U.S. Supreme Court Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317 (1986) Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett No. 85-198 Argued April 1, 1986 Decided June 25, 1986 477
U.S. 317 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus In September, 1980, respondent administratrix filed this
wrongful death action in Federal District Court, alleging that her
husband's death in 1979 resulted from his exposure to asbestos
products manufactured or distributed by the defendants, who
included petitioner corporation. In September, 1981, petitioner
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that, during
discovery, respondent failed to produce any evidence to support her
allegation that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's
products. In response, respondent produced documents tending to
show such exposure, but petitioner argued that the documents were
inadmissible hearsay, and thus could not be considered in
opposition to the summary judgment motion. In July, 1982, the court
granted the motion because there was no showing of exposure to
petitioner's products, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that summary judgment in petitioner's favor was precluded because
of petitioner's failure to support its motion with evidence tending
to negate such exposure, as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(e) and the decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress
& Co., 398 U. S. 144 . Held: 1. The Court of Appeals' position is inconsistent with the
standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c), which
provides that summary judgment is proper

															"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

															Pp. 477 U. S.
322 -326.

															(a) The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to
any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders
all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed
to Page 477 U. S. 318 make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case
with respect to which it has the burden of proof. Pp. 477 U. S.
322 -323.

															(b) There is no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other
similar materials negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary,
Rule 56(c), which refers to the affidavits, "if any," suggests the
absence of such a requirement, and Rules 56(a) and (b) provide that
claimants and defending parties may move for summary judgment "with
or without supporting affidavits." Rule 56(e), which relates to the
form and use of affidavits and other materials, does not require
that the moving party's motion always be supported by affidavits to
show initially the absence of a genuine issue for trial. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, explained. Pp. 477 U. S.
323 -326.

															(c) No serious claim can be made that respondent was
"railroaded" by a premature motion for summary judgment, since the
motion was not filed until one year after the action was commenced,
and since the parties had conducted discovery. Moreover, any
potential problem with such premature motions can be adequately
dealt with under Rule 56(f). P. 477 U. S.
326 .

															2. The questions whether an adequate showing of exposure to
petitioner's products was in fact made by respondent in opposition
to the motion, and whether such a showing, if reduced to admissible
evidence, would be sufficient to carry respondent's burden of proof
at trial, should be determined by the Court of Appeals in the first
instance. Pp. 477 U. S.
326 -327.

															244 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181, reversed and remanded.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J.,
filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 328 .
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 477 U. S. 329 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 477 U. S.
337 . Page 477 U. S. 319 JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
granted the motion of petitioner Celotex Corporation for summary
judgment against respondent Catrett because the latter was unable
to produce evidence in support of her allegation in her wrongful
death complaint that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's
asbestos products. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, however, holding that
petitioner's failure to support its motion with evidence tending to
negate such exposure precluded the entry of summary judgment in its
favor. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244
U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181 (1985). This view conflicted with
that of the Third Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic
Products, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986). [ Footnote 1 ] We granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474 U.S. 944 (1985), and now
reverse the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit.

															Respondent commenced this lawsuit in September, 1980, alleging
that the death in 1979 of her husband, Louis H. Catrett, resulted
from his exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured or
distributed by 15 named corporations. Respondent's complaint
sounded in negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability.
Two of the defendants filed motions challenging the District
Court's in personam jurisdiction, and the remaining 13,
including petitioner, filed motions for summary judgment.
Petitioner's motion, which was first filed in September, 1981,
argued that summary judgment was proper because respondent had

															"failed to produce evidence that any [Celotex] product . . . was
the proximate cause of the injuries alleged within the
jurisdictional Page 477 U. S. 320 limits of [the District] Court."

															In particular, petitioner noted that respondent had failed to
identify, in answering interrogatories specifically requesting such
information, any witnesses who could testify about the decedent's
exposure to petitioner's asbestos products. In response to
petitioner's summary judgment motion, respondent then produced
three documents which she claimed "demonstrate that there is a
genuine material factual dispute" as to whether the decedent had
ever been exposed to petitioner's asbestos products. The three
documents included a transcript of a deposition of the decedent, a
letter from an official of one of the decedent's former employers
whom petitioner planned to call as a trial witness, and a letter
from an insurance company to respondent's attorney, all tending to
establish that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner's
asbestos products in Chicago during 1970-1971. Petitioner, in turn,
argued that the three documents were inadmissible hearsay, and thus
could not be considered in opposition to the summary judgment
motion.

															In July, 1982, almost two years after the commencement of the
lawsuit, the District Court granted all of the motions filed by the
various defendants. The court explained that it was granting
petitioner's summary judgment motion because

															"there [was] no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to the
defendant Celotex's product in the District of Columbia or
elsewhere within the statutory period."

															App. 217. [ Footnote 2 ]
Respondent Page 477 U. S. 321 appealed only the grant of summary judgment in favor of
petitioner, and a divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. The majority of the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner's summary judgment motion was rendered "fatally
defective" by the fact that petitioner "made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to
support its motion." 244 U.S.App.D.C. at 163, 756 F.2d at 184
(emphasis in original). According to the majority, Rule 56(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [ Footnote 3 ] and this Court's decision in Adickes v. S.
H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S. 159 (1970), establish that

															"the party opposing the motion for summary judgment bears the
burden of responding only after the moving party has met
its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any
genuine issues of material fact."

															244 U.S.App.D.C. at 163, 756 Page 477 U. S. 322 F.2d at 184 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The
majority therefore declined to consider petitioner's argument that
none of the evidence produced by respondent in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment would have been admissible at trial. Ibid. The dissenting judge argued that

															"[t]he majority errs in supposing that a party seeking summary
judgment must always make an affirmative evidentiary showing, even
in cases where there is not a triable, factual dispute." Id. at 167, 756 F.2d at 188 (Bork, J., dissenting).
According to the dissenting judge, the majority's decision
"undermines the traditional authority of trial judges to grant
summary judgment in meritless cases." Id. at 166, 756 F.2d
at 187.

															We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of
Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set
forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[ Footnote 4 ] Under Rule 56(c),
summary judgment is proper

															"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

															In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry
of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, Page 477 U. S. 323 there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which
she has the burden of proof. "[T]h[e] standard [for granting
summary judgment] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). . . ." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., ante at 477 U. S.
250 .

															Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But
unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied
requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion
with affidavits or other similar materials negating the
opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the
affidavits, if any " (emphasis added), suggests the absence
of such a requirement. And if there were any doubt about the
meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such doubt is clearly removed
by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide that claimants and
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment " with
or without supporting affidavits " (emphasis added). The import
of these subsections is that, regardless of whether the moving
party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the
motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before
the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of
the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported Page 477 U. S. 324 claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a
way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. [ Footnote 5 ]

															Respondent argues, however, that Rule 56(e), by its terms,
places on the nonmoving party the burden of coming forward with
rebuttal affidavits, or other specified kinds of materials, only in
response to a motion for summary judgment "made and supported as
provided in this rule." According to respondent's argument, since
petitioner did not "support" its motion with affidavits, summary
judgment was improper in this case. But as we have already
explained, a motion for summary judgment may be made pursuant to
Rule 56 "with or without supporting affidavits." In cases like the
instant one, where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of
proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion
may properly be made in reliance solely on the "pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file."
Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be
"made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56(e)
therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings
and by her own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

															We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in
a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary
judgment. Obviously, Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party
to depose her own witnesses. Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary
judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary
materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings
themselves, and it is from this list that one would normally expect
the nonmoving party to make the showing to which we have
referred. Page 477 U. S. 325 The Court of Appeals in this case felt itself constrained,
however, by language in our decision in Adickes v. S. H. Kress
& Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970). There we held that summary judgment had been improperly
entered in favor of the defendant restaurant in an action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the course of its opinion, the Adickes Court said that

															"both the commentary on and the background of the 1963 amendment
conclusively show that it was not intended to modify the burden of
the moving party . . . to show initially the absence of a genuine
issue concerning any material fact." Id. at 398 U. S. 159 .
We think that this statement is accurate in a literal sense, since
we fully agree with the Adickes Court that the 1963
amendment to Rule 56(e) was not designed to modify the burden of
making the showing generally required by Rule 56(c). It also
appears to us that, on the basis of the showing before the Court in Adickes, the motion for summary judgment in that case
should have been denied. But we do not think the Adickes language quoted above should be construed to mean that the burden
is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence
showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with
respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden
of proof. Instead, as we have explained, the burden on the moving
party may be discharged by "showing" -- that is, pointing out to
the district court -- that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case.

															The last two sentences of Rule 56(e) were added, as this Court
indicated in Adickes, to disapprove a line of cases
allowing a party opposing summary judgment to resist a properly
made motion by reference only to its pleadings. While the Adickes Court was undoubtedly correct in concluding that
these two sentences were not intended to reduce the burden of the
moving party, it is also obvious that they were not adopted to add to that burden. Yet that is exactly the result which
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals would produce; in effect, an
amendment to Rule 56(e) designed to Page 477 U. S. 326 facilitate the granting of motions for summary judgment
would be interpreted to make it more difficult to grant
such motions. Nothing in the two sentences themselves requires this
result, for the reasons we have previously indicated, and we now
put to rest any inference that they do so.

															Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that district courts are
widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that
she had to come forward with all of her evidence. See 244
U.S.App.D.C. at 167-168, 756 F.2d at 189 (Bork, J., dissenting);
10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2720, pp. 28-29 (1983). It would surely defy common
sense to hold that the District Court could have entered summary
judgment sua sponte in favor of petitioner in the instant
case, but that petitioner's filing of a motion requesting such a
disposition precluded the District Court from ordering it.

															Respondent commenced this action in September, 1980, and
petitioner's motion was filed in September, 1981. The parties had
conducted discovery, and no serious claim can be made that
respondent was in any sense "railroaded" by a premature motion for
summary judgment. Any potential problem with such premature motions
can be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f), [ Footnote 6 ] which allows a summary judgment motion
to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to be continued, if the
nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full
discovery.

															In this Court, respondent's brief and oral argument have been
devoted as much to the proposition that an adequate showing of
exposure to petitioner's asbestos products was Page 477 U. S. 327 made as to the proposition that no such showing should have been
required. But the Court of Appeals declined to address either the
adequacy of the showing made by respondent in opposition to
petitioner's motion for summary judgment or the question whether
such a showing, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be
sufficient to carry respondent's burden of proof at trial. We think
the Court of Appeals, with its superior knowledge of local law, is
better suited than we are to make these determinations in the first
instance.

															The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50 years
authorized motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the
lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact. Summary judgment
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action." Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. l; see Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 467
(1984). Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the
Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a
defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient
claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to
trial, with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and
private resources. But with the advent of "notice pleading," the
motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its
place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in
fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also
for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to
demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial,
that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. Page 477 U. S. 328 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Since our grant of certiorari in this case, the Fifth Circuit
has rendered a decision squarely rejecting the position adopted
here by the District of Columbia Circuit. See Fontenot v.
Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (1986).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS, in dissent, argues that the District Court
granted summary judgment only because respondent presented no
evidence that the decedent was exposed to Celotex asbestos products in the District of Columbia. See post at 477 U. S.
338 -339. According to JUSTICE STEVENS, we should affirm
the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court,
on the "narrower ground" that respondent "made an adequate showing"
that the decedent was exposed to Celotex asbestos products in
Chicago during 1970-1971. See ibid. JUSTICE STEVENS' position is factually incorrect. The District
Court expressly stated that respondent had made no showing of
exposure to Celotex asbestos products "in the District of Columbia or elsewhere. " App. 217 (emphasis added). Unlike JUSTICE
STEVENS, we assume that the District Court meant what it said. The
majority of the Court of Appeals addressed the very issue raised by
JUSTICE STEVENS, and decided that

															"[t]he District Court's grant of summary judgment must therefore
have been based on its conclusion that there was 'no showing that
the plaintiff was exposed to defendant Celotex's product in the
District of Columbia or elsewhere within the statutory
period.'" Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U.S.App.D.C.
160, 162, n. 3, 756 F.2d 181, 183, n. 3 (1985) (emphasis in
original). In other words, no judge involved in this case to date
shares JUSTICE STEVENS' view of the District Court's decision.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Rule 56(e) provides:

															"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
him."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Rule 56(c) provides:

															"The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of
hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages."

															[ Footnote 5 ] See Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A
Critical Analysis, 83 Yale L.J. 745, 752 (1974); Currie, Thoughts
on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 72, 79
(1977).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Rule 56(f) provides:

															"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery
to be had or may make such other order as is just."

															JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

															I agree that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that the
moving defendant must always support his motion with evidence or
affidavits showing the absence of a genuine dispute about a
material fact. I also agree that the movant may rely on
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the like, to
demonstrate that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case,
and hence that there can be no factual dispute. But the movant must
discharge the burden the Rules place upon him: it is not enough to
move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way
or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence
to prove his case.

															A plaintiff need not initiate any discovery or reveal his
witnesses or evidence unless required to do so under the discovery
Rules or by court order. Of course, he must respond if required to
do so; but he need not also depose his witnesses or obtain their
affidavits to defeat a summary judgment motion asserting only that
he has failed to produce any support for his case. It is the
defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the
suit.

															Petitioner Celotex does not dispute that, if respondent has
named a witness to support her claim, summary judgment should not
be granted without Celotex somehow showing that the named witness'
possible testimony raises no genuine issue of material fact. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 43, 45. It asserts, however, that respondent has failed
on request to produce any basis for her case. Respondent, on the
other hand, does not contend that she was not obligated to reveal
her witnesses and evidence, but insists that she has revealed
enough to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Because the Court
of Appeals found it unnecessary to address this aspect Page 477 U. S. 329 of the case, I agree that the case should be remanded for
further proceedings.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

															This case requires the Court to determine whether Celotex
satisfied its initial burden of production in moving for summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked evidence to
establish an essential element of her case at trial. I do not
disagree with the Court's legal analysis. The Court clearly rejects
the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the defendant must provide
affirmative evidence disproving the plaintiff's case. Beyond this,
however, the Court has not clearly explained what is required of a
moving party seeking summary judgment on the ground that the
nonmoving party cannot prove its case. [ Footnote 2/1 ] This lack of clarity is unfortunate:
district courts must routinely decide summary judgment motions, and
the Court's opinion will very likely create confusion. For this
reason, even if I agreed with the Court's result, I would have
written separately to explain more clearly the law in this area.
However, because I believe that Celotex did not meet its burden of
production under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, I respectfully
dissent from the Court's judgment. Page 477 U. S. 330 I Summary judgment is appropriate where the court is satisfied
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(c). The burden of establishing the
nonexistence of a "genuine issue" is on the party moving for
summary judgment. 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2727, p. 121 (2d ed.1983) (hereinafter
Wright) (citing cases); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker,
Moore's Federal Practice � 56.15[3] (2d ed.1985) (hereinafter
Moore) (citing cases). See also ante at 477 U. S. 323 ; ante at 477 U. S. 328 (WHITE, J., concurring). This burden has two distinct components:
an initial burden of production, which shifts to the nonmoving
party if satisfied by the moving party; and an ultimate burden of
persuasion, which always remains on the moving party. See 10A Wright § 2727. The court need not decide whether the moving
party has satisfied its ultimate burden of persuasion [ Footnote 2/2 ] unless and until the court
finds that the moving party has discharged its initial Page 477 U. S. 331 burden of production. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S.
157 -161 (1970); 1963 Advisory Committee's Notes on
Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(e), 28 U.S.C.App. p. 626.

															The burden of production imposed by Rule 56 requires the moving
party to make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to
summary judgment. 10A Wright § 2727. The manner in which this
showing can be made depends upon which party will bear the burden
of persuasion on the challenged claim at trial. If the moving party
will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must
support its motion with credible evidence -- using any of the
materials specified in Rule 56(c) -- that would entitle it to a
directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Ibid. Such
an affirmative showing shifts the burden of production to the party
opposing the motion, and requires that party either to produce
evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a "genuine
issue" for trial or to submit an affidavit requesting additional
time for discovery. Ibid.; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. 56(e),
(f).

															If the burden of persuasion at trial would be on the nonmoving
party, the party moving for summary judgment may satisfy Rule 56's
burden of production in either of two ways. First, the moving party
may submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element
of the nonmoving party's claim. Second, the moving party may
demonstrate to the court that the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving
party's claim. See 10A Wright § 2727, pp. 130-131; Louis,
Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 Yale
L.J. 745, 750 (1974) (hereinafter Louis). If the nonmoving party
cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial
would be useless, and the moving party is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
ante at 477 U. S.
249 .

															Where the moving party adopts this second option and seeks
summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party -- who will
bear the burden of persuasion at trial -- has Page 477 U. S. 332 no evidence, the mechanics of discharging Rule 56's burden of
production are somewhat trickier. Plainly, a conclusory assertion
that the nonmoving party has no evidence is insufficient. See
ante at 477 U. S. 328 (WHITE, J., concurring). Such a "burden" of production is no burden
at all, and would simply permit summary judgment procedure to be
converted into a tool for harassment. See Louis 750-751.
Rather, as the Court confirms, a party who moves for summary
judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party has no evidence
must affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record. Ante at 477 U. S. 323 .
This may require the moving party to depose the nonmoving party's
witnesses or to establish the inadequacy of documentary evidence.
If there is literally no evidence in the record, the moving party
may demonstrate this by reviewing for the court the admissions,
interrogatories, and other exchanges between the parties that are
in the record. Either way, however, the moving party must
affirmatively demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record
to support a judgment for the nonmoving party.

															If the moving party has not fully discharged this initial burden
of production, its motion for summary judgment must be denied, and
the court need not consider whether the moving party has met its
ultimate burden of persuasion. Accordingly, the nonmoving party may
defeat a motion for summary judgment that asserts that the
nonmoving party has no evidence by calling the court's attention to
supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or
ignored by the moving party. In that event, the moving party must
respond by making an attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of this
evidence, for it is only by attacking all the record evidence
allegedly supporting the nonmoving party that a party seeking
summary judgment satisfies Rule 56's burden of production.
[ Footnote 2/3 ] Thus, if the record
disclosed that the moving Page 477 U. S. 333 party had overlooked a witness who would provide relevant
testimony for the nonmoving party at trial, the court could not
find that the moving party had discharged its initial burden of
production unless the moving party sought to demonstrate the
inadequacy of this witness' testimony. Absent such a demonstration,
summary judgment would have to be denied on the ground that the
moving party had failed to meet its burden of production under Rule
56.

															The result in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, is fully consistent with these principles. In that case, petitioner
was refused service in respondent's lunchroom, and then was
arrested for vagrancy by a local policeman as she left. Petitioner
brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the refusal
of service and subsequent arrest were the product of a conspiracy
between respondent and the police; as proof of this conspiracy,
petitioner's complaint alleged that the arresting officer was in
respondent's store at the time service was refused. Respondent
subsequently moved for summary judgment on the ground that there
was no actual evidence in the record from which a jury could draw
an inference of conspiracy. In response, petitioner pointed to a
statement from her own deposition and an unsworn statement by a
Kress employee, both already in the record and both ignored by
respondent, that the policeman who arrested petitioner was in the
store at the time she was refused service. We agreed that

															"[i]f a policeman were present, . . . it would be open to a
jury, in light of the sequence that fol Page 477 U. S. 334 lowed, to infer from the circumstances that the policeman and
Kress employee had a 'meeting of the minds,' and thus reached an
understanding that petitioner should be refused service."

															398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 158 .
Consequently, we held that it was error to grant summary judgment
"on the basis of this record," because respondent had "failed to
fulfill its initial burden" of demonstrating that there was no
evidence that there was a policeman in the store. Id. at 398 U. S.
157 -158.

															The opinion in Adickes has sometimes been read to hold
that summary judgment was inappropriate because the respondent had
not submitted affirmative evidence to negate the possibility that
there was a policeman in the store. See Brief for
Respondent 20, n. 30 (citing cases). The Court of Appeals
apparently read Adickes this way, and therefore required
Celotex to submit evidence establishing that plaintiff's decedent
had not been exposed to Celotex asbestos. I agree with the Court
that this reading of Adickes was erroneous, and that
Celotex could seek summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff
could not prove exposure to Celotex asbestos at trial. However,
Celotex was still required to satisfy its initial burden of
production. II I do not read the Court's opinion to say anything inconsistent
with or different than the preceding discussion. My disagreement
with the Court concerns the application of these principles to the
facts of this case.

															Defendant Celotex sought summary judgment on the ground that
plaintiff had "failed to produce" any evidence that her decedent
had ever been exposed to Celotex asbestos. [ Footnote 2/4 ] App. 170. Celotex supported this motion
with a Page 477 U. S. 335 two-page "Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No
Genuine Issue" and a three-page "Memorandum of Points and
Authorities" which asserted that the plaintiff had failed to
identify any evidence in responding to two sets of interrogatories
propounded by Celotex, and that therefore the record was "totally
devoid" of evidence to support plaintiff's claim. See id. at 171-176.

															Approximately three months earlier, Celotex had filed an
essentially identical motion. Plaintiff responded to this earlier
motion by producing three pieces of evidence which she claimed
"[a]t the very least . . . demonstrate that there is a genuine
factual dispute for trial," id. at 143: (1) a letter from
an insurance representative of another defendant describing
asbestos products to which plaintiff's decedent had been exposed, id. at 160; (2) a letter from T. R. Hoff, a former
supervisor of decedent, describing asbestos products to which
decedent had been exposed, id. at 162; and (3) a copy of
decedent's deposition from earlier workmen's compensation
proceedings, id. at 164. Plaintiff also apparently
indicated Page 477 U. S. 336 at that time that she intended to call Mr. Hoff as a witness at
trial. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7, 27-29.

															Celotex subsequently withdrew its first motion for summary
judgment. See App. 167. [ Footnote 2/5 ] However, as a result of this motion, when
Celotex filed its second summary judgment motion, the record did
contain evidence -- including at least one witness -- supporting
plaintiff's claim. Indeed, counsel for Celotex admitted to this
Court at oral argument that Celotex was aware of this evidence and
of plaintiff's intention to call Mr. Hoff as a witness at trial
when the second summary judgment motion was filed. Tr. of Oral Arg.
5-7. Moreover, plaintiff's response to Celotex' second motion
pointed to this evidence -- noting that it had already been
provided to counsel for Celotex in connection with the first motion
-- and argued that Celotex had failed to "meet its burden of
proving that there is no genuine factual dispute for trial." App.
188.

															On these facts, there is simply no question that Celotex failed
to discharge its initial burden of production. Having chosen to
base its motion on the argument that there was no evidence in the
record to support plaintiff's claim, Celotex was not free to ignore
supporting evidence that the record clearly contained. Rather,
Celotex was required, as an initial matter, to attack the adequacy
of this evidence. Celotex' failure to fulfill this simple
requirement constituted a failure to discharge its initial burden
of production under Rule 56, and thereby rendered summary judgment
improper. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Page 477 U. S. 337 This case is indistinguishable from Adickes. Here, as
there, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the record contained no evidence to support an essential element of
the plaintiff's claim. Here, as there, the plaintiff responded by
drawing the court's attention to evidence that was already in the
record and that had been ignored by the moving party. Consequently,
here, as there, summary judgment should be denied on the ground
that the moving party failed to satisfy its initial burden of
production. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															It is also unclear what the Court of Appeals is supposed to do
in this case on remand. JUSTICE WHITE -- who has provided the
Court's fifth vote -- plainly believes that the Court of Appeals
should reevaluate whether the defendant met its initial burden of
production. However, the decision to reverse, rather than to vacate
the judgment below, implies that the Court of Appeals should assume
that Celotex has met its initial burden of production and ask only
whether the plaintiff responded adequately, and, if so, whether the
defendant has met its ultimate burden of persuasion that no genuine
issue exists for trial. Absent some clearer expression from the
Court to the contrary, JUSTICE WHITE's understanding would seem to
be controlling. Cf. Marks v. United States, 430 U.
S. 188 , 430 U. S. 193 (1977).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The burden of persuasion imposed on a moving party by Rule 56 is
a stringent one. 6 Moore � 56.15[3], p. 56-466; 10A Wright § 2727,
p. 124. Summary judgment should not be granted unless it is clear
that a trial is unnecessary, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
ante at 477 U. S. 255 ,
and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial
should be resolved against the moving party, Adickes v. S. H.
Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 , 398 U. S.
158 -159 (1970). In determining whether a moving party
has met its burden of persuasion, the court is obliged to take
account of the entire setting of the case, and must consider all
papers of record as well as any materials prepared for the motion.
10A Wright § 2721, p. 44; see, e.g., Stepanischen v. Merchants
Despatch Transportation Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 930 (CA1 1983); Higgenbotham v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 607 F.2d 653,
656 (CA5 1979). As explained by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust
Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U. S. 574 (1986),

															"[i]f . . . there is any evidence in the record from any source
from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party's] favor
may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary
judgment. . . ."

															723 F.2d at 258.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Once the moving party has attacked whatever record evidence --
if any -- the nonmoving party purports to rely upon, the burden of
production shifts to the nonmoving party, who must either (1)
rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party's papers,
(2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine
issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an
affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided
in Rule 56(f). See 10A Wright § 2727, pp. 138-143. Summary
judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond
in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party
responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its
ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine
issue of material fact for trial. See, e.g., First National
Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.
S. 253 , 391 U. S. 289 (1968).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS asserts that the District Court granted summary
judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show
exposure in the District of Columbia. He contends that the judgment
of the Court of Appeals reversing the District Court's judgment
should be affirmed on the "narrow ground" that it was "palpably
erroneous" to grant summary judgment on this basis. Post at 477 U. S. 339 (dissenting). The Court replies that what the District Court said
was that plaintiff had failed to show exposure in the District of
Columbia "or elsewhere." Ante at 477 U. S. 320 ,
n. 2. In my view, it does not really matter which reading is
correct in this case. For, contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' claim,
deciding this case on the ground that Celotex failed to meet its
burden of production under Rule 56 does not involve an "abstract
exercise in Rule construction." Post at 477 U. S. 339 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). To the contrary, the principles
governing a movant's burden of proof are straightforward and well
established, and deciding the case on this basis does not require a
new construction of Rule 56 at all; it simply entails applying
established law to the particular facts of this case. The choice to
reverse because of "palpable erro[r]" with respect to the burden of
a moving party under Rule 56 is thus no more "abstract" than the
choice to reverse because of such error with respect to the
elements of a tort claim. Indeed, given that the issue of the
moving party's burden under Rule 56 was the basis of the Court of
Appeals' decision, the question upon which certiorari was granted,
and the issue briefed by the parties and argued to the Court, it
would seem to be the preferable ground for deciding the case.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Celotex apparently withdrew this motion because, contrary to the
assertion made in the first summary judgment motion, its second set
of interrogatories had not been served on the plaintiff.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															If the plaintiff had answered Celotex' second set of
interrogatories with the evidence in her response to the first
summary judgment motion, and Celotex had ignored those
interrogatories and based its second summary judgment motion on the
first set of interrogatories only, Celotex obviously could not
claim to have discharged its Rule 56 burden of production. This
result should not be different simply because the evidence
plaintiff relied upon to support her claim was acquired by Celotex
other than in plaintiff's answers to interrogatories.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Although JUSTICE WHITE agrees that,

															"if [plaintiff] has named a witness to support her claim,
summary judgment should not be granted without Celotex somehow
showing that the named witness' possible testimony raises no
genuine issue of material fact,"

															he would remand "[b]ecause the Court of Appeals found it
unnecessary to address this aspect of the case." Ante at 477 U. S.
328 -329 (concurring). However, Celotex has admitted that
plaintiff had disclosed her intent to call Mr. Hoff as a witness at
trial before Celotex filed its second motion for summary judgment.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. Under the circumstances, then, remanding is a
waste of time.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															As the Court points out, ante at 477 U. S.
319 -320, petitioner's motion for summary judgment was
based on the proposition that respondent could not prevail unless
she proved that her deceased husband had been exposed to
petitioner's products "within the jurisdictional limits" of the
District of Columbia. [ Footnote
3/1 ] Page 477 U. S. 338 Respondent made an adequate showing -- albeit possibly not in
admissible form [ Footnote 3/2 ] --
that her husband had been exposed to petitioner's product in
Illinois. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Although
the basis of the motion and the argument had been the lack of
exposure in the District of Columbia, the District Court
stated at the end of the argument:

															"The Court will grant the defendant Celotex's motion for summary
judgment, there being no showing that the plaintiff was exposed to
the defendant Celotex's product in the District of Columbia or
elsewhere within the statutory period. App. 217 (emphasis
added). The District Court offered no additional explanation and no
written opinion. The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that
Celotex had not met its burden; the court noted the incongruity of
the District Court's opinion in the context of the motion and
argument, but did not rest on that basis because of the 'or
elsewhere' language. [ Footnote
3/4 ]"

															Taken in the context of the motion for summary judgment on the
basis of no exposure in the District of Columbia, the Page 477 U. S. 339 District Court's decision to grant summary judgment was palpably
erroneous. The court's bench reference to "or elsewhere" neither
validated that decision nor raised the complex question addressed
by this Court today. In light of the District Court's plain error,
therefore, it is perfectly clear that, even after this Court's
abstract exercise in Rule construction, we should nonetheless
affirm the reversal of summary judgment on that narrow ground.
[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] See Motion of Defendant Celotex Corporation for Summary
Judgment, App. 170 ("Defendant Celotex Corporation, pursuant to
Rule 56 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, moves this
Court for an Order granting Summary Judgment on the ground that
plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that any product designed,
manufactured or distributed by Celotex Corporation was the
proximate cause of the injuries alleged within the
jurisdictional limits of this Court ") (emphasis added);
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion of
Defendant Celotex Corporation for Summary Judgment, id. at
175 (Plaintiff "must demonstrate some link between a Celotex
Corporation product claimed to be the cause of the decedent's
illness and the decedent himself. The record is totally devoid of
any such evidence within the jurisdictional confines of this
Court ") (emphasis added); Transcript of Argument in Support of
Motion of Defendant Celotex Corporation for Summary Judgment, id. at 211 ("Our position is . . . there has been no
product identification of any Celotex products . . . that have been
used in the District of Columbia to which the decedent was
exposed") (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 3/2 ] But cf. ante at 477 U. S. 324 ("We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in
a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary
judgment").

															[ Footnote 3/3 ] See App. 160 (letter from Aetna Life Insurance Co.)
(referring to the "asbestos that Mr. Catrett came into contact with
while working for Anning-Johnson Company" and noting that the
"manufacturer of this product" was purchased by Celotex); id. at 162 (lettter from Anning-Johnson Co.) (confirming
that Catrett worked for the company and supervised the installation
of asbestos produced by the company that Celotex ultimately
purchased); id. at 164, 164c (deposition of Catrett)
(description of his work with asbestos "in Chicago").

															[ Footnote 3/4 ] See Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d
181, 185, n. 14 (1985) ("[T]he discussion at the time the motion
was granted actually spoke to venue. It was only the phrase or
elsewhere,' appearing with no prior discussion, in the judge's oral
ruling at the close of argument that made the grant of summary
judgment even conceivably proper"). [ Footnote 3/5 ] Cf. 477
U.S. 317 fn3/2|>n. 2, supra. The Court's statement
that the case should be remanded because the Court of Appeals has a
"superior knowledge of local law," ante at 477 U. S. 327 ,
is bewildering because there is no question of local law to be
decided. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.
S. 341 , 426 U. S.
345 -347 (1976).

															The Court's decision to remand when a sufficient ground for
affirmance is available does reveal, however, the Court's
increasing tendency to adopt a presumption of reversal. See,
e.g., New York v. P. J. Video, Inc., 475 U.
S. 868 , 475 U. S. 884 (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v.
Worthinston, 475 U. S. 709 , 475 U. S. 715 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 475 U. S. 796 , 475 U. S. 800 (1986) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania v.
Goldhammer, 474 U. S. 28 , 474 U. S. 81 (1985) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). As a matter of efficient judicial
administration and of respect for the state and federal courts, I
believe the presumption should be precisely the opposite.


Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court

U.S. Supreme Court Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987) Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Ct. of California No. 85-693 Argued November 5,
1986 Decided February 24,
1987 480
U.S. 102 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA Syllabus Petitioner manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells
them to several tire manufacturers, including Cheng Shin Rubber
Industrial Co. (Cheng Shin). The sales to Cheng Shin, which
amounted to at least 100,000 assemblies annually from 1978 to 1982,
took place in Taiwan, to which the assemblies were shipped from
Japan. Cheng Shin incorporates the assemblies into its finished
tires, which it sells throughout the world, including the United
States, where 20 percent of its sales take place in California.
Affidavits indicated that petitioner was aware that tires
incorporating its assemblies would end up in California, but, on
the other hand, that it never contemplated that its sales to Cheng
Shin in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuits in California.
Nevertheless, in 1979, a product liability suit was brought in
California Superior Court arising from a motorcycle accident
allegedly caused by defects in a tire manufactured by Cheng Shin,
which in turn filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from
petitioner. Although the main suit was eventually settled and
dismissed, the Superior Court denied petitioner's motion to quash
the summons issued against it. The State Court of Appeal then
ordered that the summons be quashed, but the State Supreme Court
reversed, finding that petitioner's intentional act of placing its
assemblies into the stream of commerce by delivering them to Cheng
Shin in Taiwan, coupled with its awareness that some of them would
eventually reach California, were sufficient to support state court
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is
remanded. 39 Cal. 3d 35 , 702 P.2d 543 ,
reversed and remanded.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts
I and II-B, concluding that the state court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over petitioner would be unreasonable and unfair, in
violation of the Due Process Clause. Pp. 480 U. S.
113 -116.

															(a) The burden imposed on petitioner by the exercise of state
court jurisdiction would be severe, since petitioner would be
required not only to traverse the distance between Japan and
California, but also to submit Page 480 U. S. 103 its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign judicial system. Such
unique burdens should have significant weight in assessing the
reasonableness of extending personal jurisdiction over national
borders. Pp. 480 U. S.
113 -114.

															(b) The interests of Cheng Shin and the forum State in the
exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner would be slight, and would
be insufficient to justify the heavy burdens placed on petitioner.
The only surviving question is whether a Japanese corporation
should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the bases of a sale
made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to Taiwan. The
facts do not demonstrate that it would be more convenient for Cheng
Shin to litigate its claim in California, rather than in Taiwan or
Japan, while California's interests are diminished by Cheng Shin's
lack of a California residence and by the fact that the dispute is
primarily about indemnity, rather than the safety of consumers.
While the possibility of being sued in California might create an
additional deterrent to petitioner's manufacture of unsafe
assemblies, the same effect would result from pressures placed on
petitioner by Cheng Shin, whose California sales would subject it
to state tort law. Pp. 480 U. S.
114 -115.

															(c) The procedural and substantive policies of other nations
whose interests are affected by the forum State's assertion of
jurisdiction over an alien defendant must be taken into account,
and great care must be exercised when considering personal
jurisdiction in the international context. Although other nations'
interests will differ from case to case, those interests, as well
as the Federal Government's interest in its foreign relations
policies, will always be best served by a careful inquiry into the
reasonableness of the particular assertion of jurisdiction, and an
unwillingness to find an alien defendant's serious burdens
outweighed where, as here, the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum State are minimal. P. 480 U. S.
115 .

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL,
and JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded in Parts II-A and III that, even
assuming, arguendo, that petitioner was aware that some of
the assemblies it sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into
tires sold in California, the facts do not establish minimum
contacts sufficient to render the State's exercise of personal
jurisdiction consistent with fair play and substantial justice, as
required by the Due Process Clause. Since petitioner does not do
business, have an office, agents, employees, or property, or
advertise or solicit business in California, and since it did not
create, control, or employ the distribution system that brought its
assemblies to, or design them in anticipation of sales in,
California, it did not engage in any action to purposely avail
itself of the California market. The "substantial connection"
between a defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must derive from an action purposely directed
toward the forum State, and the mere placement of a product Page 480 U. S. 104 into the stream of commerce is not such an act, even if done
with an awareness that the stream will sweep the product into the
forum State absent additional conduct indicating an intent to serve
the forum state market. Pp. 480 U. S.
108 -113, 116.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, agreed with the Court's conclusion in Part II-B
that the exercise of jurisdiction over petitioner would not comport
with "fair play and substantial justice," but disagreed with Part
II-A's interpretation of the stream-of-commerce theory, and with
the conclusion that petitioner did not purposely avail itself of
the California market. As long as a defendant is aware that the
final product is being marketed in the forum State, jurisdiction
premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce
is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and no showing of
additional conduct is required. Here, even though petitioner did
not design or control the distribution system that carried its
assemblies into California, its regular and extensive sales to a
manufacturer it knew was making regular sales of the final product
in California were sufficient to establish minimum contacts with
California. Pp. 480 U. S.
116 -121.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, joined by JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
agreed that the California Supreme Court's judgment should be
reversed for the reasons stated in Part II-B of the Court's
opinion, but did not join Part II-A, for the reasons that (1) the
Court's holding that the State's exercise of jurisdiction over
petitioner would be "unreasonable and unfair" alone requires
reversal, and renders any examination of minimum contacts
unnecessary; and (2) even assuming that the "purposeful availment"
test should be formulated here, Part II-A misapplies it to the
facts of this case, since, in its dealings with Cheng Shin,
petitioner has arguably engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than
the mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce. Pp. 480 U. S.
121 -122.

															O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part I, the
opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in which REHNQUIST,
C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A and III, in
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and POWELL and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BRENNAN,
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 480 U. S. 116 .
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, in which WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 480 U. S.
121 . Page 480 U. S. 105 JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court with respect to Part
I, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II-B, in which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, and an
opinion with respect to Parts II-A and III, in which THE CHIEF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE SCALIA join.

															This case presents the question whether the mere awareness on
the part of a foreign defendant that the components it
manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would
reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes
"minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State such
that the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 , 326 U. S. 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.
S. 457 , 311 U. S. 463 (1940). I On September 23, 1978, on Interstate Highway 80 in Solano
County, California, Gary Zurcher lost control of his Honda
motorcycle and collided with a tractor. Zurcher was severely
injured, and his passenger and wife, Ruth Ann Moreno, was killed.
In September 1979, Zurcher filed a product liability action in the
Superior Court of the State of Page 480 U. S. 106 California in and for the County of Solano. Zurcher alleged that
the 1978 accident was caused by a sudden loss of air and an
explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle, and alleged that the
motorcycle tire, tube, and sealant were defective. Zurcher's
complaint named, inter alia, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial
Co., Ltd. (Cheng Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube.
Cheng Shin in turn filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification
from its codefendants and from petitioner, Asahi Metal Industry
Co., Ltd. (Asahi), the manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly.
Zurcher's claims against Cheng Shin and the other defendants were
eventually settled and dismissed, leaving only Cheng Shin's
indemnity action against Asahi.

															California's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of
jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States." Cal.Civ.Proc.Code Ann. §
410.10 (West 1973). Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's service of
summons, arguing the State could not exert jurisdiction over it
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

															In relation to the motion, the following information was
submitted by Asahi and Cheng Shin. Asahi is a Japanese corporation.
It manufactures tire valve assemblies in Japan and sells the
assemblies to Cheng Shin, and to several other tire manufacturers,
for use as components in finished tire tubes. Asahi's sales to
Cheng Shin took place in Taiwan. The shipments from Asahi to Cheng
Shin were sent from Japan to Taiwan. Cheng Shin bought and
incorporated into its tire tubes 150,000 Asahi valve assemblies in
1978; 500,000 in 1979; 500,000 in 1980;100,000 in 1981; and 100,000
in 1982. Sales to Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi's
income in 1981 and 0.44 percent in 1982. Cheng Shin alleged that
approximately 20 percent of its sales in the United States are in
California. Cheng Shin purchases valve assemblies from other
suppliers as well, and sells finished tubes throughout the
world. Page 480 U. S. 107 In 1983, an attorney for Cheng Shin conducted an informal
examination of the valve stems of the tire tubes sold in one cycle
store in Solano County. The attorney declared that, of the
approximately 115 tire tubes in the store, 97 were purportedly
manufactured in Japan or Taiwan, and of those 97, 21 valve stems
were marked with the circled letter "A", apparently Asahi's
trademark. Of the 21 Asahi valve stems, 12 were incorporated into
Cheng Shin tire tubes. The store contained 41 other Cheng Shin
tubes that incorporated the valve assemblies of other
manufacturers. Declaration of Kenneth B. Shepard in Opposition to
Motion to Quash Subpoena, App. to Brief for Respondent 5-6. An
affidavit of a manager of Cheng Shin whose duties included the
purchasing of component parts stated:

															"In discussions with Asahi regarding the purchase of valve stem
assemblies, the fact that my Company sells tubes throughout the
world and specifically the United States has been discussed. I am
informed and believe that Asahi was fully aware that valve stem
assemblies sold to my Company and to others would end up throughout
the United States and in California." 39 Cal. 3d 35 ,
48, n. 4, 702 P.2d 543 ,
549-550, n. 4 (1985). An affidavit of the president of Asahi, on
the other hand, declared that Asahi "has never contemplated that
its limited sales of tire valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would
subject it to lawsuits in California." Ibid. The record
does not include any contract between Cheng Shin and Asahi. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 24.

															Primarily on the basis of the above information, the Superior
Court denied the motion to quash summons, stating:

															"Asahi obviously does business on an international scale. It is
not unreasonable that they defend claims of defect in their product
on an international scale."

															Order Denying Motion to Quash Summons, Zurcher v. Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Co., No. 76180 (Super. Ct., Solano County,
Cal., Apr. 20, 1983).

															The Court of Appeal of the State of California issued a
peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Superior Court to quash
service of summons. The court concluded that

															"it Page 480 U. S. 108 would be unreasonable to require Asahi to respond in California
solely on the basis of ultimately realized foreseeability that the
product into which its component was embodied would be sold all
over the world, including California."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. B5-B6.

															The Supreme Court of the State of California reversed and
discharged the writ issued by the Court of Appeal. 39 Cal. 3d 35 , 702 P.2d 543 (1985). The court observed:

															"Asahi has no offices, property or agents in California. It
solicits no business in California, and has made no direct sales
[in California]." Id. at 48, 702 P.2d at 549. Moreover, "Asahi did not
design or control the system of distribution that carried its valve
assemblies into California." Id. at 49, 702 P.2d at 549.
Nevertheless, the court found the exercise of jurisdiction over
Asahi to be consistent with the Due Process Clause. It concluded
that Asahi knew that some of the valve assemblies sold to Cheng
Shin would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in California, and
that Asahi benefited indirectly from the sale in California of
products incorporating its components. The court considered Asahi's
intentional act of placing its components into the stream of
commerce -- that is, by delivering the components to Cheng Shin in
Taiwan -- coupled with Asahi's awareness that some of the
components would eventually find their way into California,
sufficient to form the basis for state court jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause.

															We granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1044 (1986), and now
reverse. II B The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of a state court to exert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. "[T]he constitutional touchstone" of the
determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with due process "remains whether the defendant purposefully
established minimum contacts' in the Page 480 U. S.
109 forum State." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 , 471 U. S. 474 (1985), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. at 326 U. S. 316 .
Most recently, we have reaffirmed the oft-quoted reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U.S. 253 (1958), that
minimum contacts must have a basis in "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S.
475 .

															"Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts proximately
result from actions by the defendant himself that create a
'substantial connection' with the forum State." Ibid., quoting McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co., 355 U. S. 220 , 355 U. S. 223 (1957) (emphasis in original).

															Applying the principle that minimum contacts must be based on an
act of the defendant, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 (1980), rejected the assertion that a consumer's unilateral act of
bringing the defendant's product into the forum State was a
sufficient constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. It had been argued in World-Wide Volkswagen that, because an automobile retailer and its wholesale distributor
sold a product mobile by design and purpose, they could foresee
being haled into court in the distant States into which their
customers might drive. The Court rejected this concept of
foreseeability as an insufficient basis for jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 444 U. S.
295 -296. The Court disclaimed, however, the idea that
"foreseeability is wholly irrelevant" to personal jurisdiction,
concluding that

															"[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in
the forum State." Id. at 444 U. S.
297 -298 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned: Page 480 U. S. 110 "When a corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State,' Hanson v.
Denckla , 357 U.S. [235,] 357 U.S. 253 [(1958)], it has clear
notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate
the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing
the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State. Hence, if the sale of a
product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an
isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the
manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to
subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly
defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its
owners or to others." Id. at 444 U. S.
297 .

															In World-Wide Volkswagen itself, the state court sought
to base jurisdiction not on any act of the defendant, but on the
foreseeable unilateral actions of the consumer. Since World-Wide Volkswagen, lower courts have been confronted
with cases in which the defendant acted by placing a product in the
stream of commerce, and the stream eventually swept defendant's
product into the forum State, but the defendant did nothing else to
purposefully avail itself of the market in the forum State. Some
courts have understood the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in World-Wide Volkswagen, to allow an exercise of personal
jurisdiction to be based on no more than the defendant's act of
placing the product in the stream of commerce. Other courts have
understood the Due Process Clause and the above-quoted language in World-Wide Volkswagen to require the action of the
defendant to be more purposefully directed at the forum State than
the mere act of placing a product in the stream of commerce.

															The reasoning of the Supreme Court of California in the present
case illustrates the former interpretation of World-Wide
Volkswagen. The Supreme Court of California held that, because
the stream of commerce eventually brought Page 480 U. S. 111 some valves Asahi sold Cheng Shin into California, Asahi's
awareness that its valves would be sold in California was
sufficient to permit California to exercise jurisdiction over Asahi
consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The
Supreme Court of California's position was consistent with those
courts that have held that mere foreseeability or awareness was a
constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the
defendant's product made its way into the forum State while still
in the stream of commerce. See Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge
Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (CA5 1984); Hedrick v.
Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (CA9 1983).

															Other courts, however, have understood the Due Process Clause to
require something more than that the defendant was aware of its
product's entry into the forum State through the stream of commerce
in order for the State to exert jurisdiction over the defendant. In
the present case, for example, the State Court of Appeal did not
read the Due Process Clause, as interpreted by World-Wide
Volkswagen, to allow

															"mere foreseeability that the product will enter the forum state
[to] be enough by itself to establish jurisdiction over the
distributor and retailer."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. B5. In Humble v. Toyota Motor
Co., 727 F.2d 709 (CA8 1984), an injured car passenger brought
suit against Arakawa Auto Body Company, a Japanese corporation that
manufactured car seats for Toyota. Arakawa did no business in the
United States; it had no office, affiliate, subsidiary, or agent in
the United States; it manufactured its component parts outside the
United States and delivered them to Toyota Motor Company in Japan.
The Court of Appeals, adopting the reasoning of the District Court
in that case, noted that, although it "does not doubt that Arakawa
could have foreseen that its product would find its way into the
United States," it would be "manifestly unjust" to require Arakawa
to defend itself in the United States. Id. at 710-711,
quoting 578 F.
Supp. 530 , 533 (ND Iowa 1982). See also Hutson v. Fehr
Bros., Page 480 U. S. 112 Inc., 584 F.2d 833 (CA8 1978); see generally Max
Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 299 (CA3 1985)
(collecting "stream of commerce" cases in which the "manufacturers
involved had made deliberate decisions to market their products in
the forum state").

															We now find this latter position to be consonant with the
requirements of due process. The "substantial connection," Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S. 475 ; McGee, 355 U.S. at 355 U. S. 223 ,
between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding
of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Burger
King, supra, at 471 U. S. 476 ; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.
S. 770 , 465 U. S. 774 (1984). The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the defendant may
indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum
State, for example, designing the product for the market in the
forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or
marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve
as the sales agent in the forum State. But a defendant's awareness
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the
forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum
State.

															Assuming, arguendo, that respondents have established
Asahi's awareness that some of the valves sold to Cheng Shin would
be incorporated into tire tubes sold in California, respondents
have not demonstrated any action by Asahi to purposefully avail
itself of the California market. Asahi does not do business in
California. It has no office, agents, employees, or property in
California. It does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in
California. It did not create, control, or employ the distribution
system that brought its valves to California. Cf. Hicks v.
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Page 480 U. S. 113 452 F.
Supp. 130 (MD Pa. 1978). There is no evidence that Asahi
designed its product in anticipation of sales in California. Cf. Rockwell International Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche
Giovanni Agusta, 553 F.
Supp. 328 (ED Pa. 1982). On the basis of these facts, the
exertion of personal jurisdiction over Asahi by the Superior Court
of California exceeds the limits of due process. B The strictures of the Due Process Clause forbid a state court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over Asahi under circumstances that
would offend " traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
at 326 U. S. 316 ,
quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 311 U. S.
463 . We have previously explained that the determination of the
reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction in each case will
depend on an evaluation of several factors. A court must consider
the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and
the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in
its determination

															"the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of
the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 444 U. S. 292 (citations omitted). Page 480 U. S. 114 A consideration of these factors in the present case clearly
reveals the unreasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over
Asahi, even apart from the question of the placement of goods in
the stream of commerce.

															Certainly the burden on the defendant in this case is severe.
Asahi has been commanded by the Supreme Court of California not
only to traverse the distance between Asahi's headquarters in Japan
and the Superior Court of California in and for the County of
Solano, but also to submit its dispute with Cheng Shin to a foreign
nation's judicial system. The unique burdens placed upon one who
must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have
significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching
the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.

															When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests
of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will
justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant. In
the present case, however, the interests of the plaintiff and the
forum in California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi are
slight. All that remains is a claim for indemnification asserted by
Cheng Shin, a Tawainese corporation, against Asahi. The transaction
on which the indemnification claim is based took place in Taiwan;
Asahi's components were shipped from Japan to Taiwan. Cheng Shin
has not demonstrated that it is more convenient for it to litigate
its indemnification claim against Asahi in California, rather than
in Taiwan or Japan.

															Because the plaintiff is not a California resident, California's
legitimate interests in the dispute have considerably diminished.
The Supreme Court of California argued that the State had an
interest in "protecting its consumers by ensuring that foreign
manufacturers comply with the state's safety standards." 39 Cal. 3d
at 49, 702 P.2d at 550. The State Supreme Court's definition of
California's interest, however, was overly broad. The dispute
between Cheng Shin and Asahi is primarily about indemnification,
rather than safety Page 480 U. S. 115 standards. Moreover, it is not at all clear at this point that
California law should govern the question whether a Japanese
corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the basis
of a sale made in Taiwan and a shipment of goods from Japan to
Taiwan. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.
S. 797 , 472 U. S.
821 -822 (1985); Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 449 U. S. 302 , 449 U. S.
312 -313 (1981). The possibility of being haled into a
California court as a result of an accident involving Asahi's
components undoubtedly creates an additional deterrent to the
manufacture of unsafe components; however, similar pressures will
be placed on Asahi by the purchasers of its components as long as
those who use Asahi components in their final products, and sell
those products in California, are subject to the application of
California tort law. World-Wide Volkswagen also admonished courts to take
into consideration the interests of the "several States," in
addition to the forum State, in the efficient judicial resolution
of the dispute and the advancement of substantive policies. In the
present case, this advice calls for a court to consider the
procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose
interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the
California court. The procedural and substantive interests of other
nations in a state court's assertion of jurisdiction over an alien
defendant will differ from case to case. In every case, however,
those interests, as well as the Federal Government's interest in
its foreign relations policies, will be best served by a careful
inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in
the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious
burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on
the part of the plaintiff or the forum State. "Great care and
reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal
jurisdiction into the international field." United States v.
First National City Bank, 379 U. S. 378 , 379 U. S. 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Born, Reflections on
Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, to be published in 17
Ga.J.Int'l & Comp.L. 1 (1987). Page 480 U. S. 116 Considering the international context, the heavy burden on the
alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the
forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California
court over Asahi in this instance would be unreasonable and
unfair. III Because the facts of this case do not establish minimum contacts
such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consistent with
fair play and substantial justice, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of California is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. * We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could,
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants
based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than
on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the
federal court sits. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 293-295 (CA3 1985); DeJames v. Magnificence
Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (CA3 1981); see
also Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in
International Cases, to be published in 17 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp.
L. 1 (1987); Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien
Defendants, 69 Va.L.Rev. 85, 127-145 (1983).

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.

															I do not agree with the interpretation in Part II-A of the
stream-of-commerce theory, nor with the conclusion that Asahi did
not "purposely avail itself of the California market." Ante at 480 U. S. 112 .
I do agree, however, with the Court's conclusion in Part II-B that
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi in this case would
not comport with "fair play and substantial justice," International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.
S. 310 , 326 U. S. 320 (1945). This is one of those rare cases in which

															"minimum requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and
substantial justice' . . . defeat the reasonableness of
jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged
in forum activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.
S. 462 , 471 U. S.
477 -478 (1985). I therefore join Parts I and II-B of the
Court's opinion, and write separately to explain my disagreement
with Part II-A.

															Part II-A states that

															"a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will
sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere
act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward Page 480 U. S. 117 the forum State." Ante at 480 U. S. 112 .
Under this view, a plaintiff would be required to show
"[a]dditional conduct" directed toward the forum before finding the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant to be consistent with
the Due Process Clause. Ibid. I see no need for such a
showing, however. The stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and
anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to
retail sale. As long as a participant in this process is aware that
the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will
the litigation present a burden for which there is no corresponding
benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce
benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in
the forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that
regulate and facilitate commercial activity. These benefits accrue
regardless of whether that participant directly conducts business
in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct directed
toward that State. Accordingly, most courts and commentators have
found that jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into
the stream of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause,
and have not required a showing of additional conduct. [ Footnote 1 ] Page 480 U. S. 118 The endorsement in Part II-A of what appears to be the minority
view among Federal Courts of Appeals [ Footnote 2 ] represents a marked retreat from the analysis
in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.
S. 286 (1980). In that case,

															"respondents [sought] to base jurisdiction on one isolated
occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom: the
fortuitous circumstance that a single Audi automobile, sold in New
York to New York residents, happened to suffer an accident while
passing through Oklahoma." Id. at 444 U. S. 295 .
The Court held that the possibility of an accident in Oklahoma,
while to some extent foreseeable in light of the inherent mobility
of the automobile, was not enough to establish Page 480 U. S. 119 minimum contacts between the forum State and the retailer or
distributor. Id. at 444 U. S.
295 -296. The Court then carefully explained:

															"[T]his is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there." Id. at 444 U. S. 297 .
The Court reasoned that, when a corporation may reasonably
anticipate litigation in a particular forum, it cannot claim that
such litigation is unjust or unfair, because it

															"can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by
procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to consumers,
or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the
State." Ibid. To illustrate the point, the Court contrasted the foreseeability
of litigation in a State to which a consumer fortuitously
transports a defendant's product (insufficient contacts) with the
foreseeability of litigation in a State where the defendant's
product was regularly sold (sufficient contacts). The
Court stated:

															"Hence, if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or
distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject
it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to
others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased Page 480 U. S. 120 by consumers in the forum State." Id. at 444 U. S.
297 -298 (emphasis added). The Court concluded its
illustration by referring to Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d
432 , 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961), a well known stream-of-commerce case in which the
Illinois Supreme Court applied the theory to assert jurisdiction
over a component parts manufacturer that sold no components
directly in Illinois, but did sell them to a manufacturer who
incorporated them into a final product that was sold in Illinois.
444 U.S. at 444 U. S.
297 -298.

															The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen thus took great care
to distinguish

															"between a case involving goods which reach a distant State
through a chain of distribution and a case involving goods which
reach the same State because a consumer . . . took them there." Id. at 444 U. S.
306 -307 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 3 ] The California Supreme Court took note
of this distinction, and correctly concluded that our holding in World-Wide Volkswagen preserved the stream-of-commerce
theory. See App. to Pet. for Cert. C-9, and n. 3,
C-13-C-15; cf. Comment, Federalism, Due Process, and
Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1341, 1359-1361, and nn. 140-146 (1980). Page 480 U. S. 121 In this case, the facts found by the California Supreme Court
support its finding of minimum contacts. The court found that,

															"[a]lthough Asahi did not design or control the system of
distribution that carried its valve assemblies into California,
Asahi was aware of the distribution system's operation, and it knew
that it would benefit economically from the sale in California of
products incorporating its components."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. C-11. [ Footnote 4 ] Accordingly, I cannot join the determination
in Part II-A that Asahi's regular and extensive sales of component
parts to a manufacturer it knew was making regular sales of the
final product in California is insufficient to establish minimum
contacts with California.

															[ Footnote 1 ] See, e.g., Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Technology
Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (CA5 1984); Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji
Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (CA9 1983); Nelson v. Park Industries,
Inc., 717 F.2d 1120, 1126 (CA7 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984); Stabilisierungsfonds fur Wein v. Kaiser
Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 207 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 378,
647 F.2d 200, 203 (1981); Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh, 618
F.2d 1186, 1190-1191 (CA6), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841
(1980); cf. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v.
Philadelphia Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440 (CA10 1985) (endorsing
stream-of-commerce theory, but finding it inapplicable in instant
case), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986); Montalbano
v. Easco Hand Tools, Inc., 766 F.2d 737 (CA2 1985) (noting
potential applicability of stream-of-commerce theory, but remanding
for further factual findings). See generally Currie, The
Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U.Ill.Law Forum 533, 546-560 (approving and tracing
development of the stream-of-commerce theory); C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069, pp. 259-261 (1969)
(recommending in effect a stream-of-commerce approach); Von Mehren
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 Harv.L.Rev. 1121, 1168-1172 (1966) (same).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit appears to be the
only Court of Appeals to have expressly adopted a narrow
construction of the stream-of-commerce theory analogous to the one
articulated in Part II-A today, although the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit has implicitly adopted it. See Humble v.
Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., 727 F.2d 709 (CA8 1984); Banton
Industries, Inc. v. Dimatic Die & Tool Co., 801 F.2d 1283
(CA11 1986). Two other Courts of Appeals have found the theory
inapplicable when only a single sale occurred in the forum State,
but do not appear committed to the interpretation of the theory
that the Court adopts today. E.g., Chung v. NANA Development
Corp., 783 F.2d 1124 (CA4), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
948 (1986); Dalmau Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 781
F.2d 9 (CA1 1986). Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has not interpreted the theory as JUSTICE O'CONNOR's
opinion has, but has rejected stream-of-commerce arguments for
jurisdiction when the relationship between the distributor and the
defendant "remains in dispute" and "evidence indicating that
[defendant] could anticipate either use of its product or
litigation in [the forum State] is totally lacking," Max
Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 298, 300, n. 13, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), and when the
defendant's product was not sold in the forum State and the
defendant "did not take advantage of an indirect marketing scheme," DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															In dissent, I argued that the distinction was without
constitutional significance, because, in my view, the
foreseeability that a customer would use a product in a distant
State was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 444 U.S. at 444 U. S.
306 -307, and nn. 11, 12. See also id. at 444 U. S. 315 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree that jurisdiction is
necessarily lacking if the product enters the State not through the
channels of distribution, but in the course of its intended use by
the consumer"); id. at 444 U. S.
318 -319 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ("[F]oreseeable use
in another State seems to me little different from foreseeable
resale in another State"). But I do not read the decision in World-Wide Volkswagen to establish a per se rule
against the exercise of jurisdiction where the contacts arise from
a consumer's use of the product in a given State, but only a rule
against jurisdiction in cases involving "one isolated occurrence
[of consumer use, amounting to] . . . the fortuitous circumstance.
. . ." Id. at 444 U. S. 295 . See Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d at 1358-1359.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Moreover, the Court found that "at least 18 percent of the tubes
sold in a particular California motorcycle supply shop contained
Asahi valve assemblies," App. to Pet. for Cert. C-11, n. 5, and
that Asahi had an ongoing business relationship with Cheng Shin
involving average annual sales of hundreds of thousands of valve
assemblies, id. at C-2.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of California should be
reversed for the reasons stated in Part II-B of the Court's
opinion. While I join Parts I and II-B, I do not join Part II-A for
two reasons. First, it is not necessary to the Court's decision. An
examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to
determine whether a state court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction is constitutional. See Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 , 471 U. S.
476 -478 (1985). Part II-B establishes, after considering
the factors set forth in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 , 444 U. S. 292 (1980), that California's exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi in
this case would be "unreasonable and unfair." Ante at 480 U. S. 116 .
This finding alone requires reversal; this case fits within the
rule that

															"minimum requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and
substantial justice' may defeat Page 480 U. S. 122 the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has
purposefully engaged in forum activities." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471 U. S.
477 -478 (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U. S. 310 , 326 U. S. 320 (1945)). Accordingly, I see no reason in this case for the
plurality to articulate "purposeful direction" or any other test as
the nexus between an act of a defendant and the forum State that is
necessary to establish minimum contacts.

															Second, even assuming that the test ought to be formulated here,
Part II-A misapplies it to the facts of this case. The plurality
seems to assume that an unwavering line can be drawn between "mere
awareness" that a component will find its way into the forum State
and "purposeful availment" of the forum's market. Ante at 480 U. S. 112 .
Over the course of its dealings with Cheng Shin, Asahi has arguably
engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than "[t]he placement of a
product into the stream of commerce, without more. . . ." Ibid. Whether or not this conduct rises to the level of
purposeful availment requires a constitutional determination that
is affected by the volume, the value, and the hazardous character
of the components. In most circumstances I would be inclined to
conclude that a regular course of dealing that results in
deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of several
years would constitute "purposeful availment," even though the item
delivered to the forum State was a standard product marketed
throughout the world.