U.S. Supreme Court Arizona v. Mauro, 481
U.S. 520 (1987) Arizona v. Mauro No. 85-2121 Argued March 31, 1987 Decided May 4, 1987 481
U.S. 520 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ARIZONA Syllabus After being advised of his Miranda rights while in
custody for killing his son, respondent stated that he did not wish
to answer any questions until a lawyer was present. All questioning
then ceased and respondent was placed in the police captain's
office, since there was no secure detention area. Following her
questioning in another room, respondent's wife insisted that she be
allowed to speak with her husband. Although reluctant at first, the
police allowed the meeting in the office on the condition that an
officer be present. Using a recorder placed in plain sight, the
officer taped a brief conversation, during which the wife expressed
despair, and respondent told her not to answer questions until a
lawyer was present. The prosecution used the tape to rebut
respondent's insanity defense, the trial court having refused to
suppress it upon finding that the police's actions were not a
subterfuge to avoid the dictates of Miranda. Respondent
was convicted and sentenced to death, but the Arizona Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the police had impermissibly interrogated
respondent within the meaning of Miranda. Noting police
admissions that they knew it was "possible" that respondent might
make incriminating statements if he saw his wife, the court relied
on the ruling in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.
S. 291 , that "interrogation" includes a practice --
whether actual questioning or "its functional equivalent" -- that
the police know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from a suspect. According to Innis, the
likelihood-of-response question focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the
police. Held: The police's actions following respondent's
refusal to be questioned without a lawyer did not constitute
interrogation or its functional equivalent. The purpose of Miranda and Innis is to prevent the government
from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract
confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment.
This purpose is not implicated here, since respondent was not
subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct
questioning. There is no evidence that the police allowed the wife
to meet with respondent in order to obtain incriminating
statements. Moreover, police testimony, which the trial court found
credible, indicated a number of legitimate reasons for an officer's
presence at the meeting, including the wife's safety and various
security considerations. Furthermore, an examination of the
situation Page 481 U. S. 521 from respondent's perspective demonstrates the improbability
that he would have felt he was being coerced to incriminate himself
simply because he was told his wife would be allowed to speak to
him. Although the police were indeed aware that it was "possible"
respondent would incriminate himself while talking to his wife,
police do not "interrogate" a suspect simply by hoping he will
confess. Thus, respondent's statements to his wife were voluntary,
and their use at his trial was not prohibited by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 481 U. S. 525 -530.

															149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393 ,
reversed and remanded.

															POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 481 U. S.
530 .

															JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															While respondent in this case was in police custody, he
indicated that he did not wish to answer any questions until a
lawyer was present. The issue presented is whether, in the
circumstances of this case, officers interrogated respondent in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments when they allowed
him to speak with his wife in the presence of a police officer. I On November 23, 1982, the Flagstaff Police Department received a
telephone call from a local K mart store. The caller stated that a
man had entered the store claiming to have killed his son. When
officers reached the store, respondent Mauro freely admitted that
he had killed his son. He directed the officers to the child's
body, and then was arrested and advised of his constitutional
rights pursuant to Page 481 U. S. 522 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The officers then took Mauro to the police station, where
he was advised of his Miranda rights again. At that point,
Mauro told the officers that he did not wish to make any more
statements without having a lawyer present. All questioning then
ceased. As no secure detention area was available, Mauro was held
in the office of the police captain.

															At the same time, one of the officers, Detective Manson, was
questioning Mauro's wife in another room. After she finished
speaking with Manson, Mrs. Mauro asked if she could speak to her
husband. Manson was reluctant to allow the meeting, but after Mrs.
Mauro insisted, he discussed the request with his supervisor,
Sergeant Allen. Allen testified that he "saw no harm in it, and
suggested to [Manson] that, if she really sincerely wanted to talk
to him, to go ahead and allow it." App. 74. Allen instructed Manson
not to leave Mr. and Mrs. Mauro alone, and suggested that Manson
tape-record the conversation.

															Manson then

															"told both Mr. and Mrs. Mauro that they could speak together
only if an officer were present in the room to observe and hear
what was going on." Id. at 218 (findings of trial court). He brought Mrs.
Mauro into the room and seated himself at a desk, placing a tape
recorder in plain sight on the desk. He recorded their brief
conversation, in which she expressed despair about their situation.
During the conversation, Mauro told his wife not to answer
questions until a lawyer was present. [ Footnote 1 ] Page 481 U. S. 523 Mauro's defense at trial was that he had been insane at the time
of the crime. In rebuttal, the prosecution played the tape of the
meeting between Mauro and his wife, arguing that it demonstrated
that Mauro was sane on the day of the murder. Mauro sought
suppression of the recording on the ground that it was a product of
police interrogation in violation of his Miranda rights.
The trial court refused to suppress the recording. First, it
explained the basis of the officers' decision to allow Mrs. Mauro
to meet with her husband in the presence of a policeman:

															"The police counseled [Mrs. Mauro] not to [speak with her
husband], but she was adamant about that. They finally yielded to
her insistent demands. The Police Station lacked a secure interview
room. The police justifiably appeared [ sic ] for Mrs.
Mauro's . . . safety, and they were also concerned about security,
both in terms of whether Mr. and Mrs. Mauro might cook up a lie
or Page 481 U. S. 524 swap statements with each other that shouldn't have been
allowed, and whether some escape attempt might have been made, or
whether there might have been an attempt to smuggle in a weapon.
They really had no idea what to expect along those lines." Ibid. In light of these justifications, the trial court
found

															"that this procedure was not a ruse, nor a subterfuge by the
police. They did not create this situation [ i.e., allowing
the meeting] as an indirect means of avoiding the dictates of Miranda. " Ibid. Accordingly, the trial court admitted the
evidence. Mauro was convicted of murder and child abuse, and
sentenced to death.

															The Arizona Supreme Court reversed. 149 Ariz. 24, 716 P.2d 393 (1986). It found that, by allowing Mauro to speak with his wife in
the presence of a police officer, the detectives interrogated Mauro
within the meaning of Miranda. This interrogation was
impermissible, the court said, because Mauro previously had invoked
the right to have counsel present before being questioned further.
The court noted that both detectives had acknowledged in pretrial
hearings that they knew it was "possible" that Mauro might make
incriminating statements if he saw his wife. [ Footnote 2 ] The court relied Page 481 U. S. 525 on our statement in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.
S. 291 (1980), that interrogation includes a "practice
that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect," id. at 446 U. S. 301 .
The court then concluded that the officers' testimony demonstrated
that there had been interrogation, because "[t]hey both knew that,
if the conversation took place, incriminating statements were
likely to be made." 149 Ariz. at 31, 716 P.2d at 400. Therefore, it
held that the tape recording was not properly admitted at Mauro's
trial.

															Arizona filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because the
decision below appeared to misconstrue our decision in Rhode
Island v. Innis, supra, we granted the petition, 479 U.S. 811
(1986). We now reverse. II We begin by summarizing the relevant legal principles. The Fifth
Amendment provides that no "person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." [ Footnote 3 ] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court concluded that,

															"without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 384 U. S. 467 .
"Accordingly, the Court formulated the now-familiar procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.'" Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.
S. 564 , 479 U. S. 572 (1987) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 384 U. S.
444 ). Among these is the rule that, when an accused
has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, [he] is not subject to further interrogation by the
authorities Page 481 U. S. 526 until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 , 451 U. S.
484 -485 (1981).

															One of the questions frequently presented in cases in this area
is whether particular police conduct constitutes "interrogation."
In Miranda, the Court suggested in one passage that
"interrogation" referred only to actual "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 444 .
But this statement was clarified in Rhode Island v. Innis,
supra. In that case, the Court reviewed the police practices
that had evoked the Miranda Court's concern about the
coerciveness of the " interrogation environment.'" 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 299 (quoting Miranda, supra, at 384 U. S.
457 ). The questioned practices included "the use of lineups in which a coached witness would pick the
defendant as the perpetrator . . . [,] the so-called 'reverse
line-up,' in which a defendant would be identified by coached
witnesses as the perpetrator of a fictitious crime,"

															and a variety of

															"psychological ploys, such as to 'posi[t]' 'the guilt of the
subject,' to 'minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,' and
'to cast blame on the victim or on society.'"

															446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 299 (quoting Miranda, supra, at 384 U. S. 450 )
(brackets by Innis Court). None of these techniques
involves express questioning, and yet the Court found that any of
them, coupled with the "interrogation environment," was likely
to

															"'subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner,' and
thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination."

															466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 399 (quoting Miranda, supra, at 384 U. S.
457 ). Thus, the Innis Court concluded that the
goals of the Miranda safeguards could be effectuated if
those safeguards extended not only to express questioning, but also
to "its functional equivalent." 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 301 .
The Court explained the phrase "functional equivalent" of
interrogation as including

															"any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an Page 481 U. S. 527 incriminating response from the suspect." Ibid. (footnotes omitted). Finally, it noted that
"[t]he latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Ibid. III We now turn to the case before us. The officers gave Mauro the
warnings required by Miranda. Mauro indicated that he did
not wish to be questioned further without a lawyer present. Mauro
never waived his right to have a lawyer present. The sole issue,
then, is whether the officers' subsequent actions rose to the level
of interrogation -- that is, in the language of Innis, whether they were the "functional equivalent" of police
interrogation. We think it is clear under both Miranda and Innis that Mauro was not interrogated. The tape recording
of the conversation between Mauro and his wife shows that Detective
Manson asked Mauro no questions about the crime or his conduct.
[ Footnote 4 ] Nor is it
suggested -- or supported by any evidence -- that Sergeant Allen's
decision to allow Mauro's wife to see him was the kind of
psychological ploy that properly could be treated as the functional
equivalent of interrogation. [ Footnote 5 ] Page 481 U. S. 528 There is no evidence that the officers sent Mrs. Mauro in to see
her husband for the purpose of eliciting incriminating statements.
As the trial court found, the officers tried to discourage her from
talking to her husband, but finally "yielded to her insistent
demands," App. 218. Nor was Detective Manson's presence improper.
His testimony, that the trial court found credible, indicated a
number of legitimate reasons -- not related to securing
incriminating statements -- for having a police officer present. See supra, at 481 U. S.
523 -524 (quoting App. 218). Finally, the weakness of
Mauro's claim that he was interrogated is underscored by examining
the situation from his perspective. Cf Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 301 (suggesting that the suspect's perspective may be relevant in some
cases in determining whether police actions constitute
interrogation). We doubt that a suspect, told by officers that his
wife will be allowed to speak to him, would feel that he was being
coerced to incriminate himself in any way.

															The Arizona Supreme Court was correct to note that there was a
"possibility" that Mauro would incriminate himself while talking to
his wife. It also emphasized that the officers were aware of that
possibility when they agreed to allow the Mauros to talk to each
other. [ Footnote 6 ] But the
actions in this case Page 481 U. S. 529 were far less questionable than the "subtle compulsion" that we
held not to be interrogation in Innis. See id. at 446 U. S. 303 .
Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will
incriminate himself. In Miranda, and again in Innis, the Court emphasized:

															"Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any
statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental
import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not
whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of
warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. . . .
Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment, and their admissibility is not affected by our holding
today." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 478 ,
quoted in Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at 446 U. S.
299 -300. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.
S. 298 , 470 U. S. 305 (1985). (" [F]ar from being prohibited by the Constitution,
admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently
desirable'" (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181 , 431 U. S. 187 (1977))). Mauro was not subjected to compelling influences,
psychological ploys, or direct questioning. Thus, his volunteered
statements cannot properly be considered the result of police
interrogation. In deciding whether particular police conduct is interrogation,
we must remember the purpose behind our decisions in Miranda and Edwards: preventing government
officials from Page 481 U. S. 530 using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions
that would not be given in an unrestrained environment. The
government actions in this case do not implicate this purpose in
any way. Police departments need not adopt inflexible rules barring
suspects from speaking with their spouses, nor must they ignore
legitimate security concerns by allowing spouses to meet in
private. In short, the officers in this case acted reasonably and
lawfully by allowing Mrs. Mauro to speak with her husband. In this
situation, the Federal Constitution does not forbid use of Mauro's
subsequent statements at his criminal trial. IV The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed. The case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The entire conversation proceeded as follows:

															"MRS. MAURO: Please -- please, I don't know what to do. We
should have put David [the victim] in the hospital. Please -- I
don't know what we're going to do. We should have went for help --
we should have went for help."

															"[MR. MAURO]: You tried as best you could to stop it."

															"MRS. MAURO: I -- "

															"[MR. MAURO]: Shut up."

															"MRS. MAURO: -- taken him to a mental hospital or something.
What'll we do?"

															"[MR. MAURO]: Shut up."

															"DET. MANSON: Do you know a reverend or a priest or someone you
can talk to -- take care of David?"

															"MRS. MAURO: No."

															"[MR. MAURO]: Don't answer questions until you get rights of
attorney before you find out whats [ sic ] going on. You
tried to stop me as best you can. What are you going to do, kill
me? You tried the best you can to stop me."

															"MRS. MAURO: I don't -- we don't -- I don't have money."

															"[MR. MAURO]: There's a public attorney."

															"MRS. MAURO: I don't know."

															"[MR. MAURO]: There's a public attorney. Why don't you just be
quiet."

															"MRS. MAURO: I don't have any money to bury him. I don't have
any money. All I got is enough money for the rent for the children
and that's it."

															"DET. MANSON: Did you want to talk to your husband any
more?"

															"MRS. MAURO: No, I can't talk to him."

															"[MR. MAURO]: Then don't talk to me -- get out."

															"MRS. MAURO: I don't know what to do. O.K."

															149 Ariz. 24, 30-31, 716 P.2d 393 ,
399-400 (1986).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The court relied on testimony of the officers at the hearing in
the trial court on the suppression motion. Sergeant Allen testified
as follows:

															"Q. [C]ertainly when you sent an officer in there to listen to
that conversation, you knew that it was possible that he might make
incriminating statements?"

															"A. That's correct."

															"Q. And obviously, you wanted to record that conversation so as
to have a record of those incriminating statements."

															"A. That's correct." Id. at 30, 716 P.2d at 399. Detective Manson's
testimony was as follows:

															"Q. [Detective Manson], certainly you were aware that, during
the conversation, either [Mrs. Mauro] or my client may have given
an incriminating statement?"

															"A. Yes."

															"Q. And obviously one of the purposes of your tape-recording the
interview was to take down any such statements?"

															"A. Yes, sir." Ibid. [ Footnote 3 ]

															In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964),
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires observance of
this privilege in state court proceedings.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															In the course of the conversation, that apparently lasted only a
few minutes, Manson made two statements, both apparently directed
at Mauro's wife. See n 1, supra. [ Footnote 5 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that the officers "employed a powerful
psychological ploy." Post at 481 U. S. 531 .
He bases this statement on his reading of the record that the
officers

															"failed to give respondent any advance warning that Mrs. Mauro
was coming to talk to him, that a police officer would accompany
her, or that their conversation would be recorded." Ibid. This reading is difficult to reconcile with the
trial court's conclusion that the officers

															"told both Mr. and Mrs. Mauro that they could speak together
only if an officer were present in the room to observe and hear
what was going on."

															App. 218. This sentence seems to indicate that Mauro received
advance warning. But accepting the facts as JUSTICE STEVENS states
them, the opinion still makes it clear that Mauro was fully
informed before the conversation began. Similarly, it may be that
the officers did not give Mr. Mauro advance warning that they would
record the conversation, but the trial court noted that

															"[t]he officer who was present produced a tape recorder and told
the couple that their conversation would be recorded, and put that
tape recorder down on the desk in plain sight and taped their
conversation, so they had knowledge that that was going on." Ibid. JUSTICE STEVENS also implies that respondent was
forced against his will to talk to his wife. Post at 481 U. S. 531 .
But, as the trial court observed,

															"[t]he defendant, with knowledge that the police were listening,
could have chosen not to speak to his wife. Instead, he chose to
speak."

															App. 219. In short, the trial court's findings completely rebut
the atmosphere of oppressive police conduct portrayed by the
dissent.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The dissent suggests that the Arizona Supreme Court found as a
fact that the officers intended to interrogate Mauro and faults us
for reversing this allegedly factual finding. With due respect, we
disagree with this reading of the record. The Arizona Supreme Court
did not conclude that the officers intended to interrogate Mauro.
Rather, it concluded that "[t]hey both knew that . . .
incriminating statements were likely to be made." 149 Ariz. at 31,
716 P.2d at 400. Taken in context, this is a determination that the
facts known to the officers satisfied the legal standard we
established in Rhode Island v. Innis. Our decision today
does not overturn any of the factual findings of the Arizona
Supreme Court. Rather, it rests on a determination that the facts
of this case do not present a sufficient likelihood of
incrimination to satisfy the legal standard articulated in Miranda v. Arizona and in Rhode Island v.
Innis. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

															The Supreme Court of Arizona unanimously and unequivocally
concluded that the police intended to interrogate respondent.
[ Footnote 2/1 ] This Court reverses,
finding that no interrogation Page 481 U. S. 531 occurred because Mauro "was not subjected to compelling
influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning." Ante at 481 U. S. 529 .
The record indicates, however, that the police employed a powerful
psychological ploy; they failed to give respondent any advance
warning that Mrs. Mauro was coming to talk to him, that a police
officer would accompany her, or that their conversation would be
recorded. [ Footnote 2/2 ] As the
transcript of the conversation reveals, respondent would not have
freely chosen to speak with her. See ante at 481 U. S.
522 -523, n. 1. These facts compel the conclusion that
the police took advantage of Mrs. Mauro's request to visit her
husband, setting up a confrontation between them at a time when he
manifestly desired to remain silent. Because they allowed
respondent's conversation with his wife to commence at a time when
they knew it was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating
statement, the police interrogated him. The Court's opposite
conclusion removes an important brick from the wall of Page 481 U. S. 532 protection against police overreaching that surrounds the Fifth
Amendment rights of suspects in custody. I At the time of the meeting in question between William Mauro and
his wife, he was in police custody and had requested an attorney.
It is therefore undisputed that he could not be subjected to
interrogation until he either received the assistance of counsel or
initiated a conversation with the police. See ante at 481 U. S.
525 -526; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.
S. 477 , 451 U. S.
484 -485 (1981). Since neither event occurred, the
tape-recorded evidence must be excluded if it was the product of
"interrogation" within the meaning of Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980).

															Police conduct may constitute "interrogation" even if the
officers do not pose direct questions to the suspect. The Court
explained the term in Rhode Island v. Innis :

															"[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. . . .
A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to
evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation." Id. at 446 U. S. 301 (footnotes omitted).

															In a footnote, the Court added:

															"By 'incriminating response,' we refer to any response --
whether inculpatory or exculpatory -- that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial." Id. at 446 U. S. 301 ,
n. 5 (emphasis in original).

															The Arizona Supreme Court correctly applied the Innis standard when it held that

															"the admission of a tape-recorded conversation between [Mauro]
and his wife violated his state and federal rights not to
incriminate himself. U.S.Const. amend. V, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. 2,
§ 10."

															149 Ariz. 24, 29, Page 481 U. S. 533 716 P.2d 393 ,
398 (1986). [ Footnote 2/3 ] After
distinguishing the cases on which the Attorney General of Arizona
relied, [ Footnote 2/4 ] the State
Supreme Court explained:

															"Unlike the Narten cases and Summerlin, this
is not a case where an officer accidentally overhears a
conversation. Rather, here we have illicit custodial interrogation.
At the time of the tape recording at issue, appellant was under
arrest and being detained at a police station. There is no doubt
that this constituted a custodial setting. However, besides being
in a custodial setting, the conversation must constitute
'interrogation.'"

															"Interrogation includes a 'practice that the police should know
is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a
suspect.' Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S.
291 , 446 U. S. 301 . . .
(1980)."

															"The focus in ascertaining whether particular police conduct
amounts to interrogation, then, is not on the form of the words
used, but the intent of the police officers and the perceptions of
the Page 481 U. S. 534 suspect."

															" State v. Finehout, 136 Ariz. at 230, 665 P.2d at 574.
An incriminating response is any response -- whether inculpatory or
exculpatory -- that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S.
301 n. 5. . . ."

															"The intent of the detectives is clear from their own testimony.
They both knew that, if the conversation took place, incriminating
statements were likely to be made. With that in mind, they decided
to take in a tape recorder, sit near appellant and his wife and
allow the conversation to commence."

															"Since the intent of the detectives is so clear, we need not
address appellant's perceptions. Whether the police knew that
appellant was unusually disoriented or upset might have been an
important factor in this case had the State's intent not been so
unambiguous. See id., 446 U.S. at 446 U. S.
302 -03 . . . (suspect's peculiar susceptibility to the
police appeal and whether the police knew that appellant was
unusually disoriented or upset are factors to be examined in
determining the perceptions of a suspect). We find, therefore, that
in allowing the conversation to commence, the police did indirectly
what they could not do directly -- interrogate appellant." Id. at 31-32, 716 P.2d at 400-401. II The Court's proffered reasons for disturbing these cogent
findings are unpersuasive. In Rhode Island v. Innis, the
Court emphasized that the police "cannot be held accountable for
the unforeseeable results of their words or actions." 446 U.S. at 446 U. S.
301 -302. But there is a grand canyon between innocent
unforeseeability and the mere lack of explicit police subterfuge
that the Court now finds adequate to preclude a finding that an
interrogation has taken place. It is, of course, true that the
trial court found that the spousal conversation, which Detective
Manson witnessed and recorded, Page 481 U. S. 535 "was not a ruse, nor a subterfuge by the police. . . . They did
not create this situation as an indirect means of avoiding the
dictates of Miranda. "

															App. 218. But this observation, as the Arizona Supreme Court
correctly recognized, is not sufficient to satisfy the concerns of
the Fifth Amendment.

															It is undisputed that a police decision to place two suspects in
the same room and then to listen to or record their conversation
may constitute a form of interrogation even if no questions are
asked by any police officers. That is exactly what happened here.
[ Footnote 2/5 ] The police placed
respondent and his wife, who was also in police custody, in the
same small area. Mr. and Mrs. Mauro were both suspects in the
murder of their son. Each of them had been interrogated separately
before the officers decided to allow them to converse, an act that
surely did not require a tape recorder or the presence of a police
officer within hearing range. Under the circumstances, the police
knew or should have known that Mrs. Mauro's encounter with
respondent was reasonably likely to produce an incriminating
response. Indeed, Officer Allen's supervisor testified that the
police had a reasonable expectation that the spousal conversation
would provide information on the murder investigation. When
asked,

															"what was the purpose in having Detective Manson present during
any interview or confrontation . . . between the defendant, Mr.
Mauro, and his wife . . . ?"

															Captain Latham replied:

															"Well, one of the reasons would be to, for her protection, in
case he attacked her or there was any violence that occurred. . . .
The other reason would be to see what the conversation was about. She and he both were under investigation at that time, and any
statements that she made or he made could shed light on our
case. "

															App. 101 (emphasis added). Page 481 U. S. 536 In my opinion, it was not only likely, but highly probable, that
one of the suspects would make a statement that the prosecutor
might seek to introduce at trial. It follows that the police
conduct in this case was the "functional equivalent" of deliberate,
direct interrogation.

															The State should not be permitted to set aside this conclusion
with testimony that merely indicates that the evidence-gathering
purpose of the police was mixed with other motives. For example, it
is irrelevant to the inquiry whether the police had legitimate
security reasons for having an officer present that were "not
related to securing incriminating statements." Ante at 481 U. S. 528 .
Nor does it matter that the officers lacked a precise expectation
of how the statements Mauro would make might be incriminating; much
interrogation is exploratory, rather than directed at the admission
of a fact whose incriminatory import is already known to the
officers.

															The Court's final proffered reason for disregarding the findings
of the Supreme Court of Arizona is that the suspect may not have
felt coerced to incriminate himself. The police did not compel or
even encourage Mauro to speak with his wife. When they brought her
into the room without warning Mauro in advance, however, they
expected that the resulting conversation "could shed light on our
case." App. 101. Under the circumstances, the mere fact that
respondent's wife made the initial request leading to the
conversation does not alter the correctness of the Supreme Court of
Arizona's analysis. The officers exercised exclusive control over
whether and when the suspects spoke with each other; the police
knew that whatever Mauro might wish to convey to his wife at that
moment he would have to say under the conditions unilaterally
imposed by the officers. In brief, the police exploited the
custodial situation and the understandable desire of Mrs. Mauro to
speak with respondent to conduct an interrogation.

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court credited part, but not all, of
the following testimony by Detective Manson:

															"Q. I'd like to ask you some questions concerning police
interrogation techniques, if I might."

															"Do you have any experience in police interrogation
techniques?"

															"A. Yes, sir."

															" * * * *" "Q. Another technique, Byron, would be to, for example, if you
are investigating a juvenile matter, to have the parents come down
and speak to the juvenile in your presence?"

															"A. That's correct."

															"Q. Along those same lines, it's not uncommon to ask a family
member to come in and speak to someone in your presence?"

															"A. That's correct."

															"Q. And, in fact, that technique was utilized in this case,
isn't it true?"

															"A. I don't believe so, no, sir. That was not our purpose. That
was not an interrogation method."

															App. 79, 81.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The trial court found that the police "told both Mr. and Mrs.
Mauro that they could speak together only if an officer were
present in the room to observe what was going on." App. 218. This
advice was not given to Mr. Mauro until Mrs. Mauro entered the room
in which he was being held. The trial court did not dispute the
testimony of Officer Manson, which establishes that, up to the
moment when Mrs. Mauro and Officer Manson entered the room with the
tape recorder running, every effort was made to keep respondent
from knowing that Mrs. Mauro was in the police station:

															"Q. When did Mrs. Mauro become aware that her husband was in
custody at the Police Station?"

															"A. I'm not sure. It was probably during our initial interview.
I know that we had closed the door to the captain's office, and
that we entered through the back door. We didn't want them to see
each other." Id. at 111-112.

															There is nothing in the trial court's opinion or elsewhere in
the record to support the Court's apparent assumption, see
ante at 481 U. S.
527 -528, n. 5, that Officer Manson separately advised
respondent beforehand that his wife would be brought in to see him
and that a police officer would monitor the conversation.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The Arizona Supreme Court, after studying the trial record in
light of our precedents, concluded that respondent's Fifth
Amendment rights had been violated. Its decision rests on a careful
evaluation of the behavior of the local police. Justices of that
court regularly review cases in which Arizona police officers have
testified. The Arizona Supreme Court's assessment of the actual
intent of the Arizona police officers who testified in this case is
therefore a good deal more reliable than this Court's. Indeed,
whenever this Court reviews a state appellate court's examination
of a trial record, there is a special risk of error resulting from
lack of familiarity with local conditions and from the limited time
the Members of this Court can devote to study of the trial record.
In some instances, this risk of error is outweighed by the
necessity of granting review to decide an "issue of general or
recurring significance" or to resolve a split of authority. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523 , 479 U. S. 536 (1987) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In my opinion, however, no trace
of such necessity is present in this case. The vote of four Members
of this Court to grant certiorari in this case was surely an
exercise of indiscretion.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] State v. Narten, 99 Ariz. 116, 407 P.2d
81 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); Narten v. Eyman, 460 F.2d 184 (CA9 1969); State v.
Summerlin, 138 Ariz. 426, 675 P.2d 686 (1984).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The regrettable irony in this case is that respondent endured
the functional equivalent of interrogation while in the very
process of advising his wife to exercise her own Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. See ante at 481 U. S.
522 -523, n. 1.