U.S. Supreme Court Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908) Loewe v. Lawlor No. 388 Argued December 4, 5,
1907 Decided February 3,
1908 208
U.S. 274 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT Syllabus After the Circuit Court of Appeals has certified questions to
this court and this court has issued its writ of certiorari
requiring the whole record to be sent up, it devolves upon this
court under § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1891, to decide the whole
matter in controversy in the same manner as if it had been brought
here for review by writ of error or appeal.

															The Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, has a broader
application that the prohibition of restraints of trade unlawful at
common law. Page 208 U. S. 275 It prohibits any combination which essentially obstructs the
free flow of commerce between the States, or restricts, in that
regard, the liberty of a trader to engage in business, and this
includes restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and
strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of interstate
trade except on conditions that the combination imposes.

															A combination may be in restraint of interstate trade and within
the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act although the persons exercising
the restraint may not themselves be engaged in interstate trade,
and some of the means employed may be acts within a State and
individually beyond the scope of Federal authority, and operate to
destroy intrastate trade as interstate trade, but the acts must be
considered as a whole, and if the purposes are to prevent
interstate transportation, the plan is open to condemnation under
the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890. Swift v. United
States, 196 U. S. 375 .

															The Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, makes no distinction between
classes. Organizations of farmers and laborers were not exempted
from its operation, notwithstanding the efforts which the records
of Congress show were made in that direction.

															A combination of labor organizations and the members thereof, to
compel a manufacturer whose goods are almost entirely sold in other
States to unionize his shops and, on his refusal so to do to,
boycott his goods and prevent their sale in States other than his
own until such time as the resulting damage forces him to comply
with their demands is, under the conditions of this case, a
combination in restraint of interstate trade or commerce within the
meaning of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, and the manufacturer
may maintain an action for threefold damages under 7 of that
act.

															The facts are stated in the opinion. Page 208 U. S. 283 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

															This was an action brought in the Circuit Court for the District
of Connecticut under § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, c.
647, 26 Stat. 209, claiming threefold damages for injuries
inflicted on plaintiffs by a combination or conspiracy declared to
be unlawful by the act.

															Defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint, assigning general
and special grounds. The demurrer was sustained as to the first six
paragraphs, which rested on the ground that the combination stated
was not within the Sherman Act, and this rendered it unnecessary to
pass upon any other questions in the case, and, upon plaintiffs
declining to amend their complaint, the court dismissed it with
costs. 148 Fed.Rep. 924, and see 142 Fed.Rep. 216; 130
Fed.Rep. 633. Page 208 U. S. 284 The case was then carried by writ of error to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and that court, desiring the
instruction of this court upon a question arising on the writ of
error, certified that question to this court. The certificate
consisted of a brief statement of facts, and put the question thus:
"Upon this state of facts, can plaintiffs maintain an action
against defendants under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2,
1890?"

															After the case on certificate had been docketed here, plaintiffs
in error applied, and defendants in error joined in the
application, to this court to require the whole record and cause to
be sent up for its consideration. The application was granted, and
the whole record and cause being thus brought before this court, it
devolved upon the court, under § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1891, to
"decide the whole matter in controversy in the same manner as if it
had been brought there for review by writ of error or appeal."

															The case comes up, then, on complaint and demurrer, and we give
the complaint in the margin. * Page 208 U. S. 285 The question is whether, upon the facts therein averred and
admitted by the demurrer, this action can be maintained under the
Anti-Trust Act.

															The first, second and seventh sections of that act are as
follows: Page 208 U. S. 286 "1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall make any such Page 208 U. S. 287 contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court. " Page 208 U. S. 288 "2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty Page 208 U. S. 289 of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court. " Page 208 U. S. 290 "7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden
or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any
Circuit Court of the United States in the district in Page 208 U. S. 291 which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by
him sustained, and the costs of suit; including a reasonable
attorney's fee. " Page 208 U. S. 292 In our opinion, the combination described in the declaration is
a combination "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States," in the sense in which those words are used in the act, and
the action can be maintained accordingly. Page 208 U. S. 293 And that conclusion rests on many judgments of this court, to
the effect that the act prohibits any combination whatever to
secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce
between the States, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a
trader to engage in business. Page 208 U. S. 294 The combination charged falls within the class of restraints of
trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily
not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that the
combination imposes, and there is no doubt Page 208 U. S. 295 that (to quote from the well known work of Chief Justice Erle on
Trade Unions),

															"at common law, every person has individually, and the public
also, has collectively, a right to require that the course of trade
should be kept free from unreasonable Page 208 U. S. 296 obstruction."

															But the objection here is to the jurisdiction, because, even
conceding that the declaration states a case good at common law, it
is contended that it does not state one within the statute. Thus,
it is said that the restraint alleged would operate to entirely
destroy plaintiffs' business, and thereby include intrastate trade
as well; that physical obstruction Page 208 U. S. 297 is not alleged as contemplated, and that defendants are not
themselves engaged in interstate trade.

															We think none of these objections is tenable, and that they are
disposed of by previous decisions of this court. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 ; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.
S. 505 , and Northern Securities Company v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197 ,
hold, in effect, that the Anti-Trust law has a broader application
than the prohibition of restraints of trade unlawful at common law.
Thus, in the Trans-Missouri Case, 166 U.
S. 290 , it was said that,

															"assuming that agreements of this nature are not void at common
law, and that the various cases cited by the learned courts below
show it, the answer to the statement of their validity is to be
found in the terms of the statute under consideration;"

															and, in the Northern Securities Case, 193
U. S. 331 , that

															"the act declares illegal every contract, combination or
conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature, and whoever may
be the parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."

															We do not pause to comment on cases, such as United States
v. Knight, 156 U. S. 1 ; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.
S. 578 , and Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 60 ; in
which the undisputed facts showed that the purpose of the agreement
was not to obstruct or restrain interstate commerce. The object and
intention of the combination determined its legality.

															In Swift v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375 , a bill was brought against a number of
corporations, firms and individuals of different States alleging
that they were engaged in interstate commerce in the purchase,
sale, transportation and delivery, and subsequent resale at the
point of delivery of meats, and that they combined to refrain from
bidding against each other in the purchase of cattle; to maintain a
uniform price at which the meat should be sold, and to maintain
uniform charges in delivering meats thus sold through the channels
of interstate trade to the various dealers and consumers in other
States. Page 208 U. S. 298 And that, thus, they artificially restrained commerce in fresh
meats from the purchase and shipment of livestock from the plains
to the final distribution of the meats to the consumers in the
markets of the country.

															Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said (pp. 196 U. S. 395 , 196 U. S. 396 , 196 U. S.
398 ):

															"Commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cattle
are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation
that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and
when, in effect, they do so with only the interruption necessary to
find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical,
constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current
of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a
part and incident of such commerce."

															" * * * *" "The general objection is urged that the bill does not set forth
sufficient, definite or specific facts. This objection is serious,
but it seems to us inherent in the nature of the case. The scheme
alleged is so vast that it presents a new problem in pleading. If,
as we must assume, the scheme is entertained, it is, of course,
contrary to the very words of the statute. Its size makes the
violation of the law more conspicuous, and yet the same thing makes
it impossible to fasten the principal fact to a certain time and
place. The elements, too, are so numerous and shifting, even the
constituent parts alleged are and, from their nature must be, so
extensive in time and space that something of the same
impossibility applies to them."

															" * * * *" "The scheme as a whole seems to us to be within reach of the
law. The constituent elements, as we have stated them, are enough
to give to the scheme a body and, for all that we can say, to
accomplish it. Moreover, whatever we may think of them separately,
when we take them up as distinct charges, they are alleged
sufficiently as elements of the scheme. It is Page 208 U. S. 299 suggested that the several acts charged are lawful, and that
intent can make no difference. But they are bound together as parts
of a single plan. The plan may make the parts unlawful."

															And the same principle was expressed in Aikens v.
Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194 , 195 U. S. 205 ,
involving a statute of Wisconsin prohibiting combinations "for the
purpose of willfully or maliciously injuring another in his
reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever,"
etc., in which Mr. Justice Holmes said:

															"The statute is directed against a series of acts, and acts of
several, the acts of combining, with intent to do other acts, 'The
very plot is an act in itself.' Mulcahy v. The Queen, L.R.
3 H.L. 306, 317. But an act which in itself is merely a voluntary
muscular contraction derives all its character from the
consequences which will follow it under the circumstances in which
it was done. When the acts consist of making a combination
calculated to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such acts,
when done maliciously, cannot be denied because they are to be
followed and worked out by conduct which might have been lawful if
not preceded by the acts. No conduct has such an absolute privilege
as to justify all possible schemes of which it may be a part. The
most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions
may be made a step in a criminal plot, and, if it is a step in a
plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to
prevent the punishment of the plot by law."

															In Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 , the
petition alleged that the defendants were practically the only
manufacturers of cast iron within thirty-six States and
Territories, that they had entered into a combination by which they
agreed not to compete with each other in the sale of pipe, and the
territory through which the constituent companies could make sales
was allotted between them. This court held that the agreement
which, prior to any act of transportation, limited the prices at
which the pipe could be Page 208 U. S. 300 sold after transportation, was within the law. Mr. Justice
Peckham, delivering the opinion, said (p. 175 U. S.
242 ):

															"And when Congress has enacted a statute such as the one in
question, any agreement or combination which directly operates not
alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation and
delivery of an article of interstate commerce by preventing or
restricting its sale, etc., thereby regulates interstate
commerce."

															In Montague & Company v. Lowry, 193 U. S.
38 , which was an action brought by a private citizen
under § 7 against a combination engaged in the manufacture of
tiles, defendants were wholesale dealers in tiles in California,
and combined with manufacturers in other States to restrain the
interstate traffic in tiles by refusing to sell any tiles to any
wholesale dealer in California who was not a member of the
association, except at a prohibitive rate. The case was a
commercial boycott against such dealers in California as would not
or could not obtain membership in the association. The restraint
did not consist in a physical obstruction of interstate commerce,
but in the fact that the plaintiff and other independent dealers
could not purchase their tiles from manufacturers in other States
because such manufacturers had combined to boycott them. This court
held that this obstruction to the purchase of tiles, a fact
antecedent to physical transportation, was within the prohibition
of the act. Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the court, said (p. 193 U. S. 45 ),
concerning the agreement, that it

															"restrained trade, for it narrowed the market for the sale of
tiles in California from the manufacturers and dealers therein in
other States, so that they could only be sold to the members of the
association, and it enhanced prices to the nonmember."

															The averments here are that there was an existing interstate
traffic between plaintiffs and citizens of other States, and that,
for the direct purpose of destroying such interstate traffic,
defendants combined not merely to prevent plaintiffs from
manufacturing articles then and there intended for transportation
beyond the State, but also to prevent the vendees from reselling
the hats which they had imported from Connecticut, or from Page 208 U. S. 301 further negotiating with plaintiffs for the purchase and
intertransportation of such hats from Connecticut to the various
places of destination. So that, although some of the means whereby
the interstate traffic was to be destroyed were acts within a
State, and some of them were, in themselves, as a part of their
obvious purpose and effect, beyond the scope of Federal authority,
still, as we have seen, the acts must be considered as a whole, and
the plan is open to condemnation notwithstanding a negligible
amount of intrastate business might be affected in carrying it out.
If the purposes of the combination were, as alleged, to prevent any
interstate transportation at all, the fact that the means operated
at one end before physical transportation commenced, and at the
other end after the physical transportation ended, was
immaterial.

															Nor can the act in question be held inapplicable because
defendants were not themselves engaged in interstate commerce. The
act made no distinction between classes. It provided that "every"
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was
illegal. The records of Congress show that several efforts were
made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of farmers and
laborers from the operation of the act, and that all these efforts
failed, so that the act remained as we have it before us.

															In an early case, United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated
Council, 54 Fed.Rep. 994, the United States filed a bill under
the Sherman act in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, averring the existence of

															"a gigantic and widespread combination of the members of a
multitude of separate organizations for the purpose of restraining
the commerce among the several States and with foreign
countries,"

															and it was contended that the statute did not refer to
combinations of laborers. But the court, granting the injunction,
said:

															"I think the Congressional debates show that the statute had its
origin in the evils of massed capital; but, when the Congress came
to formulating the prohibition, which is the yardstick for
measuring the complainant's right to the injunction, Page 208 U. S. 302 it expressed it in these words:"

															"Every contract or combination in the form of trust, or
otherwise in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal."

															"The subject had so broadened in the minds of the legislators
that the source of the evil was not regarded as material, and the
evil in its entirety is dealt with. They made the interdiction
include combinations of labor, as well as of capital; in fact, all
combinations in restraint of commerce, without reference to the
character of the persons who entered into them. It is true this
statute has not been much expounded by judges, but, as it seems to
me, its meaning, as far as relates to the sort of combinations to
which it is to apply, is manifest, and that it includes
combinations which are composed of laborers acting in the interest
of laborers."

															" * * * *" "It is the successful effort of the combination of the
defendants to intimidate and overawe others who were at work in
conducting or carrying on the commerce of the country in which the
court finds their error and their violation of the statute. One of
the intended results of their combined action was the forced
stagnation of all the commerce which flowed through New Orleans.
This intent and combined action are nonetheless unlawful because
they included in their scope the paralysis of all other business
within the city as well."

															The case was affirmed on appeal by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 57 Fed.Rep. 85.

															Subsequently came the litigation over the Pullman strike and the
decisions, In re Debs, 64 Fed.Rep. 724, 745, 755; S.C., 158 U. S. 158 U.S.
564. The bill in that case was filed by the United States against
the officers of the American Railway Union, which alleged that a
labor dispute existed between the Pullman Palace Car Company and
its employes; that thereafter the four officers of the railway
union combined together and with others to compel an adjustment of
such dispute by creating a boycott against the cars of the car
company; that, to make such boycott effective, they had already
prevented certain Page 208 U. S. 303 of the railroads running out of Chicago from operating their
trains; that they asserted that they could and would tie up,
paralyze and break down any and every railroad which did not accede
to their demands, and that the purpose and intention of the
combination was

															"to secure unto themselves the entire control of the interstate,
industrial and commercial business in which the population of the
city of Chicago and of other communities along the lines of road of
said railways are engaged with each other, and to restrain any and
all other persons from any independent control or management of
such interstate, industrial or commercial enterprises, save
according to the will and with the consent of the defendants."

															The Circuit Court proceeded principally upon the Sherman
Anti-Trust law, and granted an injunction. In this court, the case
was rested upon the broader ground that the Federal Government had
full power over interstate commerce and over the transmission of
the mails, and, in the exercise of those powers, could remove
everything put upon highways, natural or artificial, to obstruct
the passage of interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mails.
But, in reference to the Anti-Trust Act, the court expressly stated
(158 U.S. 158 U. S.
600 ):

															"We enter into no examination of the act of July 2, 1890, c.
647, 26 Stat. 209, upon which the Circuit Court relied mainly to
sustain its jurisdiction. It must not be understood from this that
we dissent from the conclusions of that court in reference to the
scope of the act, but simply that we prefer to rest our judgment on
the broader ground which has been discussed in this opinion,
believing it of importance that the principles underlying it should
be fully stated and affirmed."

															And, in the opinion, Mr. Justice Brewer, among other things,
said (p. 158 U. S.
581 ):

															"It is curious to note the fact that, in a large proportion of
the cases in respect to interstate commerce brought to this court,
the question presented was of the validity of state legislation in
its bearings upon interstate commerce, and the uniform course of
decision has been to declare that it is not within Page 208 U. S. 304 the competency of a State to legislate in such a manner as to
obstruct interstate commerce. If a State, with its recognized
powers of sovereignty, is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce,
can it be that any mere voluntary association of individuals within
the limits of that State has a power which the State itself does
not possess?"

															The question answers itself, and, in the light of the
authorities, the only inquiry is as to the sufficiency of the
averments of fact. We have given the declaration in full in the
margin, and it appears therefrom that it is charged that defendants
formed a combination to directly restrain plaintiffs' trade; that
the trade to be restrained was interstate; that certain means to
attain such restraint were contrived to be used and employed to
that end; that those means were so used and employed by defendants,
and that thereby they injured plaintiffs' property and
business.

															At the risk of tediousness, we repeat that the complaint averred
that plaintiffs were manufacturers of hats in Danbury, Connecticut,
having a factory there, and were then and there engaged in an
interstate trade in some twenty States other than the State of
Connecticut; that they were practically dependent upon such
interstate trade to consume the product of their factory, only a
small percentage of their entire output being consumed in the State
of Connecticut; that, at the time the alleged combination was
formed, they were in the process of manufacturing a large number of
hats for the purpose of fulfilling engagements then actually made
with consignees and wholesale dealers in States other than
Connecticut, and that, if prevented from carrying on the work of
manufacturing these hats, they would be unable to complete their
engagements.

															That defendants were members of a vast combination called The
United Hatters of North America, comprising about 9,000 members and
including a large number of subordinate unions, and that they were
combined with some 1,400,000 others into another association known
as The American Federation of Page 208 U. S. 305 Labor, of which they were members, whose members resided in all
the places in the several States where the wholesale dealers in
hats and their customers resided and did business; that defendants
were

															"engaged in a combined scheme and effort to force all
manufacturers of fur hats in the United States, including the
plaintiffs, against their will and their previous policy of
carrying on their business, to organize their workmen in the
departments of making and finishing, in each of their factories,
into an organization, to be part and parcel of the said combination
known as The United Hatters of North America, or, as the defendants
and their confederates term it, to unionize their shops, with the
intent thereby to control the employment of labor in and the
operation of said factories and to subject the same to the
direction and control of persons, other than the owners of the
same, in a manner extremely onerous and distasteful to such owners,
and to carry out such scheme, effort and purpose by restraining and
destroying the interstate trade and commerce of such manufacturers
by means of intimidation of and threats made to such manufacturers
and their customers in the several States of boycotting them, their
product and their customers, using therefor all the powerful means
at their command, as aforesaid, until such time as, from the damage
and loss of business resulting therefrom, the said manufacturers
should yield to the said demand to unionize their factories."

															That the conspiracy or combination was so far progressed that,
out of eighty-two manufacturers of this country engaged in the
production of fur hats, seventy had accepted the terms and acceded
to the demand that the shop should be conducted in accordance, so
far as conditions of employment were concerned, with the will of
the American Federation of Labor; that the local union demanded of
plaintiffs that they should unionize their shop under peril of
being boycotted by this combination, which demand defendants
declined to comply with; that thereupon the American Federation of
Labor, acting through its official organ and through its
organizers, declared a boycott. Page 208 U. S. 306 The complaint then thus continued:

															"20. On or about July 25, 1902, the defendants, individually and
collectively and as members of said combinations and associations,
and with other persons whose names are unknown to the plaintiffs,
associated with them, in pursuance of the general scheme and
purpose aforesaid, to force all manufacturers of fur hats, and
particularly the plaintiffs, to so unionize their factories,
wantonly, wrongfully, maliciously, unlawfully and in violation of
the provisions of the 'Act of Congress, approved July 2, 1890,' and
entitled 'An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful
Restraints and Monopolies,' and with intent to injure the property
and business of the plaintiffs by.means of acts done which are
forbidden and declared to be unlawful by said act of Congress,
entered into a combination and conspiracy to restrain the
plaintiffs and their customers in States other than Connecticut, in
carrying on said trade and commerce among the several States, and
to wholly prevent them from engaging in and carrying on said trade
and commerce between them and to prevent the plaintiffs from
selling their hats to wholesale dealers and purchasers in said
States other than Connecticut, and to prevent said dealers and
customers in said other States from buying the same, and to prevent
the plaintiffs from obtaining orders for their hats from such
customers, and filling the same, and shipping said hats to said
customers in said States as aforesaid, and thereby injure the
plaintiffs in their property and business and to render unsalable
the product and output of their said factory, so the subject of
interstate commerce, in whosoever's hands the same might be or
come, through said interstate trade and commerce, and to employ as
means to carry out said combination and conspiracy and the purposes
thereof, and accomplish the same, the following measures and acts, viz: "

															"To cause, by means of threats and coercion, and without warning
or information to the plaintiffs, the concerted and simultaneous
withdrawal of all the makers and finishers of hats then working for
them, who were not members of their said Page 208 U. S. 307 combination, The United Hatters of North America, as well as
those who were such members, and thereby cripple the operation of
the plaintiffs' factory, and prevent the plaintiffs from filling a
large number of orders then on hand from such wholesale dealers in
States other than Connecticut which they had engaged to fill and
were then in the act of filling, as was well known to the
defendants; in connection therewith to declare a boycott against
all hats made for sale and sold and delivered, or to be so sold or
delivered, by the plaintiffs to said wholesale dealers in States
other than Connecticut, and to actively boycott the same and the
business of those who should deal in them, and thereby prevent the
sale of the same by those in whose hands they might be or come
through said interstate trade in said several States; to procure
and cause others of said combinations united with them in said
American Federation of Labor, in like manner to declare a boycott
against and to actively boycott the same and the business of such
wholesale dealers as should buy or sell them, and of those who
should purchase them from such wholesale dealers; to intimidate
such wholesale dealers from purchasing or dealing in the hats of
the plaintiffs by informing them that the American Federation of
Labor had declared a boycott against the product of the plaintiffs
and against any dealer who should handle it, and that the same was
to be actively pressed against them, and by distributing circulars
containing notices that such dealers and their customers were to be
boycotted; to threaten with a boycott those customers who should
buy any goods whatever, even though union made, of such boycotted
dealers, and at the same time to notify such wholesale dealers that
they were at liberty to deal in the hats of any other nonunion
manufacturer of similar quality to those made by the plaintiffs,
but must not deal in the hats made by the plaintiffs under threats
of such boycotting; to falsely represent to said wholesale dealers
and their customers, that the plaintiffs had discriminated against
the union men in their employ, had thrown them out of employment
because they refused to give up their union cards and Page 208 U. S. 308 teach boys, who were intended to take their places after seven
months' instruction, and had driven their employes to extreme
measures"

															"by their persistent, unfair and un-American policy of
antagonizing union labor, forcing wages to a starvation scale, and
given boys and cheap, unskilled foreign labor preference over
experienced and capable union workmen,"

															"in order to intimidate said dealers from purchasing said hats
by reason of the prejudice thereby created against the plaintiffs
and the hats made by them among those who might otherwise purchase
them; to use the said union label of said The United Hatters of
North America as an instrument to aid them in carrying out said
conspiracy and combination against the plaintiffs' and their
customers' interstate trade aforesaid, and, in connection with the
boycotting above-mentioned, for the purpose of describing and
identifying the hats of the plaintiffs and singling them out to be
so boycotted; to employ a large number of agents to visit said
wholesale dealers and their customers, at their several places of
business, and threaten them with loss of business if they should
buy or handle the hats of the plaintiffs, and thereby prevent them
from buying said hats, and in connection therewith to cause said
dealers to be waited upon by committees representing large
combinations of persons in their several localities to make similar
threats to them; to use the daily press in the localities where
such wholesale dealers reside, and do business, to announce and
advertise the said boycotts against the hats of the plaintiffs and
said wholesale dealers, and thereby make the same more effective
and oppressive, and to use the columns of their said paper, The
Journal of the United Hatters of North America, for that purpose,
and to describe the acts of their said agents in prosecuting the
same."

															And then followed the averments that the defendants proceeded to
carry out their combination to restrain and destroy interstate
trade and commerce between plaintiffs and their customers in other
States by employing the identical means contrived for that purpose,
and that, by reason of those acts, Page 208 U. S. 309 plaintiffs were damaged in their business and property in some
$80,000.

															We think a case within the statute was set up, and that the
demurrer should have been overruled. Judgment reversed, and case remanded with a direction to
proceed accordingly. * The complaint alleged that the defendants were residents of
the District of Connecticut, and that complainants resided in
Danbury, in that district, were copartners, and located and doing
business as manufacturers and sellers of hats there; that they
had

															"a factory for the making of hats, for sale by them in the
various States of the Union, and have for many years employed, at
said factory, a large number of men in the manufacture and sale of
said hats, and have invested in that branch of their business a
large amount of capital, and, in their business of selling the
product of their factory and filling orders for said hats, have
built up and established a large interstate trade, employing more
than two hundred and thirty (230) persons in making and annually
selling hats of a value exceeding four hundred thousand (400,000)
dollars."

															"4. The plaintiffs, deeming it their right to manage and conduct
their business without interference from individuals or
associations not connected therewith, have for many years
maintained the policy of refusing to suffer or permit any person or
organization to direct or control their said business, and, in
consequence of said policy, have conducted their said business upon
the broad and patriotic principle of not discriminating against any
person seeking employment because of his being or not being
connected with any labor or other organization, and have refused to
enter into agreement with any person or organization whereby the
rights and privileges, either of themselves or any employee, would
be jeopardized, surrendered to or controlled by said person or
organization, and have believed said policy, which was and is well
known to the defendants, to be absolutely necessary to the
successful conduct of their said business and the welfare of their
employes."

															"5. The plaintiffs, for many years, have been and now are
engaged in trade and commerce among the several States of the
Union, in selling and shipping almost the whole of the product of
their said factory by common carriers, from said Danbury to
wholesale dealers residing and doing business in each of the States
of Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Missouri, Nebraska, Arkansas, California and other
States, to the amount of many hundreds of thousands of dollars, and
in sending agents with samples from said Danbury into and through
each of said States to visit said wholesale dealers at their places
of business in said several States, and solicit and procure from
them orders for said hats, to be filled by hats to be shipped from
their said factory at said Danbury, by common carriers to said
wholesale dealers, to be by them paid for after the delivery
thereof at their several places of business."

															"6. On July 25, 1902, the amount of capital invested by the
plaintiffs in said business of making and selling hats,
approximated one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, and the value
of the hats annually sold and shipped by them in previous years to
said dealers in States other than Connecticut exceeded four hundred
thousand dollars, while the value of hats sold by them in the State
of Connecticut did not exceed ten thousand dollars."

															"7. On July 25, 1902, the plaintiffs had made preparations to do
a large and profitable business with said wholesale dealers in
other States, and the condition of their business was such as to
warrant the full belief that the ensuing year would be the most
successful in their experience. Their factory was then running to
its full capacity in filling a large number of orders from such
wholesale dealers in other States. They were then employing about
one hundred and sixty men in the making and finishing departments,
a large number in the trimming and other departments, whose work
was dependent upon the previous work of the makers and finishers,
and they then had about one hundred and fifty dozens of hats in
process of manufacture, and in such condition as to be perishable
and ruined if work was stopped upon them."

															"8. The plaintiffs then were and now are almost wholly dependent
upon the sale and shipments of hats as aforesaid, to said dealers
in States other than Connecticut, to keep their said factory
running and to dispose of its product and their capital in said
business profitably employed, and the restraint, curtailment and
destruction of their said trade and commerce with their said
customers in said States other than Connecticut, by the
combination, conspiracy and acts of the defendants, as hereinafter
set forth, have been and now are of serious damage to the property
and business of the plaintiffs, as hereinafter set forth."

															"9. The individual defendants, named in this writ, are all
members of a combination or association of persons, styling
themselves The United Hatters of North America, and said
combination includes more than nine thousand persons, residing in
the several States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, California, and
the Province of Ontario in the Dominion of Canada. The said
combination is subdivided into twenty subcombinations, each of
which is by themselves styled a local union of The United Hatters
of North America. Six of said subcombinations are in the State of
Connecticut, and known as local Unions 1 and 2, 10 and 11, and 15
and 16 of The United Hatters of North America, and have an
aggregate membership of more than three thousand persons residing
in the State of Connecticut."

															"10. Said combination of persons, collectively known as The
United Hatters of North America, owns, controls, edits, publishes,
and issues a paper styled The Journal of the United Hatters of
North America, in which are published reports of many of the acts
of its agents, hereinafter mentioned, which circulates widely among
its members and the public, and which affords a ready, convenient,
powerful and effective vehicle for the dissemination of information
to its members and the public as to boycotts declared and pushed by
them, and of the acts and measures of its members and agents for
carrying such boycotts into effect, and was so used by them in
connection with the acts of the defendants hereinafter set
forth."

															"11. Said combination owns and absolutely controls the use of a
certain label or distinguishing mark, which it styles the Union
Label of the United Hatters of North America, which mark, when so
used by them, affords to them a ready, convenient and effective
instrument and means of boycotting the hats of any manufacturer
against whom they may desire to use it for that purpose."

															"12. The defendants in this suit are also all members of a
combination or association of persons calling themselves and known
as The American Federation of Labor, which includes more than a
million and four hundred thousand members residing in the several
States and Territories of the Union, and in the Dominion of Canada,
and in all the places in the several States, where the wholesale
dealers in hats, hereinbefore mentioned, and their customers
reside, and do business. Said combination is subdivided in
subordinate groups, or combinations, comprising one hundred and ten
national and international unions and combination, of which the
said combinations of persons styling themselves The United Hatters
of North America is one, composed of twelve thousand local unions,
twenty-eight State federations or combinations, more than five
hundred central labor unions or combinations, and more than two
thousand local unions or combinations, which are not included in
the above-mentioned national and international combinations."

															"13. Said combination of persons collectively known as The
American Federation of Labor owns, controls, edits, publishes, and
issues a paper or magazine called The American Federationist, which
it declares to be its official organ and mouthpiece, which has a
very wide circulation among its members and others, and which
affords a ready, convenient, powerful and effective vehicle and
instrument for the dissemination of information, as to persons,
their products and manufactures, boycotted or to be boycotted, by
its members, and as to measures adopted and statements to be
published, detrimental to such persons and to the sale of their
manufactures and for boycotting such persons, their manufactures,
and said paper has been and now is constantly used, printed and
distributed for said purposes among its members and the public and
was so used by the defendants and their confederates in boycotting
the products of the firm of F. Berg & Co., of Orange, New
Jersey, and H. H. Roelofs & Co., of Philadelphia, Pa., hat
manufacturers, to their very great injury and until the said firms
successively yielded to their demands in pursuance of the general
scheme of the defendants hereinafter set forth."

															"14. The persons united in said combination, known as The
American Federation of Labor, including the persons in said
subcombination known as The United Hatters of North America,
constantly employ more than one thousand agents in the States and
Territories of the United States, to push, enforce and carry into
effect all boycotts declared by the said members, including those
in aid of the combined scheme, purpose and effort hereinafter
stated, to force all the manufacturers of fur hats in the United
States, including the plaintiffs, to unionize their factories by
restraining and destroying their interstate trade and commerce, as
hereinafter stated, all of which said agents act under the
immediate supervision and personal direction of one Samuel Gompers,
who is chief agent of the said combination of persons for said
purpose, and of each of the said combinations, and the said agents
make monthly reports of their doings in pushing and enforcing and
causing to be pushed and enforced said boycotts, and publish the
same monthly in said paper known as The American Federationist, of
which he is the editor, appointed by the said members, which said
paper, in connection with said statement or summary, is declared to
be the authorized and official mouthpiece of each of said
subcombinations, including the said United Hatters of North
America. Said statement is declared by the defendants to be a
faithful record of the doings of said agents, and each of said
statements, made during the period covered by the acts of the
defendants against the plaintiffs herein stated, contains the
announcement to the members of said combination and the public that
all boycotts declared by them are being by them and their agents
pushed, enforced and observed."

															"15. Said combination of persons collectively known as The
American Federation of Labor, of which the defendants are members,
was by the defendants and their other members formed for the
purpose among others, of facilitating the declaration and
successful maintenance of boycotts, by and for said combination of
persons known as The United Hatters of North America, acting
through the said Federation of Labor and its other component parts
or members, and it and its component parts have frequently declared
boycotts, at the request of the defendants, against the business
and product of various hat manufacturers, and have vigorously
prosecuted the same by and through the powerful machinery at their
command as aforesaid, in carrying out their general scheme herein
stated, to the great damage and loss of business of said
manufacturers, and particularly during the years of 1901 and 1902,
they declared, prosecuted and waged, at the request of the
defendants and their agents, a boycott against the hats made by and
the business of H. H. Roelofs Co., of Philadelphia, Pa. until, by
causing them great damage and loss of business, they coerced them
into yielding to the demand of the defendants and their agents,
that the said factory of said Roelofs & Co. be unionized, as
termed by the defendants, and into agreeing to employ, and
employing exclusively, members of their said combination in the
making and finishing departments of said factory, and in large
measure surrendering to the defendants and their agents the control
of said factory and business, all of which was well known to the
plaintiffs, their customers, wholesale dealers and the public, and
was, by the defendants and their agents, widely proclaimed through
all their agencies above mentioned, in connection with their acts
against the plaintiffs, as hereinafter set forth, for the purpose
of intimidating and coercing said wholesale dealers and their
customers from buying the hats of the plaintiffs, by creating in
their minds the fear that the defendants would invoke and put into
operation against them all said powerful means, measures and
machinery if they should handle the hats of the plaintiffs."

															"16. The defendants, together with the other persons united with
them in said combination, known as The United Hatters of North
America, have been for many years, and now are, engaged in a
combined scheme and effort to force all manufacturers of fur hats
in the United States, including the plaintiffs, against their will
and their previous policy of carrying on their business, to
organize their workmen in the departments of making and finishing,
in each of their factories, into an organization, to be part and
parcel of the said combination known as The United Hatters of North
America, or as the defendants and their confederates term it, to
unionize their shops, with the intent thereby to control the
employment of labor in and the operation of said factories, and to
subject the same to the direction and control of persons, other
than the owners of the same, in a manner extremely onerous and
distasteful to such owners, and to carry out such scheme, effort
and purpose, by restraining and destroying the interstate trade and
commerce of such manufacturers by means of intimidation of and
threats made to such manufacturers and their customers in the
several States, of boycotting them, their product and their
customers, using therefor all the powerful means at their command
as aforesaid, until such time as, from the damage and loss of
business resulting therefrom, the said manufacturers should yield
to the said demand to unionize their factories."

															"17. The defendants and other members of said United Hatters of
North America, acting with them and in pursuance of said general
combined scheme and purpose, and in carrying the same into effect
against said manufacturers, including the plaintiffs, and by use of
the means above stated, and the fear thereof, have, within a very
few years, forced the following named manufacturers of hats in the
United States to yield to their demand, and unionize their
factories, viz.: [here follow 70 names of corporations and
individuals] and until there remained, according to the statements
of the defendants, only twelve hat factories in the United States
which had not submitted to their said demands, and the defendants,
in pursuing their warfare against the plaintiffs, as hereinafter
set forth, and in connection with their said acts against them,
have made public announcement of that fact and of the firms so
coerced by them, in order thereby to increase the effectiveness of
their acts in intimidating said wholesale dealers and their
customers in States other than Connecticut, from buying hats from
plaintiffs, as hereinafter set forth."

															"18. To carry out said scheme and purpose, the defendants have
appointed, and employed and do steadily employ, certain special
agents to act in their behalf, with full and express authority from
them and the other members of said combination, and under explicit
instructions from them, to use every means in their power to compel
all such manufacturers of hats to so unionize their factories, and
each and all of the defendants in this suit did the several acts
hereinafter stated, either by themselves or their agents, by them
thereto fully authorized."

															"19. On or about March 1, 1901, in pursuance of said general
scheme and purpose, the defendants and the other members of said
combination, The United Hatters of North America, through their
agents, the said John A. Moffit, Martin Lawlor, John Phillips,
James P. Maher and Charles J. Barrett, who acted for themselves and
the other defendants, demanded of the plaintiffs that they should
unionize their said factory, in the making and finishing
departments, and also thereby acquire the right to use and use the
said union label, subject to the right of the defendants to recall
the same at pleasure, in all hats made by them, and then notified
the plaintiffs that, if they failed to yield to said demand, the
defendants and all the other members of the said combination known
as The United Hatters of North America, would resort to their said
usual and well known methods to compel them so to do. After several
conferences, and in April, 1901, the plaintiffs replied to the said
demand of the defendants as follows:"

															" Firmly believing that we are acting for the best interests of
our firm, for the best interests of those whom we employ, and for
the best interests of Danbury, by operating an independent or open
factory, we hereby notify you that we decline to have our shop
unionized, and if attacked, shall use all lawful means to protect
our business interests."

															"The plaintiffs were then employing many union and non-union
men, and their said factory was running smoothly and satisfactorily
both to the plaintiffs and their employes. The defendants, their
confederates and agents, deferred the execution of their said
threat against the plaintiffs until the conclusion of their attack
made in pursuance of the same general scheme and purpose against H.
H. Roelofs & Co., which resulted in the surrender of Roelofs
& Co., on July 15, 1902, except that the defendants, their
confederates and agents, in November, 1901, caused the said
American Federation of Labor to declare a boycott against any
dealer or dealers who should handle the products of the
plaintiffs."

															"20. On or about July 25, 1902, the defendants individually and
collectively, and as members of said combinations and associations,
and with other persons whose names are unknown to the plaintiffs,
associated with them, in pursuance of the general scheme and
purpose aforesaid, to force all manufacturers of fur hats, and
particularly the plaintiffs, to so unionize their factories,
wantonly, wrongfully, maliciously, unlawfully and in violation of
the provisions of the 'Act of Congress, approved July 2, 1890,' and
entitled 'An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against Unlawful
Restraints and Monopolies,' and with intent to injure the property
and business of the plaintiffs by means of acts done which are
forbidden and declared to be unlawful, by said act of Congress,
entered into a combination and conspiracy to restrain the
plaintiffs and their customers in States other than Connecticut, in
carrying on said trade and commerce among the several States and to
wholly prevent them from engaging in and carrying on said trade and
commerce between them and to prevent the plaintiffs from selling
their hats to wholesale dealers and purchasers in said States other
than Connecticut, and to prevent said dealers and customers in said
other States from buying the same, and to prevent the plaintiffs
from obtaining orders for their hats from such customers, and
filling the same, and shipping said hats to said customers in said
States as aforesaid, and thereby injure the plaintiffs in their
property and business and to render unsalable the product and
output of their said factory, so the subject of interstate
commerce, in whosoever's hands the same might be or come, through
said interstate trade and commerce, and to employ as means to carry
out said combination and conspiracy and the purposes thereof, and
accomplish the same, the following measures and acts, viz: "

															"To cause, by means of threats and coercion, and without warning
or information to the plaintiffs, the concerted and simultaneous
withdrawal of all the makers and finishers of hats then working for
them who were not members of their said combination, The United
Hatters of North America, as well as those who were such members,
and thereby cripple the operation of the plaintiffs' factory, and
prevent the plaintiffs from filling a large number of orders then
on hand, from such wholesale dealers in States other than
Connecticut, which they had engaged to fill and were then in the
act of filling, as was well known to the defendants; in connection
therewith to declare a boycott against all hats made for sale and
sold and delivered, or to be sold or delivered, by the plaintiffs
to said wholesale dealers in States other than Connecticut, and to
actively boycott the same and the business of those who should deal
in them, and thereby prevent the sale of the same by those in whose
hands they might be or come through said interstate trade in said
several States; to procure and cause others of said combinations
united with them in said American Federation of Labor, in like
manner to declare a boycott against and to actively boycott the
same and the business of such wholesale dealers as should buy or
sell them, and of those who should purchase them from such
wholesale dealers; to intimidate such wholesale dealers from
purchasing or dealing in the hats of the plaintiff by informing
them that the American Federation of Labor had declared a boycott
against the product of the plaintiffs and against any dealer who
should handle it, and that the same was to be actively pressed
against them, and by distributing circulars containing notices that
such dealers and their customers were to be boycotted; to threaten
with a boycott those customers who should buy any goods whatever,
even though union made, of such boycotted dealers, and at the same
time to notify such wholesale dealers that they were at liberty to
deal in the hats of any other non-union manufacturer of similar
quality to those made by the plaintiffs, but must not deal in the
hats made by the plaintiffs under threats of such boycotting; to
falsely represent to said wholesale dealers and their customers
that the plaintiffs had discriminated against the union men in
their employ, had thrown them out of employment because they
refused to give up their union cards and teach boys, who were
intended to take their places after seven months' instruction, and
had driven their employes to extreme measures"

															"by their persistent, unfair and un-American policy of
antagonizing union labor, forcing wages to a starvation scale, and
given boys and cheap, unskilled foreign labor preference over
experienced and capable union workmen,"

															"in order to intimidate said dealers from purchasing said hats
by reason of the prejudice thereby created against the plaintiffs
and the hats made by them among those who might otherwise purchase
them; to use the said union label of said The United Hatters of
North America as an instrument to aid them in carrying out said
conspiracy and combination against the plaintiffs' and their
customers' interstate trade aforesaid, and in connection with the
boycotting above-mentioned, for the purpose of describing and
identifying the hats of the plaintiffs, and singling them out to be
so boycotted; to employ a large number of agents to visit said
wholesale dealers and their customers, at their several places of
business, and threaten them with loss of business if they should
buy or handle the hats of the plaintiffs, and thereby prevent them
from buying said hats, and, in connection therewith, to cause said
dealers to be waited upon by committees representing large
combinations of persons in their several localities to make similar
threats to them; to use the daily press in the localities where
such wholesale dealers reside and do business to announce and
advertise the said boycotts against the hats of the plaintiffs and
said wholesale dealers, and thereby make the same more effective
and impressive, and to use the columns of their said paper, The
Journal of the United Hatters of North America, for that purpose,
and to describe the acts of their said agents in prosecuting the
same."

															"21. Afterwards, to-wit, on July 25, 1902, and on divers days
since hitherto, the defendants, in pursuance of said combination
and conspiracy, and to carry the same into effect, did cause the
concerted and simultaneous withdrawal, by means of threats and
coercion made by them, and without previous warning or information
thereof to the plaintiffs, of all but ten of the nonunion makers
and finishers of hats then working for them, as well as all of
their union makers and finishers, leaving large numbers of hats in
an unfinished and perishable condition, with intent to cripple, and
did thereby cripple, the operation of the plaintiffs' factory until
the latter part of October, 1902, and thereby prevented the
plaintiffs from filling a large number of orders then on hand from
such wholesale dealers in States other than Connecticut, which they
had engaged to fill and were then in the act of filling, as well
known to the defendants, and thereby caused the loss to the
plaintiffs of many orders from said wholesale dealers in other
States, and greatly hindered and delayed them in filling such
orders, and falsely representing to said wholesale dealers, their
customers, and the public generally in States other than
Connecticut that the plaintiffs had discriminated against the union
men in their employ, and had discharged or thrown out of employment
their union men in August, 1902; that they had driven their
employes to extreme measures by their persistent, unfair and
un-American policy of antagonizing union labor, forcing wages down
to a starvation scale and giving boys and cheap, unskilled foreign
labor preference over experienced and capable workmen; that skilled
hatters had been discharged from said factory for no other cause
than their devotion and adherence to the principles of organized
labor in refusing to give up their union cards, and to teach the
trade to boys who were intended to take the place of union workmen
after seven months' instruction, and that, unable to submit longer
to a system of petty tyrannies that might be tolerated in Siberia
but could not be borne by independent Americans, the workmen in the
factory inaugurated the strike to compel the firm to recognize
their rights, in order to prejudice, and did thereby prejudice, the
public, against the plaintiffs and their product, and in order to
intimidate, and did thereby intimidate said wholesale dealers and
their customers, in States other than Connecticut, from purchasing
hats from the plaintiffs by reason of the fear of the prejudice
created against said hats, and in connection therewith declared a
boycott "

															brk:

															against all hats made for and so sold and delivered, and to be
so sold and delivered to said wholesale dealers, in States other
than Connecticut, and actively boycotted the same and the business
of those who dealt in them in such other States, and thereby
restrained and prevented the purchase of the same from the
plaintiffs, and the sale of the same by those in whose hands they
were, or might thereafter be, in the course of such interstate
trade, and caused and procured others of said combinations united
with them in the said American Federation of Labor to declare a
boycott against the plaintiffs, their product and against the
business of such wholesale dealers in States other than
Connecticut, as should buy or sell them, and of those who should
purchase from such wholesale dealers any goods whatever, and
further intimidated said wholesale dealers from purchasing or
dealing in hats made by the plaintiffs, as aforesaid, by informing
them that the American Federation of Labor had declared a boycott
against the hats of the plaintiffs and against any dealer who
should handle them, and that said boycott was to be actively
pressed against them, and by sending agents and committees from
various of said labor organizations, to threaten said wholesale
dealers and their customers with a boycott from them if they
purchased or handled the goods of plaintiffs, and by distributing
in San Francisco, California, and other places, circulars
containing notices that such dealers, and their customers were to
be boycotted, and threatened with a boycott, and did actively
boycott the customers who did or should buy any goods whatever,
even though union made, of such wholesale dealers so boycotted, and
used the daily press to advertise and announce said boycott and the
measures taken in pursuance thereof by said labor organizations,
particularly The San Francisco Bulletin, in its issues of July 2
and July 4, 1903, and a daily paper published in Richmond,
Virginia, on December 10, 1902, and notified such wholesale dealers
in States other than Connecticut that they were at liberty to deal
in the hats of any other nonunion hat manufacturer of similar
quality to those of the plaintiffs, but they must not deal in hats
made by the plaintiffs, under threats of being boycotted for so
doing, and used the said union label of the United Hatters of North
America as an instrument to aid them in carrying out said
combination and conspiracy against the plaintiffs' and their
customers' interstate trade, as aforesaid, and in connection with
such boycotting by using the same and its absence from the hats of
the plaintiffs, as an insignia or device to indicate to the
purchaser that the hats of the plaintiffs were to be boycotted, and
to point them out for that purpose, and employed a large number of
agents to visit said wholesale dealers and their customers at their
several places of business in each of said States, particularly
Philadelphia and other places in the State of Pennsylvania, in
Baltimore in the State of Maryland, in Richmond and other places in
the State of Virginia, and in San Francisco and other place in the
State of California, to intimidate and threaten them, if they
should continue to deal in or handle the hats of the plaintiffs,
and among many other instances of like kind, the said William C.
Hennelly and Daniel P. Kelly, in behalf of all said defendants, and
acting for them, demanded the firm of Triest & Co., wholesale
dealers in hats, doing business in said San Francisco, that they
should agree not to buy or deal in the hats made by the plaintiffs,
under threats made by them to said firm of boycotting their
business and that of their customers, and, upon their refusing to
comply with such demand and yield to such threats, the defendants
by their aid agents caused announcement to be made in the
newspapers of said city that said Triest & Co. were to be
boycotted therefor, and that the labor council of San Francisco
would be addressed by them for that purpose, and that they had
procured a boycott to be declared by said labor council, and
thereupon the defendants, through their said agents, Hennelly and
Kelly, printed, published, issued and distributed to the retail
dealers in hat, in several States upon the Pacific coast, the
following circular, to-wit:

															" San Francisco Labor Council" " Affiliated with the American Federation of Labor" " Secretary's Office, 927 Market Street" " Rooms 405, 406, 407 Emma Spreckel's Building" " Meets every Friday, at 1159 Mission St." "Telephone South 447"

															Address all communications to 927 Market Street

															" San Francisco, July 3, 1903"

															"To whom it may concern:"

															" At a special meeting of the San Francisco Labor Council held
on the above date, the hat jobbing concern known as Triest &
Co., 116 Sansome St., San Francisco, was declared unfair for
persistently patronizing the unfair hat manufacturing concern of D.
E. Loewe & Co., Danbury, Connecticut, where the union hatters
have been on strike, for union conditions, since August 20, 1902.
Triest & Co. will be retained on the unfair list as long as
they handle the product of this unfair hat manufacturing concern.
Union men do not usually patronize retail stores who buy from
unfair jobbing houses or manufacturers. Under these circumstances,
all friends of organized labor, and those desiring the patronage of
organized workers, will not buy goods from Triest & Co., 116
Sansome St., San Francisco."

															" Yours respectfully,"

															" G. B. BENHAM,"

															" President S.F. Labor Council "

															"T. E. ZANT"

															" Secretary S.F. Labor Council. [L.S.]"

															"W. C. HENNELLY,"

															"D. F. KELLY"

															" Representing United Hatters of North America "

															" Also the following, to-wit:"

															" San Francisco Labor Council" " Affiliated with American Federation of Labor," " Secretary's Office, 927 Market Street" " Rooms 405, 406, 407 Emma Spreckel's Building" " Meets every Friday at 1159 Mission St." " Telephone South 447" " Address all communications to 927 Market Street" " San Francisco, July 14, 1903"

															"Messrs. _____ _____."

															" Gentlemen: We beg leave to call your attention to the
following products which are on the unfair list of the American
Federation of Labor."

															" We do this in order that you refrain from handling these
goods, as the patronage of the firms named below is taken by the
organized worker as an evidence of a desire to patronize those who
are opposed to the interest of organized labor. The declaration of
unfairness regarding the firms mentioned is fully sanctioned, and
will be supported to the fullest degree by the San Francisco Labor
Council."

															" Trusting that you will be able to avoid the handling of these
goods in the future, we are,"

															" Yours respectfully,"

															" G. B. BENHAM, President."

															"T. E. ZANT, Secretary [L.S.]"

															" UnfairList." " Loewe & Co., Danbury, Conn. and Triest & Co., 116
Sansome St., San Francisco, Hat Manufacturer;"

															" Cluett, Peabody & Co., Shirts and Collars, Troy, New York,
and 562 Mission St., San Francisco, Cal.;"

															" United Shirt and Collar Co., Troy, New York, and 25 Sansome
St., San Francisco, Cal.;"

															" Van Zandt, Jacob & Co., Troy, New York; Greenbaum, Weil
& Michaels, Selling Agent, 27 Sansome St., San Francisco,
Cal."

															"and caused said circulars to be mailed to and personally
delivered to the retail dealer in hats, and the other customers of
said Triest & Co., upon the Pacific coast, and to many others,
thereby causing the loss of many orders and customers to said
Triest & Co., and to the plaintiffs, for the purpose of
intimidating and coercing said Triest & Co. not to deal with
the plaintiff, and thereby cause the loss of many orders and
customers to said Triest & Co., and to the plaintiffs."

															"22. By means of each and all of said acts done by the
defendants in pursuance of said combination and conspiracy, they
have greatly restrained, diminished, and, in many places destroyed
the trade and commerce of the plaintiffs with said wholesale
dealer, in said States other than Connecticut, by the loss of many
orders and customers directly resulting therefrom, and the
plaintiff have been injured in their business and property by
reason of said combination and conspiracy, and the act of the
defendants done in pursuance thereof, and to carry the same into
effect, which are declared to be unlawful by said act of Congress,
to the amount of eighty thousand ($80,000) dollars, to recover
threefold which damages, under section 7 of said act this suit is
brought."