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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–96

															_________________

															SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

															[June 25, 2013]

															     Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.

															     The Voting Rights Act
of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary
problem. Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain federal
permission before enacting any law related to voting—a
drastic departure from basic principles of federalism. And §4
of the Act applied that requirement only to some States—an
equally dramatic departure from the principle that all States enjoy
equal sovereignty. This was strong medicine, but Congress
determined it was needed to address entrenched racial
discrimination in voting, “an insidious and pervasive evil
which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through
unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309 (1966) . As
we explained in upholding the law, “exceptional conditions
can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”
Id., at 334. Reflecting the unprecedented nature of these measures,
they were scheduled to expire after five years. See Voting Rights
Act of 1965, §4(a), 79Stat. 438.

															     Nearly 50 years later,
they are still in effect; indeed, they have been made more
stringent, and are now scheduled to last until 2031. There is no
denying, however, that the conditions that originally justified
these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions. By 2009, “the racial gap in voter registration
and turnout [was] lower in the States originally covered by §5
than it [was] nationwide.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util.
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193 –204 (2009).
Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that African-American
voter turnout has come to exceed white voter turnout in five of the
six States originally covered by §5, with a gap in the sixth
State of less than one half of one percent. See Dept. of Commerce,
Census Bureau, Re-ported Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and
His-panic Origin, for States (Nov. 2012) (Table 4b).

															     At the same time,
voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that. The
question is whether the Act’s extraordinary measures,
including its disparate treatment of the States, continue to
satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short time ago,
“the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by
current needs.” Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.

															I

															A

															     The Fifteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1870, in the wake of the Civil War. It
provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude,” and it gives Congress the “power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.”

															     “The first
century of congressional enforcement of the Amendment, however, can
only be regarded as a failure.” Id., at 197. In the 1890s,
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia began to enact literacy tests for voter
registration and to employ other methods designed to prevent
African-Americans from voting. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 310.
Congress passed statutes outlawing some of these practices and
facilitating litigation against them, but litigation remained slow
and expensive, and the States came up with new ways to discriminate
as soon as existing ones were struck down. Voter registration of
African-Americans barely improved. Id., at 313–314.

															     Inspired to action by
the civil rights movement, Congress responded in 1965 with the
Voting Rights Act. Section 2 was enacted to forbid, in all 50
States, any “standard, practice, or procedure . . .
imposed or applied . . . to deny or abridge the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color.” 79Stat. 437. The current version forbids any
“standard, practice, or procedure” that “results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42
U. S. C. §1973(a). Both the Federal Government and
individuals have sued to enforce §2, see, e.g., Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U. S. 997 (1994) , and injunctive relief is
available in appropriate cases to block voting laws from going into
effect, see 42 U. S. C. §1973j(d). Section 2 is
permanent, applies nationwide, and is not at issue in this
case.

															     Other sections targeted
only some parts of the country. At the time of the Act’s
passage, these “covered” jurisdictions were those
States or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or
device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had
less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964
Presidential election. §4(b), 79Stat. 438. Such tests or
devices included literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character
requirements, the need for vouchers from registered voters, and the
like. §4(c), id., at 438–439. A covered jurisdiction
could “bail out” of coverage if it had not used a test
or device in the preceding five years “for the purpose or
with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color.” §4(a), id., at 438. In 1965,
the covered States included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. The additional covered
subdivisions included 39 counties in North Carolina and one in
Arizona. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App. (2012).

															     In those jurisdictions,
§4 of the Act banned all such tests or devices. §4(a),
79Stat. 438. Section 5 provided that no change in voting procedures
could take effect until it was approved by federal authorities in
Washington, D. C.—either the Attorney General or a court
of three judges. Id., at 439. A jurisdiction could obtain such
“preclearance” only by proving that the change had
neither “the purpose [nor] the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race or color.” Ibid.

															     Sections 4 and 5 were
intended to be temporary; they were set to expire after five years.
See §4(a), id., at 438; Northwest Austin, supra, at 199. In
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, we upheld the 1965 Act against
constitutional challenge, explaining that it was justified to
address “voting discrimination where it persists on a
pervasive scale.” 383 U. S., at 308.

															     In 1970, Congress
reauthorized the Act for another five years, and extended the
coverage formula in §4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting
test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of
1968. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, §§3–4,
84Stat. 315. That swept in several counties in California, New
Hampshire, and New York. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App. Congress also
extended the ban in §4(a) on tests and devices nationwide.
§6, 84Stat. 315.

															     In 1975, Congress
reauthorized the Act for seven more years, and extended its
coverage to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50
percent voter registration or turnout as of 1972. Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975, §§101, 202, 89Stat. 400, 401.
Congress also amended the definition of “test or
device” to include the practice of providing English-only
voting materials in places where over five percent of voting-age
citizens spoke a single language other than English. §203,
id., at 401–402. As a result of these amendments, the States
of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas, as well as several counties in
California, Flor-ida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South
Da-kota, became covered jurisdictions. See 28 CFR pt. 51, App.
Congress correspondingly amended sections 2 and 5 to forbid voting
discrimination on the basis of membership in a language minority
group, in addition to discrimination on the basis of race or color.
§§203, 206, 89Stat. 401, 402. Finally, Congress made the
nationwide ban on tests and devices permanent. §102, id., at
400.

															     In 1982, Congress
reauthorized the Act for 25 years, but did not alter its coverage
formula. See Voting Rights Act Amendments, 96Stat. 131. Congress
did, however, amend the bailout provisions, allowing political
subdivisions of covered jurisdictions to bail out. Among other
prerequisites for bailout, jurisdictions and their subdivisions
must not have used a forbidden test or device, failed to receive
preclearance, or lost a §2 suit, in the ten years prior to
seeking bailout. §2, id., at 131–133.

															     We upheld each of these
reauthorizations against constitutional challenge. See Georgia v.
United States, 411 U. S. 526 (1973) ; City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980) ; Lopez v. Monterey County, 525
U. S. 266 (1999) .

															     In 2006, Congress again
reauthorized the Voting Rights Act for 25 years, again without
change to its coverage formula. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and
Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amend-ments Act, 120Stat. 577. Congress also amended §5 to
prohibit more conduct than before. §5, id., at 580– 581;
see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U. S. 320, 341
(2000) (Bossier II); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U. S. 461, 479
(2003) . Section 5 now forbids voting changes with “any
discriminatory purpose” as well as voting changes that
diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or
language minority status, “to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.” 42 U. S. C.
§§1973c(b)–(d).

															     Shortly after this
reauthorization, a Texas utility district brought suit, seeking to
bail out from the Act’s cover- age and, in the alternative,
challenging the Act’s constitutionality. See Northwest
Austin, 557 U. S., at 200–201. A three-judge District
Court explained that only a State or political subdivision was
eligible to seek bailout under the statute, and concluded that the
utility district was not a political subdivision, a term that
encompassed only “counties, parishes, and voter-registering
subunits.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 232 (DC 2008). The District
Court also rejected the constitutional challenge. Id., at 283.

															     We reversed. We
explained that “ ‘normally the Court will not
decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon
which to dispose of the case.’ ” Northwest Austin,
supra, at 205 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S.
48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)). Concluding that “underlying
constitutional concerns,” among other things,
“compel[led] a broader reading of the bailout
provision,” we construed the statute to allow the utility
district to seek bailout. Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 207.
In doing so we expressed serious doubts about the Act’s
con-tinued constitutionality.

															     We explained that
§5 “imposes substantial federalism costs” and
“differentiates between the States, despite our his- toric
tradition that all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.” Id.,
at 202, 203 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also noted that
“[t]hings have changed in the South. Voter turnout and
registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory
evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold
office at unprece-dented levels.” Id., at 202. Finally, we
questioned whether the problems that §5 meant to address were
still “concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for
preclearance.” Id., at 203.

															     Eight Members of the
Court subscribed to these views, and the remaining Member would
have held the Act unconstitutional. Ultimately, however, the
Court’s construction of the bailout provision left the
constitutional issues for another day.

															B

															     Shelby County is
located in Alabama, a covered jurisdiction. It has not sought
bailout, as the Attorney General has recently objected to voting
changes proposed from within the county. See App. 87a–92a.
Instead, in 2010, the county sued the Attorney General in Federal
District Court in Washington, D. C., seeking a declaratory
judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are
facially unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction
against their enforcement. The District Court ruled against the
county and upheld the Act. 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 508 (2011).
The court found that the evidence before Congress in 2006 was
sufficient to justify reauthorizing §5 and continuing the
§4(b) coverage formula.

															     The Court of Appeals
for the D. C. Circuit affirmed. In assessing §5, the
D. C. Circuit considered six primary categories of evidence:
Attorney General objections to voting changes, Attorney General
requests for more information regarding voting changes, successful
§2 suits in covered jurisdictions, the dispatching of federal
observers to monitor elections in covered jurisdictions, §5
preclearance suits involving covered jurisdictions, and the
deterrent effect of §5. See 679 F. 3d 848, 862–863
(2012). After extensive analysis of the record, the court accepted
Congress’s conclusion that §2 litigation remained
inadequate in the covered jurisdictions to protect the rights of
minority voters, and that §5 was therefore still necessary.
Id., at 873.

															     Turning to §4, the
D. C. Circuit noted that the evidence for singling out the
covered jurisdictions was “less robust” and that the
issue presented “a close question.” Id., at 879. But
the court looked to data comparing the number of successful §2
suits in the different parts of the country. Coupling that evidence
with the deterrent effect of §5, the court concluded that the
statute continued “to single out the jurisdictions in which
discrimination is concentrated,” and thus held that the
coverage formula passed constitutional muster. Id., at 883.

															     Judge Williams
dissented. He found “no positive cor-relation between
inclusion in §4(b)’s coverage formula and low black
registration or turnout.” Id., at 891. Rather, to the extent
there was any correlation, it actually went the other way:
“condemnation under §4(b) is a marker of higher black
registration and turnout.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Judge
Williams also found that “[c]overed jurisdictions have far
more black officeholders as a proportion of the black population
than do uncovered ones.” Id., at 892. As to the evidence of
successful §2 suits, Judge Williams disaggregated the reported
cases by State, and concluded that “[t]he five worst
uncovered jurisdictions . . . have worse records than
eight of the covered jurisdictions.” Id., at 897. He also
noted that two covered jurisdictions—Arizona and
Alaska—had not had any successful reported §2 suit
brought against them during the entire 24 years covered by the
data. Ibid. Judge Williams would have held the coverage formula of
§4(b) “irrational” and unconstitutional. Id., at
885.

															     We granted certiorari.
568 U. S. ___ (2012).

															II

															     In Northwest Austin,
we stated that “the Act imposes current burdens and must be
justified by current needs.” 557 U. S., at 203. And we
concluded that “a departure from the fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s
disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.” Ibid. These basic principles guide
our review of the question before us. [ 1 ]

															A

															     The Constitution and
laws of the United States are “the supreme Law of the
Land.” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. State
legislation may not contravene federal law. The Federal Government
does not, however, have a general right to review and veto state
enactments before they go into effect. A proposal to grant such
authority to “negative” state laws was considered at
the Constitutional Convention, but rejected in favor of allowing
state laws to take effect, subject to later challenge under the
Supremacy Clause. See 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
pp. 21, 164–168 (M. Farrand ed. 1911); 2 id., at
27–29, 390–392.

															     Outside the strictures
of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in
structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives.
Indeed, the Constitution provides that all powers not specifically
granted to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or
citizens. Amdt. 10. This “allocation of powers in our federal
system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty
of the States.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___,
___ (2011) (slip op., at 9). But the federal balance “is not
just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

															     More specifically,
“ ‘the Framers of the Constitution intended the
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment,
the power to regulate elections.’ ” Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452 –462 (1991) (quoting Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 647 (1973) ; some internal quotation
marks omitted). Of course, the Federal Government retains
significant control over federal elections. For instance, the
Constitution authorizes Congress to establish the time and manner
for electing Senators and Representatives. Art. I, §4,
cl. 1; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz.,
Inc., ante, at 4–6. But States have “broad powers to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
exercised.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89, 91 (1965)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arizona, ante, at
13–15. And “[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall
be chosen.” Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U. S.
135, 161 (1892) . Drawing lines for congressional districts is
likewise “primarily the duty and responsibility of the
State.” Perry v. Perez, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (per
curiam) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															     Not only do States
retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there is also a
“fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the
States. Northwest Austin, supra, at 203 (citing United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 16 (1960) ; Lessee of Pollard v.
Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845); and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700,
725–726 (1869); emphasis added). Over a hundred years ago,
this Court explained that our Nation “was and is a union of
States, equal in power, dignity and authority.” Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U. S. 559, 567 (1911) . Indeed, “the
constitutional equality of the States is essential to the
harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was
organized.” Id., at 580. Coyle concerned the admission of new
States, and Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle
operated as a bar on differential treatment outside that context.
383 U. S., at 328–329. At the same time, as we made
clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent
disparate treatment of States. 557 U. S., at 203.

															     The Voting Rights Act
sharply departs from these basic principles. It suspends “all
changes to state election law—however innocuous—until
they have been precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D.
C.” Id., at 202. States must beseech the Federal Government
for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the
right to enact and execute on their own, subject of course to any
injunction in a §2 action. The Attorney General has 60 days to
object to a preclearance request, longer if he requests more
information. See 28 CFR §§51.9, 51.37. If a State seeks
preclearance from a three-judge court, the process can take
years.

															     And despite the
tradition of equal sovereignty, the Act applies to only nine States
(and several additional counties). While one State waits months or
years and expends funds to implement a validly enacted law, its
neighbor can typically put the same law into effect immediately,
through the normal legislative process. Even if a noncovered
jurisdiction is sued, there are important differences between those
proceedings and preclearance proceedings; the preclearance
proceeding “not only switches the burden of proof to the
supplicant jurisdiction, but also applies substantive standards
quite different from those governing the rest of the nation.”
679 F. 3d, at 884 (Williams, J., dissenting) (case below).

															     All this explains why,
when we first upheld the Act in 1966, we described it as
“stringent” and “potent.” Katzenbach, 383
U. S., at 308, 315, 337. We recognized that it “may have
been an uncommon exercise of congressional power,” but
concluded that “legislative measures not oth-erwise
appropriate” could be justified by “exceptional
con-ditions.” Id., at 334. We have since noted that the Act
“authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state
and local policymaking,” Lopez, 525 U. S., at 282, and
represents an “extraordinary departure from the traditional
course of relations between the States and the Federal
Government,” Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502
U. S. 491 –501 (1992). As we reiterated in Northwest
Austin, the Act constitutes “extraordinary legislation
otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.” 557 U. S.,
at 211.

															B

															     In 1966, we found
these departures from the basic features of our system of
government justified. The “blight of racial discrimination in
voting” had “infected the electoral process in parts of
our country for nearly a century.” Katzenbach, 383
U. S., at 308. Several States had enacted a variety of
requirements and tests “specifically designed to
prevent” African-Americans from voting. Id., at 310.
Case-by-case litigation had proved inadequate to prevent such
racial discrimination in voting, in part because States
“merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the
federal decrees,” “enacted difficult new tests,”
or simply “defied and evaded court orders.” Id., at
314. Shortly before enactment of the Voting Rights Act, only 19.4
percent of African-Americans of voting age were registered to vote
in Alabama, only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent in
Mississippi. Id., at 313. Those figures were roughly 50 percentage
points or more below the figures for whites. Ibid.

															     In short, we concluded
that “[u]nder the compulsion of these unique circumstances,
Congress responded in a permissibly decisive manner.” Id., at
334, 335. We also noted then and have emphasized since that this
extra-ordinary legislation was intended to be temporary, set to
expire after five years. Id., at 333; Northwest Austin, supra, at
199.

															     At the time, the
coverage formula—the means of linking the exercise of the
unprecedented authority with the problem that warranted
it—made sense. We found that “Congress chose to limit
its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed
necessary.” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 328. The areas
where Congress found “evidence of actual voting
discrimination” shared two characteristics: “the use of
tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the
1964 presidential election at least 12 points below the national
average.” Id., at 330. We explained that “[t]ests and
devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their long
history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is
pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement
must inevitably affect the number of actual voters.” Ibid. We
therefore concluded that “the coverage formula [was] rational
in both practice and theory.” Ibid. It accurately reflected
those jurisdictions uniquely characterized by voting discrimination
“on a pervasive scale,” linking coverage to the devices
used to effectuate discrimination and to the resulting
disenfranchisement. Id., at 308. The formula ensured that the
“stringent remedies [were] aimed at areas where voting
discrimination ha[d] been most flagrant.” Id., at 315.

															C

															     Nearly 50 years
later, things have changed dramati-cally. Shelby County contends
that the preclearance re-quirement, even without regard to its
disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments have a
good deal of force. In the covered jurisdictions, “[v]oter
turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority
candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.” Northwest
Austin, 557 U. S., at 202. The tests and devices that blocked
access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40
years. See §6, 84Stat. 315; §102, 89Stat. 400.

															     Those conclusions are
not ours alone. Congress said the same when it reauthorized the Act
in 2006, writing that “[s]ignificant progress has been made
in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority
voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters,
minority voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress,
State legislatures, and local elected offices.”
§2(b)(1), 120Stat. 577. The House Report elaborated that
“the number of African-Americans who are registered and who
turn out to cast ballots has increased significantly over the last
40 years, particularly since 1982,” and noted that
“[i]n some circumstances, minorities register to vote and
cast ballots at levels that surpass those of white voters.”
H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, p. 12 (2006). That Report
also explained that there have been “significant increases in
the number of African-Americans serving in elected offices”;
more specifically, there has been approximately a 1,000 percent
increase since 1965 in the number of African-American elected
officials in the six States originally covered by the Voting Rights
Act. Id., at 18.

															     The following chart,
compiled from the Senate and House Reports, compares voter
registration numbers from 1965 to those from 2004 in the six
originally covered States. These are the numbers that were before
Congress when it reauthorized the Act in 2006:

															1965

															2004

															White

															Black

															Gap

															White

															Black

															Gap

															Alabama

															69.2

															19.3

															49.9

															73.8

															72.9

															 0.9

															Georgia

															62.[6]

															27.4

															35.2

															63.5

															64.2

															 -0.7

															Louisiana

															80.5

															31.6

															48.9

															75.1

															71.1

															4.0

															Mississippi

															69.9

															 6.7

															63.2

															72.3

															76.1

															 -3.8

															South Carolina

															75.7

															37.3

															38.4

															74.4

															71.1

															  3.3

															Virginia

															61.1

															38.3

															22.8

															68.2

															57.4

															10.8

															See S. Rep. No. 109–295, p. 11
(2006); H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 12. The 2004 figures
come from the Census Bureau. Census Bureau data from the most
recent election indicate that African-American voter turnout
exceeded white voter turnout in five of the six States originally
covered by §5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one
half of one percent. See Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, Reported
Voting and Registration, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for
States (Table 4b). The preclearance statistics are also
illuminating. In the first decade after enactment of §5, the
Attorney General objected to 14.2 percent of proposed voting
changes. H. R Rep. No. 109–478, at 22. In the last
decade before reenactment, the Attorney General objected to a mere
0.16 percent. S. Rep. No. 109–295, at 13.

															     There is no doubt that
these improvements are in large part because of the Voting Rights
Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial
discrimination and integrating the voting process. See
§2(b)(1), 120Stat. 577. During the “Freedom
Summer” of 1964, in Philadelphia, Mississippi, three men were
murdered while working in the area to register African-American
voters. See United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 790 (1966)
. On “Bloody Sunday” in 1965, in Selma, Alabama, police
beat and used tear gas against hundreds marching in sup- port of
African-American enfranchisement. See Northwest Austin, supra, at
220, n. 3 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Today both of those towns are governed by
African-American mayors. Problems remain in these States and
others, but there is no denying that, due to the Voting Rights Act,
our Nation has made great strides.

															     Yet the Act has not
eased the restrictions in §5 or narrowed the scope of the
coverage formula in §4(b) along the way. Those extraordinary
and unprecedented features were reauthorized—as if nothing
had changed. In fact, the Act’s unusual remedies have grown
even stronger. When Congress reauthorized the Act in 2006, it did
so for another 25 years on top of the previous 40—a far cry
from the initial five-year period. See 42 U. S. C.
§1973b(a)(8). Congress also expanded the prohibitions in
§5. We had previously interpreted §5 to prohibit only
those redistricting plans that would have the purpose or effect of
worsening the position of minority groups. See Bossier II, 528
U. S., at 324, 335–336. In 2006, Congress amended
§5 to prohibit laws that could have favored such groups but
did not do so because of a discriminatory purpose, see 42
U. S. C. §1973c(c), even though we had stated that
such broadening of §5 coverage would “exacerbate the
substantial federalism costs that the preclearance procedure
already exacts, perhaps to the extent of raising concerns about
§5’s constitutionality,” Bossier II, supra, at 336
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition,
Congress expanded §5 to prohibit any voting law “that
has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the
ability of any citizens of the United States,” on account of
race, color, or language minority status, “to elect their
preferred candidates of choice.” §1973c(b). In light of
those two amendments, the bar that covered jurisdictions must clear
has been raised even as the conditions justifying that requirement
have dramatically improved.

															     We have also previously
highlighted the concern that “the preclearance requirements
in one State [might] be unconstitutional in another.”
Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 203; see Georgia v. Ashcroft,
539 U. S., at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“considerations of race that would doom a redistricting plan
under the Fourteenth Amendment or §2 [of the Voting Rights
Act] seem to be what save it under §5”). Nothing has
happened since to alleviate this troubling concern about the
current application of §5.

															     Respondents do not deny
that there have been improvements on the ground, but argue that
much of this can be attributed to the deterrent effect of §5,
which dissuades covered jurisdictions from engaging in
discrimination that they would resume should §5 be struck
down. Under this theory, however, §5 would be effectively
immune from scrutiny; no matter how “clean” the record
of covered jurisdictions, the argument could always be made that it
was deterrence that accounted for the good behavior.

															     The provisions of
§5 apply only to those jurisdictions singled out by §4.
We now consider whether that coverage formula is constitutional in
light of current conditions.

															III

															A

															     When upholding the
constitutionality of the coverage formula in 1966, we concluded
that it was “rational in both practice and theory.”
Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 330. The formula looked to cause
(discriminatory tests) and ef- fect (low voter registration and
turnout), and tailored the remedy (preclearance) to those
jurisdictions exhibiting both.

															     By 2009, however, we
concluded that the “coverage formula raise[d] serious
constitutional questions.” Northwest Austin, 557 U. S.,
at 204. As we explained, a statute’s “current
burdens” must be justified by “current needs,”
and any “disparate geographic coverage” must be
“sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”
Id., at 203. The coverage formula met that test in 1965, but no
longer does so.

															     Coverage today is based
on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula captures
States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration
and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been
banned nationwide for over 40 years. §6, 84Stat. 315;
§102, 89Stat. 400. And voter registration and turnout numbers
in the covered States have risen dramatically in the years since.
H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 12. Racial disparity in those
numbers was compelling evidence justifying the preclearance remedy
and the coverage formula. See, e.g., Katzenbach, supra, at 313,
329–330. There is no longer such a disparity.

															     In 1965, the States
could be divided into two groups: those with a recent history of
voting tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those
without those characteristics. Congress based its coverage formula
on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer divided along
those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if
it were.

															B

															     The
Government’s defense of the formula is limited. First, the
Government contends that the formula is
“reverse-engineered”: Congress identified the
jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with criteria to
describe them. Brief for Federal Respondent 48–49. Under that
reasoning, there need not be any logical relationship be-tween the
criteria in the formula and the reason for coverage; all that is
necessary is that the formula happen to capture the jurisdictions
Congress wanted to single out.

															     The Government suggests
that Katzenbach sanctioned such an approach, but the analysis in
Katzenbach was quite different. Katzenbach reasoned that the
coverage formula was rational because the “formula
. . . was relevant to the problem”: “Tests
and devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their
long history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate
is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread
disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual
voters.” 383 U. S., at 329, 330.

															     Here, by contrast, the
Government’s reverse- engineering argument does not even
attempt to demonstrate the continued relevance of the formula to
the problem it targets. And in the context of a decision as
significant as this one—subjecting a disfavored subset of
States to “extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to
our federal system,” Northwest Austin, supra, at
211—that failure to establish even relevance is fatal.

															     The Government falls
back to the argument that because the formula was relevant in 1965,
its continued use is permissible so long as any discrimination
remains in the States Congress identified back
then—regardless of how that discrimination compares to
discrimination in States unburdened by coverage. Brief for Federal
Respondent 49–50. This argument does not look to
“current political conditions,” Northwest Austin,
supra, at 203, but instead relies on a comparison between the
States in 1965. That comparison reflected the different histories
of the North and South. It was in the South that slavery was upheld
by law until uprooted by the Civil War, that the reign of Jim Crow
denied African-Americans the most basic freedoms, and that state
and local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise citizens
on the basis of race. The Court invoked that history—rightly
so—in sustaining the disparate coverage of the Voting Rights
Act in 1966. See Katzenbach, supra, at 308 (“The
constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be
judged with reference to the historical experience which it
reflects.”).

															     But history did not end
in 1965. By the time the Act was reauthorized in 2006, there had
been 40 more years of it. In assessing the “current
need[ ]” for a preclearance system that treats States
differently from one another today, that history cannot be ignored.
During that time, largely because of the Voting Rights Act, voting
tests were abolished, disparities in voter registration and turnout
due to race were erased, and African-Americans attained political
office in record numbers. And yet the coverage formula that
Congress reauthorized in 2006 ignores these developments, keeping
the focus on decades-old data rel-evant to decades-old problems,
rather than current data reflecting current needs.

															     The Fifteenth Amendment
commands that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on
account of race or color, and it gives Congress the power to
enforce that command. The Amendment is not designed to punish for
the past; its purpose is to ensure a better future. See Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 512 (2000) (“Consistent with
the design of the Constitution, the [Fifteenth] Amendment is cast
in fundamental terms, terms transcending the particular controversy
which was the immediate impetus for its enactment.”). To
serve that purpose, Congress—if it is to divide the
States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on
a basis that makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot
rely simply on the past. We made that clear in Northwest Austin,
and we make it clear again today.

															C

															     In defending the
coverage formula, the Government, the intervenors, and the dissent
also rely heavily on data from the record that they claim justify
disparate coverage. Congress compiled thousands of pages of
evidence before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act. The court
below and the parties have debated what that record
shows—they have gone back and forth about whether to compare
covered to noncovered jurisdictions as blocks, how to disaggregate
the data State by State, how to weigh §2 cases as evidence of
ongoing discrimination, and whether to consider evidence not before
Congress, among other issues. Compare, e.g., 679 F. 3d, at
873–883 (case below), with id., at 889–902 (Williams,
J., dissenting). Regardless of how to look at the record, however,
no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the
“pervasive,” “flagrant,”
“widespread,” and “rampant” discrimination
that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the
covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that time.
Katzenbach, supra, at 308, 315, 331; Northwest Austin, 557
U. S., at 201.

															     But a more fundamental
problem remains: Congress did not use the record it compiled to
shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions. It instead
reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts having no logical
relation to the present day. The dissent relies on
“second-generation barriers,” which are not impediments
to the casting of ballots, but rather electoral arrangements that
affect the weight of minority votes. That does not cure the
problem. Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting such
efforts simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance
on the §4 coverage formula, which is based on voting tests and
access to the ballot, not vote dilution. We cannot pretend that we
are reviewing an updated statute, or try our hand at updating the
statute ourselves, based on the new record compiled by Congress.
Contrary to the dissent’s contention, see post, at 23, we are
not ignoring the record; we are simply recognizing that it played
no role in shaping the statutory formula before us today.

															     The dissent also turns
to the record to argue that, in light of voting discrimination in
Shelby County, the county cannot complain about the provisions that
subject it to preclearance. Post, at 23–30. But that is like
saying that a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of stopping
all redheads cannot complain about that policy, if it turns out his
license has expired. Shelby County’s claim is that the
coverage formula here is unconstitutional in all its applications,
because of how it selects the jurisdictions sub-jected to
preclearance. The county was selected based on that formula, and
may challenge it in court.

															D

															     The dissent proceeds
from a flawed premise. It quotes the famous sentence from McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), with the following emphasis:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.” Post, at 9 (emphasis in dissent). But this
case is about a part of the sentence that the dissent does not
emphasize—the part that asks whether a legislative means is
“consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.” The dissent states that “[i]t cannot
tenably be maintained” that this is an issue with regard to
the Voting Rights Act, post, at 9, but four years ago, in an
opinion joined by two of today’s dissenters, the Court
expressly stated that “[t]he Act’s preclearance
requirement and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional
questions.” Northwest Austin, supra, at 204. The dissent does
not explain how those “serious constitutional
questions” became untenable in four short years.

															     The dissent treats the
Act as if it were just like any other piece of legislation, but
this Court has made clear from the beginning that the Voting Rights
Act is far from ordinary. At the risk of repetition, Katzenbach
indicated that the Act was “uncommon” and “not
otherwise appropriate,” but was justified by
“exceptional” and “unique” conditions. 383
U. S., at 334, 335. Multiple decisions since have reaffirmed
the Act’s “extraordinary” nature. See, e.g.,
Northwest Austin, supra, at 211. Yet the dissent goes so far as to
suggest instead that the preclearance requirement and disparate
treatment of the States should be upheld into the future
“unless there [is] no or almost no evidence of
unconstitutional action by States.” Post, at 33.

															     In other ways as well,
the dissent analyzes the ques- tion presented as if our decision in
Northwest Austin never happened. For example, the dissent refuses
to con- sider the principle of equal sovereignty, despite Northwest
Austin’s emphasis on its significance. Northwest Austin also
emphasized the “dramatic” progress since 1965, 557
U. S., at 201, but the dissent describes current levels of
discrimination as “flagrant,” “widespread,”
and “pervasive,” post, at 7, 17 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Despite the fact that Northwest Austin requires an
Act’s “disparate geographic coverage” to be
“sufficiently related” to its targeted problems, 557
U. S., at 203, the dissent maintains that an Act’s
limited coverage actually eases Congress’s burdens, and
suggests that a fortuitous relationship should suffice. Although
Northwest Austin stated definitively that “current
burdens” must be justified by “current needs,”
ibid., the dissent argues that the coverage formula can be
justified by history, and that the required showing can be weaker
on reenactment than when the law was first passed.

															     There is no valid
reason to insulate the coverage for-mula from review merely because
it was previously enacted 40 years ago. If Congress had started
from scratch in 2006, it plainly could not have enacted the present
coverage formula. It would have been irrational for Congress to
distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on
40-year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely
different story. And it would have been irrational to base coverage
on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been
illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress has
done.

															*  *  *

															     Striking down an Act of
Congress “is the gravest and most delicate duty that this
Court is called on to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275
U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). We do not do
so lightly. That is why, in 2009, we took care to avoid ruling on
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act when asked to do so,
and instead resolved the case then before us on statutory grounds.
But in issuing that decision, we expressed our broader concerns
about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could have updated
the coverage formula at that time, but did not do so. Its failure
to act leaves us today with no choice but to declare §4(b)
unconstitutional. The formula in that section can no longer be used
as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.

															     Our decision in no way
affects the permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination in
voting found in §2. We issue no holding on §5 itself,
only on the coverage formula. Congress may draft another formula
based on current conditions. Such a formula is an initial
prerequisite to a determination that exceptional conditions still
exist justifying such an “extraordinary departure from the
traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal
Government.” Presley, 502 U. S., at 500–501. Our
country has changed, and while any racial discrimination in voting
is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation it passes to
remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.

															     The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Both the Fourteenth and s
were at issue in Northwest Austin, see Juris. Statement i, and
Brief for Federal Appellee 29–30, in Northwest Austin
Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, O. T. 2008, No.
08–322, and accordingly Northwest Austin guides our review
under both Amendments in this case. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–96

															_________________

															SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

															[June 25, 2013]

															     Justice Thomas,
concurring.

															     I join the
Court’s opinion in full but write separately to explain that
I would find §5 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as
well. The Court’s opinion sets forth the reasons.

															     “The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary measures to address an
extraordinary problem.” Ante, at 1. In the face of
“unremitting and ingenious defiance” of citizens’
constitutionally protected right to vote, §5 was necessary to
give effect to the Fifteenth Amendment in particular regions of the
country. South Carolina v. Katzen-bach, 383 U. S. 301, 309
(1966) . Though §5’s preclear- ance requirement
represented a “shar[p] depart[ure]” from “basic
principles” of federalism and the equal sovereignty of the
States, ante, at 9, 11, the Court upheld the measure against early
constitutional challenges because it was necessary at the time to
address “voting discrimination where it persist[ed] on a
pervasive scale.” Katzenbach, supra, at 308.

															     Today, our Nation has
changed. “[T]he conditions that originally justified
[§5] no longer characterize voting in the covered
jurisdictions.” Ante, at 2. As the Court explains:
“ ‘[V]oter turnout and registration rates now
approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal
decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
un-precedented levels.’ ” Ante, at 13–14
(quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U. S. 193, 202 (2009) ).

															     In spite of these
improvements, however, Congress increased the already significant
burdens of §5. Following its reenactment in 2006, the Voting
Rights Act was amended to “prohibit more conduct than
before.” Ante, at 5. “Section 5 now forbids voting
changes with ‘any dis-criminatory purpose’ as well as
voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of
race, color, or language minority status, ‘to elect their
preferred candidates of choice.’ ” Ante, at 6.
While the pre-2006 version of the Act went well beyond protection
guaranteed under the Constitution, see Reno v. Bossier Parish
School Bd., 520 U. S. 471 –482 (1997), it now goes even
further.

															     It is, thus, quite
fitting that the Court repeatedly points out that this legislation
is “extraordinary” and “unprecedented” and
recognizes the significant constitutional problems created by
Congress’ decision to raise “the bar that covered
jurisdictions must clear,” even as “the conditions
justifying that requirement have dramatically improved.”
Ante, at 16–17. However one aggregates the data compiled by
Congress, it cannot justify the considerable burdens created by
§5. As the Court aptly notes: “[N]o one can fairly say
that [the record] shows anything approaching the
‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’
‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination
that faced Congress in 1965, and that clearly distinguished the
covered jurisdictions from the rest of the Nation at that
time.” Ante, at 21. Indeed, circumstances in the covered
jurisdictions can no longer be characterized as
“exceptional” or “unique.”  “The
extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to
previously uphold §5 as enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment no
longer exists.” Northwest Austin, supra, at 226 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Section 5
is, thus, unconstitutional.

															     While the Court claims
to “issue no holding on §5 itself,” ante, at 24,
its own opinion compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed
to justify “ ‘current burdens’ ”
with a record demonstrating “ ‘current
needs.’ ” See ante, at 9 (quoting Northwest
Austin, supra, at 203). By leaving the inevitable conclusion
unstated, the Court needlessly prolongs the demise of that
provision. For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinion, I
would find §5 unconstitutional. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 12–96

															_________________

															SHELBY COUNTY, ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

															[June 25, 2013]

															     Justice Ginsburg,
with whom Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan
join, dissenting.

															     In the Court’s
view, the very success of §5 of the Voting Rights Act demands
its dormancy. Congress was of another mind. Recognizing that large
progress has been made, Congress determined, based on a voluminous
record, that the scourge of discrimination was not yet extirpated.
The question this case presents is who decides whether, as
currently operative, §5 remains justifiable, [ 1 ] this Court, or a Congress charged with
the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War Amendments “by
appropriate legislation.” With overwhelming support in both
Houses, Congress concluded that, for two prime reasons, §5
should continue in force, unabated. First, continuance would
facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus far made; and
second, continuance would guard against backsliding. Those
assessments were well within Congress’ province to make and
should elicit this Court’s unstinting approbation.

															I

															     “[V]oting
discrimination still exists; no one doubts that.” Ante, at 2.
But the Court today terminates the remedy that proved to be best
suited to block that discrimination. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA) has worked to combat voting discrimination where other
remedies had been tried and failed. Particularly effective is the
VRA’s requirement of federal preclearance for all changes to
voting laws in the regions of the country with the most aggravated
records of rank discrimination against minority voting rights.

															     A century after the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments guaranteed citizens the right
to vote free of discrimination on the basis of race, the
“blight of racial discrimination in voting” continued
to “infec[t] the electoral process in parts of our
country.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301,
308 (1966) . Early attempts to cope with this vile infection
resembled battling the Hydra. Whenever one form of voting
discrimination was identified and prohibited, others sprang up in
its place. This Court repeatedly encountered the remarkable
“variety and persistence” of laws disenfranchising
minority citizens. Id., at 311. To take just one example, the
Court, in 1927, held unconstitutional a Texas law barring black
voters from participating in primary elections, Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536 ; in 1944, the Court struck down a
“reenacted” and slightly altered version of the same
law, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 ; and in 1953, the
Court once again confronted an attempt by Texas to
“circumven[t]” the Fifteenth Amendment by adopting yet
another variant of the all-white primary, Terry v. Adams, 345
U. S. 461 .

															     During this era, the
Court recognized that discrimination against minority voters was a
quintessentially political problem requiring a political solution.
As Justice Holmes explained: If “the great mass of the white
population intends to keep the blacks from voting,”
“relief from [that] great political wrong, if done, as
alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be
given by them or by the legislative and political department of the
government of the United States.” Giles v. Harris, 189
U. S. 475, 488 (1903) .

															     Congress learned from
experience that laws targeting particular electoral practices or
enabling case-by-case litigation were inadequate to the task. In
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, Congress authorized
and then expanded the power of “the Attorney General to seek
injunctions against public and private interference with the right
to vote on racial grounds.” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at
313. But circumstances reduced the ameliorative potential of these
legislative Acts:

															“Voting suits are unusually onerous
to prepare, sometimes requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent
combing through registration records in preparation for trial.
Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample
opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and others
involved in the proceed-ings. Even when favorable decisions have
finally been obtained, some of the States affected have merely
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal
decrees or have enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the
existing disparity between white and Negro registration.
Alternatively, certain local officials have defied and evaded court
orders or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze
the voting rolls.” Id., at 314 (footnote omitted).

															Patently, a new approach was needed.

															     Answering that need,
the Voting Rights Act became one of the most consequential,
efficacious, and amply justified exercises of federal legislative
power in our Nation’s his-tory. Requiring federal
preclearance of changes in voting laws in the covered
jurisdictions—those States and localities where opposition to
the Constitution’s commands were most virulent—the VRA
provided a fit solution for minority voters as well as for States.
Under the preclearance regime established by §5 of the VRA,
covered jurisdictions must submit proposed changes in voting laws
or procedures to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which has 60 days
to respond to the changes. 79Stat. 439, codified at 42
U. S. C. §1973c(a). A change will be approved unless
DOJ finds it has “the purpose [or] . . . the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color.” Ibid. In the alternative, the covered jurisdiction
may seek approval by a three-judge District Court in the District
of Columbia.

															     After a century’s
failure to fulfill the promise of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, passage of the VRA finally led to signal improvement on
this front. “The Justice Department estimated that in the
five years after [the VRA’s] passage, almost as many blacks
registered [to vote] in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana,
North Carolina, and South Carolina as in the entire century before
1965.” Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in
Controversies in Minority Voting 7, 21 (B. Grofman & C.
Davidson eds. 1992). And in assessing the overall effects of the
VRA in 2006, Congress found that “[s]ignificant progress has
been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by
minority voters, including increased numbers of registered minority
voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in
Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices. This
progress is the direct result of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.” Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006
(hereinafter 2006 Reauthorization), §2(b)(1), 120Stat. 577. On
that matter of cause and effects there can be no genuine doubt.

															     Although the VRA
wrought dramatic changes in the realization of minority voting
rights, the Act, to date, surely has not eliminated all vestiges of
discrimination against the exercise of the franchise by minority
citizens. Jurisdictions covered by the preclearance requirement
continued to submit, in large numbers, proposed changes to voting
laws that the Attorney General declined to approve, auguring that
barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the
preclearance remedy elimi-nated. City of Rome v. United States, 446
U. S. 156, 181 (1980) . Congress also found that as
“registration and voting of minority citizens increas[ed],
other measures may be resorted to which would dilute increasing
minority voting strength.” Ibid. (quoting H. R. Rep. No.
94–196, p. 10 (1975)). See also Shaw v. Reno, 509
U. S. 630, 640 (1993) (“[I]t soon became apparent that
guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root
out other racially discriminatory voting practices” such as
voting dilution). Efforts to reduce the impact of minority votes,
in contrast to direct attempts to block access to the bal- lot, are
aptly described as “second-generation barriers” to
minority voting.

															     Second-generation
barriers come in various forms. One of the blockages is racial
gerrymandering, the redrawing of legislative districts in an
“effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting.”
Id., at 642. Another is adoption of a system of at-large voting in
lieu of district-by-district voting in a city with a sizable black
minority. By switching to at-large voting, the overall majority
could control the election of each city council member, effectively
eliminating the potency of the minority’s votes. Grofman
& Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election Structure on Black
Representation in Eight Southern States, in Quiet Revolution in the
South 301, 319 (C. Davidson & B. Grofman eds. 1994)
(hereinafter Quiet Revolution). A similar effect could be achieved
if the city engaged in discriminatory annexation by incorporating
majority-white areas into city limits, thereby decreasing the
effect of VRA-occasioned increases in black voting. Whatever the
device employed, this Court has long recognized that vote dilution,
when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to
vote as certainly as denial of access to the ballot. Shaw, 509
U. S., at 640–641; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U. S. 544, 569 (1969) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
555 (1964) . See also H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, p. 6
(2006) (although “[d]iscrimination today is more subtle than
the visible methods used in 1965,” “the effect and
results are the same, namely a diminishing of the minority
community’s ability to fully participate in the electoral
process and to elect their preferred candidates”).

															     In response to evidence
of these substituted barriers, Congress reauthorized the VRA for
five years in 1970, for seven years in 1975, and for 25 years in
1982. Ante, at 4–5. Each time, this Court upheld the
reauthorization as a valid exercise of congressional power. Ante,
at 5. As the 1982 reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration
date, Congress again considered whether the VRA’s
preclearance mechanism remained an appropriate response to the
problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions.

															     Congress did not take
this task lightly. Quite the opposite. The 109th Congress that took
responsibility for the renewal started early and conscientiously.
In October 2005, the House began extensive hearings, which
continued into November and resumed in March 2006. S. Rep. No.
109–295, p. 2 (2006). In April 2006, the Senate followed
suit, with hearings of its own. Ibid. In May 2006, the bills that
became the VRA’s reauthorization were introduced in both
Houses. Ibid. The House held further hearings of considerable
length, as did the Senate, which continued to hold hearings into
June and July. H. R. Rep. 109–478, at 5; S. Rep.
109–295, at 3–4. In mid-July, the House considered and
rejected four amendments, then passed the reauthorization by a vote
of 390 yeas to 33 nays. 152 Cong. Rec. H5207 (July 13, 2006);
Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117
Yale L. J. 174, 182–183 (2007) (hereinafter Persily).
The bill was read and debated in the Senate, where it passed by a
vote of 98 to 0. 152 Cong. Rec. S8012 (July 20, 2006). President
Bush signed it a week later, on July 27, 2006, recognizing the need
for “further work . . . in the fight against
injustice,” and calling the reauthorization “an example
of our continued commitment to a united America where every person
is valued and treated with dignity and respect.” 152 Cong.
Rec. S8781 (Aug. 3, 2006).

															     In the long course of
the legislative process, Congress “amassed a sizable
record.” Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 205 (2009) . See also 679 F. 3d
848, 865–873 (CADC 2012) (describing the “extensive
record” supporting Congress’ determina-tion that
“serious and widespread intentional discrimination persisted
in covered jurisdictions”). The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees held 21 hearings, heard from scores of witnesses,
received a number of investigative reports and other written
documentation of continuing discrimina-tion in covered
jurisdictions. In all, the legislative record Congress compiled
filled more than 15,000 pages. H. R. Rep. 109–478, at 5,
11–12; S. Rep. 109–295, at 2–4, 15. The
compilation presents countless “examples of fla-grant racial
discrimination” since the last reauthoriza-tion; Congress
also brought to light systematic evidence that “intentional
racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and widespread
in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still
needed.” 679 F. 3d, at 866.

															     After considering the
full legislative record, Congress made the following findings: The
VRA has directly caused significant progress in eliminating
first-generation barriers to ballot access, leading to a marked
increase in minority voter registration and turnout and the number
of minority elected officials. 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(1).
But despite this progress, “second generation barriers
constructed to prevent minority voters from fully participating in
the electoral process” continued to exist, as well as
racially polarized voting in the covered jurisdictions, which
increased the political vulnerability of racial and language
minorities in those jurisdictions. §§2(b)(2)–(3),
120Stat. 577. Extensive “[e]vidence of continued
discrimination,” Congress concluded, “clearly show[ed]
the continued need for Federal oversight” in covered
jurisdictions. §§2(b)(4)–(5), id., at
577–578. The overall record demonstrated to the federal
lawmakers that, “without the continuation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 protections, racial and language minority
citizens will be deprived of the opportunity to exercise their
right to vote, or will have their votes diluted, undermining the
significant gains made by minorities in the last 40 years.”
§2(b)(9), id., at 578.

															     Based on these
findings, Congress reauthorized preclearance for another 25 years,
while also undertaking to reconsider the extension after 15 years
to ensure that the provision was still necessary and effective. 42
U. S. C. §1973b(a)(7), (8) (2006 ed., Supp. V). The
question before the Court is whether Congress had the authority
under the Constitution to act as it did.

															II

															     In answering this
question, the Court does not write on a clean slate. It is well
established that Congress’ judgment regarding exercise of its
power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments warrants
substantial deference. The VRA addresses the combination of race
discrimination and the right to vote, which is “preservative
of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370
(1886) . When confronting the most constitutionally invidious form
of discrimination, and the most fundamental right in our democratic
system, Congress’ power to act is at its height.

															     The basis for this
deference is firmly rooted in both constitutional text and
precedent. The Fifteenth Amendment, which targets precisely and
only racial discrimination in voting rights, states that, in this
domain, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.” [ 2 ] In choosing this language, the Amendment’s
framers invoked Chief Justice Marshall’s formulation of the
scope of Congress’ powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause:

															“Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).

															     It cannot tenably be
maintained that the VRA, an Act of Congress adopted to shield the
right to vote from racial discrimination, is inconsistent with the
letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment, or any provision of
the Constitution read in light of the Civil War Amendments. Nowhere
in today’s opinion, or in Northwest Austin, [ 3 ] is there clear recognition of the
transformative effect the Fifteenth Amendment aimed to achieve.
Notably, “the Founders’ first successful amendment told
Congress that it could ‘make no law’ over a certain
domain”; in contrast, the Civil War Amendments used
“language [that] authorized transformative new federal
statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and inequality”
and provided “sweeping enforcement powers . . . to
enact ‘appropriate’ legislation targeting state
abuses.” A. Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography
361, 363, 399 (2005). See also McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 153, 182 (1997) (quoting Civil War-era framer that
“the remedy for the violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments was expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was
legislative.”).

															     The stated purpose of
the Civil War Amendments was to arm Congress with the power and
authority to protect all persons within the Nation from violations
of their rights by the States. In exercising that power, then,
Congress may use “all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted” to the constitutional ends declared by these
Amendments. McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 421. So when Congress acts to
enforce the right to vote free from racial discrimination, we ask
not whether Congress has chosen the means most wise, but whether
Congress has rationally selected means appropriate to a legitimate
end. “It is not for us to review the congressional resolution
of [the need for its chosen remedy]. It is enough that we be able
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the
conflict as it did.” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S.
641, 653 (1966) .

															     Until today, in
considering the constitutionality of the VRA, the Court has
accorded Congress the full measure of respect its judgments in this
domain should garner. South Carolina v. Katzenbach supplies the
standard of review: “As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitu-tional prohibition of racial discrimination in
voting.” 383 U. S., at 324. Faced with subsequent
reauthorizations of the VRA, the Court has reaffirmed this
standard. E.g., City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 178. Today’s
Court does not purport to alter settled precedent establishing that
the dispositive question is whether Congress has employed
“rational means.”

															     For three reasons,
legislation reauthorizing an existing statute is especially likely
to satisfy the minimal requirements of the rational-basis test.
First, when reauthorization is at issue, Congress has already
assembled a legislative record justifying the initial legislation.
Congress is en-titled to consider that preexisting record as well
as the record before it at the time of the vote on reauthorization.
This is especially true where, as here, the Court has repeatedly
affirmed the statute’s constitutionality and Congress has
adhered to the very model the Court has upheld. See id., at 174
(“The appellants are asking us to do nothing less than
overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach
. . . , in which we upheld the constitutionality of the
Act.”); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U. S. 266, 283
(1999) (similar).

															     Second, the very fact
that reauthorization is necessary arises because Congress has built
a temporal limitation into the Act. It has pledged to review, after
a span of years (first 15, then 25) and in light of contemporary
evidence, the continued need for the VRA. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U. S. 306, 343 (2003) (anticipating, but not guaranteeing,
that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences [in higher
education] will no longer be necessary”).

															     Third, a reviewing
court should expect the record supporting reauthorization to be
less stark than the record originally made. Demand for a record of
violations equivalent to the one earlier made would expose Congress
to a catch-22. If the statute was working, there would be less
evidence of discrimination, so opponents might argue that Congress
should not be allowed to renew the statute. In contrast, if the
statute was not working, there would be plenty of evidence of
discrimination, but scant reason to renew a failed regulatory
regime. See Persily 193–194.

															     This is not to suggest
that congressional power in this area is limitless. It is this
Court’s responsibility to ensure that Congress has used
appropriate means. The question meet for judicial review is whether
the chosen means are “adapted to carry out the objects the
amendments have in view.” Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S.
339, 346 (1880) . The Court’s role, then, is not to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress, but to determine
whether the legislative record sufficed to show that
“Congress could rationally have determined that [its chosen]
provisions were appropriate methods.” City of Rome, 446
U. S., at 176–177.

															     In summary, the
Constitution vests broad power in Congress to protect the right to
vote, and in particular to combat racial discrimination in voting.
This Court has repeatedly reaffirmed Congress’ prerogative to
use any rational means in exercise of its power in this area. And
both precedent and logic dictate that the rational-means test
should be easier to satisfy, and the burden on the statute’s
challenger should be higher, when what is at issue is the
reauthorization of a remedy that the Court has previously affirmed,
and that Congress found, from contemporary evidence, to be working
to advance the legislature’s legitimate objective.

															III

															     The 2006
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act fully satisfies the
standard stated in McCulloch, 4 Wheat., at 421: Congress may choose
any means “appropriate” and “plainly adapted
to” a legitimate constitutional end. As we shall see, it is
implausible to suggest otherwise.

															A

															     I begin with the
evidence on which Congress based its decision to continue the
preclearance remedy. The surest way to evaluate whether that remedy
remains in order is to see if preclearance is still effectively
preventing discriminatory changes to voting laws. See City of Rome,
446 U. S., at 181 (identifying “information on the
number and types of submissions made by covered jurisdictions and
the number and nature of objections interposed by the Attorney
General” as a primary basis for upholding the 1975
reauthorization). On that score, the record before Congress was
huge. In fact, Congress found there were more DOJ objections
between 1982 and 2004 (626) than there were between 1965 and the
1982 reauthorization (490). 1 Voting Rights Act: Evidence of
Continued Need, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., p.
172 (2006) (hereinafter Evidence of Continued Need).

															     All told, between 1982
and 2006, DOJ objections blocked over 700 voting changes based on a
determination that the changes were discriminatory. H. R. Rep.
No. 109–478, at 21. Congress found that the majority of DOJ
objections included findings of discriminatory intent, see 679
F. 3d, at 867, and that the changes blocked by preclearance
were “calculated decisions to keep minority voters from fully
participating in the political process.” H. R. Rep.
109–478, at 21. On top of that, over the same time period the
DOJ and private plaintiffs succeeded in more than 100 actions to
enforce the §5 preclearance requirements. 1 Evidence of
Continued Need 186, 250.

															     In addition to blocking
proposed voting changes through preclearance, DOJ may request more
information from a jurisdiction proposing a change. In turn, the
jurisdiction may modify or withdraw the proposed change. The number
of such modifications or withdrawals provides an indication of how
many discriminatory proposals are deterred without need for formal
objection. Congress received evidence that more than 800 proposed
changes were altered or withdrawn since the last reauthorization in
1982. H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 40–41. [ 4 ] Congress also received empirical
studies finding that DOJ’s requests for more information had
a significant effect on the degree to which covered jurisdictions
“compl[ied] with their obligatio[n]” to protect
minority voting rights. 2 Evidence of Continued Need 2555.

															     Congress also received
evidence that litigation under §2 of the VRA was an inadequate
substitute for preclearance in the covered jurisdictions.
Litigation occurs only after the fact, when the illegal voting
scheme has already been put in place and individuals have been
elected pursuant to it, thereby gaining the advantages of
incumbency. 1 Evidence of Continued Need 97. An illegal scheme
might be in place for several election cycles before a §2
plaintiff can gather sufficient evidence to challenge it. 1 Voting
Rights Act: Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 92 (2005)
(hereinafter Section 5 Hearing). And litigation places a heavy
financial burden on minority voters. See id., at 84. Congress also
received evidence that preclearance lessened the litigation burden
on covered jurisdictions themselves, because the preclearance
process is far less costly than defending against a §2 claim,
and clearance by DOJ substantially reduces the likelihood that a
§2 claim will be mounted. Reauthorizing the Voting Rights
Act’s Temporary Provisions: Policy Perspectives and Views
From the Field: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13,
120–121 (2006). See also Brief for States of New York,
California, Mississippi, and North Carolina as Amici Curiae
8–9 (Section 5 “reduc[es] the likelihood that a
jurisdiction will face costly and protracted Section 2
litigation”).

															     The number of
discriminatory changes blocked or deterred by the preclearance
requirement suggests that the state of voting rights in the covered
jurisdictions would have been significantly different absent this
remedy. Sur-veying the type of changes stopped by the preclearance
procedure conveys a sense of the extent to which §5 continues
to protect minority voting rights. Set out below are characteristic
examples of changes blocked in the years leading up to the 2006
reauthorization:

															In 1995, Mississippi sought to reenact a dual
voter registration system, “which was initially enacted in
1892 to disenfranchise Black voters,” and for that reason,
was struck down by a federal court in 1987. H. R. Rep. No.
109–478, at 39.

															Following the 2000 census, the City of Albany,
Georgia, proposed a redistricting plan that DOJ found to be
“designed with the purpose to limit and retrogress the
increased black voting strength . . . in the city as a
whole.” Id., at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															In 2001, the mayor and all-white five-member
Board of Aldermen of Kilmichael, Mississippi, abruptly canceled the
town’s election after “an unprecedented number”
of African-American can-didates announced they were running for
office. DOJ required an election, and the town elected its first
black mayor and three black aldermen. Id., at 36–37.

															In 2006, this Court found that Texas’
attempt to redraw a congressional district to reduce the strength
of Latino voters bore “the mark of intentional discrimination
that could give rise to an equal protection violation,” and
ordered the district redrawn in compliance with the VRA. League of
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 440
(2006) . In response, Texas sought to undermine this Court’s
order by curtailing early voting in the district, but was blocked
by an action to enforce the §5 preclearance requirement. See
Order in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Texas, No.
06–cv–1046 (WD Tex.), Doc. 8.

															In 2003, after African-Americans won a majority
of the seats on the school board for the first time in history,
Charleston County, South Carolina, proposed an at-large voting
mechanism for the board. The proposal, made without consulting any
of the African-American members of the school board, was found to
be an “ ‘exact replica’ ” of an
earlier voting scheme that, a federal court had determined,
violated the VRA. 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 483 (DDC 2011). See
also S. Rep. No. 109–295, at 309. DOJ invoked §5 to
block the proposal.

															In 1993, the City of Millen, Georgia, proposed
to delay the election in a majority-black district by two years,
leaving that district without representation on the city council
while the neighboring majority-white district would have three
representatives. 1 Section 5 Hearing 744. DOJ blocked the proposal.
The county then sought to move a polling place from a predominantly
black neighborhood in the city to an inaccessible location in a
predominantly white neighborhood outside city limits. Id., at
816.

															In 2004, Waller County, Texas, threatened to
prosecute two black students after they announced their intention
to run for office. The county then attempted to reduce the
availability of early voting in that election at polling places
near a historically black university. 679 F. 3d, at
865–866.

															In 1990, Dallas County, Alabama, whose county
seat is the City of Selma, sought to purge its voter rolls of many
black voters. DOJ rejected the purge as discriminatory, noting that
it would have disquali-fied many citizens from voting “simply
because they failed to pick up or return a voter update form, when
there was no valid requirement that they do so.” 1 Section 5
Hearing 356.

															     These examples, and
scores more like them, fill the pages of the legislative record.
The evidence was indeed sufficient to support Congress’
conclusion that “racial discrimination in voting in covered
jurisdictions [remained] serious and pervasive.” 679
F. 3d, at 865. [ 5 ]

															     Congress further
received evidence indicating that formal requests of the kind set
out above represented only the tip of the iceberg. There was what
one commentator described as an “avalanche of case studies of
voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions,”
ranging from “outright intimidation and violence against
minority voters” to “more subtle forms of voting rights
deprivations.” Persily 202 (footnote omitted). This evidence
gave Congress ever more reason to conclude that the time had not
yet come for relaxed vigilance against the scourge of race
discrimination in voting.

															     True, conditions in the
South have impressively improved since passage of the Voting Rights
Act. Congress noted this improvement and found that the VRA was the
driving force behind it. 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(1). But
Congress also found that voting discrimination had evolved into
subtler second-generation barriers, and that eliminating
preclearance would risk loss of the gains that had been made.
§§2(b)(2), (9). Concerns of this order, the Court
previously found, gave Congress adequate cause to reauthorize the
VRA. City of Rome, 446 U. S., at 180–182 (congressional
reauthorization of the preclearance requirement was justified based
on “the number and nature of objections interposed by the
Attorney General” since the prior reauthorization; extension
was “necessary to pre-serve the limited and fragile
achievements of the Act and to promote further amelioration of
voting discrimination”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Facing such evidence then, the Court expressly rejected the
argument that disparities in voter turnout and number of elected
officials were the only metrics capable of justifying
reauthorization of the VRA. Ibid.

															B

															     I turn next to the
evidence on which Congress based its decision to reauthorize the
coverage formula in §4(b). Because Congress did not alter the
coverage formula, the same jurisdictions previously subject to
preclearance continue to be covered by this remedy. The evidence
just described, of preclearance’s continuing efficacy in
blocking constitutional violations in the covered jurisdictions,
itself grounded Congress’ conclusion that the remedy should
be retained for those jurisdictions.

															     There is no question,
moreover, that the covered jurisdictions have a unique history of
problems with racial discrimination in voting. Ante, at
12–13. Consideration of this long history, still in living
memory, was altogether appropriate. The Court criticizes Congress
for failing to recognize that “history did not end in
1965.” Ante, at 20. But the Court ignores that
“what’s past is prologue.” W. Shakespeare, The
Tempest, act 2, sc. 1. And “[t]hose who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it.” 1 G. Santayana, The Life of
Reason 284 (1905). Congress was especially mindful of the need to
reinforce the gains already made and to prevent backsliding. 2006
Reauthorization §2(b)(9).

															     Of particular
importance, even after 40 years and thousands of discriminatory
changes blocked by preclearance, conditions in the covered
jurisdictions demonstrated that the formula was still justified by
“current needs.” Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at
203.

															     Congress learned of
these conditions through a report, known as the Katz study, that
looked at §2 suits between 1982 and 2004. To Examine the
Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing before
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 964–1124 (2005)
(hereinafter Impact and Effectiveness). Because the private right
of action authorized by §2 of the VRA applies nationwide, a
comparison of §2 lawsuits in covered and noncovered
jurisdictions provides an appropriate yardstick for measuring
differences between covered and noncovered jurisdictions. If
differences in the risk of voting discrimination between covered
and noncovered jurisdictions had disappeared, one would expect that
the rate of successful §2 lawsuits would be roughly the same
in both areas. [ 6 ] The
study’s findings, however, indicated that racial
discrimination in voting remains “concentrated in the
jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.” Northwest
Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.

															     Although covered
jurisdictions account for less than 25 percent of the
country’s population, the Katz study revealed that they
accounted for 56 percent of successful §2 litigation since
1982. Impact and Effectiveness 974. Controlling for population,
there were nearly four times as many successful §2 cases in
covered jurisdictions as there were in noncovered jurisdictions.
679 F. 3d, at 874. The Katz study further found that §2
lawsuits are more likely to succeed when they are filed in covered
jurisdictions than in noncovered jurisdictions. Impact and
Effectiveness 974. From these findings—ignored by the
Court—Congress reasonably concluded that the coverage formula
continues to identify the jurisdictions of greatest concern.

															     The evidence before
Congress, furthermore, indicated that voting in the covered
jurisdictions was more racially polarized than elsewhere in the
country. H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 34–35. While
racially polarized voting alone does not signal a constitutional
violation, it is a factor that increases the vulnerability of
racial minorities to dis-criminatory changes in voting law. The
reason is twofold. First, racial polarization means that racial
minorities are at risk of being systematically outvoted and having
their interests underrepresented in legislatures. Second,
“when political preferences fall along racial lines, the
natural inclinations of incumbents and ruling parties to entrench
themselves have predictable racial effects. Under circumstances of
severe racial polarization, efforts to gain political advantage
translate into race-specific disadvantages.” Ansolabehere,
Persily, & Stewart, Regional Differences in Racial Polarization
in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the
Constitutionality of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 Harv.
L. Rev. Forum 205, 209 (2013).

															     In other words, a
governing political coalition has an incentive to prevent changes
in the existing balance of voting power. When voting is racially
polarized, efforts by the ruling party to pursue that incentive
“will inevitably discriminate against a racial group.”
Ibid. Just as buildings in California have a greater need to be
earthquake-proofed, places where there is greater racial
polarization in voting have a greater need for prophylactic
measures to prevent purposeful race discrimination. This point was
understood by Congress and is well recognized in the academic
literature. See 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(3), 120Stat. 577
(“The continued evidence of racially polarized voting in each
of the jurisdictions covered by the [preclearance requirement]
demonstrates that racial and language minorities remain politically
vulnerable”); H. R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 35;
Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting
Racial and Language Minorities, in Quiet Revolution 21, 22.

															     The case for retaining
a coverage formula that met needs on the ground was therefore
solid. Congress might have been charged with rigidity had it
afforded covered jurisdictions no way out or ignored jurisdictions
that needed superintendence. Congress, however, responded to this
concern. Critical components of the congressional design are the
statutory provisions allowing jurisdictions to “bail
out” of preclearance, and for court-ordered “bail
ins.” See Northwest Austin, 557 U. S., at 199. The VRA
permits a jurisdiction to bail out by showing that it has complied
with the Act for ten years, and has engaged in efforts to eliminate
intimidation and harassment of vot-ers. 42 U. S. C.
§1973b(a) (2006 ed. and Supp. V). It also authorizes a court
to subject a noncovered jurisdiction to federal preclearance upon
finding that violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
have occurred there. §1973a(c) (2006 ed.).

															     Congress was satisfied
that the VRA’s bailout mechanism provided an effective means
of adjusting the VRA’s coverage over time. H. R. Rep.
No. 109–478, at 25 (the success of bailout “illustrates
that: (1) covered status is neither permanent nor over-broad; and
(2) covered status has been and continues to be within the control
of the jurisdiction such that those jurisdictions that have a
genuinely clean record and want to terminate coverage have the
ability to do so”). Nearly 200 jurisdictions have
successfully bailed out of the preclearance requirement, and DOJ
has consented to every bailout application filed by an eligible
jurisdiction since the current bailout procedure became effective
in 1984. Brief for Federal Respondent 54. The bail-in mechanism has
also worked. Several jurisdictions have been subject to federal
preclearance by court orders, including the States of New Mexico
and Arkansas. App. to Brief for Federal Respondent 1a–3a.

															     This experience exposes
the inaccuracy of the Court’s portrayal of the Act as static,
unchanged since 1965. Congress designed the VRA to be a dynamic
statute, capable of adjusting to changing conditions. True, many
covered jurisdictions have not been able to bail out due to recent
acts of noncompliance with the VRA, but that truth reinforces the
congressional judgment that these jurisdictions were rightfully
subject to preclearance, and ought to remain under that regime.

															IV

															     Congress approached
the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA with great care and
seriousness. The same cannot be said of the Court’s opinion
today. The Court makes no genuine attempt to engage with the
massive legislative record that Congress assembled. Instead, it
relies on increases in voter registration and turnout as if that
were the whole story. See supra, at 18–19. Without even
identifying a standard of review, the Court dismissively brushes
off arguments based on “data from the record,” and
declines to enter the “debat[e about] what [the] record
shows.” Ante, at 20–21. One would expect more from an
opinion striking at the heart of the Nation’s signal piece of
civil-rights legislation.

															     I note the most
disturbing lapses. First, by what right, given its usual restraint,
does the Court even address Shelby County’s facial challenge
to the VRA? Second, the Court veers away from controlling precedent
regarding the “equal sovereignty” doctrine without even
acknowledging that it is doing so. Third, hardly showing the
respect ordinarily paid when Congress acts to implement the Civil
War Amendments, and as just stressed, the Court does not even deign
to grapple with the legislative record.

															A

															     Shelby County
launched a purely facial challenge to the VRA’s 2006
reauthorization. “A facial challenge to a legislative
Act,” the Court has other times said, “is, of course,
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481
U. S. 739, 745 (1987) .

															     “[U]nder our
constitutional system[,] courts are not roving commissions assigned
to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.”
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 –611 (1973).
Instead, the “judicial Power” is limited to deciding
particular “Cases” and “Controversies.”
U. S. Const., Art. III, §2. “Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the
principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground
that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in
other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick, 413
U. S., at 610. Yet the Court’s opinion in this case
contains not a word explaining why Congress lacks the power to
subject to preclearance the particular plaintiff that initiated
this lawsuit—Shelby County, Alabama. The reason for the
Court’s silence is apparent, for as applied to Shelby County,
the VRA’s preclearance requirement is hardly contestable.

															     Alabama is home to
Selma, site of the “Bloody Sunday” beatings of
civil-rights demonstrators that served as the catalyst for the
VRA’s enactment. Following those events, Martin Luther King,
Jr., led a march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama’s capital,
where he called for passage of the VRA. If the Act passed, he
foresaw, progress could be made even in Alabama, but there had to
be a steadfast national commitment to see the task through to
completion. In King’s words, “the arc of the moral
universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” G. May,
Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the
Transformation of American Democracy 144 (2013).

															     History has proved King
right. Although circumstances in Alabama have changed, serious
concerns remain. Between 1982 and 2005, Alabama had one of the
highest rates of successful §2 suits, second only to its
VRA-covered neighbor Mississippi. 679 F. 3d, at 897 (Williams,
J., dissenting). In other words, even while subject to the
restraining effect of §5, Alabama was found to have
“deni[ed] or abridge[d]” voting rights “on
account of race or color” more frequently than nearly all
other States in the Union. 42 U. S. C. §1973(a).
This fact prompted the dissenting judge below to concede that
“a more narrowly tailored coverage formula” capturing
Alabama and a handful of other jurisdictions with an established
track record of racial discrimination in voting “might be
defensible.” 679 F. 3d, at 897 (opinion of Williams,
J.). That is an understatement. Alabama’s sorry history of
§2 violations alone provides sufficient justification for
Congress’ determination in 2006 that the State should remain
subject to §5’s preclearance requirement. [ 7 ]

															     A few examples suffice
to demonstrate that, at least in Alabama, the “current
burdens” imposed by §5’s preclearance requirement
are “justified by current needs.” Northwest Austin, 557
U. S., at 203. In the interim between the VRA’s 1982 and
2006 reauthorizations, this Court twice confronted purposeful
racial discrimination in Alabama. In Pleasant Grove v. United
States, 479 U. S. 462 (1987) , the Court held that Pleasant
Grove—a city in Jefferson County, Shelby County’s
neighbor—engaged in purposeful discrimination by annexing
all-white areas while rejecting the annexation request of an
adjacent black neighborhood. The city had “shown unambiguous
opposition to racial integration, both before and after the passage
of the fed-eral civil rights laws,” and its strategic
annexations appeared to be an attempt “to provide for the
growth of a monolithic white voting block” for “the
impermissible purpose of minimizing future black voting
strength.” Id., at 465, 471–472.

															     Two years before
Pleasant Grove, the Court in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S.
222 (1985) , struck down a provision of the Alabama Constitution
that prohibited individuals convicted of misdemeanor offenses
“involving moral turpitude” from voting. Id., at 223
(internal quotation marks omitted). The provision violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the Court
unanimously concluded, because “its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of
race[,] and the [provision] continues to this day to have that
effect.” Id., at 233.

															     Pleasant Grove and
Hunter were not anomalies. In 1986, a Federal District Judge
concluded that the at-large election systems in several Alabama
counties violated §2. Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 640
F. Supp. 1347, 1354–1363 (MD Ala. 1986). Summarizing its
findings, the court stated that “[f ]rom the late
1800’s through the present, [Alabama] has consistently
erected barriers to keep black persons from full and equal
participation in the social, economic, and political life of the
state.” Id., at 1360.

															     The Dillard litigation
ultimately expanded to include 183 cities, counties, and school
boards employing discriminatory at-large election systems. Dillard
v. Baldwin Cty. Bd. of Ed., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (MD Ala.
1988). One of those defendants was Shelby County, which eventually
signed a consent decree to resolve the claims against it. See
Dillard v. Crenshaw Cty., 748 F. Supp. 819 (MD Ala. 1990).

															     Although the Dillard
litigation resulted in overhauls of numerous electoral systems
tainted by racial discrimination, concerns about backsliding
persist. In 2008, for example, the city of Calera, located in
Shelby County, requested preclearance of a redistricting plan that
“would have eliminated the city’s sole majority-black
district, which had been created pursuant to the consent decree in
Dillard.” 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (DC 2011). Although
DOJ objected to the plan, Calera forged ahead with elections based
on the unprecleared voting changes, resulting in the defeat of the
incumbent African-American councilman who represented the former
majority-black district. Ibid. The city’s defiance required
DOJ to bring a §5 enforcement action that ultimately yielded
appropriate redress, including restoration of the majority-black
district. Ibid.; Brief for Respondent-Intervenors Earl Cunningham
et al. 20.

															     A recent FBI
investigation provides a further window into the persistence of
racial discrimination in state politics. See United States v.
McGregor, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1344–1348 (MD Ala.
2011). Recording devices worn by state legislators cooperating with
the FBI’s investigation captured conversations between
members of the state legislature and their political allies. The
recorded conversations are shocking. Members of the state Senate
derisively refer to African-Americans as “Aborigines”
and talk openly of their aim to quash a particular gambling-related
referendum because the referendum, if placed on the ballot, might
increase African-American voter turnout. Id., at 1345–1346
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also id., at 1345
(legislators and their allies expressed concern that if the
referendum were placed on the ballot, “ ‘[e]very
black, every illiterate’ would be ‘bused [to the polls]
on HUD financed buses’ ”). These conversations
oc-curred not in the 1870’s, or even in the 1960’s,
they took place in 2010. Id., at 1344–1345. The District
Judge presiding over the criminal trial at which the recorded
conversations were introduced commented that the “recordings
represent compelling evidence that political exclusion through
racism remains a real and enduring problem” in Alabama. Id.,
at 1347. Racist sentiments, the judge observed, “remain
regrettably entrenched in the high echelons of state
government.” Ibid.

															     These recent episodes
forcefully demonstrate that §5’s preclearance
requirement is constitutional as applied to Alabama and its
political subdivisions. [ 8 ]
And under our case law, that conclusion should suffice to resolve
this case. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 –25
(1960) (“[I]f the complaint here called for an application of
the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,
that should have been an end to the question of
constitutionality.”). See also Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721, 743 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (where, as here, a state or local government raises a
facial challenge to a federal statute on the ground that it exceeds
Congress’ enforcement powers under the Civil War Amendments,
the challenge fails if the opposing party is able to show that the
statute “could constitutionally be applied to some
jurisdictions”).

															     This Court has
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to legislation
enacted pursuant to Congress’ enforcement powers under the
Civil War Amendments upon finding that the legislation was
constitutional as applied to the particular set of circumstances
before the Court. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U. S. 151,
159 (2006) (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA) validly abrogates state sovereign immunity “insofar as
[it] creates a private cause of action . . . for conduct
that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment”); Tennessee
v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 –534 (2004) (Title II of the ADA
is constitutional “as it applies to the class of cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts”);
Raines, 362 U. S., at 24–26 (federal statute proscribing
deprivations of the right to vote based on race was constitutional
as applied to the state officials before the Court, even if it
could not constitutionally be applied to other parties). A similar
approach is warranted here. [ 9 ]

															     The VRA’s
exceptionally broad severability provision makes it particularly
inappropriate for the Court to allow Shelby County to mount a
facial challenge to §§4(b) and 5 of the VRA, even though
application of those provisions to the county falls well within the
bounds of Congress’ legislative authority. The severability
provision states:

															“If any provision of [this Act] or
the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held
invalid, the remainder of [the Act] and the application of the
provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.” 42
U. S. C. §1973p.

															In other words, even if the VRA could not
constitutionally be applied to certain States—e.g., Arizona
and Alaska, see ante, at 8—§1973p calls for those
unconstitutional applications to be severed, leaving the Act in
place for juris-dictions as to which its application does not
transgress constitutional limits.

															     Nevertheless, the Court
suggests that limiting the jurisdictional scope of the VRA in an
appropriate case would be “to try our hand at updating the
statute.” Ante, at 22. Just last Term, however, the Court
rejected this very argument when addressing a materially identical
severability provision, explaining that such a provision is
“Congress’ explicit textual instruction to leave
unaffected the remainder of [the Act]” if any particular
“application is unconstitutional.” National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. __, __ (2012)
(plurality opinion) (slip op., at 56) (internal quotation marks
omitted); id., at __ (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring
in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 60)
(agreeing with the plurality’s severability analysis). See
also Raines, 362 U. S., at 23 (a statute capable of some
constitutional applications may nonetheless be susceptible to a
facial challenge only in “that rarest of cases where this
Court can justifiably think itself able confidently to discern that
Congress would not have desired its legislation to stand at all
unless it could validly stand in its every application”).
Leaping to resolve Shelby County’s facial challenge without
considering whether application of the VRA to Shelby County is
constitutional, or even addressing the VRA’s severability
provision, the Court’s opinion can hardly be described as an
exemplar of restrained and moderate decisionmaking. Quite the
opposite. Hubris is a fit word for today’s demolition of the
VRA.

															B

															     The Court stops any
application of §5 by holding that §4(b)’s coverage
formula is unconstitutional. It pins this result, in large measure,
to “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty.”
Ante, at 10–11, 23. In Katzenbach, however, the Court held,
in no uncertain terms, that the principle “applies only to
the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to
the remedies for local evils which have subsequently
appeared.” 383 U. S., at 328–329 (emphasis
added).

															     Katzenbach, the Court
acknowledges, “rejected the notion that the [equal
sovereignty] principle operate[s] as a bar on differential
treatment outside [the] context [of the admission of new
States].” Ante, at 11 (citing 383 U. S., at
328–329) (emphasis omitted). But the Court clouds that once
clear understanding by citing dictum from Northwest Austin to
convey that the principle of equal sovereignty “remains
highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of
States.” Ante, at 11 (citing 557 U. S., at 203). See
also ante, at 23 (relying on Northwest Austin’s
“emphasis on [the] significance” of the
equal-sovereignty principle). If the Court is suggesting that
dictum in Northwest Austin silently overruled Katzenbach’s
limitation of the equal sovereignty doctrine to “the
admission of new States,” the suggestion is untenable.
Northwest Austin cited Katzenbach’s holding in the course of
declining to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or even what
standard of review applied to the question. 557 U. S., at
203–204. In today’s decision, the Court ratchets up
what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing breadth to
the equal sovereignty principle in flat contradiction of
Katzenbach. The Court does so with nary an explanation of why it
finds Katzenbach wrong, let alone any discussion of whether stare
decisis nonetheless counsels adherence to Katzenbach’s ruling
on the limited “significance” of the equal sovereignty
principle.

															     Today’s
unprecedented extension of the equal sover-eignty principle outside
its proper domain—the admission of new States—is
capable of much mischief. Federal statutes that treat States
disparately are hardly novelties. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C.
§3704 (no State may operate or permit a sports-related
gambling scheme, unless that State conducted such a scheme
“at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and
ending August 31, 1990”); 26 U. S. C. §142(l)
(EPA required to locate green building project in a State meeting
specified population criteria); 42 U. S. C. §3796bb
(at least 50 percent of rural drug enforcement assistance funding
must be allocated to States with “a population density of
fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile or a State in which the
largest county has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand
people, based on the decennial census of 1990 through fiscal year
1997”); §§13925, 13971 (similar population criteria
for funding to combat rural domestic violence); §10136
(specifying rules applicable to Nevada’s Yucca Mountain
nuclear waste site, and providing that “[n]o State, other
than the State of Nevada, may receive financial assistance under
this subsection after December 22, 1987”). Do such provisions
remain safe given the Court’s expansion of equal
sovereignty’s sway?

															     Of gravest concern,
Congress relied on our pathmarking Katzenbach decision in each
reauthorization of the VRA. It had every reason to believe that the
Act’s limited geographical scope would weigh in favor of, not
against, the Act’s constitutionality. See, e.g., United
States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 –627 (2000) (confining
preclearance regime to States with a record of discrimination
bolstered the VRA’s constitutionality). Congress could hardly
have foreseen that the VRA’s limited geographic reach would
render the Act constitutionally suspect. See Persily 195
(“[S]upporters of the Act sought to develop an evidentiary
record for the principal purpose of explaining why the covered
jurisdictions should remain covered, rather than justifying the
coverage of certain jurisdictions but not others.”).

															     In the Court’s
conception, it appears, defenders of the VRA could not prevail upon
showing what the record overwhelmingly bears out, i.e., that there
is a need for continuing the preclearance regime in covered States.
In addition, the defenders would have to disprove the existence of
a comparable need elsewhere. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 61–62
(suggesting that proof of egregious episodes of racial
discrimination in covered jurisdictions would not suffice to carry
the day for the VRA, unless such episodes are shown to be absent
elsewhere). I am aware of no precedent for imposing such a double
burden on defenders of legislation.

															C

															     The Court has time
and again declined to upset legislation of this genre unless there
was no or almost no evidence of unconstitutional action by States.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 530 (1997)
(legislative record “mention[ed] no episodes [of the kind the
legislation aimed to check] occurring in the past 40 years”).
No such claim can be made about the congressional record for the
2006 VRA reauthorization. Given a record replete with examples of
denial or abridgment of a paramount federal right, the Court should
have left the matter where it belongs: in Congress’
bailiwick.

															     Instead, the Court
strikes §4(b)’s coverage provision because, in its view,
the provision is not based on “current conditions.”
Ante, at 17. It discounts, however, that one such condition was the
preclearance remedy in place in the covered jurisdictions, a remedy
Congress designed both to catch discrimination before it causes
harm, and to guard against return to old ways. 2006 Reauthorization
§2(b)(3), (9). Volumes of evidence supported Congress’
de-termination that the prospect of retrogression was real.
Throwing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to
work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.

															     But, the Court insists,
the coverage formula is no good; it is based on “decades-old
data and eradicated practices.” Ante, at 18. Even if the
legislative record shows, as engaging with it would reveal, that
the formula accurately identifies the jurisdictions with the worst
conditions of voting discrimination, that is of no moment, as the
Court sees it. Congress, the Court decrees, must “star[t]
from scratch.” Ante, at 23. I do not see why that should be
so.

															     Congress’ chore
was different in 1965 than it was in 2006. In 1965, there were a
“small number of States . . . which in most
instances were familiar to Congress by name,” on which
Congress fixed its attention. Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 328.
In drafting the coverage formula, “Congress began work with
reliable evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great
majority of the States” it sought to target. Id., at 329.
“The formula [Congress] eventually evolved to describe these
areas” also captured a few States that had not been the
subject of congressional factfinding. Ibid. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the formula in its entirety, finding it fair “to infer
a significant danger of the evil” in all places the formula
covered. Ibid.

															     The situation Congress
faced in 2006, when it took up reauthorization of the coverage
formula, was not the same. By then, the formula had been in effect
for many years, and all of the jurisdictions covered by it were
“familiar to Congress by name.” Id., at 328. The
question before Congress: Was there still a sufficient basis to
support continued application of the preclearance remedy in each of
those already-identified places? There was at that point no chance
that the formula might inadvertently sweep in new areas that were
not the subject of congressional findings. And Congress could
determine from the record whether the jurisdictions captured by the
coverage for-mula still belonged under the preclearance regime. If
they did, there was no need to alter the formula. That is why the
Court, in addressing prior reauthorizations of the VRA, did not
question the continuing “relevance” of the formula.

															     Consider once again the
components of the record before Congress in 2006. The coverage
provision identified a known list of places with an undisputed
history of serious problems with racial discrimination in voting.
Recent evidence relating to Alabama and its counties was there for
all to see. Multiple Supreme Court decisions had upheld the
coverage provision, most recently in 1999. There was extensive
evidence that, due to the preclearance mechanism, conditions in the
covered jurisdictions had notably improved. And there was evidence
that preclearance was still having a substantial real-world effect,
having stopped hundreds of discriminatory voting changes in the
covered jurisdictions since the last reauthorization. In addition,
there was evidence that racial polarization in voting was higher in
covered jurisdictions than elsewhere, increasing the vulnerability
of minority citizens in those jurisdictions. And countless
witnesses, reports, and case studies documented continuing problems
with voting dis-crimination in those jurisdictions. In light of
this rec- ord, Congress had more than a reasonable basis to
conclude that the existing coverage formula was not out of sync
with conditions on the ground in covered areas. And certainly
Shelby County was no candidate for release through the mechanism
Congress provided. See supra, at 22–23, 26–28.

															     The Court holds
§4(b) invalid on the ground that it is “irrational to
base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such
tests have been illegal since that time.” Ante, at 23. But
the Court disregards what Congress set about to do in enacting the
VRA. That extraordinary legislation scarcely stopped at the
particular tests and devices that happened to exist in 1965. The
grand aim of the Act is to secure to all in our polity equal
citizenship stature, a voice in our democracy undiluted by race. As
the record for the 2006 reauthorization makes abundantly clear,
second-generation barriers to minority voting rights have emerged
in the covered jurisdictions as attempted substitutes for the
first-generation barriers that originally triggered preclearance in
those jurisdictions. See supra, at 5–6, 8, 15–17.

															     The sad irony of
today’s decision lies in its utter failure to grasp why the
VRA has proven effective. The Court appears to believe that the
VRA’s success in eliminating the specific devices extant in
1965 means that preclearance is no longer needed. Ante, at
21–22, 23–24. With that belief, and the argument
derived from it, history repeats itself. The same
assumption—that the problem could be solved when particular
methods of voting discrimination are identified and
eliminated—was indulged and proved wrong repeatedly prior to
the VRA’s enactment. Unlike prior statutes, which singled out
particular tests or devices, the VRA is grounded in Congress’
recognition of the “variety and persistence” of
measures designed to impair minority voting rights. Katzenbach, 383
U. S., at 311; supra, at 2. In truth, the evolution of voting
discrimination into more subtle second-generation barriers is
powerful evidence that a remedy as effective as preclearance
remains vital to protect minority voting rights and prevent
backsliding.

															     Beyond question, the
VRA is no ordinary legislation. It is extraordinary because
Congress embarked on a mission long delayed and of extraordinary
importance: to realize the purpose and promise of the Fifteenth
Amendment. For a half century, a concerted effort has been made to
end racial discrimination in voting. Thanks to the Voting Rights
Act, progress once the subject of a dream has been achieved and
continues to be made.

															     The record supporting
the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA is also extraordinary. It was
described by the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee as
“one of the most extensive considerations of any piece of
legislation that the United States Congress has dealt with in the
27½ years” he had served in the House. 152 Cong. Rec.
H5143 (July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). After
exhaustive evidence-gathering and deliberative process, Congress
reauthorized the VRA, including the coverage provision, with
overwhelming bipartisan support. It was the judgment of Congress
that “40 years has not been a sufficient amount of time to
eliminate the vestiges of discrimination following nearly 100 years
of disregard for the dictates of the 15th amendment and to ensure
that the right of all citizens to vote is protected as guaranteed
by the Constitution.” 2006 Reauthorization §2(b)(7),
120Stat. 577. That determination of the body empowered to enforce
the Civil War Amendments “by appropriate legislation”
merits this Court’s utmost respect. In my judgment, the Court
errs egregiously by overriding Congress’ decision.

															*  *  *

															     For the reasons
stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Notes 1 The Court purports to
declare unconstitutional only the coverage formula set out in
§4(b). See ante, at 24. But without that formula, §5 is
immobilized. 2 The Constitution uses the
words “right to vote” in five separate places: the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and s. Each of
these Amendments contains the same broad empowerment of Congress to
enact “appropriate legislation” to enforce the
protected right. The implication is unmistakable: Under our
constitutional structure, Congress holds the lead rein in making
the right to vote equally real for all U. S. citizens. These
Amendments are in line with the special role assigned to Congress
in protecting the integrity of the democratic process in federal
elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, §4 (“[T]he
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter” regulations
concerning the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives.”); Arizona v. Inter Tribal
Council of Ariz., Inc., ante, at 5–6. 3 Acknowledging the
existence of “serious constitutional questions,” see
ante, at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted), does not suggest
how those questions should be answered. 4 This number includes only
changes actually proposed. Congress also received evidence that
many covered jurisdictions engaged in an “informal
consultation process” with DOJ before formally submitting a
proposal, so that the deterrent effect of preclearance was far
broader than the formal submissions alone suggest. The Continuing
Need for Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 53–54
(2006). All agree that an unsupported assertion about
“deterrence” would not be sufficient to justify keeping
a remedy in place in perpetuity. See ante, at 17. But it was
certainly reasonable for Congress to consider the testimony of
witnesses who had worked with officials in covered jurisdictions
and observed a real-world deterrent effect. 5 For an illustration
postdating the 2006 reauthorization, see South Carolina v. United
States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (DC 2012), which involved a South
Carolina voter-identification law enacted in 2011. Concerned that
the law would burden minority voters, DOJ brought a §5
enforcement action to block the law’s implementation. In the
course of the litigation, South Carolina officials agreed to
binding interpretations that made it “far easier than some
might have expected or feared” for South Carolina citizens to
vote. Id., at 37. A three-judge panel precleared the law after
adopting both interpretations as an express “condition of
preclearance.” Id., at 37–38. Two of the judges
commented that the case demonstrated “the continuing utility
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in deterring problematic, and
hence encouraging non-discriminatory, changes in state and local
voting laws.” Id., at 54 (opinion of Bates, J.). 6 Because preclearance
occurs only in covered jurisdictions and can be expected to stop
the most obviously objectionable measures, one would expect a lower
rate of successful §2 lawsuits in those jurisdictions ifthe
risk of voting discrimination there were the same as elsewhere in
the country. 7 This lawsuit was filed by
Shelby County, a political subdivision of Alabama, rather than by
the State itself. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to judge Shelby
County’s constitutional challenge in light of instances of
discrimination statewide because Shelby County is subject to
§5’s preclearance requirement by virtue of
Alabama’s designation as a covered jurisdiction under
§4(b) of the VRA. See ante, at 7. In any event, Shelby
County’s recent record of employing an at-large electoral
system tainted by intentional racial discrimination is by itself
sufficient to justify subjecting the county to §5’s
preclearance mandate. See infra, at 26. 8 Congress continued
preclearance over Alabama, including Shelby County, after
considering evidence of current barriers there to minority voting
clout. Shelby County, thus, is no “redhead” caught up
in an arbitrary scheme. See ante, at 22. 9 The Court does not
contest that Alabama’s history of racial discrimination
provides a sufficient basis for Congress to require Alabama and its
political subdivisions to preclear electoral changes. Nevertheless,
the Court asserts that Shelby County may prevail on its facial
challenge to §4’s coverage formula because it is subject
to §5’s preclearance requirement by virtue of that
formula. See ante, at 22 (“The county was selected [for
preclearance] based on th[e] [coverage] formula.”). This
misses the reality that Congress decided to subject Alabama to
preclearance based on evidence of continuing constitutional
violations in that State. See supra, at 28, n. 8.