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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 11–1545 and 11–1547

															_________________

															CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, et al.,
PETITIONERS

															11–1545 v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
et al.

															CABLE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND
TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL,
PETITIONER

															11–1547 v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
et al.

															on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit

															[May 20, 2013]

															Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															We consider whether an agency’s interpretation
of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of its regulatory
authority (that is, its jurisdiction) is entitled to deference
under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S.
837 (1984).

															I

															Wireless telecommunications networks require
towers and antennas; proposed sites for those towers and antennas
must be approved by local zoning authorities. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress “impose[d] specific
limitations on the traditional authority of state and local
governments to regulate the location, construction, and
modification of such facilities,” Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams , 544 U.S.
113 , 115 (2005), and incorporated those limitations into the
Communications Act of 1934, see 110Stat. 56, 151. Section 201(b) of
that Act empowers the Federal Communications Commission to
“prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
public interest to carry out [its] provisions.” Ch. 296, 52Stat.
588, codified at 47 U. S. C. §201(b). Of course, that
rulemaking authority extends to the subsequently added portions of
the Act. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd. , 525 U.S.
366 , 377–378 (1999).

															The Act imposes five substantive limitations,
which are codified in 47 U. S. C. §332(c)(7)(B); only one
of them, §332(c)(7)(B)(ii), is at issue here. That provision
requires state or local governments to act on wireless siting
applications “within a reasonable period of time after the request
is duly filed.” Two other features of §332(c)(7) are relevant.
First, subparagraph (A), known as the “saving clause,” provides
that nothing in the Act, except those limitations provided
in §332(c)(7)(B), “shall limit or affect the authority of a State
or local government” over siting decisions. Second,
§332(c)(7)(B)(v) authorizes a person who believes a state or local
government’s wireless-siting decision to be inconsistent with any
of the limitations in §332(c)(7)(B) to “commence an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction.”

															In theory, §332(c)(7)(B)(ii) requires state and
local zoning authorities to take prompt action on siting
applications for wireless facilities. But in practice, wireless
providers often faced long delays. In July 2008, CTIA—The Wireless
Association,[ 1 ] which
represents wireless service providers, petitioned the FCC to
clarify the meaning of §332(c)(7)(B)(ii)’s requirement that zoning
authorities act on siting requests “within a reasonable period of
time.” In November 2009, the Commission, relying on its broad
statutory authority to implement the provisions of the
Communications Act, issued a declaratory ruling responding to
CTIA’s petition. In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling ,
24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 14001. The Commission found that the “record
evidence demonstrates that unreasonable delays in the personal
wireless service facility siting process have obstructed the
provision of wireless services” and that such delays “impede the
promotion of ad- vanced services and competition that Congress
deemed critical in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.” Id., at 14006, 14008. A “reasonable period of time” under
§332(c)(7)(B)(ii), the Commission determined, is presumptively (but
rebuttably) 90 days to process a collocation application (that is,
an application to place a new antenna on an existing tower) and 150
days to process all other applications. Id., at 14005.

															Some state and local governments opposed
adoption of the Declaratory Ruling on the ground that the
Commission lacked “authority to interpret ambiguous provisions of
Section 332(c)(7).” Id., at 14000. Specifically, they argued
that the saving clause, §332(c)(7)(A), and the judicial review
provision, §337(c)(7)(B)(v), together display a congressional
intent to withhold from the Commission authority to interpret the
limitations in §332(c)(7)(B). Asserting that ground of objection,
the cities of Arlington and San Antonio, Texas, petitioned for
review of the Declaratory Ruling in the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit.

															Relying on Circuit precedent, the Court of
Appeals held that the Chevron framework applied to the
threshold question whether the FCC possessed statutory authority to
adopt the 90- and 150-day timeframes. 668 F.3d 229, 248 (CA5 2012)
(citing Texas v. United States , 497 F.3d 491, 501
(CA5 2007)). Applying Chevron , the Court of Appeals found
“§332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the FCC’s author- ity to administer
§332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations ambiguous,” 668 F. 3d , at 250,
and held that “the FCC’s interpretation of its statutory authority”
was a permissible construction of the statute. Id., at 254.
On the merits, the court upheld the presumptive 90- and 150-day
deadlines as a “permissible construction of §332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and
(v) . . . entitled to Chevron deference.” Id. , at 256.

															We granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ___
(2012), limited to the first question presented: “Whether
. . . a court should apply Chevron to
. . . an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.”
Pet. for Cert. in No. 11–1545, p. i.

															II

															A

															As this case turns on the scope of the
doctrine enshrined in Chevron , we begin with a description
of that case’s now-canonical formulation. “When a court reviews an
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions.” 467 U. S., at 842. First,
applying the ordinary tools of statutory construction, the court
must determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id., at 842–843. But “if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.” Id., at 843. Chevron is rooted in a background
presumption of congressional intent: namely, “that Congress, when
it left ambiguity in a statute” administered by an agency,
“understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity
allows.” Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),
N. A. , 517 U.S.
735 , 740–741 (1996). Chevron thus provides a stable
background rule against which Congress can legislate: Statutory
ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency.
See Iowa Utilities Bd. , 525 U. S., at 397. Congress
knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe, and
in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency
discretion.

															B

															The question here is whether a court must
defer under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of a
statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency’s
statutory authority (that is, its jurisdiction). The argument
against deference rests on the premise that there exist two
distinct classes of agency interpretations: Some
interpretations—the big, important ones, presumably—define the
agency’s “jurisdiction.” Others—humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff—are
simply applications of jurisdiction the agency plainly has. That
premise is false, because the distinction between “jurisdictional”
and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations is a mirage. No matter how
it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an
agency’s inter- pretation of a statute it administers is always,
simply, whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its
statutory authority .

															The misconception that there are, for Chevron purposes, separate “jurisdictional” questions on
which no deference is due derives, perhaps, from a reflexive
extension to agen- cies of the very real division between the
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional that is applicable to courts.
In the judicial context, there is a meaningful line: Whether
the court decided correctly is a question that has different
consequences from the question whether it had the power to decide at all . Congress has the power (within limits) to tell the
courts what classes of cases they may decide, see Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. , 321 U.S.
50 , 63–64 (1944); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner &
Co. , 303 U.S.
323 , 330 (1938), but not to prescribe or superintend how they
decide those cases, see Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc. , 514 U.S.
211 , 218–219 (1995). A court’s power to decide a case is
independent of whether its decision is correct, which is why even
an erroneous judgment is entitled to res judicata effect. Put
differently, a jurisdictionally proper but substantively incorrect
judicial decision is not ultra vires.

															That is not so for agencies charged with
administering congressional statutes. Both their power to act and
how they are to act is authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so
that when they act improperly, no less than when they act beyond
their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires . Because the
question—whether framed as an incorrect application of agency
authority or an assertion of author- ity not conferred—is always
whether the agency has gone beyond what Congress has permitted it
to do, there is no principled basis for carving out some arbitrary
subset of such claims as “jurisdictional.”

															An example will illustrate just how illusory the
pro- posed line between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional”
agency interpretations is. Imagine the following validly-enacted
statute:

															Common Carrier Act

															Section 1. The Agency shall have jurisdiction to
prohibit any common carrier from imposing an unreasonable condition
upon access to its facilities.

															There is no question that this
provision—including the terms “common carrier” and “unreasonable
condition”—defines the Agency’s jurisdiction. Surely, the argument
goes, a court must determine de novo the scope of that
jurisdiction.

															Consider, however, this alternative formulation
of the statute:

															Common Carrier Act

															Section 1. No common carrier shall impose an
unreasonable condition upon access to its facilities.

															Section 2. The Agency may prescribe rules and
regulations necessary in the public interest to effectuate Section
1 of this Act.

															Now imagine that the Agency, invoking its
Section 2 authority, promulgates this Rule: “(1) The term ‘common
carrier’ in Section 1 includes Internet Service Providers. (2) The
term ‘unreasonable condition’ in Section 1 includes unreasonably
high prices. (3) A monthly fee greater than $25 is an unreasonable
condition on access to Internet service.” By this Rule, the Agency
has claimed for itself jurisdiction that is doubly questionable:
Does its authority extend to Internet Service Providers? And does
it extend to setting prices? Yet Section 2 makes clear that
Congress, in petitioners’ words, “conferred interpretive power on
the agency” with respect to Section 1. Brief for Petitioners in No.
1545, p. 14. Even under petitioners’ theory, then, a court should
defer to the Agency’s interpretation of the terms “common carrier”
and “unreasonable condition”—that is to say, its assertion that its
“jurisdiction” extends to regulating Internet Service Providers and
setting prices.

															In the first case, by contrast, petitioners’
theory would accord the agency no deference. The trouble with this
is that in both cases, the underlying question is exactly the
same : Does the statute give the agency authority to regulate
Internet Service Providers and cap prices, or not?[ 2 ] The reality, laid bare, is that there is no difference , insofar as the validity of agency action is
concerned, between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its authority
(its “jurisdiction”) and its exceeding authorized application of
authority that it unquestionably has. “To exceed authorized
application is to exceed authority. Virtually any administrative
action can be characterized as either the one or the other,
depending on how generally one wishes to describe the
‘authority.’ ” Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore , 487 U.S.
354 , 381 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 29 (1983) (“Administrative application of law is
administrative formulation of law whenever it involves elaboration
of the statutory norm.”).

															This point is nicely illustrated by our decision
in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S.
327 (2002). That case considered whether the FCC’s
“jurisdiction” to regulate the rents utility-pole owners charge for
“pole attachments” (defined as attachments by a cable television
system or provider of telecommunications service) extended to
attachments that provided both cable television and high-speed
Internet access (attachments for so-called “commingled services”). Id ., at 331–336. We held, sensibly, that Chevron applied. 534 U. S. , at 333, 339. Whether framed as
going to the scope of the FCC’s delegated authority or the
FCC’s application of its delegated authority, the underlying
question was the same: Did the FCC exceed the bounds of its
statutory authority to regulate rents for “pole attachments” when
it sought to regulate rents for pole attachments providing
commingled services?

															The label is an empty distraction because every
new application of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a
questionable extension of the agency’s jurisdiction. One of the
briefs in support of petitioners explains, helpfully, that
“[j]urisdictional questions concern the who, what, where, and when of regulatory power: which subject matters may an
agency regulate and under what conditions.” Brief for IMLA
Respondents 18–19. But an agency’s application of its
authority pursuant to statutory text answers the same questions. Who is an “outside salesman”? What is a “pole
attachment”? Where do the “waters of the United States” end? When must a Medicare provider challenge a reimbursement
determination in order to be entitled to an administrative appeal?
These can all be reframed as questions about the scope of agencies’
regulatory jurisdiction— and they are all questions to which the Chevron framework applies. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp. , 567 U. S. ___, ___, ___
(2012) (slip op., at 2, 8); National Cable &
Telecommunications Assn., supra, at 331, 333; United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. , 474 U.S.
121 , 123, 131 (1985); Sebelius v. Auburn Regional
Medical Center, 568 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2013) (slip op.,
at 1, 11).

															In sum, judges should not waste their time in
the mental acrobatics needed to decide whether an agency’s
interpretation of a statutory provision is “jurisdictional” or
“nonjurisdictional.” Once those labels are sheared away, it becomes
clear that the question in every case is, simply, whether the
statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion of authority, or
not. See H. Edwards & L. Elliott, Federal Standards of Review
146 (2007) (“In practice, it does not appear to matter whether
delegated authority is viewed as a threshold inquiry.”). The
federal judge as haruspex, sifting the entrails of vast statutory
schemes to divine whether a particular agency interpretation
qualifies as “jurisdictional,” is not engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking.

															C

															Fortunately, then, we have consistently held
“that Chevron applies to cases in which an agency adopts a
con- struction of a jurisdictional provision of a statute it
administers.” 1 R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise §3.5, p. 187
(2010). One of our opinions explicitly says that no “exception
exists to the normal [deferential] standard of review” for
“ ‘jurisdictional or legal question[s] concerning the
coverage’ ” of an Act. NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, Inc. , 465 U.S.
822 , 830, n. 7 (1984). A prime example of deferential review
for questions of jurisdiction is Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor , 478 U.S.
833 (1986). That case involved a CFTC interpretation of 7
U. S. C. §18(c), which provides that before the
Commission takes action on a complaint, the complainant must file a
bond to cover “any reparation award that may be issued by the
Commission against the complainant on any counterclaim by
respondent.” (Emphasis added.) The CFTC, pursuant to its broad
rulemaking authority, see §12a(5), interpreted that oblique
reference to counterclaims as granting it “the power to take
jurisdiction over” not just federal-law counterclaims, but
state-law counterclaims as well. Schor , supra , at
844. We not only deferred under Chevron to the Commission’s
“eminently reasonable . . . interpretation of the statute
it is entrusted to administer,” but also chided the Court of
Appeals for declining to afford def- erence because of the
putatively “ ‘statutory interpretation-jurisdictional’ nature
of the question at issue.” 478 U. S. , at 844–845.

															Similar examples abound. We have afforded Chevron deference to the Commerce Department’s determination
that its authority to seek antidumping duties extended to uranium
imported under contracts for enrichment services, United
States v. Eurodif S. A. , 555
U.S. 305 , 316 (2009); to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s
view that courts, not the Commission, possessed “initial
jurisdiction with respect to the award of reparations” for
unreasonable shipping charges, Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.
258 , 269 (1993) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted); and to the Army Corps of Engineers’ assertion that its
permitting authority over discharges into “waters of the United
States” extended to “freshwater wetlands” adjacent to covered
waters, Riverside Bayview Homes, supra , at 123–124, 131. We
have even deferred to the FCC’s assertion that its broad regulatory
authority extends to pre-empting conflicting state rules. City
of New York v. FCC , 486 U.S.
57 , 64 (1988); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp , 467 U.S.
691 , 700 (1984).[ 3 ]

															Our cases hold that Chevron applies
equally to statutes designed to curtail the scope of agency
discretion. For instance, in Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 470 U.S.
116 , 123 (1985), we considered a statute prohibiting the
Environmental Protection Agency from “modify[ing] any requirement
of this section as it applies to any specific pollutant which is on
the toxic pollutant list.” The EPA construed the statute as not
precluding it from granting variances with respect to certain toxic
pollutants. Finding no “clear congressional intent to forbid EPA’s
sensible variance mechanism,” id., at 134, we deferred to
the EPA’s construction of this express limitation on its own
regulatory authority, id., at 125 (citing Chevron ,
467 U. S. 837); see also, e.g., Japan Whaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc. , 478 U.S.
221 , 226, 232–234 (1986).

															The U. S. Reports are shot through with
applications of Chevron to agencies’ constructions of the
scope of their own jurisdiction. And we have applied Chevron where concerns about agency self-aggrandizement are at their
apogee: in cases where an agency’s expansive construction of the
extent of its own power would have wrought a fundamental change in
the regulatory scheme. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S.
120 (2000), the threshold question was the “appropriate
framework for analyzing” the FDA’s assertion of “jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products,” id., at 126, 132—a question of
vast “economic and political magnitude,” id., at 133.
“Because this case involves an administrative agency’s construction
of a statute that it administers,” we held, Chevron applied.
529 U. S. , at 132. Similarly, in MCI
Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. , 512 U.S.
218 , 224, 229, 231 (1994), we applied the Chevron framework to the FCC’s assertion that the statutory phrase “modify
any requirement” gave it authority to eliminate rate-filing
requirements, “the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated
industry,” for long-distance telephone carriers.

															The false dichotomy between “jurisdictional” and
“non- jurisdictional” agency interpretations may be no more than a
bogeyman, but it is dangerous all the same. Like the Hound of the
Baskervilles, it is conjured by those with greater quarry in sight:
Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself.
Savvy challengers of agency action would play the “jurisdictional”
card in every case. See, e.g., Cellco Partnership v. FCC , 700 F.3d 534, 541 (CADC 2012). Some judges would be
deceived by the specious, but scary-sounding,
“jurisdictional”-“nonjurisdictional” line; others tempted by the
prospect of making public policy by prescribing the meaning of
ambiguous statutory commands. The effect would be to transfer any
number of interpretive decisions—archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light of
competing policy interests—from the agencies that administer the
statutes to federal courts.[ 4 ]
We have cautioned that “judges ought to refrain from substituting
their own interstitial lawmaking” for that of an agency. Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin , 444
U.S. 555 , 568 (1980). That is precisely what Chevron prevents.

															III

															A

															One group of respondents contends that Chevron deference is inappropriate here because the FCC has
“assert[ed] jurisdiction over matters of traditional state and
local concern.” Brief for IMLA Respondents 35. But this case has
nothing to do with federalism. Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) explicitly
supplants state authority by requiring zoning authorities to
render a decision “within a reasonable period of time,” and the
meaning of that phrase is indisputably a question of federal law.
We rejected a similar faux-federalism argument in the Iowa
Utilities Board case, in terms that apply equally here: “This
is, at bottom, a debate not about whether the States will be
allowed to do their own thing, but about whether it will be the FCC
or the federal courts that draw the lines to which they must hew.”
525 U. S., at 379, n. 6. These lines will be drawn either
by unelected federal bureaucrats, or by unelected (and even less
politically accountable) federal judges. “[I]t is hard to spark a
passionate ‘States’ rights’ debate over that detail.” Ibid. B

															A few words in response to the dissent. The
question on which we granted certiorari was whether “a court should
apply Chevron to review an agency’s determination of its own
jurisdiction.” Pet. for Cert. i.[ 5 ] Perhaps sensing the incoherence of the
“jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional” line, the dissent does not even
attempt to defend it, see post, at 5, but proposes a much
broader scope for de novo judicial review:
Jurisdictional or not, and even where a rule is at issue and the
statute contains a broad grant of rulemaking authority, the dissent
would have a court search provision-by-provision to determine
“whether [that] delegation covers the ‘specific provision’ and
‘particular question’ before the court.” Post, at 11–12.

															The dissent is correct that United
States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S.
218 (2001), requires that, for Chevron deference to
apply, the agency must have received congressional authority to
determine the particular matter at issue in the particular manner
adopted. No one disputes that. But Mead denied Chevron deference to action, by an agency with rulemaking
authority, that was not rulemaking. What the dissent needs, and
fails to produce, is a single case in which a general conferral of
rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held insufficient to
support Chevron deference for an exercise of that authority
within the agency’s substantive field. There is no such case, and
what the dissent proposes is a massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence.

															Where we differ from the dissent is in its
apparent rejection of the theorem that the whole includes all of
its parts—its view that a general conferral of rulemaking authority
does not validate rules for all the matters the agency is
charged with administering. Rather, the dissent proposes that even
when general rulemaking authority is clear, every agency
rule must be subjected to a de novo judicial
determination of whether the particular issue was committed
to agency discretion. It offers no standards at all to guide this
open-ended hunt for congressional intent (that is to say, for
evidence of congressional intent more specific than the conferral
of general rulemaking author- ity). It would simply punt that
question back to the Court of Appeals, presumably for application
of some sort of totality-of-the-circumstances test—which is really,
of course, not a test at all but an invitation to make an
ad hoc judgment regarding congressional intent. Thirteen
Courts of Appeals applying a totality-of-the-circumstances test
would render the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable and
destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron. The
excessive agency power that the dissent fears would be replaced by
chaos. There is no need to wade into these murky waters. It
suffices to decide this case that the preconditions to deference
under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has
unambiguously vested the FCC with general authority to administer
the Communications Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the
agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority.

															*  *  *

															Those who assert that applying Chevron to “jurisdictional” interpretations “leaves the fox in charge of
the henhouse” overlook the reality that a separate category of
“jurisdictional” interpretations does not exist. The
fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by estab- lishing
an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency decisionmaking that
is accorded no deference, but by taking seriously, and applying
rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.
Where Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go
beyond it; and where Congress has established an ambiguous line,
the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow.
But in rigorously applying the latter rule, a court need not pause
to puzzle over whether the interpretive question presented is
“jurisdictional.” If “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute,” that is the end of the matter. Chevron , 467 U. S., at 842.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 This is not a
typographical error. CTIA—The Wireless Association was the name of
the petitioner. CTIA is presumably an (unpronounceable) acronym,
but even the organization’s website does not say what it stands
for. That secret, known only to wireless-service-provider insiders,
we will not disclose here. 2 The dissent’s non-answer
to this example reveals the hollowness of its theory. It “might,”
the dissent claims, be “harder” to interpret the first Act, because
it is (somehow) less “clear” than the second Act. Post, at
15–16 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). That it is even possible that the two could come out differently under the
dissent’s test (whatever it is) shows that that test must be wrong.
The two statutes are substantively identical. Any difference in
outcome would be arbitrary, so a sound interpretive approach should
yield none. 3 The dissent’s reliance on
dicta in Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett , 494 U.S.
638 (1990), see post, at 8–9, is misplaced. In that
case, the Department of Labor had interpreted a statute creating a
private right of action for migrant or seasonal farmworkers as
providing no remedy where a state workers’-compensation law covered
the worker. 494 U. S. , at 649. We held that we had no
need to “defer to the Secretary of Labor’s view of the scope of”
that private right of action “because Congress has expressly
established the Judiciary and not the Department of Labor as the
adjudicator of private rights of action arising under the statute.” Ibid . Adams Fruit stands for the modest proposition
that the Judiciary, not any executive agency, determines “the
scope”—including the available remedies—“of judicial power vested
by” statutes establishing private rights of action. Id., at
650. Adams Fruit explicitly affirmed the Department’s
authority to promulgate the substantive standards enforced through
that private right of action. See ibid. The dissent’s
invocation of Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S.
243 (2006), see post, at 10–11, is simply perplexing:
The majority opinion in that case expressly lists the
Communications Act as an example of a statute under which an
agency’s “authority is clear because the statute gives an agency
broad power to enforce all provisions of the statute.” 546
U. S. , at 258–259 (citing 47 U. S. C.
§201(b); emphasis added). That statement cannot be squared with the
dissent’s proposed remand for the Fifth Circuit to determine
“whether Congress delegated interpretive authority over
§332(c)(7)(B)(ii) to the FCC.” Post, at 18. 4 The Chief Justice’s
discomfort with the growth of agency power, see post, at
2–4, is perhaps understandable. But the dissent overstates when it
claims that agencies exercise “legislative power” and “judicial
power.” Post , at 2; see also post, at 16. The former
is vested exclusively in Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I,
§1, the latter in the “one supreme Court” and “such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,”
Art. III, §1. Agencies make rules (“Private cattle may be
grazed on public lands X, Y, and Z subject to certain
conditions”) and conduct adjudications (“This rancher’s grazing
permit is revoked for violation of the conditions”) and have done
so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities take
“legislative” and “judicial” forms, but they are exercises
of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the “executive Power.” Art. II, §1,
cl. 1. 5 The dissent—apparently
with no attempt at irony—accuses us of “misunderstand[ing]” the
question presented as one of “jurisdiction.” Post, at 5.
Whatever imprecision inheres in our understanding of the question
presented derives solely from our having read it. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 11–1545 and 11–1547

															_________________

															CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, et al.,
PETITIONERS

															11–1545 v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
et al.

															CABLE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND
TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL,
PETITIONER

															11–1547 v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
et al.

															on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit

															[May 20, 2013]

															Justice Breyer, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.

															I agree with the Court that normally “the
question a court faces when confronted with an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it administers” is, “simply, whether
the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory
authority.” Ante, at 5–6. In this context, “the
distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ and ‘non-jurisdictional’
interpretations is a mirage.” Ante, at 5.

															Deciding just what those statutory bounds are,
however, is not always an easy matter, and the Court’s case law
abounds with discussion of the subject. A reviewing judge, for
example, will have to decide independently whether Congress
delegated authority to the agency to provide interpretations of, or
to enact rules pursuant to, the statute at issue—interpretations or
rules that carry with them “the force of law.” United States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S.
218 , 229 (2001). If so, the reviewing court must give special
leeway or “deference” to the agency’s interpretation. See id., at 227–228.

															We have added that, if “[e]mploying traditional
tools of statutory construction,” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S.
421 , 446 (1987), the court determines that Congress has spoken
clearly on the disputed question, then “that is the end of the
matter,” Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S.
837 , 842 (1984). The agency is due no deference, for Congress
has left no gap for the agency to fill. Id., at 842–844. If,
on the other hand, Congress has not spoken clearly, if, for example
it has written ambiguously, then that ambiguity is a sign—but not
always a conclusive sign—that Congress intends a reviewing court to
pay particular attention to ( i.e. , to give a degree of
deference to) the agency’s interpretation. See Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S.
243 , 258–269 (2006); Mead, supra, at 229.

															I say that the existence of statutory ambiguity
is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that Congress has
left a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill be- cause
our cases make clear that other, sometimes context-specific,
factors will on occasion prove relevant. (And, given the vast
number of government statutes, regulatory programs, and underlying
circumstances, that variety is hardly surprising.) In Mead, for example, we looked to several factors other than simple
ambiguity to help determine whether Congress left a statutory gap,
thus delegating to the agency the authority to fill that gap with
an interpretation that would carry “the force of law.” 533
U. S., at 229–231. Elsewhere, we have assessed

															“the interstitial nature of the legal
question, the re- lated expertise of the Agency, the importance of
the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of
that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has
given the question over a long period of time.” Barnhart v. Walton , 535 U.S.
212 , 222 (2002).

															The subject matter of the relevant provision—for
instance, its distance from the agency’s ordinary statutory duties
or its falling within the scope of another agency’s authority—has
also proved relevant. See Gonzalez , supra, at
265–266. See also Gellhorn & Verkuil, Controlling Chevron -Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989,
1007–1010 (1999).

															Moreover, the statute’s text, its context, the
structure of the statutory scheme, and canons of textual
construction are relevant in determining whether the statute is
ambiguous and can be equally helpful in determining whether such
ambiguity comes accompanied with agency authority to fill a gap
with an interpretation that carries the force of law. See Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig , 541 U.S.
232 , 239–242 (2004); Zuni Public School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Education , 550 U.S.
81 , 98–99 (2007); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. , 529 U.S.
120 , 133 (2000); Dole v. Steelworkers , 494 U.S.
26 , 36 (1990). Statutory purposes, including those revealed in
part by legislative and regulatory history, can be similarly
relevant. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , supra, at 143–147; Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation v. LTV Corp. , 496 U.S.
633 , 649 (1990); Global Crossing Telecommunications,
Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc. , 550 U.S.
45 , 48–49 (2007). See also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utilities Bd. , 525 U.S.
366 , 412–413 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

															Although seemingly complex in abstract
description, in practice this framework has proved a workable way
to approximate how Congress would likely have meant to allocate
interpretive law-determining authority between reviewing court and
agency. The question whether Congress has delegated to an agency
the authority to provide an interpretation that carries the force
of law is for the judge to answer independently. The judge,
considering “traditional tools of statutory construction,” Cardoza-Fonseca , supra , at 446, will ask whether
Congress has spoken unambiguously. If so, the text controls. If
not, the judge will ask whether Congress would have intended the
agency to resolve the resulting ambiguity. If so, deference is
warranted. See Mead , supra, at 229. Even if not,
however, sometimes an agency interpretation, in light of the
agency’s special expertise, will still have the “power to persuade,
if lacking power to control,” Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. , 323 U.S.
134 , 140 (1944).

															The case before us offers an example. The
relevant statutory provision requires state or local governments to
act on wireless siting applications “within a reasonable period of
time after” a wireless service provider files such a request. 47
U. S. C. §332(c)(7)(B)(ii). The Federal Com- munications
Commission (FCC) argued that this pro- vision granted it a degree
of leeway in determining the amount of time that is reasonable.
Many factors favor the agency’s view: (1) the language of the
Telecommunications Act grants the FCC broad authority (including
rulemaking authority) to administer the Act; (2) the words are
open-ended— i.e. “ambiguous”; (3) the provision concerns
an interstitial administrative matter, in respect to which the
agency’s expertise could have an important role to play; and
(4) the matter, in context, is complex, likely making the
agency’s expertise useful in helping to answer the “rea-
sonableness” question that the statute poses. See §151 (creating
the FCC); §201(b) (providing rulemaking auth- ority); National
Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet
Services , 545 U.S.
967 , 980–981 (2005) (acknowledging the FCC’s authority to
administer the Act).

															On the other side of the coin, petitioners point
to two statutory provisions which, they believe, require a
different conclusion—namely, that the FCC lacked authority
altogether to interpret §332(c)(7)(B)(ii). First, a nearby saving
clause says: “Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this
chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local
government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities.” §332(c)(7)(A). Second, a judicial review
provision, says: “Any person adversely affected by any final action
or failure to act by a State or local government or any
instrumentality thereof that is inconsistent with this subparagraph
may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act, commence
an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.”
§332(c)(7)(B)(v).

															In my view, however, these two provisions cannot
provide good reason for reaching the conclusion advocated by
petitioners. The first provision begins with an exception, stating
that it does not apply to (among other things) the
“reasonableness” provision here at issue. The second sim- ply sets
forth a procedure for judicial review, a review that applies to
most government actions. Both are consistent with a statutory
scheme that gives States, localities, the FCC, and reviewing courts
each some role to play in the location of wireless service
facilities. And neither “expressly describ[es] an exception” to the
FCC’s plenary authority to interpret the Act. American Hospital
Assn. v. NLRB , 499 U.S.
606 , 613 (1991).

															For these reasons, I would reject petitioners’
argument and conclude that §332(c)(7)(B)(ii)—the “reasonableness”
statute—leaves a gap for the FCC to fill. I would hold that the
FCC’s lawful efforts to do so carry “the force of law.” Mead, 533 U. S. , at 229. The Court of Appeals
ultimately reached the same conclusion (though for somewhat dif-
ferent reasons), and the majority affirms the lower court. I
consequently join the majority’s judgment and such por- tions of
its opinion as are consistent with what I have written here. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 11–1545 and 11–1547

															_________________

															CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, et al.,
PETITIONERS

															11–1545 v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
et al.

															CABLE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, AND
TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE OF THE NEW ORLEANS CITY COUNCIL,
PETITIONER

															11–1547 v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
et al.

															on writs of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit

															[May 20, 2013]

															Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice
Kennedy and Justice Alito join, dissenting.

															My disagreement with the Court is fundamental.
It is also easily expressed: A court should not defer to an agency
until the court decides, on its own, that the agency is entitled to
deference. Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of law when
and because Congress has conferred on the agency interpretive
authority over the question at issue. An agency cannot exercise
interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether an
agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without
deference to the agency.

															I

															One of the principal authors of the
Constitution famously wrote that the “accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
. . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.” The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(J. Madison). Although modern administrative agencies fit most
comfortably within the Executive Branch, as a practical matter they
exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the
force of law; executive power, by policing compliance with those
regulations; and judicial power, by adjudicating enforcement
actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have violated
their rules. The accumulation of these powers in the same hands is
not an occasional or isolated exception to the constitutional plan;
it is a central feature of modern American government.

															The administrative state “wields vast power and
touches almost every aspect of daily life.” Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. , 561
U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 18). The Framers could
hardly have envisioned today’s “vast and varied federal
bureaucracy” and the authority administrative agencies now hold
over our economic, social, and political activities. Ibid. “[T]he administrative state with its reams of regulations would
leave them rubbing their eyes.” Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S.
706 , 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting), quoted in Federal
Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority , 535 U.S.
743 , 755 (2002). And the federal bureaucracy continues to grow;
in the last 15 years, Congress has launched more than 50 new
agencies. Compare Office of the Federal Register, United States
Government Manual 1997/1998, with Office of the Federal Register,
United States Government Manual 2012. And more are on the way. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service, C. Copeland, New
Entities Created Pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act 1 (2010) (The PPACA “creates, requires others to create,
or authorizes dozens of new entities to implement the
legislation”).

															Although the Constitution empowers the President
to keep federal officers accountable, administrative agencies enjoy
in practice a significant degree of independence. As scholars have
noted, “no President (or his executive office staff) could, and
presumably none would wish to, supervise so broad a swath of
regulatory activity.” Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv.
L. Rev. 2245, 2250 (2001); see also S. Breyer, Making Our
Democracy Work 110 (2010) (“the president may not have the time or
willingness to review [agency] decisions”). President Truman
colorfully described his power over the administrative state by
complaining, “I thought I was the president, but when it comes to
these bureaucrats, I can’t do a damn thing.” See R. Nathan, The
Administrative Presidency 2 (1986). President Kennedy once told a
constituent, “I agree with you, but I don’t know if the government
will.” See id., at 1. The collection of agencies housed
outside the traditional executive departments, including the
Federal Communications Commission, is routinely described as the
“headless fourth branch of government,” reflecting not only the
scope of their authority but their practical independence. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of United States, D. Lewis
& J. Selin, Sourcebook of United States Executive Agencies 11
(2012).

															As for judicial oversight, agencies enjoy broad
power to construe statutory provisions over which they have been
given interpretive authority. In Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , we
established a test for reviewing “an agency’s construction of the
statute which it administers.” 467 U.S.
837 , 842 (1984). If Congress has “directly spoken to the
precise question at issue,” we said, “that is the end of the
matter.” Ibid. A contrary agency interpretation must give
way. But if Congress has not expressed a specific intent, a court
is bound to defer to any “permissible construction of the statute,”
even if that is not “the reading the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Id., at 843, and n. 11.

															When it applies, Chevron is a powerful
weapon in an agency’s regulatory arsenal. Congressional delegations
to agencies are often ambiguous—expressing “a mood rather than a
message.” Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need
for Better Definition of Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1263,
1311 (1962). By design or default, Congress often fails to speak to
“the precise question” before an agency. In the absence of such an
answer, an agency’s interpretation has the full force and effect of
law, unless it “exceeds the bounds of the permissible.” Barnhart v. Walton , 535 U.S.
212 , 218 (2002).

															It would be a bit much to describe the result as
“the very definition of tyranny,” but the danger posed by the
growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed. See, e.g., Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co. , 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 3) (noting that the FCC “has repeatedly
been rebuked in its attempts to expand the statute beyond its text,
and has repeatedly sought new means to the same ends”); Sackett v. EPA , 566 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2012)
(slip op., at 9–10) (rejecting agency argument that would “enable
the strong-arming of regulated parties into ‘voluntary compliance’
without the opportunity for judicial review”).

															What the Court says in footnote 4 of its opinion
is good, and true (except of course for the “dissent overstates”
part). Ante, at 13–14, n. 4. The Framers did divide
governmental power in the manner the Court describes, for the
purpose of safeguarding liberty. And yet . . . the
citizen confronting thousands of pages of regulations—promulgated
by an agency directed by Congress to regulate, say, “in the public
interest”—can perhaps be excused for thinking that it is the agency
really doing the legislating. And with hundreds of federal agencies
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life, that citizen might
also understandably question whether Presidential oversight—a
critical part of the Constitutional plan—is always an effective
safeguard against agency overreaching.

															It is against this background that we consider
whether the authority of administrative agencies should be
augmented even further, to include not only broad power to give
definitive answers to questions left to them by Congress, but also
the same power to decide when Congress has given them that
power.

															Before proceeding to answer that question,
however, it is necessary to sort through some confusion over what
this litigation is about. The source of the confusion is a familiar
culprit: the concept of “jurisdiction,” which we have repeatedly
described as a word with “ ‘many, too many, meanings.’ ” Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers , 558 U.S.
67 , 81 (2009).

															The Court states that the question “is whether a
court must defer under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation
of a statutory ambiguity that concerns the scope of the agency’s
statutory authority (that is, its jurisdiction).” Ante, at
5. That is fine—until the parenthetical. The parties, amici ,
and court below too often use the term “jurisdiction” imprecisely,
which leads the Court to misunderstand the argument it must
confront. That argument is not that “there exist two distinct
classes of agency interpretations,” some “big, important ones” that
“define the agency’s ‘jurisdiction,’ ” and other “humdrum,
run-of-the-mill” ones that “are simply applications of jurisdiction
the agency plainly has.” Ibid. The argument is instead that
a court should not defer to an agency on whether Congress has
granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory
ambiguity at issue.

															You can call that “jurisdiction” if you’d like,
as petitioners do in the question presented. But given that the
term is ambiguous, more is required to understand its use in that
question than simply “having read it.” Ante, at 15,
n. 5. It is important to keep in mind that the term, in the
present context, has the more precise meaning noted above,
encompassing congressionally delegated authority to issue
interpretations with the force and effect of law. See 668 F.3d 229,
248 (CA5 2012) (case below) (“The issue in the instant case is
whether the FCC possessed statutory authority to administer
§332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v) by adopting the 90- and 150-day time
frames”). And that has nothing do with whether the statutory
provisions at issue are “big” or “small.”

															II

															“It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). The rise of the modern
administrative state has not changed that duty. Indeed, the
Administrative Procedure Act, governing judicial review of most
agency action, instructs reviewing courts to decide “all relevant
questions of law.” 5 U. S. C. §706.

															We do not ignore that command when we afford an
agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference; we
respect it. We give binding deference to permissible agency
interpretations of statutory ambiguities because Con- gress
has delegated to the agency the authority to interpret those
ambiguities “with the force of law.” United States v. Mead Corp. , 533 U.S.
218 , 229 (2001); see also Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27–28 (1983) (“the
court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to ‘say what the
law is’ by deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is simply
applying the law as ‘made’ by the authorized law-making
entity”).

															But before a court may grant such deference, it
must on its own decide whether Congress—the branch vested with
lawmaking authority under the Constitution—has in fact delegated to
the agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity at issue. See ante, at 4 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (“The question whether Congress has delegated to an
agency the authority to provide an interpretation that carries the
force of law is for the judge to answer independently.”). Agencies
are creatures of Congress; “an agency literally has no power to act
. . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC , 476 U.S.
355 , 374 (1986). Whether Congress has conferred such power is
the “relevant question[ ] of law” that must be answered before
affording Chevron deference. 5 U. S. C. §706.

															III

															A

															Our precedents confirm this
conclusion—beginning with Chevron itself. In Chevron ,
the EPA promulgated a regulation interpreting the term “stationary
sources” in the Clean Air Act. 467 U. S., at 840 (quoting 42
U. S. C. §7502(b)(6)(1982 ed.)). An environmental group
petitioned for review of the rule, challenging it as an
impermissible interpretation of the Act. 467 U. S., at 841,
859. Finding the statutory text “not dispositive” and the
legislative history “silent on the precise issue,” we upheld the
rule. Id., at 862, 866.

															In our view, the challenge to the agency’s
interpretation “center[ed] on the wisdom of the agency’s policy,
rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left
open by Congress.” Id., at 866. Judges, we said, “are not
experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch
of the Government.” Id., at 865. Thus, because Congress had
not answered the specific question at issue, judges had no business
providing their own resolution on the basis of their “personal
policy preferences.” Ibid. Instead, the “agency to which
Congress ha[d] delegated policymaking responsibilities” was the
appropriate political actor to resolve the competing interests at
stake, “within the limits of that delegation.” Ibid. Chevron ’s rule of deference was based
on—and limited by—this congressional delegation. And the Court did
not ask simply whether Congress had delegated to the EPA the
authority to administer the Clean Air Act generally. We asked
whether Congress had “delegat[ed] authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation.” Id., at 843–844 (emphasis added); see id. , at 844 (discussing “the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question ” (emphasis added)). We
deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary sources” based
on our conclusion that the agency had been “charged with
responsibility for administering the provision. ” Id., at 865 (emphasis added).

															B

															We have never faltered in our understanding of
this straightforward principle, that whether a particular agency
interpretation warrants Chevron deference turns on the
court’s determination whether Congress has delegated to the agency
the authority to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue.

															We made the point perhaps most clearly in Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett , 494
U.S. 638 (1990). In that case, the Department of Labor
contended the Court should defer to its interpretation of the scope
of the private right of action provided by the Migrant and Seasonal
Agriculture Worker Protection Act (AWPA), 29 U. S. C.
§1854, against employers who intentionally violated the Act’s motor
vehicle safety provisions. We refused to do so. Although “as an
initial matter” we rejected the idea that Congress left a
“statutory ‘gap’ ” for the agency to fill, we reasoned that if
the “AWPA’s language establishing a private right of action is
ambiguous,” the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of its scope
did not warrant Chevron deference. 494 U. S., at
649.

															In language directly applicable to the question
before us, we explained that “[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority.” Ibid. Although “Congress clearly envisioned,
indeed expressly mandated, a role for the Department of Labor in
administering the statute by requiring the Secretary to promulgate standards implementing AWPA’s motor vehicle
provisions ,” we found “[n]o such delegation regarding AWPA’s enforcement provisions .” Id., at 650 (emphasis
added). It would therefore be “inappropriate,” we said, “to consult
executive interpretations” of the enforcement provisions to resolve
ambiguities “surrounding the scope of AWPA’s judicially enforceable
remedy.” Ibid. Without questioning the principle that agency
determinations “within the scope of delegated authority are
entitled to deference,” we explained that “it is fundamental ‘that
an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no
jurisdiction.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Federal Maritime
Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc. , 411
U.S. 726 , 745 (1973)).

															Our subsequent cases follow the same approach.
In United States v. Mead Corp. , supra , for
example, Chevron deference turned on whether Congress had
delegated to the agency authority to interpret the statutory
ambiguity by a particular means. The Customs Service had issued a
“classification ruling,” interpreting the term “diaries” in a
tariff schedule to include “day planners” of the type Mead
imported, and on that basis subjected the planners to a
four-percent tariff. Mead protested the imposition of the tariff,
the Customs Service claimed Chevron deference for its
interpretation, and the controversy made its way to our Court. Id., at 224–226.

															In Mead , we again made clear that the
“category of interpretative choices” to which Chevron deference applies is defined by congressional intent. Id., at 229. Chevron deference, we said, rests on a recognition
that Congress has delegated to an agency the interpretive authority
to implement “a particular provision” or answer “ ‘a
particular question.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Chevron ,
467 U. S., at 844) . An agency’s interpretation of “a
particular statutory provision” thus qualifies for Chevron deference only “when it appears that Congress delegated authority
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
pro-mulgated in the exercise of that authority.” 533 U. S., at
226–227.

															The Court did not defer to the agency’s views
but instead determined that Congress had not delegated interpretive
authority to the Customs Service to definitively construe the
tariff schedule through classification rulings. Neither the
statutory authorization for the classification rulings, nor the
Customs Service’s practice in issuing such rulings, “reasonably
suggest[ed] that Congress ever thought of [such] classification
rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them.” Id., at 231. And in the absence of such a delegation, we concluded the
interpretations adopted in those rulings were “beyond the Chevron pale.” Id., at 234. Gonzales v. Oregon , 546 U.S.
243 (2006), is in the same line of precedent. In that case, as
here, deference turned on whether a congressional delegation of
interpretive authority reached a particular statutory ambiguity.
The Attorney General claimed Chevron deference for his
interpretation of the phrase “legitimate medical purpose” in the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to exclude the prescribing and
dispensing of controlled substances for the purpose of assisting
suicide. Id., at 254, 258. No one disputed that “legitimate
medical purpose” was “ambiguous in the relevant sense.” Id., at 258. Nor did any Justice dispute that the Attorney General had
been granted the power in the CSA to promulgate rules with the
force of law. Ibid. ; see id., at 281 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Nevertheless, the Court explained, “ Chevron deference . . . is not accorded merely because the
statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is involved.” Id., at 258. The regulation advancing the interpretation, we
said, “must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has
delegated to the official.” Ibid. (citing Mead , supra, at 226–227).

															In the CSA, Congress delegated to the Attorney
General the authority to promulgate regulations “relating to the
registration and control of the manufacture, distribution, and
dispensing of controlled substances,” 21 U. S. C. §821,
or “for the efficient execution of his functions under [the CSA],”
§871(b). After considering the text, structure, and purpose of the
Act, the Court concluded on its own that interpreting
“legitimate medical purpose” fell under neither delegation. Gonzales, 546 U. S., at 258–269. Because the regulation
“was not promulgated pursuant to the Attorney General’s authority,
its interpretation of ‘legitimate medical purpose’ d[id] not
receive Chevron deference.” Id., at 268. Adams Fruit , Mead , and Gonzales thus confirm that Chevron deference is based
on, and finds legitimacy as, a congressional delegation of
interpretive authority. An agency interpretation warrants such
deference only if Congress has delegated authority to definitively
interpret a particular ambiguity in a particular manner. Whether
Congress has done so must be determined by the court on its own
before Chevron can apply. See H. Edwards, L. Elliot, &
M. Levy, Federal Courts Standards of Review 168 (2d ed. 2013) (“a
court decides de novo whether an agency has acted
within the bounds of congressionally delegated authority” (citing Mead , supra, at 226–227, and Gonzales , supra, at 258)); Sales & Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory
Silences , 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1497, 1564 (2009) (“if
delegation really is antecedent to deference, as Mead insists, it cannot be that courts should defer to an agency’s views
on whether a delegation has taken place”).

															In other words, we do not defer to an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous provision unless Congress wants us
to, and whether Congress wants us to is a question that courts, not
agencies, must decide. Simply put, that question is “beyond the Chevron pale.” Mead , supra , at 234.

															IV

															Despite these precedents, the FCC argues that
a court need only locate an agency and a grant of general
rulemaking authority over a statute. Chevron deference then
applies, it contends, to the agency’s interpretation of any
ambiguity in the Act, including ambiguity in a provision said to
carve out specific provisions from the agency’s general rulemaking
authority. If Congress intends to exempt part of the statute from
the agency’s interpretive authority, the FCC says, Congress “can
ordinarily be expected to state that intent explicitly.” Brief for
Federal Respondents 30 (citing American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB , 499 U.S.
606 (1991)).

															If a congressional delegation of interpretive
authority is to support Chevron deference, however, that
delegation must extend to the specific statutory ambiguity at
issue. The appropriate question is whether the delegation covers
the “specific provision” and “particular question” before the
court. Chevron , 467 U. S., at 844. A congressional
grant of authority over some portion of a statute does not
necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency interpretive
authority over all its provisions. See Adams Fruit , 494
U. S., at 650.

															An example that might highlight the point
concerns statutes that parcel out authority to multiple agencies,
which “may be the norm, rather than an exception.” Gersen,
Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2006 S. Ct. Rev. 201, 208; see, e.g., Gonzales , 546
U. S, at 250–251 (describing shared author-ity over the CSA
between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S.
471 , 478 (1999) (authority to issue regulations implementing
the Americans with Disabilities Act “is split primarily among three
Government agencies”). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, for example, authorizes rulemaking by at
least eight different agencies. See Con-gressional Research
Service, C. Copeland, Rulemaking Requirements and Authorities in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 7
(2010). When presented with an agency’s interpretation of such a
statute, a court cannot simply ask whether the statute is one that
the agency administers; the question is whether authority over the
particular ambiguity at issue has been delegated to the particular
agency.

															By the same logic, even when Congress provides
interpretive authority to a single agency, a court must decide if
the ambiguity the agency has purported to interpret with the force
of law is one to which the congressional delegation extends. A
general delegation to the agency to administer the statute will
often suffice to satisfy the court that Congress has delegated
interpretive authority over the ambiguity at issue. But if Congress
has exempted particular provisions from that authority, that
exemption must be respected, and the determination whether Congress
has done so is for the courts alone.

															The FCC’s argument that Congress “can ordinarily
be expected to state that intent explicitly,” Brief for Federal
Respondents 30 (citing American Hospital , supra ),
goes to the merits of that determination, not to whether a court
should decide the question de novo or defer to the
agency. Indeed, that is how the Court in American Hospital considered it. It was in the process of “employing
the traditional tools of statutory construction” that the Court
said it would have expected Congress to speak more clearly if it
had intended to exclude an entire subject area—employee units for
collecting bargaining—from the NLRB’s general rulemaking authority. Id., at 613, 614. The Court concluded, after considering the
language, structure, policy, and legislative history of the Act on
its own—without deferring to the agency—that the meaning of the
statute was “clear and contrary to the meaning advanced by
petitioner.” Id., at 609–614. To be sure, the Court also
noted that “[e]ven if we could find any ambiguity in [the
provision] after employing the traditional tools of statutory
construction, we would still defer to Board’s reasonable
interpretation.” Id., at 614 (emphasis added). But that
single sentence of dictum cannot carry the day for the FCC
here.

															V

															As the preceding analysis makes clear, I do
not understand petitioners to ask the Court—nor do I think it
necessary—to draw a “specious, but scary-sounding” line between
“big, important” interpretations on the one hand and “humdrum,
run-of-the-mill” ones on the other. Ante, at 5, 12. Drawing
such a line may well be difficult. Distinguishing between whether
an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous term is reasonable and
whether that term is for the agency to interpret is not nearly so
difficult. It certainly did not confuse the FCC in this proceeding.
Compare In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling , 24 FCC
Rcd. 13994, 14000–14003 (2009) (addressing the latter question),
with id., at 14003–14015 (addressing the former). Nor did it
confound the Fifth Circuit. Compare 668 F. 3d, at 247–254
(deciding “whether the FCC possessed statutory authority to
administer §332(c)(7)(B)(ii)”), with id., at 254–260
(considering “whether the 90- and 150-day time frames themselves
also pass muster under Chevron ”). More importantly, if the
legitimacy of Chevron deference is based on a congressional
delegation of interpretive authority, then the line is one the
Court must draw.

															The majority’s hypothetical Common Carrier Acts
do not demonstrate anything different. Ante, at 6–8. The
major-ity states that in its second Common Carrier Act, Section 2
makes clear that Congress “ ‘conferred interpretative power on
the agency’ ” to interpret the ambiguous terms “common
carrier” and “unreasonable condition.” Ante, at 7 (quoting
Brief for Petitioners in No. 1545, p. 14). Thus, it says,
under anyone’s theory a court must defer to the agency’s reasonable
interpretations of those terms. Correct.

															The majority claims, however, that “petitioners’
theory would accord the agency no deference” in its interpretation
of the same ambiguous terms in the first Common Carrier Act. Ante, at 7–8. But as I understand petitioners’ argument—and
certainly in my own view—a court, in both cases, need only decide
for itself whether Congress has delegated to the agency authority
to interpret the ambiguous terms, before affording the agency’s
interpretation Chevron deference.

															For the second Common Carrier Act, the answer is
easy. The majority’s hypothetical Congress has spoken clearly and
specifically in Section 2 of the Act about its delegation of
authority to interpret Section 1. As for the first Act, it is
harder to analyze the question, given only one section of a
presumably much larger statute. But if the first Common Carrier Act
is like most agencies’ organic statutes, I have no reason to doubt
that the agency would likewise have interpretive authority over the
same ambiguous terms, and therefore be entitled to deference in
con-struing them, just as with the second Common Carrier Act. There
is no new “test” to worry about, cf. ante, at 16; courts
would simply apply the normal rules of statutory construction.

															That the question might be harder with respect
to the first Common Carrier Act should come as no surprise. The
second hypothetical Congress has more carefully defined the
agency’s authority than the first. Whatever standard of
review applies, it is more difficult to interpret an unclear
statute than a clear one. My point is simply that before a court
can defer to the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous terms in
either Act, it must determine for itself that Congress has
delegated authority to the agency to issue those interpretations
with the force of law.

															The majority also expresses concern that
adopting petitioners’ position would undermine Chevron ’s
stable background rule against which Congress legislates. Ante, at 5. That, of course, begs the question of what that
stable background rule is. See Merrill & Hickman, Chevron ’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. Rev. 833, 910 (2001)
(“Courts have never deferred to agencies with respect to questions
such as whether Congress has delegated to an agency the power to
act with the force of law through either legislative rules or
binding adjudications. Similarly, it has never been maintained that
Congress would want courts to give Chevron deference to an
agency’s determination that it is entitled to Chevron deference, or should give Chevron deference to an agency’s
determination of what types of interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference” (footnote omitted)).

															VI

															The Court sees something nefarious behind the
view that courts must decide on their own whether Congress has
delegated interpretative authority to an agency, before deferring
to that agency’s interpretation of law. What is afoot, according to
the Court, is a judicial power-grab, with nothing less than
“ Chevron itself” as “the ultimate target.” Ante, at
12.

															The Court touches on a legitimate concern: Chevron importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating
to itself policymaking properly left, under the separation of
powers, to the Executive. But there is another concern at play, no
less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the
obligation of the Judiciary not only to confine itself to its
proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as
well.

															An agency’s interpretive authority, entitling
the agency to judicial deference, acquires its legitimacy from a
delegation of lawmaking power from Congress to the Executive. Our
duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the
Executive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the
Judiciary and the Executive. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton , 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 8). In
the present context, that means ensuring that the Legislative
Branch has in fact delegated lawmaking power to an agency within
the Executive Branch, before the Judiciary defers to the Executive
on what the law is. That concern is heightened, not diminished, by
the fact that the administrative agencies, as a practical matter,
draw upon a potent brew of executive, legislative, and judicial
power. And it is heightened, not diminished, by the dramatic shift
in power over the last 50 years from Congress to the Executive—a
shift effected through the administrative agencies.

															We reconcile our competing responsibilities in
this area by ensuring judicial deference to agency interpretations
under Chevron —but only after we have determined on our own
that Congress has given interpretive authority to the agency. Our
“task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority,” Monaghan,
83 Colum. L. Rev., at 27; that is not a task we can delegate
to the agency. We do not leave it to the agency to decide when it
is in charge.

															*  *  *

															In these cases, the FCC issued a declaratory
ruling interpreting the term “reasonable period of time” in 47
U. S. C. §332(c)(7)(B)(ii). The Fifth Circuit correctly
recognized that it could not apply Chevron deference to the
FCC’s interpretation unless the agency “possessed statutory
authority to administer §332(c)(7)(B)(ii),” but it erred by
granting Chevron deference to the FCC’s view on that
antecedent question. See 668 F. 3d, at 248. Because the court
should have determined on its own whether Congress delegated
interpretive authority over §332(c)(7)(B)(ii) to the FCC before
affording Chevron deference, I would vacate the decision
below and remand the cases to the Fifth Circuit to perform the
proper inquiry in the first instance.

															I respectfully dissent.