U.S. Supreme Court Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987) Edwards v. Aguillard No. 85-1513 Argued December 10,
1986 Decided June 19, 1987 482
U.S. 578 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Louisiana's "Creationism Act" forbids the teaching of the theory
of evolution in public elementary and secondary schools unless
accompanied by instruction in the theory of "creation science." The
Act does not require the teaching of either theory unless the other
is taught. It defines the theories as "the scientific evidences for
[creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific
evidences." Appellees, who include Louisiana parents, teachers, and
religious leaders, challenged the Act's constitutionality in
Federal District Court, seeking an injunction and declaratory
relief. The District Court granted summary judgment to appellees,
holding that the Act violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The Act is facially invalid as violative of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, because it lacks a clear secular
purpose. Pp. 482 U.S.
585 -594.

															(a) The Act does not further its stated secular purpose of
"protecting academic freedom." It does not enhance the freedom of
teachers to teach what they choose, and fails to further the goal
of "teaching all of the evidence." Forbidding the teaching of
evolution when creation science is not also taught undermines the
provision of a comprehensive scientific education. Moreover,
requiring the teaching of creation science with evolution does not
give schoolteachers a flexibility that they did not already possess
to supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of
theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life. Furthermore,
the contention that the Act furthers a "basic concept of fairness"
by requiring the teaching of all of the evidence on the subject is
without merit. Indeed, the Act evinces a discriminatory preference
for the teaching of creation science and against the teaching of
evolution by requiring that curriculum guides be developed and
resource services supplied for teaching creationism, but not for
teaching evolution, by limiting membership on the resource services
panel to "creation scientists," and by forbidding school boards to
discriminate against anyone who "chooses to be a creation
scientist" or to teach creation science, while failing to protect
those who choose to teach other theories or who refuse Page 482 U. S. 579 to teach creation science. A law intended to maximize the
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction would
encourage the teaching of all scientific theories about human
origins. Instead, this Act has the distinctly different purpose of
discrediting evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every
turn with the teaching of creationism. Pp. 482 U. S.
586 -589.

															(b) The Act impermissibly endorses religion by advancing the
religious belief that a supernatural being created humankind. The
legislative history demonstrates that the term "creation science,"
as contemplated by the state legislature, embraces this religious
teaching. The Act's primary purpose was to change the public school
science curriculum to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in
its entirety. Thus, the Act is designed either to promote the
theory of creation science that embodies a particular religious
tenet or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific theory disfavored
by certain religious sects. In either case, the Act violates the
First Amendment. Pp. 482 U. S.
589 -594.

															2. The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment
upon a finding that appellants had failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact. Appellants relied on the "uncontroverted"
affidavits of scientists, theologians, and an education
administrator defining creation science as "origin through abrupt
appearance in complex form" and alleging that such a viewpoint
constitutes a true scientific theory. The District Court, in its
discretion, properly concluded that the postenactment testimony of
these experts concerning the possible technical meanings of the
Act's terms would not illuminate the contemporaneous purpose of the
state legislature when it passed the Act. None of the persons
making the affidavits produced by appellants participated in or
contributed to the enactment of the law. Pp. 482 U. S.
594 -596.

															765 F.2d 1251, affirmed.

															BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all
but Part II of which O'CONNOR, J., joined. POWELL, J., filed a
concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 482 U. S. 597 .
WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 482 U. S. 608 .
SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
joined, post, p. 482 U. S.
610 . Page 482 U. S. 580 JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.t

															The question for decision is whether Louisiana's "Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public
School Instruction" Act (Creationism Act), La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§
17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982), is facially invalid Page 482 U. S. 581 as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. I The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of
evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in
"creation science." § 17:286.4A. No school is required to teach
evolution or creation science. If either is taught, however, the
other must also be taught. Ibid. The theories of evolution
and creation science are statutorily defined as "the scientific
evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those
scientific evidences." §§ 17.286.3(2) and (3).

															Appellees, who include parents of children attending Louisiana
public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious leaders,
challenged the constitutionality of the Act in District Court,
seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. [ Footnote 1 ] Appellants, Louisiana officials
charged with implementing the Act, defended on the ground that the
purpose of the Act is to protect a legitimate secular interest,
namely, academic freedom. [ Footnote
2 ] Appellees attacked the Act as facially invalid because Page 482 U. S. 582 it violated the Establishment Clause and made a motion for
summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F.
Supp. 426 (ED La.1985). The court held that there can be no
valid secular reason for prohibiting the teaching of evolution, a
theory historically opposed by some religious denominations. The
court further concluded that

															"the teaching of 'creation-science' and 'creationism,' as
contemplated by the statute, involves teaching 'tailored to the
principles' of a particular religious sect or group of sects." Id. at 427 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 , 393 U. S. 106 (1968)). The District Court therefore held that the Creationism Act
violated the Establishment Clause either because it prohibited the
teaching of evolution or because it required the teaching of
creation science with the purpose of advancing a particular
religious doctrine.

															The Court of Appeals affirmed. 765 F.2d 1251 (CA5 1985). The
court observed that the statute's avowed purpose of protecting
academic freedom was inconsistent with requiring, upon risk of
sanction, the teaching of creation science whenever evolution is
taught. Id. at 1257. The court found that the Louisiana
Legislature's actual intent was "to discredit evolution by
counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of
creationism, a religious belief." Ibid. Because the
Creationism Act was thus a law furthering a particular religious
belief, the Court of Appeals held that the Act violated the
Establishment Clause. A suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied
over a dissent. 778 F.2d 225 (CA5 1985). We noted probable
jurisdiction, 476 U.S. 1103 (1986), and now affirm. II The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any law
"respecting an establishment of religion." [ Footnote 3 ] The Court Page 482 U. S. 583 has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether
legislation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the
legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose.
Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not
result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971). [ Footnote 4 ] State action violates the Establishment Clause
if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.

															In this case, the Court must determine whether the Establishment
Clause was violated in the special context of the public elementary
and secondary school system. States and local school boards are
generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public
schools. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 , 478 U. S. 683 (1986); id. at 478 U. S. 687 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.
S. 503 , 393 U. S. 507 (1969).

															"At the same time . . . we have necessarily recognized that the
discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of
education must be exercised in a manner that comports with the
transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment." Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No.
26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853 , 457 U. S. 864 (1982).

															The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and Page 482 U. S. 584 secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the
education of their children, but condition their trust on the
understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to
advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs
of the student and his or her family. Students in such institutions
are impressionable, and their attendance is involuntary. See,
e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.
S. 373 , 473 U. S. 383 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S.
38 , 472 U. S. 60 , n.
51 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.
S. 349 , 421 U. S. 369 (1975); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S.
252 -253 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). The State
exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory
attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation of
teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer
pressure. [ Footnote 5 ] See
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, supra, at 478 U. S. 683 ; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 81 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore,

															"[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and
the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no
activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools. . . ." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 , 333 U. S. 231 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

															Consequently, the Court has been required often to invalidate
statutes which advance religion in public elementary and secondary
schools. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
supra, (school district's use of religious school teachers in
public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, (Alabama
statute authorizing moment of silence for school prayer); Stone v. Page 482 U. S. 585 Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980)
(posting copy of Ten Commandments on public classroom wall); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968)
(statute forbidding teaching of evolution); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, supra, (daily reading of Bible); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 430 (1962) (recitation of "denominationally neutral" prayer).

															Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test,
we must do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the
context of public elementary and secondary schools. We now turn to
the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test. III Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that
animated adoption of the Act. "The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 690 (1984) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). A governmental intention to
promote religion is clear when the State enacts a law to serve a
religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promotion of
religion in general, see Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 52 -53
(Establishment Clause protects individual freedom of conscience "to
select any religious faith or none at all"), or by advancement of a
particular religious belief, e.g., Stone v. Graham, supra, at 449 U. S. 41 (invalidating requirement to post Ten Commandments, which are
"undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths")
(footnote omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 393 U. S. 106 (holding that banning the teaching of evolution in public schools
violates the First Amendment, since "teaching and learning" must
not "be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious
sect or dogma"). If the law was enacted for the purpose of
endorsing religion, "no consideration of the second or third
criteria [of Lemon ] is necessary." Wallace v. Jaffree,
supra, at 472 U. S. 56 . In
this case, appellants have identified no clear secular purpose for
the Louisiana Act. Page 482 U. S. 586 True, the Act's stated purpose is to protect academic freedom.
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). This phrase might, in
common parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the
freedom of teachers to teach what they will. The Court of Appeals,
however, correctly concluded that the Act was not designed to
further that goal. [ Footnote 6 ]
We find no merit in the State's argument that the

															"legislature may not [have] use[d] the terms 'academic freedom'
in the correct legal sense. They might have [had] in mind, instead,
a basic concept of fairness; teaching all of the evidence."

															Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. Even if "academic freedom" is read to mean
"teaching all of the evidence" with respect to the origin of human
beings, the Act does not further this purpose. The goal of
providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered
either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the
teaching of creation science. A While the Court is normally deferential to a State's
articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the
statement Page 482 U. S. 587 of such purpose be sincere, and not a sham. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); id. at 472 U. S. 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Stone v. Graham,
supra, at 449 U. S. 41 ; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
223 -224. As JUSTICE O'CONNOR stated in Wallace: "It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the
legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian
endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored
to the Establishment Clause's purpose of assuring that Government
not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice."

															472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 75 (concurring in judgment).

															It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of the
legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the science
curriculum. During the legislative hearings, Senator Keith stated:
"My preference would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be
taught." 2 App. E-621. Such a ban on teaching does not promote --
indeed, it undermines -- the provision of a comprehensive
scientific education.

															It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation
science with evolution does not advance academic freedom. The Act
does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not already
possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the
presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of
life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that no law prohibited
Louisiana public school teachers from teaching any scientific
theory. 765 F.2d at 1257. As the president of the Louisiana Science
Teachers Association testified,

															"[a]ny scientific concept that's based on established fact can
be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation allowing
this is necessary."

															2 App. E-616. The Act provides Louisiana schoolteachers with no
new authority. Thus, the stated purpose is not furthered by it.

															The Alabama statute held unconstitutional in Wallace v.
Jaffree, supra, is analogous. In Wallace, the State
characterized its new law as one designed to provide a 1-minute
period for meditation. We rejected that stated purpose as
insufficient, Page 482 U. S. 588 because a previously adopted Alabama law already provided for
such a 1-minute period. Thus, in this case, as in Wallace, "[a]ppellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not
fully served by [existing state law] before the enactment of [the
statute in question]." 472 U.S. at 472 U. S.
59 .

															Furthermore, the goal of basic "fairness" is hardly furthered by
the Act's discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation
science and against the teaching of evolution. [ Footnote 7 ] While requiring that curriculum guides
be developed for creation science, the Act says nothing of
comparable guides for evolution. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:286.7A (West
1982). Similarly, resource services are supplied for creation
science, but not for evolution. § 17:286.7B. Only "creation
scientists" can serve on the panel that supplies the resource
services. Ibid. The Act forbids school boards to
discriminate against anyone who "chooses to be a creation
scientist" or to teach "creationism," but fails to protect those
who choose to teach evolution or any other non-creation-science
theory, or who refuse to teach creation science. § 17:286.4C.

															If the Louisiana Legislature's purpose was solely to maximize
the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it
would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about
the origins of humankind. [ Footnote
8 ] But under Page 482 U. S. 589 the Act's requirements, teachers who were once free to teach any
and all facets of this subject are now unable to do so. Moreover,
the Act fails even to ensure that creation science will be taught,
but instead requires the teaching of this theory only when the
theory of evolution is taught. Thus we agree with the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the Act does not serve to protect academic
freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting
"evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the
teaching of creationism. . . ." 765 F.2d at 1257. B Stone v. Graham invalidated the State's requirement
that the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms.

															"The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish
and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact"

															449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 41 (footnote omitted). As a result, the contention that the law was
designed to provide instruction on a "fundamental legal code" was
"not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment." Ibid. Similarly, Abington School Dist. v. Schempp held unconstitutional a statute

															"requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the
school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer by the students in unison,"

															despite the proffer of such secular purposes as the

															promotion of moral values, the contradiction Page 482 U. S. 590 to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of
our institutions, and the teaching of literature.

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
223 .

															As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this
case to the legislature's preeminent religious purpose in enacting
this statute. There is a historic and contemporaneous link between
the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching
of evolution. [ Footnote 9 ] It
was this link that concerned the Court in Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), which also involved a facial challenge to a statute
regulating the teaching of evolution. In that case, the Court
reviewed an Arkansas statute that made it unlawful for an
instructor to teach evolution or to use a textbook that referred to
this scientific theory. Although the Arkansas anti-evolution law
did not explicitly state its predominate religious purpose, the
Court could not ignore that "[t]he statute was a product of the
upsurge of fundamentalist' religious fervor" that has long
viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the
literal interpretation of the Bible. Id. at 393 U. S. 98 , 393 U. S.
106 -107. [ Footnote
10 ] After reviewing the history of anti-evolution statutes, the
Court determined that "there can be no doubt that the motivation for the [Arkansas]
law was the same [as other anti-evolution statutes]: to suppress
the teaching of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine
creation of man." Id. at 393 U. S. 109 .
The Court found that there can be no legitimate Page 482 U. S. 591 state interest in protecting particular religions from
scientific views "distasteful to them," id. at 393 U. S. 107 (citation omitted), and concluded

															"that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma, . . ." id. at 393 U. S.
106 .

															These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms between the
teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of
evolution are present in this case. The preeminent purpose of the
Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind. [ Footnote 11 ] The term "creation
science" was defined as embracing this particular religious
doctrine by those responsible for the passage of the Creationism
Act. Senator Keith's leading expert on creation science, Edward
Boudreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the theory of
creation science included belief in the existence of a supernatural
creator. See 1 App. E-421 - E-422 (noting that "creation
scientists" point to high probability that life was "created by an
intelligent mind"). [ Footnote
12 ] Senator Keith also cited testimony from other experts to
support the creation science view that "a creator [was] responsible
for the universe and everything in it." [ Footnote 13 ] 2 App. E-497. The legislative history Page 482 U. S. 592 therefore reveals that the term "creation science," as
contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for
the creation of humankind.

															Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature
required the teaching of a theory that coincided with this
religious view. The legislative history documents that the Act's
primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public
schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in
its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism Act, Senator Keith,
explained during the legislative hearings that his disdain for the
theory of evolution resulted from the support that evolution
supplied to views contrary to his own religious beliefs. According
to Senator Keith, the theory of evolution was consonant with the
"cardinal principle[s] of religious humanism, secular humanism,
theological liberalism, aetheistism [ sic ]." 1 App. E-312 -
E-313; see also 2 App. E-499 - E-500. The state senator
repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious
views should be included in the public school curriculum to redress
the fact that the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with
what he characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own.
[ Footnote 14 ] Page 482 U. S. 593 The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum
to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to
the theory of evolution.

															In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to
restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular
religious viewpoint. Out of many possible science subjects taught
in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the teaching
of the one scientific theory that historically has been opposed by
certain religious sects. As in Epperson, the legislature
passed the Act to give preference to those religious groups which
have as one of their tenets the creation of humankind by a divine
creator. The "overriding fact" that confronted the Court in Epperson was

															"that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a
particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it
is deemed to conflict with . . . a particular interpretation of the
Book of Genesis by a particular religious group."

															393 U.S. at 393 U. S. 103 .
Similarly, the Creationism Act is designed either to
promote the theory of creation science which embodies a particular
religious tenet by requiring that creation science be taught
whenever evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching
of a scientific theory disfavored by certain religious sects by
forbidding the teaching of evolution when creation science is not
also taught. The Establishment Clause, however, "forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a
particular dogma." Id. at 393 U. S.
106 -107 (emphasis added). Because the primary purpose of
the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief,
the Act endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment.

															We do not imply that a legislature could never require that
scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught.
Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its
decision Page 482 U. S. 594 forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not mean that
no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten
Commandments played an exclusively religious role in the history of
Western Civilization. 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 42 . In
a similar way, teaching a variety of scientific theories about the
origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with
the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science
instruction. But because the primary purpose of the Creationism Act
is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. [ Footnote 15 ] IV Appellants contend that genuine issues of material fact remain
in dispute, and therefore the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides
that summary judgment

															"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

															A court's finding of improper purpose behind a statute is
appropriately determined by the statute on its face, its
legislative history, or its interpretation by a responsible
administrative agency. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. at 472 U. S. 56 -61; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 41 -42; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 393 U. S.
103 -109. The plain meaning of the statute's words,
enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative
history, can control the determination of legislative purpose. See Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Richards v. United
States, 369 U. S. 1 , 369 U. S. 9 (1962); Jay Page 482 U. S. 595 v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345 , 351 U. S. 357 (1956). Moreover, in determining the legislative purpose of a
statute, the Court has also considered the historical context of
the statute, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, and the
specific sequence of events leading to passage of the statute, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977).

															In this case, appellees' motion for summary judgment rested on
the plain language of the Creationism Act, the legislative history
and historical context of the Act, the specific sequence of events
leading to the passage of the Act, the State Board's report on a
survey of school superintendents, and the correspondence between
the Act's legislative sponsor and its key witnesses. Appellants
contend that affidavits made by two scientists, two theologians,
and an education administrator raise a genuine issue of material
fact, and that summary judgment was therefore barred. The
affidavits define creation science as "origin through abrupt
appearance in complex form," and allege that such a viewpoint
constitutes a true scientific theory. See App. to Brief
for Appellants A-7 to A-40.

															We agree with the lower courts that these affidavits do not
raise a genuine issue of material fact. The existence of
"uncontroverted affidavits" does not bar summary judgment.
[ Footnote 16 ] Moreover, the
postenactment testimony of outside experts is of little use in
determining the Louisiana Legislature's purpose in enacting this
statute. The Louisiana Legislature did hear and rely on scientific
experts in passing the bill, [ Footnote 17 ] but none of the persons making the
affidavits produced by the appellants Page 482 U. S. 596 participated in or contributed to the enactment of the law or
its implementation. [ Footnote
18 ] The District Court, in its discretion, properly concluded
that a Monday morning "battle of the experts" over possible
technical meanings of terms in the statute would not illuminate the
contemporaneous purpose of the Louisiana Legislature when it made
the law. [ Footnote 19 ] We
therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in finding
that appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact,
and in granting summary judgment. [ Footnote 20 ] V The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by
requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from
public school classrooms or the presentation of a religious
viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety. Page 482 U. S. 597 The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because it seeks to employ the symbolic and financial support of
government to achieve a religious purpose. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals therefore is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Appellants, the Louisiana Governor, the Attorney General, the
State Superintendent, the State Department of Education, and the
St. Tammany Parish School Board, agreed not to implement the
Creationism Act pending the final outcome of this litigation. The
Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, and the
Orleans Parish School Board were among the original defendants in
the suit, but both later realigned as plaintiffs.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The District Court initially stayed the action pending the
resolution of a separate lawsuit brought by the Act's legislative
sponsor and others for declaratory and injunctive relief. After the
separate suit was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v.
Louisiana Department of Education, 553 F.
Supp. 295 (MD La.1982), the District Court lifted its stay in
this case and held that the Creationism Act violated the Louisiana
Constitution. The court ruled that the State Constitution grants
authority over the public school system to the Board of Elementary
and Secondary Education, rather than the state legislature. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the question to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which found the Creationism Act did not
violate the State Constitution, Aguillard v.
Treen, 440 So. 2d
704 (1983). The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the
District Court to determine whether the Creationism Act violates
the Federal Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F.2d 676
(CA5 1983).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. . . ." Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, this "fundamental concept of liberty" applies
to the States. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 (1940).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The Lemon test has been applied in all cases since its
adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), where the Court held that the Nebraska Legislature's
practice of opening a session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by
the State did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court based
its conclusion in that case on the historical acceptance of the
practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining
the proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free
public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the
Constitution was adopted. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S. 80 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 238 ,
and n. 7 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring)).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The potential for undue influence is far less significant with
regard to college students, who voluntarily enroll in courses.
"This distinction warrants a difference in constitutional results." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S. 253 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Thus, for instance, the Court has not
questioned the authority of state colleges and universities to
offer courses on religion or theology. See Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 , 454 U. S. 271 (1981) (POWELL, J.); id. at 474 U. S. 281 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The Court of Appeals stated that

															"[a]cademic freedom embodies the principle that individual
instructors are at liberty to teach that which they deem to be
appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment."

															765 F.2d at 1257. But, in the State of Louisiana, courses in
public schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education, and
teachers are not free, absent permission, to teach courses
different from what is required. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46. "Academic
freedom," at least as it is commonly understood, is not a relevant
concept in this context. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals
explained, the Act

															"requires, presumably upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of creation
science whenever evolution is taught. Although states may prescribe
public school curriculum concerning science instruction under
ordinary circumstances, the compulsion inherent in the Balanced
Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea of
academic freedom as it is universally understood."

															765 F.2d at 1257 (emphasis in original). The Act actually serves
to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach
evolution without also teaching creation science, even if teachers
determine that such curriculum results in less effective and
comprehensive science instruction.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The Creationism Act's provisions appear among other provisions
prescribing the courses of study in Louisiana's public schools.
These other provisions, similar to those in other States, prescribe
courses of study in such topics as driver training, civics, the
Constitution, and free enterprise. None of these other provisions,
apart from those associated with the Creationism Act, nominally
mandates "equal time" for opposing opinions within a specific area
of learning. See, e.g., La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 17:261-17:281
(West 1982 and Supp.1987).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The dissent concludes that the Act's purpose was to protect the
academic freedom of students, and not that of teachers. Post at 482 U. S. 628 .
Such a view is not at odds with our conclusion that, if the Act's
purpose was to provide comprehensive scientific education (a
concern shared by students and teachers, as well as parents), that
purpose was not advanced by the statute's provisions. Supra at 482 U. S.
587 .

															Moreover, it is astonishing that the dissent, to prove its
assertion, relies on a section of the legislation that was
eventually deleted by the legislature. Compare § 3702 in 1
App. E-292 (text of section prior to amendment) with La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). The dissent contends that
this deleted section -- which was explicitly rejected by the
Louisiana Legislature -- reveals the legislature's "obviously
intended meaning of the statutory terms academic freedom.'" Post at 482 U. S. 628 .
Quite to the contrary, Boudreaux, the main expert relied on by the
sponsor of the Act, cautioned the legislature that the words
"academic freedom" meant "freedom to teach science." 1 App. E-429.
His testimony was given at the time the legislature was deciding
whether to delete this section of the Act. [ Footnote 9 ] See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529
F. Supp. 1255 , 1258-1264 (ED Ark.1982) (reviewing historical
and contemporary antagonisms between the theory of evolution and
religious movements).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The Court evaluated the statute in light of a series of
anti-evolution statutes adopted by state legislatures dating back
to the Tennessee statute that was the focus of the celebrated Scopes trial in 1925. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. at 393 U. S. 98 , 393 U. S. 101 ,
n. 8, and 393 U. S. 109 .
The Court found the Arkansas statute comparable to this Tennessee
"monkey law," since both gave preference to " religious
establishments which have as one of their tenets or dogmas the
instantaneous creation of man.'" Id. at 393 U. S. 103 ,
n. 11 (quoting Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 126, 289
S.W. 363, 369 (1927) (Chambliss, J., concurring)). [ Footnote 11 ]

															While the belief in the instantaneous creation of humankind by a
supernatural creator may require the rejection of every aspect of
the theory of evolution, an individual instead may choose to accept
some or all of this scientific theory as compatible with his or her
spiritual outlook. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-29.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation science in terms of a
theory that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. See, e.g., 2 App. E-501 - E-502 (equating creation science
with a theory pointing "to conditions of a creator"); 1 App. E-153
- E-154 ("Creation . . . requires the direct involvement of a
supernatural intelligence"). The lead witness at the hearings
introducing the original bill, Luther Sunderland, described
creation science as postulating "that everything was created by
some intelligence or power external to the universe." Id. at E-9 - E-10.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Senator Keith believed that creation science embodied this
view:

															"One concept is that a creator, however you define a creator,
was responsible for everything that is in this world. The other
concept is that it just evolved." Id. at E-280. Besides Senator Keith, several of the
most vocal legislators also revealed their religious motives for
supporting the bill in the official legislative history. See,
e.g., id. at E-441, E-443 (Sen. Saunders noting that bill was
amended so that teachers could refer to the Bible and other
religious texts to support the creation science theory); 2 App.
E-561 - E-662, E-610 (Rep. Jenkins contending that the existence of
God was a scientific fact).

															[ Footnote 14 ] See, e.g., 1 App. E-74 - E-75 (noting that evolution is
contrary to his family's religious beliefs); id. at E-313
(contending that evolution advances religions contrary to his own); id. at E-357 (stating that evolution is "almost a
religion" to science teachers); id. at E-418 (arguing that
evolution is cornerstone of some religions contrary to his own); 2
App. E-763 - E-764 (author of model bill, from which Act is
derived, sent copy of the model bill to Senator Keith and advised
that "I view this whole battle as one between God and anti-God
forces. . . . [I]f evolution is permitted to continue, . . . it
will continue to be made to appear that a Supreme Being is
unnecessary. . . .").

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a
clear secular purpose, while both agreed that the Creationism Act's
primary purpose was to advance religion. "When both courts below
are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court
normally should hesitate to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 66 (POWELL, J., concurring).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															There is

															"no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving
party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.
S. 317 , 477 U. S. 323 (1986) (emphasis in original).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The experts, who were relied upon by the sponsor of the bill and
the legislation's other supporters, testified that creation science
embodies the religious view that there is a supernatural creator of
the universe. See, supra, at 482 U. S.
591 -592.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Appellants contend that the affidavits are relevant because the
term "creation science" is a technical term similar to that found
in statutes that regulate certain scientific or technological
developments. Even assuming, arguendo, that "creation
science" is a term of art as represented by appellants, the
definition provided by the relevant agency provides a better
insight than the affidavits submitted by appellants in this case.
In a 1981 survey conducted by the Louisiana Department of
Education, the school superintendents in charge of implementing the
provisions of the Creationism Act were asked to interpret the
meaning of "creation science" as used in the statute. About 75
percent of Louisiana's superintendents stated that they understood
"creation science" to be a religious doctrine. 2 App. E-798 -
E-799. Of this group, the largest proportion of superintendents
interpreted creation science, as defined by the Act, to mean the
literal interpretation of the Book of Genesis. The remaining
superintendents believed that the Act required teaching the view
that "the universe was made by a creator." Id. at
E-799.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The Court has previously found the postenactment elucidation of
the meaning of a statute to be of little relevance in determining
the intent of the legislature contemporaneous to the passage of the
statute. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 57 , n.
45; id. at 472 U. S. 75 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															Numerous other Establishment Clause cases that found state
statutes to be unconstitutional have been disposed of without
trial. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.
S. 116 (1982); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 (1962).

															JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
concurring.

															I write separately to note certain aspects of the legislative
history, and to emphasize that nothing in the Court's opinion
diminishes the traditionally broad discretion accorded state and
local school officials in the selection of the public school
curriculum. I This Court consistently has applied the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), to determine whether a particular state action violates the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution. [ Footnote 2/1 ] See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist.
v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 , 473 U. S. 383 (1985) ("We have particularly relied on Lemon in every
case involving the sensitive relationship between government and
religion in the education of our children"). The first requirement
of the Lemon test is that the challenged statute have a
"secular legislative purpose." Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 612 . See Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S. 773 (1973). If no valid secular purpose can be identified, then the
statute violates the Establishment Clause. A "The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U. S. 723 , 421 U. S. 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., Page 482 U. S. 598 concurring). The Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science Act (Act or Balanced Treatment Act),
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:286.1 et seq. (West 1982), provides
in part:

															"[P]ublic schools within [the] state shall give balanced
treatment to creation-science and to evolution-science. Balanced
treatment of these two models shall be given in classroom lectures
taken as a whole for each course, in textbook materials taken as a
whole for each course, in library materials taken as a whole for
the sciences and taken as a whole for the humanities, and in other
educational programs in public schools, to the extent that such
lectures, textbooks, library materials, or educational programs
deal in any way with the subject of the origin of man, life, the
earth, or the universe. When creation or evolution is taught, each
shall be taught as a theory, rather than as proven scientific
fact."

															§ 17:286.4(A). "Balanced treatment" means

															providing whatever information and instruction in both creation
and evolution models the classroom teacher determines is necessary
and appropriate to provide insight into both theories in view of
the textbooks and other instructional materials available for use
in his classroom.

															§ 17:286.3(1). "Creation-science" is defined as "the scientific
evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific
evidences." § 17:286.3(2). "Evolution-science" means "the
scientific evidences for evolution and inferences from those
scientific evidences." § 17:286.3(3).

															Although the Act requires the teaching of the scientific
evidences of both creation and evolution whenever either is taught,
it does not define either term.

															"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their
ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S.
37 , 444 U. S. 42 (1979). The "doctrine or theory of creation" is commonly defined as
"holding that matter, the various forms of life, and the world were
created by a transcendent God out Page 482 U. S. 599 of nothing." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 532
(unabridged 1981). "Evolution" is defined as

															"the theory that the various types of animals and plants have
their origin in other preexisting types, the distinguishable
differences being due to modifications in successive
generations." Id. at 789. Thus, the Balanced Treatment Act mandates
that public schools present the scientific evidence to support a
theory of divine creation whenever they present the scientific
evidence to support the theory of evolution.

															"[C]oncepts concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are
manifestly religious. . . . These concepts do not shed that
religiosity merely because they are presented as a philosophy or as
a science." Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F.
Supp. 1284 , 1322 (NJ 1977), aff'd, per curiam, 592
F.2d 197 (CA3 1979). From the face of the statute, a purpose to
advance a religious belief is apparent.

															A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of
a state legislature. The religious purpose must predominate. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 , 472 U. S. 56 (1985); id. at 472 U. S. 64 (POWELL, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.
S. 668 , 465 U. S. 681 ,
n. 6 (1984). The Act contains a statement of purpose: to "protec[t]
academic freedom." § 17:286.2. This statement is puzzling. Of
course, the "academic freedom" of teachers to present information
in public schools, and students to receive it, is broad. But it
necessarily is circumscribed by the Establishment Clause. "Academic
freedom" does not encompass the right of a legislature to structure
the public school curriculum in order to advance a particular
religious belief. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 , 393 U. S. 106 (1968). Nevertheless, I read this statement in the Act as rendering
the purpose of the statute at least ambiguous. Accordingly, I
proceed to review the legislative history of the Act. B In June, 1980, Senator Bill Keith introduced Senate Bill 956 in
the Louisiana Legislature. The stated purpose of the bill Page 482 U. S. 600 was to

															"assure academic freedom by requiring the teaching of the theory
of creation ex nihilo in all public schools where the
theory of evolution is taught."

															1 App. E-1. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The
bill defined the "theory of creation ex nihilo " as

															"the belief that the origin of the elements, the galaxy, the
solar system, of life, of all the species of plants and animals,
the origin of man, and the origin of all things and their processes
and relationships were created ex nihilo and fixed by
God." Id. at E-1a - E-1b. This theory was referred to by
Senator Keith as "scientific creationism." Id. at E-2.

															While a Senate committee was studying scientific creationism,
Senator Keith introduced a second draft of the bill, requiring
balanced treatment of "evolution science" and "creation science." Id. at E-108. Although the Keith bill prohibited
"instruction in any religious doctrine or materials," id. at E-302, it defined "creation-science" to include

															"the scientific evidences and related inferences that indicate
(a) sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing;
(b) the insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing
about development of all living kinds from a single organism; (c)
changes only within fixed limits or originally created kinds of
plants and animals; (d) separate ancestry for man and apes; (e)
explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism, including the
occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (f) a Page 482 U. S. 601 relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds." Id. at E-298 - E-299.

															Significantly, the model Act on which the Keith bill relied was
also the basis for a similar statute in Arkansas. See McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education, 529
F. Supp. 1255 (ED Ark.1982). The District Court in McLean carefully examined this model Act, particularly the
section defining creation science, and concluded that "[b]oth [its]
concepts and wording . . . convey an inescapable religiosity." Id. at 1265. The court found that "[t]he ideas of [this
section] are not merely similar to the literal interpretation of
Genesis; they are identical and parallel to no other story of
creation." Ibid. The complaint in McLean was filed on May 27, 1981. On
May 28, the Louisiana Senate committee amended the Keith bill to
delete the illustrative list of scientific evidences. According to
the legislator who proposed the amendment, it was "not intended to
try to gut [the bill] in any way, or defeat the purpose [for] which
Senator Keith introduced [it]," 1 App. E-432, and was not viewed as
working "any violence to the bill." Id. at E-438. Instead,
the concern was "whether this should be an all-inclusive list." Ibid. The legislature then held hearings on the amended bill that
became the Balanced Treatment Act under review. The principal
creation scientist to testify in support of the Act was Dr. Edward
Boudreaux. He did not elaborate on the nature of creation science
except to indicate that the "scientific evidences" of the theory
are "the objective information of science [that] point[s] to
conditions of a creator." 2 id. at E-501 - E-502. He
further testified that the recognized creation scientists in the
United States, who "numbe[r] something like a thousand [and] who
hold doctorate and masters degrees in all areas of science," are
affiliated with either or both the Institute for Creation Research
and the Creation Research Society. Id. at E-503 - E-504.
Information on both of these organizations is part of the
legislative history, Page 482 U. S. 602 and a review of their goals and activities sheds light on the
nature of creation science as it was presented to, and understood
by, the Louisiana Legislature.

															The Institute for Creation Research is an affiliate of the
Christian Heritage College in San Diego, California. The Institute
was established to address the

															"urgent need for our nation to return to belief in a personal,
omnipotent Creator, who has a purpose for His creation and to whom
all people must eventually give account."

															1 id. at E-197. A goal of the Institute is "a revival
of belief in special creation as the true explanation of the origin
of the world." Therefore, the Institute currently is working on the
"development of new methods for teaching scientific creationism in
public schools." Id. at E-197 - E-199. The Creation
Research Society (CRS) is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan. A member
must subscribe to the following statement of belief: "The Bible is
the written word of God, and because it is inspired throughout, all
of its assertions are historically and scientifically true." 2 id. at E-583. To study creation science at the CRS, a
member must accept "that the account of origins in Genesis is a
factual presentation of simple historical truth." Ibid. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 482 U. S. 603 C When, as here, "both courts below are unable to discern an
arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate
to find one." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 66 (POWELL, J., concurring). My examination of the language and the
legislative history of the Balanced Treatment Act confirms that the
intent of the Louisiana Legislature was to promote a particular
religious belief. The legislative history of the Arkansas statute
prohibiting the teaching of evolution examined in Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), was strikingly similar to the legislative history of the
Balanced Treatment Act. In Epperson, the Court found:

															"It is clear that fundamentalist sectarian conviction was and is
the law's reason for existence. Its antecedent, Tennessee's 'monkey
law,' candidly stated its purpose: to make it unlawful"

															"to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine
Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that
man has descended from a lower order of animals."

															"Perhaps the sensational publicity attendant upon the Scopes trial induced Arkansas to adopt less explicit
language. It eliminated Tennessee's reference to 'the story of the
Divine creation of man' as taught in the Bible, but there is no
doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the
teaching of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the divine
creation of man." Id. at 107-109 (footnotes omitted).

															Here, it is clear that religious belief is the Balanced
Treatment Act's "reason for existence." The tenets of creation
science parallel the Genesis story of creation, [ Footnote 2/4 ] and this is a Page 482 U. S. 604 religious belief. "[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 , 449 U. S. 41 (1980). Although the Act, as finally enacted, does not contain
explicit reference to its religious purpose, there is no indication
in the legislative history that the deletion of "creation ex
nihilo " and the four primary tenets of the theory was intended
to alter the purpose of teaching creation science. Instead, the
statements of purpose of the sources of creation science in the
United States make clear that their purpose is to promote a
religious belief. I find no persuasive evidence in the legislative
history that the legislature's purpose was any different. The fact
that the Louisiana Legislature purported to add information to the
school curriculum, rather than detract from, it as in Epperson, does not affect my analysis. Both legislatures
acted with the unconstitutional purpose of structuring the public
school curriculum to make it compatible with a particular religious
belief the "divine creation of man."

															That the statute is limited to the scientific evidences
supporting the theory does not render its purpose secular. In
reaching its conclusion that the Act is unconstitutional, the Court
of Appeals "[did] not deny that the underpinnings of creationism
may be supported by scientific evidence." 765 F.2d 1251, 1256
(1985). And there is no need to do so. Whatever the academic merit
of particular subjects or theories, the Establishment Clause limits
the discretion of state officials to pick and choose among them for
the purpose of promoting a particular religious belief. The
language of the statute and its legislative history convince me
that the Louisiana Legislature exercised its discretion for this
purpose in this case. Page 482 U. S. 605 II Even though I find Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act
unconstitutional, I adhere to the view "that the States and locally
elected school boards should have the responsibility for
determining the educational policy of the public schools." Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26
v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853 , 457 U. S. 893 (1982) (POWELL, J., dissenting). A decision respecting the subject
matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the
Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught
" happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions.'" Harris v. McRae, 448 U.
S. 297 , 448 U. S. 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 442 (1961)). In the context of a challenge under the Establishment
Clause, interference with the decisions of these authorities is
warranted only when the purpose for their decisions is clearly
religious. The history of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment has
been chronicled by this Court in detail. See, e.g., Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 8 -14
(1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S.
425 -430 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 366 U. S.
437 -442. Therefore, only a brief review at this point
may be appropriate. The early settlers came to this country from
Europe to escape religious persecution that took the form of forced
support of state-established churches. The new Americans thus
reacted strongly when they perceived the same type of religious
intolerance emerging in this country. The reaction in Virginia, the
home of many of the Founding Fathers, is instructive. George
Mason's draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted by
the House of Burgesses in 1776. Because of James Madison's
influence, the Declaration of Rights embodied the guarantee of free exercise of religion, as opposed to toleration. Eight
years later, a provision prohibiting the establishment of religion
became a part of Virginia law when James Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Page 482 U. S. 606 Assessments, written in response to a proposal that all Virginia
citizens be taxed to support the teaching of the Christian
religion, spurred the legislature to consider and adopt Thomas
Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. See
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 770 ,
n. 28. Both the guarantees of free exercise and against the
establishment of religion were then incorporated into the Federal
Bill of Rights by its drafter, James Madison.

															While the "meaning and scope of the First Amendment" must be
read "in light of its history and the evils it was designed forever
to suppress," Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 330 U. S. 14 -15,
this Court has also recognized that "this Nation's history has not
been one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and
State." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 760 .

															"The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that
there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted
in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower
Compact to the Constitution itself." Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S. 213 (1963). [ Footnote 2/5 ] The Court
properly has noted "an unbroken history of official acknowledgment
. . . of the role of religion in American life." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 674 , and has recognized that these references
to "our religious heritage" are constitutionally acceptable. Id. at 465 U. S.
677 .

															As a matter of history, schoolchildren can and should properly
be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I
would see no constitutional problem if schoolchildren were taught
the nature of the Founding Father's religious beliefs and how these
beliefs affected the attitudes Page 482 U. S. 607 of the times and the structure of our government. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Courses in comparative
religion, of course, are customary and constitutionally
appropriate. [ Footnote 2/7 ] In
fact, since religion permeates our history, a familiarity with the
nature of religious beliefs is necessary to understand many
historical, as well as contemporary, events. [ Footnote 2/8 ] In addition, it is worth noting that the
Establishment Page 482 U. S. 608 Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use of
religious documents in public school education. Although this Court
has recognized that the Bible is "an instrument of religion," Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S. 224 ,
it also has made clear that the Bible "may constitutionally be used
in an appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics,
comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. at 449 U. S. 42 (citing Abington School District v. Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S.
225 ). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time best
seller," [ Footnote 2/9 ] with
undoubted literary and historic value apart from its religious
content. The Establishment Clause is properly understood to
prohibit the use of the Bible and other religious documents in
public school education only when the purpose of the use is to
advance a particular religious belief. III In sum, I find that the language and the legislative history of
the Balanced Treatment Act unquestionably demonstrate that its
purpose is to advance a particular religious belief. Although the
discretion of state and local authorities over public school
curricula is broad,

															"the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that
teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or
prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. at 339 U. S. 106 .
Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court and its judgment
that the Balanced Treatment Act violates the Establishment Clause
of the Constitution.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															As the Court recognizes, ante at 482 U. S. 583 ,
n. 4, the one exception to this consistent application of the Lemon test is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.
S. 783 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Creation " ex nihilo " means creation "from nothing," and
has been found to be an "inherently religious concept." McLean
v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529
F. Supp. 1255 , 1266 (ED Ark.1982). The District Court in McLean found:

															"The argument that creation from nothing in [§] 4(a)(1) [of the
substantially similar Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act] does not
involve a supernatural deity has no evidentiary or rational
support. To the contrary, 'creation out of nothing' is a concept
unique to Western religions. In traditional Western religious
thought, the conception of a creator of the world is a conception
of God. Indeed, creation of the world 'out of nothing' is the
ultimate religious statement, because God is the only actor." Id. at 1265.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The District Court in McLean noted three other elements
of the CRS statement of belief to which members must subscribe:

															"'[i] All basic types of living things, including man, were made
by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in
Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation
have accomplished only changes within the original created kinds.
[ii] The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as
the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event, world-wide in its
extent and effect. [iii] Finally, we are an organization of
Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord and
Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as one
man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis
for our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind.
Therefore, salvation can come only thru [ sic ] accepting
Jesus Christ as our Savior.'"

															629 F. Supp. at 1260, n. 7.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															After hearing testimony from numerous experts, the District
Court in McLean concluded that "[t]he parallels between
[the definition section of the model Act] and Genesis are quite
specific." Id. at 1265, n.19. It found the concepts of
"sudden creation from nothing," a worldwide flood of divine origin,
and "kinds" to be derived from Genesis; "relatively recent
inception" to mean "an age of the earth from 6,000 to 10,000 years"
and to be based "on the genealogy of the Old Testament using the
rather astronomical ages assigned to the patriarchs"; and the
"separate ancestry of man and ape" to focus on "the portion of the
theory of evolution which Fundamentalists find most offensive." Ibid. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 (1968)).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson:

															"[T]he Bible is the best book in the world. It contains more of
my little philosophy than all the libraries I have seen; and such
parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, I
postpone for future investigation."

															Letter of Dec. 25, 1813, 10 Works of John Adams 85 (1856).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															There is an enormous variety of religions in the United States.
The Encyclopedia of American Religions (2d ed.1987) describes 1,347
religious organizations. The United States Census Bureau groups the
major American religions into: Buddhist Churches of America;
Eastern Churches; Jews; Old Catholic, Polish National Catholic, and
Armenian Churches; The Roman Catholic Church; Protestants; and
Miscellaneous. Statistical Abstract of the United States 50 (106th
ed.1986).

															Our country has become strikingly multireligious, as well as
multiracial and multiethnic. This fact, perhaps more than anything
one could write, demonstrates the wisdom of including the
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. States' proposals for
what became the Establishment Clause evidence the goal of
accommodating competing religious beliefs. See, e.g., New
York's Resolution of Ratification reprinted in 2 Documentary
History of the Constitution 190, 191 (1894) ("[N]o Religious Sect
or Society ought to be favoured or established by Law in preference
of others").

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															State-sponsored universities in Louisiana already offer courses
integrating religious studies into the curriculum. Approximately
half of the state-sponsored universities offer one or more courses
involving religion. As an example, Louisiana State University at
Baton Rouge offers seven courses: Introduction to Religion, Old
Testament, New Testament, Faith and Doubt, Jesus in History and
Tradition, Eastern Religions, and Philosophy of Religion.

															Of course, the difference in maturity between college-age and
secondary students may affect the constitutional analysis of a
particular public school policy. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 , 454 U. S. 274 , n.
14 (1981). Nevertheless, many general teaching guides suggest that
education as to the nature of various religious beliefs could be
integrated into a secondary school curriculum in a manner
consistent with the Constitution. See, e.g., C. Kniker,
Teaching about Religion in Public Schools (1985); Religion in
Elementary Social Studies Project, Final Report (Fla.State
Univ.1976); L. Karp, Teaching the Bible as Literature in Public
Schools (1973).

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															For example, the political controversies in Northern Ireland,
the Middle East, and India cannot be understood properly without
reference to the underlying religious beliefs and the conflicts
they tend to generate.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981, section 2, p. 24, col. 3;
N. McWhirter, 1986 Guiness Book of World Records 144 (the Bible is
the world's most widely distributed book).

															JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.

															As it comes to us, this is not a difficult case. Based on the
historical setting and plain language of the Act, both courts
construed the statutory words "creation science" to refer to a
religious belief, which the Act required to be taught if
evolution Page 482 U. S. 609 was taught. In other words, the teaching of evolution was
conditioned on the teaching of a religious belief. Both courts
concluded that the state legislature's primary purpose was to
advance religion, and that the statute was therefore
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.

															We usually defer to courts of appeals on the meaning of a state
statute, especially when a district court has the same view. Of
course, we have the power to disagree, and the lower courts in a
particular case may be plainly wrong. But if the meaning ascribed
to a state statute by a court of appeals is a rational construction
of the statute, we normally accept it. Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491 , 472 U. S.
499 -500 (1985); Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U. S. 650 , 462 U. S.
654 -655, n. 5 (1983); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U. S. 306 , 462 U. S. 314 ,
n. 8 (1983); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.
S. 547 , 386 U. S. 558 ,
n. 12 (1967); General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U. S. 159 , 351 U. S. 165 (1956). We do so because we believe "that district courts and
courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret
the laws of their respective States." Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, supra, at 472 U. S. 500 . Brockett also indicates that the usual rule applies in
First Amendment cases.

															Here, the District Judge, relying on the terms of the Act,
discerned its purpose to be the furtherance of a religious belief,
and a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed. Of those four judges,
two are Louisianians. I would accept this view of the statute. Even
if, as an original matter, I might have arrived at a different
conclusion based on a reading of the statute and the record before
us, I cannot say that the two courts below are so plainly wrong
that they should be reversed. Rehearing en banc was denied by an
8-7 vote, the dissenters expressing their disagreement with the
panel decision. The disagreement, however, was over the
construction of the Louisiana statute, particularly the assessment
of its purpose, and offers no justification for departing from the
usual rule counseling against de novo constructions of
state statutes. Page 482 U. S. 610 If the Court of Appeals' construction is to be accepted, so is
its conclusion that, under our prior cases, the Balanced Treatment
Act is unconstitutional because its primary purpose is to further a
religious belief by imposing certain requirements on the school
curriculum. Unless, therefore, we are to reconsider the Court's
decisions interpreting the Establishment Clause, I agree that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.

															JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.

															Even if I agreed with the questionable premise that legislation
can be invalidated under the Establishment Clause on the basis of
its motivation alone, without regard to its effects, I would still
find no justification for today's decision. The Louisiana
legislators who passed the "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution-Science Act" (Balanced Treatment Act),
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982), each of whom had
sworn to support the Constitution, [ Footnote 3/1 ] were well aware of the potential
Establishment Clause problems, and considered that aspect of the
legislation with great care. After seven hearings and several
months of study, resulting in substantial revision of the original
proposal, they approved the Act overwhelmingly, and specifically
articulated the secular purpose they meant it to serve. Although
the record contains abundant evidence of the sincerity of that
purpose (the only issue pertinent to this case), the Court today
holds, essentially on the basis of "its visceral knowledge
regarding what must have motivated the legislators," 778
F.2d 225, 227 (CA5 1985) (Gee, J., dissenting) (emphasis added),
that the members of the Louisiana Legislature knowingly violated
their oaths and then lied about it. I dissent. Had requirements of
the Balanced Treatment Act that Page 482 U. S. 611 are not apparent on its face been clarified by an interpretation
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, or by the manner of its
implementation, the Act might well be found unconstitutional; but
the question of its constitutionality cannot rightly be disposed of
on the gallop, by impugning the motives of its supporters. I This case arrives here in the following posture: the Louisiana
Supreme Court has never been given an opportunity to interpret the
Balanced Treatment Act, State officials have never attempted to
implement it, and it has never been the subject of a full
evidentiary hearing. We can only guess at its meaning. We know that
it forbids instruction in either "creation science" or "evolution
science" without instruction in the other, § 17:286.4A, but the
parties are sharply divided over what creation science consists of.
Appellants insist that it is a collection of educationally valuable
scientific data that has been censored from classrooms by an
embarrassed scientific establishment. Appellees insist it is not
science at all, but thinly veiled religious doctrine. Both
interpretations of the intended meaning of that phrase find
considerable support in the legislative history.

															At least at this stage in the litigation, it is plain to me that
we must accept appellants' view of what the statute means. To begin
with, the statute itself defines "creation science" as
"the scientific evidences for creation and inferences from
those scientific evidences. " § 17:286.3(2) (emphasis added).
If, however, that definition is not thought sufficiently helpful,
the means by which the Louisiana Supreme Court will give the term
more precise content is quite clear -- and again, at this stage in
the litigation, favors the appellants' view. "Creation science" is
unquestionably a "term of art," see Brief for 72 Nobel
Laureates et al. as Amici Curiae 20, and thus,
under Louisiana law, is "to be interpreted according to [its]
received meaning and acceptation with the learned in the art, trade
or profession to which [it] refer[s]." La.Civ.Code Page 482 U. S. 612 Ann., Art. 15 (West 1952). [ Footnote
3/2 ] The only evidence in the record of the "received meaning
and acceptation" of "creation science" is found in five affidavits
filed by appellants. In those affidavits, two scientists, a
philosopher, a theologian, and an educator, all of whom claim
extensive knowledge of creation science, swear that it is
essentially a collection of scientific data supporting the theory
that the physical universe and life within it appeared suddenly,
and have not changed substantially since appearing. See App. to Juris. Statement A-19 (Kenyon); id. at A-36
(Morrow); id. at A-41 (Miethe). These experts insist that
creation science is a strictly scientific concept that can be
presented without religious reference. See id. at A-19 -
A-20, A-35 (Kenyon); id. at A-36 - A-38 (Morrow); id. at A-40, A-41, A-43 (Miethe); id. at A-47,
A-48 (Most); id. at A-49 (Clinkert). At this point, then,
we must assume that the Balanced Treatment Act does not require the presentation of religious doctrine.

															Nothing in today's opinion is plainly to the contrary, but what
the statute means and what it requires are of rather little concern
to the Court. Like the Court of Appeals, 765 F.2d 1251, 1253, 1254
(CA5 1985), the Court finds it necessary to consider only the
motives of the legislators who supported the Balanced Treatment
Act, ante at 482 U. S. 586 , 482 U. S.
593 -594, 482 U. S. 596 .
After examining the statute, its legislative history, and its
historical and social context, the Court holds that the Louisiana
Legislature acted without "a secular legislative purpose," and that
the Act therefore fails the "purpose" prong of the three-part test
set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 , 403 U. S. 612 (1971). As I explain below, infra at 482 U. S.
636 -640, Page 482 U. S. 613 I doubt whether that "purpose" requirement of Lemon is
a proper interpretation of the Constitution; but even if it were, I
could not agree with the Court's assessment that the requirement
was not satisfied here.

															This Court has said little about the first component of the Lemon test. Almost invariably, we have effortlessly
discovered a secular purpose for measures challenged under the
Establishment Clause, typically devoting no more than a sentence or
two to the matter. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 , 474 U. S.
485 -486 (1986); Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball, 473 U. S. 373 , 473 U. S. 383 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.
S. 388 , 463 U. S.
394 -395 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 , 459 U. S.
123 -124 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.
S. 263 , 454 U. S. 271 (1981); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 , 444 U. S. 654 , 444 U. S. 657 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S. 236 (1977) (plurality opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 , 421 U. S. 363 (1975); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S. 773 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472 , 413 U. S.
479 -480, n. 7 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 , 403 U. S.
678 -679 (1971) (plurality opinion); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 613 .
In fact, only once before deciding Lemon, and twice since,
have we invalidated a law for lack of a secular purpose. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980)
(per curiam); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 (1968).

															Nevertheless, a few principles have emerged from our cases,
principles which should, but to an unfortunately large extent do
not, guide the Court's application of Lemon today. It is
clear, first of all, that regardless of what "legislative purpose"
may mean in other contexts, for the purpose of the Lemon test, it means the "actual" motives of those responsible for the
challenged action. The Court recognizes this, see ante at 482 U.S. 585 , as it has in
the past, see, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services
for Blind, supra, at 474 U. S. 486 ; Wallace v. Page 482 U. S. 614 Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 56 .
Thus, if those legislators who supported the Balanced Treatment Act in fact acted with a "sincere" secular purpose, ante at 482 U. S. 587 ,
the Act survives the first component of the Lemon test,
regardless of whether that purpose is likely to be achieved by the
provisions they enacted.

															Our cases have also confirmed that, when the Lemon Court referred to "a secular . . . purpose," 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 612 ,
it meant " a secular purpose." The author of Lemon, writing for the Court, has said that invalidation
under the purpose prong is appropriate when "there [is] no
question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations." Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 , 465 U. S. 680 (1984) (Burger, C.J.) (emphasis added); see also id. at 465 U. S. 681 ,
n. 6; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 472 U. S. 56 ("[T]he First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated
if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion") (emphasis added; footnote omitted). In all three cases
in which we struck down laws under the Establishment Clause for
lack of a secular purpose, we found that the legislature's sole
motive was to promote religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree,
supra, at 472 U. S. 56 , 472 U. S. 57 , 472 U. S. 60 ; Stone v. Graham, supra, at 449 U. S. 41 , 449 U. S. 43 , n.
5; Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 393 U. S. 103 , 393 U. S.
107 -108; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 465 U. S. 680 (describing Stone and Epperson as cases in which
we invalidated laws "motivated wholly by religious
considerations"). Thus, the majority's invalidation of the Balanced
Treatment Act is defensible only if the record indicates that the
Louisiana Legislature had no secular purpose.

															It is important to stress that the purpose forbidden by Lemon is the purpose to "advance religion." 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 613 ; accord, ante at 482 U.S.
585 ("promote" religion); Witters v. Washington Dept. of
Services for Blind, supra, at 474 U. S. 486 ("endorse religion"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 56 ("advance religion"); ibid. ("endorse . . . religion"); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 788 (" advancing' . . . religion"); Levitt v. Committee
for Page 482 U. S. 615 Public Education & Religious Liberty, supra, at 413 U. S. 481 ("advancing religion"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York
City, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 674 (1970) ("establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion"); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 , 392 U. S. 243 (1968) ("`advancement or inhibition of religion'") (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S. 222 (1963)). Our cases in no way imply that the Establishment Clause
forbids legislators merely to act upon their religious convictions.
We surely would not strike down a law providing money to feed the
hungry or shelter the homeless if it could be demonstrated that,
but for the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would
not have been approved. Also, political activism by the religiously
motivated is part of our heritage. Notwithstanding the majority's
implication to the contrary, ante at 482 U. S.
589 -591, we do not presume that the sole purpose of a
law is to advance religion merely because it was supported strongly
by organized religions or by adherents of particular faiths. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 397 U. S. 670 ; cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 , 448 U. S.
319 -320 (1980). To do so would deprive religious men and
women of their right to participate in the political process.
Today's religious activism may give us the Balanced Treatment Act,
but yesterday's resulted in the abolition of slavery, and
tomorrow's may bring relief for famine victims.

															Similarly, we will not presume that a law's purpose is to
advance religion merely because it " happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions,'" Harris v.
McRae, supra, at 448 U. S. 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 442 (1961)), or because it benefits religion, even substantially. We
have, for example, turned back Establishment Clause challenges to
restrictions on abortion funding, Harris v. McRae, supra, and to Sunday closing laws, McGowan v. Maryland, supra, despite the fact that both "agre[e] with the dictates of [some]
Judaeo-Christian religions," id. at 366 U. S.
442 . "In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures conclude
that the general welfare of society, Page 482 U. S. 616 wholly apart from any religious considerations, demands such
regulation." Ibid. On many past occasions, we have had no difficulty
finding a secular purpose for governmental action far more likely
to advance religion than the Balanced Treatment Act. See, e.g.,
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S.
394 -395 (tax deduction for expenses of religious
education); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 236 (plurality opinion) (aid to religious schools); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 421 U. S. 363 (same); Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 773 (same); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 613 (same); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 397 U. S. 672 (tax exemption for church property); Board of Education v.
Allen, supra, at 392 U. S. 243 (textbook loans to students in religious schools). Thus, the fact
that creation science coincides with the beliefs of certain
religions, a fact upon which the majority relies heavily, does not
itself justify invalidation of the Act.

															Finally, our cases indicate that even certain kinds of
governmental actions undertaken with the specific intention of
improving the position of religion do not "advance religion" as
that term is used in Lemon. 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 613 .
Rather, we have said that, in at least two circumstances,
government must act to advance religion, and that, in a
third, it may do so.

															First, since we have consistently described the Establishment
Clause as forbidding not only state action motivated by the desire
to advance religion, but also that intended to
"disapprove," "inhibit," or evince "hostility" toward religion, see, e.g., ante at 482
U.S. 585 (" disapprove'") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,
supra, at 465 U. S. 690 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring)); Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 465 U. S. 673 ("hostility"); Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 788 ("`inhibi[t]'"); and since we have said that governmental
"neutrality" toward religion is the preeminent goal of the First
Amendment, see, e.g., Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 382 ; Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.
S. 736 , 426 U. S. 747 (1976) (plurality opinion); Page 482 U. S. 617 Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S.
792 -793; a State which discovers that its employees are
inhibiting religion must take steps to prevent them from doing so,
even though its purpose would clearly be to advance religion. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 397 U. S. 673 .
Thus, if the Louisiana Legislature sincerely believed that the
State's science teachers were being hostile to religion, our cases
indicate that it could act to eliminate that hostility without
running afoul of Lemon's purpose test.

															Second, we have held that intentional governmental advancement
of religion is sometimes required by the Free Exercise Clause. For
example, in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security
Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205 (1972); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), we held that, in some circumstances, States must
accommodate the beliefs of religious citizens by exempting them
from generally applicable regulations. We have not yet come close
to reconciling Lemon and our Free Exercise cases, and
typically we do not really try. See, e.g., Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., supra, at 480 U. S.
144 -145; Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment
Security Div., supra, at 450 U. S.
719 -720. It is clear, however, that members of the
Louisiana Legislature were not impermissibly motivated for purposes
of the Lemon test if they believed that approval of the
Balanced Treatment Act was required by the Free Exercise
Clause.

															We have also held that, in some circumstances, government may
act to accommodate religion, even if that action is not required by
the First Amendment. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n
of Fla., supra, at 480 U. S.
144 -145. It is well established that

															"[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are
by no means coextensive with the noninterference mandated by the
Free Exercise Clause." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, at 397 U. S.
673 ; Page 482 U. S. 618 see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.
S. 437 , 401 U. S. 453 (1971). We have implied that voluntary governmental accommodation
of religion is not only permissible, but desirable. See, e.g.,
ibid. Thus, few would contend that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which both forbids religious discrimination by
private sector employers, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),
and requires them reasonably to accommodate the religious practices
of their employees, § 2000e(j), violates the Establishment Clause,
even though its "purpose" is, of course, to advance religion, and
even though it is almost certainly not required by the Free
Exercise Clause. While we have warned that, at some point,
accommodation may devolve into "an unlawful fostering of religion," Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., supra, at 480 U. S. 145 ,
we have not suggested precisely (or even roughly) where that point
might be. It is possible, then, that, even if the sole motive of
those voting for the Balanced Treatment Act was to advance
religion, and its passage was not actually required, or even
believed to be required, by either the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clauses, the Act would nonetheless survive scrutiny
under Lemon's purpose test.

															One final observation about the application of that test:
although the Court's opinion gives no hint of it, in the past we
have repeatedly affirmed "our reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives to the States." Mueller v. Allen,
supra, at 463 U. S. 394 ; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 465 U. S. 699 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). We "presume that legislatures act in a
constitutional manner." Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.
S. 340 , 480 U. S. 351 (1987); see also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.
S. 957 , 457 U. S. 963 (1982) (plurality opinion); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57 , 453 U. S. 64 (1981); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802 , 394 U. S. 809 (1969). Whenever we are called upon to judge the constitutionality
of an act of a state legislature,

															"we must have 'due regard to the fact that this Court is not
exercising a primary judgment, but is sitting in judgment Page 482 U. S. 619 upon those who also have taken the oath to observe the
Constitution and who have the responsibility for carrying on
government.'" Rostker v. Goldberg, supra, at 453 U. S. 64 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 , 341 U. S. 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). This is particularly true,
we have said, where the legislature has specifically considered the
question of a law's constitutionality. Ibid. With the foregoing in mind, I now turn to the purposes
underlying adoption of the Balanced Treatment Act. II A We have relatively little information upon which to judge the
motives of those who supported the Act. About the only direct
evidence is the statute itself and transcripts of the seven
committee hearings at which it was considered. Unfortunately,
several of those hearings were sparsely attended, and the
legislators who were present revealed little about their motives.
We have no committee reports, no floor debates, no remarks inserted
into the legislative history, no statement from the Governor, and
no postenactment statements or testimony from the bill's sponsor or
any other legislators. Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 43 , 472 U. S. 56 -57.
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that the majority is wrong in
holding that the Balanced Treatment Act is without secular
purpose.

															At the outset, it is important to note that the Balanced
Treatment Act did not fly through the Louisiana Legislature on
wings of fundamentalist religious fervor -- which would be
unlikely, in any event, since only a small minority of the State's
citizens belong to fundamentalist religious denominations. See B. Quinn, H. Anderson, M. Bradley, P. Goetting, &
P. Shriver, Churches and Church Membership in the United States 16
(1982). The Act had its genesis (so to speak) in legislation
introduced by Senator Bill Keith in June, Page 482 U. S. 620 1980. After two hearings before the Senate Committee on
Education, Senator Keith asked that his bill be referred to a study
commission composed of members of both Houses of the Louisiana
Legislature. He expressed hope that the joint committee would give
the bill careful consideration and determine whether his arguments
were "legitimate." 1 App. E-29 - E-30. The committee met twice
during the interim, heard testimony (both for and against the bill)
from several witnesses, and received staff reports. Senator Keith
introduced his bill again when the legislature reconvened. The
Senate Committee on Education held two more hearings, and approved
the bill after substantially amending it (in part over Senator
Keith's objection). After approval by the full Senate, the bill was
referred to the House Committee on Education. That committee
conducted a lengthy hearing, adopted further amendments, and sent
the bill on to the full House, where it received favorable
consideration. The Senate concurred in the House amendments, and,
on July 20, 1981, the Governor signed the bill into law.

															Senator Keith's statements before the various committees that
considered the bill hardly reflect the confidence of a man
preaching to the converted. He asked his colleagues to "keep an
open mind," and not to be "biased" by misleading characterizations
of creation science. Id. at E-33. He also urged them to
"look at this subject on its merits, and not on some preconceived
idea." Id. at E-34; see also 2 id. at
E-491. Senator Keith's reception was not especially warm. Over his
strenuous objection, the Senate Committee on Education voted 5-1 to
amend his bill to deprive it of any force; as amended, the bill
merely gave teachers permission to balance the teaching of creation
science or evolution with the other. 1 id. at E-442 -
E-461. The House Committee restored the "mandatory" language to the
bill by a vote of only 6-5, 2 id. at E-626 - E-627, and
both the full House (by vote of 52-35), id. at E-700 -
E-706, and full Senate (23-15), id. at E-735 - E-738, had
to repel further efforts to gut the bill. Page 482 U. S. 621 The legislators understood that Senator Keith's bill involved a
"unique" subject, 1 id. at E-106 (Rep. M. Thompson), and
they were repeatedly made aware of its potential constitutional
problems, see, e.g., id. at E-26 - E-28 (McGehee); id. at E-38 - E-39 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-241 -
E-242 (Rossman); id. at E-257 (Probst); id. at
E-261 (Beck); id. at E-282 (Sen. Keith). Although the
Establishment Clause, including its secular purpose requirement,
was of substantial concern to the legislators, they eventually
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Balanced Treatment Act: the
House approved it 71-19 (with 15 members absent), 2 id. at
E-716 - E-722; the Senate 26-12 (with all members present), id. at E-741 - E-744. The legislators specifically
designated the protection of "academic freedom" as the purpose of
the Act. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). We cannot
accurately assess whether this purpose is a "sham," ante at 482 U. S. 587 ,
until we first examine the evidence presented to the legislature
far more carefully than the Court has done.

															Before summarizing the testimony of Senator Keith and his
supporters, I wish to make clear that I by no means intend to
endorse its accuracy. But my views (and the views of this Court)
about creation science and evolution are (or should be) beside the
point. Our task is not to judge the debate about teaching the
origins of life, but to ascertain what the members of the Louisiana
Legislature believed. The vast majority of them voted to approve a
bill which explicitly stated a secular purpose; what is crucial is
not their wisdom in believing that purpose would be
achieved by the bill, but their sincerity in believing it
would be.

															Most of the testimony in support of Senator Keith's bill came
from the Senator himself, and from scientists and educators he
presented, many of whom enjoyed academic credentials that may have
been regarded as quite impressive by members of the Louisiana
Legislature. To a substantial extent, their testimony was devoted
to lengthy, and, to the layman, seemingly expert, scientific
expositions on the origin Page 482 U. S. 622 of life. See, e.g., 1 App. E-11 - E-18 (Sunderland); id. at E-50 - E-60 (Boudreaux); id. at E-86 -
E-89 (Ward); id. at E-130 - E-153 (Boudreaux paper); id. at E-321 - E-326 (Boudreaux); id. at E-423 -
E-428 (Sen. Keith). These scientific lectures touched upon, inter alia, biology, paleontology, genetics, astronomy,
astrophysics, probability analysis, and biochemistry. The witnesses
repeatedly assured committee members that "hundreds and hundreds"
of highly respected, internationally renowned scientists believed
in creation science, and would support their testimony. See,
e.g., id. at E-5 (Sunderland); id. at E-76 (Sen.
Keith); id. at E-100 - E-101 (Reiboldt); id. at
E-327 - E-328 (Boudreaux); 2 id. at E-503 - E-504
(Boudreaux).

															Senator Keith and his witnesses testified essentially as set
forth in the following numbered paragraphs:

															(1) There are two and only two scientific explanations for the
beginning of life [ Footnote 3/3 ] --
evolution and creation science. 1 id. at E-6 (Sunderland); id. at E-34 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-280 (Sen.
Keith); id. at E-417 - E-418 (Sen. Keith). Both are bona fide "sciences." Id. at E-6 - E-7
(Sunderland); id. at E-12 (Sunderland); id. at
E-416 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-427 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-491 - E-492 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-497 -
E-498 (Sen. Keith). Both posit a theory of the origin of life, and
subject that theory to empirical testing. Evolution posits that
life arose out of inanimate chemical compounds and has gradually
evolved over millions of years. Creation science posits that all
life forms now on earth appeared suddenly and relatively recently,
and have changed little. Since there are only two possible
explanations of the origin of life, any evidence that tends to
disprove the theory of evolution necessarily tends to prove the
theory of creation science, and vice versa. For example, the abrupt
appearance in the fossil record of complex life, and the extreme
rarity Page 482 U. S. 623 of transitional life forms in that record, are evidence for
creation science. 1 id. at E-7 (Sunderland); id. at E-12 - E-18 (Sunderland); id. at E-45 - E-60
(Boudreaux); id. at E-67 (Harlow); id. at E-130 -
E-153 (Boudreaux paper); id. at E-423 - E-428 (Sen.
Keith).

															(2) The body of scientific evidence supporting creation science
is as strong as that supporting evolution. In fact, it may be
stronger. Id. at E-214 (Young statement); id. at
E-310 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-416 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-492 (Sen. Keith). The evidence for evolution is
far less compelling than we have been led to believe. Evolution is
not a scientific "fact," since it cannot actually be observed in a
laboratory. Rather, evolution is merely a scientific theory or
"guess." 1 id. at E-20 - E-21 (Morris); id. at
E-85 (Ward); id. at E-100 (Reiboldt); id. at
E-328 - E-329 (Boudreaux); 2 id. at E-506 (Boudreaux). It
is a very bad guess at that. The scientific problems with evolution
are so serious that it could accurately be termed a "myth." 1 id. at E-85 (Ward); id. at E-92 - E-93
(Kalivoda); id. at E-95 - E-97 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-154 (Boudreaux paper); id. at E-329 (Boudreaux); id. at E-453 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-505 - E-506
(Boudreaux); id. at E-516 (Young).

															(3) Creation science is educationally valuable. Students exposed
to it better understand the current state of scientific evidence
about the origin of life. 1 id. at E-19 (Sunderland); id. at E-39 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-79 (Kalivoda); id. at E-308 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-513 - E-514
(Morris). Those students even have a better understanding of
evolution. 1 id. at E-19 (Sunderland). Creation science
can and should be presented to children without any religious
content. Id. at E-12 (Sunderland); id. at E-22
(Sanderford); id. at E-35 - E-36 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-101 (Reiboldt); id. at E-279 - E-280
(Sen. Keith); id. at E-282 (Sen. Keith).

															(4) Although creation science is educationally valuable and
strictly scientific, it is now being censored from or
misrepresented in the public schools. Id. at E-19
(Sunderland); id. Page 482 U. S. 624 at E-21 (Morris); id. at E-34 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-37 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-42 (Sen.
Keith); id. at E-92 (Kalivoda); id. at E-97 -
E-98 (Reiboldt); id. at E-214 (Young statement); id. at E-218 (Young statement); id. at E-280
(Sen. Keith); id. at E-309 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at
E-513 (Morris). Evolution, in turn, is misrepresented as an
absolute truth. 1 id. at E-63 (Harlow); id. at
E-74 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-81 (Kalivoda); id. at
E-214 (Young statement); 2 id. at E-507 (Harlow); id. at E-513 (Morris); id. at E-516 (Young).
Teachers have been brainwashed by an entrenched scientific
establishment composed almost exclusively of scientists to whom
evolution is like a "religion." These scientists discriminate
against creation scientists, so as to prevent evolution's
weaknesses from being exposed. 1 id. at E-61 (Boudreaux); id. at E-63 - E-64 (Harlow); id. at E-78 - E-79
(Kalivoda); id. at E-80 (Kalivoda); id. at E-95 -
E-97 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-129 (Boudreaux paper); id. at E-218 (Young statement); id. at E-357
(Sen. Keith); id. at E-430 (Boudreaux).

															(5) The censorship of creation science has at least two harmful
effects. First, it deprives students of knowledge of one of the two
scientific explanations for the origin of life, and leads them to
believe that evolution is proven fact; thus, their education
suffers, and they are wrongly taught that science has proved their
religious beliefs false. Second, it violates the Establishment
Clause. The United States Supreme Court has held that secular
humanism is a religion. Id. at E-36 (Sen. Keith)
(referring to Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.
S. 488 , 367 U. S. 495 ,
n. 11 (1961));1 App. E-418 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-499
(Sen. Keith). Belief in evolution is a central tenet of that
religion. 1 id. at E-282 (Sen. Keith); id. at
E-312 - E-313 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-317 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-418 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-499 (Sen.
Keith). Thus, by censoring creation science and instructing
students that evolution is fact, public school teachers are now advancing religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 1 id. at E-2 - E-4 Page 482 U. S. 625 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-36 - E-37, E-39 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-154 - E-155 (Boudreaux paper); id. at
E-281 - E-282 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-313 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-315 - E-316 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-317
(Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-499 - E-500 (Sen. Keith).

															Senator Keith repeatedly and vehemently denied that his purpose
was to advance a particular religious doctrine. A t the outset of
the first hearing on the legislation, he testified:

															"We are not going to say today that you should have some kind of
religious instructions in our schools. . . . We are not talking
about religion today. . . . I am not proposing that we take the
Bible in each science class and read the first chapter of
Genesis."

															1 id. at E-35. At a later hearing, Senator Keith
stressed:

															"[T]o . . . teach religion and disguise it as creationism . . .
is not my intent. My intent is to see to it that our textbooks are
not censored." Id. at E-280. He made many similar statements
throughout the hearings. See, e.g., id. at E-41; id. at E-282; id. at E-310; id. at
E-417; see also id. at E-44 (Boudreaux); id. at
E-80 (Kalivoda).

															We have no way of knowing, of course, how many legislators
believed the testimony of Senator Keith and his witnesses. But in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, [ Footnote 3/4 ] we Page 482 U. S. 626 have to assume that many of them did. Given that assumption, the
Court today plainly errs in holding that the Louisiana Legislature
passed the Balanced Treatment Act for exclusively religious
purposes. B Even with nothing more than this legislative history to go on, I
think it would be extraordinary to invalidate the Balanced
Treatment Act for lack of a valid secular purpose. Striking down a
law approved by the democratically elected representatives of the
people is no minor matter.

															"The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save,
and not to destroy. We have repeatedly held that, as between two
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the act." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1 , 301 U. S. 30 (1937). So, too, it seems to me, with discerning statutory purpose.
Even if the legislative history were silent or ambiguous about the
existence of a secular purpose -- and here it is not -- the statute
should survive Lemon's purpose test. But even more
validation than mere legislative history is present here. The
Louisiana Legislature explicitly set forth its secular purpose Page 482 U. S. 627 ("protecting academic freedom") in the very text of the Act.
La.Rev.Stat. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). We have in the past repeatedly
relied upon or deferred to such expressions, see, e.g.,
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. at 444 U. S. 654 ; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 363, 421 U. S.
367 -368; Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 773 ; Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
479 -480, n. 7; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
at 403 U. S.
678 -679 (plurality opinion); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 613 ; Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S.
243 .

															The Court seeks to evade the force of this expression of purpose
by stubbornly misinterpreting it, and then finding that the
provisions of the Act do not advance that misinterpreted purpose,
thereby showing it to be a sham. The Court first surmises that
"academic freedom" means "enhancing the freedom of teachers to
teach what they will," ante at 482 U. S. 586 -- even though "academic freedom" in that sense has little scope in
the structured elementary and secondary curriculums with which the
Act is concerned. Alternatively, the Court suggests that it might
mean "maximiz[ing] the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of
science instruction," ante at 482 U. S. 588 -- though that is an exceedingly strange interpretation of the
words, and one that is refuted on the very face of the statute. See § 17:286.5. Had the Court devoted to this central
question of the meaning of the legislatively expressed purpose a
small fraction of the research into legislative history that
produced its quotations of religiously motivated statements by
individual legislators, it would have discerned quite readily what
"academic freedom" meant: students' freedom from indoctrination. The legislature wanted to ensure that
students would be free to decide for themselves how life began,
based upon a fair and balanced presentation of the scientific
evidence -- that is, to protect "the right of each [student]
voluntarily to determine what to believe (and what not to believe)
free of any coercive pressures from the State." Grand Page 482 U. S. 628 Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. at 473 U. S. 385 .
The legislature did not care whether the topic of origins
was taught; it simply wished to ensure that, when the
topic was taught, students would receive " all of the
evidence.'" Ante at 482 U. S. 586 (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. 60). As originally introduced, the "purpose" section of the Balanced
Treatment Act read:

															"This Chapter is enacted for the purposes of protecting academic
freedom . . . of students . . . and assisting students in their search for truth."

															1 App. E-292 (emphasis added). Among the proposed findings of
fact contained in the original version of the bill was the
following:

															"Public school instruction in only evolution science . . . violates the principle of academic freedom because it denies
students a choice between scientific models, and instead
indoctrinates them in evolution science alone. " Id. at E-295 (emphasis added). [ Footnote 3/5 ] Senator Keith unquestionably understood
"academic freedom" to mean "freedom from indoctrination." See
id. at E-36 (purpose of bill is "to protect academic freedom
by providing student choice"); id. at E-283 (purpose of
bill is to protect "academic freedom" by giving students a
"choice," rather than subjecting them to "indoctrination on
origins").

															If one adopts the obviously intended meaning of the statutory
term "academic freedom," there is no basis whatever for concluding
that the purpose they express is a "sham." Ante Page 482 U. S. 629 at 482 U. S. 587 .
To the contrary, the Act pursues that purpose plainly and
consistently. It requires that, whenever the subject of origins is
covered, evolution be "taught as a theory, rather than as proven
scientific fact," and that scientific evidence inconsistent with
the theory of evolution ( viz., "creation science") be
taught as well. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:286.4A (West 1982). Living up
to its title of " Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science
and Evolution-Science Act," § 17.286.1, it treats the teaching of
creation the same way. It does not mandate instruction in creation
science, § 17:286.5; forbids teachers to present creation science
"as proven scientific fact," § 17:286.4A; and bans the
teaching of creation science unless the theory is (to use the
Court's terminology) "discredit[ed] . . . at every turn'" with
the teaching of evolution. Ante at 482 U. S. 589 (quoting 765 F.2d at 1257). It surpasses understanding how the
Court can see in this a purpose "to restructure the science
curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint," ante at 482 U. S. 593 ,
"to provide a persuasive advantage to a particular religious
doctrine," ante at 482 U. S. 592 ,
"to promote the theory of creation science which embodies a
particular religious tenet," ante at 482 U. S. 593 ,
and "to endorse a particular religious doctrine," ante at 482 U. S.
594 . The Act's reference to "creation" is not convincing evidence of
religious purpose. The Act defines creation science as
" scientific evidenc[e], " § 17:286.3(2) (emphasis added),
and Senator Keith and his witnesses repeatedly stressed that the
subject can and should be presented without religious content. See supra, at 482 U. S. 623 .
We have no basis on the record to conclude that creation science
need be anything other than a collection of scientific data
supporting the theory that life abruptly appeared on earth. See 482
U.S. 578 fn3/4|>n. 4, supra. Creation science, its
proponents insist, no more must explain whence life came
than evolution must explain whence came the inanimate materials
from which it says life evolved. But even if that were not so, to
posit a past creator is not to posit the eternal and personal God
who is the object of religious veneration. Page 482 U. S. 630 Indeed, it is not even to posit the " unmoved mover"
hypothesized by Aristotle and other notably nonfundamentalist
philosophers. Senator Keith suggested this when he referred to "a
creator, however you define a creator. " 1 App. E-280
(emphasis added).

															The Court cites three provisions of the Act which, it argues,
demonstrate a "discriminatory preference for the teaching of
creation science" and no interest in "academic freedom." Ante at 482 U. S. 588 .
First, the Act prohibits discrimination only against creation
scientists and those who teach creation science. § 17:286.4C.
Second, the Act requires local school boards to develop and provide
to science teachers "a curriculum guide on presentation of
creation-science." § 17:286.7A. Finally, the Act requires the
Governor to designate seven creation scientists who shall, upon
request, assist local school boards in developing the curriculum
guides. § 17:286.7B. But none of these provisions casts doubt upon
the sincerity of the legislators' articulated purpose of "academic
freedom" -- unless, of course, one gives that term the obviously
erroneous meanings preferred by the Court. The Louisiana
legislators had been told repeatedly that creation scientists were
scorned by most educators and scientists, who themselves had an
almost religious faith in evolution. It is hardly surprising, then,
that, in seeking to achieve a balanced, "nonindoctrinating"
curriculum, the legislators protected from discrimination only
those teachers whom they thought were suffering from
discrimination. (Also, the legislators were undoubtedly aware of Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), and thus could quite reasonably have concluded that
discrimination against evolutionists was already prohibited.) The
two provisions respecting the development of curriculum guides are
also consistent with "academic freedom" as the Louisiana
Legislature understood the term. Witnesses had informed the
legislators that, because of the hostility of most scientists and
educators to creation science, the topic had been censored from or
badly misrepresented in elementary Page 482 U. S. 631 and secondary school texts. In light of the unavailability of
works on creation science suitable for classroom use (a fact
appellees concede, see Brief for Appellees 27, 40) and the
existence of ample materials on evolution, it was entirely
reasonable for the legislature to conclude that science teachers
attempting to implement the Act would need a curriculum guide on
creation science, but not on evolution, and that those charged with
developing the guide would need an easily accessible group of
creation scientists. Thus, the provisions of the Act of so much
concern to the Court support the conclusion that the
legislature acted to advance "academic freedom."

															The legislative history gives ample evidence of the sincerity of
the Balanced Treatment Act's articulated purpose. Witness after
witness urged the legislators to support the Act so that students
would not be "indoctrinated," but would instead be free to decide
for themselves, based upon a fair presentation of the scientific
evidence, about the origin of life. See, e.g., 1 App. E-18
(Sunderland) ("all that we are advocating" is presenting
"scientific data" to students and "letting [them] make up their own
mind[s]"); id. at E-19 - E-20 (Sunderland) (Students are
now being "indoctrinated" in evolution through the use of "censored
school books. . . . All that we are asking for is [the] open
unbiased education in the classroom . . . your students deserve"); id. at E-21 (Morris) ("A student cannot [make an
intelligent decision about the origin of life] unless he is well
informed about both [evolution and creation science]"); id. at E-22 (Sanderford) ("We are asking very simply
[that] . . . creationism [be presented] alongside . . . evolution,
and let people make their own mind[s] up"); id. at E-23
(Young) (the bill would require teachers to live up to their
"obligation to present all theories," and thereby enable "students
to make judgments themselves"); id. at E-44 (Boudreaux)
("Our intention is truth, and, as a scientist, I am interested in
truth"); id. at E-60 - E-61 (Boudreaux) ("[W]e [teachers]
are guilty of a lot of Page 482 U. S. 632 brainwashing. . . . We have a duty to . . . [present the] truth"
to students "at all levels from grade school on through the college
level"); id. at E-79 (Kalivoda) ("This [hearing] is being
held, I think, to determine whether children will benefit from
freedom of information, or if they will be handicapped
educationally by having little or no information about creation"); id. at E-80 (Kalivoda) ("I am not interested in teaching
religion in schools. . . . I am interested in the truth, and
[students'] having the opportunity to hear more than one side"); id. at E-98 (Reiboldt) ("The students have a right to know
there is an alternate creationist point of view. They have a right
to know the scientific evidences which suppor[t] that
alternative"); id. at E-218 (Young statement) (passage of
the bill will ensure that "communication of scientific ideas and
discoveries may be unhindered"); 2 id. at E-514 (Morris)
("[A]re we going to allow [students] to look at evolution, to look
at creationism, and to let one or the other stand or fall on its
own merits, or will we, by failing to pass this bill, . . . deny
students an opportunity to hear another viewpoint?"); id. at E-516 - E-517 (Young) ("We want to give the children here in
this state an equal opportunity to see both sides of the
theories"). Senator Keith expressed similar views. See,
e.g., 1 id. at E-36; id. at E-41; id. at E-280; id. at E-283.

															Legislators other than Senator Keith made only a few statements
providing insight into their motives, but those statements cast no
doubt upon the sincerity of the Act's articulated purpose. The
legislators were concerned primarily about the manner in which the
subject of origins was presented in Louisiana schools --
specifically, about whether scientifically valuable information was
being censored, and students misled about evolution.
Representatives Cain, Jenkins, and F. Thompson seemed impressed by
the scientific evidence presented in support of creation science. See 2 id. at E-530 (Rep. F. Thompson); id. at E-533 (Rep. Cain); id. at E-613 (Rep.
Jenkins). At the first study commission hearing, Senator Picard and
Representative M. Thompson questioned Page 482 U. S. 633 Senator Keith about Louisiana teachers' treatment of evolution
and creation science. See 1 id. at E-71 - E-74.
At the close of the hearing, Representative M. Thompson told the
audience:

															"We, as members of the committee, will also receive from the
staff information of what is currently being taught in the
Louisiana public schools. We really want to see [it]. I . . . have
no idea in what manner [biology] is presented, and in what manner
the creationist theories [are] excluded in the public school[s]. We
want to look at what the status of the situation is." Id. at E-104. Legislators made other comments
suggesting a concern about censorship and misrepresentation of
scientific information. See, e.g., id. at E-386 (Sen.
McLeod); 2 id. at E-527 (Rep. Jenkins); id. at
E-528 (Rep. M. Thompson); id. at E-534 (Rep. Fair).

															It is undoubtedly true that what prompted the legislature to
direct its attention to the misrepresentation of evolution in the
schools (rather than the inaccurate presentation of other topics)
was its awareness of the tension between evolution and the
religious beliefs of many children. But even appellees concede that
a valid secular purpose is not rendered impermissible simply
because its pursuit is prompted by concern for religious
sensitivities. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 56. If a history teacher
falsely told her students that the bones of Jesus Christ had been
discovered, or a physics teacher that the Shroud of Turin had been
conclusively established to be inexplicable on the basis of natural
causes, I cannot believe (despite the majority's implication to the
contrary, see ante at 482 U. S.
592 -593) that legislators or school board members would
be constitutionally prohibited from taking corrective action simply
because that action was prompted by concern for the religious
beliefs of the misinstructed students.

															In sum, even if one concedes, for the sake of argument, that a
majority of the Louisiana Legislature voted for the Balanced
Treatment Act partly in order to foster (rather Page 482 U. S. 634 than merely eliminate discrimination against) Christian
fundamentalist beliefs, our cases establish that that, alone, would
not suffice to invalidate the Act, so long as there was a genuine
secular purpose as well. We have, moreover, no adequate basis for
disbelieving the secular purpose set forth in the Act itself, or
for concluding that it is a sham enacted to conceal the
legislators' violation of their oaths of office. I am astonished by
the Court's unprecedented readiness to reach such a conclusion,
which I can only attribute to an intellectual predisposition
created by the facts and the legend of Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) -- an instinctive reaction that
any governmentally imposed requirements bearing upon the teaching
of evolution must be a manifestation of Christian fundamentalist
repression. In this case, however, it seems to me the Court's
position is the repressive one. The people of Louisiana, including
those who are Christian fundamentalists, are quite entitled, as a
secular matter, to have whatever scientific evidence there may be
against evolution presented in their schools, just as Mr. Scopes
was entitled to present whatever scientific evidence there was for
it. Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature has done is
unconstitutional because there is no such evidence, and the scheme
they have established will amount to no more than a presentation of
the Book of Genesis. But we cannot say that on the evidence before
us in this summary judgment context, which includes ample
uncontradicted testimony that "creation science" is a body of
scientific knowledge, rather than revealed belief. Infinitely
less can we say (or should we say) that the scientific
evidence for evolution is so conclusive that no one could be
gullible enough to believe that there is any real scientific
evidence to the contrary, so that the legislation's stated purpose
must be a lie. Yet that illiberal judgment, that Scopes -in-reverse, is ultimately the basis on which the
Court's facile rejection of the Louisiana Legislature's purpose
must rest. Page 482 U. S. 635 Since the existence of secular purpose is so entirely clear, and
thus dispositive, I will not go on to discuss the fact that, even
if the Louisiana Legislature's purpose were exclusively to advance
religion, some of the well-established exceptions to the
impermissibility of that purpose might be applicable -- the
validating intent to eliminate a perceived discrimination against a
particular religion, to facilitate its free exercise, or to
accommodate it. See supra, at 482 U. S.
617 -618. I am not, in any case, enamored of those
amorphous exceptions, since I think them no more than unpredictable
correctives to what is (as the next Part of this opinion will
discuss) a fundamentally unsound rule. It is surprising, however,
that the Court does not address these exceptions, since the context
of the legislature's action gives some reason to believe they may
be applicable. [ Footnote 3/6 ] Page 482 U. S. 636 Because I believe that the Balanced Treatment Act had a secular
purpose, which is all the first component of the Lemon test requires, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and remand for further consideration. III I have to this point assumed the validity of the Lemon "purpose" test. In fact, however, I think the pessimistic
evaluation that THE CHIEF JUSTICE made of the totality of Lemon is particularly applicable to the "purpose" prong:
it is

															"a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of
the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply, and
yields unprincipled results. . . ." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 472 U. S. 112 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

															Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made
such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most
conscientious governmental officials can only guess what motives
will be held unconstitutional. We have said essentially the
following: government may not act with the purpose of advancing
religion, except when forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause
(which is now and then); or when eliminating existing governmental
hostility to religion (which exists sometimes); or even when merely
accommodating governmentally uninhibited religious practices,
except that at some point (it is unclear where) intentional
accommodation results in the fostering of religion, which is of
course unconstitutional. See supra, at 482 U. S.
614 -618.

															But the difficulty of knowing what vitiating purpose one is
looking for is as nothing compared with the difficulty of knowing
how or where to find it. For while it is possible to discern the
objective "purpose" of a statute ( i.e., the public good at
which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal
motivation for a statute where that is explicitly set forth (as it
was, to no avail, here), discerning the subjective motivation of
those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an
impossible task. The number of possible Page 482 U. S. 637 motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even
finite. In the present case, for example, a particular legislator
need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted to foster
religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may have
thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have
wanted to make amends with a faction of his party he had alienated
on another vote, or he may have been a close friend of the bill's
sponsor, or he may have been repaying a favor he owed the majority
leader, or he may have hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote
and make a fund-raising appearance for him, or he may have been
pressured to vote for a bill he disliked by a wealthy contributor
or by a flood of constituent mail, or he may have been seeking
favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to hurt the
feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill, or he may
have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed the
bill, or he may have been mad at his wife, who opposed the bill, or
he may have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated when the vote
was called, or he may have accidentally voted "yes" instead of
"no," or, of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a
combination of some of the above and many other motivations. To
look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably
to look for something that does not exist.

															Putting that problem aside, however, where ought we to look for
the individual legislator's purpose? We cannot, of course, assume
that every member present (if, as is unlikely, we know who or even
how many they were) agreed with the motivation expressed in a
particular legislator's preenactment floor or committee statement.
Quite obviously, "[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech
about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others
to enact it." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.
S. 367 , 391 U. S. 384 (1968). Can we assume, then, that they all agree with the
motivation expressed in the staff-prepared committee reports they
might have read -- even though we are unwilling to Page 482 U. S. 638 assume that they agreed with the motivation expressed in the
very statute that they voted for? Should we consider postenactment
floor statements? Or postenactment testimony from legislators,
obtained expressly for the lawsuit? Should we consider media
reports on the realities of the legislative bargaining? All of
these sources, of course, are eminently manipulable. Legislative
histories can be contrived and sanitized, favorable media coverage
orchestrated, and postenactment recollections conveniently
distorted. Perhaps most valuable of all would be more objective
indications -- for example, evidence regarding the individual
legislators' religious affiliations. And if that, why not evidence
regarding the fervor or tepidity of their beliefs?

															Having achieved, through these simple means, an assessment of
what individual legislators intended, we must still confront the
question (yet to be addressed in any of our cases) how many of them must have the invalidating intent. If a state
senate approves a bill by vote of 26 to 25, and only one of the 26
intended solely to advance religion, is the law unconstitutional?
What if 13 of the 26 had that intent? What if 3 of the 26 had the
impermissible intent, but 3 of the 25 voting against the bill were
motivated by religious hostility, or were simply attempting to
"balance" the votes of their impermissibly motivated colleagues? Or
is it possible that the intent of the bill's sponsor is alone
enough to invalidate it -- on a theory, perhaps, that even though
everyone else's intent was pure, what they produced was the fruit
of a forbidden tree?

															Because there are no good answers to these questions, this Court
has recognized from Chief Justice Marshall, See Fletcher v.
Peck , 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 130 (1810), to Chief Justice Warren, United States v. O'Brien,
supra, at 391 U. S.
383 -384, that determining the subjective intent of
legislators is a perilous enterprise. See also Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 , 403 U. S.
224 -225 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
at 393 U. S. 113 (Black, J., concurring). It is perilous, I might note, not just for
the judges who will very likely reach the wrong result, Page 482 U. S. 639 but also for the legislators who find that they must assess the
validity of proposed legislation -- and risk the condemnation of
having voted for an unconstitutional measure -- not on the basis of
what the legislation contains, nor even on the basis of what they
themselves intend, but on the basis of what others have in
mind.

															Given the many hazards involved in assessing the subjective
intent of governmental decisionmakers, the first prong of Lemon is defensible, I think, only if the text of the
Establishment Clause demands it. That is surely not the case. The
Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." One could argue, I suppose, that any
time Congress acts with the intent of advancing religion,
it has enacted a "law respecting an establishment of religion";
but, far from being an unavoidable reading, it is quite an
unnatural one. I doubt, for example, that the Clayton Act, 38 Stat.
730, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq., could reasonably
be described as a "law respecting an establishment of religion" if
bizarre new historical evidence revealed that it lacked a secular
purpose, even though it has no discernible nonsecular effect. It
is, in short, far from an inevitable reading of the Establishment
Clause that it forbids all governmental action intended to advance
religion; and, if not inevitable, any reading with such untoward
consequences must be wrong.

															In the past, we have attempted to justify our embarrassing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence [ Footnote 3/7 ] on the ground that it Page 482 U. S. 640 "sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. at 444 U. S. 662 .
One commentator has aptly characterized this as "a euphemism . . .
for . . . the absence of any principled rationale." Choper, supra, 482
U.S. 578 fn3/7|>n. 7, at 681. I think it time that we
sacrifice some "flexibility" for "clarity and predictability."
Abandoning Lemon's purpose test -- a test which
exacerbates the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, has no basis in the language or history of the Amendment,
and, as today's decision shows, has wonderfully flexible
consequences -- would be a good place to start.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															Article VI, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides that "the
Members of the several State Legislatures . . . shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Thus, the popular dictionary definitions cited by JUSTICE
POWELL, ante at 482 U. S.
598 -599 (concurring opinion), and appellees, see Brief for Appellees 25, 26; Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, 34,
are utterly irrelevant, as are the views of the school
superintendents cited by the majority, ante at 482 U.S. 595 , n. 18.
Three-quarters of those surveyed had "[n]o" or "[l]imited"
knowledge of "creation science theory," and not a single
superintendent claimed "[e]xtensive" knowledge of the subject. 2
App. E-798.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Although creation scientists and evolutionists also disagree
about the origin of the physical universe, both proponents and
opponents of Senator Keith's bill focused on the question of the
beginning of life.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Although appellees and amici dismiss the testimony of
Senator Keith and his witnesses as pure fantasy, they did not
bother to submit evidence of that to the District Court, making it
difficult for us to agree with them. The State, by contrast,
submitted the affidavits of two scientists, a philosopher, a
theologian, and an educator, whose academic credentials are rather
impressive. See App. to Juris. Statement A-17 - A-18
(Kenyon); id. at A-36 (Morrow); id. at A-39 -
A-40 (Miethe); id. at A-46 - A-47 (Most); id. at
A-49 (Clinkert). Like Senator Keith and his witnesses, the affiants
swear that evolution and creation science are the only two
scientific explanations for the origin of life, see id. at
A-19 - A-20 (Kenyon); id. at A-38 (Morrow); id. at A-41 (Miethe); that creation science is strictly scientific, see id. at A-18 (Kenyon); id. at A-36 (Morrow); id. at A-40 - A-41 (Miethe); id. at A-49
(Clinkert); that creation science is simply a collection of
scientific data that supports the hypothesis that life appeared on
earth suddenly, and has changed little, see id. at A-19
(Kenyon); id. at A-36 (Morrow); id. at A-41
(Miethe); that hundreds of respected scientists believe in creation
science, see id. at A-20 (Kenyon); that evidence for
creation science is as strong as evidence for evolution, see
id. at A-21 (Kenyon); id. at A-34 - A-35 (Kenyon); id. at A-37 - A-38 (Morrow); that creation science is
educationally valuable, see id. at A-19 (Kenyon); id. at A-36 (Morrow); id. at A-38 - A-39
(Morrow); id. at A-49 (Clinkert); that creation science
can be presented without religious content, see id. at
A-19 (Kenyon); id. at A-35 (Kenyon); id. at A-36
(Morrow); id. at A-40 (Miethe); id. at A-43 -
A-44 (Miethe); id. at A-47 (Most); id. at A-49
(Clinkert); and that creation science is now censored from
classrooms, while evolution is misrepresented as proven fact, see id. at A-20 (Kenyon); id. at A-35 (Kenyon); id. at A-39 (Morrow); id. at A-50 (Clinkert). It
is difficult to conclude on the basis of these affidavits -- the
only substantive evidence in the record -- that the laymen serving
in the Louisiana Legislature must have disbelieved Senator Keith or
his witnesses.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The majority finds it "astonishing" that I would cite a portion
of Senator Keith's original bill that was later deleted as evidence
of the legislature's understanding of the phrase "academic
freedom." Ante at 482 U. S. 589 , n. 8. What is astonishing is the
majority's implication that the deletion of that section deprives
it of value as a clear indication of what the phrase meant -- there
and in the other, retained, sections of the bill. The Senate
Committee on Education deleted most of the lengthy "purpose"
section of the bill (with Senator Keith's consent) because it
resembled legislative "findings of fact," which, committee members
felt, should generally not be incorporated in legislation. The
deletion had absolutely nothing to do with the manner in which the
section described "academic freedom." See 1 App. E-314 -
E-320; id. at E-440 - E-442.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															As the majority recognizes, ante at 482 U. S. 592 ,
Senator Keith sincerely believed that "secular humanism is a bona
fide religion," 1 App. E-36; see also id. at E-418; 2 id. at E-499, and that "evolution is the cornerstone of
that religion," 1 id. at E-418; see also id. at
E-282; id. at E-312 - E-313; id. at E-317; 2 id. at E-499. The Senator even told his colleagues that
this Court had "held" that secular humanism was a religion. See 1 id. at E-36, id. at E-418; 2 id. at E-499. (In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 , 367 U. S. 495 ,
n. 11 (1961), we did indeed refer to "Secular Humanism" as a
"religio[n].") Senator Keith and his supporters raised the
"religion" of secular humanism not, as the majority
suggests, to explain the source of their "disdain for the theory of
evolution," ante at 482 U. S. 592 ,
but to convince the legislature that the State of Louisiana was violating the Establishment Clause because its teachers
were misrepresenting evolution as fact, and depriving students of
the information necessary to question that theory. 1 App. E-2 - E-4
(Sen. Keith); id. at E-36 - E-37, E-39 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-154 - E-155 (Boudreaux paper); id. at
E-281 - E-282 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-317 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-499 - E-500 (Sen. Keith). The Senator repeatedly
urged his colleagues to pass his bill to remedy this
Establishment Clause violation by ensuring state neutrality in
religious matters, see, e.g., 1 id. at E-36; id. at E-39; id. at E-313, surely a permissible
purpose under Lemon. Senator Keith's argument may be
questionable, but nothing in the statute or its legislative history
gives us reason to doubt his sincerity or that of his
supporters.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Professor Choper summarized our school aid cases thusly:

															"[A] provision for therapeutic and diagnostic health services to
parochial school pupils by public employees is invalid if provided
in the parochial school, but not if offered at a neutral site, even
if in a mobile unit adjacent to the parochial school. Reimbursement
to parochial schools for the expense of administering
teacher-prepared tests required by state law is invalid, but the
state may reimburse parochial schools for the expense of
administering state-prepared tests. The state may lend school
textbooks to parochial school pupils because, the Court has
explained, the books can be checked in advance for religious
content, and are 'self-policing;' but the state may not lend other
seemingly self-policing instructional items such as tape recorders
and maps. The state may pay the cost of bus transportation to
parochial schools, which the Court has ruled are 'permeated' with
religion; but the state is forbidden to pay for field trip
transportation visits 'to governmental, industrial, cultural, and
scientific centers designed to enrich the secular studies of
students.'"

															Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 673, 680-681 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).

															Since that was written, more decisions on the subject have been
rendered, but they leave the theme of chaos securely unimpaired. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.
S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985).