U.S. Supreme Court California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35 (1988) California v.
Greenwood No. 86-684 Argued January 11,
1988 Decided May 16, 1988 486 U.S.
35 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT Syllabus Acting on information indicating that respondent Greenwood might
be engaged in narcotics trafficking, police twice obtained from his
regular trash collector garbage bags left on the curb in front of
his house. On the basis of items in the bags which were indicative
of narcotics use, the police obtained warrants to search the house,
discovered controlled substances during the searches, and arrested
respondents on felony narcotics charges. Finding that probable
cause to search the house would not have existed without the
evidence obtained from the trash searches, the State Superior Court
dismissed the charges under People v.
Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 ,
486 P.2d 1262, which held that warrantless trash searches violate
the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. Although
noting a post- Krivda state constitutional amendment
eliminating the exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation
of state, but not federal, law, the State Court of Appeal affirmed
on the ground that Krivda was based on federal, as well as
state, law. Held: 1. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search
and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of
a home. Pp. 486 U. S.
39 -44.

															(a) Since respondents voluntarily left their trash for
collection in an area particularly suited for public inspection,
their claimed expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items they
discarded was not objectively reasonable. It is common knowledge
that plastic garbage bags left along a public street are readily
accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at
the curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party,
the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through it or
permitted others, such as the police, to do so. The police cannot
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of
criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of
the public. Pp. 486 U. S.
43 -44.

															(b) Greenwood's alternative argument that his expectation of
privacy in his garbage should be deemed reasonable as a matter of
federal constitutional law because the warrantless search and
seizure of his garbage was impermissible as a matter of California
law under Krivda, Page 486 U. S. 36 which he contends survived the state constitutional amendment,
is without merit. The reasonableness of a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes does not depend upon privacy concepts embodied
in the law of the particular State in which the search occurred;
rather, it turns upon the understanding of society as a whole that
certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from
government invasion. There is no such understanding with respect to
garbage left for collection at the side of a public street. Pp. 486 U. S.
43 -44.

															2. Also without merit is Greenwood's contention that the
California constitutional amendment violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as this Court's Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule decisions have not required suppression where the
benefits of deterring minor police misconduct were overbalanced by
the societal costs of exclusion, California was not foreclosed by
the Due Process Clause from concluding that the benefits of
excluding relevant evidence of criminal activity do not outweigh
the costs when the police conduct at issue does not violate federal
law. Pp. 486 U. S.
44 -45. 182 Cal. App.
3d 729 , 227 Cal. Rptr.
539 , reversed and remanded.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ.,
joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL,
J., joined, post, p. 486 U. S. 45 .
KENNEDY, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Page 486 U. S. 37 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The issue here is whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the
warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection
outside the curtilage of a home. We conclude, in accordance with
the vast majority of lower courts that have addressed the issue,
that it does not. I In early 1984, Investigator Jenny Stracner of the Laguna Beach
Police Department received information indicating that respondent
Greenwood might be engaged in narcotics trafficking. Stracner
learned that a criminal suspect had informed a federal drug
enforcement agent in February, 1984, that a truck filled with
illegal drugs was en route to the Laguna Beach address at which
Greenwood resided. In addition, a neighbor complained of heavy
vehicular traffic late at night in front of Greenwood's
single-family home. The neighbor reported that the vehicles
remained at Greenwood's house for only a few minutes.

															Stracner sought to investigate this information by conducting a
surveillance of Greenwood's home. She observed several vehicles
make brief stops at the house during the late-night and
early-morning hours, and she followed a truck from the house to a
residence that had previously been under investigation as a
narcotics trafficking location.

															On April 6, 1984, Stracner asked the neighborhood's regular
trash collector to pick up the plastic garbage bags that Greenwood
had left on the curb in front of his house and to turn the bags
over to her without mixing their contents with garbage from other
houses. The trash collector cleaned his truck bin of other refuse,
collected the garbage bags from the street in front of Greenwood's
house, and turned the bags over to Stracner. The officer searched
through the rubbish Page 486 U. S. 38 and found items indicative of narcotics use. She recited the
information that she had gleaned from the trash search in an
affidavit in support of a warrant to search Greenwood's home.

															Police officers encountered both respondents at the house later
that day when they arrived to execute the warrant. The police
discovered quantities of cocaine and hashish during their search of
the house. Respondents were arrested on felony narcotics charges.
They subsequently posted bail.

															The police continued to receive reports of many late-night
visitors to the Greenwood house. On May 4, Investigator Robert
Rahaeuser obtained Greenwood's garbage from the regular trash
collector in the same manner as had Stracner. The garbage again
contained evidence of narcotics use.

															Rahaeuser secured another search warrant for Greenwood's home
based on the information from the second trash search. The police
found more narcotics and evidence of narcotics trafficking when
they executed the warrant. Greenwood was again arrested.

															The Superior Court dismissed the charges against respondents on
the authority of People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 ,
486 P.2d 1262 (1971), which held that warrantless trash searches
violate the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. The
court found that the police would not have had probable cause to
search the Greenwood home without the evidence obtained from the
trash searches.

															The Court of Appeal affirmed. 182 Cal. App.
3d 729 , 227 Cal. Rptr.
539 (1986). The court noted at the outset that the fruits of
warrantless trash searches could no longer be suppressed if Krivda were based only on the California Constitution,
because, since 1982, the State has barred the suppression of
evidence seized in violation of California law but not federal law. See Cal.Const., Art. I, § 28(d); In re Lance
W., 37 Cal. 3d
873 , 694 P.2d 744 (1985). But Krivda, a decision binding on the Court of
Appeal, also held that the fruits of warrantless trash searches
were to be excluded under federal Page 486 U. S. 39 law. Hence, the Superior Court was correct in dismissing the
charges against respondents. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 227 Cal.Rptr,
at 542. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for
review of the Court of Appeal's decision. We granted certiorari,
483 U.S. 1019, and now reverse. II The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at
the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth
Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.
S. 709 , 480 U. S. 715 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.
S. 207 , 476 U. S. 211 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.
S. 170 , 466 U. S. 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Respondents do not disagree with
this standard.

															They assert, however, that they had, and exhibited, an
expectation of privacy with respect to the trash that was searched
by the police: the trash, which was placed on the street for
collection at a fixed time, was contained in opaque plastic bags,
which the garbage collector was expected to pick up, mingle with
the trash of others, and deposit at the garbage dump. The trash was
only temporarily on the street, and there was little likelihood
that it would be inspected by anyone.

															It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents
of their garbage bags would become known to the police or other
members of the public. An expectation of privacy does not give rise
to Fourth Amendment protection, Page 486 U. S. 40 however, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation
as objectively reasonable.

															Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the
public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment
protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left
on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to
animals, [ Footnote 2 ] children,
scavengers, [ Footnote 3 ]
snoops, [ Footnote 4 ] and other
members of the public. See Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d at 367, 486
P.2d at 1269. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb
for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash
collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash
or permitted others, such as the police, to do so. Accordingly,
having deposited their garbage

															"in an area particularly suited for Page 486 U. S. 41 public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public
consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take
it," United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (CA3
1981), respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded.

															Furthermore, as we have held, the police cannot reasonably be
expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity
that could have been observed by any member of the public. Hence,
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, supra, at 389 U. S. 351 .
We held in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.
S. 735 (1979), for example, that the police did not
violate the Fourth Amendment by causing a pen register to be
installed at the telephone company's offices to record the
telephone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect. An individual has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on his
telephone, we reasoned, because he voluntarily conveys those
numbers to the telephone company when he uses the telephone. Again,
we observed that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties." Id. at 442 U. S.
743 -744.

															Similarly, we held in California v. Ciraolo, supra, that the police were not required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain
a warrant before conducting surveillance of the respondent's fenced
backyard from a private plane flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet.
We concluded that the respondent's expectation that his yard was
protected from such surveillance was unreasonable, because "[a]ny
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed." Id. at 476 U. S.
213 -214.

															Our conclusion that society would not accept as reasonable
respondents' claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for
collection in an area accessible to the public is reinforced by the
unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Federal Courts of
Appeals. See United States v. Dela Espriella, Page 486 U. S. 42 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (CA9 1986); United States v.
O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-1534 (CA11 1985); United
States v. Michaels, 726 F.2d 1307, 1312-1313 (CA8), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 791-794 (CA7), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962
(1983); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 308-309
(CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, supra, at 399; United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-101
(CA5 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025 (CA4
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); Magda v.
Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112-113 (CA6 1976) (per curiam); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-974 (CA1
1972). In United States v. Thornton, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 46,
56, and n. 11, 746 F.2d 39, 49, and n. 11 (1984), the court
observed that

															"the overwhelming weight of authority rejects the proposition
that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to
trash discarded outside the home and the curtilege [ sic ]
thereof."

															In addition, of those state appellate courts that have
considered the issue, the vast majority have held that the police
may conduct warrantless searches and seizures of garbage discarded
in public areas. See Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass.
508, 512-513, 492
N.E.2d 719 , 721-722 (1986); Cooks v.
State, 699 P.2d
653 , 656 (Okla. Crim.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935
(1985); State v. Stevens, 123 Wis.2d 303, 314-317, 367 N.W.2d
788 , 794-797, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985); State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d
224 , 228-230 (N.D.1985); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio
App.3d 36, 37-38, 484 N.E.2d 215, 217-218 (1984); State v.
Oquist, 327 N.W.2d
587 (Minn.1982); People v. Whotte, 113 Mich.App. 12,
317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); Commonwealth v. Minton, 288
Pa.Super. 381, 391, 432
A.2d 212 , 217 (1981); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d
1326 (Fla.App.1980); People v. Huddleston, 38 Ill.App.3d
277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Willis v. State, 518
S.W.2d 247 , 249 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Smith v.
State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied, Page 486 U. S. 43 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586,
592-593, 503 P.2d 807 ,
813-814 (1972); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122 ,
125-126 (Wyo.1970); State v. Purvis, 249 Ore. 404, 411, 438 P.2d
1002 , 1005 (1968). But see State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw.
658, 701 P.2d 1274 (1985); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 729, 486 P.2d 1262
(1971). [ Footnote 5 ] III We reject respondent Greenwood's alternative argument for
affirmance: that his expectation of privacy in his garbage should
be deemed reasonable as a matter of federal constitutional law
because the warrantless search and seizure of his garbage was
impermissible as a matter of California law. He urges that the
state law right of Californians to privacy in their garbage,
announced by the California Supreme Court in Krivda,
supra, survived the subsequent state constitutional amendment
eliminating the suppression remedy as a means of enforcing that
right. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 886-887, 694 P.2d
at 752-753. Hence, he argues that the Fourth Amendment should
itself vindicate that right.

															Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the
Federal Constitution. We have never intimated, however, that
whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in
which the search occurs. We have emphasized instead that the Fourth
Amendment analysis must turn on such factors as "our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most
scrupulous protection from government invasion." Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 178 (emphasis added). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
S. 128 , 439 U. S.
143 -144, n. 12 (1978). We have already concluded that
society as a whole possesses no such understanding Page 486 U. S. 44 with regard to garbage left for collection at the side of a
public street. Respondent's argument is no less than a suggestion
that concepts of privacy under the laws of each State are to
determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment. We do not accept this
submission. IV Greenwood finally urges as an additional ground for affirmance
that the California constitutional amendment eliminating the
exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of state but not
federal law violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In his view, having recognized a state law right to be
free from warrantless searches of garbage, California may not under
the Due Process Clause deprive its citizens of what he describes as
"the only effective deterrent" to violations of this right.
Greenwood concedes that no direct support for his position can be
found in the decisions of this Court. He relies instead on cases
holding that individuals are entitled to certain procedural
protections before they can be deprived of a liberty or property
interest created by state law. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U. S. 460 (1983); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980).

															We see no merit in Greenwood's position. California could amend
its Constitution to negate the holding in Krivda that
state law forbids warrantless searches of trash. We are convinced
that the State may likewise eliminate the exclusionary rule as a
remedy for violations of that right. At the federal level, we have
not required that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment be suppressed in all circumstances. See, e.g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Rather, our decisions concerning the scope of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule have balanced the benefits of deterring
police misconduct against the costs of excluding reliable evidence
of criminal activity. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
908 -913. We Page 486 U. S. 45 have declined to apply the exclusionary rule indiscriminately
"when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith
or their transgressions have been minor," because

															"the magnitude of the benefit conferred on . . . guilty
defendants [in such circumstances] offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system." Id. at 468 U. S. 908 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 428 U. S. 490 (1976)).

															The States are not foreclosed by the Due Process Clause from
using a similar balancing approach to delineate the scope of their
own exclusionary rules. Hence, the people of California could
permissibly conclude that the benefits of excluding relevant
evidence of criminal activity do not outweigh the costs when the
police conduct at issue does not violate federal law. V The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is therefore
reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The Court of Appeal also held that respondent Van Houten had
standing to seek the suppression of evidence discovered during the
April 4 search of Greenwood's home. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 227
Cal. Rptr. at 542-543.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															For example, State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d
224 (N. D.1985), involved the search of a garbage bag that a
dog, acting "at the behest of no one," id. at 228, had
dragged from the defendants' yard into the yard of a neighbor. The
neighbor deposited the bag in his own trash can, which he later
permitted the police to search. The North Dakota Supreme Court held
that the search of the garbage bag did not violate the defendants'
Fourth Amendment rights.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															It is not only the homeless of the Nation's cities who make use
of others' refuse. For example, a nationally syndicated consumer
columnist has suggested that apartment dwellers obtain cents-off
coupons by "mak[ing] friends with the fellow who handles the trash"
in their buildings, and has recounted the tale of

															"the 'Rich lady' from Westmont who, once a week, puts on rubber
gloves and hip boots and wades into the town garbage dump looking
for labels and other proofs of purchase"

															needed to obtain manufacturers' refunds. M. Sloane, "The
Supermarket Shopper's" 1980 Guide to Coupons and Refunds 74, 161
(1980).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Even the refuse of prominent Americans has not been
invulnerable. In 1975, for example, a reporter for a weekly tabloid
seized five bags of garbage from the sidewalk outside the home of
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Washington Post, July 9, 1975,
p. A1, col. 8. A newspaper editorial criticizing this journalistic
"trash-picking" observed that "[e]vidently . . . everybody does
it.'" Washington Post, July 10, 1975, p. A18, col. 1. We of course
do not, as the dissent implies, "bas[e] [our] conclusion" that
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
garbage on this "sole incident." Post at 486 U. S.
51 . [ Footnote 5 ]

															Given that the dissenters are among the tiny minority of judges
whose views are contrary to ours, we are distinctly unimpressed
with the dissent's prediction that "society will be shocked to
learn" of today's decision. Post at 486 U. S.
46 .

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															Every week for two months, and at least once more a month later,
the Laguna Beach police clawed through the trash that respondent
Greenwood left in opaque, sealed bags on the curb outside his home.
Record 113. Complete strangers minutely scrutinized their bounty,
undoubtedly dredging up intimate details of Greenwood's private
life and habits. The intrusions proceeded without a warrant, and no
court before or since has concluded that the police acted on
probable cause to believe Greenwood was engaged in any criminal
activity.

															Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted
notions of civilized behavior. I suspect, therefore, Page 486 U. S. 46 that members of our society will be shocked to learn that the
Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, deems unreasonable our
expectation that the aspects of our private lives that are
concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public. I "A container which can support a reasonable expectation of
privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a
warrant." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.
S. 109 , 120, n. 466 U. S. 17 (1984) (citations omitted). Thus, as the
Court observes, if Greenwood had a reasonable expectatlon that the
contents of the bags that he placed on the curb would remain
private, the warrantless search of those bags violated the Fourth
Amendment. Ante at 486 U. S.
39 .

															The Framers of the Fourth Amendment understood that
"unreasonable searches" of "paper[s] and effects" -- no less than
"unreasonable searches" of "person[s] and houses" -- infringe
privacy. As early as 1878, this Court acknowledged that the
contents of

															"[l]etters and sealed packages . . . in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection . . . as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles." Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 , 96 U. S. 733 .
In short, so long as a package is "closed against inspection," the
Fourth Amendment protects its contents, "wherever they may be," and
the police must obtain a warrant to search it just "as is required
when papers are subjected to search in one's own household." Ibid. Accord, United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970).

															With the emergence of the reasonable-expectation-o-privacy
analysis, see Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 , 442 U. S. 740 (1979), we have reaffirmed this fundamental principle. In Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981), for example, Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of
four, pronounced that,

															"unless the container is such that its contents may be said to
be in plain view, those contents are fully Page 486 U. S. 47 protected by the Fourth Amendment," id. at 453 U. S. 427 ,
and soundly rejected any distinction for Fourth Amendment purposes
among various opaque, sealed containers:

															"[E]ven if one wished to import such a distinction into the
Fourth Amendment, it is difficult if not impossible to perceive any
objective criteria by which that task might be accomplished. What
one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper
bag. . . . And . . . no court, no constable, no citizen, can
sensibly be asked to distinguish the relative 'privacy interests'
in a closed suitcase, briefcase, portfolio, duffelbag, or box." Id. at 453 U. S.
426 -427. See also id. at 453 U. S. 428 (expectation of privacy attaches to any container unless it "so
clearly announce[s] its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer"). With only one exception, every
Justice who wrote in that case eschewed any attempt to distinguish
"worthy" from "unworthy" containers. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															More recently, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 (1982), the Court, relying on the

															"virtually unanimous agreement Page 486 U. S. 48 in Robbins . . . that a constitutional distinction
between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper,"

															held that a distinction among "paper bags, locked trunks, lunch
buckets, and orange crates" would be inconsistent with

															"the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [A] traveler
who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper
bag or knotted scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive
with the locked attache case."

															"As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth
Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container
that conceals its contents from plain view. " Id. at 456 U. S.
822 -823 (emphasis added; footnote and citation omitted). See also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 129 (opinion of WHITE, J.).

															Accordingly, we have found a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of a 200-pound "double-locked footlocker," United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 11 (1977); a "comparatively small, unlocked suitcase," Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 , 442 U. S. 762 ,
n. 9 (1979); a "totebag," Robbins, 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 422 ;
and "packages wrapped in green opaque plastic," ibid. See also Ross, supra, at 456 U. S. 801 , 456 U. S.
822 -823 (suggesting that a warrant would have been
required to search a " lunchtype' brown paper bag" and a
"zippered red leather pouch" had they not been found in an
automobile); Jacobsen, supra, at 466 U. S. 111 , 466 U. S.
114 -115 (suggesting that a warrantless search of an
"ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper" would have violated
the Fourth Amendment had a private party not already opened
it). Our precedent, therefore, leaves no room to doubt that, had
respondents been carrying their personal effects in opaque, sealed
plastic bags -- identical to the ones they placed on the curb --
their privacy would have been protected from warrantless police
intrusion. So far as Fourth Amendment protection is concerned,
opaque plastic bags are every bit as Page 486 U. S. 49 worthy as "packages wrapped in green opaque plastic" and
"double-locked footlocker[s]." Cf. Robbins, supra, at 453 U. S. 441 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court's discovery of
reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of "two plastic
garbage bags"). II Respondents deserve no less protection just because Greenwood
used the bags to discard, rather than to transport, his personal
effects. Their contents are not inherently any less private, and
Greenwood's decision to discard them, at least in the manner in
which he did, does not diminish his expectation of privacy.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] Page 486 U. S. 50 A trash bag, like any of the above-mentioned containers, "is a
common repository for one's personal effects" and, even more than
many of them, is "therefore . . . inevitably associated with the
expectation of privacy." Sanders, supra, at 442 U. S. 762 (citing Chadwick, supra, at 433 U. S. 13 ).
"[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste
products. . . ." Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 ,
798 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973). See
California v. Rooney, 483 U. S. 307 , 483 U. S.
320 -321, n. 3 (1987) (WHITE, J., dissenting) (renowned
archaeologist Emil Haury once said, "[i]f you want to know what is
really going on in a community, look at its garbage") (quoted by W.
Rathje, Archaeological Ethnography . . . Because Sometimes It Is
Better to Give Than to Receive, in Explorations in Ethnoarchaeology
49, 54 (R. Gould ed.1978)); Weberman, The Art of Garbage Analysis:
You Are What You Throw Away, 76 Esquire 113 (1971) (analyzing trash
of various celebrities and drawing conclusions about their private
lives). A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating,
reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced it. A
search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate
details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like
rifling through desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging
through trash can divulge the target's financial and professional
status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts,
personal relationships, and romantic interests. It cannot be
doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors telling evidence of the
"intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life,'" which the Fourth Amendment is
designed Page 486 U. S.
51 to protect. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.
S. 170 , 466 U. S. 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616 , 116 U. S. 630 (1886)). See also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.
S. 294 , 480 U. S. 300 (1987). The Court properly rejects the State's attempt to distinguish
trash searches from other searches on the theory that trash is
abandoned, and therefore not entitled to an expectation of privacy.
As the author of the Court's opinion observed last Term, a
defendant's

															"property interest [in trash] does not settle the matter for
Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the Fourth Amendment is
not determined by state property law." Rooney, supra, at 483 U. S. 320 (WHITE, J., dissenting). In evaluating the reasonableness of
Greenwood's expectation that his sealed trash bags would not be
invaded, the Court has held that we must look to "understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society." [ Footnote 2/3 ] Most of us, I believe, would be
incensed to discover a meddler -- whether a neighbor, a reporter,
or a detective -- scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to
discover some detail of our personal lives. See State v.
Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1331 (Fla. App.1980) (Anstead, J.,
dissenting). That was, quite naturally, the reaction to the sole
incident on which the Court bases its conclusion that "snoops" and
the like defeat the expectation of privacy in trash. Ante at 486 U. S. 40 ,
and n. 4. When a tabloid reporter examined then-Secretary of
State Page 486 U. S. 52 Henry Kissinger's trash and published his findings, Kissinger
was "really revolted" by the intrusion, and his wife suffered
"grave anguish." N.Y. Times, July 9, 1975, p. A1, col. 8. The
public response roundly condemning the reporter demonstrates that
society not only recognized those reactions as reasonable, but
shared them as well. Commentators variously characterized his
conduct as "a disgusting invasion of personal privacy," Flieger,
Investigative Trash, U.S. News & World Report, July 28, 1975,
p. 72 (editor's page); "indefensible . . . as civilized behavior,"
Washington Post, July 10, 1975, p. A18, col. 1 (editorial); and
contrary to "the way decent people behave in relation to each
other," ibid. Beyond a generalized expectation of privacy, many
municipalities, whether for reasons of privacy, sanitation, or
both, reinforce confidence in the integrity of sealed trash
containers by

															"prohibit[ing] anyone, except authorized employees of the Town .
. . to rummage into, pick up, collect, move or otherwise interfere
with articles or materials placed on . . . any public street for
collection." United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (CA2 1971)
(paraphrasing ordinance for town of Cheektowaga, New York). See
also United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100 (CA5 1979)
(per curiam); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (CA6
1976) (per curiam); People v. Rooney, 175 Cal. App.
3d 634 , 645, 221 Cal. Rptr.
49 , 56 (1985), cert. dism'd, 483 U.
S. 307 (1987); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357 ,
366, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (1971), vacated and remanded, 409 U. S. 33 (1972); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App.3d 36, 38, n. 3, 484
N.E.2d 215, 218, n. 3 (1984). In fact, the California Constitution,
as interpreted by the State's highest court, guarantees a right of
privacy in trash vis-a-vis government officials.2 See
Krivda, supra, (recognizing right); In re Lance
W., 37 Cal. 3d
873 , 886-887, 694 P.2d 744 ,
752-753 (1985) (later constitutional amendment abolished
exclusionary remedy, but left intact the substance of the
right). Page 486 U. S. 53 That is not to deny that isolated intrusions into opaque, sealed
trash containers occur. When, acting on their own, "animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, [or] other members of the public," ante at 486 U. S. 40 (footnotes omitted), actually rummage through a bag of
trash and expose its contents to plain view,

															"police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public," ante at 486 U. S. 41 .
That much follows from cases like Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 117 ,
120, n. 17 (emphasis added), which held that police may
constitutionally inspect a package whose "integrity" a private
carrier has already "compromised," because

															"[t]he Fourth Amendment is implicated only if the authorities
use information with respect to which the expectation of privacy
has not already been frustrated,"

															and California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.
S. 207 , 476 U. S.
213 -214 (1986) (emphasis added), which held that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from observing what
"[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced
down could have seen."

															Had Greenwood flaunted his intimate activity by strewing his
trash all over the curb for all to see, or had some nongovernmental
intruder invaded his privacy and done the same, I could accept the
Court's conclusion that an expectation of privacy would have been
unreasonable. Similarly, had police searching the city dump run
across incriminating evidence that, despite commingling with the
trash of others, still retained its identity as Greenwood's, we
would have a different case. But all that Greenwood "exposed . . .
to the public," ante at 486 U. S. 40 ,
were the exteriors of several opaque, sealed containers. Until the
bags were opened by police, they hid their contents from the
public's view every bit as much as did Chadwick's double-locked
footlocker and Robbins' green plastic wrapping. Faithful
application of the warrant requirement does not require police to
"avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could
have been observed by any member of the public." Rather, it only
requires them Page 486 U. S. 54 to adhere to norms of privacy that members of the public plainly
acknowledge.

															The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open
and rummage through the containers does not negate the expectation
of privacy in their contents any more than the possibility of a
burglary negates an expectation of privacy in the home; or the
possibility of a private intrusion negates an expectation of
privacy in an unopened package; or the possibility that an operator
will listen in on a telephone conversation negates an expectation
of privacy in the words spoken on the telephone. "What a person . .
. seeks to preserve as private, even in an area aceessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 389 U. S.
351 -352. We have therefore repeatedly rejected attempts
to justify a State's invasion of privacy on the ground that the
privacy is not absolute. See Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 , 365 U. S.
616 -617 (1961) (search of a house invaded tenant's
Fourth Amendment rights even though landlord had authority to enter
house for some purposes); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 , 376 U. S.
487 -490 (1964) (implicit consent to janitorial personnel
to enter motel room does not amount to consent to police search of
room); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.
S. 709 , 480 U. S. 717 (1987) (a government employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, even though "it is the nature of government
offices that others -- such as fellow employees, supervisors,
consensual visitors, and the general public -- may have frequent
access to an individual's office"). As JUSTICE SCALIA aptly put it,
the Fourth Amendment protects "privacy . . . not solitude." O'Connor, supra, at 480 U. S. 730 (opinion concurring in judgment).

															Nor is it dispositive that

															"respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express
purpose of conveying it to a third party, . . . who might himself
have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such as
the police, to do so." Ante at 486 U. S. 40 . In
the first place, Greenwood can hardly be faulted for leaving trash
on his curb when a county ordinance Page 486 U. S. 55 commanded him to do so, Orange County Code § 4-3-45(a) (1986)
(must "remov[e] from the premises at least once each week" all
"solid waste created, produced or accumulated in or about [his]
dwelling house"), and prohibited him from disposing of it in any
other way, see Orange County Code § 3-3-85 (1988) (burning
trash is unlawful). Unlike in other circumstances where privacy is
compromised, Greenwood could not "avoid exposing personal
belongings . . . by simply leaving them at home." O'Connor,
supra, at 480 U. S. 725 .
More importantly, even the voluntary relinquishment of possession
or control over an effect does not necessarily amount to a
relinquishment of a privacy expectation in it. Were it otherwise, a
letter or package would lose all Fourth Amendment protection when
placed in a mailbox or other depository with the "express purpose"
of entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier; those
bailees are just as likely as trash collectors (and certainly have
greater incentive) to "sor[t] through" the personal effects
entrusted to them, "or permi[t] others, such as police to do so."
Yet it has been clear for at least 110 years that the possibility
of such an intrusion does not justify a warrantless search by
police in the first instance. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1878); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.
S. 249 (1970); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 (1984). [ Footnote 2/4 ] III In holding that the warrantless search of Greenwood's trash was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court paints a grim
picture of our society. It depicts a society in which local
authorities may command their citizens to dispose of their personal
effects in the manner least protective of the Page 486 U. S. 56 "sanctity of [the] home and the privacies of life," Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. at 116 U. S. 630 ,
and then monitor them arbitrarily and without judicial oversight --
a society that is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an
individual's expectation of privacy in the most private of personal
effects sealed in an opaque container and disposed of in a manner
designed to commingle it imminently and inextricably with the trash
of others. Ante at 486 U. S. 39 .
The American society with which I am familiar "chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance," Johnson v.
United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948), and is more dedicated to individual liberty and more
sensitive to intrusions on the sanctity of the home than the Court
is willing to acknowledge.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ] See 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 436 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); id. at 437 (REHNQUIST, J.,
dissenting); id. at 444 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But
see id. at 436 U. S.
433 -434 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting
position that all containers, even "the most trivial," like "a
cigar box or a Dixie cup," are entitled to the same Fourth
Amendment protection). Cf. New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 , 453 U. S.
460 -461, n. 4 (1981) (defining "container," for purposes
of search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, as "any object
capable of holding another object," including "luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like").

															In addition to finding that Robbins had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his duffelbag and plastic-wrapped packages, the Court
also held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 153 (1925), did not apply to packages found in an automobile. The Court
overruled the latter determination in United States v.
Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982), but reaffirmed that where, as here, the automobile
exception is inapplicable, police may not conduct a warrantless
search of any container that conceals its contents.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Both to support its position that society recognizes no
reasonable privacy interest in sealed, opaque trash bags and to
refute the prediction that "society will be shocked to learn" of
that conclusion, supra, at 46, the Court relies heavily
upon a collection of lower court cases finding no Fourth Amendment
bar to trash searches. But the authority that leads the Court to be
"distinctly unimpressed" with our position, ante at 486 U. S. 43 , n.
5, is itself impressively undistinguished. Of 11 Federal Court of
Appeals cases cited by the Court, at least 2 are factually or
legally distinguishable, see United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-1534 (CA11 1985) (police may search an
apparently valuable briefcase "discarded next to an overflowing
trash bin on a busy city street"); United States v.
Thornton, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 46, 56, 746 F.2d 39, 49 (1984)
(reasonable federal agents could believe in good faith that a trash
search is legal), and 7 rely entirely or almost entirely on an
abandonment theory that, as noted infra at 486 U. S. 51 ,
the Court has discredited, see United States v. Dela
Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (CA9 1986) ("The question,
then, becomes whether placing garbage for collection constitutes
abandonment of property"); United States v. Terry, 702
F.2d 299, 308-309 (CA2) ("[T]he circumstances in this case clearly
evidence abandonment by Williams of his trash"), cert. denied
sub nom. Williams v. United States, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (CA3 1981)
("[T]he placing of trash in garbage cans at a time and place for
anticipated collection by public employees for hauling to a public
dump signifies abandonment"); United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-101 (CA5 1979) (per curiam) ("[T]he act of placing
garbage for collection is an act of abandonment which terminates
any fourth amendment protection"), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1081 (1980); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1025
(CA4 1978) ("The act of placing [garbage] for collection is an act
of abandonment and what happens to it thereafter is not within the
protection of the fourth amendment"), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 959 (1979); Magda v. Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (CA6
1976) (per curiam) ("[F]ederal case law . . . holds that garbage .
. . is abandoned and no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (CA1 1972)
(when defendant "deposited the bags on the sidewalk, he abandoned
them"). A reading of the Court's collection of state court cases
reveals an equally unimpressive pattern.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 , 439 U. S.
143 -144, n. 12 (1978). See ante at 486 U. S. 43 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment analysis must turn on such factors as our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most
scrupulous protection from government invasion'") (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170 , 466 U. S. 178 (1984)); Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420 , 453 U. S. 428 (1981) (plurality opinion) ("Expectations of privacy are
established by general social norms"); Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States, 476 U. S. 227 , 476 U. S. 248 (1986) (opinion of Powell, J.); Bush & Bly, Expectation of
Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash Reconnaissance after Katz v. United States, 23 Ariz.L.Rev. 283, 293 (1981)
("[S]ocial custom . . . serves as the most basic foundation of a
great many legitimate privacy expectations") (citation
omitted). [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															To be sure, statutes criminalizing interference with the mails
might reinforce the expectation of privacy in mail, see,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1705, 1708, but the expectation of
privacy in no way depends on statutory protection. In fact, none of
the cases cited in the text even mention such statutes in finding
Fourth Amendment protection in materials handed over to public or
private carriers for delivery.


U.S. Supreme Court Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533 (1988) Murray v. United
States No. 86-995 Argued December 8,
1987 Decided June 27, 1988 487
U.S. 533 ast|>* 487
U.S. 533 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT Syllabus While surveiling petitioner Murray and others suspected of
illegal drug activities, federal agents observed both petitioners
driving vehicles into, and later out of, a warehouse, and, upon
petitioners' exit, saw that the warehouse contained a
tractor-trailer rig bearing a long container. Petitioners later
turned over their vehicles to other drivers, who were in turn
followed and ultimately arrested, and the vehicles were lawfully
seized and found to contain marijuana. After receiving this
information, several agents forced their way into the warehouse and
observed in plain view numerous burlap-wrapped bales. The agents
left without disturbing the bales and did not return until they had
obtained a warrant to search the warehouse. In applying for the
warrant, they did not mention the prior entry or include any
recitations of their observations made during that entry. Upon
issuance of the warrant, they reentered the warehouse and seized
270 bales of marijuana and other evidence of crime. The District
Court denied petitioners' pretrial motion to suppress the evidence,
rejecting their arguments that the warrant was invalid because the
agents did not inform the Magistrate about their prior warrantless
entry, and that the warrant was tainted by that entry. Petitioners
were subsequently convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute
illegal drugs. The Court of Appeals affirmed, assuming for purposes
of its decision on the suppression question that the first entry
into the warehouse was unlawful. Held: The Fourth Amendment does not require the
suppression of evidence initially discovered during police
officers' illegal entry of private premises if that evidence is
also discovered during a later search pursuant to a valid warrant
that is wholly independent of the initial illegal entry. Pp. 487 U. S.
536 -544.

															(a) The "independent source" doctrine permits the introduction
of evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an
unlawful search, but later obtained independently from lawful
activities untainted by the initial illegality. Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 .
There is no merit to petitioners' contention that allowing the Page 487 U. S. 534 doctrine to apply to evidence initially discovered during an
illegal search, rather than limiting it to evidence first obtained
during a later lawful search, will encourage police routinely to
enter premises without a warrant. Pp. 487 U. S.
536 -541.

															(b) Although the federal agents' knowledge that marijuana was in
the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful
entry, it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the
warrant, and if that later acquisition was not the result of the
earlier entry, the independent source doctrine allows the admission
of testimony as to that knowledge. This same analysis applies to
the tangible evidence, the bales of marijuana. United States v.
Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736 (CA1), is unpersuasive insofar as it
distinguishes between tainted intangible and tangible evidence. The
ultimate question is whether the search pursuant to warrant was in
fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible
evidence at issue. This would not have been the case if the agents'
decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen
during the initial entry or if information obtained during that
entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to
issue the warrant. Because the District Court did not explicitly
find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not
earlier entered the warehouse, the cases are remanded for a
determination whether the warrant-authorized search of the
warehouse was an independent source in the sense herein described.
Pp. 487 U. S.
541 -544.

															803 F.2d 20, vacated and remanded.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 487 U. S. 544 .
STEVENS, J. . filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 487 U. S. 551 .
BRENNAN and KENNEDY, JJ., took no part in the consideration or
decision of the cases. Page 487 U. S. 535 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Segura v. United States, 468 U.
S. 796 (1984), we held that police officers' illegal
entry upon private premises did not require suppression of evidence
subsequently discovered at those premises when executing a search
warrant obtained on the basis of information wholly unconnected
with the initial entry. In these consolidated cases, we are faced
with the question whether, again assuming evidence obtained
pursuant to an independently obtained search warrant, the portion
of such evidence that had been observed in plain view at the time
of a prior illegal entry must be suppressed. I Both cases arise out of the conviction of petitioner Michael F.
Murray, petitioner James D. Carter, and others for conspiracy to
possess and distribute illegal drugs. Insofar as relevant for our
purposes, the facts are as follows: based on information received
from informants, federal law enforcement agents had been surveiling
petitioner Murray and several of his coconspirators. At about 1:45
p.m. on April 6, 1983, they observed Murray drive a truck and
Carter drive a green camper, into a warehouse in South Boston. When
the petitioners drove the vehicles out about 20 minutes later, the
surveiling agents saw within the warehouse two individuals and a
tractor-trailer rig bearing a long, dark container. Murray and
Carter later turned over the truck and camper to other drivers, who
were in turn followed and ultimately arrested, and the vehicles
lawfully seized. Both vehicles were found to contain marijuana.

															After receiving this information, several of the agents
converged on the South Boston warehouse and forced entry. They
found the warehouse unoccupied, but observed in plain view numerous
burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain marijuana.
They left without disturbing the bales, kept the warehouse under
surveillance, and did not reenter it until they had a search
warrant. In applying for Page 487 U. S. 536 the warrant, the agents did not mention the prior entry, and did
not rely on any observations made during that entry. When the
warrant was issued -- at 10:40 p.m., approximately eight hours
after the initial entry -- the agents immediately reentered the
warehouse and seized 270 bales of marijuana and notebooks listing
customers for whom the bales were destined.

															Before trial, petitioners moved to suppress the evidence found
in the warehouse. The District Court denied the motion, rejecting
petitioners' arguments that the warrant was invalid because the
agents did not inform the Magistrate about their prior warrantless
entry, and that the warrant was tainted by that entry. United
States v. Carter, No. 83102-S (Mass., Dec. 23, 1983), App. to
Pet. for Cert. 44a-45a. The First Circuit affirmed, assuming for
purposes of its decision that the first entry into the warehouse
was unlawful. United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d 589
(1985). Murray and Carter then separately filed petitions for
certiorari, which we granted, [ Footnote 1 ] 480 U.S. 916 (1987), and have consolidated
here. II The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of
tangible materials seized during an unlawful search, Weeks v.
United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an
unlawful search, Silverman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 505 (1961). Beyond that, the exclusionary rule also
prohibits the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible
and testimonial, that is Page 487 U. S. 537 the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise
acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the
point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes "so
attentuated as to dissipate the taint," Nardone v. United
States, 308 U. S. 338 , 308 U. S. 341 (1939). See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 , 371 U. S.
484 -485 (1963).

															Almost simultaneously with our development of the exclusionary
rule, in the first quarter of this century, we also announced what
has come to be known as the "independent source" doctrine. See
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.
S. 385 , 251 U. S. 392 (1920). That doctrine, which has been applied to evidence acquired
not only through Fourth Amendment violations, but also through
Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, has recently been described
as follows:

															"[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct
and the public interest in having juries receive all probative
evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in
the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no
police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When the challenged
evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence
would put the police in a worse position than they would have been
in absent any error or violation." Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431 , 467 U. S. 443 (1984). The dispute here is over the scope of this doctrine.
Petitioners contend that it applies only to evidence obtained for
the first time during an independent lawful search. The Government
argues that it applies also to evidence initially discovered
during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later
obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial
illegality. We think the Government's view has better support in
both precedent and policy.

															Our cases have used the concept of "independent source" in a
more general and a more specific sense. The more general sense
identifies all evidence acquired in a fashion untainted Page 487 U. S. 538 by the illegal evidence-gathering activity. Thus, where an
unlawful entry has given investigators knowledge of facts x and y, but fact z has been learned by
other means, fact z can be said to be admissible because
derived from an "independent source." This is how we used the term
in Segura v. United States, 468 U.
S. 796 (1984). In that case, agents unlawfully entered
the defendant's apartment and remained there until a search warrant
was obtained. The admissibility of what they discovered while
waiting in the apartment was not before us, id. at 468 U. S.
802 -803, n. 4, but we held that the evidence found for
the first time during the execution of the valid and untainted
search warrant was admissible because it was discovered pursuant to
an "independent source," id. at 468 U. S.
813 -814. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 , 388 U. S.
240 -242 (1967); Costello v. United States, 365 U. S. 265 , 365 U. S. 280 (1961); Nardone v. United States, supra, at 308 U. S.
341 .

															The original use of the term, however, and its more important
use for purposes of this case, was more specific. It was originally
applied in the exclusionary rule context, by Justice Holmes, with
reference to that particular category of evidence acquired by an
untainted search which is identical to the evidence unlawfully
acquired -- that is, in the example just given, to knowledge
of facts x and y derived from an independent
source:

															"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used
at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from
an independent source, they may be proved like any others." Silverthorne Lumber, supra, at 251 U. S.
392 .

															As the First Circuit has observed,

															"[i]n the classic independent source situation, information
which is received through an illegal source is considered to be
cleanly obtained when Page 487 U. S. 539 it arrives through an independent source." United States v. Silvestri, 787 F.2d 736, 739 (1986).
We recently assumed this application of the independent source
doctrine (in the Sixth Amendment context) in Nix v. Williams,
supra. There, incriminating statements obtained in violation
of the defendant's right to counsel had led the police to the
victim's body. The body had not in fact been found through an
independent source as well, and so the independent source doctrine
was not itself applicable. We held, however, that evidence
concerning the body was nonetheless admissible because a search had
been under way which would have discovered the body, had it not
been called off because of the discovery produced by the unlawfully
obtained statements. 467 U.S. at 476 U. S.
448 -450. This "inevitable discovery" doctrine obviously
assumes the validity of the independent source doctrine as applied
to evidence initially acquired unlawfully. It would make no sense
to admit the evidence because the independent search, had it not
been aborted, would have found the body, but to exclude the
evidence if the search had continued and had in fact found the
body. The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct
requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent
source doctrine: since the tainted evidence would be admissible if
in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be
admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.

															Petitioners' asserted policy basis for excluding evidence which
is initially discovered during an illegal search, but is
subsequently acquired through an independent and lawful source, is
that a contrary rule will remove all deterrence to, and indeed
positively encourage, unlawful police searches. As petitioners see
the incentives, law enforcement officers will routinely enter
without a warrant to make sure that what they expect to be on the
premises is in fact there. If it is not, they will have spared
themselves the time and trouble of getting a warrant; if it is,
they can get the warrant and use the evidence despite the unlawful
entry. Brief for Petitioners Page 487 U. S. 540 42. We see the incentives differently. An officer with probable
cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant would be foolish to
enter the premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he
would risk suppression of all evidence on the premises, both seen
and unseen, since his action would add to the normal burden of
convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause the much more
onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information
gained from the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement
officers' decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision
to grant it. See 487 U. S. infra. Nor would the officer without sufficient probable
cause to obtain a search warrant have any added incentive to
conduct an unlawful entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used
to establish probable cause before a magistrate. [ Footnote 2 ]

															It is possible to read petitioners' briefs as asserting the more
narrow position that the "independent source" doctrine does apply
to independent acquisition of evidence previously Page 487 U. S. 541 derived indirectly from the unlawful search, but does
not apply to what they call "primary evidence," that is, evidence
acquired during the course of the search itself. In addition to
finding no support in our precedent, see Silverthorne
Lumber, 251 U.S. at 251 U. S. 392 (referring specifically to evidence seized during an unlawful
search), this strange distinction would produce results bearing no
relation to the policies of the exclusionary rule. It would mean,
for example, that the government's knowledge of the existence and
condition of a dead body, knowledge lawfully acquired through
independent sources, would have to be excluded if government agents
had previously observed the body during an unlawful search of the
defendant's apartment; but not if they had observed a notation that
the body was buried in a certain location, producing consequential
discovery of the corpse. III To apply what we have said to the present cases: knowledge that
the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the
time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of
entry pursuant to the warrant, and if that later acquisition was
not the result of the earlier entry, there is no reason why the
independent source doctrine should not apply. Invoking the
exclusionary rule would put the police (and society) not in the
same position they would have occupied if no violation occurred,
but in a worse one. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S.
443 .

															We think this is also true with respect to the tangible
evidence, the bales of marijuana. It would make no more sense to
exclude that than it would to exclude tangible evidence found upon
the corpse in Nix, if the search in that case had not been
abandoned and had in fact come upon the body. The First Circuit has
discerned a difference between tangible and intangible evidence
that has been tainted, in that objects "once seized cannot be
cleanly reseized without returning the objects to private control." United States v. Silvestri, 787 Page 487 U. S. 542 F.2d at 739. It seems to us, however, that reseizure of tangible
evidence already seized is no more impossible than rediscovery of
intangible evidence already discovered. The independent source
doctrine does not rest upon such metaphysical analysis, but upon
the policy that, while the government should not profit from its
illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position
than it would otherwise have occupied. So long as a later, lawful
seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which
may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept
in the police's possession), there is no reason why the independent
source doctrine should not apply.

															The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuant
to warrant was, in fact, a genuinely independent source of the
information and tangible evidence at issue here. This would not
have been the case if the agents' decision to seek the warrant was
prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry, [ Footnote 3 ] or if information obtained
during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his
decision to issue the warrant. On this point, the Court of Appeals
said the following:

															"[W]e can be absolutely certain that the warrantless entry in no
way contributed in the slightest either to the issuance of a
warrant or to the discovery of the evidence Page 487 U. S. 543 during the lawful search that occurred pursuant to the
warrant."

															" * * * *" "This is as clear a case as can be imagined where the discovery
of the contraband in plain view was totally irrelevant to the later
securing of a warrant and the successful search that ensued. As
there was no causal link whatever between the illegal entry and the
discovery of the challenged evidence, we find no error in the
court's refusal to suppress." United States v. Moscatiello, 771 F.2d at 603, 604.
Although these statements can be read to provide emphatic support
for the Government's position, it is the function of the District
Court, rather than the Court of Appeals, to determine the facts,
and we do not think the Court of Appeals' conclusions are supported
by adequate findings. The District Court found that the agents did
not reveal their warrantless entry to the Magistrate, App. to Pet.
for Cert. 43a, and that they did not include in their application
for a warrant any recitation of their observations in the
warehouse, id. at 44a-45a. It did not, however, explicitly
find that the agents would have sought a warrant if they had not
earlier entered the warehouse. The Government concedes this in its
brief. Brief for United States 17, n. 5. To be sure, the District
Court did determine that the purpose of the warrantless entry was,
in part, "to guard against the destruction of possibly critical
evidence," App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a, and one could perhaps infer
from this that the agents who made the entry already planned to
obtain that "critical evidence" through a warrant-authorized
search. That inference is not, however, clear enough to justify the
conclusion that the District Court's findings amounted to a
determination of independent source.

															Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand these cases to
the Court of Appeals with instructions that it remand to the
District Court for determination whether the Page 487 U. S. 544 warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent
source of the challenged evidence in the sense we have
described. It is so ordered. JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the
consideration or decision of this litigation.

															* Together with No. 86-1016, Carter v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The original petitions raised both the present Fourth Amendment
claim and a Speedy Trial Act claim. We granted the petitions,
vacated the judgment below, and remanded for reconsideration of the
Speedy Trial Act issue in light of Henderson v. United
States, 476 U. S. 321 (1986). Carter v. United States and Murray v. United
States, 476 U.S. 1138 (1986). On remand, the Court of Appeals
again rejected the Speedy Trial Act claim, and did not reexamine
its prior ruling on the Fourth Amendment question. 803 F.2d 20
(1986). Petitioners again sought writs of certiorari, which we
granted limited to the Fourth Amendment question.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															JUSTICE MARSHALL argues, in effect, that where the police cannot
point to some historically verifiable fact demonstrating that the
subsequent search pursuant to a warrant was wholly unaffected by
the prior illegal search -- e.g., that they had already
sought the warrant before entering the premises -- we should adopt
a per se rule of inadmissibilty. See post at 487 U. S. 549 .
We do not believe that such a prophylatic exception to the
independent source rule is necessary. To say that a district court
must be satisfied that a warrant would have been sought without the
illegal entry is not to give dispositive effect to police officers'
assurances on the point. Where the facts render those assurances
implausible, the independent source doctrine will not apply.

															We might note that there is no basis for pointing to the present
cases as an example of a "search first, warrant later" mentality.
The District Court found that the agents entered the warehouse

															"in an effort to apprehend any participants who might have
remained inside and to guard against the destruction of possibly
critical evidence." United States v. Carter, No. 83-102-S (Mass., Dec. 23,
1983), App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a. While they may have misjudged
the existence of sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless entry (the Court of Appeals did not reach that issue,
and neither do we), there is nothing to suggest that they went in
merely to see if there was anything worth getting a warrant
for.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															JUSTICE MARSHALL argues that

															"the relevant question [is] whether, even if the initial entry
uncovered no evidence, the officers would return immediately with a
warrant to conduct a second search." Post at 487 U. S. 548 ,
n. 2; see post at 487 U. S. 549 -550, n. 4. We do not see how this is
"relevant" at all. To determine whether the warrant was independent
of the illegal entry, one must ask whether it would have been
sought even if what actually happened had not occurred -- not
whether it would have been sought if something else had happened.
That is to say, what counts is whether the actual illegal search
had any effect in producing the warrant, not whether some
hypothetical illegal search would have aborted the warrant. Only
that much is needed to assure that what comes before the court is
not the product of illegality; to go further than that would be to
expand our existing exclusionary rule.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE O'CONNOR
join, dissenting.

															The Court today holds that the "independent source" exception to
the exclusionary rule may justify admitting evidence discovered
during an illegal warrantless search that is later "rediscovered"
by the same team of investigators during a search pursuant to a
warrant obtained immediately after the illegal search. I believe
the Court's decision, by failing to provide sufficient guarantees
that the subsequent search was, in fact, independent of the illegal
search, emasculates the Warrant Clause and undermines the
deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. I therefore
dissent.

															This Court has stated frequently that the exclusionary rule is
principally designed to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 , 468 U. S. 906 (1984); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.
S. 206 , 364 U. S. 217 (1960). By excluding evidence discovered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the rule

															"compel[s] respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way, by removing the incentive to disregard
it." Id. at 364 U. S. 217 .
The Court has crafted exceptions to the exclusionary rule when the
purposes of the rule are not furthered by the exclusion. As the
Court today recognizes, the independent source exception to the
exclusionary rule "allows admission of evidence that has been
discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional
violation." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.
S. 431 , 467 U. S. 443 (1984); see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 , 251 U. S. 392 (1920). The independent source exception, like the inevitable
discovery exception, is primarily Page 487 U. S. 545 based on a practical view that, under certain circumstances, the
beneficial deterrent effect that exclusion will have on future
constitutional violations is too slight to justify the social cost
of excluding probative evidence from a criminal trial. See Nix
v. Williams, supra, at 467 U. S.
444 -446; cf. United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U. S.
906 -909. When the seizure of the evidence at issue is
"wholly independent of" the constitutional violation, then
exclusion arguably will have no effect on a law enforcement
officer's incentive to commit an unlawful search. [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Given the underlying justification for the independent source
exception, any inquiry into the exception's application must keep
sight of the practical effect admission will have on the incentives
facing law enforcement officers to engage in unlawful conduct. The
proper scope of the independent source exception, and guidelines
for its application, cannot be divined in a factual vacuum;
instead, they must be informed by the nature of the constitutional
violation and the deterrent effect of exclusion in particular
circumstances. In holding that the independent source exception may
apply to the facts of these cases, I believe the Court loses sight
of the practical moorings of the independent source exception and
creates an affirmative incentive for unconstitutional searches.
This holding can find no justification in the purposes underlying
both the exclusionary rule and the independent source
exception.

															The factual setting of the instant case is straightforward.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) agents stopped two vehicles after they Page 487 U. S. 546 left a warehouse and discovered bales of marijuana. DEA
Supervisor Garibotto and an assistant United States attorney then
returned to the warehouse, which had been under surveillance for
several hours. After demands that the warehouse door be opened went
unanswered, Supervisor Garibotto forced open the door with a tire
iron. A number of agents entered the warehouse. No persons were
found inside, but the agents saw numerous bales of marijuana in
plain view. Supervisor Garibotto then ordered everyone out of the
warehouse. Agents did not reenter the warehouse until a warrant was
obtained some eight hours later. The warehouse was kept under
surveillance during the interim.

															It is undisputed that the agents made no effort to obtain a
warrant prior to the initial entry. The agents had not begun to
prepare a warrant affidavit, and, according to FBI Agent Cleary,
who supervised the FBI's involvement, they had not even engaged in
any discussions of obtaining a warrant. App 52. The affidavit in
support of the warrant obtained after the initial search was
prepared by DEA Agent Keaney, who had tactical control over the DEA
agents and who had participated in the initial search of the
warehouse. The affidavit did not mention the warrantless search of
the warehouse, nor did it cite information obtained from that
search. In determining that the challenged evidence was admissible,
the Court of Appeals assumed that the initial warrantless entry was
not justified by exigent circumstances, and that the search
therefore violated the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.

															Under the circumstances of these cases, the admission of the
evidence "reseized" during the second search severely undermines
the the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule. Indeed,
admission in these cases affirmatively encourages illegal searches.
The incentives for such illegal conduct are clear. Obtaining a
warrant is inconvenient and time consuming. Even when officers have
probable cause to support a warrant application, therefore, they
have an incentive first Page 487 U. S. 547 to determine whether it is worthwhile to obtain a warrant.
Probable cause is much less than certainty, and many "confirmatory"
searches will result in the discovery that no evidence is present,
thus saving the police the time and trouble of getting a warrant.
If contraband is discovered, however, the officers may later seek a
warrant to shield the evidence from the taint of the illegal
search. The police thus know in advance that they have little to
lose and much to gain by forgoing the bother of obtaining a warrant
and undertaking an illegal search.

															The Court, however, "see[s] the incentives differently." Ante at 487 U. S. 540 .
Under the Court's view, today's decision does not provide an
incentive for unlawful searches, because the officer undertaking
the search would know that

															"his action would add to the normal burden of convincing a
magistrate that there is probable cause the much more onerous
burden of convincing a trial court that no information gained from
the illegal entry affected either the law enforcement officers'
decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate's decision to grant
it." Ibid. The Court, however, provides no hint of why this
risk would actually seem significant to the officers. Under the
circumstances of these cases, the officers committing the illegal
search have both knowledge and control of the factors central to
the trial court's determination. First, it is a simple matter, as
was done in these cases, to exclude from the warrant application
any information gained from the initial entry, so that the
magistrate's determination of probable cause is not influenced by
the prior illegal search. Second, today's decision makes the
application of the independent source exception turn entirely on an
evaluation of the officers' intent. It normally will be difficult
for the trial court to verify, or the defendant to rebut, an
assertion by officers that they always intended to obtain a
warrant, regardless of the results of the illegal search. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The testimony of the
officers Page 487 U. S. 548 conducting the illegal search is the only direct evidence of
intent, and the defendant will be relegated simply to arguing that
the officers should not be believed. Under these circumstances, the
litigation risk described by the Court seems hardly a risk at all;
it does not significantly dampen the incentive to conduct the
initial illegal search. [ Footnote
2/3 ]

															The strong Fourth Amendment interest in eliminating these
incentives for illegal entry should cause this Court to scrutinize
closely the application of the independent source exception to
evidence obtained under the circumstances of the instant cases;
respect for the constitutional guaranty requires a rule that does
not undermine the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule.
When, as here, the same team of investigators is involved in both
the first and second search, there is a significant danger that the
"independence" of the Page 487 U. S. 549 source will in fact be illusory, and that the initial search
will have affected the decision to obtain a warrant notwithstanding
the officers' subsequent assertions to the contrary. It is
therefore crucial that the factual premise of the exception --
complete independence -- be clearly established before the
exception can justify admission of the evidence. I believe the
Court's reliance on the intent of the law enforcement officers who
conducted the warrantless search provides insufficient guarantees
that the subsequent legal search was unaffected by the prior
illegal search.

															To ensure that the source of the evidence is genuinely
independent, the basis for a finding that a search was untainted by
a prior illegal search must focus, as with the inevitable discovery
doctrine, on "demonstrated historical facts capable of ready
verification or impeachment." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. at 467 U. S. 445 ,
n. 5. In the instant cases, there are no "demonstrated historical
facts" capable of supporting a finding that the subsequent warrant
search was wholly unaffected by the prior illegal search. The same
team of investigators was involved in both searches. The warrant
was obtained immediately after the illegal search, and no effort
was made to obtain a warrant prior to the discovery of the
marijuana during the illegal search. The only evidence available
that the warrant search was wholly independent is the testimony of
the agents who conducted the illegal search. Under these
circumstances, the threat that the subsequent search was tainted by
the illegal search is too great to allow for the application of the
independent source exception. [ Footnote
2/4 ] The Court's Page 487 U. S. 550 contrary holding lends itself to easy abuse, and offers an
incentive to bypass the constitutional requirement that probable
cause be assessed by a neutral and detached magistrate before the
police invade an individual's privacy. [ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The decision in Segura v. United States, 468 U.
S. 796 (1984), is not to the contrary. In Segura, the Court expressly distinguished between evidence
discovered during an initial warrantless entry and evidence that
was not discovered until a subsequent legal search. The Court held
that, under those circumstances, when no information from an
illegal search was used in a subsequent warrant application, the
warrant provided an independent source for the evidence first
uncovered in the second, lawful search. Segura is readily distinguished from the present cases.
The admission of evidence first discovered during a legal search
does not significantly lessen the deterrence facing the law
enforcement officers contemplating an illegal entry so long as the
evidence that is seen is excluded. This was clearly the view of
Chief Justice Burger, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, when he stated
that the Court's ruling would not significantly detract from the
deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule because

															"officers who enter illegally will recognize that whatever
evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry may be
suppressed, as it was by the Court of Appeals in this case." Id. at 468 U. S. 812 .
As I argue above, extending Segura to cover evidence
discovered during an initial illegal search will eradicate this
remaining deterrence to illegal entry. Moreover, there is less
reason to believe that Page 487 U. S. 551 an initial illegal entry was prompted by a desire to determine
whether to bother to get a warrant in the first place, and thus was
not wholly independent of the second search, if officers understand
that evidence they discover during the illegal search will be
excluded even if they subsequently return with a warrant.

															In sum, under circumstances as are presented in these cases,
when the very law enforcement officers who participate in an
illegal search immediately thereafter obtain a warrant to search
the same premises, I believe the evidence discovered during the
initial illegal entry must be suppressed. Any other result
emasculates the Warrant Clause, and provides an intolerable
incentive for warrantless searches. I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The clearest case for the application of the independent source
exception is when a wholly separate line of investigation, shielded
from information gathered in an illegal search, turns up the same
evidence through a separate, lawful search. Under these
circumstances, there is little doubt that the lawful search was not
connected to the constitutional violation. The exclusion of such
evidence would not significantly add to the deterrence facing the
law enforcement officers conducting the illegal search, because
they would have little reason to anticipate the separate
investigation leading to the same evidence.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Such an intent-based rule is of dubious value for other reasons
as well. First, the intent of the officers prior to the illegal
entry often will be of little significance to the relevant
question: whether, even if the initial entry uncovered no evidence,
the officers' would return immediately with a warrant to conduct a
second search. Officers who have probable cause to believe
contraband is present genuinely might intend later to obtain a
warrant, but after the illegal search uncovers no such contraband,
those same officers might decide their time is better spent than to
return with a warrant. In addition, such an intent rule will be
difficult to apply. The Court fails to describe how a trial court
will properly evaluate whether the law enforcement officers' fully
intended to obtain a warrant regardless of what they discovered
during the illegal search. The obvious question is whose intent is
relevant? Intentions clearly may differ both among supervisory
officers and among officers who initiate the illegal search.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The litigation risk facing these law enforcement officers may be
contrasted with the risk faced by the officer in Nix v.
Williams, 467 U. S. 431 (1984). Nix involved an application of the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. In that case, the
Court stressed that an officer

															"who is faced with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally
will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the
evidence sought would inevitably be discovered." Id. at 467 U. S. 445 .
Unlike the officer in Nix, who had no way of knowing about
the progress of a wholly separate line of investigation that
already had begun at the time of his unconstitutional conduct, the
officers in the instant cases, at least under the Court's analysis,
have complete knowledge and control over the factors relevant to
the determination of "independence."

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															To conclude that the initial search had no effect on the
decision to obtain a warrant, and thus that the warrant search was
an "independent source" of the challenged evidence, one would have
to assume that, even if the officers entered the premises and
discovered no contraband, they nonetheless would have gone to the
Magistrate, sworn that they had probable cause to believe that
contraband was in the building, and then returned to conduct
another search. Although such a scenario is possible, I believe it
is more plausible to believe that the officers would not have
chosen to return immediately to the premises with a warrant to
search for evidence had they not discovered evidence during the
initial search.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Given that the law enforcement officers in these cases made no
movement to obtain a warrant prior to the illegal search, these
cases do not present the more difficult issue whether, in light of
the strong interest in deterring illegal warrantless searches, the
evidence discovered during an illegal search ever may be admitted
under the independent source exception when the second legal search
is conducted by the same investigative team pursuing the same line
of investigation.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															While I join JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion explaining why the
majority's extension of the Court's holding in Segura v. United
States, 468 U. S. 796 (1984), "emasculates the Warrant Clause and provides an intolerable
incentive for warrantless searches," ante this page, I
remain convinced that the Segura decision itself was
unacceptable because, even then, it was obvious that it would
"provide government agents with an affirmative incentive to engage
in unconstitutional violations of the privacy of the home," 468
U.S. at 468 U. S. 817 (dissenting opinion). I fear that the Court has taken another
unfortunate step down the path to a system of "law enforcement
unfettered by process concerns." Patterson v. Illinois,
ante at 487 U. S. 305 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In due course, I trust it will pause
long enough to remember that

															"the efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided
by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 , 232 U. S.
393 -394 (1914).