U.S. Supreme Court Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 21 How. 506
506 (1858) Ableman v. Booth 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 Syllabus 1. The process of a State court or judge has no authority beyond
the limits of the sovereignty which confers the judicial power.

															2. A habeas corpus, issued by a State judge or court, has no
authority within the limits of the sovereignty assigned by the
Constitution to the United States. The sovereignty of the United
States and of a State are distinct and independent of each other
within their respective spheres of action, although both exist and
exercise their powers within the same territorial limits.

															3. When a writ of habeas corpus is served on a marshal or other
person having a prisoner in custody under the authority of the
United States, it is his duty, by a proper return, to make known to
the State judge or court the authority by which he holds him. But,
at the same time, it is his duty not to obey the process of the
State authority, but to obey and execute the process of the United
States.

															4. This court has appellate power in all cases arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States, with such exceptions
and regulations as Congress may make, whether the cases arise in a
State Court or an inferior court of the United States. And, under
the act of Congress of 1789, when the decision of the State court
is against the right claimed under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, a writ of error will lie to bring the judgment of
the State court before this court for reexamination and
revision.

															5. The act of Congress of September 18, 1850, usually called the
fugitive slave law, is constitutional in all its provisions.

															6. The commissioner appointed by the District Court of the
United States for the district of Wisconsin had authority to issue
his warrant and commit the defendant in error for an offence
against eh act of September 18, 1850.

															7. The District Court of the United States had exclusive
jurisdiction to try and punish the offence, and the validity of its
proceedings and judgment cannot be reexamined and set aside by any
other tribunal.

															These two cases were brought up from the Supreme Court Page 62 U. S. 507 of the State of Wisconsin by a writ of error issued under the
25th section of the judiciary act.

															The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

															Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

															The plaintiff in error in the first of these cases is the
marshal of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, and the
two cases have arisen out of the same transaction, and depend, to
some extent, upon the same principles. On that account, they have
been argued and considered together; and the following are the
facts as they appear in the transcripts before us:

															Sherman M. Booth was charged before Winfield Smith, a
commissioner duly appointed by the District Court of the United
States for the district of Wisconsin, with having, on the 11th day
of March, 1854, aided and abetted, at Milwaukee, in the said
district, the escape of a fugitive slave from the deputy marshal,
who had him in custody under a warrant issued by the district judge
of the United States for that district, under the act of Congress
of September 18, 1850.

															Upon the examination before the commissioner, he was satisfied
that an offence had been committed as charged, and that there was
probable cause to believe that Booth had been guilty of it, and
thereupon held him to bail to appear and answer before the District
Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin on the
first Monday in July then next ensuing. But on the 26th of May, his
bail or surety in the recognisance delivered him to the marshal, in
the presence of the commissioner, and requested the commissioner to
recommit Booth to the custody of the marshal, and he having failed
to recognise again for his appearance before the District Court,
the commissioner committed him to the custody of the marshal, to be
delivered to the keeper of the jail until he should be discharged
by due course of law.

															Booth made application on the next day, the 27th of May, Page 62 U. S. 508 to A. D. Smith, one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the
State of Wisconsin, for a writ of habeas corpus, stating that he
was restrained of his liberty by Stephen V. R. Ableman, marshal of
the United States for that district, under the warrant of
commitment hereinbefore mentioned, and alleging that his
imprisonment was illegal because the act of Congress of September
18, 1850, was unconstitutional and void, and also that the warrant
was defective, and did not describe the offence created by that
act, even if the act were valid.

															Upon this application, the justice, on the same day, issued the
writ of habeas corpus, directed to the marshal, requiring him
forthwith to have the body of Booth before him (the said justice)
together with the time and cause of his imprisonment. The marshal
thereupon, on the day above mentioned, produced Booth and made his
return, stating that he was received into his custody as marshal on
the day before, and held in custody by virtue of the warrant of the
commissioner above mentioned, a copy of which he annexed to and
returned with the writ.

															To this return Booth demurred, as not sufficient in law to
justify his detention. And upon the hearing the justice decided
that his detention was illegal, and ordered the marshal to
discharge him and set him at liberty, which was accordingly
done.

															Afterwards, on the 9th of June in the same year, the marshal
applied to the Supreme Court of the State for a certiorari, setting
forth in his application the proceedings hereinbefore mentioned,
and charging that the release of Booth by the justice was erroneous
and unlawful, and praying that his proceedings might be brought
before the Supreme Court of the State for revision.

															The certiorari was allowed on the same day, and the writ was
accordingly issued on the 12th of the same month, and returnable on
the third Tuesday of the month, and on the 20th, the return was
made by the justice, stating the proceedings as hereinbefore
mentioned.

															The case was argued before the Supreme Court of the State, and,
on the 19th of July, it pronounced its judgment, affirming Page 62 U. S. 509 the decision of the associate justice discharging Booth from
imprisonment, with costs against Ableman, the marshal.

															Afterwards, on the 26th of October, the marshal sued out a writ
of error, returnable to this court on the first Monday of December,
1854, in order to bring the judgment here for revision, and the
defendant in error was regularly cited to appear on that day, and
the record and proceedings were certified to this court by the
clerk of the State court in the usual form, in obedience to the
writ of error. And on the 4th of December, Booth, the defendant in
error, filed a memorandum in writing in this court, stating that he
had been cited to appear here in this case, and that he submitted
it to the judgment of this court on the reasoning in the argument
and opinions in the printed pamphlets therewith sent.

															After the judgment was entered in the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin, and before the writ of error was sued out, the State
court entered on its record that, in the final judgment it had
rendered, the validity of the act of Congress of September 18,
1850, and of February 12, 1793, and the authority of the marshal to
hold the defendant in his custody under the process mentioned in
his return to the writ of habeas corpus were respectively drawn in
question, and the decision of the court in the final judgment was
against their validity, respectively.

															This certificate was not necessary to give this court
jurisdiction, because the proceedings, upon their face, show that
these questions arose, and how they were decided, but it shows
that, at that time, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin did not question
their obligation to obey the writ of error, nor the authority of
this court to reexamine their judgment in the cases specified. And
the certificate is given for the purpose of placing distinctly on
the record the points that were raised and decided in that court,
in order that this court might have no difficulty in exercising its
appellate power and pronouncing its judgment upon all of them.

															We come now to the second case. At the January term of the
District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin,
after Booth had been set at liberty and after the transcript of the
proceedings in the case above mentioned had been Page 62 U. S. 510 returned to and filed in this court, the grand jury found a bill
of indictment against Booth for the offence with which he was
charged before the commissioner and from which the State court had
discharged him. The indictment was found on the 4th of January,
1855. On the 9th, a motion was made by counsel on behalf of the
accused to quash the indictment, which was overruled by the court,
and he thereupon pleaded not guilty, upon which issue was joined.
On the 10th, a jury was called and appeared in court, when he
challenged the array, but the challenge was overruled and the jury
empaneled. The trial, it appears, continued from day to day, until
the 13th, when the jury found him guilty in the manner and form in
which he stood indicted in the fourth and fifth counts. On the
16th, he moved for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, which
motions were argued on the 20th, and on the 23d the court overruled
the motions and sentenced the prisoner to be imprisoned for one
month, and to pay a fine of $1,000 and the costs of prosecution,
and that he remain in custody until the sentence was complied
with.

															We have stated more particularly these proceedings from a sense
of justice to the District Court, as they show that every
opportunity of making his defence was afforded him, and that his
case was fully heard and considered.

															On the 26th of January, three days after the sentence was
passed, the prisoner by his counsel filed his petition in the
Supreme Court of the State, and with his petition filed a copy of
the proceedings in the District Court, and also affidavits from the
foreman and one other member of the jury who tried him, stating
that their verdict was guilty on the fourth and fifth counts, and
not guilty on the other three, and stated in his petition that his
imprisonment was illegal because the fugitive slave law was
unconstitutional, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to
try or punish him for the matter charged against him, and that the
proceedings and sentence of that court were absolute nullities in
law. Various other objections to the proceedings are alleged which
are unimportant in the questions now before the court, and need
not, therefore, be particularly stated. On the next day, the 27th,
the court directed Page 62 U. S. 511 two writs of habeas corpus to be issued, one to the marshal and
one to the sheriff of Milwaukee, to whose actual keeping the
prisoner was committed by the marshal, by order of the District
Court. The habeas corpus directed each of them to produce the body
of the prisoner and make known the cause of his imprisonment
immediately after the receipt of the writ.

															On the 30th of January the marshal made his return, not
acknowledging the jurisdiction but stating the sentence of the
District Court as his authority; that the prisoner was delivered
to, and was then in the actual keeping of the sheriff of Milwaukee
county by order of the court, and he therefore had no control of
the body of the prisoner; and if the sheriff had not received him,
he should have so reported to the District Court, and should have
conveyed him to some other place or prison, as the court should
command.

															On the same day, the sheriff produced the body of Booth before
the State court, and returned that he had been committed to his
custody by the marshal by virtue of a transcript, a true copy of
which was annexed to his return, and which was the only process or
authority by which he detained him.

															This transcript was a full copy of the proceedings and sentence
in the District Court of the United States, as hereinbefore stated.
To this return the accused, by his counsel, filed a general
demurrer.

															The court ordered the hearing to be postponed until the 2d of
February, and notice to be given to the district attorney of the
United States. It was accordingly heard on that day, and on the
next (February 3d), the court decided that the imprisonment was
illegal, and ordered and adjudged that Booth be, and he was by that
judgment, forever discharged from that imprisonment and restraint,
and he was accordingly set at liberty.

															On the 21st of April next following, the Attorney General of the
United States presented a petition to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, stating briefly the facts in the case and at the
same time presenting an exemplification of the proceedings
hereinbefore stated, duly certified by the clerk of the State court
and averring in his petition that the State court had no Page 62 U. S. 512 jurisdiction in the case, and praying that a writ of error might
issue to bring its judgment before this court to correct the error.
The writ of error was allowed and issued, and, according to the
rules and practice of the court, was returnable on the first Monday
of December, 1855, and a citation for the defendant in error to
appear on that day was issued by the Chief Justice at the same
time.

															No return having been made to this writ, the Attorney General,
on the 1st of February, 1856, filed affidavits showing that the
writ of error had been duly served on the clerk of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, at his office, on the 30th of May, 1855, and
the citation served on the defendant in error on the 28th of June,
in the same year. And also the affidavit of the district attorney
of the United States for the district of Wisconsin, setting forth
that when he served the writ of error upon the clerk, as above
mentioned, he was informed by the clerk, and has also been informed
by one of the justices of the Supreme Court, which released
Booth,

															" that the court had directed the clerk to make no return to
the writ of error, and to enter no order upon the journals or
records of the court concerning the same. "

															And, upon these proofs, the Attorney General moved the court for
an order upon the clerk to make return to the writ of error, on or
before the first day of the next ensuing term of this court. The
rule was accordingly laid, and, on the 22d of July, 1856, the
Attorney General filed with the clerk of this court the affidavit
of the marshal of the district of Wisconsin that he had served the
rule on the clerk on the 7th of the month above mentioned, and no
return having been made, the Attorney General, on the 27th of
February, 1857, moved for leave to file the certified copy of the
record of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which he had produced
with his application for the writ of error, and to docket the case
in this court in conformity with a motion to that effect made at
the last term. And the court thereupon, on the 6th of March, 1857,
ordered the copy of the record filed by the Attorney General to be
received and entered on the docket of this court, to have the same
effect and legal operation as if returned by the clerk with the
writ of error, and that the case stand for argument Page 62 U. S. 513 at the next ensuing term, without further notice to either
party.

															The case was accordingly docketed, but was not reached for
argument in the regular order and practice of the court until the
present term.

															This detailed statement of the proceedings in the different
courts has appeared to be necessary in order to form a just
estimate of the action of the different tribunals in which it has
been heard, and to account for the delay in the final decision of a
case, which, from its character, would seem to have demanded prompt
action. The first case, indeed, was reached for trial two terms
ago. But as the two cases are different portions of the same
prosecution for the same offence, they unavoidably, to some extent,
involve the same principles of law, and it would hardly have been
proper to hear and decide the first before the other was ready for
hearing and decision. They have accordingly been argued together,
by the Attorney General of the United States, at the present term.
No counsel has in either case appeared for the defendant in error.
But we have the pamphlet arguments filed and referred to by Booth
in the first case, as hereinbefore mentioned, also the opinions and
arguments of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and of the judges who
compose it, in full, and are enabled, therefore, to see the grounds
on which they rely to support their decisions.

															It will be seen from the foregoing statement of facts that a
judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin in the first
of these cases, claimed and exercised the right to supervise and
annul the proceedings of a commissioner of the United States, and
to discharge a prisoner who had been committed by the commissioner
for an offence against the laws of this Government, and that this
exercise of power by the judge was afterwards sanctioned and
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State.

															In the second case, the State court has gone a step further, and
claimed and exercised jurisdiction over the proceedings and
judgment of a District Court of the United States, and, upon a
summary and collateral proceeding by habeas corpus, Page 62 U. S. 514 has set aside and annulled its judgment and discharged a
prisoner who had been tried and found guilty of an offence against
the laws of the United States and sentenced to imprisonment by the
District Court.

															And it further appears that the State court have not only
claimed and exercised this jurisdiction, but have also determined
that their decision is final and conclusive upon all the courts of
the United States, and ordered their clerk to disregard and refuse
obedience to the writ of error issued by this court, pursuant to
the act of Congress of 1789, to bring here for examination and
revision the judgment of the State court.

															These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United
States, as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State
courts over the courts of the United States, in cases arising under
the Constitution and laws of the United States, is now for the
first time asserted and acted upon in the Supreme Court of a
State.

															The supremacy is not, indeed, set forth distinctly and broadly,
in so many words, in the printed opinions of the judges. It is
intermixed with elaborate discussions of different provisions in
the fugitive slave law, and of the privileges and power of the writ
of habeas corpus. But the paramount power of the State court lies
at the foundation of these decisions, for their commentaries upon
the provisions of that law, and upon the privileges and power of
the writ of habeas corpus, were out of place, and their judicial
action upon them without authority of law, unless they had the
power to revise and control the proceedings in the criminal case of
which they were speaking, and their judgments releasing the
prisoner and disregarding the writ of error from this court can
rest upon no other foundation.

															If the judicial power exercised in this instance has been
reserved to the States, no offence against the laws of the United
States can be punished by their own courts without the permission
and according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which
the party happens to be imprisoned, for if the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin possessed the power it has exercised in relation to
offences against the act of Congress in question, Page 62 U. S. 515 it necessarily follows that they must have the same judicial
authority in relation to any other law of the United States, and,
consequently, their supervising and controlling power would embrace
the whole criminal code of the United States, and extend to
offences against our revenue laws, or any other law intended to
guard the different departments of the General Government from
fraud or violence. And it would embrace all crimes, from the
highest to the lowest; including felonies, which are punished with
death, as well as misdemeanors, which are punished by imprisonment.
And, moreover, if the power is possessed by the Supreme Court of
the State of Wisconsin, it must belong equally to every other State
in the Union when the prisoner is within its territorial limits,
and it is very certain that the State courts would not always agree
in opinion, and it would often happen that an act which was
admitted to be an offence, and justly punished, in one State would
be regarded as innocent, and indeed as praiseworthy, in
another.

															It would seem to be hardly necessary to do more than state the
result to which these decisions of the State courts must inevitably
lead. It is, of itself, a sufficient and conclusive answer, for no
one will suppose that a Government which has now lasted nearly
seventy years, enforcing its laws by its own tribunals and
preserving the union of the States, could have lasted a single
year, or fulfilled the high trusts committed to it, if offences
against its laws could not have been punished without the consent
of the State in which the culprit was found.

															The judges of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin do not distinctly
state from what source they suppose they have derived this judicial
power. There can be no such thing as judicial authority unless it
is conferred by a Government or sovereignty, and if the judges and
courts of Wisconsin possess the jurisdiction they claim, they must
derive it either from the United States or the State. It certainly
has not been conferred on them by the United States, and it is
equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it,
even if it had attempted to do so, for no State can authorize one
of its judges Page 62 U. S. 516 or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or
otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent
Government. And although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within
its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is
limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United States.
And the powers of the General Government, and of the State,
although both exist and are exercised within the same territorial
limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independently of each other within their respective
spheres. And the sphere of action appropriated to the United States
is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a
State judge or a State court, as if the line of division was traced
by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye. And the State of
Wisconsin had no more power to authorize these proceedings of its
judges and courts than it would have had if the prisoner had been
confined in Michigan, or in any other State of the Union, for an
offence against the laws of the State in which he was
imprisoned.

															It is, however, due to the State to say that we do not find this
claim of paramount jurisdiction in the State courts over the courts
of the United States asserted or countenanced by the Constitution
or laws of the State. We find it only in the decisions of the
judges of the Supreme Court. Indeed, at the very time these
decisions were made, there was a statute of the State which
declares that a person brought up on a habeas corpus shall be
remanded if it appears that he is confined:

															"1st. By virtue of process, by any court or judge of the United
States, in a case where such court or judge has exclusive
jurisdiction; or,"

															"2d. By virtue of the final judgment or decree of any competent
court of civil or criminal jurisdiction."

															Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin, 1849, ch. 124, page
629.

															Even, therefore, if these cases depended upon the laws of
Wisconsin, it would be difficult to find in these provisions such a
grant of judicial power as the Supreme Court claims to have derived
from the State.

															But, as we have already said, questions of this kind must Page 62 U. S. 517 always depend upon the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and not of a State. The Constitution was not formed merely
to guard the States against danger from foreign nations, but mainly
to secure union and harmony at home, for if this object could be
attained, there would be but little danger from abroad, and, to
accomplish this purpose, it was felt by the statesmen who framed
the Constitution and by the people who adopted it that it was
necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States
then possessed should be ceded to the General Government, and that,
in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme, and
strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without
interruption from a State or from State authorities. And it was
evident that anything short of this would be inadequate to the main
objects for which the Government was established, and that local
interests, local passions or prejudices, incited and fostered by
individuals for sinister purposes, would lead to acts of aggression
and injustice by one State upon the rights of another, which would
ultimately terminate in violence and force unless there was a
common arbiter between them, armed with power enough to protect and
guard the rights of all by appropriate laws to be carried into
execution peacefully by its judicial tribunals.

															The language of the Constitution by which this power is granted
is too plain to admit of doubt or to need comment. It declares
that

															"this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be passed in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding."

															But the supremacy thus conferred on this Government could not
peacefully be maintained unless it was clothed with judicial power
equally paramount in authority to carry it into execution, for if
left to the courts of justice of the several States, conflicting
decisions would unavoidably take place, and the local tribunals
could hardly be expected to be always free Page 62 U. S. 518 from the local influences of which we have spoken. And the
Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States, and the
powers granted to the Federal Government, would soon receive
different interpretations in different States, and the Government
of the United States would soon become one thing in one State and
another thing in another. It was essential, therefore, to its very
existence as a Government that it should have the power of
establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State
power, to carry into effect its own laws, and that a tribunal
should be established in which all cases which might arise under
the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United States,
whether in a State court or a court of the United States, should be
finally and conclusively decided. Without such a tribunal, it is
obvious that there would be no uniformity of judicial decision, and
that the supremacy, (which is but another name for independence) so
carefully provided in the clause of the Constitution above referred
to could not possibly be maintained peacefully unless it was
associated with this paramount judicial authority.

															Accordingly, it was conferred on the General Government in
clear, precise, and comprehensive terms. It is declared that its
judicial power shall (among other subjects enumerated) extend to
all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution and laws
of the United States, and that, in such cases, as well as the
others there enumerated, this court shall have appellate
jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as Congress shall make. The appellate power,
it will be observed, is conferred on this court in all cases or
suits in which such a question shall arise. It is not confined to
suits in the inferior courts of the United States, but extends to
all cases where such a question arises, whether it be in a judicial
tribunal of a State or of the United States. And it is manifest
that this ultimate appellate power in a tribunal created by the
Constitution itself was deemed essential to secure the independence
and supremacy of the General Government in the sphere of action
assigned to it, to make the Constitution and laws of the United
States uniform, and the same in every State, and to guard against
evils which would Page 62 U. S. 519 inevitably arise from conflicting opinions between the courts of
a State and of the United States, if there was no common arbiter
authorized to decide between them.

															The importance which the framers of the Constitution attached to
such a tribunal, for the purpose of preserving internal
tranquillity, is strikingly manifested by the clause which gives
this court jurisdiction over the sovereign States which compose
this Union when a controversy arises between them. Instead of
reserving the right to seek redress for injustice from another
State by their sovereign powers, they have bound themselves to
submit to the decision of this court, and to abide by its judgment.
And it is not out of place to say here that experience has
demonstrated that this power was not unwisely surrendered by the
States, for, in the time that has already elapsed since this
Government came into existence, several irritating and angry
controversies have taken place between adjoining States in relation
to their respective boundaries, and which have sometimes threatened
to end in force and violence but for the power vested in this court
to hear them and decide between them.

															The same purposes are clearly indicated by the different
language employed when conferring supremacy upon the laws of the
United States, and jurisdiction upon its courts. In the first case,
it provides that

															"this Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law
of the land, and obligatory upon the judges in every State."

															The words in italics show the precision and foresight which
marks every clause in the instrument. The sovereignty to be created
was to be limited in its powers of legislation, and if it passed a
law not authorized by its enumerated powers, it was not to be
regarded as the supreme law of the land, nor were the State judges
bound to carry it into execution. And as the courts of a State, and
the courts of the United States, might, and indeed certainly would,
often differ as to the extent of the powers conferred by the
General Government, it was manifest that serious controversies
would arise between the authorities of the United States and of the
States, which must be settled by force of arms unless some Page 62 U. S. 520 tribunal was created to decide between them finally and with out
appeal.

															The Constitution has accordingly provided, as far as human
foresight could provide, against this danger. And, in conferring
judicial power upon the Federal Government, it declares that the
jurisdiction of its courts shall extend to all cases arising under
"this Constitution" and the laws of the United States -- leaving
out the words of restriction contained in the grant of legislative
power which we have above noticed. The judicial power covers every
legislative act of Congress, whether it be made within the limits
of its delegated powers or be an assumption of power beyond the
grants in the Constitution.

															This judicial power was justly regarded as indispensable not
merely to maintain the supremacy of the laws of the United States,
but also to guard the States from any encroachment upon their
reserved rights by the General Government. And as the Constitution
is the fundamental and supreme law, if it appears that an act of
Congress is not pursuant to and within the limits of the power
assigned to the Federal Government, it is the duty of the courts of
the United States to declare it unconstitutional and void. The
grant of judicial power is not confined to the administration of
laws passed in pursuance to the provisions of the Constitution, nor
confined to the interpretation of such laws, but, by the very terms
of the grant, the Constitution is under their view when any act of
Congress is brought before them, and it is their duty to declare
the law void, and refuse to execute it, if it is not pursuant to
the legislative powers conferred upon Congress. And as the final
appellate power in all such questions is given to this court,
controversies as to the respective powers of the United States and
the States, instead of being determined by military and physical
force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled with the
calmness and deliberation of judicial inquiry. And no one can fail
to see that, if such an arbiter had not been provided in our
complicated system of government, internal tranquillity could not
have been preserved, and if such controversies were left to
arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State and National,
would soon cease to be Governments Page 62 U. S. 521 of laws, and revolutions by force of arms would take the place
of courts of justice and judicial decisions.

															In organizing such a tribunal, it is evident that every
precaution was taken which human wisdom could devise to fit it for
the high duty with which it was intrusted. It was not left to
Congress to create it by law, for the States could hardly be
expected to confide in the impartiality of a tribunal created
exclusively by the General Government without any participation on
their part. And as the performance of its duty would sometimes come
in conflict with individual ambition or interests and powerful
political combinations, an act of Congress establishing such a
tribunal might be repealed in order to establish another more
subservient to the predominant political influences or excited
passions of the day. This tribunal, therefore, was erected, and the
powers of which we have spoken conferred upon it, not by the
Federal Government, but by the people of the States, who formed and
adopted that Government and conferred upon it all the powers,
legislative, executive, and judicial, which it now possesses. And
in order to secure its independence and enable it faithfully and
firmly to perform its duty, it engrafted it upon the Constitution
itself, and declared that this court should have appellate power in
all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. So long, therefore, as this Constitution shall endure, this
tribunal must exist with it, deciding in the peaceful forms of
judicial proceeding the angry and irritating controversies between
sovereignties which, in other countries, have been determined by
the arbitrament of force.

															These principles of constitutional law are confirmed and
illustrated by the clause which confers legislative power upon
Congress. That power is specifically given in article 1, section 8,
paragraph 18, in the following words:

															"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."

															Under this clause of the Constitution, it became the duty of
Congress to pass such laws as were necessary and proper to Page 62 U. S. 522 carry into execution the powers vested in the judicial
department. And in the performance of this duty, the First
Congress, at its first session, passed the act of 1789, ch. 20,
entitled " An act to establish the judicial courts of the United
States. " It will be remembered that many of the members of the
Convention were also members of this Congress, and it cannot be
supposed that they did not understand the meaning and intention of
the great instrument which they had so anxiously and deliberately
considered, clause by clause, and assisted to frame. And the law
they passed to carry into execution the powers vested in the
judicial department of the Government proves past doubt that their
interpretation of the appellate powers conferred on this court was
the same with that which we have now given, for, by the 25th
section of the act of 1789, Congress authorized writs of error to
be issued from this court to a State court whenever a right had
been claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States
and the decision of the State court was against it. And to make
this appellate power effectual and altogether independent of the
action of State tribunals, this act further provides that, upon
writs of error to a State court, instead of remanding the cause for
a final decision in the State court, this court may, at their
discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before,
proceed to a final decision of the same and award execution.

															These provisions in the act of 1789 tell us, in language not to
be mistaken, the great importance which the patriots and statement
of the First Congress attached to this appellate power, and the
foresight and care with which they guarded its free and independent
exercise against interference or obstruction by States or State
tribunals.

															In the case before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, a right was
claimed under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
the decision was against the right claimed, and it refuses
obedience to the writ of error, and regards its own judgment as
final. It has not only reversed and annulled the judgment of the
District Court of the United States, but it has reversed and
annulled the provisions of the Constitution itself, Page 62 U. S. 523 and the act of Congress of 1789, and made the superior and
appellate tribunal the inferior and subordinate one.

															We do not question the authority of State court or judge who is
authorized by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas
corpus to issue it in any case where the party is imprisoned within
its territorial limits, provided it does not appear, when the
application is made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under
the authority of the United States. The court or judge has a right
to inquire, in this mode of proceeding, for what cause and by what
authority the prisoner is confined within the territorial limits of
the State sovereignty. And it is the duty of the marshal or other
person having the custody of the prisoner to make known to the
judge or court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds
him in custody. This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus,
and the duty of the officer to make a return, grows necessarily out
of the complex character of our Government and the existence of two
distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial
space, each of them restricted in its powers and each within its
sphere of action, prescribed by the Constitution of the United
States, independent of the other. But, after the return is made and
the State judge or court judicially apprized that the party is in
custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed
no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion
and jurisdiction of another Government, and that neither the writ
of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority
can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties.
He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States. If he has committed an offence against their laws,
their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully
imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him
redress. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the
marshal or other person holding him to make known, by a proper
return, the authority under which he detains him, it is at the same
time imperatively his duty to obey the process of the United
States, to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and to refuse
obedience to the mandate or Page 62 U. S. 524 process of any other Government. And consequently it is his duty
not to take the prisoner, nor suffer him to be taken, before a
State judge or court upon a habeas corpus issued under State
authority. No State judge or court, after they are judicially
informed that the party is imprisoned under the authority of the
United States, has any right to interfere with him or to require
him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, in
the form of judicial process or otherwise, should attempt to
control the marshal or other authorized officer or agent of the
United States in any respect, in the custody of his prisoner, it
would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force
that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against
illegal interference. No judicial process, whatever form it may
assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued, and an
attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than
lawless violence.

															Nor is there anything in this supremacy of the General
Government, or the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals to awaken
the jealousy or offend the natural and just pride of State
sovereignty. Neither this Government nor the powers of which we are
speaking were forced upon the States. The Constitution of the
United States, with all the powers conferred by it on the General
Government and surrendered by the States, was the voluntary act of
the people of the several States, deliberately done for their own
protection and safety against injustice from one another. And their
anxiety to preserve it in full force, in all its powers, and to
guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority on the part
of a State is proved by the clause which requires that the members
of the State Legislatures and all executive and judicial officers
of the several States (as well as those of the General Government)
shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this
Constitution. This is the last and closing clause of the
Constitution, and inserted when the whole frame of Government, with
the powers hereinbefore specified, had been adopted by the
Convention, and it was in that form, and with these powers, that
the Constitution Page 62 U. S. 525 was submitted to the people of the several States for their
consideration and decision.

															Now, it certainly can be no humiliation to the citizen of a
republic to yield a ready obedience to the laws as administered by
the constituted authorities. On the contrary, it is among his first
and highest duties as a citizen, because free government cannot
exist without it. Nor can it be inconsistent with the dignity of a
sovereign State to observe faithfully, and in the spirit of
sincerity and truth, the compact into which it voluntarily entered
when it became a State of this Union. On the contrary, the highest
honor of sovereignty is untarnished faith. And certainly no faith
could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which
every State has plighted to the other States to support the
Constitution as it is, in all its provisions, until they shall be
altered in the manner which the Constitution itself prescribes. In
the emphatic language of the pledge required, it is to support
this Constitution. And no power is more clearly conferred by
the Constitution and laws of the United States than the power of
this court to decide, ultimately and finally, all cases arising
under such Constitution and laws, and for that purpose to bring
here for revision, by writ of error, the judgment of a State court,
where such questions have arisen, and the right claimed under them
denied by the highest judicial tribunal in the State.

															We are sensible that we have extended the examination of these
decisions beyond the limits required by any intrinsic difficulty in
the questions. But the decisions in question were made by the
supreme judicial tribunal of the State, and when a court so
elevated in its position has pronounced a judgment which, if it
could be maintained, would subvert the very foundations of this
Government, it seemed to be the duty of this court, when exercising
its appellate power, to show plainly the grave errors into which
the State court has fallen and the consequences to which they would
inevitably lead.

															But it can hardly be necessary to point out the errors which
followed their mistaken view of the jurisdiction they might
lawfully exercise, because, if there was any defect of power in the
commissioner, or in his mode of proceeding, it was for the Page 62 U. S. 526 tribunals of the United States to revise and correct it, and not
for a State court. And as regards the decision of the District
Court, it had exclusive and final jurisdiction by the laws of the
United States, and neither the regularity of its proceedings nor
the validity of its sentence could be called in question in any
other court, either of a State or the United States, by habeas
corpus or any other process.

															But although we think it unnecessary to discuss these questions,
yet, as they have been decided by the State court, and are before
us on the record, and we are not willing to be misunderstood, it is
proper to say that, in the judgment of this court, the act of
Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its
provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the United
States, that the commissioner had lawful authority to issue the
warrant and commit the party, and that his proceedings were regular
and conformable to law. We have already stated the opinion and
judgment of the court as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
District Court and the appellate powers which this court is
authorized and required to exercise. And if any argument was needed
to show the wisdom and necessity of this appellate power, the cases
before us sufficiently prove it, and at the same time emphatically
call for its exercise.

															The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin must therefore be
reversed in each of the cases now before the court.