NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 14–181

															_________________

															ALFRED GOBEILLE, in his official capacity as
chair of the vermont green mountaincare board, PETITIONER v. LIBERTYMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[March 1, 2016]

															Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															This case presents a challenge to the
applicability of a state law requiring disclosure of payments
relating to health care claims and other information relating to
health care services. Vermont enacted the statute so it could
maintain an all-inclusive health care database.Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit.
18, §9410(a)(1) (2015 Cum. Supp.) ( V. S. A.). The
state law, by its terms, applies to health plans established by
employers and regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C.
§1001 et seq. The question before the Court is whether
ERISA pre-empts the Vermont statute as it applies to ERISA
plans.

															I

															A

															Vermont requires certain public and private
entities that provide and pay for health care services to report
information to a state agency. The reported information is compiled
into a database reflecting “all health care utilization, costs, and
resources in [ Vermont], and health care utilization and costs
for services provided to Vermont residents in another state.” 18 V.
S. A. §9410(b). A database of this kind is sometimes called an
all-payer claims database, for it requires submission of data from
all health insurers and other entities that pay for health care
services. Almost 20 States have or are implementing similar
databases. See Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici
Curiae 1, and n. 1.

															Vermont’s law requires health insurers, health
care providers, health care facilities, and governmental agencies
to report any “information relating to health care costs, prices,
quality, utilization, or resources required” by the state agency,
including data relating to health insurance claims and enrollment.
§9410(c)(3). Health insurers must submit claims data on members,
subscribers, and policyholders. §9410(h). The Vermont law defines
health insurer to include a “self-insured . . . health
care benefit plan,” §9402(8), as well as “any third party
administrator” and any “similar entity with claims data,
eligibility data, provider files, and other information relating to
health care provided to a Vermont resident.” §9410( j)(1)(B).
The database must be made “available as a resource for insurers,
employers, providers, purchasers of health care, and State agencies
to continuously review health care utili-zation, expenditures, and
performance in Vermont.” §9410(h)(3)(B).

															Vermont law leaves to a state agency the
responsibility to “establish the types of information to be filed
under this section, and the time and place and the manner in which
such information shall be filed.” §9410(d). The law has been
implemented by a regulation creating the Vermont Healthcare Claims
Uniform Reporting and Evaluation System. The regulation requires
the submission of “medical claims data, pharmacy claims data,
member eligibility data, provider data, and other information,”
Reg. H–2008–01, Code of Vt. Rules 21–040–021, §4(D) (2016) (CVR),in
accordance with specific formatting, coding, and other
requirements, §5. Under the regulation, health insurers must report
data about the health care services provided to Vermonters
regardless of whether they are treated in Vermont or out-of-state
and about non-Vermonters who are treated in Vermont. §4(D); see
also §1. The agency at present does not collect data on denied
claims, §5(A)(8), but the statute would allow it to do so.

															Covered entities (reporters) must register with
the State and must submit data monthly, quarterly, or annually,
depending on the number of individuals that an entity serves. The
more people served, the more frequently the reports must be filed.
§§4, 6(I). Entities with fewer than 200 members need not report at
all, ibid. , and are termed “voluntary” reporters as distinct
from “mandated” reporters, §3. Reporters can be fined for not
complying with the statute or the regulation. §10; 18 V. S. A.
§9410(g).

															B

															Respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
maintains a health plan (Plan) that provides benefits in all 50
States to over 80,000 individuals, comprising respondent’s
employees, their families, and former employees. The Plan is
self-insured and self-funded, which means that Plan benefits are
paid by respondent. The Plan, which qualifies as an “employee
welfare benefit plan” under ERISA, 29 U. S. C. §1002(1),
is subject to “ERISA’s comprehensive regulation,” New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 514 U. S. 645, 650 (1995) .
Respondent, as the Plan sponsor, is both a fiduciary and plan
administrator.

															The Plan uses Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts, Inc. (Blue Cross) as a third-party administrator.
Blue Cross manages the “processing, review, and payment” of claims
for respondent. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan , 746
F. 3d 497, 502 (CA2 2014) (case below). In its contract with
Blue Cross, respondent agreed to “hold [Blue Cross] harmless for
any charges, including legal fees, judgments, administrative
expenses and benefit payment requirements, . . . arising
from or in connection with [the Plan] or due to [respondent’s]
failure to comply with any laws or regulations.” App. 82. The Plan
is a voluntary reporter under the Vermont regulation because it
covers some 137 Vermonters, which is fewer than the 200-person
cutoff for mandated reporting. Blue Cross, however, serves several
thousand Vermonters, and so it is a mandated reporter. Blue Cross,
therefore, must report the information it possesses about the
Plan’s members in Vermont.

															In August 2011, Vermont issued a subpoena
ordering Blue Cross to transmit to a state-appointed contractor all
the files it possessed on member eligibility, medical claims, and
pharmacy claims for Vermont members. Id., at 33. (For
clarity, the Court uses “Vermont” to refer not only to the State
but also to state officials acting in their official capacity.) The
penalty for noncompliance, Vermont threatened, would be a fine of
up to $2,000 a day and a suspension of Blue Cross’ authorization to
operate in Vermont for as long as six months. Id., at 31.
Respondent, concerned in part that the disclosure of confidential
information regarding its members might violate its fiduciary
duties under the Plan, instructed Blue Cross not to comply.
Respondent then filed this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Vermont. It sought a declaration that
ERISA pre-empts application of Vermont’s statute and regulation to
the Plan and an injunction forbidding Vermont from trying to
acquire data about the Plan or its members.

															Vermont filed a motion to dismiss, which the
District Court treated as one for summary judgment, see Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 12(d), and respondent filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. The District Court granted summary judgment to
Vermont. It first held that respondent, despite being a mere
voluntary reporter, had standing to sue because it was faced with
either allegedly violating its “fiduciary and administrative
responsibilities to the Plan” or assuming liability for Blue Cross’
withholding of the data from Vermont. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kimbell , No. 2:11–cv–204 (D Vt., Nov. 9, 2012),
p. 12. The District Court then concluded that the State’s
reporting scheme was not pre-empted. Although that scheme “may have
some indirect effect on health benefit plans,” the court reasoned
that the “effect is so peripheral that the regulation cannot be
considered an attempt to interfere with the administration or
structure of a welfare benefit plan.” Id. , at 31–32.

															The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed. The panel was unanimous in concluding that respondent had
standing, but it divided on the merits of the pre-emption
challenge. The panel majority explained that “one of ERISA’s core
functions—reporting—[cannot] be laden with burdens, subject to
incompatible, multiple and variable demands, and freighted with
risk of fines, breach of duty, and legal expense.” 746 F. 3d,
at 510. The Vermont regime, the court held, does just that. Id., at 508–510.

															This Court granted certiorari to address the
important issue of ERISA pre-emption. 576 U. S. ___
(2015).

															II

															The text of ERISA’s express pre-emption clause
is the necessary starting point. It is terse but comprehensive.
ERISA pre-empts

															“any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29
U. S. C. §1144(a).

															The Court has addressed the potential reach of
this clause before. In Travelers, the Court observed that
“[i]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of
its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption
would never run its course.” 514 U. S., at 655. That is a
result “no sensible person could have intended.” California Div.
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
N. A., Inc. , 519 U. S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). So the need for workable standards has led the Court
to reject “uncritical literalism” in applying the clause. Travelers , 514 U. S., at 656.

															Implementing these principles, the Court’s case
law to date has described two categories of state laws that ERISA
pre-empts. First, ERISA pre-empts a state law if it has a
“ ‘reference to’ ” ERISA plans. Ibid. To be more
precise, “[w]here a State’s law acts immediately and exclusively
upon ERISA plans . . . or where the existence of ERISA
plans is essential to the law’s operation . . . , that
‘reference’ will result in pre-emption.” Dillingham , supra, at 325. Second, ERISA pre-empts a state law that has
an impermissible “connection with” ERISA plans, meaning a state law
that “governs . . . a central matter of plan
administration” or “interferes with nationally uniform plan
administration.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U. S.
141, 148 (2001) . A state law also might have an impermissible
connection with ERISA plans if “acute, albeit indirect, economic
effects” of the state law “force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain
scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice
of insurers.” Travelers , supra , at 668. When
considered together, these formulations ensure that ERISA’s express
pre-emption clause receives the broad scope Congress intended while
avoiding the clause’s susceptibility to limitless application.

															III

															Respondent contends that Vermont’s law falls
in the second category of state laws that are pre-empted by ERISA:
laws that govern, or interfere with the uniformity of, plan
administration and so have an impermissible “ ‘connection
with’ ” ERISA plans. Egelhoff , supra , at 148; Travelers , 514 U. S., at 656. When presented with these
contentions in earlier cases, the Court has considered “the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the
state law that Congress understood would survive,” ibid .,
and “the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans,” Dillingham , supra , at 325. Here, those considerations
lead the Court to conclude that Vermont’s regime, as applied to
ERISA plans, is pre-empted.

															A

															ERISA does not guarantee substantive benefits.
The statute, instead, seeks to make the benefits promised by an
employer more secure by mandating certain oversight systems and
other standard procedures. Travelers , 514 U. S., at
651. Those systems and procedures are intended to be uniform. Id. , at 656 (ERISA’s pre-emption clause “indicates
Congress’s intent to establish the regulation of employee welfare
benefit plans ‘as exclusively a federal concern’ ” (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. , 451 U. S.
504, 523 (1981) )). “Requiring ERISA administrators to master the
relevant laws of 50 States and to contend with litigation would
undermine the congressional goal of ‘minimiz[ing] the
administrative and financial burden[s]’ on plan
administrators—burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.” Egelhoff , supra , at 149–150 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon , 498 U. S. 133,
142 (1990) ); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne , 482 U. S. 1, 9 (1987) .

															ERISA’s reporting, disclosure, and recordkeeping
requirements for welfare benefit plans are extensive. ERISA plans
must present participants with a plan description explaining, among
other things, the plan’s eligibility requirements and
claims-processing procedures. §§1021(a)(1), 1022, 1024(b)(1). Plans
must notify participants when a claim is denied and state the basis
for the denial. §1133(1). Most important for the pre-emption
question presented here, welfare benefit plans governed by ERISA
must file an annual report with the Secretary of Labor. The report
must include a financial statement listing assets and liabilities
for the previous year and, further, receipts and disbursements of
funds. §§1021(b), 1023(b)(1), 1023(b)(3)(A)–(B), 1024(a). The
information on assets and liabilities as well as receipts and
disbursements must be provided to plan participants on an annual
basis as well. §§1021(a)(2), 1023(b)(3)(A)–(B), 1024(b)(3). Because
welfare benefit plans are in the business of providing benefits to
plan participants, a plan’s reporting of data on disbursements by
definition incorporates paid claims. See Dept. of Labor, Schedule H
(Form 5500)Financial Information (2015) (requiring reporting of
“[b]enefit claims payable” and “[b]enefit payment and payments to
provide benefits”), online at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2015-5500-Schedule-H.pdf (as last
visited Feb. 26, 2016).

															The Secretary of Labor has authority to
establish additional reporting and disclosure requirements for
ERISA plans. ERISA permits the Secretary to use the data disclosed
by plans “for statistical and research purposes, and [to] compile
and publish such studies, analyses, reports, and surveys based
thereon as he may deem appropriate.” §1026(a). The Secretary also
may, “in connection” with any research, “collect, compile, analyze,
and publish data, information, and statistics relating to” plans.
§1143(a)(1); see also §1143(a)(3) (approving “other studies
relating to employee benefit plans, the matters regulated by this
subchapter, and the enforcement procedures provided for under this
subchapter”).

															ERISA further permits the Secretary of Labor to
“requir[e] any information or data from any [plan] where he finds
such data or information is necessary to carry out the purposes of”
the statute, §1024(a)(2)(B), and, when investigating a possible
statutory violation, “to require the submission of reports, books,
and records, and the filing of data” related to other requisite
filings, §1134(a)(1). The Secretary has the general power to
promulgate regulations “necessary or appropriate” to administer the
statute, §1135, and to provide exemptions from any reporting
obligations, §1024(a)(3).

															It should come as no surprise, then, that plans
must keep detailed records so compliance with ERISA’s reporting and
disclosure requirements may be “verified, explained, or clarified,
and checked for accuracy and completeness.” §1027. The records to
be retained must “include vouchers, worksheets, receipts, and
applicable resolutions.” Ibid. ; see also §1135 (allowing the
Secretary to “provide for the keeping of books and records, and for
the inspection of such books and records”).

															These various requirements are not mere
formalities. Violation of any one of them may result in both civil
and criminal liability. See §§1131–1132.

															As all this makes plain, reporting, disclosure,
and recordkeeping are central to, and an essential part of, the
uniform system of plan administration contemplated by ERISA. The
Court, in fact, has noted often that these requirements are
integral aspects of ERISA. See, e.g. , Dillingham , 519
U. S., at 327; Travelers , supra, at 651; Ingersoll-Rand, supra, at 137; Massachusetts v. Morash , 490 U. S. 107, 113, 115 (1989) ; Fort
Halifax , supra , at 9; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts , 471 U. S. 724, 732 (1985) .

															Vermont’s reporting regime, which compels plans
to report detailed information about claims and plan members, both
intrudes upon “a central matter of plan administration” and
“interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.” Egelhoff , 532 U. S., at 148 . The State’s law and
regulation govern plan reporting, disclosure, and—by necessary
implication—recordkeeping. These matters are fundamental components
of ERISA’s regulation of plan administration. Differing, or even
parallel, regulations from multiple jurisdictions could create
wasteful administrative costs and threaten to subject plans to
wide-ranging liability. See, e.g., 18 V. S. A.
§9410(g) (supplying penalties for violation of Vermont’s reporting
rules); CVR §10 (same). Pre-emption is necessary to prevent the
States from imposing novel, inconsistent, and burdensome reporting
requirements on plans.

															The Secretary of Labor, not the States, is
authorized to administer the reporting requirements of plans
governed by ERISA. He may exempt plans from ERISA report-ing
requirements altogether. See §1024(a)(3); 29 CFR §2520.104–44
(2005) (exempting self-insured health plans from the annual
financial reporting requirement). And, he may be authorized to
require ERISA plans to report data similar to that which Vermont
seeks, though that question is not presented here. Either way, the
uniform rule design of ERISA makes it clear that these decisions
are for federal authorities, not for the separate States.

															B

															Vermont disputes the pre-emption of its
reporting regime on several fronts. The State argues that
respondent has not demonstrated that the reporting regime in fact
has caused it to suffer economic costs. Brief for Petitioner 52–54.
But respondent’s challenge is not based on the theory that the
State’s law must be pre-empted solely because of economic burdens
caused by the state law. See Travelers , 514 U. S., at
668. Respondent argues, rather, that Vermont’s scheme regulates a
central aspect of plan administration and, if the scheme is not
pre-empted, plans will face the possibility of a body of disuniform
state reporting laws and, even if uniform, the necessity to
accommodate multiple governmental agencies. A plan need not wait to
bring a pre-emption claim until confronted with numerous
inconsistent obligations and encumbered with any ensuing costs.

															Vermont contends, furthermore, that ERISA does
not pre-empt the state statute and regulation because the state
reporting scheme has different objectives. This Court has
recognized that “[t]he principal object of [ERISA] is to protect
plan participants and beneficiaries.” Boggs v. Boggs ,
520 U. S. 833, 845 (1997) . And “[i]n enacting ERISA,
Congress’ primary concern was with the mismanagement of funds
accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to pay
employees benefits from accumulated funds.” Morash , supra , at 115. The State maintains that its program has
nothing to do with the financial solvency of plans or the prudent
behavior of fiduciaries. See Brief for Petitioner 29. This does not
suffice to avoid federal pre-emption.

															“[P]re-emption claims turn on Congress’s
intent.” Travelers , 514 U. S., at 655. The purpose of a
state law, then, is relevant only as it may relate to the “scope of
the state law that Congress understood would survive,” id. ,
at 656, or “the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA
plans,” Dillingham , supra , at 325. In Travelers , for example, the Court noted that “[b]oth the
purpose and the effects of” the state law at issue “distinguish[ed]
it from” laws that “function as a regulation of an ERISA plan
itself.” 514 U. S., at 658–659. The perceived difference here
in the objectives of the Vermont law and ERISA does not shield
Vermont’s reporting regime from pre-emption. Vermont orders health
insurers, including ERISA plans, to report detailed information
about the administration of benefits in a systematic manner. This
is a direct regulation of a fundamental ERISA function. Any
difference in purpose does not transform this direct regulation of
“a central matter of plan administration,” Egelhoff , supra , at 148, into an innocuous and peripheral set of
additional rules.

															The Vermont regime cannot be saved by invoking
the State’s traditional power to regulate in the area of public
health. The Court in the past has “addressed claims of pre-emption
with the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to
supplant state law,” in particular state laws regulating a subject
of traditional state power. Travelers , supra , at
654–655. ERISA, however, “certainly contemplated the pre-emption of
substantial areas of traditional state regulation.” Dillingham , 519 U. S., at 330. ERISA pre-empts a state
law that regulates a key facet of plan administration even if the
state law exercises a traditional state power. See Egelhoff ,
532 U. S., at 151–152. The fact that reporting is a principal
and essential feature of ERISA demonstrates that Congress intended
to pre-empt state reporting laws like Vermont’s, including those
that operate with the purpose of furthering public health. The
analysis may be different when applied to a state law, such as a
tax on hospitals, see De Buono v. NYSA–ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund , 520 U. S. 806 (1997) , the
enforcement of which necessitates incidental reporting by ERISA
plans; but that is not the law before the Court. Any presumption
against pre-emption, whatever its force in other instances, cannot
validate a state law that enters a fundamental area of ERISA
regulation and thereby counters the federal purpose in the way this
state law does.

															IV

															Respondent suggests that the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which created new
reporting obligations for employer-sponsored health plans and
incorporated those requirements into the body of ERISA, further
demonstrates that ERISA pre-empts Vermont’s reporting regime. See
29 U. S. C. §1185d; 42 U. S. C. §§300gg–15a,
17; §18031(e)(3). The ACA, however, specified that it shall not “be
construed to preempt any State law that does not prevent the
application of the provisions” of the ACA. 42 U. S. C.
§18041(d). This anti-pre-emption provision might prevent any new
ACA-created reporting obligations from pre-empting state reporting
regimes like Vermont’s, notwithstanding the incorporation of these
requirements in the heart of ERISA. But see 29 U. S. C.
§1191(a)(2) (providing that the new ACA provisions shall not be
construed to affect or modify the ERISA pre-emption clause as
applied to group health plans); 42 U. S. C.
§300gg–23(a)(2) (same).

															The Court has no need to resolve this issue.
ERISA’s pre-existing reporting, disclosure, and recordkeeping
provisions—upon which the Court’s conclusion rests—maintain their
pre-emptive force whether or not the new ACA reporting obligations
also pre-empt state law.

															*  *  *

															ERISA’s express pre-emption clause requires
invalidation of the Vermont reporting statute as applied to ERISA
plans. The state statute imposes duties that are inconsistent with
the central design of ERISA, which is to provide a single uniform
national scheme for the administration of ERISA plans without
interference from laws of the several States even when those laws,
to a large extent, impose parallel requirements. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is

															Affirmed . SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 14–181

															_________________

															ALFRED GOBEILLE, in his official capacity as
chair of the vermont green mountaincare board, PETITIONER v. LIBERTYMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[March 1, 2016]

															Justice Thomas, concurring.

															I join the Court’s opinion because it faithfully
applies our precedents interpreting 29 U. S. C. §1144,
the express pre-emption provision of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). I write separately because I have
come to doubt whether §1144 is a valid exercise of congressional
power and whether our approach to ERISA pre-emption is consistent
with our broader pre-emption jurisprudence.

															I

															Section 1144 contains what may be the most
expansive express pre-emption provision in any federal statute.
Section 1144(a) states: “Except as provided” in §1144(b) ERISA
“shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” Under the ordinary
meaning of the phrase “relate to,” §1144(a) pre-empts all state
laws that “ ‘stand in some relation’ ” to, “ ‘have
bearing or concern’ ” on, “ ‘pertain’ ” to,
“ ‘refer’ ” to, or ‘ “bring into association with or
connection with’ ” an ERISA plan. Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc. , 463 U. S. 85 , n. 16 (1983) (quoting
Black’s Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). And §1144(b) seemingly
acknowledges how broadly §1144(a) extends by excepting “gener-ally
applicable criminal law[s]” and state laws “regulat[ing] insurance,
banking, or securities”—but not generally applicable civil
laws—from pre-emption. §§1144(b)(2)(A), (b)(4). Section 1144, in
sum, “is clearly expansive”—so much so that “one might be excused
for wondering, at first blush, whether the words of limitation
(‘insofar as they . . . relate’) do much limiting.” New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. , 514 U. S. 645, 655
(1995) .

															Read according to its plain terms, §1144 raises
constitutional concerns. “[T]he Supremacy Clause gives ‘supreme’
status only to those [federal laws] that are ‘made in
Pursuance’ ” of the Constitution. Wyeth v. Levine , 555 U. S. 555, 585 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (quoting Art. VI, cl. 2). But I question
whether any provision of Article I authorizes Congress to prohibit
States from applying a host of generally applicable civil laws to
ERISA plans. “The Constitution requires a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local.” United States v. Morrison , 529 U. S. 598 –618 (2000). If the Federal
Government were “to take over the regulation of entire areas of
traditional state concern,” including “areas having nothing to do
with the regulation of commercial activities,” then “the boundaries
between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and
political responsibility would become illusory.” United
States v. Lopez , 514 U. S. 549, 577 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Just because Congress can regulate some
aspects of ERISA plans pursuant to the Commerce Clause does not
mean that Congress can exempt ERISA plans from state regulations
that have nothing to do with interstate commerce. See Gonzales v. Raich , 545 U. S. 1 –60 (2005)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).

															II

															This Court used to interpret §1144 according
to its text. But we became uncomfortable with how much state law
§1144 would pre-empt if read literally. “If ‘relate to’ were taken
to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy,” we
explained, “then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never
run its course.” Travelers , supra , at 655.

															Rather than addressing the constitutionality of
§1144, we abandoned efforts to give its text its ordinary meaning.
In Travelers , we adopted atextual but what we thought to be
“workable” standards to construe §1144. Ante, at 6. Thus, to
determine whether a state law impermissibly “relates to” an ERISA
plan due to some “connection with” that plan, we now “look both to
the objectives of the ERISA statute . . . as well as to
the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U. S. 141, 147 (2001)
(citing Travelers ; internal quotation marks omitted).

															We decided Travelers in 1995. I joined
that opinion and have joined others applying the approach we
adopted in Travelers . But our interpretation of ERISA’s
express pre-emption provision has become increasingly difficult to
reconcile with our pre-emption jurisprudence. Travelers departed from the statutory text, deeming it “unhelpful.” 514
U. S., at 656. But, in other cases involving express
pre-emption provisions, the text has been the beginning and often
the end of our analysis. E.g., Chamber of Commerce of United
States of America v. Whiting , 563 U. S. 582, 594
(2011) (“ ‘focus[ing] on the plain wording’ ” to define
the scope of the Immigration Reform and Control Act’s express
pre-emption clause); see also National Meat Assn . v. Harris , 565 U. S. ___, ___, ___–___
(2012) (slip op., at 4, 6–10) (parsing the text to determine the
scope of the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s express pre-emption
clause). We have likewise refused to look to policy limits that are
not “remotely discernible in the statutory text.” Whiting , supra, at 599. We have not given a sound basis for departing
from these principles and treating §1144 differently from other
express pre-emption provisions. Travelers’ approach to ERISA pre-emption
also does not avoid constitutional concerns. We have continued to
interpret §1144 as pre-empting “substantial areas of traditional
state regulation” and “pre-empt[ing] a state law . . .
even if the state law exercises a traditional state power.” Ante , at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Until we
confront whether Congress had the constitutional authority to
pre-empt such a wide array of state laws in the first place, the
Court—and lower courts—will continue to struggle to apply §1144. It
behooves us to address whether Article I gives Congress such power
and whether §1144 may permissibly be read to avoid unconstitutional
results. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 14–181

															_________________

															ALFRED GOBEILLE, in his official capacity as
chair of the vermont green mountaincare board, PETITIONER v. LIBERTYMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[March 1, 2016]

															Justice Breyer, concurring.

															I write separately to emphasize that a failure
to find pre-emption here would subject self-insured health plans
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
88Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §1001 et
seq. , to 50 or more potentially conflicting information
reporting requirements. Doing so is likely to create serious
administrative problems. The Court points out that the respondent’s
plan provides benefits to over 80,000 individuals living in 50
different States. See ante, at 3. In addition, amici
curiae tell us that self-insured, ERISA-based health plans
provide benefits to 93 million Americans. Brief for American
Benefits Council et al. as Amici Curiae 8. If each State is
free to go its own way, each independently determining what
information each plan must provide about benefits, the result could
well be unnecessary, duplicative, and conflicting reporting
requirements, any of which can mean increased confusion and
increased cost. Private standard setting can of course help
alleviate these problems, but given the large number of different
possible regulations, I do not believe that is sufficient. Cf. A.
Costello & M. Taylor, APCD Council & NAHDO, Standardization
of Data Collection in All-Payer Claims Databases 3–4 (Jan. 2011),
online at
https://www.apcdcouncil.org / publication/standardization-data-collection-all-payer-claims-databases
(as last visited Feb. 26, 2016).

															I would also emphasize that pre-emption does not
necessarily prevent Vermont or other States from obtaining the
self-insured, ERISA-based health-plan information that they need.
States wishing to obtain information can ask the Federal Government
for appropriate approval. As the majority points out, the
“Secretary of Labor has authority to establish additional reporting
and disclosure requirements for ERISA plans.” Ante, at 8;
see 29 U. S. C. §1135. Moreover, the Secretary “is
authorized to undertake research and surveys and in connection
therewith to collect, compile, analyze and publish data,
information, and statistics relating to employee benefit plans,
including retirement, deferred compensation, and welfare plans.”
§1143(a)(1). At least one other important statute provides the
Secretary of Health and Human Services with similar authority. See
42 U. S. C. §300gg–17(a) (part of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act that is applicable to group health
insurance plans including ERISA plans); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4 (the Department of Labor, the Department of
Health and Human Services, and the Department of Treasury are
“currently considering a rulemaking to require health plans to
report more detailed information about various aspects of plan
administration, such as enrollment, claims processing, and benefit
offerings”).

															I see no reason why the Secretary of Labor could
not develop reporting requirements that satisfy the States’ needs,
including some State-specific requirements, as appropriate. Nor do
I see why the Department could not delegate to a particular State
the authority to obtain data related to that State, while also
providing the data to the Federal Secretary for use by other States
or at the federal level.

															Although the need for federal approval or
authorization limits to some degree the States’ power to obtain
information, requiring that approval has considerable advantages.
The federal agencies are more likely to be informed about, and to
understand, ERISA-related consequences and health-care needs from a
national perspective. Their involvement may consequently secure for
the States necessary information without unnecessarily creating
costly conflicts—particularly when compared with such alternatives
as giving each State free rein to go its own way or asking
nonexpert federal courts to try to iron out, regulation by
regulation, such conflicts. Cf. Med-tronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U. S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (reading a complex, ambiguous
regulatory statute to permit “informed agency involvement” is more
likely to achieve Congress’ general objectives).

															For these reasons, and others that the majority
sets forth, I agree that Vermont’s statute is pre-empted because it
“interferes with nationally uniform plan administration.” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U. S. 141, 148 (2001)
. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 14–181

															_________________

															ALFRED GOBEILLE, in his official capacity as
chair of the vermont green mountaincare board, PETITIONER v. LIBERTYMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[March 1, 2016]

															Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sotomayor
joins, dissenting.

															To better control health care outcomes and
costs, Vermont requires all public and private entities that pay
for health care services provided to Vermont residents to supply
data to the State’s all-payer claims database. Many States have
similar databases in place or in development. The question
presented in this case is whether Vermont’s health care
data-collection law is preempted by the Employer Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88Stat. 832, 29 U. S. C.
§1001 et seq. , the federal law regulating employee
benefit plans. I would hold that Vermont’s effort to track health
care services provided to its residents and the cost of those
services does not impermissibly intrude on ERISA’s dominion over
employee benefit plans.

															I

															In 2005, the Vermont Legislature established
the Vermont Health Care Uniform Reporting and Evaluation System, a
database populated by information on health care claims paid by
insurers and other coverage providers. See Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18,
§9410 (2015 Cum. Supp.); Reg. H–2008–01, Code Vt. Rules 21–040–021,
§4(D) (2016) (directing insurers and other coverage providers to
“submit medical claims data, pharmacy claims data, member
eligibility data, provider data, and other information related to
health care provided to Vermont residents and health care provided
by Vermont health care providers and facilities”). Health insurers
and other coverage providers must report the required data if they
cover at least 200 Vermont residents. §3(Ab).

															Seventeen other States have enacted similar
database systems, called “all-payer claims databases.”[ 1 ] These States, like Vermont, collect
health-claims data to serve compelling interests, including
identification of reforms effective to drive down health care
costs, evaluation of relative utility of different treatment
options, and detection of instances of discrimination in the
provision of care. See Brief for National Governors Association et
al. as Amici Curiae 11–14; Brief for Harvard Law School
Center for Health Law and Policy Innovation et al. as Amici
Curiae 11–18; Brief for State of New York et al. as Amici
Curiae 12–20. See also Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, §9410(a)(1)
(Vermont’s data-collection law is designed to help “identif[y]
health care needs and infor[m] health care policy,” “evaluat[e] the
effectiveness of intervention programs on improving patient
outcomes,” “compar[e] costs between various treatment settings and
approaches,” “determin[e] the capacity and distribution of existing
resources,” and “provid[e] information to . . .
purchasers of health care”).[ 2 ]

															Respondent Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
(Lib-erty), in common with legions of employers, provides health
care to its employees through a self-insured plan, administered by
Blue Cross/Blue Shield (Blue Cross).[ 3 ] Because Blue Cross administers thousands of health care
policies in Vermont, the State requires it to report data for all
of the plans it administers, and Blue Cross has complied with this
mandate. In 2010, for example, Blue Cross reported data on over
7,000 Vermont health care-plan beneficiaries. Roughly half of the
beneficiaries received coverage through self-insured employer
policies. App. 205. In 2011, at Liberty’s request, Blue Cross did
not submit data on Vermont residents who received coverage through
Liberty’s plan. Id ., at 21–23. Vermont ordered Blue Cross to
provide the claims data. Id., at 23, 31–33. Lib-erty
instructed Blue Cross not to comply and, shortly thereafter, filed
the instant suit, seeking to block Vermont from obtaining the
data.

															In defense of its resistance to Vermont’s
data-collection law, Liberty relies on its plan’s status as an
ERISA-covered “employee welfare benefit plan,” defined as “any
plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by
an employer . . . for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of
insurance or otherwise, . . . medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness.”
29 U. S. C. §1002(1). Because ERISA directs plan
fiduciaries to conserve plan assets for the purpose of “providing
benefits to participants,” §1104(a)(1)(A)(ii), Liberty maintains
that ERISA preempts diverse state health-claims reporting laws. If
there is to be mandatory health-claims reporting by ERISA plans,
Liberty urges, the source of the mandate should be a uniform
national reporting regime. See Brief for Respondent 26–29; Tr. of
Oral Arg. 32–33.

															Opposing ERISA-grounded preemption of its
data-collection law, Vermont points out that the efficacy of the
State’s law depends on comprehensive reporting, i.e., collecting data on numerous beneficiaries from each of several
major segments of the health care market. See Brief for Petitioner
12; Brief for Harvard Law School Center for Health Law and Policy
Innovation et al. as Amici Curiae 18–19.[ 4 ] About half of Americans with health insurance
receive coverage from their employers, Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of
Census, J. Smith & C. Medalia, Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States: 2013, p. 2 (2014), and 61% of such persons are
covered by an employer’s self-insured plan. Brief for Harvard Law
School Center for Health Law and Policy Innovation et al. as Amici Curiae 20. In Vermont, about 20% of the database’s
total content originates from employer self-insured plans. Brief
for Petitioner 12, and n. 10. Stopping States from collecting
claims data from self-insured employer health care plans would thus
hugely undermine the reporting regimes on which Vermont and other
States depend to maintain and improve the quality, and hold down
the cost, of health care services.

															The United States District Court for the
District of Vermont rejected Liberty’s plea for preemption.
Vermont’s data-collection law, that court determined, served the
State’s undoubted interest in regulating health care markets, and
did not substantially interfere with the operation of Liberty’s
ERISA plans. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 64–66, 78–79. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, two to one. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegan , 746 F. 3d 497
(2014). The majority acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s
ERISA-preemption decisions of the 1990’s “marked something of a
pivot” in starting with a presumption “ ‘that Congress does
not intend to supplant state law,’ especially if the ‘state action
[occurs] in fields of traditional state regulation,’ like health
care.” Id., at 506 (quoting New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co. , 514 U. S. 645 –655 (1995)). Nonetheless, the majority
con-cluded that ERISA preempted the application of Vermont’s
data-collection law to Liberty’s plan. 746 F. 3d , at
506, 508. The reporting of information about plan benefits, the
majority reasoned, qualifies as a “core ERISA functio[n]” and,
therefore, must be “subject to a uniform federal standard.” Id., at 505, 508. Judge Straub dissented, offering a concise
critique of the majority’s opinion:

															“The majority finds that the burden
imposed by the Vermont reporting requirement warrants preemption of
the [data-collection] statute. This conclusion falters for two
primary reasons. First, the reporting requirement imposed by the
Vermont statute differs in kind from the ‘reporting’ that is
required by ERISA and therefore was not the kind of state law
Congress intended to preempt. Second, Liberty Mutual has failed to
show any actual burden, much less a burden that triggers ERISA
preemption. Rather, the Vermont statute . . . does not
interfere with an ERISA plan’s administration of benefits.” Id., at 511.

															II

															Essentially for the reasons Judge Straub
identified, I would hold that ERISA does not preempt Vermont’s
data-collection statute. That law and ERISA serve different
purposes. ERISA’s domain is the design and administration of
employee benefit plans: notably, prescriptions on the vesting of
benefits, claims processing, and the designation of beneficiaries.
See Travelers , 514 U. S., at 656 (“Congress intended to
ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform
body of benefits law. . . .” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Its reporting requirements, geared to those
functions, ensure that the plans in fact provide covered benefits.
Vermont’s data-collection statute, in contrast, aims to improve the
quality and utilization, and reduce the cost, of health care in
Vermont by providing consumers, government officials, and
researchers with comprehensive data about the health care delivery
system. Nor does Vermont’s law impose burdens on ERISA plans of the
kind this Court has found sufficient to warrant preemption.

															ERISA’s preemption clause provides that the Act
“shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29
U. S. C. §1144(a). Lacking clear direction from the
clause’s “opaque” text, De Buono v. NYSA–ILA Medical and
Clinical Services Fund , 520 U. S. 806, 809 (1997) , the
Court has sought to honor Congress’ evident call for an expansive
preemption principle without invalidating state regulations falling
outside ERISA’s domain. See Travelers , 514 U. S., at
655–656 (“The governing text of [the] ERISA [preemption clause] is
clearly expansive. . . . [But] [i]f ‘relate to’ were
taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then
for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course,
for really, universally, relations stop nowhere.” (some internal
quotation marks omitted)).[ 5 ]

															Seeking to bring some measure of determinacy to
ERISA preemption, the Court has stated: “[A] law ‘relates to’ an
employee benefit plan . . . if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan.” Id., at 656 (some internal
quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Court of Appeals found,
and the parties do not here contest, that Vermont’s data-collection
law lacks “reference to” ERISA plans because the law applies to all
health care payers and does not home in on ERISA plans. See 746
F. 3d, at 508, n. 9. The question, therefore, is whether
the law has an impermissible “connection with” ERISA plans. Because
the term “ ‘connection with’ is scarcely more restrictive than
‘relate to,’ ” the Court has “cautioned against
. . . uncritical literalism,” Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U. S. 141, 147 (2001) (internal quotation
marks omitted), and has set out this further formulation: “[T]o
determine whether a state law has the forbidden connection, we look
both to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope
of the state law that Congress understood would survive, as well as
to the nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

															In framing preemption doctrine, the Court does
not “assum[e] lightly that Congress has derogated state regulation,
but instead . . . addresse[s] claims of pre-emption with
the starting presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant
state law,” Travelers , 514 U. S., at 654, especially
where the State’s regulation deals with “matters of health and
safety,” De Buono , 520 U. S., at 814 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In Travelers and subsequent
decisions upholding state laws against preemption challenges, this
Court made clear that this presumption plays an important role in
ERISA cases. Travelers , 514 U. S., at 654, 661; California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc. , 519 U. S. 316 –331
(1997); De Buono , 520 U. S., at 814. Vermont’s
data-collection law is a vital part of the State’s control of its
own health care market. See supra, at 1–2, 4; 746
F. 3d, at 513 (Straub, J., dissenting). The presumption
against preemption should thus apply full strength, and Liberty has
not rebutted it, i.e., it has not shown that ERISA demands
the preemption of Vermont’s data-collection law. To the contrary,
the Court’s ERISA preemption precedent points against preemption in this case.

															A

															To determine whether Vermont’s data-collection
law, as applied to Liberty’s plan, has an impermissible “connection
with” ERISA plans, I look first to the “objectives of the ERISA
statute as a guide.” Egelhoff , 532 U. S., at 147; Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. , 575 U. S. ___, ___
(2015) (slip op., at 11) (emphasizing “the importance of
considering the target at which the state law aims ”
in applying ordinary field-preemption principles). Because ERISA’s
reporting requirements and the Vermont law elicit different
information and serve distinct purposes, there is no sensible
reason to find the Vermont data-collection law preempted.

															ERISA-covered benefit plans must, absent
exemption, file annual reports containing financial and actuarial
data to enable the Secretary of Labor to evaluate plans’ management
and solvency. See 29 U. S. C. §§1023, 1024(a)(2)(B); Dillingham , 519 U. S., at 326–327 (Congress
“established extensive reporting . . . requirements” to
protect against “the mismanagement of funds accumulated to finance
employee benefits and the failure to pay employees’ benefits from
accumulated funds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).[ 6 ]

															Beyond debate, Vermont’s data-collection law
does not seek to regulate the management and solvency of
ERISA-covered welfare plans. See supra, at 2 (reciting
objectives of the Vermont data-collection law). Vermont requests no
information on plan finances. See Reg. H–2008–01, Code of Vt. Rules
21–040–021, §4(D); supra, at 2 (detailing the types of data
collected by Vermont). The State collects data on paid health care
claims, not denied claims. See §5(A)(8). Vermont seeks a better
understanding of how its residents obtain health care and how
effective that care is. Unlike ERISA superintendence, Vermont’s
interest does not lie in reviewing whether a self-insured provider
is keeping its bargain to covered employees. Nor does Vermont’s
statute even arguably regulate relationships among the prime ERISA
entities: beneficiaries, participants, administrators, employees,
trustees and other fiduciaries, and the plan itself.

															Despite these significant differences between
ERISA’s reporting requirements and Vermont’s data-collection
regime, Liberty contends that Congress intended to spare ERISA
plans from benefit-related reporting requirements unless those
requirements are nationally uniform. In support of this contention,
Liberty points to dicta from this Court’s opinions and selections
from ERISA’s legislative history. See, e.g., Travelers , 514
U. S., at 661 (“ ‘[S]ubject matters covered by ERISA
[include] reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the
like.’ ” (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ,
463 U. S. 85, 98 (1983) )); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon , 498 U. S. 133, 137 (1990) (ERISA “sets
various uniform standards, including rules concerning reporting,
disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for both pension and
welfare plans.”); 120 Cong. Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Javits) (“State laws compelling disclosure from . . .
plans . . . will be superseded.”). Far from unambiguously
endorsing Liberty’s sweeping view of ERISA’s preemptive scope,
these statements can be read at least as reasonably for the
unremarkable principle that ERISA preempts state reporting rules
designed to serve the same purposes as ERISA’s reporting
requirements. This more limited understanding is consistent with
the Court’s admonition to pay close attention to the “objectives of
the ERISA statute as a guide.” Egelhoff , 532 U. S., at
147.

															B

															Satisfied that ERISA’s objectives do not
require preemption of Vermont’s data-collection law, I turn to the
“nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” Ibid . The imposition of some burdens on the administration
of ERISA plans, the Court has held, does not suffice to require
preemption. See De Buono , 520 U. S., at 815. While a
law imposing costs so acute as to effectively dictate how a plan is
designed or administered could trigger preemption, see id., at 816, n. 16, no such extreme effects are present here.
Moreover, no “central matter of plan administration,” Egelhoff, 532 U. S., at 148, is touched by Vermont’s
data-collection law. That law prescribes no vesting requirements,
benefit levels, beneficiary designations, or rules on how claims
should be processed or paid. Indeed, Vermont’s law does not require
Liberty to do anything. The burden of compliance falls on Blue
Cross, which apparently provides the data without protest on behalf
of other self-funded plans. See supra, at 3.

															Reporting and disclosure are no doubt required
of ERISA plans, but those requirements are ancillary to the areas
ERISA governs. Reporting and recordkeeping incident to state laws
of general applicability have been upheld as they bear on ERISA
plans. In De Buono , 520 U. S., at 809–810, 816, for
example, the Court held that a gross-receipts tax on patient
services provided by a hospital operated by an ERISA plan was not
preempted, even though administration of the tax required filing
quarterly reports. And in Dillingham , 519 U. S., at
319, the Court held that California’s prevailing-wage law was not
preempted as applied to apprenticeship programs established by
ERISA plans. Prevailing-wage laws typically require employees to
keep records of the wages paid to employees and make them available
for review by state authorities. See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code
Ann. §1776 (West 1989) (prevailing-wage law in Dillingham ).
The Second Circuit erred, then, in holding that ERISA preempts any
state-law reporting obligation that is more than “slight.” See 746
F. 3d, at 508–509.

															The Vermont data-collection statute keeps
company with the laws considered in De Buono and Dillingham : It is generally applicable and does not involve
“a central matter of plan administration.” Egelhoff , 532
U. S., at 148. And, as Judge Straub emphasized in his dissent,
Liberty “failed to provide any details or showing of the alleged
burden,” instead “arguing only that ‘all regulations have their
costs.’ ” 746 F. 3d, at 515 (quoting Liberty’s appellate
brief).

															As the United States explains, the supposition
indulged by the Second Circuit that Vermont’s law imposed a
substantial burden “is not obvious, or even particularly plausible,
without any factual support.” Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 28. The data-collection law “essentially requires Blue
Cross [Liberty’s third-party administrator] to take information
generated in the ordinary course of its claims-payment operations
and report that information in a prescribed format to the [State].” Ibid. The Court of Appeals majority accentuated the sheer
number of data entries that must be reported to Vermont. See 746
F. 3d, at 509–510, and n. 13. Accord ante, at 1
(opinion of Breyer, J.) Entirely overlooked in that enumeration is
the technological capacity for efficient computer-based data
storage, formatting, and submission. See Brief for National
Association of Health Data Organizations et al. as Amici
Curiae 7–9, 13 (describing three-step electronic path data take
from health provider, to insurer or health care plan, and
ultimately to the State’s database).[ 7 ] Where regulatory compliance depends upon the use of
evolving technologies, it should be incumbent on the objector to
show concretely what the alleged regulatory burden in fact
entails.[ 8 ]

															Because data-collection laws like Vermont’s are
not uniform from State to State, compliance is inevitably
burdensome, Liberty successfully argued in the Court of Appeals.
The Court replays this reasoning in today’s opinion. See ante, at 7, 10. But state-law diversity is a hallmark of our
political system and has been lauded in this Court’s opinions. See, e.g., Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Comm’n , 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op.,
at 28) (“This Court has long recognized the role of States as
laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”
(citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann , 285 U. S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); internal quotation
marks omitted)). Something more than an inherent characteristic of
our federal system, therefore, must underpin the ERISA-grounded
preemption Liberty urges.[ 9 ]

															Liberty points to Egelhoff as exemplary.
In Egelhoff , 532 U. S., at 143–144, a deceased
ERISA-plan participant’s ex-spouse challenged a state law that
revoked her beneficiary status automatically upon her divorce, even
though the ERISA plan’s terms did not. The Court held that ERISA
preempted the law because it “binds ERISA plan administrators to a
particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status.” Id., at 147. In that context, the Court said: “Requiring
ERISA administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States
. . . would undermine the congressional goal of
minimizing the administrative and financial burdens on plan
administrators—burdens ultimately borne by the beneficiaries.” Id., at 149–150 (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).

															The Court took care, however, to confine Egelhoff to issues implicating “a central matter of plan
administration,” in other words, “a core ERISA concern.” Id., at 147–148. What does that category comprise? As
earlier described, see supra, at 6, 11, prescriptions on
benefit levels, beneficiary designations, vesting requirements, and
rules on processing and payment of claims would rank under the
central or core ERISA subject-matter rubric.[ 10 ] So, too, would reporting and disclosure
obligations, but of what kind? Those that further regulation of the
design and administration of employee benefit plans, i.e., reporting and disclosures tied to the areas ERISA governs. ERISA’s
reporting and disclosure requirements are thus concerned with
mismanagement of funds, failure to pay employee benefits, plan
assets or allocations, all information bearing on the financial
integrity of the plan. See supra, at 8–9. Vermont’s
data-collection law, eliciting information on medical claims,
services provided to beneficiaries, charges and payment for those
services, and demographic makeup of those receiving benefits, does
not fit the bill any more than reporting relating to a plan’s taxes
or wage payments does.

															Numerous States have informed the Court of their
urgent need for information yielded by their health care
data-collection laws. See Brief for National Governors Association
et al. as Amici Curiae ; Brief for State of New York et
al. as Amici Curiae ; Brief for Connecticut Health Insurance
Exchange as Amicus Curiae ; Brief for State of New Hampshire
as Amicus Curiae . Wait until the Federal Government acts is
the Court’s response. The Department of Labor’s capacious grant of
statutory authority, the Court observes, might allow it to collect
the same data Vermont and other States seek about ERISA plan
health-benefit payments. See ante, at 10; ante, at
2–3 (opinion of Breyer, J.). Once the information is collected, the
Court conjectures, the Department could pass the data on to the
States. Cf. ante, at 2–3 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (suggesting
that States could seek the Department’s permission to enforce
reporting requirements like Vermont’s). It is unsettling, however,
to leave the States dependent on a federal agency’s grace, i.e., the Department of Labor’s willingness to take on a
chore divorced from ERISA’s objectives.[ 11 ]

															*  *  *

															Declaring “reporting,” unmodified, a central
or core ERISA function, as the Second Circuit did, 746 F. 3d,
at 508, passes the line this Court drew in Travelers , De
Buono , and Dillingham when it reined in §1144(a) so that
it would no longer operate as a “super-preemption” provision.
Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA, 74 Tulane L. Rev.
951, 959 (2000); see supra, at 8. I dissent from the Court’s
retrieval of preemption doctrine that belongs in the discard
bin. Notes 1 States, in addition to
Vermont, so far maintaining all-payer claims databases are:
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
Brief for National Governors Association et al. as Amici
Curiae 8, and n. 9. 2 Illustrative of the
utility of all-payer claims databases, Minnesota evaluated data on
emergency-room visits and concluded that the condition causing two
of every three visits could have been treated more efficiently, and
as effectively, in a nonhospital setting. Brief for State of New
York et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13. 3 Liberty’s plan would not,
on its own, trigger Vermont’s reporting requirements. As of 2011,
only 137 plan participants resided in the State, out of the total
84,711 individuals covered by Liberty’s plan. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 50. 4 The Federal Government
supplies Medicare claims data to Vermont and other States that
maintain similar databases. See 42 U. S. C. §1395kk(e)
(requiring the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
make Medicare data available to state health-claims databases). And
HHS has authorized the States to include Medicaid claims data in
their databases. See Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 7. 5 I have joined opinions
proposing that the Court acknowledge that the “ ‘relate to’
clause of the pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the field in
which ordinary field pre-emption applies—namely, the field
of laws regulating” employee-benefit plans. California Div. of
Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A.,
Inc. , 519 U. S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U. S. 141, 153 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Whether measured against ordinary
preemption principles or this Court’s ERISA-specific precedent,
Vermont’s data-collection law should survive
inspection. 6 The Court suggests that
the Department of Labor collects, pursuant to ERISA’s reporting
rules, similar information to the data that Vermont’s regime
elicits. See ante, at 8. But these reporting obligations are
not remotely similar. As one of Liberty’s amici curiae explains, the Department of Labor reporting form cited by the Court
requires reporting of the “total amount of claims paid annually by
the plan,” not the “granular claim-by-claim” information (including
data about the “location of services rendered”) that Vermont
collects. Brief for National Coordinating Committee for
Multiemployer Plans as Amicus Curiae 15, n. 4. See also
Reply Brief 13, and n. 6. The data entries cited by the Court
require a plan to enter, in merely a handful of boxes on a
four-page form, the aggregate sums of all claims paid annually. See
Dept. of Labor, Schedule H (Form 5500) Financial Information
(2015), online at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2015-5500-Schedule-H.pdf (all Internet
materials as last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 7 Amici supporting
Liberty point to several allegedly burdensome features of
compliance with Vermont’s law, but they appear to be no more than
everyday facets of modern regulatory compliance: installing and
maintaining a software system to collect and remit data to the
State, seeking variances from state regulators when health
providers do not submit required information to the plan or its
administrator, and reformatting data to comply with state-database
formatting and encryption standards. See Brief for Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Association as Amicus Curiae 30–32, and
nn. 7–8; Brief for National Coordinating Committee for
Multiemployer Plans as Amicus Curiae 11–13,
16–18. 8 Liberty contends that it
need not quantify the precise cost of compliance with Vermont’s law
to prove that the law is burdensome. But Liberty should at least
introduce concrete evidence of the alleged burdens. A finder of
fact would reasonably ask, for example: Do Blue Cross’s existing
technologies for data storage already have capacity to store and
report the data sought by Vermont? And is compliance with Vermont’s
reporting rules any more burdensome than compliance with other
state reporting laws with which the plan already
complies? 9 Concurring in the Court’s
opinion, Justice Breyer worries that “[i]f each State is free to go
its own way, . . . the result could well be unnecessary,
duplicative, and conflicting reporting requirements.” Ante, at 1. In support, Justice Breyer cites a 2011 report. A. Costello
& M. Taylor, APCD Council & NAHDO, Standardization of Data
Collec-tion in All-Payer Claims Databases 1 (Jan. 1 online 2011),
at
https:// www.apcdcouncil.org / publication / standardization-data-collection-all-payer-claims-databases.
In fact, the organizations that published this report inform us, in
a brief supporting Vermont, that “submitting claims data to
[all-payer claims databases] . . . is a routine,
straightforward process” and that States and private organizations
have worked in recent years to standardize data-reporting
requirements. Brief for National Association of Health Data
Organizations et al. as Amici Curiae 13. 10 The
“core ERISA concern” (or “central matter of plan administration”)
inquiry is not meaningfully different from the examination whether
a state law is inconsistent with the “objectives of the ERISA
statute.” Egelhoff , 532 U. S., at 147; see supra, at 8–10. The Court appears to disagree, stating that
“[a]ny difference in purpose” between ERISA and Vermont’s reporting
requirements “does not transform [Vermont’s] direct regulation of a
‘central matter of plan administration’ into an innocuous and
peripheral set of additional rules.” Ante, at 11–12 (quoting Egelhoff , 532 U. S., at 148). In other words, the Court
assumes that a state law that is not inconsistent with ERISA’s
purposes can nonetheless burden a “central matter of plan
administration” or implicate a “core ERISA concern.” Missing from
the Court’s opinion is any definition of these terms. What meaning
can “central matter of plan administration” and “core ERISA
concern” have if they are divorced from ERISA’s
purposes? 11 The
Court’s analysis may hamper States’ abilities to require reporting,
not just of plan benefits, but of plan assets as well. For example,
the Department of Labor collects information about real property
held in trust by a pension plan so that it can assess the plan’s
financial well-being. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. States may need to
collect the same information for a very different purpose, such as
assessing a property tax.