NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
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Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 23–367

															_________________

															Starbucks Corporation, PETITIONER v. M.
Kathleen McKinney, Regional Di- rector of region 15 of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor
Relations Board

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit

															[June 13, 2024]

															Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The National Labor Relations Board can bring
in-house enforcement proceedings against employers and labor unions
for engaging in unfair labor practices. Section 10( j) of the
National Labor Relations Act authorizes the Board to seek a
preliminary injunction from a federal district court while these
administrative enforcement proceedings take place. The question in
this case is whether the traditional four-factor test for a
preliminary injunction articulated in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7 (2008), governs the Board’s requests under §10( j). We
conclude that it does, and therefore vacate and remand.

															I

															A

															The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
prohibits employers and unions from engaging in certain “unfair
labor practice[s].” 49Stat. 452, 29 U. S. C. §§158(a),
(b). The National Labor Relations Board enforces that prohibition.
§160(a). The Board’s “authority kicks in when a person files a
charge with the agency alleging that” an employer or labor union
has engaged in an unfair labor practice. Glacier Northwest,
Inc. v. Teamsters , 598 U.S. 771, 775 (2023) (citing 29
CFR §101.2 (2021)). A regional Director then investigates the
charge. §101.4 (2023). And, “[i]f the charge appears to have
merit,” the director institutes a formal action against the
offending party by issuing an administrative complaint. §101.8.
This complaint triggers adjudicatory proceedings within the agency,
first before an administrative law judge, and then before the Board
itself. See 29 U. S. C. §§160(b), (c); 29 CFR §§101.10 to
101.12. A federal court of appeals may review the Board’s final
order, if an aggrieved party seeks judicial review or if the Board
seeks enforcement of its order. 29 U. S. C.
§§160(e)–(f ). On review, the Board’s findings of fact are
“conclusive” “if supported by substantial evidence.” Ibid. Because the Board’s administrative proceedings
take years, Congress vested the Board with authority to seek a
preliminary injunction in federal court while the proceedings
unfold. Section 10( j) of the NLRA provides that, “upon
issuance of a complaint,” the Board may “petition any United States
district court . . . for appropriate temporary relief.”
§160( j). A district court considering a §10( j) petition
may “grant to the Board such temporary relief . . . as it
deems just and proper.” Ibid. B

															Starbucks is the world’s largest coffeehouse
chain, with over 34,000 locations. In 2022, six employees at a
Memphis, Tennessee, location announced plans to unionize the store
and formed an organizing committee. Several employees, including
some members of the organizing committee, invited a news crew from
a local television station to visit the store after hours to
promote their unionizing effort. The news crew interviewed the
employees about their reasons for organizing and what they hoped to
achieve. The next day, store management learned about the media
event and launched an investigation. Starbucks ultimately fired
multiple employees involved with the media event for violating
company policy. These included the members of the organizing
committee who were in attendance. The union coordinating with the
employees filed charges with the Board. The union alleged that
Starbucks unlawfully interfered with the employees’ right to
unionize and discriminated against union supporters, in violation
of 29 U. S. C. §§158(a)(1) and (3). After investigating
the allegations, the Board issued a complaint against Starbucks.
The regional Director then filed a §10( j) petition in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee,
seeking a preliminary injunction that would, among other things,
require Starbucks to reinstate the fired employees.

															To assess whether the Board was entitled to a
preliminary injunction under §10( j), the District Court
applied the two-part test established by Sixth Circuit precedent.
That test asks whether “there is reasonable cause to believe that
unfair labor practices have occurred,” and whether injunctive
relief is “just and proper.” McKinney v. Ozburn-Hessey
Logistics, LLC , 875 F.3d 333, 339 (2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Board could establish reasonable cause by
simply showing that its “legal theory [was] substantial and not
frivolous.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). And,
relief would be just and proper if it were “necessary to return the
parties to [the] status quo pending the Board’s proceedings in
order to protect the Board’s remedial powers under the NLRA.” Ibid . (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this
standard, the District Court granted an injunction to the Board.
2022 WL 5434206, *12 (WD Tenn., Aug. 18, 2022). And, applying
Circuit precedent, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 77 F. 4th 391,
400–401 (2023).[ 1 ]*

															Not all courts evaluate petitions for
§10( j) injunctions under the standard applied by the Sixth
Circuit. Some courts instead apply the four-part test for
preliminary injunctions articulated in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 555 U.S.
7 . See, e . g ., Hooks v. Nexstar
Broadcasting, Inc. , 54 F. 4th 1101, 1114 (CA9 2022); McKinney v. Southern Bakeries, LLC , 786 F.3d 1119,
1122 (CA8 2015); Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co. , 570
F.3d 534, 542–543 (CA4 2009); Bloedorn v. Francisco
Foods, Inc. ¸ 276 F.3d 270 , 286 (CA7 2001). That familiar standard requires a
plaintiff to make a clear showing that “he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter , 555 U. S., at 20, 22. We granted certiorari to
resolve the Circuit split about what standard governs the Board’s
requests for preliminary injunctions under §10( j), 601
U. S. ___ (2024), and now vacate and remand.

															II

															Section 10( j) authorizes a federal
district court “to grant . . . such temporary relief
. . . as it deems just and proper” during the pendency of
the Board’s administrative proceedings. §160( j). When
Congress empowers courts to grant equitable relief, there is a
strong presumption that courts will exercise that authority in a
manner consistent with traditional principles of equity. For
preliminary injunctions, the four criteria identified in Winter encompass the relevant equitable principles. Nothing
in §10( j) displaces the presumption that those traditional
principles govern. We therefore conclude that district courts must
use the traditional four-part test when evaluating the Board’s
request for a preliminary injunction under §10( j).

															A

															A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary”
equitable remedy that is “never awarded as of right.” Winter , 555 U. S., at 24. Its purpose “is merely to
preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the
merits can be held.” University of Tex. v. Camenisch , 451 U.S.
390 , 395 (1981). The default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must make a clear showing that “he is likely
to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter , 555 U. S., at 20, 22. “These
commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which injunctions
are sought in the federal courts reflect a ‘practice with a
background of several hundred years of history.’ ” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo , 456
U.S. 305 , 313 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles , 321 U.S.
321 , 329 (1944)); see also Georgia v. Brailsford ,
2 Dall. 402, 406 (1792) (opinion of Iredell, J.); id ., at
407 (opinion of Blair, J.).

															When interpreting a statute that authorizes
federal courts to grant preliminary injunctions, “we do not lightly
assume that Congress has intended to depart from established
principles.” Romero-Barcelo , 456 U. S., at 313; see
also Porter v. Warner Holding Co. , 328 U.S.
395 , 398 (1946). This Court has consistently employed this
presumption when interpreting a wide variety of statutes that
authorize preliminary and permanent injunctions. See, e . g ., United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Cooperative , 532 U.S.
483 , 496 (2001) (Controlled Substances Act); Romero-Barcelo , 456 U. S., at 312–313 (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act); Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell , 480 U.S.
531 , 542–544 (1987) (Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act); Hecht , 321 U. S., at 329 (Emergency
Price Control Act). Thus, absent a clear command from Congress,
courts must adhere to the traditional four-factor test.

															Nothing in §10( j)’s text overcomes the
presumption that the four traditional criteria govern a
preliminary-injunction request by the Board. Section 10( j)
authorizes a district court “to grant to the Board such temporary
relief . . . as it deems just and proper.” We do not
understand the statutory directive to grant relief when the
district court “deems” it “just and proper” to jettison the normal
equitable rules. To the contrary, the phrase “just and proper”
invokes the discretion that courts have traditionally exercised
when faced with requests for equitable relief. As a matter of
ordinary meaning, the word “just” means “fair” and “righteous.”
Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 1334 (1942); see also
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1348 (2d ed. 1934)
(“righteous” and “equitable”). And, the word “proper” means
“appropriate,” “suitable,” or “correct.” Id., at 1983.
Crafting “fair” and “appropriate” equitable relief necessitates the
exercise of discretion—the hallmark of traditional equitable
practice. See Hecht , 321 U. S., at 329 (“The essence of
equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the
particular case”); see also 77 F. 4th, at 403 (Readler, J.,
concurring); Kinney v. Pioneer Press , 881 F.2d 485,
491 (CA7 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Section 10( j) tells the
district court to do what’s ‘just and proper’, which we read as a
statement that traditional rules govern”).

															This Court’s precedent also counsels against
reading §10( j) to supplant the traditional equitable
principles governing injunctions. In Hecht , the Court
interpreted the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942’s instruction
that an injunction “shall be granted” if the Office of Price
Administration shows that a defendant “has engaged or is about to
engage” in a prohibited act. 321 U. S., at 322 (quoting ch.
26, 56Stat. 23, 50 U. S. C. App. §925 (1940 ed., Supp.
II)). This language is far more favorable to the agency than
§10( j) because it seemingly suggests that courts must grant injunctive relief where the agency makes the required
showing. Yet, the Court refused to read the Emergency Price Control
Act to create such “a major departure from th[e] long tradition” of
equity. 321 U. S., at 330. The Court reasoned that “if
Congress desired to make such an abrupt departure from traditional
equity practice . . . , it would have made its desire
plain.” Ibid. If the Emergency Price Control Act did not
displace the presumption that traditional equitable principles
apply, then §10( j)’s discretion-inviting directive to grant
injunctive relief as district courts “dee[m] just and proper” does
not either.

															Finally, §10( j)’s text bears no
resemblance to the language that Congress has employed when it has
altered the normal equitable rules. Some statutes increase the
burden for obtaining an injunction. Another provision in the NLRA
itself, for example, makes it harder for the Government to obtain
an injunction against union strikes and lockouts by requiring a
showing that the strike or lockout “affects an entire industry or a
substantial part thereof ” and “imperil[s] the national health
or safety.” 29 U. S. C. §178(a). And, courts evaluating
preliminary-injunction requests under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act must “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public
safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.” 18
U. S. C. §3626(a)(2). Other statutes expressly relieve
the party moving for an injunction from showing that he can satisfy
one of the traditional criteria. For instance, plaintiffs alleging
trademark violations are entitled to “a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm . . . upon a finding of likelihood of
success on the merits.” 132Stat. 2208, 15 U. S. C.
§1116(a). Unlike these statutes, §10( j) omits any specific
instruction that suggests Congress altered the traditional
equitable rules. It simply invites courts to grant equitable relief
where they deem it “just and proper.” And, in exercising this
discretionary authority, courts must “be guided by sound
[equitable] principles.” Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S.
418 , 434 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															In sum, because nothing in §10( j)’s text
overcomes the presumption that traditional equitable principles
govern, district courts considering the Board’s request for a
preliminary injunction must apply the Winter framework,
which embodies those traditional principles.

															B

															Rather than contest that traditional equitable
criteria govern, the Board recasts the dispute as one about how
statutory context informs the application of those criteria. The
Board highlights that Congress made the Board, not federal courts,
responsible for adjudicating charges of unfair labor practices in
the first instance and that courts of appeals must review the
Board’s final decisions deferentially. According to the Board,
these contextual considerations require district courts evaluating
§10( j) petitions to apply the traditional criteria in a less
exacting way, and the Sixth Circuit’s reasonable-cause standard
appropriately accounts for context. The partial dissent also
asserts that “a district court’s preliminary look at the merits” of
a §10(j) petition “should be far less searching than normal” for
similar reasons. Post , at 14 (Jackson, J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment, and dissenting in part). We
disagree.

															The reasonable-cause standard goes far beyond
simply fine tuning the traditional criteria to the §10( j)
context—it substantively lowers the bar for securing a preliminary
injunction by requiring courts to yield to the Board’s preliminary
view of the facts, law, and equities. Nowhere is this more evident
than with what the Board, as movant, must show about the merits of
its claims. Under the traditional standard, the Board would have to
make a clear showing that it “is likely to succeed on the merits.” Winter , 555 U. S., at 20. And, in assessing that
likelihood, a district court must evaluate any factual conflicts or
difficult questions of law. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M.
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.3 (3d ed. 2013). By
contrast, the Board may obtain a §10( j) injunction under the
reasonable-cause standard by merely showing “reasonable cause to
believe that unfair labor practices have occurred.” Ozburn-Hessey Logistics , 875 F. 3d, at 339 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Board “need not convince the court of
the validity of [its] theory of liability, as long as the theory is
substantial and not frivolous.” Gottfried v. Frankel ,
818 F.2d 485, 493 (CA6 1987). And, “[i]n reviewing the supporting
facts, a district court may not resolve conflicting evidence or
make credibility determinations.” 77 F. 4th, at 397.

															There is an obvious difference between having
the Board show that it is “likely” to succeed on the merits and
having it show only that its theory of the case is “substantial and
not frivolous,” without having to convince the court that its
theory is likely meritorious. In fact, it is hard to imagine how
the Board could lose under the reasonable-cause test if courts
deferentially ask only whether the Board offered a minimally
plausible legal theory, while ignoring conflicting law or facts. As
Judge Readler explained, if the reasonable-cause standard were
“applied in the traditional civil litigation setting, any complaint
that could withstand Rule 12(b)(6) would automatically be deserving
of injunctive relief as well, rendering the court more a spectator
than a referee when it comes to matters of equity.” Id. , at
408 (concurring opinion). Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts that apply
the reasonable-cause standard freely acknowledge that the threshold
merits showing is “significantly lower than a requirement to show
. . . ‘likelihood of success’ ” under the
traditional standard. Overstreet v. El Paso Disposal,
L.P. , 625 F.3d 844, 851, n. 10 (CA5 2010); see also Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel, Inc. , 859 F.2d 26,
29 (CA6 1988) (characterizing the Board’s burden to show reasonable
cause as “relatively insubstantial” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

															Section 10( j)’s statutory context does not
compel this watered-down approach to equity. The Board and the
partial dissent are correct that §10( j) proceedings are
different from ordinary preliminary-injunction proceedings insofar
as the Board, not the district court, will adjudicate the claims in
the first instance. But, they do not explain why this difference
should matter. The Board suggests that district courts risk
supplanting its adjudicatory authority by conducting an independent
assessment of the merits and equitable factors. But, no matter how
searching the district court’s merits inquiry or what evidence it
considers or credits, the Board remains free to reach its own legal
conclusions and develop its own record in its administrative
proceedings. See Camenisch , 451 U. S., at 395. Also,
since irreparable harm and the other equitable factors are not part
of the unfair-labor-practice claim, the district court’s assessment
of those factors is completely irrelevant to the Board’s
adjudicatory authority.

															The Board and the partial dissent also reason
that district courts should apply a deferential standard because
the Board’s final decisions are reviewed deferentially by a court
of appeals. But, none of the views advanced in a §10( j)
petition represent the Board’s formal position—they are simply the
preliminary legal and factual views of the Board’s in-house
attorneys who investigated and initiated the administrative
complaint. And, deference to what is “nothing more than an agency’s
convenient litigating position” is “entirely inappropriate.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital , 488 U.S.
204 , 213 (1988). The Board’s attempt to salvage the
reasonable-cause standard using statutory context thus fails.

															III

															For the foregoing reasons, we hold that
district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated
in Winter when considering the Board’s requests for a
preliminary injunction under §10( j). We therefore vacate the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 *Other courts have applied a
similar two-part test when assessing §10( j) petitions. See, e . g ., Kinard v. Dish Network Corp. , 890
F.3d 608, 612 (CA5 2018); Chester v. Grane Healthcare
Co. , 666 F.3d 87, 89–90 (CA3 2011). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 23–367

															_________________

															Starbucks Corporation, PETITIONER v. M.
Kathleen McKinney, Regional Di- rector of region 15 of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor
Relations Board

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the sixth circuit

															[June 13, 2024]

															Justice Jackson, concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment, and dissenting in part.

															“When Congress entrusts to an equity court the
enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment, it
must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of
equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory
purposes.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc. , 361 U.S.
288 , 291–292 (1960). Accordingly, when interpreting a statute
that authorizes equitable relief, like a preliminary injunction,
this Court typically employs what amounts to a two-part inquiry
focused on congressional intent. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles , 321
U.S. 321 , 328–331 (1944). First, we determine whether Congress
has stripped courts of their traditional equitable discretion by “a
clear and valid legislative command.” Porter v. Warner
Holding Co. , 328 U.S.
395 , 398 (1946). Second, if no such clear command is found, we
look to the statutory context to assess how courts should exercise
their equitable discretion “ ‘as conditioned by the
necessities of the public interest which Congress has sought to
protect.’ ” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo , 456 U.S.
305 , 320 (1982) (quoting Hecht , 321 U. S., at
330).

															Today, the Court correctly applies the first
step, but ignores the second. I agree with the majority that
nothing in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) clearly strips
courts of their equitable discretion to determine whether to issue
a so-called §10(j) injunction. And I concur in the conclusion that
we should vacate and remand for the Sixth Circuit to reevaluate
this case under our traditional four-factor test for assessing
requests for preliminary injunctions. But I cannot join the
majority in ignoring the choices Congress has made in the NLRA
about how courts should exercise their discretion in light of the
National Labor Relations Board’s authority over labor disputes.
Because the majority chooses the simplicity of unfettered judicial
discretion over the nuances of Congress’s direction, I respectfully
dissent in part.

															I

															The question in this case is how district
courts should evaluate the Board’s request for a preliminary
injunction in light of Congress’s intentions. See 29
U. S. C. §160(j) (authorizing a district court to issue
“such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper”). The majority suggests a sharp dichotomy: Either courts
retain all of their equitable discretion, or the Board gets undue
deference. See ante, at 8–10. But, “[w]hen Congress invokes
the Chancellor’s conscience to further transcendent legislative
purposes, what is required is the principled application of
standards consistent with those purposes,” not unbridled equitable
discretion, “ ‘which varies like the Chancellor’s
foot.’ ” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S.
405 , 417 (1975) (alteration omitted).

															Our Hecht case is instructive, for it
establishes the framework we have long used to assess whether an
injunction authorized by a statute should issue.[ 1 ] In Hecht , the Court was asked to
determine whether the Emergency Price Control Act’s direction that
an injunction “ ‘shall be granted’ ” after a violation
was found displaced a court’s equitable discretion. 321 U. S.,
at 322. As the majority acknowledges, after finding no clear
indication that Congress intended to displace equitable discretion,
the Hecht Court concluded that the answer was no. See ante, at 7.[ 2 ]

															But Hecht did not end there. The Court
emphasized that the mere fact that the Emergency Price Control Act
lacked an “unequivocal statement” displacing courts’ equitable
discretion did not “imply that courts should administer [the Act]
grudgingly.” 321 U. S., at 329–330. Instead, the Court
explained, courts should see themselves as partners of the agency
that administered the Act. Congress “entrusted” each “with a share
of . . . responsibility” for effectuating its goals. Id ., at 331. In other words, “[c]ourt and agency are the
means adopted to attain the prescribed end, and so far as their
duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words should
be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action.” Id., at 330. Therefore, a court’s “discretion
. . . must be exercised in light of the large objectives
of the Act.” Id. , at 331. Hecht ’s two-step framework is still in
use today. We only rarely find that a statute clearly displaces
courts’ equitable discretion. See, e . g ., TVA v. Hill , 437 U.S.
153 , 193–195 (1978) (finding such displacement in the
Endangered Species Act). So, in most cases in which equitable
relief is authorized by statute, the movant must contend with the
court’s equitable authority. In statutes that involve preliminary
injunctive relief, that means the party seeking relief “must
establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 555 U.S.
7 , 20 (2008).

															Even so, under the Hecht framework, we
have consistently held that courts’ exercise of equitable
discretion is informed by congressional intent. Put simply, “a
court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore the judgment of Congress,
deliberately expressed in legislation.’ ” United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative , 532 U.S.
483 , 497 (2001) (quoting Virginian R. Co. v. Railway
Employees , 300 U.S.
515 , 551 (1937)). For each of the four factors, then, courts
must look to the choices made by Congress for guidance. See Oakland Cannabis , 532 U. S., at 497 (“ ‘Once
Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is . . . for the courts to
enforce them when enforcement is sought’ ” (quoting Hill , 437 U. S., at 194)).

															II

															A

															Here, the choices Congress has made regarding
how labor disputes are to be resolved—including its decision to
authorize preliminary injunctive relief in some circumstances—are
clear and comprehensive. As briefly explained below, Congress has
long sought to contain the unbounded exercise of judicial
discretion to issue injunctions in the context of labor disputes,
leaving the resolution of those particular conflicts primarily in
the hands of the Board. See Brief for Service Employees
International Union as Amicus Curiae 4–11.

															That is for good reason. To put it bluntly,
courts exercising their equitable discretion amidst labor disputes
today do so against the backdrop of an ignominious history of
abuse. See generally F. Frankfurter & N. Greene, The Labor
Injunction (1930). “In the early part of [the 20th] century, the
federal courts generally were regarded as allies of management in
its attempt to prevent the organization and strengthening of labor
unions.” Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks , 398 U.S.
235 , 250 (1970). “Injunctions figured in virtually every
railroad strike; in most strikes in which industrial unionism,
‘amalgamation,’ or ‘federation’ was at issue; in most major
organizing and recognition strikes, boycotts, closed shop or
sympathy strikes or anti-union/open-shop lockouts of significant
magnitude; and in a small but still significant and growing portion
of ordinary mine-run strikes.” W. Forbath, The Shaping of the
American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1152 (1989).
“[I]n this industrial struggle the injunction became a potent
weapon that was wielded against the activities of labor groups.” Boys Markets , 398 U. S., at 250 . Congress reacted to this antidemocratic
“ ‘government by injunction’ ” by seeking to cabin
courts’ power to intervene. Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake
Valley Farm Products, Inc. , 311 U.S.
91 , 102 (1940). Its initial attempt, in the Clayton Act of
1914, was unsuccessful, due in large part to judicial frustration
of congressional intent. See BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB , 536 U.S.
516 , 543 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). Its next attempt, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,
was impossible to ignore. There, Congress “deprive[d] the courts of
jurisdiction to issue an injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except” under specified
circumstances and with particular procedural checks. New Negro
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. , 303 U.S.
552 , 561–562 (1938); see also Marine Cooks v. Panama
S. S. Co. , 362 U.S.
365 , 369 (1960) (“The language [of the Norris-LaGuardia Act] is
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the federal courts
out of the labor injunction business except in very limited
circumstances”).

															Three years later, in 1935, Congress passed the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §151 et
seq . The Act aimed to “eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce” by
protecting workers’ rights. §151. To achieve this aim, the NLRA
codified “[e]mployees[’] . . . right to
self-organization,” to form and join unions, to collectively
bargain, and to strike. §157. It also made it unlawful for
employers and unions to engage in particular unfair labor
practices. See §158. Employers, for example, cannot interfere with
employees’ efforts to organize a union or engage in collective
bargaining. See §§157, 158(a). Similarly, unions cannot, inter
alia , coerce employees to join a union or refuse to engage in
collective bargaining. See §158(b).

															Notably, though, Congress did not leave it to
courts to protect the rights established in the NLRA. See Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB , 313 U.S.
177 , 193 (1941). Instead, Congress created an expert agency,
the National Labor Relations Board, to investigate, adjudicate, and
stop unfair labor practices. See 29 U. S. C. §160(a). The
agency is headed by a five-member board that is charged with
resolving unfair labor practice cases, see §153(a); the enforcement
role is occupied by a General Counsel, see §153(d). The General
Counsel is charged with investigating and prosecuting unfair labor
practice cases, as well as overseeing Regional Offices that carry
out much of the day-to-day work of enforcing labor law and policy.
See ibid. ; see also NLRB v. Food & Commercial
Workers , 484 U.S.
112 , 117–118 (1987).

															To evaluate and remedy unfair labor practices,
the Board follows a four-step process. See ante, at 2.
First, a charge is filed and investigated, with parties generally
permitted to present evidence and arguments related to the alleged
violation. See 29 CFR §§101.2, 101.4 (2023). Second, if the
investigation yields sufficient information to show an unfair labor
practice, the Regional Director can issue a complaint. See §101.8.
Third, an administrative law judge holds a hearing and issues a
decision on the merits of the complaint, which a party can then
appeal to the Board. See §§101.10 to 101.12. Finally, if the unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint are sustained, the Board
can seek enforcement of the order, and any aggrieved party can seek
review, in a federal court of appeals. See 29 U. S. C.
§

															B

															Crucially for present purposes, Congress
recognized that delay in vindicating labor rights “during the
‘notoriously glacial’ course of NLRB proceedings” can lead to their
defeat. Kinney v. Pioneer Press , 881 F.2d 485, 491
(CA7 1989). This case is illustrative of the problem. In February
2022, Starbucks fired five of six members of an organizing
committee, along with two other union-aligned workers, just as a
campaign for unionization was building momentum. The Board took up
the workers’ complaint soon after. Now, more than two years later,
their case remains pending.

															To respond to situations such as this one,
Congress gave the Board specific power to seek preliminary
injunctive relief. These injunctions are generally referred to as
“§10(j) injunctions,” named after the section of the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947 in which they were originally introduced. See 29 U. S.
C. §160(j). There is broad consensus about why Congress allowed the
Board to seek §10(j) injunctions. As summarized in the Senate
Report on Taft-Hartley:

															“Time is usually of the essence in [labor
disputes], and consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board
hearing and order, followed many months later by an enforcing
decree of the circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving
the desired objectives—the prompt elimination of the obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and encouragement of the practice and
procedure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence we have
provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and not in
vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in
the case of all types of unfair labor practices.” S. Rep. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1947).

															See also, e.g. , Kinney , 881 F. 2d,
at 488 (Easterbrook, J.) (quoting this passage); Miller v. California Pacific Medical Center , 19 F.3d 449 , 455, n. 3 (CA9 1994) (en banc) (same); Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit and Allied Garment
Workers’ Union , 494 F.2d 1230, 1241–1242 (CA2 1974) (Friendly,
J.) (discussing similar legislative history).

															In short, Congress designed §10(j) “ ‘as a
means of preserving or restoring the status quo as it existed
before the onset of unfair labor practices’ ” so that the
Board’s ultimate ability to remedy an unfair labor practice would
not be impeded. NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc. , 83 F.3d 1559 , 1575 (CA7 1996).

															In addition to authorizing §10(j) injunctions,
Congress made two other pertinent choices in the statute. First, it
granted the Board power to seek a §10(j) injunction. See 29
U. S. C. §160(j). No private party has authority to seek
§10(j) relief. See Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers
Co. , 348 U.S.
511 , 517 (1955). And, by the statute’s own terms, power is left
to the Board itself, rather than the General Counsel or another
member of the prosecutorial branch of the agency. That is unlike a
closely related section of the statute, §10( l ), which
authorizes the relevant “officer or regional attorney” to file for
preliminary relief in cases involving certain unfair labor
practices by unions. See 29 U. S. C. §160( l ).
Second, Congress granted the Board discretion to determine
whether or not to seek preliminary injunctive relief. See §160(j).
Thus, the Board need only seek §10(j) relief when it deems doing so
appropriate or necessary. Again, by contrast, requests for relief
under §10( l ) are mandatory once an investigation yields
“reasonable cause to believe” that an unfair labor practice has
occurred. See §160( l ).

															The NLRA does not specify how the Board should
exercise its discretion to seek §10(j) injunctions. But the agency
has crafted an extensive, and strikingly deliberative, standard
operating procedure. See Brief for Respondent 4 (citing Office of
the General Counsel, NLRB, Section 10(j) Manual (Mar. 2020)).
First, the Regional Director must submit a written memorandum to
the General Counsel explaining why temporary relief is appropriate
in a given case. Second, the General Counsel must review the
memorandum and determine whether the request for relief is
warranted. Third, if the General Counsel determines that a §10(j)
injunction should be sought, then she must present a recommendation
to the Board. Fourth, and finally, the Board must either accept or
reject the recommendation. It is only after the Board approves the
filing of a request for a §10(j) injunction in this fashion that
the General Counsel or relevant Regional Director files that
request in federal district court.

															When the district court receives the Board’s
application for a §10(j) injunction, the statutory scheme kicks
back in. “Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon
shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief
or restraining order as it deems just and proper.” 29
U. S. C. §160(j). If granted, a §10(j) injunction returns
workers, unions, and employers to the status quo as it existed
before the alleged NLRA violation. See Electro-Voice, Inc. ,
83 F. 3d, at 1575.

															III

															A

															What standard should district courts use to
decide whether granting the Board’s §10(j) request for interim
relief is “just and proper”? That is the question this case
presents, and as I previously explained, we use Hecht’ s
framework to answer. So, first, we determine whether Congress has
clearly displaced courts’ equitable discretion. And, second, if no
such clear statement exists, we evaluate how that discretion should
be exercised in light of Congress’s choices in the NLRA.

															At step one, the parties here do not dispute
that §10(j)’s text, context, and legislative history lack the clear
congressional intent required to preclude district courts from
exercising equitable discretion. See Brief for Petitioner 15; Brief
for Respondent 9. Also, no Circuit, not even the Sixth Circuit
below, holds that §10(j) deprives district courts of their
equitable discretion. See, e . g ., Gottfried v. Frankel , 818 F.2d 485, 493–494 (CA6 1987) (“The granting of
injunctive relief under this ‘just and proper’ standard, is a
matter committed to judicial discretion” (some internal quotation
marks omitted)). I agree with the majority that courts faced with a
Board petition for a §10(j) injunction should evaluate that request
using all four factors in our established Winter test. See Winter , 555 U. S., at 20; see also ante, at
6.

															The remaining question— Hecht’ s second
step—is the more challenging one. To the extent the majority
addresses it at all, it has done an insufficient job of explaining how district courts’ equitable discretion is channeled by
Congress’s choices within the NLRA.

															The fact that this needs to be done is
uncontroversial. “Obviously,” Starbucks says, “ ‘statutory
context is relevant to the consideration of equitable
relief.’ ” Reply Brief 10 (quoting Brief for Respondent 15);
see also Brief for Respondent 9; Reply Brief 2; Tr. of Oral Arg.
20–24, 33–35. And every relevant Circuit, including those that use
the standard four-factor test, understands district courts’
equitable discretion to issue a §10(j) injunction has to be
informed by the statutory context of the NLRA. See, e . g ., Pye v. Sullivan Bros. Printers,
Inc. , 38 F.3d 58 , 63 (CA1 1994); Hoffman v. Inn Credible
Caterers, Ltd. , 247 F.3d 360 , 368 (CA2 2001); Chester v. Grane
Healthcare Co. , 666 F.3d 87, 98–100 (CA3 2011); Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co. , 570 F.3d 534, 543 (CA4 2009); McKinney v. Creative Vision Resources, LLC , 783 F.3d
293, 296–297 (CA5 2015); Ahearn v. Jackson Hospital
Corp. , 351 F.3d 226 , 237–239 (CA6 2003); Bloedorn v. Francisco Foods, Inc. , 276 F.3d 270 , 287–288 (CA7 2001); McKinney v. Southern Bakeries, LLC , 786 F.3d 1119, 1122–1123 (CA8 2015); Miller , 19 F. 3d, at 459–460; Sharp v. Webco
Industries, Inc. , 225 F.3d 1130 , 1133–1136 (CA10 2000); NLRB v. Hartman
and Tyner, Inc. , 714 F.3d 1244, 1249–1250 (CA11 2013). But the
Court today provides little helpful guidance on this front.

															B

															Given our precedents and the statute’s text,
the interaction between Congress’s choices in the NLRA and a
district court’s equitable assessment of a request for §10(j)
relief is straightforward for three of the four equitable
factors.

															To show irreparable harm, the Board must
establish that its ability to remedy a violation of labor rights
will likely be precluded absent interim relief. See, e . g ., Frankl v. HTH Corp. , 650 F.3d
1334, 1362 (CA9 2012) (“In the context of the NLRA, permitting an
alleged unfair labor practice to reach fruition and thereby render
meaningless the Board’s remedial authority is irreparable harm”
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). When evaluating
the balance of the equities, district courts may consider harms to
an opposing party, but they are prohibited from crediting a party’s
desire to continue engaging in an alleged violation of the NLRA.
See Oakland Cannabis , 532 U. S., at 498 (“[W]hen a
court of equity exercises its discretion, it may not consider the
advantages and disadvantages of nonenforcement of the statute”).
When addressing the public interest, courts must defer to
Congress’s articulation of that interest in the NLRA itself. See 29
U. S. C. §151 (“It is . . . the policy of the
United States to . . . encourag[e] . . .
collective bargaining and . . . protec[t] the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing”); see also Virginian R. Co. , 300 U. S., at 552 (“The fact that
Congress has indicated its purpose . . . is in itself a
declaration of public interest and policy which should be
persuasive in inducing courts to give relief ”).

															The final factor—the likelihood of success on
the merits—is more difficult to evaluate. That factor can be
articulated in “a bewildering variety of formulations,” but, at
core, it asks courts to predict how likely it is that a party
seeking preliminary relief will ultimately prevail on the merits of
their claims. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure §2948.3, p. 197 (3d ed. 2013); see also id., at 201 (“All courts agree that a plaintiff must present
a prima facie case but need not show a certainty of winning”
(footnote omitted)). In my view, three aspects of the NLRA’s scheme
should inform this evaluation.

															First, as described above, the NLRA makes the
Board, not district courts, the primary adjudicator of labor
disputes and the central expositor of labor policy. See 29
U. S. C. §160(a); see also Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB , 437 U.S.
483 , 500 (1978) (“It is the Board on which Congress conferred
the authority to develop and apply fundamental national labor
policy”); Garner v. Teamsters , 346 U.S.
485 , 490 (1953) (“Congress . . . confide[d] primary
interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and
specially constituted tribunal,” the Board). This means that,
unlike in the typical preliminary injunction context, the district
court is not making a predictive judgment about how it will rule on
the merits itself. Instead, the court is predicting the future
decision of the Board. See Miller , 19 F. 3d, at 460; Bloedorn , 276 F. 3d, at 288.

															Second, as I previously explained, §10(j)
empowers the Board—acting in its adjudicatory capacity—to seek
injunctive relief. 29 U. S. C. §160(j); see also Brief
for Respondent 28–29; Tr. of Oral Arg. 50, 63–64. When it does so,
the Board is not acting as a party to the underlying
dispute.[ 3 ] We also have
evidence that the Board’s screening process for determining when to
seek a §10(j) injunction is exceedingly rigorous: Of the roughly
20,000 unfair labor practice charges filed last year, the Board
authorized the filing of a petition for §10(j) relief only 14
times . See Brief for Respondent 39. This means that, by the
time the district court gets a (rare) §10(j) request, the Board has
already deemed an unfair labor charge likely meritorious, and has
determined that preservation of the status quo is needed to
facilitate its own likely judgment.

															Finally, the NLRA gives federal courts only a
limited role in reviewing the Board’s decisions. In the court of
appeals, the Board’s factual findings are “conclusive” if supported
by substantial evidence. See §§160(e), (f ). We have also long
recognized that the Board’s legal interpretations are to be
accorded “considerable deference.” NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, Inc. , 465 U.S.
822 , 829 (1984); see also Ford Motor Co. (Chicago Stamping
Plant) v. NLRB , 441 U.S.
488 , 497 (1979) (“Of course, the judgment of the Board is
subject to judicial review; but if its construction of the statute
is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because
the courts might prefer another view”); NLRB v. United
Ins. Co. of America , 390 U.S.
254 , 260 (1968) (same for “application of law to facts”). What
is more, absent highly unusual circumstances, district courts play
no role in the review process at all. See §160(e) (allowing the
Board to file enforcement orders in district courts only if “all
the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in
vacation”).

															These three features of the statutory scheme
necessarily mean that a district court’s preliminary look at the
merits when considering the Board’s petition for interim relief
under §10(j) should be far less searching than normal. A §10(j)
injunction request simply does not present the district court with
an opportunity to wade into the midst of an ongoing labor dispute
(over which it otherwise has no say) and offer its own take about
how the merits should be decided. Instead, in deference to
Congress’s choices as codified in the NLRA, the district court’s
task is much simpler: to evaluate a petition for a §10(j)
injunction in a manner that accounts for the statutory scheme
authorizing such relief and the district court’s proper role within
it. Thus, so long as the Board has presented “some evidence to
support the unfair labor practice charge, together with an arguable
legal theory,” a district court should find this final factor
satisfied. Miller , 19 F. 3d, at 460.

															C

															The majority’s contrary conclusion on the
likelihood-of-success factor is based on various misrepresentations
about the Board’s authority under the NLRA. For example, in
addition to mistakenly consigning the Board to the status of a mere
party movant, see n. 3, supra, the majority misstates
the Board’s role in seeking §10(j) relief generally, see ante, at 10 (“[T]he views advanced in a §10(j) petition
. . . are simply the preliminary legal and factual views
of the Board’s in-house attorneys who investigated and initiated
the administrative complaint”). Similarly, the majority
misrepresents the Board’s arguments in this case regarding how the
statutory scheme informs district courts’ analysis. Far from
failing to explain the relevance of district courts’ lack of
jurisdiction over labor disputes, ibid. , the Board has
offered a detailed argument, consistent with our precedent and the
longstanding decisions of the lower courts, for why this structural
feature of the NLRA is important and why it might well be
dispositive of the likelihood of success analysis. See Brief for
Respondent 26–29, 35–36; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 35–36. The
majority also completely misses the significance of the limited
role that federal courts of appeal play in reviewing the Board’s
decisions. See ante, at 2, 10.

															Unfortunately, today’s decision appears to be
another installment in a series of labor cases in which this Court
has failed “to heed Congress’s intent with respect to the Board’s
primary role in adjudicating labor disputes.” Glacier Northwest,
Inc. v. Teamsters , 598 U.S. 771, 814 (2023) (Jackson,
J., dissenting). And, like its earlier decisions, “[t]he Court’s
ruling is likely to cause considerable confusion among the lower
courts,” which have been for decades exercising their equitable
discretion informed by the NLRA. Ibid. I recognize that, as
a practical matter, the majority’s decision here may make little
difference, since requests for §10(j) relief are rare. But that
fact is more a function of the Board’s gatekeeping role than
anything else. Now that the Court has concluded the Board’s
authorization to seek §10(j) interim relief is of no moment, the
Board may find it unnecessary to play the gatekeeping role Congress
designed for it in this context. As a result, today’s decision
might force not just courts, but also the Board, to disregard
Congress’s direction.

															*  *  *

															A petition for §10(j) relief serves a
straightforward, but significant purpose: “to preserve the NLRB’s
remedial power while the Board resolves an unfair labor practice
charge.” Miller , 19 F. 3d, at 452. Today, the majority
casts a district court’s decision regarding a §10(j) request as one
that invokes the full sweep of a court’s traditional equitable
discretion—without regard for the Board’s authority or the
statutory scheme that authorizes courts to issue such interim
relief in the first place. In doing so, “the Court unnecessarily
and casually substitutes the chancellor’s clumsy foot for the rule
of law.” Weinberger , 456 U. S., at 335 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). I am loath to bless this aggrandizement of judicial
power where Congress has so plainly limited the discretion of the
courts, and where it so clearly intends for the expert agency it
has created to make the primary determinations about both merits
and process. Notes 1 As Judge Friendly
explained, “Mr. Justice Douglas’ classic opinion in Hecht ”
is “a decision of such widely recognized significance that it is
not unreasonable to attribute knowledge of it to at least some of
the framers of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 in which [§]10(j)
. . . originated.” Danielson v. Joint Bd. of
Coat, Suit and Allied Garment Workers’ Union, 494 F.2d 1230,
1240 (CA2 1974). 2 The majority correctly
states this holding, but its analysis of Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321 (1944), misleadingly suggests a near-unobtainable standard
for displacement. Hecht does not hold that the statutory
phrase “shall be granted” is insufficiently clear to displace a
court’s equitable discretion. Contra, ante, at 6–7 . Rather, the Hecht Court found that such language was “less
mandatory than a literal reading might suggest” because of two
other indicia of congressional intent. 321 U. S., at 328.
First, the statute itself gave courts discretion to enter an
injunction “or other order,” as they deemed fit. Ibid . And,
second, the legislative history suggested that courts should retain
their equitable discretion to provide the relief “ ‘proper in
the circumstances of each particular case.’ ” Id ., at
329 (quoting S. Rep. No. 931, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 10
(1942)). 3 If it were, then, of
course, the majority would be correct to observe that the Board
should have to demonstrate the merits of its claims under the
traditional test. See ante, at 8. What the majority fails to
adequately address is the unique position of the Board when it
seeks a §10(j) injunction, per Congress’s directives. Unlike other
similar movants for interim relief, the Board is the
decider of the merits of the underlying dispute. So all that
the Board is requesting from the district court is a legally
enforceable means of preserving the status quo until it can render
its decision.