U.S. Supreme Court Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980) Rhode Island v. Innis No. 78-1076 Argued October 30,
1979 Decided May 12, 1980 446
U.S. 291 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
RHODE ISLAND Syllabus Shortly after a taxicab driver, who had been robbed by a man
wielding a sawed-off shotgun, identified a picture of respondent as
that of his assailant, a Providence, R.I., patrolman spotted
respondent, who was unarmed, on the street, arrested him, and
advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 .
When other police officers arrived at the arrest scene, respondent
was twice again advised of his Miranda rights, and he
stated that he understood his rights and wanted to speak with a
lawyer. Respondent was then placed in a police car to be driven to
the central station in the company of three officers, who were
instructed not to question respondent or intimidate him in any way.
While en route to the station, two of the officers engaged in a
conversation between themselves concerning the missing shotgun. One
of the officers stated that there were "a lot of handicapped
children running around in this area" because a school for such
children was located nearby, and "God forbid one of them might find
a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." Respondent
interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn
the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.
Upon returning to the scene of the arrest where a search for the
shotgun was in progress, respondent was again advised of his Miranda rights, replied that he understood those rights,
but that he "wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the
kids in the area in the school," and then led the police to the
shotgun. Before trial on charges of kidnaping, robbery, and murder
of another taxicab driver, the trial court denied respondent's
motion to suppress the shotgun and the statement he had made to the
police regarding its discovery, ruling that respondent had waived
his Miranda rights, and respondent was subsequently
convicted. The Rhode Island Supreme Court set aside the conviction
and held that respondent was entitled to a new trial, concluding
that respondent had invoked his Miranda right to counsel
and that, contrary to Miranda 's mandate that, in the
absence of counsel, all custodial interrogation then cease, the
police officers in the vehicle had "interrogated" respondent
without a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Held: Respondent was not "interrogated" in violation of
his right under Miranda to remain silent until he had
consulted with a lawyer. Pp. 446 U. S.
297 -303. Page 446 U. S. 292 (a) The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation"
under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition
focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than
the intent of the police. Pp. 446 U. S.
298 -302.

															(b) Here, there was no express questioning of respondent; the
conversation between the two officers was, at least in form,
nothing more than a dialogue between them to which no response from
respondent was invited. Moreover, respondent was not subjected to
the "functional equivalent" of questioning, since it cannot be said
that the officers should have known that their conversation was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
respondent. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
officers were aware that respondent was peculiarly susceptible to
an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of handicapped
children, or that the police knew that respondent was unusually
disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. Nor does the record
indicate that, in the context of a brief conversation, the officers
should have known that respondent would suddenly be moved to make a
self-incriminating response. While it may be said that respondent
was subjected to "subtle compulsion," it must also be established
that a suspect's incriminating response was the product of words or
actions on the part of the police that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, which was
not established here. Pp. 446 U. S.
302 -303.

															120 R.I. ___, 391
A.2d 1158 , vacated and remanded.

															STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a
concurring opinion, post, p. 446 U. S. 304 .
BURGER, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 446 U. S. 304 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 446 U. S. 305 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 446 U. S.
307 . Page 446 U. S. 293 MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 , 384 U. S. 474 ,
the Court held that, once a defendant in custody asks to speak with
a lawyer, all interrogation must cease until a lawyer is present.
The issue in this case is whether the respondent was "interrogated"
in violation of the standards promulgated in the Miranda opinion. I On the night of January 12, 1975, John Mulvaney, a Providence,
R.I., taxicab driver, disappeared after being dispatched to pick up
a customer. His body was discovered four days later buried in a
shallow grave in Coventry, R.I. He had died from a shotgun blast
aimed at the back of his head.

															On January 17, 1975, shortly after midnight, the Providence
police received a telephone call from Gerald Aubin, also a taxicab
driver, who reported that he had just been robbed by a man wielding
a sawed-off shotgun. Aubin further reported that he had dropped off
his assailant near Rhode Island College in a section of Providence
known as Mount Pleasant. While at the Providence police station
waiting to give a statement, Aubin noticed a picture of his
assailant on a bulletin board. Aubin so informed one of the police
officers present. The officer prepared a photo array, and again
Aubin identified a picture of the same person. That person was the
respondent. Shortly thereafter, the Providence police began a
search of the Mount Pleasant area.

															At approximately 4:30 a.m. on the same date, Patrolman Lovell,
while cruising the streets of Mount Pleasant in a patrol Page 446 U. S. 294 car, spotted the respondent standing in the street facing him.
When Patrolman Lovell stopped his car, the respondent walked
towards it. Patrolman Lovell then arrested the respondent, who was
unarmed, and advised him of his so-called Miranda rights.
While the two men waited in the patrol car for other police
officers to arrive, Patrolman Lovell did not converse with the
respondent other than to respond to the latter's request for a
cigarette.

															Within minutes, Sergeant Sears arrived at the scene of the
arrest, and he also gave the respondent the Miranda warnings. Immediately thereafter, Captain Leyden and other police
officers arrived. Captain Leyden advised the respondent of his Miranda rights. The respondent stated that he understood
those rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer. Captain Leyden then
directed that the respondent be placed in a "caged wagon," a
four-door police car with a wire screen mesh between the front and
rear seats, and be driven to the central police station. Three
officers, Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna, were assigned
to accompany the respondent to the central station. They placed the
respondent in the vehicle and shut the doors. Captain Leyden then
instructed the officers not to question the respondent or
intimidate or coerce him in any way. The three officers then
entered the vehicle, and it departed.

															While en route to the central station, Patrolman Gleckman
initiated a conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the
missing shotgun. [ Footnote 1 ]
As Patrolman Gleckman later testified:

															"A. At this point, I was talking back and forth with Patrolman
McKenna, stating that I frequent this area while on patrol, and
[that, because a school for handicapped children is located
nearby,] there's a lot of handicapped children running around in
this area, and God Page 446 U. S. 295 forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they
might hurt themselves."

															App. 43-44. Patrolman McKenna apparently shared his fellow
officer's concern:

															"A. I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it was a
safety factor, and that we should, you know, continue to search for
the weapon and try to find it." Id. at 53. While Patrolman Williams said nothing, he
overheard the conversation between the two officers:

															"A. He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little -- I
believe he said a girl -- would pick up the gun, maybe kill
herself." Id. at 59. The respondent then interrupted the
conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around
so he could show them where the gun was located. At this point,
Patrolman McKenna radioed back to Captain Leyden that they were
returning to the scene of the arrest, and that the respondent would
inform them of the location of the gun. At the time the respondent
indicated that the officers should turn back, they had traveled no
more than a mile, a trip encompassing only a few minutes.

															The police vehicle then returned to the scene of the arrest,
where a search for the shotgun was in progress. There, Captain
Leyden again advised the respondent of his Miranda rights.
The respondent replied that he understood those rights, but that he
"wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the
area in the school." The respondent then led the police to a nearby
field, where he pointed out the shotgun under some rocks by he side
of the road.

															On March 20, 1975, a grand jury returned an indictment charging
the respondent with the kidnaping, robbery, and murder of John
Mulvaney. Before trial, the respondent moved to suppress the
shotgun and the statements he had Page 446 U. S. 296 made to the police regarding it. After an evidentiary hearing at
which the respondent elected not to testify, the trial judge found
that the respondent had been "repeatedly and completely advised of
his Miranda rights." He further found that it was

															"entirely understandable that [the officers in the police
vehicle] would voice their concern [for the safety of the
handicapped children] to each other."

															The judge then concluded that the respondent's decision to
inform the police of the location of the shotgun was "a waiver,
clearly, and on the basis of the evidence that I have heard, and
[ sic ] intelligent waiver, of his [ Miranda ] right
to remain silent." Thus, without passing on whether the police
officers had, in fact, "interrogated" the respondent, the trial
court sustained the admissibility of the shotgun and testimony
related to its discovery. That evidence was later introduced at the
respondent's trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
all counts.

															On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision,
set aside the respondent's conviction. 120 R.I. ___, 391
A.2d 1158 . Relying at least in part on this Court's decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 , the
court concluded that the respondent had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, and that, contrary to Miranda's mandate that, in the absence of counsel, all
custodial interrogation then cease, the police officers in the
vehicle had "interrogated" the respondent without a valid waiver of
his right to counsel. It was the view of the state appellate court
that, even though the police officers may have been genuinely
concerned about the public safety, and even though the respondent
had not been addressed personally by the police officers, the
respondent nonetheless had been subjected to "subtle coercion" that
was the equivalent of "interrogation" within the meaning of the Miranda opinion. Moreover, contrary to the holding of the
trial court, the appellate court concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to support a finding of waiver. Having Page 446 U. S. 297 concluded that both the shotgun and testimony relating to its
discovery were obtained in violation of the Miranda standards, and therefore should not have been admitted into
evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the respondent
was entitled to a new trial.

															We granted certiorari to address for the first time the meaning
of "interrogation" under Miranda v. Arizona, 440 U.S.
934. II In its Miranda opinion, the Court concluded that, in
the context of "custodial interrogation," certain procedural
safeguards are necessary to protect a defendant's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination. More specifically, the Court held that

															"the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective
to secure the privilege against self-incrimination."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 444 .
Those safeguards included the now familiar Miranda warnings -- namely, that the defendant be informed

															"that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires"

															-- or their equivalent. Id. at 384 U. S.
479 .

															The Court in the Miranda opinion also outlined in some
detail the consequences that would result if a defendant sought to
invoke those procedural safeguards. With regard to the right to the
presence of counsel, the Court noted:

															"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. . . . If the individual states that he wants an attorney,
the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that
time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the
attorney and to Page 446 U. S. 298 have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the
individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants
one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to
remain silent." Id. at 384 U. S.
473 -474.

															In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the
respondent was fully informed of his Miranda rights, and
that he invoked his Miranda right to counsel when he told
Captain Leyden that he wished to consult with a lawyer. It is also
uncontested that the respondent was "in custody" while being
transported to the police station.

															The issue, therefore, is whether the respondent was
"interrogated" by the police officers in violation of the
respondent's undisputed right under Miranda to remain
silent until he had consulted with a lawyer. [ Footnote 2 ] In resolving this issue, we first
define the term "interrogation" under Miranda, before
turning to a consideration of the facts of this case. A The starting point for defining "interrogation" in this context
is, of course, the Court's Miranda opinion. There the
Court observed that,

															"[b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Id. at 384 U. S. 44 (emphasis added). This passage and other references throughout the
opinion to "questioning" might suggest that the Miranda rules were to apply only to those police interrogation practices
that involve express questioning of a defendant while in
custody. Page 446 U. S. 299 We do not, however, construe the Miranda opinion so
narrowly. The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the
"interrogation environment" created by the interplay of
interrogation and custody would "subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner," and thereby undermine the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 384 U. S.
457 -458. The police practices that evoked this concern
included several that did not involve express questioning. For
example, one of the practices discussed in Miranda was the
use of lineups in which a coached witness would pick the defendant
as the perpetrator. This was designed to establish that the
defendant was, in fact, guilty as a predicate for further
interrogation. Id. at 384 U. S. 453 .
A variation on this theme discussed in Miranda was the
so-called "reverse line-up" in which a defendant would be
identified by coached witnesses as the perpetrator of a fictitious
crime, with the object of inducing him to confess to the actual
crime of which he was suspected in order to escape the false
prosecution. Ibid. The Court in Miranda also
included in its survey of interrogation practices the use of
psychological ploys, such as to "posi[t]" "the guilt of the
subject," to "minimize the moral seriousness of the offense," and
"to cast blame on the victim or on society." Id. at 384 U. S. 450 .
It is clear that these techniques of persuasion, no less than
express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to
amount to interrogation. [ Footnote
3 ]

															This is not to say, however, that all statements obtained by the
police after a person has been taken into custody are to be
considered the product of interrogation. As the Court in Miranda noted:

															"Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any
statement given freely and voluntarily without Page 446 U. S. 300 any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is
in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police
without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be
interrogated. . . . Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment, and their admissibility is not
affected by our holding today." Id. at 384 U. S. 478 (emphasis added). It is clear, therefore, that the special
procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not
where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a
suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. "Interrogation,"
as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a
measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody
itself. [ Footnote 4 ]

															We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play
whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express Page 446 U. S. 301 questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the
term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to
express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part
of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response [ Footnote 5 ] from the suspect. [ Footnote 6 ] The latter portion of this definition focuses
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in
custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police
practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying
intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is
reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect
thus amounts to interrogation. [ Footnote 7 ] But, since the police surely Page 446 U. S. 302 cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of
their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend
only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. [ Footnote
8 ] B Turning to the facts of the present case, we conclude that the
respondent was not "interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda. It is undisputed that the first prong of the
definition of "interrogation" was not satisfied, for the
conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no
express questioning of the respondent. Rather, that conversation
was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between the two
officers to which no response from the respondent was invited.

															Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that the respondent was
subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. It cannot
be said, in short, that Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have
known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the respondent. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent
was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience
concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor is there
anything in the Page 446 U. S. 303 record to suggest that the police knew that the respondent was
unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. [ Footnote 9 ]

															The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief
conversation, the officers should have known that the respondent
would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response.
Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to have
consisted of no more than a few off-hand remarks, we cannot say
that the officers should have known that it was reasonably likely
that Innis would so respond. This is not a case where the police
carried on a lengthy harangue in the presence of the suspect. Nor
does the record support the respondent's contention that, under the
circumstances, the officers' comments were particularly
"evocative." It is our view, therefore, that the respondent was not
subjected by the police to words or actions that the police should
have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from him.

															The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, in short, in equating
"subtle compulsion" with interrogation. That the officers' comments
struck a responsive chord is readily apparent. Thus, it may be
said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did say, that the
respondent was subjected to "subtle compulsion." But that is not
the end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a
suspect's incriminating response was the product of words or
actions on the part of the police that they should have known were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. [ Footnote 10 ] This was not
established in the present case. Page 446 U. S. 304 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Although there was conflicting testimony about the exact seating
arrangements, it is clear that everyone in the vehicle heard the
conversation.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Since we conclude that the respondent was not "interrogated" for Miranda purposes, we do not reach the question whether the
respondent waived his right under Miranda to be free from
interrogation until counsel was present.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															To limit the ambit of Miranda to express questioning
would "place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise
methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the
plain mandate of Miranda. " Commonwealth v.
Hamilton, 945 Pa. 292, 297, 285 A.2d 172, 175.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															There is language in the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in this case suggesting that the definition of
"interrogation" under Miranda is informed by this Court's
decision in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.
S. 387 . 120 R.I. ___, 391
A.2d 1158 , 1161-1162. This suggestion is erroneous. Our
decision in Brewer rested solely on the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. 430 U.S. at 430 U. S.
397 -399. That right, as we held in Massiah v. United
States, 377 U. S. 201 , 377 U. S. 206 ,
prohibits law enforcement officers from "deliberately elicit[ing]"
incriminating information from a defendant in the absence of
counsel after a formal charge against the defendant has been filed.
Custody in such a case is not controlling; indeed, the petitioner
in Massiah was not in custody. By contrast, the right to
counsel at issue in the present case is based not on the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments, but rather on the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments as interpreted in the Miranda opinion. The
definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, if indeed the term "interrogation" is even apt in the
Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since
the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are
quite distinct. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams,
Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When
Does it Matter?, 67 Geo.L.J. 1, 41-55 (1978).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															By "incriminating response" we refer to any response -- whether
inculpatory or exculpatory -- that the prosecution may seek to
introduce at trial. As the Court observed in Miranda: "No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct
confessions and statements which amount to 'admissions' of part or
all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrimination
protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself
in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination.
Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinction may be
drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be
merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement made were, in fact, truly
exculpatory, it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution.
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the
defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation,
and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word, and may not be
used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for
any other statement." 384 U. S.
476 -477.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															One of the dissenting opinions seems totally to misapprehend
this definition in suggesting that it "will almost certainly
exclude every statement [of the police] that is not punctuated with
a question mark." Post at 446 U. S.
312 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant,
for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have
known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke
an incriminating response. In particular, where a police practice
is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused,
it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the
police should have known was reasonably likely to have that
effect.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion
might be an important factor in determining whether the police
should have known that their words or actions were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The record in no way suggests that the officers' remarks were
designed to elicit a response. See n 7, supra. It is significant that the trial
judge, after hearing the officers' testimony, concluded that it was
"entirely understandable that [the officers] would voice their
concern [for the safety of the handicapped children] to each
other."

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															By way of example, if the police had done no more than to drive
past the site of the concealed weapon while taking the most direct
route to the police station, and if the respondent, upon noticing
for the first time the proximity of the school for handicapped
children, had blurted out that he would show the officers where the
gun was located, it could not seriously be argued that this "subtle
compulsion" would have constituted "interrogation" within the
meaning of the Miranda opinion.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

															I would prefer to reverse the judgment for the reasons stated in
my dissenting opinion in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.
S. 387 (1977); but, given that judgment and the Court's
opinion in Brewer, I join the opinion of the Court in the
present case.

															MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment.

															Since the result is not inconsistent with Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), I concur in the judgment.

															The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear, and
law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would
neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at
this late date. I fear, however, that the rationale in Parts 446 U. S. S.
302|>II-B of the Court's opinion will not clarify the tension
between this holding and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.
S. 387 (1977), and our other cases. It may introduce new
elements of uncertainty; under the Court's test, a police officer,
in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the
suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused. See, e.g.,
ante at 446 U. S. 302 ,
n. 8. Few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind
of evaluation seemingly contemplated; even a psychiatrist, asked to
express an expert opinion on these aspects of a suspect in custody,
would very likely employ extensive questioning and observation to
make the judgment now charged to police officers. Page 446 U. S. 305 Trial judges have enough difficulty discerning the boundaries
and nuances flowing from post- Miranda opinions, and we do
not clarify that situation today. * * That we may well be adding to the confusion is suggested by
the problem dealt with in California v. Braeseke, 444 U. S. 1309 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers) (difficulty of determining
whether a defendant has waived his Miranda rights), and
cases cited therein.

															MR JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.

															I am substantially in agreement with the Court's definition of
"interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). In my view, the Miranda safeguards apply whenever
police conduct is intended or likely to produce a response from a
suspect in custody. As I read the Court's opinion, its definition
of "interrogation" for Miranda purposes is equivalent, for
practical purposes, to my formulation, since it contemplates
that,

															"where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating
response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will
not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably
likely to have that effect." Ante at 446 U. S. 302 ,
n. 7. Thus, the Court requires an objective inquiry into the likely
effect of police conduct on a typical individual, taking into
account any special susceptibility of the suspect to certain kinds
of pressure of which the police know or have reason to know.

															I am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how this
objective standard, as applied to the facts before us, can
rationally lead to the conclusion that there was no interrogation.
Innis was arrested at 4:30 a.m., handcuffed, searched, advised of
his rights, and placed in the back seat of a patrol car. Within a
short time, he had been twice more advised of his rights and driven
away in a four-door sedan with three police officers. Two officers
sat in the front seat, and one sat beside Innis in the back seat.
Since the car traveled no more than a mile before Innis agreed to
point out the location of Page 446 U. S. 306 the murder weapon, Officer Gleckman must have begun almost
immediately to talk about the search for the shotgun.

															The Court attempts to characterize Gleckman's statements as "no
more than a few off-hand remarks" which could not reasonably have
been expected to elicit a response. Ante at 446 U. S. 303 .
If the statements had been addressed to respondent, it would be
impossible to draw such a conclusion. The simple message of the
"talking back and forth" between Gleckman and McKenna was that they
had to find the shotgun to avert a child's death.

															One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of
a suspect -- any suspect -- than the assertion that, if
the weapon is not found, an innocent person will be hurt or killed.
And not just any innocent person, but an innocent child -- a little
girl -- a helpless, handicapped little girl on her way to school.
The notion that such an appeal could not be expected to have any
effect unless the suspect were known to have some special interest
in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous. As a matter of
fact, the appeal to a suspect to confess for the sake of others, to
"display some evidence of decency and honor," is a classic
interrogation technique. See, e.g., F. Inbau & J.
Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions 60-62 (2d
ed.1967).

															Gleckman's remarks would obviously have constituted
interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to respondent,
and the result should not be different because they were nominally
addressed to McKenna. This is not a case where police officers,
speaking among themselves, are accidentally overheard by a suspect.
These officers were "talking back and forth" in close quarters with
the handcuffed suspect,* traveling past the very place where they
believed the weapon was located. They knew respondent would hear
and attend to their conversation, and they are chargeable with
knowledge Page 446 U. S. 307 of and responsibility for the pressures to speak which they
created.

															I firmly believe that this case is simply an aberration, and
that, in future cases, the Court will apply the standard adopted
today in accordance with its plain meaning.

															* Gleckman may even have been sitting in the back seat beside
respondent. See App. 50, 52, 56; but see id. 39,
43, 47, 58.

															MR JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															An original definition of an old term coupled with an original
finding of fact on a cold record makes it possible for this Court
to vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island. That
court, on the basis of the facts in the record before it, concluded
that members of the Providence, R.I., police force had interrogated
respondent, who was clearly in custody at the time, in the absence
of counsel after he had requested counsel. In my opinion, the state
court's conclusion that there was interrogation rests on a proper
interpretation of both the facts and the law; thus, its
determination that the products of the interrogation were
inadmissible at trial should be affirmed.

															The undisputed facts can be briefly summarized. Based on
information that respondent, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, had
just robbed a cab driver in the vicinity of Rhode Island College, a
number of Providence police officers began a thorough search of the
area in the early morning of January 17, 1975. One of them arrested
respondent without any difficulty at about 4:30 a.m. Respondent did
not then have the shotgun in his possession, and presumably had
abandoned it, or hidden it, shortly before he was arrested. Within
a few minutes, at least a dozen officers were on the scene. App.
37. It is fair to infer that an immediate search for the missing
weapon was a matter of primary importance.

															When a police captain arrived, he repeated the Miranda warnings that a patrolman and a sergeant had already given to
respondent, and respondent said he wanted an attorney. The captain
then ordered two officers who were assigned to Page 446 U. S. 308 a "caged wagon" to transport respondent to the central station,
and ordered a third officer to ride in the back seat with
respondent. While the wagon was en route to the station, one of the
officers, Officer Gleckman, stated that there was a school for
handicapped children in the vicinity and, "God forbid," one of them
should find the shotgun and hurt herself. [ Footnote 2/1 ] As a result of this statement, respondent
told the officers that he was willing to show them where the gun
was hidden. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The
wagon returned to the scene, and respondent helped the officers
locate the gun.

															After a suppression hearing, the trial court assumed, without
deciding, that Officer Gleckman's statement constituted
interrogation. The court nevertheless allowed the shotgun and
testimony concerning respondent's connection to it into evidence on
the ground that respondent had waived his Miranda rights
when he consented to help police locate the gun. On appeal from
respondent's conviction for kidnaping, robbery and murder, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Officer Gleckman's statement
constituted impermissible interrogation, and rejected the trial
court's waiver analysis. It therefore reversed respondent's
conviction and remanded for a new trial. Today, the Court reverses
the Rhode Island court's resolution of the interrogation issue,
creating a new definition of that term and holding, as a matter of
law, that the statement at issue in this case did not constitute
interrogation. Page 446 U. S. 309 I As the Court recognizes, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ,
makes it clear that, once respondent requested an attorney, he had
an absolute right to have any type of interrogation cease until an
attorney was present. [ Footnote
2/3 ] As it also recognizes, Miranda requires that the
term "interrogation" be broadly construed to include "either
express questioning or its functional equivalent." Ante at 446 U. S.
300 -301. [ Footnote 2/4 ]
In my view, any statement that would normally be understood by the
average listener as calling for a response is the functional
equivalent of a direct question, whether or not it is punctuated by
a question mark. The Court, however, takes a much narrower view. It
holds that police conduct is not the "functional equivalent" of
direct questioning unless the police should have known that what
they were saying or doing was likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect. [ Footnote
2/5 ] This holding represents a plain departure from the
principles set forth in Miranda. Page 446 U. S. 310 In Miranda, the Court required the now-familiar
warnings to be given to suspects prior to custodial interrogation
in order to dispel the atmosphere of coercion that necessarily
accompanies such interrogations. In order to perform that function
effectively, the warnings must be viewed by both the police and the
suspect as a correct and binding statement of their respective
rights. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Thus, if,
after being told that he has a right to have an attorney present
during interrogation, a suspect chooses to cut off questioning
until counsel can be obtained, his choice must be "scrupulously
honored" by the police. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 , 423 U. S. 104 ; id. at 423 U. S. 110 ,
n. 2 (WHITE, J., concurring in result). At the least, this must
mean that the police are prohibited from making deliberate attempts
to elicit statements from the suspect. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Yet the Court is unwilling to characterize
all such attempts as "interrogation," noting only that,

															"where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating
response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will
not also be one which the police Page 446 U. S. 311 should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect.
[ Footnote 2/8 ]" Ante at 446 U. S. 302 ,
n. 7.

															From the suspect's point of view, the effectiveness of the
warnings depends on whether it appears that the police are
scrupulously honoring his rights. Apparent attempts to elicit
information from a suspect after he has invoked his right to cut
off questioning necessarily demean that right and tend to reinstate
the imbalance between police and suspect that the Miranda warnings are designed to correct. [ Footnote 2/9 ] Thus, if the rationale for requiring those
warnings in the first place is to be respected, any police conduct
or statements that would appear to a reasonable person in the
suspect's position to call for a response must be considered
"interrogation." [ Footnote
2/10 ]

															In short, in order to give full protection to a suspect's right
to be free from any interrogation at all, the definition of
"interrogation" must include any police statement or conduct that
has the same purpose or effect as a direct question. Statements
that appear to call for a response from the suspect, as well as
those that are designed to do so, should be considered
interrogation. By prohibiting only those relatively few statements
or actions that a police officer should know are likely to elicit
an incriminating response, the Court today accords a suspect Page 446 U. S. 312 considerably less protection. Indeed, since I suppose most
suspects are unlikely to incriminate themselves even when
questioned directly, this new definition will almost certainly
exclude every statement that is not punctuated with a question mark
from the concept of "interrogation." [ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The difference between the approach required by a faithful
adherence to Miranda and the stinted test applied by the
Court today can be illustrated by comparing three different ways in
which Officer Gleckman could have communicated his fears about the
possible dangers posed by the shotgun to handicapped children. He
could have:

															"(1) directly asked Innis:"

															"Will you please tell me where the shotgun is so we can protect
handicapped schoolchildren from danger?"

															"(2) announced to the other officers in the wagon:"

															"If the man sitting in the back seat with me should decide to
tell us where the gun is, we can protect handicapped children from
danger."

															"or (3) stated to the other officers:"

															"It would be too bad if a little handicapped girl would pick up
the gun that this man left in the area, and maybe kill
herself."

															In my opinion, all three of these statements should be
considered interrogation, because all three appear to be designed
to elicit a response from anyone who in fact knew where the gun was
located. [ Footnote 2/12 ] Under
the Court's test, on the other hand, Page 446 U. S. 313 the form of the statements would be critical. The third
statement would not be interrogation because in the Court's view
there was no reason for Officer Gleckman to believe that Innis was
susceptible to this type of an implied appeal, ante at 446 U. S. 302 ;
therefore, the statement would not be reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response. Assuming that this is true, see
infra at 446 U. S.
314 -315, then it seems to me that the first two
statements, which would be just as unlikely to elicit such a
response, should also not be considered interrogation. But because
the first statement is clearly an express question, it would be
considered interrogation under the Court's test. The second
statement, although just as clearly a deliberate appeal to Innis to
reveal the location of the gun, would presumably not be
interrogation because (a) it was not in form a direct question, and
(b) it does not fit within the "reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response" category that applies to indirect
interrogation.

															As this example illustrates, the Court's test creates an
incentive for police to ignore a suspect's invocation of his rights
in order to make continued attempts to extract information from
him. If a suspect does not appear to be susceptible to a particular
type of psychological pressure, [ Footnote 2/13 ] the police are apparently free to exert
that pressure on him despite his request for counsel, so long as
they are careful not to punctuate their statements with question
marks. And if, contrary to all reasonable expectations, the suspect
makes an Page 446 U. S. 314 incriminating statement, that statement can be used against him
at trial. The Court thus turns Miranda's unequivocal rule
against any interrogation at all into a trap in which unwary
suspects may be caught by police deception. II Even if the Court's new definition of the term "interrogation"
provided a proper standard for deciding this case, I find it
remarkable that the Court should undertake the initial task of
applying its new standard to the facts of the present case. As
noted above, the trial judge did not decide whether Officer
Gleckman had interrogated respondent. Assuming, arguendo, that he had, the judge concluded that respondent had waived his
request for counsel by offering to help find the gun. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court disagreed on the waiver questions, [ Footnote 2/14 ] and expressly concluded
that interrogation had occurred. Even if the Rhode Island court
might have reached a different conclusion under the Court's new
definition, I do not believe we should exclude it from
participating in a review of the actions taken by the Providence
police. Indeed, given the creation of a new standard of decision at
this stage of the litigation, the proper procedure would be to
remand to the trial court for findings on the basis of evidence
directed at the new standard.

															In any event, I think the Court is clearly wrong in holding, as
a matter of law, that Officer Gleckman should not have realized
that his statement was likely to elicit an incriminating Page 446 U. S. 315 response. The Court implicitly assumes that, at least in the
absence of a lengthy harangue, a criminal suspect will not be
likely to respond to indirect appeals to his humanitarian impulses.
It then goes on to state that the officers in this case had no
reason to believe that respondent would be unusually susceptible to
such appeals. Ante at 446 U. S. 302 .
Finally, although the significance of the officer's intentions is
not clear under its objective test, the Court states in a footnote
that the record "in no way suggests" that Officer Gleckman's
remarks were designed to elicit a response. Ante at 446 U. S. 303 ,
n. 9.

															The Court's assumption that criminal suspects are not
susceptible to appeals to conscience is directly contrary to the
teachings of police interrogation manuals, which recommend
appealing to a suspect's sense of morality as a standard and often
successful interrogation technique. [ Footnote 2/15 ] Surely the practical experience embodied
in such manuals should not be ignored in a case such as this, in
which the record is devoid of any evidence -- one way or the other
-- as to the susceptibility of suspects in general or of Innis in
particular.

															Moreover, there is evidence in the record to support the view
that Officer Gleckman's statement was intended to elicit a response
from Innis. Officer Gleckman, who was not regularly assigned to the
caged wagon, was directed by a police captain to ride with
respondent to the police station. Although there is a dispute in
the testimony, it appears that Gleckman may well have been riding
in the back seat with Innis. [ Footnote 2/16 ] The record does not explain why,
notwithstanding Page 446 U. S. 316 the fact that respondent was handcuffed, unarmed, and had
offered no resistance when arrested by an officer acting alone, the
captain ordered Officer Gleckman to ride with respondent. [ Footnote 2/17 ] It is not inconceivable
that two professionally trained police officers concluded that a
few well chosen remarks might induce respondent to disclose the
whereabouts of the shotgun. [ Footnote
2/18 ] This conclusion becomes even more plausible in light of
the emotionally charged words chosen by Officer Gleckman ("God
forbid" that a "little girl" should find the gun and hurt herself).
[ Footnote 2/19 ] III Under my view of the correct standard, the judgment of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court should be affirmed because the Page 446 U. S. 317 statements made within Innis' hearing were as likely to elicit a
response as a direct question. However, even if I were to agree
with the Court's much narrower standard, I would disagree with its
disposition of this particular case, because the Rhode Island
courts should be given an opportunity to apply the new standard to
the facts of this case.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Although the testimony is not entirely clear as to the exact
wording of Officer Gleckman's statement, it appears that he talked
about the possible danger being to a little girl. App. 59.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															After he returned to the scene, respondent told the police
captain that he wanted to help them locate the shotgun because he
"wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the
area in the school." Id. at 39. Given the timing of
respondent's statement and the absence of any evidence that he knew
about the school prior to Officer Gleckman's statement, it is clear
that respondent's statement was the direct product of the
conversation in the police wagon.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] Ante at 446 U. S. 293 , 446 U. S.
297 -298. In Miranda, the Court explicitly
stated: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
474 .

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															As the Court points out, ante at 446 U. S. 299 ,
the Court in Miranda was acutely aware of the fact that
police interrogation techniques are not limited to direct
questioning.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															"That is to say, the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Ante at 446 U. S.
301 .

															In limiting its test to police statements "likely to elicit an
incriminating response," the Court confuses the scope of the
exclusionary rule with the definition of "interrogation." Of
course, any incriminating statement as defined in Miranda, quoted ante at 446 U. S. 301 ,
n. 5, must be excluded from evidence if it is the product of
impermissible interrogation. But I fail to see how this rule helps
in deciding whether a particular statement or tactic constitutes
"interrogation." After all, Miranda protects a suspect in
Innis' position not simply from interrogation that is likely to be
successful, but from any interrogation at all.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															"We have concluded that, without proper safeguards, the process
of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of
crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat
these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the
privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights, and the exercise
of those rights must be fully honored."

															384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
467 .

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.
S. 387 , 430 U. S. 398 399, the Court applied the "deliberately elicited" standard in
determining that statements were extracted from Williams in
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Although this
case involves Fifth Amendment rights and the Miranda rules
designed to safeguard those rights, respondent's invocation of his
right to counsel makes the two cases indistinguishable. In both
cases the police had an unqualified obligation to refrain from
trying to elicit a response from the suspect in the absence of his
attorney. See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"?
When Does it Matter?, 67 Geo.L.J. 1, 73 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															This factual assumption is extremely dubious. I would assume
that police often interrogate suspects without any reason to
believe that their efforts are likely to be successful, in the hope
that a statement will nevertheless be forthcoming.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127
U.Pa.L.Rev. 581, 609-611 (1979). As MR. JUSTICE WHITE pointed out
in his opinion concurring in the result in Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 , when
a suspect invokes his right to an attorney, he is expressing "his
own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities
without legal advice." Id. at 423 U. S. 110 ,
n. 2. Under these circumstances, continued interrogation is likely
to produce the same type of coercive atmosphere that the Miranda warnings are supposed to dispel.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															I would use an objective standard both to avoid the difficulties
of proof inherent in a subjective standard and to give police
adequate guidance in their dealings with suspects who have
requested counsel.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The Court's suggestion, ante at 446 U. S. 301 ,
n. 6, that I totally misapprehend the import of its definition is
belied by its application of the new standard to the facts of this
case.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ] See White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The
Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17
Am.Crim.L.Rev. 53, 68 (1979), where the author proposes the same
test and applies it to the facts of this case, stating:

															"Under the proposed objective standard, the result is obvious.
Since the conversation indicates a strong desire to know the
location of the shotgun, any person with knowledge of the weapon's
location would be likely to believe that the officers wanted him to
disclose its location. Thus, a reasonable person in Innis's
position would believe that the officers were seeking to solicit
precisely the type of response that was given."

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															As THE CHIEF JUSTICE points out in his concurring opinion,
"[f]ew, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of
evaluation seemingly contemplated [by the Court's opinion]" except
by close and careful observation. Ante at 446 U. S. 304 .
Under these circumstances, courts might well find themselves
deferring to what appeared to be good faith judgments on the part
of the police.

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															Like the Rhode Island Supreme Court, I think it takes more than
a prisoner's answer to a question to waive his right not to have
the question asked in the first place. See Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. at 430 U. S. 404 ; Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 423 U. S. 110 ,
n. 2 (WHITE, J., concurring in result) ("[T]he accused having
expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the
authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the
authorities' insistence to make a statement without counsel's
presence may properly be viewed with skepticism"). See also
People v Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 210, 400 N.E.2d 360,
364-365 (1980).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ] See, e.g., F. Inbau & J. Reid, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions 661 (2d ed.1967). Under the
heading

															"Urge the Subject to Tell the Truth for the Sake of His Own
Conscience, Mental Relief, or Moral Well-being, as Well as 'for the
Sake of Everybody Concerned,"

															and Also Because It Is "the Only Decent and Honorable Thing to
Do,

															the authors advise interrogators to "challenge . . . the
offender to display some evidence of decency and honor" by
appealing to his religious or moral sensibilities.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															Officer Gleckman testified that he was riding in the front seat
with the driver. App. 46. However, Officer McKenna, who had also
ridden in the wagon, and the police captain both testified that
Gleckman rode in the back seat with the suspect. Id. at
50-52, 55-56, 339. Thereafter, the third officer in the wagon
corroborated Gleckman's testimony. Id. at 58.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															This was apparently a somewhat unusual procedure. Officer
McKenna testified:

															"If I remember correctly, the vehicle -- Innis was placed in it
and the vehicle door was closed, and we were waiting for
instructions from Captain Leyden. . . . At that point, Captain
Leyden instructed Patrolman Gleckman to accompany us. There's
usually two men assigned to the wagon, but, in this particular
case, he wanted a third man to accompany us, and Gleckman got in
the rear seat. In other words, the door was closed. Gleckman opened
the door and got in the vehicle with the subject. Myself, I went
over to the other side and got in the passenger's side in the
front." Id. 55-56.

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															Although Officer Gleckman testified that the captain told him
not to interrogate, intimidate or coerce respondent on the way
back, id. at 46, this does not rule out the possibility
that either or both af them thought an indirect psychological ploy
would be permissible.

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															In his article quoted in 446
U.S. 291 fn2/12|>n. 12, supra, Professor White also
points out that the officers were probably aware that the chances
of a handicapped child's finding the weapon at a time when police
were not present were relatively slim. Thus, he concluded that it
was unlikely that the true purpose of the conversation was to voice
a genuine concern over the children's welfare. See 17
Am.Crim.L.Rev. at 68.