Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.

U.S. Supreme Court Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. No. 75-616 Argued October 13,
1976 Decided January 11,
1977 429
U.S. 252 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC), a
nonprofit developer, contracted to purchase a tract within the
boundaries of petitioner Village in order to build racially
integrated low- and moderate-income housing. The contract was
contingent upon securing rezoning as well as federal housing
assistance. MHDC applied to the Village for the necessary rezoning
from a single-family to a multiple-family (R-5) classification. At
a series of Village Plan Commission public meetings, both
supporters and opponents touched upon the fact that the project
would probably be racially integrated. Opponents also stressed
zoning factors that pointed toward denial of MHDC's application:
the location had always been zoned single-family, and the Village's
apartment policy called for limited use of R-5 zoning, primarily as
a buffer between single-family development and commercial or
manufacturing districts, none of which adjoined the project's
proposed location. After the Village denied rezoning, MHDC and
individual minority respondents filed this suit for injunctive and
declaratory relief, alleging that the denial was racially
discriminatory and violated, inter alia, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing
Act. The District Court held that the Village's rezoning denial was
motivated not by racial discrimination but by a desire to protect
property values and maintain the Village's zoning plan. Though
approving those conclusions, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that the "ultimate effect" of the rezoning denial was racially
discriminatory and observing that the denial would
disproportionately affect blacks, particularly in view of the fact
that the general suburban area, though economically expanding,
continued to be marked by residential segregation. Held: 1. MHDC and at least one individual respondent have standing to
bring this action. Pp. 429 U. S.
260 -264.

															(a) MHDC has met the constitutional standing requirements by
showing injury fairly traceable to petitioners' acts. The
challenged action of the Village stands as an absolute barrier to
constructing the housing for which MHDC had contracted, a barrier
which could be Page 429 U. S. 253 removed if injunctive relief were granted. MHDC, despite the
contingency provisions in its contract, has suffered economic
injury based upon the expenditures it made in support of its
rezoning petition, as well as noneconomic injury from the defeat of
its objective, embodied in its specific project, of making suitable
low-cost housing available where such housing is scarce. Pp. 429 U. S.
261 -263.

															(b) Whether MHDC has standing to assert the constitutional
rights of its prospective minority tenants need not be decided, for
at least one of the individual respondents, a Negro working in the
Village and desirous of securing low-cost housing there but who now
lives 20 miles away, has standing. Focusing on the specific MHDC
project, he has adequately alleged an "actionable causal
relationship" between the Village's zoning practices and his
asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.
S. 490 , 422 U. S. 507 .
Pp. 429 U. S.
263 -264.

															2. Proof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and respondents failed to carry their burden
of proving that such an intent or purpose was a motivating factor
in the Village's rezoning decision. Pp. 429 U.S. 264 -271.

															(a) Official action will not be held unconstitutional solely
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact. "[Such]
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 , 426 U. S. 242 .
A racially discriminatory intent, as evidenced by such factors as
disproportionate impact, the historical background of the
challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures
from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the
decisionmakers, must be shown. Pp. 429 U.S. 264 -268.

															(b) The evidence does not warrant overturning the concurrent
findings of both courts below that there was no proof warranting
the conclusion that the Village's rezoning decision was racially
motivated. Pp. 429 U. S.
268 -271.

															3. The statutory question whether the rezoning decision violated
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was not decided by the Court of
Appeals, and should be considered on remand. P. 429 U. S.
271 .

															517 F.2d 409, reversed and remanded.

															POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. MARSHALL,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 429 U. S. 271 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 429 U. S. 272 .
STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Page 429 U. S. 254 MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In 1971, respondent Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village of Arlington Heights,
Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel from single-family to
multiple family classification. Using federal financial assistance,
MHDC planned to build 190 clustered townhouse units for low- and
moderate-income tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request.
MHDC, joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. [ Footnote
1 ] They alleged that the denial was racially discriminatory and
that it violated, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et
seq. Following a bench trial, the District Court entered
judgment for the Village, 373 F.
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, and
that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 517 F.2d 409 (1975). We granted Page 429 U. S. 255 the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975), and
now reverse. I Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 26 miles
northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the land in Arlington
Heights is zoned for detached single-family homes, and this is in
fact the prevailing land use. The Village experienced substantial
growth during the 1960's, but, like other communities in northwest
Cook County, its population of racial minority groups remained
quite low. According to the 1970 census, only 27 of the Village's
64,000 residents were black.

															The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (Order), own an
80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington Heights. Part
of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high school, and part by
the Order's three-story novitiate building, which houses
dormitories and a Montessori school. Much of the site, however,
remains vacant. Since 1959, when the Village first adopted a zoning
ordinance, all the land surrounding the Viatorian property has been
zoned R-3, a single-family specification with relatively small
minimum lot-size requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land
there are single-family homes just across a street; to the east,
the Viatorian property directly adjoins the backyards of other
single-family homes.

															The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to low- and
moderate-income housing. Investigation revealed that the most
expeditious way to build such housing was to work through a
nonprofit developer experienced in the use of federal housing
subsidies under § 236 of the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246,
as added and amended, 12 U.S.C. § 17I5z-1. [ Footnote 2 ] Page 429 U. S. 256 MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968 by several
prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of building low- and
moderate-income housing throughout the Chicago area. In 1970, MHDC
was in the process of building one § 236 development near Arlington
Heights, and already had provided some federally assisted housing
on a smaller scale in other parts of the Chicago area.

															After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into a
99-year lease and an accompanying agreement of sale covering a
15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian property.
MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the sale agreement was
contingent upon MHDC's securing zoning clearances from the Village
and § 236 housing assistance from the Federal Government. If MHDC
proved unsuccessful in securing either, both the lease and the
contract of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal
limitations governing land-acquisition costs for § 236 housing.

															MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the project, Page 429 U. S. 257 to be known as Lincoln Green. The plans called for 20 two-story
buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit having its own
private entrance from the outside. One hundred of the units would
have a single bedroom, thought likely to attract elderly citizens.
The remainder would have two, three, or four bedrooms. A large
portion of the site would remain open, with shrubs and trees to
screen the homes abutting the property to the east.

															The planned development did not conform to the Village's zoning
ordinance, and could not be built unless Arlington Heights rezoned
the parcel to R-5, its multiple family housing classification.
Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village Plan Commission a petition
for rezoning, accompanied by supporting materials describing the
development and specifying that it would be subsidized under § 236.
The materials made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an
affirmative marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized
development is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted studies
demonstrating the need for housing of this type and analyzing the
probable impact of the development. To prepare for the hearings
before the Plan Commission and to assure compliance with the
Village building code, fire regulations, and related requirements,
MHDC consulted with the Village staff for preliminary review of the
development. The parties have stipulated that every change
recommended during such consultations was incorporated into the
plans.

															During the spring of 1971, the Plan Commission considered the
proposal at a series of three public meetings, which drew large
crowds. Although many of those attending were quite vocal and
demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, a number of
individuals and representatives of community groups spoke in
support of rezoning. Some of the comments, both from opponents and
supporters, addressed what was referred to as the "social issue" --
the desirability or undesirability of introducing at this location
in Arlington Heights Page 429 U. S. 258 low- and moderate income housing, housing that would probably be
racially integrated.

															Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning aspects of
the petition, stressing two arguments. First, the area always had
been zoned single-family, and the neighboring citizens had built or
purchased there in reliance on that classification. Rezoning
threatened to cause a measurable drop in property value for
neighboring sites. Second, the Village's apartment policy, adopted
by the Village Board in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R-5
zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between single-family
development and land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial
or manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing
district.

															At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission adopted a
motion to recommend to the Village's Board of Trustees that it deny
the request. The motion stated:

															"While the need for low and moderate income housing may exist in
Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Commission would be
derelict in recommending it at the proposed location."

															Two members voted against the motion and submitted a minority
report, stressing that, in their view, the change to accommodate
Lincoln Green represented "good zoning." The Village Board met on
September 28, 1971, to consider MHDC's request and the
recommendation of the Plan Commission. After a public hearing, the
Board denied the rezoning by a 6-1 vote.

															The following June, MHDC and three Negro individuals filed this
lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. [ Footnote 3 ] A second
nonprofit corporation and an individual of Mexican-American descent
intervened as plaintiffs. Page 429 U. S. 259 The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. Assuming that
MHDC had standing to bring the suit, [ Footnote 4 ] the District Court held that the petitioners
were not motivated by racial discrimination or intent to
discriminate against low income groups when they denied rezoning,
but rather by a desire "to protect property values and the
integrity of the Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp. at 211. The
District Court concluded also that the denial would not have a
racially discriminatory effect.

															A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved the
District Court's finding that the defendants were motivated by a
concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, rather than by racial
discrimination. Deciding whether their refusal to rezone would have
discriminatory effects was more complex. The court observed that
the refusal would have a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based
upon family income, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area
residents who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green,
although they composed a far lower percentage of total area
population. The court reasoned, however, that, under our decision
in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), such a disparity in racial impact alone does not call for
strict scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the
construction of the low-cost housing. [ Footnote 5 ]

															There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly
discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy Park
Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, Page 429 U. S. 260 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), the
Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be examined
in light of its "historical context and ultimate effect." [ Footnote 6 ] 517 F.2d at 413. Northwest
Cook County was enjoying rapid growth in employment opportunities
and population, but it continued to exhibit a high degree of
residential segregation. The court held that Arlington Heights
could not simply ignore this problem. Indeed, it found that the
Village had been "exploiting" the situation by allowing itself to
become a nearly all-white community. Id. at 414. The
Village had no other current plans for building low- and
moderate-income housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village
were available to MHDC at an economically feasible price.

															Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially discriminatory
effects and could be tolerated only if it served compelling
interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire to protect
property values met this exacting standard. The court therefore
concluded that the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. II At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' standing
to bring the suit. It is not clear that this challenge was pressed
in the Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction to decide the
case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.
S. 411 , 395 U. S. 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it.

															In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), a case similar in some respects to this one, we reviewed
the constitutional limitations and prudential considerations that
guide a court in determining a party's standing, and we need not
repeat that discussion here. The essence of the standing
question, Page 429 U. S. 261 in its constitutional dimension, is

															"whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial
powers on his behalf." Id. at 422 U. S.
498 -499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186 , 369 U. S. 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the
challenged action of the defendant. The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.
S. 669 , 412 U. S. 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed
fairly traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions. Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S.
26 , 426 U. S. 41 -42
(1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.
S. 488 , 414 U. S. 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.
S. 614 , 410 U. S. 617 (1973). A Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged action of the
petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing the
housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian site. If MHDC
secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that barrier will be
removed. An injunction would not, of course, guarantee that Lincoln
Green will be built. MHDC would still have to secure financing,
qualify for federal subsidies, [ Footnote 7 ] and carry through with construction. But all
housing developments are subject to some extent to similar
uncertainties. When a project is as detailed and specific as
Lincoln Green, a court is not required to engage in undue
speculation Page 429 U. S. 262 as a predicate for finding that the plaintiff has the requisite
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an injury to
itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra at 426 U. S.
38 .

															Petitioners nonetheless appear to argue that MHDC lacks standing
because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC, they point out,
is not the owner of the property in question. Its contract of
purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning. [ Footnote 8 ] MHDC owes the owners nothing if
rezoning is denied.

															We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place, it
is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury from a
refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions in its
contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars on the plans for
Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted to the Village in
support of the petition for rezoning. Unless rezoning is granted,
many of these plans and studies will be worthless even if MHD finds
another site at an equally attractive price.

															Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing
requirements. It has long been clear that economic injury is not
the only kind of injury that can support a plaintiff's Page 429 U. S. 263 standing. United States v. SCRAP, supra at 412 U. S.
686 -687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.
S. 727 , 405 U. S. 734 (1972); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.
S. 150 , 397 U. S. 154 (1970). MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, but rather
from an interest in making suitable low-cost housing available in
areas where such housing is scarce. This is not mere abstract
concern about a problem of general interest. See Sierra Club v.
Morton, supra at 405 U. S. 739 .
The specific project MHDC intends to build, whether or not it will
generate profits, provides that "essential dimension of
specificity" that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger
v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.
S. 208 , 418 U. S. 221 (1974). B Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements, and it
therefore has standing to assert its own rights. Foremost among
them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary or irrational zoning
actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.
S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183 (1928); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S.
1 (1974). But the heart of this litigation has never
been the claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead, it has been the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone
discriminates against racial minorities in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to
assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. at 422 U. S. 499 .
But we need not decide whether the circumstances of this case would
justify departure from that prudential limitation and permit MHDC
to assert the constitutional rights of its prospective minority
tenants. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.
S. 249 (1953); cf. 396 U. S. Page 429 U. S. 264 Little Hunting Park, 396 U. S. 229 , 396 U. S. 237 (1969); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.
60 , 245 U. S. 72 -73
(1917). For we have at least one individual plaintiff who has
demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his own. [ Footnote 9 ]

															Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell factory in
Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20 miles away in Evanston
in a 5-room house with his mother and his son. The complaint
alleged that he seeks and would qualify for the housing MHDC wants
to build in Arlington Heights. Ransom testified at trial that, if
Lincoln Green were built he would probably move there, since it is
closer to his job.

															The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing nearer
his employment has been thwarted by official action that is
racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief he seeks,
there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth v. Seldin,
supra at 422 U. S. 504 ,
that the Lincoln Green project will materialize, affording Ransom
the housing opportunity he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not
a generalized grievance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth,
supra at 422 U. S. 507 , 422 U. S. 508 n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent on
speculation about the possible actions of third parties not before
the court. See id. at 422 U. S. 505 ; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 41 -42.
Unlike the individual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has
adequately averred an "actionable causal relationship" between
Arlington Heights' zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin, supra at 422 U. S. 507 .
We therefore proceed to the merits. III Our decision last Term, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), made it clear that official action will not be held Page 429 U. S. 265 unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially
disproportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination." Id. at 426 U. S. 242 .
Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Although some
contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases, [ Footnote 10 ] the holding in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety
of contexts. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver,
Colo., 413 U. S. 189 , 413 U. S. 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S.
52 , 376 U. S. 56 -57
(1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 , 325 U. S.
403 -404 (1945) (jury selection). Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory
purposes. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or
administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision
motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular
purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one. [ Footnote 11 ] In fact, it is because legislators
and administrators are properly concerned with balancing numerous
competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the
merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or
irrationality. But racial discrimination is not just another
competing consideration. When there is a proof that a
discriminatory purpose Page 429 U. S. 266 has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial
deference is no longer justified. [ Footnote 12 ]

															Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.
The impact of the official action -- whether it "bears more heavily
on one race than another," Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S. 242 -- may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.
S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.
S. 268 (1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. [ Footnote 13 ] But such cases are
rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, [ Footnote 14 ] and the Court must look
to other evidence. [ Footnote
15 ] Page 429 U. S. 267 The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra;
Griffin v. School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F.
Supp. 872 (SD Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933
(1949); cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colo.
supra at 413 U. S. 207 .
The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker's purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 , 387 U. S.
373 -376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 297 U. S. 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here always had been
zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to R-3 when the town learned of
MHDC's plan to erect integrated housing, [ Footnote 16 ] we would have a far different case.
Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford
evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. Substantive
departures too may be relevant, particularly if the factors usually
considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision
contrary to the one reached. [ Footnote 17 ] Page 429 U. S. 268 The legislative or administrative history may be highly
relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or
reports. In some extraordinary instances, the members might be
called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of
the official action, although even then such testimony frequently
will be barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.
S. 683 , 418 U. S. 705 (1974); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed.1961).
[ Footnote 18 ]

															The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be
exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether
racially discriminatory intent existed. With these in mind, we now
address the case before us. IV This case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in the
Court of Appeals before our decision in Washington v. Davis,
supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous theory that
the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially discriminatory
effect and was, without more, unconstitutional. But both courts
below understood that at least part of their function was to
examine the purpose underlying the decision. Page 429 U. S. 269 In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at the
various hearings might have been motivated by opposition to
minority groups. The court held, however, that the evidence "does
not warrant the conclusion that this motivated the defendants." 373
F. Supp. at 211.

															On appeal, the Court of Appeals focused primarily on
respondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not been
consistently applied and was being invoked with a strictness here
that could only demonstrate some other underlying motive. The court
concluded that the buffer policy, though not always applied with
perfect consistency, had on several occasions formed the basis for
the Board's decision to deny other rezoning proposals. "The
evidence does not necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights
administered this policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F.2d at
412. The Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning to
MHDC.

															We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the Village's
decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities.
Minorities constitute 18% of the Chicago area population, and 40%
of the income groups said to be eligible for Lincoln Green. But
there is little about the sequence of events leading up to the
decision that would spark suspicion. The area around the Viatorian
property has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes surround
the 80-acre site, and the Village is undeniably committed to
single-family homes as its dominant residential land use. The
rezoning request progressed according to the usual procedures.
[ Footnote 19 ] The Plan
Commission even scheduled two additional Page 429 U. S. 270 hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC and permit it to
supplement its presentation with answers to questions generated at
the first hearing.

															The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board members,
as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost exclusively on
the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition, and the zoning factors on
which they relied are not novel criteria in the Village's rezoning
decisions. There is no reason to doubt that there has been reliance
by some neighboring property owners on the maintenance of
single-family zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally
adopted its buffer policy long before MHDC entered the picture, and
has applied the policy too consistently for us to infer
discriminatory purpose from its application in this case. Finally,
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand at trial.
Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of invidious
purpose. [ Footnote 20 ]

															In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the concurrent
findings of both courts below. Respondents simply failed to carry
their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the Village's decision. [ Footnote 21 ] Page 429 U. S. 271 This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court of
Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried a
discriminatory "ultimate effect" is without independent
constitutional significance. V Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to rezone
violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et
seq. They continue to urge here that a zoning decision made by
a public body may, and that petitioners' action did, violate § 3604
or § 3617. The Court of Appeals, however, proceeding in a somewhat
unorthodox fashion, did not decide the statutory question. We
remand the case for further consideration of respondents' statutory
claims. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Respondents named as defendants both the Village and a number of
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the
Mayor, the Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning,
and the entire Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will
occasionally refer to all the petitioners collectively as "the
Village."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners
of rental housing projects which meet the Act's requirements, if
the savings are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a
rather complex formula. Qualifying owners effectively pay 1%
interest on money borrowed to construct, rehabilitate, or purchase
their properties. (Section 236 has been amended frequently in minor
respects since this litigation began. See 12 U.S.C. §
1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authorization Act of
1976, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.)

															New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 1973 by executive
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly
could claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be
eligible for aid under § 8 of the United States Housing Act of
1937, as amended by § 201(a) of the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), and
by the Housing Authorization Act of 1976, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under
the § 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
contracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will
make up the difference between a fair market rent for the area and
the amount contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible
tenant family pays between 15% and 25% of its gross income for
rent. Respondents indicated at oral argument that, despite the
demise of the § 236 program, construction of the MHDC project could
proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance is now granted.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as
a class action pursuant to Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 but the District
Court declined to certify. 373 F.
Supp. 208 , 209 (1974).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															A different District Judge had heard early motions in the case.
He had sustained the complaint against a motion to dismiss for lack
of standing, and the judge who finally decided the case said he
found "no need to reexamine [the predecessor judge's] conclusions"
in this respect. Ibid. [ Footnote 5 ]

															Nor is there reason to subject the Village's action to more
stringent review simply because it involves respondents' interest
in securing housing. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56 , 405 U. S. 73 -74
(1972). See generally San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 , 411 U. S. 18 -39
(1973).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															This language apparently derived from our decision in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 , 387 U. S. 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the California Supreme Court in
the case then under review).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Petitioners suggest that the suspension of the § 236 housing
assistance program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its
proposed project, and therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The
District Court also expressed doubts about MHDC's position in the
case in light of the suspension. 373 F. Supp. at 211. Whether
termination of all available assistance programs would preclude
standing is not a matter we need to decide, in view of the current
likelihood that subsidies may be secured under § 8 of the United
States Housing Act of 1937, as amended by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974. See n 2, supra. [ Footnote 8 ]

															Petitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon
rezoning cannot contest a zoning decision in the Illinois courts.
Under the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has
standing to pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining
Corp. v. City of Evanston, 23 Ill. 2d
48 , 177 N.E.2d
191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of Evanston, 29
Ill.App.3d 782, 331 N.E.2d 380 (1975).

															State law of standing, however, does not govern such
determinations in the federal courts. The constitutional and
prudential considerations canvassed at length in Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), respond to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature.
Illinois may choose to close its courts to applicants for rezoning
unless they have an interest more direct than MHDC's, but this
choice does not necessarily disqualify MHDC from seeking relief in
federal courts for an asserted injury to its federal rights.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing
to maintain the suit.

															[ Footnote 10 ] Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 , 403 U. S. 225 (1971); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.
S. 451 , 407 U. S.
461 -462 (1972); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 , 391 U. S.
381 -386 (1968). See discussion in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S.
242 -244.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.
S. 263 , 410 U. S.
276 -277 (1973), in a somewhat different context, we
observed:

															"The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971), without a
requirement that primacy be ascertained. Legislation is frequently
multi-purposed: the removal of even a 'subordinate' purpose may
shift altogether the consensus of legislative judgment supporting
the statute."

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															For a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem
of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup.Ct.Rev. 95,
116-118.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Several of our jury-selection cases fall into this category.
Because of the nature of the jury selection task, however, we have
permitted a finding of constitutional violation even when the
statistical pattern does not approach the extremes of Yick
Wo or Gomillion. See, e.g., Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U. S. 346 , 396 U. S. 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404 , 389 U. S. 407 (1967)

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official racial
discrimination is a necessary predicate to a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. A single invidiously discriminatory governmental
act -- in the exercise of the zoning power as elsewhere -- would
not necessarily be immunized by the absence of such discrimination
in the making of other comparable decisions. See City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358 , 422 U. S. 378 (1975).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of
disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the
"heterogeneity" of the Nation's population. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 , 406 U. S. 548 (1972); see also Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S.
248 .

															[ Footnote 16 ] See, e.g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286
F.2d 222 (CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs'
land for a park upon learning that the homes plaintiffs were
erecting there would be sold under a marketing plan designed to
assure integration); Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium on new subdivisions
and rezoned area for parkland shortly after learning of plaintiffs'
plans to build low-income housing). To the extent that the decision
in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of
discriminatory impact, we have indicated our disagreement. Washington v. Davis, supra at 426 U. S.
244 -245.

															[ Footnote 17 ] See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (CA10
1970). The plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build
low-income housing on the site of a former school that they had
purchased. The city refused to rezone the land from PF, its public
facilities classification, to R-4, high-density residential. All
the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the present and the
former planning director for the city testified that there was no
reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be
classified R-4. Based on this and other evidence, the Court of
Appeals ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's]
holding of racial motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable
action." Id. at 1040.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															This Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v.
Peck , 6 Cranch 87, 10 U. S. 130 -131
(1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive
motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of
other branches of government. Placing a decisionmaker on the stand
is therefore "usually to be avoided." Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 , 401 U. S. 420 (1971). The problems involved have prompted a good deal of
scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif.L.Rev. 341, 356-361 (1949);
A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 208-221 (1962); Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
Yale L.J. 1205 (1970); Brest, supra, n 12.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Respondents have made much of one apparent procedural departure.
The parties stipulated that the Village Planner, the staff member
whose primary responsibility covered zoning and planning matters,
was never asked for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning
request. The omission does seem curious, but respondents failed to
prove at trial what role the Planner customarily played in rezoning
decisions, or whether his opinion would be relevant to respondents'
claims.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															Respondents complain that the District Court unduly limited
their efforts to prove that the Village Board acted for
discriminatory purposes, since it forbade questioning Board members
about their motivation at the time they cast their votes. We
perceive no abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case,
even if such an inquiry into motivation would otherwise have been
proper. See n 18, supra. Respondents were allowed, both during the discovery
phase and at trial, to question Board members fully about materials
and information available to them at the time of decision. In light
of respondents' repeated insistence that it was effect, and not
motivation, which would make out a constitutional violation, the
District Court's action was not improper.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by
a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have
required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would,
however, have shifted to the Village the burden of establishing
that the same decision would have resulted even had the
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this were
established, the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper
consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances,
there would be no justification for judicial interference with the
challenged decision. But, in this case, respondents failed to make
the required threshold showing. See Mt. Healthy City Board of
Ed. v. Doyle, post, p. 429 U. S. 274 .

															MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															I concur in Parts I-III of the Court's opinion. However, I
believe the proper result would be to remand this entire case to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and today's opinion. The Court of Appeals is better
situated Page 429 U. S. 272 than this Court both to reassess the significance of the
evidence developed below in light of the standards we have set
forth and to determine whether the interests of justice require
further District Court proceedings directed toward those
standards.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															The Court reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals because
it finds, after reexamination of the evidence supporting the
concurrent findings below, that

															"[r]espondents . . . failed to carry their burden of proving
that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the
Village's decision." Ante at 429 U. S. 270 .
The Court reaches this result by interpreting our decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), and applying it to this case, notwithstanding that the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in this case before Washington v. Davis was handed down, and thus did not have
the benefit of our decision when it found a Fourteenth Amendment
violation.

															The Court gives no reason for its failure to follow our usual
practice in this situation of vacating the judgment below and
remanding in order to permit the lower court to reconsider its
ruling in light of our intervening decision. The Court's
articulation of a legal standard nowhere mentioned in Davis indicates that it feels that the application of Davis to these facts calls for substantial analysis. If
this is true, we would do better to allow the Court of Appeals to
attempt that analysis in the first instance. Given that the Court
deems it necessary to reexamine the evidence in the case in light
of the legal standard it adopts, a remand is especially
appropriate. As the cases relied upon by the Court indicate, the
primary function of this Court is not to review the evidence
supporting findings of the lower courts. See, e.g., Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 , 376 U. S. 56 -57
(1964); Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398 , 325 U. S. 402 (1945). Page 429 U. S. 273 A further justification for remanding on the constitutional
issue is that a remand is required in any event on respondents'
Fair Housing Act claim, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., not yet
addressed by the Court of Appeals. While conceding that a remand is
necessary because of the Court of Appeals' "unorthodox" approach of
deciding the constitutional issue without reaching the statutory
claim, ante at 429 U. S. 271 ,
the Court refuses to allow the Court of Appeals to reconsider its
constitutional holding in light of Davis should it become
necessary to reach that issue.

															Even if I were convinced that it was proper for the Court to
reverse the judgment below on the basis of an intervening decision
of this Court and after a reexamination of concurrent findings of
fact below, I believe it is wholly unnecessary for the Court to
embark on a lengthy discussion of the standard for proving the
racially discriminatory purpose required by Davis for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. The District Court found that the
Village was motivated "by a legitimate desire to protect property
values and the integrity of the Village's zoning plan." The Court
of Appeals accepted this finding as not clearly erroneous, and the
Court quite properly refuses to overturn it on review here. There
is thus no need for this Court to list various "evidentiary
sources" or "subjects of proper inquiry" in determining whether a
racially discriminatory purpose existed.

															I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case for consideration of the statutory issue and, if
necessary, for consideration of the constitutional issue in light
of Washington v. Davis.