U.S. Supreme Court Lavender v. Kurn, 327
U.S. 645 (1946) Lavender v. Kurn No. 550 Argued March 6, 7,
1946 Decided March 25,
1946 327
U.S. 645 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MISSOURI Syllabus 1. In this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the evidence of the defendants' negligence (detailed in the
opinion) was sufficient to justify submission of the case to the
jury, and the judgment of the appellate court setting aside the
verdict for the plaintiff cannot be sustained. P. 327 U. S.
652 .

															2. There being a reasonable basis in the record for an inference
by the jury that the injury resulted from the defendants'
negligence, it is not within the province of the appellate court to
weigh the conflicting evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses,
and arrive at a conclusion opposite from that reached by the jury.
P. 327 U. S.
652 .

															3. In suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the
appellate court's function is exhausted when the evidentiary basis
for the jury's verdict becomes apparent, it being immaterial that
the court might draw a contrary inference or consider another
conclusion more reasonable. P. 327 U. S.
653 .

															4. Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to
support the conclusion reached by the jury does reversible error
appear. P. 327 U. S.
653 .

															5. The jury could reasonably have inferred from the evidence in
this case that the place at which the employee of the carrier was
working, though technically a public street, was unsafe, and that
this circumstance contributed in part to the employee's death. P. 327 U. S.
653 .

															6. In actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
rulings on the admissibility of evidence must normally be left to
the sound discretion of the trial judge. P. 327 U. S.
654 .

															354 Mo.196, 189 S.W.2d 253, reversed.

															In a suit brought in a state court under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act by petitioner against the respondents, Page 327 U. S. 646 a judgment for the petitioner was reversed by the Supreme Court
of the State. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U.S. 713. Reversed, p. 327 U. S.
654 .

															MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The Federal Employers' Liability Act permits recovery for
personal injuries to an employee of a railroad engaged in
interstate commerce if such injuries result

															"in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines,
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or
other equipment."

															45 U.S.C. § 51.

															Petitioner, the administrator of the estate of L. E. Haney,
brought this suit under the Act against the respondent trustees of
the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company (Frisco) and the
respondent Illinois Central Railroad Company. It was charged that
Haney, while employed as a switchtender by the respondents in the
switchyard of the Grand Central Station in Memphis, Tennessee, was
killed as a result of respondents' negligence. Following a trial in
the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of petitioner, and awarded damages in
the amount of Page 327 U. S. 647 $30,000. Judgment was entered accordingly. On appeal, however,
the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the judgment, holding that
there was no substantial evidence of negligence to support the
submission of the case to the jury. 189 S.W.2d 253. We granted
certiorari, 326 U.S. 713, to review the propriety of the Supreme
Court's action under the circumstances of this case.

															It was admitted that Haney was employed by the Illinois Central,
or a subsidiary corporation thereof, as a switchtender in the
railroad yards near the Grand Central Station, which was owned by
the Illinois Central. His duties included the throwing of switches
for the Illinois Central, as well as for the Frisco and other
railroads using that station. For these services, the trustees of
Frisco paid the Illinois Central two-twelfths of Haney's wages;
they also paid two-twelfths of the wages of two other
switch-tenders who worked at the same switches. In addition, the
trustees paid Illinois Central $1.87 1/2 for each passenger car
switched into Grand Central Station, which included all the cars in
the Frisco train being switched into the station at the time Haney
was killed.

															The Illinois Central tracks run north and south directly past
and into the Grand Central Station. About 2,700 feet south of the
station, the Frisco tracks cross at right angles to the Illinois
Central tracks. A westbound Frisco train wishing to use the station
must stop some 250 feet or more west of this crossing and back into
the station over a switch line curving east and north. The events
in issue center about the switch several feet north of the main
Frisco tracks at the point where the switch line branches off. This
switch controls the tracks at this point.

															It was very dark on the evening of December 21, 1939. At about
7:30 p.m., a westbound interstate Frisco passenger train stopped on
the Frisco main line, its rear some 20 or 30 feet west of the
switch. Haney, in the performance of his duties, threw or opened
the switch to permit Page 327 U. S. 648 the train to back into the station. The respondents claimed that
Haney was then required to cross to the south side of the track
before the train passed the switch, and the conductor of the train
testified that he saw Haney so cross. But there was also evidence
that Haney's duties required him to wait at the switch north of the
track until the train had cleared, close the switch, return to his
shanty near the crossing, and change the signals from red to green
to permit trains on the Illinois Central tracks to use the
crossing. The Frisco train cleared the switch, backing at the rate
of 8 or 10 miles per hour. But the switch remained open, and the
signals still were red. Upon investigation, Haney was found north
of the track near the switch lying face down on the ground,
unconscious. An ambulance was called, but he was dead upon arrival
at the hospital.

															Haney had been struck in the back of the head, causing a
fractured skull from which he died. There were no known
eyewitnesses to the fatal blow. Although it is not clear, there is
evidence that his body was extended north and south, the head to
the south. Apparently he had fallen forward to the south; his face
was bruised on the left side from hitting the ground, and there
were marks indicating that his toes had dragged a few inches
southward as he fell. His head was about 5 1/2 feet north of the
Frisco tracks. Estimates ranged from 2 feet to 14 feet as to how
far west of the switch he lay.

															The injury to Haney's head was evidenced by a gash about two
inches long from which blood flowed. The back of Haney's white cap
had a corresponding black mark about an inch and a half long and an
inch wide, running at an angle downward to the right of the center
of the back of the head. A spot of blood was later found at a point
3 or 4 feet north of the tracks. The conclusion following an
autopsy was that Haney's skull was fractured by "some fast-moving
small round object." One of the Page 327 U. S. 649 examining doctors testified that such an object might have been
attached to a train backing at the rate of 8 or 10 miles per hour.
But he also admitted that the fracture might have resulted from a
blow from a pipe or club, or some similar round object, in the
hands of an individual.

															Petitioner's theory is that Haney was struck by the curled end
or tip of a mail hook hanging down loosely on the outside of the
mail car of the backing train. This curled end was 73 inches above
the top of the rail, which was 7 inches high. The overhang of the
mail car in relation to the rails was about 2 to 2 1/2 feet. The
evidence indicated that, when the mail car swayed or moved around a
curve, the mail hook might pivot, its curled end swinging out as
much as 12 to 14 inches. The curled end could thus be swung out to
a point 3 to 3 1/2 feet from the rail, and about 73 inches above
the top of the rail. Both east and west of the switch, however, was
an uneven mound of cinders and dirt rising at its highest points 18
to 24 inches above the top of the rails. Witnesses differed as to
how close the mound approached the rails, the estimates varying
from 3 to 15 feet. But, taking the figures most favorable to the
petitioner, the mound extended to a point 6 to 12 inches north of
the overhanging side of the mail car. If the mail hook end swung
out 12 to 14 inches, it would be 49 to 55 inches above the highest
parts of the mound. Haney was 67 1/2 inches tall. If he had been
standing on the mound about a foot from the side of the mail car,
he could have been hit by the end of the mail hook, the exact point
of contact depending upon the height of the mound at the particular
point. His wound was about 4 inches below the top of his head, or
63 1/2 inches above the point where he stood on the mound -- well
within the possible range of the mail hook end.

															Respondents' theory is that Haney was murdered. They point to
the estimates that the mound was 10 to 15 feet north of the rail,
making it impossible for the mail Page 327 U. S. 650 hook end to reach a point of contact with Haney's head.
Photographs were placed in the record to support the claim that the
ground was level north of the rail for at least 10 feet. Moreover,
it appears that the area immediately surrounding the switch was
quite dark. Witnesses stated that it was so dark that it was
impossible to see a 3-inch pipe 25 feet away. It also appears that
many hoboes and tramps frequented the area at night in order to get
rides on freight trains. Haney carried a pistol to protect himself.
This pistol was found loose under his body by those who came to his
rescue. It was testified, however, that the pistol had apparently
slipped out of his pocket or scabbard as he fell. Haney's clothes
were not disarranged, and there was no evidence of a struggle or
fight. No rods, pipes, or weapons of any kind, except Haney's own
pistol, were found near the scene. Moreover, his gold watch and
diamond ring were still on him after he was struck. Six days later,
his unsoiled billfold was found on a high board fence about a block
from the place where Haney was struck, and near the point where he
had been placed in an ambulance. It contained his social security
card and other effects, but no money. His wife testified that he
"never carried much money, not very much more than $10." Such were
the facts in relation to respondents' theory of murder.

															Finally, one of the Frisco foremen testified that he arrived at
the scene shortly after Haney was found injured. He later examined
the fireman's side of the train very carefully, and found nothing
sticking out or in disorder. In explaining why he examined this
side of the train so carefully, he stated that, while he was at the
scene of the accident, "someone said they thought that train No.
106 backing in to Grand Central Station is what struck this man,"
and that Haney "was supposed to have been struck by something
protruding on the side of the train." The foreman testified that
these statements were made by an Page 327 U. S. 651 unknown Illinois Central switchman standing near the fallen body
of Haney. The foreman admitted that the switchman "didn't see the
accident." This testimony was admitted by the trial court over the
strenuous objections of respondents' counsel that it was mere
hearsay falling outside the res gestae rule.

															The jury was instructed that Frisco's trustees were liable if it
was found that they negligently permitted a rod or other object to
extend out from the side of the train as it backed past Haney, and
that Haney was killed as the direct result of such negligence, if
any. The jury was further told that Illinois Central was liable if
it was found that the company negligently maintained an unsafe and
dangerous place for Haney to work, in that the ground was high and
uneven and the light insufficient and inadequate, and that Haney
was injured and killed as a direct result of the said place's being
unsafe and dangerous. This latter instruction as to Illinois
Central did not require the jury to find that Haney was killed by
something protruding from the train.

															The Supreme Court, in upsetting the jury's verdict against both
the Frisco trustees and the Illinois Central, admitted that

															"It could be inferred from the facts that Haney could have been
struck by the mail hook knob if he were standing on the
south side of the mound and the mail hook extended out as far as 12
or 14 inches."

															But it held that "all reasonable minds would agree that it would
be mere speculation and conjecture to say that Haney was struck by
the mail hook," and that "plaintiff failed to make a submissible
case on that question." It also ruled that there "was no
substantial evidence that the uneven ground and insufficient light
were cause or contributing causes of the death of Haney." Finally,
the Supreme Court held that the testimony of the foreman as to the
statement made to him by the unknown switchmen was inadmissible
under the res gestae rule, since the switchman spoke from
what he had heard, rather than from his own knowledge. Page 327 U. S. 652 We hold, however, that there was sufficient evidence of
negligence on the part of both the Frisco trustee and the Illinois
Central to justify the submission of the case to the jury and to
require appellate courts to abide by the verdict rendered by the
jury.

															The evidence we have already detailed demonstrates that there
was evidence from which it might be inferred that the end of the
mail hook struck Haney in the back of the head -- an inference that
the Supreme Court admitted could be drawn. That inference is not
rendered unreasonable by the fact that Haney apparently fell
forward toward the main Frisco track, so that his head was 5 1/2
feet north of the rail. He may well have been struck and then
wandered in a daze to the point where he fell forward. The
testimony as to blood marks some distance away from his head lends
credence to that possibility, indicating that he did not fall
immediately upon being hit. When that is added to the evidence most
favorable to the petitioner as to the height and swing-out of the
hook, the height and location of the mound, and the nature of
Haney's duties, the inference that Haney was killed by the hook
cannot be said to be unsupported by probative facts, or to be so
unreasonable as to warrant taking the case from the jury.

															It is true that there is evidence tending to show that it was
physically and mathematically impossible for the hook to strike
Haney. And there are facts from which it might reasonably be
inferred that Haney was murdered. But such evidence has become
irrelevant upon appeal, there being a reasonable basis in the
record for inferring that the hook struck Haney. The jury having
made that inference, the respondents were not free to relitigate
the factual dispute in a reviewing court. Under these
circumstances, it would be an undue invasion of the jury's historic
function for an appellate court to weigh the conflicting evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses, and Page 327 U. S. 653 arrive at a conclusion opposite from the one reached by the
jury. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54 , 318 U. S. 67 -68; Bailey v. Central Vermont R.R. Co., 319 U.
S. 350 , 319 U. S.
353 -354; Tennant v. Peoria & P.U. R. Co., 321 U. S. 29 , 321 U. S. 35 . See also Moore, "Recent Trends in Judicial Interpretation
in Railroad Cases Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act," 29
Marquette L.Rev. 73.

															It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved
speculation and conjecture. Whenever facts are in dispute or the
evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on
the part of those whose duty it is to settle the dispute by
choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference.
Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support
the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where,
as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the
jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are
inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court's
function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent,
it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference
or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.

															We are unable therefore to sanction a reversal of the jury's
verdict against Frisco's trustees. Nor can we approve any
disturbance in the verdict as to Illinois Central. The evidence was
uncontradicted that it was very dark at the place where Haney was
working, and the surrounding ground was high and uneven. The
evidence also showed that this area was entirely within the
domination and control of Illinois Central, despite the fact that
the area was technically located in a public street of the City of
Memphis. It was not unreasonable to conclude that these conditions
constituted an unsafe and dangerous working place, and that such
conditions contributed in part to Haney's death, assuming that it
resulted primarily from the mail hook striking his head. Page 327 U. S. 654 In view of the foregoing disposition of the case, it is
unnecessary to decide whether the allegedly hearsay testimony was
admissible under the res gestae rule. Rulings on the
admissibility of evidence must normally be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge in action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. But inasmuch as there is adequate support
in the record for the jury's verdict apart from the hearsay
testimony, we need not determine whether that discretion was abused
in this instance.

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed, and
the case is remanded for whatever further proceedings may be
necessary not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concur in the
result.

															MR. JUSTICE REED dissents.

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.


U.S. Supreme Court International Shoe v. State of
Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945) International Shoe v. State of
Washington No. 107 Argued November 14,
1945 Decided December 3,
1945 326
U.S. 310 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON Syllabus Activities within a State of salesmen in the employ of a foreign
corporation, exhibiting samples of merchandise and soliciting
orders from prospective buyers to be accepted or rejected by the
corporation at a point outside the State, were systematic and
continuous, and resulted in a large volume of interstate business.
A statute of the State requires employers to pay into the state
unemployment compensation fund a specified percentage of the wages
paid for the services of employees within the State. Held: 1. In view of 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) , providing that no person
shall be relieved from compliance with a state law requiring
payments to an unemployment fund on the ground that he is engaged
in interstate commerce, the fact that the corporation is engaged in
interstate commerce does not relieve it from liability for payments
to the state unemployment compensation fund. P. 326 U. S.
315 .

															2. The activities in behalf of the corporation render it
amenable to suit in courts of the State to recover payments due to
the state unemployment compensation fund. P. 326 U. S.
320 .

															(a) The activities in question established between the State and
the corporation sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable
and just, and in conformity to the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against the
corporation an obligation arising out of such activities. P. 326 U. S.
320 .

															(b) In such a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment
compensation fund, service of process upon one of the corporation's
salesmen within the State, and notice sent by registered mail to
the corporation at its home office, satisfies the requirements of
due process. P. 326 U. S.
320 . Page 326 U. S. 311 3. The tax imposed by the state unemployment compensation
statute -- construed by the state court, in its application to the
corporation, as a tax on the privilege of employing salesmen within
the State -- does not violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. P. 326 U. S.
321 .

															22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P.2d 801, affirmed.

															APPEAL from a judgment upholding the constitutionality of a
state unemployment compensation statute as applied to the appellant
corporation.

															MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The questions for decision are (1) whether, within the
limitations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
appellant, a Delaware corporation, has, by its activities in the
State of Washington, rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the
courts of that state to recover unpaid contributions to the state
unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes,
Washington Unemployment Compensation Act, Washington Revised
Statutes, § 9998-103a through § 9998-123a, 1941 Supp., and (2)
whether the state can exact those contributions consistently with
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

															The statutes in question set up a comprehensive scheme of
unemployment compensation, the costs of which are defrayed by
contributions required to be made by employers to a state
unemployment compensation fund. Page 326 U. S. 312 The contributions are a specified percentage of the wages
payable annually by each employer for his employees' services in
the state. The assessment and collection of the contributions and
the fund are administered by appellees. Section 14(c) of the Act
(Wash.Rev.Stat., 1941 Supp., § 9998-114c) authorizes appellee
Commissioner to issue an order and notice of assessment of
delinquent contributions upon prescribed personal service of the
notice upon the employer if found within the state, or, if not so
found, by mailing the notice to the employer by registered mail at
his last known address. That section also authorizes the
Commissioner to collect the assessment by distraint if it is not
paid within ten days after service of the notice. By §§ 14e and 6b,
the order of assessment may be administratively reviewed by an
appeal tribunal within the office of unemployment upon petition of
the employer, and this determination is, by § 6i, made subject to
judicial review on questions of law by the state Superior Court,
with further right of appeal in the state Supreme Court, as in
other civil cases.

															In this case, notice of assessment for the years in question was
personally served upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant in
the State of Washington, and a copy of the notice was mailed by
registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis, Missouri.
Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment, and
moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground
that the service upon appellant's salesman was not proper service
upon appellant; that appellant was not a corporation of the State
of Washington, and was not doing business within the state; that it
had no agent within the state upon whom service could be made; and
that appellant is not an employer, and does not furnish employment
within the meaning of the statute.

															The motion was heard on evidence and a stipulation of facts by
the appeal tribunal, which denied the motion Page 326 U. S. 313 and ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the
unpaid contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner;
both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. 22 Wash. 2d
146, 154 P.2d 801. Appellant in each of these courts assailed the
statute as applied, as a violation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and as imposing a constitutionally prohibited
burden on interstate commerce. The cause comes here on appeal under
§ 237(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), appellant
assigning as error that the challenged statutes, as applied,
infringe the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
commerce clause.

															The facts, as found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the
state Superior Court and Supreme Court, are not in dispute.
Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of
business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture
and sale of shoes and other footwear. It maintains places of
business in several states other than Washington, at which its
manufacturing is carried on and from which its merchandise is
distributed interstate through several sales units or branches
located outside the State of Washington.

															Appellant has no office in Washington, and makes no contracts
either for sale or purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no
stock of merchandise in that state, and makes there no deliveries
of goods in intrastate commerce. During the years from 1937 to
1940, now in question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen
salesmen under direct supervision and control of sales managers
located in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in Washington; their
principal activities were confined to that state, and they were
compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their sales.
The commissions for each year totaled more than $31,000. Appellant
supplies its salesmen with a line of samples, each consisting of
one shoe of a pair, which Page 326 U. S. 314 they display to prospective purchasers. On occasion, they rent
permanent sample rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business
buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or business buildings
temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals is
reimbursed by appellant.

															The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their
samples and soliciting orders from prospective buyers, at prices
and on terms fixed by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders
to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or rejection,
and, when accepted, the merchandise for filling the orders is
shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers
within the state. All the merchandise shipped into Washington is
invoiced at the place of shipment, from which collections are made.
No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to make
collections.

															The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the regular
and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by appellant's
salesmen, resulting in a continuous flow of appellant's product
into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business in the
state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts. But
it was also of opinion that there were sufficient additional
activities shown to bring the case within the rule, frequently
stated, that solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign
corporation plus some additional activities there are sufficient to
render the corporation amenable to suit brought in the courts of
the state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities
there. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 , 234 U. S. 587 ; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S.
79 , 246 U. S. 87 ; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 134
F.2d 511, 516. The court found such additional activities in the
salesmen's display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms,
and the salesmen's residence within the state, continued over a
period of years, all resulting in a Page 326 U. S. 315 substantial volume of merchandise regularly shipped by appellant
to purchasers within the state. The court also held that the
statute, as applied, did not invade the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and did not impose a
prohibited burden on such commerce.

															Appellant's argument, renewed here, that the statute imposes an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce need not detain us.
For 53 Stat. 1391, 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) provides that

															"No person required under a State law to make payments to an
unemployment fund shall be relieved from compliance therewith on
the ground that he is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or
that the State law does not distinguish between employees engaged
in interstate or foreign commerce and those engaged in intrastate
commerce."

															It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the
commerce power, may authorize the states, in specified ways, to
regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 ; Perkins v. Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586; Standard
Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U. S. 306 , 319 U. S. 308 ; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.
S. 652 , 324 U. S. 679 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.
S. 761 , 325 U. S.
769 .

															Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were
not sufficient to manifest its "presence" there, and that, in its
absence, the state courts were without jurisdiction, that,
consequently, it was a denial of due process for the state to
subject appellant to suit. It refers to those cases in which it was
said that the mere solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods
within a state, to be accepted without the state and filled by
shipment of the purchased goods interstate, does not render the
corporation seller amenable to suit within the state. See Green
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U.
S. 530 , 205 U. S. 533 ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 234 U. S.
586 -587; Philadelphia Page 326 U. S. 316 & Reading R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.
S. 264 , 243 U. S. 268 ; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra, 246 U. S. 87 .
And appellant further argues that, since it was not present within
the state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to taxation
or other money exaction. It thus denies the power of the state to
lay the tax or to subject appellant to a suit for its
collection.

															Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714 , 95 U. S. 733 .
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process
requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 . See Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 , 243 U. S. 91 . Compare Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.
S. 313 , 318 U. S. 316 , 318 U. S. 319 . See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.
S. 421 ; Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.
S. 352 ; Young v. Masci, 289 U.
S. 253 . ,

															Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, Klein v.
Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 , 282 U. S. 24 , it
is clear that, unlike an individual, its "presence" without, as
well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to
act for it. To say that the corporation is so far "present" there
as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or
the maintenance of suits against it in the courts of the state, is
to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or
"presence" are Page 326 U. S. 317 used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's
agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process. L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson
v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141. Those demands may be
met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum
as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular
suit which is brought there. An "estimate of the inconveniences"
which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its
"home" or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, supra, 141.

															"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted
when the activities of the corporation there have not only been
continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities
sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an
agent to accept service of process has been given. St. Clair v.
Cox, 106 U. S. 350 , 106 U. S. 355 ; Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.
S. 602 , 172 U. S.
610 -611; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v.
Meyer, 197 U. S. 407 , 197 U. S.
414 -415; Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245 , 213 U. S.
255 -256; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
supra; cf. St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.
S. 218 . Conversely, it has been generally recognized
that the casual presence of the corporate agent, or even his
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the
corporation's behalf, are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there. St.
Clair v. Cox, supra, 106 U. S. 359 , 106 U. S. 360 ; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S.
8 , 204 U. S. 21 ; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., supra, 515, and cases
cited. To require the corporation in such circumstances to defend
the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries
on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great
and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due
process. Page 326 U. S. 318 While it has been held, in cases on which appellant relies, that
continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to
support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits
unrelated to that activity, Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough,
supra; Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., supra; Simon v.
Southern R. Co., 236 U. S. 115 ; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra; cf. Davis
v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312 , 262 U. S. 317 ,
there have been instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities. See
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915; cf. St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander, supra. Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional
acts of the corporate agent in a state sufficient to impose an
obligation or liability on the corporation has not been thought to
confer upon the state authority to enforce it, Rosenberg Bros.
& Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.
S. 516 , other such acts, because of their nature and
quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed
sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit. Cf. Kane
v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 ; Hess v. Pawloski, supra; Young v. Masci, supra. True, some
of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have been
supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its
consent to service and suit, consent being implied from its
presence in the state through the acts of its authorized agents. Lafayette Insurance Co. v.
French , 18 How. 404, 59 U. S. 407 ; St. Clair v. Cox, supra, 106 U. S. 356 ; Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, supra, 213 U. S. 254 ; Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.
S. 361 , 289 U. S.
364 -365. But, more realistically, it may be said that
those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the
fiction. Smolik v. Philadelphia & Page 326 U. S. 319 Reading Co., 222 F. 148, 151. Henderson, The Position
of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law, 94-95.

															It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary
line between those activities which justify the subjection of a
corporation to suit and those which do not cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has
sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the
corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another
state, is a little more or a little less. St. Louis S.W. R. Co.
v. Alexander, supra, 227 U. S. 228 ; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra, 234 U. S. 587 .
Whether due process is satisfied must depend, rather, upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the
due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that
a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an
individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra;
Minnesota Commercial Assn. v. Benn, 261 U.
S. 140 .

															But, to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that
privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to
respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue. Compare International Harvester Co.
v. Kentucky, supra, with Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.,
supra, and People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
supra. Compare Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley,
supra, 172 U. S. 619 , 172 U. S. 620 , and Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, supra, with Old Wayne Life
Assn. v. McDonough, supra. See 29 Columbia Law
Review, 187-195. Page 326 U. S. 320 Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of
appellant in the State of Washington were neither irregular nor
casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the years in
question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business,
in the course of which appellant received the benefits and
protection of the laws of the state, including the right to resort
to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation
which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities. It is
evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations
which appellant has incurred there. Hence, we cannot say that the
maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington involves
an unreasonable or undue procedure.

															We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the
process within the state upon an agent whose activities establish
appellant's "presence" there was not sufficient notice of the suit,
or that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to make
the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It
is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the
state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there
gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual. Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley, supra, 172 U. S. 618 , 172 U. S. 619 ; Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co., 198 U.
S. 424 , 198 U. S.
437 -438; Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, supra, 213 U. S.
254 -255. Cf. Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 , 237 U. S. 194 , 237 U. S. 195 ; See Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke
Co. , 19 Wall. 58, 86 U. S. 61 ; McDonald v. Mabee, supra; Milliken v. Meyer, supra. Nor
can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by
registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to
apprise appellant of the suit. Compare Hess v. Pawloski, supra,
with McDonald v. Mabee, supra, Page 326 U. S. 321 243 U. S. 92 ,
and Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13 , 276 U. S. 19 , 276 U. S. 24 ; cf. Becquet v. MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951; Maubourquet v. Wyse, 1 Ir.Rep.C.L. 471. See Washington
v. Superior Court, supra, 289 U. S.
365 .

															Only a word need be said of appellant's liability for the
demanded contributions to the state unemployment fund. The Supreme
Court of Washington, construing and applying the statute, has held
that it imposes a tax on the privilege of employing appellant's
salesmen within the state measured by a percentage of the wages,
here, the commissions payable to the salesmen. This construction we
accept for purposes of determining the constitutional validity of
the statute. The right to employ labor has been deemed an
appropriate subject of taxation in this country and England, both
before and since the adoption of the Constitution. Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 , 301 U. S. 579 , et seq. And such a tax imposed upon the employer for
unemployment benefits is within the constitutional power of the
states. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.
S. 495 , 301 U. S. 508 , et seq. Appellant having rendered itself amenable to suit upon
obligations arising out of the activities of its salesmen in
Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in
personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the
privilege of employing appellant's salesmen within the state. For
Washington has made one of those activities which, taken together,
establish appellant's "presence" there for purposes of suit the
taxable event by which the state brings appellant within the reach
of its taxing power. The state thus has constitutional power to lay
the tax and to subject appellant to a suit to recover it. The
activities which establish its "presence" subject it alike to
taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax. Equitable
Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.
S. 143 , 238 U. S. 146 ; cf. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Taxation, 322 U. S. 435 , 322 U. S. 442 , et seq.; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, Page 326 U. S. 322 supra, 318 U. S.
316 -319; see General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U. S. 335 . Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the following opinion.

															Congress, pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate
commerce, has expressly provided that a State shall not be
prohibited from levying the kind of unemployment compensation tax
here challenged. 26 U.S.C. 1600. We have twice decided that this
Congressional consent is an adequate answer to a claim that
imposition of the tax violates the Commerce Clause. Perkins v.
Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586, affirming 342 Pa. 529; Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.
S. 306 , 319 U. S. 308 .
Two determinations by this Court of an issue so palpably without
merit are sufficient. Consequently, that part of this appeal which
again seeks to raise the question seems so patently frivolous as to
make the case a fit candidate for dismissal. Fay v.
Crozer, 217 U. S. 455 . Nor
is the further ground advanced on this appeal, that the State of
Washington has denied appellant due process of law, any less devoid
of substance. It is my view, therefore, that we should dismiss the
appeal as unsubstantial, [ Footnote
1 ] Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U. S.
86 , 287 U. S. 90 , 287 U. S. 92 , and
decline the invitation to formulate broad rules as to the meaning
of due process, which here would amount to deciding a
constitutional question "in advance of the necessity for its
decision." Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.
S. 450 , 325 U. S.
461 . Page 326 U. S. 323 Certainly appellant cannot, in the light of our past decisions,
meritoriously claim that notice by registered mail and by personal
service on its sales solicitors in Washington did not meet the
requirements of procedural due process. And the due process clause
is not brought in issue any more by appellant's further
conceptualistic contention that Washington could not levy a tax or
bring suit against the corporation because it did not honor that
State with its mystical "presence." For it is unthinkable that the
vague due process clause was ever intended to prohibit a State from
regulating or taxing a business carried on within its boundaries
simply because this is done by agents of a corporation organized
and having its headquarters elsewhere. To read this into the due
process clause would, in fact, result in depriving a State's
citizens of due process by taking from the State the power to
protect them in their business dealings within its boundaries with
representatives of a foreign corporation. Nothing could be more
irrational, or more designed to defeat the function of our
federative system of government. Certainly a State, at the very
least, has power to tax and sue those dealing with its citizens
within its boundaries, as we have held before. Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313 .
Were the Court to follow this principle, it would provide a
workable standard for cases where, as here, no other questions are
involved. The Court has not chosen to do so, but instead has
engaged in an unnecessary discussion, in the course of which it has
announced vague Constitutional criteria applied for the first time
to the issue before us. It has thus introduced uncertain elements
confusing the simple pattern and tending to curtail the exercise of
State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution.

															The criteria adopted, insofar as they can be identified, read as
follows: Due Process does permit State courts to "enforce the
obligations which appellant has incurred" if Page 326 U. S. 324 it be found "reasonable and just according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice." And this, in
turn, means that we will "permit" the State to act if, upon

															"an 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of
business,"

															we conclude that it is "reasonable" to subject it to suit in a
State where it is doing business.

															It is true that this Court did use the terms "fair play" and
"substantial justice" in explaining the philosophy underlying the
holding that it could not be "due process of law" to render a
personal judgment against a defendant without notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457 . In McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S.
90 , 243 U. S. 91 ,
cited in the Milliken, case, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the Court, warned against judicial curtailment of this
opportunity to be heard, and referred to such a curtailment as a
denial of "fair play," which even the common law would have deemed
"contrary to natural justice." And previous cases had indicated
that the ancient rule against judgments without notice had stemmed
from "natural justice" concepts. These cases, while giving
additional reasons why notice under particular circumstances is
inadequate, did not mean thereby that all legislative enactments
which this Court might deem to be contrary to natural justice ought
to be held invalid under the due process clause. None of the cases
purport to support or could support a holding that a State can tax
and sue corporations only if its action comports with this Court's
notions of "natural justice." I should have thought the Tenth
Amendment settled that.

															I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State,
without any "ifs" or "buts," a power to tax and to open the doors
of its courts for its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do
business in those States. Believing that the Constitution gave the
States that power, I think it a judicial deprivation to condition
its exercise upon this Page 326 U. S. 325 Court's notion of "fair play," however appealing that term may
be. Nor can I stretch the meaning of due process so far as to
authorize this Court to deprive a State of the right to afford
judicial protection to its citizens on the ground that it would be
more "convenient" for the corporation to be sued somewhere
else.

															There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play,"
"justice," and "reasonableness." But they were not chosen by those
who wrote the original Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment as
a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or
Federal laws passed by elected legislative representatives. No one,
not even those who most feared a democratic government, ever
formally proposed that courts should be given power to invalidate
legislation under any such elastic standards. Express prohibitions
against certain types of legislation are found in the Constitution,
and, under the long-settled practice, courts invalidate laws found
to conflict with them. This requires interpretation, and
interpretation, it is true, may result in extension of the
Constitution's purpose. But that is no reason for reading the due
process clause so as to restrict a State's power to tax and sue
those whose activities affect persons and businesses within the
State, provided proper service can be had. Superimposing the
natural justice concept on the Constitution's specific prohibitions
could operate as a drastic abridgment of democratic safeguards they
embody, such as freedom of speech, press and religion, [ Footnote 2 ] and the right to counsel.
This Page 326 U. S. 326 has already happened. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.
S. 455 . Compare Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487 , 322 U. S.
494 -503. For application of this natural law concept,
whether under the terms "reasonableness," "justice," or "fair
play," makes judges the supreme arbiters of the country's laws and
practices. Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S.
5 , 305 U. S. 17 -18; Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 , 315 U. S. 600 ,
n. 4. This result, I believe, alters the form of government our
Constitution provides. I cannot agree.

															True, the State's power is here upheld. But the rule announced
means that tomorrow's judgment may strike down a State or Federal
enactment on the ground that it does not conform to this Court's
idea of natural justice. I therefore find myself moved by the same
fears that caused Mr. Justice Holmes to say in 1930:

															"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that
I feel at the ever-increasing scope given to the Fourteenth
Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional
rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any
limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they
happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason
undesirable." Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 , 281 U. S.
595 .

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															This Court has, on several occasions, pointed out the
undesirable consequences of a failure to dismiss frivolous appeals. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.
S. 542 , 272 U. S. 544 ; United Surety Co. v. American Fruit Product Co., 238 U. S. 140 ; De Bearn v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 233 U. S.
24 , 233 U. S.
33 -34.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															These First Amendment liberties -- freedom of speech, press and
religion -- provide a graphic illustration of the potential
restrictive capacity of a rule under which they are protected at a
particular time only because the Court, as then constituted,
believes them to be a requirement of fundamental justice.
Consequently, under the same rule, another Court, with a different
belief as to fundamental justice, could, at least as against State
action, completely or partially withdraw Constitutional protection
from these basic freedoms, just as though the First Amendment had
never been written.


U.S. Supreme Court Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947) Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert No. 93 Argued December 18, 19,
1946 Decided March 10,
1947 330
U.S. 501 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT Syllabus 1. A federal district court has power to dismiss an action at
law pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens -- at
least where its jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship
and the state courts have such power. Pp. 330 U. S.
502 -509, 330 U. S.
512 .

															2. A resident of Virginia brought an action in a federal
district court in New York City against a Pennsylvania corporation
qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York (where it
had designated agents to receive service of process) to recover
damages for destruction of plaintiff's public warehouse and its
contents in Virginia by fire resulting from defendant's negligence.
The court had jurisdiction (based solely on diversity of
citizenship), and the venue was correct, but all events in
litigation had taken place in Virginia, most of the witnesses
resided there, and both state and federal courts in Virginia were
available to plaintiff and were able to obtain jurisdiction of
defendant. Applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the court dismissed the suit. Held: it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Pp. 330 U. S.
509 -512.

															3. Important considerations in the application of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens, from the standpoint of litigants,
are relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of
obtaining attendance Page 330 U. S. 502 of willing witnesses, possibility of view of the premises if
that be appropriate, and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. P. 330 U. S.
508 .

															4. Considerations of public interest in applying the doctrine
include the undesirability of piling up litigation in congested
centers, the burden of jury duty on people of a community having no
relation to the litigation, the local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home, and the unnecessary injection of
problems in conflict of laws. Pp. 330 U. S.
508 -509.

															153 F.2d 883, reversed.

															Applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a
district court dismissed a tort action in New York arising out of
events occurring in Virginia. 62 F. Supp.
291 . The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 153 F.2d 883. This
Court granted certiorari. 328 U.S. 830. Reversed, p. 330 U. S.
512 .

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The questions are whether the United States District Court has
inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens and, if so, whether that power was
abused in this case.

															The respondent-plaintiff brought this action in the Southern
District of New York, but resides at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he
operated a public warehouse. He alleges that the
petitioner-defendant, in violation of the ordinances of Lynchburg,
so carelessly handled a delivery of gasoline to his warehouse tanks
and pumps as to cause Page 330 U. S. 503 an explosion and fire which consumed the warehouse building to
his damage of $41,889.10, destroyed merchandise and fixtures to his
damage of $3,602.40, caused injury to his business and profits of
$20,038.27, and burned the property of customers in his custody
under warehousing agreements to the extent of $300,000. He asks
judgment of $365,529.77, with costs and disbursements, and interest
from the date of fire. The action clearly is one in tort.

															The petitioner-defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of Pennsylvania, qualified to do business in both Virginia and
New York, and it has designated officials of each state as agents
to receive service of process. When sued in New York, the
defendant, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claimed that the appropriate place for trial is Virginia, where the
plaintiff lives and defendant does business, where all events in
litigation took place, where most of the witnesses reside, and
where both state and federal courts are available to plaintiff, and
are able to obtain jurisdiction of the defendant.

															The case, on its merits, involves no federal question, and was
brought in the United States District Court solely because of
diversity in citizenship of the parties. Because of the character
of its jurisdiction and the holdings of and under Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 , the
District Court considered that the law of New York as to forum
non conveniens applied, and that it required the case to be
left to Virginia courts. [ Footnote
1 ] It therefore dismissed.

															The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed as to the applicability
of New York law, took a restrictive view of the application of the
entire doctrine in federal courts, and, one judge dissenting,
reversed. [ Footnote 2 ] The case
is here on certiorari. 328 U.S. 830. Page 330 U. S. 504 I It is conceded that the venue statutes of the United States
permitted the plaintiff to commence his action in the Southern
District of New York, and empower that court to entertain it.
[ Footnote 3 ] But that does not
settle the question whether it must do so. Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is absence
of jurisdiction or mistake of venue.

															This Court, in one form of words or another, has repeatedly
recognized the existence of the power to decline jurisdiction in
exceptional circumstances. As formulated by Mr. Justice Brandeis,
the rule is:

															"Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction
must exercise it is not universally true -- else the admiralty
court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the
litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts
administering other systems of our law. Courts of equity and of law
also occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise
jurisdiction where the suit is between aliens or nonresidents, or
where, for kindred reasons, the litigation can more appropriately
be conducted in a foreign tribunal." Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413 , 285 U. S.
422 -423.

															We later expressly said that a state court "may, in appropriate
cases, apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens. " Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 , 294 U. S. 643 ; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.
S. 287 , 317 U. S. 294 ,
n. 5. Even where federal rights binding on state courts under the
Constitution are sought to be adjudged, this Court has sustained
state courts in a refusal to entertain a litigation between a
nonresident and a foreign corporation or between two foreign
corporations. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 ; Anglo-American Provision Co.
v. Page 330 U. S. 505 Davis Provision Co. No. 1, 191 U.
S. 373 . It has held the use of an inappropriate forum in
one case an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Equity Co., 262 U.
S. 312 . On substantially forum non conveniens grounds, we have required federal courts to relinquish decision of
cases within their jurisdiction where the court would have to
participate in the administrative policy of a state. Railroad
Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.
S. 570 ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.
S. 315 ; but cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228 .
And, most recently, we decided Williams v. Green Bay &
Western R. Co., 326 U. S. 549 , in
which the Court, without questioning the validity of the doctrine,
held it had been applied in that case without justification.
[ Footnote 4 ]

															It is true that, in cases under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, we have held that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be
defeated on the basis of forum non conveniens. But this
was because the special venue act under which those cases are
brought was believed to require it. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.
v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 ; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.
S. 698 . Those decisions do not purport to modify the
doctrine as to other cases governed by the general venue
statutes. Page 330 U. S. 506 But the court below says that

															"The Kepner case . . . warned against refusal of
jurisdiction in a particular case controlled by congressional act;
here, the only difference is that congressional act, plus judicial
interpretation (under the Neirbo case), spells out the
result."

															153 F.2d at 885. The Federal Employers' Liability Act, however,
which controlled decision in the Kepner case, specifically
provides where venue may be had in any suit on a cause of action
arising under that statute. What the court below refers to as
"congressional act, plus judicial interpretation" is the general
statute of venue in diversity suits, plus our decision that it
gives the defendant "a personal privilege respecting the venue, or
place of suit, which he may assert, or may waive at his election," Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. S. 165 , 308 U. S. 168 .
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, as interpreted by Kepner, increases the number of places where the defendant
may be sued, and makes him accept the plaintiff's choice. The Neirbo case is only a declaration that, if the defendant,
by filing consent to be sued, waives its privilege to be sued at
its place of residence, it may be sued in the federal courts at the
place where it has consented to be sued. But the general venue
statute plus the Neirbo interpretation do not add up to a
declaration that the court must respect the choice of the
plaintiff, no matter what the type of suit or issues involved. The
two, taken together, mean only that the defendant may consent to be
sued, and it is proper for the federal court to take jurisdiction,
not that the plaintiff's choice cannot be questioned. The
defendant's consent to be sued extends only to give the court
jurisdiction of the person; it assumes that the court, having the
parties before it, will apply all the applicable law, including, in
those cases where it is appropriate, its discretionary judgment as
to whether the suit should be entertained. In all cases in which
the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into Page 330 U. S. 507 play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant
is amenable to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice
between them. II The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a
court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute. These statutes are drawn with a necessary generality, and
usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy. But the
open door may admit those who seek not simply justice, but perhaps
justice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is
under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a
most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at some
inconvenience to himself.

															Many of the states have met misuse of venue by investing courts
with a discretion to change the place of trial on various grounds,
such as the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.
[ Footnote 5 ] The federal law
contains no such express criteria to guide the district court in
exercising its power. But the problem is a very old one affecting
the administration of the courts as well as the rights of
litigants, and, both in England and in this country, the common law
worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it. [ Footnote 6 ] Page 330 U. S. 508 Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances
which will justify or require either grant or denial of remedy. The
doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court to which
plaintiff resorts, and experience has not shown a judicial tendency
to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in many
abuses. [ Footnote 7 ]

															If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given
results are difficult to forecast or state, those to be considered
are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and the
one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the
litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access
to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for
attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action, and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. There may
also be questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to
fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the
defendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary
to his own right to pursue his remedy. [ Footnote 8 ] But, unless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.

															Factors of public interest also have place in applying the
doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when
litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being
handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be
imposed upon the people of a community Page 330 U. S. 509 which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch
the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial
in their view and reach, rather than in remote parts of the country
where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There
is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case
in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the
case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle
problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.

															The law of New York as to the discretion of a court to apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, and as to the standards
that guide discretion is, so far as here involved, the same as the
federal rule. Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158
N.E. 508; Wedemann v. United States Trust Co.. 258 N.Y.
315, 179 N.E. 712; see Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading
Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223. It would not
be profitable therefore to pursue inquiry as to the source from
which our rule must flow. III Turning to the question whether this is one of those rather rare
cases where the doctrine should be applied, we look first to the
interests of the litigants.

															The plaintiff himself is not a resident of New York, nor did any
event connected with the case take place there, nor does any
witness with the possible exception of experts live there. No one
connected with that side of the case save counsel for the plaintiff
resides there, and he has candidly told us that he was retained by
insurance companies interested presumably because of subrogation.
His affidavits and argument are devoted to controverting claims as
to defendant's inconvenience, rather than to showing that the
present forum serves any convenience Page 330 U. S. 510 of his own, with one exception. The only justification for trial
in New York advanced here is one rejected by the district court and
is set forth in the brief as follows:

															"This Court can readily realize that an action of this type,
involving as it does a claim for damages in an amount close to
$400,000, is one which may stagger the imagination of a local jury
which is surely unaccustomed to dealing with amounts of such a
nature. Furthermore, removed from Lynchburg, the respondent will
have an opportunity to try this case free from local influences and
preconceived notions which make it difficult to procure a jury
which has no previous knowledge of any of the facts herein."

															This unproven premise that jurors of New York live on terms of
intimacy with $400,000 transactions is not an assumption we easily
make. Nor can we assume that a jury from Lynchburg and vicinity
would be "staggered" by contemplating the value of a warehouse
building that stood in their region, or of merchandise and fixtures
such as were used there, nor are they likely to be staggered by the
value of chattels which the people of that neighborhood put in
storage. It is a strange argument on behalf of a Virginia plaintiff
that the community which gave him patronage to make his business
valuable is not capable of furnishing jurors who know the value of
the goods they store, the building they are stored in, or the
business their patronage creates. And there is no specification of
any local influence, other than accurate knowledge of local
conditions, that would make a fair trial improbable. The net of
this is that we cannot say the District Court was bound to
entertain a provincial fear of the provincialism of a Virginia
jury. That leaves the Virginia plaintiff without even a suggested
reason for transporting this suit to New York. Page 330 U. S. 511 Defendant points out that not only the plaintiff, but every
person who participated in the acts charged to be negligent,
resides in or near Lynchburg. It also claims a need to interplead
an alleged independent contractor which made the delivery of the
gasoline and which is a Virginia corporation domiciled in
Lynchburg, that it cannot interplead in New York. There also are
approximately 350 persons residing in and around Lynchburg who
stored with plaintiff the goods for the damage to which he seeks to
recover. The extent to which they have left the community since the
fire and the number of them who will actually be needed is in
dispute. The complaint alleges that defendant's conduct violated
Lynchburg ordinances. Conditions are said to require proof by
firemen and by many others. The learned and experienced trial judge
was not unaware that litigants generally manage to try their cases
with fewer witnesses than they predict in such motions as this. But
he was justified in concluding that this trial is likely to be
long, and to involve calling many witnesses, and that Lynchburg,
some 400 miles from New York, is the source of all proofs for
either side, with possible exception of experts. Certainly to fix
the place of trial at a point where litigants cannot compel
personal attendance and may be forced to try their cases on
deposition is to create a condition not satisfactory to court,
jury, or most litigants. Nor is it necessarily cured by the
statement of plaintiff's counsel that he will see to getting many
of the witnesses to the trial, and that some of them "would be
delighted to come to New York to testify." There may be
circumstances where such a proposal should be given weight. In
others, the offer may not turn out to be as generous as defendant
or court might suppose it to be. Such matters are for the District
Court to decide in exercise of a sound discretion.

															The court likewise could well have concluded that the task of
the trial court would be simplified by trial in Virginia. Page 330 U. S. 512 If trial was in a state court, it could apply its own law to
events occurring there. If in federal court by reason of diversity
of citizenship, the court would apply the law of its own state in
which it is likely to be experienced. The course of adjudication in
New York federal court might be beset with conflict of laws
problems all avoided if the case is litigated in Virginia, where it
arose.

															We are convinced that the District Court did not exceed its
powers or the bounds of its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's
complaint and remitting him to the courts of his own community. The
Circuit Court of Appeals took too restrictive a view of the
doctrine as approved by this Court. Its judgment is Reversed. MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON dissent. They do not set
out the factual reasons for their dissent, since the Court's
affirmance of Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518 ,
would control.

															[ Footnote 1 ] Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.
Supp. 291 .

															[ Footnote 2 ] Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883.

															[ Footnote 3 ] See 28 U.S.C. § 112; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. S. 165 .

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The doctrine did not originate in federal, but in state, courts.
This Court, in recognizing and approving it by name, has never
indicated that it was rejecting application of the doctrine to law
actions which had been an integral and necessary part of evolution
of the doctrine. And cf. Slater v. Mexican National R.
Co., 194 U. S. 120 .
Wherever it is applied in courts of other jurisdictions, its
application does not depend on whether the action is at law, Collard v. Beach, 93 App.Div. 339, 87 N.Y.S. 884; Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508; Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 86
N.H. 341, 168 A. 895; or in equity, Langfelder v. Universal
Laboratories, 293 N.Y. 200, 56 N.E.2d 550; Egbert v.
Short, 2 Ch. 250. See footnote 1, Koster v.
(American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., post, 330 U. S. 518 .

															[ Footnote 5 ] See Foster, Place of Trial -- Interstate Application of
Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 41, 47, 62.

															[ Footnote 6 ] See Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B. 141; cf. La Societe du Gaz de Paris v. La Societe Anonyme de
Navigation "Les Armateurs Francais," [1926] Sess.Cas. (H.L.)
13. Collard v. Beach, 93 App.Div. 339, 87 N.Y.S. 884; Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 86
N.H. 341, 168 A. 895; see Pietraroia v. New Jersey & Hudson
R. & Ferry Co., 197 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E. 120; Great
Western Railway Co. of Canada v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305.

															[ Footnote 7 ] See Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill.L.Rev. 867,
889.

															[ Footnote 8 ] See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col.L.Rev. 1.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

															The defendant corporation is organized under the laws of
Pennsylvania, but is qualified to do business and maintains an
office in New York. Plaintiff is an individual residing and doing
business in Virginia. The accident in which plaintiff alleges to
have been damaged occurred in Lynchburg, Virginia. Plaintiff
brought this action in the Federal District Court in New York.
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78, carried over
into the Judicial Code, § 24, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1), confers
jurisdiction upon federal district courts of all actions at law
between citizens of different states. The Court does not suggest
that the federal district court in New York lacks jurisdiction
under this statute, or that the venue was improper in this case. 28
U.S.C. § 112. Cf. 308 U. S. v. Page 330 U. S. 513 Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.
S. 165 . But it holds that a district court may abdicate
its jurisdiction when a defendant shows to the satisfaction of a
district court that it would be more convenient and less vexatious
for the defendant if the trial were held in another jurisdiction.
Neither the venue statute nor the statute which has governed
jurisdiction since 1789 contains any indication or implication that
a federal district court, once satisfied that jurisdiction and
venue requirements have been met, may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction. Except in relation to the exercise of the
extraordinary admiralty and equity powers of district courts, this
Court has never before held contrary to the general principle
that

															"the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to
judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case
to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their
authority or duty in any case in favor of another
jurisdiction." Hyde v. Stone , 20 How. 170, 61 U. S. 175 ,
quoted with approval in Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529 , 148 U. S. 534 . See also Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S.
11 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 ; Evey v. Mexican Cent. R. Co., 81 F. 294. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Never until today has this Court
held, in actions for money damages for violations of common law or
statutory rights, that a district court can abdicate its statutory
duty to exercise its jurisdiction for the alleged convenience of
the defendant to a lawsuit. Compare Slater v. Mexican National
R. Co., 194 U. S. 120 .

															For reasons peculiar to the special problems of admiralty and to
the extraordinary remedies of equity, the courts exercising
admiralty and equity powers have been permitted Page 330 U. S. 514 at times to decline to exercise their jurisdiction. Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Co., 285 U.
S. 413 ; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U. S. 123 ; cf. Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U.
S. 549 . This exception is rooted in the kind of relief
which these courts grant and the kinds of problems which they
solve. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.
S. 228 , 320 U. S. 235 ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 , 319 U. S. 333 n. 29. Courts of equity developed to afford relief where a money
judgment in the common law courts provided no adequate remedy for
an injured person. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
From the beginning of equitable jurisdiction up to now, the
chancery courts have generally granted or withheld their special
remedies at their discretion, and "courts of admiralty . . . act
upon enlarged principles of equity." O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287 , 168 U. S. 297 .
But this Court has, on many occasions, severely restricted the
discretion of district courts to decline to grant even the
extraordinary equitable remedies. Meredith v. Winter Haven,
supra, and cases there cited, 320 U.S. at 320 U. S.
234 -235. Previously, federal courts have not generally
been allowed the broad and indefinite discretion to dispose even of
equity cases solely on a trial court's judgment of the relative
convenience of the forum for the parties themselves. For a major
factor in these equity decisions has been the relative ability of
the forum to shape and execute its equitable remedy. Cf. Rogers
v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra. Page 330 U. S. 515 No such discretionary authority to decline to decide a case,
however, has, before today, been vested in federal courts in
actions for money judgments deriving from statutes or the common
law. [ Footnote 2/3 ] To engraft the
doctrine of forum non conveniens upon the statutes fixing
jurisdiction and proper venue in the district courts in such
actions seems to me to be far more than the mere filling in of the
interstices of those statutes. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															It may be that a statute should be passed authorizing the
federal district courts to decline to try so-called common law
cases according to the convenience of the parties. But whether
there should be such a statute, and determination of its scope and
the safeguards which should surround it, are, in my judgment,
questions of policy which Congress should decide. There are strong
arguments presented by the Court in its opinion why federal courts
exercising their common law jurisdiction should have the
discretionary powers which equity courts have always possessed in
dispensing equitable relief. I think equally strong arguments could
be advanced to show that they should not. For any individual or
corporate defendant who does part of his business in states other
than the one in which he Page 330 U. S. 516 is sued will almost invariably be put to some inconvenience to
defend himself. It will be a poorly represented multistate
defendant who cannot produce substantial evidence and good reasons
fitting the rule now adopted by this Court tending to establish
that the forum of action against him is most inconvenient. The
Court's new rule will thus clutter the very threshold of the
federal courts with a preliminary trial of fact concerning the
relative convenience of forums. The preliminary disposition of this
factual question will, I believe, produce the very kind of
uncertainty, confusion, and hardship which stalled and handicapped
persons seeking compensation for maritime injuries following this
Court's decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 . The
broad and indefinite discretion left to federal courts to decide
the question of convenience from the welter of factors which are
relevant to such a judgment will inevitably produce a complex of
close and indistinguishable decisions from which accurate
prediction of the proper forum will become difficult, if not
impossible. Yet plaintiffs will be asked

															"to determine with certainty before bringing their actions that
factual question over which courts regularly divide among
themselves and within their own membership. As penalty for error,
the injured individual may not only suffer serious financial loss
through the delay and expense of litigation, but discover that his
claim has been barred by the statute of limitations in the proper
forum while he was erroneously pursuing it elsewhere." Davis v. Department of Labor & Industries, 317 U. S. 249 , 317 U. S.
254 .

															This very case illustrates the hazards of delay. It must be
begun anew in another forum after the District Court, the Circuit
Court of Appeals, and now this Court have had their time-consuming
say as to the relative convenience of the forum in which the
plaintiff chose to seek redress. Whether the statute of limitations
has run Page 330 U. S. 517 against the plaintiff we do not know. The convenience which the
individual defendant will enjoy from the Court's new rule of forum non conveniens in law actions may be thought to
justify its inherent delays, uncertainties, administrative
complications, and hardships. But, in any event, Congress has not
yet said so, and I do not think that this Court should, 150 years
after the passage of the Judiciary Act, fill in what it thinks is a
deficiency in the deliberate policy which Congress adopted.
[ Footnote 2/5 ] Whether the doctrine
of forum non conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for
Congress to adopt it.

															MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE joins in this opinion.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1 , 223 U. S. 58 , it
was stated that:

															"The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of
duty to exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous, does not
militate against that implication." Cf. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377 , 279 U. S. 388 .

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Although the distinction between actions at law and suits in
equity in federal courts has been abolished by the adoption of the
single form of civil action, Rule 2, F.R.C.P., see 1
Moore, Federal Practice (1938) c. 2, there remains to federal
courts the same discretion, no more and no less, in the exercise of
special equitable remedies as existed before the adoption of the
federal rules. Neither the rules, the statutes, tradition, nor
practical considerations justify application of equitable
discretion to actions for money judgments based on common law or
statutory rights.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															This Court, whose jurisdiction is primarily appellate, has held
that it need not exercise its constitutionally granted original
jurisdiction even at common law where there is another suitable
forum. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.
S. 439 , 324 U. S.
464 -465. But the Constitution, not Congress, fixes this
Court's jurisdiction. And it was this Court's duty to interpret its
constitutional jurisdiction. It is the duty of Congress to fix the
jurisdiction of the district courts by statute. It did so. It is
not the duty of this Court to amend that statute.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															"I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are
confined from molar to molecular motions." Holmes, J., dissenting
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205 , 244 U. S. 218 . See also dissenting opinion, State Tax Commission v.
Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 , 316 U. S. 185 ,
and authorities there collected.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The very law review articles which are relied upon to document
this theory of a federal rule of forum non conveniens reveal that judicial adoption of this theory without a new act of
Congress would be an unwarranted judicial innovation. Foster, Place
of Trial -- Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of
Adjustment, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 41, 52; Blair, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col.L.Rev. 1, 18. For
Instance, it is stated that,

															"No matter how little dispute there is as to the desirability of
such legislation, there is comparatively little chance of
overcoming legislative inertia and securing its passage unless some
accident happens to focus attention upon it. The best hope is that
the courts will feel free to take appropriate action without
specific legislation authorizing them to do so."

															Foster, supra, at 52.