NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–647

															_________________

															ROSE MARY KNICK, PETITIONER v. TOWNSHIP
OF SCOTT, PENNSYLVANIA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[June 21, 2019]

															Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court.

															The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” In Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S.
172 (1985), we held that a property owner whose property has
been taken by a local government has not suffered a violation of
his Fifth Amendment rights—and thus cannot bring a federal takings
claim in federal court—until a state court has denied his claim for
just compensation under state law.

															The Williamson County Court anticipated
that if the property owner failed to secure just compensation under
state law in state court, he would be able to bring a “ripe”
federal takings claim in federal court. See id ., at 194. But
as we later held in San Remo Hotel , L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco , 545
U.S. 323 (2005), a state court’s resolution of a claim for just
compensation under state law generally has preclusive effect in any
subsequent federal suit. The takings plaintiff thus finds himself
in a Catch-22: He cannot go to federal court without going to state
court first; but if he goes to state court and loses, his claim
will be barred in federal court. The federal claim dies
aborning.

															The San Remo preclusion trap should tip
us off that the state-litigation requirement rests on a mistaken
view of the Fifth Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, after
all, guarantees “a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional
treatment at the hands of state officials,” and the settled rule is
that “exhaustion of state remedies ‘is not a prerequisite to
an action under [42 U. S. C.] §1983.’ ” Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S.
477 , 480 (1994) (quoting Patsy v. Board of Regents of
Fla. , 457 U.S.
496 , 501 (1982)). But the guarantee of a federal forum rings
hollow for takings plaintiffs, who are forced to litigate their
claims in state court.

															We now conclude that the state-litigation
requirement imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs,
conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence, and must be
overruled. A property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment
takings claim when the government takes his property without paying
for it. That does not mean that the government must provide
compensation in advance of a taking or risk having its action
invalidated: So long as the property owner has some way to obtain
compensation after the fact, governments need not fear that courts
will enjoin their activities. But it does mean that the property
owner has suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights when
the government takes his property without just compensation, and
therefore may bring his claim in federal court under §1983 at that
time.

															I

															Petitioner Rose Mary Knick owns 90 acres of
land in Scott Township, Pennsylvania, a small community just north
of Scranton. Knick lives in a single-family home on the property
and uses the rest of the land as a grazing area for horses and
other farm animals. The property includes a small graveyard where
the ancestors of Knick’s neighbors are allegedly buried. Such
family cemeteries are fairly common in Pennsylvania, where
“backyard burials” have long been permitted.

															In December 2012, the Township passed an
ordinance requiring that “[a]ll cemeteries . . . be kept
open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours.”
The ordinance defined a “cemetery” as “[a] place or area of ground,
whether contained on private or public property, which has been set
apart for or otherwise utilized as a burial place for deceased
human beings.” The ordinance also authorized Township “code
enforcement” officers to “enter upon any property” to determine the
existence and location of a cemetery. App. 21–23.

															In 2013, a Township officer found several grave
markers on Knick’s property and notified her that she was violating
the ordinance by failing to open the cemetery to the public during
the day. Knick responded by seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief in state court on the ground that the ordinance effected a
taking of her property. Knick did not seek compensation for the
taking by bringing an “inverse condemnation” action under state
law. Inverse condemnation is “a cause of action against a
governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant.” United
States v. Clarke , 445 U.S.
253 , 257 (1980) (quoting D. Hagman, Urban Planning and Land
Development Control Law 328 (1971)). Inverse condemnation stands in
contrast to direct condemnation, in which the government initiates
proceedings to acquire title under its eminent domain authority.
Pennsylvania, like every other State besides Ohio, provides a state
inverse condemnation action. 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. §502(c)
(2009).[ 1 ]

															In response to Knick’s suit, the Township
withdrew the violation notice and agreed to stay enforcement of the
ordinance during the state court proceedings. The court, however,
declined to rule on Knick’s request for declara- tory and
injunctive relief because, without an ongoing en- forcement action,
she could not demonstrate the irreparable harm necessary for
equitable relief.

															Knick then filed an action in Federal District
Court under 42 U. S. C. §1983, alleging that the
ordinance violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.[ 2 ] The District
Court dismissed Knick’s takings claim under Williamson
County because she had not pursued an inverse condemnation
action in state court. 2016 WL 4701549, *5–*6 (MD Pa., Sept. 8,
2016). On appeal, the Third Circuit noted that the ordinance was
“extraordinary and constitutionally suspect,” but affirmed the
District Court in light of Williamson County . 862 F.3d 310,
314 (2017).

															We granted certiorari to reconsider the holding
of Williamson County that property owners must seek just
compensation under state law in state court before bringing a
federal takings claim under §1983. 583 U. S. ___ (2018).

															II

															In Williamson County , a property
developer brought a takings claim under §1983 against a zoning
board that had rejected the developer’s proposal for a new
subdivision. Williamson County held that the developer’s
Fifth Amendment claim was not “ripe” for two reasons. First, the
developer still had an opportunity to seek a variance from the
appeals board, so any taking was therefore not yet final. 473
U. S., at 186–194. Knick does not question the validity of
this finality requirement, which is not at issue here.

															The second holding of Williamson County is that the developer had no federal takings claim because he had
not sought compensation “through the procedures the State ha[d]
provided for doing so.” Id. , at 194. That is the holding
Knick asks us to overrule. According to the Court, “if a State
provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the
property owner cannot claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause
until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.” Id. , at 195. The Court concluded that the developer’s
federal takings claim was “premature” because he had not sought
compensation through the State’s inverse condemnation procedure. Id ., at 197.

															The unanticipated consequences of this ruling
were not clear until 20 years later, when this Court decided San
Remo . In that case, the takings plaintiffs complied with Williamson County and brought a claim for compensation in
state court. 545 U. S., at 331. The complaint made clear that
the plaintiffs sought relief only under the takings clause of the
State Constitution, intending to reserve their Fifth Amendment
claim for a later federal suit if the state suit proved
unsuccessful. Id ., at 331–332. When that happened, however,
and the plaintiffs proceeded to federal court, they found that
their federal claim was barred. This Court held that the full faith
and credit statute, 28 U. S. C. §1738, required the
federal court to give preclusive effect to the state court’s
decision, blocking any subsequent consideration of whether the
plaintiff had suffered a taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. 545 U. S., at 347. The adverse state court decision
that, according to Williamson County , gave rise to a ripe
federal takings claim simultaneously barred that claim, preventing
the federal court from ever considering it.

															The state-litigation requirement relegates the
Takings Clause “to the status of a poor relation” among the
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Dolan v. City of
Tigard , 512 U.S.
374 , 392 (1994). Plaintiffs asserting any other constitutional
claim are guaranteed a federal forum under §1983, but the
state-litigation requirement “hand[s] authority over federal
takings claims to state courts.” San Remo , 545 U. S.,
at 350 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment). Fidelity to
the Takings Clause and our cases construing it requires overruling Williamson County and restoring takings claims to the
full-fledged constitutional status the Framers envisioned when they
included the Clause among the other protections in the Bill of
Rights.

															III

															A

															Contrary to Williamson County , a
property owner has a claim for a violation of the Takings Clause as
soon as a government takes his property for public use without
paying for it. The Clause provides: “[N]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.” It does not
say: “Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
an available procedure that will result in compensation.” If a
local government takes private property without paying for it, that
government has violated the Fifth Amendment—just as the Takings
Clause says—without regard to subsequent state court proceedings.
And the property owner may sue the government at that time in
federal court for the “deprivation” of a right “secured by the
Constitution.” 42 U. S. C. §1983.

															We have long recognized that property owners may
bring Fifth Amendment claims against the Federal Government as soon
as their property has been taken. The Tucker Act, which provides
the standard procedure for bringing such claims, gives the Court of
Federal Claims jurisdiction to “render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution” or
any federal law or contract for damages “in cases not sounding in
tort.” 28 U. S. C. §1491(a)(1). We have held that “[i]f
there is a taking, the claim is ‘founded upon the Constitution’ and
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and
determine.” United States v. Causby , 328 U.S.
256 , 267 (1946). And we have explained that “the act of taking”
is the “event which gives rise to the claim for compensation.” United States v. Dow , 357 U.S.
17 , 22 (1958).

															The Fifth Amendment right to full compensation
arises at the time of the taking, regardless of post-taking
remedies that may be available to the property owner. That
principle was confirmed in Jacobs v. United States , 290 U.S.
13 (1933), where we held that a property owner found to have a
valid takings claim is entitled to compensation as if it had been
“paid contemporaneously with the taking”—that is, the compensation
must generally consist of the total value of the property when
taken, plus interest from that time. Id. , at 17 (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States , 261 U.S.
299 , 306 (1923)). We rejected the view of the lower court that
a property owner is entitled to interest only when the government
provides a particular remedy—direct condemnation proceedings—and
not when the owner brings a takings suit under the Tucker Act. “The
form of the remedy d[oes] not qualify the right. It rest[s] upon
the Fifth Amendment.” 290 U. S., at 16. Jacobs made clear that, no matter what
sort of procedures the government puts in place to remedy a taking,
a property owner has a Fifth Amendment entitlement to compensation
as soon as the government takes his prop- erty without paying for
it. Whether the government does nothing, forcing the owner to bring
a takings suit under the Tucker Act, or whether it provides the
owner with a statutory compensation remedy by initiating direct
condemnation proceedings, the owner’s claim for compensation
“rest[s] upon the Fifth Amendment.”

															Although Jacobs concerned a taking by the
Federal Government, the same reasoning applies to takings by the
States. The availability of any particular compensation remedy,
such as an inverse condemnation claim under state law, cannot
infringe or restrict the property owner’s federal constitutional
claim—just as the existence of a state action for battery does not
bar a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force. The fact that the
State has provided a property owner with a procedure that may
subsequently result in just compensation cannot deprive the owner
of his Fifth Amendment right to compensation under the
Constitution, leaving only the state law right. And that is key
because it is the existence of the Fifth Amendment right that
allows the owner to proceed directly to federal court under
§1983. Williamson County had a different view of
how the Takings Clause works. According to Williamson
County , a taking does not give rise to a federal constitutional
right to just compensation at that time, but instead gives a right
to a state law procedure that will eventually result in just
compensation. As the Court put it, “if a State provides an adequate
procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot
claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause until it has used the
procedure and been denied just compensation.” 473 U. S., at
195. In the absence of a state remedy, the Fifth Amendment right to
compensation would attach immediately. But, under Williamson
County , the presence of a state remedy qualifies the right,
preventing it from vesting until exhaustion of the state procedure.
That is what Jacobs confirmed could not be done.

															Just two years after Williamson County ,
in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , 482 U.S.
304 (1987), the Court returned to the understanding that the
Fifth Amendment right to compensation automatically arises at the
time the government takes property without paying for it. Relying
heavily on Jacobs and other Fifth Amendment precedents
neglected by Williamson County , First English held
that a property owner is entitled to compensation for the temporary
loss of his property. We explained that “government action that
works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the
‘constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.’ ” 482
U. S., at 315. Because of “the self-executing character” of
the Takings Clause “with respect to compensation,” a property owner
has a constitutional claim for just compensation at the time of the
taking. Ibid. (quoting 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain §25.41
(3d rev. ed. 1972)). The government’s post-taking actions (there,
repeal of the challenged ordinance) cannot nullify the property
owner’s existing Fifth Amendment right: “[W]here the government’s
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation.” 482 U. S., at 321.[ 3 ]

															In holding that a property owner acquires an
irrevocable right to just compensation immediately upon a taking, First English adopted a position Justice Brennan had taken
in an earlier dissent. See id ., at 315, 318 (quoting and
citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego , 450 U.S.
621 , 654, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).[ 4 ] In that opinion, Justice Brennan explained
that “once there is a ‘taking,’ compensation must be
awarded” because “[a]s soon as private property has been taken,
whether through formal condemnation proceedings, occupancy,
physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has already suffered a constitutional violation.” Id. , at 654. First English embraced that view,
reaffirming that “in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy
is required by the Constitution.” 482 U. S., at 316; see ibid ., n. 9 (rejecting the view that “the Constitution
does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to award
money damages against the government” (quoting Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 14)). Compensation under the Takings
Clause is a remedy for the “constitutional violation” that “the
landowner has already suffered” at the time of the
uncompensated taking. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. , 450
U. S., at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see First
English , 482 U. S., at 315.

															A later payment of compensation may remedy the
constitutional violation that occurred at the time of the taking,
but that does not mean the violation never took place. The
violation is the only reason compensation was owed in the first
place. A bank robber might give the loot back, but he still robbed
the bank. The availability of a subsequent compensation remedy for
a taking without compensation no more means there never was a
constitutional violation in the first place than the availability
of a damages action renders negligent conduct compliant with the
duty of care.

															In sum, because a taking without compensation
violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at the time of the
taking, the property owner can bring a federal suit at that time.
Just as someone whose property has been taken by the Federal
Government has a claim “founded . . . upon the
Constitution” that he may bring under the Tucker Act, someone whose
property has been taken by a local government has a claim under
§1983 for a “deprivation of [a] right[ ] . . .
secured by the Constitution” that he may bring upon the taking in
federal court. The “general rule” is that plaintiffs may bring
constitutional claims under §1983 “without first bringing any sort
of state lawsuit, even when state court actions addressing the
underlying behavior are available.” D. Dana & T. Merrill,
Property: Takings 262 (2002); see McNeese v. Board of Ed.
for Community Unit School Dist. 187 , 373
U.S. 668 , 672 (1963) (observing that it would defeat the
purpose of §1983 “if we held that assertion of a federal claim in a
federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same claim in
a state court”); Monroe v. Pape , 365 U.S.
167 , 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state rem- edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked.”). This is as true for takings
claims as for any other claim grounded in the Bill of Rights.

															B Williamson County effectively
established an exhaustion requirement for §1983 takings claims when
it held that a property owner must pursue state procedures for
obtaining compensation before bringing a federal suit. But the
Court did not phrase its holding in those terms; if it had, its
error would have been clear. Instead, Williamson County broke with the Court’s longstanding position that a property owner
has a constitutional claim to compensation at the time the
government deprives him of his property, and held that there can be
no uncompensated taking, and thus no Fifth Amendment claim
actionable under §1983, until the property owner has tried and
failed to obtain compensation through the available state
procedure. “[U]ntil it has used the procedure and been denied just
compensation,” the property owner “ ‘has no claim against the
Government’ for a taking.” 473 U. S., at 194–195 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. , 467
U.S. 986 , 1018, n. 21 (1984)). Williamson County drew that understanding
of the Clause from Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. , a
decision from the prior Term. Monsanto did not involve a
takings claim for just compensation. The plaintiff there sought to
enjoin a federal statute because it effected a taking, even though
the statute set up a special arbitration procedure for obtaining
compensation, and the plaintiff could bring a takings claim
pursuant to the Tucker Act if arbitration did not yield sufficient
compensation. 467 U. S., at 1018. The Court rejected the
plaintiff’s claim because “[e]quitable relief is not available to
enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use, duly
authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.” Id. , at
1016 (footnote omitted). That much is consistent with our
precedent: Equitable relief was not available because monetary
relief was under the Tucker Act.

															That was enough to decide the case. But Monsanto went on to say that if the plaintiff obtained
compensation in arbitration, then “no taking has occurred and the
[plaintiff] has no claim against the Government.” Id ., at
1018, n. 21. Certainly it is correct that a fully compensated
plaintiff has no further claim, but that is because the taking has
been remedied by compensation, not because there was no
taking in the first place. See First English , 482
U. S., at 316, n. 9. The statute in Monsanto simply required the plaintiff to attempt to vindicate its claim to
compensation through arbitration before proceeding under the Tucker
Act. The case offers no support to Williamson County in this
regard, because Congress—unlike the States—is free to require
plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing
constitutional claims. See McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S.
140 , 144 (1992) (“Where Congress specifically mandates,
exhaustion is required.”). Williamson County also relied on Monsanto when it analogized its new state-litigation
requirement to federal takings practice, stating that “taking[s]
claims against the Federal Government are premature until the
property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the
Tucker Act.” 473 U. S., at 195. But the Court was simply
confused. A claim for just compensation brought under the Tucker
Act is not a prerequisite to a Fifth Amendment takings claim—it is a Fifth Amendment takings claim. A party who loses a
Tucker Act suit has nowhere else to go to seek compensation for an
alleged taking.

															Other than Monsanto , the principal case
to which Williamson County looked was Parratt v. Taylor , 451 U.S.
527 (1981). Like Monsanto , Parratt did not
involve a takings claim for just compensation. Indeed, it was not a
takings case at all. Parratt held that a prisoner deprived
of $23.50 worth of hobby materials by the rogue act of a state
employee could not state a due process claim if the State provided
adequate post-deprivation process. 451 U. S., at 543–544. But
the analogy from the due process context to the takings context is
strained, as Williamson County itself recognized. See 473
U. S., at 195, n. 14. It is not even possible for a State
to provide pre-deprivation due process for the unauthorized act of
a single employee. That is quite different from the taking of
property by the government through physical invasion or a
regulation that destroys a property’s productive use.

															The poor reasoning of Williamson County may be partially explained by the circumstances in which the
state-litigation issue reached the Court. The Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the Fifth Amendment entitles a
property owner to just compensation when a regulation temporarily
deprives him of the use of his property. ( First English later held that the answer was yes.) As amicus curiae in
support of the local government, the United States argued in this
Court that the developer could not state a Fifth Amendment claim
because it had not pursued an inverse condemnation suit in state
court. Neither party had raised that argument before.[ 5 ] The Court then adopted the reasoning of
the Solicitor General in an alternative holding, even though the
case could have been resolved solely on the narrower and settled
ground that no taking had occurred because the zoning board had not
yet come to a final decision regarding the developer’s proposal. In
these circumstances, the Court may not have ade- quately tested the
logic of the state-litigation requirement or considered its
implications, most notably the preclusion trap later sprung by San Remo . That consequence was totally unanticipated in Williamson County .

															The dissent, doing what respondents do not even
dare to attempt, defends the original rationale of Williamson
County —that there is no Fifth Amendment violation, and thus no
Fifth Amendment claim, until the government denies the property
owner compensation in a subsequent proceeding.[ 6 ] But although the dissent makes a more
thoughtful and considered argument than Williamson County ,
it cannot reconcile its view with our repeated holdings that a
property owner acquires a constitutional right to compensation at
the time of the taking. See supra , at 7–11. The only reason
that a taking would automatically entitle a property owner to the
remedy of compensation is that, as Justice Brennan explained, with
the uncompensated taking “the landowner has already suffered
a constitutional violation.” San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. ,
450 U. S., at 654 (dissenting opinion). The dissent here
provides no more reason to resist that conclusion than did Williamson County .

															C

															The Court in Williamson County relied
on statements in our prior opinions that the Clause “does not
provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in
advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is
entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate provision for
obtaining compensation” after a taking. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co. , 135 U.S.
641 , 659 (1890). Respondents rely on the same cases in
contending that uncompensated takings for which compensation is
subsequently available do not violate the Fifth Amendment at the
time of the taking. But respondents read those statements too
broadly. They concerned requests for injunctive relief, and the
availability of subsequent compensation meant that such an
equitable remedy was not available. See Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases , 419 U.S.
102 , 107, 149 (1974) (reversing a decision “enjoin[ing]” the
enforcement of a federal statute because “the availability of the
Tucker Act guarantees an adequate remedy at law for any taking
which might occur”); Hurley v. Kincaid , 285 U.S.
95 , 99, 105 (1932) (rejecting a request to “enjoin the carrying
out of any work” on a flood control project because the Tucker Act
provided the plaintiff with “a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at law”). Simply because the property owner was not entitled to
injunctive relief at the time of the taking does not mean there was
no violation of the Takings Clause at that time.

															The history of takings litigation provides
valuable context. At the time of the founding there usually was no
compensation remedy available to property owners. On occasion, when
a legislature authorized a particular government action that took
private property, it might also create a special owner-initiated
procedure for obtaining compensation. But there were no general
causes of action through which plaintiffs could obtain compensation
for property taken for public use. Brauneis, The First
Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century
State Just Compensation Law, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 57, 69–70, and
n. 33 (1999).

															Until the 1870s, the typical recourse of a
property owner who had suffered an uncompensated taking was to
bring a common law trespass action against the responsible
corporation or government official. The official would then raise
the defense that his trespass was lawful because authorized by
statute or ordinance, and the plaintiff would respond that the law
was unconstitutional because it provided for a taking without just
compensation. If the plaintiff prevailed, he nonetheless had no way
at common law to obtain money damages for a permanent taking—that
is, just compensation for the total value of his prop- erty. He
could obtain only retrospective damages, as well as an injunction
ejecting the government from his property going forward. See id ., at 67–69, 97–99.

															As Chancellor Kent explained when granting a
property owner equitable relief, the Takings Clause and its analogs
in state constitutions required that “a fair compensation must, in
all cases, be previously made to the individuals affected.” Gardner v. Newburgh , 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166
(N. Y. 1816) (emphasis added). If a government took property
without payment, a court would set aside the taking because it
violated the Constitution and order the property restored to its
owner. The Framers meant to prohibit the Federal Government from taking property without paying for it. Allowing the
government to keep the property pending subsequent
compensation to the owner, in proceedings that hardly existed in
1787, was not what they envisioned.

															Antebellum courts, which had no means of
compensating a property owner for his loss, had no way to redress
the violation of an owner’s Fifth Amendment rights other than
ordering the government to give him back his prop- erty. See Callender v. Marsh , 18 Mass. 418, 430–431 (1823)
(“[I]f by virtue of any legislative act the land of any citizen
should be occupied by the public . . . , without any
means provided to indemnify the owner of the property,
. . . because such a statute would be directly contrary
to the [Massachusetts takings clause]; and as no action can be
maintained against the public for damages, the only way to secure
the party in his constitutional rights would be to declare void the
public appropriation.”). But in the 1870s, as state courts began to
recognize implied rights of action for damages under the state
equivalents of the Takings Clause, they declined to grant
injunctions because prop- erty owners had an adequate remedy at
law. See, e.g. , Stet- son v. Chicago &
Evanston R. Co. , 75 Ill. 74, 78 (1874) (“What injury, if any,
[the property owner] has sustained, may be compensated by damages
recoverable by an action at law.”); see also Brauneis, supra , at 97–99, 110–112. On the federal level, Congress
enabled property owners to obtain compensation for takings in
federal court when it passed the Tucker Act in 1887, and we
subsequently joined the state courts in holding that the
compensation remedy is required by the Takings Clause itself. See First English , 482 U. S., at 316 (collecting
cases).

															Today, because the federal and nearly all state
governments provide just compensation remedies to property owners
who have suffered a taking, equitable relief is generally
unavailable. As long as an adequate provision for obtaining just
compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin the government’s
action effecting a taking. But that is because, as the Court
explained in First English , such a procedure is a remedy for
a taking that violated the Constitution, not because the
availability of the procedure somehow prevented the violation from
occurring in the first place. See supra , at 9–11.[ 7 ]

															The dissent contends that our characterization
of Cherokee Nation effectively overrules “a hundred-plus
years of legal rulings.” Post , at 6 (opinion of Kagan, J.).
But under today’s decision every one of the cases cited by the
dissent would come out the same way—the plaintiffs would not be
entitled to the relief they requested because they could instead
pursue a suit for compensation. The premise of such a suit for
compensation is that the prop- erty owner has already suffered a
violation of the Fifth Amendment that may be remedied by money
damages.[ 8 ]

															*  *  *

															We conclude that a government violates the
Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and
that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under §1983
at that time. That does not as a practical matter mean that
government action or regulation may not proceed in the absence of
contemporaneous compensation. Given the availability of post-taking
compensation, barring the government from acting will ordinarily
not be appropriate. But because the violation is complete at the
time of the taking, pursuit of a remedy in federal court need not
await any subsequent state action. Takings claims against local
governments should be handled the same as other claims under the
Bill of Rights. Williamson County erred in holding
otherwise.

															IV

															The next question is whether we should
overrule Williamson County , or whether stare decisis counsels in favor of adhering to the decision, despite its error.
The doctrine of stare decisis reflects a judgment “that ‘in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right.’ ” Agostini v. Felton , 521 U.S.
203 , 235 (1997) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co. , 285 U.S.
393 , 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). The doctrine “is
at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution,” as we did in Williamson County , because only this Court or a
constitutional amendment can alter our holdings. Agostini ,
521 U. S., at 235.

															We have identified several factors to consider
in deciding whether to overrule a past decision, including “the
quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it
established, its consistency with other related decisions,
. . . and reliance on the decision.” Janus v. State , County , and Municipal Employees , 585
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 34–35). All of these
factors counsel in favor of overruling Williamson
County . Williamson County was not just wrong. Its
reasoning was exceptionally ill founded and conflicted with much of
our takings jurisprudence. See supra , at 12–14. Its key
conclusion, which it drew from unnecessary language in Monsanto —that a property owner does not have a ripe federal
takings claim until he has unsuccessfully pursued an initial state
law claim for just compensation—ignored Jacobs and many
subsequent decisions holding that a property owner acquires a Fifth
Amendment right to compensation at the time of a taking. This
contradiction was on stark display just two years later in First
English .

															The decision has come in for repeated criticism
over the years from Justices of this Court and many respected
commentators. See San Remo , 545 U. S., at 348
(Rehnquist, C. J., joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas,
JJ., concurring in judgment); Arrigoni Enter- prises , LLC v. Durham , 578 U. S. ___ (2016) (Thomas, J.,
joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari);
Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1630,
1647–1649 (2015); McConnell, Horne and the Normalization of
Takings Litigation: A Response to Professor Echeverria, 43 Env. L.
Rep. 10749, 10751 (2013); Friedman, Under the Law of Federal
Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts,
104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211, 1264 (2004); Monaghan, State Law Wrongs,
State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
979, 989 (1986). Even the academic defenders of the
state-litigation requirement base it on federalism concerns
(although they do not reconcile those concerns with the settled
construction of §1983) rather than the reasoning of the opinion
itself. See Echeverria, Horne v. Department of
Agriculture : An Invitation To Reexamine “Ripeness” Doctrine in
Takings Litigation, 43 Env. L. Rep. 10735, 10744 (2013); Sterk, The
Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
251, 288 (2006).

															Because of its shaky foundations, the
state-litigation requirement has been a rule in search of a
justification for over 30 years. We eventually abandoned the view
that the requirement is an element of a takings claim and recast it
as a “prudential” ripeness rule. See Horne v. Department
of Agriculture , 569 U.S.
513 , 525–526 (2013); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency , 520 U.S.
725 , 733–734 (1997). No party defends that approach here. See
Brief for Respondents 37; Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 19–20. Respondents have taken a new tack, adopting a
§1983–specific theory at which Williamson County did not
even hint. See n. 6, supra . The fact that the
justification for the state-litigation requirement continues to
evolve is another factor undermining the force of stare
decisis . See Janus , 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
23).

															The state-litigation requirement has also proved
to be unworkable in practice. Williamson County envisioned
that takings plaintiffs would ripen their federal claims in state
court and then, if necessary, bring a federal suit under §1983.
But, as we held in San Remo , the state court’s resolution of
the plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim has preclusive effect in
any subsequent federal suit. The upshot is that many takings
plaintiffs never have the opportunity to litigate in a federal
forum that §1983 by its terms seems to provide. That significant
consequence was not considered by the Court in Williamson
County .

															The dissent argues that our constitutional
holding in Williamson County should enjoy the “enhanced”
form of stare decisis we usually reserve for statutory
decisions, because Congress could have eliminated the San
Remo preclusion trap by amending the full faith and credit
statute. Post , at 17 (quoting Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment , LLC , 578 U. S. ___, ___ (slip op.,
at 8)). But takings plaintiffs, unlike plaintiffs bringing any
other constitutional claim, would still have been forced to pursue
relief under state law before they could bring suit in federal
court. Congress could not have lifted that unjustified exhaustion
requirement because, under Williamson County , a property
owner had no federal claim until a state court denied him
compensation.

															Finally, there are no reliance interests on the
state-litigation requirement. We have recognized that the force of stare decisis is “reduced” when rules that do not “serve as
a guide to lawful behavior” are at issue. United States v. Gaudin , 515 U.S.
506 , 521 (1995); see Alleyne v. United States ,
570 U.S. 99, 119 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Our holding
that uncompensated takings violate the Fifth Amendment will not
expose governments to new liability; it will simply allow into
federal court takings claims that otherwise would have been brought
as inverse condemnation suits in state court.

															Governments need not fear that our holding will
lead federal courts to invalidate their regulations as
unconstitutional. As long as just compensation remedies are
available—as they have been for nearly 150 years—injunctive relief
will be foreclosed. For the same reason, the Federal Government
need not worry that courts will set aside agency actions as
unconstitutional under the Administrative Procedure Act. 5
U. S. C. §706(2)(B). Federal courts will not invalidate
an otherwise lawful uncompensated taking when the property owner
can receive complete relief through a Fifth Amendment claim brought
under the Tucker Act.

															In light of all the foregoing, the dissent
cannot, with respect, fairly maintain its extreme assertions
regarding our application of the principle of stare
decisis .

															*  *  *

															The state-litigation requirement of Williamson County is overruled. A property owner may bring a
takings claim under §1983 upon the taking of his property without
just compensation by a local government. The judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is vacated, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 A property owner in Ohio
who has suffered a taking without compensation must seek a writ of
mandamus to compel the government to initiate condemnation
proceedings. See, e.g. , State ex rel. Doner v. Zody , 130 Ohio St. 3d 446, 2011-Ohio-6117, 958 N.E.2d
1235. 2 Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at
law . . . .” 3 First English distinguished Williamson County in a footnote, explaining
that the case addressed only “whether the constitutional claim was
ripe for review” before the State denied compensation. 482
U. S., at 320, n. 10. But Williamson County was
based on the premise that there was no Fifth Amendment claim at
all until the State denies compensation. Having rejected that
premise, First English eliminated the rationale for the
state-litigation requirement. The author of First English later recognized that it was “not clear . . . that Williamson County was correct in demanding that
. . . the claimant must seek compensation in state court
before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court.” San
Remo Hotel , L. P. v. City and County of San
Francisco , 545 U.S.
323 , 349 (2005) (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in
judgment). 4 Justice Brennan was
joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. The majority did
not disagree with Justice Brennan’s analysis of the merits, but
concluded that the Court lacked jurisdiction to address the
question presented. Justice Rehnquist, concurring on the
jurisdictional issue, noted that if he were satisfied that
jurisdiction was proper, he “would have little difficulty in
agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion.” 450
U. S., at 633–634. The Court reached the merits of the
question presented in San Diego in First English ,
adopting Justice Brennan’s view in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. 5 The Solicitor General
continues this tradition here, arguing for the first time as amicus curiae that state inverse condemnation claims
“aris[e] under” federal law and can be brought in federal court
under 28 U. S. C. §1331 through the Grable doctrine. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22–24;
see Grable & Sons Metal Products , Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg. , 545 U.S.
308 (2005). Because we agree with the Solicitor General’s
principal contention that federal takings claims can be brought
immediately under §1983, we have no occasion to consider his novel
§1331 argument. 6 The dissent thinks that
respondents still press this theory. Post , at 6 n. 3. But
respondents instead describe Williamson County as resting on
an understanding not of the elements of a federal takings claim but
of the scope of 42 U. S. C. §1983. They even go so far as
to rewrite petitioner’s question presented in such terms. Brief for
Respondents i. For respondents, it does not matter whether a
property owner has a Fifth Amendment claim at the time of a taking.
What matters is that, in respondents’ view, no constitutional
violation occurs for purposes of §1983 until the government has
subsequently denied compensation. That characterization has no
basis in the Williamson County opinion, which did not even
quote §1983 and stated that the Court’s reasoning applied with
equal force to takings by the Federal Government, not covered by
§1983. 473 U. S., at 195. Respondents’ attempt to recast the
state-litigation requirement as a §1983-specific rule fails for the
same reason as the logic of Williamson County —a property
owner has a Fifth Amendment claim for a violation of the Takings
Clause as soon as the government takes his property without paying
for it. 7 Among the cases invoking
the Cherokee Nation language that the parties have raised,
only one, Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co. , 309 U.S.
18 (1940), rejected a demand for compensation. Yearsley concerned a state tort suit alleging a taking by a contractor
building dikes for the Federal Government. In ruling for the
contractors, we sug-gested that the taking did not violate the
Fifth Amendment because the property owner had the opportunity to
pursue a claim for just compensation under the Tucker Act. As
explained, however, a claim for compensation brought under the
Tucker Act is a claim for a violation of the Fifth
Amendment; it does not prevent a violation from occurring.
Regardless, Yearsley was right to hold that the contractors
were immune from suit. Because the Tucker Act provides a complete
remedy for any taking by the Federal Government, it “excludes
liability of the Government’s representatives lawfully acting on
its behalf in relation to the taking,” barring the plaintiffs from
seeking any relief from the contractors themselves. Id. , at
22. 8 The dissent also asserts
that today’s ruling “betrays judicial federalism.” Post , at
15. But since the Civil Rights Act of 1871, part of “judicial
federalism” has been the availability of a federal cause of action
when a local government violates the Constitution. 42
U. S. C. §1983. Invoking that federal protection in the
face of state action violating the Fifth Amendment cannot properly
be regarded as a betrayal of federalism. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–647

															_________________

															ROSE MARY KNICK, PETITIONER v. TOWNSHIP
OF SCOTT, PENNSYLVANIA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[June 21, 2019]

															Justice Thomas, concurring.

															The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prohibits
the government from “tak[ing]” private property “without just
compensation.” The Court correctly interprets this text by holding
that a violation of this Clause occurs as soon as the government
takes property without paying for it.

															The United States, by contrast, urges us not to
enforce the Takings Clause as written. It worries that requiring
payment to accompany a taking would allow courts to enjoin or
invalidate broad regulatory programs “merely” because the program
takes property without paying for it. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12. According to the United States, “there is
a ‘nearly infinite variety of ways in which government actions or
regulations can affect property interests,’ ” and it ought to
be good enough that the government “implicitly promises to pay
compensation for any taking” if a property owner successfully sues
the government in court. Supplemental Letter Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 5 (Supp. Brief) (citing the Tucker
Act, 28 U. S. C. §1491). Government officials, the United
States contends, should be able to implement regulatory programs
“without fear” of injunction or invalidation under the Takings
Clause, “even when” the program is so far reaching that the
officials “cannot determine whether a taking will occur.” Supp.
Brief 5.

															This “sue me” approach to the Takings Clause is
untenable. The Fifth Amendment does not merely provide a damages
remedy to a property owner willing to “shoulder the burden of
securing compensation” after the government takes property without
paying for it. Arrigoni Enterprises, LLC v. Durham ,
578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (slip op., at 2). Instead, it makes just
compensation a “prerequisite” to the government’s authority to
“tak[e] property for public use.” Ibid. A “purported
exercise of the eminent-domain power” is therefore “invalid” unless
the government “pays just compensation before or at the time of its
taking.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 3). If this requirement
makes some regulatory programs “unworkable in practice,” Supp.
Brief 5, so be it—our role is to enforce the Takings Clause as
written.

															Of course, as the Court correctly explains, the
United States’ concerns about injunctions may be misplaced. Ante, at 15–18. Injunctive relief is not available when an
adequate remedy exists at law. E.g. , Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms , 561 U.S.
139 , 156 (2010). And even when relief is appropriate for a
particular plaintiff, it does not follow that a court may enjoin or
invalidate an entire regulatory “program,” Supp. Brief 5, by
granting relief “beyond the parties to the case,” Trump v. Hawaii , 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 6); see id. , at ___ (slip op., at
2) (expressing skepticism about “universal injunctions”).

															Still, “[w]hen the government repudiates [its]
duty” to pay just compensation, its actions “are not only
unconstitutional” but may be “tortious as well.” Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. , 526
U.S. 687 , 717 (1999) (plurality opinion). I do not understand
the Court’s opinion to foreclose the application of ordinary
remedial principles to takings claims and related common-law tort
claims, such as trespass. I therefore join it in full. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 17–647

															_________________

															ROSE MARY KNICK, PETITIONER v. TOWNSHIP
OF SCOTT, PENNSYLVANIA, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[June 21, 2019]

															Justice Kagan, with whom Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor join, dissenting.

															Today, the Court formally overrules Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S.
172 (1985). But its decision rejects far more than that single
case. Williamson County was rooted in an understanding of
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause stretching back to the late
1800s. On that view, a government could take property so long as it
provided a reliable mechanism to pay just compensation, even if the
payment came after the fact. No longer. The majority today holds,
in conflict with precedent after precedent, that a government
violates the Constitution whenever it takes property without
advance compensation—no matter how good its commitment to pay. That
conclusion has no basis in the Takings Clause. Its consequence is
to channel a mass of quintessentially local cases involving complex
state-law issues into federal courts. And it transgresses all usual
principles of stare decisis . I respectfully dissent.

															I

															Begin with the basics—the meaning of the
Takings Clause. The right that Clause confers is not to be free
from government takings of property for public purposes. Instead,
the right is to be free from those takings when the government
fails to provide “just compensation.” In other words, the
government can take private property for public purposes, so
long as it fairly pays the property owner. That precept, which the
majority does not contest, comes straight out of the constitutional
text: “[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” Amdt. 5. “As its language indicates,
[the Takings Clause] does not prohibit the taking of private
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power.” First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , 482
U.S. 304 , 314 (1987). And that constitutional choice accords
with ancient principles about what governments do. The eminent
domain power—the capacity to “take private property for public
uses”—is an integral “attribute of sovereignty.” Boom Co. v. Patterson , 98 U.S.
403 , 406 (1879); see Kohl v. United States , 91 U.S.
367 , 371 (1876) (The power is “essential to [the Government’s]
independent existence and perpetuity”). Small surprise, then, that
the Constitution does not prohibit takings for public purposes, but
only requires the government to pay fair value.

															In that way, the Takings Clause is unique among
the Bill of Rights’ guarantees. It is, for example, unlike the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against excessive force—which the
majority mistakenly proposes as an analogy. See ante , at 8.
Suppose a law enforcement officer uses excessive force and the
victim recovers damages for his injuries. Did a constitutional
violation occur? Of course. The Constitution prohibits what the
officer did; the payment of damages merely remedied the
constitutional wrong. But the Takings Clause is different because
it does not prohibit takings; to the contrary, it permits them
provided the government gives just compensation. So when the
government “takes and pays,” it is not violating the Constitution
at all. Put another way, a Takings Clause violation has two
necessary elements. First, the government must take the property.
Second, it must deny the property owner just compensation. See Horne v. Department of Agriculture , 569 U.S.
513 , 525–526 (2013) (“[A] Fifth Amendment claim is premature
until it is clear that the Government has both taken property and denied just compensation” (emphasis in original)). If
the government has not done both, no constitutional violation has
happened. All this is well-trod ground. See, e.g. , United
States v. Jones , 109 U.S.
513 , 518 (1883); Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United
States , 261 U.S.
581 , 586 (1923). Even the majority (despite its faulty analogy)
does not contest it.

															Similarly well-settled—until the majority’s
opinion today—was the answer to a follow-on question: At what point
has the government denied a property owner just compensation, so as
to complete a Fifth Amendment violation? For over a hundred years,
this Court held that advance or contemporaneous payment was not
required, so long as the government had established reliable
procedures for an owner to later obtain just compensation
(including interest for any time elapsed). The rule got its start
in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co. , 135 U.S.
641 (1890), where the Tribe argued that a federal statute
authorizing condemnation of its property violated the Fifth
Amendment because the law did not require advance payment. The
Court disagreed. It held that the Takings Clause “does not provide
or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of
the occupancy of the land to be taken” so long as the government
made available to the owner “reasonable, certain and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation” afterward. Id. , at
659. Decade after decade, the Court repeated that
principle.[ 1 ] As another case
put the point: The Takings Clause does not demand “that
compensation should be made previous to the taking” so long as
“adequate means [are] provided for a reasonably just and prompt
ascertainment and payment of the compensation.” Crozier v. Krupp A. G. , 224 U.S.
290 , 306 (1912). And the Court also made clear that a statute
creating a right of action against the responsible government
entity generally qualified as a constitutionally adequate
compensatory mechanism. See, e.g. , Williams v. Parker , 188 U.S.
491 , 502 (1903); Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr.
Co. , 309 U.S.
18 , 20–21 (1940).[ 2 ] Williamson County followed from those
decisions as night the day. The case began when a local planning
commission rejected a property owner’s development proposal. The
owner chose not to seek compensation through the procedure the
State had created—an “inverse condemnation” action against the
commission. Instead, the owner sued in federal court alleging a
Takings Clause violation under 42 U. S. C. §1983.
Consistent with the century’s worth of precedent I have recounted
above, the Court found that no Fifth Amendment violation had yet
occurred. See 473 U. S., at 195. The Court first recognized
that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.” Id. , at 194. Next, the Court stated (citing no fewer than
five precedents) that the Amendment does not demand that
“compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the
taking.” Ibid. “[A]ll that is required,” the Court
continued, is that the State have provided “a ‘reasonable, certain
and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Cherokee Nation , 135 U. S., at
659). Here, the State had done so: Nothing suggested that the
inverse condemnation procedure was inadequate. 473 U. S., at
196–197. So the property owner’s claim was “not yet ripe”: The
owner could not “claim a violation of the [Takings] Clause until it
[had] used the procedure and been denied.” Id. , at
194–195.

															So contrary to the majority’s portrayal, Williamson County did not result from some inexplicable
confusion about “how the Takings Clause works.” Ante , at 8.
Far from it. Williamson County built on a long line of
decisions addressing the elements of a Takings Clause violation.
The Court there said only two things remotely new. First, the Court
found that the State’s inverse condemnation procedure qualified as
a “reasonable, certain and adequate” procedure. But no one in this
case disputes anything to do with that conclusion—including that
the equivalent Pennsylvania procedure here is similarly adequate.
Second, the Court held that a §1983 suit could not be brought until
a property owner had unsuccessfully invoked the State’s procedure
for obtaining payment. But that was a direct function of the
Court’s prior holdings. Everyone agrees that a §1983 suit cannot be
brought before a constitutional violation has occurred. And
according to the Court’s repeated decisions, a Takings Clause
violation does not occur until an owner has used the government’s
procedures and failed to obtain just compensation. All that Williamson County did was to put the period on an
already-completed sentence about when a takings claim
arises.[ 3 ]

															Today’s decision thus overthrows the Court’s
long-settled view of the Takings Clause. The majority declares, as
against a mountain of precedent, that a government taking private
property for public purposes must pay compensation at that moment
or in advance. See ante , at 6–7. If the government fails to
do so, a constitutional violation has occurred, regardless of
whether “reasonable, certain and adequate” compensatory mechanisms
exist. Cherokee Nation , 135 U. S., at 659. And
regardless of how many times this Court has said the opposite
before. Under cover of overruling “only” a single decision, today’s
opinion smashes a hundred-plus years of legal rulings to
smithereens.

															II

															So how does the majority defend taking down Williamson County and its many precursors? Its decision
rests on four ideas: a comparison between takings claims and other
constitutional claims, a resort to the Takings Clause’s text, and
theories about two lines of this Court’s precedent. All are
misguided. The majority uses the term “shaky foundations.” Ante , at 21. It knows whereof it speaks.

															The first crack comes from the repeated
assertion (already encountered in the majority’s Fourth Amendment
analogy, see supra , at 2) that Williamson County treats takings claims worse than other claims founded in the Bill
of Rights. See ante , at 6, 8, 11–12, 20. That is not so. The
distinctive aspects of litigating a takings claim merely reflect
the distinctive aspects of the constitutional right. Once again, a
Fourth Amendment claim arises at the moment a police officer uses
excessive force, because the Constitution prohibits that thing and
that thing only. (Similarly, for the majority’s other analogies, a
bank robber commits his offense when he robs a bank and a
tortfeasor when he acts negligently—because that conduct, and it
alone, is what the law forbids.) Or to make the same point a bit
differently, even if a government could compensate the victim in
advance—as the majority requires here—the victim would still suffer
constitutional injury when the force is used. But none of that is
true of Takings Clause violations. That kind of infringement, as
explained, is complete only after two things occur: (1) the
government takes property, and (2) it fails to pay just
compensation. See supra , at 2–3. All Williamson
County and its precursors do is recognize that fact, by saying
that a constitutional claim (and thus a §1983 suit) arises only
after the second condition is met—when the property owner comes
away from the government’s compensatory procedure empty-handed.
That is to treat the Takings Clause exactly as its dual elements
require—and because that is so, neither worse nor better than any
other right.

															Second, the majority contends that its rule
follows from the constitutional text, because the Takings Clause
does not say “[n]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without an available procedure that will result in compensation.” Ante , at 6. There is a reason the majority devotes only a
few sentences to that argument. Because here’s another thing the
text does not say: “Nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without advance or contemporaneous payment of just
compensation, notwithstanding ordinary procedures.” In other words,
the text no more states the majority’s rule than it does Williamson County ’s (and its precursors’). As constitutional
text often is, the Takings Clause is spare. It says that a
government taking property must pay just compensation—but does not
say through exactly what mechanism or at exactly what time. That
was left to be worked out, consistent with the Clause’s (minimal)
text and purpose. And from 1890 until today, this Court worked it
out Williamson County ’s way, rather than the majority’s. See supra , at 3–4. Under our caselaw, a government could use
reliable post-taking compensatory mechanisms (with payment
calculated from the taking) without violating the Takings
Clause.

															Third, the majority tries to explain away that
mass of precedent, with a theory so, well, inventive that it
appears in neither the petitioner’s nor her 15-plus amici ’s
briefs. Don’t read the decisions “too broadly,” the majority says. Ante , at 16. Yes, the Court in each rejected a takings
claim, instructing the property owner to avail herself instead of a
government-created compensatory mechanism. But all the Court meant
(the majority says) was that the plaintiffs had sought the wrong
kind of relief: They could not get injunctions because the
available compensatory procedures gave an adequate remedy at law.
The Court still believed (so says the majority) that the cases
involved constitutional violations. Or said otherwise (again,
according to the majority), the Court still understood the Takings
Clause to prohibit delayed payment.

															Points for creativity, but that is just not what
the decisions say. Most of the cases involved requests for
injunctions, but the equity/law distinction played little or no
role in our analyses. Instead, the decisions addressed directly
what the Takings Clause requires (or not). And as already shown, supra , at 3–4, they held that the Clause does not demand
advance payment. Beginning again at the beginning, Cherokee
Nation decided that the Takings Clause “does not provide or
require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance.” 135
U. S., at 659. In Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot
Co. , 169 U.S.
557 , 567–568 (1898), the Court declared that a property owner
had no “constitutional right to have the amount of his compensation
finally determined and paid before yielding possession.” By the
time of Williams v. Parker , 188 U. S., at 502,
the Court could state that “it is settled by repeated decisions”
that the Constitution allows the taking of property “prior to any
payment.” Similarly, in Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence , 262 U.S.
668 , 677 (1923), the Court noted that “[i]t has long been
settled that the taking of property . . . need not be
accompanied or preceded by payment, but that the requirement of
just compensation is satisfied when” there is a pledge of
“reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment.” In Hurley v. Kincaid , 285 U.S.
95 , 104 (1932), the Court repeated that the “ Fifth Amendment
does not entitle [a property owner] to be paid in advance of the
taking.” I could go on—there are eighty more years to cover, and
more decisions in the early years too—but by now you probably get
the idea.

															Well, just one more especially good
demonstration. In Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co. , 309 U.S.
18 (1940), the plaintiffs sought money damages for an alleged
Takings Clause violation. For that reason, the Court’s theory about
suits seeking injunctions has no possible application. Still, the
Court rejected the claim: The different remedy requested made no
difference in the result. And yet more important: In refusing to
find a Takings Clause violation, the Court used the exact same
reasoning as it had in all the cases requesting injunctions. Once
again, the Court did not focus on the nature of the relief sought.
It simply explained that the government had provided a procedure
for obtaining post-taking compensation—and that was enough. “The
Fifth Amendment does not entitle him [the owner] to be paid in
advance of the taking,” held the Court, quoting the last injunction
case described above. Id. , at 21 (quoting Hurley , 285
U. S., at 104; brackets in original). Because the government
had set up an adequate compensatory mechanism, the taking was
“within [the government’s] constitutional power.” 309 U. S.,
at 22. Once again, the opposite of what the majority pronounces
today.[ 4 ]

															Fourth and finally, the majority lays claim to
another line of decisions—involving the Tucker Act—but with no
greater success. The Tucker Act waives the Federal Government’s
sovereign immunity and grants the Court of Federal Claims
jurisdiction over suits seeking compensation for takings. See 28
U. S. C. §1491(a)(1). According to the majority, this
Court’s cases establish that such an action “ is a claim for
a violation of the Fifth Amendment”—that is, for a constitutional
offense that has already happened because of the absence of advance
payment. Ante , at 19, n. 7 (emphasis in original); see ante , at 13. But again, the precedents say the opposite. The
Tucker Act is the Federal Government’s equivalent of a State’s
inverse condemnation procedure, by which a property owner can
obtain just compensation. The former, no less than the latter, forestalls any constitutional violation by ensuring that an
owner gets full and fair payment for a taking. The Court, for
example, stated in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. , 474 U.S.
121 , 128 (1985), that “so long as [post-taking Tucker Act]
compensation is available for those whose property is in fact
taken, the governmental action is not unconstitutional.” Similarly,
we held in Preseault v. ICC , 494 U.S.
1 , 4–5 (1990) that when “compensation is available to [property
owners] under the Tucker Act[,] the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment are satisfied.” And again, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S.
986 , 1016 (1984) we rejected a takings claim because the
plaintiff could “seek just compensation under the Tucker Act” and
“[t]he Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation precede
the taking.” All those decisions (and there are others) rested on
the premise, merely reiterated in Williamson County , that
the “availability of a suit for compensation against the sovereign
will defeat a contention that the action is unconstitutional as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment.” Larson v. Domestic and
Foreign Commerce Corp. , 337 U.S.
682 , 697, n. 18 (1949).[ 5 ]

															To the extent it deals with these cases (mostly,
it just ignores them), the majority says only that they (like Williamson County ) were “confused” or wrong. See ante , at 13, 19, n. 7. But maybe the majority should
take the hint: When a theory requires declaring precedent after
precedent after precedent wrong, that’s a sign the theory itself
may be wrong. The majority’s theory is just that.

															III

															And not only wrong on prior law. The
majority’s overruling of Williamson County will have two
damaging consequences. It will inevitably turn even well-meaning
government officials into lawbreakers. And it will subvert
important principles of judicial federalism.

															To begin with, today’s decision means that
government regulators will often have no way to avoid violating the
Constitution. There are a “nearly infinite variety of ways” for
regulations to “affect property interests.” Arkansas Game and
Fish Comm’n v. United States , 568 U.S.
23 , 31 (2012). And under modern takings law, there is “no magic
formula” to determine “whether a given government interference with
property is a taking.” Ibid. For that reason, a government
actor usually cannot know in advance whether implementing a
regulatory program will effect a taking, much less of whose
property. Until today, such an official could do his work without
fear of wrongdoing, in any jurisdiction that had set up a reliable
means for property owners to obtain compensation. Even if some
regulatory action turned out to take someone’s property, the
official would not have violated the Constitution. But no longer.
Now, when a government undertakes land-use regulation (and what
government doesn’t?), the responsible employees will almost
inescapably become constitutional malefactors. That is not a fair
position in which to place persons carrying out their governmental
duties.

															Still more important, the majority’s ruling
channels to federal courts a (potentially massive) set of cases
that more properly belongs, at least in the first instance, in
state courts—where Williamson County put them. The
regulation of land use, this Court has stated, is “perhaps the
quintessential state activity.” FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U.S.
742 , 768, n. 30 (1982). And a claim that a land-use
regulation violates the Takings Clause usually turns on state-law
issues. In that respect, takings claims have little in common with
other constitutional challenges. The question in takings cases is
not merely whether a given state action meets federal
constitutional standards. Before those standards can come into
play, a court must typically decide whether, under state law, the
plaintiff has a property interest in the thing regulated. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation , 524 U.S.
156 , 164 (1998); see also Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings
Litigation, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 251, 288 (2006) (“[I]f
background state law did not recognize or create property in the
first instance, then a subsequent state action cannot take
property”). Often those questions—how does pre-existing state law
define the property right?; what interests does that law grant?;
and conversely what interests does it deny?—are nuanced and
complicated. And not a one of them is familiar to federal
courts.

															This case highlights the difficulty. The
ultimate constitutional question here is: Did Scott Township’s
cemetery ordinance “go[ ] too far” (in Justice Holmes’s
phrase), so as to effect a taking of Rose Mary Knick’s property? Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon , 260 U.S.
393 , 415 (1922). But to answer that question, it is first
necessary to address an issue about background state law. In the
Township’s view, the ordinance did little more than codify
Pennsylvania common law, which (the Township says) has long
required property owners to make land containing human remains open
to the public. See Brief for Respondents 48; Brief for Cemetery Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae 6–26. If the Township is right on
that state-law question, Knick’s constitutional claim will fail:
The ordinance, on that account, didn’t go far at all. But Knick
contends that no common law rule of that kind exists in
Pennsylvania. See Reply Brief 22. And if she is right, her takings
claim may yet have legs. But is she? Or is the Township? I confess:
I don’t know. Nor, I would venture, do my colleagues on the federal
bench. But under today’s decision, it will be the Federal District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania that will have to
resolve this question of local cemetery law.

															And if the majority thinks this case is an
outlier, it’s dead wrong; indeed, this case will be easier than
many. Take Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council , 505 U.S.
1003 (1992). There, this Court held that a South Carolina ban
on development of beachfront property worked a taking of the
plaintiff’s land—unless the State’s nuisance law already prohibited
such development. See id. , at 1027–1030. The Court
then—quite sensibly—remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme
Court to resolve that question. See id. , at 1031–1032. (And
while spotting the nuisance issue, the Court may have overlooked
other state-law constraints on development. In some States, for
example, the public trust doctrine or public prescriptive easements
limit the development of beachfront land. See Sterk, The Federalist
Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L. J. 203,
227 (2004).) Or consider Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection , 560 U.S.
702 (2010). The federal constitutional issue there was whether
a decision of the Florida Supreme Court relating to beachfront
property constituted a taking. To resolve that issue, though, the
Court first had to address whether, under pre-existing Florida
property law, “littoral-property owners had rights to future
accretions and contact with the water superior to the State’s right
to fill in its submerged land.” Id. , at 730. The Court bit
the bullet and decided that issue itself, as it sometimes has to
(though thankfully with the benefit of a state high court’s
reasoning). But there is no such necessity here—and no excuse for
making complex state-law issues part of the daily diet of federal
district courts.

															State courts are—or at any rate, are supposed to
be—the “ultimate expositors of state law.” Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S.
684 , 691 (1975). The corollary is that federal courts should
refrain whenever possible from deciding novel or difficult
state-law questions. That stance, as this Court has long
understood, respects the “rightful independence of the state
governments,” “avoid[s] needless friction with state policies,” and
promotes “harmonious relation[s] between state and federal
authority.” Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S.
496 , 500–501 (1941). For that reason, this Court has promoted
practices of certification and abstention to put difficult
state-law issues in state judges’ hands. See, e.g. , Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona , 520 U.S.
43 , 77 (1997) (encouraging certification of “novel or unsettled
questions of state law” to “hel[p] build a cooperative judicial
federalism”); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux , 360 U.S.
25 , 28 (1959) (approving federal-court abstention in an eminent
domain proceeding because such cases “turn on legislation with much
local variation interpreted in local settings”). We may as well not
have bothered. Today’s decision sends a flood of complex state-law
issues to federal courts. It makes federal courts a principal
player in local and state land-use disputes. It betrays judicial
federalism.

															IV

															Everything said above aside, Williamson
County should stay on the books because of stare
decisis . Adherence to precedent is “a foundation stone of the
rule of law.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community ,
572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014). “[I]t promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S.
808 , 827 (1991). Stare decisis , of course, is “not an
inexorable command.” Id. , at 828. But it is not enough that
five Justices believe a precedent wrong. Reversing course demands a
“special justification—over and above the belief that the precedent
was wrongly decided.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,
LLC , 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 8) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The majority offers no reason that
qualifies.

															In its only real stab at a special
justification, the major- ity focuses on what it calls the “ San
Remo preclusion trap.” Ante , at 2. As the majority
notes, this Court held in a post- Williamson County decision
interpreting the full faith and credit statute, 28
U. S. C. §1738, that a state court’s resolution of an
inverse condemnation proceeding has preclusive effect in a later
federal suit. See San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and
County of San Francisco , 545 U.S.
323 (2005); ante , at 1–2, 5–6, 22. The interaction
between San Remo and Williamson County means that
“many takings plaintiffs never have the opportunity to litigate in
a federal forum.” Ante , at 22. According to the majority,
that unanticipated result makes Williamson County itself
“unworkable.” Ibid. But in highlighting the preclusion concern, the
majority only adds to the case for respecting stare
decisis —because that issue can always be addressed by Congress.
When “correction can be had by legislation,” Justice Brandeis once
stated, the Court should let stand even “error[s on] matter[s] of
serious concern.” Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff
Bureau, Inc. , 476 U.S.
409 , 424 (1986) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co. , 285 U.S.
393 , 406 (1932) (dissenting)). Or otherwise said, stare
decisis then “carries enhanced force.” Kimble , 576
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8); see South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. , 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (Roberts, C.
J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2) (The stare decisis “bar is
even higher” when Congress “can, if it wishes, override this
Court’s decisions with contrary legislation”). Here, Congress can
reverse the San Remo preclusion rule any time it wants, and
thus give property owners an opportunity— after a state-court
proceeding—to litigate in federal court. The San Remo decision, as noted above, interpreted the federal full faith and
credit statute; Congress need only add a provision to that law to
flip the Court’s result. In fact, Congress has already considered
proposals responding to San Remo —though so far to no avail.
See Brief for Congressman Steve King et al. as Amici Curiae 7. Following this Court’s normal rules of practice means leaving
the San Remo “ball[ in] Congress’s court,” so that branch
can decide whether to pick it up. Kimble , 576 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 8).[ 6 ]

															And the majority has no other special
justification. It says Williamson County did not create
“reliance interests.” Ante, at 23. But even if so, those
interests are a plus-factor in the doctrine; when they
exist, stare decisis becomes “superpowered.” Kimble ,
576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10); Payne , 501
U. S., at 828 ( Stare decisis concerns are “at their
acme” when “reliance interests are involved”). The absence of
reliance is not itself a reason for overruling a decision. Next,
the majority says that the “justification for [ Williamson
County ’s] state-litigation requirement” has “evolve[d].” Ante , at 22. But to start with, it has not. The original
rationale—in the majority’s words, that the requirement “is an
element of a takings claim,” ante , at 22—has held strong for
35 years (including in the cases the majority cites), and is the
same one I rely on today. See, e.g., Horne , 569
U. S., at 525–526 (quoting Williamson County ’s
rationale); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency , 520 U.S.
725 , 734 (1997) (same); supra , at 2–3. And anyway,
“evolution” in the way a decision is described has never been a
ground for abandoning stare decisis . Here, the majority’s
only citation is to last Term’s decision overruling a 40-year-old
precedent. See ante , at 22 (citing Janus v. State,
County, and Municipal Employees , 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018)
(slip op., at 23)). If that is the way the majority means to
proceed—relying on one subversion of stare decisis to
support another—we may as well not have principles about precedents
at all.

															What is left is simply the majority’s view that Williamson County was wrong. The majority repurposes all its
merits arguments—all its claims that Williamson County was
“ill founded”—to justify its overruling. Ante , at 20–21. But
the entire idea of stare decisis is that judges do not get
to reverse a decision just because they never liked it in the first
instance. Once again, they need a reason other than the idea
“that the precedent was wrongly decided.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. , 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014); see supra , at 16. For it is hard to overstate the value, in a
country like ours, of stability in the law.

															Just last month, when the Court overturned
another longstanding precedent, Justice Breyer penned a dissent.
See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt , 587
U. S. ___, ___ (2019). He wrote of the dangers of reversing
legal course “only because five Members of a later Court” decide
that an earlier ruling was incorrect. Id. , at ___ (slip op.,
at 13). He concluded: “Today’s decision can only cause one to
wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.” Ibid. Well, that didn’t take long. Now one may wonder yet again. Notes 1 See also, e.g. , Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co. , 309 U.S.
18 , 21–22 (1940); Hurley v. Kincaid , 285 U.S.
95 , 104 (1932); Dohany v. Rogers , 281 U.S.
362 , 365 (1930); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence , 262 U.S.
668 , 677 (1923); Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United
States , 261 U.S.
581 , 587 (1923); Hayes v. Port of Seattle , 251 U.S.
233 , 238 (1920); Bragg v. Weaver , 251 U.S.
57 , 62 (1919); Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint
Bernard Mining Co. , 196 U.S.
239 , 251–252 (1905); Williams v. Parker , 188 U.S.
491 , 502 (1903); Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot
Co. , 169 U.S.
557 , 568 (1898); Sweet v. Rechel , 159 U.S.
380 , 400–402 (1895). 2 In many of these cases,
the Court held as well that if payment occurs later, it must
include interest. See, e.g. , id. , at 407; Albert
Hanson Lumber Co. , 261 U. S., at 586. That requirement
flows from the constitutional demand for “just” compensation: As
one of the early cases explained, the property owner must be placed
“in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his
property had not been taken.” Ibid. 3 Contrary to the
majority’s description, see ante , at 15, and n. 6, the
respondents have exactly this view of Williamson County (and
of the cases preceding it). The respondents discuss (as I do, see supra , at 3–4) the “long line of precedent” holding that
“the availability of a reason-able, certain, and adequate
inverse-condemnation procedure fulfills the duty” of a government
to pay just compensation for a taking. Brief for Respondents 22–23.
The respondents then conclude (again, as I do, see supra , at
4–6) that Williamson County “sound[ly]” and
“straightforwardly applied that precedent to hold that a property
owner who forgoes an available and adequate inverse-condemnation
remedy has not been deprived of any constitutional right and thus
cannot proceed under Section 1983.” Brief for Respondents 22.
(Again contra the majority, the respondents’ only theory of §1983
is the one everyone agrees with—that a §1983 suit cannot be brought
before a constitu-tional violation has occurred.) So while I
appreciate the compliment, I cannot claim to argue anything novel
or “dar[ing]” here. Ante , at 15. My argument is the same as
the respondents’, which is the same as Williamson County ’s,
which is the same as all the prior precedents’. 4 The majority’s supposed
best case to the contrary, First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles , 482 U.S.
304 (1987), is not so good, as is apparent from its express
statement that it accords with Williamson County. See 482
U. S., at 320, n. 10. In First English , the Court
held that a property owner was entitled to compensation for the
temporary loss of his property, occurring while a (later-repealed)
regulation was in effect. See id. , at 321. The Court made
clear that a government’s duty to compensate for a taking—including
a temporary taking—arises from the Fifth Amendment, as of course it
does. See id. , at 315. But the Court nowhere suggested that
a Fifth Amendment violation happens even before a government denies
the required compensation. (You will scan the majority’s
description of First English in vain for a quote to that
effect—because no such quote exists. See ante , at 9–11.) To
the contrary, the Court went out of its way to recognize the Williamson County principle that “no constitutional
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied.” 482
U. S., at 320, n. 10 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 5 Jacobs v. United States , 290 U.S.
13 (1933), the Tucker Act case the majority cites to support
its argument, says nothing different. The majority twice notes Jacobs ’ statement that a Tucker Act claim “rest[s] upon the
Fifth Amendment.” Ante , at 7–8 (quoting 290 U. S., at
16). And so it does, because the compensatory obligation that the
Tucker Act vindicates arises from—or “rests upon”—the Fifth
Amendment. But that is a far cry from saying, as the majority does,
that theGovernment has already violated the Fifth Amendment when
the Tucker Act claim is brought—before the Government has denied
fair compensation. 6 Confronted with that
point, the majority shifts ground. It notes that even if Congress
eliminated the San Remo rule, takings plaintiffs would still
have to comply with Williamson County ’s “unjustified” demand
that they bring suit in state court first. See ante , at 22.
But that argument does not even purport to state a special
justification. It merely reiterates the majority’s view on the
merits.