U.S. Supreme Court Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) Lochner v. New York No. 292 Argued February 23, 24, 1905 Decided April 17, 1906 198 U.S.
45 ERROR TO THE COUNTY COURT OF ONEIDA COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK Syllabus The general right to make a contract in relation to his business
is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and
this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as
controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police
power.

															Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to
it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell
labor.

															There is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for
interfering with the liberty of the person or the right of free
contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a
baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified a a health
law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the
individuals following that occupation.

															Section 110 of the labor law of the State of New York, providing
that no employes shall be required or permitted to work in bakeries
more than sixty hours in a week, or ten hours a day, is not a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, but an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right
and liberty of the individual to contract in relation to labor,
and, as such, it is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal
Constitution.

															This is a writ of error to the County Court of Oneida County, in
the State of New York (to which court the record had been
remitted), to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal of that
State affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court, which itself
affirmed the judgment of the County Court, convicting the defendant
of a misdemeanor on an indictment under a statute of that State,
known, by its short title, as the labor Page 198 U. S. 46 law. The section of the statute under which the indictment was
found is section 110, and is reproduced in the margin, * (together with
the other sections of the labor law upon the subject of bakeries,
being sections 111 to 115, both inclusive). The indictment averred
that the defendant

															"wrongfully and unlawfully required and permitted an employee
working for him in his biscuit, bread and cake bakery and
confectionery establishment, at the city of Utica, in this county,
to work more than sixty hours in one week,"

															after having been theretofore convicted of a violation of the
same act, and therefore, as averred, he committed the crime or
misdemeanor, second offense. The plaintiff in error demurred to the
indictment on several grounds, one of which was that the facts
stated did not Page 198 U. S. 47 constitute a crime. The demurrer was overruled, and the
plaintiff in error having refused to plead further, a plea of not
guilty was entered by order of the court and the trial commenced,
and he was convicted of misdemeanor, second offense, as indicted,
and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to stand committed until
paid, not to exceed fifty days in the Oneida County jail. A
certificate of reasonable doubt was granted by the county judge of
Oneida County, whereon an appeal was taken to the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, where the
judgment of conviction was affirmed. 73 App.Div.N.Y. 120. A further
appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment
of conviction was again affirmed. 177 N.Y. 145. Page 198 U. S. 52 MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of the
facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

															The indictment, it will be seen, charges that the plaintiff in
error violated the one hundred and tenth section of article 8,
chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, known as the labor law of the
State of New York, in that he wrongfully and unlawfully required
and permitted an employee working for him to work more than sixty
hours in one week. There is nothing in any of the opinions
delivered in this case, either in the Supreme Court or the Court of
Appeals of the State, which construes the section, in using the
word "required," as referring to any physical force being used to
obtain the labor of an employee. It is assumed that the word means
nothing more than the requirement arising from voluntary contract
for such labor in excess of the number of hours specified in the
statute. There is no pretense in any of the opinions that the
statute was intended to meet a case of involuntary labor in any
form. All the opinions assume that there is no real distinction, so
far as this question is concerned, between the words "required" and
"permitted." The mandate of the statute that "no employee shall be
required or permitted to work," is the substantial equivalent of an
enactment that "no employee shall contract or agree to work," more
than ten hours per day, and, as there is no provision for special
emergencies, the statute is mandatory in all cases. It is not an
act merely fixing the number of hours which shall constitute a
legal day's work, but an absolute prohibition upon the employer's
permitting, under any circumstances, more than ten hours' work to
be done in his establishment. The employee may desire to earn the
extra money which would arise from his working more than the
prescribed Page 198 U. S. 53 time, but this statute forbids the employer from permitting the
employee to earn it.

															The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between the employer and employes concerning the number of hours in
which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. The
general right to make a contract in relation to his business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 .
Under that provision, no State can deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. The right to
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this
amendment unless there are circumstances which exclude the right.
There are, however, certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of
each State in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the
exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted
by the courts. Those powers, broadly stated and without, at
present, any attempt at a more specific limitation, relate to the
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public. Both
property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may
be imposed by the governing power of the State in the exercise of
those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment was
not designed to interfere. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.
S. 623 ; In re Kemmler, 136 U.
S. 436 ; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S.
86 ; In re Converse, 137 U.
S. 624 .

															The State therefore has power to prevent the individual from
making certain kinds of contracts, and, in regard to them, the
Federal Constitution offers no protection. If the contract be one
which the State, in the legitimate exercise of its police power,
has the right to prohibit, it is not prevented from prohibiting it
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Contracts in violation of a statute,
either of the Federal or state government, or a contract to let
one's property for immoral purposes, or to do any other unlawful
act, could obtain no protection from the Federal Constitution as
coming under the liberty of Page 198 U. S. 54 person or of free contract. Therefore, when the State, by its
legislature, in the assumed exercise of its police powers, has
passed an act which seriously limits the right to labor or the
right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood between
persons who are sui juris (both employer and employee), it
becomes of great importance to determine which shall prevail -- the
right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose or
the right of the State to prevent the individual from laboring or
from entering into any contract to labor beyond a certain time
prescribed by the State.

															This court has recognized the existence and upheld the exercise
of the police powers of the States in many cases which might fairly
be considered as border ones, and it has, in the course of its
determination of questions regarding the asserted invalidity of
such statutes on the ground of their violation of the rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, been guided by rules of a very
liberal nature, the application of which has resulted, in numerous
instances, in upholding the validity of state statutes thus
assailed. Among the later cases where the state law has been upheld
by this court is that of Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.
S. 366 . A provision in the act of the legislature of
Utah was there under consideration, the act limiting the employment
of workmen in all underground mines or workings to eight hours per
day "except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in
imminent danger." It also limited the hours of labor in smelting
and other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or
metals to eight hours per day except in like cases of emergency.
The act was held to be a valid exercise of the police powers of the
State. A review of many of the cases on the subject, decided by
this and other courts, is given in the opinion. It was held that
the kind of employment, mining, smelting, etc., and the character
of the employes in such kinds of labor, were such as to make it
reasonable and proper for the State to interfere to prevent the
employees from being constrained by the rules laid down by the
proprietors in regard to labor. The following citation Page 198 U. S. 55 from the observations of the Supreme Court of Utah in that case
was made by the judge writing the opinion of this court, and
approved:

															"The law in question is confined to the protection of that class
of people engaged in labor in underground mines and in smelters and
other works wherein ores are reduced and refined. This law applies
only to the classes subjected by their employment to the peculiar
conditions and effects attending underground mining and work in
smelters and other works for the reduction and refining of ores.
Therefore it is not necessary to discuss or decide whether the
legislature can fix the hours of labor in other employments."

															It will be observed that, even with regard to that class of
labor, the Utah statute provided for cases of emergency wherein the
provisions of the statute would not apply. The statute now before
this court has no emergency clause in it, and, if the statute is
valid, there are no circumstances and no emergencies under which
the slightest violation of the provisions of the act would be
innocent. There is nothing in Holden v. Hardy which covers
the case now before us. Nor does Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 ,
touch the case at bar. The Atkin case was decided upon the
right of the State to control its municipal corporations and to
prescribe the condition upon which it will permit work of a public
character to be done for a municipality. Knoxville Iron Co. v.
Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 , is
equally far from an authority for this legislation. The employees
in that case were held to be at a disadvantage with the employer in
matters of wages, they being miners and coal workers, and the act
simply provided for the cashing of coal orders when presented by
the miner to the employer.

															The latest case decided by this court involving the police power
is that of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, decided at this term
and reported in 197 U. S. 197 U.S.
11. It related to compulsory vaccination, and the law was held
valid as a proper exercise of the police powers with reference to
the public health. It was stated in the opinion that it was a
case

															"of an adult who, for aught that appears, was himself in perfect
health and a fit Page 198 U. S. 56 subject for vaccination, and yet, while remaining in the
community, refused to obey the statute and the regulation adopted
in execution of its provisions for the protection of the public
health and the public safety, confessedly endangered by the
presence of a dangerous disease."

															That case is also far from covering the one now before the
court. Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164 , was
upheld as a proper exercise of the police power relating to the
observance of Sunday, and the case held that the legislature had
the right to declare that, as matter of law, keeping barber shops
open on Sunday was not a work of necessity or charity.

															It must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the
valid exercise of the police power by the State. There is no
dispute concerning this general proposition. Otherwise the
Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy, and the legislatures
of the States would have unbounded power, and it would be enough to
say that any piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the
morals, the health or the safety of the people; such legislation
would be valid no matter how absolutely without foundation the
claim might be. The claim of the police power would be a mere
pretext -- become another and delusive name for the supreme
sovereignty of the State to be exercised free from constitutional
restraint. This is not contended for. In every case that comes
before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character
is concerned and where the protection of the Federal Constitution
is sought, the question necessarily arises: is this a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which
may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of himself
and his family? Of course, the liberty of contract relating to
labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to
purchase as the other to sell labor.

															This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the Page 198 U. S. 57 court for that of the legislature. If the act be within the
power of the State, it is valid although the judgment of the court
might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a law. But the
question would still remain: is it within the police power of the
State?, and that question must be answered by the court.

															The question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure and
simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There is no reasonable
ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of
free contract by determining the hours of labor in the occupation
of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are not
equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual
occupations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and
care for themselves without the protecting arm of the State,
interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They
are in no sense wards of the State. Viewed in the light of a purely
labor law, with no reference whatever to the question of health, we
think that a law like the one before us involves neither the
safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public, and that the
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by
such an act. The law must be upheld, if at all, as a law pertaining
to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a
baker. It does not affect any other portion of the public than
those who are engaged in that occupation. Clean and wholesome bread
does not depend upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day
or only sixty hours a week. The limitation of the hours of labor
does not come within the police power on that ground.

															It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail
-- the power of the State to legislate or the right of the
individual to liberty of person and freedom of contract. The mere
assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to
the public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid.
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and
the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act
can be held to be valid which interferes Page 198 U. S. 58 with the general right of an individual to be free in his person
and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.

															This case has caused much diversity of opinion in the state
courts. In the Supreme Court, two of the five judges composing the
Appellate Division dissented from the judgment affirming the
validity of the act. In the Court of Appeals, three of the seven
judges also dissented from the judgment upholding the statute.
Although found in what is called a labor law of the State, the
Court of Appeals has upheld the act as one relating to the public
health -- in other words, as a health law. One of the judges of the
Court of Appeals, in upholding the law, stated that, in his
opinion, the regulation in question could not be sustained unless
they were able to say, from common knowledge, that working in a
bakery and candy factory was an unhealthy employment. The judge
held that, while the evidence was not uniform, it still led him to
the conclusion that the occupation of a baker or confectioner was
unhealthy, and tended to result in diseases of the respiratory
organs. Three of the judges dissented from that view, and they
thought the occupation of a baker was not to such an extent
unhealthy as to warrant the interference of the legislature with
the liberty of the individual.

															We think the limit of the police power has been reached and
passed in this case. There is, in our judgment, no reasonable
foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a
health law to safeguard the public health or the health of the
individuals who are following the trade of a baker. If this statute
be valid, and if, therefore, a proper case is made out in which to
deny the right of an individual, sui juris, as employer or
employee, to make contracts for the labor of the latter under the
protection of the provisions of the Federal Constitution, there
would seem to be no length to which legislation of this nature
might not go. The case differs widely, as we have already stated,
from the expressions of this court in regard to laws of this
nature, as stated in Holden v. Hardy and Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, supra. Page 198 U. S. 59 We think that there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a
baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one to that degree
which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right
to labor, and with the right of free contract on the part of the
individual, either as employer or employee. In looking through
statistics regarding all trades and occupations, it may be true
that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy as some
other trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others. To
the common understanding, the trade of a baker has never been
regarded as an unhealthy one. Very likely, physicians would not
recommend the exercise of that or of any other trade as a remedy
for ill health. Some occupations are more healthy than others, but
we think there are none which might not come under the power of the
legislature to supervise and control the hours of working therein
if the mere fact that the occupation is not absolutely and
perfectly healthy is to confer that right upon the legislative
department of the Government. It might be safely affirmed that
almost all occupations more or less affect the health. There must
be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some small
amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with
liberty. It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any
department, may possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness.
But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative
majorities? A printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a
cabinetmaker, a dry goods clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's or a
physician's clerk, or a clerk in almost any kind of business, would
all come under the power of the legislature on this assumption. No
trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one's living could escape
this all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature in
limiting the hours of labor in all employments would be valid
although such limitation might seriously cripple the ability of the
laborer to support himself and his family. In our large cities
there are many buildings into which the sun penetrates for but a
short time in each day, and these buildings are occupied by people
carrying on the Page 198 U. S. 60 business of bankers, brokers, lawyers, real estate, and many
other kinds of business, aided by many clerks, messengers, and
other employs. Upon the assumption of the validity of this act
under review, it is not possible to say that an act prohibiting
lawyers' or bank clerks, or others from contracting to labor for
their employers more than eight hours a day would be invalid. It
might be said that it is unhealthy to work more than that number of
hours in an apartment lighted by artificial light during the
working hours of the day; that the occupation of the bank clerk,
the lawyer's clerk, the real estate clerk, or the broker's clerk in
such offices is therefore unhealthy, and the legislature, in its
paternal wisdom, must therefore have the right to legislate on the
subject of, and to limit the hours for, such labor, and, if it
exercises that power and its validity be questioned, it is
sufficient to say it has reference to the public health; it has
reference to the health of the employees condemned to labor day
after day in buildings where the sun never shines; it is a health
law, and therefore it is valid, and cannot be questioned by the
courts.

															It is also urged, pursuing the same line of argument, that it is
to the interest of the State that its population should be strong
and robust, and therefore any legislation which may be said to tend
to make people healthy must be valid as health laws, enacted under
the police power. If this be a valid argument and a justification
for this kind of legislation, it follows that the protection of the
Federal Constitution from undue interference with liberty of person
and freedom of contract is visionary wherever the law is sought to
be justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Scarcely any
law but might find shelter under such assumptions, and conduct,
properly so called, as well as contract, would come under the
restrictive sway of the legislature. Not only the hours of
employees, but the hours of employers, could be regulated, and
doctors, lawyers, scientists, all professional men, as well as
athletes and artisans, could be forbidden to fatigue their brains
and bodies by prolonged hours of exercise, lest the fighting
strength Page 198 U. S. 61 of the State be impaired. We mention these extreme cases because
the contention is extreme. We do not believe in the soundness of
the views which uphold this law. On the contrary, we think that
such a law as this, although passed in the assumed exercise of the
police power, and as relating to the public health, or the health
of the employees named, is not within that power, and is invalid.
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law,
but is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both
employers and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon
such terms as they may think best, or which they may agree upon
with the other parties to such contracts. Statutes of the nature of
that under review, limiting the hours in which grown and
intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere meddlesome
interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are not
saved from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the
exercise of the police power and upon the subject of the health of
the individual whose rights are interfered with, unless there be
some fair ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is
material danger to the public health or to the health of the
employees if the hours of labor are not curtailed. If this be not
clearly the case, the individuals whose rights are thus made the
subject of legislative interference are under the protection of the
Federal Constitution regarding their liberty of contract as well as
of person, and the legislature of the State has no power to limit
their right as proposed in this statute. All that it could properly
do has been done by it with regard to the conduct of bakeries, as
provided for in the other sections of the act above set forth.
These several sections provide for the inspection of the premises
where the bakery is carried on, with regard to furnishing proper
wash-rooms and water-closets, apart from the bake-room, also with
regard to providing proper drainage, plumbing and painting; the
sections, in addition, provide for the height of the ceiling, the
cementing or tiling of floors, where necessary in the opinion of
the factory inspector, and for other things of Page 198 U. S. 62 that nature; alterations are also provided for and are to be
made where necessary in the opinion of the inspector, in order to
comply with the provisions of the statute. These various sections
may be wise and valid regulations, and they certainly go to the
full extent of providing for the cleanliness and the healthiness,
so far as possible, of the quarters in which bakeries are to be
conducted. Adding to all these requirements a prohibition to enter
into any contract of labor in a bakery for more than a certain
number of hours a week is, in our judgment, so wholly beside the
matter of a proper, reasonable and fair provision as to run counter
to that liberty of person and of free contract provided for in the
Federal Constitution.

															It was further urged on the argument that restricting the hours
of labor in the case of bakers was valid because it tended to
cleanliness on the part of the workers, as a man was more apt to be
cleanly when not overworked, and, if cleanly, then his "output" was
also more likely to be so. What has already been said applies with
equal force to this contention. We do not admit the reasoning to be
sufficient to justify the claimed right of such interference. The
State in that case would assume the position of a supervisor, or pater familias, over every act of the individual, and its
right of governmental interference with his hours of labor, his
hours of exercise, the character thereof, and the extent to which
it shall be carried would be recognized and upheld. In our
judgment, it is not possible, in fact, to discover the connection
between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and the
healthful quality of the bread made by the workman. The connection,
if any exists, is too shadowy and thin to build any argument for
the interference of the legislature. If the man works ten hours a
day, it is all right, but if ten and a half or eleven, his health
is in danger and his bread may be unhealthful, and, therefore, he
shall not be permitted to do it. This, we think, is unreasonable,
and entirely arbitrary. When assertions such as we have adverted to
become necessary in order to give, if possible, a plausible
foundation for the contention that the law is a "health law," Page 198 U. S. 63 it gives rise to at least a suspicion that there was some other
motive dominating the legislature than the purpose to subserve the
public health or welfare.

															This interference on the part of the legislatures of the several
States with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems
to be on the increase. In the Supreme Court of New York, in the
case of People v. Beattie, Appellate Division, First
Department, decided in 1904, 89 N.Y.Supp. 193, a statute regulating
the trade of horseshoeing, and requiring the person practicing such
trade to be examined and to obtain a certificate from a board of
examiners and file the same with the clerk of the county wherein
the person proposes to practice his trade, was held invalid as an
arbitrary interference with personal liberty and private property
without due process of law. The attempt was made, unsuccessfully,
to justify it as a health law.

															The same kind of a statute was held invalid ( In re
Aubry ) by the Supreme Court of Washington in December, 1904.
78 Pac.Rep. 900. The court held that the act deprived citizens of
their liberty and property without due process of law and denied to
them the equal protection of the laws. It also held that the trade
of a horseshoer is not a subject of regulation under the police
power of the State as a business concerning and directly affecting
the health, welfare or comfort of its inhabitants, and that,
therefore, a law which provided for the examination and
registration of horseshoers in certain cities was unconstitutional
as an illegitimate exercise of the police power.

															The Supreme Court of Illinois in Bessette v. People, 193 Illinois 334, also held that a law of the same nature,
providing for the regulation and licensing of horseshoers, was
unconstitutional as an illegal interference with the liberty of the
individual in adopting and pursuing such calling as he may choose,
subject only to the restraint necessary secure the common welfare. See also Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 437; Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Nebraska 127, 145. In Page 198 U. S. 64 these cases, the courts upheld the right of free contract and
the right to purchase and sell labor upon such terms as the parties
may agree to.

															It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many
of the laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed
to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public
health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives. We
are justified in saying so when, from the character of the law and
the subject upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the
public health or welfare bears but the most remote relation to the
law. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural
and legal effect of the language employed, and whether it is or is
not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States must be
determined from the natural effect of such statutes when put into
operation, and not from their proclaimed purpose. Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U. S. 313 ; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78 . The
court looks beyond the mere letter of the law in such cases. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 .

															It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor
as provided for in this section of the statute under which the
indictment was found, and the plaintiff in error convicted, has no
such direct relation to, and no such substantial effect upon, the
health of the employee as to justify us in regarding the section as
really a health law. It seems to us that the real object and
purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the
master and his employees (all being men sui juris ) in a
private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any
real and substantial degree to the health of the employees. Under
such circumstances, the freedom of master and employee to contract
with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining
the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with without violating
the Federal Constitution.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, as well as
that of the Supreme Court and of the County Court of Oneida County,
must be reversed, and the case remanded to Page 198 U. S. 65 the County Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. Reversed. *

															"§ 110. Hours of labor in bakeries and confectionery
establishments. -- No employee shall be required or permitted
to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or confectionery
establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more than
ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a
shorter work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in any
one week than will make an average of ten hours per day for the
number of days during such week in which such employee shall
work."

															"§ 111. Drainage and plumbing of building and rooms occupied
by bakeries. -- All buildings or rooms occupied as biscuit,
bread, pie or cake bakeries shall be drained and plumbed in a
manner conducive to the proper and healthful sanitary condition
thereof, and shall be constructed with air shafts, windows or
ventilating pipes, sufficient to insure ventilation. The factory
inspector may direct the proper drainage, plumbing and ventilation
of such rooms or buildings. No cellar or basement not now used for
a bakery shall hereafter be so occupied or used unless the
proprietor shall comply with the sanitary provisions of this
article."

															"§ 112. Requirements as to rooms, furniture, utensils and
manufactured products. -- Every room used for the manufacture
of flour or meal food products shall be at least eight feet in
height and shall have, if deemed necessary by the factory
inspector, an impermeable floor constructed of cement, or of tiles
laid in cement, or an additional flooring of wood properly
saturated with linseed oil. The side walls of such rooms shall be
plastered or wainscoted. The factory inspector may require the side
walls and ceiling to be whitewashed at least once in three months.
He may also require the woodwork of such walls to be painted. The
furniture and utensils shall be so arranged as to be readily
cleansed and not prevent the proper cleaning of any part of a room.
The manufactured flour or meal food products shall be kept in dry
and airy rooms, so arranged that the floors, shelves and all other
facilities for storing the same can be properly cleaned. No
domestic animal, except cats, shall be allowed to remain in a room
used as a biscuit, bread, pie, or cake bakery, or any room in such
bakery where flour or meal product are stored."

															"§ 113. Wash-rooms and closets; sleeping places. --
Every such bakery shall be provided with a proper washroom and
water-closet or water-closet apart from the bake-room, or room
where the manufacture of such food product is conducted, and no
water-closet, earth-closet, privy or ash-pit shall be within or
connected directly with the bake-room of any bakery, hotel or
public restaurant."

															"No person shall sleep in a room occupied as a bake-room.
Sleeping places for the persons employed in the bakery shall be
separate from the rooms where flour or meal food products are
manufactured or stored. If the sleeping places are on the same
floor where such products are manufactured, stored or sold, the
factory inspector may inspect and order them put in a proper
sanitary condition."

															"§ 114. Inspection of bakeries. -- The factory
inspector shall cause all bakeries to be inspected. If it be found
upon such inspection that the bakeries so inspected are constructed
and conducted in compliance with the provisions of this chapter,
the factory inspector shall issue a certificate to the person
owning or conducting such bakeries."

															"§ 115. Notice requiring alterations. -- If, in the
opinion of the factory inspector, alterations are required in or
upon premises occupied and used as bakeries in order to comply with
the provisions of this article, a written notice shall be served by
him upon the owner, agent or lessee of such premises, either
personally or by mail, requiring such alteration to be made within
sixty day after such service, and such alterations hall be made
accordingly."

															MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE
DAY concurred, dissenting.

															While this court has not attempted to mark the precise
boundaries of what is called the police power of the State, the
existence of the power has been uniformly recognized, both by the
Federal and state courts.

															All the cases agree that this power extends at least to the
protection of the lives, the health, and the safety of the public
against the injurious exercise by any citizen of his own
rights.

															In Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S.
501 , after referring to the general principle that
rights given by the Constitution cannot be impaired by state
legislation of any kind, this court said:

															"It [this court] has, nevertheless, with marked distinctness and
uniformity, recognized the necessity, growing out of the
fundamental conditions of civil society, of upholding state police
regulations which were enacted in good faith and had appropriate
and direct connection with that protection to life, health, and
property which each State owes to her citizens."

															So, in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S.
27 :

															"But neither the [14th] Amendment -- broad and comprehensive as
it is -- nor any other Amendment was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people."

															Speaking generally, the State, in the exercise of its powers,
may not unduly interfere with the right of the citizen to enter
into contracts that may be necessary and essential in the enjoyment
of the inherent rights belonging to everyone, among which rights is
the right

															"to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood
or avocation."

															This was declared Page 198 U. S. 66 in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.
S. 578 , 165 U. S. 589 .
But, in the same case, it was conceded that the right to contract
in relation to persons and property or to do business within a
State may be "regulated, and sometimes prohibited, when the
contracts or business conflict with the policy of the State as
contained in its statutes." (P. 165 U. S.
591 ).

															So, as said in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.
S. 366 , 169 U. S.
391 :

															"This right of contract, however, is itself subject to certain
limitations which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of
its police powers. While this power is inherent in all government,
it has doubtless been greatly expanded in its application during
the past century owing to an enormous increase in the number of
occupations which are dangerous, or so far detrimental to the
health of the employees as to demand special precautions for their
wellbeing and protection, or the safety of adjacent property. While
this court has held, notably in the cases of Davidson v. New
Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 , and Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 , that the police
power cannot be put forward as an excuse for oppressive and unjust
legislation, it may be lawfully resorted to for the purpose of
preserving the public health, safety or morals, or the abatement of
public nuisances, and a large discretion"

															"is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only
what the interests of the public require, but what measures are
necessary for the protection of such interests."

															" Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 , 152 U. S.
136 ."

															Referring to the limitations placed by the State upon the hours
of workmen, the court in the same case said (p. 118 U. S.
395 ):

															"These employments, when too long pursued, the legislature has
judged to be detrimental to the health of the employees, and, so
long as there are reasonable grounds for believing that this is so,
its decision upon this subject cannot be reviewed by the Federal
courts."

															Subsequently in Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.
S. 183 , 177 U. S. 188 ,
this court said:

															"Regulations respecting the pursuit of a lawful trade or
business are of very frequent occurrence in the various cities of
the country, and what such regulations shall be and Page 198 U. S. 67 to what particular trade, business or occupation they shall
apply are questions for the State to determine, and their
determination comes within the proper exercise of the police power
by the State, and unless the regulations are so utterly
unreasonable and extravagant in their nature and purpose that the
property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and
in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed without
due process of law, they do not extend beyond the power of the
State to pass, and they form no subject for Federal
interference."

															"As stated in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S.
86 ,"

															"the possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such
reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority
of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order
and morals of the community."

															In St. Louis, Iron Mountain &c. Ry. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404 , 173 U. S. 409 ,
and in Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S.
13 , 183 U. S. 21 , 183 U. S. 22 , it
was distinctly adjudged that the right of contract was not
"absolute in respect to every matter, but may be subjected to the
restraints demanded by the safety and welfare of the State." Those
cases illustrate the extent to which the State may restrict or
interfere with the exercise of the right of contracting.

															The authorities on the same line are so numerous that further
citations are unnecessary.

															I take it to be firmly established that what is called the
liberty of contract may, within certain limits, be subjected to
regulations designed and calculated to promote the general welfare
or to guard the public health, the public morals or the public
safety. "The liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import,"
this court has recently said,

															"an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the
common good." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11 . Page 198 U. S. 68 Granting then that there is a liberty of contract which cannot
be violated even under the sanction of direct legislative
enactment, but assuming, as according to settled law we may assume,
that such liberty of contract is subject to such regulations as the
State may reasonably prescribe for the common good and the
wellbeing of society, what are the conditions under which the
judiciary may declare such regulations to be in excess of
legislative authority and void? Upon this point there is no room
for dispute, for the rule is universal that a legislative
enactment, Federal or state, is never to be disregarded or held
invalid unless it be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in
excess of legislative power. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
supra, we said that the power of the courts to review
legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general
welfare exists only

															"when that which the legislature has done comes within the rule
that, if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real
or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all
question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the
fundamental law"

															-- citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.
S. 623 , 123 U. S. 661 ; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 , 136 U. S. 320 ; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 , 191 U. S. 223 .
If there be doubt as to the validity of the statute, that doubt
must therefore be resolved in favor of its validity, and the courts
must keep their hands off, leaving the legislature to meet the
responsibility for unwise legislation. If the end which the
legislature seeks to accomplish be one to which its power extends,
and if the means employed to that end, although not the wisest or
best, are yet not plainly and palpably unauthorized by law, then
the court cannot interfere. In other words, when the validity of a
statute is questioned, the burden of proof, so to speak, is upon
those who assert it to be unconstitutional. McCulloch
v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S.
421 .

															Let these principles be applied to the present case. By the.
statute in question, it is provided that

															"No employee shall be required or permitted to work in a
biscuit, bread or cake Page 198 U. S. 69 bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in
any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the
purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day of the week;
nor more hours in any one week than will make an average of ten
hours per day for the number of days during such week in which such
employee shall work."

															It is plain that this statute was enacted in order to protect
the physical wellbeing of those who work in bakery and
confectionery establishments. It may be that the statute had its
origin, in part, in the belief that employers and employees in such
establishments were not upon an equal footing, and that the
necessities of the latter often compelled them to submit to such
exactions as unduly taxed their strength. Be this as it may, the
statute must be taken as expressing the belief of the people of New
York that, as a general rule, and in the case of the average man,
labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in such establishments
may endanger the health of those who thus labor. Whether or not
this be wise legislation it is not the province of the court to
inquire. Under our systems of government, the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation. So that, in
determining the question of power to interfere with liberty of
contract, the court may inquire whether the means devised by the
State are germane to an end which may be lawfully accomplished and
have a real or substantial relation to the protection of health, as
involved in the daily work of the persons, male and female, engaged
in bakery and confectionery establishments. But when this inquiry
is entered upon, I find it impossible, in view of common
experience, to say that there is here no real or substantial
relation between the means employed by the State and the end sought
to be accomplished by its legislation. Mugler v. Kansas,
supra. Nor can I say that the statute has no appropriate or
direct connection with that protection to health which each State
owes to her citizens, Patterson v. Kentucky, supra; or
that it is not promotive of the health of the employees in
question, Holden v. Hardy, Lawton v. Steele, Page 198 U. S. 70 supra; or that the regulation prescribed by the State
is utterly unreasonable and extravagant or wholly arbitrary, Gundling v. Chicago, supra. Still less can I say that the
statute is, beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law. Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
supra. Therefore, I submit that this court will transcend its
functions if it assumes to annul the statute of New York. It must
be remembered that this statute does not apply to all kinds of
business. It applies only to work in bakery and confectionery
establishments, in which, as all know, the air constantly breathed
by workmen is not as pure and healthful as that to be found in some
other establishments or out of doors.

															Professor Hirt, in his treatise on the "Diseases of the
Workers," has said:

															"The labor of the bakers is among the hardest and most laborious
imaginable, because it has to be performed under conditions
injurious to the health of those engaged in it. It is hard, very
hard work, not only because it requires a great deal of physical
exertion in an overheated workshop and during unreasonably long
hours, but more so because of the erratic demands of the public,
compelling the baker to perform the greater part of his work at
night, thus depriving him of an opportunity to enjoy the necessary
rest and sleep, a fact which is highly injurious to his
health."

															Another writer says:

															"The constant inhaling of flour dust causes inflammation of the
lungs and of the bronchial tubes. The eyes also suffer through this
dust, which is responsible for the many cases of running eyes among
the bakers. The long hours of toil to which all bakers are
subjected produce rheumatism, cramps and swollen legs. The intense
heat in the workshops induces the workers to resort to cooling
drinks, which, together with their habit of exposing the greater
part of their bodies to the change in the atmosphere, is another
source of a number of diseases of various organs. Nearly all bakers
are pale-faced and of more delicate health than the workers of
other crafts, which is chiefly due to their hard work and their
irregular and unnatural mode of living, whereby the power of
resistance against disease is Page 198 U. S. 71 greatly diminished. The average age of a baker is below that of
other workmen; they seldom live over their fiftieth year, most of
them dying between the ages of forty and fifty. During periods of
epidemic diseases, the bakers are generally the first to succumb to
the disease, and the number swept away during such periods far
exceeds the number of other crafts in comparison to the men
employed in the respective industries. When, in 1720, the plague
visited the city of Marseilles, France, every baker in the city
succumbed to the epidemic, which caused considerable excitement in
the neighboring cities and resulted in measures for the sanitary
protection of the bakers."

															In the Eighteenth Annual Report by the New York Bureau of
Statistics of Labor it is stated that, among the occupations
involving exposure to conditions that interfere with nutrition is
that of a baker (p. 52). In that Report, it is also stated
that,

															"from a social point of view, production will be increased by
any change in industrial organization which diminishes the number
of idlers, paupers and criminals. Shorter hours of work, by
allowing higher standards of comfort and purer family life, promise
to enhance the industrial efficiency of the wage-working class --
improved health, longer life, more content and greater intelligence
and inventiveness."

															(P. 82).

															Statistics show that the average daily working time among
workingmen in different countries is, in Australia, 8 hours; in
Great Britain, 9; in the United States, 9; in Denmark, 9; in
Norway, 10; Sweden, France and Switzerland, 10; Germany, 10;
Belgium, Italy and Austria, 11, and in Russia, 12 hours.

															We judicially know that the question of the number of hours
during which a workman should continuously labor has been, for a
long period, and is yet, a subject of serious consideration among
civilized peoples and by those having special knowledge of the laws
of health. Suppose the statute prohibited labor in bakery and
confectionery establishments in excess of eighteen hours each day.
No one, I take it, could dispute the power of the State to enact
such a statute. But the statute Page 198 U. S. 72 before us does not embrace extreme or exceptional cases. It may
be said to occupy a middle ground in respect of the hours of labor.
What is the true ground for the State to take between legitimate
protection, by legislation, of the public health and liberty of
contract is not a question easily solved, nor one in respect of
which there is or can be absolute certainty. There are very few, if
any, questions in political economy about which entire certainty
may be predicated. One writer on relation of the State to labor has
well said:

															"The manner, occasion, and degree in which the State may
interfere with the industrial freedom of its citizens is one of the
most debatable and difficult questions of social science."

															Jevons, 33.

															We also judicially know that the number of hours that should
constitute a day's labor in particular occupations involving the
physical strength and safety of workmen has been the subject of
enactments by Congress and by nearly all of the States. Many if not
most of those enactments fix eight hours as the proper basis of a
day's labor.

															I do not stop to consider whether any particular view of this
economic question presents the sounder theory. What the precise
facts are it may be difficult to say. It is enough for the
determination of this case, and it is enough for this court to
know, that the question is one about which there is room for debate
and for an honest difference of opinion. There are many reasons of
a weighty, substantial character, based upon the experience of
mankind, in support of the theory that, all things considered, more
than ten hours' steady work each day, from week to week, in a
bakery or confectionery establishment, may endanger the health, and
shorten the lives of the workmen, thereby diminishing their
physical and mental capacity to serve the State, and to provide for
those dependent upon them.

															If such reasons exist, that ought to be the end of this case,
for the State is not amenable to the judiciary in respect of its
legislative enactments unless such enactments are plainly,
palpably, beyond all question, inconsistent with the
Constitution Page 198 U. S. 73 of the United States. We are not to presume that the State of
New York has acted in bad faith. Nor can we assume that its
legislature acted without due deliberation, or that it did not
determine this question upon the fullest attainable information,
and for the common good. We cannot say that the State has acted
without reason, nor ought we to proceed upon the theory that its
action is a mere sham. Our duty, I submit, is to sustain the
statute as not being in conflict with the Federal Constitution for
the reason -- and such is an all-sufficient reason -- it is not
shown to be plainly and palpably inconsistent with that instrument.
Let the State alone in the management of its purely domestic
affairs so long as it does not appear beyond all question that it
has violated the Federal Constitution. This view necessarily
results from the principle that the health and safety of the people
of a State are primarily for the State to guard and protect.

															I take leave to say that the New York statute, in the
particulars here involved, cannot be held to be in conflict with
the Fourteenth Amendment without enlarging the scope of the
Amendment far beyond its original purpose and without bringing
under the supervision of this court matters which have been
supposed to belong exclusively to the legislative departments of
the several States when exerting their conceded power to guard the
health and safety of their citizens by such regulations as they in
their wisdom deem best. Health laws of every description
constitute, said Chief Justice Marshall, a part of that mass of
legislation which

															"embraces everything within the territory of a State not
surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves." Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 203 . A
decision that the New York statute is void under the Fourteenth
Amendment will, in my opinion, involve consequences of a
far-reaching and mischievous character; for such a decision would
seriously cripple the inherent power of the States to care for the
lives, health and wellbeing of their citizens. Those are matters
which can be best controlled by the States. Page 198 U. S. 74 The preservation of the just powers of the States is quite as
vital as the preservation of the powers of the General
Government.

															When this court had before it the question of the
constitutionality of a statute of Kansas making it a criminal
offense for a contractor for public work to permit or require his
employees to perform labor upon such work in excess of eight hours
each day, it was contended that the statute was in derogation of
the liberty both of employees and employer. It was further
contended that the Kansas statute was mischievous in its
tendencies. This court, while disposing of the question only as it
affected public work, held that the Kansas statute was not void
under the Fourteenth Amendment. But it took occasion to say what
may well be here repeated:

															"The responsibility therefor rests upon legislators, not upon
the courts. No evils arising from such legislation could be more
far-reaching than those that might come to our system of government
if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by the
fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation, and upon
grounds merely of justice or reason or wisdom, annul statutes that
had received the sanction of the people's representatives. We are
reminded by counsel that it is the solemn duty of the courts in
cases before them to guard the constitutional rights of the citizen
against merely arbitrary power. That is unquestionably true. But it
is equally true -- indeed, the public interests imperatively demand
-- that legislative enactments should be recognized and enforced by
the courts as embodying the will of the people unless they are
plainly and palpably, beyond all question, in violation of the
fundamental law of the Constitution." Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 , 191 U. S.
223 .

															The judgment in my opinion should be affirmed.

															MR. JUSTICE HOLMES dissenting.

															I regret sincerely that I am unable to agree with the
judgment Page 198 U. S. 75 in this case, and that I think it my duty to express my
dissent.

															This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I
agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and
long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my
duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement
has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law. It is settled by various decisions of this court
that state constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many
ways which we, as legislators, might think as injudicious, or, if
you like, as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with this,
interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws
are ancient examples. A more modern one is the prohibition of
lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as
he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same,
which has been a shibboleth for some well known writers, is
interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state
or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes thought
desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. The other day,
we sustained the Massachusetts vaccination law. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 .
United States and state statutes and decisions cutting down the
liberty to contract by way of combination are familiar to this
court. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 . Two
years ago, we upheld the prohibition of sales of stock on margins
or for future delivery in the constitution of California. Otis
v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606 . The
decision sustaining an eight hour law for miners is still recent. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 .
Some of these laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges
are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissez faire. Page 198 U. S. 76 It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the
accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or
novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the
question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States.

															General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision
will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise. But I think that the proposition just
stated, if it is accepted, will carry us far toward the end. Every
opinion tends to become a law. I think that the word liberty in the
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the
natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a
rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law. It does not
need research to show that no such sweeping condemnation can be
passed upon the statute before us. A reasonable man might think it
a proper measure on the score of health. Men whom I certainly could
not pronounce unreasonable would uphold it as a first instalment of
a general regulation of the hours of work. Whether in the latter
aspect it would be open to the charge of inequality I think it
unnecessary to discuss.


U.S. Supreme Court Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) Muller v. Oregon No. 107 Argued January 15,
1908 Decided February 24,
1908 208
U.S. 412 ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON Syllabus The peculiar value of a written constitution is that it places,
in unchanging form, limitations upon legislative action, questions
relating to which are not settled by even a consensus of public
opinion; but when the extent of one of those limitations is
affected by a question of fact which is debatable and debated, a
widespread and long continued belief concerning that fact is worthy
of consideration.

															This Court takes judicial cognizance of all matters of general
knowledge -- such as the fact that woman's physical structure and
the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage
which justifies a difference in legislation in regard to some of
the burdens which rest upon her.

															As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the
physical wellbeing of woman is an object of public interest. The
regulation of her hour of labor falls within the police power of
the State, and a statute directed exclusively to such regulation
does not conflict with the due process or equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

															The right of a State to regulate the working hours of women
rests on the police power and the right to preserve the health of
the women of the State, and is not affected by other laws of the
State granting or denying to women the same rights as to contract
and the elective franchise as are enjoyed by men.

															While the general liberty to contract in regard to one's
business and the sale of one's labor is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, that liberty is subject to proper restrictions under the
police power of the State.

															The statute of Oregon of 1903 providing that no female shall
work in certain establishments more than ten hour a day is not
unconstitutional so far as respects laundries.

															48 Oregon, 252, affirmed.

															The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the
statute Page 208 U. S. 413 of Oregon limiting the hours of employment of women, are stated
in the opinion. Page 208 U. S. 416 MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the court:

															On February 19, 1903, the legislature of the State of Oregon
passed an act (Session Laws 1903, p. 148) the first section of
which is in these words:

															"SEC. 1. That no female [shall] be employed in any mechanical
establishment, or factory, or laundry in this State more than ten
hours during any one day. The hours of work may be so arranged as
to permit the employment of females Page 208 U. S. 417 at any time so that they shall not work more than ten hours
during the twenty-four hours of any one day."

															Sec. 3 made a violation of the provisions of the prior sections
a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not less than $10 nor more than
$25. On September 18, 1905, an information was filed in the circuit
court of the State for the County of Multnomah, charging that the
defendant

															"on the 4th day of September, A.D. 1905, in the county of
Multnomah and State of Oregon, then and there being the owner of a
laundry, known as the Grand Laundry, in the city of Portland, and
the employer of females therein, did then and there unlawfully
permit and suffer one Joe Haselbock, he, the said Joe Haselbock,
then and there being an overseer, superintendent, and agent of said
Curt Muller, in the said Grand Laundry, to require a female,
to-wit, one Mrs. E. Gotcher, to work more than ten hours in said
laundry on said 4th day of September, A.D. 1905, contrary to the
statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and
dignity of the State of Oregon."

															A trial resulted in a verdict against the defendant, who was
sentenced to pay a fine of $10. The Supreme Court of the State
affirmed the conviction, State v. Muller, 48 Oregon 252,
whereupon the case was brought here on writ of error.

															The single question is the constitutionality of the statute
under which the defendant was convicted so far as it affects the
work of a female in a laundry. That it does not conflict with any
provisions of the state constitution is settled by the decision of
the Supreme Court of the State. The contentions of the defendant,
now plaintiff in error, are thus stated in his brief:

															"(1) Because the statute attempts to prevent persons sui
juris from making their own contracts, and thus violates the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, as follows:"

															" No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. " Page 208 U. S. 418 "(2) Because the statute does not apply equally to all persons
similarly situated, and is class legislation."

															"(3) The statute is not a valid exercise of the police power.
The kinds of work prescribed are not unlawful, nor are they
declared to be immoral or dangerous to the public health; nor can
such a law be sustained on the ground that it is designed to
protect women on account of their sex. There is no necessary or
reasonable connection between the limitation prescribed by the act
and the public health, safety, or welfare."

															It is the law of Oregon that women, whether married or single,
have equal contractual and personal rights with men. As said by
Chief Justice Wolverton in First National Bank v. Leonard, 36 Oregon 390, 396, after a review of the various statutes of the
State upon the subject:

															"We may therefore say with perfect confidence that, with these
three sections upon the statute book, the wife can deal not only
with her separate property, acquired from whatever source, in the
same manner as her husband can with property belonging to him, but
that she may make contracts and incur liabilities, and the same may
be enforced against her, the same as if she were a femme
sole. There is now no residuum of civil disability resting
upon her which is not recognized as existing against the husband.
The current runs steadily and strongly in the direction of the
emancipation of the wife, and the policy, as disclosed by all
recent legislation upon the subject in this State, is to place her
upon the same footing as if she were a femme sole not only
with respect to her separate property, but as it affects her right
to make binding contracts; and the most natural corollary to the
situation is that the remedies for the enforcement of liabilities
incurred are made coextensive and coequal with such enlarged
conditions."

															It thus appears that, putting to one side the elective
franchise, in the matter of personal and contractual rights, they
stand on the same plane as the other sex. Their rights in these
respects can no more be infringed than the equal rights of their
brothers. We held in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45 , that Page 208 U. S. 419 a law providing that no laborer shall be required or permitted
to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week or ten hours in
a day was not, as to men, a legitimate exercise of the police power
of the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary
interference with the right and liberty of the individual to
contract in relation to his labor, and, as such, was in conflict
with, and void under, the Federal Constitution. That decision is
invoked by plaintiff in error as decisive of the question before
us. But this assumes that the difference between the sexes does not
justify a different rule respecting a restriction of the hours of
labor.

															In patent cases, counsel are apt to open the argument with a
discussion of the state of the art. It may not be amiss, in the
present case, before examining the constitutional question, to
notice the course of legislation, as well as expressions of opinion
from other than judicial sources. In the brief filed by Mr. Louis
D. Brandeis for the defendant in error is a very copious collection
of all these matters, an epitome of which is found in the margin. * Page 208 U. S. 420 While there have been but few decisions bearing directly upon
the question, the following sustain the constitutionality of such
legislation: Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120
Massachusetts 383; Wenham v. State, 65 Nebraska 394, 400,
406; State v. Buchanan, 29 Washington 602; Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa.Sup.Ct. 5, 17; against them
is the case of Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois 98.

															The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not
be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no
discussion of the constitutional question presented to us for
determination, yet they are significant of a widespread belief that
woman's physical structure, and the functions she performs in
consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or
qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted to
toil. Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even
a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value
of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form
limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence
and stability to popular government which otherwise would be
lacking. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and
debatable, and the extent to Page 208 U. S. 421 which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by
the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long-continued
belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge.

															It is undoubtedly true, as more than once declared by this
Court, that the general right to contract in relation to one's
business is part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; yet it is equally
well settled that this liberty is not absolute, and extending to
all contracts, and that a State may, without conflicting with the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, restrict in many respects
the individual's power of contract. Without stopping to discuss at
length the extent to which a State may act in this respect, we
refer to the following cases in which the question has been
considered: Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.
S. 578 ; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.
S. 366 ; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45 .

															That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal
functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of
motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant
testimony of the medical fraternity, continuance for a long time on
her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to
injurious effects upon the body, and, as healthy mothers are
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical wellbeing of woman
becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.

															Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always
been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset
by superior physical strength, and this control in various forms,
with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. As
minors, though not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in
the courts as needing especial care that her rights may be
preserved. Education was long denied her, and while now the doors
of the schoolroom are opened and her opportunities for acquiring
knowledge are great, yet, even with that and the Page 208 U. S. 422 consequent increase of capacity for business affairs, it is
still true that, in the struggle for subsistence, she is not an
equal competitor with her brother. Though limitations upon personal
and contractual rights may be removed by legislation, there is that
in her disposition and habits of life which will operate against a
full assertion of those rights. She will still be where some
legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real
equality of right. Doubtless there are individual exceptions, and
there are many respects in which she has an advantage over him;
but, looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an
independent position in life, she is not upon an equality.
Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly
placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her
protection may be sustained even when like legislation is not
necessary for men, and could not be sustained. It is impossible to
close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother,
and depends upon him. Even though all restrictions on political,
personal, and contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so
far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with
him, it would still be true that she is so constituted that she
will rest upon and look to him for protection; that her physical
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions --
having in view not merely her own health, but the wellbeing of the
race -- justify legislation to protect her from the greed, as well
as the passion, of man. The limitations which this statute places
upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her
employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for
her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. Many words
cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in structure of
body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of
physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor,
particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health
upon the future wellbeing of the race, the self-reliance which
enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain
the struggle for subsistence. This difference Page 208 U. S. 423 justifies a difference in legislation, and upholds that which is
designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon
her.

															We have not referred in this discussion to the denial of the
elective franchise in the State of Oregon, for, while that may
disclose a lack of political equality in all things with her
brother, that is not of itself decisive. The reason runs deeper,
and rests in the inherent difference between the two sexes and in
the different functions in life which they perform.

															For these reasons, and without questioning in any respect the
decision in Lochner v. New York, we are of the opinion
that it cannot be adjudged that the act in question is in conflict
with the Federal Constitution so far as it respects the work of a
female in a laundry, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Oregon is affirmed.

															* The following legislation of the states imposes restriction in
some form or another upon the hours of labor that may be required
of women: Massachusetts: 1874, Rev.Laws 1902, chap. 106, § 24;
Rhode Island: 1885, Acts and Resolves 1902, chap. 994, p. 73;
Louisiana: 1886, Rev.Laws 1904, vol. 1, § 4, p. 989; Connecticut:
1887, Gen.Stat.Revision 1902, § 4691; Maine: 1887, Rev.Stat. 1903,
chap. 40, § 48; New Hampshire: 1887, Laws 1907, chap. 94, p. 95;
Maryland: 1888, Pub.Gen.Laws 1903, art. 100, § 1; Virginia: 1890,
Code 1904, title 51A, chap. 178A, § 3657b; Pennsylvania: 1897, Laws
1905, No. 226, p. 352; New York: 1899, Laws 1907, chap. 507, § 77,
subdiv. 3, p. 1078; Nebraska: 1899, Comp.Stat. 1905, § 7955, p.
1986; Washington: Stat. 1901, chap. 68, § 1, p. 118; Colorado: Acts
1903, chap. 138, § 3, p. 310; New Jersey: 1892, Gen.Stat. 1895, p.
2350, §§ 66. 67; Oklahoma; 1890, Rev.Stat. 1903, chap. 25, art. 58,
§ 729; North Dakota: 1877, Rev.Code 1905, § 9440; South Dakota:
1877, Rev.Code (Penal Code § 764), p. 1185; Wisconsin: 1897, Code
1898, § 1728; South Carolina: Acts 1907, No. 233.

															In foreign legislation, Mr. Brandeis calls attention to these
statutes: Great Britain, 1844: Law 1901, 1 Edw. VII. chap. 22.
France, 1848: Act Nov. 2, 1892, and March 30, 1900. Switzerland,
Canton of Glarus, 1848: Federal Law 1877, art. 2, § 1. Austria,
1855; Acts 1897, art. 96a, §§ 1-3. Holland, 1889; art. 5, § 1.
Italy, June 19, 1902, art. 7. Germany, Laws 1891.

															Then follow extracts from over ninety reports of committees,
bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of
factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that
long hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of
their special physical organization. The matter is discussed in
these reports in different aspects, but all agree as to the danger.
It would, of course, take too much space to give these reports in
detail. Following them are extracts from similar reports discussing
the general benefits of short hours from an economic aspect of the
question. In many of these reports, individual instances are given
tending to support the general conclusion. Perhaps the general
scope and character of all these reports may be summed up in what
an inspector for Hanover says:

															"The reasons for the reduction of the working day to ten hours
-- (a) the physical organization of women, (b) her maternal
functions, (c) the rearing and education of the children, (d) the
maintenance of the home -- are all so important and so far-reaching
that the need for such reduction need hardly be discussed."