OCTOBER TERM, 1996

															Syllabus

															OHIO v. ROBINETTE

															CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO No.95-891. Argued
October 8, 1996-Decided November 18,1996

															After an Ohio deputy sheriff stopped respondent Robinette for
speeding, gave him a verbal warning, and returned his driver's
license, the deputy asked whether he was carrying illegal
contraband, weapons, or drugs in his car. Robinette answered "no"
and consented to a search of the car, which revealed a small amount
of marijuana and a pill. He was arrested and later charged with
knowing possession of a controlled substance when the pill turned
out to be methylenedioxymethamphetamine. Following denial of his
pretrial suppression motion, he was found guilty, but the Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the search resulted
from an unlawful detention. The State Supreme Court affirmed,
establishing as a bright-line prerequisite for consensual
interrogation under these circumstances the requirement that an
officer clearly state when a citizen validly detained for a traffic
offense is "legally free to go."

															Held:

															1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision. The contention that jurisdiction is lacking
because the Ohio decision rested in part upon the State
Constitution is rejected under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 ,
1040-1041. Although the opinion below mentions the Ohio
Constitution in passing, it clearly relies on federal law,
discussing and citing federal cases almost exclusively. It is not
dispositive that those citations appear only in the opinion and not
in the official syllabus. Under Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562 , 566, it is
permissible to turn to an Ohio opinion's body when the syllabus
speaks only in general terms of "the federal and Ohio
Constitutions." Nor is the Court's jurisdiction defeated by the
additional holding below that continuing detention of a person
stopped for a traffic violation constitutes an illegal seizure when
the officer's motivation for continuing is not related to the
purpose of the original, constitutional stop and there are no
articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate
illegal activity. Under Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813, the officer's subjective intentions do not make
continued detention illegal, so long as the detention is justified
by the circumstances viewed objectively. Pp. 36-39.

															2. The Fourth Amendment does not require that a lawfully seized
defendant be advised that he is "free to go" before his consent to
search 34 Syllabus

															will be recognized as voluntary. The Amendment's touchstone is
reasonableness, which is measured in objective terms by examining
the totality of the circumstances. In applying this test, the Court
has consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing
the factspecific nature of the reasonableness inquiry. Indeed, in
rejecting a per se rule very similar to one adopted below,
this Court has held that the voluntariness of a consent to search
is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 248-249.
The Ohio Supreme Court erred in holding otherwise. It would be
unrealistic to require the police to always inform detainees that
they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed
voluntary. Cf. id., at 231. Pp. 39-40.

															73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695, reversed and remanded.

															REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 40. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 45. Carley J. Ingram argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs was Mathias H. Heck, Jr. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General
Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben, Paul A. Engelmayer, and Joseph C. Wyderko. James D. Ruppert argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Alabama et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney
General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor,
and Simon B. Karas, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows: Jeff Sessions of Alabama, Daniel E. Lungren of California, Gale A. Norton of
Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Robert
Butterworth of Florida, Margery S. Bronster of
Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Jim Ryan of
Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, A. B.
Chandler III of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub of
Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran,
Jr., of Maryland, Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey
III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Joseph
P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa 35 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be advised
that he is "free to go" before his consent to search will be
recognized as voluntary. We hold that it does not.

															This case arose on a stretch of Interstate 70 north of Dayton,
Ohio, where the posted speed limit was 45 miles per hour because of
construction. Respondent Robert D. Robinette was clocked at 69
miles per hour as he drove his car along this stretch of road, and
was stopped by Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery County
Sheriff's Office. Newsome asked for and was handed Robinette's
driver's license, and he ran a computer check which indicated that
Robinette had no previous violations. Newsome then asked Robinette
to step out of his car, turned on his mounted video camera, issued
a verbal warning to Robinette, and returned his license.

															At this point, Newsome asked, "One question before you get gone:
[A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your

															of Nevada, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz
of New Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of
North Carolina, W A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Theodore
Kulongoski of Oregon, Thomas W Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania,
Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Bennett of South Dakota,
Charles W Bursen of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L.
Amestoy of Vermont, James S. Gilmore III of Virginia, Darrell V.
McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia, James E. Doyle of Wisconsin, and
William U. Hill of Wyoming; and for Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement, Inc., by Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W Schmidt, James P.
Manak, and Bernard J. Farber. Tracey Maclin, Steven R. Shapiro, and Jeffrey M.
Gamso filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et
al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.

															Briefs of amicus curiae were filed for the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Sheryl Gordon
McCloud; and for the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers by W Andrew Hasselbach. 36 car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" App.
to Brief for Respondent 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Robinette answered "no" to these questions, after which Deputy
Newsome asked if he could search the car. Robinette consented. In
the car, Deputy Newsome discovered a small amount of marijuana and,
in a film container, a pill which was later determined to be
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). Robinette was then arrested
and charged with knowing possession of a controlled substance,
MDMA, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.11(A) (1993).

															Before trial, Robinette unsuccessfully sought to suppress this
evidence. He then pleaded "no contest," and was found guilty. On
appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the search
resulted from an unlawful detention. The Supreme Court of Ohio, by
a divided vote, affirmed. 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 653 N. E. 2d 695
(1995). In its opinion, that court established a bright-line
prerequisite for consensual interrogation under these
circumstances: "The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to
be secure in one's person and property requires that citizens
stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining
officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an
officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any
attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase
'At this time you legally are free to go' or by words of similar
import." Id., at 650-651, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696. We granted certiorari, 516 U. S. 1157 (1996), to review this per se rule, and we now reverse.

															We must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to review
the Ohio Supreme Court's decision. Respondent contends that we lack
such jurisdiction because the Ohio decision rested upon the Ohio
Constitution, in addition to the 37 Federal Constitution. Under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), when "a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal law required
it to do so." * Id., at 1040-1041. Although the opinion
below mentions Art. I, § 14, of the Ohio Constitution in passing (a
section which reads identically to the Fourth Amendment), the
opinion clearly relies on federal law nevertheless. Indeed, the
only cases it discusses or even cites are federal cases, except for
one state case which itself applies the Federal Constitution.

															Our jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that these
citations appear in the body of the opinion, while, under Ohio law,
"[the] Supreme Court speaks as a court only through the syllabi of
its cases." See Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U. S. 257 , 259
(1976). When the syllabus, as here, speaks only in general terms of
"the federal and Ohio Constitutions," it is permissible for us to
turn to the body of the opinion to discern the grounds for
decision. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U. S.
562 , 566 (1977).

															Respondent Robinette also contends that we may not reach the
question presented in the petition because the Supreme Court of
Ohio also held, as set out in the syllabus paragraph (1): "When the motivation behind a police officer's continued
detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not
related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and
when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts
giving rise to a suspicion of some *Respondent and his amici ask us to take this opportunity
to depart from Michigan v. Long. We are no more
persuaded by this argument now than we were two Terms ago, see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995), and we
again reaffirm the Long presumption. 38 separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the
detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure."
73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d, at 696. In reliance on this ground, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
when Newsome returned to Robinette's car and asked him to get out
of the car, after he had determined in his own mind not to give
Robinette a ticket, the detention then became unlawful.

															Respondent failed to make any such argument in his brief in
opposition to certiorari. See this Court's Rule 15.2. We believe
the issue as to the continuing legality of the detention is a
"predicate to an intelligent resolution" of the question presented,
and therefore "fairly included therein." This Court's Rule 14.1(a); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U. S. 252 , 258259, n.
5 (1980). The parties have briefed this issue, and we proceed to
decide it.

															We think that under our recent decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996)
(decided after the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the present case),
the subjective intentions of the officer did not make the continued
detention of respondent illegal under the Fourth Amendment. As we
made clear in Whren, "'the fact that [an] officer does not
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not
invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action.' ... Subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id., at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128 ,
138 (1978)). And there is no question that, in light of the
admitted probable cause to stop Robinette for speeding, Deputy
Newsome was objectively justified in asking Robinette to get out of
the car, subjective thoughts notwithstanding. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 , 111, n. 6
(1977) ("We hold ... that once a motor vehicle has been lawfully
detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the
driver to get out 39 of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures").

															We now turn to the merits of the question presented. We have
long held that the "touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248 , 250
(1991). Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by
examining the totality of the circumstances.

															In applying this test we have consistently eschewed bright-line
rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry. Thus, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983), we expressly disavowed any "litmuspaper test" or single
"sentence or ... paragraph ... rule," in recognition of the
"endless variations in the facts and circumstances" implicating the
Fourth Amendment. Id., at 506. Then, in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 (1988),
when both parties urged "bright-line rule[s] applicable to all
investigatory pursuits," we rejected both proposed rules as
contrary to our "traditional contextual approach." Id., at
572-573. And again, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991),
when the Florida Supreme Court adopted a per se rule that
questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a seizure, we reversed,
reiterating that the proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of
"all the circumstances surrounding the encounter." Id., at
439.

															We have previously rejected a per se rule very similar to
that adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in determining the
validity of a consent to search. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), it
was argued that such a consent could not be valid unless the
defendant knew that he had a right to refuse the request. We
rejected this argument:

															"While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to
be taken into account, the government need not establish such
knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent." Id., at 227. And just as it "would be thoroughly impractical
to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of
an effective warning," id., at 231, so too would it be 40 GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment

															unrealistic to require police officers to always inform
detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may
be deemed voluntary.

															The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that
the consent be voluntary, and "[v]oluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from all the circumstances," id., at 248-249.
The Supreme Court of Ohio having held otherwise, its judgment is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring in the judgment.

															Robert Robinette's traffic stop for a speeding violation on an
interstate highway in Ohio served as prelude to a search of his
automobile for illegal drugs. Robinette's experience was not
uncommon in Ohio. As the Ohio Supreme Court related, the sheriff's
deputy who detained Robinette for speeding and then asked Robinette
for permission to search his vehicle "was on drug interdiction
patrol at the time." 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 651, 653 N. E. 2d 695, 696
(1995). The deputy testified in Robinette's case that he routinely
requested permission to search automobiles he stopped for traffic
violations. Ibid. According to the deputy's testimony in
another prosecution, he requested consent to search in 786 traffic
stops in 1992, the year of Robinette's arrest. State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App. 3d 586, 594, n. 3, 639 N. E. 2d
498, 503, n. 3, dism'd, 69 Ohio St. 3d 1488, 635 N. E. 2d 43
(1994).

															From their unique vantage point, Ohio's courts observed that
traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to contraband
searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no
reason to suspect illegal activity. One Ohio appellate court noted:
"[H]undreds, and perhaps thousands of Ohio citizens are being
routinely delayed in their travels and asked to relinquish to
uniformed police officers their 41 right to privacy in their automobiles and luggage, sometimes for
no better reason than to provide an officer the opportunity to
'practice' his drug interdiction technique." 93 Ohio App. 3d, at
594, 639 N. E. 2d, at 503 (footnote omitted).

															Against this background, the Ohio Supreme Court determined, and
announced in Robinette's case, that the federal and state
constitutional rights of Ohio citizens to be secure in their
persons and property called for the protection of a clear-cut
instruction to the State's police officers: An officer wishing to
engage in consensual interrogation of a motorist at the conclusion
of a traffic stop must first tell the motorist that he or she is
free to go. The Ohio Supreme Court described the need for its
first-tell-then-ask rule this way: "The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can
be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has
occurred .... "Most people believe that they are validly in a police officer's
custody as long as the officer continues to interrogate them. The
police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of
authority. That the officer lacks legal license to continue to
detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person
would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to
address him. "While the legality of consensual encounters between police and
citizens should be preserved, we do not believe that this legality
should be used by police officers to turn a routine traffic stop
into a fishing expedition for unrelated criminal activity. The
Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and Section 14,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution exist to protect citizens
against such an unreasonable interference with their liberty." 73
Ohio St. 3d, at 654-655, 653 N. E. 2d, at 698-699. 42 GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment

															Today's opinion reversing the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
does not pass judgment on the wisdom of the first-tell-then-ask
rule. This Court's opinion simply clarifies that the Ohio Supreme
Court's instruction to police officers in Ohio is not, under this
Court's controlling jurisprudence, the command of the Federal
Constitution. See ante, at 3940. The Ohio Supreme Court
invoked both the Federal Constitution and the Ohio Constitution
without clearly indicating whether state law, standing alone,
independently justified the court's rule. The ambiguity in the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision renders this Court's exercise of
jurisdiction proper under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 ,
1040-1042 (1983), and this Court's decision on the merits is
consistent with the Court's "totality of the circumstances" Fourth
Amendment precedents, see ante, at 39. I therefore concur in
the Court's judgment.

															I write separately, however, because it seems to me improbable
that the Ohio Supreme Court understood its firsttell-then-ask rule
to be the Federal Constitution's mandate for the Nation as a whole.
"[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds
to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 , 719
(1975). * But ordinarily, when a state high court grounds a rule of
criminal procedure in the Federal Constitution, the

															*Formerly, the Ohio Supreme Court was "reluctant to use the Ohio
Constitution to extend greater protection to the rights and civil
liberties of Ohio citizens" and had usually not taken advantage of
opportunities to "us[e] the Ohio Constitution as an independent
source of constitutional rights." Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St. 3d 35, 42, n. 8, 616 N. E. 2d 163,
168, n. 8 (1993). Recently, however, the state high court
declared:

															"The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force ....
As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the
United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of
the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in
according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals
and groups." Id., at 35, 616 N. E. 2d, at 164
(syllabus). 43 court thereby signals its view that the Nation's Constitution
would require the rule in all 50 States. Given this Court's
decisions in consent-to-search cases such as Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973), and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 (1991), however, I
suspect that the Ohio Supreme Court may not have homed in on the
implication ordinarily to be drawn from a state court's reliance on
the Federal Constitution. In other words, I question whether the
Ohio court thought of the strict rule it announced as a rule for
the governance of police conduct not only in Miami County, Ohio,
but also in Miami, Florida.

															The first-tell-then-ask rule seems to be a prophylactic measure
not so much extracted from the text of any constitutional provision
as crafted by the Ohio Supreme Court to reduce the number of
violations of textually guaranteed rights. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a similarly motivated
rule as a minimal national requirement without suggesting that the
text of the Federal Constitution required the precise measures the
Court's opinion set forth. See id., at 467 ("[T]he Constitution
[does not] necessarily requir[e] adherence to any particular
solution" to the problems associated with custodial
interrogations.); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 , 306 (1985)
("The Miranda exclusionary rule ... sweeps more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself."). Although all parts of the United
States fall within this Court's domain, the Ohio Supreme Court is
not similarly situated. That court can declare prophylactic rules
governing the conduct of officials in Ohio, but it cannot command
the police forces of sister States. The very ease with which the
Court today disposes of the federal leg of the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision strengthens my impression that the Ohio Supreme Court saw
its rule as a measure made for Ohio, designed to reinforce in that
State the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 44 GINSBURG, J., concurring in judgment

															The Ohio Supreme Court's syllabus and opinion, however, were
ambiguous. Under Long, the existence of ambiguity regarding
the federal- or state-law basis of a state-court decision will
trigger this Court's jurisdiction. Long governs even when,
all things considered, the more plausible reading of the state
court's decision may be that the state court did not regard the
Federal Constitution alone as a sufficient basis for its ruling.
Compare Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 , 7-9 (1995),
with id., at 31-33 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).

															It is incumbent on a state court, therefore, when it determines
that its State's laws call for protection more complete than the
Federal Constitution demands, to be clear about its ultimate
reliance on state law. Similarly, a state court announcing a new
legal rule arguably derived from both federal and state law can
definitively render state law an adequate and independent ground
for its decision by a simple declaration to that effect. A recent
Montana Supreme Court opinion on the scope of an individual's
privilege against self-incrimination includes such a
declaration: "While we have devoted considerable time to a lengthy discussion
of the application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, it is to be noted that this holding is also based
separately and independently on [the defendant's] right to remain
silent pursuant to Article II, Section 25 of the Montana
Constitution." State v. Fuller, 276 Mont. 155, 167,
915 P. 2d 809, 816, cert. denied, post, p. 930. An explanation of this order meets the Court's instruction in Long that "[i]f the state court decision indicates clearly
and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate,
adequate, and independent grounds, [this Court] will not undertake
to review the decision." 463 U. S., at 1041.

															On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court may choose to clarify that its
instructions to law enforcement officers in Ohio find 45 adequate and independent support in state law, and that in
issuing these instructions, the court endeavored to state
dispositively only the law applicable in Ohio. See Evans, 514 U. S., at 30-34 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). To avoid
misunderstanding, the Ohio Supreme Court must itself speak with the
clarity it sought to require of its State's police officers. The
efficacy of its endeavor to safeguard the liberties of Ohioans
without disarming the State's police can then be tested in the
precise way Our Federalism was designed to work. See, e. g.,
Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:

															Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N. Y.
U. L. Rev. 1, 11-18 (1995); Linde, First Things First:

															Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BaIt. L. Rev.
379, 392-396 (1980).

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															The Court's holding today is narrow: The Federal Constitution
does not require that a lawfully seized person be advised that he
is "free to go" before his consent to search will be recognized as
voluntary. I agree with that holding. Given the Court's reading of
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, I also agree that it is
appropriate for the Court to limit its review to answering the sole
question presented in the State's certiorari petition.1 As I read
the state-court opinion, however, the prophylactic rule announced
in the second syllabus was intended as a guide to the decision of
future cases rather than an explanation of the decision in this
case. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Ohio because it correctly held that respondent's consent to the
search of his vehicle was the product of an unlawful detention.
Moreover, it is important

															1 "Whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires police officers to inform motorists, lawfully
stopped for traffic violations, that the legal detention has
concluded before any subsequent interrogation or search will be
found to be consensual?" Pet. for Cert. i. 46 to emphasize that nothing in the Federal Constitution-or in this
Court's opinion-prevents a State from requiring its law enforcement
officers to give detained motorists the advice mandated by the Ohio
court.

															I

															The relevant facts are undisputed.2 Officer Newsome stopped
respondent because he was speeding. Neither at the time of the stop
nor at any later time prior to the search of respondent's vehicle
did the officer have any basis for believing that there were drugs
in the car. After ordering respondent to get out of his car,
issuing a warning, and returning his driver's license, Newsome took
no further action related to the speeding violation. He did,
however, state:

															"One question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal
contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything
like that?" Thereafter, he obtained respondent's consent to search
the car.

															These facts give rise to two questions of law: whether
respondent was still being detained when the "one question" was
asked, and, if so, whether that detention was unlawful. In my
opinion the Ohio Appellate Court and the Ohio Supreme Court
correctly answered both of those questions.

															The Ohio Supreme Court correctly relied upon United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980),3
which stated that "a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment ... if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave." Id., at 554 (opinion of
Stewart, J.); see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 , 573 (1988)
(noting that "[t]he Court has since embraced this test"). See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 , 435-436
(1991) (applying variant of this approach). The Ohio Court

															2 This is in part because crucial portions of the exchange were
videotaped; this recording is a part of the record.

															3 See 73 Ohio St. 3d 650, 654, 653 N. E. 2d 695, 698 (1995). 47 of Appeals applied a similar analysis. See App. to Pet. for
Cert. 17-18.

															Several circumstances support the Ohio courts' conclusion that a
reasonable motorist in respondent's shoes would have believed that
he had an obligation to answer the "one question" and that he could
not simply walk away from the officer, get back in his car, and
drive away. The question itself sought an answer "before you
get gone." In addition, the facts that respondent had been
detained, had received no advice that he was free to leave, and was
then standing in front of a television camera in response to an
official command are all inconsistent with an assumption that he
could reasonably believe that he had no duty to respond. The Ohio
Supreme Court was surely correct in stating: "Most people believe
that they are validly in a police officer's custody as long as the
officer continues to interrogate them. The police officer retains
the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the officer
lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most
citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away
as the officer continues to address him." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 655,
653 N. E. 2d, at 698.4

															Moreover, as an objective matter it is fair to presume that most
drivers who have been stopped for speeding are in a hurry to get to
their destinations; such drivers have no interest in prolonging the
delay occasioned by the stop just to engage in idle conversation
with an officer, much less to allow

															4 A learned commentator has expressed agreement on this point.
See 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), p. 112 (3d ed. 1996
and Supp. 1997) ("Given the fact that [defendant] quite clearly had
been seized when his car was pulled over, the return of the
credentials hardly manifests a change in status when it was
immediately followed by interrogation concerning other criminal
activity"); see also ibid. (approving of Ohio Supreme Court's
analysis in this case). We have indicated as much ourselves in the
past. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 , 436 (1984)
("Certainly few motorists would feel free either to disobey a
directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop
without being told they might do so"). 48 a potentially lengthy search.5 I also assume that motorists-even
those who are not carrying contraband-have an interest in
preserving the privacy of their vehicles and possessions from the
prying eyes of a curious stranger. The fact that this particular
officer successfully used a similar method of obtaining consent to
search roughly 786 times in one year, State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App. 3d 586, 591592, 639 N. E. 2d 498,
502, dism'd, 69 Ohio St. 3d 1488, 635 N. E. 2d 43 (1994), indicates
that motorists generally respond in a manner that is contrary to
their self-interest. Repeated decisions by ordinary citizens to
surrender that interest cannot satisfactorily be explained on any
hypothesis other than an assumption that they believed they had a
legal duty to do so.

															The Ohio Supreme Court was therefore entirely correct to presume
in the first syllabus preceding its opinion that a "continued
detention" was at issue here. 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E. 2d,
at 696.6 The Ohio Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion. In
response to the State's con-

															5 Though this search does not appear to have been particularly
intrusive, that may not always be so. See Brief for American Civil
Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 28-29. Indeed, our
holding in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248 (1991),
allowing police to open closed containers in the context of an
automobile consent search where the "consent would reasonably be
understood to extend to a particular container," id., at 252,
ensures that many motorists will wind up "consenting" to a far
broader search than they might have imagined. See id., at 254-255
("only objection that the police could have to" a rule requiring
police to seek consent to search containers as well as the
automobile itself "is that it would prevent them from exploiting
the ignorance of a citizen who simply did not anticipate that his
consent to search the car would be understood to authorize the
police to rummage through his packages") (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

															6 It is ordinarily the syllabus that precedes an Ohio Supreme
Court opinion, rather than the opinion itself, that states the law
of the case. Cassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d
17,24,231 N. E. 2d 64, 68 (1967); see Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Ed. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75 , 86, n. 8
(1984); Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U. S. 257 ,259
(1976). 49 tention that Robinette "was free to go" at the time consent was
sought, that court held-after reviewing the recordthat "a
reasonable person in Robinette's position would not believe that
the investigative stop had been concluded, and that he or she was
free to go, so long as the police officer was continuing to ask
investigative questions." App. to Pet. for Cert. 17-18. As I read
the Ohio opinions, these determinations were independent of the
bright-line rule criticized by the majority.7 I see no reason to
disturb them.

															In the first syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court also answered the
question whether the officer's continued detention of respondent
was lawful or unlawful. See ante, at 3738. Although there is
a possible ambiguity in the use of the word "motivation" in the
Ohio Supreme Court's explanation of why the traffic officer's
continued detention of respondent was an illegal seizure, the first
syllabus otherwise was a correct statement of the relevant federal
rule as well as the relevant Ohio rule. As this Court points out in
its opinion, as a matter of federal law the subjective motivation
of the officer does not determine the legality of a detention.
Because I assume that the learned judges sitting on the Ohio
Supreme Court were well aware of this proposition, we should
construe the syllabus generously by replacing the ambiguous term
"motivation behind" with the term "justification for" in order to
make the syllabus unambiguously state the correct rule of federal
law. So amended, the controlling proposition of federal law
reads: "When the [justification for] a police officer's continued
detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is 7 Indeed, the first paragraph of the Ohio Supreme Court's
opinion clearly indicates that the bright-line rule was meant to
apply only infuture cases. The Ohio Supreme Court first
explained: "We find that the search was invalid since it was the
product of an unlawful seizure." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 652, 653 N. E.
2d, at 697. Only then did the court proceed to point out that it
would "also use this case to establish a bright-line test .... " Ibid. 50 not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop,
and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable
facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity
justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention
constitutes an illegal seizure." 73 Ohio St. 3d, at 650, 653 N. E.
2d, at 696. Notwithstanding that the subjective motivation for the officer's
decision to stop respondent related to drug interdiction, the
legality of the stop depended entirely on the fact that respondent
was speeding. Of course, "[a]s a general matter, the decision to
stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 , 810
(1996). As noted above, however, by the time Robinette was asked
for consent to search his automobile, the lawful traffic stop had
come to an end; Robinette had been given his warning, and the
speeding violation provided no further justification for detention.
The continued detention was therefore only justifiable, if at all,
on some other grounds.8

															At no time prior to the search of respondent's vehicle did any
articulable facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion of some
separate illegal activity that would justify further detention. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 , 682 (1985); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 , 881882
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 21 (1968). As
an objective matter, it inexorably follows that when the officer
had completed his task of either arresting or reprimanding the
driver of the speeding car, his continued detention of that

															8 Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 , 500 (1983)
(plurality opinion) ("[A]n investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the
purpose of the stop"); United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U. S. 873 , 881 (1975)
("stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation'" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 29 (1968)). 51 person constituted an illegal seizure. This holding by the Ohio
Supreme Court is entirely consistent with federallaw.9

															The proper disposition follows as an application of wellsettled
law. We held in Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983),
that a consent obtained during an illegal detention is ordinarily
ineffective to justify an otherwise invalid search.lO See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S., at 433-434 (noting
that if consent was given during the course of an unlawful seizure,
the results of the search "must be suppressed as tainted fruit"); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 , 218-219
(1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 , 601-602
(1975). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963).
Because Robinette's consent to the search was the product of an
unlawful detention, "the consent was tainted by the illegality and
was ineffective to justify the search." Royer, 460 U. S., at
507508 (plurality opinion). I would therefore affirm the judgment
below.

															II

															A point correctly raised by JUSTICE GINSBURG merits emphasis.
The Court's opinion today does not address either the wisdom of the
rule announced in the second syllabus pre-

															9 Since "this Court reviews judgments, not opinions," Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 ,
842 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that Robinette's
continued seizure was illegal on these grounds provides a
sufficient basis for affirming its judgment.

															lOWriting for a plurality of the Court, Justice White explained
that "statements given during a period of illegal detention are
inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product
of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act
of free will." 460 U. S., at 501. The defendant in Royer had
been "illegally detained when he consented to the search." Id., at 507. As a result, the plurality agreed that "the
consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to
justify the search." Id., at 507-508. Concurring in the
result, Justice Brennan agreed with this much of the plurality's
decision, diverging on other grounds. See id., at 509. Justice
Brennan's agreement on that narrow principle represents the holding
of the Court. See Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188 , 193
(1977). 52 ceding the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion or the validity of that
rule as a matter of Ohio law. Nevertheless the risk that the
narrowness of the Court's holding may not be fully understood
prompts these additional words.

															There is no rule of federal law that precludes Ohio from
requiring its police officers to give its citizens warnings that
will help them to understand whether a valid traffic stop has come
to an end, and will help judges to decide whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances at
issue in any given case.ll Nor, as I have previously observed, is
there anything "in the Federal Constitution that prohibits a State
from giving lawmaking power to its courts." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456 , 479, and
n. 3 (1981) (dissenting opinion). Thus, as far as we are concerned,
whether Ohio acts through one branch of its government or another,
it has the same power to enforce a warning rule as other States
that may adopt such rules by executive action.12

															11 Indeed, we indicated in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429 ,
437 (1991), that the fact a defendant had been explicitly advised
that he could refuse to give consent was relevant to the question
whether he was seized at the time consent was sought. And, in other
cases, we have stressed the importance of similar advice as a
circumstance supporting the conclusion that a consent to search was
voluntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 227
(1973); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 , 558559
(1980). Cf. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U. S. 1 , 9 (1982)
(consent to search was voluntary where defendant "consented, in
writing, ... after being advised that his consent must be voluntary
and that he had an absolute right to refuse consent").

															12 As we are informed by a brief amicus curiae filed by
Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.: "Such a warning may
be good police practice, and indeed amicus knows that many
law enforcement agencies among our constituents have routinely
incorporated a warning into their Fourth Amendment consent forms
that they use in the field, but it is precisely that-a practice and not a constitutional imperative. An
officer who includes such a warning in his request for consent
undoubtedly presents a stronger case for a finding of voluntariness
in a suppression hearing, and we would not suggest that such
agencies and officers do other- 53 Moreover, while I recognize that warning rules provide benefits
to the law enforcement profession and the courts, as well as to the
public, I agree that it is not our function to pass judgment on the
wisdom of such rules. Accordingly, while I have concluded that the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio should be affirmed, and thus
dissent from this Court's disposition of the case, I am in full
accord with its conclusion that the Federal Constitution neither
mandates nor prohibits the warnings prescribed by the Ohio Court.
Whether such a practice should be followed in Ohio is a matter for
Ohio lawmakers to decide.

															wise. We know, too, that instructors in many police training
programs of leading universities and management institutes
routinely recommend such warnings as a sound practice, likely to
bolster the voluntariness of a consent to search. [We ourselves]
conduc[t] law enforcement training programs at the national level
and many of our own speakers have made this very point." Brief for
Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., as Amicus Curiae
7.


OCTOBER TERM, 1998

															Syllabus

															KNOWLES v. IOWA

															CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

															No. 97-7597. Argued November 3, 1998-Decided December 8,1998

															An Iowa policeman stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding and
issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The officer then
conducted a full search of the car, without either Knowles' consent
or probable cause, found marijuana and a "pot pipe," and arrested
Knowles. Before his trial on state drug charges, Knowles moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that because he had not been
arrested, the search could not be sustained under the "search
incident to arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218 . The trial court denied the motion and found Knowles
guilty, based on state law giving officers authority to conduct a
full-blown search of an automobile and driver where they issue a
citation instead of making a custodial arrest. In affirming, the
State Supreme Court applied its bright-line "search incident to
citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement,
reasoning that so long as the officer had probable cause to make a
custodial arrest, there need not in fact have been an arrest. Held: The search at issue, authorized as it was by state
law, nonetheless violates the Fourth Amendment. Neither of the two
historical exceptions for the "search incident to arrest"
exception, see Robinson, supra, at 234, is sufficient to
justify the search in the present case. First, the threat to
officer safety from issuing a traffic citation is a good deal less
than in the case of a custodial arrest. While concern for safety
during a routine traffic stop may justify the "minimal" additional
intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it
does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion
attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to
search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. Second, the
need to discover and preserve evidence does not exist in a traffic
stop, for once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a
citation, all evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been
obtained. Iowa's argument that a "search incident to citation" is
justified because a suspect may try to hide evidence of his
identity or of other crimes is unpersuasive. An officer may arrest
a driver if he is not satisfied with the identification furnished,
and the possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence of
an unrelated offense seems remote. Pp. 116-119.

															569 N. W. 2d 601, reversed and remanded. 114 REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court. Paul Rosenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Maria Ruhtenberg. Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General of Iowa,
argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Elizabeth
M. Osenbaugh, Solicitor General. *

															CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner Knowles for speeding,
but issued him a citation rather than arresting him. The question
presented is whether such a procedure authorizes the officer,
consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of
the car. We answer this question "no."

															Knowles was stopped in Newton, Iowa, after having been clocked
driving 43 miles per hour on a road where the speed limit was 25
miles per hour. The police officer issued a citation to Knowles,
although under Iowa law he might have arrested him. The officer
then conducted a full search of the car, and under the driver's
seat he found a bag of marijuana and a "pot pipe." Knowles was then
arrested and charged with violation of state laws dealing with
controlled substances.

															Before trial, Knowles moved to suppress the evidence so
obtained. He argued that the search could not be sustained under
the "search incident to arrest" exception recognized in United
States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973),
because he had not been placed under arrest. At the hearing on the
motion to suppress, the police officer conceded that he had

															* James J. Tomkovicz, Steven R. Shapiro, Susan N.
Herman, and Lisa B. Kemler filed a brief for the
American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging
reversal. Stephen R. McSpadden filed a brief for the National
Association of Police Organizations, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. 115 neither Knowles' consent nor probable cause to conduct the
search. He relied on Iowa law dealing with such searches.

															Iowa Code Ann. § 321.485(1)(a) (West 1997) provides that Iowa
peace officers having cause to believe that a person has violated
any traffic or motor vehicle equipment law may arrest the person
and immediately take the person before a magistrate. Iowa law also
authorizes the far more usual practice of issuing a citation in
lieu of arrest or in lieu of continued custody after an initial
arrest.1 See Iowa Code Ann. § 805.1(1) (West Supp. 1997). Section
805.1(4) provides that the issuance of a citation in lieu of an
arrest "does not affect the officer's authority to conduct an
otherwise lawful search." The Iowa Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision as providing authority to officers to conduct a
fullblown search of an automobile and driver in those cases where
police elect not to make a custodial arrest and instead issue a
citation-that is, a search incident to citation. See State v. Meyer, 543 N. W. 2d 876, 879 (1996); State v. Becker, 458 N. W. 2d 604, 607 (1990).

															Based on this authority, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress and found Knowles guilty. The Supreme Court of Iowa,
sitting en bane, affirmed by a divided vote. 569 N. W. 2d 601
(1997). Relying on its earlier opinion in State v. Doran, 563 N. W. 2d 620 (1997), the Iowa Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the search under a bright-line
"search incident to citation" exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement, reasoning that so long as the

															1 Iowa law permits the issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest
for most offenses for which an accused person would be "eligible
for bail." See Iowa Code Ann. §805.1(1) (West Supp. 1997). In
addition to traffic and motor vehicle equipment violations, this
would permit the issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest for such
serious felonies as second-degree burglary, § 713.5 (West Supp.
1997), and first-degree theft, § 714.2(1) (West 1993), both
bailable offenses under Iowa law. See §811.1 (West Supp. 1997)
(listing all nonbailable offenses). The practice in Iowa of
permitting citation in lieu of arrest is consistent with law reform
efforts. See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(h), p. 99, and
n. 151 (3d ed. 1996). 116 arresting officer had probable cause to make a custodial arrest,
there need not in fact have been a custodial arrest. We granted
certiorari, 523 U. S. 1019 (1998), and we now reverse.

															The State contends that Knowles has challenged Iowa Code's §
805.1(4) only "on its face" and not "as applied," in which case,
the argument continues, his challenge would run afoul of Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968). But
in his motion to suppress, Knowles argued that "[b]ecause the
officer had no probable cause and no search warrant, and the search
cannot otherwise be justified under the Fourth Amendment, the
search of the car was unconstitutional." App. 7. Knowles did not
argue below, and does not argue here, that the statute could never
be lawfully applied. The question we therefore address is whether
the search at issue, authorized as it was by state law, nonetheless
violates the Fourth Amendment.2

															In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical
rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and
(2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. 414 U.
S., at 234. See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U. S.
800 ,802-803 (1974); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 ,
762763 (1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 , 367
(1964);

															2 Iowa also contends that Knowles' challenge is precluded
because he failed to seek review of a separate decision of the Iowa
Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of a city ordinance. That decision, Iowa
argues, resulted from the same search at issue here, rejected the
same Fourth Amendment challenge Knowles now makes, and, under
principles of res judicata, bars his present challenge. Even if
Knowles' failure to seek certiorari review of this decision could
preclude his present challenge, Iowa waived this argument by
failing to raise it in its brief in opposition to the petition for
certiorari. See this Court's Rule 15.2; Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.
S. 808 , 816 (1985) ("Nonjurisdictional defects of this sort
should be brought to our attention no later than in
respondent's brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari; if
not, we consider it within our discretion to deem the defect
waived"). 117 Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 , 30 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 , 392
(1914). But neither of these underlying rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in
the present case.

															We have recognized that the first rationale-officer safety-is
"'both legitimate and weighty,'" Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408 ,
412 (1997) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 , 110 (1977) (per curiam)). The threat to officer safety from issuing a
traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of
a custodial arrest. In Rob inson, we stated that a custodial
arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and
transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We
recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the
fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and
uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at
234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a
relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' ... than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420 , 439
(1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 , 296 (1973)
("Where there is no formal arrest ... a person might well be less
hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").

															This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent
in the case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But
while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify
the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and
passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search.
Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other,
independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from
danger. For example, they 118 may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a
"patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion
that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968);
conduct a "Terry pat down" of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and
may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.
S. 1032 , 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the
passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant
to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 , 460
(1981).

															Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to
search incident to arrest-the need to discover and preserve
evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a
citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had
been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to
be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger
compartment of the car.

															Iowa nevertheless argues that a "search incident to citation" is
justified because a suspect who is subject to a routine traffic
stop may attempt to hide or destroy evidence related to his
identity (e.g., a driver's license or vehicle registration), or
destroy evidence of another, as yet undetected crime. As for the
destruction of evidence relating to identity, if a police officer
is not satisfied with the identification furnished by the driver,
this may be a basis for arresting him rather than merely issuing a
citation. As for destroying evidence of other crimes, the
possibility that an officer would stumble onto evidence wholly
unrelated to the speeding offense seems remote.

															In Robinson, we held that the authority to conduct a full
field search as incident to an arrest was a "bright-line rule,"
which was based on the concern for officer safety and destruction
or loss of evidence, but which did not depend in every case upon
the existence of either concern. Here we 119 are asked to extend that "bright-line rule" to a situation where
the concern for officer safety is not present to the same extent
and the concern for destruction or loss of evidence is not present
at all. We decline to do so. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Iowa is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered.