U.S. Supreme Court Illinois v. Krull, 480
U.S. 340 (1987) Illinois v. Krull No. 85-608 Argued November 5,
1986 Decided March 9, 1987 480
U.S. 340 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ILLINOIS Syllabus An Illinois statute, as it existed in 1981, required licensed
motor vehicle and vehicular parts sellers to permit state officials
to inspect certain required records. In 1981, pursuant to the
statute, a police detective entered respondents' automobile
wrecking yard and asked to see records of vehicle purchases. He was
told that the records could not be located, but was given a list of
approximately five purchases. After receiving permission to look at
the cars in the yard, he ascertained that three were stolen and
that a fourth had had its identification number removed. He then
seized the cars, and respondents were arrested and charged with
various crimes. The state trial court granted respondents' motion
to suppress the evidence seized from the yard, agreeing with a
federal court ruling, issued the day after the search, that the
state statute violated the Fourth Amendment because it permitted
officers unbridled discretion in their warrantless searches. The
State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner's argument that
the seized evidence was admissible because the detective had acted
in good faith reliance on the statute in making the search. Held: 1. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence obtained by police who acted in objectively reasonable
reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative
searches, but which is subsequently found to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Pp. 480 U. S.
349 -355.

															(a) Application of the exclusionary rule in these circumstances
would have little deterrent effect on future police misconduct,
which is the basic purpose of the rule. Officers conducting such
searches are simply fulfilling their responsibility to enforce the
statute as written. If a statute is not clearly unconstitutional,
officers cannot be expected to question the judgment of the
legislature that passed the law. Pp. 480 U. S.
349 -350.

															(b) Application of the exclusionary rule cannot be justified on
the basis of deterring legislative misconduct. Police, not
legislators, are the focus of the rule. Furthermore, there is no
evidence to suggest that legislatures are inclined to ignore or
subvert the Fourth Amendment. There is also no indication that the
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a statute subsequently
declared unconstitutional would have a significant deterrent effect
on the enactment of similar laws. Legislators Page 480 U. S. 341 enact statutes for broad programmatic purposes, not for the
purpose of procuring evidence in particular cases. The greatest
deterrent to unconstitutional enactments is the courts' power to
invalidate such statutes. Even if the exclusionary rule provided
some incremental deterrent, its benefit would be outweighed by the
substantial social costs exacted by the rule. Pp. 480 U. S.
350 -353.

															(c) The contention that the application of the exclusionary rule
is required because large numbers of people are affected by a
warrantless administrative search statute is not persuasive.
Although the number of individuals affected may be considered in
weighing the costs and benefits of applying the rule, the fact that
many are affected will not require the rule's application if such
application will not have a meaningful deterrent effect. P. 480 U. S.
353 .

															(d) The contention that the exception to the exclusionary rule
recognized here will discourage criminal defendants from presenting
meritorious Fourth Amendment claims is also not persuasive.
Defendants will always be able to argue in a suppression motion
that the officer's reliance on the warrantless search statute was
not objectively reasonable, and therefore was not in good faith.
Furthermore, persons covered by a statute may bring an action
seeking a declaration of the statute's unconstitutionality and an
injunction barring its implementation. Pp. 480 U. S.
353 -354.

															(e) Under the exception to the exclusionary rule recognized
here, a statute cannot support objectively reasonable reliance if,
in passing it, the legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility
to enact constitutional laws, or if the statutory provisions are
such that a reasonable law enforcement officer should have known
that the statute was unconstitutional. P. 480 U. S.
355 .

															2. The detective's reliance on the Illinois statute was
objectively reasonable. Even assuming that the statute was
unconstitutional because it vested state officials with too much
discretion, this constitutional defect would not have been obvious
to a police officer acting in good faith. Pp. 480 U. S.
356 -360. 107 Ill. 2d
107 , 481 N.E.2d
703 , reversed and remanded.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, POWELL, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 480 U. S. 361 .
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 480 U. S.
361 . Page 480 U. S. 342 JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 (1984), this Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by
police officers who acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a
search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but where the
warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. See also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.
S. 981 (1984). The present case presents the question
whether a similar exception to the exclusionary rule should be
recognized when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance
upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches, but
where the statute is ultimately found to violate the Fourth
Amendment. I The State of Illinois, as part of its Vehicle Code, has a
comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the sale of motor
vehicles and vehicular parts. See Ill.Rev.Stat., ch.
951/2, �� 5-100 to 5-801 (1985). A person who sells motor vehicles,
or deals in automotive parts, or processes automotive scrap metal,
or engages in a similar business must obtain a license from the
Illinois Secretary of State. �� 5-101, 5-102, 5-301. Page 480 U. S. 343 A licensee is required to maintain a detailed record of all
motor vehicles and parts that he purchases or sells, including the
identification numbers of such vehicles and parts, and the dates of
acquisition and disposition. � 5-401.2. In 1981, the statute in its
then form required a licensee to permit state officials to inspect
these records "at any reasonable time during the night or day" and
to allow

															"examination of the premises of the licensee's established place
of business for the purpose of determining the accuracy of required
records."

															Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 95 1/2, 115-401(e) (1981). [ Footnote 1 ]

															Respondents in 1981 operated Action Iron & Metal, Inc., an
automobile wrecking yard located in the city of Chicago. Detective
Leilan K. McNally of the Chicago Police Department regularly
inspected the records of wrecking yards pursuant to the state
statute. Tr. 12. [ Footnote 2 ]
On the morning of July 5, 1981, he entered respondents' yard. Id. at 7. He identified himself as a police officer to
respondent Lucas, who was working at the yard, and asked to see the
license and records of vehicle purchases. Lucas could not locate
the license or records, but he did produce a paper pad on which
approximately five vehicle purchases were listed. Id. at
25-26. McNally then requested and received permission from Lucas to
look at the cars in the yard. Upon checking with his mobile
computer the serial numbers of several of the vehicles, McNally
ascertained that three of them were stolen. Also, the
identification number of a fourth had been removed. McNally seized
the four vehicles and placed Lucas under arrest. Id. at
8-9, 16-17. Respondent Krull, the holder of the license, and
respondent Mucerino, who was present at the yard the day of the
search, were arrested later. Respondents Page 480 U. S. 344 were charged with various criminal violations of the Illinois
motor vehicle statutes.

															The state trial court (the Circuit Court of Cook County) granted
respondents' motion to suppress the evidence seized from the yard.
App. 20-21. Respondents had relied on a federal court ruling,
issued the day following the search, that 115-401(e), authorizing
warrantless administrative searches of licensees, was
unconstitutional. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 518 F.
Supp. 582 (ND Ill. 1981), aff'd, in part, vacated in part,
and remanded in part, 721 F.2d 1072 Page 480 U. S. 345 (CA7 1983). The Federal District Court in that case had
concluded that the statute permitted officers unbridled discretion
in their searches and was therefore not " a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant.'" 518 F. Supp. at 585-586,
quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.
S. 594 , 452 U. S. 603 (1981). The state trial court in the instant case agreed that the
statute was invalid, and concluded that its unconstitutionality
"affects all pending prosecutions not completed." App. 20. On that
basis, the trial court granted respondents' motion to suppress the
evidence. Id. at 20-21. [ Footnote 3 ] The Appellate Court of Illinois, First Judicial District,
vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id. at 22. It observed that recent
developments in the law indicated that Detective McNally's good
faith reliance on the state statute might be relevant in assessing
the admissibility of evidence, but that the trial court should
first make a factual determination regarding McNally's good faith. Id. at 25. It also observed that the trial court might
wish to reconsider its holding regarding the unconstitutionality of
the statute in light of the decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upholding the amended form of the
Illinois statute. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072 (CA7 1983). [ Footnote 4 ] On remand, however, the state trial court
adhered to its decision to grant respondents' motion to suppress.
It stated that the relevant statute was the one in effect at the
time McNally searched respondents' yard, and that this statute was
unconstitutional for the reasons stated by the Federal District
Court in Bionic. It further concluded that, because the
good faith of an officer is relevant, if at all, only when he acts
pursuant to a warrant, Detective McNally's possible good faith
reliance upon the statute had no bearing on the case. App. 32-35.
[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. [ Footnote 6 ] 107 Ill. 2d
107 , 481 N.E.2d
703 (1985). It first ruled that the state statute, as it
existed at the time McNally searched respondents' yard, was
unconstitutional. It noted that statutes authorizing Page 480 U. S. 346 warrantless administrative searches in heavily regulated
industries had been upheld where such searches were necessary to
promote enforcement of a substantial state interest, and where the
statute, " in terms of [the] certainty and regularity of its
application, provide[d] a constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant.'" Id. at 116, 481 N.E.2d at 707, quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 603 .
Although acknowledging that the statutory scheme authorizing
warrantless searches of licensees furthered a strong public
interest in preventing the theft of automobiles and the trafficking
in stolen automotive parts, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment because it "vested
State officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and
how long to search." 107 Ill. 2d at 116, 481 N.E.2d at
707. The court rejected the State's argument that the evidence seized
from respondents' wrecking yard should nevertheless be admitted
because the police officer had acted in good faith reliance on the
statute authorizing such searches. The court observed that, in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31 (1979), this Court had upheld an arrest and search made pursuant to
an ordinance defining a criminal offense, where the ordinance was
subsequently held to violate the Fourth Amendment. The Illinois
court noted that this Court, in DeFillippo, had contrasted
the ordinance then before it, defining a substantive criminal
offense, with a procedural statute directly authorizing searches
without a warrant or probable cause, and had stated that evidence
obtained in searches conducted pursuant to the latter type of
statute traditionally had not been admitted. 107 Ill. 2d at 118,
481 N.E.2d.at 708. Because the Illinois statute did not define a
substantive criminal offense, but, instead, was a procedural
statute directly authorizing warrantless searches, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that good faith reliance upon that statute
could not be used to justify the admission of evidence under an
exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 118-119, 481
N.E.2d at 708.

															We granted certiorari, 475 U.S. 1080 (1986), to consider whether
a good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
applies when an officer's reliance on the constitutionality of a
statute is objectively reasonable, but the statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional. Page 480 U. S. 347 II A When evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its
use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal
search and seizure. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
S. 643 (1961). The Court has stressed that the "prime
purpose" of the exclusionary rule

															"is to deter future unlawful police conduct, and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against
unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 , 414 U. S. 347 (1974). Application of the exclusionary rule "is neither intended
nor able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which
he has already suffered.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
at 468 U. S. 906 ,
quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 , 428 U. S. 540 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Rather, the rule "operates as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.'"

															468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 906 ,
quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 414 U. S.
348 .

															As with any remedial device, application of the exclusionary
rule properly has been restricted to those situations in which its
remedial purpose is effectively advanced. Thus, in various
circumstances, the Court has examined whether the rule's deterrent
effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such
deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information
from the truth-seeking process. See, e.g., United States v.
Janis, 428 U. S. 433 , 428 U. S. 454 (1976) (evidence obtained by state officers in violation of Fourth
Amendment may be used in federal civil proceeding because
likelihood of deterring conduct of state officers does not outweigh
societal costs imposed by exclusion); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351-352 (evidence obtained in
contravention of Fourth Amendment may be used in grand jury
proceedings because minimal advance in deterrence of police Page 480 U. S. 348 misconduct is outweighed by expense of impeding role of grand
jury).

															In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer
whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ultimately
found to be defective. On the basis of three factors, the Court
concluded that there was no sound reason to apply the exclusionary
rule as a means of deterring misconduct on the part of judicial
officers who are responsible for issuing warrants. First, the
exclusionary rule was historically designed "to deter police
misconduct, rather than to punish the errors of judges and
magistrates." 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 916 .
Second, there was

															"no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined
to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among
these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of
exclusion." Ibid. Third, and of greatest importance to the Court,
there was no basis

															"for believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a
warrant will have a significant deterrent effect on the issuing
judge or magistrate." Ibid. The Court explained:

															"Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement
team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." Id. at 468 U. S. 917 .
Thus, the threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to
deter such individuals from improperly issuing warrants, and a
judicial ruling that a warrant was defective was sufficient to
inform the judicial officer of the error made.

															The Court then considered whether application of the
exclusionary rule in that context could be expected to alter the
behavior of law enforcement officers. In prior cases, the Court had
observed that, because the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police officers from violating the Fourth Amendment, evidence
should be suppressed

															"only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had
knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the Page 480 U. S. 349 search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Peltier, 422 U.
S. 531 , 422 U. S. 542 (1975); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.
S. 433 , 417 U. S. 447 (1974). Where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, the
Court explained in Leon, "'[e]xcluding the evidence will not further the ends of the
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way, for it is painfully
apparent that . . . the officer is acting as a reasonable officer
would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the
evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to
make him less willing to do his duty.'" United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 920 ,
quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
539 -540 (WHITE, J., dissenting).

															The Court in Leon concluded that a deterrent effect was
particularly absent when an officer, acting in objective good
faith, obtained a search warrant from a magistrate and acted within
its scope. "In most such cases, there is no police illegality, and
thus nothing to deter." 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
920 -921. It is the judicial officer's responsibility to
determine whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, and, in
the ordinary case, police officers cannot be expected to question
that determination. Because the officer's sole responsibility after
obtaining a warrant is to carry out the search pursuant to it,
applying the exclusionary rule in these circumstances could have no
deterrent effect on a future Fourth Amendment violation by the
officer. Id. at 468 U. S.
921 . B The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the
present case. The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable
reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the
officer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an
officer acts in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant.
Unless a statute is clearly unconstitutional, an Page 480 U. S. 350 officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the
legislature that passed the law. If the statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence obtained pursuant to
it prior to such a judicial declaration will not deter future
Fourth Amendment violations by an officer who has simply fulfilled
his responsibility to enforce the statute as written. To paraphrase
the Court's comment in Leon :

															"Penalizing the officer for the [legislature's] error, rather
than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
Fourth Amendment violations." Ibid. [ Footnote
7 ]

															Any difference between our holding in Leon and our
holding in the instant case, therefore, must rest on a difference
between the effect of the exclusion of evidence on judicial
officers and the effect of the exclusion of evidence on
legislators. Although these two groups clearly serve different
functions in the criminal justice system, those differences are not
controlling for purposes of this case. We noted in Leon, as an initial matter, that the exclusionary rule was aimed at
deterring police misconduct. 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 916 .
Thus, legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the
rule. Moreover, to the extent we consider the rule's effect on
legislators, our initial inquiry, as set out in Leon, is
whether there is evidence to suggest that legislators "are inclined
to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. Although
legislators are not "neutral judicial officers," as are judges and
magistrates, id. at 468 U. S. 917 ,
neither are they "adjuncts to the Page 480 U. S. 351 law enforcement team." Ibid. The role of legislators in
the criminal justice system is to enact laws for the purpose of
establishing and perpetuating that system. In order to fulfill this
responsibility, legislators' deliberations of necessity are
significantly different from the hurried judgment of a law
enforcement officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948). Before assuming office, state legislators are required to
take an oath to support the Federal Constitution. See U.S.
Const., Art. VI, cl. 3. Indeed, by according laws a presumption of
constitutional validity, courts presume that legislatures act in a
constitutional manner. See e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U. S. 802 , 394 U. S.
808 -809 (1969); see generally 1 N. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 2.01 (4th ed.1985).

															There is no evidence suggesting that Congress or state
legislatures have enacted a significant number of statutes
permitting warrantless administrative searches violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Legislatures generally have confined their
efforts to authorizing administrative searches of specific
categories of businesses that require regulation, and the resulting
statutes usually have been held to be constitutional. See,
e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.
S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970); United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 651 F.2d 532 (CA8 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1016 (1982); see also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
10.2, pp. 132-134, n. 89.1 (Supp. 1986) (collecting cases). Thus,
we are given no basis for believing that legislators are inclined
to subvert their oaths and the Fourth Amendment and that
"lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme
sanction of exclusion." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
916 .

															Even if we were to conclude that legislators are different in
certain relevant respects from magistrates, because legislators are
not officers of the judicial system, the next inquiry Page 480 U. S. 352 necessitated by Leon is whether exclusion of evidence
seized pursuant to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional
will "have a significant deterrent effect," ibid., on
legislators enacting such statutes. Respondents have offered us no
reason to believe that applying the exclusionary rule will have
such an effect. Legislators enact statutes for broad, programmatic
purposes, not for the purpose of procuring evidence in particular
criminal investigations. Thus, it is logical to assume that the
greatest deterrent to the enactment of unconstitutional statutes by
a legislature is the power of the courts to invalidate such
statutes. Invalidating a statute informs the legislature of its
constitutional error, affects the admissibility of all evidence
obtained subsequent to the constitutional ruling, and often results
in the legislature's enacting a modified and constitutional version
of the statute, as happened in this very case. There is nothing to
indicate that applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized
pursuant to the statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity
will act as a significant, additional deterrent. [ Footnote 8 ] Moreover, to the extent that
application of the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental
deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against the
"substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule." Page 480 U. S. 353 Id. at 468 U. S. 907 .
[ Footnote 9 ] When we indulge in
such weighing, we are convinced that applying the exclusionary rule
in this context is unjustified.

															Respondents argue that the result in this case should be
different from that in Leon because a statute authorizing
warrantless administrative searches affects an entire industry and
a large number of citizens, while the issuance of a defective
warrant affects only one person. This distinction is not
persuasive. In determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule,
a court should examine whether such application will advance the
deterrent objective of the rule. Although the number of individuals
affected may be considered when "weighing the costs and benefits," ibid., of applying the exclusionary rule, the simple fact
that many are affected by a statute is not sufficient to tip the
balance if the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would not
be advanced in any meaningful way. [ Footnote 10 ]

															We also do not believe that defendants will choose not to
contest the validity of statutes if they are unable to benefit
directly by the subsequent exclusion of evidence, thereby resulting
in statutes that evade constitutional review. First, in Leon, we explicitly rejected the argument that the good
faith exception adopted in that case would "preclude review Page 480 U. S. 354 of the constitutionality of the search or seizure" or would
cause defendants to lose their incentive to litigate meritorious
Fourth Amendment claims. We stated that

															"the magnitude of the benefit conferred on defendants by a
successful [suppression] motion makes it unlikely that litigation
of colorable claims will be substantially diminished." Id. at 468 U. S. 924 ,
and n. 25. In an effort to suppress evidence, a defendant has no
reason not to argue that a police officer's reliance on a warrant
or statute was not objectively reasonable and therefore cannot be
considered to have been in good faith. Second, unlike a person
searched pursuant to a warrant, a person subject to a statute
authorizing searches without a warrant or probable cause may bring
an action seeking a declaration that the statute is
unconstitutional and an injunction barring its implementation.
Indeed, that course of action was followed with respect to the
statute at issue in this case. Several businesses brought a
declaratory judgment suit in Federal District Court challenging �
5-401(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (1981), and the provision was
declared unconstitutional. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales,
Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. at 585. Subsequent to that
declaration, respondents, in their state court criminal trial,
challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to the
statute. App. 13-17. [ Footnote
11 ] Page 480 U. S. 355 The Court noted in Leon that the "good faith" exception
to the exclusionary rule would not apply

															"where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role
in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S.
319 (1979),"

															or where the warrant was so facially deficient "that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." 468
U.S. at 468 U. S. 923 .
Similar constraints apply to the exception to the exclusionary rule
we recognize today. A statute cannot support objectively reasonable
reliance if, in passing the statute, the legislature wholly
abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws. Nor can
a law enforcement officer be said to have acted in good faith
reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a
reasonable officer should have known that the statute was
unconstitutional. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.
S. 800 , 457 U. S. 818 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions,
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known"). As we emphasized in Leon, the standard of
reasonableness we adopt is an objective one; the standard does not
turn on the subjective good faith of individual officers. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 919 ,
n. 20. [ Footnote 12 ] Page 480 U. S. 356 III Applying the principle enunciated in this case, we necessarily
conclude that Detective McNally's reliance on the Page 480 U. S. 357 Illinois statute was objectively reasonable. [ Footnote 13 ] On several occasions, this
Court has upheld legislative schemes that authorized warrantless
administrative searches of heavily regulated industries. See
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594 (1981) (inspections of underground and surface mines pursuant to
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 (1972) (inspections of firearms dealers under Gun Control Act of
1968); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 (1970)
(inspections of liquor dealers under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b) and 7606
(1964 ed.)). It has recognized that an inspection program may be a
necessary component of regulation in certain industries, and has
acknowledged that unannounced, warrantless inspections may be
necessary "if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection
made effective." United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S. 316 ; Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 452 U. S. 603 .
Thus, the Court explained in Donovan that its prior
decisions

															"make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required
when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches
are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal
regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that
the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that
his Page 480 U. S. 358 property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes." Id. at 452 U. S.
600 .

															In Donovan, the Court pointed out that a valid
inspection scheme must provide, "in terms of the certainty and
regularity of its application . . . a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant." Id. at 452 U. S. 603 .
In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.
S. 307 (1978), to be sure, the Court held that a
warrantless administrative Page 480 U. S. 359 search under § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 was invalid, partly because the

															"authority to make warrantless searches devolve[d] almost
unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative officers,
particularly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to
search." Id. at 436 U. S. 323 .
[ Footnote 14 ] In contrast,
the Court in Donovan concluded that the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 imposed a system of inspection that
was sufficiently tailored to the problems of unsafe conditions in
mines, and was sufficiently pervasive that it checked the
discretion of Government officers and established "a predictable
and guided federal regulatory presence." 452 U.S. at 452 U. S.
604 .

															Under the standards established in these cases, Detective
McNally's reliance on the Illinois statute authorizing warrantless
inspections of licensees was objectively reasonable. In ruling on
the statute's constitutionality, the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized that the licensing and inspection scheme furthered a
strong public interest, for it helped to "facilitate the discovery
and prevention of automobile thefts." 107 Ill. 2d at 116, 481
N.E.2d at 707. The court further concluded that it was

															"reasonable to assume that warrantless administrative searches
are necessary in order to adequately control the theft of
automobiles and automotive parts." Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
upholding the amended version of the statute, pointed out that used
car and automotive parts dealers in Illinois "are put on notice
that they are entering a field subject to extensive state
regulation." See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v.
Fahner, 721 F.2d at 1079. The Illinois statute was thus
directed at one specific and heavily regulated industry, the
authorized warrantless searches were necessary to the effectiveness
of the inspection system, and licensees were put on notice that
their businesses would be subject to inspections pursuant to the
state administrative scheme.

															According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the statute failed to
pass constitutional muster solely because the statute "vested State
officials with too much discretion to decide who, when, and how
long to search." 107 Ill. 2d at 116, 481 N.E.2d at 707. Assuming,
as we do for purposes of this case, that the Illinois Supreme Court
was correct in its constitutional analysis, this defect in the
statute was not sufficiently obvious so as to render a police
officer's reliance upon the statute objectively unreasonable. The
statute provided that searches could be conducted "at any
reasonable time during the night or day," and seemed to limit the
scope of the inspections to the records the businesses were
required to maintain and to the business premises "for the purposes
of determining the accuracy of required records." Ill.Rev.Stat.,
ch. 95 1/2, � 5-401(e) (1981). While statutory provisions that
circumscribe officers' discretion may be important in establishing
a statute's constitutionality, [ Footnote 15 ] the additional restrictions on
discretion Page 480 U. S. 360 that might have been necessary are not so obvious that an
objectively reasonable police officer would have realized the
statute was unconstitutional without them. [ Footnote 16 ] We therefore conclude that
Detective McNally relied, in objective good faith, on a statute
that appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless administrative
search of respondents' business. [ Footnote 17 ] Page 480 U. S. 361 Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is
reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Paragraph 6-401 of the 1981 compilation was repealed by 1983
Ill.Laws No. 83-1473, § 2, effective Jan. 1, 1986. Its current
compilation replacement bears the same paragraph number.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Citations to the transcript refer to the Sept. 26, 1981, hearing
on respondents' suppression motion held in the Circuit Court of
Cook County. 2 Record 24.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The trial court also concluded that Lucas had not consented to
the search. App. 20. That ruling is not now at issue here.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Following the decision of the District Court in Bionic Auto
Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F.
Supp. 582 (ND Ill.1981), the Illinois Legislature amended the
statute to limit the timing, frequency, and duration of the
administrative search. 1982 Ill.Laws No. 82-984, codified, as
amended, at Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 95 1/2, � 5-403 (1985). See n 1, supra. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not address the
validity of the earlier form of the statute, for it held that the
amended statute satisfied the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721
F.2d 1072, 1075 (1983).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The trial court also indicated that McNally may have acted
outside the scope of his statutory authority when he examined
vehicles other than those listed on the pad offered by Lucas. App.
29; 5 Record 2, 8.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The State bypassed the Illinois intermediate appellate court and
appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Indeed, the possibility of a deterrent effect may be even less
when the officer acts pursuant to a statute rather than a warrant.
In Leon, the Court pointed out:

															"One could argue that applying the exclusionary rule in cases
where the police failed to demonstrate probable cause in the
warrant application deters future inadequate presentations or
'magistrate shopping,' and thus promotes the ends of the Fourth
Amendment."

															468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 918 .
Although the Court in Leon dismissed that argument as
speculative, ibid., the possibility that a police officer
might modify his behavior does not exist at all when the officer
relies on an existing statute that authorizes warrantless
inspections and does not require any pre-inspection action,
comparable to seeking a warrant, on the part of the officers.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															It is possible, perhaps, that there are some legislators who,
for political purposes, are possessed with a zeal to enact a
particular unconstitutionally restrictive statute, and who will not
be deterred by the fact that a court might later declare the law
unconstitutional. But we doubt whether a legislator possessed with
such fervor, and with such disregard for his oath to support the
Constitution, would be significantly deterred by the possibility
that the exclusionary rule would preclude the introduction of
evidence in a certain number of prosecutions. Moreover, and of
equal importance, just as we were not willing to assume in Leon that the possibility of magistrates' acting as
"rubber stamps for the police" was a problem of major proportions, see 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 916 ,
n. 14, we are not willing to assume now that there exists a
significant problem of legislators who perform their legislative
duties with indifference to the constitutionality of the statutes
they enact. If future empirical evidence ever should undermine that
assumption, our conclusions may be revised accordingly. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
927 -928 (concurring opinion).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															In Leon, the Court pointed out:

															"An objectionable collateral consequence of this interference
with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is that
some guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as
a result of favorable plea bargains." Id. at 468 U. S.
907 .

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Moreover, it is not always true that the issuance of defective
warrants will affect only a few persons. For example, it is
possible that, before this Court's rather controversial decision in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 , 462 U. S. 238 ,
and n. 11 (1983), a number of magistrates believed that probable
cause could be established solely on the uncorroborated allegations
of a police officer, and a significant number of warrants may have
been issued on that basis. Until that view was adjusted by this
Court's ruling, many persons may have been affected by the
systematic granting of warrants based on erroneous views of the
standards necessary to establish probable cause.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Other plaintiffs have challenged state statutes on Fourth
Amendment grounds in declaratory judgment actions. See
California Restaurant Assn. v. Henning, 173 Cal. App.
3d 1069 , 219 Cal. Rptr.
630 (1985) (organization of restaurant owners challenged
constitutionality of state statute vesting authority in State Labor
Commissioner to issue subpoenas compelling production of books and
records); Hawaii Psychiatric Soc. v.
Ariyoshi, 481 F.
Supp. 1028 (Haw. 1979) (action to enjoin enforcement of state
statute that authorized issuance of administrative inspection
warrants to search records of Medicaid providers); Bilbrey v.
Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (CA9 1984) (parents sought declaration
that school board guidelines authorizing warrantless searches by
school principal and teacher were unconstitutional); see also
Mid-Atlantic Accessories Trade Assn. v.
Maryland, 500 F.
Supp. 834 , 848-849 (Md. 1980) (challenging constitutionality of
Maryland Drug Paraphernalia Act as violative of the Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions).

															The dissent takes issue with the rule announced in this case
because it can result in having a defendant, who has successfully
challenged the constitutionality of a statute, denied the benefits
of suppression of evidence. Post at 480 U. S.
368 -369. As the dissent itself recognizes, however, this
identical concern was present in Leon. The dissent offers
no reason why this concern should be different when a defendant
challenges the constitutionality of a statute, rather than of a
warrant.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The Illinois Supreme Court did not consider whether an officer's
objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute justifies an
exception to the exclusionary rule. Instead, as noted above, the
court rested its holding on the existence of a
"substantive-procedural dichotomy," which it would derive from this
Court's opinion in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S.
31 (1979). See 107 Ill.
2d 107 , 118, 481 N.E.2d
703 , 708 (1985). We do not believe the distinction relied upon
by the Illinois court is relevant in deciding whether the
exclusionary rule should be applied in this case.

															This Court in DeFillippo, which was decided before Leon, drew a distinction between evidence obtained when
officers rely upon a statute that defines a substantive crime, and
evidence obtained when officers rely upon a statute that authorizes
searches without a warrant or probable cause. The Court stated that
evidence obtained in searches conducted pursuant to the latter type
of statute traditionally had been excluded. 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 39 .
None of the cases cited in DeFillippo in support of the
distinction, however, addressed the question whether a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized when an
officer's reliance on a statute was objectively reasonable. Rather,
those cases simply evaluated the constitutionality of particular
statutes, or their application, that authorized searches without a
warrant or probable cause. See Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979) (statute that allowed police to search luggage of any person
arriving at an airport or pier in Puerto Rico, without any
requirement of probable cause, violated Fourth Amendment); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266 (1973) (search pursuant to statute that allowed
United States Border Patrol to conduct warrantless searches within
a "reasonable distance" from border, and regulation that defined
such distance as 100 air miles, and without any requirement of
probable cause violated Fourth Amendment); Berger v. New
York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967)
(statute that authorized court-ordered eavesdropping without
requirement that information to be seized be particularized
violated Fourth Amendment). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968)
(search pursuant to statute that allowed officers to search an
individual upon "reasonable suspicion" that he was engaged in
criminal activity was unreasonable because it was conducted without
probable cause). See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 912 ,
n. 8.

															For purposes of deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule,
we see no valid reason to distinguish between statutes that define
substantive criminal offenses and statutes that authorize
warrantless administrative searches. In either situation,
application of the exclusionary rule will not deter a violation of
the Fourth Amendment by police officers, because the officers are
merely carrying out their responsibilities in implementing the
statute. Similarly, in either situation, there is no basis for
assuming that the exclusionary rule is necessary or effective in
deterring a legislature from passing an unconstitutional statute.
There is no basis for applying the exclusionary rule to exclude
evidence obtained when a law enforcement officer acts in
objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute, regardless of
whether the statute may be characterized as "substantive" or
"procedural."

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The question whether the Illinois statute in effect at the time
of McNally's search was, in fact, unconstitutional is not before
us. We are concerned here solely with whether the detective acted
in good faith reliance upon an apparently valid statute. The
constitutionality of a statutory scheme authorizing warrantless
searches of automobile junkyards will be considered in No. 86-80, New York v. Burger, cert. granted, 479 U.S. 812
(1986).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															The Court expressly limited its holding in Barlow's to
the inspection provisions of the Act. It noted that the

															"reasonableness of a warrantless search . . . will depend upon
the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each
statute,"

															and that some statutes

															"apply only to a single industry, where regulations might
already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception
to the warrant requirement could apply."

															436 U.S. at 436 U. S.
321 .

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															For example, the amended version of the Illinois statute, upheld
by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, incorporated the
following: (1) the inspections were to be initiated while business
was being conducted; (2) each inspection was not to last more than
24 hours; (3) the licensee or his representative was entitled to be
present during the inspection; and (4) no more than six inspections
of one business location could be conducted within any 6-month
period except pursuant to a search warrant or in response to public
complaints about violations. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 95 1/2, � 5-403
(1985).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Indeed, less than a year and a half before the search of
respondents' yard, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld an Indiana
statute, authorizing warrantless administrative searches of
automobile businesses, that was similar to the Illinois statute and
did not include extensive restrictions on police officers'
discretion. See State v. Tindell, 272 Ind. 479, 399 N.E.2d
746 (1980).

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															Respondents also argue that Detective McNally acted outside the
scope of the statute, and that such action constitutes an
alternative ground for suppressing the evidence even if we
recognize, as we now do, a good faith exception when officers
reasonably rely on statutes and act within the scope of those
statutes. We have observed, see n 5, supra, that the trial court indicated
that McNally may have acted outside the scope of his statutory
authority. In its brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, the State
commented that "[McNally's] search was properly limited to
examining the records and inventory of the Action Iron and Metal
Company." Brief for Appellant in No. 60629 (Sup.Ct.Ill.), p. 26.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, made no reference to the trial
court's discussion regarding the scope of McNally's authority;
instead, it affirmed the suppression of the evidence on the ground
that a good faith exception was not applicable in the context of
the statute before it.

															We anticipate that the Illinois Supreme Court, on remand, will
consider whether the trial court made a definitive ruling regarding
the scope of the statute, whether the State preserved its objection
to any such ruling, and, if so, whether the trial court properly
interpreted the statute. At this juncture, we decline the State's
invitation to recognize an exception for an officer who
erroneously, but in good faith, believes he is acting within the
scope of a statute. Not only would such a ruling be premature, but
it does not follow inexorably from today's decision. As our opinion
makes clear, the question whether the exclusionary rule is
applicable in a particular context depends significantly upon the
actors who are making the relevant decision that the rule is
designed to influence. The answer to this question might well be
different when police officers act outside the scope of a statute,
albeit in good faith. In that context, the relevant actors are not
legislators or magistrates, but police officers, who concededly are
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948).

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

															While I join in JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S dissenting opinion, I do not
find it necessary to discuss the Court's holdings in United
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), and United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 (1976). See post at 480 U. S.
368 -369. Accordingly, I do not subscribe to that portion
of the opinion.

															JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															The Court today extends the good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), in order to provide a grace period for unconstitutional
search and seizure legislation during which the State is permitted
to violate constitutional requirements with impunity. Leon's rationale does not support this extension of its
rule, and the Court is unable to give any independent reason in
defense of this departure from established precedent. Accordingly,
I respectfully dissent.

															The Court, ante at 480 U. S. 348 ,
accurately summarizes Leon's holding:

															"In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule
should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer
whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ultimately
found to be defective. Page 480 U. S. 362 The Court also accurately summarizes the reasoning supporting
this conclusion as based upon three factors: the historic purpose
of the exclusionary rule, the absence of evidence suggesting that
judicial officers are inclined to ignore Fourth Amendment
limitations, and the absence of any basis for believing that the
exclusionary rule significantly deters Fourth Amendment violations
by judicial officers in the search warrant context. Ibid. In my view, application of Leon's stated rationales leads
to a contrary result in this case."

															I agree that the police officer involved in this case acted in
objective good faith in executing the search pursuant to
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 95 1/2, � 5-401(e) (1981) (repealed 1985). Ante at 480 U. S. 360 .
And, as the Court notes, ante at 480 U. S. 357 ,
n. 13, the correctness of the Illinois Supreme Court's finding that
this statute violated the Fourth Amendment is not in issue here.
Thus, this case turns on the effect to be given to statutory
authority for an unreasonable search.

															Unlike the Court, I see a powerful historical basis for the
exclusion of evidence gathered pursuant to a search authorized by
an unconstitutional statute. Statutes authorizing unreasonable
searches were the core concern of the framers of the Fourth
Amendment. This Court has repeatedly noted that reaction against
the ancient Act of Parliament authorizing indiscriminate general
searches by writ of assistance, 7 & 8 Wm. III, c. 22, § 6
(1696), was the moving force behind the Fourth Amendment. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S.
583 -584, and n. 21 (1980); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 , 379 U. S.
481 -482 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S.
624 -630 (1886). James Otis' argument to the royal
Superior Court in Boston against such overreaching laws is as
powerful today as it was in 1761:

															". . . I will to my dying day oppose with all the powers and
faculties God has given me, all such instruments of Page 480 U. S. 363 slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ
of assistance is. . . ."

															" * * * *" ". . . It is a power, that places the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer. . . ."

															". . . No Acts of Parliament can establish such a writ; though
it should be made in the very words of the petition, it would be
void. An act against the constitution is void."

															2 Works of John Adams 523-525 (C. Adams ed.1850). See
Paxton's Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761). James Otis lost the
case he argued; and, even had he won it, no exclusionary rule
existed to prevent the admission of evidence gathered pursuant to a
writ of assistance in a later trial. But history's court has
vindicated Otis. The principle that no legislative Act can
authorize an unreasonable search became embodied in the Fourth
Amendment.

															Almost 150 years after Otis' argument, this Court determined
that evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment would
be excluded in federal court. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), the rule was further extended to state criminal trials.
This exclusionary rule has, of course, been regularly applied to
evidence gathered under statutes that authorized unreasonable
searches. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S.
85 (1979) (statute authorized search and detention of
persons found on premises being searched pursuant to warrant); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U. S. 465 (1979) (statute authorized search of luggage of persons entering
Puerto Rico); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973) (statute authorized search of automobiles without probable
cause within border areas); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 (1968)
(statute authorized frisk absent constitutionally required
suspicion that officer was in danger); Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967)
(permissive eavesdrop statute). Page 480 U. S. 364 Indeed, Weeks itself made clear that the exclusionary
rule was intended to apply to evidence gathered by officers acting
under "legislative . . . sanction." Weeks v. United States,
supra, at 232 U. S.
394 . Leon, on its face, did not purport to disturb these
rulings.

															"'Those decisions involved statutes which, by their own terms,
authorized searches under circumstances which did not satisfy the
traditional warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.' Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 39 . The substantive
Fourth Amendment principles announced in those cases are fully
consistent with our holding here." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S. 912 ,
n. 8. In short, both the history of the Fourth Amendment and this
Court's later interpretations of it support application of the
exclusionary rule to evidence gathered under the 20th-century
equivalent of the Act authorizing the writ of assistance.

															This history also supplies the evidence that Leon demanded for the proposition that the relevant state actors, here
legislators, might pose a threat to the values embodied in the
Fourth Amendment. Legislatures have, upon occasion, failed to
adhere to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as the cited
cases illustrate. Indeed, as noted, the history of the Amendment
suggests that legislative abuse was precisely the evil the Fourth
Amendment was intended to eliminate. In stark contrast, the framers
did not fear that judicial officers, the state actors at issue in Leon, posed a serious threat to Fourth Amendment values.
James Otis is as clear on this point as he was in denouncing the
unconstitutional Act of Parliament:

															"In the first place, may it please your Honors, I will admit
that writs of one kind may be legal; that is, special writs,
directed to special officers, and to search certain houses, &c.
specially set forth in the writ, may be granted by the Court of
Exchequer at home, upon oath made before the Lord Treasurer by the
person who asks it, that Page 480 U. S. 365 he suspects such goods to be concealed in those very places he
desires to search."

															2 Works of John Adams 524 (C. Adams ed.1850). The distinction
drawn between the legislator and the judicial officer is sound. The
judicial role is particularized, fact-specific, and nonpolitical.
Judicial authorization of a particular search does not threaten the
liberty of everyone, but rather authorizes a single search under
particular circumstances. The legislative Act, on the other hand,
sweeps broadly, authorizing whole classes of searches, without any
particularized showing. A judicial officer's unreasonable
authorization of a search affects one person at a time; a
legislature's unreasonable authorization of searches may affect
thousands or millions, and will almost always affect more than one.
Certainly the latter poses a greater threat to liberty.

															Moreover, the Leon Court relied explicitly on the
tradition of judicial independence in concluding that, until it was
presented with evidence to the contrary, there was relatively
little cause for concern that judicial officers might take the
opportunity presented by the good faith exception to authorize
unconstitutional searches.

															"Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement
team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions." United States v. Leon, supra, at 468 U. S. 917 .
Unlike police officers, judicial officers are not "engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson
v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948). The legislature's objective in passing a law authorizing
unreasonable searches, however, is explicitly to facilitate law
enforcement. Fourth Amendment rights have at times proved
unpopular; it is a measure of the framers' fear that a passing
majority might find it expedient to compromise Fourth Amendment
values that these values were embodied in the Constitution itself. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 , 168 U. S. 544 (1897). Legislators, by virtue of their political role, are more
often subjected Page 480 U. S. 366 to the political pressures that may threaten Fourth Amendment
values than are judicial officers.

															Finally, I disagree with the Court that there is "no reason to
believe that applying the exclusionary rule" will deter legislation
authorizing unconstitutional searches. Ante at 480 U. S.
352 -352.

															"The inevitable result of the Constitution's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause is that police officers
who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals."

															Stewart, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1365, 1393 (1983). Providing
legislatures a grace period during which the police may freely
perform unreasonable searches in order to convict those who might
have otherwise escaped creates a positive incentive to promulgate
unconstitutional laws. Cf. Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. at 232 U. S.
392 -393. While I heartily agree with the Court that
legislators ordinarily do take seriously their oaths to uphold the
Constitution and that it is proper to presume that legislative Acts
are constitutional, ante at 480 U. S. 351 ,
it cannot be said that there is no reason to fear that a particular
legislature might yield to the temptation offered by the Court's
good faith exception.

															Accordingly, I find that none of Leon's stated
rationales, see ante at 480 U. S. 348 ,
supports the Court's decision in this case. History suggests that
the exclusionary rule ought to apply to the unconstitutional
legislatively authorized search, and this historical experience
provides a basis for concluding that legislatures may threaten
Fourth Amendment values. Even conceding that the deterrent value of
the exclusionary rule in this context is arguable, I am unwilling
to abandon both history and precedent weighing in favor of
suppression. And if I were willing, I still could not join the
Court's opinion, because the rule it adopts is both difficult to
administer and anomalous.

															The scope of the Court's good faith exception is unclear.
Officers are to be held not

															"to have acted in good faith reliance upon a statute if its
provisions are such that a reasonable Page 480 U. S. 367 officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional. Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S.
800 , 457 U. S. 818 (1982)." Ante at 480 U. S. 355 .
I think the Court errs in importing Harlow's "clearly
established law" test into this area, because it is not apparent
how much constitutional law the reasonable officer is expected to
know. In contrast, Leon simply instructs courts that
police officers may rely upon a facially valid search warrant. Each
case is a fact-specific, self-terminating episode. Courts need not
inquire into the officer's probable understanding of the state of
the law except in the extreme instance of a search warrant upon
which no reasonable officer would rely. Under the decision today,
however, courts are expected to determine at what point a
reasonable officer should be held to know that a statute has, under
evolving legal rules, become "clearly" unconstitutional. The
process of clearly establishing constitutional rights is a long,
tedious, and uncertain one. Indeed, as the Court notes, ante at 480 U. S. 357 ,
n. 13, the unconstitutionality of the Illinois statute is not
clearly established to this day. The Court has granted certiorari
on the question of the constitutionality of a similar statutory
scheme in New York v. Burger, 479
U. S. 482 (1986). Thus, some six years after the events
in question in this case, the constitutionality of statutes of this
kind remains a fair ground for litigation. Nothing justifies a
grace period of such extraordinary length for an unconstitutional
legislative act.

															The difficulties in determining whether a particular statute
violates clearly established rights are substantial. See 5
K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 27:24, p. 130 (2d ed. 1984)
("The most important effect of [ Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183 (1984)] on future law relates to locating the line between
established constitutional rights and clearly established
constitutional rights. In assigning itself the task of drawing such
a line, the Court may be attempting the impossible. Law that can be
clearly stated in the abstract usually becomes unclear when applied
to variable and imperfectly Page 480 U. S. 368 understood facts. . . ."). The need for a rule so difficult of
application outside the civil damages context is, in my view,
dubious. The Court has determined that fairness to the defendant,
as well as public policy, dictates that individual government
officers ought not be subjected to damages suits for arguable
constitutional violations. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 , 457 U. S. 807 (1982) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.
S. 478 , 438 U. S. 506 (1978)). But suppression of illegally obtained evidence does not
implicate this concern.

															Finally, I find the Court's ruling in this case at right angles,
if not directly at odds, with the Court's recent decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987). In Griffith, the Court held that "basic norms of
constitutional adjudication" and fairness to similarly situated
defendants, id. at 479 U. S. 322 ,
require that we give our decisions retroactive effect to all cases
not yet having reached final, and unappealable, judgment. While the
extent to which our decisions ought to be applied retroactively has
been the subject of much debate among members of the Court for many
years, id. at 479 U. S.
320 -326, there has never been any doubt that our
decisions are applied to the parties in the case before the Court. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 , 388 U. S. 301 (1967). The novelty of the approach taken by the Court in this case
is illustrated by the fact that, under its decision today, no
effective remedy is to be provided in the very case in which the
statute at issue was held unconstitutional. I recognize that the
Court today, as it has done in the past, divorces the suppression
remedy from the substantive Fourth Amendment right. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
905 -908. This Court has held that the exclusionary rule
is a

															"judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." United States v. Calandra , 414 U.
S. 338 , 414 U. S. 348 (1974). Moreover, the exclusionary remedy is not made available in
all instances when Fourth Amendment rights are implicated. See,
e.g., 428 U. S. S.
369� v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976) (barring habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment
suppression claims); United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 (1976) (no suppression remedy for state Fourth
Amendment violations in civil proceedings by or against the United
States). Nevertheless, the failure to apply the exclusionary rule
in the very case in which a state statute is held to have violated
the Fourth Amendment destroys all incentive on the part of
individual criminal defendants to litigate the violation of their
Fourth Amendment rights. In my view, whatever "basic norms of
constitutional adjudication," Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, at 479 U. S. 322 ,
otherwise require, surely they mandate that a party appearing
before the Court might conceivably benefit from a judgment in his
favor. The Court attempts to carve out a proviso to its good faith
exception for those cases in which "the legislature wholly
abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws." Ante@ at 480 U. S. 355 .
Under what circumstances a legislature can be said to have "wholly
abandoned" its obligation to pass constitutional laws is not
apparent on the face of the Court's opinion. Whatever the scope of
the exception, the inevitable result of the Court's decision to
deny the realistic possibility of an effective remedy to a party
challenging statutes not yet declared unconstitutional is that a
chill will fall upon enforcement and development of Fourth
Amendment principles governing legislatively authorized searches.
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.