
in prison. He may succeed, on appeal or in habeas, in getting the
conviction reversed. But then, what remedy does he have for all the
harm he has suffered? The point of §1983 is to provide such
redress—because a remedy “is a vital component of any scheme for
vindicating cherished constitutional guarantees.” Gomez v. Toledo , 446 U.S.
635 , 639 (1980). The majority here, as elsewhere, injures the
right by denying the remedy. See, e.g. , Egbert v. Boule , 596 U. S. ___ (2022). I respectfully
dissent. Notes 1 *Other constitutional rules,
like Miranda , leave room for States to experiment with
procedures, so long as the procedures satisfy the constitutionally
mandated baseline. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin , 500 U.S.
44 , 58 (1991) (States may adopt different procedures for
providing probable-cause determinations for persons arrested
without a warrant, so long as those determinations are made
promptly); Smith v. Robbins , 528
U.S. 259 , 276–277 (2000) (States may adopt different procedures
to ensure effective appellate review for indigent defendants’
claims, “so long as [the State] reasonably ensures that an
indigent’s appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the
merit of that appeal”).