Houston East and West Texas Railway Co. v. U.S.

U.S. Supreme Court Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 234
U.S. 342 (1914) Houston East and West Texas Railway
Company v. United States Nos. 567, 568 Argued October 28, 29,
1913 Decided June 8, 1914 234
U.S. 342 APPEALS FROM THE COMMERCE
COURT Syllabus The object of the commerce clause was to prevent interstate
trade from being destroyed or impeded by the rivalries of local
governments, and it is the essence of the complete and paramount
power confided Page 234 U. S. 343 to Congress to regulate interstate commerce that, wherever it
exists, it dominates.

															Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers
are so related that the government of the one involves the control
of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is entitled
to prescribe the final and dominant rule; otherwise the Nation
would not be supreme within the National field.

															While Congress does not possess authority to regulate the
internal commerce of a State, as such, it does possess power to
foster and protect interstate commerce, although, in taking
necessary measures so to do, it may be necessary to control
intrastate transactions of interstate carriers.

															The use by the State of an instrument of interstate commerce in
a discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury on any part of that
commerce is a ground for Federal intervention; nor can a State
authorize a carrier to do that which Congress may forbid and has
forbidden.

															In removing injurious discriminations against interstate traffic
arising from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates,
Congress is not bound to reduce the latter to the level of the
former.

															Congress, having the power to control intrastate charges of an
interstate carrier to the extent necessary to prevent injurious
discrimination against interstate commerce, may provide for its
execution through the aid of a subordinate body.

															By § 3 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, 24 Stat. 379, 380,
Congress has delegated to the Interstate Commerce Commission power
to prevent all discriminations against interstate commerce by
interstate carriers, subject to the Act, which it is within the
power of Congress to condemn.

															Where the Interstate Commerce Commission has found after due
investigation that unjust discrimination against localities exists
under substantially similar conditions of transportation, the
Commission has power to correct it, and this notwithstanding the
limitations contained in the proviso to § 1 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce.

															The earlier action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was not
of such controlling character as to preclude the Commission from
giving effect to the Act to Regulate Commerce, and in this case
having, after examination of the question of its authority, decided
to make a remedial order to prevent unjust discrimination and the
Commerce Court having sustained that authority of the Commission,
this court should not reverse unless, as is not the case, the law
has been misapplied. Page 234 U. S. 344 No local rule can nullify the lawful exercise of Federal
authority, and after the Interstate Commerce Commission has made an
order within its jurisdiction, there is no compulsion on the
carrier to comply with any inconsistent local requirement.

															Although there is gravity in any question presented when state
and Federal news conflict, it has been recognized from the
beginning that this Nation could not prosper if interstate and
foreign trade were governed by many masters, and where the freedom
of such commerce is involved, the judgment of Congress and the
agencies it lawfully establishes must control.

															An order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission that, in
order to correct discrimination found to exist against specified
localities, interstate carriers should desist from charging higher
rates for transportation between certain specified interstate
points than between certain specified intrastate points, held to be within the power delegated by Congress to the
Commission; also held that, so far as the carriers'
interstate rates conformed to what was found to be reasonable by
the Commission, they were entitled to maintain them, and that they
were free to comply with the order by so adjusting their intrastate
rates, to which the order related, as to remove the forbidden
discrimination.

															205 Fed.Rep. 380, affirmed.

															The facts, which involve the validity of an order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission relating to rates between
Shreveport, Louisiana, and points within the State of Texas, and
the effect of orders of the Railroad Commission of the State of
Texas in regard to rates wholly within that State, are stated in
the opinion. Page 234 U. S. 345 MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

															These suits were brought in the Commerce Court by the Houston,
East & West Texas Railway Company, and the Houston &
Shreveport Railroad Company, and by the Texas & Pacific Railway
Company, respectively, to set aside an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, dated March 11, 1912, upon the ground that it
exceeded the Commission's authority. Other railroad companies
[ Footnote 1 ] intervened in
support of the petitions, and the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Railroad Commission of Louisiana intervened in opposition.
The petitions were dismissed. 205 Fed.Rep. 380.

															The order of the Interstate Commerce Commission was made in a
proceeding initiated in March, 1911, by the Railroad Commission of
Louisiana. The complaint was that the appellants, and other
interstate carriers, maintained unreasonable rates from Shreveport,
Louisiana, to various points in Texas, and, further, that these
carriers in the adjustment of rates over their respective lines
unjustly discriminated in favor of traffic within the State of
Texas and against similar traffic between Louisiana and Texas. The
carriers filed answers; numerous pleas of intervention by shippers
and commercial bodies were allowed; testimony was taken and
arguments were heard.

															The gravamen of the complaint, said the Interstate Page 234 U. S. 346 Commerce Commission, was that the carriers made rates out of
Dallas and other Texas points into eastern Texas which were much
lower than those which they extended into Texas from Shreveport.
The situation may be briefly described: Shreveport, Louisiana, is
about 40 miles from the Texas state line, and 231 miles from
Houston, Texas, on the line of the Houston, East & West Texas
and Houston & Shreveport Companies (which are affiliated in
interest); it is 189 miles from Dallas, Texas, on the line of the
Texas & Pacific. Shreveport competes with both cities for the
trade of the intervening territory. The rates on these lines from
Dallas and Houston, respectively, eastward to intermediate points
in Texas were much less, according to distance, than from
Shreveport westward to the same points. It is undisputed that the
difference was substantial, and injuriously affected the commerce
of Shreveport. It appeared, for example, that a rate of 60 cents
carried first class traffic a distance of 160 miles to the eastward
from Dallas, while the same rate would carry the same class of
traffic only 55 miles into Texas from Shreveport. The first class
rate from Houston to Lufkin, Texas, 118.2 miles, was 50 cents per
100 pounds, while the rate from Shreveport to the same point, 112.5
miles, was 69 cents. The rate on wagons from Dallas to Marshall,
Texas, 147.7 miles was 36.8 cents, and from Shreveport to Marshall,
42 miles, 56 cents. The rate on furniture from Dallas to Longview,
Texas, 124 miles, was 24.8 cents, and that from Shreveport to
Longview, 65.7 miles, was 35 cents. These instances of differences
in rates are merely illustrative; they serve to indicate the
character of the rate adjustment.

															The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the interstate
class rates out of Shreveport to named Texas points were
unreasonable, and it established maximum class rates for this
traffic. These rates, we understand, were substantially the same as
the class rates fixed by the Page 234 U. S. 347 Railroad Commission of Texas, and charged by the carriers, for
transportation for similar distances in that State. The Interstate
Commerce Commission also found that the carriers maintained "higher
rates from Shreveport to points in Texas" than were in force "from
cities in Texas to such points under substantially similar
conditions and circumstances," and that thereby "an unlawful and
undue preference and advantage" was given to the Texas cities and a
"discrimination" that was "undue and unlawful" was effected against
Shreveport. In order to correct this discrimination, the carriers
were directed to desist from charging higher rates for the
transportation of any commodity from Shreveport to Dallas and
Houston, respectively, and intermediate points, than were
contemporaneously charged for the carriage of such commodity from
Dallas and Houston toward Shreveport for equal distances, as the
Commission found that relation of rates to be reasonable. 23 I.C.C.
31, 46-48.

															The order in question is set forth in the margin. [ Footnote 2 ] The Page 234 U. S. 348 report states that, under this order, it will be the duty of the
companies "to duly and justly equalize the terms and conditions"
upon which they will extend "transportation to traffic of a similar
character moving into Texas from Page 234 U. S. 349 Shreveport with that moving wholly within Texas," but that, in
effecting such equalization, the class scale rates as prescribed
shall not be exceeded.

															In their petition in the Commerce Court, the appellants assailed
the order in its entirety, but subsequently they withdrew their
opposition to the fixing of maximum class rates, and these rates
were put in force by the carriers in May, 1912.

															The attack was continued upon that portion of the order which
prohibited the charge of higher rates for carrying articles from
Shreveport into Texas than those charged for eastward traffic from
Dallas and Houston, respectively, for equal distances. There are,
it appears, commodity rates fixed by the Railroad Commission of
Texas for intrastate hauls which are substantially less than the
class, or standard, rates prescribed by that Commission, and thus
the commodity rates charged by the carriers from Dallas and Houston
eastward to Texas points are less than the rates which they demand
for the transportation of the same articles for like distances from
Shreveport into Texas. The present controversy relates to these
commodity rates.

															The point of the objection to the order is that, as the
discrimination found by the Commission to be unjust arises out of
the relation of intrastate rates, maintained under state authority,
to interstate rates that have been upheld as reasonable, its
correction was beyond the Commission's power. Manifestly, the order
might be complied with, and the discrimination avoided, either by
reducing the interstate rates from Shreveport to the level of the
competing intrastate rates, or by raising these intrastate Page 234 U. S. 350 rates to the level of the interstate rates, or by such reduction
in the one case and increase in the other as would result in
equality. But it is urged that, so far as the interstate rates were
sustained by the Commission as reasonable, the Commission was
without authority to compel their reduction in order to equalize
them with the lower intrastate rates. The holding of the Commerce
Court was that the order relieved the appellants from further
obligation to observe the intrastate rates, and that they were at
liberty to comply with the Commission's requirements by increasing
these rates sufficiently to remove the forbidden discrimination.
The invalidity of the order in this aspect is challenged upon two
grounds:

															(1) That Congress is impotent to control the intrastate charges
of an interstate carrier even to the extent necessary to prevent
injurious discrimination against interstate traffic; and

															(2) That, if it be assumed that Congress has this power, still
it has not been exercised, and hence the action of the Commission
exceeded the limits of the authority which has been conferred upon
it.

															First. It is unnecessary to repeat what has frequently been said
by this court with respect to the complete and paramount character
of the power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among the
several States. It is of the essence of this power that, where it
exists, it dominates. Interstate trade was not left to be destroyed
or impeded by the rivalries of local governments. The purpose was
to make impossible the recurrence of the evils which had
overwhelmed the Confederation and to provide the necessary basis of
national unity by insuring "uniformity of regulation against
conflicting and discriminating state legislation." By virtue of the
comprehensive terms of the grant, the authority of Congress is at
all times adequate to meet the varying exigencies that arise and to
protect the national interest by securing the freedom of
interstate Page 234 U. S. 351 commercial intercourse from local control. Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 196 , 22 U. S. 224 ; Brown v.
Maryland , 12 Wheat. 419, 25 U. S. 446 ; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.
S. 691 , 102 U. S. 696 , 102 U. S. 697 ; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 45 , 124 U. S. 473 ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S.
1 , 223 U. S. 47 , 223 U. S. 53 , 223 U. S. 54 ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 398 , 230 U. S.
399 .

															Congress is empowered to regulate -- that is, to provide the law
for the government of interstate commerce; to enact "all
appropriate legislation" for its "protection and advancement"
( The Daniel
Ball , 10 Wall. 557, 77 U. S. 564 );
to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure its safety"
( County of Mobile v. Kimball, supra ); "to foster, protect,
control and restrain" ( Second Employers' Liability Cases,
supra ). Its authority, extending to these interstate carriers
as instruments of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the
right to control their operations in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate to the security of that
traffic, to the efficiency of the interstate service, and to the
maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be
conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance. As
it is competent for Congress to legislate to these ends,
unquestionably it may seek their attainment by requiring that the
agencies of interstate commerce shall not be used in such manner as
to cripple, retard or destroy it. The fact that carriers are
instruments of intrastate commerce, as well as of interstate
commerce, does not derogate from the complete and paramount
authority of Congress over the latter or preclude the Federal power
from being exerted to prevent the intrastate operations of such
carriers from being made a means of injury to that which has been
confided to Federal care. Wherever the interstate and intrastate
transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the
one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the
State, that is entitled to prescribe Page 234 U. S. 352 the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be
denied the exercise of its constitutional authority and the State,
and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 221 U. S. 612 , 221 U. S. 618 ; Southern Railway Co. v. United States, 222 U. S.
20 , 222 U. S. 26 , 222 U. S. 27 ; Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, pp. 223 U. S. 48 , 223 U. S. 51 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 , 224 U. S. 205 , 224 U. S. 213 ; Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, p. 230 U. S. 431 ; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Behrens, 233 U.
S. 473 .

															In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, supra, the argument against the validity of the
Hours of Service Act (March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415)
involved the consideration that the interstate and intrastate
transactions of the carriers were so interwoven that it was utterly
impracticable for them to divide their employes so that those who
were engaged in interstate commerce should be confined to that
commerce exclusively. Employes dealing with the movement of trains
were employed in both sorts of commerce; but the court held that
this fact did not preclude the exercise of Federal power. As
Congress could limit the hours of labor of those engaged in
interstate transportation, it necessarily followed that its will
could not be frustrated by prolonging the period of service through
other requirements of the carriers or by the commingling of duties
relating to interstate and intrastate operations. Again, in Southern Railway Co. v. United States, supra, the question
was presented whether the amendment to the Safety Appliance Act
(March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943) was within the power of
Congress in view of the fact that the statute was not confined to
vehicles that were used in interstate traffic, but also embraced
those used in intrastate traffic. The court answered affirmatively,
because there was such a close relation between the two classes of
traffic moving over the same railroad as to make it certain that
the safety Page 234 U. S. 353 of the interstate traffic, and of those employed in its
movement, would be promoted in a real and substantial sense by
applying the requirements of the act to both classes of vehicles.
So, in the Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra, it
was insisted that, while Congress had the authority to regulate the
liability of a carrier for injuries sustained by one employee
through the negligence of another, where all were engaged in
interstate commerce, that power did not embrace instances where the
negligent employee was engaged in intrastate commerce. The court
said that this was a mistaken theory, as the causal negligence,
when operating injuriously upon an employee engaged in interstate
commerce, had the same effect with respect to that commerce as if
the negligent employee were also engaged therein. The decision in Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.
S. 463 , is not opposed, for the statute there in
question (June 11, 1906, c. 3073, 34 Stat. 232) sought to regulate
the liability of interstate carriers for injuries to any employee
even though his employment had no connection whatever with
interstate commerce. ( See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Behrens,
supra. )

															While these decisions sustaining the Federal power relate to
measures adopted in the interest of the safety of persons and
property, they illustrate the principle that Congress, in the
exercise of its paramount power, may prevent the common
instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial
intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to the
injury of interstate commerce. This is not to say that Congress
possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a
State, as such, but that it does possess the power to foster and
protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or
appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of
interstate carriers may thereby be controlled.

															This principle is applicable here. We find no reason to doubt
that Congress is entitled to keep the highways of Page 234 U. S. 354 interstate communication open to interstate traffic upon fair
and equal terms. That an unjust discrimination in the rates of a
common carrier, by which one person or locality is unduly favored
as against another under substantially similar conditions of
traffic, constitutes an evil is undeniable, and where this evil
consists in the action of an interstate carrier in unreasonably
discriminating against interstate traffic over its line, the
authority of Congress to prevent it is equally clear. It is
immaterial, so far as the protecting power of Congress is
concerned, that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates, as
compared with interstate rates. The use of the instrument of
interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict
injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes abundant
ground for Federal intervention. Nor can the attempted exercise of
state authority alter the matter, where Congress has acted, for a
State may not authorize the carrier to do that which Congress is
entitled to forbid and has forbidden.

															It is also to be noted -- as the Government has well said in its
argument in support of the Commission's order -- that the power to
deal with the relation between the two kinds of rates, as a
relation, lies exclusively with Congress. It is manifest that the
State cannot fix the relation of the carrier's interstate and
intrastate charges without directly interfering with the former,
unless it simply follows the standard set by Federal authority.
This question was presented with respect to the long and short haul
provision of the Kentucky constitution, adopted in 1891, which the
court had before it in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Eubank, 184 U. S. 27 . The
state court had construed this provision as embracing a long haul,
from a place outside to one within the State, and a shorter haul on
the same line and in the same direction between points within the
State. This court held that, so construed, the provision was
invalid as being a regulation of interstate commerce Page 234 U. S. 355 because "it linked the interstate rate to the rate for the
shorter haul, and thus the interstate charge was directly
controlled by the state law." See 230 U.S. pp. 230 U. S. 428 , 230 U. S. 429 .
It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the
relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil
to be corrected, and this it may do completely by reason of its
control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is
necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective
government of that commerce.

															It is also clear that, in removing the injurious discriminations
against interstate traffic arising from the relation of intrastate
to interstate rates, Congress is not bound to reduce the latter
below what it may deem to be a proper standard fair to the carrier
and to the public. Otherwise, it could prevent the injury to
interstate commerce only by the sacrifice of its judgment as to
interstate rates. Congress is entitled to maintain its own standard
as to these rates, and to forbid any discriminatory action by
interstate carriers which will obstruct the freedom of movement of
interstate traffic over their lines in accordance with the terms it
establishes.

															Having this power, Congress could provide for its execution
through the aid of a subordinate body, and we conclude that the
order of the Commission now in question cannot be held invalid upon
the ground that it exceeded the authority which Congress could
lawfully confer.

															Second. The remaining question is with regard to the scope of
the power which Congress has granted to the Commission.

															Section three of the Act to Regulate Commerce provides (February
4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 380):

															"SEC. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to Page 234 U. S. 356 any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality,
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect
whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic,
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any
respect whatsoever."

															This language is certainly sweeping enough to embrace all the
discriminations of the sort described which it was within the power
of Congress to condemn. There is no exception or qualification with
respect to an unreasonable discrimination against interstate
traffic produced by the relation of intrastate to interstate rates
as maintained by the carrier. It is apparent from the legislative
history of the act that the evil of discrimination was the
principal thing aimed at, and there is no basis for the contention
that Congress intended to exempt any discriminatory action or
practice of interstate carriers affecting interstate commerce which
it had authority to reach. The purpose of the measure was thus
emphatically stated in the elaborate report of the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce which accompanied it:

															"The provisions of the bill are based upon the theory that the
paramount evil chargeable against the operation of the
transportation system of the United States as now conducted is
unjust discrimination between persons, places, commodities, or
particular descriptions of traffic. The underlying purpose and aim
of the measure is the prevention of these discriminations. . .
."

															(Senate Report No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 215).

															The opposing argument rests upon the proviso in the first
section of the act which, in its original form, was as follows:

															"Provided, however, that the provisions of this act shall not
apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the
receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property, wholly
within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from
or to any State or Territory Page 234 U. S. 357 as aforesaid."

															When the act was amended so as to confer upon the Commission the
authority to prescribe maximum interstate rates, this proviso was
reenacted, and when the act was extended to include telegraph,
telephone and cable companies engaged in interstate business, an
additional clause was inserted so as to exclude intrastate
messages. See acts of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat.
584; June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 545.

															Congress thus defined the scope of its regulation and provided
that it was not to extend to purely intrastate traffic. It did not
undertake to authorize the Commission to prescribe intrastate
rates, and thus to establish a unified control by the exercise of
the ratemaking power over both descriptions of traffic. Undoubtedly
-- in the absence of a finding by the Commission of unjust
discrimination -- intrastate rates were left to be fixed by the
carrier and subject to the authority of the States or of the
agencies created by the States. This was the question recently
decided by this court in the Minnesota Rate Cases, supra. There, the State of Minnesota had established reasonable rates for
intrastate transportation throughout the State, and it was
contended that, by reason of the passage of the Act to Regulate
Commerce, the State could no longer exercise the statewide
authority for this purpose which it had formerly enjoyed, and the
court was asked to hold that an entire scheme of intrastate rates,
otherwise validly established, was null and void because of its
effect upon interstate rates. There had been no finding by the
Interstate Commerce Commission of any unjust discrimination. The
present question, however, was reserved, the court saying (230 U.S.
p. 230 U. S.
419 ): " It is urged, however, that the words of the
proviso" (referring to the proviso above-mentioned)

															"are susceptible of a construction which would permit the
provisions of section three of the act, prohibiting carriers from
giving an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
locality, to apply to unreasonable discriminations Page 234 U. S. 358 between localities in different States, as well when arising
from an intrastate rate as compared with an interstate rate as when
due to interstate rates exclusively. If it be assumed that the
statute should be so construed, and it is not necessary now to
decide the point, it would inevitably follow that the controlling
principle governing the enforcement of the act should be applied to
such cases as might thereby be brought within its purview, and the
question whether the carrier, in such a case, was giving an undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to one locality as against
another, or subjecting any locality to an undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage, would be primarily for the investigation
and determination of the Interstate Commerce Commission and not for
the courts."

															Here, the Commission expressly found that unjust discrimination
existed under substantially similar conditions of transportation
and the inquiry is whether the Commission had power to correct it.
We are of the opinion that the limitation of the proviso in section
one does not apply to a case of this sort. The Commission was
dealing with the relation of rates injuriously affecting, through
an unreasonable discrimination, traffic that was interstate. The
question was thus not simply one of transportation that was "wholly
within one State." These words of the proviso have appropriate
reference to exclusively intrastate traffic, separately considered;
to the regulation of domestic commerce, as such. The powers
conferred by the act are not thereby limited where interstate
commerce itself is involved. This is plainly the case when the
Commission finds that unjust discrimination against interstate
trade arises from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as
maintained by a carrier subject to the act. Such a matter is one
with which Congress alone is competent to deal, and, in view of the
aim of the act and the comprehensive terms of the provisions
against unjust discrimination, Page 234 U. S. 359 there is no ground for holding that the authority of Congress
was unexercised, and that the subject was thus left without
governmental regulation. It is urged that the practical
construction of the statute has been the other way. But, in
assailing the order, the appellants ask us to override the
construction which has been given to the statute by the authority
charged with its execution, and it cannot be said that the earlier
action of the Commission was of such a controlling character as to
preclude it from giving effect to the law. The Commission, having
before it a plain case of unreasonable discrimination on the part
of interstate carriers against interstate trade, carefully examined
the question of its authority and decided that it had the power to
make this remedial order. The Commerce Court sustained the
authority of the Commission, and it is clear that we should not
reverse the decree unless the law has been misapplied. This we
cannot say; on the contrary, we are convinced that the authority of
the Commission was adequate.

															The further objection is made that the prohibition of section
three is directed against unjust discrimination or undue preference
only when it arises from the voluntary act of the carrier and does
not relate to acts which are the result of conditions wholly beyond
its control. East Tennessee &c. Rwy. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1 , 181 U. S. 18 . The
reference is not to any inherent lack of control arising out of
traffic conditions, but to the requirements of the local
authorities which are assumed to be binding upon the carriers. The
contention is thus merely a repetition in another form of the
argument that the Commission exceeded its power; for it would not
be contended that local rules could nullify the lawful exercise of
Federal authority. In the view that the Commission was entitled to
make the order, there is no longer compulsion upon the carriers by
virtue of any inconsistent local requirement. We are not unmindful
of the gravity of the Page 234 U. S. 360 question that is presented when state and federal views
conflict. But it was recognized at the beginning that the Nation
could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade were governed by
many masters, and, where the interests of the freedom of interstate
commerce are involved, the judgment of Congress and of the agencies
it lawfully establishes must control.

															In conclusion: reading the order in the light of the report of
the Commission, it does not appear that the Commission attempted to
require the carriers to reduce their interstate rates out of
Shreveport below what was found to be a reasonable charge for that
service. So far as these interstate rates conformed to what was
found to be reasonable by the Commission, the carriers are entitled
to maintain them, and they are free to comply with the order by so
adjusting the other rates to which the order relates as to remove
the forbidden discrimination. But this result they are required to
accomplish.

															The decree of the Commerce Court is affirmed in each case. Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas, the
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company, and the St. Louis
Southwestern Railway Company of Texas.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"This case being at issue upon complaint and answers on file,
and having been duly heard and submitted by the parties, and full
investigation of the matters and things involved having been had,
and the Commission having, on the date hereof, made and filed a
report containing its findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
which said report is hereby referred to and made a part
hereof:"

															"It is ordered, That defendants The Texas & Pacific Railway
Company, The Houston, East & West Texas Railway Company, and
Houston & Shreveport Railroad Company be, and they are hereby,
notified and required to cease and desist, on or before the 1st day
of May, 1912, and for a period of not less than two years
thereafter abstain, from exacting their present class rates for the
transportation of traffic from Shreveport, La., to the points in
Texas hereinafter mentioned on their respective lines, as the
Commission in said report finds such rates to be unjust and
unreasonable."

															"It is further ordered, That defendant The Texas & Pacific
Railway Company be, and it is hereby, notified and required to
establish and put in force, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912,
and maintain in force thereafter during a period of not less than
two years, and apply to the transportation of traffic from
Shreveport, La. to the below-named points in Texas, class rates
which shall not exceed the following, in cents per 100 pounds,
which rates are found by the Commission in its report to be
reasonable, to-wit: (rates inserted)."

															"It is further ordered, That defendants The Houston, East &
West Texas Railway Company and Houston & Shreveport Railroad
Company be, and they are hereby, notified and required to establish
and put in force, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and
maintain in force thereafter during a period of not less than two
years, and apply to the transportation of traffic from Shreveport,
La. to the below-named points in Texas, class rates which shall not
exceed the following, in cents per 100 pounds, which rates are
found by the Commission in its report to be reasonable, to wit:
(rates inserted)."

															"It is further ordered, That defendant The Texas & Pacific
Railway Company be, and it is hereby, notified and required to
cease and desist, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and for a
period of not less than two years thereafter abstain, from exacting
any higher rates for the transportation of any article from
Shreveport, La. to Dallas, Tex. and points on its line intermediate
thereto, than are contemporaneously exacted for the transportation
of such article from Dallas, Tex. toward said Shreveport for an
equal distance, as said relation of rates has been found by the
Commission in said report to be reasonable."

															"It is further ordered, That defendants The Houston, East &
West Texas Railway Company and Houston & Shreveport Railroad
Company be, and they are hereby, notified and required to cease and
desist, on or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and for a period of
not less than two years thereafter abstain, from exacting any
higher rates for the transportation of any article from Shreveport,
La., to Houston, Tex., and points on its line intermediate thereto,
than are contemporaneously exacted for the transportation of such
article from Houston, Tex. toward said Shreveport for an equal
distance, as said relation of rates has been found by the
Commission in said report to be reasonable."

															"And it is further ordered, That said defendants be, and they
are hereby, notified and required to establish and put in force, on
or before the 1st day of May, 1912, and maintain in force
thereafter during a period of not less than two years,
substantially similar practices respecting the concentration of
interstate cotton at Shreveport, La. to those which are
contemporaneously observed by said defendants respecting the
concentration of cotton within the state of Texas, provided the
practices adopted shall be justifiable under the act to regulate
commerce and applicable fairly under like conditions elsewhere on
the lines of such defendants."


U.S. Supreme Court Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903) Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock No. 275 Argued October 23,
1902 Decided January 5,
1903 187
U.S. 553 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA Syllabus The provisions in article 12 of the Medicine Lodge Treaty of
1867 with the Kiousa and Comanche Indians to the effect that no
treaty for the cession of any part of the reservation therein
described, which may be held in common, shall be of any force or
validity as against the Indians unless executed and signed by at
least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying the
same, cannot be adjudged to materially limit and qualify the
controlling authority of Congress in respect to the care and
protection of the Indians and to deprive Congress, in a possible
emergency, when the necessity might be urgent for a partition and
disposal of the tribal lands, of all power to act if the assent of
three-fourths of all the male Indians could not be obtained.
Congress has always exercised plenary authority over the tribal
relations of the Indians and the power has always been deemed a
political one not subject to be controlled by the courts.

															In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over
treaties with the Indians and Indian tribal property, even if a
subsequent agreement or treaty purporting to be signed by
three-fourths of all the male Indians was not signed and amendments
to such subsequent treaty were not submitted to the Indians, as all
these matters were solely within the domain of the legislative
authority, the action of Congress is conclusive upon the
courts.

															As the Act of June 6, 1900, as to the disposition of these lands
was enacted at a time when the tribal relations between the
confederated tribes of the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches still
existed, and that statute and the statutes Page 187 U. S. 554 supplementary thereto dealt with the disposition of tribal
property and purported to give an adequate consideration for the
surplus lands not allotted among the Indians or reserved for their
benefit, such legislation was constitutional, and this Court will
presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith and exercised its
best judgment in the premises, and as Congress possessed full power
in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the
motives which prompted the enactment of such legislation.

															In 1867, a treaty was concluded with the Kiousa and Comanche
tribes of Indians, and such other friendly tribes as might be
united with them, setting apart a reservation for the use of such
Indians. By a separate treaty, the Apache tribe of Indians was
incorporated with the two former-named, and became entitled to
share in the benefits of the reservation. 15 Stat. 581, 589.

															The first named treaty is usually called the Medicine Lodge
Treaty. By the sixth article thereof, it was provided that heads of
families might select a tract of land within the reservation, not
exceeding 320 acres in extent, which should thereafter cease to be
held in common, and should be for the exclusive possession of the
Indian making the selection, so long as he or his family might
continue to cultivate the land. The twelfth article of the treaty
was as follows:

															"Article 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of
the reservation herein described which may be held in common shall
be of any validity or force as against the said Indians unless
executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male
Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be
understood or construed in such manner as to deprive, without his
consent, any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any
tract of land selected by him as provided in article III (VI) of
this treaty."

															The three tribes settled under the treaties upon the described
land. On October 6, 1892, 456 male adult members of the
confederated tribes signed, with three commissioners representing
the United States, an agreement concerning the reservation. The
Indian agent, in a certificate appended to the agreement,
represented that there were then 562 male adults in the three
tribes. Senate Ex.Doc. No. 27, 52d Congress, second session, Page 187 U. S. 555 page 17. Four hundred and fifty-six male adults therefore
constituted more than three-fourths of the certified number of
total male adults in the three tribes. In form, the agreement was a
proposed treaty, the terms of which, in substance, provided for a
surrender to the United States of the rights of the tribes in the
reservation, for allotments out of such lands to the Indians in
severalty, the fee simple title to be conveyed to the allottees or
their heirs after the expiration of twenty-five years, and the
payment or setting apart for the benefit of the tribes of two
million dollars as the consideration for the surplus of land over
and above the allotments which might be made to the Indians. It was
provided that sundry named friends of the Indians (among such
persons being the Indian agent and an army officer) "should each be
entitled to all the benefits, in land only conferred under this
agreement, the same as if members of said tribes." Eliminating
350,000 acres of mountainous land, the quantity of surplus lands
suitable for farming and grazing purposes was estimated at
2,150,000 acres. Concerning the payment to be made for these
surplus lands, the commission, in their report to the President
announcing the termination of the negotiations, said (Senate
Ex.Doc. No. 17, second session, 52d Congress):

															"In this connection, it is proper to add that the commission
agreed with the Indians to incorporate the following in their
report, which is now done:"

															"The Indians upon this reservation seem to believe (but whether
from an exercise of their own judgment or from the advice of others
the commission cannot determine) that their surplus land is worth
two and one-half million dollars, and Congress may be induced to
give them that much for it. Therefore, in compliance with their
request, we report that they desire to be heard through an attorney
and a delegation to Washington upon that question, the agreement
signed, however, to be effective upon ratification no matter what
Congress may do with their appeal for the extra half million
dollars."

															In transmitting the agreement to the Secretary of the Interior,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs said:

															"The price paid, while considerably in excess of that paid Page 187 U. S. 556 to the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, seems to be fair and reasonable,
both to the government and the Indians, the land being doubtless of
better quality than that in the Cheyenne and Arapahoe
reservation."

															Attention was directed to the provision in the agreement in
favor of the Indian agent and an army officer, and it was suggested
that to permit them to avail thereof would establish a bad
precedent.

															Soon after the signing of the foregoing agreement it was claimed
by the Indians that their assent had been obtained by fraudulent
misrepresentations of its terms by the interpreters, and it was
asserted that the agreement should not be held binding upon the
tribes because three-fourths of the adult male members had not
assented thereto, as was required by the twelfth article of the
Medicine Lodge treaty.

															Obviously, in consequence of the policy embodied in section 2079
of the Revised Statutes, departing from the former custom of
dealing with Indian affairs by treaty and providing for legislative
action on such subjects, various bills were introduced in both
Houses of Congress designed to give legal effect to the agreement
made by the Indians in 1892. These bills were referred to the
proper committee, and before such committees the Indians presented
their objections to the propriety of giving effect to the
agreement. (H.R.Doc. No. 431, 55th Congress, second session.) In
1898, the Committee on Indian Affairs of the House of
Representatives unanimously reported a bill for the execution of
the agreement made with the Indians. The report of the committee
recited that a favorable conclusion had been reached by the
committee "after the fullest hearings from delegations of the
Indian tribes and all parties at interest." (H.R.Doc. No. 419,
first session, 56th Congress, p. 5.)

															The bill thus reported did not exactly conform to the agreement
as signed by the Indians. It modified the agreement by changing the
time for making the allotments, and it also provided that the
proceeds of the surplus lands remaining after allotments to the
Indians should be held to await the judicial decision of a claim
asserted by the Choctaw and Chickasaw Page 187 U. S. 557 tribes of Indians to the surplus lands. This claim was based
upon a treaty made in 1866, by which the two tribes ceded the
reservation in question, it being contended that the lands were
impressed with a trust in favor of the ceding tribes, and that,
whenever the reservation was abandoned, so much of it as was not
allotted to the confederated Indians of the Comanche, Kiousa, and
Apache tribes reverted to the Choctaws and Chickasaws.

															The bill just referred to passed the House of Representatives on
May 16, 1898. (31st Cong.Rec. p. 4947.) When the bill reached the
Senate that body, on January 25, 1899, adopted a resolution calling
upon the Secretary of the Interior for information as to whether
the signatures attached to the agreement comprised three-fourths of
the male adults of the tribes. In response the Secretary of the
Interior informed the Senate, under date of January 28, 1899, that
the records of the department "failed to show a census of these
Indians for the year 1892," but that

															"from a roll used in making a payment to them in January and
February, 1893, it appeared that there were 725 males over eighteen
years of age, of whom 639 were twenty-one years and over."

															The Secretary further called attention to the fact that, by the
agreement of 1892 a right of selection was conferred upon each
member of the tribes over eighteen years of age, and observed:

															"If 18 years and over be held to be the legal age of those who
were authorized to sign the agreement, the number of persons who
actually signed was 87 less than three-fourths of the adult male
membership of the tribes, and if 21 years be held to be the minimum
age, then 23 less than three-fourths signed the agreement. In
either event, less than three-fourths of the male adults appear to
have so signed."

															With this information before it, the bill was favorably reported
by the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate, but did not pass
that body.

															At the first session of the following Congress (the
Fifty-sixth), bills were introduced in both the Senate and House of
Representatives substantially like that which has just been
noticed. (Senate, 1352; H.R. 905.) Page 187 U. S. 558 In the meanwhile, about October, 1899, the Indians had at a
general council at which 571 male adults of the tribes purported to
be present, protested against the execution of the provisions of
the agreement of 1892, and adopted a memorial to Congress praying
that that body should not give effect to the agreement. This
memorial was forwarded to the Secretary of the Interior by the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs with lengthy comments, pointing out
the fact that the Indians claimed that their signatures to the
agreement had been procured by fraud, and that the legal number of
Indians had not signed the agreement, and that the previous bills
and bills then pending contemplated modification of the agreement
in important particulars without the consent of the Indians. This
communication from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, together
with the memorial of the Indians, were transmitted by the Secretary
of the Interior to Congress. Senate Doc. No. 76; H.R.Doc. No. 333;
first session, Fifty-sixth Congress. Attention was called to the
fact that, although by the agreement of October 6, 1892, one-half
of each allotment was contemplated to be agricultural land, there
was only sufficient agricultural land in the entire reservation to
average thirty acres per Indian. After setting out the charges of
fraud and complaints respecting the proposed amendments designed to
be made to the agreement, as above stated, particular complaint was
made of the provision in the agreement of 1892 as to allotments in
severalty among the Indians of lands for agricultural purposes.
After reciting that the tribal lands were not adapted to such
purposes, but were suitable for grazing, the memorial proceeded as
follows:

															"We submit that the provision for lands to be allotted to us
under this treaty are insufficient, because it is evident we
cannot, on account of the climate of our section, which renders the
maturity of crops uncertain, become a successful farming community;
that we or whoever else occupies these lands will have to depend
upon the cattle industry for revenue and support. And we therefore
pray, if we cannot be granted the privilege of keeping our
reservation under the treaty made with us in 1868, and known as the
Medicine Lodge treaty, that authority Page 187 U. S. 559 be granted for the consideration of a new treaty that will make
the allowance of land to be allotted to us sufficient for us to
graze upon it enough stock cattle, the increase from which we can
market for support of ourselves and families."

															With the papers just referred to before it, the House Committee
on Indian Affairs, in February, 1900, favorably reported a bill to
give effect to the agreement of 1892.

															On January 19, 1900, an act was passed by the Senate
entitled

															"An Act to Ratify an Agreement Made with the Indians of the Fort
Hall Indian Reservation in Idaho, and Making an Appropriation to
Carry the Same into Effect."

															In February, 1900, the House Committee on Indian Affairs, having
before it the memorial of the Indians transmitted by the Secretary
of the Interior, and also having for consideration the Senate bill
just alluded to, reported that bill back to the House favorably,
with certain amendments. (H.R.Doc. No. 419, 56th Congress, first
session.) One of such amendments consisted in adding to the bill in
question, as section 6, a provision to execute the agreement made
with the Kiousa, Comanche, and Apache Indians in 1892. Although the
bill thus reported embodied the execution of the agreement last
referred to, the title of the bill was not changed, and
consequently referred only to the execution of the agreement made
with the Indians of the Fort Hall reservation in Idaho. The
provisions thus embodied in section 6 of the bill in question
substantially conformed to those contained in the bill which had
previously passed the House, except that the previous enactment on
this subject was changed so as to do away with the necessity for
making to each Indian one-half of his allotment in agricultural
land and the other half in grazing land. In addition, a clause was
inserted in the bill providing for the setting apart of a large
amount of grazing land to be used in common by the Indians. The
provision in question was as follows:

															"That in addition to the allotment of lands to said Indians as
provided for in this agreement, the Secretary of the Interior shall
set aside for the use in common for said Indian tribes four hundred
and eighty thousand acres of grazing lands, to be Page 187 U. S. 560 selected by the Secretary of the Interior, either in one or more
tracts as will best subserve the interest of said Indians."

															The provision of the agreement in favor of the Indian agent and
army officer was also eliminated.

															The bill, moreover, exempted the money consideration for the
surplus lands from all claims for Indian depredations, and
expressly provided that in the event the claim of the Choctaws and
Chickasaws was ultimately sustained, the consideration referred to
should be subject to the further action of Congress. In this bill,
as in previous ones, provision was made for allotments to the
Indians, the opening of the surplus land for settlement, etc. The
bill became a law by concurrence of the Senate in the amendments
adopted by the House as just stated.

															Thereafter, by acts approved on January 4, 1901, 31 Stat. 727,
c. 8, March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1078, c. 832, and March 3, 1901, 31
Stat. 1093, c. 846, authority was given to extend the time for
making allotments and opening of the surplus land for settlement
for a period not exceeding eight months from December 6, 1900;
appropriations were made for surveys in connection with allotments
and setting apart of grazing lands, and authority was conferred to
establish counties and county seats, townsites, etc., and proclaim
the surplus lands open for settlement by white people.

															On June 6, 1901, a bill was filed on the equity side of the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, wherein Lone Wolf (one
of the appellants herein) was named as complainant, suing for
himself as well as for all other members of the confederated tribes
of the Kiousa, Comanche, and Apache Indians, residing in the
Territory of Oklahoma. The present appellees (the Secretary of the
Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Commissioner
of the General Land Office) were made respondents to the bill.
Subsequently, by an amendment to the bill, members of the Kiousa,
Comanche, and Apache tribes were joined with Lone Wolf as parties
complainant.

															The bill recited the establishing and occupancy of the
reservation in Oklahoma by the confederated tribes of Kiousas,
Comanches, and Apaches, the signing of the agreement of October 6,
1892, and the subsequent proceedings which have been detailed, Page 187 U. S. 561 culminating in the passage of the Act of June 6, 1900, and the
act of Congress supplementary to said act. In substance, it was
further charged in the bill that the agreement had not been signed
as required by the Medicine Lodge treaty -- that is, by
three-fourths of the male adult members of the bribe -- and that
the signatures thereto had been obtained by fraudulent
misrepresentations and concealment, similar to those recited in the
memorial signed at the 1899 council. In addition to the grievance
previously stated in the memorial, the charge was made that the
interpreters falsely represented, when the said treaty was being
considered by the Indians, that the treaty provided "for the sale
of their surplus lands at some time in the future at the price of
$2.50 per acre," whereas, in truth and in fact "by the terms of
said treaty, only $1.00 an acre is allowed for said surplus lands,"
which sum, it was charged, was an amount far below the real value
of said lands. It was also averred that portions of the signed
agreement had been changed by Congress without submitting such
changes to the Indians for their consideration. Based upon the
foregoing allegations, it was alleged that so much of said act of
Congress of June 6, 1900, and so much of said acts supplementary
thereto and amendatory thereof as provided for the taking effect of
said agreement, the allotment of certain lands mentioned therein to
members of said Indian tribes, the surveying, laying out, and
platting townsites and locating county seats on said lands, and the
ceding to the United States and the opening to settlement by white
men of two million acres of said lands, were enacted in violation
of the property rights of the said Kiousa, Comanche, and Apache
Indians, and if carried into effect would deprive said Indians of
their lands without due process of law, and that said parts of said
acts were contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and
were void, and conferred no right, power, or duty upon the
respondents to do or perform any of the acts or things enjoined or
required by the acts of Congress in question. Alleging the
intention of the respondents to carry into effect the aforesaid
claimed unconstitutional and void acts, and asking discovery by
answers to interrogatories propounded to the respondents, the
allowance of a temporary restraining order, and a final decree Page 187 U. S. 562 awarding a perpetual injunction, was prayed, to restrain the
commission by the respondents of the alleged unlawful acts by them
threatened to be done. General relief was also prayed.

															On January 6, 1901, a rule to show cause why a temporary
injunction should not be granted was issued. In response to this
rule, an affidavit of the Secretary of the Interior was filed in
which, in substance, it was averred that the complainant (Lone
Wolf) and his wife and daughter had selected allotments under the
Act of June 6, 1900, and the same had been approved by the
Secretary of the Interior, and that all other members of the tribes
excepting twelve had also accepted and retained allotments in
severalty, and that the greater part thereof had been approved
before the bringing of this suit. It was also averred that the
480,000 acres of grazing land provided to be set apart, in the Act
of June 6, 1900, for the use by the Indians in common, had been so
set apart prior to the institution of the suit, "with the approval
of a council composed of chiefs and headmen of said Indians."
Thereupon an affidavit verified by Lone Wolf was filed in which in
effect he denied that he had accepted an allotment of lands under
the Act of June 6, 1900, and the acts supplementary to and
amendatory thereof. Thereafter, on June 17, 1901, leave was given
to amend the bill and the same was amended, as heretofore stated,
by adding additional parties complainant and by providing a
substituted first paragraph of the bill, in which was set forth,
among other things, that the three tribes at a general council held
on June 7, 1901, had voted to institute all legal and other
proceedings necessary to be taken, to prevent the carrying into
effect of the legislation complained of.

															The Supreme Court of the District, on June 21, 1901, denied the
application for a temporary injunction. The cause was thereafter
submitted to the court on a demurrer to the bill as amended. The
demurrer was sustained, and the complainants electing of appeals of
the District. While this appeal was pending, the President issued a
proclamation, dated July 4, 1901 (32 Stat.Appx. Proclamations, 11),
in which it was Page 187 U. S. 563 ordered that the surplus lands ceded by the Comanche, Kiousa,
and Apache and other tribes of Indians should be opened to entry
and settlement on August 6, 1901. Among other things, it was
recited in the proclamation that all the conditions required by law
to be performed prior to the opening of the lands to settlement and
entry had been performed. It was also therein recited that, in
pursuance of the act of Congress ratifying the agreement,
allotments of land in severalty had been regularly made to each
member of the Comanche, Kiousa, and Apache tribes of Indians; the
lands occupied by religious societies or other organizations for
religious or educational work among the Indians had been regularly
allotted and confirmed to such societies and organizations,
respectively, and the Secretary of the Interior, out of the lands
ceded by the agreement, had regularly selected and set aside for
the use in common for said Comanche, Kiousa, and Apache tribes of
Indians four hundred and eighty acres of grazing lands.

															The Court of Appeals (without passing on a motion which had been
made to dismiss the appeal) affirmed the decree of the court below,
and overruled a motion for reargument. 19 App.D.C. 315. An appeal
was allowed, and the decree of affirmance is now here for
review.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															By the sixth article of the first of the two treaties referred
to in the preceding statement, proclaimed on August 25, 1868, 15
Stat. 581, it was provided that heads of families of the tribes
affected by the treaty might select, within the reservation, a
tract of land of not exceeding 320 acres in extent, which should
thereafter cease to be held in common, and should be for the
exclusive possession of the Indian making the selection Page 187 U. S. 564 so long as he or his family might continue to cultivate the
land. The twelfth article reads as follows:

															"Article 12. No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of
the reservation herein in described, which may be held in common,
shall be of any validity or force as against the said Indians
unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the
adult male Indians occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe
shall be understood or construed in such manner as to deprive,
without his consent, any individual member of the tribe of his
rights to any tract of land selected by him as provided in article
III (VI) of this treaty."

															The appellants base their right to relief on the proposition
that, by the effect of the article just quoted, the confederated
tribes of Kiousas, Comanches, and Apaches were vested with an
interest in the lands held in common within the reservation, which
interest could not be divested by Congress in any other mode than
that specified in the said twelfth article, and that, as a result
of the said stipulation, the interest of the Indians in the common
lands fell within the protection of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and such interest -- indirectly,
at least -- came under the control of the judicial branch of the
government. We are unable to yield our assent to this view.

															The contention in effect ignores the status of the contracting
Indians and the relation of dependency they bore and continue to
bear towards the government of the United States. To uphold the
claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the treaty
was to materially limit and qualify the controlling authority of
Congress in respect to the care and protection of the Indians, and
to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when the necessity
might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the tribal lands,
of all power to act, if the assent of the Indians could not be
obtained.

															Now it is true that, in decisions of this Court, the Indian
right of occupancy of tribal lands, whether declared in a treaty or
otherwise created, has been stated to be sacred, or, as sometimes
expressed, as sacred as the fee of the United States in the same
lands. Johnson v.
McIntosh , (1823) 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U. S.
574 ; Page 187 U. S. 565 Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia , (1831) 5 Pet. 1, 30 U. S. 48 ; Worcester v.
Georgia , (1832) 6 Pet. 515, 31 U. S. 581 ; United States v.
Cook , (1873) 19 Wall. 591, 86 U. S. 592 ; Leavenworth &c. R. Co. v. United States, (1875) 92 U. S. 733 , 92 U. S. 755 ; Beecher v. Wetherby, (1877) 95 U.
S. 525 . But in none of these cases was there involved a
controversy between Indians and the government respecting the power
of Congress to administer the property of the Indians. The
questions considered in the cases referred to, which either
directly or indirectly had relation to the nature of the property
rights of the Indians, concerned the character and extent of such
rights as respected states or individuals. In one of the cited
cases, it was clearly pointed out that Congress possessed a
paramount power over the property of the Indians by reason of its
exercise of guardianship over their interests, and that such
authority might be implied, even though opposed to the strict
letter of a treaty with the Indians. Thus, in Beecher v.
Wetherby, 95 U. S. 525 ,
discussing the claim that there had been a prior reservation of
land by treaty to the use of a certain tribe of Indians, the Court
said (p. 95 U. S.
525 ):

															"But the right which the Indians held was only that of
occupancy. The fee was in the United States, subject to that right,
and could be transferred by them whenever they chose. The grantee,
it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not disturb
the occupancy of the Indians; that occupancy could only be
interfered with or determined by the United States. It is to be
presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed by
such considerations of justice as would control a Christian people
in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. Be that is it
may, the propriety or justice of their action towards the Indians
with respect to their lands is a question of governmental policy,
and is not a matter open to discussion in a controversy between
third parties, neither of whom derives title from the Indians."

															Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has
always been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by
the judicial department of the government. Until the year 1871, the
policy was pursued of dealing with the Page 187 U. S. 566 Indian tribes by means of treaties, and, of course, a moral
obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing
the stipulations entered into on its behalf. But, as with treaties
made with foreign nations, Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 , 130 U. S. 600 ,
the legislative power might pass laws in conflict with treaties
made with the Indians. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.
S. 264 , 169 U. S. 270 ; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U. S. 504 , 163 U. S. 511 ; Spalding v. Chandler, 160 U. S. 394 , 160 U. S. 405 ; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U. S. 114 , 152 U. S. 117 ; Cherokee
Tobacco , 11 Wall. 616.

															The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty,
though presumably such power will be exercised only when
circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in
disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should
do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into between the
United States and a tribe of Indians, it was never doubted that the
power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that, in a contingency,
such power might be availed of from considerations of governmental
policy, particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards
the Indians. In United States v. Kagama, (1885) 118 U. S. 375 ,
speaking of the Indians, the Court said (p. 118 U. S.
382 ):

															"After an experience of a hundred years of the treatymaking
system of government Congress has determined upon a new departure
-- to govern them by acts of Congress. This is seen in the Act of
March 3, 1871, embodied in section 2079 of the Revised
Statutes:"

															"No Indian nation or tribe, within the territory of the United
States, shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent
nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified
with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen
hundred and seventy-one, shall be hereby invalidated or
impaired."

															In upholding the validity of an act of Congress which conferred
jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States for certain
crimes committed on an Indian reservation within a state, the Court
said (p. 118 U. S.
383 ): Page 187 U. S. 567 "It seems to us that this is within the competency of Congress.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for
their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They own no
allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection.
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where
they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the federal government with them and the treaties in which it
has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power. This has always been recognized by the executive and by
Congress, and by this Court, whenever the question has arisen."

															" * * * *" "The power of the general government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
among whom they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it
never has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its
exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce
its laws on all the tribes."

															That Indians who had not been fully emancipated from the control
and protection of the United States are subject at least so far as
the tribal lands were concerned, to be controlled by direct
legislation of Congress, is also declared in Choctaw Nation v.
United States, 119 U. S. 1 , 119 U. S. 27 , and Stephens v. Choctaw Nation, 174 U.
S. 445 , 174 U. S.
483 .

															In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over
treaties with the Indians and Indian tribal property, we may not
specially consider the contentions pressed upon our notice that the
signing by the Indians of the agreement of October 6, 1892, was
obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations, and concealment, that
the requisite three-fourths of adult male Indians had not signed,
as required by the twelfth article of the treaty of 1867, and that
the treaty as signed had been amended by Congress without
submitting such amendments to the action Page 187 U. S. 568 of the Indians since all these matters, in any event, were
solely within the domain of the legislative authority, and its
action is conclusive upon the courts.

															The Act of June 6, 1900, which is complained of in the bill, was
enacted at a time when the tribal relations between the
confederated tribes of Kiousas, Comanches, and Apaches still
existed, and that statute and the statutes supplementary thereto
dealt with the disposition of tribal property, and purported to
give an adequate consideration for the surplus lands not allotted
among the Indians or reserved for their benefit. Indeed, the
controversy which this case presents is concluded by the decision
in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.
S. 294 , where it was held that full administrative power
was possessed by Congress over Indian tribal property. In effect,
the action of Congress now complained of was but an exercise of
such power, a mere change in the form of investment of Indian
tribal property, the property of those who, as we have held, were
in substantial effect the wards of the government. We must presume
that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the
Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch
of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises. In
any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the
judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which
prompted the enactment of this legislation. If injury was
occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as implying, by
the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be sought by an
appeal to that body for redress, and not to the courts. The
legislation in question was constitutional, and the demurrer to the
bill was therefore rightly sustained.

															The motion to dismiss does not challenge jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Without expressly referring to the propositions of
fact upon which it proceeds, suffice it to say that we think it
need not be further adverted to, since, for the reasons previously
given and the nature of the controversy, we think the decree below
should be Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurs in the result.