Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York

U.S. Supreme Court Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New
York, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of
New York No. 135 Argued November 19,
1969 Decided May 4, 1970 397
U.S. 664 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK Syllabus Appellant property owner unsuccessfully sought an injunction in
the New York courts to prevent the New York City Tax Commission
from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations
for properties used solely for religious worship, as authorized by
the state constitution and the implementing statute providing for
tax exemptions for property used exclusively for religious,
educational, or charitable purposes. Appellant contended that the
exemptions, as applied to religious bodies, violated provisions
prohibiting establishment of religion under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Held: 1. The First Amendment tolerates neither governmentally
established religion nor governmental interference with religion.
Pp. 397 U. S.
667 -672.

															2. The legislative purpose of tax exemptions is not aimed at
establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion, and New York's
legislation simply spares the exercise of religion from the burden
of property taxation levied on private profit institutions. Pp. 397 U. S.
672 -674.

															3. The tax exemption creates only a minimal and remote
involvement between church and state, far less than taxation of
churches would entail, and it restricts the fiscal relationship
between them, thus tending to complement and reinforce the desired
separation insulating each from the other. Pp. 397 U. S.
674 -676.

															4. Freedom from taxation for two centuries has not led to an
established church or religion, and, on the contrary, has helped to
guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief. Pp. 397 U. S.
676 -680.

															24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, affirmed. Page 397 U. S. 666 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Appellant, owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York,
sought an injunction in the New York courts to prevent the New York
City Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions to
religious organizations for religious properties used solely for
religious worship. The exemption from state taxes is authorized by
Art. 16, § 1, of the New York Constitution, which provides in
relevant part:

															"Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws.
Exemptions may be altered or repealed except those exempting real
or personal property used exclusively for religious, educational
or Page 397 U. S. 667 charitable purposes as defined by law and owned by any
corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for
one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit.
[ Footnote 1 ]"

															The essence of appellant's contention was that the New York City
Tax Commission's grant of an exemption to church property
indirectly requires the appellant to make a contribution to
religious bodies, and thereby violates provisions prohibiting
establishment of religion under the First Amendment which, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, is binding on the States. [ Footnote 2 ]

															Appellee's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, and the New York
Court of Appeals affirmed. We noted probable jurisdiction, 395 U.S.
957 (1969), and affirm. I Prior opinions of this Court have discussed the development and
historical background of the First Amendment in detail. See
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 (1947); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.
S. 421 (1962). It would therefore serve no useful
purpose to review in detail the background of the Establishment and
Free Page 397 U. S. 668 Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment or to restate what the
Court's opinions have reflected over the years.

															It is sufficient to note that, for the men who wrote the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the "establishment" of a
religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity. In England, and
in some Colonies at the time of the separation in 1776, the Church
of England was sponsored and supported by the Crown as a state, or
established, church; in other countries, "establishment" meant
sponsorship by the sovereign of the Lutheran or Catholic Church. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 370 U. S. 428 n. 10. See generally C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E.
Roberts, Freedom from Federal Establishment (1964). The exclusivity
of established churches in the 17th and 18th centuries, of course,
was often carried to prohibition of other forms of worship. See
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 9 -11; L.
Pfeffer, Church, State and Freedom 71 et seq. (1967).

															The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the
Constitution. The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the
Religion Clauses may have been calculated, but the purpose was to
state an objective, not to write a statute. In attempting to
articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's
opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general
principles on a case by-case basis. The considerable internal
inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in
retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of
these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular
cases, but have limited meaning as general principles.

															The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a Page 397 U. S. 669 logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other. For
example, in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 (1952), MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, writing for the
Court, noted:

															"The First Amendment, however, does not say that, in every and
all respects, there shall be a separation of Church and State." Id. at 343 U. S.
312 .

															"We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no
partiality to any one group, and that lets each flourish according
to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma." Id. at 343 U. S.
313 .

															MR. JUSTICE HARLAN expressed something of this in his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), saying that the constitutional neutrality imposed on us

															"is not so narrow a channel that the slightest deviation from an
absolutely straight course leads to condemnation." Id. at 374 U. S.
422 .

															The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be
an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic
purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be
sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. The
general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that
has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate
either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts, there is room for play in the joints productive
of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to
exist without sponsorship and without interference.

															Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore
turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to
establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have
the effect of doing so. Adherence to the policy of neutrality that
derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses Page 397 U. S. 670 has prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance
toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on
religious practice.

															Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches
frequently take strong positions on public issues, including, as
this case reveals in the several briefs amici, vigorous
advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course, churches,
as much as secular bodies and private citizens, have that right. No
perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very
existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts -- one
that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.

															The hazards of placing too much weight on a few words or phrases
of the Court is abundantly illustrated within the pages of the
Court's opinion in Everson. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, writing for
the Court s majority, said the First Amendment

															"means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government
can . . . pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another."

															330 U.S. at 330 U. S. 15 . Yet
he had no difficulty in holding that:

															"Measured by these standards, we cannot say that the First
Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax raised funds to
pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general
program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public
and other schools. It is undoubtedly true that children are
helped to get to church schools. There is even a possibility that
some of the children might not be sent to the church schools if the
parents were compelled to pay their children's bus fares out of
their own pockets. . . ." Id. at 330 U. S. 17 .
(Emphasis added.) Page 397 U. S. 671 The Court did not regard such "aid" to schools teaching a
particular religious faith as any more a violation of the
Establishment Clause than providing "state-paid policemen, detailed
to protect children . . . [at the schools] from the very real
hazards of traffic. . . ." Ibid. Mr. Justice Jackson, in perplexed dissent in Everson, noted that

															"the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and
uncompromising separation . . . seem utterly discordant with its
conclusion. . . ." Id. at 330 U. S. 19 .

															Perhaps so. One can sympathize with Mr. Justice Jackson's
logical analysis but agree with the Court's eminently sensible and
realistic application of the language of the Establishment Clause.
In Everson, the Court declined to construe the Religion
Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history. Surely, bus
transportation and police protection to pupils who receive
religious instruction "aid" that particular religion to maintain
schools that plainly tend to assure future adherents to a
particular faith by having control of their total education at an
early age. No religious body that maintains schools would deny this
as an affirmative, if not dominant, policy of church schools. But
if, as in Everson, buses can be provided to carry and
policemen to protect church school pupils, we fail to see how a
broader range of police and fire protection given equally to all
churches, along with nonprofit hospitals, art galleries, and
libraries receiving the same tax exemption, is different for
purposes of the Religion Clauses.

															Similarly, making textbooks available to pupils in parochial
schools in common with public schools was surely an "aid" to the
sponsoring churches, because it relieved those churches of an
enormous aggregate cost Page 397 U. S. 672 for those books. Supplying of costly teaching materials was not
seen either as manifesting a legislative purpose to aid or as
having a primary effect of aid contravening the First Amendment. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 (1968). In so holding, the Court was heeding both
its own prior decisions and our religious tradition. MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, in Zorach v. Clauson, supra, after recalling that
we "are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being," went on to say:

															"We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the
spiritual needs of man deem necessary. . . . When the state
encourages religious instruction . . . it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs."

															343 U.S. at 343 U. S.
313 -314. (Emphasis added.)

															With all the risks inherent in programs that bring about
administrative relationships between public education bodies and
church-sponsored schools, we have been able to chart a course that
preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while
avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a
"tightrope," and one we have successfully traversed. II The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither
the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither
sponsorship nor hostility. New York, in common with the other
States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a
harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster
its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their
activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those
properties for nonpayment of taxes. It Page 397 U. S. 673 has not singled out one particular church or religious group, or
even churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all
houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned
by nonprofit, quasi -public corporations which include
hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional,
historical, and patriotic groups. The State has an affirmative
policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life and finds this classification useful,
desirable, and in the public interest. Qualification for tax
exemption is not perpetual or immutable; some tax exempt groups
lose that status when their activities take them outside the
classification and new entities can come into being and qualify for
exemption.

															Governments have not always been tolerant of religious activity,
and hostility toward religion has taken many shapes and forms
economic, political, and sometimes harshly oppressive. Grants of
exemption historically reflect the concern of authors of
constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent in the
imposition of property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable
and balanced attempt to guard against those dangers. The limits of
permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means
coextensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise
Clause. To equate the two would be to deny a national heritage with
roots in the Revolution itself. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 , 374 U. S. 423 (1963) (HARLAN, J., dissenting); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 , 366 U. S. 608 (1961). See generally Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax
Exemptions for Religious Activities in The Wall Between Church and
State 95 (D. Oaks ed.1963). We cannot read New York's statute as
attempting to establish religion; it is simply sparing the exercise
of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on private
profit institutions. Page 397 U. S. 674 We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the
social welfare services or "good works" that some churches perform
for parishioners and others -- family counseling, aid to the
elderly and the infirm, and to children. Churches vary
substantially in the scope of such services; programs expand or
contract according to resources and need. As public-sponsored
programs enlarge, private aid from the church sector may diminish.
The extent of social services may vary, depending on whether the
church serves an urban or rural, a rich or poor constituency. To
give emphasis to so variable an aspect of the work of religious
bodies would introduce an element of governmental evaluation and
standards as to the worth of particular social welfare programs,
thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which
the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize. Hence, the use of a
social welfare yardstick as a significant element to qualify for
tax exemption could conceivably give rise to confrontations that
could escalate to constitutional dimensions.

															Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not
aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not
end the inquiry, however. We must also be sure that the end result
-- the effect -- is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course,
taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of
involvement with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to
expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax
valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the
direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of
those legal processes.

															Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to
afford an indirect economic benefit, and also gives rise to some,
but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing Page 397 U. S. 675 them. In analyzing either alternative, the questions are whether
the involvement is excessive and whether it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement. Obviously a direct money
subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as
with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained
and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of
statutory or administrative standards, but that is not this case.
The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly less in
their potential than the hazards of government supporting churches;
[ Footnote 3 ] each relationship
carries some involvement, rather than the desired insulation and
separation. We cannot ignore the instances in history when church
support of government led to the kind of involvement we seek to
avoid.

															The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship, since the
government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches, but
simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state.
No one has ever suggested that tax exemption has converted
libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or
put employees "on the public payroll." There is no genuine nexus
between tax exemption and establishment of religion. As Mr. Justice
Holmes commented in a related context, "a page of Page 397 U. S. 676 history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 , 256 U. S. 349 (1921). The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement
between church and state, and far less than taxation of churches.
It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and
tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating
each from the other.

															Separation in this context cannot mean absence of all contact;
the complexities of modern life inevitably produce some contact,
and the fire and police protection received by houses of religious
worship are no more than incidental benefits accorded all persons
or institutions within a State's boundaries, along with many other
exempt organizations. The appellant has not established even an
arguable quantitative correlation between the payment of an ad
valorem property tax and the receipt of these municipal
benefits.

															All of the 50 States provide for tax exemption of places of
worship, most of them doing so by constitutional guarantees. For so
long as federal income taxes have had any potential impact on
churches -- over 75 years -- religious organizations have been
expressly exempt from the tax. [ Footnote 4 ] Such treatment is an "aid" to churches no more
and no less in principle than the real estate tax exemption granted
by States. Few concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of
our national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times,
than for the government to exercise at the very least this kind of
benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise Page 397 U. S. 677 generally so long a none was favored over others and none
suffered interference.

															It is significant that Congress, from its earliest days, has
viewed the Religion Clauses of the Constitution as authorizing
statutory real estate tax exemption to religious bodies. In 1802,
the 7th Congress enacted a taxing statute for the County of
Alexandria, adopting the 1800 Virginia statutory pattern which
provided tax exemptions for churches. 2 Stat. 194. [ Footnote 5 ] As early as 1813, the 12th
Congress refunded import duties paid by religious societies on the
importation of religious articles. [ Footnote 6 ] During this period, the City Council of
Washington, D.C., acting under congressional authority, Act of
Incorporation, § 7, 2 Stat. 197 (May 3, 1802), enacted a series of
real and personal property assessments that uniformly exempted
church property. [ Footnote 7 ]
In 1870, the Congress specifically exempted all churches in the
District of Columbia Page 397 U. S. 678 and appurtenant grounds and property "from any and all taxes or
assessments, national, municipal, or county." Act of June 17, 1870,
16 Stat. 153. [ Footnote 8 ]

															It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even
when that span of time covers our entire national existence, and
indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice of according the
exemption to churches, openly and by affirmative state action, not
covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast
aside. Nearly 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes stated:

															"If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it. . . ." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S.
22 , 260 U. S. 31 (1922).

															Nothing in this national attitude toward religious tolerance and
two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given the
remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion, and,
on the contrary, it has operated affirmatively to help guarantee
the free exercise of all forms of religious belief. Thus, it is
hardly useful to suggest that tax exemption is but the "foot in the
door" or the "nose of the camel in the tent" leading to an
established church. If tax exemption can be seen as this first step
toward "establishment" of religion, as MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS fears,
the second step has been long in coming. Any move that
realistically "establishes" a church or tends to do so can be dealt
with "while this Court sits."

															Mr. Justice Cardozo commented in The Nature of the Judicial
Process 51 (1921) on the "tendency of a principle Page 397 U. S. 679 to expand itself to the limit of its logic"; such expansion must
always be contained by the historical frame of reference of the
principle's purpose, and there is no lack of vigilance on this
score by those who fear religious entanglement in government.

															The argument that making "fine distinctions" between what is and
what is not absolute under the Constitution is to render us a
government of men, not laws, gives too little weight to the fact
that it is an essential part of adjudication to draw distinctions,
including fine ones, in the process of interpreting the
Constitution. We must frequently decide, for example, what are
"reasonable" searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
Determining what acts of government tend to establish or interfere
with religion falls well within what courts have long been called
upon to do in sensitive areas.

															It is interesting to note that, while the precise question we
now decide has not been directly before the Court previously, the
broad question was discussed by the Court in relation to real
estate taxes assessed nearly a century ago on land owned by and
adjacent to a church in Washington, D.C. [ Footnote 9 ] At that time, Congress granted real estate
tax exemptions to buildings devoted to art, to institutions of
public charity, libraries, cemeteries, and "church buildings, and
grounds actually occupied by such buildings." In denying tax
exemption as to land owned by but not used for the church, but
rather to produce income, the Court concluded:

															"In the exercise of this [taxing] power, Congress, like any
State legislature unrestricted by constitutional provisions, may,
at its discretion, wholly exempt certain classes of property from
taxation, or Page 397 U. S. 680 may tax them at a lower rate than other property." Gibbons v. District of Columbia 116 U.
S. 404 , 116 U. S. 408 (1886).

															It appears that, at least up to 1885, this Court, reflecting
more than a century of our history and uninterrupted practice,
accepted without discussion the proposition that federal or state
grants of tax exemption to churches were not a violation of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. As to the New York
statute, we now confirm that view. Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Art. 16, § 1, of the New York State Constitution is implemented
by § 420, subd. 1, of the New York Real Property Tax Law, which
states in pertinent part:

															"Real property owned by a corporation or association organized
exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women,
or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary,
hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific,
literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic,
historical or cemetery purposes . . . and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes . . . shall be
exempt from taxation as provided in this section."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . ."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The support of religion with direct allocation of public revenue
was a common colonial practice. See C. Antieau, A. Downey,
& E. Roberts, Freedom from Federal Establishment cc. 1 and 2
(1964). A general assessment proposed in the Virginia Legislature
in 1784 prompted the writing of James Madison's Remonstrance. See opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissenting, post at 397 U. S.
704 -706; 397 U. S.
716 -727. Governmental support of religion is common in
many countries. See e.g., R. Murray, A Brief History of
the Church of Sweden 75 (1961); G. Codding, The Federal Government
of Switzerland 53-54 (1961); M. Scehic, Zbirka Propisa o
Doprinosima i Porezima Gradjana 357 (Yugoslavia) (1968).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Act of August 27, 1894, § 32, 28 Stat. 556. Following passage of
the Sixteenth Amendment, federal income tax acts have consistently
exempted corporations and associations organized and operated
exclusively for religious purposes, along with eleemosynary groups,
from payment of the tax. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, § IIG(a), 38 Stat.
172. See Int.Rev.Code of 1954, § 501 et seq., 26
U.S.C. § 501 et seq. [ Footnote 5 ]

															In 1798, Congress passed an Act to provide for the valuation of
lands and dwelling houses. All existing state exemptions were
expressly excluded from the aforesaid valuation and enumeration.
Act of July 9, 1798, § 8, 1 Stat. 585. Subsequent levies of direct
taxes expressly or impliedly incorporated existing state
exemptions. Act of July 14, 1798, § 2, 1 Stat. 598 (express
incorporation of state exemption). See Act of Aug. 2,
1813, § 4, 3 Stat. 71; Act of Jan. 9, 1815, § 5, 3 Stat. 166
(express incorporation of state exemptions).

															[ Footnote 6 ] See 6 Stat. 116 (1813), relating to plates for printing
Bibles. See also 6 Stat. 346 (1826) relating to church
vestments, furniture, and paintings; 6 Stat. 162 (1816), Bible
plates; 6 Stat. 600 (1834), and 6 Stat. 675 (1836), church
bells.

															[ Footnote 7 ] See, e.g., Acts of the Corporation of the City of
Washington, First Council, c. V, approved Oct. 6, 1802, p. 13; Acts
of the Corporation of the City of Washington, Second Council, § 1,
approved Sept. 12, 1803, p. 13; Acts of the Corporation of the City
of Washington, Third Council. § 1, approved Sept. 5, 1804, p. 13.
Succeeding Acts of the Corporation impliedly renewed the exemption
in subsequent assessments. See, e.g., Acts of the
Corporation of the City of Washington, Thirteenth Council, c. 19, §
2, approved July 27, 1815, p.24.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Subsequent Acts of Congress carried over the substance of the
exemption. Act of July 12, 1876, § 8, 19 Stat. 85; Act of March 3,
1877, § 8, 19 Stat. 399; Act of August 15, 1916, 39 Stat. 514;
D.C.Code Ann. § 47-801a (1967).

															[ Footnote 9 ] Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.
S. 404 (1886). Cf. Washington Ethical Society v.
District of Columbia, 101 U.S. App.D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127
(1957).

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

															I concur for reasons expressed in my opinion in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 230 (1963). I adhere to the view there stated that, to give concrete
meaning to the Establishment Clause,

															"the line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers. It is a line
which the Court has consistently sought to mark in its decisions
expounding the religious guarantees of the First Amendment. What
the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the
Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the
organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use
essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where
secular means would suffice. When the secular and religious
institutions become involved in such a manner, there inhere in the
relationship precisely those Page 397 U. S. 681 dangers -- as much to church as to state -- which the Framers
feared would subvert religious liberty and the strength of a system
of secular government. On the other hand, there may be myriad forms
of involvements of government with religion which do not import
such dangers, and therefore should not, in my judgment, be deemed
to violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 374 U. S.
294 -295. Thus, in my view, the history, purpose, and
operation of real property tax exemptions for religious
organizations must be examined to determine whether the
Establishment Clause is breached by such exemptions. See
id. at 374 U. S.
293 . I The existence from the beginning of the Nation's life of a
practice, such as tax exemptions for religious organizations, is
not conclusive of its constitutionality. But such practice is a
fact of considerable import in the interpretation of abstract
constitutional language. On its face, the Establishment Clause is
reasonably susceptible of different interpretations regarding the
exemptions. This Court's interpretation of the clause, accordingly,
is appropriately influenced by the reading it has received in the
practices of the Nation. As Mr. Justice Holmes observed in an
analogous context, in resolving such questions of interpretation,
"a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345 , 256 U. S. 349 (1921). The more longstanding and widely accepted a practice, the
greater its impact upon constitutional interpretation. History is
particularly compelling in the present case because of the
undeviating acceptance given religious tax exemptions from our
earliest days as a Nation. Rarely if ever has this Court considered
the constitutionality of a practice for which the historical
support is so overwhelming. Page 397 U. S. 682 The Establishment Clause, along with the other provisions of the
Bill of Rights, was ratified by the States in 1791. Religious tax
exemptions were not an issue in the petitions calling for the Bill
of Rights, in the pertinent congressional debates, or in the
debates preceding ratification by the States. [ Footnote 2/1 ] The absence of concern about the
exemptions could not have resulted from failure to foresee the
possibility of their existence, for they were widespread during
colonial days. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
Rather, it seems clear that the exemptions were not among the evils
that the Framers and Ratifiers of the Establishment Clause sought
to avoid. Significantly, within a decade after ratification, at
least four States passed statutes exempting the property of
religious organizations from taxation. [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Although the First Amendment may not have applied to the States
during this period, practice in Virginia at the time is nonetheless
instructive. The Commonwealth's efforts to separate church and
state provided the direct antecedents of the First Amendment, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S.
437 -440 (1961); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
supra, at 374 U. S.
233 -234 Page 397 U. S. 683 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U. S. 1 , 330 U. S. 33 -38
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), and Virginia remained unusually
sensitive to the proper relation between church and state during
the years immediately following ratification of the Establishment
Clause. Virginia's protracted movement to disestablish the
Episcopal Church culminated in the passage on January 24, 1799, of
"An ACT to repeal certain acts, and to declare the construction of
the [Virginia] bill of rights and constitution, concerning
religion." The 1799 Act stated that the Virginia Bill of Rights
had

															"excepted from the powers given to the [civil] government the
power of reviving any species of ecclesiastical or church
government . . . by referring the subject of religion to
conscience,"

															and that the repealed measures had "bestowed property upon [the
Anglican] church," had "asserted a legislative right to establish
any religious sect," and had

															"incorporated religious sects, all of which is inconsistent with
the principles of the constitution, and of religious freedom, and
manifestly tends to the reestablishment of a national church."

															2 Va. Statutes at Large of 1792-1806 (Shepherd) 149. Yet, just
one year after the passage of this Act, Virginia reenacted a
measure exempting from taxation property belonging to "any . . .
college, houses for divine worship, or seminary of learning." Id. at 200. This exemption dated at least from 1777, and
had been reaffirmed immediately before and after ratification of
the First Amendment. See 9 Va.Statutes at Large
(1775-1778, Hening), at 351; 13 Va.Statutes at Large (1789-1792,
Hening), at 112, 241, 336337. It may reasonably be inferred that
the Virginians did not view the exemption for "houses of divine
worship" as an establishment of religion.

															Similarly, in 1784, the New York Legislature repealed colonial
acts establishing the Episcopal Church in several counties of the
State. See N.Y.Laws of 1777-1784, Page 397 U. S. 684 c. 38, p. 661. Yet, in 1799, the legislature provided that

															"no house or land belonging to . . . any church or place of
public worship, . . . nor any college or incorporated academy, nor
any school house, . . . alms house or property belonging to any
incorporated library, shall be taxed by virtue of this act."

															N.Y.Laws of 1797-1800, c. 72, at 414. And early practice in the
District of Columbia -- governed from the outset by the First
Amendment -- mirrored that in the States. In 1802, the Corporation
of the City of Washington, under authority delegated by Congress,
exempted "houses for public worship" from real property taxes. Acts
of the Corporation of the City of Washington, First Council, c. V,
approved Oct. 6, 1802, p. 13. See also the congressional
Acts cited in the Court's opinion, ante at 397 U. S.
677 -678.

															Thomas Jefferson was President when tax exemption was first
given Washington churches, and James Madison sat in sessions of the
Virginia General Assembly that voted exemptions for churches in
that Commonwealth. [ Footnote 2/4 ] I
have found no record of their personal views on the respective
Acts. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The absence of
such a record is itself Page 397 U. S. 685 significant. It is unlikely that two men so concerned with the
separation of church and state would have remained silent had they
thought the exemptions established religion. And if they had not
either approved the exemptions or been mild in their opposition, it
is probable that their views would be known to us today. Both
Jefferson and Madison wrote prolifically about issues they felt
important, and their opinions were well known to contemporary
chroniclers. See, for example, the record preserved of
Madison's battle in 1784-1785 against the proposal in the Virginia
Assembly to levy a general tax to support "Teachers of the
Christian Religion," in the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE
DOUGLAS, post at 397 U. S.
704 -706, 397 U. S.
719 -727. Much the same can be said of the other Framers
and Ratifiers of the Bill of Rights who remained active in public
affairs during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The adoption
of the early exemptions without controversy, in other words,
strongly suggests that they were not thought incompatible with
constitutional prohibitions against involvements of church and
state.

															The exemptions have continued uninterrupted to the present day.
They are in force in all 50 States. No judicial decision, state or
federal, has ever held that they violate the Establishment Clause.
In 1886, for example, this Court, in Gibbons v. District of
Columbia, 116 U. S. 404 ,
rejected on statutory grounds a church's claim for the exemption of
certain of its land under congressional statutes exempting
Washington churches and appurtenant ground from real property
taxes. But the Court Page 397 U. S. 686 gave not the slightest hint that it ruled against the church
because, under the First Amendment, any exemption would have been
unconstitutional. To the contrary, the Court's opinion implied that
nothing in the Amendment precludes exemption of church
property:

															"We are not disposed to deny that grounds left open around a
church, not merely to admit light and air but also to add to its
beauty and attractiveness, may, if not used or intended to be used
for any other purpose, be exempt from taxation under these
statutes." Id. at 116 U. S. 407 .
[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Mr. Justice Holmes said that

															"[i]f a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common
consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to
affect it. . . ." Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S.
22 , 260 U. S. 31 (1922). For almost 200 years, the view expressed in the actions of
legislatures and courts has been that tax exemptions for churches
do not threaten "those consequences which the Framers deeply
feared" or "tend to promote that type of interdependence between
religion and state which the First Amendment was designed to
prevent." Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S. 236 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). An examination both of the governmental
purposes for granting the exemptions and of the type of Page 397 U. S. 687 church-state relationship that has resulted from their existence
makes clear that no "strong case" exists for holding
unconstitutional this historic practice. [ Footnote 2/7 ] II Government has two basic secular purposes for granting real
property tax exemptions to religious organizations. [ Footnote 2/8 ] First, these organizations
are exempted because they, among a range of other private,
nonprofit organizations, contribute to the wellbeing of the
community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear
burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by general
taxation or be left undone, to the detriment of the community. See, for example, 1938 N.Y. Constitutional Convention,
Report of the Committee on Taxation, Doc. No. 2, p. 2. Thus, New
York exempts

															"[r]eal property owned by a corporation or association Page 397 U. S. 688 organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men
and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent,
missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground,
scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library,
patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes, for the enforcement of
laws relating to children or animals, or for two or more such
purposes. . . ."

															N.Y.Real Prop.Tax Law § 420, subd. 1 (Supp. 1969-1970).

															Appellant seeks to avoid the force of this secular purpose of
the exemptions by limiting his challenge to "exemptions from real
property taxation to religious organizations on real property used
exclusively for religious purposes." Appellant assumes, apparently,
that church-owned property is used for exclusively religious
purposes if it does not house a hospital, orphanage, weekday
school, or the like. Any assumption that a church building itself
is used for exclusively religious activities, however, rests on a
simplistic view of ordinary church operations. As the appellee's
brief cogently observes,

															"the public welfare activities and the sectarian activities of
religious institutions are . . . intertwined. . . . Often, a
particular church will use the same personnel, facilities and
source of funds to carry out both its secular and religious
activities."

															Thus, the same people who gather in church facilities for
religious worship and study may return to these facilities to
participate in Boy Scout activities, to promote anti-poverty
causes, to discuss public issues, or to listen to chamber music.
Accordingly, the funds used to maintain the facilities as a place
for religious worship and study also maintain them as a place for
secular activities beneficial to the community as a whole. Even
during formal worship services, churches frequently collect the
funds used to finance Page 397 U. S. 689 their secular operations and make decisions regarding their
nature.

															Second, government grants exemptions to religious organizations
because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American
society by their religious activities. Government may properly
include religious institutions among the variety of private,
nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and
enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society. See
Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101
U.S.App.D.C. 371, 373, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (1957). To this end, New
York extends its exemptions not only to religious and social
service organizations, but also to scientific, literary, bar,
library, patriotic, and historical groups, and generally to
institutions "organized exclusively for the moral or mental
improvement of men and women." The very breadth of this scheme of
exemptions negates any suggestion that the State intends to single
out religious organizations for special preference. The scheme is
not designed to inject any religious activity into a nonreligious
context, as was the case with school prayers. No particular
activity of a religious organization -- for example, the
propagation of its beliefs -- is specially promoted by the
exemptions. They merely facilitate the existence of a broad range
of private, nonprofit organizations, among them religious groups,
by leaving each free to come into existence, then to flourish or
wither, without being burdened by real property taxes. III Although governmental purposes for granting religious exemptions
may be wholly secular, exemptions can nonetheless violate the
Establishment Clause if they result in Page 397 U. S. 690 extensive state involvement with religion. Accordingly, those
who urge the exemptions' unconstitutionality argue that exemptions
are the equivalent of governmental subsidy of churches. General
subsidies of religious activities would, of course, constitute
impermissible state involvement with religion.

															Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are qualitatively
different. Though both provide economic assistance, [ Footnote 2/9 ] they do so in fundamentally
different ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public
monies to the subsidized enterprise, and uses resources exacted
from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other hand,
involves no such transfer. [ Footnote
2/10 ] It assists the exempted enterprise only passively, by
relieving a privately funded venture of the burden of paying taxes.
In other words, Page 397 U. S. 691 "[i]n the case of direct subsidy, the state forcibly diverts the
income of both believers and nonbelievers to churches," while,

															"[i]n the case of an exemption, the state merely refrains from
diverting to its own uses income independently generated by the
churches through voluntary contributions."

															Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development, pt. II, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 513, 553 (1968). Thus,

															"the symbolism of tax exemption is significant as a
manifestation that organized religion is not expected to support
the state; by the same token, the state is not expected to support
the church."

															Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1680,
1687 n. 16 (1969). Tax exemptions, accordingly, constitute mere
passive state involvement with religion, and not the affirmative
involvement characteristic of outright governmental subsidy.
[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															Even though exemptions produce only passive state involvement
with religion, nonetheless some argue that their termination would
be desirable as a means of reducing the level of church-state
contact. But it cannot realistically be said that termination of
religious tax exemptions would quantitatively lessen the extent of
state involvement with religion. Appellee contends that,

															"[a]s a practical matter, the public welfare activities and the
sectarian activities of religious institutions are so intertwined
that they cannot be separated for the purpose of determining
eligibility for tax exemptions."

															If not impossible, the separation would certainly involve
extensive state investigation into church operations and finances.
Moreover, the termination of exemptions would give rise, as the
Court says, to the necessity for

															"tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures,
and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the
train of those legal processes." Ante Page 397 U. S. 692 at 397 U. S. 674 .
Taxation, further, would bear unequally on different churches,
having its most disruptive effect on those with the least ability
to meet the annual levies assessed against them. And taxation would
surely influence the allocation of church resources. By diverting
funds otherwise available for religious or public service purposes
to the support of the Government, taxation would necessarily affect
the extent of church support for the enterprises that they now
promote. In many instances, the public service activities would
bear the brunt of the reallocation, as churches looked first to
maintain their places and programs of worship. In short, the
cessation of exemptions would have a significant impact on
religious organizations. Whether Government grants or withholds the
exemptions, it is going to be involved with religion. [ Footnote 2/12 ] IV Against the background of this survey of the history, purpose,
and operation of religious tax exemptions, I must conclude that the
exemptions do not "serve the essentially religious activities of
religious institutions." Their principal effect is to carry out
secular purposes -- the encouragement of public service activities
and of a pluralistic society. During their ordinary operations,
most churches engage in activities of a secular nature Page 397 U. S. 693 that benefit the community, and all churches, by their
existence, contribute to the diversity of association, viewpoint,
and enterprise so highly valued by all of us.

															Nor do I find that the exemptions "employ the organs of
government for essentially religious purposes." To the extent that
the exemptions further secular ends, they do not advance
"essentially religious purposes." To the extent that purely
religious activities are benefited by the exemptions, the benefit
is passive. Government does not affirmatively foster these
activities by exempting religious organizations from taxes, as it
would were it to subsidize them. The exemption simply leaves
untouched that which adherents of the organization bring into being
and maintain.

															Finally, 1 do not think that the exemptions "use essentially
religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means
would suffice." The means churches use to carry on their public
service activities are not "essentially religious" in nature. They
are the same means used by any purely secular organization --
money, human time and skills, physical facilities. It is true that
each church contributes to the pluralism of our society through its
purely religious activities, but the state encourages these
activities not because it champions religion per se, but
because it values religion among a variety of private, nonprofit
enterprises that contribute to the diversity of the Nation. Viewed
in this light, there is no nonreligious substitute for religion as
an element in our societal mosaic, just as there is no nonliterary
substitute for literary groups.

															As I said in Schempp, the First Amendment does not
invalidate

															"the propriety of certain tax . . . exemptions which
incidentally benefit churches and religious institutions, along
with many secular charities and nonprofit organizations. . . .
[R]eligious institutions simply share benefits which government
makes generally available Page 397 U. S. 694 to educational, charitable, and eleemosynary groups. There is no
indication that taxing authorities have used such benefits in any
way to subsidize worship or foster belief in God."

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
301 .

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															In fact, it does not appear that the exemptions were even
discussed. See, e.g., C. Antieau, p. Carroll, & T.
Burke, Religion Under the State Constitutions 122 (1965):

															"As far as anyone has been able to discover, the topic was never
mentioned in the debates which took place prior to the adoption of
the First Amendment."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See, e.g., C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts,
Freedom from Federal Establishment 20-21, 73-74, 175 (1964); cf. 3 A. Stokes, Church and State in the United States 419
(1950).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															2 Del.Laws of 1700-1797, p. 1247 (Act of Feb. 9, 1796); 2
Md.Laws (1785-1799, Kilty), c. 89 (Act of Jan. 20, 1798); N.Y.Laws
of 1797-1800, c. 72, at 414 (Act of April 1, 1799); 2 Va.Statutes
at Large of 1792-1806 (Shepherd) 200 (Act of Jan. 23, 1800). See also 16 Penn.Statutes at Large of 1682-1801, at 379
(Act of April 11, 1799). For practice in other States, see the accounts in Antieau, Carroll, & Burke, supra, 397
U.S. 664 fn2/1|>n. 1, at 123-169; Antieau, Downey, &
Roberts, supra, 397
U.S. 664 fn2/2|>n. 2, at 73-74; C. Zollmann, American Civil
Church Law 238-242 (1917).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] See, e.g., E. Swem & J. Williams, A Register of the
General Assembly of Virginia, 1776-1918, p. 53 (1918); Journal of
the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia 94, 98
(1799-1800).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In an essay written after he had left the presidency, Madison
did argue against tax exemptions for churches, the incorporation of
ecclesiastical bodies with the power of acquiring and holding
property in perpetuity, the right of the Houses of Congress to
choose chaplains who are paid out of public funds, the provision of
chaplains in the Army and Navy, and presidential proclamations of
days of thanksgiving or prayer -- though he admitted proclaiming
several such days at congressional request. See Fleet,
Madison's "Detatched Memoranda," 3 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d ser.) 534,
555-562 (1946). These arguments were advanced long after the
passage of the Virginia exemption discussed in the text, supra, and even longer after the adoption of the
Establishment Clause. They represent, at most, an extreme view of
church-state relations which Madison himself may have reached only
late in life. He certainly expressed no such understanding of
Establishment during the debates on the First Amendment. See 1 Annals of Cong. 434, 730-731, 755 (1789). And even
if he privately held these views at that time, there is no evidence
that they were shared by others among the Framers and Ratifiers of
the Bill of Rights.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See also, e.g., Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 , 134 U. S. 237 (1890), where the Court stated:

															"The provision in the Fourteenth Amendment that no State shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws was not intended to prevent a State from adjusting its
system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it
chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at
all, such as churches, libraries and the property of charitable
institutions."

															Indeed, the Court seems always to have viewed attacks upon the
constitutionality of the exemptions as wholly frivolous. See,
e.g., Lundbe v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d
644 , 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub nom. Heisey v. County
of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); General Finance Corp. v.
Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176
A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.
S. 423 (1962).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] Compare the very different situation regarding prayers
in public schools. The practice was not widespread at the time of
the adoption of the First Amendment. Legislative authorization for
the prayers came much later, and then only in a relatively small
number of States. Moreover, courts began to question the
constitutionality of the practice by the late 19th century. The
prayers were found unconstitutional by courts in six States and by
state attorneys general in several others. See 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 270 , 374 U. S.
274 -275.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															The only governmental purposes germane to the present inquiry,
of course, are those that now exist. As I said in Schempp, "In the Sunday Law Cases, we found in state laws
compelling a uniform day of rest from worldly labor no violation of
the Establishment Clause. . . . The basic ground of our decision
was that, granted the Sunday Laws were first enacted for religious
ends, they were continued in force for reasons wholly secular,
namely, to provide a universal day of rest and ensure the health
and tranquillity of the community. In other words, government may
originally have decreed a Sunday day of rest for the impermissible
purpose of supporting religion. but abandoned that purpose and
retained the laws for the permissible purpose of furthering
overwhelmingly secular ends."

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
263 -264.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															In certain circumstances, of course, the economic value of a
subsidy exceeds that of an exemption. If the only state assistance
received by a religious organization is a real property tax
exemption, the church must raise privately every cent that it
spends. If, on the other hand, the only state aid to a church is a
general subsidy, the church is relieved of the need to support
itself to the extent that its subsidy payments from the State
exceed its tax payments to the State. Thus, to take the extreme
case, a lightly taxed religious organization that received a large,
general subsidy could purchase property, construct buildings and
maintain its program wholly at public expense. Such dependence on
state support is impossible when the only aid provided is a real
property tax exemption.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															A real property tax exemption cannot be viewed as the free
provision by the State of certain basic services fire, police,
water, and the like. As the Court, ante at 397 U. S. 676 ,
points out,

															"the fire and police protection received by houses of religious
worship are no more than incidental benefits accorded all persons
or institutions within a State's boundaries, along with many other
exempt organizations. The appellant has not established even an
arguable quantitative correlation between the payment of an ad
valorem property tax and the receipt of these municipal
benefits." See generally Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the
Constitution, 78 Yale L.J. 1285, 1304-1310 (1969).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ] See also, e.g., Bittker, supra, 397
U.S. 664 fn2/10|>n. 10, at 1285-1304.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The state involvement with religion that would be occasioned by
any cessation of exemptions might conflict with the demands of the
Free Exercise Clause. Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliz.
Blue Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440 (1969); Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of
God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.
S. 367 , 396 U. S.
368 -370 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). It is
unnecessary to reach any questions of free exercise in the present
case, however. And while I believe that

															"hostility, not neutrality, would characterize the refusal to
provide [the exemptions] . . . , I do not say that government must
provide [them], or that the courts should intercede if it fails to
do so."

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S.
299 .

															Opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN.

															While I entirely subscribe to the result reached today, and find
myself in basic agreement with what THE CHIEF JUSTICE has written,
I deem it appropriate, in view of the radiations of the issues
involved, to state those considerations that are, for me,
controlling in this case, and lead me to conclude that New York's
constitutional provision, as implemented by its real property law,
does not offend the Establishment Clause. Preliminarily, I think it
relevant to face up to the fact that it is far easier to agree on
the purpose that underlies the First Amendment's Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses than to obtain agreement on the standards
that should govern their application. What is at stake as a matter
of policy is preventing that kind and degree of government
involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt
to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system to the
breaking point. I Two requirements frequently articulated and applied in our cases
for achieving this goal are "neutrality" and "voluntarism." E.g., see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 , 374 U. S. 305 (1963) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). These related and mutually reinforcing concepts are
short-form for saying that the Government must neither legislate to
accord benefits that favor religion over nonreligion, nor sponsor a
particular sect, nor try to encourage participation in or
abnegation of religion. Mr. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion
in Page 397 U. S. 695 Abington, which I joined, set forth these
principles:

															"The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that
government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that
it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and
nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious
belief."

															374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 305 .
The Court's holding in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.
S. 488 , 367 U. S. 495 (1961), is to the same effect: the State cannot

															"constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can [it] aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs."

															In the vast majority of cases, the inquiry, albeit an elusive
one, can end at this point. Neutrality and voluntarism stand as
barriers against the most egregious, and hence divisive, kinds of
state involvement in religious matters.

															While these concepts are at the "core" of the Religion Clauses,
they may not suffice, by themselves, to achieve in all cases the
purposes of the First Amendment. As Professor Freund has only
recently pointed out in Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
Harv.L.Rev. 1680 (1969), governmental involvement, while neutral,
may be so direct or in such degree as to engender a risk of
politicizing religion. Thus, as the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE
notes, religious groups inevitably represent certain points of
view, and not infrequently assert them in the political arena, as
evidenced by the continuing debate respecting birth control and
abortion laws. Yet history cautions that political fragmentation on
sectarian lines must be guarded against. Although the very fact of
neutrality may limit the intensity of involvement, government
participation in certain programs, whose very nature is apt to
entangle the state in details of administration and planning, may
escalate to the point of inviting undue fragmentation. See my concurring Page 397 U. S. 696 opinion in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 , 392 U. S. 249 (1968), and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, at 374 U. S.
307 . II This legislation neither encourages nor discourages
participation in religious life, and thus satisfies the voluntarism
requirement of the First Amendment. Unlike the instances of school
prayers, Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, and Engel v. Vitale, supra, or "released time" programs, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952), and McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.
S. 203 (1948), the State is not "utilizing the prestige,
power, and influence" of a public institution to bring religion
into the lives of citizens. 374 U.S. at 374 U. S. 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

															The statute also satisfies the requirement of neutrality.
Neutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of
analysis. The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of
governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious
gerrymanders. In any particular case, the critical question is
whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad
that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could
be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.

															The statute that implements New York's constitutional provision
for tax exemptions to religious organizations has defined a class
of nontaxable entities whose common denominator is their nonprofit
pursuit of activities devoted to cultural and moral improvement and
the doing of "good works" by performing certain social services in
the community that might otherwise have to be assumed by
government. Included are such broad and divergent groups as
historical and literary societies and, more generally, associations
"for the moral or mental Page 397 U. S. 697 improvement of men." The statute, by its terms, grants this
exemption in furtherance of moral and intellectual diversity, and
would appear not to omit any organization that could be reasonably
thought to contribute to that goal.

															To the extent that religious institutions sponsor the secular
activities that this legislation is designed to promote, it is
consistent with neutrality to grant them an exemption just as other
organizations devoting resources to these projects receive
exemptions. I think, moreover, in the context of a statute so broad
as the one before us, churches may properly receive an exemption
even though they do not themselves sponsor the secular-type
activities mentioned in the statute, but exist merely for the
convenience of their interested members. As long as the breadth of
exemption includes groups that pursue cultural, moral, or spiritual
improvement in multifarious secular ways, including, I would
suppose, groups whose avowed tenets may be anti-theological,
atheistic, or agnostic, I can see no lack of neutrality in
extending the benefit of the exemption to organized religious
groups. [ Footnote 3/1 ] Page 397 U. S. 698 III Whether the present exemption entails that degree of involvement
with government that presents threat of fragmentation along
religious lines involves, for me, a more subtle question than
deciding simply whether neutrality has been violated. Unlike the
subsidy that my Brother DOUGLAS foresees as the next step down the
road, tax exemptions to nonprofit organizations are an institution
in themselves, so much so that they are, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE
points out, expected and accepted as a matter of course. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, supra. In the instant case noninvolvement is further
assured by the neutrality and breadth of the exemption. In the
context of an exemption so sweeping as the one before us here, its
administration need not entangle government in difficult
classifications of what is or is not religious, for any
organization -- although not religious in a customary sense --
would qualify under the pervasive rubric of a group dedicated to
the moral and cultural improvement of men. Obviously the more
discriminating and complicated the basis of classification for an
exemption -- even Page 397 U. S. 699 a neutral one -- the greater the potential for state involvement
in evaluating the character of the organizations. Cf.
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440 (1969).

															I agree with my Brother DOUGLAS that exemptions do not differ
from subsidies as an economic matter. Aside from the longstanding
tradition behind exemptions, there are other differences, however.
Subsidies, unlike exemptions, must be passed on periodically, and
thus invite more political controversy than exemptions. Moreover,
subsidies or direct aid, as a general rule, are granted on the
basis of enumerated and more complicated qualifications, and
frequently involve the state in administration to a higher degree,
though, to be sure, this is not necessarily the case.

															Whether direct aid or subsidies entail that degree of
involvement that is prohibited by the Constitution is a question
that must be reserved for a later case upon a record that fully
develops all the pertinent considerations, [ Footnote 3/2 ] such as the significance and character of
subsidies in our political system and the role of the government in
administering the subsidy in relation to the particular program
aided. It may also be that the States, while bound to observe
strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with involvement
-- on a neutral basis -- than the Federal Government. Cf.,
e.g., my separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 496 (1957).

															I recognize that, for those who seek inflexible solutions, this
tripartite analysis provides little comfort. It is always possible
to shrink from a first step lest the momentum will plunge the law
into pitfalls that lie in the trail ahead. I, for one, however, do
not believe Page 397 U. S. 700 that a "slippery slope" is necessarily without a constitutional
toehold. Like THE CHIEF JUSTICE, I am of the view that it is the
task of this tribunal to "draw distinctions, including fine ones,
in the process of interpreting the Constitution." Ante at 397 U. S. 679 .
The prospect of difficult questions of judgment in constitutional
law should not be the basis for prohibiting legislative action that
is constitutionally permissible. I think this one is, and, on the
foregoing premises, join with the Court in upholding this New York
statute.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															While I would suppose most churches devote part of their
resources to secular community projects and conventional charitable
activities, it is a question of fact, a fact that would only be
relevant if we had before us a statute framed more narrowly to
include only "charities" or a limited class of organizations, and
churches. In such a case, depending on the administration of the
exemption, it might be that the granting of an exemption to
religion would turn out to be improper. This would depend, I
believe, on what activities the church in fact sponsored. It would
also depend, I think, on whether or to what extent the exemption
were accorded to secular social organizations, conceived to benefit
their own membership, but also engaged in incidental general
philanthropic or cultural undertakings. It might also depend on
whether, if church-sponsored programs were not open to all without
charge, the exemption were extended to private clubs and
organizations promoting activities on a contributory basis. These
would all be questions of fact to be determined by the revenue
authorities and the courts. While such determinations necessarily
involve government in the religious institutions, they do not
offend the First Amendment. That an evaluation of the scope of
charitable activities in proportion to doctrinal pursuits may be
difficult does not render it undue interference with religion, cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Eliz. Blue Hull Church, 393 U. S. 440 (1969), for it does not entail judicial inquiry into dogma and
belief. Indeed, such an inquiry may be inescapable in the context
of a statute of less breadth than the one before us.

															I would hold the present exemption neutral because New York has
created a general class so broad that it would be difficult to
conclude that religious organizations cannot properly be included
in it.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The dimension of the problem would also require consideration of
what kind of pluralistic society is compatible with the political
concept and traditions embodied in our Constitution.

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

															Petitioner is the owner of real property in New York, and is a
Christian. But he is not a member of any of the religious
organizations, "rejecting them as hostile." The New York statute
exempts from taxation real property "owned by a corporation or
association organized exclusively for . . . religious . . .
purposes" and used "exclusively for carrying out" such purposes.
[ Footnote 4/1 ] Yet nonbelievers who
own realty are taxed at the usual rate. The question in the case
therefore is whether believers -- organized in church groups -- can
be made exempt from real estate taxes merely because they are
believers, while nonbelievers, whether organized or not, must pay
the real estate taxes.

															My Brother HARLAN says he "would suppose" that the tax exemption
extends to "groups whose avowed tenets may be anti-theological,
atheistic, or agnostic." Ante at 397 U. S. 697 .
If it does, then the line between believers and nonbelievers has
not been drawn. But, with all respect, there is not even a
suggestion in the present record that the statute covers property
used exclusively by organizations for "anti-theological purposes,"
"atheistic purposes," or "agnostic purposes."

															In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.
S. 488 , we held that Page 397 U. S. 701 a State could not bar an atheist from public office in light of
the freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. Neither the State nor the Federal
Government, we said,

															"can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid
all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs." Id. at 367 U. S.
495 .

															That principle should govern this case.

															There is a line between what a State may do in encouraging
"religious" activities, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 , and what a State may not do by using its
resources to promote "religious" activities, McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U. S. 203 , or
bestowing benefits because of them. Yet that line may not always be
clear. Closing public schools on Sunday is in the former category;
subsidizing churches, in my view, is in the latter. Indeed, I would
suppose that, in common understanding, one of the best ways to
"establish" one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax
exemption does. The State may not do that any more than it may
prefer "those who believe in no religion over those who do
believe." Zorach v. Clauson, supra, at 343 U. S.
314 .

															In affirming this judgment, the Court largely overlooks the
revolution initiated by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That revolution involved the imposition of new and far-reaching
constitutional restraints on the States. Nationalization of many
civil liberties has been the consequence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, reversing the historic position that the foundations of
those liberties rested largely in state law.

															The process of the "selective incorporation" of various
provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment,
although often provoking lively disagreement Page 397 U. S. 702 at large as well as among the members of this Court, has been a
steady one. It started in 1897 with Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.
v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226 , in
which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment precluded a
State from taking private property for public use without payment
of just compensation, as provided in the Fifth Amendment. The first
direct holding as to the incorporation of the First Amendment into
the Fourteenth occurred in 1931, in Stromberg v.
California, 283 U. S. 359 , a
case involving the right of free speech, although that holding in Stromberg had been foreshadowed in 1925 by the Court's
opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.
S. 652 . As regards the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause was expressly deemed
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment in 1940 in Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 ,
although that holding had been foreshadowed in 1923 and 1934 by the
Court's dicta in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 , 262 U. S. 399 ,
and Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 , 293 U. S. 262 .
The Establishment Clause was not incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment until Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 , was
decided in 1947.

															Those developments in the last 30 years have had unsettling
effects. It was, for example, not until 1962 that state-sponsored,
sectarian prayers were held to violate the Establishment Clause. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 .
That decision brought many protests, for the habit of putting one
sect's prayer in public schools had long been practiced. Yet if the
Catholics, controlling one school board, could put their prayer
into one group of public schools, the Mormons, Baptists, Moslems,
Presbyterians, and others could do the same once they got control.
And so the seeds of Establishment would grow, and a secular
institution would be used to serve a sectarian end. Page 397 U. S. 703 Engel was as disruptive of traditional state practices
as was Stromberg. Prior to Stromberg, a State
could arrest an unpopular person who made a rousing speech on the
charge of disorderly conduct. Since Stromberg, that has
been unconstitutional. And so the revolution occasioned by the
Fourteenth Amendment has progressed as Article after Article in the
Bill of Rights has been incorporated in it and made applicable to
the States.

															Hence, the question in the present case makes irrelevant the
"two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation," referred to
by the Court. Ante at 397 U. S. 678 .
If history be our guide, then tax exemption of church property in
this country is indeed highly suspect, as it arose in the early
days when the church was an agency of the state. See W.
Torpey, Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America 171
(1948). The question here, though, concerns the meaning of the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause made applicable
to the States for only a few decades, at best.

															With all due respect, the governing principle is not controlled
by Everson v. Board of Education, supra. Everson involved the use of public funds to bus children to parochial as
well as to public schools. Parochial schools teach religion, yet
they are also educational institutions offering courses competitive
with public schools. They prepare students for the professions and
for activities in all walks of life. Education in the secular sense
was combined with religious indoctrination at the parochial schools
involved in Everson. Even so, the Everson decision was five to four, and, though one of the five, I have
since had grave doubts about it, because I have become convinced
that grants to institutions teaching a sectarian creed violate the
Establishment Clause. See Engel v. Vitale, supra, at 370 U. S.
443 -444 (Douglas, J., concurring). Page 397 U. S. 704 This case, however, is quite different. Education is not
involved. The financial support rendered here is to the church, the
place of worship. A tax exemption is a subsidy. Is my Brother
BRENNAN correct in saying that we would hold that state or federal
grants to churches, say, to construct the edifice itself would be
unconstitutional? What is the difference between that kind of
subsidy and the present subsidy? [ Footnote 4/2 ]

															The problem takes us back where Madison was in 1784 and 1785,
when he battled the Assessment Bill [ Footnote 4/3 ] in Virginia. That bill levied a tax for
the support of Christian churches, leaving to each taxpayer the
choice as to "what society of Christians" he wanted the tax paid,
and, absent such designation, the tax was to go for education. Even
so, Madison was unrelenting in his opposition. As stated by Mr.
Justice Rutledge:

															"The modified Assessment Bill passed second reading in December,
1784, and was all but enacted. Page 397 U. S. 705 Madison and his followers, however, maneuvered deferment of
final consideration until November, 1785. And before the Assembly
reconvened in the fall, he issued his historic Memorial and
Remonstrance." Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 330 U. S. 37 (dissenting opinion).

															The Remonstrance [ Footnote 4/4 ]
stirred up such a storm of popular protest that the Assessment Bill
was defeated. [ Footnote 4/5 ]

															The Remonstrance covers some aspects of the present subsidy,
including Madison's protest in paragraph 3 to a requirement that
any person be compelled to contribute even "three pence" to support
a church. All men, he maintained in paragraph 4, enter society "on
equal conditions," including the right to free exercise of
religion:

															"Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess
and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine
origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have
not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this
freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not against man:
To God, therefore, not to men, must an account of it be rendered.
As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar
burdens, so it violates the same principle, by granting to others
peculiar exemptions."

															Madison's assault on the Assessment Bill was, in fact, an
assault based on both the concepts of "free exercise" and
"establishment" of religion later embodied in the First Amendment.
Madison, whom we recently called "the leading architect of the
religion clauses of the First Amendment," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83 , 392 U. S.
103 , Page 397 U. S. 706 was indeed their author and chief promoter. [ Footnote 4/6 ] As Mr. Justice Rutledge said:

															"All the great instruments of the Virginia struggle for
religious liberty thus became warp and woof of our constitutional
tradition, not simply by the course of history, but by the common
unifying force of Madison's life, thought and sponsorship. He
epitomized the whole of that tradition in the Amendment's compact,
but nonetheless comprehensive, phrasing." Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 330 U. S. 39 .

															The Court seeks to avoid this historic argument as to the
meaning of "establishment" and "free exercise" by relying on the
long practice of the States in granting the subsidies challenged
here.

															Certainly government may not lay a tax on either worshiping or
preaching. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.
S. 105 , we ruled on a state license tax levied on
religious colporteurs as a condition to pursuit of their
activities. In holding the tax unconstitutional, we said:

															"The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to
control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40 , 292 U. S.
44 -45, and cases cited. Those who can tax the exercise
of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those
who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary
evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full
purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable
manner would thus be denied the needy. Those who can deprive
religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part
of Page 397 U. S. 707 the vital power of the press which has survived from the
Reformation." Id. at 319 U. S.
112 .

															Churches, like newspapers also enjoying First Amendment rights,
have no constitutional immunity from all taxes. As we said in Murdock: "We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are
free from all financial burdens of government. See Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 , 297 U. S.
250 . We have here something quite different, for
example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious
activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with
those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax
from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon." Ibid. State aid to places of worship, whether, in the form of direct
grants or tax exemption, takes us back to the Assessment Bill and
the Remonstrance. The church qua church would not be
entitled to that support from believers and from nonbelievers
alike. Yet the church qua nonprofit charitable institution
is one of many that receive a form of subsidy through tax
exemption. To be sure, the New York statute [ Footnote 4/7 ] does not single out the church for grant
or favor. It includes churches in a long list of nonprofit
organizations: for the moral or mental improvement of men and women
(§ 420); for charitable, hospital, or educational purposes
( ibid. ); for playgrounds ( ibid. ); for scientific
or literary objects ( ibid. ); for bar associations, medical
societies, or libraries ( ibid. ); for patriotic and
historical purposes ( ibid. ); for cemeteries
( ibid. ); for the enforcement of laws relating to children
or animals ( ibid. ); for opera Page 397 U. S. 708 houses (§ 426); for fraternal organizations (§ 428); for
academies of music (§ 434); for veterans' organizations (§ 452);
for pharmaceutical societies (§ 472), and for dental societies (§
474). While the beneficiaries cover a wide range, "atheistic,"
"agnostic," or "anti-theological" groups do not seem to be
included.

															Churches perform some functions that a State would
constitutionally be empowered to perform. I refer to nonsectarian
social welfare operations such as the care of orphaned children and
the destitute and people who are sick. A tax exemption to agencies
performing those functions would therefore be as constitutionally
proper as the grant of direct subsidies to them. Under the First
Amendment, a State may not, however, provide worship if private
groups fail to do so. As Mr. Justice Jackson said:

															"[A State] may socialize utilities and economic enterprises and
make taxpayers' business out of what conventionally had been
private business. It may make public business of individual
welfare, health, education, entertainment or security. But it
cannot make public business of religious worship or instruction, or
of attendance at religious institutions of any character. . . .
That is a difference which the Constitution sets up between
religion and almost every other subject matter of legislation, a
difference which goes to the very root of religious freedom and
which the Court is overlooking today." Everson v. Board of Education, supra, at 330 U. S. 26 (dissenting opinion).

															That is a major difference between churches, on the one hand,
and the rest of the nonprofit organizations, on the other.
Government could provide or finance operas, hospitals, historical
societies, and all the rest because they represent social welfare
programs within Page 397 U. S. 709 the reach of the police power. In contrast, government may not
provide or finance worship because of the Establishment Clause any
more than it may single out "atheistic" or "agnostic" centers or
groups and create or finance them.

															The Brookings Institution, writing in 1933, before the
application of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the States, said about tax exemptions of religious groups:
[ Footnote 4/8 ]

															"Tax exemption, no matter what its form, is essentially a
government grant or subsidy. Such grants would seem to be justified
only if the purpose for which they are made is one for which the
legislative body would be equally willing to make a direct
appropriation from public funds equal to the amount of the
exemption. This test would not be met except in the case where the
exemption is granted to encourage certain activities of private
interests which, if not thus performed, would have to be assumed by
the government at an expenditure at least as great as the value of
the exemption."

															(Emphasis added.)

															Since 1947, when the Establishment Clause was made applicable to
the States, that report would have to state that the exemption
would be justified only where "the legislative body could make" an
appropriation for the cause.

															On the record of this case, the church qua nonprofit,
charitable organization is intertwined with the church qua church. A church may use the same facilities, resources, and
personnel in carrying out both its secular and its sectarian
activities. The two are unitary, and, on the present record, have
not been separated one from Page 397 U. S. 710 the other. The state has a public policy of encouraging private
public welfare organizations, which it desires to encourage through
tax exemption. Why may it not do so and include churches qua welfare organizations on a nondiscriminatory basis?
That avoids, it is argued, a discrimination against churches, and,
in a real sense, maintains neutrality toward religion which the
First Amendment was designed to foster. Welfare services, whether
performed by churches or by nonreligious groups, may well serve the
public welfare.

															Whether a particular church seeking an exemption for its welfare
work could constitutionally pass muster would depend on the special
facts. The assumption is that the church is a purely private
institution, promoting a sectarian cause. The creed, teaching, and
beliefs of one may be undesirable or even repulsive to others. Its
sectarian faith sets it apart from all others, and makes it
difficult to equate its constituency with the general public. The
extent that its facilities are open to all may only indicate the
nature of its proselytism. Yet, though a church covers up its
religious symbols in welfare work, its welfare activities may
merely be a phase of sectarian activity. I have said enough to
indicate the nature of this tax exemption problem.

															Direct financial aid to churches or tax exemptions to the church qua church is not, in my view, even arguably permitted.
Sectarian causes are certainly not anti-public, and many would rate
their own church, or perhaps all churches, as the highest form of
welfare. The difficulty is that sectarian causes must remain in the
private domain, not subject to public control or subsidy. That
seems to me to be the requirement of the Establishment Clause. As
Edmond Cahn said:

															"In America, Madison submitted most astutely, the rights of
conscience must be kept not only free, but equal, as well. And in
view of the endless variations Page 397 U. S. 711 -- not only among the numerous sects but also among the
organized activities they pursued and the relative emotional values
they attached to their activities -- how could any species of
government assistance be considered genuinely equal from sect to
sect? If, for example, a state should attempt to subsidize all
sectarian schools without discrimination, it would necessarily
violate the principle of equality because certain sects felt
impelled to conduct a large number of such schools, others few,
others none. [ Footnote 4/9 ] How
could the officers of government begin to measure the intangible
factors that a true equality of treatment would involve, i.e., the relative intensity of religious attachment to
parochial education that the respective groups required of their
lay and clerical members? It would be presumptuous even to inquire.
Thus, just as, in matters of race, our belated recognition of
intangible factors has finally led us to the maxim 'separate,
therefore unequal,' so, in matters of religion, Madison's immediate
recognition of intangible factors led us promptly to the maxim
'equal, therefore separate.' Equality was out of the question
without total separation."

															Confronting Injustice 186-187 (1967).

															The exemptions provided here insofar as welfare projects are
concerned may have the ring of neutrality. But subsidies, either
through direct grant or tax exemption for sectarian causes, whether
carried on by church qua church or by church qua welfare agency, must be treated differently lest we in time allow
the church qua church to be on the public payroll, which,
I fear, is imminent. Page 397 U. S. 712 As stated by my Brother BRENNAN in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 259 (concurring opinion),

															"It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of
sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but,
in as high degree, it is the devout believer who fears the
secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with
and dependent upon the government."

															Madison, as President, vetoed a bill incorporating the
Protestant Episcopal Church in Alexandria, Virginia, as being a
violation of the Establishment Clause. He said, inter
alia: [ Footnote 4/10 ]

															"[T]he bill vests in the said incorporated church an authority
to provide for the support of the poor and the education of poor
children of the same, an authority which, being altogether
superfluous if the provision is to be the result of pious charity,
would be a precedent for giving to religious societies as such a
legal agency in carrying into effect a public and civil duty."

															He also vetoed a bill that reserved a parcel of federal land
"for the use" of the Baptist Church as violating the Establishment
Clause. [ Footnote 4/11 ]

															What Madison would have thought of the present state subsidy to
churches -- a tax exemption, as distinguished from an outright
grant -- no one can say with certainty. The fact that Virginia
early granted church tax exemptions cannot be credited to Madison.
Certainly he seems to have been opposed. In his paper Monopolies,
Perpetuities, Corporations, Ecclesiastical Endowments, he wrote:
[ Footnote 4/12 ]

															"Strongly guarded as is the separation between Religion &
Govt in the Constitution of the United Page 397 U. S. 713 States the danger of encroachment by Ecclesiastical Bodies, may
be illustrated by precedents already furnished in their short
history."

															And he referred, inter alia, to the "attempt in
Kentucky for example, where it was proposed to exempt Houses of
Worship from taxes." From these three statements, Madison, it
seems, opposed all state subsidies to churches. Cf. D.
Robertson, Should Churches Be Taxed? 661 (1968).

															We should adhere to what we said in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 495 ,
that neither a State nor the Federal Government

															"can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which
aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs."

															(Emphasis added.)

															Unless we adhere to that principle, we do not give full support
either to the Free Exercise Clause or to the Establishment
Clause.

															If a church can be exempted from paying real estate taxes, why
may not it be made exempt from paying special assessments? The
benefits in the two cases differ only in degree, and the burden on
nonbelievers is likewise no different in kind. [ Footnote 4/13 ] Page 397 U. S. 714 The religiously used real estate of the churches today
constitutes a vast domain. See M. Larson & C. Lowell,
The Churches: Their Riches, Revenues, and Immunities (1969). Their
assets total over $141 billion, and their annual income at least
$22 billion. Id. at 232. And the extent to which they are
feeding from the public trough in a variety of forms is alarming. Id., c. 10.

															We are advised that, since 1968, at least five States have
undertaken to give subsidies to parochial and other private schools
[ Footnote 4/14 ] -- Pennsylvania,
Ohio, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. And it is reported
that, under two federal Acts, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, and the Higher Education Act of
1965, 79 Stat. 1219, billions of dollars have been granted
to parochial and other private schools.

															The federal grants to elementary and secondary schools under 79
Stat. 27 were made to the States, which in turn made advances to
elementary and secondary schools. Those figures are not
available.

															But the federal grants to private institutions of higher
education are revealed in Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW), Digest of Educational Statistics 16 (1969). These
show in billions of dollars the following: [ Footnote 4/15 ]

															19666. . . . . . . . $1-4

															1966-67. . . . . . . $1.6

															1967-68. . . . . . . $1.7

															1968-69. . . . . . . $1.9

															1969-70. . . . . . . $2.1 Page 397 U. S. 715 It is an old, old problem. Madison adverted to it: [ Footnote 4/16 ]

															"Are there not already examples in the U.S. of ecclesiastical
wealth equally beyond its object and the foresight of those who
laid the foundation of it? In the U.S., there is a double motive
for fixing limits in this case, because wealth may increase not
only from additional gifts, but from exorbitant advances in the
value of the primitive one. In grants of vacant lands, and of lands
in the vicinity of growing towns & cities, the increase of
value is often such as, if foreseen, would essentially controul the
liberality confirming them. The people of the U.S. owe their
Independence & their liberty to the wisdom of descrying in the
minute tax of 3 pence on tea the magnitude of the evil comprized in
the precedent. Let them exert the same wisdom in watching agst
every evil lurking under plausible disguises, and growing up from
small beginnings. [ Footnote 4/17 ]
" Page 397 U. S. 716 If believers are entitled to public financial support, so are
nonbelievers. A believer and nonbeliever under the present law are
treated differently because of the articles of their faith.
Believers are doubtless comforted that the cause of religion is
being fostered by this legislation. Yet one of the mandates of the
First Amendment is to promote a viable, pluralistic society and to
keep government neutral, not only between sects, but also between
believers and nonbelievers. The present involvement of government
in religion may seem de minimis. But it is, I fear, a long
step down the Establishment path. Perhaps I have been misinformed.
But as I have read the Constitution and its philosophy, I gathered
that independence was the price of liberty.

															I conclude that this tax exemption is unconstitutional.

															| 397
U.S. 664 app1| APPENDIX I TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING Assessment Bill. The December 24, 1784, print reproduced in the
Supplemental Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J., in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 72 :

															" A BILL ESTABLISHING A PROVISION" " FOR TEACHERS OF THE" " CHRISTIAN RELIGION" "Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a
natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their
vices, and preserve the peace of society; Page 397 U. S. 717 which cannot be effected without a competent provision for
learned teachers, who may be thereby enabled to devote their time
and attention to the duty of instructing such citizens, as from
their circumstances and want of education, cannot otherwise attain
such knowledge, and it is judged that such provision may be made by
the Legislature, without counteracting the liberal principle
heretofore adopted and intended to be preserved by abolishing all
distinctions of preeminence amongst the different societies or
communities of Christians;"

															" Be it therefore enacted by the General Assembly, That
for the support of Christian teachers, ___ percentum on the amount,
or ___ in the pound on the sum payable for tax on the property
within this Commonwealth, is hereby assessed, and shall be paid by
every person chargeable with the said tax at the time the same
shall become due, and the Sheriffs of the several Counties shall
have power to levy and collect the same in the same manner and
under the like restrictions and limitations, as are or may be
prescribed by the laws for raising the Revenues of this State."

															" And be it enacted, That for every sum so paid, the
Sheriff or Collector shall give a receipt, expressing therein to
what society of Christians the person from whom he may receive the
same shall direct the money to be paid, keeping a distinct account
thereof in his books. The Sheriff of every County, shall, on or
before the ___ day of ___ in every year, return to the Court, upon
oath, two alphabetical lists of the payments to him made,
distinguishing in columns opposite to the names of the persons who
shall have paid the same, the society to which the money so paid
was by them appropriated, and one column for the names where no
appropriation shall be made. One of which lists, after being
recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, shall be filed by
the Clerk in his office; the other shall by the Sheriff Page 397 U. S. 718 be fixed up in the Court-house, there to remain for the
inspection of all concerned. And the Sheriff, after deducting five
percentum for the collection, shall forthwith pay to such person or
persons as shall be appointed to receive the same by the Vestry,
Elders, or Directors, however denominated of each such society, the
sum so stated to be due to that society; or in default thereof,
upon the motion of such person or persons to the next or any
succeeding Court, execution shall be awarded for the same against
the Sheriff and his security, his and their executors or
administrators; provided that ten days previous notice be given of
such motion. And upon every such execution, the Officer serving the
same shall proceed to immediate sale of the estate taken, and shall
not accept of security for payment at the end of three months, nor
to have the goods forthcoming at the day of sale; for his better
direction wherein, the Clerk shall endorse upon every such
execution that no security of any kind shall be taken."

															" And be it further enacted, That the money to be raised
by virtue of this Act, shall be by the Vestries, Elders, or
Directors of each religious society, appropriated to a provision
for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel of their denomination, or
the providing places of divine worship, and to none other use
whatsoever; except in the denominations of Quakers and Menonists,
who may receive what is collected from their members, and place it
in their general fund, to be disposed of in a manner which they
shall think best calculated to promote their particular mode of
worship."

															" And be it enacted, That all sums which at the time of
payment to the Sheriff or Collector may not be appropriated by the
person paying the same, shall be accounted for with the Court in
manner as by this Act is directed, and after deducting for his
collection, the Sheriff shall pay the amount thereof (upon account
certified Page 397 U. S. 719 by the Court to the Auditors of Public Accounts, and by them to
the Treasurer) into the public Treasury, to be disposed of under
the direction of the General Assembly, for the encouragement of
seminaries of learning within the Counties whence such sums shall
arise, and to no other use or purpose whatsoever."

															"THIS Act shall commence, and be in force, from and after the
___ day of ___ in the year ___."

															" A Copy from the Engrossed Bill. "

															JOHN BECKLEY, C.H.D.

															| 397
U.S. 664 app2| APPENDIX II TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J., DISSENTING [ Footnote 4/18 ] Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, as
reproduced in the Appendix to the dissenting opinion of Rutledge,
J., in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S.
1 , 330 U. S. 63 (2
The Writings of James Madison 183-191 (G. Hunt ed.1901)):

															"We, the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth, having
taken into serious consideration a Bill printed by order of the
last Session of General Assembly, entitled 'A Bill establishing a
provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion,' and conceiving
that the same, if finally armed with the sanctions of a law, will
be a dangerous abuse of power, are bound, as faithful members of a
free State, to remonstrate against it, and to declare the reasons
by which we are determined. We remonstrate against the said
Bill,"

															"1. Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth
'that Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the
Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence.' The Religion, then, of every
man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every Page 397 U. S. 720 man, and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these
may dictate. This right is, in its nature, an unalienable right. It
is unalienable because the opinions of men, depending only on the
evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot follow the
dictates of other men. It is unalienable also because what is here
a right towards men is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty
of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only,
as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both
in order of time and degree of obligation to the claims of Civil
Society. Before any man can be considered as a member of Civil
Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the
Universe. And if a member of Civil Society who enters into any
subordinate Association must always do it with a reservation of his
duty to the general authority, much more must every man who becomes
a member of any particular Civil Society do it with a saving of his
allegiance to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that,
in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the
institution of Civil Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt
from its cognizance. True it is that no other rule exists by which
any question which may divide a Society can be ultimately
determined but the will of the majority; but it is also true that
the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority."

															"2. Because, if religion be exempt from the authority of the
Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the
Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and vicegerents
of the former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited:
it is limited with regard to the coordinate departments; more
necessarily is it limited with regard to the constituents. The
preservation of a free government requires not merely that the
metes and bounds which separate each department Page 397 U. S. 721 of power may be invariably maintained, but, more especially,
that neither of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier
which defends the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty
of such an encroachment exceed the commission from which they
derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to
it are governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an
authority derived from them, and are slaves."

															"3. Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment
on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first
duty of citizens, and one of [the] noblest characteristic of the
late Revolution. The freemen of America did not wait till usurped
power had strengthened itself by exercise and entangled the
question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the
principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the
principle. We revere this lesson too much soon to forget it. Who
does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians in exclusion
of all other Sects? That the same authority which can force a
citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment may force him to conform to any
other establishment in all cases whatsoever?"

															"4. Because, the bill violates that equality which ought to be
the basis of every law, and which is more indispensable in
proportion as the validity or expediency of any law is more liable
to be impeached. If 'all men are by nature equally free and
independent,' all men are to be considered as entering into Society
on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore
retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above
all are they to be considered as retaining an ' equal title
to the free exercise of Religion according to the dictates Page 397 U. S. 722 of conscience.' Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to
embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to
be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us.
If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not
against man. To God, therefore, not to men, must an account of it
be rendered. As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to
peculiar burdens, so it violates the same principle by granting to
others peculiar exemptions. Are the Quakers and Menonists the only
sects who think a compulsive support of their religions unnecessary
and unwarrantable? Can their piety alone be intrusted with the care
of public worship? Ought their Religions to be endowed above all
others with extraordinary privileges by which proselytes may be
enticed from all others? We think too favorably of the justice and
good sense of these denominations to believe that they either covet
preeminencies over their fellow citizens or that they will be
seduced by them from the common opposition to the measure."

															"5. Because the bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is
a competent Judge of Religious truth or that he may employ Religion
as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension
falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and
throughout the world, the second, an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation."

															"6. Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not
requisite for the support of the Christian Religion. To say that it
is is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself, for every
page of it disavows a dependence on the powers of this world; it is
a contradiction to fact, for it is known that this Religion both
existed and flourished not only without the support of human laws,
but in spite of every opposition from them, and not only Page 397 U. S. 723 during the period of miraculous aid, but long after it had been
left to its own evidence and the ordinary care of Providence. Nay,
it is a contradiction in terms, for a Religion not invented by
human policy must have preexisted and been supported before it was
established by human policy. It is, moreover, to weaken in those
who profess this Religion a pious confidence in its innate
excellence and the patronage of its Author, and to foster in those
who still reject it a suspicion that its friends are too conscious
of its fallacies to trust it to its own merits."

															"7. Because experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of
Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen
centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on
trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride
and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity;
in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the
Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its
greatest lustre; those of every sect point to the ages prior to its
incorporation with Civil policy. Propose a restoration of this
primitive state in which its Teachers depended on the voluntary
rewards of their flocks; many of them predict its downfall. On
which side ought their testimony to have greatest weight, when for
or when against their interest?"

															"8. Because the establishment in question is not necessary for
the support of Civil Government. If it be urged as necessary for
the support of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting
Religion, and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it cannot
be necessary for the former. If Religion be not within [the]
cognizance of Civil Government, how can its legal establishment be
said to be necessary to civil Government? What influence, in fact,
have ecclesiastical establishments Page 397 U. S. 724 had on Civil Society? In some instances, they have been seen to
erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many
instances, they have been seen upholding the thrones of political
tyranny; in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the
liberties of the people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public
liberty may have found an established clergy convenient
auxiliaries. A just government, instituted to secure &
perpetuate it, needs them not. Such a government will be best
supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his
Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his
property, by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect nor
suffering any Sect to invade those of another."

															"9. Because the proposed establishment is a departure from that
generous policy which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and
oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our
country and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a
melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of
holding forth an asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of
persecution. It degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those
whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative
authority. Distant as it may be in its present form from the
Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the
first step, the other the last, in the career of intolerance. The
magnanimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions
must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek
some other haven where liberty and philanthropy in their due extent
may offer a more certain repose from his troubles."

															"10. Because it will have a like tendency to banish our
Citizens. The allurements presented by other situations are every
day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive to
emigration, by revoking the liberty Page 397 U. S. 725 which they now enjoy would be the same species of folly which
has dishonoured and depopulated flourishing kingdoms."

															"11. Because it will destroy that moderation and harmony which
the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has
produced amongst its several sects. Torrents of blood have been
spilt in the old world by vain attempts of the secular arm to
extinguish Religious discord by proscribing all difference in
Religious opinions. Time has at length revealed the true remedy.
Every relaxation of narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has
been tried, has been found to assuage the disease. The American
Theatre has exhibited proofs that equal and compleat liberty, if it
does not wholly eradicate it, sufficiently destroys its malignant
influence on the health and prosperity of the State. If, with the
salutary effects of this system under our own eyes, we begin to
contract the bonds of Religious freedom, we know no name that will
too severely reproach our folly. At least let warning be taken at
the first fruits of the threatened innovation. The very appearance
of the Bill has transformed that 'Christian forbearance, love and
charity' which of late mutually prevailed into animosities and
jealousies which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not
be dreaded should this enemy to the public quiet be armed with the
force of a law?"

															"12. Because the policy of the bill is adverse to the diffusion
of the light of Christianity. The first wish of those who enjoy
this precious gift ought to be that it may be imparted to the whole
race of mankind. Compare the number of those who have as yet
received it with the number still remaining under the dominion of
false Religions, and how small is the former. Does the policy of
the Bill tend to lessen the disproportion? No; it at once
discourages those who are strangers to the light of [revelation]
from coming into the Region Page 397 U. S. 726 of it, and countenances by example the nations who continue in
darkness in shutting out those who might convey it to them. Instead
of leveling as far as possible every obstacle to the victorious
progress of truth, the Bill, with an ignoble and unchristian
timidity, would circumscribe it with a wall of defence against the
encroachments of error."

															"13. Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions acts
obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens tend to enervate the
laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be
difficult to execute any law which is not generally deemed
necessary or salutary, what must be the case where it is deemed
invalid and dangerous? and what may be the effect of so striking an
example of impotency in the Government, on its general
authority."

															"14. Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy
ought not to be imposed without the clearest evidence that it is
called for by a majority of citizens, and no satisfactory method is
yet proposed by which the voice of the majority in this case may be
determined, or its influence secured. 'The people of the respective
counties are indeed requested to signify their opinion respecting
the adoption of the Bill to the next Session of Assembly.' But the
representation must be made equal before the voice either of the
Representatives or of the Counties will be that of the people. Our
hope is that neither of the former will, after due consideration,
espouse the dangerous principle of the Bill. Should the event
disappoint us, it will still leave us in full confidence that a
fair appeal to the latter will reverse the sentence against our
liberties."

															"15. Because, finally, 'the equal right of every citizen to the
free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of
conscience' is held by the same tenure with all our other rights.
If we recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we
weigh its importance, it cannot Page 397 U. S. 727 be less dear to us; if we consult the Declaration of those
rights which pertain to the good people of Virginia as the 'basis
and foundation of Government,' it is enumerated with equal
solemnity, or rather studied emphasis. Either, then, we must say,
that the will of the Legislature is the only measure of their
authority, and that, in the plenitude of this authority, they may
sweep away all our fundamental rights, or that they are bound to
leave this particular right untouched and sacred. Either we must
say that they may controul the freedom of the press, may abolish
the trial by jury, may swallow up the Executive and Judiciary
Powers of the State; nay, that they may despoil us of our very
right to suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent and
hereditary assembly, or we must say that they have no authority to
enact into law the Bill under consideration. We the subscribers say
that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such
authority. And, that no effort may be omitted on our part against
so dangerous an usurpation, we oppose to it this remonstrance,
earnestly praying, as we are in duty bound, that the Supreme
Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom it is
addressed, may, on the one hand, turn their councils from every act
which would affront his holy prerogative or violate the trust
committed to them, and, on the other, guide them into every measure
which may be worthy of his [blessing, may re]dound to their own
praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the
prosperity, and the Happiness of the Commonwealth."

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															N.Y.Real Prop.Tax Law § 420, subd. 1 (Supp. 1969-1970).

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															In the oral argument in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 , the
following colloquy took place between MR. JUSTICE BLACK and counsel
John L. Franklin:

															"MR. JUSTICE BLACK. Do I understand you to take the position
that, if the State of Illinois wanted to contribute five million
dollars a year to religion, they could do so, so long as they
provided the same to every faith?"

															"MR. FRANKLIN. Yes, and the State of Illinois does contribute
five million dollars annually to religious faiths, equally, and
more than five million dollars, and has during its entire
history."

															"MR. JUSTICE BLACK. How does it do it?"

															"MR. FRANKLIN. By tax exemptions specifically granted to
religious organizations."

															"MR. JUSTICE BLACK. Your position is that they could grant five
million dollars a year to religion, if they wanted to, out of the
taxpayer's money, so long as they treated all faiths the same?"

															"MR. FRANKLIN. Yes, Your Honor. That is our interpretation of
the meaning of the first clause of the First Amendment."

															J. O'Neill, Religion and Education under the Constitution 225
(1949).

															[ Footnote 4/3 ] See Appendix I to this dissent, post, p. 397 U. S.
716 .

															[ Footnote 4/4 ] See Appendix II to this dissent, post, p. 397 U. S.
719 .

															[ Footnote 4/5 ] See H. Eckenrode, Separation of Church and State in
Virginia, c. V (1910).

															[ Footnote 4/6 ]

															Annals of Cong. 434, 729-1.

															[ Footnote 4/7 ] 397
U.S. 664 fn4/1|>N. 1, supra. [ Footnote 4/8 ]

															The Brookings Institution, Report on a Survey of Administration
in Iowa: The Revenue System 33 (1933).

															[ Footnote 4/9 ]

															This inequality, some argue, is pronounced when it comes to aid
to parochial schools, now run mainly by the Catholic Church. See G. Cogdell, What Price Parochiaid? 670 (1970).

															[ Footnote 4/10 ]

															H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 210, pt. 1, 53d Cong., 2d Sess.,
489-490.

															[ Footnote 4/11 ] Id. at 490

															[ Footnote 4/12 ]

															Fleet, Madison's "Detatched Memoranda," 3 Wm. & Mary Q. (3d
ser.) 534, 551, 555 (1946).

															[ Footnote 4/13 ] See Zollmann, Tax Exemptions of American Church
Property, 14 Mich.L.Rev. 646, 655-656 (1916).

															The New York Supreme Court in In re Mayor of New York, 11 Johns. 77, 81, said:

															"As the church property is not, nor is likely soon to be, either
appropriated to renting or exposed to sale, but is devoted
exclusively to religious purposes, the benefit resulting to it, by
the improvement of Nassau-street, must be small in comparison with
that of other property, and it, therefore, ought not to contribute
in the like proportion. It may be considered, possibly, as
benefited by rendering the access to the churches more convenient,
and the places more pleasant and salubrious by the freer
circulation of the air. This may have some influence on the pew
rents, and the ground may become permanently more valuable. These,
however, appear to be small and remote benefits to property so
circumstanced, and to charge the churches equally with adjoining
private property is unreasonable and extravagant, and, on this
point, the report ought to be sent back to the commissioner for
revisal and correction."

															[ Footnote 4/14 ]

															U.S. News & World Report, May 4, 1970, p. 34.

															[ Footnote 4/15 ]

															These total include all types of federal aid -- physical plants,
dormitory construction, laboratories, libraries, lunch programs,
fellowships and scholarships, etc.

															Of the total federal outlays for education, only two-fifths are
for programs administered by the Office of Education; other parts
of the Department of HEW account for one-fifth. The rest of the
outlays are distributed among 24 federal departments and agencies,
of which the largest shares are accounted for by the Department of
Defense, the Veterans Administration, the National Science
Foundation, and the Office of Economic Opportunity. U.S. Bureau of
the Budget, Special Analysis, Federal Education Program, 1971
Budget, Special Analysis I, pt. 2, p. 115 (Feb.1970).

															[ Footnote 4/16 ]

															Fleet, supra, 397
U.S. 664 fn4/12|>n. 12, at 557-558.

															[ Footnote 4/17 ]

															In 1875, President Grant, in his State of the Union Message,
referred to the vast amounts of untaxed church property:

															"In 1850, I believe, the church property of the United States
which paid no tax, municipal or State, amounted to about
$83,000,000. In 1860, the amount had doubled; in 1875, it is about
$1,000,000,000. By 1900, without check, it is safe to say this
property will reach a sum exceeding $3,000,000,000. So vast a sum,
receiving all the protection and benefits of Government without
bearing its proportion of the burdens and expenses of the same,
will not be looked upon acquiescently by those who have to pay the
taxes. In a growing country, where real estate enhances so rapidly
with time, as in the United States, there is scarcely a limit to
the wealth that may be acquired by corporations, religious or
otherwise, if allowed to retain real estate without taxation. The
contemplation of so vast a property as here alluded to, without
taxation, may lead to sequestration, without constitutional
authority and through blood."

															"I would suggest the taxation of all property equally, whether
church or corporation, exempting only the last resting place of the
dead and possibly, with proper restrictions, church edifices."

															9 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 4288-4289 (1897).

															[ Footnote 4/18 ]

															Footnote omitted.