U.S. Supreme Court INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032 (1984) INS v. Lopez-Mendoza No. 83-491 Argued April 18, 1984 Decided July 5, 1984 468
U.S. 1032 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent Mexican citizens were ordered deported by an
Immigration Judge. Respondent Lopez-Mendoza unsuccessfully objected
to being summoned to the deportation hearing following his
allegedly unlawful arrest by an Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) agent, but he did not object to the receipt in
evidence of his admission, after the arrest, of illegal entry into
this country. Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez, who also admitted his
illegal entry after being arrested by an INS agent, unsuccessfully
objected to the evidence of his admission offered at the
deportation proceeding, contending that it should have been
suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the deportation orders. The
Court of Appeals reversed respondent Sandoval-Sanchez' deportation
order, holding that his detention by INS agents violated the Fourth
Amendment, that his admission of illegal entry was the product of
this detention, and that the exclusionary rule barred its use in a
deportation proceeding. The court vacated respondent
Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order and remanded his case to the BIA
to determine whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated in the
course of his arrest. Held: 1. A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to
determine a person's eligibility to remain in this country. The
purpose of deportation is not to punish past transgressions, but
rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration
laws. Consistent with the civil nature of a deportation proceeding,
various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial
do not apply in a deportation hearing. Pp. 468 U. S.
1038 -1039.

															2. The "body" or identity of a defendant in a criminal or civil
proceeding is never itself suppressible as the fruit of an unlawful
arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or
interrogation occurred. On this basis alone, the Court of Appeals'
decision as to respondent Lopez-Mendoza must be reversed, since he
objected only to being summoned to his deportation hearing after an
allegedly unlawful arrest, and did not object to the evidence
offered against him. The mere fact of an illegal arrest has no
bearing on a subsequent deportation hearing. Pp. 468 U. S.
1039 -1040. Page 468 U. S. 1033 3. The exclusionary rule does not apply in a deportation
proceeding; hence, the rule does not apply so as to require that
respondent Sandoval-Sanchez' admission of illegal entry after his
allegedly unlawful arrest be excluded from evidence at his
deportation hearing. Under the balancing test applied in United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 ,
whereby the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully obtained
evidence are weighed against the likely costs, the balance comes
out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation
proceedings. Several factors significantly reduce the likely
deterrent value of the rule in such proceedings. First, regardless
of how the arrest of an illegal alien is effected, deportation will
still be possible when evidence not derived directly from the
arrest is sufficient to support deportation. Second, based on
statistics indicating that over 97.7 percent of illegal aliens
agree to voluntary deportation without a formal hearing, every INS
agent knows that it is unlikely that any particular arrestee will
end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal
deportation hearing. Third, the INS has its own comprehensive
scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by its agents. And
finally, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in
deportation proceedings is undermined by the availability of
alternative remedies for INS practices that might violate Fourth
Amendment rights. As to the social costs of applying the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings, they would be high.
In particular, the application of the rule in cases such as
respondent Sandoval-Sanchez' would compel the courts to release
from custody persons who would then immediately resume their
commission of a crime through their continuing, unlawful presence
in this country, and would unduly complicate the INS's deliberately
simple deportation hearing system. Pp. 468 U.S. 1040 -1050.

															705 F.2d 1059, reversed.

															O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV,
in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in which BLACKMUN,
POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 468 U. S.
1051 , WHITE, J., post, p. 468 U. S.
1052 , MARSHALL, J., post, p. 468 U. S.
1060 , and STEVENS, J., post, p. 468 U. S.
1061 , filed dissenting opinions. Page 468 U. S. 1034 JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II,
III, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part V, in which
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST joined. * This litigation requires us to decide whether an admission of
unlawful presence in this country made subsequently to an allegedly
unlawful arrest must be excluded as evidence in a civil deportation
hearing. We hold that the exclusionary rule need not be applied in
such a proceeding. I Respondents Adan Lopez-Mendoza and Elias Sandoval-Sanchez, both
citizens of Mexico, were summoned to separate deportation
proceedings in California and Washington, and both were ordered
deported. They challenged the regularity of those proceedings on
grounds related to the lawfulness of their respective arrests by
officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On
administrative appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), an
agency of the Department of Justice, affirmed the deportation
orders.

															The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
reversed Sandoval-Sanchez' deportation order and vacated and
remanded Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order. 705 F.2d 1059 (1983).
It ruled that Sandoval-Sanchez' admission of his illegal presence
in this country was the fruit of an unlawful arrest, and that the
exclusionary rule applied in a deportation proceeding.
Lopez-Mendoza's deportation order was vacated and his case remanded
to the BIA to Page 468 U. S. 1035 determine whether the Fourth Amendment had been violated in the
course of his arrest. We granted certiorari, 464 U.S. 1037
(1984). A Respondent Lopez-Mendoza was arrested in 1976 by INS agents at
his place of employment, a transmission repair shop in San Mateo,
Cal. Responding to a tip, INS investigators arrived at the shop
shortly before 8 a.m. The agents had not sought a warrant to search
the premises or to arrest any of its occupants. The proprietor of
the shop firmly refused to allow the agents to interview his
employees during working hours. Nevertheless, while one agent
engaged the proprietor in conversation, another entered the shop
and approached Lopez-Mendoza. In response to the agent's
questioning, Lopez-Mendoza gave his name and indicated that he was
from Mexico with no close family ties in the United States. The
agent then placed him under arrest. Lopez-Mendoza underwent further
questioning at INS offices, where he admitted he was born in
Mexico, was still a citizen of Mexico, and had entered this country
without inspection by immigration authorities. Based on his
answers, the agents prepared a "Record of Deportable Alien" (Form
I-213), and an affidavit which Lopez-Mendoza executed, admitting
his Mexican nationality and his illegal entry into this
country.

															A hearing was held before an Immigration Judge. Lopez-Mendoza's
counsel moved to terminate the proceeding on the ground that
Lopez-Mendoza had been arrested illegally. The judge ruled that the
legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation
proceeding, and therefore declined to rule on the legality of
Lopez-Mendoza's arrest. Matter of Lopez-Mendoza, No. A22
452 208 (INS, Dec. 21, 1977), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert.
97a. The Form I-213 and the affidavit executed by Lopez-Mendoza
were received into evidence without objection from Lopez-Mendoza.
On the basis of this evidence, the Immigration Judge found
Lopez-Mendoza Page 468 U. S. 1036 deportable. Lopez-Mendoza was granted the option of voluntary
departure.

															The BIA dismissed Lopez-Mendoza's appeal. It noted that "[t]he
mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subsequent
deportation proceeding," In re Lopez-Mendoza, No. A22 452
208 (BIA, Sept.19, 1979), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 10Oa,
102a, and observed that Lopez-Mendoza had not objected to the
admission into evidence of Form I-213 and the affidavit he had
executed. Id. at 103a. The BIA also noted that the
exclusionary rule is not applied to redress the injury to the
privacy of the search victim, and that the BIA had previously
concluded that application of the rule in deportation proceedings
to deter unlawful INS conduct was inappropriate. Matter of
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1979).

															The Court of Appeals vacated the order of deportation and
remanded for a determination whether Lopez-Mendoza's Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated when he was arrested. B Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez (who is not the same individual who
was involved in Matter of Sandoval, supra ) was arrested in
1977 at his place of employment, a potato processing plant in
Pasco, Wash. INS Agent Bower and other officers went to the plant,
with the permission of its personnel manager, to check for illegal
aliens. During a change in shift, officers stationed themselves at
the exits while Bower and a uniformed Border Patrol agent entered
the plant. They went to the lunchroom and identified themselves as
immigration officers. Many people in the room rose and headed for
the exits or milled around; others in the plant left their
equipment and started running; still others who were entering the
plant turned around and started walking back out. The two officers
eventually stationed themselves at the main entrance to the plant
and looked for passing employees who averted their heads, avoided
eye contact, or tried to hide Page 468 U. S. 1037 themselves in a group. Those individuals were addressed with
innocuous questions in English. Any who could not respond in
English and who otherwise aroused Agent Bower's suspicions were
questioned in Spanish as to their right to be in the United
States.

															Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez was in a line of workers entering
the plant. Sandoval-Sanchez testified that he did not realize that
immigration officers were checking people entering the plant, but
that he did see standing at the plant entrance a man in uniform who
appeared to be a police officer. Agent Bower testified that it was
probable that he, not his partner, had questioned Sandoval-Sanchez
at the plant, but that he could not be absolutely positive. The
employee he thought he remembered as Sandoval-Sanchez had been
"very evasive," had averted his head, turned around, and walked
away when he saw Agent Bower. App. 137, 138. Bower was certain that
no one was questioned about his status unless his actions had given
the agents reason to believe that he was an undocumented alien.

															Thirty-seven employees, including Sandoval-Sanchez, were briefly
detained at the plant and then taken to the county jail. About
one-third immediately availed themselves of the option of voluntary
departure, and were put on a bus to Mexico. Sandoval-Sanchez
exercised his right to a deportation hearing. Sandoval-Sanchez was
then questioned further, and Agent Bower recorded Sandoval-Sanchez'
admission of unlawful entry. Sandoval-Sanchez contends he was not
aware that he had a right to remain silent.

															At his deportation hearing, Sandoval-Sanchez contended that the
evidence offered by the INS should be suppressed as the fruit of an
unlawful arrest. The Immigration Judge considered and rejected
Sandoval-Sanchez' claim that he had been illegally arrested, but
ruled in the alternative that the legality of the arrest was not
relevant to the deportation hearing. Matter of
Sandoval-Saqchez, No. A22 346 925 Page 468 U. S. 1038 (INS, Oct. 7, 1977), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 104a.
Based on the written record of Sandoval-Sanchez' admissions, the
Immigration Judge found him deportable and granted him voluntary
departure. The BIA dismissed Sandoval-Sanchez' appeal. In re
Sandoval-Sanchez, No. A22 346 925 (BIA, Feb. 21, 1980). It
concluded that the circumstances of the arrest had not affected the
voluntariness of his recorded admission, and again declined to
invoke the exclusionary rule, relying on its earlier decision in Matter of Sandoval, supra. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that Sandoval-Sanchez'
detention by the immigration officers violated the Fourth
Amendment, that the statements he made were a product of that
detention, and that the exclusionary rule barred their use in a
deportation hearing. The deportation order against Sandoval-Sanchez
was accordingly reversed. II A deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine
eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful
entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is
itself a crime. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306, 1325. The deportation
hearing looks prospectively to the respondent's right to remain in
this country in the future. Past conduct is relevant only insofar
as it may shed light on the respondent's right to remain. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252(b); Bugajewitz v.
Adams, 228 U. S. 585 , 228 U. S. 591 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 , 149 U. S. 730 (1893).

															A deportation hearing is held before an immigration judge. The
judge's sole power is to order deportation; the judge cannot
adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any crime related to
unlawful entry into or presence in this country. Consistent with
the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply
in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation
hearing. The respondent must be given "a reasonable opportunity to
be present at [the] proceeding," but if the respondent fails to
avail himself Page 468 U. S. 1039 of that opportunity, the hearing may proceed in his absence. 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b). In many deportation cases, the INS must show only
identity and alienage; the burden then shifts to the respondent to
prove the time, place, and manner of his entry. See 8
U.S.C. § 1361; Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70
(BIA 1979). A decision of deportability need be based only on
"reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence," 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4). The BIA, for its part, has required only "clear,
unequivocal and convincing" evidence of the respondent's
deportability, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 CFR §
242.14(a) (1984). The Courts of Appeals have held, for example that
the absence of Miranda warnings does not render an
otherwise voluntary statement by the respondent inadmissible in a
deportation case. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808
(CA1 1977); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (CA2
1975); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 399-401 (CA7
1975). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.
S. 217 , 362 U. S.
236 -237 (1960) (search permitted incidental to an arrest
pursuant to an administrative warrant issued by the INS); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 , 347 U. S. 531 (1954) ( Ex Post Facto Clause has no application to
deportation); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.
S. 524 , 342 U.S.
544 -546 (1952) (Eighth Amendment does not require bail to be
granted in certain deportation cases); United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149 , 263 U. S. 157 (1923) (involuntary confessions admissible at deportation hearing).
In short, a deportation hearing is intended to provide a
streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country,
nothing more. The purpose of deportation is not to punish past
transgressions, but rather to put an end to a continuing violation
of the immigration laws. III The "body" or identity of a defendant or respondent in a
criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a
fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an
unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. See Gerstein Page 468 U. S. 1040 v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 , 420 U. S. 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.
S. 519 , 342 U. S. 522 (1952); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra, at 263 U. S. 158 . A
similar rule applies in forfeiture proceedings directed against
contraband or forfeitable property. See, e.g., United States v.
Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F.2d 293 (CA8
1982); United States v. One (1) 1971 Harley-Davidson
Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (CA9 1974); United States v. One
1965 Buick, 397 F.2d 782 (CA6 1968).

															On this basis alone, the Court of Appeals' decision as to
respondent Lopez-Mendoza must be reversed. At his deportation
hearing, Lopez-Mendoza objected only to the fact that he had been
summoned to a deportation hearing following an unlawful arrest; he
entered no objection to the evidence offered against him. The BIA
correctly ruled that "[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest has no
bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding." [ Footnote 1 ] In re Lopez-Mendoza, No.
A22 452 208 (BIA, Sept.19, 1979), reprinted in App. to Pet. for
Cert. 102a. IV Respondent Sandoval-Sanchez has a more substantial claim. He
objected not to his compelled presence at a deportation proceeding,
but to evidence offered at that proceeding. The general rule in a
criminal proceeding is that statements and other evidence obtained
as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if
the link between the Page 468 U. S. 1041 evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963). The reach of the exclusionary rule beyond
the context of a criminal prosecution, however, is less clear.
Although this Court has once stated in dictum that

															"[i]t may be assumed that evidence obtained by the [Labor]
Department through an illegal search and seizure cannot be made the
basis of a finding in deportation proceedings," United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, supra, at 263 U. S. 155 ,
the Court has never squarely addressed the question before. Lower
court decisions dealing with this question are sparse. [ Footnote 2 ]

															In United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 (1976), this Court set forth a framework for
deciding in what types of proceeding application of the
exclusionary rule is appropriate. Imprecise as the exercise may be,
the Court recognized in Janis that there is no choice but
to weigh the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized
evidence against the likely costs. On the benefit side of the
balance "the prime purpose' of the [exclusionary] rule, if not
the sole one, `is to deter future unlawful police conduct.'" Id. at 428 U. S. 446 ,
quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 , 414 U. S. 347 (1974). On the cost side, there is the loss of often probative
evidence and all of the secondary costs that flow from the less
accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that therefore
occurs. At stake in Janis was application of the exclusionary
rule in a federal civil tax assessment proceeding following the
unlawful seizure of evidence by state, not federal, officials. The
Court noted at the outset that

															"[i]n the complex and turbulent Page 468 U. S. 1042 history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to exclude
evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 447 (footnote omitted). Two factors in Janis suggested that the
deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in the context of that
case was slight. First, the state law enforcement officials were
already "punished" by the exclusion of the evidence in the state
criminal trial as a result of the same conduct. Id. at 428 U. S. 448 .
Second, the evidence was also excludable in any federal criminal
trial that might be held. Both factors suggested that further
application of the exclusionary rule in the federal civil
proceeding would contribute little more to the deterrence of
unlawful conduct by state officials. On the cost side of the
balance, Janis focused simply on the loss of "concededly
relevant and reliable evidence." Id. at 428 U. S. 447 .
The Court concluded that, on balance, this cost outweighed the
likely social benefits achievable through application of the
exclusionary rule in the federal civil proceeding.

															While it seems likely that the deterrence value of applying the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings would be higher than
it was in Janis, it is also quite clear that the social
costs would be very much greater as well. Applying the Janis balancing test to the benefits and costs of
excluding concededly reliable evidence from a deportation
proceeding, we therefore reach the same conclusion as in Janis. The likely deterrence value of the exclusionary rule in
deportation proceedings is difficult to assess. On the one hand, a
civil deportation proceeding is a civil complement to a possible
criminal prosecution, and to this extent it resembles the civil
proceeding under review in Janis. The INS does not suggest
that the exclusionary rule should not continue to apply in criminal
proceedings against an alien who unlawfully enters or remains in
this country, and the prospect of losing evidence that might
otherwise be used in a criminal prosecution undoubtedly supplies
some residual deterrent to unlawful conduct by INS officials. But
it must be acknowledged Page 468 U. S. 1043 that only a very small percentage of arrests of aliens are
intended or expected to lead to criminal prosecutions. Thus, the
arresting officer's primary objective, in practice, will be to use
evidence in the civil deportation proceeding. Moreover, here, in
contrast to Janis, the agency officials who effect the
unlawful arrest are the same officials who subsequently bring the
deportation action. As recognized in Janis, the
exclusionary rule is likely to be most effective when applied to
such "intrasovereign" violations.

															Nonetheless, several other factors significantly reduce the
likely deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in a civil
deportation proceeding. First, regardless of how the arrest is
effected, deportation will still be possible when evidence not
derived directly from the arrest is sufficient to support
deportation. As the BIA has recognized, in many deportation
proceedings,

															"the sole matters necessary for the Government to establish are
the respondent's identity and alienage -- at which point, the
burden shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place and manner
of entry." Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 79. Since
the person and identity of the respondent are not themselves
suppressible, see supra at 468 U. S.
1039 -1040, the INS must prove only alienage, and that
will sometimes be possible using evidence gathered independently
of, or sufficiently attenuated from, the original arrest. See
Matter of Sandoval, supra, at 79; see, e.g.,
Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d 666 (CA2 1975). The INS' task
is simplified in this regard by the civil nature of the proceeding.
As Justice Brandeis stated:

															"Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character. . .
. [T]here is no rule of law which prohibits officers charged with
the administration of the immigration law from drawing an inference
from the silence of one who is called upon to speak. . . . A person
arrested on the preliminary warrant is not protected by a
presumption of citizenship comparable to the presumption of
innocence in a criminal case. There is no provision which forbids
drawing an adverse inference from the fact of standing Page 468 U. S. 1044 mute." United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. at 263 U. S.
153 -154.

															The second factor is a practical one. In the course of a year,
the average INS agent arrests almost 500 illegal aliens. Brief for
Petitioner 38. Over 97.5% apparently agree to voluntary deportation
without a formal hearing. 705 F.2d at 1071, n. 17. Among the
remainder who do request a formal hearing (apparently a dozen or so
in all, per officer, per year), very few challenge the
circumstances of their arrests. As noted by the Court of
Appeals,

															"the BIA was able to find only two reported immigration cases
since 1899 in which the [exclusionary] rule was applied to bar
unlawfully seized evidence, only one other case in which the rule's
application was specifically addressed, and fewer than fifty BIA
proceedings since 1952 in which a Fourth Amendment challenge to the
introduction of evidence was even raised." Id. at 1071. Every INS agent knows, therefore, that it
is highly unlikely that any particular arrestee will end up
challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal deportation
proceeding. When an occasional challenge is brought, the
consequences from the point of view of the officer's overall arrest
and deportation record will be trivial. In these circumstances, the
arresting officer is most unlikely to shape his conduct in
anticipation of the exclusion of evidence at a formal deportation
hearing.

															Third, and perhaps most important, the INS has its own
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by
its officers. Most arrests of illegal aliens away from the border
occur during farm, factory, or other workplace surveys. Large
numbers of illegal aliens are often arrested at one time, and
conditions are understandably chaotic. See Brief for
Petitioner in INS v. Delgado, O.T. 1983, No. 82-1271, pp.
3-5. To safeguard the rights of those who are lawfully present at
inspected workplaces the INS has developed rules restricting stop,
interrogation, and arrest practices. Id. at 7, n. 7,
32-40, and n. 25. These Page 468 U. S. 1045 regulations require that no one be detained without reasonable
suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no one be arrested unless
there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence
thereof. New immigration officers receive instruction and
examination in Fourth Amendment law, and others receive periodic
refresher courses in law. Brief for Petitioner 39-40. Evidence
seized through intentionally unlawful conduct is excluded by
Department of Justice policy from the proceeding for which it was
obtained. See Memorandum from Benjamin R. Civiletti to
Heads of Offices, Boards, Bureaus and Divisions, Violations of
Search and Seizure Law (Jan. 16, 1981). The INS also has in place a
procedure for investigating and punishing immigration officers who
commit Fourth Amendment violations. See Office of General
Counsel, INS, U.S. Dept. of Justice, The Law of Arrest, Search, and
Seizure for Immigration Officers 35 (Jan.1983). The INS's attention
to Fourth Amendment interests cannot guarantee that constitutional
violations will not occur, but it does reduce the likely deterrent
value of the exclusionary rule. Deterrence must be measured at the
margin.

															Finally, the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in
deportation proceedings is undermined by the availability of
alternative remedies for institutional practices by the INS that
might violate Fourth Amendment rights. The INS is a single agency,
under central federal control, and engaged in operations of broad
scope but highly repetitive character. The possibility of
declaratory relief against the agency thus offers a means for
challenging the validity of INS practices when standing
requirements for bringing such an action can be met. Cf. INS v.
Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984).

															Respondents contend that retention of the exclusionary rule is
necessary to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights of ethnic
Americans, particularly the Hispanic-Americans lawfully in this
country. We recognize that respondents raise here legitimate and
important concerns. But application of the exclusionary rule to
civil deportation proceedings Page 468 U. S. 1046 can be justified only if the rule is likely to add significant
protection to these Fourth Amendment rights. The exclusionary rule
provides no remedy for completed wrongs; those lawfully in this
country can be interested in its application only insofar as it may
serve as an effective deterrent to future INS misconduct. For the
reasons we have discussed, we conclude that application of the rule
in INS civil deportation proceedings, as in the circumstances
discussed in Janis, "is unlikely to provide significant,
much less substantial, additional deterrence." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 458 .
Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all
persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the
exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings will contribute
materially to that end.

															On the other side of the scale, the social costs of applying the
exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings are both unusual and
significant. The first cost is one that is unique to continuing
violations of the law. Applying the exclusionary rule in
proceedings that are intended not to punish past transgressions,
but to prevent their continuance or renewal, would require the
courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law. This
Court has never before accepted costs of this character in applying
the exclusionary rule.

															Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule should
be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective action at
a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence underlying the order
had been improperly obtained, or to compel police to return
contraband explosives or drugs to their owner if the contraband had
been unlawfully seized. On the rare occasions that it has
considered costs of this type, the Court has firmly indicated that
the exclusionary rule does not extend this far. See United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 , 342 U. S. 54 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.
S. 699 , 334 U. S. 710 (1948). The rationale for these holdings is not difficult to
find.

															"Both Trupiano and Jeffers concerned objects
the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime. The
repossession Page 468 U. S. 1047 of such per se contraband by Jeffers and Trupiano would
have subjected them to criminal penalties. The return of the
contraband would clearly have frustrated the express public policy
against the possession of such objects." One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.
S. 693 , 380 U. S. 699 (1965) (footnote omitted). Precisely the same can be said here.
Sandoval-Sanchez is a person whose unregistered presence in this
country, without more, constitutes a crime. [ Footnote 3 ] His release within our borders would
immediately subject him to criminal penalties. His release would
clearly frustrate the express public policy against an alien's
unregistered presence in this country. Even the objective of
deterring Fourth Amendment violations should not require such a
result. The constable's blunder may allow the criminal to go free,
but we have never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue
in the commission of an ongoing crime. When the crime in question
involves unlawful presence in this country, the criminal may go
free, but he should not go free within our borders. [ Footnote 4 ] Page 468 U. S. 1048 Other factors also weigh against applying the exclusionary rule
in deportation proceedings. The INS currently operates a
deliberately simple deportation hearing system, streamlined to
permit the quick resolution of very large numbers of deportation
actions, and it is against this backdrop that the costs of the
exclusionary rule must be assessed. The costs of applying the
exclusionary rule, like the benefits, must be measured at the
margin.

															The average immigration judge handles about six deportation
hearings per day. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 16. Neither the
hearing officers nor the attorneys participating in those hearings
are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of Fourth Amendment
law. The prospect of even occasional invocation of the exclusionary
rule might significantly change and complicate the character of
these proceedings. The BIA has described the practical problems as
follows:

															"Absent the applicability of the exclusionary rule, questions
relating to deportability routinely involve simple factual
allegations and matters of proof. When Fourth Amendment issues are
raised at deportation hearings, the result is a diversion of
attention from the main issues which those proceedings were created
to resolve, both in terms of the expertise of the administrative
decisionmakers and of the structure of the forum to accommodate
inquiries into search and seizure questions. The result frequently
seems to be a long, confused record in which the issues are not
clearly defined and in which there is voluminous testimony. . . .
The ensuing delays and inordinate amount of time spent on such
cases at all levels has an adverse impact on the effective
administration Page 468 U. S. 1049 of the immigration laws. . . . This is particularly true in a
proceeding where delay may be the only 'defense' available and
where problems already exist with the use of dilatory tactics." Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N., at 80 (footnote
omitted). This sober assessment of the exclusionary rule's likely
costs, by the agency that would have to administer the rule in at
least the administrative tiers of its application, cannot be
brushed off lightly.

															The BIA's concerns are reinforced by the staggering dimension of
the problem that the INS confronts. Immigration officers apprehend
over one million deportable aliens in this country every year. Id. at 85. A single agent may arrest many illegal aliens
every day. Although the investigatory burden does not justify the
commission of constitutional violations, the officers cannot be
expected to compile elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports
detailing the circumstances of every arrest. At present, an officer
simply completes a "Record of Deportable Alien" that is introduced
to prove the INS's case at the deportation hearing; the officer
rarely must attend the hearing. Fourth Amendment suppression
hearings would undoubtedly require considerably more, and the
likely burden on the administration of the immigration laws would
be correspondingly severe.

															Finally, the INS advances the credible argument that applying
the exclusionary rule to deportation proceedings might well result
in the suppression of large amounts of information that had been
obtained entirely lawfully. INS arrests occur in crowded and
confused circumstances. Though the INS agents are instructed to
follow procedures that adequately protect Fourth Amendment
interests, agents will usually be able to testify only to the fact
that they followed INS rules. The demand for a precise account of
exactly what happened in each particular arrest would plainly
preclude mass arrests, even when the INS is confronted, Page 468 U. S. 1050 as it often is, with massed numbers of ascertainably illegal
aliens, and even when the arrests can be and are conducted in full
compliance with all Fourth Amendment requirements.

															In these circumstances, we are persuaded that the Janis balance between costs and benefits comes out against applying the
exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings held by the INS. By
all appearances the INS has already taken sensible and reasonable
steps to deter Fourth Amendment violations by its officers, and
this makes the likely additional deterrent value of the
exclusionary rule small. The costs of applying the exclusionary
rule in the context of civil deportation hearings are high. In
particular, application of the exclusionary rule in cases such as
Sandoval-Sanchez' would compel the courts to release from custody
persons who would then immediately resume their commission of a
crime through their continuing, unlawful presence in this
country.

															"There comes a point at which courts, consistent with their duty
to administer the law, cannot continue to create barriers to law
enforcement in the pursuit of a supervisory role that is properly
the duty of the Executive and Legislative Branches." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 459 .
That point has been reached here. V We do not condone any violations of the Fourth Amendment that
may have occurred in the arrests of respondents Lopez-Mendoza or
Sandoval-Sanchez. Moreover, no challenge is raised here to the
INS's own internal regulations. Cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984). Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule's value
might change if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth
Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread. Cf.
United States v. Leon, ante at 468 U. S. 928 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Finally, we do not deal here with
egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that
might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine Page 468 U. S. 1051 the probative value of the evidence obtained. [ Footnote 5 ] Cf. Rochin v.
California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952). At issue here is the exclusion of credible evidence
gathered in connection with peaceful arrests by INS officers. We
hold that evidence derived from such arrests need not be suppressed
in an INS civil deportation hearing.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Reversed. * THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins all but Part V of this opinion.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The Court of Appeals brushed over Lopez-Mendoza's failure to
object to the evidence in an apparently unsettled footnote of its
decision. The Court of Appeals was initially of the view that a
motion to terminate a proceeding on the ground that the arrest of
the respondent was unlawful is, "for all practical purposes," the
same as a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful
arrest. Slip opinion at 1765, n. 1 (Apr. 25, 1983). In the bound
report of its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals takes a
somewhat different view, stating in a revised version of the same
footnote that

															"the only reasonable way to interpret the motion to terminate is
as one that includes both a motion to suppress and a motion to
dismiss."

															705 F.2d 1059, 1060, n. 1 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															In United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832 (Vt.
1899), a District Judge excluded letters seized from the appellant
in a civil deportation proceeding. In Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110 (Mont.), appeal dism'd sub nom. Andrews v.
Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (CA9 1920), another District Judge
granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that papers and
pamphlets used against the habeas petitioner in a deportation
proceeding had been unlawfully seized. Wong Chung Che v.
INS, 565 F.2d 166 (CA1 1977), held that papers obtained by INS
agents in an unlawful search are inadmissible in deportation
proceedings.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Sandoval-Sanchez was arrested on June 23, 1977. His deportation
hearing was held on October 7, 1977. By that time, he was under a
duty to apply for registration as an alien. A failure to do so
plainly constituted a continuing crime. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306.
Sandoval-Sanchez was not, of course, prosecuted for this crime, and
we do not know whether or not he did make the required application.
But it is safe to assume that the exclusionary rule would never be
at issue in a deportation proceeding brought against an alien who
entered the country unlawfully and then voluntarily admitted to his
unlawful presence in an application for registration.

															Sandoval-Sanchez was also not prosecuted for his initial illegal
entry into this country, an independent crime under 8 U.S.C. §
1325. We need not decide whether or not remaining in this country
following an illegal entry is a continuing or a completed crime
under § 1325. The question is academic, of course, since in either
event the unlawful entry remains both punishable and continuing
grounds for deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Similarly, in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.
S. 883 (1984), the Court concluded that an employer can
be guilty of an unfair labor practice in his dealings with an alien
notwithstanding the alien's illegal presence in this country.
Retrospective sanctions against the employer may accordingly be
imposed by the National Labor Relations Board to further the public
policy against unfair labor practices. But while he maintains the
status of an illegal alien, the employee is plainly not entitled to
the prospective relief -- reinstatement and continued employment --
that probably would be granted to other victims of similar unfair
labor practices.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															We note that, subsequent to its decision in Matter of
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1979), the BIA held that
evidence will be excluded if the circumstances surrounding a
particular arrest and interrogation would render use of the
evidence obtained thereby "fundamentally unfair" and in violation
of due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Matter of
Toro, 17 I. &. N. Dec. 340, 343 (1980). See also
Matter of Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (1980)
(suppression of admission of alienage obtained after request for
counsel had been repeatedly refused); Matter of
Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 (Feb. 21, 1980) (suppression
of evidence obtained as a result of a night-time warrantless entry
into the aliens' residence).

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

															I fully agree with JUSTICE WHITE that, under the analysis
developed by the Court in such cases as United States v.
Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 (1974), the exclusionary rule must apply in civil
deportation proceedings. However, for the reasons set forth today
in my dissenting opinion in United States v. Leon, ante p. 468 U. S. 897 , I
believe the basis for the exclusionary rule does not derive from
its effectiveness as a deterrent, but is instead found in the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment itself. My view of the
exclusionary rule would, of course, require affirmance of the Court
of Appeals. In this case, federal law enforcement officers arrested
respondents Sandoval-Sanchez and Lopez-Mendoza in violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights. The subsequent admission of any
evidence secured pursuant to these unlawful arrests Page 468 U. S. 1052 in civil deportation proceedings would, in my view, also
infringe those rights. The Government of the United States bears an
obligation to obey the Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not
lifted simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, nor because the
evidence obtained by those officers was to be used in civil
deportation proceedings.

															JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															The Court today holds that the exclusionary rule does not apply
in civil deportation proceedings. Because I believe that the
conclusion of the majority is based upon an incorrect assessment of
the costs and benefits of applying the rule in such proceedings, I
respectfully dissent. [ Footnote
2/1 ]

															The paradigmatic case in which the exclusionary rule is applied
is when the prosecutor seeks to use evidence illegally obtained by
law enforcement officials in his case in chief in a criminal trial.
In other classes of cases, the rule is applicable only when the
likelihood of deterring the unwanted conduct outweighs the societal
costs imposed by exclusion of relevant evidence. United States
v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 , 428 U. S. 454 (1976). Thus, the Court has, in a number of situations, refused to
extend the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than the criminal
trial itself. For example, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court held that the deterrent effect of the rule would
not be reduced by refusing to allow a state prisoner to litigate a
Fourth Amendment claim in federal habeas corpus proceedings if he
was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate it in state
court. Similarly, in United Page 468 U. S. 1053 States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S. 351 (1974), we concluded that "[a]ny incremental deterrent effect which
might be achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceedings
is uncertain, at best." And in United States v. Janis,
supra, we declined to extend the exclusionary rule to bar the
introduction in a federal civil proceeding of evidence
unconstitutionally seized by a state law enforcement officer. In
all of these cases, it was unquestioned that the illegally seized
evidence would not be admissible in the case in chief of the
proceeding for which the evidence was gathered; only its collateral
use was permitted.

															Civil deportation proceedings are in no sense "collateral." The
majority correctly acknowledges that the "primary objective" of the
INS agent is "to use evidence in the civil deportation proceeding,"
and that "the agency officials who effect the unlawful arrest are
the same officials who subsequently bring the deportation action." Ante at 468 U. S.
1043 . The Immigration and Naturalization Service
likewise concedes that INS agents are "in the business of
conducting searches for and seizures of illegal aliens for the
purpose of bringing about their deportation." Brief for Petitioner
37. Thus, unlike the situation in Janis, the conduct
challenged here falls within "the offending officer's zone of
primary interest." 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 458 .
The majority nonetheless concludes that application of the rule in
such proceedings is unlikely to provide significant deterrence.
Because INS agents are law enforcement officials whose mission is
closely analogous to that of police officers, and because civil
deportation proceedings are to INS agents what criminal trials are
to police officers, I cannot agree with that assessment.

															The exclusionary rule rests on the Court's belief that exclusion
has a sufficient deterrent effect to justify its imposition, and
the Court has not abandoned the rule. As long as that is the case,
there is no principled basis for distinguishing between the
deterrent effect of the rule in criminal cases and in civil
deportation proceedings. The majority attempts to justify the
distinction by asserting that deportation will still Page 468 U. S. 1054 be possible when evidence not derived from the illegal search or
seizure is independently sufficient. Ante at 468 U. S.
1043 -1044. However, that is no less true in criminal
cases. The suppression of some evidence does not bar prosecution
for the crime, and in many cases, even though some evidence is
suppressed, a conviction will nonetheless be obtained.

															The majority also suggests that the fact that most aliens elect
voluntary departure dilutes the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule, because the infrequency of challenges to
admission of evidence will mean that "the consequences from the
point of view of the officer's overall arrest and deportation
record will be trivial." Ante at 468 U. S.
1044 . It is true that a majority of apprehended aliens
elect voluntary departure, while a lesser number go through civil
deportation proceedings and a still smaller number are criminally
prosecuted. However, that fact no more diminishes the importance of
the exclusionary sanction than the fact that many criminal
defendants plead guilty dilutes the rule's deterrent effect in
criminal cases. The possibility of exclusion of evidence quite
obviously plays a part in the decision whether to contest either
civil deportation or criminal prosecution. Moreover, in
concentrating on the incentives under which the individual agent
operates to the exclusion of the incentives under which the agency
as a whole operates neglects the "systemic" deterrent effect that
may lead the agency to adopt policies and procedures that conform
to Fourth Amendment standards. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U. S. 200 , 442 U. S. 221 (1979) (STEVENS, J., concurring).

															The majority believes "perhaps most important" the fact that the
INS has a "comprehensive scheme" in place for deterring Fourth
Amendment violations by punishing agents who commit such
violations, but it points to not a single instance in which that
scheme has been invoked. [ Footnote
2/2 ] Ante at Page 468 U. S. 1055 468 U. S.
1044 -1045. Also, immigration officers are instructed and
examined in Fourth Amendment law, and it is suggested that this
education is another reason why the exclusionary rule is
unnecessary. Ibid. A contrary lesson could be discerned
from the existence of these programs, however, when it is recalled
that they were instituted during "a legal regime in which the cases
and commentators uniformly sanctioned the invocation of the rule in
deportation proceedings." 705 F.2d 1059, 1071 (CA9 1983). Thus,
rather than supporting a conclusion that the exclusionary rule is
unnecessary, the existence of these programs instead suggests that
the exclusionary rule has created incentives for the agency to
ensure that its officers follow the dictates of the Constitution.
Since the deterrent function of the rule is furthered if it alters
either "the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the
policies of their departments," United States v. Leon,
ante at 468 U. S. 918 ,
it seems likely that it was the rule's deterrent effect that led to
the programs to which the Court now points for its assertion that
the rule would have no deterrent effect.

															The suggestion that alternative remedies, such as civil suits,
provide adequate protection is unrealistic. Contrary to the
situation in criminal cases, once the Government has improperly
obtained evidence against an illegal alien, he is removed from the
country, and is therefore in no position to file civil actions in
federal courts. Moreover, those who are legally in the country but
are nonetheless subjected to illegal searches and seizures are
likely to be poor and uneducated, and many will not speak English.
It is doubtful that the threat of civil suits by these persons will
strike fear into the hearts of those who enforce the Nation's
immigration laws.

															It is also my belief that the majority exaggerates the costs
associated with applying the exclusionary rule in this context.
Evidence obtained through violation of the Fourth Amendment is not
automatically suppressed, and any inquiry Page 468 U. S. 1056 into the burdens associated with application of the exclusionary
rule must take that fact into account. In United States v.
Leon, ante p. 468 U. S. 897 , we
have held that the exclusionary rule is not applicable when
officers are acting in objective good faith. Thus, if the agents
neither knew nor should have known that they were acting contrary
to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be
suppressed even if it is held that their conduct was illegal.

															As is noted ante at 468 U. S.
1051 , n. 5, the BIA has already held that evidence will
be suppressed if it results from egregious violations of
constitutional standards. Thus, the mechanism for dealing with
suppression motions exists and is utilized, significantly
decreasing the force of the majority's predictions of dire
consequences flowing from "even occasional invocation of the
exclusionary rule." Ante at 468 U. S.
1048 . Although the standard currently utilized by the
BIA may not be precisely coextensive with the good faith exception,
any incremental increase in the amount of evidence that is
suppressed through application of Leon is unlikely to be
significant. Likewise, any difference that may exist between the
two standards is unlikely to increase significantly the number of
suppression motions filed.

															Contrary to the view of the majority, it is not the case that
Sandoval-Sanchez' "unregistered presence in this country, without
more, constitutes a crime." Ante at 468 U. S.
1047 . Section 275 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
makes it a crime to enter the United States illegally. 8 U.S.C. §
1325. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The first
offense constitutes a misdemeanor, and subsequent offenses
constitute felonies. Ibid. Those few cases that have
construed this statute have held that a violation takes Page 468 U. S. 1057 place at the time of entry and that the statute does not
describe a continuing offense. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 473-474 (CA9 1983); United States v.
Rincon-Jimenez, 595 F.2d 1192, 1194 (CA9 1979). Although this
Court has not construed the statute, it has suggested in dictum
that this interpretation is correct, United States v.
Cores, 356 U. S. 405 , 356 U. S. 408 ,
n. 6 (1958), and it is relatively clear that such an interpretation
is most consistent with the statutory language. Therefore, it is
simply not the case that suppressing evidence in deportation
proceedings will "allo[w] the criminal to continue in the
commission of an ongoing crime." Ante at 468 U. S.
1047 . It is true that some courts have construed § 276
of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which applies to aliens previously
deported who enter or are found in the United States, to describe a
continuing offense. [ Footnote 2/4 ] United States v. Bruno, 328 F.
Supp. 815 (WD Mo.1971); United States v.
Alvarado-Soto, 120 F.
Supp. 848 (SD Cal.1954); United States v. Rincon-Jimenez,
supra, (dictum). But see United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128 (CA3 1980). In such cases, however, the Government
will have a record of the prior deportation and will have little
need for any evidence that might be suppressed through application
of the exclusionary rule. See United States v.
Pineda-Chinchilla, 712 F.2d 942 (CA5 1983) (illegality of
arrest does not bar introduction of INS records to demonstrate
prior deportation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 964 (1983).

															Although the majority relies on the registration provisions of 8
U.S.C. §§ 1302 and 1306 for its "continuing crime" argument, those
provisions provide little support for the general Page 468 U. S. 1058 rule laid down that the exclusionary rule does not apply in
civil deportation proceedings. First. § 1302 requires that aliens
register within 30 days of entry into the country. Thus, for the
first 30 days, failure to register is not a crime. Second, § 1306
provides that only willful failure to register is a
misdemeanor. Therefore, "unregistered presence in this country,
without more," ante at 468 U. S.
1047 , does not constitute a crime; rather, unregistered
presence plus willfulness must be shown. There is no finding that
Sandoval-Sanchez willfully failed to register, which is a necessary
predicate to the conclusion that he is engaged in a continuing
crime. Third, only aliens 14 years of age or older are required to
register; those under 14 years of age are to be registered by their
parents or guardian. By the majority's reasoning, therefore,
perhaps the exclusionary rule should apply in proceedings to deport
children under 14, since their failure to register does not
constitute a crime.

															Application of the rule, we are told, will also seriously
interfere with the "streamlined" nature of deportation hearings,
because

															"[n]either the hearing officers nor the attorneys participating
in those hearings are likely to be well versed in the intricacies
of Fourth Amendment law." Ante at 468 U. S.
1048 . Yet the majority deprecates the deterrent benefit
of the exclusionary rule in part on the ground that immigration
officers receive a thorough education in Fourth Amendment law. Ante at 468 U. S.
1044 -1045. The implication that hearing officers should
defer to law enforcement officers' superior understanding of
constitutional principles is startling indeed.

															Prior to the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70 (1979), neither
the Board nor any court had held that the exclusionary rule did not
apply in civil deportation proceedings. 705 F.2d at 1071. The Board
in Sandoval noted that there were "fewer than fifty" BIA
proceedings since 1952 in which motions had been made to suppress
evidence on Fourth Amendment Page 468 U. S. 1059 grounds. This is so despite the fact that

															"immigration law practitioners have been informed by the major
treatise in their field that the exclusionary rule was available to
clients facing deportation. See 1A C. Gordon and H.
Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.2c at 5-31 (rev.
ed.1980)."

															705 F.2d at 1071. The suggestion that

															"[t]he prospect of even occasional invocation of the
exclusionary rule might significantly change and complicate the
character of these proceedings," ante at 468 U. S.
1048 , is thus difficult to credit. The simple fact is
that, prior to 1979, the exclusionary rule was available in civil
deportation proceedings, and there is no indication that it
significantly interfered with the ability of the INS to
function.

															Finally, the majority suggests that application of the
exclusionary rule might well result in the suppression of large
amounts of information legally obtained because of the "crowded and
confused circumstances" surrounding mass arrests. Ante at 468 U. S.
1049 . The result would be that INS agents would have to
keep a "precise account of exactly what happened in each particular
arrest," which would be impractical considering the "massed numbers
of ascertainably illegal aliens." Ante at 468 U. S.
1049 -1050. Rather than constituting a rejection of the
application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation
proceedings, however, this argument amounts to a rejection of the
application of the Fourth Amendment to the activities of INS
agents. If the pandemonium attending immigration arrests is so
great that violations of the Fourth Amendment cannot be ascertained
for the purpose of applying the exclusionary rule, there is no
reason to think that such violations can be ascertained for
purposes of civil suits or internal disciplinary proceedings, both
of which are proceedings that the majority suggests provide
adequate deterrence against Fourth Amendment violations. The Court
may be willing to throw up its hands in dismay because it is
administratively inconvenient to determine whether Page 468 U. S. 1060 constitutional rights have been violated, but we neglect our
duty when we subordinate constitutional rights to expediency in
such a manner. Particularly is this so when, as here, there is but
a weak showing that administrative efficiency will be seriously
compromised.

															In sum, I believe that the costs and benefits of applying the
exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings do not differ in
any significant way from the costs and benefits of applying the
rule in ordinary criminal proceedings. Unless the exclusionary rule
is to be wholly done away with and the Court's belief that it has
deterrent effects abandoned, it should be applied in deportation
proceedings when evidence has been obtained by deliberate
violations of the Fourth Amendment or by conduct a reasonably
competent officer would know is contrary to the Constitution.
Accordingly, I dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															I also question the Court's finding that Lopez-Mendoza failed to
object to admission of the evidence. Ante at 468 U.S. 1040 , and n. 1. The Court of
Appeals held that he had made a proper objection, 705 F.2d 1059,
1060, n. 1 (CA9 1983), and the INS did not seek review of that
conclusion, Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 8. Moreover, the fact that
changes in an opinion are made between the time of the slip opinion
and the bound volume has never before been considered evidence that
the holding of a case is "unsettled." See ante at 468 U.S. 1040 , n. 1.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The INS suggests that its disciplinary rules are "not mere paper
procedures" and that, over a period of four years, 20 officers were
suspended or terminated for misconduct toward aliens. Brief for
Petitioner 45, n. 28. The INS does not assert, however, that any of
these officers were disciplined for Fourth Amendment violations,
and it appears that the 11 officers who were terminated were
terminated for rape or assault. See Brief for Respondents
60, n. 42.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Section 275 provides in part:

															"Any alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes
examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) obtains
entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading
representation . . . shall be guilty of a [crime]. . . ."

															8 U.S.C. § 1325.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Section 276 provides in part:

															"Any alien who -- "

															"(1) has been arrested and deported or excluded and deported,
and thereafter"

															"(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the
United States . . ."

															"shall be guilty of a felony."

															8 U.S.C. § 1326.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

															I agree with JUSTICE WHITE that application to this case of the
mode of analysis embodied in the decisions of the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 (1974), compels the conclusion that the
exclusionary rule should apply in civil deportation proceedings. Ante at 468 U. S.
1052 -1054. However, I continue to believe that that mode
of analysis fails to reflect the constitutionally mandated
character of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon,
ante at 468 U. S.
931 -938 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Janis, supra, at 428 U. S. 460 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In my view, a
sufficient reason for excluding from civil deportation proceedings
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is that
there is no other way to achieve

															"the twin goals of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of
partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people --
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct -- that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining Page 468 U. S. 1061 popular trust in government." United States v. Calandra, supra, at 414 U. S. 357 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															Because the Court has not yet held that the rule of United
States v. Leon, ante p. 468 U. S. 897 , has
any application to warrantless searches, I do not join the portion
of JUSTICE WHITE's opinion that relies on that case. I do, however,
agree with the remainder of his dissenting opinion.