U.S. Supreme Court Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984) Lynch v. Donnelly No. 82-1256 Argued October 4,
1983 Decided March 5, 1984 465
U.S. 668 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT Syllabus The city of Pawtucket, R.I., annually erects a Christmas display
in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the
heart of the city's shopping district. The display includes, in
addition to such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree,
and a banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a creche or Nativity
scene, which has been part of this annual display for 40 years or
more. Respondents brought an action in Federal District Court,
challenging the inclusion of the creche in the display on the
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The District Court upheld the challenge and permanently
enjoined the city from including the creche in the display. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Notwithstanding the religious significance of the
creche, Pawtucket has not violated the Establishment Clause. Pp. 465 U. S.
672 -687.

															(a) The concept of a "wall" of separation between church and
state is a useful metaphor, but is not an accurate description of
the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The
Constitution does not require complete separation of church and
state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.
Anything less would require the "callous indifference," Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 , 343 U. S. 314 ,
that was never intended by the Establishment Clause. Pp. 465 U. S.
672 -673.

															(b) This Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause
comports with the contemporaneous understanding of the Framers'
intent. That neither the draftsmen of the Constitution, who were
Members of the First Congress, nor the First Congress itself saw
any establishment problem in employing Chaplains to offer daily
prayers in the Congress is a striking example of the accommodation
of religious beliefs intended by the Framers. Pp. 465 U. S.
673 -674.

															(c) Our history is pervaded by official acknowledgment of the
role of religion in American life, and equally pervasive is
evidence of accommodation of all faiths and all forms of religious
expression and hostility toward none. Pp. 465 U. S.
674 -678. Page 465 U. S. 669 (d) Rather than taking an absolutist approach in applying the
Establishment Clause and mechanically invalidating all governmental
conduct or statutes that confer benefits or give special
recognition to religion in general or to one faith, this Court has
scrutinized challenged conduct or legislation to determine whether,
in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith or tends
to do so. In the line-drawing process called for in each case, it
has often been found useful to inquire whether the challenged law
or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary
effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an
excessive entanglement of government with religion. But this Court
has been unwilling to be confined to any single test or criterion
in this sensitive area. Pp. 465 U. S.
678 -679.

															(e) Here, the focus of the inquiry must be on the creche in the
context of the Christmas season. Focus exclusively on the religious
component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation
under the Establishment Clause. Pp. 465 U. S.
679 -680.

															(f) Based on the record in this case, the city has a secular
purpose for including the creche in its Christmas display, and has
not impermissibly advanced religion or created an excessive
entanglement between religion and government. The display is
sponsored by the city to celebrate the Holiday recognized by
Congress and national tradition and to depict the origins of that
Holiday; these are legitimate secular purposes. Whatever benefit to
one faith or religion or to all religions inclusion of the creche
in the display effects, is indirect, remote, and incidental, and is
no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the
congressional and executive recognition of the origins of
Christmas, or the exhibition of religious paintings in
governmentally supported museums. This Court is unable to discern a
greater aid to religion from the inclusion of the creche than from
the substantial benefits previously held not violative of the
Establishment Clause. As to administrative entanglement, there is
no evidence of contact with church authorities concerning the
content or design of the exhibition prior to or since the city's
purchase of the creche. No expenditures for maintenance of the
creche have been necessary, and, since the city owns the creche,
now valued at $200, the tangible material it contributes is de
minimis. Political divisiveness alone cannot serve to
invalidate otherwise permissible conduct, and, in any event, apart
from the instant litigation, there is no evidence of political
friction or divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history of
the city's Christmas celebration. Pp. 465 U. S.
680 -685.

															(g) It would be ironic if the inclusion of the creche in the
display, as part of a celebration of an event acknowledged in the
Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people,
the Executive Branch, Page 465 U. S. 670 Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries, would so "taint" the
exhibition as to render it violative of the Establishment Clause.
To forbid the use of this one passive symbol while hymns and carols
are sung and played in public places including schools, and while
Congress and state legislatures open public sessions with prayers,
would be an overreaction contrary to this Nation's history and this
Court's holdings. Pp. 465 U. S.
685 -686.

															691 F.2d 1029, reversed.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 465 U. S. 687 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL,
BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 465 U. S. 694 .
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J.,
joined, post, p. 465 U. S.
726 .

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment prohibits a municipality Page 465 U. S. 671 from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual
Christmas display. I Each year, in cooperation with the downtown retail merchants'
association, the city of Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas
display as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday season.
The display is situated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization
and located in the heart of the shopping district. The display is
essentially like those to be found in hundreds of towns or cities
across the Nation -- often on public grounds -- during the
Christmas season. The Pawtucket display comprises many of the
figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas,
including, among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer
pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a clown,
an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large
banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and the creche at issue
here. All components of this display are owned by the city.

															The creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or
more years, consists of the traditional figures, including the
Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and
animals, all ranging in height from 5" to 5'. In 1973, when the
present creche was acquired, it cost the city $1,365; it now is
valued at $200. The erection and dismantling of the creche costs
the city about $20 per year; nominal expenses are incurred in
lighting the creche. No money has been expended on its maintenance
for the past 10 years.

															Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual members of the
Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union, and
the affiliate itself, brought this action in the United States
District Court for Rhode Island, challenging the city's inclusion
of the creche in the annual display. The District Court held that
the city's inclusion of the creche in the display violates the
Establishment Clause, 525 F.
Supp. 1150 , 1178 (1981), which is binding on the states through
the Page 465 U. S. 672 Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court found that, by
including the creche in the Christmas display, the city has "tried
to endorse and promulgate religious beliefs," id. at 1173,
and that "erection of the creche has the real and substantial
effect of affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the
creche represents." Id. at 1177. This "appearance of
official sponsorship," it believed, "confers more than a remote and
incidental benefit on Christianity." Id. at 1178. Last,
although the court acknowledged the absence of administrative
entanglement, it found that excessive entanglement has been
fostered as a result of the political divisiveness of including the
creche in the celebration. Id. at 1179-1180. The city was
permanently enjoined from including the creche in the display.

															A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed. 691 F.2d 1029 (1982). We granted certiorari, 460 U.S.
1080 (1983), and we reverse. II A This Court has explained that the purpose of the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment is

															"to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [the
church or the state] into the precincts of the other." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 614 (1971). At the same time, however, the Court has recognized
that

															"total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable." Ibid. In every Establishment Clause case, we must
reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of
preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state
upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often
noted, total separation of the two is not possible. Page 465 U. S. 673 The Court has sometimes described the Religion Clauses as
erecting a "wall" between church and state, see, e.g., Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 18 (1947). The concept of a "wall" of separation is a useful figure of
speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. [ Footnote 1 ] The metaphor has served as
a reminder that the Establishment Clause forbids an established
church or anything approaching it. But the metaphor itself is not a
wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the
relationship that in fact exists between church and state.

															No significant segment of our society, and no institution within
it, can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from
all the other parts, much less from government. "It has never been
thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total
separation. . . ." Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 , 413 U. S. 760 (1973). Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 , 343 U. S. 314 , 343 U. S. 315 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 , 333 U. S. 211 (1948). Anything less would require the "callous indifference" we
have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause. Zorach, supra, at 343 U. S. 314 . Indeed, we have observed, such hostility
would bring us into "war with our national tradition as embodied in
the First Amendment's guaranty of the free exercise of religion." McCollum, supra, at 333 U. S.
211 -212. B The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause has
comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees. A significant example Page 465 U. S. 674 of the contemporaneous understanding of that Clause is found in
the events of the first week of the First Session of the First
Congress in 1789. In the very week that Congress approved the
Establishment Clause as part of the Bill of Rights for submission
to the states, it enacted legislation providing for paid Chaplains
for the House and Senate. In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), we noted that 17 Members of that First Congress had been
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention where freedom of speech,
press, and religion and antagonism toward an established church
were subjects of frequent discussion. We saw no conflict with the
Establishment Clause when Nebraska employed members of the clergy
as official legislative Chaplains to give opening prayers at
sessions of the state legislature. Id. at 463 U. S.
791 .

															The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in
1789 takes on special significance in light of the Court's emphasis
that the First Congress

															"was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been
regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in
the interpretation of that fundamental instrument," Myers v. United States, 272 U. S.
52 , 272 U. S.
174 -175 (1926). It is clear that neither the 17
draftsmen of the Constitution who were Members of the First
Congress, nor the Congress of 1789, saw any establishment problem
in the employment of congressional Chaplains to offer daily prayers
in the Congress, a practice that has continued for nearly two
centuries. It would be difficult to identify a more striking
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by the
Framers. C There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all
three branches of government of the role of religion in American
life from at least 1789. Seldom in our opinions was this more
affirmatively expressed than in Justice Douglas' opinion for the
Court validating a program allowing release of Page 465 U. S. 675 public school students from classes to attend off-campus
religious exercises. Rejecting a claim that the program violated
the Establishment Clause, the Court asserted pointedly:

															"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 343 U. S. 313 . See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S. 213 (1963).

															Our history is replete with official references to the value and
invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements
of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders. Beginning in the
early colonial period long before Independence, a day of
Thanksgiving was celebrated as a religious holiday to give thanks
for the bounties of Nature as gifts from God. President Washington
and his successors proclaimed Thanksgiving, with all its religious
overtones, a day of national celebration [ Footnote 2 ] and Congress made it a National Holiday
more than a century ago. Ch. 167, 16 Stat. 168. That holiday has
not lost its theme of expressing thanks for Divine aid [ Footnote 3 ] any more than has Christmas
lost its religious significance. Page 465 U. S. 676 Executive Orders and other official announcements of Presidents
and of the Congress have proclaimed both Christmas and Thanksgiving
National Holidays in religious terms. And, by Acts of Congress, it
has long been the practice that federal employees are released from
duties on these National Holidays, while being paid from the same
public revenues that provide the compensation of the Chaplains of
the Senate and the House and the military services. See J.Res. 5, 23 Stat. 516. Thus, it is clear that Government has long
recognized -- indeed it has subsidized -- holidays with religious
significance.

															Other examples of reference to our religious heritage are found
in the statutorily prescribed national motto "In God We Trust," 36
U.S.C. § 186, which Congress and the President mandated for our
currency, see 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (1982 ed.), and in
the language "One nation under God," as part of the Pledge of
Allegiance to the American flag. That pledge is recited by many
thousands of public school children -- and adults every year.

															Art galleries supported by public revenues display religious
paintings of the 15th and 16th centuries, predominantly inspired by
one religious faith. The National Gallery in Page 465 U. S. 677 Washington, maintained with Government support, for example, has
long exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably the
Last Supper, and paintings depicting the Birth of Christ, the
Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, among many others with explicit
Christian themes and messages. [ Footnote 4 ] The very chamber in which oral arguments on
this case were heard is decorated with a notable and permanent --
not seasonal -- symbol of religion: Moses with the Ten
Commandments. Congress has long provided chapels in the Capitol for
religious worship and meditation.

															There are countless other illustrations of the Government's
acknowledgment of our religious heritage and governmental
sponsorship of graphic manifestations of that heritage. Congress
has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of Prayer
each year "on which [day] the people of the United States may turn
to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups, and as
individuals." 36 U.S.C. § 169h. Our Presidents have repeatedly
issued such Proclamations. [ Footnote 5 ] Presidential Proclamations and messages have
also issued to commemorate Jewish Heritage Week, Presidential
Proclamation No. 4844, 3 CFR 30 (1982), and the Jewish High Holy
Days, 17 Weekly Comp. of Pres.Doc. 1058 (1981). One cannot look at
even this brief resume without finding that our history is pervaded
by expressions of religious beliefs such as are found in Zorach. Equally pervasive is the evidence of accommodation
of all faiths and all forms of religious expression, and hostility
toward none. Through this accommodation, Page 465 U. S. 678 as Justice Douglas observed, governmental action has "follow[ed]
the best of our traditions" and "respect[ed] the religious nature
of our people." 343 U.S. at 3 343 U. S. 14 . III This history may help explain why the Court consistently has
declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment
Clause. We have refused "to construe the Religion Clauses with a
literalness that would undermine the ultimate constitutional
objective as illuminated by history. " Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 671 (1970) (emphasis added). In our modern, complex society, whose
traditions and constitutional underpinnings rest on and encourage
diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in
applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic, and has been
uniformly rejected by the Court.

															Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct
or statutes that confer benefits or give special recognition to
religion in general or to one faith -- as an absolutist approach
would dictate -- the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation
or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it
establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so. See Walz, supra, at 397 U. S. 669 .
Joseph Story wrote a century and a half ago:

															"The real object of the [First] Amendment was . . . to prevent
any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government."

															3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 728 (1833).

															In each case, the inquiry calls for line-drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed. The Establishment Clause, like
the Due Process Clauses, is not a precise, detailed provision in a
legal code capable of ready application. The purpose of the
Establishment Clause "was to state an objective, not to write a
statute." Walz, supra, at 397 U. S. 668 .
The line between permissible relationships and those barred by the
Clause can no Page 465 U. S. 679 more be straight and unwavering than due process can be defined
in a single stroke or phrase or test. The Clause erects a "blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances
of a particular relationship." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
614 .

															In the line-drawing process, we have often found it useful to
inquire whether the challenged law or conduct has a secular
purpose, whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or
inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive entanglement
of government with religion. Lemon, supra. But we have
repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion in this sensitive area. See, e.g.,
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 , 403 U. S.
677 -678 (1971); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 773 .
In two cases, the Court did not even apply the Lemon "test." We did not, for example, consider that analysis relevant in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983). Nor did we find Lemon useful in Larson v.
Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982), where there was substantial evidence of overt
discrimination against a particular church.

															In this case, the focus of our inquiry must be on the creche in
the context of the Christmas season. See, e.g., Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980)
(per curiam); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963). In Stone, for example, we invalidated a state
statute requiring the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on
public classroom walls. But the Court carefully pointed out that
the Commandments were posted purely as a religious admonition,
not

															"integrated into the school curriculum, where the Bible may
constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history,
civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like."

															449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 42 .
Similarly, in Abington, although the Court struck down the
practices in two States requiring daily Bible readings in public
schools, it specifically noted that nothing in the Court's holding
was intended to

															"indicat[e] that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education,
may not be effected consistently Page 465 U. S. 680 with the First Amendment."

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 225 .
Focus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would
inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment
Clause.

															The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on
the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has
concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations. See, e.g., Stone
v. Graham, supra, at 449 U. S. 41 ; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 , 393 U. S.
107 -109 (1968); Abington School District v. Schempp,
supra, at 374 U. S.
223 -224; Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 , 370 U. S.
424 -425 (1962). Even where the benefits to religion were
substantial, as in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 (1968); Walz, supra; and Tilton,
supra, we saw a secular purpose and no conflict with the
Establishment Clause. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982).

															The District Court inferred from the religious nature of the
creche that the city has no secular purpose for the display. In so
doing, it rejected the city's claim that its reasons for including
the creche are essentially the same as its reasons for sponsoring
the display as a whole. The District Court plainly erred by
focusing almost exclusively on the creche. When viewed in the
proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent
that, on this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish
that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message. In a pluralistic society, a variety
of motives and purposes are implicated. The city, like the
Congresses and Presidents, however, has principally taken note of a
significant historical religious event long celebrated in the
Western World. The creche in the display depicts the historical
origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National
Holiday. See Allen v. Hickel, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 424
F.2d 944 Page 465 U. S. 681 (1970); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and
State v. City and County of Denver, 526 F.
Supp. 1310 (Colo.1981).

															The narrow question is whether there is a secular purpose for
Pawtucket's display of the creche. The display is sponsored by the
city to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the origins of that
Holiday. These are legitimate secular purposes. [ Footnote 6 ] The District Court's inference,
drawn from the religious nature of the creche, that the city has no
secular purpose was, on this record, clearly erroneous. [ Footnote 7 ]

															The District Court found that the primary effect of including
the creche is to confer a substantial and impermissible benefit on
religion in general, and on the Christian faith in particular.
Comparisons of the relative benefits to religion of different forms
of governmental support are elusive and difficult to make. But to
conclude that the primary effect of including the creche is to
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would
require that we view it as more beneficial to and more an
endorsement of religion, for example, than expenditure of large
sums of public money for textbooks supplied throughout the country
to students attending church-sponsored schools, Board of
Education v. Allen, supra; [ Footnote 8 ] expenditure of public funds for transportation
of Page 465 U. S. 682 students to church-sponsored schools, Everson v. Board of
Education, supra; [ Footnote
9 ] federal grants for college buildings of church-sponsored
institutions of higher education combining secular and religious
education, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 (1971); [ Footnote 10 ] noncategorical grants to church-sponsored
colleges and universities, Roemer v. Board of Public
Works, 426 U. S. 736 (1976); and the tax exemptions for church properties sanctioned in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 (1970). It would also require that we view it as more of an
endorsement of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws upheld in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961); [ Footnote 11 ] the
release time program for religious training in Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952); and the legislative prayers upheld in Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983).

															We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving from
inclusion of the creche than from these benefits and endorsements
previously held not violative of the Establishment Clause. What was
said about the legislative prayers in Marsh, supra, at 463 U. S. 792 ,
and implied about the Sunday Closing Laws in McGowan is
true of the city's inclusion of the creche: its "reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some . .
. religions." See McGowan, supra, at 366 U. S.
442 .

															This case differs significantly from Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., supra, and McCollum, where religion was
substantially Page 465 U. S. 683 aided. In Grendel's Den, important governmental power
-- a licensing veto authority -- had been vested in churches. In McCollum, government had made religious instruction
available in public school classrooms; the State had not only used
the public school buildings for the teaching of religion, it
had

															"afford[ed] sectarian groups an invaluable aid . . . [by]
provid[ing] pupils for their religious classes through use of the
State's compulsory public school machinery."

															333 U.S. at 333 U. S. 212 .
No comparable benefit to religion is discernible here.

															The dissent asserts some observers may perceive that the city
has aligned itself with the Christian faith by including a
Christian symbol in its display, and that this serves to advance
religion. We can assume, arguendo, that the display
advances religion in a sense; but our precedents plainly
contemplate that, on occasion, some advancement of religion will
result from governmental action. The Court has made it abundantly
clear, however, that "not every law that confers an indirect,'
`remote,' or `incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, for that
reason alone, constitutionally invalid." Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 771; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.
S. 263 , 454 U. S. 273 (1981). Here, whatever benefit there is to one faith or religion or
to all religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental; display of
the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion
than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of
the Holiday itself as "Christ's Mass," or the exhibition of
literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally
supported museums. The District Court found that there had been no administrative
entanglement between religion and state resulting from the city's
ownership and use of the creche. 525 F. Supp. at 1179. But it went
on to hold that some political divisiveness was engendered by this
litigation. Coupled with its finding of an impermissible sectarian
purpose and effect, this persuaded the court that there was
"excessive entanglement." The Court of Appeals expressly declined
to Page 465 U. S. 684 accept the District Court's finding that inclusion of the creche
has caused political divisiveness along religious lines, and noted
that this Court has never held that political divisiveness alone
was sufficient to invalidate government conduct.

															Entanglement is a question of kind and degree. In this case,
however, there is no reason to disturb the District Court's finding
on the absence of administrative entanglement. There is no evidence
of contact with church authorities concerning the content or design
of the exhibit prior to or since Pawtucket's purchase of the
creche. No expenditures for maintenance of the creche have been
necessary; and since the city owns the creche, now valued at $200,
the tangible material it contributes is de minimis. In
many respects, the display requires far less ongoing, day-to-day
interaction between church and state than religious paintings in
public galleries. There is nothing here, of course, like the
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"
or the "enduring entanglement" present in Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 403 U. S.
619 -622.

															The Court of Appeals correctly observed that this Court has not
held that political divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate
otherwise permissible conduct. And we decline to so hold today.
This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored
schools or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no
inquiry into potential political divisiveness is even called for, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 , 463 U. S.
403 -404, n. 11 (1983). In any event, apart from this
litigation, there is no evidence of political friction or
divisiveness over the creche in the 40-year history of Pawtucket's
Christmas celebration. The District Court stated that the inclusion
of the creche for the 40 years has been "marked by no apparent
dissension," and that the display has had a "calm history." 525 F.
Supp. at 1179. Curiously, it went on to hold that the political
divisiveness engendered by this lawsuit was evidence of excessive
entanglement. A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a
lawsuit, however, create the appearance Page 465 U. S. 685 of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of
entanglement.

															We are satisfied that the city has a secular purpose for
including the creche, that the city has not impermissibly advanced
religion, and that including the creche does not create excessive
entanglement between religion and government. IV JUSTICE BRENNAN describes the creche as a "re-creation of an
event that lies at the heart of Christian faith," post at 465 U. S. 711 .
The creche, like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a
reminder of the origins of Christmas. Even the traditional, purely
secular displays extant at Christmas, with or without a creche,
would inevitably recall the religious nature of the Holiday. The
display engenders a friendly community spirit of goodwill in
keeping with the season. The creche may well have special meaning
to those whose faith includes the celebration of religious Masses,
but none who sense the origins of the Christmas celebration would
fail to be aware of its religious implications. That the display
brings people into the central city, and serves commercial
interests and benefits merchants and their employees, does not, as
the dissent points out, determine the character of the display.
That a prayer invoking Divine guidance in Congress is preceded and
followed by debate and partisan conflict over taxes, budgets,
national defense, and myriad mundane subjects, for example, has
never been thought to demean or taint the sacredness of the
invocation. [ Footnote
12 ]

															Of course, the creche is identified with one religious faith,
but no more so than the examples we have set out from prior cases
in which we found no conflict with the Establishment Page 465 U. S. 686 Clause. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 (1961); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.
S. 783 (1983). It would be ironic, however, if the
inclusion of a single symbol of a particular historic religious
event, as part of a celebration acknowledged in the Western World
for 20 centuries, and in this country by the people, by the
Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries,
would so "taint" the city's exhibit as to render it violative of
the Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive
symbol -- the creche -- at the very time people are taking note of
the season with Christmas hymns and carols in public schools and
other public places, and while the Congress and legislatures open
sessions with prayers by paid chaplains, would be a stilted
overreaction contrary to our history and to our holdings. If the
presence of the creche in this display violates the Establishment
Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas,
and of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to the
Constitution.

															The Court has acknowledged that the "fears and political
problems" that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th
century are of far less concern today. Everson, 330 U.S.
at 330 U. S. 8 . We
are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of
Rome, or other powerful religious leaders behind every public
acknowledgment of the religious heritage long officially recognized
by the three constitutional branches of government. Any notion that
these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a state church
is farfetched indeed. V That this Court has been alert to the constitutionally expressed
opposition to the establishment of religion is shown in numerous
holdings striking down statutes or programs as violative of the
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 (1968); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra; Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472 (1973); Committee Page 465 U. S. 687 for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.
S. 349 (1975); and Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). The most recent example of this careful scrutiny is found
in the case invalidating a municipal ordinance granting to a church
a virtual veto power over the licensing of liquor establishments
near the church. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982). Taken together, these cases abundantly demonstrate the
Court's concern to protect the genuine objectives of the
Establishment Clause. It is far too late in the day to impose a
crabbed reading of the Clause on the country. VI We hold that, notwithstanding the religious significance of the
creche, the city of Pawtucket has not violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 13 ] Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ] See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S.
145 , 98 U. S. 164 (1879) (quoting reply from Thomas Jefferson to an address by a
committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (January 1,
1802)).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The day after the First Amendment was proposed, Congress urged
President Washington to proclaim

															"a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by
acknowledging with grateful hearts the many and signal favours of
Almighty God." See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church and State in the
United States 87 (rev. 1st ed.1964). President Washington
proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to "offe[r] our
prayers and supplications to the Great Lord and Ruler of Nations,
and beseech Him to pardon our national and other transgressions. .
. ." J. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents 1789-1897, p. 64 (1899).

															Presidents Adams and Madison also issued Thanksgiving
Proclamations, as have almost all our Presidents, see 3 A.
Stokes, Church and State in the United States 180-193 (1950),
through the incumbent, see Presidential Proclamation No.
4883, 3 CFR 68 (1982).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															An example is found in President Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation
of Thanksgiving:

															"[I]t is fitting that we give thanks with special fervor to our
Heavenly Father for the mercies we have received individually and
as a nation and for the blessings He has restored, through the
victories of our arms and those of our Allies, to His children in
other lands."

															" * * * *" "To the end that we may bear more earnest witness to our
gratitude to Almighty God, I suggest a nationwide reading of the
Holy Scriptures during the period from Thanksgiving Day to
Christmas."

															Presidential Proclamation No. 2629, 58 Stat. 1160.

															President Reagan and his immediate predecessors have issued
similar Proclamations. See, e.g., Presidential
Proclamation No. 5098, 3 CFR 94 (1984); Presidential Proclamation
No. 4803, 3 CFR 117 (1981); Presidential Proclamation No. 4333, 3
CFR 419 (1971-1975 Comp.); Presidential Proclamation No. 4093, 3
CFR 89 (1971-1975 Comp.); Presidential Proclamation No. 3752, 3 CFR
75 (1966-1970 Comp.); Presidential Proclamation No. 3560, 3 CFR 312
(1959-1963 Comp.).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The National Gallery regularly exhibits more than 200 similar
religious paintings.

															[ Footnote 5 ] See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation No. 5017, 3 CFR 8
(1984); Presidential Proclamation No. 4795, 3 CFR 109 (1981);
Presidential Proclamation No. 4379, 3 CFR 486 (1971-1975 Comp.);
Presidential Proclamation No. 4087, 3 CFR 81 (1971-1975 Comp.);
Presidential Proclamation No. 3812, 3 CFR 155 (1966-1970 Comp.);
Presidential Proclamation No. 3501, 3 CFR 228 (1959-1963
Comp.).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The city contends that the purposes of the display are
"exclusively secular." We hold only that Pawtucket has a secular
purpose for its display, which is all that Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), requires. Were the test that the government must have
"exclusively secular" objectives, much of the conduct and
legislation this Court has approved in the past would have been
invalidated.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															JUSTICE BRENNAN argues that the city's objectives could have
been achieved without including the creche in the display, post at 465 U. S. 699 .
True or not, that is irrelevant. The question is whether the
display of the creche violates the Establishment Clause.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Allen Court noted that "[p]erhaps free books make
it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian
school. . . ." 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 244 .

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															In Everson, the Court acknowledged that "[i]t is
undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church
schools," and that

															"some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if
the parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of
their own pockets. . . ."

															330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 17 .

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															We recognized in Tilton that the construction grants
"surely aid[ed]" the institutions that received them. 403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
679 .

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															"In McGowan v. Maryland . . . , Sunday Closing Laws
were sustained even though one of their undeniable effects was to
render it somewhat more likely that citizens would respect
religious institutions and even attend religious services." Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S.
775 -776 (1973).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															JUSTICE BRENNAN states that "by focusing on the holiday context' in which the nativity scene appear[s]," the Court
"seeks to explain away the clear religious import of the
creche," post, at 465 U. S. 705 ,
and that it has equated the creche with a Santa's house or
reindeer, post, at 465 U. S. 711 -712. Of course, this is not true.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The Court of Appeals viewed Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982), as commanding a "strict scrutiny" due to the city's
ownership of the $200 creche which it considers as a discrimination
between Christian and other religions. It is correct that we
require strict scrutiny of a statute or practice patently
discriminatory on its face. But we are unable to see this display,
or any part of it, as explicitly discriminatory in the sense
contemplated in Larson. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.

															I concur in the opinion of the Court. I write separately to
suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine. The
suggested approach leads to the same result in this case as that
taken by the Court, and the Court's opinion, as I read it, is
consistent with my analysis. I The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community. Government can run afoul of that
prohibition in two principal ways. One is excessive Page 465 U. S. 688 entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere
with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions
access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by
nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political
constituencies defined along religious lines. E.g., Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982). The second and more direct infringement is government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message
to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
Disapproval sends the opposite message. See generally Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).

															Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971), as a guide to detecting these two forms
of unconstitutional government action. * It has never
been entirely clear, however, Page 465 U. S. 689 how the three parts of the test relate to the principles
enshrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on institutional
entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion
clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device. II In this case, as even the District Court found, there is no
institutional entanglement. Nevertheless, the respondents contend
that the political divisiveness caused by Pawtucket's display of
its creche violates the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test. The Court's opinion follows the suggestion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 , 463 U. S.
403 -404, n. 11 (1983), and concludes that "no inquiry
into potential political divisiveness is even called for" in this
case. Ante at 465 U. S. 684 .
In my view, political divisiveness along religious lines should not
be an independent test of constitutionality.

															Although several of our cases have discussed political
divisiveness under the entanglement prong of Lemon, see, e.g.,
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 , 413 U. S. 796 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 623 ,
we have never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for
holding a government practice unconstitutional. Guessing the
potential for political divisiveness inherent in a government
practice is simply too speculative an enterprise, in part because
the existence of the litigation, as this case illustrates, itself
may affect the political response to the government practice.
Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the
Establishment Clause. Its existence may be evidence that
institutional entanglement is excessive or that a government
practice is perceived as an endorsement of religion. But the
constitutional inquiry should focus ultimately on the character of
the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on
the divisiveness itself. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional
entanglement. Page 465 U. S. 690 III The central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has endorsed
Christianity by its display of the creche. To answer that question,
we must examine both what Pawtucket intended to communicate in
displaying the creche and what message the city's display actually
conveyed. The purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test
represent these two aspects of the meaning of the city's
action.

															The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the
intention of the speaker and on the "objective" meaning of the
statement in the community. Some listeners need not rely solely on
the words themselves in discerning the speaker's intent: they can
judge the intent by, for example, examining the context of the
statement or asking questions of the speaker. Other listeners do
not have or will not seek access to such evidence of intent. They
will rely instead on the words themselves; for them, the message
actually conveyed may be something not actually intended. If the
audience is large, as it always is when government "speaks" by word
or deed, some portion of the audience will inevitably receive a
message determined by the "objective" content of the statement, and
some portion will inevitably receive the intended message.
Examination of both the subjective and the objective components of
the message communicated by a government action is therefore
necessary to determine whether the action carries a forbidden
meaning.

															The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government's actual purpose, the practice under review in fact
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative
answer to either question should render the challenged practice
invalid. A The purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that a
government activity have a secular purpose. That requirement Page 465 U. S. 691 is not satisfied, however, by the mere existence of some secular
purpose, however dominated by religious purposes. In Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980), for example, the Court held that posting copies of the Ten
Commandments in schools violated the purpose prong of the Lemon test, yet the State plainly had some secular
objectives, such as instilling most of the values of the Ten
Commandments and illustrating their connection to our legal system, but see 449 U.S. at 449 U. S. 41 . See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
223 -224. The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the government intends to
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.

															Applying that formulation to this case, I would find that
Pawtucket did not intend to convey any message of endorsement of
Christianity or disapproval of non-Christian religions. The evident
purpose of including the creche in the larger display was not
promotion of the religious content of the creche, but celebration
of the public holiday through its traditional symbols. Celebration
of public holidays, which have cultural significance even if they
also have religious aspects, is a legitimate secular purpose.

															The District Court's finding that the display of the creche had
no secular purpose was based on erroneous reasoning. The District
Court believed that it should ascertain the city's purpose in
displaying the creche separate and apart from the general purpose
in setting up the display. It also found that, because the
tradition-celebrating purpose was suspect in the court's eyes, the
city's use of an unarguably religious symbol "raises an inference"
of intent to endorse. When viewed in light of correct legal
principles, the District Court's finding of unlawful purpose was
clearly erroneous. B Focusing on the evil of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a
government practice merely because it in fact causes, Page 465 U. S. 692 even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.
The laws upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.
S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption for religious, educational,
and charitable organizations), in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961) (mandatory Sunday closing law), and in Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) (released time from school for off-campus religious
instruction), had such effects, but they did not violate the
Establishment Clause. What is crucial is that a government practice
not have the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having
that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make
religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in
the political community.

															Pawtucket's display of its creche, I believe, does not
communicate a message that the government intends to endorse the
Christian beliefs represented by the creche. Although the religious
and indeed sectarian significance of the creche, as the District
Court found, is not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday
setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the
purpose of the display -- as a typical museum setting, though not
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates
any message of endorsement of that content. The display celebrates
a public holiday, and no one contends that declaration of that
holiday is understood to be an endorsement of religion. The holiday
itself has very strong secular components and traditions.
Government celebration of the holiday, which is extremely common,
generally is not understood to endorse the religious content of the
holiday, just as government celebration of Thanksgiving is not so
understood. The creche is a traditional symbol of the holiday that
is very commonly displayed along with purely secular symbols, as it
was in Pawtucket.

															These features combine to make the government's display of the
creche in this particular physical setting no more an endorsement
of religion than such governmental "acknowledgments" Page 465 U. S. 693 of religion as legislative prayers of the type approved in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), government declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday,
printing of "In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions
with "God save the United States and this honorable court." Those
government acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only ways
reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes
of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their
history and ubiquity, those practices are not understood as
conveying government approval of particular religious beliefs. The
display of the creche likewise serves a secular purpose --
celebration of a public holiday with traditional symbols. It cannot
fairly be understood to convey a message of government endorsement
of religion. It is significant in this regard that the creche
display apparently caused no political divisiveness prior to the
filing of this lawsuit, although Pawtucket had incorporated the
creche in its annual Christmas display for some years. For these
reasons, I conclude that Pawtucket's display of the creche does not
have the effect of communicating endorsement of Christianity.

															The District Court's subsidiary findings on the effect test are
consistent with this conclusion. The court found as facts that the
creche has a religious content, that it would not be seen as an
insignificant part of the display, that its religious content is
not neutralized by the setting, that the display is celebratory and
not instructional, and that the city did not seek to counteract any
possible religious message. These findings do not imply that the
creche communicates government approval of Christianity. The
District Court also found, however, that the government was
understood to place its imprimatur on the religious content of the
creche. But whether a government activity communicates endorsement
of religion is not a question of simple historical fact. Page 465 U. S. 694 Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the
question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based
classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a
legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial
interpretation of social facts. The District Court's conclusion
concerning the effect of Pawtucket's display of its creche was in
error as a matter of law. IV Every government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion. In making that determination, courts must
keep in mind both the fundamental place held by the Establishment
Clause in our constitutional scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in
which Establishment Clause values can be eroded. Government
practices that purport to celebrate or acknowledge events with
religious significance must be subjected to careful judicial
scrutiny.

															The city of Pawtucket is alleged to have violated the
Establishment Clause by endorsing the Christian beliefs represented
by the creche included in its Christmas display. Giving the
challenged practice the careful scrutiny it deserves, I cannot say
that the particular creche display at issue in this case was
intended to endorse or had the effect of endorsing Christianity. I
agree with the Court that the judgment below must be reversed.

															* The Court wrote in Lemon v. Kurtzman that a statute
must pass three tests to withstand Establishment Clause
challenge.

															"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"

															403 U.S. at 403 U. S.
612 -613 (citations omitted). Though phrased as a
uniformly applicable test for constitutionality, this three-part
test "provides no more than [a] helpful signpos[t]' in dealing
with Establishment Clause challenges." Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 , 463 U. S. 394 (1983) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.
S. 734 , 413 U. S. 741 (1973)). Moreover, the Court has held that a statute or practice that
plainly embodies an intentional discrimination among religions must
be closely fitted to a compelling state purpose in order to survive
constitutional challenge. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982). As the Court's opinion observes, ante at 465 U. S. 687 ,
n. 13, this case does not involve such discrimination. The Larson standard, I believe, may be assimilated to the Lemon test in the clarified version I propose. Plain
intentional discrimination should give rise to a presumption, which
may be overcome by a showing of compelling purpose and close fit,
that the challenged government conduct constitutes an endorsement
of the favored religion or a disapproval of the disfavored.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															The principles announced in the compact phrases of the Religion
Clauses have, as the Court today reminds us, ante at 465 U. S.
678 -679, proved difficult to apply. Faced with that
uncertainty, the Court properly looks for guidance to the settled
test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.
S. 602 (1971), for assessing whether a challenged
governmental practice involves an impermissible step toward the
establishment of religion. Ante at 465 U. S. 679 .
Applying that test to this case, the Page 465 U. S. 695 Court reaches an essentially narrow result which turns largely
upon the particular holiday context in which the city of
Pawtucket's nativity scene appeared. The Court's decision
implicitly leaves open questions concerning the constitutionality
of the public display on public property of a creche standing
alone, or the public display of other distinctively religious
symbols such as a cross. [ Footnote
2/1 ] Despite the narrow contours of the Court's opinion, our
precedents, in my view, compel the holding that Pawtucket's
inclusion of a life-sized display depicting the biblical
description of the birth of Christ as part of its annual Christmas
celebration is unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of such
practices or the setting in which the city's creche is presented
obscures or diminishes the plain fact that Pawtucket's action
amounts to an impermissible governmental endorsement of a
particular faith. I Last Term, I expressed the hope that the Court's decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), would prove to be only a single, aberrant departure from
our settled method Page 465 U. S. 696 of analyzing Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 463 U. S. 796 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). That the Court today returns to the
settled analysis of our prior cases gratifies that hope. At the
same time, the Court's less-than-vigorous application of the Lemon test suggests that its commitment to those standards
may only be superficial. [ Footnote
2/2 ] After reviewing the Court's opinion, I am convinced that
this case appears hard not because the principles of decision are
obscure, but because the Christmas holiday seems so familiar and
agreeable. Although the Page 465 U. S. 697 Court's reluctance to disturb a community's chosen method of
celebrating such an agreeable holiday is understandable, that
cannot justify the Court's departure from controlling precedent. In
my view, Pawtucket's maintenance and display at public expense of a
symbol as distinctively sectarian as a creche simply cannot be
squared with our prior cases. And it is plainly contrary to the
purposes and values of the Establishment Clause to pretend, as the
Court does, that the otherwise secular setting of Pawtucket's
nativity scene dilutes in some fashion the creche's singular
religiosity, or that the city's annual display reflects nothing
more than an "acknowledgment" of our shared national heritage.
Neither the character of the Christmas holiday itself nor our
heritage of religious expression supports this result. Indeed, our
remarkable and precious religious diversity as a Nation, see
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 , 367 U. S. 495 (1961); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S.
240 -241 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), which the
Establishment Clause seeks to protect, runs directly counter to
today's decision. A As we have sought to meet new problems arising under the
Establishment Clause, our decisions, with few exceptions, have
demanded that a challenged governmental practice satisfy the
following criteria:

															"First, the [practice] must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, [it] must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 465 U. S.
612 -613 (citations omitted). [ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 465 U. S. 698 This well-defined three-part test expresses the essential
concerns animating the Establishment Clause. Thus, the test is
designed to ensure that the organs of government remain strictly
separate and apart from religious affairs, for "a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade
religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 , 370 U. S. 431 (1962). And it seeks to guarantee that government maintains a
position of neutrality with respect to religion and neither
advances nor inhibits the promulgation and practice of religious
beliefs. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 15 (1947) ("Neither [a State nor the Federal Government] can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.
97 , 393 U. S.
103 -104 (1968); Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 , 413 U. S.
792 -793 (1973). In this regard, we must be alert in our
examination of any challenged practice not only for an official
establishment of religion, but also for those other evils at which
the Clause was aimed -- " sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'" Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 772 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.
S. 664 , 397 U. S. 668 (1970)). Applying the three-part test to Pawtucket's creche, I am
persuaded that the city's inclusion of the creche in its Christmas
display simply does not reflect a "clearly secular . . . purpose." Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 773 .
Unlike the typical case in which the record reveals some
contemporaneous expression of a clear purpose to advance religion, see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 393 U. S.
107 -109; Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 370 U. S. 423 ,
or, conversely, a clear secular purpose, see, e.g., Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, at 403 U. S. 613 ; Wolman v. Walter, Page 465 U. S. 699 433 U. S. 229 , 433 U. S. 236 (1977), here we have no explicit statement of purpose by
Pawtucket's municipal government accompanying its decision to
purchase, display, and maintain the creche. Governmental purpose
may nevertheless be inferred. For instance, in Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 , 449 U. S. 41 (1980) (per curiam), this Court found, despite the State's avowed
purpose of reminding schoolchildren of the secular application of
the commands of the Decalogue, that the "preeminent purpose for
posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly
religious in nature." In the present case, the city claims that its
purposes were exclusively secular. Pawtucket sought, according to
this view, only to participate in the celebration of a national
holiday and to attract people to the downtown area in order to
promote pre-Christmas retail sales and to help engender the spirit
of goodwill and neighborliness commonly associated with the
Christmas season. Brief for Petitioners 29.

															Despite these assertions, two compelling aspects of this case
indicate that our generally prudent "reluctance to attribute
unconstitutional motives" to a governmental body, Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U. S. 388 , 463 U. S. 394 (1983), should be overcome. First, as was true in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 , 459 U. S.
123 -124 (1982), all of Pawtucket's "valid secular
objectives can be readily accomplished by other means." [ Footnote 2/4 ] Plainly, the city's interest
in celebrating the holiday and in promoting both retail sales and
goodwill are fully served by the elaborate display of Santa Claus,
reindeer, and wishing wells that are already a part of Pawtucket's
annual Christmas Page 465 U. S. 700 display. [ Footnote 2/5 ] More
importantly, the nativity scene, unlike every other element of the
Hodgson Park display, reflects a sectarian exclusivity that the
avowed purposes of celebrating the holiday season and promoting
retail commerce simply do not encompass. To be found
constitutional, Pawtucket's seasonal celebration must at least be
nondenominational and not serve to promote religion. The inclusion
of a distinctively religious element like the creche, however,
demonstrates that a narrower sectarian purpose lay behind the
decision to include a nativity scene. That the creche retained this
religious character for the people and municipal government of
Pawtucket is suggested by the Mayor's testimony at trial, in which
he stated that, for him as well as others in the city, the effort
to eliminate the nativity scene from Pawtucket's Christmas
celebration "is a step towards establishing another religion,
non-religion that it may be." App. 100. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Plainly, the city and its leaders
understood that the inclusion of the creche in its display would
serve the wholly religious purpose Page 465 U. S. 701 of "keep[ing] Christ in Christmas.'" 525
F. Supp. 1150 , 1173 (RI 1981). From this record, therefore, it
is impossible to say with the kind of confidence that was possible
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S. 445 (1961), that a wholly secular goal predominates. The "primary effect" of including a nativity scene in the city's
display is, as the District Court found, to place the government's
imprimatur of approval on the particular religious beliefs
exemplified by the creche. Those who believe in the message of the
nativity receive the unique and exclusive benefit of public
recognition and approval of their views. For many, the city's
decision to include the creche as part of its extensive and costly
efforts to celebrate Christmas can only mean that the prestige of
the government has been conferred on the beliefs associated with
the creche, thereby providing "a significant symbolic benefit to
religion. . . ." Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., supra, at 459 U. S.
125 -126. The effect on minority religious groups, as
well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the
message that their views are not similarly worthy of public
recognition nor entitled to public support. [ Footnote 2/7 ] It was precisely this sort of religious
chauvinism that the Establishment Clause was intended forever to
prohibit. In this case, as in Engel v. Vitale, "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind Page 465 U. S. 702 a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain."

															370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 431 .
Our decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.
S. 263 (1981), rests upon the same principle. There the
Court noted that a state university policy of "equal access" for
both secular and religious groups would "not confer any imprimatur
of state approval" on the religious groups permitted to use the
facilities because "a broad spectrum of groups" would be served and
there was no evidence that religious groups would dominate the
forum. Id. at 454 U. S. 274 .
Here, by contrast, Pawtucket itself owns the creche, and instead of
extending similar attention to a "broad spectrum" of religious and
secular groups, it has singled out Christianity for special
treatment.

															Finally, it is evident that Pawtucket's inclusion of a creche as
part of its annual Christmas display does pose a significant threat
of fostering "excessive entanglement." As the Court notes, ante at 465 U. S. 683 ,
the District Court found no administrative entanglement in this
case, primarily because the city had been able to administer the
annual display without extensive consultation with religious
officials. See 525 F. Supp. at 1179. Of course, there is
no reason to disturb that finding, but it is worth noting that,
after today's decision, administrative entanglements may well
develop. Jews and other non-Christian groups, prompted perhaps by
the Mayor's remark that he will include a Menorah in future
displays, [ Footnote 2/8 ] can be
expected to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and
faced with such requests, government will have to become involved
in accommodating the various demands. Cf. Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 796 ("competing efforts [by religious groups] to gain or maintain the
support of government" may "occasio[n] considerable civil strife").
More importantly, although no political divisiveness was apparent
in Pawtucket Page 465 U. S. 703 prior to the filing of respondents' lawsuit, that act, as the
District Court found, unleashed powerful emotional reactions which
divided the city along religious lines. 525 F. Supp. at 1180. The
fact that calm had prevailed prior to this suit does not
immediately suggest the absence of any division on the point for,
as the District Court observed, the quiescence of those opposed to
the creche may have reflected nothing more than their sense of
futility in opposing the majority. Id. at 1179. Of course,
the Court is correct to note that we have never held that the
potential for divisiveness alone is sufficient to invalidate a
challenged governmental practice; we have, nevertheless, repeatedly
emphasized that "too close a proximity" between religious and civil
authorities, Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 259 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), may represent a "warning signal" that
the values embodied in the Establishment Clause are at risk. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S. 798 .
[ Footnote 2/9 ] Furthermore, the
Court should not blind itself to the fact that, because
communities Page 465 U. S. 704 differ in religious composition, the controversy over whether
local governments may adopt religious symbols will continue to
fester. In many communities, non-Christian groups can be expected
to combat practices similar to Pawtucket's; this will be so
especially in areas where there are substantial non-Christian
minorities. [ Footnote 2/10 ]

															In sum, considering the District Court's careful findings of
fact under the three-part analysis called for by our prior cases, I
have no difficulty concluding that Pawtucket's display of the
creche is unconstitutional. [ Footnote
2/11 ] Page 465 U. S. 705 B The Court advances two principal arguments to support its
conclusion that the Pawtucket creche satisfies the Lemon test. Neither is persuasive. First. The Court, by focusing on the holiday "context"
in which the nativity scene appeared, seeks to explain away the
clear religious import of the creche and the findings of the
District Court that most observers understood the creche as both a
symbol of Christian beliefs and a symbol of the city's support for
those beliefs. See ante at 465 U. S.
679 -684; see also ante at 465 U. S. 694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). Thus, although the Court concedes that
the city's inclusion of the nativity scene plainly serves "to
depict the origins" of Christmas as a "significant historical
religious event," ante at 465 U. S. 681 , 465 U. S. 680 ,
and that the creche "is identified with one religious faith," ante at 465 U. S. 685 ,
we are nevertheless expected to believe that Pawtucket's use of the
creche does not signal the city's support for the sectarian
symbolism that the nativity scene evokes. The effect of the creche,
of course, must be gauged not only by its inherent religious Page 465 U. S. 706 significance, but also by the overall setting in which it
appears. But it blinks reality to claim, as the Court does, that by
including such a distinctively religious object as the creche in
its Christmas display, Pawtucket has done no more than make use of
a "traditional" symbol of the holiday, and has thereby purged the
creche of its religious content and conferred only an "incidental
and indirect" benefit on religion. The Court's struggle to ignore
the clear religious effect of the creche seems to me misguided for
several reasons. In the first place, the city has positioned the
creche in a central and highly visible location within the Hodgson
Park display. The District Court's findings in this regard are
unambiguous:

															"[D]espite the small amount of ground covered by the creche,
viewers would not regard the creche as an insignificant part of the
display. It is an almost life sized tableau marked off by a white
picket fence. Furthermore, its location lends the creche
significance. The creche faces the Roosevelt Avenue bus stops and
access stairs where the bulk of the display is placed. Moreover,
the creche is near two of the most enticing parts of the display
for children -- Santa's house and the talking wishing well.
Although the Court recognizes that one cannot see the creche from
all possible vantage points, it is clear from the City's own photos
that people standing at the two bus shelters and looking down at
the display will see the creche centrally and prominently
positioned."

															525 F. Supp. at 1176-1177 (citations omitted; footnote
omitted).

															Moreover, the city has done nothing to disclaim government
approval of the religious significance of the creche, to suggest
that the creche represents only one religious symbol among many
others that might be included in a seasonal display truly aimed at
providing a wide catalog of ethnic and religious celebrations, or
to disassociate itself from the religious content of the creche. In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 225 ,
we noted that reading aloud Page 465 U. S. 707 from the Bible would be a permissible schoolroom exercise only
if it was "presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education" that would remove any message of governmental
endorsement of religion. Similarly, when the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit approved the inclusion of a creche
as part of a national "Pageant of Peace" on federal parkland
adjacent to the White House, it did so on the express condition
that the Government would erect "explanatory plaques" disclaiming
any sponsorship of religious beliefs associated with the creche. Allen v. Morton, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 241-242, 495 F.2d
65, 67-68 (1973) (per curiam). In this case, by contrast, Pawtucket
has made no effort whatever to provide a similar cautionary
message.

															Third, we have consistently acknowledged that an otherwise
secular setting alone does not suffice to justify a governmental
practice that has the effect of aiding religion. In Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U. S. 734 , 413 U. S. 743 (1973), for instance, we observed that

															"[a]id normally may be thought to have a primary effect of
advancing religion . . . when it [supports] a specifically
religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular
setting."

															The demonstrably secular context of public education, therefore,
did not save the challenged practice of school prayer in Engel or in Schempp. Similarly, in Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 , 403 U. S. 683 (1971), despite the generally secular thrust of the financing
legislation under review, the Court unanimously struck down that
aspect of the program which permitted church-related institutions
eventually to assume total control over the use of buildings
constructed with federal aid. [ Footnote 2/12 ] Page 465 U. S. 708 Finally, and most importantly, even in the context of
Pawtucket's seasonal celebration, the creche retains a specifically
Christian religious meaning. I refuse to accept the notion implicit
in today's decision that non-Christians would find that the
religious content of the creche is eliminated by the fact that it
appears as part of the city's otherwise secular celebration of the
Christmas holiday. The nativity scene is clearly distinct in its
purpose and effect from the rest of the Hodgson Park display for
the simple reason that it is the only one rooted in a biblical
account of Christ's birth. It is the chief symbol of the
characteristically Christian belief that a divine Savior was
brought into the world and that the purpose of this miraculous
birth was to illuminate a path toward salvation and redemption.
[ Footnote 2/13 ] For Christians,
that path is exclusive, precious, and holy. But for those who do
not share these beliefs, the symbolic reenactment of the birth of a
divine being who has been miraculously incarnated as a man stands
as a dramatic reminder of their differences with Christian faith.
[ Footnote 2/14 ] When government
appears to sponsor such religiously Page 465 U. S. 709 inspired views, we cannot say that the practice is

															"'so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious
function,' . . . that [it] may fairly be viewed as reflect[ing] a
neutral posture toward religious institutions." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 782 (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 18 ). To
be so excluded on religious grounds by one's elected government is
an insult and an injury that, until today, could not be
countenanced by the Establishment Clause. Second. The Court also attempts to justify the creche
by entertaining a beguilingly simple, yet faulty syllogism. The
Court begins by noting that government may recognize Christmas Day
as a public holiday; the Court then asserts that the creche is
nothing more than a traditional element of Christmas celebrations;
and it concludes that the inclusion of a creche as part of a
government's annual Christmas celebration is constitutionally
permissible. See ante at 465 U. S.
680 -683, 465 U. S.
685 -686; see also ante at 465 U. S.
692 -694 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). The Court apparently
believes that once it finds that the designation of Christmas as a
public holiday is constitutionally acceptable, it is then free to
conclude that virtually every form of governmental association with
the celebration of the holiday is also constitutional. The vice of
this dangerously superficial argument is that it overlooks the fact
that the Christmas holiday in our national culture contains both
secular and sectarian elements. [ Footnote 2/15 ] To say that government may recognize the
holiday's traditional, secular elements of Page 465 U. S. 710 gift-giving, public festivities, and community spirit, does not
mean that government may indiscriminately embrace the distinctively
sectarian aspects of the holiday. Indeed, in its eagerness to
approve the creche, the Court has advanced a rationale so
simplistic that it would appear to allow the Mayor of Pawtucket to
participate in the celebration of a Christmas Mass, since this
would be just another unobjectionable way for the city to
"celebrate the holiday." As is demonstrated below, the Court's
logic is fundamentally flawed both because it obscures the reason
why public designation of Christmas Day as a holiday is
constitutionally acceptable, and blurs the distinction between the
secular aspects of Christmas and its distinctively religious
character, as exemplified by the creche.

															When government decides to recognize Christmas Day as a public
holiday, it does no more than accommodate the calendar of public
activities to the plain fact that many Americans will expect on
that day to spend time visiting with their families, attending
religious services, and perhaps enjoying some respite from
pre-holiday activities. The Free Exercise Clause, of course, does
not necessarily compel the government to provide this
accommodation, but neither is the Establishment Clause offended by
such a step. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 (1952). Because it is clear that the celebration
of Christmas has both secular and sectarian elements, it may well
be that, by taking note of the holiday, the government is simply
seeking to serve the same kinds of wholly secular goals -- for
instance, promoting goodwill and a common day of rest -- that were
found to justify Sunday Closing Laws in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). [ Footnote 2/16 ] If public
officials go further and participate in the secular celebration Page 465 U. S. 711 of Christmas -- by, for example, decorating public places with
such secular images as wreaths, garlands, or Santa Claus figures --
they move closer to the limits of their constitutional power, but
nevertheless remain within the boundaries set by the Establishment
Clause. But when those officials participate in or appear to
endorse the distinctively religious elements of this otherwise
secular event, they encroach upon First Amendment freedoms. For it
is at that point that the government brings to the forefront the
theological content of the holiday, and places the prestige, power,
and financial support of a civil authority in the service of a
particular faith.

															The inclusion of a creche in Pawtucket's otherwise secular
celebration of Christmas clearly violates these principles. Unlike
such secular figures as Santa Claus, reindeer, and carolers, a
nativity scene represents far more than a mere "traditional" symbol
of Christmas. The essence of the creche's symbolic purpose and
effect is to prompt the observer to experience a sense of simple
awe and wonder appropriate to the contemplation of one of the
central elements of Christian dogma -- that God sent His Son into
the world to be a Messiah. [ Footnote
2/17 ] Contrary to the Court's suggestion, the creche is far
from a mere representation of a "particular historic religious
event." Ante at 465 U. S. 686 .
It is, instead, best understood as a mystical re-creation of an
event that lies at the heart of Christian faith. [ Footnote 2/18 ] To suggest, as the Court does, Page 465 U. S. 712 that such a symbol is merely "traditional," and therefore no
different from Santa's house or reindeer is not only offensive to
those for whom the creche has profound significance [ Footnote 2/19 ] but insulting to those who
insist, for religious or personal reasons, that the story of Christ
is in no sense a part of "history" nor an unavoidable element of
our national "heritage." [ Footnote
2/20 ]

															For these reasons, the creche in this context simply cannot be
viewed as playing the same role that an ordinary museum display
does. See ante at 465 U. S. 676 -677, 465 U. S. 683 , 465 U. S. 685 .
The Court seems to assume that prohibiting Pawtucket from
displaying a creche would be tantamount to prohibiting a state
college from including the Bible or Milton's Paradise Lost in a
course on English literature. But in those cases, the religiously
inspired materials are being considered solely as literature. The
purpose is plainly not to single out the particular religious
beliefs that may have inspired the authors, but to see in these
writings the outlines of a larger imaginative universe shared with
other forms of literary expression. [ Footnote 2/21 ] The same may be said of a course devoted
to the study of art; when the course turns to Gothic architecture,
the emphasis is not on the religious beliefs which the cathedrals
exalt, but rather upon the "aesthetic consequences of [such
religious] thought." [ Footnote
2/22 ] Page 465 U. S. 713 In this case, by contrast, the creche plays no comparable
secular role. Unlike the poetry of Paradise Lost which students in
a literature course will seek to appreciate primarily for esthetic
or historical reasons, the angels, shepherds, Magi, and infant of
Pawtucket's nativity scene can only be viewed as symbols of a
particular set of religious beliefs. It would be another matter if
the creche were displayed in a museum setting, in the company of
other religiously inspired artifacts, as an example, among many, of
the symbolic representation of religious myths. In that setting, we
would have objective guarantees that the creche could not suggest
that a particular faith had been singled out for public favor and
recognition. The effect of Pawtucket's creche, however, is not
confined by any of these limiting attributes. In the absence of any
other religious symbols or of any neutral disclaimer, the
inescapable effect of the creche will be to remind the average
observer of the religious roots of the celebration he is witnessing
and to call to mind the scriptural message that the nativity
symbolizes. The fact that Pawtucket has gone to the trouble of
making such an elaborate public celebration and of including a
creche in that otherwise secular setting inevitably serves to
reinforce the sense that the city means to express solidarity with
the Christian message of the creche and to dismiss other faiths as
unworthy of similar attention and support. II Although the Court's relaxed application of the Lemon test to Pawtucket's creche is regrettable, it is at least
understandable and properly limited to the particular facts of this
case. The Court's opinion, however, also sounds a broader Page 465 U. S. 714 and more troubling theme. Invoking the celebration of
Thanksgiving as a public holiday, the legend "In God We Trust" on
our coins, and the proclamation "God save the United States and
this Honorable Court" at the opening of judicial sessions, the
Court asserts, without explanation, that Pawtucket's inclusion of a
creche in its annual Christmas display poses no more of a threat to
Establishment Clause values than these other official
"acknowledgments" of religion. Ante at 465 U. S.
674 -678, 465 U. S.
685 -686; see also ante at 465 U. S.
692 -693 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring).

															Intuition tells us that some official "acknowledgment" is
inevitable in a religious society if government is not to adopt a
stilted indifference to the religious life of the people. See
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.
S. 203 , 333 U. S. 232 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). It is equally true, however,
that, if government is to remain scrupulously neutral in matters of
religious conscience, as our Constitution requires, then it must
avoid those overly broad acknowledgments of religious practices
that may imply governmental favoritism toward one set of religious
beliefs. This does not mean, of course, that public officials may
not take account, when necessary, of the separate existence and
significance of the religious institutions and practices in the
society they govern. Should government choose to incorporate some
arguably religious element into its public ceremonies, that
acknowledgment must be impartial; it must not tend to promote one
faith or handicap another; and it should not sponsor religion
generally over nonreligion. Thus, in a series of decisions
concerned with such acknowledgments, we have repeatedly held that
any active form of public acknowledgment of religion indicating
sponsorship or endorsement is forbidden. E.g., Stone v.
Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980)
(posting of Ten Commandments in schoolroom); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968)
(prohibition on teaching principles of Darwinian evolution); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 (1963) (mandatory Bible-reading at beginning
of Page 465 U. S. 715 school day); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 (1962) (mandatory reading of state-composed
prayer); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,
supra, (use of public school facilities for religious
instruction).

															Despite this body of case law, the Court has never
comprehensively addressed the extent to which government may
acknowledge religion by, for example, incorporating religious
references into public ceremonies and proclamations, and I do not
presume to offer a comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, it appears
from our prior decisions that at least three principles -- tracing
the narrow channels which government acknowledgments must follow to
satisfy the Establishment Clause -- may be identified. First,
although the government may not be compelled to do so by the Free
Exercise Clause, it may, consistently with the Establishment
Clause, act to accommodate to some extent the opportunities of
individuals to practice their religion. See Schempp,
supra, at 374 U. S.
296 -299 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). That is the essential
meaning, I submit, of this Court's decision in Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952), finding that government does not violate the Establishment
Clause when it simply chooses to "close its doors or suspend its
operations as to those who want to repair to their religious
sanctuary for worship or instruction." Id. at 343 U. S. 314 .
And for me, that principle would justify government's decision to
declare December 25th a public holiday. See supra at 465 U. S.
710 .

															Second, our cases recognize that, while a particular
governmental practice may have derived from religious motivations
and retain certain religious connotations, it is nonetheless
permissible for the government to pursue the practice when it is
continued today solely for secular reasons. As this Court noted
with reference to Sunday Closing Laws in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961), the mere fact that a governmental practice coincides to
some extent with certain religious beliefs does not render it
unconstitutional. Thanksgiving Day, in my view, fits easily within
this principle, Page 465 U. S. 716 for, despite its religious antecedents, [ Footnote 2/23 ] the current practice of celebrating
Thanksgiving is unquestionably secular and patriotic. We all may
gather with our families on that day to give thanks both for
personal and national good fortune, but we are free, given the
secular character of the holiday, to address that gratitude either
to a divine beneficence or to such mundane sources as good luck or
the country's abundant natural wealth.

															Finally, we have noted that government cannot be completely
prohibited from recognizing in its public actions the religious
beliefs and practices of the American people as an aspect of our
national history and culture. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 370 U. S. 435 ,
n. 21; Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S.
300 -304 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). While I remain
uncertain about these questions, I would suggest that such
practices as the designation of "In God We Trust" as our national
motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of
Allegiance to the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt
phrase, as a form a "ceremonial deism," [ Footnote 2/24 ] protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any
significant religious content. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. at 463 U. S. 818 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Page 465 U. S. 717 Moreover, these references are uniquely suited to serve such
wholly secular purposes as solemnizing public occasions, or
inspiring commitment to meet some national challenge in a manner
that simply could not be fully served in our culture if government
were limited to purely nonreligious phrases. Cf. Schempp,
supra, at 374 U. S. 265 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). The practices by which the government
has long acknowledged religion are therefore probably necessary to
serve certain secular functions, and that necessity, coupled with
their long history, gives those practices an essentially secular
meaning.

															The creche fits none of these categories. Inclusion of the
creche is not necessary to accommodate individual religious
expression. This is plainly not a case in which individual
residents of Pawtucket have claimed the right to place a creche as
part of a wholly private display on public land. Cf. Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981); McCreary v. Stone, 575
F. Supp. 1112 (SDNY 1983). Nor is the inclusion of the creche
necessary to serve wholly secular goals; it is clear that the
city's secular purposes of celebrating the Christmas holiday and
promoting retail commerce can be fully served without the creche. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland and supra at 465 U. S.
699 -700. And the creche, because of its unique
association with Christianity, is clearly more sectarian than those
references to God that we accept in ceremonial phrases or in other
contexts that assure neutrality. The religious works on display at
the National Gallery, Presidential references to God during an
Inaugural Address, or the national motto present no risk of
establishing religion. To be sure, our understanding of these
expressions may begin in contemplation of some religious element,
but it does not end there. Their message is dominantly secular. In
contrast, the message of the creche begins and ends with reverence
for a particular image of the divine.

															By insisting that such a distinctively sectarian message is
merely an unobjectionable part of our "religious heritage," see
ante at 465 U. S. 676 , 465 U. S.
685 -686, the Court takes a long step backwards Page 465 U. S. 718 to the days when Justice Brewer could arrogantly declare for the
Court that "this is a Christian nation." Church of Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U. S. 457 , 143 U. S. 471 (1892). Those days, I had thought, were forever put behind us by
the Court's decision in Engel v. Vitale, in which we
rejected a similar argument advanced by the State of New York that
its Regent's Prayer was simply an acceptable part of our "spiritual
heritage." 370 U.S. at 370 U. S.
425 . III The American historical experience concerning the public
celebration of Christmas, if carefully examined, provides no
support for the Court's decision. The opening sections of the
Court's opinion, while seeking to rely on historical evidence, do
no more than recognize the obvious: because of the strong religious
currents that run through our history, an inflexible or
absolutistic enforcement of the Establishment Clause would be both
imprudent and impossible. See ante at 465 U. S.
673 -678. This observation is at once uncontroversial and
unilluminating. Simply enumerating the various ways in which the
Federal Government has recognized the vital role religion plays in
our society does nothing to help decide the question presented in this case.

															Indeed, the Court's approach suggests a fundamental
misapprehension of the proper uses of history in constitutional
interpretation. Certainly, our decisions reflect the fact that an
awareness of historical practice often can provide a useful guide
in interpreting the abstract language of the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 397 U. S.
676 -680; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 366 U. S.
431 -445; Engel, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S.
425 -429. But historical acceptance of a particular
practice alone is never sufficient to justify a challenged
governmental action, since, as the Court has rightly observed,

															"no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the
Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our
entire national existence and indeed predates it." Walz, supra, at 397 U. S. 678 . See also Committee
for Page 465 U. S. 719 Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 792 .
Attention to the details of history should not blind us to the
cardinal purposes of the Establishment Clause, nor limit our
central inquiry in these cases -- whether the challenged practices
"threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 236 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). In recognition of this fact, the Court
has, until today, consistently limited its historical inquiry to
the particular practice under review.

															In McGowan, for instance, the Court carefully canvassed
the entire history of Sunday Closing Laws from the colonial period
up to modern times. On the basis of this analysis, we concluded
that, while such laws were rooted in religious motivations, the
current purpose was to serve the wholly secular goal of providing a
uniform day of rest for all citizens. 366 U.S. at 366 U. S. 445 .
Our inquiry in Walz was similarly confined to the special
history of the practice under review. There the Court found a
pattern of "undeviating acceptance" over the entire course of the
Nation's history of according property tax exemptions to religious
organizations, a pattern which supported our finding that the
practice did not violate the Religion Clauses. Finally, where
direct inquiry into the Framers' intent reveals that the First
Amendment was not understood to prohibit a particular practice, we
have found such an understanding compelling. Thus, in Marsh v.
Chambers, after marshaling the historical evidence which
indicated that the First Congress had authorized the appointment of
paid chaplains for its own proceedings only three days before it
reached agreement on the final wording of the Bill of Rights, the
Court concluded on the basis of this "unique history" that the
modern-day practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer was
constitutional. 463 U.S. at 463 U. S.
787 -791.

															Although invoking these decisions in support of its result, the
Court wholly fails to discuss the history of the public celebration
of Christmas or the use of publicly displayed nativity scenes. The
Court, instead, simply asserts, without any historical analysis or
support whatsoever, that the now-familiar Page 465 U. S. 720 celebration of Christmas springs from an unbroken history of
acknowledgment "by the people, by the Executive Branch, by the
Congress, and the courts for 2 centuries. . . ." Ante at 465 U. S. 686 .
The Court's complete failure to offer any explanation of its
assertion is perhaps understandable, however, because the
historical record points in precisely the opposite direction. Two
features of this history are worth noting. First, at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, there was
no settled pattern of celebrating Christmas, either as a purely
religious holiday or as a public event. Second, the historical
evidence, such as it is, offers no uniform pattern of widespread
acceptance of the holiday, and indeed suggests that the development
of Christmas as a public holiday is a comparatively recent
phenomenon. [ Footnote 2/25 ]

															The intent of the Framers with respect to the public display of
nativity scenes is virtually impossible to discern, primarily
because the widespread celebration of Christmas did not emerge in
its present form until well into the 19th century. Carrying a
well-defined Puritan hostility to the celebration of Christ's birth
with them to the New World, the founders of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony pursued a vigilant policy of opposition to any public
celebration of the holiday. Page 465 U. S. 721 To the Puritans, the celebration of Christmas represented a
"Popish" practice lacking any foundation in Scripture. This
opposition took legal form in 1659 when the Massachusetts Bay
Colony made the observance of Christmas Day, "by abstinence from
labor, feasting, or any other way," an offense punishable by fine.
Although the Colony eventually repealed this ban in 1681, the
Puritan objection remained firm. [ Footnote 2/26 ]

															During the 18th century, sectarian division over the celebration
of the holiday continued. As increasing numbers of members of the
Anglican and the Dutch and German Reformed Churches arrived, the
practice of celebrating Christmas as a purely religious holiday
grew. But denominational differences continued to dictate
differences in attitude toward the holiday. American Anglicans, who
carried with them the Church of England's acceptance of the
holiday, Roman Catholics, and various German groups all made the
celebration of Christmas a vital part of their religious life. By
contrast, many nonconforming Protestant groups, including the
Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Methodists,
continued to regard the holiday with suspicion and antagonism well
into the 19th century. [ Footnote
2/27 ] This pattern of sectarian Page 465 U. S. 722 division concerning the holiday suggests that for the Framers of
the Establishment Clause, who were acutely sensitive to such
sectarian controversies, no single view of how government should
approach the celebration of Christmas would be possible.

															Many of the same religious sects that were devotedly opposed to
the celebration of Christmas on purely religious grounds were also
some of the most vocal and dedicated foes of established religions
in the period just prior to the Revolutionary War. [ Footnote 2/28 ] The Puritans, and later
the Presbyterians, Baptists, and Methodists, generally associated
the celebration of Christmas with the elaborate and, in their view,
sacreligious celebration of the holiday by the Church of England,
and also with, for them, the more sinister theology of "Popery."
[ Footnote 2/29 ] In the eyes of
these dissenting religious sects, therefore, the groups most
closely associated with established Page 465 U. S. 723 religion -- the Churches of England and of Rome -- were also
most closely linked to the profane practice of publicly celebrating
Christmas. For those who authored the Bill of Rights, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the public celebration of Christmas
would have been regarded as at least a sensitive matter, if not
deeply controversial. As we have repeatedly observed, the Religion
Clauses were intended to ensure a benign regime of competitive
disorder among all denominations, so that each sect was free to vie
against the others for the allegiance of its followers without
state interference. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
The historical record, contrary to the Court's uninformed
assumption, suggests that at the very least conflicting views
toward the celebration of Christmas were an important element of
that competition at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution.

															Furthermore, unlike the religious tax exemptions upheld in Walz, the public display of nativity scenes as part of
governmental celebrations of Christmas does not come to us
supported by an unbroken history of widespread acceptance. It was
not until 1836 that a State first granted legal recognition to
Christmas as a public holiday. This was followed in the period
between 1845 and 1865, by 28 jurisdictions which included Christmas
Day as a legal holiday. [ Footnote
2/30 ] Congress did not follow the States' lead until 1870, when
it established December 25th, along with the Fourth of July, New
Year's Day, and Thanksgiving, as a legal holiday in the District of
Columbia. [ Footnote 2/31 ] This
pattern of legal recognition tells us only that Page 465 U. S. 724 public acceptance of the holiday was gradual and that the
practice -- in stark contrast to the record presented in either Walz or Marsh -- did not take on the character of
a widely recognized holiday until the middle of the 19th
century.

															The historical evidence with respect to public financing and
support for governmental displays of nativity scenes is even more
difficult to gauge. What is known suggests that German immigrants
who settled in Pennsylvania early in the 18th century, presumably
drawing upon European traditions, were probably the first to
introduce nativity scenes to the American celebration of Christmas.
[ Footnote 2/32 ] It also appears
likely that this practice expanded as more Roman Catholic
immigrants settled during the 19th century. From these modest
beginnings, the familiar creche scene developed and gained wider
recognition by the late 19th century. [ Footnote 2/33 ] It is simply impossible to tell,
however, whether the practice ever gained widespread acceptance,
much less official endorsement, until the 20th century.

															In sum, there is no evidence whatsoever that the Framers would
have expressly approved a federal celebration of the Christmas
holiday including public displays of a nativity Page 465 U. S. 725 scene; accordingly, the Court's repeated invocation of the
decision in Marsh, see ante at 465 U. S.
673 -674, 465 U. S. 682 , 465 U. S.
685 -686, is not only baffling, it is utterly irrelevant.
Nor is there any suggestion that publicly financed and supported
displays of Christmas creches are supported by a record of
widespread, undeviating acceptance that extends throughout our
history. Therefore, our prior decisions which relied upon concrete,
specific historical evidence to support a particular practice
simply have no bearing on the question presented in this case.
Contrary to today's careless decision, those prior cases have all
recognized that the "illumination" provided by history must always
be focused on the particular practice at issue in a given case.
Without that guiding principle and the intellectual discipline it
imposes, the Court is at sea, free to select random elements of
America's varied history solely to suit the views of five Members
of this Court. IV Under our constitutional scheme, the role of safeguarding our
"religious heritage" and of promoting religious beliefs is reserved
as the exclusive prerogative of our Nation's churches, religious
institutions, and spiritual leaders. Because the Framers of the
Establishment Clause understood that "religion is too personal, too
sacred, too holy to permit its unhallowed perversion' by civil
[authorities]," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 432 ,
the Clause demands that government play no role in this effort. The
Court today brushes aside these concerns by insisting that
Pawtucket has done nothing more than include a "traditional" symbol
of Christmas in its celebration of this national holiday, thereby
muting the religious content of the creche. Ante at 465 U. S. 685 .
But the city's action should be recognized for what it is: a
coercive, though perhaps small, step toward establishing the
sectarian preferences of the majority at the expense of the
minority, accomplished by placing public facilities and funds in
support of the religious symbolism and theological tidings that
the Page 465 U. S. 726 creche conveys. As Justice Frankfurter, writing in McGowan
v. Maryland, observed, the Establishment Clause

															"withdr[aws] from the sphere of legitimate legislative concern
and competence a specific, but comprehensive, area of human
conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some
transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief
or disbelief."

															366 U.S. at 366 U. S.
465 -466 (separate opinion). That the Constitution sets
this realm of thought and feeling apart from the pressures and
antagonisms of government is one of its supreme achievements.
Regrettably, the Court today tarnishes that achievement.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															For instance, nothing in the Court's opinion suggests that the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit erred when it found that a
city-financed platform and cross used by Pope John Paul II to
celebrate Mass and deliver a sermon during his 1979 visit to
Philadelphia was an unconstitutional expenditure of city funds. Gifillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924 (1980). Nor
does the Court provide any basis for disputing the holding of the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that the erection and
maintenance of an illuminated Latin cross on state park property
violates the Establishment Clause. American Civil Liberties Union
of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d
1098 (1983). See also Fox v. City of Los
Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d
792 , 587 P.2d 663 (1978); Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254
Ore. 539, 463 P.2d
360 (1969). And given the Court's focus upon the otherwise
secular setting of the Pawtucket creche, it remains uncertain
whether, absent such secular symbols as Santa Claus' house, a
talking wishing well, and cutout clowns and bears, a similar
nativity scene would pass muster under the Court's standard. Cf. McCreary v. Stone, 575 F.
Supp. 1112 (SDNY 1983) (holding that village did not violate
Establishment Clause by refusing to permit a private group to erect
a creche in a public park).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Although I agree with the Court that no single formula can ever
fully capture the analysis that may be necessary to resolve
difficult Establishment Clause problems, see 465
U.S. 668 fn2/11|>n. 11, infra, I fail to understand
the Court's insistence upon referring to the settled test set forth
in Lemon as simply one path that may be followed or not at
the Court's option. See ante at 465 U. S. 679 .
The Court's citation of Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 (1971), and Committee for Public Education
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 (1973), to support this assertion is meaningless,
because both of those decisions applied the three-prong Lemon test. Indeed, ever since its initial formulation,
the Lemon test has been consistently looked upon as the
fundamental tool of Establishment Clause analysis. In Nyquist, the Court described the test in mandatory
terms:

															"Taken together, [our] decisions dictate that to pass muster
under the Establishment Clause the law in question [must satisfy
the three elements of the Lemon test]."

															413 U.S. at 413 U. S.
772 -773. And just last Term, in Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982), THE CHIEF JUSTICE, speaking for the Court, wrote that

															"[t]his Court has consistently held that a statute must satisfy
three criteria [as set forth in Lemon ] to pass muster
under the Establishment Clause." Id. at 459 U. S. 123 . See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S.
39 , 449 U. S. 40 -41
(1980) (per curiam); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S.
236 -236 (1977). In addition, the Court's citation of Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228 (1982), also fails to support the Court's assertion. In Larson, we first reviewed a state law granting a
denominational preference under a "strict scrutiny" analysis, id. at 456 U. S.
246 -251, but then concluded by finding the statute
unconstitutional under the Lemon analysis as well. Id. at 456 U. S.
251 -255. Thus, despite the Court's efforts to evade the
point, the fact remains that Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), is the only case in which the Court has not applied either
the Lemon or a "strict scrutiny" analysis. I can only
conclude that, with today's unsupported assertion, the Court hopes
to provide a belated excuse for the failure in Marsh to
address the analysis of the Lemon test.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., supra, at 459 U. S. 123 ; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 , 454 U. S. 271 (1981); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S. 236 (1977); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.
S. 664 , 397 U. S. 674 (1970). As JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring opinion rightly observes,
this test provides a helpful analytical tool in considering the
central question posed in this case -- whether Pawtucket has run
afoul of the Establishment Clause by endorsing religion through its
display of the creche. Ante at 465 U. S.
690 .

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															I find it puzzling, to say the least, that the Court today
should find "irrelevant," ante at 465 U. S. 681 ,
n. 7, the fact that the city's secular objectives can be readily
and fully accomplished without including the creche, since only
last Term, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. at 459 U. S.
123 -124, the Court relied upon precisely the same point
in striking down a Massachusetts statute which vested in church
governing bodies the power to veto applications for liquor
licenses. It seems the Court is willing to alter its analysis from
Term to Term in order to suit its preferred results.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Several representatives of Pawtucket's business community
testified that, although the overall Christmas display played an
important role in promoting downtown holiday trade, the display
would serve this purpose equally well even if the creche were
removed. App. 133, 135, 139-140. The Mayor also testified that, if
the nativity scene had to be eliminated, the city would continue to
erect the annual display without it. Id. at 115.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The District Court also admitted into evidence, without
objection from petitioners, a considerable amount of correspondence
received by Mayor Lynch in support of maintaining the creche in the
city's Christmas display. One such letter, which appears to be
representative of the views of many, congratulates the Mayor on his
efforts "to keep Christ' in Christmas. . . ." App. 161. For the
District Court's findings concerning the meaning of these letters, see 525 F.
Supp. 1150 , 1162 (RI 1981) ("Overall the tenor of the
correspondence is that the lawsuit represents an attack on the
presence of religion as part of the community's life, an attempt to
deny the majority the ability to express publically its beliefs in
a desired and traditionally accepted way"). Furthermore, as the
District Court found, "the City has accepted and implemented the view of its
predominantly Christian citizens that it is a 'good thing' to have
a creche in a Christmas display . . . because it is a good thing to
'keep Christ in Christmas.'" Id. at 1173.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In this regard, the views expressed by the California Supreme
Court in considering a similar issue are particularly relevant:

															"When a city so openly promotes the religious meaning of one
religion's holidays, the benefit reaped by that religion and the
disadvantage suffered by other religions is obvious. Those persons
who do not share those holidays are relegated to the status of
outsiders by their own government; those persons who do observe
those holidays can take pleasure in seeing the symbol of their
belief given official sanction and special status." Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d at 803, 687 P.2d
at 670 (striking down as unconstitutional the erection of an
illuminated cross in front of city hall). See also Lowe v. City
of Eugene, 264 Ore. at 644-546, 463 P.2d at 363.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See App. 104.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															The suggestion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.
S. 388 , 463 U. S.
403 -404, n. 11 (1983), relied upon by the Court today, see ante at 465 U. S. 684 ; ante at 465 U. S. 689 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring), that inquiry into potential political
divisiveness is unnecessary absent direct subsidies to
church-sponsored schools or colleges, derives from a distorted
reading of our prior cases. Simply because the Court in Lemon -- a case involving such subsidies -- inquired into
potential divisiveness while distinguishing Everson and Allen -- cases not involving such subsidies -- does not
provide any authority for the proposition that the Court in Lemon meant to confine the divisiveness inquiry only to
cases factually identical to Lemon itself. Indeed, in Walz, the Court considered the question of divisiveness in
the context of state tax exemptions to all religious institutions.
I agree, however, with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's helpful suggestion that,
while political divisiveness is "an evil addressed by the
Establishment Clause," the ultimate inquiry must always focus on
"the character of the government activity that might cause such
divisiveness." Ante at 465 U. S. 689 .
Having said that, I should also emphasize that I disagree
fundamentally with JUSTICE O'CONNOR's apparent conclusion that
Pawtucket's inclusion of the creche is not the kind of governmental
act that may engender sharp division along religious lines. The
contrary is demonstrated by the history of this case.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															This and similar issues relating to governmental endorsement of
religious symbols has engendered continuing controversy which has
reached the courts on many occasions. See, e.g., American Civil
Liberties Union of Georgia v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce,
Inc., 698 F.2d 1098 (CA11 1983); Florey v. Sioux Falls
School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (CA8 1980); Allen v.
Morton, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 495 F.2d 65 (1973); Allen v.
Hickel, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 424 F.2d 944 (1970); McCreary
v. Stone, 575 F.
Supp. 1112 (SDNY 1983); Citizens Concerned for Separation
of Church and State v. Denver, 508 F.
Supp. 823 (Colo.1981); Russell v.
Mamaroneck, 440 F.
Supp. 607 (SDNY 1977); Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 40
Misc.2d 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup.Ct.1963). Given the narrowness of
the Court's decision today, see supra at 465 U. S.
694 -695, and n. 1, the potential for controversy is
unlikely to abate.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															The Court makes only a half-hearted attempt, see ante at 465 U. S.
680 -681, 465 U. S.
682 -683, to grapple with the fact that Judge Pettine's
detailed findings may not be overturned unless they are shown to be
"clearly erroneous." Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 52(a). See
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273 , 456 U. S.
285 -290 (1982). In my view, petitioners have made no
such showing in this case. JUSTICE O'CONNOR's concurring opinion
properly accords greater respect to the District Court's findings,
but I am at a loss to understand how the court's specific and
well-supported finding that the city was understood to have placed
its stamp of approval on the sectarian content of the creche can,
in the face of the Lemon test, be dismissed as simply an
"error as a matter of law." Ante at 465 U. S.
694 .

															Moreover, although the Court brushes the point aside with little
explanation, see ante at 465 U. S. 687 ,
n. 13, the Lemon decision's three-prong analysis is not
the only available standard of review. As the Court of Appeals
recognized, the "strict scrutiny" analysis adopted in Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
244 -246, addresses situations in which a governmental
policy or practice grants official preference to one religious
denomination over another. 691 F.2d 1029, 1034-1035 (CA1 1982).
While I am inclined to agree with the Court of Appeals that
Pawtucket's practice fails this test, it is not necessary that I
address this point in view of my conclusion that the city's
inclusion of the creche violates the standards fixed in Lemon. Furthermore, I continue to believe that the test I set forth in Schempp is an appropriate means of determining whether
rights guaranteed by the Establishment Clause have been infringed.
In my view,

															"those involvements of religious with secular institutions which
(a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious
institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially
religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve
governmental ends, where secular means would suffice"

															must be struck down. 374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
294 -295. In the present case, I particularly believe the
third element of this test is not met, since all of Pawtucket's
governmental goals -- celebrating the holiday season and promoting
commerce -- can be fully realized without the use of the creche by
employing such wholly secular means as Santa Claus, reindeer, and
cutout figures. See supra at 465 U. S.
699 -700.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															Indeed, in the aid-to-sectarian-schools cases, the state
financing schemes under review almost always require us to focus on
a specific element that may violate the Establishment Clause, even
though it is a part of a complex and otherwise secular statutory
framework. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.
S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 (1977). See also Committee for Public
Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.
S. 646 , 444 U. S. 662 (1980) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] See R. Brown, The Birth of the Messiah (1977); W. Auld,
Christmas Traditions (1931); A. McArthur, The Evolution of the
Christian Year (1953).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															For Christians, of course, the essential message of the nativity
is that God became incarnate in the person of Christ. But just as
fundamental to Jewish thought is the belief in the "non-incarnation
of God, . . . [t]he God in whom [Jews] believe, to whom [Jews] are
pledged, does not unite with human substance on earth." M. Buber,
Israel and the World (1948) (reprinted in F. Talmage, Disputation
and Dialogue: Readings in the Jewish-Christian Encounter 281-282
(1975)) (emphasis deleted). This distinction, according to Buber,
"constitute[s] the ultimate division between Judaism and
Christianity." Id. at 281. See also R. Reuther,
Faith and Fratricide 246 (1974).

															Similarly, those who follow the tenets of Unitarianism might
well find Pawtucket's support for the symbolism of the creche,
which highlights the Trinitarian tradition in Christian faith, to
be an affront to their belief in a single divine being. See J. Williams, What Americans Believe and How They
Worship 316-317 (3d ed.1969). See also C. Olmstead,
History of Religion in the United States 296-299 (1960).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals recognized that
Christmas comprises both secular and sectarian elements, and that
this distinction is of constitutional importance. See 525
F.Supp. at 1163-1164; 691 F.2d at 1032-1033; id. at
1035-1037 (Bownes, J., concurring). In addition, many observers
have explained that historically the Christmas celebration derives
both from traditional, folk elements such as gift-giving and winter
seasonal celebrations, as well as from Christian religious
elements. See, e.g., J. Barnett, The American Christmas, A
Study in National Culture 9-14 (1954) (hereafter Barnett); R.
Meyers, Celebrations: The Complete Book of American Holidays
309-344 (1972); B. Rosenthal & N. Rosenthal, Christmas 14-15
(1980).

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															It is worth noting that Christmas shares the list of federal
holidays with such patently secular, patriotic holidays as the
Fourth of July, Memorial Day, Washington's Birthday, Labor Day, and
Veterans Day. See 5 U.S.C. § 6103(a). We may reasonably
infer from the distinctly secular character of the company that
Christmas keeps on this list that it too is included for
essentially secular reasons.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ] See W. Auld, Christmas Traditions (1931); A. McArthur,
The Evolution of the Christian Year (1953).

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															As one commentator has observed:

															"Today, of course, it is admitted even by Catholic exegetes that
[the Biblical stories recounting Christ's birth] are a collection
of largely uncertain, mutually contradictory, strongly legendary
and ultimately theologically motivated narratives, with a character
of their own. Unlike the rest of Jesus' life, there are dream
happenings here and angels constantly enter on the scene and leave
it -- as heavenly messengers of God announcing important
events."

															H. Kung, On Being A Christian 451 (E. Quinn trans., 1976)
(footnote omitted). See also R. Brown, The Birth of the
Messiah 25-41 (1977); Elliott, The Birth and Background of Jesus of
Nazareth, 28 History Today 773, 774-780 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Many Christian commentators have voiced strong objections to
what they consider to be the debasement and trivialization of
Christmas through too close a connection with commercial and public
celebrations. See, e.g., Kelley, Beyond Separation of
Church and State, 5 J. Church & State 181 (1963). See
generally Barnett 55-57.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ] See A. Stokes & L. Pfeffer, Church and State in the
United States 383 (rev. ed.1964); R. Morgan, The Supreme Court and
Religion 126 (1972); Barnett 68 (discussing opposition by Jews and
other non-Christian religious groups to public celebrations of
Christmas). See also Talmage, supra, 465
U.S. 668 fn2/14|>n. 14.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ] See N. Frye, The Secular Scripture 14-15 (1976).

															[ Footnote 2/22 ]

															O. von Simson, The Gothic Cathedral 27 (1956). See also E. Panofsky Meaning in the Visual Arts (1974). Compare Justice Jackson's explanation of his view that the study of
religiously inspired material can, in the correct setting, be made
a part of a secular educational program:

															"[m]usic without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral,
or painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and
incomplete, even from a secular point of view." Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 , 333 U. S. 236 (1948) (concurring opinion).

															[ Footnote 2/23 ]

															The constitutional problems posed by the religious antecedents
of the early Thanksgiving celebrations were well recognized by
Thomas Jefferson. Refusing on Establishment Clause grounds to
declare national days of thanksgiving or fasting, Jefferson
explained:

															"I consider the government of the United States as interdicted
by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions,
their doctrines, disciplines, or exercises. . . . [I]t is only
proposed that I should recommend, not prescribe, a day of fasting
and prayer. . . . [But] I do not believe it is for the interest of
religion to invite the civil magistrate to direct its exercises,
its discipline, or its doctrines. . . . Fasting and prayer are
religious exercises; the enjoining them an act of discipline."

															11 Jefferson's Writings 428-430 (1904) (emphasis deleted). See generally L. Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom 266
(1967).

															[ Footnote 2/24 ]

															Sutherland, Book Review, 40 Ind.L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (quoting Dean
Rostow's 1962 Meiklejohn Lecture delivered at Brown
University).

															[ Footnote 2/25 ]

															The Court's insistence upon pursuing this vague historical
analysis is especially baffling since even the petitioners and
their supporting amici concede that no historical evidence
equivalent to that relied upon in Marsh, McGowan, or Walz supports publicly sponsored Christmas displays. At
oral argument, counsel for petitioners was asked whether there is
"anything we can refer to to let us know how long it has been the
practice in this country for public bodies to have nativity scenes
displayed?" Counsel responded:

															"Specifically, I cannot. . . . The recognition of Christmas [as
a public holiday] began in the middle part of the last century . .
. but specifically with respect to the use of the nativity scene,
we have been unable to locate that data."

															Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.

															In addition, the Solicitor General, appearing as amicus in support of petitioners, was asked: "Do we have . . . evidence
[of the intent of the Framers] here with respect to the display of
a nativity scene?" He responded: "Not with that degree of
specificity." Id. at 22-23.

															[ Footnote 2/26 ] See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America
209 (rev. ed.1970). For an example of this notorious Puritan
antipathy to the holiday, consider the remarks of Judge Sewell, a
Puritan, who in 1685 expressed his concerns about the influence of
public celebration of Christmas:

															"Some, somehow observe the day, but are vexed, I believe, that
the Body of the People Profane it; and, blessed be God, no
Authority yet to compel them to keep it."

															Quoted in Barnett 3.

															[ Footnote 2/27 ] See generally Barnett 4-6, 21-22; Sweet, Christmas in
American History, 22 Chi.Theol.Sem.Register 12, 14 (Nov.1932); R.
Meyers, Celebrations: The Complete Book of American Holidays
314-315 (1972). Some indication of this denominational opposition
to the religious celebration of Christmas can be gleaned from the
following account of Christmas services in the New York Daily Times
for December 26, 1855:

															"The churches of the Presbyterians, Baptists and Methodists were
not open on Dec. 25 except where some Mission Schools had a
celebration. They do not accept the day as a Holy One, but the
Episcopalian, Catholic and German Churches were all open. Inside
they were decked with evergreens."

															Quoted in Barnett 8.

															In addition, consider the account written in 1874 of Henry Ward
Beecher, a Congregationalist, describing his New England
childhood:

															"To me, Christmas is a foreign day, and I shall die so. When I
was a boy, I wondered what Christmas was. I knew there was such a
time, because we had an Episcopal church in our town and I saw them
dressing it with evergreens. . . . A little later, I understood it
was a Romish institution, kept up by the Romish Church. Brought up
in the strictest state of New England, brought up in the most
literal style of worship . . . I passed all my youth without any
knowledge of Christmas, and so I have no associations with the
day."

															Quoted in Meyers, supra 465
U.S. 668 fn2/15|>n. 15, at 315-316.

															[ Footnote 2/28 ]

															The role of these religious groups in the struggle for
disestablishment and their place in the history of the
Establishment Clause have already been chronicled at some length in
our cases, and therefore I will not repeat that history here. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 9 -15
(1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 , 370 U. S. 428 ,
and n. 10 (1962); Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 413 U. S. 770 ,
and n. 28. For more comprehensive discussions of the efforts of
these denominations to bring about disestablishment, see S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (rev. ed.1970);
B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
257-263 (1967); W. McLoughlin, New England Dissent: 1630-1833
(1971); L. Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom (1967).

															[ Footnote 2/29 ] See Barnett 2-6.

															[ Footnote 2/30 ]

															For a compilation of these developments, see id. at
19-20.

															[ Footnote 2/31 ]

															Ch. 167, 16 Stat. 168. There is no suggestion in the brief
congressional discussion concerning the decision to declare
Christmas Day a public holiday in the District of Columbia that
Congress meant to do anything more than to put the District on
equal footing with the many States that had declared those days
public holidays by that time. See Cong.Globe, 41st Cong.,
2d Sess., 4805 (1870).

															Significantly, it was not until 1885 that Congress provided
holiday payment for federal employees on December 25. See J.Res. 5, 23 Stat. 516.

															[ Footnote 2/32 ] See Barnett 11-12; Meyers, supra, 465
U.S. 668 fn2/15|>n. 15 . The symbol of the creche as an
artifact of Christmas celebration apparently owes its origins to
St. Francis of Assisi who, according to most accounts, first
popularized the ritual reenactment of the birth of Christ by
erecting a manger attended by townspeople who played the
now-traditional roles of shepherds, Magi, etc., in the village of
Greccio, Italy, in 1224. See W. Auld, Christmas Traditions
56 (1931); M. Krythe, All About Christmas 85 (1954).

															[ Footnote 2/33 ]

															One commentator has noted that the increasing secularization of
the Christmas celebration which occurred during the 19th century
led

															"members of the Puritan and evangelical churches [to be] less
inclined to oppose the secular celebration when it no longer
symbolized the religious and political dominance of the Church of
England. This tolerance increased during the nineteenth century,
and undoubtedly encouraged [the] popularity [of the celebration of
Christmas]."

															Barnett 6; see also id. at 11-12, 22-23.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,
dissenting.

															As JUSTICE BRENNAN points out, the logic of the Court's decision
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971) (which THE CHIEF JUSTICE would say has
been applied by this Court "often," ante at 465 U. S. 679 ,
but which JUSTICE O'CONNOR acknowledges with the words, "Our prior
cases have used the three-part test articulated in Lemon, " ante at 465 U. S.
688 ), compels an affirmance here. If that case and its
guidelines mean anything, the presence of Pawtucket's creche in a
municipally sponsored display must be held to be a violation of the
First Amendment.

															Not only does the Court's resolution of this controversy make
light of our precedents, but also, ironically, the majority does an
injustice to the creche and the message it manifests. While certain
persons, including the Mayor of Pawtucket, undertook a crusade to
"keep Christ' in Christmas," App. 161, the Court today has
declared that presence virtually irrelevant. The majority urges
that the display, "with or without a creche," "recall[s] the
religious nature of the Holiday," and "engenders a friendly
community spirit of goodwill in keeping with the season." Ante at 465 U. S. 685 .
Before the District Court, an expert witness for the city
made Page 465 U. S. 727 a similar, though perhaps more candid, point, stating that
Pawtucket's display invites people "to participate in the Christmas
spirit, brotherhood, peace, and let loose with their money." See 525 F.
Supp. 1150 , 1161 (RI 1981). The creche has been relegated to
the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for
commercial purposes but devoid of any inherent meaning and
incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it
is an integral part. The city has its victory -- but it is a
Pyrrhic one indeed.

															The import of the Court's decision is to encourage use of the
creche in a municipally sponsored display, a setting where
Christians feel constrained in acknowledging its symbolic meaning
and non-Christians feel alienated by its presence. Surely, this is
a misuse of a sacred symbol. Because I cannot join the Court in
denying either the force of our precedents or the sacred message
that is at the core of the creche, I dissent and join JUSTICE
BRENNAN's opinion.