U.S. Supreme Court NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. No. 419 Argued February 10, 11,
1937 Decided April 12, 1937 301 U.S.
1 ast|>* 301 U.S.
1 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus 1. The distinction between what is national and what is local in
the activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of our
federal form of government. P. 301 U. S. 29 .

															2. The validity of provisions which, considered by themselves,
are constitutional, held not affected by general and
ambiguous declarations in the same statute. P. 301 U. S. 30 .

															3. An interpretation which conforms a statute to the
Constitution must be preferred to another which would render it
unconstitutional or of doubtful validity. P. 301 U. S. 30 .

															4. Acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign
commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the
congressional Page 301 U. S. 2 power, and this includes acts, having that effect, which grow
out of labor disputes. P. 301 U. S. 31 .

															5. Employees in industry have a fundamental right to organize
and select representatives of their own choosing for collective bar
gaining, and discrimination or coercion upon the part of their
employer to prevent the free exercise of this right is a proper
subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority. P. 301 U. S. 33 .

															6. The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which
can be deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of such commerce.
Pp. 301 U. S.
34 -36.

															7. Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential, or
appropriate, to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress has the power to exercise that control. P. 301 U. S. 37 .

															8. This power must be considered in the light of our dual system
of government, and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them would, in view of our complex society, effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government. The question is
necessarily one of degree. P. 301 U. S. 37 .

															9. Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate
commerce, is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
commerce clause, and it is primarily for Congress to consider and
decide the fact of the danger and meet it. P. 301 U. S. 37 .

															10. The close and intimate effect which brings the subject
within the reach of federal power may be due to activities in
relation to productive industry, although the industry when
separately viewed is local. P. 301 U. S. 38 .

															11. The relation to interstate commerce of the manufacturing
enterprise involved in this case was such that a stoppage of its
operations by industrial strife would have an immediate, direct and
paralyzing effect upon interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress had
constitutional authority, for the protection of interstate
commerce, to safeguard the right of the employees in the
manufacturing plant to self-organization and free choice of their
representatives for collective bargaining. P. 301 U. S. 41 . Page 301 U. S. 3 Judicial notice is taken of the facts that the recognition of
the right of employees to self-organization and to have
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace, and
that refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most
prolific causes of strife.

															12. The National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, empowers
the National Labor Relations Board to prevent any person from
engaging in unfair labor practices "affecting commerce"; its
definition of "commerce" (aside from commerce within a territory or
the District of Columbia) is such as to include only interstate and
foreign commerce, and the term "affecting commerce" it defines as
meaning

															"in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce."

															The "unfair labor practices," as defined by the Act and involved
in this case, are restraint or coercion of employees in their
rights to self-organization and to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and discrimination against
them in regard to hire or tenure of employment for the purpose of
encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization.
§§ 7 and 8. The Act (§ 9a) declares that representatives, for the
purpose of collective bargaining, of the majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in that unit; but that any individual employee or
a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer. Held: (1) That in safeguarding rights of employees and empowering the
Board, the statute, insofar as involved in the present case,
confines itself to such control of the industrial relationship as
may be constitutionally exercised by Congress to prevent burden or
obstruction to interstate or foreign commerce arising from
industrial disputes. P. 301 U. S. 43 .

															(2) The Act imposes upon the employer the duty of conferring and
negotiating with the authorized representatives of the employees
for the purpose of settling a labor dispute, but it does not
preclude such individual contracts as the employer may elect to
make directly with individual employees. P. 301 U. S. 44 .

															(3) The Act does not compel agreements between employers and
employees. Its theory is that free opportunity for negotiation Page 301 U. S. 4 with accredited representatives of employees is likely to
promote industrial peace, and may bring about the adjustments and
agreements which the Act, in itself, does not attempt to compel. P. 301 U. S. 45 .

															(4) The Act does not interfere with the normal right of the
employer to hire, or with the right of discharge when exercised for
other reasons than intimidation and coercion, and what is the true
reason in this regard is left the subject of investigation in each
case, with full opportunity to show the facts. P. 301 U. S. 45 .

															13. A corporation which manufactured iron and steel products in
its factories in Pennsylvania from raw materials, most of which it
brought in from other States, and which shipped 75% of the
manufactured products out of Pennsylvania and disposed of them
throughout this country and in Canada, was required by orders of
the National Labor Relations Board to tender reinstatement to men
who had been employed in one of the factories but were discharged
because of their union activities and for the purpose of
discouraging union membership. The orders further required that the
company make good the pay the men had lost through their discharge,
and that it desist from discriminating against members of the
union, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and from
interfering by coercion with the self-organization of its employees
in the plant. Held that the orders were authorized by the
National Labor Relations Act, and that the Act is constitutional as
thus applied to the company. Pp. 301 U. S. 30 , 301 U. S. 32 , 301 U. S. 34 , 301 U. S. 41 .

															14. The right of employers to conduct their own business is not
arbitrarily restrained by regulations that merely protect the
correlative rights of their employees to organize for the purpose
of securing the redress of grievances and of promoting agreements
with employers relating to rates of pay and conditions of work. P. 301 U. S. 43 .

															15. The fact that the National Labor Relations Act subjects the
employer to supervision and restraint and leaves untouched the
abuses for which employees may be responsible, and fails to provide
a more comprehensive plan, with better assurance of fairness to
both sides and with increased chances of success in bringing about
equitable solutions of industrial disputes affecting interstate
commerce, does not affect its validity. The question is as to the
power of Congress, not as to its policy, and legislative authority,
exerted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils
within its reach. P. 301 U. S. 46 . Page 301 U. S. 5 16. The National Labor Relations Act establishes standards to
which the Board must conform. There must be complaint, notice and
hearing. The Board must receive evidence and make findings. These
findings as to the facts are to be conclusive, but only if
supported by evidence. The order of the Board is subject to review
by the designated court, and only when sustained by the court may
the order be enforced. Upon that review, all questions of the
jurisdiction of the Board and the regularity of its proceedings,
all questions of constitutional right or statutory authority, are
open to examination by the court. These procedural provisions
afford adequate opportunity to secure judicial protection against
arbitrary action, in accordance with the well settled rules
applicable to administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in
the enforcement of valid legislation. P. 301 U. S. 47 .

															17. The provision of the National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c),
authorizing the Board to require the reinstatement of employees
found to have been discharged because of their union activity or
for the purpose of discouraging membership in the union, is valid.
P. 301 U. S. 47 .

															18. The provision of the Act, § 10(c), that the Board, in
requiring reinstatement, may direct the payment of wages for the
time lost by the discharge, less amounts earned by the employee
during that period, does not contravene the provisions of the
Seventh Amendment with respect to jury trial in suits at common
law. P. 301 U. S. 48 .

															83 F.2d 998, reversed.

															CERTIORARI, 299 U.S. 534, to review a decree of the Circuit
Court of Appeals declining to enforce an order of the National
Labor Relations Board. Page 301 U. S. 22 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In a proceeding under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
[ Footnote 1 ] the National Labor
Relations Board found that the respondent, Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation, had violated the Act by engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce. The proceeding was instituted by the
Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200, affiliated with the Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America, a labor
organization. The unfair labor practices charged were that the
corporation was discriminating against members of the union with
regard to hire and tenure of employment, and was coercing and
intimidating its employees in order to interfere with their
self-organization. The discriminatory and coercive action alleged
was the discharge of certain employees.

															The National Labor Relations Board, sustaining the charge,
ordered the corporation to cease and desist from such
discrimination and coercion, to offer reinstatement to ten of the
employees named, to make good their losses in pay, and to post for
thirty days notices that the corporation would not discharge or
discriminate against members, or those desiring to become members,
of the labor union. As the corporation failed to comply, the Board
petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order. The
court denied the petition, holding that the order lay beyond the
range of federal power. 83 F.2d 998. We granted certiorari.

															The scheme of the National Labor Relations Act -- which is too
long to be quoted in full -- may be briefly stated. The first
section sets forth findings with respect to the injury to commerce
resulting from the denial by employers of the right of employees to
organize and from the refusal of employers to accept the procedure
of collective Page 301 U. S. 23 bargaining. There follows a declaration that it is the policy of
the United States to eliminate these causes of obstruction to the
free flow of commerce. [ Footnote
2 ] The Act Page 301 U. S. 24 then defines the terms it uses, including the terms "commerce"
and "affecting commerce." § 2. It creates the National Labor
Relations Board, and prescribes its organization. §§ 6. It sets
forth the right of employees to self-organization and to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing. § 7. It
defines "unfair labor practices." § 8. It lays down rules as to the
representation of employees for the purpose of collective
bargaining. § 9. The Board is empowered to prevent the described
unfair labor practices affecting commerce and the Act prescribes
the procedure to that end. The Board is authorized to petition
designated courts to secure the enforcement of its orders. The
findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
are to be conclusive. If either party, on application to the court,
shows that additional evidence is material and that there were
reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the
hearings before the Board, the court may order the additional
evidence to be taken. Any person aggrieved by a final order of the
Board may obtain a review in the designated courts with the same
procedure as in the case of an application by the Board for the
enforcement of its order. § 10. The Board has broad powers of
investigation. § 11. Interference with members of the Board or its
agents in the performance of their duties is punishable by fine and
imprisonment. § 12. Nothing in the Act is to be construed, to
interfere with the right to strike. § 13. There is a separability
clause to the effect that, if any provision of the Act or its
application to any person or circumstances shall be held invalid,
the remainder of the Act or its application to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected. § 15. The particular
provisions which are involved in the instant case will be
considered more in detail in the course of the discussion. The
procedure in the instant case followed the statute. The labor union
filed with the Board its verified charge. Page 301 U. S. 25 The Board thereupon issued its complaint against the respondent
alleging that its action in discharging the employees in question
constituted unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the
meaning of § 8, subdivisions (1) and (3), and § 2, subdivisions (6)
and (7) of the Act. Respondent, appearing specially for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the Board, filed its answer.
Respondent admitted the discharges, but alleged that they were made
because of inefficiency or violation of rule or for other good
reasons, and were not ascribable to union membership or activities.
As an affirmative defense, respondent challenged the constitutional
validity of the statute and its applicability in the instant case.
Notice of hearing was given, and respondent appeared by counsel.
The Board first took up the issue of jurisdiction, and evidence was
presented by both the Board and the respondent. Respondent then
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and, on
denial of that motion, respondent, in accordance with its special
appearance, withdrew from further participation in the hearing. The
Board received evidence upon the merits, and, at its close, made
its findings and order.

															Contesting the ruling of the Board, the respondent argues (1)
that the Act is in reality a regulation of labor relations, and not
of interstate commerce; (2) that the Act can have no application to
the respondent's relations with its production employees, because
they are not subject to regulation by the federal government, and
(3) that the provisions of the Act violate § 2 of Article III and
the Fifth and Seventh Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States.

															The facts as to the nature and scope of the business of the
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation have been found by the Labor
Board, and, so far as they are essential to the determination of
this controversy, they are not in dispute. The Labor Board has
found: the corporation is Page 301 U. S. 26 organized under the laws of Pennsylvania and has its principal
office at Pittsburgh. It is engaged in the business of
manufacturing iron and steel in plants situated in Pittsburgh and
nearby Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. It manufactures and distributes a
widely diversified line of steel and pig iron, being the fourth
largest producer of steel in the United States. With its
subsidiaries -- nineteen in number -- it is a completely integrated
enterprise, owning and operating ore, coal and limestone
properties, lake and river transportation facilities, and terminal
railroads located at its manufacturing plants. It owns or controls
mines in Michigan and Minnesota. It operates four ore steamships on
the Great Lakes, used in the transportation of ore to its
factories. It owns coal mines in Pennsylvania. It operates towboats
and steam barges used in carrying coal to its factories. It owns
limestone properties in various places in Pennsylvania and West
Virginia. It owns the Monongahela connecting railroad which
connects the plants of the Pittsburgh works and forms an
interconnection with the Pennsylvania, New York Central, and
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad systems. It owns the Aliquippa and
Southern Railroad Company, which connects the Aliquippa works with
the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie, part of the New York Central system.
Much of its product is shipped to its warehouses in Chicago,
Detroit, Cincinnati and Memphis -- to the last two places by means
of its own barges and transportation equipment. In Long Island
City, New York, and in New Orleans, it operates structural steel
fabricating shops in connection with the warehousing of
semi-finished materials sent from its works. Through one of its
wholly owned subsidiaries, it owns, leases and operates stores,
warehouses and yards for the distribution of equipment and supplies
for drilling and operating oil and gas wells and for pipelines,
refineries, and pumping stations. It has sales offices in Page 301 U. S. 27 twenty cities in the United States and a wholly owned subsidiary
which is devoted exclusively to distributing its product in Canada.
Approximately 75 percent. of its product is shipped out of
Pennsylvania.

															Summarizing these operations, the Labor Board concluded that the
works in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa

															"might be likened to the heart of a self-contained, highly
integrated body. They draw in the raw materials from Michigan,
Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, in part through arteries
and by means controlled by the respondent; they transform the
materials and then pump them out to all parts of the nation through
the vast mechanism which the respondent has elaborated."

															To carry on the activities of the entire steel industry, 33,000
men mine ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone,
16,000 men manufacture coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, and
83,000 men transport its product. Respondent has about 10,000
employees in its Aliquippa plant, which is located in a community
of about 30,000 persons.

															Respondent points to evidence that the Aliquippa plant, in which
the discharged men were employed, contains complete facilities for
the production of finished and semi-finished iron and steel
products from raw materials; that its works consist primarily of a
byproduct coke plant for the production of coke; blast furnaces for
the production of pig iron; open hearth furnaces and Bessemer
converters for the production of steel; blooming mills for the
reduction of steel ingots into smaller shapes, and a number of
finishing mills such as structural mills, rod mills, wire mills,
and the like. In addition, there are other buildings, structures
and equipment, storage yards, docks and an intra-plant storage
system. Respondent's operations at these works are carried on in
two distinct stages, the first being the conversion of raw
materials into pig Page 301 U. S. 28 iron and the second being the manufacture of semi-finished and
finished iron and steel products, and, in both cases, the
operations result in substantially changing the character, utility
and value of the materials wrought upon, which is apparent from the
nature and extent of the processes to which they are subjected and
which respondent fully describes. Respondent also directs attention
to the fact that the iron ore which is procured from mines in
Minnesota and Michigan and transported to respondent's plant is
stored in stockpiles for future use, the amount of ore in storage
varying with the season, but usually being enough to maintain
operations from nine to ten months; that the coal which is procured
from the mines of a subsidiary located in Pennsylvania and taken to
the plant at Aliquippa is there, like ore, stored for future use,
approximately two to three months' supply of coal being always on
hand, and that the limestone which is obtained in Pennsylvania and
West Virginia is also stored in amounts usually adequate to run the
blast furnaces for a few weeks. Various details of operation,
transportation, and distribution are also mentioned which, for the
present purpose, it is not necessary to detail.

															Practically all the factual evidence in the case, except that
which dealt with the nature of respondent's business, concerned its
relations with the employees in the Aliquippa plant whose discharge
was the subject of the complaint. These employees were active
leaders in the labor union. Several were officers, and others were
leaders of particular groups. Two of the employees were motor
inspectors; one was a tractor driver; three were crane operators;
one was a washer in the coke plant, and three were laborers. Three
other employees were mentioned in the complaint, but it was
withdrawn as to one of them and no evidence was heard on the action
taken with respect to the other two. Page 301 U. S. 29 While respondent criticizes the evidence and the attitude of the
Board, which is described as being hostile toward employers and
particularly toward those who insisted upon their constitutional
rights, respondent did not take advantage of its opportunity to
present evidence to refute that which was offered to show
discrimination and coercion. In this situation, the record presents
no ground for setting aside the order of the Board so far as the
facts pertaining to the circumstances and purpose of the discharge
of the employees are concerned. Upon that point, it is sufficient
to say that the evidence supports the findings of the Board that
respondent discharged these men "because of their union activity
and for the purpose of discouraging membership in the union." We
turn to the questions of law which respondent urges in contesting
the validity and application of the Act. First. The scope of the Act. -- The Act is challenged
in its entirety as an attempt to regulate all industry, thus
invading the reserved powers of the States over their local
concerns. It is asserted that the references in the Act to
interstate and foreign commerce are colorable, at best; that the
Act is not a true regulation of such commerce or of matters which
directly affect it, but, on the contrary, has the fundamental
object of placing under the compulsory supervision of the federal
government all industrial labor relations within the nation. The
argument seeks support in the broad words of the preamble (section
one [ Footnote 3 ]) and in the
sweep of the provisions of the Act, and it is further insisted that
its legislative history shows an essential universal purpose in the
light of which its scope cannot be limited by either construction
or by the application of the separability clause.

															If this conception of terms, intent, and consequent
inseparability were sound, the Act would necessarily fall Page 301 U. S. 30 by reason of the limitation upon the federal power which inheres
in the constitutional grant, as well as because of the explicit
reservation of the Tenth Amendment. Schechter Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 495 , 295 U. S. 549 , 295 U. S. 550 , 295 U. S. 554 .
The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such
an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause
itself establishes, between commerce "among the several States" and
the internal concerns of a State. That distinction between what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital
to the maintenance of our federal system. Id. But we are not at liberty to deny effect to specific provisions,
which Congress has constitutional power to enact, by superimposing
upon them inferences from general legislative declarations of an
ambiguous character, even if found in the same statute. The
cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save, and not to
destroy. We have repeatedly held that, as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be
unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt
that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt, the
rule is the same. Federal Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco
Co., 264 U. S. 298 307; Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375 , 264 U. S. 390 ; Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Boone, 270 U.
S. 466 , 270 U. S. 472 ; Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 , 275 U. S. 148 ; Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.
S. 331 , 275 U. S.
346 .

															We think it clear that the National Labor Relations Act may be
construed so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional
authority. The jurisdiction conferred upon the Board, and invoked
in this instance, is found in § 10(a), which provides:

															"SEC. 10(a). The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
(listed in section 8) affecting commerce. " Page 301 U. S. 31 The critical words of this provision, prescribing the limits of
the Board's authority in dealing with he labor practices, are
"affecting commerce." The Act specifically defines the "commerce"
to which it refers (§ 2(6)):

															"The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, commerce,
transportation, or communication among the several States, or
between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United
States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign
country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points
in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or
the District of Columbia or any foreign country."

															There can be no question that the commerce thus contemplated by
the Act (aside from that within a Territory or the District of
Columbia) is interstate and foreign commerce in the constitutional
sense. The Act also defines the term "affecting commerce" (§
2(7)):

															"The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led
or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce."

															This definition is one of exclusion as well as inclusion. The
grant of authority to the Board does not purport to extend to the
relationship between all industrial employees and employers. Its
terms do not impose collective bargaining upon all industry
regardless of effects upon interstate or foreign commerce. It
purports to reach only what may be deemed to burden or obstruct
that commerce, and, thus qualified, it must be construed as
contemplating the exercise of control within constitutional bounds.
It is a familiar principle that acts which directly burden or
obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are
within the reach of the congressional power. Acts having that
effect are not Page 301 U. S. 32 rendered immune because they grow out of labor disputes. See
Texas & N.O. R . Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.
S. 548 , 281 U. S. 570 ; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra, pp. 295 U. S. 544 , 295 U. S. 545 ; Virginian Railway v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 . It
is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is
the criterion. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 51 .
Whether or not particular action does affect commerce in such a
close and intimate fashion as to be subject to federal control, and
hence to lie within the authority conferred upon the Board, is left
by the statute to be determined as individual cases arise. We are
thus to inquire whether, in the instant case, the constitutional
boundary has been passed. Second. The fair labor practices in question. -- The
unfair labor practices found by the Board are those defined in § 8,
subdivisions (1) and (3). These provide:

															"Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
--"

															"(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."

															"(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. . . . [ Footnote 4 ] " Page 301 U. S. 33 Section 8, subdivision (1), refers to § 7, which is as
follows:

															"Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection."

															Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further
than to safeguard the right of employees to self-organization and
to select representatives of their own choosing for collective
bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion
by their employer.

															That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to
organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as
the respondent has to organize its business and select its own
officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the
free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and
representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent
legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason for labor
organizations. We said that they were organized out of the
necessities of the situation; that a single employee was helpless
in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on
his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and family; that, if
the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he
was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary
and unfair treatment; that union was essential to give laborers
opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council, 257 U. S. 184 , 257 U. S. 209 .
We reiterated these views when we had under consideration the
Railway Labor Act of 1926. Fully recognizing the legality of
collective action on the part of employees in Page 301 U. S. 34 order to safeguard their proper interests, we said that Congress
was not required to ignore this right, but could safeguard it.
Congress could seek to make appropriate collective action of
employees an instrument of peace, rather than of strife. We said
that such collective action would be a mockery if representation
were made futile by interference with freedom of choice. Hence, the
prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of
representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference
between employers and employees, "instead of being an invasion of
the constitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of
the rights of both." Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks,
supra. We have reasserted the same principle in sustaining the
application of the Railway Labor Act as amended in 1934. Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40,
supra. Third. The application of the Act to employees engaged in
production. -- The principle involved. -- Respondent says that
whatever may be said of employees engaged in interstate commerce,
the industrial relations and activities in the manufacturing
department of respondent's enterprise are not subject to federal
regulation. The argument rests upon the proposition that
manufacturing, in itself, is not commerce. Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 , 128 U. S. 20 , 21; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.
S. 344 , 259 U. S. 407 , 259 U. S. 408 ; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 , 262 U. S. 178 ; United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457 , 265 U. S. 465 ; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S.
64 , 268 U. S. 82 ; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.
S. 295 , 268 U. S. 310 ; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra, p. 295 U. S. 547 ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.
S. 238 , 298 U. S. 304 , 298 U. S. 317 , 298 U. S.
327 .

															The Government distinguishes these cases. The various parts of
respondent's enterprise are described as interdependent and as thus
involving "a great movement of Page 301 U. S. 35 iron ore, coal and limestone along well defined paths to the
steel mills, thence through them, and thence in the form of steel
products into the consuming centers of the country -- a definite
and well understood course of business." It is urged that these
activities constitute a "stream" or "flow" of commerce, of which
the Aliquippa manufacturing plant is the focal point, and that
industrial strife at that point would cripple the entire movement.
Reference is made to our decision sustaining the Packers and
Stockyards Act. [ Footnote 5 ] Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 . The
Court found that the stockyards were but a "throat" through which
the current of Commerce flowed and the transactions which there
occurred could not be separated from that movement. Hence, the
sales at the stockyards were not regarded as merely local
transactions, for, while they created "a local change of title,"
they did not "stop the flow," but merely changed the private
interests in the subject of the current. Distinguishing the cases
which upheld the power of the State to impose a nondiscriminatory
tax upon property which the owner intended to transport to another
State, but which was not in actual transit and was held within the
State subject to the disposition of the owner, the Court
remarked:

															"The question, it should be observed, is not with respect to the
extent of the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
but whether a particular exercise of state power in view of its
nature and operation must be deemed to be in conflict with this
paramount authority." Id., p. 258 U. S. 526 . See Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S.
1 , 290 U. S. 8 .
Applying the doctrine of Stafford v. Wallace, supra, the
Court sustained the Grain Futures Act of 1922 [ Footnote 6 ] with respect to transactions on the
Chicago Board of Trade, although these transactions were "not in
and of themselves interstate commerce." Congress had found Page 301 U. S. 36 that they had become "a constantly recurring burden and
obstruction to that commerce." Chicago Board of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 , 262 U. S. 32 ; compare Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 , 259 U. S. 69 . See also Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 .

															Respondent contends that the instant case presents material
distinctions. Respondent says that the Aliquippa plant is extensive
in size and represents a large investment in buildings, machinery
and equipment. The raw materials which are brought to the plant are
delayed for long periods and, after being subjected to
manufacturing processes, "are changed substantially as to
character, utility and value." The finished products which
emerge

															"are to a large extent manufactured without reference to
preexisting orders and contracts, and are entirely different from
the raw materials which enter at the other end."

															Hence, respondent argues that,

															"If importation and exportation in interstate commerce do not
singly transfer purely local activities into the field of
congressional regulation, it should follow that their combination
would not alter the local situation." Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
Co., 249 U. S. 134 , 249 U. S. 151 ; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, supra. We do not find it necessary to determine whether these features
of defendant's business dispose of the asserted analogy to the
"stream of commerce" cases. The instances in which that metaphor
has been used are but particular, and not exclusive, illustrations
of the protective power which the Government invokes in support of
the present Act. The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions is not limited to
transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part of a
"flow" of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions
may be due to injurious action springing from other sources. The
fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is Page 301 U. S. 37 the power to enact "all appropriate legislation" for "its
protection and advancement" ( The Daniel
Ball , 10 Wall. 557, 77 U. S. 564 );
to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure its safety"
( Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U.
S. 691 , 102 U. S. 696 , 102 U. S.
697 ); "to foster, protect, control and restrain." Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, p. 223 U. S. 47 . See Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, supra. That
power is plenary, and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce
"no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it." Second Employers' Liability Cases, p. 223 U. S. 51 ; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra. Although
activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. Schechter
Corp. v. United States, supra. Undoubtedly the scope of this
power must be considered in the light of our dual system of
government, and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in
view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government. Id. The question is
necessarily one of degree. As the Court said in Chicago Board
of Trade v. Olsen, supra, p. 262 U. S. 37 ,
repeating what had been said in Stafford v. Wallace,
supra: "Whatever amounts to more or less constant practice, and
threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden the freedom of interstate
commerce is within the regulatory power of Congress under the
commerce clause and it is primarily for Congress to consider and
decide the fact of the danger and meet it."

															That intrastate activities, by reason of close and intimate
relation to interstate commerce, may fall within federal control is
demonstrated in the case of carriers who Page 301 U. S. 38 are engaged in both interstate and intrastate transportation.
There federal control has been found essential to secure the
freedom of interstate traffic from interference or unjust
discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the interstate
service. Shreveport Case, 234 U.
S. 342 , 234 U. S. 351 , 234 U. S. 352 ; Wisconsin Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563 , 257 U. S. 588 .
It is manifest that intrastate rates deal primarily with a local
activity. But, in ratemaking, they bear such a close relation to
interstate rates that effective control of the one must embrace
some control over the other. Id. Under the Transportation
Act, 1920, [ Footnote 7 ]
Congress went so far as to authorize the Interstate Commerce
Commission to establish a statewide level of intrastate rates in
order to prevent an unjust discrimination against interstate
commerce. Wisconsin Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., supra; Florida v. United States, 282 U.
S. 194 , 282 U. S. 210 , 282 U. S. 211 .
Other illustrations are found in the broad requirements of the
Safety Appliance Act and the Hours of Service Act. Southern
Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 221 U. S. 612 . It
is said that this exercise of federal power has relation to the
maintenance of adequate instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
But the agency is not superior to the commerce which uses it. The
protective power extends to the former because it exists as to the
latter.

															The close and intimate effect which brings the subject within
the reach of federal power may be due to activities in relation to
productive industry although the industry, when separately viewed,
is local. This has been abundantly illustrated in the application
of the federal Anti-Trust Act. In the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, 221 U. S. 221 U.S.
1, 221 U. S. 106 ,
that statute was applied to combinations of employers engaged in
productive industry. Page 301 U. S. 39 Counsel for the offending corporations strongly urged that the
Sherman Act had no application because the acts complained of were
not acts of interstate or foreign commerce, nor direct and
immediate in their effect on interstate or foreign commerce, but
primarily affected manufacturing and not commerce. 221 U.S. pp. 5,
125 [argument of counsel omitted in electronic version]. Counsel
relied upon the decision in United States v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 . The
Court stated their contention as follows:

															"That the act, even if the averments of the bill be true, cannot
be constitutionally applied, because to do so would extend the
power of Congress to subjects dehors the reach of its
authority to regulate commerce, by enabling that body to deal with
mere questions of production of commodities within the States."

															And the Court summarily dismissed the contention in these
words:

															"But all the structure upon which this argument proceeds is
based upon the decision in United States v. E. C. Knight
Co., 156 U. S. 1 . The view, however,
which the argument takes of that case and the arguments based upon
that view have been so repeatedly pressed upon this court in
connection with the interpretation and enforcement of the
Anti-trust Act, and have been so necessarily and expressly decided
to be unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly foreclosed
and to require no express notice"

															(citing cases). 221 U.S. pp. 221 U. S. 68 , 221 U. S. 69 .

															Upon the same principle, the Anti-Trust Act has been applied to
the conduct of employees engaged in production. Loewe
v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 ; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, supra; Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S.
37 . See also Local 16 v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 , 291 U. S. 397 ; Schechter Corp. v. United States, supra. The decisions
dealing with the question of that application illustrate both the
principle and its limitation. Thus, in the first Coronado case, the Court held that mining was not interstate commerce, that
the power of Congress did not extend to its regulation as such, Page 301 U. S. 40 and that it had not been shown that the activities there
involved -- a local strike -- brought them within the provisions of
the Anti-Trust Act, notwithstanding the broad terms of that
statute. A similar conclusion was reached in United Leather
Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., supra, Industrial
Association v. United States, supra, and Levering & Garrigues
Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103 , 289 U. S. 107 .
But, in the first Coronado case, the Court also said
that

															"if Congress deems certain recurring practices, though not
really part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, restrain or
burden it, it has the power to subject them to national supervision
and restraint."

															259 U.S. p. 259 U. S. 408 .
And, in the second Coronado case, the Court ruled that,
while the mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped
in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its
manufacture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote
obstruction to that commerce, nevertheless when the

															"intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or
production is shown to be to restrain or control the supply
entering and moving in interstate commerce, or the price of it in
interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the
Anti-Trust Act."

															268 U.S. p. 268 U. S. 310 .
And the existence of that intent may be a necessary inference from
proof of the direct and substantial effect produced by the
employees' conduct. Industrial Association v. United
States, 268 U.S. p. 268 U. S. 81 .
What was absent from the evidence in the first Coronado case appeared in the second, and the Act was accordingly applied to
the mining employees.

															It is thus apparent that the fact that the employees here
concerned were engaged in production is not determinative. The
question remains as to the effect upon interstate commerce of the
labor practice involved. In the Schechter case, supra, we
found that the effect there was so remote as to be beyond the
federal power. To find "immediacy or directness" there was to find
it "almost Page 301 U. S. 41 everywhere," a result inconsistent with the maintenance of our
federal system. In the Carter case, supra, the
Court was of the opinion that the provisions of the statute
relating to production were invalid upon several grounds -- that
there was improper delegation of legislative power, and that the
requirements not only went beyond any sustainable measure of
protection of interstate commerce, but were also inconsistent with
due process. These cases are not controlling here. Fourth. Effects of the unfair labor practice in respondent's
enterprise. -- Giving full weight to respondent's contention
with respect to a break in the complete continuity of the "stream
of commerce" by reason of respondent's manufacturing operations,
the fact remains that the stoppage of those operations by
industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate
commerce. In view of respondent's far-flung activities, it is idle
to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious
that it would be immediate, and might be catastrophic. We are asked
to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life, and to
deal with the question of direct and indirect effects in an
intellectual vacuum. Because there may be but indirect and remote
effects upon interstate commerce in connection with a host of local
enterprises throughout the country, it does not follow that other
industrial activities do not have such a close and intimate
relation to interstate commerce as to make the presence of
industrial strife a matter of the most urgent national concern.
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their
activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not
enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the
paralyzing consequences of industrial war? We have often said that
interstate commerce itself is a practical Page 301 U. S. 42 conception. It is equally true that interferences with that
commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore
actual experience.

															Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of
the right of employees to self-organization and to have
representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace.
Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific
causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history
of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial
notice, and requires no citation of instances. The opinion in the
case of Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40,
supra, points out that, in the case of carriers, experience
has shown that, before the amendment of 1934 of the Railway Labor
Act,

															"when there was no dispute as to the organizations authorized to
represent the employees and when there was a willingness of the
employer to meet such representative for a discussion of their
grievances, amicable adjustment of differences had generally
followed, and strikes had been avoided."

															That, on the other hand,

															"a prolific source of dispute had been the maintenance by the
railroad of company unions and the denial by railway management of
the authority of representatives chosen by their employees."

															The opinion in that case also points to the large measure of
success of the labor policy embodied in the Railway Labor Act. But,
with respect to the appropriateness of the recognition of
self-organization and representation in the promotion of peace, the
question is not essentially different in the case of employees in
industries of such a character that interstate commerce is put in
jeopardy from the case of employees of transportation companies.
And of what avail is it to protect the facility of transportation
if interstate commerce is throttled with respect to the commodities
to be transported! Page 301 U. S. 43 These questions have frequently engaged the attention of
Congress, and have been the subject of many inquiries. [ Footnote 8 ] The steel industry is one
of the great basic industries of the United States, with ramifying
activities affecting interstate commerce at every point. The
Government aptly refers to the steel strike of 1919-1920, with its
far-reaching consequences. [ Footnote 9 ] The fact that there appears to have been no
major disturbance in that industry in the more recent period did
not dispose of the possibilities of future and like dangers to
interstate commerce which Congress was entitled to foresee and to
exercise its protective power to forestall. It is not necessary
again to detail the facts as to respondent's enterprise. Instead of
being beyond the pale, we think that it presents in a most striking
way the close and intimate relation which a manufacturing industry
may have to interstate commerce, and we have no doubt that Congress
had constitutional authority to safeguard the right of respondent's
employees to self-organization and freedom in the choice of
representatives for collective bargaining. Fifth. The means which the Act employs. -- Questions under
the due process clause and other constitutional restrictions.
-- Respondent asserts its right to conduct its business in an
orderly manner without being subjected to arbitrary restraints.
What we have said points to the fallacy in the argument. Employees
have their correlative Page 301 U. S. 44 right to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of
grievances and to promote agreements with employers relating to
rates of pay and conditions of work. Texas & N.O. R. Co. v.
Railway Clerks, supra; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation,
No. 40. Restraint for the purpose of preventing an unjust
interference with that right cannot be considered arbitrary or
capricious. The provision of § 9(a) [ Footnote 10 ] that representatives, for the purpose of
collective bargaining, of the majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in that unit imposes upon the respondent only the duty of
conferring and negotiating with the authorized representatives of
its employees for the purpose of settling a labor dispute. This
provision has its analogue in § 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act,
which was under consideration in Virginian Railway Co. v.
System Federation, No. 40, supra. The decree which we affirmed
in that case required the Railway Company to treat with the
representative chosen by the employees and also to refrain from
entering into collective labor agreements with anyone other than
their true representative as ascertained in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. We said that the obligation to treat with
the true representative was exclusive, and hence imposed the
negative duty to treat with no other. We also pointed out that, as
conceded by the Government, [ Footnote 11 ] the injunction Page 301 U. S. 45 against the Company's entering into any contract concerning
rules, rates of pay and working conditions except with a chosen
representative was "designed only to prevent collective bargaining
with anyone purporting to represent employees" other than the
representative they had selected. It was taken "to prohibit the
negotiation of labor contracts generally applicable to employees"
in the described unit with any other representative than the one so
chosen, "but not as precluding such individual contracts" as the
Company might "elect to make directly with individual employees."
We think this construction also applies to § 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act.

															The Act does not compel agreements between employers and
employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. It does not
prevent the employer "from refusing to make a collective contract
and hiring individuals on whatever terms" the employer "may by
unilateral action determine." [ Footnote 12 ] The Act expressly provides in § 9(a) that
any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer. The
theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with
accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote
industrial peace, and may bring about the adjustments and
agreements which the Act, in itself, does not attempt to compel. As
we said in Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks,
supra, and repeated in Virginian Railway Co. v. System
Federation, No. 40, supra, the cases of Adair v. United
States, 208 U. S. 161 , and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 , are
inapplicable to legislation of this character. The Act does not
interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not,
under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with
respect to their Page 301 U. S. 46 self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand,
the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for
interference with the right of discharge when that right is
exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.
The true purpose is the subject of investigation with full
opportunity to show the facts. It would seem that, when employers
freely recognize the right of their employees to their own
organizations and their unrestricted right of representation, there
will be much less occasion for controversy in respect to the free
and appropriate exercise of the right of selection and
discharge.

															The Act has been criticized as one-sided in its application;
that it subjects the employer to supervision and restraint and
leaves untouched the abuses for which employees may be responsible;
that it fails to provide a more comprehensive plan -- with better
assurances of fairness to both sides and with increased chances of
success in bringing about, if not compelling, equitable solutions
of industrial disputes affecting interstate commerce. But we are
dealing with the power of Congress, not with a particular policy or
with the extent to which policy should go. We have frequently said
that the legislative authority, exerted within its proper field,
need not embrace all the evils within its reach. The Constitution
does not forbid "cautious advance, step by step," in dealing with
the evils which are exhibited in activities within the range of
legislative power. Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401 , 199 U. S. 411 ; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.
S. 224 , 234 U. S. 227 ; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373 , 236 U. S. 384 ; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374 , 286 U. S. 396 .
The question in such cases is whether the legislature, in what it
does prescribe, has gone beyond constitutional limits.

															The procedural provisions of the Act are assailed. But these
provisions, as we construe them, do not offend against the
constitutional requirements governing the Page 301 U. S. 47 creation and action of administrative bodies. See Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 , 227 U. S. 91 .
The Act establishes standards to which the Board must conform.
There must be complaint, notice and hearing. The Board must receive
evidence and make findings. The findings as to the facts are to be
conclusive, but only if supported by evidence. The order of the
Board is subject to review by the designated court, and only when
sustained by the court may the order be enforced. Upon that review,
all questions of the jurisdiction of the Board and the regularity
of its proceedings, all questions of constitutional right or
statutory authority, are open to examination by the court. We
construe the procedural provisions as affording adequate
opportunity to secure judicial protection against arbitrary action
in accordance with the well settled rules applicable to
administrative agencies set up by Congress to aid in the
enforcement of valid legislation. It is not necessary to repeat
these rules which have frequently been declared. None of them
appears to have been transgressed in the instant case. Respondent
was notified and heard. It had opportunity to meet the charge of
unfair labor practices upon the merits, and, by withdrawing from
the hearing, it declined to avail itself of that opportunity. The
facts found by the Board support its order, and the evidence
supports the findings. Respondent has no just ground for complaint
on this score.

															The order of the Board required the reinstatement of the
employees who were found to have been discharged because of their
"union activity" and for the purpose of "discouraging membership in
the union." That requirement was authorized by the Act. § 10(c). In Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, supra, a
similar order for restoration to service was made by the court in
contempt proceedings for the violation of an injunction issued by
the court to restrain an interference with Page 301 U. S. 48 the right of employees as guaranteed by the Railway Labor Act of
1926. The requirement of restoration to service of employees
discharged in violation of the provisions of that Act was thus a
sanction imposed in the enforcement of a judicial decree. We do not
doubt that Congress could impose a like sanction for the
enforcement of its valid regulation. The fact that, in the one
case, it was a judicial sanction, and, in the other, a legislative
one, is not an essential difference in determining its
propriety.

															Respondent complains that the Board not only ordered
reinstatement but directed the payment of wages for the time lost
by the discharge, less amounts earned by the employee during that
period. This part of the order was also authorized by the Act. §
10(c). It is argued that the requirement is equivalent to a money
judgment and hence contravenes the Seventh Amendment with respect
to trial by jury. The Seventh Amendment provides that, "In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." The
Amendment thus preserves the right which existed under the common
law when the Amendment was adopted. Shields v.
Thomas , 18 How. 253, 59 U. S. 262 ; In re Wood, 210 U. S. 246 , 210 U. S. 258 ; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474 , 293 U. S. 476 ; Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.
S. 654 , 295 U. S. 657 .
Thus, it has no application to cases where recovery of money
damages is an incident to equitable relief even though damages
might have been recovered in an action at law. Clark v.
Wooster, 119 U. S. 322 , 119 U. S. 325 ; Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Engineering Co., 243 U.
S. 273 , 243 U. S. 279 .
It does not apply where the proceeding is not in the nature of a
suit at common law. Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528 , 173 U. S.
537 .

															The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of
such a suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is
a statutory proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and payment
for time lost are Page 301 U. S. 49 requirements imposed for violation of the statute, and are
remedies appropriate to its enforcement. The contention under the
Seventh Amendment is without merit.

															Our conclusion is that the order of the Board was within its
competency, and that the Act is valid as here applied. The judgment
of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion. Reversed. For dissenting opinion, see p. 301 U. S.
76 .

															* No. 419, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.; Nos. 420 and 421, National Labor
Relations Board v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., post, p. 301 U. S. 49 ; Nos.
422 and 423, National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., post, p. 301 U. S. 58 ; No.
365, Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board,
post, p. 301 U. S. 103 , and
No. 469, Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, post, p. 301 U. S. 142 ,
which are known as the "Labor Board Cases," were disposed of in
five separate opinions. The dissenting opinion, post, p. 301 U. S. 76 ,
applies to Nos. 419, 420 and 421, and 422 and 423. The dissenting
opinion, post, p. 301 U. S. 133 , applies to No. 365. The opinion in No.
469 was unanimous.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. 151.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															This section is as follows:

															"Section 1. The denial by employers of the right of employees to
organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency,
safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b)
occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting,
restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of
commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or
(d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as
substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing
from or into the channels of commerce."

															"The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract,
and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of
ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries."

															"Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by
restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees."

															"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."

															[ Footnote 3 ] See Note 2 supra, p. 23.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															What is quoted above is followed by this proviso -- not here
involved --

															" Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in the National
Industrial Recovery Act (U.S.C. Supp. VII, title 15, secs.
701-712), as amended from time to time, or in any code or agreement
approved or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees as
provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate collective bargaining
unit covered by such agreement when made."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															42 Stat. 159.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															42 Stat. 998.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															§§ 416, 422, 41 Stat. 484, 488; Interstate Commerce Act, §
13(4).

															[ Footnote 8 ] See, for example, Final Report of the Industrial
Commission (1902), vol.19, p. 844; Report of the Anthracite Coal
Strike Commission (1902), Sen.Doc. No. 6, 58th Cong., spec. sess.;
Final Report of Commission on Industrial Relations (1916), Sen.Doc.
No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st sess., vol. I; National War Labor Board,
Principles and Rules of Procedure (1919), p. 4; Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin No. 287 (1921), pp. 52-64; History of the
Shipbuilding Labor Adjustment Board, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin No. 283.

															[ Footnote 9 ] See Investigating Strike in Steel Industries, Sen.Rep.
No. 289, 66th Cong., 1st sess.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The provision is as follows:

															"SEC. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer."

															[ Footnote 11 ] See Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 .

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Note 11