U.S. Supreme Court Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138 (1983) Connick v. Myers No. 81-1251 Argued November 8,
1982 Decided April 20,
1983 461
U.S. 138 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Respondent was employed as an Assistant District Attorney in New
Orleans with the responsibility of trying criminal cases. When
petitioner District Attorney proposed to transfer respondent to
prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court, she
strongly opposed the transfer, expressing her view to several of
her supervisors, including petitioner. Shortly thereafter, she
prepared a questionnaire that she distributed to the other
Assistant District Attorneys in the office concerning office
transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee,
the level ,of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt
pressured to work in political campaigns. Petitioner then informed
respondent that she was being terminated for refusal to accept the
transfer, and also told her that her distribution of the
questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination. Respondent
filed suit in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976
ed., Supp. V), alleging that she was wrongfully discharged because
she had exercised her constitutionally protected right of free
speech. The District Court agreed, ordered her reinstated, and
awarded backpay, damages, and attorney's fees. Finding that the
questionnaire, not the refusal to accept the transfer, was the real
reason for respondent's termination, the court held that the
questionnaire involved matters of public concern and that the State
had not "clearly demonstrated" that the questionnaire interfered
with the operation of the District Attorney's office. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.

															Held: Respondent's discharge did not offend the First Amendment.
Pp. 461 U. S.
142 -154.

															(a) In determining a public employee's rights of free speech,
the problem is to arrive

															"at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.
S. 563 , 391 U. S. 568 .
P. 461 U. S.
142 .

															(b) When a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal
court is not Page 461 U. S. 139 the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction
to the employee's behavior. Here, except for the question in
respondent's questionnaire regarding pressure upon employees to
work in political campaigns, the questions posed do not fall under
the rubric of matters of "public concern." Pp. 461 U. S.
143 -149.

															(c) The District Court erred in imposing an unduly onerous
burden on the State to justify respondent's discharge by requiring
it to "clearly demonstrate" that the speech involved "substantially
interfered" with the operation of the office. The State's burden in
justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature
of the employee's expression. Pp. 461 U. S.
149 -150.

															(d) The limited First Amendment interest involved here did not
require petitioner to tolerate action that he reasonably believed
would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy the
close working relationships within the office. The question on the
questionnaire regarding the level of confidence in supervisors was
a statement that carried the clear potential for undermining office
relations. Also, the fact that respondent exercised her rights to
speech at the office supports petitioner's fears that the function
of his office was endangered. And the fact that the questionnaire
emerged immediately after a dispute between respondent and
petitioner and his deputies requires that additional weight be
given to petitioner's view that respondent threatened his authority
to run the office. Pp. 461 U. S.
150 -154.

															654 F.2d 719, reversed.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J.
filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and
STEVENS JJ., joined, post, p. 461 U. S.
156 . Page 461 U. S. 140 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.
S. 563 (1968), we stated that a public employee does not
relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public
interest by virtue of government employment. We also recognized
that the State's interests as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees "differ significantly from those it possesses in
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in
general." Id. at 391 U. S. 568 .
The problem, we thought, was arriving

															"at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees." Ibid. We return to this problem today and consider
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the discharge
of a state employee for circulating a questionnaire concerning
internal office affairs. I The respondent, Sheila Myers, was employed as an Assistant
District Attorney in New Orleans for five and a half years. She
served at the pleasure of petitioner Harry Connick, the District
Attorney for Orleans Parish. During this period, Myers competently
performed her responsibilities of trying criminal cases.

															In the early part of October, 1980, Myers was informed that she
would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different section of
the criminal court. Myers was strongly opposed to the proposed
transfer [ Footnote 1 ] and
expressed her view to several of her supervisors, including
Connick. Despite her objections, on October 6, Myers was notified
that she was being transferred. Page 461 U. S. 141 Myers again spoke with Dennis Waldron, one of the First
Assistant District Attorneys, expressing her reluctance to accept
the transfer. A number of other office matters were discussed, and
Myers later testified that, in response to Waldron's suggestion
that her concerns were not shared by others in the office, she
informed him that she would do some research on the matter.

															That night, Myers prepared a questionnaire soliciting the views
of her fellow staff members concerning office transfer policy,
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of
confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to
work in political campaigns. [ Footnote 2 ] Early the following morning, Myers typed and
copied the questionnaire. She also met with Connick, who urged her
to accept the transfer. She said she would "consider" it. Connick
then left the office. Myers then distributed the questionnaire to
15 Assistant District Attorneys. Shortly after noon, Dennis Waldron
learned that Myers was distributing the survey. He immediately
phoned Connick and informed him that Myers was creating a
"mini-insurrection" within the office. Connick returned to the
office and told Myers that she was being terminated because of her
refusal to accept the transfer. She was also told that her
distribution of the questionnaire was considered an act of
insubordination. Connick particularly objected to the question
which inquired whether employees "had confidence in and would rely
on the word" of various superiors in the office, and to a question
concerning pressure to work in political campaigns which he felt
would be damaging if discovered by the press.

															Myers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. V),
contending that her employment was wrongfully terminated because
she had exercised her constitutionally protected right of free
speech. The District Court agreed, ordered Myers reinstated, and
awarded backpay, damages, and Page 461 U. S. 142 attorney's fees. 507 F.
Supp. 752 (ED La.1981). [ Footnote 3 ] The District Court found that, although
Connick informed Myers that she was being fired because of her
refusal to accept a transfer, the facts showed that the
questionnaire was the real reason for her termination. The court
then proceeded to hold that Myers' questionnaire involved matters
of public concern, and that the State had not "clearly
demonstrated" that the survey "substantially interfered" with the
operations of the District Attorney's office.

															Connick appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which affirmed on the basis of the District Court's
opinion. 654 F.2d 719 (1981). Connick then sought review in this
Court by way of certiorari, which we granted. 455 U.S. 999
(1982). II For at least 15 years, it has been settled that a State cannot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes the
employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of
expression. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.
S. 589 , 385 U. S.
605 -606 (1967); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.
S. 593 , 408 U. S. 597 (1972); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.
S. 507 , 445 U. S.
515 -516 (1980). Our task, as we defined it in Pickering, is to seek

															"a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees."

															391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 568 .
The District Court, and thus the Court of Appeals as well,
misapplied our decision in Pickering, and consequently, in
our view, erred in striking the balance for respondent. Page 461 U. S. 143 A The District Court got off on the wrong foot in this case by
initially finding that,

															"[t]aken as a whole, the issues presented in the questionnaire
relate to the effective functioning of the District Attorney's
Office and are matters of public importance and concern."

															507 F. Supp. at 758. Connick contends at the outset that no
balancing of interests is required in this case, because Myers'
questionnaire concerned only internal office matters, and that such
speech is not upon a matter of "public concern," as the term was
used in Pickering. Although we do not agree that Myers'
communication in this case was wholly without First Amendment
protection, there is much force to Connick's submission. The
repeated emphasis in Pickering on the right of a public
employee "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern," was not accidental. This language, reiterated in all of Pickering's progeny, [ Footnote 4 ] reflects both the historical evolvement of the
rights of public employees and the common-sense realization that
government offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter. [ Footnote 5 ]

															For most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a
public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon
the terms of employment -- including those which restricted the
exercise of constitutional rights. The classic formulation of this
position was that of Justice Holmes, who, when sitting on the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, observed: "[A policeman]
may have a constitutional Page 461 U. S. 144 right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass.
216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). For many years, Holmes' epigram
expressed this Court's law. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Los Angeles Bd. of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716 (1951); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75 (1947); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396 (1930); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371 (1882).

															The Court cast new light on the matter in a series of cases
arising from the widespread efforts in the 1950's and early 1960's
to require public employees, particularly teachers, to swear oaths
of loyalty to the State and reveal the groups with which they
associated. In Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U.
S. 183 (1952), the Court held that a State could not
require its employees to establish their loyalty by extracting an
oath denying past affiliation with Communists. In Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 (1961), the Court recognized that the government could not deny
employment because of previous membership in a particular party. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.
S. 479 , 364 U. S. 490 (1960); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.
S. 488 (1961); Cramp v. Board of Public
Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (1961). By the time Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.
S. 398 (1963), was decided, it was already

															"too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at 374 U. S. 404 .
It was therefore no surprise when, in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, supra, the Court invalidated New York statutes
barring employment on the basis of membership in "subversive"
organizations, observing that the theory that public employment
which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, had been uniformly rejected. Id. at 385 U. S.
605 -606.

															In all of these cases, the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions
sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in
public Page 461 U. S. 145 affairs. The issue was whether government employees could be
prevented or "chilled" by the fear of discharge from joining
political parties and other associations that certain public
officials might find "subversive." The explanation for the
Constitution's special concern with threats to the right of
citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. The
First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 , 354 U. S. 484 (1957); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 , 376 U. S. 269 (1964). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 , 379 U. S. 74 -75
(1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that
speech on public issues occupies the " highest rung of the
heirarchy of First Amendment values,'" and is entitled to special
protection. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.
S. 886 , 458 U. S. 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 , 447 U. S. 467 (1980). Pickering v. Board of Education, supra, followed from
this understanding of the First Amendment. In Pickering, the Court held impermissible under the First Amendment the
dismissal of a high school teacher for openly criticizing the Board
of Education on its allocation of school funds between athletics
and education and its methods of informing taxpayers about the need
for additional revenue. Pickering's subject was "a matter
of legitimate public concern" upon which "free and open debate is
vital to informed decisionmaking by the electorate." 391 U.S. at 391 U. S.
571 -572.

															Our cases following Pickering also involved
safeguarding speech on matters of public concern. The controversy
in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972), arose from the failure to rehire a teacher in the state
college system who had testified before committees of the Texas
Legislature and had become involved in public disagreement over
whether the college should be elevated to 4-year status -- a change
opposed by the Regents. In Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed.
v. Page 461 U. S. 146 Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), a public school teacher was not rehired because, allegedly,
he had relayed to a radio .station the substance of a memorandum
relating to teacher dress and appearance that the school principal
had circulated to various teachers. The memorandum was apparently
prompted by the view of some in the administration that there was a
relationship between teacher appearance and public support for bond
issues, and indeed, the radio station promptly announced the
adoption of the dress code as a news item. Most recently, in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U. S. 410 (1979), we held that First Amendment protection applies when a
public employee arranges to communicate privately with his
employer, rather than to express his views publicly. Although the
subject matter of Mrs. Givhan's statements were not the issue
before the Court, it is clear that her statements concerning the
School District's allegedly racially discriminatory policies
involved a matter of public concern. Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to
conclude that, if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,
it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge. [ Footnote 6 ] When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name
of the First Amendment. Perhaps the government employer's dismissal
of the worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals from
government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable
statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if
the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or
unreasonable. Page 461 U. S. 147 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.
S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, supra; Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U. S. 341 , 426 U. S.
349 -350 (1976).

															We do not suggest, however, that Myers' speech, even if not
touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the
protection of the First Amendment.

															"[T]he First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only
to the extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great secular
causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.'" Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U.
S. 217 , 389 U. S. 223 (1967), quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.
S. 516 , 323 U. S. 531 (1945). We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls
into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which
carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State
can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its
jurisdiction. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942); Roth v. United States, supra; New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982). For example, an employee's false criticism of his employer
on grounds not of public concern may be cause for his discharge,
but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action
accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street. We
hold only that, when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly
in reaction to the employee's behavior. Cf. Bishop v. Wood,
supra, at 426 U. S.
349 -350. Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens
are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the
government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee
grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not
work for the State.

															Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context Page 461 U. S. 148 of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. [ Footnote 7 ] In this case, with but one
exception, the questions posed by Myers to her coworkers do not
fall under the rubric of matters of "public concern." We view the
questions pertaining to the confidence and trust that Myers'
coworkers possess in various supervisors, the level of office
morale, and the need for a grievance committee as mere extensions
of Myers' dispute over her transfer to another section of the
criminal court. Unlike the dissent, post at 461 U. S. 163 ,
we do not believe these questions are of public import in
evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected
official. Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District
Attorney's Office was not discharging its governmental
responsibilities in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases. Nor did Myers seek to bring to light actual or potential
wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of Connick and
others. Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would
convey no information at all other than the fact that a single
employee is upset with the status quo. While discipline
and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient
performance of its duties, the focus of Myers' questions is not to
evaluate the performance of the office, but rather to gather
ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors.
These questions reflect one employee's dissatisfaction with a
transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause
celebre. [ Footnote 8 ] Page 461 U. S. 149 To presume that all matters which transpire within a government
office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark
-- and certainly every criticism directed at a public official --
would plant the seed of a constitutional case. While, as a matter
of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to
constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First
Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office
affairs.

															One question in Myers' questionnaire, however, does touch upon a
matter of public concern. Question 11 inquires if assistant
district attorneys "ever feel pressured to work in political
campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates." We have
recently noted that official pressure upon employees to work for
political candidates not of the worker's own choice constitutes a
coercion of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional
rights. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S.
515 -516; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.
S. 347 (1976). In addition, there is a demonstrated
interest in this country that government service should depend upon
meritorious performance, rather than political service. CSC v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75 (1947). Given this history, we believe it apparent
that the issue of whether assistant district attorneys are
pressured to work in political campaigns is a matter of interest to
the community upon which it is essential that public employees be
able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal. B Because one of the questions in Myers' survey touched upon a
matter of public concern and contributed to her discharge, we must
determine whether Connick was justified in discharging Myers. Here
the District Court again erred in imposing an unduly onerous burden
on the State to justify Page 461 U. S. 150 Myers' discharge. The District Court viewed the issue of whether
Myers' speech was upon a matter of "public concern" as a threshold
inquiry, after which it became the government's burden to "clearly
demonstrate" that the speech involved "substantially interfered"
with official responsibilities. Yet Pickering unmistakably
states, and respondent agrees, [ Footnote 9 ] that the State's burden in justifying a
particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the
employee's expression. Although such particularized balancing is
difficult, the courts must reach the most appropriate possible
balance of the competing interests. [ Footnote 10 ] C The Pickering balance requires full consideration of
the government's interest in the effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public. One hundred
years ago, the Court noted the government's legitimate purpose
in

															"promot[ing] Page 461 U. S. 151 efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,
and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public
service." Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 106 U. S. 373 .
As JUSTICE POWELL explained in his separate opinion in Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 , 416 U. S. 168 (1974):

															"To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees
whose conduct hinders efficient operation, and to do so with
dispatch. Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise
unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect discipline and morale
in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the
efficiency of an office or agency."

															We agree with the District Court that there is no demonstration
here that the questionnaire impeded Myers' ability to perform her
responsibilities. The District Court was also correct to recognize
that

															"it is important to the efficient and successful operation of
the District Attorney's office for Assistants to maintain close
working relationships with their superiors."

															507 F. Supp. at 759. Connick's judgment, and apparently also
that of his first assistant Dennis Waldron, who characterized
Myers' actions as causing a "mini-insurrection," was that Myers'
questionnaire was an act of insubordination which interfered with
working relationships. [ Footnote
11 ] When close working relationships are essential to
fulfilling public Page 461 U. S. 152 responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's
judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity
for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the
disruption of the office and the destruction of working
relationships is manifest before taking action. [ Footnote 12 ] We caution that a stronger
showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more
substantially involved matters of public concern.

															The District Court rejected Connick's position because,

															"[u]nlike a statement of fact which might be deemed critical of
one's superiors, [Myers'] questionnaire was not a statement of
fact, but the presentation and solicitation of ideas and
opinions,"

															which are entitled to greater constitutional protection because,
" under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false
idea.'" Ibid. This approach, while perhaps relevant in
weighing the value of Myers' speech, bears no logical relationship
to the issue of whether the questionnaire undermined office
relationships. Questions, no less than forcefully stated opinions
and facts, carry messages and it requires no unusual insight to
conclude that the purpose, if not the likely result, of the
questionnaire is to seek to precipitate a vote of no confidence in
Connick and his supervisors. Thus, Question 10, which asked whether
or not the Assistants had confidence in and relied on the word of
five named supervisors, is a statement that carries the clear
potential for undermining office relations. Also relevant is the manner, time, and place in which the
questionnaire was distributed. As noted in Givhan v. Western
Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. at 439 U. S. 415 ,
n. 4:

															"Private expression . . . may in some situations bring
additional Page 461 U. S. 153 factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government
employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing
agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the
content of the employee's message, but also by the manner, time,
and place in which it is delivered."

															Here the questionnaire was prepared and distributed at the
office; the manner of distribution required not only Myers to leave
her work, but others to do the same in order that the questionnaire
be completed. [ Footnote 13 ]
Although some latitude in when official work is performed is to be
allowed when professional employees are involved, and Myers did not
violate announced office policy, [ Footnote 14 ] the fact that Myers, unlike Pickering,
exercised her rights to speech at the office supports Connick's
fears that the functioning of his office was endangered.

															Finally, the context in which the dispute arose is also
significant. This is not a case where an employee, out of purely
academic interest, circulated a questionnaire so as to obtain
useful research. Myers acknowledges that it is no coincidence that
the questionnaire followed upon the heels of the transfer notice.
When employee speech concerning office policy arises from an
employment dispute concerning the very application of that policy
to the speaker, additional weight must be given to the supervisor's
view that the employee has threatened the authority of the employer
to run the office. Although we accept the District Court's factual
finding that Myers' reluctance to accede to the transfer order was
not a sufficient cause in itself for her dismissal, and thus does
not constitute a sufficient defense under Mt.
Healthy Page 461 U. S. 154 City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.
S. 274 (1977), this does not render irrelevant the fact
that the questionnaire emerged after a persistent dispute between
Myers and Connick and his deputies over office transfer policy. III Myers' questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in
only a most limited sense; her survey, in our view, is most
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning
internal office policy. The limited First Amendment interest
involved here does not require that Connick tolerate action which
he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his
authority, and destroy close working relationships. Myers'
discharge therefore did not offend the First Amendment. We
reiterate, however, the caveat we expressed in Pickering, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S.
569 :

															"Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which
critical statements by . . . public employees may be thought by
their superiors . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not
deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a
general standard against which all such statements may be
judged."

															Our holding today is grounded in our longstanding recognition
that the First Amendment's primary aim is the full protection of
speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical
realities involved in the administration of a government office.
Although today the balance is struck for the government, this is no
defeat for the First Amendment. For it would indeed be a Pyrrhic
victory for the great principles of free expression if the
Amendment's safeguarding of a public employee's right, as a
citizen, to participate in discussions concerning public affairs
were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee
grievance that we see presented here. The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is Reversed. Page 461 U. S. 155 | 461
U.S. 138 app| APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT Questionnaire distributed by respondent on October 7,
1980. PLAINTIFF's EXHIBIT 2, App.191 "PLEASE TAKE THE FEW MINUTES IT WILL REQUIRE TO FILL THIS OUT.
YOU CAN FREELY EXPRESS YOUR OPINION WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED."

" ******************************************************" "1. How long have you been in the Office?"

															"2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?"

															"3. Were the transfers as they effected [ sic ] you
discussed with you by any superior prior to the notice of them
being posted?"

															"4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have
been?"

															"5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding
transfers has been fair?"

															"6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the
office?"

															"7. If so, how do you think it effects [ sic ] overall
working performance of A.D.A. personnel?"

															"8. If so, how do you think it effects [ sic ] office
morale?"

															"9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and
developments through rumor?"

															"10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word
of:"

															"Bridget Bane"

															"Fred Harper"

															"Lindsay Larson"

															"Joe Meyer"

															"Dennis Waldron"

															"11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns
on behalf of office supported candidates?"

															"12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile
addition to the office structure? " Page 461 U. S. 156 "14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you
have."

															"THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY."

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Myers' opposition was at least partially attributable to her
concern that a conflict of interest would have been created by the
transfer because of her participation in a counseling program for
convicted defendants released on probation in the section of the
criminal court to which she was to be assigned.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The questionnaire is reproduced as an 461
U.S. 138 app|>Appendix to this opinion.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Petitioner has also objected to the assessment of damages as
being in violation of the Eleventh Amendment and to the award of
attorney's fees. Because of our disposition of the case, we do not
reach these questions.

															[ Footnote 4 ] See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.
S. 593 , 408 U. S. 598 (1972); Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 , 429 U. S. 284 (1977); Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District, 439 U. S. 410 , 439 U. S. 414 (1979).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The question of whether expression is of a kind that is of
legitimate concern to the public is also the standard in
determining whether a common law action for invasion of privacy is
present. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.
S. 469 (1975) (action for invasion of privacy cannot be
maintained when the subject matter of the publicity is matter of
public record); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.
S. 374 , 385 U. S.
387 -388 (1967).

															[ Footnote 6 ] See Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (CA7 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Schmidt v. Fremont County
School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 984 (CA10 1977).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law,
not fact. See n 10, infra. [ Footnote 8 ]

															This is not a case like Givhan, where an employee
speaks out as a citizen on a matter of general concern, not tied to
a personal employment dispute, but arranges to do so privately.
Mrs. Givhan's right to protest racial discrimination -- a matter
inherently of public concern -- is not forfeited by her choice of a
private forum. 439 U.S. at 439 U. S. 415 -416. Here, however, a questionnaire not
otherwise of public concern does not attain that status because its
subject matter could, in different circumstances, have been the
topic of a communication to the public that might be of general
interest. The dissent's analysis of whether discussions of office
morale and discipline could be matters of public concern is beside
the point -- it does not answer whether this questionnaire is such
speech.

															[ Footnote 9 ] See Brief for Respondent 9 ("These factors, including
the degree of the 'importance' of plaintiff's speech, were proper
considerations to be weighed in the Pickering balance");
Tr. of Oral Arg. 30 (counsel for respondent) ("I certainly would
not disagree that the content of the questionnaire, whether it
affects a matter of great public concern or only a very narrow
internal matter, is a relevant circumstance to be weighed in the Pickering analysis").

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															"The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority to
determine the meaning and application of those words of that
instrument which require interpretation to resolve judicial issues.
With that responsibility, we are compelled to examine for ourselves
the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they
[are] made to see whether or not they . . . are of a character
which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect." Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 , 328 U. S. 335 (1946) (footnote omitted). Because of this obligation, we cannot
"avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts
of the case." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.
S. 184 , 378 U. S. 190 (1964) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). See Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 , 372 U. S. 235 (1963); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.
S. 254 , 376 U. S. 285 (1964); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.
S. 886 , 458 U. S.
915 -916, n. 50 (1982).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Waldron testified that from what he had learned of the events on
October 7, Myers

															"was trying to stir up other people not to accept the changes
[transfers] that had been made on the memorandum and that were to
be implemented."

															App. 167. In his view, the questionnaire was a "final act of
defiance" and that, as a result of Myers' action, "there were going
to be some severe problems about the changes." Ibid. Connick testified that he reached a similar conclusion after
conducting his own investigation.

															"After I satisfied myself that not only wasn't she accepting the
transfer, but that she was affirmatively opposing it and disrupting
the routine of the office by this questionnaire. I called her in .
. . [and dismissed her]." Id. at 130.

															[ Footnote 12 ] Cf. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators'
Assn., 460 U. S. 37 , 460 U. S. 52 , n.
12 (1983) (proof of future disruption not necessary to justify
denial of access to nonpublic forum on grounds that the proposed
use may disrupt the property's intended function); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976) (same).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The record indicates that some, though not all, of the copies of
the questionnaire were distributed during lunch. Employee speech
which transpires entirely on the employee's own time, and in
nonwork areas of the office, bring different factors into the Pickering calculus, and might lead to a different
conclusion. Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.
S. 322 (1974).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															The violation of such a rule would strengthen Connick's
position. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. at 429 U. S.
284 .

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN,
and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

															Sheila Myers was discharged for circulating a questionnaire to
her fellow Assistant District Attorneys seeking information about
the effect of petitioner's personnel policies on employee morale
and the overall work performance of the District Attorney's Office.
The Court concludes that her dismissal does not violate the First
Amendment, primarily because the questionnaire addresses matters
that, in the Court's view, are not of public concern. It is
hornbook law, however, that speech about "the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated" is an essential part
of the communications necessary for self-governance the protection
of which was a central purpose of the First Amendment. Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 , 384 U. S. 218 (1966). Because the questionnaire addressed such matters and its
distribution did not adversely affect the operations of the
District Attorney's Office or interfere with Myers' working
relationship with her fellow employees, I dissent. I The Court correctly reaffirms the long-established principle
that the government may not constitutionally compel persons to
relinquish their First Amendment rights as a condition of public
employment. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 , 385 U. S.
605 -606 (1967); Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U. S. 563 , 391 U. S. 568 (1968); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.
S. 593 , 408 U. S. 597 (1972). Pickering held that the First Amendment protects
the rights of public employees "as citizens to comment on matters
of public interest" in connection with the operation of the
government agencies for which they work. 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 568 .
We recognized, however, that the Page 461 U. S. 157 government has legitimate interests in regulating the speech of
its employees that differ significantly from its interests in
regulating the speech of people generally. Ibid. We
therefore held that the scope of public employees' First Amendment
rights must be determined by balancing

															"the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." Ibid. The balancing test articulated in Pickering comes into
play only when a public employee's speech implicates the
government's interests as an employer. When public employees engage
in expression unrelated to their employment while away from the
workplace, their First Amendment rights are, of course, no
different from those of the general public. See id. at 391 U. S. 574 .
Thus, whether a public employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern is relevant to the constitutional inquiry only when
the statements at issue -- by virtue of their content or the
context in which they were made -- may have an adverse impact on
the government's ability to perform its duties efficiently.
[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court's decision today is flawed in three respects. First,
the Court distorts the balancing analysis required under Pickering by suggesting that one factor, the context in
which a statement is made, is to be weighed twice -- first in Page 461 U. S. 158 determining whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern and then in deciding whether the statement adversely
affected the government's interest as an employer. See
ante at 461 U. S.
147 -148, 461 U. S.
152 -153. Second, in concluding that the effect of
respondent's personnel policies on employee morale and the work
performance of the District Attorney's Office is not a matter of
public concern, the Court impermissibly narrows the class of
subjects on which public employees may speak out without fear of
retaliatory dismissal. See ante at 461 U. S. 148 -149.
Third, the Court misapplies the Pickering balancing test
in holding that Myers could constitutionally be dismissed for
circulating a questionnaire addressed to at least one subject that
was "a matter of interest to the community," ante at 461 U. S. 149 ,
in the absence of evidence that her conduct disrupted the efficient
functioning of the District Attorney's Office. II The District Court summarized the contents of respondent's
questionnaire as follows:

															"Plaintiff solicited the views of her fellow Assistant District
Attorneys on a number of issues, including office transfer policies
and the manner in which information of that nature was communicated
within the office. The questionnaire also sought to determine the
views of Assistants regarding office morale, the need for a
grievance committee, and the level of confidence felt by the
Assistants for their supervisors. Finally, the questionnaire
inquired as to whether the Assistants felt pressured to work in
political campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates." 507 F.
Supp. 752 , 758 (ED La.1981).

															After reviewing the evidence, the District Court found that,

															"[t]aken as a whole, the issues presented in the questionnaire
relate to the effective functioning of the District Attorney's
Office, and are matters of public importance and concern." Ibid. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of Page 461 U. S. 159 the District Court's findings and conclusions. 654 F.2d 719 (CA5
1981). The Court nonetheless concludes that Myers' questions about
the effect of petitioner's personnel policies on employee morale
and overall work performance are not "of public import in
evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected
official." Ante at 461 U. S. 148 .
In so doing, it announces the following standard:

															"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement. . . ." Ante at 461 U. S.
147 -148.

															The standard announced by the Court suggests that the manner and
context in which a statement is made must be weighed on both sides
of the Pickering balance. It is beyond dispute that how
and where a public employee expresses his views are relevant in the
second half of the Pickering inquiry -- determining
whether the employee's speech adversely affects the government's
interests as an employer. The Court explicitly acknowledged this in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U. S. 410 (1979), where we stated that, when a public employee speaks
privately to a supervisor,

															"the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be
threatened not only by the content of the . . . message but also by
the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered." Id. at 439 U. S. 415 ,
n. 4. But the fact that a public employee has chosen to express his
views in private has nothing whatsoever to do with the first half
of the Pickering calculus -- whether those views relate to
a matter of public concern. This conclusion is implicit in Givhan's holding that the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment is not "lost to the public employee who
arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to
spread his views before the public." 439 U.S. at 439 U. S.
415 -416.

															The Court seeks to distinguish Givhan on the ground
that speech protesting racial discrimination is "inherently of
public concern." Ante at 461 U. S. 148 ,
n. 8. In so doing, it suggests that there are two classes of speech
of public concern: statements "of public import" because of their
content, form, and context, Page 461 U. S. 160 and statements that, by virtue of their subject matter, are
"inherently of public concern." In my view, however, whether a
particular statement by a public employee is addressed to a subject
of public concern does not depend on where it was said or why. The
First Amendment affords special protection to speech that may
inform public debate about how our society is to be governed --
regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a public
controversy. [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison
v. Page 461 U. S. 161 Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 , 379 U. S. 74 -75
(1964).

															"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political
discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is
a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.
S. 359 , 283 U. S. 369 (1931).

															We have long recognized that one of the central purposes of the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression is to protect
the dissemination of information on the basis of which members of
our society may make reasoned decisions about the government. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
218 -219; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 , 376 U. S.
269 -270 (1964). See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech
and Its Relation to Self-Government 22-27 (1948).

															"No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly
treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through
free and open debate to consider and resolve their own
destiny." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.
S. 843 , 417 U. S. 862 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting).

															Unconstrained discussion concerning the manner in which the
government performs its duties is an essential element of the
public discourse necessary to informed self-government.

															"Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the
First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of
candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
which government is operated or should be operated, and all
such matters relating to political processes." Mills v. Alabama, supra, at 384 U. S.
218 -219 (emphasis added). Page 461 U. S. 162 The constitutionally protected right to speak out on
governmental affairs would be meaningless if it did not extend to
statements expressing criticism of governmental officials. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, we held that the
Constitution prohibits an award of damages in a libel action
brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct
absent a showing that the false statements at issue were made with
" actual malice.'" 376 U.S. at 376 U. S.
279 -280. We stated there that the First Amendment
expresses "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 376 U. S. 270 . See Garrison v. Louisiana, supra, at 379 U. S.
76 .

															In Pickering we held that the First Amendment affords
similar protection to critical statements by a public school
teacher directed at the Board of Education for whom he worked. 391
U.S. at 391 U. S. 574 .
In so doing, we recognized that "free and open debate" about the
operation of public schools "is vital to informed decisionmaking by
the electorate." Id. at 391 U. S.
571 -572. We also acknowledged the importance of allowing
teachers to speak out on school matters.

															"Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds
allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely
on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal." Id. at 391 U. S. 572 . See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.
S. 134 , 416 U. S. 228 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (describing "[t]he importance of
Government employees' being assured of their right to freely
comment on the conduct of Government, to inform the public of
abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors . . .
"). Page 461 U. S. 163 Applying these principles, I would hold that Myers'
questionnaire addressed matters of public concern because it
discussed subjects that could reasonably be expected to be of
interest to persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the
manner in which the Orleans Parish District Attorney, an elected
official charged with managing a vital governmental agency,
discharges his responsibilities. The questionnaire sought primarily
to obtain information about the impact of the recent transfers on
morale in the District Attorney's Office. It is beyond doubt that
personnel decisions that adversely affect discipline and morale may
ultimately impair an agency's efficient performance of its duties. See Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 416 U. S. 168 (opinion of POWELL, J.). Because I believe the First Amendment
protects the right of public employees to discuss such matters so
that the public may be better informed about how their elected
officials fulfill their responsibilities, I would affirm the
District Court's conclusion that the questionnaire related to
matters of public importance and concern.

															The Court's adoption of a far narrower conception of what
subjects are of public concern seems prompted by its fears that a
broader view

															"would mean that virtually every remark -- and certainly every
criticism directed at a public official -- would plant the seed of
a constitutional case." Ante at 461 U. S. 149 .
Obviously, not every remark directed at a public official by a
public employee is protected by the First Amendment. [ Footnote 2/3 ] But deciding whether a
particular matter is of public concern is an inquiry that, by its
very nature, is a sensitive one for judges charged with
interpreting a constitutional provision intended to put "the
decision as to what views shall be Page 461 U. S. 164 voiced largely into the hands of each of us. . . ." Cohen v.
California, 403 U. S. 15 , 403 U. S. 24 (1971). [ Footnote 2/4 ] The Court
recognized the sensitive nature of this determination in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), which held that the scope of the constitutional privilege
in defamation cases turns on whether or not the plaintiff is a
public figure, not on whether the statements at issue address a
subject of public concern. In so doing, the Court referred to
the

															"difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general
or public interest' and which do not,"

															and expressed "doubt [about] the wisdom of committing this task
to the conscience of judges." Id. at 418 U. S. 346 . See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S.
29 , 403 U. S. 79 (1971) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In making such a delicate
inquiry, we must bear in mind that "the citizenry is the final
judge of the proper conduct of public business." Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 , 420 U. S. 495 (1975). The Court's decision ignores these precepts. Based on its
own narrow conception of which matters are of public concern, the
Court implicitly determines that information concerning Page 461 U. S. 165 employee morale at an important government office will not
inform public debate. To the contrary, the First Amendment protects
the dissemination of such information so that the people, not the
courts, may evaluate its usefulness. The proper means to ensure
that the courts are not swamped with routine employee grievances
mischaracterized as First Amendment cases is not to restrict
artificially the concept of "public concern," but to require that
adequate weight be given to the public's important interests in the
efficient performance of governmental functions and in preserving
employee discipline and harmony sufficient to achieve that end. See Part 461 U. S. infra. [ Footnote 2/5 ] Page 461 U. S. 166 III Although the Court finds most of Myers' questionnaire unrelated
to matters of public interest, it does hold that one question --
asking whether Assistants felt pressured to work in political
campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates -- addressed a
matter of public importance and concern. The Court also recognizes
that this determination of public interest must weigh heavily in
the balancing of competing interests required by Pickering. Having gone that far, however, the Court
misapplies the Pickering test and holds -- against our
previous authorities -- that a public employer's mere apprehension
that speech will be disruptive justifies suppression of that speech
when all the objective evidence suggests that those fears are
essentially unfounded. Pickering recognized the difficulty of articulating "a
general standard against which all . . . statements may be judged,"
391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 569 ;
it did, however, identify a number of factors that may affect the
balance in particular cases. Those relevant here are whether the
statements are directed to persons with whom the speaker "would
normally be in contact in the course of his daily work"; whether
they had an adverse effect on "discipline by immediate superiors or
harmony among coworkers"; whether the employment relationship in
question is

															"the kind . . . for which it can persuasively Page 461 U. S. 167 be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to
their proper functioning;"

															and whether the statements

															"have in any way either impeded [the employee's] proper
performance of his daily duties . . . or . . . interfered with the
regular operation of the [office]." Id. at 391 U. S.
568 -573. In addition, in Givhan, we recognized
that, when the statements in question are made in private to an
employee's immediate supervisor,

															"the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be
threatened not only by the content of the . . . message, but also
by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered."

															439 U.S. at 439 U. S. 415 ,
n. 4. See supra at 461 U. S.
159 .

															The District Court weighed all of the relevant factors
identified by our cases. It found that petitioner failed to
establish that Myers violated either a duty of confidentiality or
an office policy. 507 F, Supp. at 758-759. Noting that most of the
copies of the questionnaire were distributed during lunch, it
rejected the contention that the distribution of the questionnaire
impeded Myers' performance of her duties, and it concluded that
"Connick has not shown any evidence to indicate that the
plaintiff's work performance was adversely affected by her
expression." Id. at 754-755, 759 (emphasis supplied).

															The Court accepts all of these findings. See ante at 461 U. S. 151 .
It concludes, however, that the District Court failed to give
adequate weight to the context in which the questionnaire was
distributed and to the need to maintain close working relationships
in the District Attorney's Office. In particular, the Court
suggests the District Court failed to give sufficient weight to the
disruptive potential of Question 10, which asked whether the
Assistants had confidence in the word of five named supervisors. Ante at 461 U. S. 152 .
The District Court, however, explicitly recognized that this was
petitioner's "most forceful argument"; but after hearing the
testimony of four of the five supervisors named in the question, it
found that the question had no adverse effect on Myers'
relationship with her superiors. 507 F. Supp. at 759. Page 461 U. S. 168 To this the Court responds that an employer need not wait until
the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking
action. In the face of the District Court's finding that the
circulation of the questionnaire had no disruptive effect, the
Court holds that respondent may be dismissed because petitioner
"reasonably believed [the action] would disrupt the office,
undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships." Ante at 461 U. S. 154 .
Even though the District Court found that the distribution of the
questionnaire did not impair Myers' working relationship with her
supervisors, the Court bows to petitioner's judgment because,

															"[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling
public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the
employer's judgment is appropriate." Ante at 461 U. S.
151 -152.

															Such extreme deference to the employer's judgment is not
appropriate when public employees voice critical views concerning
the operations of the agency for which they work. Although an
employer's determination that an employee's statements have
undermined essential working relationships must be carefully
weighed in the Pickering balance, we must bear in mind
that "the threat of dismissal from public employment is . . . a
potent means of inhibiting speech." Pickering, 391 U.S. at 391 U. S. 574 . See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 604 .
If the employer's judgment is to be controlling, public employees
will not speak out when what they have to say is critical of their
supervisors. In order to protect public employees' First Amendment
right to voice critical views on issues of public importance, the
courts must make their own appraisal of the effects of the speech
in question.

															In this regard, our decision in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, 393 U.
S. 503 (1969), is controlling. Tinker arose in
a public school, a context similar to the one in which the present
case arose in that the determination of the scope of the
Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech required
consideration of the "special Page 461 U. S. 169 characteristics of the . . . environment" in which the
expression took place. See id. at 393 U. S. 506 .
At issue was whether public high school students could
constitutionally be prohibited from wearing black armbands in
school to express their opposition to the Vietnam conflict. The
District Court had ruled that such a ban "was reasonable because it
was based upon [school officials'] fear of a disturbance from the
wearing of armbands." Id. at 393 U. S. 508 .
We found that justification inadequate, because, "in our system,
undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Ibid. We
concluded:

															"In order for the State . . . to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding and no showing
that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school,' the prohibition cannot
be sustained." Id. at 393 U. S. 509 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d
744, 749 (CA5 1966)).

															Because the speech at issue addressed matters of public
importance, a similar standard should be applied here. After
reviewing the evidence, the District Court found that

															"it cannot be said that the defendant's interest in promoting
the efficiency of the public services performed through his
employees was either adversely affected or substantially impeded by
plaintiff's distribution of the questionnaire."

															507 F. Supp. at 759. Based on these findings, the District Court
concluded that the circulation of the questionnaire was protected
by the First Amendment. The District Court applied the proper legal
standard and reached an acceptable accommodation between the
competing interests. I would affirm its decision and the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. Page 461 U. S. 170 IV The Court's decision today inevitably will deter public
employees from making critical statements about the manner in which
government agencies are operated for fear that doing so will
provoke their dismissal. As a result, the public will be deprived
of valuable information with which to evaluate the performance of
elected officials. Because protecting the dissemination of such
information is an essential function of the First Amendment, I
dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Although the Court's opinion states that,

															"if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge," ante at 461 U. S. 146 (footnote omitted), I do not understand it to imply that a
governmental employee's First Amendment rights outside the
employment context are limited to speech on matters of public
concern. To the extent that the Court's opinion may be read to
suggest that the dismissal of a public employee for speech
unrelated to a subject of public interest does not implicate First
Amendment interests, I disagree, because our cases establish that
public employees enjoy the full range of First Amendment rights
guaranteed to members of the general public. Under the balancing
test articulated in Pickering, however, the government's
burden to justify such a dismissal may be lighter. See 461
U.S. 138 fn2/4|>n. 4, infra. [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Although the parties offered no evidence on whether the subjects
addressed by the questionnaire were, in fact, matters of public
concern, extensive local press coverage shows that the issues
involved are of interest to the people of Orleans Parish. Shortly
after the District Court took the case under advisement, a major
daily newspaper in New Orleans carried a 7-paragraph story
describing the questionnaire, the events leading to Myers'
dismissal, and the filing of this action. The Times-Picayune/The
States-Item, Dec. 6, 1980, section 1, p. 21, col. 1. The same
newspaper also carried a 16-paragraph story when the District Court
ruled in Myers' favor, Feb. 11, 1981, section 1, p. 15, col. 2; a
14-paragraph story when the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's decision, July 28, 1981, section 1, p. 11, col. 1; a
12-paragraph story when this Court granted Connick's petition for
certiorari, Mar. 9, 1982, section 1, p. 15, col. 5.; and a
17-paragraph story when we heard oral argument, Nov. 9, 1982,
section 1, p. 13, col. 5.

															In addition, matters affecting the internal operations of the
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office often receive extensive
coverage in the same newspaper. For example, The Times-Picayune/The
States-Item carried a lengthy story reporting that the agency moved
to "plush new offices," and describing in detail the "privacy
problem" faced by Assistant District Attorneys because the office
was unable to obtain modular furniture with which to partition its
new space. Jan. 25, 1981, section 8, p. 13, col. 1. It also carried
a 16-paragraph story when a committee of the Louisiana State Senate
voted to prohibit petitioner from retaining a public relations
specialist. July 9, 1982, section 1, p. 14, col. 1.

															In light of the public's interest in the operations of the
District Attorney's Office in general, and in the dispute between
the parties in particular, it is quite possible that, contrary to
the Court's view, ante at 461 U. S.
148 -149, Myers' comments concerning morale and working
conditions in the office would actually have engaged the public's
attention had she stated them publicly. Moreover, as a general
matter, the media frequently carry news stories reporting that
personnel policies in effect at a government agency have resulted
in declining employee morale and deteriorating agency
performance.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Perhaps the simplest example of a statement by a public employee
that would not be protected by the First Amendment would be
answering "No" to a request that the employee perform a lawful task
within the scope of his duties. Although such a refusal is
"speech," which implicates First Amendment interests, it is also
insubordination, and as such it may serve as the basis for a lawful
dismissal.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Indeed, it has been suggested that

															"a classification that bases the right to First Amendment
protection on some estimate of how much general interest there is
in the communication is surely in conflict with the whole idea of
the First Amendment."

															T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 554 (1970). The
degree to which speech is of interest to the public may be relevant
in determining whether a public employer may constitutionally be
required to tolerate some degree of disruption resulting from its
utterance. See ante at 461 U. S. 152 .
In general, however, whether a government employee's speech is of
"public concern" must be determined by reference to the broad
conception of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
found necessary by the Framers

															"to supply the public need for information and education with
respect to the significant issues of the times. . . . Freedom of
discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed
or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 , 310 U. S. 102 (1940) (footnote omitted). See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 , 370 U. S. 388 (1962).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The Court's narrow conception of which matters are of public
interest is also inconsistent with the broad view of that concept
articulated in our cases dealing with the constitutional limits on
liability for invasion of privacy. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), we held that a defendant may not constitutionally be held
liable for an invasion of privacy resulting from the publication of
a false or misleading report of "matters of public interest" in the
absence of proof that the report was published with knowledge of
its falsity or reckless disregard for its truth. Id. at 385 U. S.
389 -391. In that action, Hill had sought damages
resulting from the publication of an allegedly false report that a
new play portrayed the experience of him and his family when they
were held hostage in their home in a publicized incident years
earlier. We entertained "no doubt that . . . the opening of a new
play linked to an actual incident, is a matter of public interest." Id. at 385 U. S. 388 . See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.
S. 469 (1975) (holding that a radio station could not
constitutionally be held liable for broadcasting the name of a rape
victim, because the victim's name was contained in public records).
Our discussion in Time, Inc. v. Hill of the breadth of the
First Amendment's protections is directly relevant here:

															"The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of
political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as
those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any
newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published
matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens
and public officials. . . ."

															"Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic
function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period."

															" Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S.
88 , 310 U. S. 102 . No suggestion
can be found in the Constitution that the freedom there guaranteed
for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness
and importance of the ideas seeking expression."

															" Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.
252 , 314 U. S. 269 ."

															385 U.S. at 385 U. S.
388 .

															The quoted passage makes clear that, contrary to the Court's
view, ante at 461 U. S. 143 ,
n. 5, the subjects touched upon in respondent's questionnaire fall
within the broad conception of "matters of public interest" that
defines the scope of the constitutional privilege in invasion of
privacy cases. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D,
Comment j (1977):

															"The scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is
not limited to 'news,' in the sense of reports of current events or
activities. It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or
facts in giving information to the public for purposes of
education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may
reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is
published."