U.S. Supreme Court Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986) Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc. No. 84-1602 Argued December 3,
1985 Decided June 25, 1986 477
U.S. 242 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 , it was held that, in a libel suit brought by a
public official (extended by later cases to public figures), the
First Amendment requires the plaintiff to show that, in publishing
the alleged defamatory statement, the defendant acted with actual
malice. It was further held that such actual malice must be shown
with "convincing clarity." Respondents, a nonprofit corporation
described as a "citizens' lobby" and its founder, filed a libel
action in Federal District Court against petitioners, alleging that
certain statements in a magazine published by petitioners were
false and derogatory. Following discovery, petitioners moved for
summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
asserting that, because respondents were public figures, they were
required to prove their case under the New York Times
standards, and that summary judgment was proper because actual
malice was absent as a matter of law in view of an affidavit by the
author of the articles in question that they had been thoroughly
researched and that the facts were obtained from numerous sources.
Opposing the motion, respondents claimed that an issue of actual
malice was presented because the author had relied on patently
unreliable sources in preparing the articles. After holding that New York Times applied because respondents were
limited-purpose public figures, the District Court entered summary
judgment for petitioners on the ground that the author's
investigation and research and his reliance on numerous sources
precluded a finding of actual malice. Reversing as to certain of
the allegedly defamatory statements, the Court of Appeals held that
the requirement that actual malice be proved by clear and
convincing evidence need not be considered at the summary judgment
stage, and that, with respect to those statements, summary judgment
had been improperly granted, because a jury could reasonably have
concluded that the allegations were defamatory, false, and made
with actual malice. Held: The Court of Appeals did not apply the correct
standard in reviewing the District Court's grant of summary
judgment. Pp. 477 U. S.
247 -257.

															(a) Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. At
the summary judgment stage, the trial judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and Page 477 U. S. 243 determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no such issue unless
there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a
jury to return a verdict for that party. In essence, the inquiry is
whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law. Pp. 477 U. S.
247 -252.

															(b) A trial court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a
case such as this must be guided by the New York Times "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in determining whether
a genuine issue of actual malice exists, that is, whether the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual
malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Pp. 477 U. S.
252 -256.

															(c) A plaintiff may not defeat a defendant's properly supported
motion for summary judgment in a libel case such as this one
without offering any concrete evidence from which a reasonable jury
could return a verdict in his favor, and by merely asserting that
the jury might disbelieve the defendant's denial of actual malice.
The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue
of fact, but the plaintiff is not thereby relieved of his own
burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury
verdict. Pp. 477 U. S.
256 -257.

															241 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 746 F.2d 1563, vacated and remanded.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 477 U. S. 257 .
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J.,
joined, post, p. 477 U. S.
268 . Page 477 U. S. 244 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 , 376 U. S.
279 -280 (1964), we held that, in a libel suit brought by
a public official, the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to
show that, in publishing the defamatory statement, the defendant
acted with actual malice -- "with knowledge that it was false, or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." We held
further that such actual malice must be shown with "convincing
clarity." Id. at 376 U. S.
285 -286. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 , 418 U. S. 342 (1974). These New York Times requirements we have since
extended to libel suits brought by public figures as well. See,
e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.
S. 130 (1967).

															This case presents the question whether the
clear-and-convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a
court ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which New York
Times applies. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that that requirement need not be
considered at the summary judgment stage. 241 U.S.App.D.C. 246, 746
F.2d 1563 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1134 (1985),
because that holding was in conflict with decisions of several
other Courts of Appeals, which had held that the New York
Times requirement of clear and convincing evidence must be
considered on a motion for summary judgment. [ Footnote 1 ] We now reverse. I Respondent Liberty Lobby, Inc., is a not-for-profit corporation
and self-described "citizens' lobby." Respondent Willis Carto is
its founder and treasurer. In October, 1981, Page 477 U. S. 245 The Investigator magazine published two articles: "The Private
World of Willis Carto" and "Yockey: Profile of an American Hitler."
These articles were introduced by a third, shorter article entitled
"America's Neo-Nazi Underground: Did Mein Kampf Spawn Yockey's
Imperium, a Book Revived by Carto's Liberty Lobby?" These articles
portrayed respondents as neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and
Fascist.

															Respondents filed this diversity libel action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that
some 28 statements and 2 illustrations in the 3 articles were false
and derogatory. Named as defendants in the action were petitioner
Jack Anderson, the publisher of The Investigator, petitioner Bill
Adkins, president and chief executive officer of the Investigator
Publishing Co., and petitioner Investigator Publishing Co.
itself.

															Following discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56. In their motion, petitioners asserted that,
because respondents are public figures, they were required to prove
their case under the standards set forth in New York
Times. Petitioners also asserted that summary judgment was
proper because actual malice was absent as a matter of law. In
support of this latter assertion, petitioners submitted the
affidavit of Charles Bermant, an employee of petitioners and the
author of the two longer articles. [ Footnote 2 ] In this affidavit, Bermant stated that he had
spent a substantial amount of time researching and writing the
articles, and that his facts were obtained from a wide variety of
sources. He also stated that he had at all times believed, and
still believed, that the facts contained in the articles were
truthful and accurate. Attached to this affidavit was an appendix
in which Bermant detailed the sources for each of the statements
alleged by respondents to be libelous. Page 477 U. S. 246 Respondents opposed the motion for summary judgment, asserting
that there were numerous inaccuracies in the articles and claiming
that an issue of actual malice was presented by virtue of the fact
that, in preparing the articles, Bermant had relied on several
sources that respondents asserted were patently unreliable.
Generally, respondents charged that petitioners had failed
adequately to verify their information before publishing.
Respondents also presented evidence that William McGaw, an editor
of The Investigator, had told petitioner Adkins before publication
that the articles were "terrible" and "ridiculous."

															In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the District Court
first held that respondents were limited-purpose public figures,
and that New York Times therefore applied. [ Footnote 3 ] The District Court then held that
Bermant's thorough investigation and research and his reliance on
numerous sources precluded a finding of actual malice. Thus, the
District Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of
petitioners.

															On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed as to 21 and reversed
as to 9 of the allegedly defamatory statements. Although it noted
that respondents did not challenge the District Court's ruling that
they were limited-purpose public Page 477 U. S. 247 figures, and that they were thus required to prove their case
under New York Times, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that, for the purposes of summary judgment, the requirement
that actual malice be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
rather than by a preponderance of the evidence, was irrelevant: to
defeat summary judgment, respondents did not have to show that a
jury could find actual malice with "convincing clarity." The court
based this conclusion on a perception that to impose the greater
evidentiary burden at summary judgment

															"would change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a
search for a minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an
evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the
weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts as
well."

															241 U.S.App.D.C. at 253, 746 F.2d at 1570. The court then held,
with respect to nine of the statements, that summary judgment had
been improperly granted because "a jury could reasonably conclude
that the . . . allegations were defamatory, false, and made with
actual malice." Id. at 260, 746 F.2d at 1577. II A Our inquiry is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that the heightened evidentiary requirements that apply to proof of
actual malice in this New York Times case need not be
considered for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Rule
56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary
judgment

															"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

															By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will
not defeat an otherwise properly supported Page 477 U. S. 248 motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.

															As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts
are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude
the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant
or unnecessary will not be counted. See generally 10A C.
Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §
2725, pp. 93-95 (1983). This materiality inquiry is independent of
and separate from the question of the incorporation of the
evidentiary standard into the summary judgment determination. That
is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive
law, it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are
critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs. Any proof or
evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law are not
germane to this inquiry, since materiality is only a criterion for
categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal
elements of the claim, and not a criterion for evaluating the
evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes.

															More important for present purposes, summary judgment will not
lie if the dispute about a material fact is "genuine," that is, if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. In First National Bank of Arizona v.
Cities Service Co., 391 U. S. 253 (1968), we affirmed a grant of summary judgment for an antitrust
defendant where the issue was whether there was a genuine factual
dispute as to the existence of a conspiracy. We noted Rule 56(e)'s
provision that a party opposing a properly supported motion for
summary judgment

															"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial."

															We observed further that

															"[i]t is true that the issue of material fact required by Rule
56(c) to be present to entitle a party to proceed to Page 477 U. S. 249 trial is not required to be resolved conclusively in favor of
the party asserting its existence; rather, all that is required is
that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be
shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing
versions of the truth at trial."

															391 U.S. at 391 U. S.
288 -289. We went on to hold that, in the face of the
defendant's properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff could not rest on his allegations of a conspiracy to get
to a jury without "any significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint." Id. at 391 U. S.
290 .

															Again, in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970), the Court emphasized that the availability of summary
judgment turned on whether a proper jury question was presented.
There, one of the issues was whether there was a conspiracy between
private persons and law enforcement officers. The District Court
granted summary judgment for the defendants, stating that there was
no evidence from which reasonably minded jurors might draw an
inference of conspiracy. We reversed, pointing out that the moving
parties' submissions had not foreclosed the possibility of the
existence of certain facts from which "it would be open to a jury .
. . to infer from the circumstances" that there had been a meeting
of the minds. Id. at 398 U. S.
158 -159.

															Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same
language in describing genuine factual issues under Rule 56, but it
is clear enough from our recent cases that at the summary judgment
stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial. As Adickes, supra, and Cities Service, supra, indicate, there is no issue for
trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving
party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Cities
Service, supra, at 391 U. S.
288 -289. If the evidence is merely colorable, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967)
(per curiam), or is not significantly probative, Page 477 U. S. 250 Cities Service, supra, at 391 U. S. 290 ,
summary judgment may be granted.

															That this is the proper focus of the inquiry is strongly
suggested by the Rule itself. Rule 56(e) provides that, when a
properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, [ Footnote 4 ] the adverse party "must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." [ Footnote 5 ] And, as we
noted above, Rule 56(c) provides that the trial judge shall then
grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. There is no requirement that the trial judge make
findings of fact. [ Footnote 6 ]
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining
whether there is the need for a trial -- whether, in other words,
there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party.

															Petitioners suggest, and we agree, that this standard mirrors
the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a
verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Brady v. Southern R.
Co., 320 U. S. 476 , 320 U. S.
479 -480 (1943). If reasonable minds could differ as to
the import of the evidence, however, Page 477 U. S. 251 a verdict should not be directed. Wilkerson v.
McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53 , 336 U. S. 62 (1949). As the Court long ago said in Improvement Co. v.
Munson , 14 Wall. 442, 81 U. S. 448 (1872), and has several times repeated:

															"Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a
jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party
having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a
character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in
favor of that party. Formerly it was held that, if there was what
is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case,
the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but recent decisions
of high authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in
every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a
preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally
no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could
properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon
whom the onus of proof is imposed."

															(Footnotes omitted.) See also 89 U.
S. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 89 U. S.
120 -121 (1875); Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S. 301 , 164 U. S. 307 (1896); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.
S. 333 , 288 U. S. 343 (1933).

															The Court has said that summary judgment should be granted where
the evidence is such that it "would require a directed verdict for
the moving party." Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 321 U. S. 620 , 321 U. S. 624 (1944). And we have noted that the "genuine issue" summary judgment
standard is "very close" to the "reasonable jury" directed verdict
standard:

															"The primary difference between the two motions is procedural;
summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided
on documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are made at
trial and decided on the evidence that has been admitted." Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.
S. 731 , 461 U. S. 745 ,
n. 11 (1983). In essence, though, the inquiry under each is the
same: whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission Page 477 U. S. 252 to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law. B Progressing to the specific issue in this case, we are convinced
that the inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the
substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the
trial on the merits. If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil
case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on
the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself
not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or
the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict
for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge's inquiry, therefore,
unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a
verdict --

															"whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Munson, supra, at 81 U. S.
448 .

															In terms of the nature of the inquiry, this is no different from
the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case,
where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the
trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.
S. 307 , 443 U. S.
318 -319 (1979). Similarly, where the First Amendment
mandates a "clear and convincing" standard, the trial judge, in
disposing of a directed verdict motion, should consider whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude, for example, that the
plaintiff had shown actual malice with convincing clarity. Page 477 U. S. 253 The case for the proposition that a higher burden of proof
should have a corresponding effect on the judge when deciding
whether to send the case to the jury was well made by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (1972), which overruled United States v.
Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592 (1944), a case holding that the
standard of evidence necessary for a judge to send a case to the
jury is the same in both civil and criminal cases, even though the
standard that the jury must apply in a criminal case is more
demanding than in civil proceedings. Speaking through Judge
Friendly, the Second Circuit said:

															"It would seem at first blush -- and we think also at second --
that more 'facts in evidence' are needed for the judge to allow
[reasonable jurors to pass on a claim] when the proponent is
required to establish [the claim] not merely by a preponderance of
the evidence but . . . beyond a reasonable doubt."

															464 F.2d at 242. The court could not find a

															"satisfying explanation in the Feinberg opinion why the
judge should not place this higher burden on the prosecution in
criminal proceedings before sending the case to the jury." Ibid. The Taylor court also pointed out that
almost all the Circuits had adopted something like Judge
Prettyman's formulation in Curley v. United States, 160
F.2d 229, 232-233 (1947):

															"The true rule, therefore, is that a trial judge, in passing
upon a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, must determine
whether, upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the
jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw
justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly
conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If he concludes that,
upon the evidence, there must be such a doubt in a reasonable mind,
he must grant the motion; or, to state it another way, if there is
no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted. If he
concludes that either of the Page 477 U. S. 254 two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is
fairly possible, he must let the jury decide the matter."

															This view is equally applicable to a civil case to which the
"clear and convincing" standard applies. Indeed, the Taylor court thought that it was implicit in this Court's
adoption of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for certain
kinds of cases that there was a "concomitant duty on the judge to
consider the applicable burden when deciding whether to send a case
to the jury." 464 F.2d at 243. Although the court thought that this
higher standard would not produce different results in many cases,
it could not say that it would never do so.

															Just as the "convincing clarity" requirement is relevant in
ruling on a motion for directed verdict, it is relevant in ruling
on a motion for summary judgment. When determining if a genuine
factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel suit brought by
a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum
and quality of proof necessary to support liability under New
York Times. For example, there is no genuine issue if the
evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient
caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.

															Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must
view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden. This conclusion is mandated by the nature of
this determination. The question here is whether a jury could
reasonably find either that the plaintiff proved his case
by the quality and quantity of evidence required by the governing
law or that he did not. Whether a jury could reasonably
find for either party, however, cannot be defined except by the
criteria governing what evidence would enable the jury to find for
either the plaintiff or the defendant: it makes no sense to say
that a jury could reasonably find for either party without some Page 477 U. S. 255 benchmark as to what standards govern its deliberations and
within what boundaries its ultimate decision must fall, and these
standards and boundaries are in fact provided by the applicable
evidentiary standards.

															Our holding that the clear-and-convincing standard of proof
should be taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions
does not denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes
trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the
facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is
ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.
The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 398 U. S.
158 -159. Neither do we suggest that the trial courts
should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment, or
that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where
there is reason to believe that the better course would be to
proceed to a full trial. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249 (1948).

															In sum, we conclude that the determination of whether a given
factual dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the
substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case. This is
true at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages.
Consequently, where the New York Times "clear and
convincing" evidence requirement applies, the trial judge's summary
judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be
whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that
evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff
or the defendant. Thus, where the factual dispute concerns actual
malice, clearly a material issue in a New York Times case,
the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the
evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding Page 477 U. S. 256 either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not. [ Footnote 7 ] III Respondents argue, however, that, whatever may be true of the
applicability of the "clear and convincing" standard at the summary
judgment or directed verdict stage, the defendant should seldom, if
ever, be granted summary judgment where his state of mind is at
issue and the jury might disbelieve him or his witnesses as to this
issue. They rely on Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., 368 U. S. 464 (1962), for this proposition. We do not understand Poller, however, to hold that a plaintiff may defeat a defendant's properly
supported motion for summary judgment in a conspiracy or libel
case, for example, without offering any concrete evidence from
which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor, and
by merely asserting that the jury might, and legally could,
disbelieve the defendant's denial of a conspiracy or of legal
malice. The movant has the burden of showing that there is no
genuine issue of fact, but the plaintiff is not thereby relieved of
his own burden of producing, in turn, evidence that would support a
jury verdict. Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Based on that Rule, Cities Service, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 290 ,
held that the plaintiff could not defeat the properly supported
summary judgment motion of a defendant charged with a conspiracy
without offering "any significant probative evidence tending to
support the complaint." As we have recently said, "discredited
testimony Page 477 U. S. 257 is not [normally] considered a sufficient basis for drawing a
contrary conclusion." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485 , 466 U. S. 512 (1984). Instead, the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in
order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
This is true even where the evidence is likely to be within the
possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a
full opportunity to conduct discovery. We repeat, however, that the
plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only present
evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If
he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a
trial. IV In sum, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be
guided by the New York Times "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of
actual malice exists -- that is, whether the evidence presented is
such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been
shown with convincing clarity. Because the Court of Appeals did not
apply the correct standard in reviewing the District Court's grant
of summary judgment, we vacate its decision and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ] See, e.g., Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375,
381 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981); Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940 (CA2), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839
(1980); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210 (CA7
1976).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The short, introductory article was written by petitioner
Anderson, and relied exclusively on the information obtained by
Bermant.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.
S. 323 , 418 U. S. 351 (1974), this Court summarized who will be considered to be a public
figure to whom the New York Times standards will
apply:

															"[The public figure] designation may rest on either of two
alternative bases. In some instances, an individual may achieve
such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure
for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual
voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public
controversy, and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited
range of issues. In either case, such persons assume special
prominence in the resolution of public questions."

															The District Court found that respondents, as political
lobbyists, are the second type of political figure described by the Gertz court -- a limited-purpose public figure. See
also Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications Inc., 201 U.S.App.D.C.
301, 306, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292, cert. denied. 449 U.S. 898
(1980).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Our analysis here does not address the question of the initial
burden of production of evidence, placed by Rule 56 on the party
moving for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
post, p. 477 U. S. 317 .
Respondents have not raised this issue here, and, for the purposes
of our discussion, we assume that the moving party has met
initially the requisite evidentiary burden.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															This requirement in turn is qualified by Rule 56(f)'s provision
that summary judgment be refused where the nonmoving party has not
had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to
his opposition. In our analysis here, we assume that both parties
have had ample opportunity for discovery.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In many cases, however, findings are extremely helpful to a
reviewing court.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Our statement in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.
S. 111 , 443 U. S. 120 ,
n. 9 (1979), that proof of actual malice "does not readily lend
itself to summary disposition" was simply an acknowledgment of our
general reluctance

															"to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel
and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional
protections embodied in the substantive laws." Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 , 465 U. S.
790 -791 (1984).

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. The Court today holds that "whether a given factual dispute requires submission to a jury
must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply
to the case," ante at 477 U. S. 255 .
[ Footnote 2/1 ] In my view, the
Court's analysis is deeply flawed, Page 477 U. S. 258 and rests on a shaky foundation of unconnected and unsupported
observations, assertions, and conclusions. Moreover, I am unable to
divine from the Court's opinion how these evidentiary standards are
to be considered, or what a trial judge is actually supposed to do
in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.

															To support its holding that, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a trial court must consider substantive evidentiary
burdens, the Court appropriately begins with the language of Rule
56(c), which states that summary judgment shall be granted if it
appears that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." The Court then purports to restate this Rule, and asserts
that

															"summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material
fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Ante at 477 U. S. 248 .
No direct authority is cited for the proposition that, in order to
determine whether a dispute is "genuine" for Rule 56 purposes, a
judge must ask if a "reasonable" jury could find for the nonmoving
party. Instead, the Court quotes from First
National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co. , 391
U.S. Page 477 U. S. 259 253, 391 U. S.
288 -289 (1968), to the effect that a summary judgment
motion will be defeated if

															"sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be
shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing
versions of the truth at trial," ante at 477 U. S. 249 ,
and that a plaintiff may not, in defending against a motion for
summary judgment, rest on mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings. After citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970), for the unstartling proposition that "the availability of
summary judgment turn[s] on whether a proper jury question [is]
presented," ante at 477 U. S. 249 ,
the Court then reasserts, again with no direct authority, that, in
determining whether a jury question is presented, the inquiry is
whether there are factual issues "that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party." Ante at 477 U. S. 250 .
The Court maintains that this summary judgment inquiry "mirrors"
that which applies in the context of a motion for directed verdict
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a):

															"whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law." Ante at 477 U. S.
251 -252.

															Having thus decided that a "genuine" dispute is one which is not
"one-sided," and one which could "reasonably" be resolved by a
"fair-minded" jury in favor of either party, ibid., the
Court then concludes:

															"Whether a jury could reasonably find for either party, however,
cannot be defined except by the criteria governing what evidence
would enable the jury to find for either the plaintiff or the
defendant: it makes no sense to say that a jury could reasonably
find for either party without some benchmark as to what standards
govern its deliberations and within what boundaries its ultimate
decision must fall, and these standards and boundaries are, in
fact, provided by the applicable evidentiary standards." Ante at 477 U. S.
254 -255. Page 477 U. S. 260 As far as I can discern, this conclusion, which is at the heart
of the case, has been reached without the benefit of any support in
the case law. Although, as noted above, the Court cites Adickes and Cities Service, those cases simply do
not stand for the proposition that, in ruling on a summary judgment
motion, the trial court is to inquire into the "one-sidedness" of
the evidence presented by the parties. Cities Service involved the propriety of a grant of summary judgment in favor of a
defendant alleged to have conspired to violate the antitrust laws.
The issue in the case was whether, on the basis of the facts in the
record, a jury could infer that the defendant had entered
into a conspiracy to boycott. No direct evidence of the conspiracy
was produced. In agreeing with the lower courts that the circumstantial evidence presented by the plaintiff was
insufficient to take the case to the jury, we observed that there
was "one fact" that petitioner had produced to support the
existence of the illegal agreement, and that that single fact could
not support petitioner's theory of liability. Critically, we
observed that

															"[t]he case at hand presents peculiar difficulties because the
issue of fact crucial to petitioner's case is also an issue of law,
namely the existence of a conspiracy."

															391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 289 .
In other words, Cities Service is, at heart, about whether
certain facts can support inferences that are, as a matter of
antitrust law, sufficient to support a particular theory of
liability under the Sherman Act. Just this Term, in discussing
summary judgment in the context of suits brought under the
antitrust laws, we characterized both Cities Service and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.
S. 752 (1984), as cases in which " antitrust law limit[ed] the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous
evidence. . . ." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 , 475 U. S. 588 (1986) (emphasis added). Cities Service thus provides no
authority for the conclusion that Rule 56 requires a trial court to
consider whether direct evidence produced by the parties is
"one-sided." To the contrary, in Matsushita, the most
recent Page 477 U. S. 261 case to cite and discuss Cities Service, we stated that
the requirement that a dispute be "genuine" means simply that there
must be more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." 475 U.S. at 475 U. S. 586 .
[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Nor does Adickes, also relied on by the Court, suggest
in any way that the appropriate summary judgment inquiry is whether
the evidence overwhelmingly supports one party. Adickes, like Cities Service, presented the question of whether a
grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant on a conspiracy
count was appropriate. The plaintiff, a Page 477 U. S. 262 white schoolteacher, maintained that employees of defendant
Kress conspired with the police to deny her rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to serve her in one of its
lunchrooms simply because she was white and accompanied by a number
of black schoolchildren. She maintained, among other things, that
Kress arranged with the police to have her arrested for vagrancy
when she left the defendant's premises. In support of its motion
for summary judgment, Kress submitted statements from a deposition
of one of its employees asserting that he had not communicated or
agreed with the police to deny plaintiff service or to have her
arrested, and explaining that the store had taken the challenged
action not because of the race of the plaintiff, but because it was
fearful of the reaction of some of its customers if it served a
racially mixed group. Kress also submitted affidavits from the
Chief of Police and the arresting officers denying that the store
manager had requested that petitioner be arrested, and noted that,
in the plaintiff's own deposition, she conceded that she had no
knowledge of any communication between the police and any Kress
employee, and was relying on circumstantial evidence to support her
allegations. In opposing defendant's motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff stated that defendant, in its moving papers, failed to
dispute an allegation in the complaint, a statement at her
deposition, and an unsworn statement by a Kress employee, all to
the effect that there was a policeman in the store at the time of
the refusal to serve, and that it was this policeman who
subsequently made the arrest. Plaintiff argued that this sequence
of events "created a substantial enough possibility of a conspiracy
to allow her to proceed to trial. . . ." 398 U.S. at 398 U. S.
157 .

															We agreed, and therefore reversed the lower courts, reasoning
that Kress

															"did not carry its burden because of its failure to foreclose
the possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store while
petitioner was awaiting service, and that this policeman reached an
understanding with some Page 477 U. S. 263 Kress employee that petitioner not be served." Ibid. Despite the fact that none of the materials
relied on by plaintiff met the requirements of Rule 56(e), we
stated nonetheless that Kress failed to meet its initial burden of
showing that there was no genuine dispute of a material fact.
Specifically, we held that, because Kress failed to negate
plaintiff's materials suggesting that a policeman was in fact in
the store at the time of the refusal to serve,

															"it would be open to a jury . . . to infer from the
circumstances that the policeman and a Kress employee had a
'meeting of the minds,' and thus reached an understanding that
petitioner should be refused service." Id. at 398 U. S.
158 .

															In Adickes, we held that a jury might permissibly infer
a conspiracy from the mere presence of a policeman in a restaurant.
We never reached, and did not consider, whether the evidence was
"one-sided," and, had we done so, we clearly would have had to
affirm, rather than reverse, the lower courts, since, in that case,
there was no admissible evidence submitted by petitioner, and a
significant amount of evidence presented by the defendant tending
to rebut the existence of a conspiracy. The question we did reach
was simply whether, as a matter of conspiracy law, a jury would be
entitled, again, as a matter of law, to infer from the presence of
a policeman in a restaurant the making of an agreement between that
policeman and an employee. Because we held that a jury was entitled
so to infer, and because the defendant had not carried its initial
burden of production of demonstrating that there was no evidence
that there was not a policeman in the lunchroom, we concluded that
summary judgment was inappropriate.

															Accordingly, it is surprising to find the case cited by the
majority for the proposition that "there is no issue for trial
unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party
for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Ante at 477 U. S. 249 .
There was, of course, no admissible evidence in Adickes favoring the nonmoving plaintiff; there was only
an Page 477 U. S. 264 unrebutted assertion that a Kress employee and a policeman were
in the same room at the time of the alleged constitutional
violation. Like Cities Service, Adickes suggests that, on
a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a trial court must
consider whether, as a matter of the substantive law of the
plaintiff's cause of action, a jury will be permitted to draw
inferences supporting the plaintiff's legal theory. In Cities
Service, we found, in effect, that the plaintiff had failed to
make out a prima facie case; in Adickes, we held
that the moving defendant had failed to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. In neither case is there any intimation
that a trial court should inquire whether plaintiff's evidence is
"significantly probative," as opposed to "merely colorable," or,
again, "one-sided." Nor is there in either case any suggestion
that, once a nonmoving plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case based on evidence satisfying Rule 56(e) that there
is any showing that a defendant can make to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment. Yet this is what the Court appears to hold,
relying, in part, on these two cases. [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															As explained above, and as explained also by JUSTICE REHNQUIST
in his dissent, see post at 477 U. S. 271 ,
I cannot agree that the authority cited by the Court supports its
position. In my view, the Court's result is the product of an
exercise Page 477 U. S. 265 akin to the child's game of "telephone," in which a message is
repeated from one person to another and then another; after some
time, the message bears little resemblance to what was originally
spoken. In the present case, the Court purports to restate the
summary judgment test, but, with each repetition, the original
understanding is increasingly distorted.

															But my concern is not only that the Court's decision is
unsupported; after all, unsupported views may nonetheless be
supportable. I am more troubled by the fact that the Court's
opinion sends conflicting signals to trial courts and reviewing
courts which must deal with summary judgment motions on a
day-to-day basis. This case is about a trial court's responsibility
when considering a motion for summary judgment, but in my view, the
Court, while instructing the trial judge to "consider" heightened
evidentiary standards, fails to explain what that means. In other
words, how does a judge assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a
"fair-minded" jury could "reasonably" decide? The Court provides
conflicting clues to these mysteries, which I fear can lead only to
increased confusion in the district and appellate courts.

															The Court's opinion is replete with boilerplate language to the
effect that trial courts are not to weigh evidence when deciding
summary judgment motions:

															"[I]t is clear enough from our recent cases that, at the summary
judgment stage, the judge's function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter. . . ." Ante at 477 U. S.
249 .

															"Our holding . . . does not denigrate the role of the jury. . .
. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn
in his favor." Ante at 477 U. S.
255 . Page 477 U. S. 266 But the Court's opinion is also full of language which could
surely be understood as an invitation -- if not an instruction --
to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror
would:

															"When determining if a genuine factual issue . . . exists . . a
trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum and
quality of proof necessary to support liability. . . . For
example, there is no genuine issue if the evidence presented in
the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence." Ante at 477 U. S. 254 (emphasis added).

															"[T]he inquiry . . . [is] whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury,
or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law." Ante at 477 U. S.
251 -252 (emphasis added).

															"[T]he judge must ask himself . . . whether a fair-minded jury
could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.
The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence
on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Ante at 477 U. S.
252 .

															I simply cannot square the direction that the judge "is not
himself to weigh the evidence" with the direction that the judge
also bear in mind the "quantum" of proof required and consider
whether the evidence is of sufficient "caliber or quantity" to meet
that "quantum." I would have thought that a determination of the
"caliber and quantity," i.e., the importance and value, of
the evidence in light of the "quantum," i.e., amount
"required," could only be performed by weighing the
evidence.

															If, in fact, this is what the Court would, under today's
decision, require of district courts, then I am fearful that this
new rule -- for this surely would be a brand new procedure -- will
transform what is meant to provide an expedited "summary" Page 477 U. S. 267 procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits. It is
hard for me to imagine that a responsible counsel, aware that the
judge will be assessing the "quantum" of the evidence he is
presenting, will risk either moving for or responding to a summary
judgment motion without coming forth with all of the evidence he
can muster in support of his client's case. Moreover, if the judge
on motion for summary judgment really is to weigh the evidence,
then, in my view, grave concerns are raised concerning the
constitutional right of civil litigants to a jury trial.

															It may well be, as JUSTICE REHNQUIST suggests, see post at 477 U. S.
270 -271, that the Court's decision today will be of
little practical effect. I, for one, cannot imagine a case in which
a judge might plausibly hold that the evidence on motion for
summary judgment was sufficient to enable a plaintiff bearing a
mere preponderance burden to get to the jury -- i.e., that
a prima facie case had been made out -- but insufficient
for a plaintiff bearing a clear-and-convincing burden to withstand
a defendant's summary judgment motion. Imagine a suit for breach of
contract. If, for example, the defendant moves for summary judgment
and produces one purported eyewitness who states that he was
present at the time the parties discussed the possibility of an
agreement, and unequivocally denies that the parties ever agreed to
enter into a contract, while the plaintiff produces one purported
eyewitness who asserts that the parties did in fact come to terms,
presumably that case would go to the jury. But if the defendant
produced not one, but 100 eyewitnesses, while the plaintiff stuck
with his single witness, would that case, under the Court's
holding, still go to the jury? After all, although the plaintiff's
burden in this hypothetical contract action is to prove his case by
a mere preponderance of the evidence, the judge, so the Court tells
us, is to "ask himself . . . whether a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Ante at 477 U. S. 252 .
Is there, in this hypothetical example, "a sufficient disagreement
to require submission Page 477 U. S. 268 to a jury," or is the evidence "so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law"? Ante at 477 U. S.
251 -252. Would the result change if the plaintiff's one
witness were now shown to be a convicted perjurer? Would the result
change if, instead of a garden variety contract claim, the
plaintiff sued on a fraud theory, thus requiring him to prove his
case by clear and convincing evidence?

															It seems to me that the Court's decision today unpersuasively
answers the question presented, and in doing so raises a host of
difficult and troubling questions for which there may well be no
adequate solutions. What is particularly unfair is that the mess we
make is not, at least in the first instance, our own to deal with;
it is the district courts and courts of appeals that must struggle
to clean up after us.

															In my view, if a plaintiff presents evidence which either
directly or by permissible inference (and these inferences are a
product of the substantive law of the underlying claim) supports
all of the elements he needs to prove in order to prevail on his
legal claim, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, and a defendant's motion for summary judgment must fail,
regardless of the burden of proof that the plaintiff must meet. In
other words, whether evidence is "clear and convincing," or proves
a point by a mere preponderance, is for the factfinder to
determine. As I read the case law, this is how it has been, and
because of my concern that today's decision may erode the
constitutionally enshrined role of the jury, and also undermine the
usefulness of summary judgment procedure, this is how I believe it
should remain.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court's holding today is not, of course, confined in its
application to First Amendment cases. Although this case arises in
the context of litigation involving libel and the press, the
Court's holding is that,

															"in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view
the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden." Ante at 477 U. S. 254 .
Accordingly, I simply do not understand why JUSTICE REHNQUIST,
dissenting, feels it appropriate to cite Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 (1984), and to remind the Court that we have consistently refused
to extend special procedural protections to defendants in libel and
defamation suits. The Court today does nothing of the kind. It
changes summary judgment procedure for all litigants, regardless of
the substantive nature of the underlying litigation.

															Moreover, the Court's holding is not limited to those cases in
which the evidentiary standard is "heightened," i.e., those in which a plaintiff must prove his case by more than a mere
preponderance of the evidence. Presumably, if a district court
ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a libel case is to
consider the "quantum and quality" of proof necessary to support
liability under New York Times, ante at 477 U. S. 254 ,
and then ask whether the evidence presented is of "sufficient
caliber or quantity" to support that quantum and quality, the court
must ask the same questions in a garden variety action where the
plaintiff need prevail only by a mere preponderance of the
evidence. In other words, today's decision, by its terms, applies
to all summary judgment motions, irrespective of the
burden of proof required and the subject matter of the suit.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Writing in dissent in Matsushita, JUSTICE WHITE stated
that he agreed with the summary judgment test employed by the
Court, namely, that

															"[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine
issue for trial.'"

															475 U.S. at 475 U. S. 599 .
Whether the shift, announced today, from looking to a "reasonable,"
rather than a "rational," jury is intended to be of any
significance, there are other aspects of the Matsushita dissent which I find difficult to square with the Court's holding
in the present case. The Matsushita dissenters argued:

															". . . [T]he Court summarizes Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., supra, as holding that 'courts should not
permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are
implausible. . . .'" Ante at 477 U. S. 593 .
Such language suggests that a judge hearing a defendant's motion
for summary judgment in an antitrust case should go beyond the
traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether
the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. Cities
Service and Monsanto do not stand for any such
proposition. Each of those cases simply held that a particular
piece of evidence, standing alone, was insufficiently probative to
justify sending a case to the jury. These holdings in no way
undermine the doctrine that all evidence must be construed in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.

															"If the Court intends to give every judge hearing a motion for
summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of determining if the
evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not,
it is overturning settled law. If the Court does not intend such a
pronouncement, it should refrain from using unnecessarily broad and
confusing language." Id. at 475 U. S.
600 -601 (footnote omitted). In my view, these words are
as applicable and relevant to the Court's opinion today as they
were to the opinion of the Court in Matsushita. [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															I am also baffled by the other cases cited by the majority to
support its holding. For example, the Court asserts that

															"[i]f . . . evidence is merely colorable, Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 (1967) (per curiam),
. . . summary judgment may be granted." Ante at 477 U. S.
249 -250. In Dombrowski, we reversed a judgment
granting summary judgment to the counsel to the Internal Security
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate
because there was "controverted evidence in the record . . . which
affords more than merely colorable substance" to the petitioners'
allegations. 387 U.S. at 387 U. S. 84 . Dombrowski simply cannot be read to mean that summary
judgment may be granted if evidence is merely colorable;
what the case actually says is that summary judgment will be denied if evidence is " controverted, " because
when evidence is controverted, assertions become colorable for
purposes of motions for summary judgment law.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.

															The Court, apparently moved by concerns for intellectual
tidiness, mistakenly decides that the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard governing finders of fact in libel cases must be
applied by trial courts in deciding a motion for summary judgment
in such a case. The Court refers to this as a "substantive
standard," but I think is is actually a procedural Page 477 U. S. 269 requirement engrafted onto Rule 56, contrary to our statement in Calder v. Jones, 465 U. S. 783 (1984), that

															"[w]e have already declined in other contexts to grant special
procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation
actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in
the substantive laws." Id. at 465 U. S.
790 -791. The Court, I believe, makes an even greater
mistake in failing to apply its newly announced rule to the facts
of this case. Instead of thus illustrating how the rule works, it
contents itself with abstractions and paraphrases of abstractions,
so that its opinion sounds much like a treatise about cooking by
someone who has never cooked before, and has no intention of
starting now.

															There is a large class of cases in which the higher standard
imposed by the Court today would seem to have no effect at all.
Suppose, for example, on motion for summary judgment in a
hypothetical libel case, the plaintiff concedes that his only proof
of malice is the testimony of witness A. Witness A testifies at his
deposition that the reporter who wrote the story in question told
him that she, the reporter, had done absolutely no checking on the
story, and had real doubts about whether or not it was correct as
to the plaintiff. The defendant's examination of witness A brings
out that he has a prior conviction for perjury.

															May the Court grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient
proof of malice? Surely not, if the Court means what it says when
it states:

															"Credibility determinations . . . are jury functions, not those
of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment
or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor." Ante at 477 U. S.
255 .

															The case proceeds to trial, and, at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence, the defendant moves for a directed verdict on the Page 477 U. S. 270 ground that the plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient
evidence of malice. The only evidence of malice produced by the
plaintiff is the same testimony of witness A, who is duly impeached
by the defendant for the prior perjury conviction. In addition, the
trial judge has now had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witness A, and has noticed that he fidgets when answering critical
questions, his eyes shift from the floor to the ceiling, and he
manifests all other indicia traditionally attributed to
perjurers.

															May the trial court, at this stage, grant a directed verdict?
Again, surely not; we are still dealing with "credibility
determinations. "

															The defendant now puts on its testimony, and produces three
witnesses who were present at the time when witness A alleges that
the reporter said she had not checked the story and had grave
doubts about its accuracy as to plaintiff. Witness A concedes that
these three people were present at the meeting, and that the
statement of the reporter took place in the presence of all these
witnesses. Each witness categorically denies that the reporter made
the claimed statement to witness A.

															May the trial court now grant a directed verdict at the close of
all the evidence? Certainly the plaintiff's case is appreciably
weakened by the testimony of three disinterested witnesses, and one
would hope that a properly charged jury would quickly return a
verdict for the defendant. But as long as credibility is
exclusively for the jury, it seems the Court's analysis would still
require this case to be decided by that body.

															Thus, in the case that I have posed, it would seem to make no
difference whether the standard of proof which the plaintiff had to
meet in order to prevail was the preponderance of the evidence,
clear and convincing evidence, or proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
But if the application of the standards makes no difference in the
case that I hypothesize, one may fairly ask in what sort of case does the difference in standards Page 477 U. S. 271 make a difference in outcome? Cases may be posed dealing with
evidence that is essentially documentary, rather than testimonial;
but the Court has held in a related context involving Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 52(a) that inferences from documentary evidence
are as much the prerogative of the finder of fact as inferences as
to the credibility of witnesses. Anderson v. Bessemer
City, 470 U. S. 564 , 470 U. S. 574 (1985). The Court affords the lower courts no guidance whatsoever
as to what, if any, difference the abstract standards that it
propounds would make in a particular case.

															There may be more merit than the Court is willing to admit to
Judge Learned Hand's observation in United States v.
Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (CA2), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 726 (1944), that "[w]hile at times it may be practicable"
to

															"distinguish between the evidence which should satisfy
reasonable men and the evidence which should satisfy reasonable men
beyond a reasonable doubt[,] . . . in the long run, the line
between them is too thin for day-to-day use."

															The Court apparently approves the overruling of the Feinberg case in the Court of Appeals by Judge Friendly's
opinion in United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (1972).
But even if the Court is entirely correct in its judgment on this
point, Judge Hand's statement seems applicable to this case,
because the criminal case differs from the libel case in that the
standard in the former is proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," which
is presumably easier to distinguish from the normal "preponderance
of the evidence" standard than is the intermediate standard of
"clear and convincing evidence."

															More important for purposes of analyzing the present case, there
is no exact analog in the criminal process to the motion for
summary judgment in a civil case. Perhaps the closest comparable
device for screening out unmeritorious cases in the criminal area
is the grand jury proceeding, though the comparison is obviously
not on all fours. The standard for allowing a criminal case to
proceed to trial is not whether the government has produced prima facie evidence of guilt beyond Page 477 U. S. 272 a reasonable doubt for every element of the offense, but only
whether it has established probable cause. See United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U. S. 66 , 475 U. S. 70 (1986). Thus, in a criminal case, the standard used prior to trial
is much more lenient than the "clear beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard which must be employed by the finder of fact.

															The three differentiated burdens of proof in civil and criminal
cases, vague and impressionistic though they necessarily are,
probably do make some difference when considered by the finder of
fact, whether it be a jury or a judge in a bench trial. Yet it is
not a logical or analytical message that the terms convey, but
instead almost a state of mind; we have previously said:

															"Candor suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what lay
jurors understand concerning the differences among these three
tests . . . may well be largely an academic exercise. . . . Indeed,
the ultimate truth as to how the standards of proof affect
decisionmaking may well be unknowable, given that
factfinding is a process shared by countless thousands of
individuals throughout the country. We probably can assume no more
than that the difference between a preponderance of the evidence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably is better understood
than either of them in relation to the intermediate standard of
clear and convincing evidence." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 , 441 U. S.
424 -425 (1979) (emphasis added).

															The Court's decision to engraft the standard of proof applicable
to a factfinder onto the law governing the procedural motion for a
summary judgment (a motion that has always been regarded as raising
a question of law, rather than a question of fact, see, e.g.,
La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1277-1278 (CA9 1982)
(Wallace, J.)), will do great mischief, with little corresponding
benefit. The primary effect of the Court's opinion today will
likely be to cause the decisions of trial judges on summary
judgment motions in libel cases to be Page 477 U. S. 273 more erratic and inconsistent than before. This is largely
because the Court has created a standard that is different from the
standard traditionally applied in summary judgment motions without
even hinting as to how its new standard will be applied to
particular cases.