U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941) United States v.
Darby No. 82 Argued December 19, 20,
1940 Decided February 3,
1941 312
U.S. 100 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA Syllabus 1. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 provides for fixing
minimum wages and maximum hours for employees engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce, with increased
compensation for overtime, and forbids, under pain of fine and
imprisonment: (1) violation by an employer of such wage and hour
provisions; (2) shipment by him in interstate commerce of any goods
in the production of which any employee was employed in violation
of such provisions, and (3) failure of the employer to keep such
records of his employees and of their wages and hours, as shall be
prescribed by administrative regulation or order. Held within the commerce power and consistent with the Fifth and Tenth
Amendments. P. 312 U. S.
111 .

															2. While manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce, the
shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce, and the
prohibition of such shipment by Congress is a regulation of
interstate commerce. P. 312 U. S.
113 .

															3. Congress, following its own conception of public policy
concerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on
interstate commerce, is free to exclude from it articles whose use
in the State for which they are destined it may conceive to be
injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the
State has not sought to regulate their use. P. 312 U. S.
114 .

															4. Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power
merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict
the use of articles of commerce within the States of destination,
and is valid unless prohibited by other Constitutional provisions.
P. 312 U. S.
114 .

															5. The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly
to make effective the Congressional conception of public policy
that interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of
competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce
and to the States from and to which it flows. P. 312 U.S. 115 .

															6. The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce
are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which
the Constitution places no restriction, and over which the courts
are given no control. P. 312 U.S.
115 . Page 312 U. S. 101 7. In prohibiting interstate shipment of goods produced under
the forbidden substandard labor conditions, the Act is within the
authority of Congress, if no Constitutional provision forbids. P. 312 U.S. 115 .

															8. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.
S. 251 , overruled; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 ,
declared to have been limited. Pp. 312 U.S. 115 , 312 U. S.
123 .

															9. The "production for interstate commerce" intended by the Act
includes, at least, production of goods, which, at the time of
production, the employer, according to the normal course of his
business, intends or expects to move in interstate commerce
although, through the exigencies of the business, all of the goods
may not thereafter actually enter interstate commerce. P. 312 U. S.
117 .

															10. The power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to
those intrastate activities which so affect interstate commerce or
the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make their
regulation an appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end -- the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. P. 312 U. S.
118 .

															11. Congress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of
excluding from interstate commerce all goods produced for that
commerce which do not conform to the specified labor standards, it
may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the
permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate
activities. P. 312 U. S.
121 .

															12. Independently of the prohibition of shipment or
transportation of the proscribed goods, the provision of the Act
for the suppression of their production for interstate commerce is
within the commerce power. P. 312 U. S.
122 .

															13. The Tenth Amendment is not a limitation upon the authority
of the National Government to resort to all means for the exercise
of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the
permitted end. P. 312 U. S.
123 .

															14. The requirements of the Act as to the keeping of records are
valid as incidental to the wage and hour requirements. P. 312 U. S.
124 .

															15. The wage and hour provisions of the Act do not violate the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. P. 312 U. S.
125 .

															16. In its criminal aspect, the Act is sufficiently definite to
meet constitutional demands. P. 312 U. S.
125 . 32 F. Supp.
734 , reversed.

															APPEAL, under the Criminal Appeals Act, from a judgment quashing
an indictment. Page 312 U. S. 108 MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The two principal questions raised by the record in this case
are, first, whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit
the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by
employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose
weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater than a prescribed
maximum, and, second, whether it has power to prohibit the
employment of workmen in the production of goods "for interstate
commerce" at other than prescribed wages and hours. A subsidiary
question is whether, in connection with such prohibitions, Congress
can require the employer subject to them to keep records showing
the hours worked each day and week by each of his employees
including those engaged "in the production and manufacture of
goods, to-wit, lumber, for interstate commerce.'" Appellee demurred to an indictment found in the district court
for southern Georgia charging him with violation of § 15(a)(1)(2)
and (5) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938; 52 Stat. 1060, 29
U.S.C. § 201, et seq. The district court sustained the
demurrer and quashed the indictment, and the case comes here on
direct appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code as amended, 28 Page 312 U. S. 109 U.S.C. § 345, and § 682, Title 18 U.S.C. 34 Stat. 1246, which
authorizes an appeal to this Court when the judgment sustaining the
demurrer "is based upon the invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment is founded."

															The Fair Labor Standards Act set up a comprehensive legislative
scheme for preventing the shipment in interstate commerce of
certain products and commodities produced in the United States
under labor conditions as respects wages and hours which fail to
conform to standards set up by the Act. Its purpose, as we
judicially know from the declaration of policy in § 2(a) of the
Act, [ Footnote 1 ] and the
reports of Congressional committees proposing the legislation,
S.Rept. No. 884, 75th Cong. 1st Sess.; H.Rept. No. 1452, 75th Cong.
1st Sess.; H.Rept. No. 2182, 75th Cong.3d Sess., Conference Report,
H.Rept. No. 2738, 75th Cong.3d Sess., is to exclude from interstate
commerce goods produced for the commerce and to prevent their
production for interstate commerce under conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for
health and general wellbeing, and to prevent the use of
interstate Page 312 U. S. 110 commerce as the means of competition in the distribution of
goods so produced, and as the means of spreading and perpetuating
such substandard labor conditions among the workers of the several
states. The Act also sets up an administrative procedure whereby
those standards may from time to time be modified generally as to
industries subject to the Act or within an industry in accordance
with specified standards, by an administrator acting in
collaboration with "Industry Committees" appointed by him.

															Section 15 of the statute prohibits certain specified acts, and
§ 16(a) punishes willful violation of it by a fine of not more than
$10,000, and punishes each conviction after the first by
imprisonment of not more than six months or by the specified fine,
or both. Section 15(1) makes unlawful the shipment in interstate
commerce of any goods "in the production of which any employee was
employed in violation of section 6 or section 7," which provide,
among other things, that, during the first year of operation of the
Act, a minimum wage of 25 cents per hour shall be paid to employees
"engaged in [interstate] commerce or the production of goods for
[interstate] commerce," § 6, and that the maximum hours of
employment for employees "engaged in commerce or the production of
goods for commerce" without increased compensation for overtime,
shall be forty-four hours a week. § 7.

															Section 15(a)(2) makes it unlawful to violate the provisions of
§§ 6 and 7, including the minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements just mentioned for employees engaged in production of
goods for commerce. Section 15(a)(5) makes it unlawful for an
employer subject to the Act to violate § 11(c), which requires him
to keep such records of the persons employed by him and of their
wages and hours of employment as the administrator shall prescribe
by regulation or order. Page 312 U. S. 111 The indictment charges that appellee is engaged, in the State of
Georgia, in the business of acquiring raw materials, which he
manufactures into finished lumber with the intent, when
manufactured, to ship it in interstate commerce to customers
outside the state, and that he does, in fact, so ship a large part
of the lumber so produced. There are numerous counts charging
appellee with the shipment in interstate commerce from Georgia to
points outside the state of lumber in the production of which, for
interstate commerce, appellee has employed workmen at less than the
prescribed minimum wage or more than the prescribed maximum hours
without payment to them of any wage for overtime. Other counts
charge the employment by appellee of workmen in the production of
lumber for interstate commerce at wages at less than 25 cents an
hour or for more than the maximum hours per week without payment to
them of the prescribed overtime wage. Still another count charges
appellee with failure to keep records showing the hours worked each
day a week by each of his employees as required by § 11(c) and the
regulation of the administrator, Title 29, Ch. 5, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 516, and also that appellee unlawfully failed to
keep such records of employees engaged "in the production and
manufacture of goods, to-wit lumber, for interstate commerce."

															The demurrer, so far as now relevant to the appeal, challenged
the validity of the Fair Labor Standards Act under the Commerce
Clause and the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. The district court
quashed the indictment in its entirety upon the broad grounds that
the Act, which it interpreted as a regulation of manufacture within
the states, is unconstitutional. It declared that manufacture is
not interstate commerce, and that the regulation by the Fair Labor
Standards Act of wages and hours of employment of those engaged in
the manufacture Page 312 U. S. 112 of goods which it is intended at the time of production "may or
will be" after production "sold in interstate commerce in part or
in whole" is not within the congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce.

															The effect of the court's decision and judgment is thus to deny
the power of Congress to prohibit shipment in interstate commerce
of lumber produced for interstate commerce under the proscribed
substandard labor conditions of wages and hours, its power to
penalize the employer for his failure to conform to the wage and
hour provisions in the case of employees engaged in the production
of lumber which he intends thereafter to ship in interstate
commerce in part or in whole according to the normal course of his
business, and its power to compel him to keep records of hours of
employment as required by the statute and the regulations of the
administrator.

															The case comes here on assignments by the Government that the
district court erred insofar as it held that Congress was without
constitutional power to penalize the acts set forth in the
indictment, and appellee seeks to sustain the decision below on the
grounds that the prohibition by Congress of those Acts is
unauthorized by the Commerce Clause and is prohibited by the Fifth
Amendment. The appeal statute limits our jurisdiction on this
appeal to a review of the determination of the district court so
far only as it is based on the validity or construction of the
statute. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.
S. 188 , 308 U. S.
193 -195, and cases cited. Hence, we accept the district
court's interpretation of the indictment and confine our decision
to the validity and construction of the statute.

															The prohibition of shipment of the proscribed goods in
interstate commerce. Section 15(a)(1) prohibits, and the indictment
charges, the shipment in interstate commerce, of goods produced for
interstate commerce by employees whose wages and hours of
employment do not Page 312 U. S. 113 conform to the requirements of the Act. Since this section is
not violated unless the commodity shipped has been produced under
labor conditions prohibited by § 6 and § 7, the only question
arising under the commerce clause with respect to such shipments is
whether Congress has the constitutional power to prohibit them.

															While manufacture is not, of itself, interstate commerce, the
shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce, and the
prohibition of such shipment by Congress is indubitably a
regulation of the commerce. The power to regulate commerce is the
power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is governed." Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 196 . It
extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster and protect
the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it. Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U. S. 137 ; Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321 ; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.
S. 366 ; Hoke v. United States, 227 U.
S. 308 ; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry.
Co., 242 U. S. 311 ; United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 ; McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.
S. 131 . It is conceded that the power of Congress to
prohibit transportation in interstate commerce includes noxious
articles, Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U. S. 45 ; cf. Hoke v. United States, supra; stolen articles, Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 ;
kidnapped persons, Gooch v. United States, 297 U.
S. 124 , and articles, such as intoxicating liquor or
convict made goods, traffic in which is forbidden or restricted by
the laws of the state of destination. Kentucky Whip &
Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.
S. 334 .

															But it is said that the present prohibition falls within the
scope of none of these categories; that, while the prohibition is
nominally a regulation of the commerce, its motive or purpose is
regulation of wages and hours of persons engaged in manufacture,
the control of which has been reserved to the states and upon which
Georgia Page 312 U. S. 114 and some of the states of destination have placed no
restriction; that the effect of the present statute is not to
exclude the proscribed articles from interstate commerce in aid of
state regulation, as in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v.
Illinois Central R. Co., supra, but instead, under the guise
of a regulation of interstate commerce, it undertakes to regulate
wages and hours within the state contrary to the policy of the
state which has elected to leave them unregulated.

															The power of Congress over interstate commerce "is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, 22 U. S. 196 .
That power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise
or nonexercise of state power. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co.
v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra. Congress, following its own
conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may
appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude
from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they
are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate
their use. Reid v. Colorado, supra; Lottery Case, supra;
Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, supra; Hoke v. United States,
supra. Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power
merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict
the use of articles of commerce within the states of destination,
and is not prohibited unless by other Constitutional provisions. It
is no objection to the assertion of the power to regulate
interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same
incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the
states. Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.
S. 510 , 239 U. S. 614 ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146 , 251 U. S. 156 ; United States v. Carolene
Products Co. , 304 U.S. Page 312 U. S. 115 144, 304 U. S. 147 ; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 .

															The motive and purpose of the present regulation are plainly to
make effective the Congressional conception of public policy that
interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of
competition in the distribution of goods produced under substandard
labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce
and to the states from and to which the commerce flows. The motive
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the
Constitution places no restriction, and over which the courts are
given no control. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S.
27 ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.
S. 506 , 300 U. S. 513 ,
and cases cited. "The judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative
department of the government limitations upon the exercise of its
acknowledged power." Veazie Bank v.
Fenno , 8 Wall. 533. Whatever their motive and
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred
on Congress by the Commerce Clause. Subject only to that
limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the
prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the
forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional
authority of Congress.

															In the more than a century which has elapsed since the decision
of Gibbons v. Ogden, these principles of constitutional
interpretation have been so long and repeatedly recognized by this
Court as applicable to the Commerce Clause that there would be
little occasion for repeating them now were it not for the decision
of this Court twenty-two years ago in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 . In
that case, it was held by a bare majority of the Court, over the
powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes setting
forth the fundamental issues involved, Page 312 U. S. 116 that Congress was without power to exclude the products of child
labor from interstate commerce. The reasoning and conclusion of the
Court's opinion there cannot be reconciled with the conclusion
which we have reached, that the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate
commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the
Constitution. Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been followed. The
distinction on which the decision was rested, that Congressional
power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to articles which
in themselves have some harmful or deleterious property -- a
distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by any
provision of the Constitution -- has long since been abandoned. Brooks v. United States, supra; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co.
v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra; Electric Bond & Share Co. v.
Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 303 U.
S. 419 ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S.
38 . The thesis of the opinion -- that the motive of the
prohibition or its effect to control in some measure the use or
production within the states of the article thus excluded from the
commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its
constitutional authority -- has long since ceased to have force. Reid v. Colorado, supra; Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co.
v. United States, supra; Seven Cases v. United States, supra, 239 U. S. 514 ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
supra, 251 U. S. 156 ; United States v. Carolene Products Co., supra, 304 U. S. 147 .
And finally, we have declared

															"The authority of the federal government over interstate
commerce does not differ in extent or character from that retained
by the states over intrastate commerce." United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U.
S. 533 , 307 U. S.
569 .

															The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the
interpretation of the Commerce Clause both Page 312 U. S. 117 before and since the decision, and that such vitality, as a
precedent, as it then had, has long since been exhausted. It should
be, and now is, overruled. Validity of the wage and hour requirements. Section
15(a)(2) and §§ 6 and 7 require employers to conform to the wage
and hour provisions with respect to all employees engaged in the
production of goods for interstate commerce. As appellee's
employees are not alleged to be "engaged in interstate commerce,"
the validity of the prohibition turns on the question whether the
employment, under other than the prescribed labor standards, of
employees engaged in the production of goods for interstate
commerce is so related to the commerce, and so affects it, as to be
within the reach of the power of Congress to regulate it.

															To answer this question, we must at the outset determine whether
the particular acts charged in the counts which are laid under §
15(a)(2) as they were construed below constitute "production for
commerce" within the meaning of the statute. As the Government
seeks to apply the statute in the indictment, and as the court
below construed the phrase "produced for interstate commerce," it
embraces at least the case where an employer engaged, as is
appellee, in the manufacture and shipment of goods in filling
orders of extrastate customers, manufactures his product with the
intent or expectation that, according to the normal course of his
business, all or some part of it will be selected for shipment to
those customers.

															Without attempting to define the precise limits of the phrase,
we think the acts alleged in the indictment are within the sweep of
the statute. The obvious purpose of the Act was not only to prevent
the interstate transportation of the proscribed product, but to
stop the initial step toward transportation, production with the
purpose of so transporting it. Congress was not unaware that Page 312 U. S. 118 most manufacturing businesses shipping their product in
interstate commerce make it in their shops without reference to its
ultimate destination, and then, after manufacture, select some of
it for shipment interstate and some intrastate, according to the
daily demands of their business, and that it would be practically
impossible, without disrupting manufacturing businesses, to
restrict the prohibited kind of production to the particular pieces
of lumber, cloth, furniture or the like which later move in
interstate, rather than intrastate, commerce. Cf. United States
v. New York Central R. Co., 272 U. S. 457 , 272 U. S.
464 .

															The recognized need of drafting a workable statute and the well
known circumstances in which it was to be applied are persuasive of
the conclusion, which the legislative history supports, S.Rept. No.
884, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., pp. 7 and 8; H.Rept. No. 2738, 75th
Cong.3d Sess., p. 17, that the "production for commerce" intended
includes at least production of goods which, at the time of
production, the employer, according to the normal course of his
business, intends or expects to move in interstate commerce
although, through the exigencies of the business, all of the goods
may not thereafter actually enter interstate commerce. [ Footnote 2 ]

															There remains the question whether such restriction on the
production of goods for commerce is a permissible exercise of the
commerce power. The power of Congress over interstate commerce is
not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It
extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. See McCulloch Page 312 U. S. 119 v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S. 421 . Cf. United States v. Ferger, 250 U.
S. 199 .

															While this Court has many times found state regulation of
interstate commerce, when uniformity of its regulation is of
national concern, to be incompatible with the Commerce Clause even
though Congress has not legislated on the subject, the Court has
never implied such restraint on state control over matters
intrastate not deemed to be regulations of interstate commerce or
its instrumentalities even though they affect the commerce. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 398 et seq., and case cited; 230 U. S. 410 et seq., and cases cited. In the absence of Congressional
legislation on the subject, state laws which are not regulations of
the commerce itself or its instrumentalities are not forbidden,
even though they affect interstate commerce. Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 ; Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504 ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.
S. 245 ; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.
S. 172 .

															But it does not follow that Congress may not, by appropriate
legislation, regulate intrastate activities where they have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U.
S. 453 , 303 U. S. 466 .
A recent example is the National Labor Relations Act for the
regulation of employer and employee relations in industries in
which strikes, induced by unfair labor practices named in the Act,
tend to disturb or obstruct interstate commerce. See National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 , 301 U. S. 38 , 301 U. S. 40 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.
S. 601 , 306 U. S. 604 ,
and cases cited. But, long before the adoption of the National
Labor Relations Act, this Court had many times held that the power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce extends to the
regulation through legislative action of activities intrastate Page 312 U. S. 120 which have a substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise
of the Congressional power over it. [ Footnote 3 ]

															In such legislation, Congress has sometimes left it to the
courts to determine whether the intrastate activities have the
prohibited effect on the commerce, as in the Sherman Act. It has
sometimes left it to an administrative board or agency to determine
whether the activities sought to be regulated or prohibited have
such effect, as in the case of the Interstate Commerce Act and the
National Labor Relations Act, or whether they come within the
statutory definition of the prohibited Act, as in the Federal Trade
Commission Act. And sometimes Congress itself has said that a
particular activity affects the commerce, as it did in the present
Act, the Safety Appliance Act, and the Railway Labor Act. In
passing on the validity of legislation of the class last mentioned,
the only function of courts is to determine whether the particular
activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach Page 312 U. S. 121 of the federal power. See United States v. Ferger, supra;
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Federation, 300 U.
S. 515 , 300 U. S.
553 .

															Congress having by the present Act adopted the policy of
excluding from interstate commerce all goods produced for the
commerce which do not conform to the specified labor standards, it
may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the
permitted end even though they involve control of intrastate
activities. Such legislation has often been sustained with respect
to powers other than the commerce power granted to the national
government when the means chosen, although not themselves within
the granted power, were nevertheless deemed appropriate aids to the
accomplishment of some purpose within an admitted power of the
national government. See Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 ; Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.
S. 545 , 265 U. S. 560 ; Westfall v. United States, 274 U.
S. 256 , 274 U. S. 259 . As
to state power under the Fourteenth Amendment, compare Otis v.
Parker, 187 U. S. 606 , 187 U. S. 609 ; St. John v. New York, 201 U. S. 633 ; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.
S. 192 , 226 U. S.
201 -202. A familiar like exercise of power is the
regulation of intrastate transactions which are so commingled with
or related to interstate commerce that all must be regulated if the
interstate commerce is to be effectively controlled. Shreveport
Case, 234 U. S. 342 ; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., 257 U. S. 563 ; United States v. New York Central R. Co., supra, 272 U. S. 464 ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 ; Mulford v. Smith, supra. Similarly, Congress may require
inspection and preventive treatment of all cattle in a disease
infected area in order to prevent shipment in interstate commerce
of some of the cattle without the treatment. Thornton v. United
States, 271 U. S. 414 . It
may prohibit the removal, at destination, of labels required by the
Pure Food & Drugs Act to be affixed to articles Page 312 U. S. 122 transported in interstate commerce. McDermott v.
Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 . And
we have recently held that Congress, in the exercise of its power
to require inspection and grading of tobacco shipped in interstate
commerce, may compel such inspection and grading of all tobacco
sold at local auction rooms from which a substantial part, but not
all, of the tobacco sold is shipped in interstate commerce. Currin v. Wallace, supra, 306 U. S. 11 , and see, to the like effect, United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op., supra, 307 U. S. 568 ,
note 37.

															We think also that § 15(a)(2), now under consideration, is
sustainable independently of § 15(a)(1), which prohibits shipment
or transportation of the proscribed goods. As we have said, the
evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard labor
conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate commerce
for competition by the goods so produced with those produced under
the prescribed or better labor conditions, and the consequent
dislocation of the commerce itself caused by the impairment or
destruction of local businesses by competition made effective
through interstate commerce. The Act is thus directed at the
suppression of a method or kind of competition in interstate
commerce which it has, in effect, condemned as "unfair," as the
Clayton Act has condemned other "unfair methods of competition"
made effective through interstate commerce. See Van Camp &
Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.
S. 245 ; Federal Trade Comm'n v. Keppel &
Bro., 291 U. S. 304 .

															The Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act are
familiar examples of the exertion of the commerce power to prohibit
or control activities wholly intrastate because of their effect on
interstate commerce. See, as to the Sherman Act, Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.
S. 197 ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 ; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525 ; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.
S. 344 ; Local Page 312 U. S. 123 No. 167 v. United States, 291 U.
S. 293 ; Stevens Co. v. Foster & Kleiser
Co., 311 U. S. 255 . As
to the National Labor Relations Act, see National Labor
Relations Board v. Fainblatt, supra, and cases cited.

															The means adopted by § 15(a)(2) for the protection of interstate
commerce by the suppression of the production of the condemned
goods for interstate commerce is so related to the commerce, and so
affects it, as to be within the reach of the commerce power. See Currin v. Wallace, supra, 306 U. S. 11 .
Congress, to attain its objective in the suppression of nationwide
competition in interstate commerce by goods produced under
substandard labor conditions, has made no distinction as to the
volume or amount of shipments in the commerce or of production for
commerce by any particular shipper or producer. It recognized that,
in present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the
whole, and that the total effect of the competition of many small
producers may be great. See H.Rept. No. 2182, 75th Cong.
1st Sess., p. 7. The legislation, aimed at a whole, embraces all
its parts. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt,
supra, 306 U. S.
606 .

															So far as Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.
S. 238 , is inconsistent with this conclusion, its
doctrine is limited in principle by the decisions under the Sherman
Act and the National Labor Relations Act, which we have cited and
which we follow. See also Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 ; Currin v. Wallace, supra; Mulford v. Smith, supra; United
States v. Rock Royal Co-op., supra; Clover Fork Coal Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 97 F.2d 331; National
Labor Relations Board v. Crowe Coal Co., 104 F.2d 633; National Labor Relations Board v. Good Coal Co., 110 F.2d
501.

															Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment. which
provides:

															"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the Page 312 U. S. 124 States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."

															The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the
relationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment, or that
its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. See e.g., II Elliot's Debates, 123, 131; III id. 450, 464, 600; IV id. 140, 149; I Annals of Congress, 432,
761, 767-768; Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, §§
1907-1908.

															From the beginning and for many years, the amendment has been
construed as not depriving the national government of authority to
resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee , 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 324 , 14 U. S. 325 ; McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, 17 U. S. 405 , 17 U. S. 406 ; Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S.Appx 697, 705; Lottery Case, supra; Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
supra, 193 U. S.
344 -345; Everard's Breweries v. Day, supra, 265 U. S. 558 ; United States v. Sprague, 282 U.
S. 716 , 282 U. S. 733 ; see United States v. The Brigantine William, 28 Fed.Cas.
No. 16,700, p. 622. Whatever doubts may have arisen of the
soundness of that conclusion, they have been put at rest by the
decisions under the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations
Act which we have cited. See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S.
330 -331; Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502 , 304 U. S.
516 . Validity of the requirement of records of wages and
hours. § 15(a)(5) and § 11(c). These requirements are
incidental to those for the prescribed wages and Page 312 U. S. 125 hours, and hence validity of the former turns on validity of the
latter. Since, as we have held, Congress may require production for
interstate commerce to conform to those conditions, it may require
the employer, as a means of enforcing the valid law, to keep a
record showing whether he has, in fact, complied with it. The
requirement for records even of the intrastate transaction is an
appropriate means to the legitimate end. See Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.
S. 612 ; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 ; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.
1 , 262 U. S. 42 . Validity of the wage and hour provisions under the Fifth
Amendment. Both provisions are minimum wage requirements
compelling the payment of a minimum standard wage with a prescribed
increased wage for overtime of "not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate" at which the worker is employed. Since our
decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.
S. 379 , it is no longer open to question that the fixing
of a minimum wage is within the legislative power, and that the
bare fact of its exercise is not a denial of due process under the
Fifth more than under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor is it any
longer open to question that it is within the legislative power to
fix maximum hours. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.
S. 366 ; Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.
S. 412 ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.
S. 426 ; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, supra. Similarly, the statute is not
objectionable because applied alike to both men and women. Cf.
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 .

															The Act is sufficiently definite to meet constitutional demands.
One who employs persons, without conforming to the prescribed wage
and hour conditions, to work on goods which he ships or expects to
ship across state Page 312 U. S. 126 lines is warned that he may be subject to the criminal penalties
of the Act. No more is required. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 , 229 U. S.
377 .

															We have considered, but find it unnecessary to discuss other
contentions. Reversed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															"Sec. 2. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence, in
industries engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general wellbeing of workers (1) causes commerce and the channels
and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and
perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several
States; (2) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in
commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce, and (5) interferes
with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce."

															Section 3(b) defines "commerce" as

															"trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication
among the several States or from any State to any place outside
thereof."

															[ Footnote 2 ] Cf. Administrator's Opinion, Interpretative Bulletin
No. 5, 1940 Wage and Hour Manual, p. 131 et seq. [ Footnote 3 ]

															It may prohibit wholly intrastate activities which, if
permitted, would result in restraint of interstate commerce. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.
S. 295 , 268 U. S. 310 ; Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.
S. 293 , 291 U. S. 297 .
It may regulate the activities of a local grain exchange shown to
have an injurious effect on interstate commerce. Chicago Board
of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 . It may
regulate intrastate rates of interstate carriers where the effect
of the rates is to burden interstate commerce. Houston, E.
& W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.
S. 342 ; Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563 ; United States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S.
70 , 290 U. S. 74 ; Florida v. United States, 292 U. S.
1 . It may compel the adoption of safety appliances on
rolling stock moving intrastate because of the relation to and
effect of such appliances upon interstate traffic moving over the
same railroad. Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 . It
may prescribe maximum hours for employees engaged in intrastate
activity connected with the movement of any train, such as train
dispatchers and telegraphers. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 221 U. S. 612 , 221 U. S.
619 .


U.S. Supreme Court Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) Katzenbach v. McClung No. 543 Argued October 5,
1964 Decided December 14,
1964 379
U.S. 294 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
ALABAMA Syllabus Appellees, whose restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, caters to
local white customers with take-out service for Negroes, serving
food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate
commerce, sued to enjoin appellants from enforcing against their
restaurant and others Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which they claimed was unconstitutional. A three-judge District
Court granted an injunction, holding that there was no demonstrable
connection between food purchased in interstate commerce and sold
in a restaurant and Congress' conclusion that discrimination in the
restaurant would affect commerce so as to warrant regulation of
local activities to protect interstate commerce. Held: 1. Since interference with governmental action has occurred and
the constitutionality of Title II is before the Court in a
companion case, the Court reaches the merits of this case by
considering the complaint as an application for declaratory
judgment, instead of denying relief for want of equity jurisdiction
as it would ordinarily do on the ground that appellees should have
waited to pursue the statutory procedures for adjudication of their
rights. Pp. 379 U. S.
295 -296.

															2. Congress acted within its power to protect and foster
commerce in extending coverage of Title II to restaurants serving
food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate
commerce, since it had ample basis to conclude that racial
discrimination by such restaurants burdened interstate trade. Pp. 383 U. S.
300 -305. 233 F.
Supp. 815 , reversed Page 379 U. S. 295 MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case was argued with No. 515, Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, decided this date, ante, p. 383 U. S. 241 ,
in which we upheld the constitutional validity of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against an attack by hotels, motels, and
like establishments. This complaint for injunctive relief against
appellants attacks the constitutionality of the Act as applied to a
restaurant. The case was heard by a three-judge United States
District Court and an injunction was issued restraining appellants
from enforcing the Act against the restaurant. 233 F.
Supp. 815 . On direct appeal, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253 (1958
ed.), we noted probable jurisdiction. 379 U.
S. 802 . We now reverse the judgment.

															1. The Motion to Dismiss The appellants moved in the District Court to dismiss the
complaint for want of equity jurisdiction and that claim is pressed
here. The grounds are that the Act authorizes only preventive
relief; that there has been no threat of enforcement against the
appellees and that they have alleged no irreparable injury. It is
true that ordinarily equity will not interfere in such cases.
However, we may and do consider this complaint as an application
for a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 (1958
ed.). In this case, of course, direct appeal to this Court would
still lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1958 Page 379 U. S. 296 ed.). But even though Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits declaratory relief although another adequate
remedy exists, it should not be granted where a special statutory
proceeding has been provided. See Notes on Rule 57 of
Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C.App. 5178 (1958 ed.). Title
II provides for such a statutory proceeding for the determination
of rights and duties arising thereunder, §§ 204-207, and courts
should, therefore, ordinarily refrain from exercising their
jurisdiction in such cases.

															The present case, however, is in a unique position. The
interference with governmental action has occurred and the
constitutional question is before us in the companion case of Heart of Atlanta Motel as well as in this case. It is
important that a decision on the constitutionality of the Act as
applied in these cases be announced as quickly as possible. For
these reasons, we have concluded, with the above caveat, that the
denial of discretionary declaratory relief is not required
here.

															2. The Facts Ollie's Barbecue is a family owned restaurant in Birmingham,
Alabama, specializing in barbecued meats and homemade pies, with a
seating capacity of 220 customers. It is located on a state highway
11 blocks from an interstate one and a somewhat greater distance
from railroad and bus stations. The restaurant caters to a family
and white-collar trade with a take-out service for Negroes. It
employs 36 persons, two-thirds of whom are Negroes.

															In the 12 months preceding the passage of the Act, the
restaurant purchased locally approximately $150,000 worth of food,
$69,683 or 46% of which was meat that it bought from a local
supplier who had procured it from outside the State. The District
Court expressly found that a substantial portion of the food served
in the restaurant Page 379 U. S. 297 had moved in interstate commerce. The restaurant has refused to
serve Negroes in its dining accommodations since its original
opening in 1927, and, since July 2, 1964, it has been operating in
violation of the Act. The court below concluded that, if it were
required to serve Negroes, it would lose a substantial amount of
business.

															On the merits, the District Court held that the Act could not be
applied under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was conceded that
the State of Alabama was not involved in the refusal of the
restaurant to serve Negroes. It was also admitted that the
Thirteenth Amendment was authority neither for validating nor for
invalidating the Act. As to the Commerce Clause, the court found
that it was

															"an express grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce, which consists of the movement of persons, goods or
information from one state to another,"

															and it found that the clause was also a grant of power

															"to regulate intrastate activities, but only to the extent that
action on its part is necessary or appropriate to the effective
execution of its expressly granted power to regulate interstate
commerce."

															There must be, it said, a close and substantial relation between
local activities and interstate commerce which requires control of
the former in the protection of the latter. The court concluded,
however, that the Congress, rather than finding facts sufficient to
meet this rule, had legislated a conclusive presumption that a
restaurant affects interstate commerce if it serves or offers to
serve interstate travelers or if a substantial portion of the food
which it serves has moved in commerce. This, the court held, it
could not do, because there was no demonstrable connection between
food purchased in interstate commerce and sold in a restaurant and
the conclusion of Congress that discrimination in the restaurant
would affect that commerce. Page 379 U. S. 298 The basic holding in Heart of Atlanta Motel answers
many of the contentions made by the appellees. [ Footnote 1 ] There, we outlined the overall purpose
and operational plan of Title II, and found it a valid exercise of
the power to regulate interstate commerce insofar as it requires
hotels and motels to serve transients without regard to their race
or color. In this case, we consider its application to restaurants
which serve food a substantial portion of which has moved in
commerce.

															3. The Act As Applied Section 201(a) of Title II commands that all persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services
of any place of public accommodation without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin, and § 201(b) defines establishments as places of public
accommodation if their operations affect commerce or segregation by
them is supported by state action. Sections 201(b)(2) and (c) place
any "restaurant . . . principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises" under the Act "if . . . it serves or
offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of
the food which it serves . . . has moved in commerce."

															Ollie's Barbecue admits that it is covered by these provisions
of the Act. The Government makes no contention that the
discrimination at the restaurant was supported by the State of
Alabama. There is no claim that interstate travelers frequented the
restaurant. The sole question, therefore, narrows down to whether
Title II, as applied to a restaurant annually receiving about
$70,000 worth of food which has moved in commerce, is a valid
exercise of the power of Congress. The Government Page 379 U. S. 299 has contended that Congress had ample basis upon which to find
that racial discrimination at restaurants which receive from out of
state a substantial portion of the food served does, in fact,
impose commercial burdens of national magnitude upon interstate
commerce. The appellees' major argument is directed to this
premise. They urge that no such basis existed. It is to that
question that we now turn.

															4. The Congressional Hearings As we noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel, both Houses of
Congress conducted prolonged hearings on the Act. And, as we said
there, while no formal findings were made, which, of course, are
not necessary, it is well that we make mention of the testimony at
these hearings the better to understand the problem before Congress
and determine whether the Act is a reasonable and appropriate means
toward its solution. The record is replete with testimony of the
burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination in
restaurants. A comparison of per capita spending by Negroes in
restaurants, theaters, and like establishments indicated less
spending, after discounting income differences, in areas where
discrimination is widely practiced. This condition, which was
especially aggravated in the South, was attributed in the testimony
of the Under Secretary of Commerce to racial segregation. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce on S.
1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 695. This diminutive spending
springing from a refusal to serve Negroes and their total loss as
customers has, regardless of the absence of direct evidence, a
close connection to interstate commerce. The fewer customers a
restaurant enjoys, the less food it sells, and consequently the
less it buys. S.Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19; Senate
Commerce Committee Hearings at 207. In addition, the Attorney
General testified that this type of discrimination imposed "an
artificial restriction on the market," and interfered Page 379 U. S. 300 with the flow of merchandise. Id. at 18-19; also, on
this point, see testimony of Senator Magnuson, 110
Cong.Rec. 7402-7403. In addition, there were many references to
discriminatory situations causing wide unrest and having a
depressant effect on general business conditions in the respective
communities. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Committee Hearings
at 623-630, 695-700, 1384-1385.

															Moreover, there was an impressive array of testimony that
discrimination in restaurants had a direct and highly restrictive
effect upon interstate travel by Negroes. This resulted, it was
said, because discriminatory practices prevent Negroes from buying
prepared food served on the premises while on a trip, except in
isolated and unkempt restaurants and under most unsatisfactory and
often unpleasant conditions. This obviously discourages travel and
obstructs interstate commerce, for one can hardly travel without
eating. Likewise, it was said that discrimination deterred
professional as well as skilled people from moving into areas where
such practices occurred, and thereby caused industry to be
reluctant to establish there. S.Rep. No. 872, supra, at
18-19.

															We believe that this testimony afforded ample basis for the
conclusion that established restaurants in such areas sold less
interstate goods because of the discrimination, that interstate
travel was obstructed directly by it, that business in general
suffered, and that many new businesses refrained from establishing
there as a result of it. Hence, the District Court was in error in
concluding that there was no connection between discrimination and
the movement of interstate commerce. The court's conclusion that
such a connection is outside "common experience" flies in the face
of stubborn fact.

															It goes without saying that, viewed in isolation, the volume of
food purchased by Ollie's Barbecue from sources supplied from out
of state was insignificant when Page 379 U. S. 301 compared with the total foodstuffs moving in commerce. But, as
our late Brother Jackson said for the Court in Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942):

															"That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of
federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial."

															At 317 U. S.
127 -128.

															We noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel that a number of
witnesses attested to the fact that racial discrimination was not
merely a state or regional problem, but was one of nationwide
scope. Against this background, we must conclude that, while the
focus of the legislation was on the individual restaurant's
relation to interstate commerce, Congress appropriately considered
the importance of that connection with the knowledge that the
discrimination was but

															"representative of many others throughout the country, the total
incidence of which, if left unchecked, may well become far-reaching
in its harm to commerce." Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U.
S. 643 , 322 U. S. 648 (1944).

															With this situation spreading as the record shows, Congress was
not required to await the total dislocation of commerce. As was
said in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938):

															"But it cannot be maintained that the exertion of federal power
must await the disruption of that commerce. Congress was entitled
to provide reasonable preventive measures and that was the object
of the National Labor Relations Act."

															At 305 U. S.
222 .

															5. The Power of Congress to Regulate Local
Activities Article I, § 8, cl. 3, confers upon Congress the power "[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States" and Clause 18 of
the same Article grants it the power Page 379 U. S. 302 "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. . . ." This grant, as
we have pointed out in Heart of Atlanta Motel, "extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over
it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the
granted power to regulate interstate commerce." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.
S. 110 , 315 U. S. 119 (1942). Much is said about a restaurant business being local,
but,

															"even if appellee's activity be local, and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached
by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce. . . ." Wickard v. Filburn, supra, at 317 U. S. 125 .
The activities that are beyond the reach of Congress are

															"those which are completely within a particular State, which do
not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers
of the government." Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 195 (1824). This rule is as good today as it was when Chief Justice
Marshall laid it down almost a century and a half ago.

															This Court has held time and again that this power extends to
activities of retail establishments, including restaurants, which
directly or indirectly burden or obstruct interstate commerce. We
have detailed the cases in Heart of Atlanta Motel, and
will not repeat them here.

															Nor are the cases holding that interstate commerce ends when
goods come to rest in the State of destination apposite here. That
line of cases has been applied with reference to state taxation or
regulation, but not in the field of federal regulation.

															The appellees contend that Congress has arbitrarily created a
conclusive presumption that all restaurants Page 379 U. S. 303 meeting the criteria set out in the Act "affect commerce."
Stated another way, they object to the omission of a provision for
a case-by-case determination -- judicial or administrative -- that
racial discrimination in a particular restaurant affects
commerce.

															But Congress' action in framing this Act was not unprecedented.
In United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100 (1941), this Court held constitutional the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. [ Footnote 2 ] There, Congress determined that the payment of
substandard wages to employees engaged in the production of goods
for commerce, while not itself commerce, so inhibited it as to be
subject to federal regulation. The appellees in that case argued,
as do the appellees here, that the Act was invalid because it
included no provision for an independent inquiry regarding the
effect on commerce of substandard wages in a particular business.
(Brief for appellees, pp. 76-77, United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 .)
But the Court rejected the argument, observing that:

															"[S]ometimes Congress itself has said that a particular activity
affects the commerce, as it did in the present Act, the Safety
Appliance Act, and the Railway Labor Act. In passing on the
validity of legislation of the class last mentioned the only
function of courts is to determine whether the particular activity
regulated or prohibited is within the reach of the federal
power."

															At 312 U. S.
120 -121.

															Here, as there, Congress has determined for itself that refusals
of service to Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate
flow of food and upon the movement of products generally. Of
course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular
activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude
further examination by this Court. But where we find that the
legislators, in Page 379 U. S. 304 light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational
basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the
protection of commerce, oar investigation is at an end. The only
remaining question -- one answered in the affirmative by the court
below -- is whether the particular restaurant either serves or
offers to serve interstate travelers or serves food a substantial
portion of which has moved in interstate commerce.

															The appellees urge that Congress, in passing the Fair Labor
Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act, [ Footnote 3 ] made specific findings which were
embodied in those statutes. Here, of course, Congress has included
no formal findings. But their absence is not fatal to the validity
of the statute, see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144 , 304 U. S. 152 (1938), for the evidence presented at the hearings fully indicated
the nature and effect of the burdens on commerce which Congress
meant to alleviate.

															Confronted as we are with the facts laid before Congress, we
must conclude that it had a rational basis for finding that racial
discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on
the free flow of interstate commerce. Insofar as the sections of
the Act here relevant are concerned, §§ 201(b)(2) and (c), Congress
prohibited discrimination only in those establishments having a
close tie to interstate commerce, i.e., those, like the
McClungs', serving food that has come from out of the State. We
think, in so doing, that Congress acted well within its power to
protect and foster commerce in extending the coverage of Title II
only to those restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers or
serving food, a substantial portion of which has moved in
interstate commerce.

															The absence of direct evidence connecting discriminatory
restaurant service with the flow of interstate food, Page 379 U. S. 305 a factor on which the appellees place much reliance, is not,
given the evidence as to the effect of such practices on other
aspects of commerce, a crucial matter.

															The power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where
it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional
limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost to
the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as here applied, we find to be plainly
appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to be a
national commercial problem of the first magnitude. We find it in
no violation of any express limitations of the Constitution and we
therefore declare it valid.

															The judgment is therefore Reversed. [For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, see ante, p. 383 U. S.
268 .]

															[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE Douglas, see
ante, p. 383 U. S.
279 .]

															[For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, see
ante, p. 383 U. S.
291 .]

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															That decision disposes of the challenges that the appellees base
on the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Amendments, and on the Civil Rights Case, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1958 ed.).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1958
ed.).