NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the
Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the
preliminary print goes to press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–7822

															_________________

															WALTER FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal
of california for the second appellate district

															[February 25, 2014]

															     Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.

															     Our cases firmly
establish that police officers may search jointly occupied premises
if one of the occupants[ 1 ]
consents. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974) .
In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103 (2006) , we recognized a
narrow exception to this rule, holding that the consent of one
occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and
objects to the search. In this case, we consider whether Randolph
applies if the objecting occupant is absent when another occupant
consents. Our opinion in Randolph took great pains to emphasize
that its holding was limited to situations in which the objecting
occupant is physically present. We therefore refuse to extend
Randolph to the very different situation in this case, where
consent was provided by an abused woman well after her male partner
had been removed from the apartment they shared.

															I

															A

															     The events involved
in this case occurred in Los Angeles in October 2009. After
observing Abel Lopez cash a check, petitioner Walter Fernandez
approached Lopez and asked about the neighborhood in which he
lived. When Lopez responded that he was from Mexico, Fernandez
laughed and told Lopez that he was in territory ruled by the
“D.F.S.,” i.e., the “Drifters” gang. App.
4–5. Petitioner then pulled out a knife and pointed it at
Lopez’ chest. Lopez raised his hand in self-defense, and
petitioner cut him on the wrist.

															     Lopez ran from the
scene and called 911 for help, but petitioner whistled, and four
men emerged from a nearby apartment building and attacked Lopez.
After knocking him to the ground, they hit and kicked him and took
his cell phone and his wallet, which contained $400 in cash.

															     A police dispatch
reported the incident and mentioned the possibility of gang
involvement, and two Los Angeles police officers, Detective Clark
and Officer Cirrito, droveto an alley frequented by members of the
Drifters. A man who appeared scared walked by the officers and
said: “ ‘[T]he guy is in the
apartment.’ ” Id., at 5. The officers then
observed a man run through the alley and into the building to which
the man was pointing. A minute or two later, the officers heard
sounds of screaming and fighting coming from that building.

															     After backup arrived,
the officers knocked on the door of the apartment unit from which
the screams had been heard. Roxanne Rojas answered the door. She
was holding a baby and appeared to be crying. Her face was red, and
she had a large bump on her nose. The officers also saw blood on
her shirt and hand from what appeared to be a fresh injury. Rojas
told the police that she had been in a fight. Officer Cirrito asked
if anyone else was in the apartment, and Rojas said that her
4-year-old son was the only other person present.

															     After Officer Cirrito
asked Rojas to step out of the apartment so that he could conduct a
protective sweep, petitioner appeared at the door wearing only
boxer shorts. Apparently agitated, petitioner stepped forward and
said, “ ‘You don’t have any right to come in
here. I know my rights.’ ” Id., at 6. Suspecting
that petitioner had assaulted Rojas, the officers removed him from
the apartmentand then placed him under arrest. Lopez identified
petitioner as his initial attacker, and petitioner was taken to the
police station for booking.

															     Approximately one hour
after petitioner’s arrest, Detective Clark returned to the
apartment and informed Rojas that petitioner had been arrested.
Detective Clark requested and received both oral and written
consent from Rojas to search the premises.[ 2 ] In the apartment, the police found Drifters gang
paraphernalia, a butterfly knife, clothing worn by the robbery
suspect, and ammunition. Rojas’ young son also showed the
officers where petitioner had hidden a sawed-off shotgun.

															B

															     Petitioner was
charged with robbery, Cal. Penal Code Ann. §211 (West 2008),
infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or
child’s parent, §273.5(a), possession of a firearm by a
felon, §12021(a)(1)(West 2009), possession of a short-barreled
shotgun, §12020(a)(1), and felony possession of ammunition,
§12316(b)(1).

															     Before trial,
petitioner moved to suppress the evidence found in the apartment,
but after a hearing, the court denied the motion. Petitioner then
pleaded nolo conten-dere to the firearms and ammunition charges. On
the re-maining counts—for robbery and infliction of corporal
injury—he went to trial and was found guilty by a jury. The
court sentenced him to 14 years of imprisonment.

															     The California Court of
Appeal affirmed. 208 Cal. App. 4th 100, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51
(2012). Because Randolph did not overturn our prior decisions
recognizing that an occupant may give effective consent to search a
shared residence, the court agreed with the majority of the federal
circuits that an objecting occupant’s physical presence is
“indispensible to the decision in Randolph.” Id., at
122, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 66.[ 3 ] And because petitioner was not present when Rojas
consented, the court held that petitioner’s suppression
motion had been properly denied. Id., at 121, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at
65.

															     The California Supreme
Court denied the petition for review, and we granted certiorari.
569 U. S. ___ (2013).

															II

															A

															     The Fourth Amendment
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that a
warrant may not be issued without probable cause, but “the
text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify when a search warrant
must be obtained.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U. S. ___, ___
(2011) (slip op., at 5). Our cases establish that a warrant is
generally required for a search of a home, Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006) , but “the ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness,’ ” ibid.; see also Michigan
v. Fisher, 558 U. S. 45, 47 (2009) ( per curiam). And
certain categories of permissible warrantless searches have long
been recognized.

															     Consent searches occupy
one of these categories. “Consent searches are part of the
standard investigatorytechniques of law enforcement agencies”
and are “a con-stitutionally permissible and wholly
legitimate aspect of effective police activity.” Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 –232 (1973). It would be
unreasonable—indeed, absurd—to require police officers
to obtain a warrant when the sole owner or occupant of a house or
apartment voluntarily consents to a search. The owner of a home has
a right to allow others to enter and examine the premises, and
there is no reason why the owner should not be permitted to extend
this same privilege to police officers if that is the owner’s
choice. Where the owner believes that he or she is under suspicion,
the owner may want the police to search the premises so that their
suspicions are dispelled. This may be particularly important where
the owner has a strong interest in the apprehension of the
perpetrator of a crime and believes that the suspicions of the
police are deflecting the course of their investigation. An owner
may want the police to search even where they lack probable cause,
and if a warrant were always required, this could not be done. And
even where the police could establish probable cause, requiring a
warrant despite the owner’s consent would needlessly
inconvenience everyone involved—not only the officers and the
magistrate but also the occupant of the premises, who would
generally either be compelled or would feel a need to stay until
the search was completed. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692,
701 (1981) .[ 4 ]

															     While it is clear that
a warrantless search is reasonable when the sole occupant of a
house or apartment consents, what happens when there are two or
more occupants? Must they all consent? Must they all be asked? Is
consent by one occupant enough? The Court faced that problem 40
years ago in United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 (1974)
.

															     In that case, Matlock
and a woman named Graff were living together in a house that was
also occupied by several of Graff’s siblings and by her
mother, who had rentedthe house. While in the front yard of the
house, Matlock was arrested for bank robbery and was placed in a
squad car. Although the police could have easily asked him for
consent to search the room that he and Graff shared, they did not
do so. Instead, they knocked on the door and obtained Graff’s
permission to search. The search yielded incriminating evidence,
which the defendant sought to suppress, but this Court held that
Graff’s consent justified the warrantless search. As the
Court put it, “the consent of one who possesses common
authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.”
Id., at 170.

															     In Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 (1990) , the Court reaffirmed and
extended the Matlock holding. In Rodriguez, a woman named Fischer
told police officers that she had been assaulted by Rodriguez in
what she termed “ ‘our’ apartment.”
497 U. S., at 179. She also informed the officers that
Rodriguez was asleep in the apartment, and she then accompanied the
officers to that unit. When they arrived, the officers could have
knocked on the door and awakened Rodriguez, and had they done so,
Rodriguez might well have surrendered at the door and objected to
the officers’ entry. Instead, Fischer unlocked the door, the
officers entered without a warrant, and they saw drug paraphernalia
and containers filled with white powder in plain view.

															     After the search, the
police learned that Fischer no longer resided at the apartment, and
this Court held that she did not have common authority over the
premises at the time in question. The Court nevertheless held that
the warrantless entry was lawful because the police reasonably
believed that Fischer was a resident. Id., at 188–189.

															B

															     While consent by one
resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to
justify a warrantless search, we recognized a narrow exception to
this rule in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103 (2006) . In
that case, police offi-cers responded to the Randolphs’ home
after receiving a report of a domestic dispute. When the officers
arrived, Janet Randolph informed the officers that her estranged
husband, Scott Randolph, was a cocaine user and that there were
“items of drug evidence” in the house. Id., at 107
(internal quotation marks omitted). The officers first asked Scott
for consent to search, but he “unequivocally refused.”
Ibid. The officers then turned to Janet, and she consented to the
search, which produced evidence that was later used to convict
Scott for possession of cocaine.

															     Without questioning the
prior holdings in Matlock and Rodriguez, this Court held that Janet
Randolph’s consent was insufficient under the circumstances
to justify the warrantless search. The Court reiterated the
proposition that a person who shares a residence with others
assumes the risk that “any one of them may admit visitors,
with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may nevertheless
be admitted in his absence by another.” 547 U. S., at
111. But the Court held that “a physically present
inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search
[of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent
of a fellow occupant.” Id., at 122–123 (emphasis
added).

															     The Court’s
opinion went to great lengths to make clear that its holding was
limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present.
Again and again, the opinion of the Court stressed this controlling
factor. See id., at 106 (“present at the scene”); ibid.
(“physically present”); id., at 108 (“a co-tenant
who is present”); id., at 109 (“physically
present”); id., at 114 (“a present and objecting
co-tenant”); id., at 119 (a co-tenant “standing at the
door and expressly refusing consent”); id., at 120 (“a
physically present resident”), id., at 121 (“a
physically present fellow tenant objects”); ibid. (“[A]
potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is at the door
and objects”); id., at 122 (“[A] physically present
inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search is
dispositive as to him”). The Court’s opinion could
hardly have been clearer on this point, and the separate opinion
filed by Justice Breyer, whose vote was decisive, was equally
unambiguous. See id., at 126 (concurring) (“The Court’s
opinion does not apply where the objector is not present ‘and
object[ing]’ ”).

															III

															     In this case,
petitioner was not present when Rojas consented, but petitioner
still contends that Randolph is controlling. He advances two main
arguments. First, he claims that his absence should not matter
since he was absent only because the police had taken him away.
Second, he maintains that it was sufficient that he objected to the
search while he was still present. Such an objection, he says,
should remain in effect until the objecting party “no longer
wishes to keep the police out of his home.” Brief for
Petitioner 8. Neither of these arguments is sound.

															A

															     We first consider the
argument that the presence of the objecting occupant is not
necessary when the police are responsible for his absence. In
Randolph, the Court suggested in dictum that consent by one
occupant might not be sufficient if “there is evidence that
the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the
entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection.” 547
U. S., at 121. We do not believe the statement should be read
to suggest that improper motive may invalidate objectively
justified removal. Hence, it does not govern here.

															     The Randolph dictum is
best understood not to require an inquiry into the subjective
intent of officers who detain or arrest a potential objector but
instead to refer to situations in which the removal of the
potential objector is not objectively reasonable. As petitioner
acknowledges, see Brief for Petitioner 25, our Fourth Amendment
cases “have repeatedly rejected” a subjective approach.
Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 404 (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Indeed, we have never held,
outside limited contexts such as an ‘inventory search or
administrative inspection . . . , that an officer’s
motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the
Fourth Amendment.’ ” King, 563 U. S., at ___
(slip op.,at 10).

															     Petitioner does not
claim that the Randolph Court meant to break from this consistent
practice, and we do not think that it did. And once it is
recognized that the test is one of objective reasonableness,
petitioner’s argument collapses. He does not contest the fact
that the police had reasonable grounds for removing him from the
apartment so that they could speak with Rojas, an apparent victim
of domestic violence, outside of petitioner’s potentially
intimidating presence. In fact, he does not even contest the
existence of probable cause to place him under arrest. We therefore
hold that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or
arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for
any other reason.

															     This conclusion does
not “make a mockery of Randolph,” as petitioner
protests. Brief for Petitioner 9. It simply accepts Randolph on its
own terms. The Randolph holding unequivocally requires the presence
of the objecting occupant in every situation other than the one
mentioned in the dictum discussed above.

															B

															     This brings us to
petitioner’s second argument, viz., that his objection, made
at the threshold of the premises that the police wanted to search,
remained effective until he changed his mind and withdrew his
objection. This argument is inconsistent with Randolph’s
reasoning in at least two important ways. First, the argument
cannot be squared with the “widely shared social
expectations” or “customary social usage” upon
which the Randolph holding was based. See 547 U. S., at 111,
121. Explaining why consent by one occupant could not override an
objection by a physically present occupant, the Randolph Court
stated:

															“[I]t is fair to say that a caller
standing at the door of shared premises would have no confidence
that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason
to enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, ‘stay
out.’ Without some very good reason, no sensible person would
go inside under those conditions.” Id., at 113.

															     It seems obvious that
the calculus of this hypothetical caller would likely be quite
different if the objecting tenant was not standing at the door.
When the objecting occupant is standing at the threshold saying
“stay out,” a friend or visitor invited to enter by
another occupant can expect at best an uncomfortable scene and at
worst violence if he or she tries to brush past the objector. But
when the objector is not on the scene (and especially when it is
known that the objector will not return during the course of the
visit), the friend or visitor is much more likely to accept the
invitation to enter.[ 5 ] Thus,
petitioner’s argument is inconsistent with Randolph’s
reasoning.

															     Second,
petitioner’s argument would create the very sort of practical
complications that Randolph sought to avoid. The Randolph Court
recognized that it was adopting a “formalis[tic]” rule,
but it did so in the interests of “simple clarity” and
administrability. Id., at 121, 122.

															     The rule that
petitioner would have us adopt would produce a plethora of
practical problems. For one thing, there is the question of
duration. Petitioner argues that an objection, once made, should
last until it is withdrawn by the objector, but such a rule would
be unreasonable. Suppose that a husband and wife owned a house as
joint tenants and that the husband, after objecting to a search of
the house, was convicted and sentenced to a 15-year prison term.
Under petitioner’s proposed rule, the wife would be unable to
consent to a search of the house 10 years after the date on which
her husband objected. We refuse to stretch Randolph to such strange
lengths.

															     Nor are we persuaded to
hold that an objection lasts for a “reasonable” time.
“[I]t is certainly unusual for this Court to set forth
precise time limits governing police action,” Maryland v.
Shatzer, 559 U. S. 98, 110 (2010) , and what interval of time
would be reasonable in this context? A week? A month? A year? Ten
years?

															     Petitioner’s rule
would also require the police and ultimately the courts to
determine whether, after the passage of time, an objector still had
“common authority” over the premises, and this would
often be a tricky question. Suppose that an incarcerated objector
and a consenting co-occupant were joint tenants on a lease. If the
objector, after incarceration, stopped paying rent, would he still
have “common authority,” and would his objection retain
its force? Would it be enough that his name remainedon the lease?
Would the result be different if the object-ing and consenting
lessees had an oral month-to-month tenancy?

															     Another problem
concerns the procedure needed to register a continuing objection.
Would it be necessary for an occupant to object while police
officers are at the door? If presence at the time of consent is not
needed, would an occupant have to be present at the premises when
the objection was made? Could an objection be made pre-emptively?
Could a person like Scott Randolph, suspecting that his estranged
wife might invite the police to view his drug stash and
paraphernalia, register an objection in advance? Could this be done
by posting a sign in front of the house? Could a standing objection
be registered by serving notice on the chief of police?

															     Finally, there is the
question of the particular law enforcement officers who would be
bound by an objection. Would this set include just the officers who
were present when the objection was made? Would it also apply to
other officers working on the same investigation? Would it extend
to officers who were unaware of the objection? How about officers
assigned to different but arguably related cases? Would it be
limited by law enforcement agency?

															     If Randolph is taken at
its word—that it applies only when the objector is standing
in the door saying “stay out” when officers propose to
make a consent search—all of these problems disappear.

															     In response to these
arguments, petitioner argues that Randolph’s requirement of
physical presence is not without its own ambiguity. And we
acknowledge that if, as we conclude, Randolph requires presence on
the premises to be searched, there may be cases in which the outer
boundary of the premises is disputed. The Court confronted a
similar problem last Term in Bailey v. United States, 568
U. S. ___ (2013), but despite arguments similar to those now
offered by petitioner, the Court adopted a rule that applies only
when the affected individual is near the premises being searched.
Having held that a premises rule is workable in that context, we
see no ground for reaching a different conclusion here.

															C

															     Petitioner argues
strenuously that his expansive interpretation of Randolph would not
hamper law enforcement because in most cases where officers have
probable cause to arrest a physically present objector they also
have probable cause to search the premises that the objector does
not want them to enter, see Brief for Petitioner 20–23, but
this argument misunderstands the constitutional status of consent
searches. A warrantless consent search is reasonable and thus
consistent with the Fourth Amendment irrespective of the
availability of a warrant. Even with modern technological advances,
the warrant procedure imposes burdens on the officers who wish to
search, the magistrate who must review the warrant application, and
the party willing to give consent. Whena warrantless search is
justified, requiring the police to obtain a warrant may
“unjustifiably interfer[e] with legitimate law enforcement
strategies.” King, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13).
Such a requirement may also impose an unmerited burden on the
person who consents to an immediate search, since the warrant
application procedure entails delay. Putting the exception the
Court adopted in Randolph to one side, the lawful occupant of a
house or apartment should have the right to invite the police to
enter the dwelling and conduct a search. Any other rule would
trample on the rights of the occupant who is willing to consent.
Such an occupant may want the police to search in order to dispel
“suspicion raised by sharing quarters with a criminal.”
547 U. S., at 116; see also Schneckloth, 412 U. S., at
243 (evidence obtained pursuant to a consent search “may
insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a
criminal offense”). And an occupant may want the police to
conduct a thorough search so that any dangerous contraband can be
found and removed. In this case, for example, the search resulted
in the discovery and removal of a sawed-off shotgun to which
Rojas’ 4-year-old son had access.

															     Denying someone in
Rojas’ position the right to allow the police to enter her
home would also show disrespect for her independence. Having beaten
Rojas, petitioner would bar her from controlling access to her own
home until such time as he chose to relent. The Fourth Amendment
does not give him that power.

															*  *  *

															     The judgment of the
California Court of Appeal isaffirmed.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 We use the terms
“occupant,” “resident,” and
“tenant” interchangeably to refer to persons having
“common authority” over premises within the meaning of
. See v. , . 2 Both petitioner and the
dissent suggest that Rojas’ consent was coerced. , at 9,
n. 5 (opinion of .). But the trial court found otherwise, App.
152, and the correctness of that finding is not before us. In
suggesting that Rojas’ consent was coerced, the dissent
recites portions of Rojas’ testimony from the suppression
hearing that the trial judge appears to have rejected. Similarly,
the jury plainly did not find Rojas to be credible. At trial, she
testified for the defense and told the jury, among other things,
that the wounds observed by the officers who came to her door were
not inflicted by petitioner but by a woman looking for petitioner
during a fight. 208 Cal. App. 4th 100, 109–110, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 51, 56 (2012). The jury obviously did not believe this
testimony because it found petitioner guilty of inflicting corporal
injury on her. 3 See v. , 674 F. 3d
491, 498 (CA5 2012) (“ was a narrow exception to the general
rule permitting cotenant consent, relevant only as to physically
present objectors”); v. , 518 F. 3d 954, 960 (CA8 2008)
(concluding that “the narrow holding of , which repeatedly
referenced the defendant’s physical presence immediate
objection is inapplicable”); v. , 536 F. 3d 776, 777
(CA7 2008) (recognizing that “ left the bulk of third-party
consent law in place; its holding applies only when the defendant
is both present and objects to the search of his home”); v. ,
491 F. 3d 1221, 1227 (CA10 2007) (“carefully delineated
the narrow circumstances in which its holding applied, and
. . . consciously employed a rule requiring an express
objection by a present co-tenant”); but see v. , 516
F. 3d 1117, 1124–1125 (CA9 2008) (holding that
“when a co-tenant objects to a search and another party with
common authority subsequently gives consent to that search in the
absence of the first co-tenant the search is invalid as to the
objecting co-tenant” because “[o]nce a co-tenant has
registered his objection, his refusal to grant consent remains
effective barring some objective manifestation that he has changed
his position and no longer objects”). 4 A main theme of the
dissent is that the police in this case had probable cause to
search the apartment and therefore could have obtained a warrant.
Of course, this will not always be so in cases in which one
occupant consents to a search and the other objects, and the
dissent does not suggest that a warrant should be required only
when probable cause is present. As a result, the dissent’s
repeated references to the availability of a warrant in this case
are beside the point. 5 Although the dissent
intimates that “customary social usage” goes further
than this, see , at 4, the dissent provides no support for this
doubtful proposition. In the present case, for example, suppose
that Rojas had called a relative, a friend, a supportive neighbor,
or a person who works for a group that aids battered women and had
invited that individual to enter and examine the premises while
petitioner was in jail. Would any of those invitees have felt that
it was beyond Rojas’ authority to extend that invitation over
petitioner’s objection? SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–7822

															_________________

															WALTER FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal
of california for the second appellate district

															[February 25, 2014]

															     Justice Thomas,
concurring.

															     I join the opinion of
the Court, which faithfully applies Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U. S. 103 (2006) . I write separately to make clear the extent
of my disagreement with Randolph.

															     I dissented in Randolph
because the facts of that case did not implicate a Fourth Amendment
search and never should have been analyzed as such. Id., at 145
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[N]o Fourth Amendment search
occurs where . . . the spouse of an accused voluntarily
leads the police to potential evidence of wrongdoing by the
accused”). Instead of deciding the case on that narrow
ground, the majority in Randolph looked to “widely shared
social expectations” to resolve whether the wife’s
consent to a search should control over her husband’s
objection. Id., at 111. I find no support for that novel analytical
approach in the Fourth Amendment’s text or history, or in
this Court’s jurisprudence. See id., at 128–131
(Roberts, C. J., dissenting). Accordingly, given a blank slate, I
would analyze this case consistent with The Chief Justice’s
dissent in Randolph: “A warrantless search is reasonable if
police obtain the voluntary consent of a person authorized to give
it.” Id., at 128. That is because “[c]o-occupants have
‘assumed the risk that one of their number might permit [a]
common area to be searched.’ ” Ibid. (quoting
United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164 , n. 7 (1974)).
In this case, the trial court found that Rojas’ consent was
voluntary, see ante, at n. 2, and petitioner does not contest
that Rojas had common authority over the premises. That should be
the end of the matter. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–7822

															_________________

															WALTER FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal
of california for the second appellate district

															[February 25, 2014]

															     Justice Scalia,
concurring.

															     Like Justice Thomas, I
believe Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103 (2006) , was
wrongly decided. I nonetheless join the Court’s opinion
because it is a faithful application of Randolph. I write
separately to address the argument that the search of
petitioner’s shared apartment violated the Fourth Amendment
because he had a right under property law to exclude the police.
See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae 17–23. The United States dismisses that
argument,pointing to our statement in United States v. Matlock, 415
U. S. 164 , n. 7 (1974), that a cotenant’s ability
to con-sent to a search “does not rest upon the law of
property, with its attendant historical and legal
refinements.”See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
23.

															     I do not think the
argument can be so easily dismissed. To be sure, under Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) , “property rights
‘are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment
violations.’ ” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S.
1 , ___ (2013) (slip op., at 3). But as we have recently made
clear, “[t]he Katz reasonable-expectations test ‘has
been added to, not substituted for,’ the traditional
property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.,at
___ (slip op., at 9) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565
U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 8)). I would therefore
find this a more difficult case if it were established that
prop-erty law did not give petitioner’s cotenant the right to
admit visitors over petitioner’s objection. That difficulty
does not arise, however, because the authorities cited by the
amicus association fail to establish that a guest would commit a
trespass if one of two joint tenants invited the guest to enter and
the other tenant forbade the guest to do so. Indeed, what limited
authority there is on the subject points to the opposite
conclusion. See, e.g., 86 C. J. S., Tenancy in Common
§144, p. 354 (2006) (a licensee of one tenant “is not
liable in trespass to nonconsenting cotenants”); Dinsmore v.
Renfroe, 66 Cal. App. 207, 212–214, 225 P. 886, 888–889
(1924); Buchanan v. Jencks, 38 R. I. 443, 446–451, 96 A.
307, 309–311 (1916) (and cases cited therein); cf. 2 H.
Tiffany, Real Property §457, p. 274 (3d ed. 1939) (endorsing
the opposite view but acknowledging that “there is little
authority” on the question). There accordingly is no basis
for us to conclude that the police infringed on any property right
of petitioner’s when they entered the premises with his
cotenant’s consent. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–7822

															_________________

															WALTER FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal
of california for the second appellate district

															[February 25, 2014]

															     Justice Ginsburg,
with whom Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan join, dissenting.

															     The Fourth Amendment
guarantees to the people “[t]he right . . . to be
secure in their . . . houses . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Warrants to search
premises, the Amendment further instructs, shall issue only when
authorized by a neutral magistrate upon a showing of
“probable cause” to believe criminal activity has
occurred or is afoot. This Court has read these complementary
provisions to convey that, “whenever practicable, [the police
must] obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1, 20 (1968) . The warrant requirement, Justice Jackson observed,
ranks among the “fundamental distinctions between our form of
government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state
where they are the law.” Johnson v. United States, 333
U. S. 10, 17 (1948) . The Court has accordingly declared
warrantless searches, in the main, “per se
unreasonable.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390
(1978) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Groh v. Ramirez, 540
U. S. 551, 559 (2004) . If this main rule is to remain hardy,
the Court has explained, exceptions to the warrant requirement must
be “few in number and carefully delineated.” United
States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407
U. S. 297, 318 (1972) ; see Kyllo v. United States, 533
U. S. 27, 31 (2001) .

															     Instead of adhering to
the warrant requirement, today’s decision tells the police
they may dodge it, nevermind ample time to secure the approval of a
neutral magistrate. Suppressing the warrant requirement, the Court
shrinks to petite size our holding in Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U. S. 103 (2006) , that “a physically present
inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search
[of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent
of a fellow occupant,” id., at 122–123.

															I

															     This case calls for a
straightforward application of Randolph. The police officers in
Randolph were confronted with a scenario closely resembling the
situation presented here. Once the police arrived at Janet and
Scott Randolph’s shared residence, Scott Randolph
“unequivocally refused” an officer’s request for
permission to search their home. Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U. S. 103, 107 (2006) . The officer then asked Janet Randolph
for her consent to the search, which she “readily
gave.” Ibid. The sequence here was similar. After Walter
Fernandez, while physi-cally present at his home, rebuffed the
officers’ request to come in, the police removed him from the
premises and then arrested him, albeit with cause to believe he had
assaulted his cohabitant, Roxanne Rojas. At the time of the arrest,
Rojas said nothing to contradict Fernandez’ refusal. About an
hour later, however, and with no attempt to obtain a search
warrant, the police returned to the apartment and prevailed upon
Rojas to sign a consent form authorizing search of the premises.
See infra, at 9, n. 5.

															     The circumstances
triggering “the Fourth Amendment’s traditional
hostility to police entry into a home without a warrant,” 547
U. S., at 126 (Breyer, J., concurring), are at least as
salient here as they were in Randolph. In both cases, “[t]he
search at issue was a search solely for evidence”;
“[t]he objecting party,” while on the premises,
“made his objection [to police entry] known clearly and
directly to the officers seeking to enter the [residence]”;
and “the officers might easily have secured the premises and
sought a warrant permitting them to enter.” Id., at
125–126. Here, moreover, with the objector in custody, there
was scant danger to persons on the premises, or risk that evidence
might be destroyed or concealed, pending request for, and receipt
of, a warrant. See id., at 126.

															     Despite these marked
similarities, the Court removes this case from Randolph’s
ambit. The Court does so principally by seizing on the fact that
Fernandez, unlike Scott Randolph, was no longer present and
objecting when the police obtained the co-occupant’s consent.
Ante, at 8–9. But Fernandez was present when he stated his
objection to the would-be searchers in no uncertain terms. See App.
6 (“You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my
rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The officers
could scarcely have forgotten, one hour later, that Fernandez
refused consent while physically present. That express, on-premises
objection should have been “dispositive as to him.”
Randolph, 547 U. S., at 122.[ 1 ]

															     The Court tells us that
the “widely shared social expectations” and
“customary social usage” undergirding Randolph’s
holding apply only when the objector remains physically present.
Ante, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Randolph’s
discussion of social expectations, however, does not hinge on the
objector’s physical presence vel non at the time of the
search. “[W]hen people living together disagree over the use
of their common quarters,” Randolph observes, “a
resolution must come through voluntary accommodation, not by
appeals to authority.” 547 U. S., at 113–114. See
also id., at 114 (“[T]here is no common understanding that
one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over
the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of
the curtains or invitations to outsiders.”); id., at 115
(“[T]he cooperative occupant’s invitation adds nothing
to the government’s side to counter the force of an objecting
individual’s claim to security against the government’s
intrusion into his dwelling place.”). Randolph thus trained
on whether a joint occupant had conveyed an objection to a
visitor’s entry, and did not suggest that the objection could
be ignored if the police reappeared post the objector’s
arrest.

															     A visitor might be less
reluctant to enter over a joint occupant’s objection, the
Court speculates, if that visitor knows the objector will not be
there. See ante, at 11–12. “Only in a Hobbesian
world,” however, “would one person’s social
obligations to another be limited to what the other[, because of
his presence,] is . . . able to enforce.” United
States v. Henderson, 536 F. 3d 776, 787 (CA7 2008) (Rovner,
J., dissenting). Such conjectures about social behavior, at any
rate, shed little light on the constitutionality of this
warrantless home search, given the marked distinctions between
private interactions and police investigations. Police, after all,
have power no private person enjoys. They can, as this case
illustrates, put a tenant in handcuffs and remove him from the
premises.

															     Moreover, as the Court
comprehended just last Term, “the background social norms
that invite a visitor to the front door do not invite him there to
conduct a search.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1 ,
___ (2013) (slip op., at 7). Similarly here, even if shared tenancy
were understoodto entail the prospect of visits by unwanted
socialcallers while the objecting resident was gone, that
un-welcome visitor’s license would hardly include free rein
to rummage through the dwelling in search of evidence and
contraband.[ 2 ]

															     Next, the Court
cautions, applying Randolph to these facts would pose “a
plethora of practical problems.” Ante, at 12. For instance,
the Court asks, must a cotenant’s objection, once registered,
be respected indefinitely? Yet it blinks reality to suppose that
Fernandez, by withholding consent, could stop police in their
tracks eternally. Cf. ante, at 12–13 (imagining an objector
behind bars serving his sentence, still refusing permission to
search hisresidence). To mount the prosecution eventuating in a
conviction, of course, the State would first need to obtain
incriminating evidence, and could get it easily simply by applying
for a warrant. Warrant in police hands, the Court’s practical
problems disappear.

															     Indeed, as the Court
acknowledges, see ante, at 13–14, reading Randolph to require
continuous physical presence poses administrative difficulties of
its own. Does an occupant’s refusal to consent lose force as
soon as she absents herself from the doorstep, even if only for a
moment? Are the police free to enter the instant after the objector
leaves the door to retire for a nap, answer the phone, use the
bathroom, or speak to another officer outside? See Brief for
Petitioner 28. Hypothesized practical considerations, in short,
provide no cause for today’s drastic reduction of
Randolph’s holding and attendant disregard for the warrant
requirement.

															II

															     In its zeal to
diminish Randolph, today’s decision overlooks the warrant
requirement’s venerable role as the “bulwark of Fourth
Amendment protection.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S.
154, 164 (1978) . Reducing Randolph to a “narrow
exception,” the Court declares the main rule to be that
“consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is
generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search.” Ante,
at 7. That declaration has it backwards, for consent searches
themselves are a “ ‘jealously and care-fully
drawn’ exception” to “the Fourth Amendment rule
ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s
house as unreasonable per se.” Randolph, 547 U. S.,
at 109 (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 499
(1958) ). See also Jardines, 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
4) (“[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
first among equals. At the Amendment’s ‘very
core’ stands ‘the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.’ ”); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S.
573, 585 (1980) (“[T]he physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which . . . the Fourth Amendment is
directed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).[ 3 ]

															     In this case, the
police could readily have obtained a warrant to search the shared
residence.[ 4 ] The Court does
not dispute this, but instead disparages the warrant requirement as
inconvenient, burdensome, entailing delay “[e]ven with modern
technological advances.” Ante, at 14. Shut from the
Court’s sight is the ease and speed with which search
warrants nowadays can be obtained. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 11) (observing that
technology now “allow[s] for the more expeditious processing
of warrant applications,” and citing state statutes
permitting warrants to be obtained “remotely through various
means, including telephonic or radio communication, electronic
communication . . . , and video conferencing”). See
also Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as
Amicus Curiae 29 (describing California’s procedures for
electronic warrant applications). With these developments in view,
dilution of the warrant requirement should be vigilantly
resisted.

															     Although the police
have probable cause and could obtain a warrant with dispatch, if
they can gain the consent of someone other than the suspect, why
should the law insist on the formality of a warrant? Because the
Framers saw the neutral magistrate as an essential part of the
criminal process shielding all of us, good or bad, saint or sinner,
from unchecked police activity. See, e.g., Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10 –14 (1948) (“The point of the
Fourth Amendment . . . is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). “The
investigation of crime,” of course, “would always be
simplified if warrants were unnecessary.” Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U. S. 385 (1978). “But the Fourth Amendment,”
the Court has long recognized, “reflects the view of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s
home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of
maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.” Ibid.
See also Randolph, 547 U. S., at 115, n. 5 (“A
generalized interest in expedient law enforcement cannot, without
more, justify a warrantless search.”).

															     A final word is in
order about the Court’s reference to Rojas’ autonomy,
which, in its view, is best served by allowing her consent to trump
an abusive cohabitant’s objection. See ante, at 15
(“Denying someone in Rojas’ position the right to allow
the police to enter her home would also show disrespect for her
independence.”).[ 5 ]
Rojas’ situation is not distinguishable from Janet
Randolph’s in this regard. If a person’s health and
safety are threatened by a domestic abuser, exigent circumstances
would justify immediate removal of the abuser from the premises, as
happened here. Cf. Randolph, 547 U. S., at 118 (“[T]his
case has no bearing on the capacity of the police to protect
domestic victims. . . . No question has been raised,
or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police to enter
a dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence
. . . .”). See also Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement officers
may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance
to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent
injury.”). Domestic abuse is indeed “a serious problem
in the United States,” Randolph, 547 U. S., at 117
(citing statistics); appropriate policy responses to this scourge
may include fostering effective counseling, providing public
information about, and ready access to, protective orders, and
enforcing such orders diligently.[ 6 ] As the Court understood in Randolph, however, the
specter of domestic abuse hardly necessitates the diminution of the
Fourth Amendment rights at stake here.

															*  *  *

															     For the reasons
stated, I would honor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement and hold that Fernandez’ objection to the search
did not become null upon his arrest and removal from the scene.
“There is every reason to conclude that securing a warrant
was entirely feasible in this case, and no reason to contract the
Fourth Amendment’s dominion.” Kentucky v. King, 563
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (slip op., at
5). I would therefore reverse the judgment of the California Court
of Appeal. Notes 1 The Court is correct that
this case does not involve a situation, alluded to in , where
“the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant
from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection.” v. , . Here, as in , no one disputes that the
police had probable cause to place the objecting tenant under
arrest. But had the objector’s arrest been illegal,
suggested, the remaining occupant’s consent to the search
would not suffice. The suggestion in , as the Court recognizes, see
at 9–10, is at odds with today’s decision. For
“[i]f the police cannot prevent a co-tenant from objecting to
a search through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co-tenant and
then seek to ignore an objection he has already made.” v. ,
516 F. 3d 1117, 1124–1125 (CA9 2008). 2 Remarkably, the Court
thinks my disagreement with its account of the applicable social
norms distances me from ’s understanding of social
expectations. See at 11–12, n. 5. Quite the opposite.
considered whether “customary social understanding accords
the consenting tenant authority powerful enough to prevail over the
co-tenant’s objection”; social practice in such
circumstances, the Court held, provided no cause to depart from the
“ ‘centuries-old principle of respect for privacy
of the home.’ ” 547 U. S., at 115, 121
(quoting v. , ). See also 547 U. S., at 115 (“Disputed
permission is . . . no match for this central value of
the . . . .”). I would so hold here.
Today’s decision, by contrast, provides police with ready
means to nullify a cotenant’s objection, and therefore
“fails to come to grips with the reasoning of [].” at
12, n. 5. 3 I agree with the Court
that when a sole owner or occupant consents to a search, the police
can enter without obtaining a warrant. See at 5–6. Where
multiple persons occupy the premises, it is true, this Court has
upheld warrantless home searches based on one tenant’s
consent; those cases, however, did not involve, as this case does,
an occupant who told the police they could not enter. See v. ,
(police relied on cotenant’s consent to search when other
tenant had already been detained in a nearby squad car); v. ,
(same, when the other tenant was asleep in the bedroom). The
Court’s rationale for allowing a search to proceed in those
instances—that co-occupants “assum[e] the risk that one
of their number might permit the common area to be searched,”
,415 U. S., at 171, n. 7—does not apply where, as
here, an occupant on the premises explicitly tells the police they
cannot search his home warrant. See v. , 536 F. 3d 776, 788
(CA7 2008) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (in such circumstances, the
objector “has not assumed the risk that his co-tenant may
subsequently admit the visitor, because all choice has been taken
from him in his involuntary removal from the
premises”). 4 The Court dismisses as
“beside the point” the undeniable fact that the police
easily could have obtained a warrant. at 6, n. 4. There may be
circumstances, the Court observes, in which the police, faced with
a cotenant’s objection, will lack probable cause to obtain a
warrant. That same argument was considered and rejected by the
Court in , which recognized that “alternatives to disputed
consent will not always open the door to search for evidence that
the police suspect is inside.” 547 U. S., at 120.
Moreover, it is unlikely that police, possessing an objective basis
to arrest an objecting tenant, will nevertheless lack probable
cause to obtain a search warrant. Probable cause to arrest, I
recognize, calls for a showing discrete from the showing needed to
establish probable cause to search a home. But “where, as
here, a suspect is arrested at or near his residence, it will often
‘be permissible to infer that the instrumentalities and
fruits of th[e] crime are presently in that person’s
residence.’ ” Brief for National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers as 25 (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure§3.1(b) (5th ed. 2011)). And as the Court observed in ,
if a warrant may be impeded by a tenant’s refusal to consent,
“[a] co-tenant acting on [her] own initiative may be able to
deliver evidence to the police, and . . . tell the police
what [s]he knows, for use before a magistrate in getting a
warrant.” 547 U. S., at 116 (citation
omitted). 5 Although the validity of
Rojas’ consent is not before us, the record offers cause to
doubt that her agreement to the search was, in fact, an unpressured
exercise of self-determination. At the evidentiary hearing on
Fernandez’ motion to suppress, Rojas testified that the
police, upon returning to the residence about an hour after
Fernandez’ arrest, began questioning her four-year-old son
without her permission. App. 81, 93. Rojas asked to remain present
during that questioning, but the police officer told her that their
investigation was “going to determine whether or not we take
your kids from you right now or not.” at 93 See also
(“I felt like [the police] were going to take my kids away
from me.”). Rojas thus maintained that she felt
“pressured” into giving consent. at 93–94. See
also at 93(“I felt like I had no rights.”). After about
20 or 30 minutes, Rojas acceded to the officer’s request that
she sign a consent form. Rojas testified that she
“didn’t want to sign [the form],” but did so
because she “just wanted it to just end.” at
100. 6 See generally National
Council of Juvenile and Family CourtJudges, Civil Protection
Orders: A Guide for Improving Practice(2010), online at
http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/cpo_guide.pdf (all
Internet materials as visited Feb. 21, 2014, and available in Clerk
of Court’s case file); Epidemiology and Prevention for Injury
Control Branch, California Statewide Policy Recommendations for the
Prevention of Violence Against Women (2006), online at
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/
programs/Documents/VAWSPP-EPIC.pdf.