Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

															Syllabus

															REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT No. 99-536. Argued March 21, 2000-Decided June 12,2000 Petitioner Reeves, 57, and Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, were
the supervisors in one of respondent's departments known as the
"Hinge Room," which was managed by Russell Caldwell, 45. Reeves'
responsibilities included recording the attendance and hours worked
by employees under his supervision. In 1995, Caldwell informed Powe
Chesnut, the company's director of manufacturing, that Hinge Room
production was down because employees were often absent, coming in
late, and leaving early. Because the monthly attendance reports did
not indicate a problem, Chesnut ordered an audit, which, according
to his testimony, revealed numerous timekeeping errors and
misrepresentations by Caldwell, Reeves, and Oswalt. Chesnut and
other company officials recommended to the company president,
Sandra Sanderson, that Reeves and Caldwell be fired, and she
complied. Reeves filed this suit, contending that he had been
terminated because of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). At trial,
respondent contended Reeves had been fired due to his failure to
maintain accurate attendance records. Reeves attempted to
demonstrate that this explanation was pretext for age
discrimination, introducing evidence that he had accurately
recorded the attendance and hours of the employees he supervised,
and that Chesnut, whom Oswalt described as wielding "absolute
power" within the company, had demonstrated agebased animus in his
dealings with him. The District Court denied respondent's motions
for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 50, and the case went to the jury, which returned a
verdict for Reeves. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Although
recognizing that Reeves may well have offered sufficient evidence
for the jury to have found that respondent's explanation was
pretextual, the court explained that this did not mean that Reeves
had presented sufficient evidence to show that he had been fired
because of his age. In finding the evidence insufficient, the court
weighed the additional evidence of discrimination introduced by
Reeves against other circumstances surrounding his discharge,
including that Chesnut's age-based comments were not made in the
direct context of Reeves' termination; there was no allegation that
the other individuals who recommended his firing 134 134 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															Syllabus

															were motivated by age; two of those officials were over 50; all
three Hinge Room supervisors were accused of inaccurate
recordkeeping; and several of respondent's managers were over 50
when Reeves was fired.

															Held:

															1. A plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination (as defined
in M c Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 , 802, and
subsequent decisions), combined with sufficient evidence for a
reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory
explanation for its decision, may be adequate to sustain a finding
of liability for intentional discrimination under the ADEA. In this
case, Reeves established a prima facie case and made a substantial
showing that respondent's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation, i. e., his shoddy recordkeeping, was false. He
offered evidence showing that he had properly maintained the
attendance records in question and that cast doubt on whether he
was responsible for any failure to discipline late and absent
employees. In holding that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict, the Fifth Circuit ignored this evidence, as
well as the evidence supporting Reeves' prima facie case, and
instead confined its review of the evidence favoring Reeves to that
showing that Chesnut had directed derogatory, age-based comments at
Reeves, and that Chesnut had singled him out for harsher treatment
than younger employees. It is therefore apparent that the court
believed that only this additional evidence of discrimination was
relevant to whether the jury's verdict should stand. In so
reasoning, the court misconceived the evidentiary burden borne by
plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through
indirect evidence. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.
S. 502 , 511, the Court stated that, because the factfinder's
disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant, together
with the elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to show
intentional discrimination, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination. Proof that the defendant's
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it can be quite persuasive. See id., at
517. In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. See, e. g.,
Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277 , 296.
Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated,
discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation,
especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth
the actual reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U. S. 567 ,577. Such a showing by the plaintiff will not always be adequate to sustain a jury's liability finding.
Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case and 135 introduced sufficient evidence to reject the employer's
explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that
discrimination had occurred. This Court need not-and could
not-resolve all such circumstances here. In this case, it suffices
to say that a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Pp. 141-149.

															2. Respondent was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
under the particular circumstances presented here. Pp. 149-154.

															(a) Rule 50 requires a court to render judgment as a matter of
law when a party has been fully heard on an issue, and there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for that party on that issue. The standard for judgment as a matter
of law under Rule 50 mirrors the standard for summary judgment
under Rule 56. Thus, the court must review all of the evidence in
the record, cf., e. g., Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574 , 587,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,
but making no credibility determinations or weighing any evidence, e. g., Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545 ,
554-555. The latter nmctions, along with the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts, are for the jury, not the court. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255.
Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it
must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the
jury is not required to believe. Pp. 149-151.

															(b) In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence
to sustain the jury's verdict, the Fifth Circuit misapplied the
standard of review dictated by Rule 50. The court disregarded
evidence favorable to Reeves-the evidence supporting his prima
facie case and undermining respondent's nondiscriminatory
explanation-and failed to draw all reasonable inferences in his
favor. For instance, while acknowledging the potentially damning
nature of Chesnut's age-related comments, the court discounted them
on the ground that they were not made in the direct context of
Reeves' termination. And the court discredited Reeves' evidence
that Chesnut was the actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the
fact that there was no evidence suggesting the other decisionmakers
were motivated by age. Moreover, the other evidence on which the
court relied-that Caldwell and Oswalt were also cited for poor
recordkeeping, and that respondent employed many managers over age
50-although relevant, is certainly not dispositive. See Furnco,
supra, at 580. The ultimate question in every disparate
treatment case is whether the plaintiff was the victim of
intentional discrimination. Here, the District Court informed the
jury that Reeves was required to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that his age was a determining and motivating factor in
the decision to terminate 136 136 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															Syllabus

															him. It instructed the jury that, to show respondent's
explanation was pretextual, Reeves had to demonstrate that age
discrimination, not respondent's explanation, was the real reason
for his discharge. Given that Reeves established a prima facie
case, introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject
respondent's explanation, and produced additional evidence that
Chesnut was motivated by age-based animus and was principally
responsible for Reeves' firing, there was sufficient evidence for
the jury to conclude that respondent had intentionally
discriminated. pp. 151-154. 197 F.3d
688 , reversed.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 154.

															Jim Waide argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs were David A. Chandler, Victor 1. Fleitas, Eric Schnapper,
and Alan B. Morrison.

															Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States et
al. as amici curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor
General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Matthew D.
Roberts, C. Gregory Stewart, and Philip B. Sklover. Taylor B. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief was Berkley N. Huskison.* *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the AARP
by Thomas W Osborne, Laurie A. McCann, Sally Dunaway, and Melvin
Radowitz; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by
Jeffrey Robert White; for the Hispanic National Bar Association by
Seth J. Benezra, Luis Perez, and Gilbert M. Roman; for the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law et al. by Daniel F.
Kolb, Norman Redlich, Barbara R. Arnwine, Thomas J. Henderson, Richard T. Seymour, Teresa A. Ferrante, Elainy R. Jones,
Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, Charles Stephen
Ralston, Dennis C. Hayes, Antonia Hernandez, Judith L. Lichtman,
Donna R. Lenhoff, Marcia D. Greenberger, Judith C. Appelbaum,
Martha F. Davis, Sara L. Mandelbaum, and Steven R. Shapiro; and for
the National Employment Lawyers Association by Paul W Mollica and
Paula A. Brantner.

															Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the Alabama Retail Association by John J. Coleman
III and Marcel L. Debruge; for the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States by Marshall B. Babson, Stan- 137 JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This case
concerns the kind and amount of evidence necessary to sustain a
jury's verdict that an employer unlawfully discriminated on the
basis of age. Specifically, we must resolve whether a defendant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the plaintiff's case
consists exclusively of a prima facie case of discrimination and
sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to disbelieve the
defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its
action. We must also decide whether the employer was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law under the particular circumstances
presented here.

															I

															In October 1995, petitioner Roger Reeves was 57 years old and
had spent 40 years in the employ of respondent, Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., a manufacturer of toilet seats and covers. 197 F.3d
688 , 690 (CA5 1999). Petitioner worked in a department
known as the "Hinge Room," where he supervised the "regular line." Ibid. Joe Oswalt, in his mid-thirties, supervised the Hinge
Room's "special line," and Russell Caldwell, the manager of the
Hinge Room and age 45, supervised both petitioner and Oswalt. Ibid. Petitioner's responsibilities included recording the
attendance and hours of those under his supervision, and reviewing
a weekly report that listed the hours worked by each employee. 3
Record 38-40.

															In the summer of 1995, Caldwell informed Powe Chesnut, the
director of manufacturing and the husband of company president
Sandra Sanderson, that "production was down" in ley Strauss, Stephen A. Bokat, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Ann
Elizabeth Reesman; for the Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc., by Andrew L. Frey, Charles Rothfeld, and Stephen M.
Shapiro; for the Society for Human Resource Management by Peter J. Petesch, Thomas J. Walsh,
Jr., Timothy S. Bland, and John E. Duvall; and
for the Texas Association of Business and Chamber of Commerce by Dean J. Schaner and Scott M.
Nelson. 138 138 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															the Hinge Room because employees were often absent and were
"coming in late and leaving early." 4 id., at 203-204.
Because the monthly attendance reports did not indicate a problem,
Chesnut ordered an audit of the Hinge Room's timesheets for July,
August, and September of that year. 197 F. 3d, at 690. According to
Chesnut's testimony, that investigation revealed "numerous
timekeeping errors and misrepresentations on the part of Caldwell,
Reeves, and Oswalt." Ibid. Following the audit, Chesnut,
along with Dana Jester, vice president of human resources, and Tom
Whitaker, vice president of operations, recommended to company
president Sanderson that petitioner and Caldwell be fired. Id., at 690-691. In October 1995, Sanderson followed the
recommendation and discharged both petitioner and Caldwell. Id., at 691.

															In June 1996, petitioner filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, contending
that he had been fired because of his age in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. At trial, respondent
contended that it had fired petitioner due to his failure to
maintain accurate attendance records, while petitioner attempted to
demonstrate that respondent's explanation was pretext for age
discrimination. 197 F. 3d, at 692-693. Petitioner introduced
evidence that he had accurately recorded the attendance and hours
of the employees under his supervision, and that Chesnut, whom
Oswalt described as wielding "absolute power" within the company, 3
Record 80, had demonstrated age-based animus in his dealings with
petitioner. 197 F. 3d, at 693.

															During the trial, the District Court twice denied oral motions
by respondent for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case went to the jury. 3
Record 183; 4 id., at 354. The court instructed the jury
that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prove age was a determinative or
motivating factor in the decision to 139 terminate him, then your verdict shall be for the defendant."
Tr. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). So charged, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of petitioner, awarding him $35,000 in
compensatory damages, and found that respondent's age
discrimination had been "willfu[l]." 197 F. 3d, at 691. The
District Court accordingly entered judgment for petitioner in the
amount of $70,000, which included $35,000 in liquidated damages
based on the jury's finding of willfulness. Ibid. Respondent
then renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and
alternatively moved for a new trial, while petitioner moved for
front pay. 2 Record, Doc. Nos. 36, 38. The District Court denied
respondent's motions and granted petitioner's, awarding him
$28,490.80 in front pay for two years' lost income. 2 id., Doc. Nos. 40, 41.

															The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that petitioner had not introduced sufficient evidence to sustain
the jury's finding of unlawful discrimination. 197 F. 3d, at 694.
After noting respondent's proffered justification for petitioner's
discharge, the court acknowledged that petitioner "very well may"
have offered sufficient evidence for "a reasonable jury [to] have
found that [respondent's] explanation for its employment decision
was pretextual." Id., at 693. The court explained, however,
that this was "not dispositive" of the ultimate issue-namely,
"whether Reeves presented sufficient evidence that his age
motivated [respondent's] employment decision." Ibid. Addressing this question, the court weighed petitioner's additional
evidence of discrimination against other circumstances surrounding
his discharge. See id., at 693-694. Specifically, the court
noted that Chesnut's age-based comments "were not made in the
direct context of Reeves's termination"; there was no allegation
that the two other individuals who had recommended that petitioner
be fired (Jester and Whitaker) were motivated by age; two of the
decisionmakers involved in petitioner's discharge (Jester and
Sanderson) were over the age of 50; all three of the Hinge Room
supervisors were 140 140 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															accused of inaccurate recordkeeping; and several of respondent's
management positions were filled by persons over age 50 when
petitioner was fired. Ibid. On this basis, the court
concluded that petitioner had not introduced sufficient evidence
for a rational jury to conclude that he had been discharged because
of his age. Id., at 694.

															We granted certiorari, 528 U. S. 985 (1999), to resolve a
conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's
prima facie case of discrimination (as defined in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 , 802
(1973)), combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable
factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation
for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for
intentional discrimination. Compare Kline v. TVA, 128 F.3d
337 (CA6 1997) (prima facie case combined with
sufficient evidence to disbelieve employer's explanation always
creates jury issue of whether employer intentionally
discriminated); Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d
1519 (CAll 1997) (same), cert. denied, 522 U. S.
1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E. 1. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 100 F.3d
1061 (CA3 1996) (same) (en banc), cert. denied, 521 U.
S. 1129 (1997); Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance
Corp., 17 F.3d
1104 (CA8) (same), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d
1120 (CA7 1994) (same); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d
1421 (CA9 1993) (same), with Aka v. Washington
Hospital Center, 156 F.3d
1284 (CADC 1998) (en banc) (plaintiff's discrediting of
employer's explanation is entitled to considerable weight, such
that plaintiff should not be routinely required to submit evidence
over and above proof of pretext), and with Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d
1332 (CA2 1997) (en banc) (plaintiff must introduce
sufficient evidence for jury to find both that employer's reason
was false and that real reason was discrimination), cert. denied,
522 U. S. 1075 (1998); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools,
75 F. 3d 989 (CA5 1996) (same); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F. 3d 141 676 (CA4 1995) (same); Woods v. Friction
Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d
255 (CA1 1994) (same).

															II

															Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age." 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). When a
plaintiff alleges disparate treatment, "liability depends on
whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually
motivated the employer's decision." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U. S. 604 , 610 (1993). That is, the plaintiff's age must have
"actually played a role in [the employer's decisionmaking] process
and had a determinative influence on the outcome." Ibid. Recognizing that "the question facing triers of fact in
discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult," and that
"[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's
mental processes," Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.
S. 711 , 716 (1983), the Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth
Circuit in this case, have employed some variant of the framework
articulated in McDonnell Douglas to analyze ADEA claims that
are based principally on circumstantial evidence. See, e. g., Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 206 F.3d
420 , 429 (CA4 2000); Galabya v. New York City
Bd. of Ed., 202 F. 3d 636, 639 (CA2 2000); Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d
1074 , 1077-1078 (CADC 1999); Beaird v. Seagate
Technology Inc., 145 F.3d
1159 , 1165 (CAlO), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1054 (1998); Hindman v. Transkrit Corp., 145
F.3d 986 , 990-991 (CA8 1998); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d
1428 , 1432 (CAll), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 962 (1998); Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d
1101 , 1108 (CA3 1997) (en bane); Kaniffv. Allstate
Ins. Co., 121 F.3d
258 , 263 (CA7 1997); Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 58 F.3d
454 , 456-457 (CA9 1995); Bodenheimer v. PPG
Industries, Inc., 5 F. 3d 142 142 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															955, 957 (CA5 1993); Mesnick v. General Elec.
Co., 950 F.2d
816 , 823 (CAl1991), cert. denied, 504 U. S. 985 (1992); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d
66 , 69 (CA6 1982). This Court has not squarely addressed
whether the McDonnell Douglas framework, developed to assess
claims brought under § 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), also
applies to ADEA actions. Because the parties do not dispute the
issue, we shall assume, arguendo, that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is fully applicable here. Cf. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U. S. 308 , 311
(1996). McDonnell Douglas and subsequent decisions have
"established an allocation of the burden of production and an order
for the presentation of proof in ... discriminatorytreatment
cases." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S.
502, 506 (1993). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. Ibid.; Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 , 252-253
(1981). It is undisputed that petitioner satisfied this burden
here: (i) at the time he was fired, he was a member of the class
protected by the ADEA ("individuals who are at least 40 years of
age," 29 U. S. C. § 631(a)), (ii) he was otherwise qualified for
the position of Hinge Room supervisor, (iii) he was discharged by
respondent, and (iv) respondent successively hired three persons in
their thirties to fill petitioner's position. See 197 F. 3d, at
691-692. The burden therefore shifted to respondent to "produc[e]
evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was
preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Burdine,
supra, at 254. This burden is one of production, not
persuasion; it "can involve no credibility assessment." St.
Mary's Honor Center, supra, at 509. Respondent met this burden
by offering admissible evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to
conclude that petitioner was fired because of his failure to
maintain accurate attendance records. See 197 F. 3d, at 692.
Accordingly, "the McDonnell Douglas framework-with 143 its presumptions and burdens"-disappeared, St. Mary's Honor
Center, supra, at 510, and the sole remaining issue was
"discrimination vel non," Aikens, supra, at 714.

															Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth
under this framework, "[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the
trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine, 450 U. S., at 253. And in attempting to satisfy
this burden, the plaintiff-once the employer produces sufficient
evidence to support a nondiscriminatory explanation for its
decision-must be afforded the "opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination." Ibid.; see also St. Mary's Honor Center,
supra, at 507-508. That is, the plaintiff may attempt to
establish that he was the victim of intentional discrimination "by
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence." Burdine, supra, at 256. Moreover, although the
presumption of discrimination "drops out of the picture" once the
defendant meets its burden of production, St. Mary's Honor
Center, supra, at 511, the trier of fact may still consider the
evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case "and
inferences properly drawn therefrom ... on the issue of whether the
defendant's explanation is pretextual," Burdine, supra, at
255, n. 10.

															In this case, the evidence supporting respondent's explanation
for petitioner's discharge consisted primarily of testimony by
Chesnut and Sanderson and documentation of petitioner's alleged
"shoddy record keeping." 197 F. 3d, at 692. Chesnut testified that
a 1993 audit of Hinge Room operations revealed "a very lax assembly
line" where employees were not adhering to general work rules. 4
Record 197-199. As a result of that audit, petitioner was placed on
90 days' probation for unsatisfactory performance. 197 F. 3d, at
690. In 1995, Chesnut ordered another investi- 144 144 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															gation of the Hinge Room, which, according to his testimony,
revealed that petitioner was not correctly recording the absences
and hours of employees. 4 Record 204-205. Respondent introduced
summaries of that investigation documenting several attendance
violations by 12 employees under petitioner's supervision, and
noting that each should have been disciplined in some manner. See
App. 21-24, 30-37; 4 Record 206-208. Chesnut testified that this
failure to discipline absent and late employees is "extremely
important when you are dealing with a union" because uneven
enforcement across departments would keep the company "in grievance
and arbitration cases, which are costly, all the time." 4 id., at 206. He and Sanderson also stated that petitioner's
errors, by failing to adjust for hours not worked, cost the company
overpaid wages. 3 id., at 100, 142, 154; 4 id., at
191-192, 213. Sanderson testified that she accepted the
recommendation to discharge petitioner because he had
"intentionally falsif[ied] company pay records." 3 id., at
100.

															Petitioner, however, made a substantial showing that
respondent's explanation was false. First, petitioner offered
evidence that he had properly maintained the attendance records.
Most of the timekeeping errors cited by respondent involved
employees who were not marked late but who were recorded as having
arrived at the plant at 7 a.m. for the 7 a.m. shift. 3 id., at 118-123; 4 id., at 240-247, 283-285, 291, 293-294.
Respondent contended that employees arriving at 7 a.m. could not
have been at their workstations by 7 a.m., and therefore must have
been late. 3 id., at 119-120; 4 id., at 241, 245. But
both petitioner and Oswalt testified that the company's automated
timeclock often failed to scan employees' timecards, so that the
time sheets would not record any time of arrival. 3 id., at
6, 85; 4 id., at 334-335. On these occasions, petitioner and
Oswalt would visually check the workstations and record whether the
employees were present at the start of the shift. 3 id., at
6, 85-87; 145 4 id., at 335. They stated that if an employee arrived
promptly but the timesheet contained no time of arrival, they would
reconcile the two by marking "7 a.m." as the employee's arrival
time, even if the employee actually arrived at the plant earlier. Ibid. On cross-examination, Chesnut acknowledged that the
timeclock sometimes malfunctioned, and that if "people were there
at their work station[sJ" at the start of the shift, the supervisor
"would write in seven o'clock." 4 id., at 244. Petitioner
also testified that when employees arrived before or stayed after
their shifts, he would assign them additional work so they would
not be overpaid. See 197 F. 3d, at 693.

															Petitioner similarly cast doubt on whether he was responsible
for any failure to discipline late and absent employees. Petitioner
testified that his job only included reviewing the daily and weekly
attendance reports, and that disciplinary writeups were based on
the monthly reports, which were reviewed by Caldwell. 3 Record
20-22; 4 id., at 335. Sanderson admitted that Caldwell, and
not petitioner, was responsible for citing employees for violations
of the company's attendance policy. 3 id., at 20-21,137-138.
Further, Chesnut conceded that there had never been a union
grievance or employee complaint arising from petitioner's
recordkeeping, and that the company had never calculated the amount
of overpayments allegedly attributable to petitioner's errors. 4 id., at 267, 301. Petitioner also testified that, on the day
he was fired, Chesnut said that his discharge was due to his
failure to report as absent one employee, Gina Mae Coley, on two
days in September 1995. 3 id., at 23, 70; 4 id., at
335336. But petitioner explained that he had spent those days in
the hospital, and that Caldwell was therefore responsible for any
overpayment of Coley. 3 id., at 17, 22. Finally, petitioner
stated that on previous occasions that employees were paid for
hours they had not worked, the company had simply adjusted those
employees' next paychecks to correct the errors. 3 id., at
72-73. 146 146 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															Based on this evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that
petitioner "very well may be correct" that "a reasonable jury could
have found that [respondent's] explanation for its employment
decision was pretextual." 197 F. 3d, at 693. Nonetheless, the court
held that this showing, standing alone, was insufficient to sustain
the jury's finding of liability:

															"We must, as an essential final step, determine whether Reeves
presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated [respondent's]
employment decision." Ibid. And in making this
determination, the Court of Appeals ignored the evidence supporting
petitioner's prima facie case and challenging respondent's
explanation for its decision. See id., at 693-694. The court
confined its review of evidence favoring petitioner to that
evidence showing that Chesnut had directed derogatory, age-based
comments at petitioner, and that Chesnut had singled out petitioner
for harsher treatment than younger employees. See ibid. It
is therefore apparent that the court believed that only this
additional evidence of discrimination was relevant to whether the
jury's verdict should stand. That is, the Court of Appeals
proceeded from the assumption that a prima facie case of
discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for the trier of
fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision, is insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a jury's finding of intentional discrimination.

															In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove
intentional discrimination through indirect evidence. This much is
evident from our decision in St. Mary's Honor Cen ter. There
we held that the factfinder's rejection of the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action does not compel judgment for the plaintiff. 509 U. S., at 511. The
ultimate question is whether the employer intentionally
discriminated, and proof that "the employer's proffered reason is
unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does not necessarily
establish that the plaintiff's prof- 147 fered reason ... is correct." Id., at 524. In other
words, "[i]t is not enough ... to disbelieve the employer;
the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of
intentional discrimination." Id., at 519.

															In reaching this conclusion, however, we reasoned that it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact
of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation.
Specifically, we stated: "The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion
of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection
of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier
of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Id., at 51lo Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence
is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of
intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at 517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes
part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of
proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination"). In
appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is
dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference
is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the
factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a
material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296 (1992); see also Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 620-621 (1896); 2 J. Wigmore,
Evidence § 278(2), p. 133 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979). Moreover, once
the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination
may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially
since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual
reason for its decision. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. 148 148 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC. Waters, 438
U. S. 567 , 577 (1978) ("[W]hen all legitimate reasons for
rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for
the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer,
who we generally assume acts with some reason, based his
decision on an impermissible consideration"). Thus, a plaintiff's
prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that
the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.

															This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability.
Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has
established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to
reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an
employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the
record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a
weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue
and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that
no discrimination had occurred. See Aka v. Washington
Hospital Center, 156 F. 3d, at 1291-1292; see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F. 3d, at 1338 ("[I]f
the circumstances show that the defendant gave the false
explanation to conceal something other than discrimination, the
inference of discrimination will be weak or nonexistent"). To hold
otherwise would be effectively to insulate an entire category of
employment discrimination cases from review under Rule 50, and we
have reiterated that trial courts should not "'treat discrimination
differently from other ultimate questions of fact.''' St. Mary's
Honor Center, supra, at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460 U. S.,
at 716).

															Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any
particular case will depend on a number of factors. Those include
the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie 149 case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's
explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the
employer's case and that properly may be considered on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. See infra, at 151-152. For
purposes of this case, we need not-and could not-resolve all of the
circumstances in which such factors would entitle an employer to
judgment as a matter of law. It suffices to say that, because a
prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's
explanation may permit a finding of liability, the Court of Appeals
erred in proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must always
introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.

															III A

															The remaining question is whether, despite the Court of Appeals'
misconception of petitioner's evidentiary burden, respondent was
nonetheless entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Rule 50,
a court should render judgment as a matter of law when "a party has
been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on
that issue." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(a); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U. S. 440, 447-448 (2000). The Courts of
Appeals have articulated differing formulations as to what evidence
a court is to consider in ruling on a Rule 50 motion. See Venture Technology, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas
Distribution Corp., decided with Schwimmer v. Sony
Corp. of America, 459 U. S. 1007 , 1009
(1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Some
decisions have stated that review is limited to that evidence
favorable to the nonmoving party, see, e. g., Aparicio v. Norfolk & Western R. Co., 84 F.3d
803 , 807 (CA6 1996); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d
563 , 566 (CA8 1967), while most have held that review
extends to the entire record, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmovant, see, e. g., Tate v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 150 150 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC. 997 F.2d
1433 , 1436 (CA111993); Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411

															On closer examination, this conflict seems more semantic than
real. Those decisions holding that review under Rule 50 should be
limited to evidence favorable to the nonmovant appear to have their
genesis in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53
(1949). See 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2529, pp. 297-301 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Wright
& Miller). In Wilkerson, we stated that "in passing upon
whether there is sufficient evidence to submit an issue to the jury
we need look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences which
tend to support the case of" the nonmoving party. 336 U. S., at 57.
But subsequent decisions have clarified that this passage was
referring to the evidence to which the trial court should give
credence, not the evidence that the court should review. In the analogous context of summary judgment under Rule 56, we have
stated that the court must review the record "taken as a whole." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986). And the standard for granting
summary judgment "mirrors" the standard for judgment as a matter of
law, such that "the inquiry under each is the same." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242 , 250-251
(1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317 , 323
(1986). It therefore follows that, in entertaining a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the
evidence in the record.

															In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make
credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U. S. 545 , 554-555
(1990); Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U. S. 690 ,
696, n. 6 (1962). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge." Liberty 151 Lobby, supra, at 255. Thus, although the court should
review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to
believe. See Wright & Miller 299. That is, the court should
give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as
that "evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted
and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes
from disinterested witnesses." Id., at 300.

															B

															Applying this standard here, it is apparent that respondent was
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case, in
addition to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and
creating a jury issue as to the falsity of the employer's
explanation, petitioner introduced additional evidence that Chesnut
was motivated by age-based animus and was principally responsible
for petitioner's firing. Petitioner testified that Chesnut had told
him that he "was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower"
and, on one occasion when petitioner was having difficulty starting
a machine, that he "was too damn old to do [his] job." 3 Record 26.
According to petitioner, Chesnut would regularly "cuss at me and
shake his finger in my face." 3 id., at 26-27. Oswalt,
roughly 24 years younger than petitioner, corroborated that there
was an "obvious difference" in how Chesnut treated them. 3 id., at 82. He stated that, although he and Chesnut "had
[their] differences," "it was nothing compared to the way [Chesnut]
treated Roger." Ibid. Oswalt explained that Chesnut
"tolerated quite a bit" from him even though he "defied" Chesnut
"quite often," but that Chesnut treated petitioner "[i]n a manner,
as you would ... treat ... a child when ... you're angry with
[him]." 3 id., at 82-83. Petitioner also demonstrated that,
according to company records, he and Oswalt had nearly identical
rates of productivity in 1993. 3 id., at 163-167; 4 id., at 225-226. Yet respondent conducted an efficiency
study of only the 152 152 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															regular line, supervised by petitioner, and placed only
petitioner on probation. 3 id., at 166-167; 4 id., at
229. Chesnut conducted that efficiency study and, after having
testified to the contrary on direct examination, acknowledged on
cross-examination that he had recommended that petitioner be placed
on probation following the study. 4 id., at 197199,237.

															Further, petitioner introduced evidence that Chesnut was the
actual decisionmaker behind his firing. Chesnut was married to
Sanderson, who made the formal decision to discharge petitioner. 3 id., at 90, 152. Although Sanderson testified that she fired
petitioner because he had "intentionally falsif[ied] company pay
records," 3 id., at 100, respondent only introduced evidence
concerning the inaccuracy of the records, not their falsification.
A 1994 letter authored by Chesnut indicated that he berated other
company directors, who were supposedly his coequals, about how to
do their jobs. PI. Exh. 7, 3 Record 108-112. Moreover, Oswalt
testified that all of respondent's employees feared Chesnut, and
that Chesnut had exercised "absolute power" within the company for
"[a]s long as [he] can remember." 3 id., at 80.

															In holding that the record contained insufficient evidence to
sustain the jury's verdict, the Court of Appeals misapplied the
standard of review dictated by Rule 50. Again, the court
disregarded critical evidence favorable to petitionernamely, the
evidence supporting petitioner's prima facie case and undermining
respondent's nondiscriminatory explanation. See 197 F. 3d, at
693-694. The court also failed to draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of petitioner. For instance, while acknowledging "the
potentially damning nature" of Chesnut's age-related comments, the
court discounted them on the ground that they "were not made in the
direct context of Reeves's termination." Id., at 693. And
the court discredited petitioner's evidence that Chesnut was the
actual decisionmaker by giving weight to the fact that 153 there was "no evidence to suggest that any of the other decision
makers were motivated by age." Id., at 694. Moreover, the
other evidence on which the court relied-that Caldwell and Oswalt
were also cited for poor recordkeeping, and that respondent
employed many managers over age 50although relevant, is certainly
not dispositive. See Furnco, 438 U. S., at 580 (evidence
that employer's work force was racially balanced, while "not wholly
irrelevant," was not "sufficient to conclusively demonstrate
that [the employer's] actions were not discriminatorily
motivated"). In concluding that these circumstances so overwhelmed
the evidence favoring petitioner that no rational trier of fact
could have found that petitioner was fired because of his age, the
Court of Appeals impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning
the weight of the evidence for the jury's.

															The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case
involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff
was the victim of intentional discrimination. Given the evidence in
the record supporting petitioner, we see no reason to subject the
parties to an additional round of litigation before the Court of
Appeals rather than to resolve the matter here. The District Court
plainly informed the jury that petitioner was required to show "by
a preponderance of the evidence that his age was a determining and
motivating factor in the decision of [respondent] to terminate
him." Tr. 7 (Jury Charge) (Sept. 12, 1997). The court instructed
the jury that, to show that respondent's explanation was a pretext
for discrimination, petitioner had to demonstrate "1, that the
stated reasons were not the real reasons for [petitioner's]
discharge; and 2, that age discrimination was the real
reason for [petitioner's] discharge." Ibid. (emphasis
added). Given that petitioner established a prima facie case of
discrimination, introduced enough evidence for the jury to reject
respondent's explanation, and produced additional evidence of
age-based animus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
find that respondent had 154 154 REEVES v. SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.

															intentionally discriminated. The District Court was therefore
correct to submit the case to the jury, and the Court of Appeals
erred in overturning its verdict.

															For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring.

															The Court today holds that an employment discrimination
plaintiff may survive judgment as a matter of law by
submitting two categories of evidence: first, evidence establishing
a "prima facie case," as that term is used in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 , 802
(1973); and second, evidence from which a rational factfinder could
conclude that the employer's proffered explanation for its actions
was false. Because the Court of Appeals in this case plainly, and
erroneously, required the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond
those two categories, no broader holding is necessary to support
reversal.

															I write separately to note that it may be incumbent on the
Court, in an appropriate case, to define more precisely the
circumstances in which plaintiffs will be required to submit
evidence beyond these two categories in order to survive a motion
for judgment as a matter of law. I anticipate that such
circumstances will be uncommon. As the Court notes, it is a
principle of evidence law that the jury is entitled to treat a
party's dishonesty about a material fact as evidence of
culpability. Ante, at 147. Under this commonsense principle,
evidence suggesting that a defendant accused of illegal
discrimination has chosen to give a false explanation for its
actions gives rise to a rational inference that the defendant could
be masking its actual, illegal motivation. Ibid. Whether the
defendant was in fact motivated by discrimination is of course for
the finder of fact to decide; that is the lesson of St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U. S. 502 (1993). But
the inference remains-unless it is conclusively 155 demonstrated, by evidence the district court is required to
credit on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, see ante, at 151, that discrimination could not have been the
defendant's true motivation. If such conclusive demonstrations are
(as I suspect) atypical, it follows that the ultimate question of
liability ordinarily should not be taken from the jury once the
plaintiff has introduced the two categories of evidence described
above. Because the Court's opinion leaves room for such further
elaboration in an appropriate case, I join it in full.