U.S. Supreme Court Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238 (1984) Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp. No. 81-2159 Argued October 4,
1983 Decided January 11,
1984 464
U.S. 238 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Appellant's decedent, a laboratory analyst at a federally
licensed nuclear plant in Oklahoma operated by appellee Kerr-McGee
Nuclear Corp. (hereafter appellee), was contaminated by plutonium.
Subsequently, after the decedent was killed in an unrelated
automobile accident, appellant, as administrator of the decedent's
estate, brought a diversity action in Federal District Court based
on common law tort principles under Oklahoma law to recover for the
contamination injuries to the decedent's person and property. The
jury returned a verdict in appellant's favor, awarding, in addition
to actual damages, punitive damages as authorized by Oklahoma law.
The Court of Appeals, inter alia, reversed as to the
punitive damages award on the ground that such damages were
preempted by federal law. Held: 1. The appeal is not within this Court's appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). The Court of Appeals held that, because
of the preemptive effect of federal law, punitive damages could not
be awarded. It did not purport to rule on the constitutionality of
the Oklahoma punitive damages statute, which was left untouched.
The decision, however, is reviewable by writ of certiorari. Pp. 464 U. S.
246 -248.

															2. The award of punitive damages is not preempted by federal
law. Pp. 464 U. S.
248 -258.

															(a) The federal preemption of state regulation of the safety
aspects of nuclear energy, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 ,
does not extend to the state-authorized award of punitive damages
for conduct related to radiation hazards. There is ample evidence
that Congress had no intention, when it enacted and later amended
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, of forbidding the States to provide
remedies for those suffering injuries from radiation in a nuclear
plant. Nor is appellee able to point to anything in the legislative
history of the Price-Anderson Act -- which established an
indemnification scheme for operators of nuclear facilities -- or in
the implementing regulations that indicates that punitive damages
were not to be allowed. Rather, it is clear Page 464 U. S. 239 that, in enacting and amending the Price-Anderson Act, Congress
assumed that state law remedies were available to those injured by
nuclear incidents, even though Congress was aware of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's exclusive authority to regulate safety
matters. Insofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned,
preemption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal
Government has so completely occupied the field of safety that
state remedies are foreclosed, but on whether there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or
whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages action
would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. Pp. 464 U. S.
249 -256.

															(b) The award of punitive damages in this case does not conflict
with the federal remedial scheme under which the NRC is authorized
to impose civil penalties on licensees for violation of federal
standards. Paying both federal fines and state-imposed punitive
damages for the same incident is not physically impossible, nor
does exposure to punitive damages frustrate any purpose of the
federal remedial scheme. The award of punitive damages does not
hinder the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) "to encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes," since Congress disclaimed any interest in
accomplishing this purpose by means that fail to provide adequate
remedies to those injured by exposure to hazardous nuclear
materials. Finally, the punitive damages award does not conflict
with Congress' intent to preclude dual regulation of radiation
hazards, since, as indicated above, Congress did not believe that
it was inconsistent to vest the NRC with exclusive regulatory
authority over the safety aspects of nuclear development while at
the same time allowing plaintiffs like appellant to recover for
injuries caused by nuclear hazards. Pp. 464 U. S.
257 -258.

															667 F.2d 908, reversed and remanded.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 464 U. S. 258 .
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 464 U. S.
274 . Page 464 U. S. 240 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Last Term, this Court examined the relationship between federal
and state authority in the nuclear energy field and concluded that
States are precluded from regulating the Page 464 U. S. 241 safety aspects of nuclear energy. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 , 461 U. S.
211 -213 (1983). This case requires us to determine
whether a state-authorized award of punitive damages arising out of
the escape of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear facility
is preempted either because it falls within that forbidden field or
because it conflicts with some other aspect of the Atomic Energy
Act. I Karen Silkwood was a laboratory analyst for Kerr-McGee [ Footnote 1 ] at its Cimarron plant near
Crescent, Okla. The plant fabricated plutonium fuel pins for use as
reactor fuel in nuclear powerplants. Accordingly, the plant was
subject to licensing and regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) (then the Atomic Energy Commission) pursuant to
the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 ed.
and Supp. V). [ Footnote 2 ]

															During a 3-day period of November, 1974, Silkwood was
contaminated by plutonium from the Cimarron plant. On November 5,
Silkwood was grinding and polishing plutonium samples, utilizing
glove boxes designed for that purpose. [ Footnote 3 ] In accordance with established procedures, she
checked her hands for contamination when she withdrew them from
the Page 464 U. S. 242 glove box. When some contamination was detected, a more
extensive check was performed. A monitoring device revealed
contamination on Silkwood's left hand, right wrist, upper arm,
neck, hair, and nostrils. She was immediately decontaminated, and
at the end of her shift, the monitors detected no contamination.
However, she was given urine and fecal kits and was instructed to
collect samples in order to check for plutonium discharge.

															The next day, Silkwood arrived at the plant and began doing
paperwork in the laboratory. Upon leaving the laboratory, Silkwood
monitored herself and again discovered surface contamination. Once
again, she was decontaminated.

															On the third day, November 7, Silkwood was monitored upon her
arrival at the plant. High levels of contamination were detected.
Four urine samples and one fecal sample submitted that morning were
also highly contaminated. [ Footnote
4 ] Suspecting that the contamination had spread to areas
outside the plant, the company directed a decontamination squad to
accompany Silkwood to her apartment. Silkwood's roommate, who was
also an employee at the plant, was awakened and monitored. She was
also contaminated, although to a lesser degree than Silkwood. The
squad then monitored the apartment, finding contamination in
several rooms, with especially high levels in the bathroom, the
kitchen, and Silkwood's bedroom.

															The contamination level in Silkwood's apartment was such that
many of her personal belongings had to be destroyed. Silkwood
herself was sent to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory to
determine the extent of contamination in her vital body organs. She
returned to work on November 13. That night, she was killed in an
unrelated automobile accident. 667 F.2d 908, 912 (CA10 1981). Page 464 U. S. 243 Bill Silkwood, Karen's father, brought the present diversity
action in his capacity as administrator of her estate. The action
was based on common law tort principles under Oklahoma law, and was
designed to recover for the contamination injuries to Karen's
person and property. Kerr-McGee stipulated that the plutonium which
caused the contamination came from its plant, and the jury
expressly rejected Kerr-McGee's allegation that Silkwood had
intentionally removed the plutonium from the plant in an effort to
embarrass the company. However, there were no other specific
findings of fact with respect to the cause of the
contamination.

															During the course of the trial, evidence was presented which
tended to show that Kerr-McGee did not always comply with NRC
regulations. One Kerr-McGee witness conceded that the amount of
plutonium which was unaccounted for during the period in question
exceeded permissible limits. [ Footnote 5 ] 485 F.
Supp. 566 , 586 (WD Okla.1979). An NRC official testified that
he did not feel that Kerr-McGee was conforming its conduct to the
"as low as reasonably achievable" standard. [ Footnote 6 ] Ibid. There was also some
evidence that the level of plutonium in Silkwood's apartment may
have exceeded that permitted in an unrestricted area such as a
residence. Ibid. Page 464 U. S. 244 However, there was also evidence that Kerr-McGee complied with
most federal regulations. The NRC official testified that there
were no serious personnel exposures at the plant, and that
Kerr-McGee did not exceed the regulatory requirements with respect
to exposure levels that would result in significant health hazards.
In addition, Kerr-McGee introduced the Commission's report on the
investigation of the Silkwood incident, in which the Commission
determined that Kerr-McGee's only violation of regulations
throughout the incident was its failure to maintain a record of the
dates of two urine samples submitted by Silkwood.

															The trial court determined that Kerr-McGee had not shown that
the contamination occurred during the course of Silkwood's
employment. Accordingly, the court precluded the jury from deciding
whether the personal injury claim was covered by Oklahoma's
Workers' Compensation Act, which provides the sole remedy for
accidental personal injuries arising in the course of employment.
Okla.Stat., Tit. 85, §§ 11, 12 (1981). Instead, the court submitted
the claims to the jury on alternative theories of strict liability
and negligence. [ Footnote
7 ]

															The court also instructed the jury with respect to punitive
damages, explaining the standard by which Kerr-McGee's conduct was
to be evaluated in determining whether such damages should be
awarded:

															"[T]he jury may give damages for the sake of example and by way
of punishment, if the jury finds the defendant or defendants have
been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed. .
. ."

															"Exemplary damages are not limited to cases where there is
direct evidence of fraud, malice or gross negligence. They may be
allowed when there is evidence Page 464 U. S. 245 of such recklessness and wanton disregard of another's rights
that malice and evil intent will be inferred. If a defendant is
grossly and wantonly reckless in exposing others to dangers, the
law holds him to have intended the natural consequences of his
acts, and treats him as guilty of a willful wrong."

															485 F. Supp. at 603 (Appendix).

															The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Silkwood, finding
actual damages of $505,000 ($500,000 for personal injuries and
$5,000 for property damage) and punitive damages of $10 million.
The trial court entered judgment against Kerr-McGee in that
amount.

															Kerr-McGee then moved for judgment n.o.v. or a new
trial. In denying that motion, the court rejected Kerr-McGee's
contention that compliance with federal regulations precluded an
award of punitive damages. The court noted that Kerr-McGee

															"had a duty under part 20 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to maintain the release of radiation 'as low as
reasonably achievable.' Compliance with this standard cannot be
demonstrated merely through control of escaped plutonium to within
any absolute amount." Id. at 585. Therefore, the court concluded, it is
not

															"inconsistent [with any congressional design] to impose punitive
damages for the escape of plutonium caused by grossly negligent,
reckless and willful conduct." Ibid. Kerr-McGee renewed its contentions with greater success before
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. That court, by decision
of a split panel, affirmed in part and reversed in part. 667 F.2d
908 (1981). The court first held that recovery for Silkwood's
personal injuries was controlled exclusively by Oklahoma's workers'
compensation law. It thus reversed the $500,000 judgment for those
injuries. The court then affirmed the property damage portion of
the award, holding that the workers' compensation law applied only
to personal injuries, and that Oklahoma law permitted an award
under a theory of strict liability in the circumstances Page 464 U. S. 246 of this case. Finally, the court held that, because of the
federal statutes regulating the Kerr-McGee plant, "punitive damages
may not be awarded in this case," id. at 923.

															In reaching its conclusion with respect to the punitive damages
award, the Court of Appeals adopted a broad preemption analysis. It
concluded that

															"any state action that competes substantially with the AEC (NRC)
in its regulation of radiation hazards associated with plants
handling nuclear material"

															was impermissible. Ibid. Because

															"[a] judicial award of exemplary damages under state law as
punishment for bad practices or to deter future practices involving
exposure to radiation is not less intrusive than direct legislative
acts of the state,"

															the court determined that such awards were preempted by federal
law. Ibid. Mr. Silkwood appealed, seeking review of the Court of Appeals'
ruling with respect to the punitive damages award. We noted
probable jurisdiction and postponed consideration of the
jurisdictional issue until argument on the merits. 459 U.S. 1101
(1983). II We first address the jurisdictional issue. This Court is
empowered to review the decision of a federal court of appeals "by
appeal [if] a State statute [is] held by [the] court of appeals to
be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution. . . ." 28 U.S.C. §
1254(2). Mr. Silkwood argues that, because the Court of Appeals
invalidated the punitive damages award on preemption grounds, and
because the basis for that award was a state statute, Okla.Stat.,
Tit. 23, § 9 (1981), [ Footnote
8 ] the Court of Appeals necessarily held that the state statute
was unconstitutional, at least as applied in this case.
Accordingly, Mr. Silkwood contends, this case falls within the
confines of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). We disagree. Page 464 U. S. 247 In keeping with the policy that statutes authorizing appeals are
to be strictly construed, Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 43 (1983); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U. S.
41 , 400 U. S. 42 , n.
1 (1970), we have consistently distinguished between those cases in
which a state statute is expressly struck down on constitutional
grounds and those in which an exercise of authority under state law
is invalidated without reference to the state statute. The former
come within the scope of § 1254(2)'s jurisdictional grant. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.
S. 497 , 435 U. S. 499 (1978); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 , 400 U. S. 76 , n.
6 (1970). The latter do not. Perry Education Assn., supra, at 460 U. S. 42 ; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U. S. 244 (1958); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474 , 327 U. S. 482 (1946). [ Footnote 9 ] See also County of Arlington v. United States, 669 F.2d 925 (CA4), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 801 (1982); Minnesota v.
Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (CA8 1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U. S. 977 (1977). The present case falls into the second category.

															The Court of Appeals held that, because of the preemptive effect
of federal law, "punitive damages may not be awarded in this case."
667 F.2d at 923. It did not purport to rule on the
constitutionality of the Oklahoma punitive damages statute. The
court did not mention the statute, and the parties did not contest
or defend the constitutionality of the statute in their appellate
briefs. While the award itself was struck down, the statute
authorizing such awards was left untouched. Cf. Perry Education
Assn., 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 42 .
Therefore, the present appeal is not within our § 1254(2) appellate
jurisdiction. [ Footnote
10 ] Page 464 U. S. 248 Nevertheless, the decision below is reviewable by writ of
certiorari. Ibid. The issue addressed by the court below
is important; it affects both the States' traditional authority to
provide tort remedies to their citizens and the Federal
Government's express desire to maintain exclusive regulatory
authority over the safety aspects of nuclear power. Accordingly,
treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for certiorari,
as we are authorized to do, 28 U.S.C. § 2103, we grant the petition
and reach the merits of the Court of Appeals' ruling. III As we recently observed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 (1983), state law can be preempted in either of two general ways.
If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state
law falling within that field is preempted. Id. at 461 U. S.
203 -204; Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn.
v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 , 458 U. S. 153 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.
S. 218 , 331 U. S. 230 (1947). If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation
over the matter in question, state law is still preempted to the
extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law, Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.
S. 132 , 373 U. S.
142 -143 (1963), or where the state law stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52 , 312 U. S. 67 (1941). Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, at 461 U. S. 204 .
Kerr-McGee contends that the award in this case is invalid under
either analysis. We consider each of these contentions in turn. Page 464 U. S. 249 A In Pacific Gas & Electric, an examination of the
statutory scheme and legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act
convinced us that

															"Congress . . . intended that the Federal Government should
regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the
construction and operation of a nuclear plant."

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 205 .
Thus, we concluded that

															"the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the
States." Id. at 461 U. S.
212 .

															Kerr-McGee argues that our ruling in Pacific Gas &
Electric is dispositive of the issue in this case. Noting that
"regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventive relief," San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.
S. 236 , 359 U. S. 247 (1959), Kerr-McGee submits that, because the state-authorized award
of punitive damages in this case punishes and deters conduct
related to radiation hazards, it falls within the prohibited field.
However, a review of the same legislative history which prompted
our holding in Pacific Gas & Electric, coupled with an
examination of Congress' actions with respect to other portions of
the Atomic Energy Act, convinces us that the preempted field does
not extend as far as Kerr-McGee would have it.

															As we recounted in Pacific Gas & Electric, "[u]ntil
1954, . . . the use, control, and ownership of nuclear technology
remained a federal monopoly." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 206 .
In that year, Congress enacted legislation which provided for
private involvement in the development of atomic energy. Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V).
However, the Federal Government retained extensive control over the
manner in which this development occurred. In particular, the
Atomic Energy Commission was given "exclusive jurisdiction to
license the transfer, Page 464 U. S. 250 delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear
materials." Pacific Gas & Electric, supra, at 461 U. S. 207 . See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(e), (z), (aa), 2061-2064, 2071-2078,
2091-2099, 2111-2114 (1976 ed. and Supp. V).

															In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act in order to

															"clarify the respective responsibilities . . . of the States and
the Commission with respect to the regulation of byproduct, source,
and special nuclear materials."

															42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1). See S.Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., 8-12 (1959). The Commission was authorized to turn some
of its regulatory authority over to any State which would adopt a
suitable regulatory program. However, the Commission was to retain
exclusive regulatory authority over

															"the disposal of such . . . byproduct, source, or special
nuclear material as the Commission determines . . . should, because
of the hazards or potential hazards thereof, not be disposed of
without a license from the Commission."

															42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4). The States were therefore still
precluded from regulating the safety aspects of these hazardous
materials. [ Footnote 11 ]

															Congress' decision to prohibit the States from regulating the
safety aspects of nuclear development was premised on its belief
that the Commission was more qualified to determine what type of
safety standards should be enacted in this complex area. As
Congress was informed by the AEC, the 1959 legislation provided for
continued federal control over the more hazardous materials
because

															"the technical safety considerations are of such complexity that
it is not likely that any State would be prepared to deal with them
during the foreseeable future."

															H.R.Rep. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959). If there
were nothing more, this concern over the States' inability to
formulate effective standards and Page 464 U. S. 251 the foreclosure of the States from conditioning the operation of
nuclear plants on compliance with state-imposed safety standards
arguably would disallow resort to state law remedies by those
suffering injuries from radiation in a nuclear plant. There is,
however, ample evidence that Congress had no intention of
forbidding the States to provide such remedies.

															Indeed, there is no indication that Congress even seriously
considered precluding the use of such remedies either when it
enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 or when it amended it in
1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of
Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured
by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those
injured by illegal conduct. See Construction Workers v.
Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656 , 347 U. S.
663 -664 (1954).

															More importantly, the only congressional discussion concerning
the relationship between the Atomic Energy Act and state tort
remedies indicates that Congress assumed that such remedies would
be available. After the 1954 law was enacted, private companies
contemplating entry into the nuclear industry expressed concern
over potentially bankrupting state law suits arising out of a
nuclear incident. As a result, in 1957, Congress passed the
Price-Anderson Act, an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act. Pub.L.
85-256, 71 Stat. 576. That Act established an indemnification
scheme under which operators of licensed nuclear facilities could
be required to obtain up to $60 million in private financial
protection against such suits. The Government would then provide
indemnification for the next $500 million of liability, and the
resulting $560 million would be the limit of liability for any one
nuclear incident.

															Although the Price-Anderson Act does not apply to the present
situation, [ Footnote 12 ] the
discussion preceding its enactment Page 464 U. S. 252 and subsequent amendment [ Footnote 13 ] indicates that Congress assumed that persons
injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state
tort law remedies. The Joint Committee Report on the original
version of the Price-Anderson Act explained the relationship
between the Act and existing state tort law as follows:

															"Since the rights of third parties who are injured are
established by State law, there is no interference with the State
law until there is a likelihood that the damages exceed the amount
of financial responsibility required, together with the amount of
the indemnity. At that point, the Federal interference is limited
to the prohibition of making payments through the State courts and
to prorating the proceeds available."

															S.Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1957). See
also H.R.Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1957); S.Rep.
No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1966).

															Congress clearly began working on the Price-Anderson legislation
with the assumption that, in the absence of some subsequent
legislative action, state tort law would apply. [ Footnote 14 ] This was true even though
Congress was fully aware of the Page 464 U. S. 253 Commission's exclusive regulatory authority over safety matters.
As the Joint Committee explained in 1965:

															"The Price-Anderson Act also contained provisions to improve the
AEC's procedures for regulating reactor licensees. . . . This
manifested the continuing concern of the Joint Committee and
Congress with the necessity for assuring the effectiveness of the
national regulatory program for protecting the health and safety of
employees and the public against atomic energy hazards. The
inclusion of these provisions . . . also reflected the intimate
relationship which existed between Congress' concern for prevention
of reactor accidents and the indemnity provisions of the
Price-Anderson legislation."

															S.Rep. No. 650, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1965).

															When it enacted the Price-Anderson Act, Congress was well aware
of the need for effective national safety regulation. In fact, it
intended to encourage such regulation. But, at the same time, "the
right of the State courts to establish the liability of the persons
involved in the normal way [was] maintained." S.Rep. No. 296, supra, at 22.

															The belief that the NRC's exclusive authority to set safety
standards did not foreclose the use of state tort remedies was
reaffirmed when the Price-Anderson Act was amended in 1966. The
1966 amendment was designed to respond to concerns about the
adequacy of state law remedies. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 650, supra, at 13. It provided that, in the event of an
"extraordinary nuclear occurrence," [ Footnote 15 ] licensees could be required to waive any
issue of fault, any charitable or governmental Page 464 U. S. 254 immunity defense, and any statute of limitations defense of less
than 10 years. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1). Again, however, the
importance of the legislation for present purposes is not so much
in its substance as in the assumptions on which it was based.

															Describing the effect of the 1966 amendment, the Joint Committee
stated:

															"By requiring potential defendants to agree to waive defenses
the defendants' rights are restricted; concomitantly, to this
extent, the rights of plaintiffs are enlarged. Just as the rights
of persons who are injured are established by State law, the rights
of defendants against whom liability is asserted are fixed by State
law. What this subsection does is to authorize the [NRC] to require
that defendants covered by financial protection and indemnity give
up some of the rights they might otherwise assert."

															S.Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 (1966).

															Similarly, when the Committee outlined the rights of those
injured in nuclear incidents which were not extraordinary nuclear
occurrences, its reference point was again state law.

															"Absent . . . a determination [that the incident is an
'extraordinary nuclear occurrence'], a claimant would have exactly
the same rights that he has today under existing law -- including,
perhaps, benefit of a rule of strict liability if applicable State
law so provides." Id. at 12. Indeed, the entire discussion surrounding
the 1966 amendment was premised on the assumption that state
remedies were available notwithstanding the NRC's exclusive
regulatory authority. For example, the Committee rejected a
suggestion that it adopt a federal tort to replace existing state
remedies, noting that such displacement of state remedies would
engender great opposition. Hearings before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating
to Waiver of Defenses, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 31, 75 (1966); S.Rep.
No. 1605, supra, at 6-9. If other provisions Page 464 U. S. 255 of the Atomic Energy Act already precluded the States from
providing remedies to its citizens, there would have been no need
for such concerns. Other comments made throughout the discussion
were similarly based on the assumption that state remedies were
available. [ Footnote 16 ]

															Kerr-McGee focuses on the differences between compensatory and
punitive damages awards and asserts that, at most, Congress
intended to allow the former. This argument, however, is
misdirected, because our inquiry is not whether Congress expressly
allowed punitive damages awards. Punitive damages have long been a
part of traditional state tort law. As we noted above, Congress
assumed that traditional principles of state tort law would apply
with full force unless they were expressly supplanted. Thus, it is
Kerr-McGee's burden to show that Congress intended to preclude such
awards. See Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U. S.
42 , 442 U. S. 53 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in result). Yet, the company is
unable to point to anything in the legislative history or in the
regulations that indicates that punitive damages were not to be
allowed. To the contrary, the regulations issued implementing the
insurance provisions of the Price-Anderson Act themselves
contemplate that punitive damages might be awarded under state law.
[ Footnote 17 ] Page 464 U. S. 256 In sum, it is clear that, in enacting and amending the
Price-Anderson Act, Congress assumed that state law remedies, in
whatever form they might take, were available to those injured by
nuclear incidents. This was so even though it was well aware of the
NRC's exclusive authority to regulate safety matters. No doubt
there is tension between the conclusion that safety regulation is
the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a
State may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of
liability. But as we understand what was done over the years in the
legislation concerning nuclear energy, Congress intended to stand
by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there was between
them. We can do no less. It may be that the award of damages based
on the state law of negligence or strict liability is regulatory in
the sense that a nuclear plant will be threatened with damages
liability if it does not conform to state standards, but that
regulatory consequence was something that Congress was quite
willing to accept.

															We do not suggest that there could never be an instance in which
the federal law would preempt the recovery of damages based on
state law. But insofar as damages for radiation injuries are
concerned, preemption should not be judged on the basis that the
Federal Government has so completely occupied the field of safety
that state remedies are foreclosed, but on whether there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or
whether the imposition of a state standard in a damages action
would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. We perceive no
such conflict or frustration in the circumstances of this case. Page 464 U. S. 257 B The United States, as amicus curiae, contends that the
award of punitive damages in this case is preempted because it
conflicts with the federal remedial scheme, noting that the NRC is
authorized to impose civil penalties on licensees when federal
standards have been violated. 42 U.S.C. § 2282 (1976 ed. and Supp.
V). However, the award of punitive damages in the present case does
not conflict with that scheme. Paying both federal fines and
state-imposed punitive damages for the same incident would not
appear to be physically impossible. Nor does exposure to punitive
damages frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.

															Kerr-McGee contends that the award is preempted because it
frustrates Congress' express desire "to encourage widespread
participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes." 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d). In Pacific Gas
& Electric, we observed that "[t]here is little doubt that
a primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was, and continues to
be, the promotion of nuclear power." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 221 .
However, we also observed that "the promotion of nuclear power is
not to be accomplished at all costs.'" Id. at 461 U. S. 222 .
Indeed, the provision cited by Kerr-McGee goes on to state that
atomic energy should be developed and utilized only to the extent
it is consistent "with the health and safety of the public." 42
U.S.C. § 2013(d). Congress therefore disclaimed any interest in
promoting the development and utilization of atomic energy by means
that fail to provide adequate remedies for those who are injured by
exposure to hazardous nuclear materials. Thus, the award of
punitive damages in this case does not hinder the accomplishment of
the purpose stated in § 2013(d). We also reject Kerr-McGee's submission that the punitive damages
award in this case conflicts with Congress' express intent to
preclude dual regulation of radiation hazards. See S.Rep.
No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1959). As we Page 464 U. S. 258 explained in 464 U. S. Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent to vest the NRC
with exclusive regulatory authority over the safety aspects of
nuclear development while at the same time allowing plaintiffs like
Mr. Silkwood to recover for injuries caused by nuclear hazards. We
are not authorized to second-guess that conclusion. [ Footnote 18 ] IV We conclude that the award of punitive damages in this case is
not preempted by federal law. On remand, Kerr-McGee is free to
reassert any claims it made before the Court of Appeals which were
not addressed by that court or by this opinion, including its
contention that the jury's findings with respect to punitive
damages were not supported by sufficient evidence and its argument
that the amount of the punitive damages award was excessive. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to punitive damages
is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Silkwood was employed by Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., a subsidiary
of Kerr-McGee Corp. The jury found that the former was the "mere
instrumentality" of the latter. We therefore refer to both as
Kerr-McGee.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Under 42 U.S.C. § 2073, the Commission is authorized to issue
licenses to those who handle special nuclear materials like the
plutonium processed in Kerr-McGee's plant. Section 2201(b) empowers
the Commission to set standards and issue instructions to govern
the possession and use of such materials. On April 2, 1970,
Kerr-McGee obtained a license to receive and possess special
nuclear materials at its Cimarron plant. It closed the plant in
1975.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															A glove box is a supposedly impervious box surrounding the
plutonium processing equipment which has glove holes permitting the
operator to work on the equipment or the plutonium from outside the
box.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															At trial, the parties stipulated that the urine samples had been
spiked with insoluble plutonium, i.e., plutonium which
cannot be excreted from the body. However, there was no evidence as
to who placed the plutonium in the vials.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															After allowing for hold-up (plutonium which remains in the
equipment after a very thorough cleanout), the inventory difference
(opening less closing) for the 1972-1976 period was 4.4 kilograms.
This represented 0.522% of the 842 kilograms received by Kerr-McGee
during that period. The NRC permits an inventory difference of
0.5%.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Federal regulations require that

															"persons engaged in activities under licenses issued by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission . . . make every reasonable effort to
maintain radiation exposures, and releases of radioactive materials
in effluents to unrestricted areas, as low as is reasonably
achievable."

															10 CFR § 20.1(c) (1983). In 1974, the regulation required
reasonable efforts to maintain exposures and releases "as far below
the limits specified [in other portions of the regulations] as
practicable." The difference in the terminology is not significant.
40 Fed.Reg. 33029 (1975).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															In an effort to avoid a new trial in the event that the Court of
Appeals disagreed with its ruling on the applicability of strict
liability principles, the court instructed the jury to answer a
special interrogatory as to whether Kerr-McGee negligently allowed
the plutonium to escape from its plant. The jury answered in the
affirmative.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Oklahoma statute authorizes an award of punitive damages

															"[i]n any action for the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud or malice, actual or presumed."

															[ Footnote 9 ] Wilson and Denckla involve appeals from state
court judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and its predecessor.
However, such cases are relevant to the present issue because of
"the history of . . . close relationship between" § 1254(2) and §
1257. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 , 416 U. S.
675 -677, n. 11 (1974).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Mr. Silkwood's reliance on California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U. S. 393 (1982), is misplaced. Grace Brethren involved a direct
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, a statute which we have construed
more broadly because of Congress' clear intent to create an
"exception to the policy of minimizing the mandatory docket of this
Court." Id. at 457 U. S. 405 . See also McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S.
21 , 421 U. S. 31 (1975).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															At the time this suit was filed, Oklahoma had not entered into
an agreement with the Commission under § 2021. Even if it had,
Kerr-McGee would have still been subject to exclusive NRC safety
regulation, because it was licensed to possess special nuclear
material in a quantity sufficient to form a critical mass. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(4) (1976 ed. and Supp. V).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Under the Act, the NRC is given discretion whether to require
plants licensed under § 2073 to maintain financial protection. 42
U.S.C. § 2210(a). Government indemnification is available only to
those required to maintain financial protection, § 2210(c), and
certain others not relevant here, § 2014(t), and the liability
limitation applies only to those who are indemnified. § 2210(e).
The NRC did not require plutonium processing plants to maintain
financial protection until 1977, 42 Fed.Reg. 46 (1977).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The 1957 version of the Price-Anderson Act was designed to
expire in 1967. It was extended in 1965, Pub.L. 89-210, 79 Stat.
855, and again in 1975, Pub.L. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111. In addition,
several substantive changes were made through the years, most
notably in 1966. Pub.L. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															In sustaining the Price-Anderson Act against a constitutional
challenge, we echoed that assumption, noting that, before the Act
was enacted, the only right possessed by those injured in a nuclear
incident

															"was to utilize their existing common law and state law remedies
to vindicate any particular harm visited on them from whatever
source." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59 , 438 U. S. 88 ,
89, n. 32 (1978).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															An "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is

															"any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special
nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of
confinement in amounts off-site, or causing radiation levels
off-site, which the Commission determines to be substantial, and
which the Commission determines has resulted or will probably
result in substantial damages to persons off-site or property
off-site."

															42 U.S.C. § 2014(j). The Commission's criteria for defining an
extraordinary nuclear occurrence are located at 10 CFR §§
140.81-140.85 (1983).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Atomic Energy Commission General Counsel Hennessey testified
that

															"[i]t would appear eminently reasonable to avoid disturbing
ordinary tort law remedies with respect to damage claims where the
circumstances are not substantially different from those
encountered in many activities of life which cause damage to
persons and property."

															Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Proposed
Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1966). See also id. at 41 ("the
amendments would not actually change the structure of the tort laws
of the various states. The legal principles of state law would
remain unchanged, but certain of the issues and defenses . . .
would be affected").

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															Following the 1966 amendment, the Commission published a form
for nuclear energy liability policies and indemnity agreements.
After reciting the waivers being made by the licensee in the event
of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, the form contains the
following provision: "The waivers set forth . . . above do not
apply to . . . [a]ny claim for punitive or exemplary damages. . .
." 10 CFR § 140.91, Appendix A, 11 2(c), p. 801 (1983).

															Had the Commission thought that punitive damages awards were
precluded by earlier legislation, as Kerr-McGee suggests, there
would have been no need to state that the waivers did not apply to
such awards. Since the waivers do not apply at all to the present
situation, the clear implication is that punitive damages are
available, if state law so provides.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The Government cites no evidence to support its claim that the
present award conflicts with the NRC's desire to avoid penalties
which put "a licensee out of business . . . or adversely affec[t] a
licensee's ability to safely conduct licensed activities." 47
Fed.Reg. 9991 (1982). Thus, we need not decide whether an award
could be so large as to conflict with that policy. Of course,
Kerr-McGee is free to challenge the propriety of the amount of the
award on remand. See text infra, this page.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins,
dissenting.

															I join JUSTICE POWELL's opinion in dissent and add comments of
my own that, I believe, demonstrate (a) the incompatibility between
the Court's opinion last Term in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 (1983), Page 464 U. S. 259 and its opinion in the present case, and (b) the fact that the
Court is by no means compelled to reach the result it espouses
today.

															JUSTICE POWELL's dissent well explains the fundamental
incongruity of the Court's result. The Court acknowledges that
Congress preempted state regulation of safety aspects of nuclear
operations largely out of concern that States were without the
technological expertise necessary to regulate them. Ante at 464 U. S.
250 -251. Yet the Court concludes that Congress intended
to allow a jury to impose substantial penalties upon a nuclear
licensee for failure to follow what the jury regards as adequate
safety procedures. The Court recognizes the paradox of its
disposition, but blames the irrationality on Congress. Then, with
humility, the Court explains that it is duty-bound to follow the
dictates of Congress. But such institutional modesty cannot
transfer the blame for the tension that today's decision injects
into the regulation of nuclear power. The Court, in my view,
tortures its earlier decisions and, more importantly, wreaks havoc
with the regulatory structure that Congress carefully created. I The Court recognizes that the analytic framework for this case
was established less than a year ago in Pacific Gas. The
precise issue in that case was whether the 1954 Atomic Energy Act,
68 Stat. 921, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1976
ed. and Supp. V), preempted California's authority to condition the
construction of a nuclear facility in California on the State's
finding that adequate means of disposal were available for the
plant's nuclear wastes. Two aspects of that decision control the
proper disposition of the case today.

															First, the Court concluded that federal preemption of nuclear
safety regulation was full and complete:

															"State safety regulation is not preempted only when it conflicts
with federal law. Rather, the Federal Government Page 464 U. S. 260 has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except
the limited powers expressly ceded to the States. When the Federal
Government completely occupies a given field or an identifiable
portion of it, as it has done here, the test of preemption is
whether 'the matter on which the State asserts the right to act is
in any way regulated by the Federal Act,'"

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S.
212 -213 (footnote omitted).

															The second important aspect of Pacific Gas was its
analysis of the California statute. Despite the broad federal
preemption of nuclear safety concerns, the Court upheld the state
statute. The Court recognized that the statute clearly had an
effect on the safety of nuclear plant operations, id. at 461 U. S.
196 -197, but it upheld the statute because its purpose
was economic. The Court concluded that the State had adopted the
regulation to prevent investments in powerplants that were likely
to become white elephants due to inadequate nuclear waste storage
facilities. Ibid. Because Congress had not meant the
Atomic Energy Act to deprive States of the right to make economic
decisions concerning nuclear power, the Court concluded that the
regulation was not preempted. Thus, the fundamental teaching of Pacific Gas is that state regulation of nuclear power is
preempted to the extent that its purpose is to regulate safety.

															The principles set forth in Pacific Gas compel the
conclusion that the punitive damages awarded in this case, and now
upheld, are preempted. The prospect of paying a large fine -- in
this case a potential $10 million -- for failure to operate a
nuclear facility in a particular manner has an obvious effect on
the safety precautions that nuclear licensees will follow. The
Court does not dispute, moreover, that punitive damages are
expressly designed for this purpose. Punitive damages are "private
fines levied by civil juries." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U. S. 323 , 418 U. S. 350 (1974). See Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S.
30 , 461 U. S. 49 (1983) ("[D]eterrence of future egregious Page 464 U. S. 261 conduct is a primary purpose . . . of punitive damages"). The
trial court's instructions to the jury in this case explained the
purpose of punitive damages:

															"The basis for allowance of punitive damages rests upon the
principle that they are allowed as a punishment to the offender for
the general benefit of society, both as a restraint upon the
transgressor and as a warning and example to deter the commission
of like offenses in the future."

															App. to Juris.Statement 112a.

															The conduct that the jury's punitive damages award sought to
regulate was the day-to-day safety procedures of nuclear licensees.
There was no factual finding as to how the contamination of Karen
Silkwood occurred; the trial judge expressly refused to give an
instruction on intentional infliction, and the jury rejected
Kerr-McGee's suggestion that Silkwood intentionally contaminated
herself. See ante at 464 U. S. 243 ;
667 F.2d 908, 915 (CA10 1981). It is abundantly clear, therefore,
that the punitive damages award in this case deters a nuclear
facility from operating in the same manner as Kerr-McGee. Authority
for a State to do so, however, is precisely what the Court held to
be preempted in Pacific Gas. [ Footnote 2/1 ] Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations
covered virtually every aspect of the incident in which Silkwood
was contaminated. [ Footnote 2/2 ]
The Page 464 U. S. 262 Atomic Energy Act provides a full enforcement arsenal --
including criminal sanctions -- to police compliance with federal
standards. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Indeed,
the Commission conducted a complete investigation into the Silkwood
contamination, and found no material violation of federal
regulations that could justify imposing a fine. [ Footnote 2/4 ] The District Court nevertheless
instructed the jury to fashion a fine to encourage Kerr-McGee and
other nuclear licensees to meet in the future whatever safety
standard the jury considered appropriate for plutonium. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Page 464 U. S. 263 The $10 million fine that the jury imposed is 100 times greater
than the maximum fine that may be imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission for a single violation of federal standards. The fine
apparently is more than 10 times greater than the largest single
fine that the Commission has ever imposed. [ Footnote 2/6 ] The complete federal occupation of safety
regulation compels the conclusion that such an award is
preempted.

															It is to be noted, of course, that the same preemption analysis
produces the opposite conclusion when applied to an award of
compensatory damages. It is true that the prospect of compensating
victims of nuclear accidents will affect a licensee's safety
calculus. Compensatory damages therefore have an indirect impact on
daily operations of a nuclear facility. But so did the state
statute upheld in Pacific Gas. The crucial distinction
between compensatory and punitive damages is that the purpose of
punitive damages is to regulate safety, whereas the purpose of
compensatory damages is to compensate victims. Because the Federal
Government does not regulate the compensation of victims, and
because it is inconceivable that Congress intended to leave victims
with no remedy at all, [ Footnote
2/7 ] the preemption analysis established by Page 464 U. S. 264 Pacific Gas comfortably accommodates -- indeed it
compels -- the conclusion that compensatory damages are not
preempted, whereas punitive damages are.

															Differences in the means of calculating compensatory and
punitive damages further distinguish the two, and highlight the
fundamental incompatibility of punitive damages and federal
standards. When a victim is determined to be eligible for a
compensatory award, that award is calculated by reference to the
victim's injury. Whatever compensation standard a State imposes,
whether it be negligence or strict liability, a licensee remains
free to continue operating under federal standards and to pay for
the injury that results. This presumably is what Congress had in
mind when it preempted state authority to set administrative
regulatory standards, but left state compensatory schemes intact.
Congress intended to rely solely on federal expertise in setting
safety standards, and to rely on States and juries to remedy
whatever injury takes place under the exclusive federal regulatory
scheme. Compensatory damages therefore complement the federal
regulatory standards, and are an implicit part of the federal
regulatory scheme.

															Punitive damages, in contrast, are calculated to compel
adherence to a particular standard of safety -- and it need not be
a federal standard. In setting the punitive damages award in this
case, the court instructed the jury to consider "the financial
worth of the defendant" and award an

															"amount of exemplary Page 464 U. S. 265 damages . . . consistent with the general purpose of such an
award in deterring the defendant, and others like it, from
committing similar acts in the future." 485 F.
Supp. 566 , 603 (WD Okla.1979). The punitive damages award
therefore enables a State to enforce a standard that is more
exacting than the federal standard. Were Kerr-McGee to continue
adherence only to the federal standard, it would presumably be in
continuous violation of state law -- an indication that the jury
award in this case was too small to serve its purpose. A licensee
that continues to meet only the federal standard therefore
presumably will receive increasingly large punitive sanctions in
subsequent personal injury suits, until compliance with the
state-imposed safety standard is obtained. At that point, of
course, the federal safety standard will have been entirely
supplanted. It is incredible to suggest that Congress intended the
Federal Government to have the sole authority to set safety
regulations, but left intact the authority of States to require
adherence to a different state standard through the imposition of
jury fines. The obvious conflict shows that punitive damages are
preempted.

															This preemption analysis eliminates the "tension" that the Court
concedes its disposition creates. It remains faithful to the
Federal Government's expressed desire to balance the conflict
between promoting nuclear power and ensuring safe operation of
nuclear plants. See Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U. S. 396 , 367 U. S. 404 (1961) ("the responsibility for safeguarding [public] health and
safety belongs under the statute to the Commission"). It preserves
the ability of States to provide compensation to their citizens for
injuries caused by radiation hazards. Finally, it avoids the
anomaly of a jury's imposing a fine to regulate activity considered
too complicated for state regulatory experts. See H.R.Rep.
No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1959) ("the technical safety
considerations are of such complexity that it is not Page 464 U. S. 266 likely that any State would be prepared to deal with them during
the foreseeable future"). II For reasons never expressed in its opinion, the Court rejects
the analysis outlined above and opts instead for one that it admits
creates

															"tension between the conclusion that safety regulation is the
exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a
State may nevertheless award damages based on its own law of
liability." Ante at 464 U. S. 256 .
But, with all respect, in struggling to reach its result, the Court
never focuses on the issue in this case. Without explanation, the
analysis proceeds as though the issue is whether a victim in a
nuclear accident can seek judicial recourse for her injuries. That
issue is not in dispute. The issue in this case is not whether a
victim of radiation hazards can be compensated under state law. The
issue is whether the jury can impose a fine on a nuclear operator
in addition to whatever compensatory award is given.

															The Court's obfuscation of the issue appears at the outset of
its preemption analysis, where it states rhetorically:

															"[T]here is no indication that Congress even seriously
considered precluding the use of [state law] remedies, either when
it enacted the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 and or when it amended it
in 1959. This silence takes on added significance in light of
Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured
by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for
those injured by illegal conduct. " Ante at 464 U. S. 251 (emphasis supplied). In this passage, the Court responds to an
argument that has not been made. Respondents have not attributed to
Congress a callous intent to deprive injured victims of
compensation. Page 464 U. S. 267 Pacific Gas does not imply anything so heartless. Yet
the Court's analysis never focuses on the real issue; its entire
analysis proceeds as if preemption of punitive damages would
require preemption of compensatory damages as well.

															The source of the confusion appears to be an argument by
petitioner (formerly appellant) that a preemption analysis of
punitive damages and compensatory damages must lead to the same
result, on the ground that both have a regulatory effect. [ Footnote 2/8 ] Petitioner thus placed before
the Court the bleak -- though contrived -- choice either to allow
punitive damages or to deprive injured victims of "all judicial
recourse" for their injuries. As pointed out above, there is no
reason that similar treatment of punitive and compensatory damages
is required; indeed, Pacific Gas requires that a
distinction between the two be drawn.

															The irony of the Court's approach is that Pacific Gas, decided less than a year ago, drew precisely the line that the
Court today is unable to find. Pacific Gas made clear that
the purpose of a statute is critical in a preemption analysis under
the Atomic Energy Act. In that case, moreover, the parties were in
serious dispute over whether the statute in question was motivated
out of safety or nonsafety concerns. In this case, in contrast,
there is no disagreement on the dispositive issue; the Court does
not dispute that punitive damages are intended to make a nuclear
operator adopt better safety procedures.

															Petitioner seems also to have obscured the distinction between
compensatory and punitive damages by focusing on the role of a jury
in awarding compensatory damages in a State, such as Oklahoma,
where compensation is allowed only on a showing of negligence.
[ Footnote 2/9 ] Because a
determination of negligence requires a jury to determine a
licensee's duty of Page 464 U. S. 268 care, petitioner argued that Congress has demonstrated a
willingness to allow a jury to set a standard for licensee conduct.
That being the case, petitioner suggested that there is no evidence
that Congress intended not to allow a jury to impose a punitive
award based on that standard.

															It is not at all surprising, however, that Congress would
tolerate a jury-imposed negligence standard for awarding
compensation. In its desire to promote nuclear power, Congress has
never expressed an intention to allow a nuclear licensee to avoid
paying for any injury it causes. Indeed, where Congress has
determined the liability standard for licensees, it has imposed
strict liability. [ Footnote 2/10 ]
Congress thus has demonstrated its willingness to hold a nuclear
licensee liable for all injury that it causes, regardless of
whether it is at fault. When a State chooses to impose a more
relaxed liability standard on a licensee -- such as negligence
-- the State simply eliminates part of the burden that the Federal
Government is willing to have the nuclear industry bear. In effect,
a State that uses a negligence standard simply subsidizes the
industry at the expense of those numbers of its citizenry that are
victims of radiation hazards. The fact that Congress was willing to
let States reduce the compensatory liability of licensees
is hardly support for the notion that Congress would also allow
States to set -- either through administrative regulation or tort
law -- standards of care Page 464 U. S. 269 higher than the federal standard, and impose fines to
secure compliance with them.

															Having focused on the wrong issue, the Court seeks to support
its wrong result by focusing on the legislative history of the
wrong statute. The Court relies heavily on comments made during
consideration of the Price-Anderson Act, Pub.L. 85-256, 71 Stat.
576. Congress enacted that statute in 1957 out of concern that the
potential liability arising from a nuclear occurrence exceeded the
amount of insurance a licensee could obtain. Congress perceived
that the unavailability of unlimited insurance was deterring
private investment in nuclear energy projects. Price-Anderson
therefore established a liability system to compensate victims in
the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." The system has
three major components: (1) it empowers the Commission to require a
licensee to have financial protection up to $60 million of
liability; (2) it provides for federal indemnification for the next
$500 million; and (3) it sets the $560 million thus aggregated as
the limit of liability for any one nuclear incident (with a
procedure for apportioning that amount should claims arising from
the incident exceed $560 million). After that limit, any additional
compensation to victims would require further action by Congress.
Price-Anderson also requires a licensee to waive certain defenses
that, most importantly, make clear that, in the event of an
"extraordinary nuclear occurrence," the licensee will be strictly
liable for the injuries it causes.

															Price-Anderson's legislative history plainly demonstrates that,
except in the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence,
Price-Anderson does not interfere with state tort law. For example,
the Joint Committee Report on the bill that later became
Price-Anderson explained:

															"The basic principles underlying the bill are two:"

															"1. Since the rights of third parties who are injured are
established by State law, there is no interference Page 464 U. S. 270 with the State law until there is a likelihood that the damages
exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together
with the amount of the indemnity [ i.e., $560 million]. At
that point, the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition
of making payments through the State courts and to prorating the
proceeds available."

															"2. . . . "

															S.Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1957) (emphasis
added).

															The Court relies on this passage to demonstrate, in its view,
that the entire corpus of "state tort law" is available for
application in any suit arising out of a nuclear incident. Ante at 464 U. S.
252 -254. Such an interpretation simply ignores the
context of the statement, and produces a variety of incongruities
that the Court fails to address.

															The Court's opinion omits from its quotation the first line of
the passage. That line makes clear that the passage describes only
the underlying principles of the Price-Anderson Act; it does not
purport to be a description of the relationship between all federal
nuclear regulation and state tort law. The passage demonstrates
that Price-Anderson interferes with state tort law only in certain
limited situations. But the question in this case is not whether
Price-Anderson preempted punitive damages; the issue is whether the
Atomic Energy Act preempted punitive damages in 1954. Thus, the
legislative history on which the Court bases its argument simply
begs the question of how much state tort law remained in place
before Price-Anderson was enacted.

															It is hardly surprising, moreover, that proponents of
Price-Anderson emphasized how little their proposed legislation
would interfere with state tort law. As with any federal
legislation that preempts the powers of the States, Price-Anderson
undoubtedly prompted concern about federal intrusiveness. To
assuage such concerns, proponents of Price-Anderson and later
federal statutes regulating nuclear power Page 464 U. S. 271 emphasized the minimal federal intrusion of the proposed
legislation. [ Footnote 2/11 ] But
such statements provide a most uncertain basis on which to
interpret the preemption that resulted from earlier federal
statutes. On the relevant issue -- the preemption of state law
accomplished by the Atomic Energy Act in 1954 -- this Court already
has concluded that the preemption of nuclear safety concerns was
complete.

															By using Price-Anderson's legislative history in 1957 to
conclude that the 1954 Act leaves all of state tort law intact, the
Court implicitly proves too much. Surely the Court would concede
that Congress did not intend, for example, to allow a state court
to entertain a nuisance action and enjoin the operation of a
nuclear powerplant on the ground that the plant was unsafe.
Similarly, the Court must agree that a state court could not enjoin
in a trespass action the release of effluents from a plant that was
in compliance with Commission standards. Yet the Court's position
rests on the notion that state tort law must be treated as an
undifferentiated body of law, and that all tort remedies have been
left intact.

															The Court's interpretation of Price-Anderson's legislative
history produces even greater incongruities in the operation of
Price-Anderson itself. As explained above, the Price-Anderson
liability scheme provides federal indemnification for liability
above $60 million and below $560 million. The purpose of the
indemnification is to provide compensation for victims and to
minimize the exposure of nuclear licensees. But the Court's
inconsonant holding leads to the anomalous result that, in the
event of a nuclear accident in which liability exceeds $60 million,
the Federal Government might well have to pay punitive damages to the victims of the accident. By
definition, such payments would not serve a compensatory purpose;
nor would they have the deterrent effect on licensees Page 464 U. S. 272 that justifies imposing them. Congress could not have intended
so paradoxical a result.

															Once again, the logical way out of this paradox is a conclusion
that Congress assumed that punitive damages would not be awarded
under Price-Anderson. [ Footnote
2/12 ] But such an assumption is now unavailable to the Court:
the same passages the Court uses to demonstrate that "there is no
interference with . . . State law" except in the event of a nuclear
occurrence also make clear that, even then, the

															"Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of making
payments through the state courts and to prorating the proceeds
available."

															Accordingly, it is clear that Price-Anderson itself would not
preempt punitive damages, and the Court's position puts the Federal
Government in the absurd position of paying them.

															The Court's holding produces similar incongruities in the
application of Price-Anderson to an accident in which liability
exceeds the $560 million limit. In that situation, Price-Anderson
provides for the prorating of claims. If punitive damages are
allowed, victims with large punitive awards would receive awards
greatly in excess of compensation, while other victims would
receive less than full compensation. Such a result would be grossly
inequitable, and in clear conflict with Price-Anderson's goal of
compensating victims of a nuclear accident. Once again, the obvious
implication of this result is that Congress assumed that punitive
damages would not be available. Yet the Court rejects this
assumption by insisting that references to "state tort law" in the
legislative history demonstrate that punitive damages have never
been preempted. Page 464 U. S. 273 III The Court's analysis ends where it began, still focused on the
wrong issue. In the last paragraph of its analysis, [ Footnote 2/13 ] the opinion once again
acknowledges the anomaly of its disposition, but explains:

															"Congress did not believe that it was inconsistent to vest the
NRC with exclusive regulatory authority over the safety aspects of
nuclear development while at the same time allowing plaintiffs like
Mr. Silkwood to recover for injuries caused by nuclear
hazards. We are not authorized to second-guess that
conclusion."

															(Emphasis supplied.) Ante at 464 U. S. 258 .
Not only are we not authorized to second-guess Congress'
conclusion, but also we have not been asked to do so. At the risk
of repetition, this case is not about whether Karen Silkwood's
administrator can recover for her injury; it is about whether a
person injured by radiation can be awarded an amount in excess of
the injury sustained in order to encourage all nuclear operators to
spend more on safety. On that issue, the Court's position is
plainly inconsistent with its Page 464 U. S. 274 earlier holding in Pacific Gas that "the Federal
Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
concerns." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 212 .
The Court's insistence on obfuscating the issue in this case cannot
change the will of Congress on the issue that is truly before
us.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court's opinion in Pacific Gas seemed to
contemplate even the precise issue in the case today. The Court
explained:

															"It would clearly be impermissible for California to attempt to
[regulate the construction or operation of a nuclear powerplant],
for such regulation, even if enacted out of nonsafety concerns,
would nevertheless directly conflict with the [Commission's]
exclusive authority over plant construction and operation."

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S.
212 .

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] See, e.g., 10 CFR § 19.12 (1974) (requiring education
of workers concerning hazards of radiation); §§ 20.101-20.108 and
Appendix B (radiation dose standards for individuals both in and
outside restricted areas); § 20.202 (use of personnel-monitoring
equipment); § 20.203 (posting of warnings around radiation areas);
§ 20.402 (notification of the Commission in the event of loss or
theft of nuclear materials); § 403 (notification in the event of
exposure to radiation). Part 70 of the Regulations sets forth
certain terms and conditions imposed on nuclear licenses. See,
e.g., §§ 70.23, 70.24, 73.1 (license applicants must be
determined to have qualified personnel, equipment, and procedures
adequate to protect health and safety and to protect the plant
against theft or sabotage of nuclear materials); §§ 70.51, 70.53
(nuclear balance inventory and recordkeeping for special nuclear
materials).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															42 U.S.C. §§ 2271-2284 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). Criminal
conviction for willful violations of various provisions of the Act
may result in substantial fines and imprisonment. §§ 2272-2278b,
2284. The Attorney General may seek injunctive relief to prevent or
stop violations of the Act or the Commission regulations or orders.
§ 2280. The Commission itself can impose civil penalties for
violations of specific licensing provisions of the Act. § 2282. In
1980, Congress increased the maximum civil penalty to $100,000 per
violation; if the violation is a continuing one, each day
constitutes a separate violation. § 2282(a). Finally, the
Commission can initiate proceedings to modify, suspend, or revoke
any license issued under the Act, and, in an emergency, can make
such action effective immediately. 10 CFR §§ 70.61-70.62
(1974).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The only violations of regulations revealed by the investigation
were Kerr-McGee's failure to record the voiding dates for two
bioassay samples provided by Silkwood. App. to Motion to Dismiss or
Affirm A17.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The regulatory nature of the punitive damages award is evidenced
by the jury instruction explaining how punitive damages were to be
calculated:

															"You may consider the financial worth of the defendant against
whom such damages are awarded in determining the size of such an
award that is proper under the facts of this case. That is, you may
consider the wealth of defendant Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation in
determining what amount of exemplary damages, if you find them
appropriate, is consistent with the general purpose of such an
award in deterring the defendant, and others like it, from
committing similar acts in the future, and for punishment of the
defendant for such acts."

															App. to Juris.Statement 113a. The jury was instructed further
that compliance with federal standards was not a complete defense
to the award of punitive damages:

															"You are instructed, however, that you are not bound by these
standards. Your duty is to determine what constitutes the exercise
of reasonable care in handling plutonium, or the existence of
reckless and wanton conduct, in light of the physical
characteristics of that material and the risks associated with
it." Id. at 102a.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1983, p. 26, col. 5 (largest
fine imposed to date is $850,000).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In Pacific Gas, the Court relied on the fact that there
was no federal regulation of the economic considerations of nuclear
power as clear evidence that Congress intended to leave such
concerns to consideration of the States:

															"The Nuclear Regulatory Commission . . . does not purport to
exercise its authority based on economic considerations. . . . It
is almost inconceivable that Congress would have left a regulatory
vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that Congress intended the
States to make these judgments."

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S.
207 -208. The absence of federal regulation governing the
compensation of victims of nuclear accidents is strong evidence
that Congress intended the matter to be left to the States.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See Brief for Appellant 42-43; Reply Brief for
Appellant 6-9.

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See id. at 11-12.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															The Price-Anderson Act, Pub.L. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576, was amended
in 1966 to remedy what Congress perceived to be state tort law
inadequacies in administering compensation for a victim of a major
nuclear incident. Pub.L. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891. Those amendments
require licensees, as a condition of their receiving approval of
financial protection and the indemnity afforded by Price-Anderson,
to waive certain state law defenses in the event of a major nuclear
incident. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1). The waivers assure, inter alia, that a victim's entitlement to compensation
will be determined under a strict liability standard, rather than
negligence. Congress required such waivers out of concern that
state laws, such as the negligence standard of liability, were
ill-suited to the problems of nuclear hazards. See S.Rep.
No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 13 (1966).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ] See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9
(1957); S.Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1966).

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															Such an assumption is fully consistent with the legislative
history of the Act, which, when read in context, makes clear that
its objective is to provide compensation to persons that suffer
injuries. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., 8 (1957) (Price-Anderson offers "a practical approach to the
necessity of providing adequate protection against liability
arising from atomic hazards, as well as a sound basis for compensating the public for any possible injury or damage
arising from such hazards ") (emphasis supplied).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															The next to last paragraph of the analysis seems to reflect
similar confusion. The paragraph is an attempt to respond to
respondents' argument that punitive damages conflict with the
desire of Congress to promote nuclear power. The Court
explains:

															"Congress . . . disclaimed any interest in promoting the
development and utilization of atomic energy by means that fail to
provide adequate remedies for those who are injured by exposure
to hazardous nuclear materials. Thus, the award of punitive
damages in this case does not hinder the accomplishment of the
[congressional] purpose. . . ." Ante at 464 U. S. 257 (emphasis supplied). There is no claim in this case that Congress
preempted remedies to compensate those who are injured by exposure
to hazardous nuclear materials. Unless the statement is meant to
suggest that remedies are not "adequate" unless they include
punitive damages -- an argument which the Court does not put
forward and which would be difficult to make, given that some
States do not allow punitive damages -- then the statement has
little relevance to the issue in this case.

															JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

															The Court's decision, in effect, authorizes lay juries and
judges in each of the States to make regulatory judgments as to
whether a federally licensed nuclear facility is being operated
safely. Such judgments then become the predicate to imposing heavy
punitive damages. This authority is approved in this case even
though the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (then the Atomic
Energy Commission) (AEC) -- the agency authorized by Congress to
assure the safety of nuclear facilities -- found no relevant
violation of its stringent safety requirements worthy of
punishment. The decision today also comes less than a year after we
explicitly held that federal law has "preempted" all "state safety
regulation" except certain limited powers "expressly ceded to the
States." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461 U.
S. 190 , 461 U. S. 212 (1983). [ Footnote 3/1 ] There is no
express authorization in federal law of the authority the Court
today finds in a State's common law of torts.

															Punitive damages, unrelated to compensation for any injury or
damage sustained by a plaintiff, are "regulatory" in Page 464 U. S. 275 nature, rather than compensatory. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit so found in this case -- prior even to our decision
in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 667 F.2d 908, 922
(1981). It also concluded that punitive damages are "no less
intrusive than direct legislative acts of the state." Id. at 923; see San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 , 359 U. S. 247 (1959). I agree with the Court of Appeals. I The facts are instructive. During a 3-day period in November,
1974, Karen Silkwood was contaminated by plutonium from one of
respondent Kerr-McGee's plants that had been built and was operated
pursuant to federal law and subject to extensive regulation by the
AEC. Silkwood was absent from her job for only a week -- from
November 7 until she returned to work on November 13. That night,
she was killed -- as the Court states -- "in an unrelated
automobile accident." Ante at 464 U. S. 242 .
There is no evidence that Silkwood suffered any specific injury,
[ Footnote 3/2 ] temporary or
permanent, other than mental distress for a short period. In a
state law tort action against Kerr-McGee brought by Silkwood's
father, the jury awarded "actual damages" of $505,000 and "punitive
damages" of $10 million. The District Court entered judgment on the
verdict.

															Where injury is sustained as a result of the operation of a
nuclear facility, it is not contested that compensatory damages
under state law properly may be awarded. Rather, in view of the
purpose and effect of punitive damages, the question is whether
such damages may be imposed not to compensate Page 464 U. S. 276 the injured citizen or her family but solely to punish and deter
conduct at the nuclear facility. [ Footnote 3/3 ] A The purpose of a punitive damages award was made clear by the
District Court's instructions. The jury was authorized to impose
such damages to "punish"

															"the offender for the general benefit of society, both as a
restraint upon the transgressor and as a warning and example to
deter the commission of like offenses in the future."

															585 F. Supp. 566, 603 (WD Okla.1979). [ Footnote 3/4 ] The jury also was advised that punitive
damages need not be proved by "direct evidence of fraud, malice or
gross negligence." Ibid. Rather, these could be
"inferred." Ibid. Although there was no evidence showing a
direct causal connection between any Kerr-McGee neglect and
Silkwood's minor contamination, two witnesses -- testifying as
experts -- found fault in general with operations at the plant such
as Page 464 U. S. 277 inadequate employee training and lack of supervision. [ Footnote 3/5 ] The AEC, in the discharge of
its regulatory responsibility, had cited the plant some 75 times
over a period of years for various minor violations. [ Footnote 3/6 ] None of the violations,
however, was shown to have caused the contamination, or deemed
substantial enough to justify imposition of fines by the AEC.
[ Footnote 3/7 ] Moreover, the
Commission had investigated the physical security system at the
plant only two months before Silkwood's contamination, and found no
significant deficiencies. After her contamination occurred, the AEC
conducted an investigation of that incident. Again, no significant
violation of AEC regulations was found. See ante at 464 U. S. 244 ;
AEC Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Investigation Report No.
7409, p. 5 (Dec. 16, 1974). Page 464 U. S. 278 Nevertheless, the jury imposed $10 million of punitive damages,
and, on a motion for judgment n.o.v., the District Court
agreed with the jury's award, based on its finding that the "escape
of plutonium [was] caused by grossly negligent, reckless and
willful conduct." 485 F. Supp. at 585. These serious conclusions
simply were "inferred" -- in the absence of specific evidence --
from the fact that some plutonium contamination had occurred and
from the testimony of petitioner's experts as to overall operating
conditions at the plant.

															The Court defends the awarding -- even on the basis of
inferences -- of punitive damages judgments by lay juries with no
competency to understand the highly sophisticated technology of
nuclear facilities. In doing so, it states:

															"Congress assumed that traditional principles of state tort law
would apply with full force unless they were expressly supplanted.
. . . [T]he company is unable to point to anything in the
legislative history or in the regulations that indicates that
punitive damages were not to be allowed." Ante at 464 U. S. 255 .
In my view, this conclusion is irreconcilable with Pacific Gas
& Electric Co.'s preemption holding. B We stated in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. that "the
Federal Government has occupied entirely the field of nuclear
safety concerns." 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 212 .
On its face, this is a holding that state action of any kind in
this area is preempted, whether or not Congress has been silent on
specific issues that may arise. See Fidelity Federal Savings
& Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.
S. 141 , 458 U. S. 153 (1982); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.
S. 374 , 367 U. S.
381 -383 (1961). We reiterated this principle of
preemption in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. when we held
that only those "powers expressly ceded to the States" are
not preempted. 461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 212 (emphasis added).

															Petitioner concedes that Congress did not refer to punitive
damages in the text or legislative history of the 1954 Act or its
subsequent amendments. The absence of an express reference Page 464 U. S. 279 appears plainly to bring state law of punitive damages within
the sweeping preemption we found that Congress intended in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. Nevertheless, the Court
today makes an exception to the rule announced only last Term by
refusing to find preemption unless the party arguing for preemption can find direct support in the statute, legislative
history, or regulations. Where broad federal preemption has been
found, the burden of proving an exception always should be on the
party who wishes to rely on state law. The Court's decision today
inexplicably shifts this burden to allow state law to prevail in
the absence of a showing that Congress expressly had intended to
preempt it.

															The Court does purport to find some indirect evidence of
congressional intent not to preempt state punitive damages law in
the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act, enacted in 1957.
In considering the relevance of this Act, it is important to bear
in mind that it did not apply at all to the Kerr-McGee plant at the
time of this incident, and that its purpose was not regulatory in
any relevant sense whatever. Price-Anderson was the result of
concern, particularly prevalent when experience with nuclear energy
had been limited, that extraordinary nuclear disasters could occur.
In anticipating such an occurrence, the primary concern -- of
course -- was to assure compensation for persons who suffered loss
or injury. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59 , 438 U. S. 93 (1978). A secondary, but nonetheless important, concern was that
private enterprise be encouraged to build and operate nuclear
powerplants to meet the anticipated energy needs of our Nation.
With the then uncertain prospect of a nuclear plant disaster that
would bankrupt the utility, some sort of federally backed insurance
plan was desirable in the overall public interest, as well as that
of the primary victims who suffered injury. Id. at 438 U. S. 63 -65.
Accordingly, in summary, Price-Anderson provided that the aggregate
liability for a single nuclear accident may not exceed $560
million. Licensees were required to purchase Page 464 U. S. 280 the maximum amount of insurance available in the commercial
insurance industry (approximately $60 million), and the Government
agreed to indemnify licensees for the remainder. In addition,
Price-Anderson required that licensees must waive all legal
defenses and must agree to be subject to strict liability in the
event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. Id. at 438 U. S.
65 .

															Thus, neither the Price-Anderson Act itself nor its purposes are
relevant to this case. Petitioner and the Court, finding nothing
whatever in the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act, cite
several statements in the legislative history of Price-Anderson
that there was no intention to change state tort law. [ Footnote 3/8 ] There is no mention in this
history of state punitive damages law. The argument, however, is
that "tort law" includes both compensatory and punitive awards.
This may be true generally, but certainly not necessarily true in
the context in which the term "tort law" was used in
Price-Anderson. When considering legislation addressing the
possibility of a catastrophic nuclear accident, it was natural for
Congress to make clear that the availability of compensatory
damages in ordinary personal injury and property damages cases was
not at issue. Such damages were to be imposed without fault.
Congress was not concerned in that Act with the "punishment" of
nuclear plants through jury imposition of punitive damages.

															However one may view the bits and pieces of the Price-Anderson
Act's legislative history, for present purposes, the regulatory
plan would appear to be clear. The regulation of nuclear safety
then, as now, had been entrusted by a different Act to an expert
body with full authority to issue comprehensive regulations and
assess penalties, and with the obligation to oversee the safety of
nuclear operations. Page 464 U. S. 281 II Even if Pacific Gas & Electric Co. had not been
decided, I would find preemption of punitive damages awards because
they conflict with the fundamental concept of comprehensive federal
regulation of nuclear safety. [ Footnote
3/9 ] See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52 , 312 U. S. 67 (1941). A Congress has been committed to the policy of encouraging private
development of nuclear energy from 1954 to the present. [ Footnote 3/10 ] We explicitly recognized
this commitment in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 461
U.S. at 461 U. S.
206 -207. The economy particularly of the Western
Democracies -- perhaps, indeed, democracy itself -- depends upon
the energy that is now primarily derived from fossil sources. No
informed person suggests that these sources are inexhaustible. We
had a brief but shattering experience in 1973 during the embargo on
Middle East oil. The effect of this experience confirmed Page 464 U. S. 282 the wisdom -- indeed necessity -- of identifying and exploiting
alternative energy sources -- particularly for the long-term. The
most promising new source identified to date is nuclear-generated
energy.

															Public safety always has been an overriding concern both in
Government regulation and the industry. Striking the balance
between the need to promote nuclear development and the
responsibility to insure public safety is a task that requires a
unique level of professional expertise. Congress has enacted
detailed legislation and created a highly qualified administrative
agency to promulgate and enforce regulations. [ Footnote 3/11 ] Those regulations constitute a
uniform body of law carefully designed to balance safety and
efficiency in nuclear facilities across the country. Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153-1154 (CA8
1971), summarily aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).

															The effectiveness of the overall program requires that nuclear
policy and regulation be insulated from ad hoc, uninformed
and perhaps biased decisionmaking. [ Footnote 3/12 ] It is reasonable Page 464 U. S. 283 for a nuclear facility to be held liable, even without fault on
its part, to compensate for injury or loss occasioned by the
operation of the facility. It is not reasonable to infer that
Congress intended to allow juries of lay persons, selected
essentially at random, to impose unfocused penalties solely for the
purpose of punishment and some undefined deterrence. These purposes
wisely have been left within the regulatory authority and
discretion of the NRC. [ Footnote
3/13 ] B This case is a disquieting example of how the jury system can
function as an unauthorized regulatory medium. Under accepted
principles of tort law, punitive damages may not properly be
awarded on the basis of negligent conduct. A jury therefore must
find malicious, wanton, or grossly negligent conduct. As noted
above, the evidence presented by plaintiff at the trial, for the
most part, was wide-ranging "expert" testimony as to the overall
operation of the defendant plant. There was little evidence related
in any causal way to the plutonium leak that contaminated Ms.
Silkwood. Nor was there any evidence whatever of the "oppression,"
"fraud," "malice," or "wanton reckless[ness]" mentioned in the
trial court's inflammatory instructions to the jury. See
supra at 464 U. S.
278 .

															More importantly, the trial court did not instruct the jury, as
would have been proper, that, if it found that Kerr-McGee Page 464 U. S. 284 had complied with the regulations there could be no finding of
fraud, malice, or wanton or reckless conduct. Rather, in effect,
the jury was told that it could decide that the regulations were
invalid:

															"[S]uch regulations do not have to be accepted by you as right
or accurate if they defy human credence, are questionable
under best scientific knowledge, or can be shown not to accomplish
their intended purpose."

															485 F. Supp. at 606 (emphasis added). Until today, I had not
understood that a jury lawfully could be instructed on the basis of
its own determination of "human credence" to conclude that a
presumptively valid federal regulation simply could be ignored.
This Court nevertheless -- without knowing which of the jumble of
instructions the jury actually followed [ Footnote 3/14 ] -- concluded that the award of punitive
damages does not conflict with the regulation program established
by Congress and the AEC. On the record, it is at least more likely
than not that the jury totally ignored federal regulations as
authorized by the trial court. Moreover, the Court attaches no
importance to the fact that the AEC -- the agency that adopted the
regulations and was responsible for their enforcement --
investigated the Silkwood incident and found no significant
violation of its regulations. See supra at 464 U. S.
277 . C As support for its conclusion that punitive damages and federal
nuclear safety regulation do not conflict, the Court states that
Congress did not intend to promote private development of nuclear
power "by means that fail to provide adequate Page 464 U. S. 285 remedies for those who are injured by exposure to hazardous
nuclear materials." Ante at 464 U. S. 257 .
The Court cites no authority -- in the statute, its history, or the
regulations -- for its view that Congress intended that "adequate
remedies" for persons injured should include "award[s] of punitive
damages." Nor was this case tried on the theory that punitive
damages could be awarded as a remedy for injuries suffered by
Silkwood. The instructions to the jury were precisely to the
contrary, and were explicit that the purpose of punitive damages
was to "punish" the "offender for the general benefit of society." Supra at 464 U. S. 276 .
And petitioner has not argued in this Court that the $505,000 of
"actual damages" awarded were inadequate for the injury suffered in
this case. The $10 million of punitive damages were simply a
windfall for petitioner. III In sum, the Court's decision will leave this area of the law in
disarray. No longer can the operators of nuclear facilities rely on
the regulations and oversight of the NRC. Juries unfamiliar with
nuclear technology may be competent to determine and assess
compensatory damages on the basis of liability without fault. They
are unlikely, however, to have even the most rudimentary
comprehension of what reasonably must be done to assure the safety
of employees and the public. [ Footnote 3/15 ] The District Court in this case, by
instructing the jury that it could infer malice, fraud, or gross
negligence ( see ibid. ), in effect authorized the jury to
impose punitive damages without fault. And, to make sure
that the jury understood its standardless freedom in this respect,
the Page 464 U. S. 286 Court also instructed the jury that it could ignore the
regulations prescribed by the AEC if in its opinion they defied
"human credence" or "can be shown not to accomplish their intended
purpose." Supra at 464 U. S.
284 .

															We hardly could have spoken more clearly in Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. on April 20, 1983, on the issue of
preemption.

															"State safety regulation is not preempted only when it conflicts
with federal law. Rather, the Federal Government has occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns. . . ."

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S. 212 .
This left no doubt whatever as to the sole responsibility for
nuclear safety regulation under the governance of the NRC and its
large staff -- experts in the technology and safety controls of
nuclear energy. This case makes clear the correctness of the
Court's holding in Pacific Gas & Electric. Co. Today,
the Court opens a wide and inviting door to indirect regulation by
juries authorized to impose damages to punish and deter on the
basis of inferences even when a plant has taken the utmost
precautions provided by law. Not only is this unfair, it also could
discourage investment needed to further the acknowledged national
need for this alternative source of energy. I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															In Pacific Gas & Electric Co., we held:

															"State safety regulation is not preempted only when it conflicts
with federal law. Rather, the Federal Government has occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers
expressly ceded to the States. When the Federal Government
completely occupies a given field or an identifiable portion of it,
as it has done here, the test of preemption is whether 'the matter
on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated
by the Federal Act.'"

															461 U.S. at 461 U. S.
212 -213.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The autopsy after Ms. Silkwood's death indicated that her body
contained 8.8 nanocuries of plutonium. AEC regulations specified
that the permissible body burden of plutonium for employees of
nuclear facilities was 40 nanocuries. Disagreeing with the AEC, an
expert witness for petitioner speculated at trial that the amount
of plutonium contamination Ms. Silkwood experienced might have
manifested itself in the form of lung cancer and chromosome damage
at some future date.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The distinction in this case between the two types of damages is
of major importance. There is no element of regulation when
compensatory damages are awarded, especially when liability is
imposed without fault as authorized by state law. Moreover,
personal injuries are finite. To be sure, as the compensatory award
in this case illustrates, these can result in large compensatory
judgments. But juries do have guidance from physicians, medical
records, lost wages, and -- where permanent disability or death
occurs -- actuarial testimony as to lost earnings and life
expectancy. None of these is present when punitive damages are
awarded. The contrast also is illustrated by this case. A jury with
neither pretrial knowledge of nuclear plant operations nor evidence
to guide or limit its discretion chose $10 million. It could, as
well, have been almost any other amount.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															The trial court also instructed the jury that the size of any
punitive damages award should be

															"consistent with the general purpose of such an award in
deterring the defendant, and others like it, from committing
similar acts in the future, and for punishment of the defendant for
such acts."

															585 F. Supp. at 603.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															Silkwood also proffered reports of AEC investigations of
incidents occurring in 1971, 1972, and 1973. The incidents of most
concern were a fire on March 5, 1973, and radioactive seepage from
a waste container discovered on September 25, 1973. Neither
incident resulted in any contamination outside the Kerr-McGee plant
or in any injury from contamination of Kerr-McGee employees. The
AEC did not fine the company in either instance. Other testimony on
behalf of Silkwood criticized generally the training of new
personnel, the use of respirators in contaminated areas, the design
of glove boxes in the plant, and a perceived lack of awareness of
Kerr-McGee employees that exposure to plutonium may cause
cancer.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															It is evident from these facts that the AEC was diligent and
thorough in overseeing the safety of the Kerr-McGee plant.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															In fact, except for the contamination of Silkwood that caused
her to lose seven days of work, there was no evidence that anyone
else had ever been injured by contamination from the Kerr-McGee
plant. There was evidence of one incident involving minor
contamination outside the plant that occurred on April 17, 1972. In
that instance, three maintenance personnel at the plant violated
company regulations by leaving for breakfast without checking
themselves for signs of contamination. Upon their return, it was
discovered that they had received low level contamination prior to
leaving for breakfast. None of these employees was shown to have
suffered any injury. The amount of contamination involved in this
incident was so minimal that an AEC official testified that there
was no need for Kerr-McGee to report it to the AEC.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ] See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 25
(1966); S.Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 9, 22 (1957).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															Silkwood argues that the regulation of Kerr-McGee's conduct
through punitive damages is an area of local, rather than federal,
concern. Assuming, arguendo, that this assertion is
correct, the degree of local concern is irrelevant. Federal
preemption doctrine applies regardless of the importance of the
issue to local authorities. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 , 458 U. S. 153 (1982). As the Court stated in Free v. Bland, 369 U.
S. 663 (1962):

															"The relative importance to the State of its own law is not
material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the
Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must
prevail." Id. at 369 U. S.
666 .

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															As a result of advances in nuclear technology, the percentage of
total electricity produced in the United States by nuclear means
rose from zero in 1954 to 12% in 1981. See Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 1982-1983, P. 581; 2 Historical
Statistics of the United States 826 (1975). During that period, and
to this day, I do not recall that any fatalities have occurred as a
result of contamination from nuclear facilities. Much of the credit
for the progress and safety record of the nuclear industry also
must go to Congress for enacting appropriate safety regulatory
authority, and to the action and oversight of the AEC and its
successor, the NRC.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															Congress gave the AEC several means of enforcing its
regulations. The Act provides for injunctive remedies, civil
penalties, and revocation of licenses for violation of the terms
and conditions of the license. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2236, 2280, and 2282
(1976 ed. and Supp. V). The Act also provides criminal sanctions
for willful violations of the Act and most AEC (NRC) regulations.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2272 and 2273 (1976 ed. and Supp. V).

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in public
concern over all nuclear activities -- a concern that may well
influence juries. No doubt this has been caused by the public's new
awareness of the potential for vast destruction through the use of
nuclear weapons -- an awareness evidenced by the now commonplace
demonstrations and antinuclear groups and movements that can exist,
of course, only in the free world. Often little or no distinction
is made between nuclear powerplants designed to help insure the
future of our civilization and the proliferation of nuclear weapons
that could destroy it. Those who fail to see this distinction seem
to be unaware of the overall safety record of the nuclear power
industry in the United States and other countries. See Cohen, Most Scientists Don't Join in Radiation Phobia, Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 30, 1983, P. 28, Col. 4 ("even well-educated segments
of the American public are badly misinformed" as to the risks
associated with the nuclear power industry).

															[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															The Atomic Energy Act currently provides that the NRC can levy
civil penalties for violations of licensing provisions, rules,
regulations, or orders. 42 U.S.C. § 2282(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
The penalties may not exceed $100,000 for each violation, but where
a violation is a continuing one, each day of the violation is
considered a separate violation. Ibid. At the time of Ms.
Silkwood's contamination, the maximum limit on civil penalties was
$25,000. 42 U.S.C. § 2282(a), amended by Pub.L. 96-295, 94 Stat.
787. By establishing maximum fines, Congress implicitly stated its
views on the size of monetary penalties it deemed sufficient to
achieve both punishment and deterrence. See H.R.Rep. No
96-1070, pp. 33-34 (1980); S.Rep. No. 96-176, pp. 23-24 (1979).

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															The instructions invited the jury to condemn the entire
operation of the Kerr-McGee plant. The instructions, purporting to
state "the law" that the jury was "bound to follow," were some
10,000 words long, requiring 30 pages in the printed appendix. They
were repetitive, arguably conflicting, and would have confused a
panel of experienced lawyers. It is unlikely that any lay juror had
any idea what law he or she was called upon to apply.

															[ Footnote 3/15 ]

															The Court cites a House Report in which Congress expressed its
misgivings about the ability of the States to deal with the complex
and technical nature of the safety considerations in the nuclear
industry. See H.R.Rep. No. 1125, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 3
(1959). The Court, nevertheless, is willing to allow a jury,
untrained in even the most rudimentary aspects of nuclear
technology, to impose heavy penalties on the basis of its own
perceptions or prejudices.