U.S. Supreme Court Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796 (1984) Segura v. United
States No. 82-5298 Argued November 9,
1983 Decided July 5, 1984 468
U.S. 796 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Syllabus Acting on information that petitioners probably were trafficking
in cocaine from their apartment, New York Drug Enforcement Task
Force agents began a surveillance of petitioners. Thereafter, upon
observing petitioner Colon deliver a bulky package to one Parra at
a restaurant parking lot, while petitioner Segura and one
Rivudalla-Vidal visited inside the restaurant, the agents followed
Parra and Rivudalla-Vidal to their apartment and stopped them.
Parra was found to possess cocaine, and she and Rivudalla-Vidal
were immediately arrested. After being advised of his
constitutional rights, Rivudalla-Vidal admitted that he had
purchased the cocaine from petitioner Segura and confirmed that
petitioner Colon had made the delivery at the restaurant. Task
Force agents were then authorized by an Assistant United States
Attorney to arrest petitioners, and were advised that a search
warrant for petitioners' apartment probably could not be obtained
until the following day, but that the agent should secure the
premises to prevent destruction of evidence. Later that same
evening, the agents arrested petitioner Segura in the lobby of
petitioners' apartment building, took him to the apartment, knocked
on the door, and, when it was opened by petitioner Colon, entered
the apartment without requesting or receiving permission. The
agents then conducted a limited security check of the apartment
and, in the process, observed, in plain view, various drug
paraphernalia. Petitioner Colon was then arrested, and both
petitioners were taken into custody. Two agents remained in the
apartment awaiting the warrant, but, because of "administrative
delay," the search warrant was not issued until some 19 hours after
the initial entry into the apartment. In the search pursuant to the
warrant, the agents discovered, inter alia, cocaine and
records of narcotics transactions. These items were seized,
together with those observed during the security check. The
District Court granted petitioners' pretrial motion to suppress all
the seized evidence. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence
discovered in plain view on the initial entry, but not the evidence
seized during the warrant search, must be suppressed. Petitioners
were subsequently convicted of violating federal drug laws, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but
also evidence later Page 468 U. S. 797 discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or "fruit
of the poisonous tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 , 308 U. S. 341 .
The exclusionary rule does not apply, however, if the connection
between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of
the evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint," ibid., as, for example, where the police had an
"independent source" for discovery of the evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.
S. 385 . Pp. 468 U. S.
804 -805.

															2. Here, there was an independent source for the challenged
evidence; the evidence was discovered during a search of
petitioners' apartment pursuant to a valid warrant. The information
on which the warrant was secured came from sources wholly
unconnected with the initial entry, and was known to the agents
well before that entry. Hence, whether the initial entry was
illegal or not is irrelevant to the admissibility of the evidence,
and exclusion of the evidence is not warranted as derivative or as
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Pp. 468 U. S.
813 -816.

															697 F.2d 300, affirmed.

															BURGER, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V, and
VI, in which WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined,
and an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which O'CONNOR, J.,
joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 468 U. S.
817 .

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari to decide whether, because of an earlier
illegal entry, the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of
evidence seized later from a private residence Page 468 U. S. 798 pursuant to a valid search warrant which was issued on
information obtained by the police before the entry into the
residence. I Resolution of this issue requires us to consider two separate
questions: first, whether the entry and internal securing of the
premises constituted an impermissible seizure of all the contents
of the apartment, seen and unseen; second, whether the evidence
first discovered during the search of the apartment pursuant to a
valid warrant issued the day after the entry should have been
suppressed as "fruit" of the illegal entry. Our disposition of both
questions is carefully limited.

															The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holding that
there were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless
entry into petitioners' apartment. That issue is not before us, and
we have no reason to question the courts' holding that that search
was illegal. The ensuing interference with petitioners' possessory
interests in their apartment, however, is another matter. On this
first question, we conclude that, assuming that there was a seizure of all the contents of the petitioners' apartment
when agents secured the premises from within, that seizure did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, we hold that, where
officers, having probable cause, enter premises and, with probable
cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate possessory
interests in its contents and take them into custody and, for no
more than the period here involved, secure the premises from within
to preserve the status quo while others, in good faith,
are in the process of obtaining a warrant, they do not violate the
Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures.
[ Footnote 1 ] Page 468 U. S. 799 The illegality of the initial entry, as we will show, has no
bearing on the second question. The resolution of this second
question requires that we determine whether the initial entry
tainted the discovery of the evidence now challenged. On this
issue, we hold that the evidence discovered during the subsequent
search of the apartment the following day pursuant to the valid
search warrant issued wholly on information known to the officers
before the entry into the apartment need not have been suppressed
as "fruit" of the illegal entry, because the warrant and the
information on which it was based were unrelated to the entry, and
therefore constituted an independent source for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.
S. 385 (1920). II In January, 1981, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force
received information indicating that petitioners Andres Segura and
Luz Marina Colon probably were trafficking in cocaine from their
New York apartment. Acting on this information, Task Force agents
maintained continuing surveillance over petitioners until their
arrest on February 12, 1981. On February 9, agents observed a
meeting between Segura and Enrique Rivudalla-Vidal, during which,
as it later developed, the two discussed the possible sale of
cocaine by Segura to Rivudalla-Vidal. Three days later, February
12, Segura telephoned Rivudalla-Vidal and agreed to provide him
with cocaine. The two agreed that the delivery would be made at 5
p.m. that day at a designated fast-food restaurant in Queens, N.Y.
Rivudalla-Vidal and one Esther Parra arrived at the restaurant at 5
p.m., as agreed. While Segura and Rivudalla-Vidal visited inside
the restaurant, agents observed Colon deliver a bulky package to
Parra, who had remained in Rivudalla-Vidal's car in the restaurant
parking lot. A short time after the delivery of the package,
Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra left the restaurant and Page 468 U. S. 800 proceeded to their apartment. Task Force agents followed. The
agents stopped the couple as they were about to enter
Rivudalla-Vidal's apartment. Parra was found to possess cocaine;
both Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra were immediately arrested.

															After Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra were advised of their
constitutional rights, Rivudalla-Vidal agreed to cooperate with the
agents. He admitted that he had purchased the cocaine from Segura
and he confirmed that Colon had made the delivery at the fast-food
restaurant earlier that day, as the agents had observed.
Rivudalla-Vidal informed the agents that Segura was to call him at
approximately 10 o'clock that evening to learn if Rivudalla-Vidal
had sold the cocaine, in which case Segura was to deliver
additional cocaine.

															Between 6:30 and 7 p.m. the same day, Task Force agents sought
and received authorization from an Assistant United States Attorney
to arrest Segura and Colon. The agents were advised by the
Assistant United States Attorney that, because of the lateness of
the hour, a search warrant for petitioners' apartment probably
could not be obtained until the following day, but that the agents
should proceed to secure the premises to prevent the destruction of
evidence.

															At about 7:30 p.m., the agents arrived at petitioners' apartment
and established external surveillance. At 11:15 p.m., Segura,
alone, entered the lobby of the apartment building, where he was
immediately arrested by agents. He first claimed he did not reside
in the building. The agents took him to his third floor apartment,
and when they knocked on the apartment door, a woman later
identified as Colon appeared; the agents then entered with Segura,
without requesting or receiving permission. There were three
persons in the living room of the apartment in addition to Colon.
Those present were informed by the agents that Segura was under
arrest and that a search warrant for the apartment was being
obtained.

															Following this brief exchange in the living room, the agents
conducted a limited security check of the apartment to Page 468 U. S. 801 ensure that no one else was there who might pose a threat to
their safety or destroy evidence. In the process, the agents
observed, in a bedroom in plain view, a triple-beam scale, jars of
lactose, and numerous small cellophane bags, all accouterments of
drug trafficking. None of these items was disturbed by the agents.
After this limited security check, Colon was arrested. In the
search incident to her arrest, agents found in her purse a loaded
revolver and more than $2,000 in cash. Colon, Segura, and the other
occupants of the apartment were taken to Drug Enforcement
Administration headquarters.

															Two Task Force agents remained in petitioners' apartment
awaiting the warrant. Because of what is characterized as
"administrative delay," the warrant application was not presented
to the Magistrate until 5 p.m. the next day. The warrant was
issued, and the search was performed at approximately 6 p.m., some
19 hours after the agents' initial entry into the apartment. In the
search pursuant to the warrant, agents discovered almost three
pounds of cocaine, 18 rounds of .38-caliber ammunition fitting the
revolver agents had found in Colon's possession at the time of her
arrest, more than $50,000 cash, and records of narcotics
transactions. Agents seized these items, together with those
observed during the security check the previous night.

															Before trial in the United States District Court in the Eastern
District of New York, petitioners moved to suppress all of the
evidence seized from the apartment -- the items discovered in plain
view during the initial security check and those not in plain view
first discovered during the subsequent warrant search. [ Footnote 2 ] After a full evidentiary
hearing, the Page 468 U. S. 802 District Court granted petitioners' motion. The court ruled that
there were no exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry
into the apartment. Accordingly, it held that the entry, the arrest
of Colon and search incident to her arrest, and the effective
seizure of the drug paraphernalia in plain view were illegal. The
District Court ordered this evidence suppressed as "fruits" of
illegal searches.

															The District Court held that the warrant later issued was
supported by information sufficient to establish probable cause;
however, it read United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959
(CA6), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974), as requiring
suppression of the evidence seized under the valid warrant.
[ Footnote 3 ] The District Court
reasoned that this evidence would not necessarily have been
discovered, because, absent the illegal entry and "occupation" of
the apartment, Colon might have arranged to have the drugs removed
or destroyed, in which event they would not have been in the
apartment when the warrant search was made. Under this analysis,
the District Court held that even the drugs seized under the valid
warrant were "fruit of the poisonous tree."

															On an appeal limited to the admissibility of the incriminating
evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in
part. 663 F.2d 411 (1981). It affirmed the District Court holding
that the initial warrantless entry was not justified by exigent
circumstances and that the evidence discovered in plain view during
the initial entry must be suppressed. [ Footnote 4 ] The Court of Appeals rejected the argument Page 468 U. S. 803 advanced by the United States that the evidence in plain view
should not be excluded because it was not actually "seized" until
after the search warrant was secured.

															Relying upon its holding in United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (CA2), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980),
[ Footnote 5 ] the Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court's holding requiring suppression
of the evidence seized under the valid warrant executed on the day
following the initial entry. The Court of Appeals described as
"prudentially unsound" the District Court's decision to suppress
that evidence simply because it could have been destroyed had the
agents not entered.

															Petitioners were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and of distributing and possessing
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). On the subsequent review of these convictions, the
Second Circuit affirmed, 697 F.2d 300 (1982), rejecting claims by
petitioners that the search warrant was procured through material
misrepresentations and that the evidence at trial was insufficient
as a matter of law to support Page 468 U. S. 804 their convictions. We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983),
and we affirm. III At the outset, it is important to focus on the narrow and
precise question now before us. As we have noted, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court that the initial warrantless
entry and the limited security search were not justified by exigent
circumstances, and were therefore illegal. No review of that aspect
of the case was sought by the Government, and no issue concerning
items observed during the initial entry is before the Court. The
only issue here is whether drugs and the other items not observed
during the initial entry and first discovered by the agents the day
after the entry, under an admittedly valid search warrant, should
have been suppressed.

															The suppression or exclusionary rule is a judicially prescribed
remedial measure, and, as

															"with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been
restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.
S. 338 , 414 U. S. 348 (1974). Under this Court's holdings, the exclusionary rule reaches
not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal
search or seizure, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 (1914), but also evidence later discovered and
found to be derivative of an illegality or "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.
S. 338 , 308 U. S. 341 (1939). It "extends as well to the indirect as the direct products"
of unconstitutional conduct. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 371 U. S. 484 (1963).

															Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional
search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion. The question to
be resolved when it is claimed that evidence subsequently obtained
is "tainted" or is "fruit" of a prior illegality is whether the
challenged evidence was " come at by exploitation of [the
initial] illegality, or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged Page 468 U. S. 805 of the primary taint.'" Id. at 371 U. S. 488 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

															It has been well established for more than 60 years that
evidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the
illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the
evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate the taint," Nardone
v. United States, supra, at 306 U. S. 341 .
It is not to be excluded, for example, if police had an
"independent source" for discovery of the evidence:

															"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used
at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained
from an independent source, they may be proved like any
others. " Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. at 251 U. S. 392 (emphasis added). In short, it is clear from our prior holdings
that "the exclusionary rule has no application [where] the
Government learned of the evidence from an independent
source.'" Wong Sun, supra, at 371 U. S. 487 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co., supra, at 251 U. S.
392 ); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U. S. 463 (1980); United States v. Wade, 388 U.
S. 218 , 388 U. S. 242 (1967); Costello v. United States, 365 U.
S. 265 , 365 U. S.
278 -280 (1961). IV Petitioners argue that all of the contents of the apartment,
seen and not seen, including the evidence now in question, were
"seized" when the agents entered and remained on the premises while
the lawful occupants were away from the apartment in police
custody. The essence of this argument is that, because the contents
were then under the control of the agents and no one would have
been permitted to remove the incriminating evidence from the
premises or destroy it, a Page 468 U. S. 806 "seizure" took place. Plainly, this argument is advanced to
avoid the Silverthorne "independent source" exception. If
all the contents of the apartment were "seized" at the time of the
illegal entry and securing, presumably the evidence now challenged
would be suppressible as primary evidence obtained as a direct
result of that entry.

															We need not decide whether, when the agents entered the
apartment and secured the premises, they effected a seizure of the
cocaine, the cash, the ammunition, and the narcotics records within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. By its terms, the Fourth
Amendment forbids only "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
Assuming, arguendo, that the agents seized the entire
apartment and its contents, as petitioners suggest, the seizure was
not unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

															Different interests are implicated by a seizure than by a
search. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.
S. 109 , 466 U. S. 113 ,
and n. 5, 466 U. S.
122 -126 (1984); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.
S. 730 (1983); id. at 460 U. S.
747 -748 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 13 -14,
n. 8 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42 , 399 U. S. 51 -52
(1970). A seizure affects only the person's possessory interests; a
search affects a person's privacy interests. United States v.
Jacobsen, supra, at 466 U. S. 113 ,
and n. 5; United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 433 U. S. 13 -14,
n. 8; see generally Texas v. Brown, supra, at 460 U. S.
747 -751 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
Recognizing the generally less intrusive nature of a seizure, Chadwick, supra, at 433 U. S. 13 -14,
n. 8; Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 399 U. S. 51 ,
the Court has frequently approved warrantless seizures of property,
on the basis of probable cause, for the time necessary to secure a
warrant, where a warrantless search was either held to be or likely
would have been held impermissible. Chambers v. Maroney, supra;
United States v. Chadwick, supra; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979). [ Footnote 6 ] Page 468 U. S. 807 We focused on the issue notably in Chambers, holding
that it was reasonable to seize and impound an automobile, on the
basis of probable cause, for "whatever period is necessary to
obtain a warrant for the search." 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 51 (footnote omitted). We acknowledged in Chambers that
following the car until a warrant could be obtained was an
alternative to impoundment, albeit an impractical one. But we
allowed the seizure nonetheless, because otherwise the occupants of
the car could have removed the "instruments or fruits of crime"
before the search. Id. at 399 U. S. 51 , n.
9. The Court allowed the warrantless seizure to protect the
evidence from destruction, even though there was no immediate fear
that the evidence was in the process of being destroyed or
otherwise lost. The Chambers Court declared:

															"For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between, on
the one hand, seizing and holding the car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand,
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, Page 468 U. S. 808 either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. " Id. at 52 (emphasis added)

															In Chadwick, we held that the warrantless search of the
footlocker after it had been seized and was in a secure area of the
Federal Building violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches, but neither the respondents nor the
Court questioned the validity of the initial warrantless seizure of the footlocker on the basis of probable cause.
The seizure of Chadwick's footlocker clearly interfered with his
use and possession of the footlocker -- his possessory interest --
but we held that this did not "diminish [his] legitimate
expectation that the footlocker's contents would remain
private." 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 13 -14,
n. 8 (emphasis added). And again, in Arkansas v. Sanders,
supra, we held that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant
was required to search luggage seized from an automobile which was
already in the possession and control of police at the time of the
search. However, we expressly noted that the police acted not only
"properly," but "commendably" in seizing the suitcase without a
warrant on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contained
drugs. 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 761 .
The taxi into which the suitcase had been placed was about to drive
away. However, just as there was no immediate threat of loss or
destruction of evidence in Chambers -- since officers
could have followed the car until a warrant issued -- so too, in Sanders, officers could have followed the taxicab. Indeed,
there arguably was even less fear of immediate loss of the evidence
in Sanders, because the suitcase at issue had been placed
in the vehicle's trunk, thus rendering immediate access unlikely
before police could act.

															Underlying these decisions is a belief that society's interest
in the discovery and protection of incriminating evidence from
removal or destruction can supersede, at least for a limited
period, a person's possessory interest in property, provided that
there is probable cause to believe that that property is associated
with criminal activity. See United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983). Page 468 U. S. 809 The Court has not had occasion to consider whether, when
officers have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal
activity is on the premises, the temporary securing of a dwelling
to prevent the removal or destruction of evidence violates the
Fourth Amendment. However, in two cases, we have suggested that
securing of premises under these circumstances does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, at least when undertaken to preserve the status quo while a search warrant is being sought. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), we noted with approval that, to preserve evidence, a police
guard had been stationed at the entrance to an apartment in which a
homicide had been committed, even though

															"[t]here was no indication that evidence would be lost,
destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search
warrant." Id. at 437 U. S. 394 .
Similarly, in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S.
98 (1980), although officers secured, from within, the
home of a person for whom they had an arrest warrant, and detained
all occupants while other officers were obtaining a search warrant,
the Court did not question the admissibility of evidence discovered
pursuant to the warrant later issued. [ Footnote 7 ] Page 468 U. S. 810 We see no reason, as Mincey and Rawlings would
suggest, why the same principle applied in Chambers,
Chadwick, and Sanders should not apply where a
dwelling is involved. The sanctity of the home is not to be
disputed. But the home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not
primarily because of the occupants' possessory interests
in the premises, but because of their privacy interests in
the activities that take place within. "[T]he Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 351 (1967); see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 , 445 U. S. 615 (1980) (WHITE, J., dissenting).

															As we have noted, however, a seizure affects only possessory
interests, not privacy interests. Therefore, the heightened
protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated
where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue. We hold,
therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable
cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a
search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable
seizure of either the dwelling or its contents. We reaffirm at the
same time, however, that, absent exigent circumstances, a
warrantless search -- such as that invalidated in Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 , 399 U. S. 33 -34
(1970) -- is illegal.

															Here, the agents had abundant probable cause in advance of their
entry to believe that there was a criminal drug operation being
carried on in petitioners' apartment; indeed, petitioners do not
dispute the probable cause determination. The agents had maintained
surveillance over petitioners for weeks, and had observed
petitioners leave the apartment to Page 468 U. S. 811 make sales of cocaine. Wholly apart from observations made
during that extended surveillance, Rivudalla-Vidal had told agents
after his arrest on February 13 that petitioners had supplied him
with cocaine earlier that day, that he had not purchased all of the
cocaine offered by Segura, and that Segura probably had more
cocaine in the apartment. On the basis of this information, a
Magistrate duly issued a search warrant, the validity of which was
upheld by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, and
which is not before us now.

															In this case, the agents entered and secured the apartment from
within. Arguably, the wiser course would have been to depart
immediately and secure the premises from the outside by a
"stakeout" once the security check revealed that no one other than
those taken into custody were in the apartment. But the method
actually employed does not require a different result under the
Fourth Amendment, insofar as the seizure is concerned. As the Court
of Appeals held, absent exigent circumstances, the entry may have
constituted an illegal search, or interference with petitioners'
privacy interests, requiring suppression of all evidence observed
during the entry. Securing of the premises from within, however,
was no more an interference with the petitioners' possessory
interests in the contents of the apartment than a perimeter
"stakeout." In other words, the initial entry -- legal or not --
does not affect the reasonableness of the seizure. Under either
method -- entry and securing from within or a perimeter stakeout --
agents control the apartment pending arrival of the warrant; both
an internal securing and a perimeter stakeout interfere to the same
extent with the possessory interests of the owners.

															Petitioners argue that we heighten the possibility of illegal
entries by a holding that the illegal entry and securing of the
premises from the inside do not themselves render the seizure any
more unreasonable than had the agents staked out the apartment from
the outside. We disagree. In the Page 468 U. S. 812 first place, an entry in the absence of exigent circumstances is
illegal. We are unwilling to believe that officers will routinely
and purposely violate the law as a matter of course. Second, as a
practical matter, officers who have probable cause and who are in
the process of obtaining a warrant have no reason to enter the
premises before the warrant issues, absent exigent circumstances,
which, of course, would justify the entry. United States v.
Santana, 427 U. S. 38 (1976); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 (1948). Third, officers who enter illegally will
recognize that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result
of the entry may be suppressed, as it was by the Court of Appeals
in this case. Finally, if officers enter without exigent
circumstances to justify the entry, they expose themselves to
potential civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.
S. 388 (1971).

															Of course, a seizure reasonable at its inception because based
upon probable cause may become unreasonable as a result of its
duration or for other reasons. Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983). Here, because of the delay in securing the warrant, the
occupation of the apartment continued throughout the night and into
the next day. Such delay in securing a warrant in a large
metropolitan center unfortunately is not uncommon; this is not, in
itself, evidence of bad faith. And there is no suggestion that the
officers, in bad faith, purposely delayed obtaining the warrant.
The asserted explanation is that the officers focused first on the
task of processing those whom they had arrested before turning to
the task of securing the warrant. It is not unreasonable for
officers to believe that the former should take priority, given, as
was the case here, that the proprietors of the apartment were in
the custody of the officers throughout the period in question.

															There is no evidence that the agents in any way exploited their
presence in the apartment; they simply awaited issuance of the
warrant. Moreover, more than half of the 19-hour Page 468 U. S. 813 delay was between 10 p.m. and 10 a. m. the following day, when
it is reasonable to assume that judicial officers are not as
readily available for consideration of warrant requests. Finally,
and most important, we observed in United States v. Place,
supra, at 462 U. S. 705 ,
that

															"[t]he intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure
. . . can vary both in its nature and extent. The seizure may be
made after the owner has relinquished control of the property to a
third party or . . . from the immediate custody and control of the
owner."

															Here, of course, Segura and Colon, whose possessory interests
were interfered with by the occupation, were under arrest and in
the custody of the police throughout the entire period the agents
occupied the apartment. The actual interference with their
possessory interests in the apartment and its contents was, thus,
virtually nonexistent. Cf. United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U. S. 249 (1970). We are not prepared to say under these limited
circumstances that the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. [ Footnote 8 ] V Petitioners also argue that, even if the evidence was not
subject to suppression as primary evidence "seized" by virtue of
the initial illegal entry and occupation of the premises, it should
have been excluded as "fruit" derived from that illegal entry.
Whether the initial entry was illegal or not is irrelevant to the
admissibility of the challenged evidence, because Page 468 U. S. 814 there was an independent source for the warrant under which that
evidence was seized. Exclusion of evidence as derivative or "fruit
of the poisonous tree" is not warranted here because of that
independent source.

															None of the information on which the warrant was secured was
derived from or related in any way to the initial entry into
petitioners' apartment; the information came from sources wholly
unconnected with the entry, and was known to the agents well before
the initial entry. No information obtained during the initial entry
or occupation of the apartment was needed or used by the agents to
secure the warrant. It is therefore beyond dispute that the
information possessed by the agents before they entered the
apartment constituted an independent source for the discovery and
seizure of the evidence now challenged. This evidence was
discovered the day following the entry, during the search conducted
under a valid warrant; it was the product of that search, wholly
unrelated to the prior entry. The valid warrant search was a "means
sufficiently distinguishable" to purge the evidence of any "taint"
arising from the entry. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 488 .
[ Footnote 9 ] Had police never
entered the apartment, but instead conducted a perimeter stakeout
to prevent anyone from entering the apartment and destroying
evidence, the contraband now challenged would have been discovered
and seized precisely as it was here. The legality of the initial
entry is, thus, wholly irrelevant under Wong Sun, supra, and Page 468 U. S. 815 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.
S. 385 (1920). [ Footnote 10 ]

															Our conclusion that the challenged evidence was admissible is
fully supported by our prior cases going back more than a half
century. The Court has never held that evidence is "fruit of the
poisonous tree" simply because "it would not have come to light but
for the illegal actions of the police." See Wong Sun,
supra, at 371 U. S.
487 -488; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S.
98 (1980); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.
S. 590 , 422 U. S. 599 (1975). That would squarely conflict with Silverthorne and
our other cases allowing admission of evidence, notwithstanding a
prior illegality, when the link between the illegality and that
evidence was sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint. By the
same token, our cases make clear that evidence will not be excluded
as "fruit" unless the illegality is at least the "but for" cause of
the discovery of the evidence. Suppression is not justified unless
"the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal
governmental activity." United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
at 445 U. S. 471 .
The illegal entry into petitioners' apartment did not contribute in
any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant; it
is clear, therefore, that not even the threshold "but for"
requirement was met in this case.

															The dissent contends that the initial entry and securing of the
premises are the "but for" causes of the discovery of the evidence
in that, had the agents not entered the apartment, but instead
secured the premises from the outside, Colon or her friends, if
alerted, could have removed or destroyed the evidence before the
warrant issued. While the dissent embraces this "reasoning,"
petitioners do not press this argument. Page 468 U. S. 816 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument as "prudentially
unsound," and because it rested on "wholly speculative
assumptions." Among other things, the Court of Appeals suggested
that, had the agents waited to enter the apartment until the
warrant issued, they might not have decided to take Segura to the
apartment, and thereby alert Colon. Or, once alerted by Segura's
failure to appear, Colon might have attempted to remove the
evidence, rather than destroy it, in which event the agents could
have intercepted her and the evidence.

															We agree fully with the Court of Appeals that the District
Court's suggestion that Colon and her cohorts would have removed or
destroyed the evidence was pure speculation. Even more important,
however, we decline to extend the exclusionary rule, which already
exacts an enormous price from society and our system of justice, to
further "protect" criminal activity, as the dissent would have us
do.

															It may be that, if the agents had not entered the apartment,
petitioners might have arranged for the removal or destruction of
the evidence, and that, in this sense, the agents' actions could be
considered the "but for" cause for discovery of the evidence. But
at this juncture we are reminded of Justice Frankfurter's warning
that

															"[s]ophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between
information obtained through [illegal conduct] and the Government's
proof,"

															and his admonition that the courts should consider whether,
"[a]s a matter of good sense, . . . such connection may have become
so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone, 308
U.S. at 308 U. S. 341 .
The essence of the dissent is that there is some "constitutional
right" to destroy evidence. This concept defies both logic and
common sense. VI We agree with the Court of Appeals that the cocaine, cash
records, and ammunition were properly admitted into evidence.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. It is so ordered. Page 468 U. S. 817 * JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join all
but Part IV of this opinion.

															[ Footnote 1 ] See Griswold, Criminal Procedure, -- 1969 Is It a Means
or an End?, 29 Md.L.Rev. 307, 317 (1969); see generally 2
W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.5 (1978).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra were indicted with petitioners and
were charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute
one-half kilogram of cocaine on one occasion and one kilogram on
another occasion. Both pleaded guilty to the charges. They moved in
the District Court to suppress the one-half kilogram of cocaine
found on Parra's person at the time of their arrests on the ground
that the Task Force agents had stopped them in violation of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
The court denied the motion. Rivudalla-Vidal and Parra absconded
prior to sentencing by the District Court.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															In Griffin, absent exigent circumstances, police
officers forcibly entered an apartment and discovered in plain view
narcotics and related paraphernalia. The entry took place while
other officers sought a search warrant. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of the
defendant's suppression motion.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the
initial entry into the apartment was not justified by exigent
circumstances, and thus that the items discovered in plain view
during the limited security check had to be suppressed to effect
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The United States, although
it does not concede the correctness of this holding, does not
contest it in this Court. Because the Government has decided not to
press its argument that exigent circumstances existed, we need not
and do not address this aspect of the Court of Appeals decision. We
are concerned only with whether the Court of Appeals properly
determined that the Fourth Amendment did not require suppression of
the evidence seized during execution of the valid warrant.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															In Agapito, DEA agents, following a 2-day surveillance
of the defendant's hotel room, arrested the suspected occupants of
the room in the lobby of the hotel. After the arrests, the agents
entered the hotel room and remained within, with the exception of
periodic departures, for almost 24 hours until a search warrant
issued. During their stay in the room, the agents seized but did
not open a suitcase found in the room. In the search pursuant to
the warrant, the agents found cocaine in the suitcase. Although the
Second Circuit held that the initial entry was illegal, it held
that the cocaine need not be suppressed because it was discovered
in the search under the valid warrant.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															In two instances, the Court has allowed temporary seizures and
limited detentions of property based upon less than probable cause.
In United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.
S. 249 (1970), the Court refused to invalidate the
seizure and detention -- on the basis of only reasonable suspicion
-- of two packages delivered to a United States Post Office for
mailing. One of the packages was detained on mere suspicion for
only 1 1/2 hours; by the end of that period, enough information had
been obtained to establish probable cause that the packages
contained stolen coins. But the other package was detained for 29
hours before a search warrant was finally served. Both seizures
were held reasonable. In fact, the Court suggested that both
seizures and detentions for these "limited times" were "prudent"
under the circumstances.

															Only last Term, in United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 (1983), we considered the validity of a brief
seizure and detention of a traveler's luggage on the basis of a
reasonable suspicion that the luggage contained contraband; the
purpose of the seizure and brief detention was to investigate
further the causes for the suspicion. Although we held that the
90-minute detention of the luggage in the airport was, under the
circumstances, unreasonable, we held that the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968),
applies to permit an officer, on the basis of reasonable suspicion
that a traveler is carrying luggage containing contraband, to seize
and detain the luggage briefly to "investigate the circumstances
that aroused his suspicion." 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
706 .

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															A distinguished constitutional scholar raised the question
whether a seizure of premises might not be appropriate to preserve
the status quo and protect valuable evidence while police
officers in good faith seek a warrant.

															"Here there is a very real practical problem. Does the police
officer have any power to maintain the status quo while
he, or a colleague of his, is taking the time necessary to draw up
a sufficient affidavit to support an application for a search
warrant, and then finding a magistrate, submitting the application
to him, obtaining the search warrant if it is issued, and then
bringing it to the place where the arrest was made. It seems
inevitable that a minimum of several hours will be required for
this process, at the very best. Unless there is some kind of a
power to prevent removal of material from the premises, or
destruction of material during this time, the search warrant will
almost inevitably be fruitless. "

															Griswold, 29 Md.L.Rev. at 317 (emphasis added).

															Justice Black posed essentially the same question in his dissent
in Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 , 399 U. S. 36 (1970). After pointing out that Vale's arrest just outside his
residence was

															"plainly visible to anyone within the house, and the police had
every reason to believe that someone in the house was likely to
destroy the contraband if the search were postponed,"

															he noted:

															"This case raises most graphically the question how does a
policeman protect evidence necessary to the State if he must leave
the premises to get a warrant, allowing the evidence he seeks to be
destroyed. The Court's answer to that question makes unnecessarily
difficult the conviction of those who prey upon society." Id. at 399 U. S.
41 .

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Our decision in United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 (1983), is not inconsistent with this conclusion.
There, we found unreasonable a 90-minute detention of a traveler's
luggage. But the detention was based only on a suspicion that the
luggage contained contraband, not on probable cause. After probable
cause was established, authorities held the unopened luggage for
almost three days before a warrant was obtained. It was not
suggested that this delay presented an independent basis for
suppression of the evidence eventually discovered.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Our holding in this respect is consistent with the vast majority
of Federal Courts of Appeals which have held that evidence obtained
pursuant to a valid warrant search need not be excluded because of
a prior illegal entry. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 700 F.2d 1232 (CA8 1983); United States v. Kinney, 638
F.2d 941 (CA6), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Fitzharris, 633 F.2d 416 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981); United States v.
Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (CA2 1980); United States v.
Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174 (CA11 1982) (dictum). The only Federal
Court of Appeals to hold otherwise is the Ninth Circuit. See
United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886 (1983); United States
v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (1980).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															It is important to note that the dissent stresses the legal
status of the agents' initial entry and occupation of the
apartment; however, this case involves only evidence seized in the
search made subsequently under a valid warrant. Implicit in the
dissent is that the agents' presence in the apartment denied
petitioners some legal "right" to arrange to have the incriminating
evidence concealed or destroyed.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL,
and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

															Correct analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues raised by this
case requires, first, a precise identification of the two
constitutional violations that occurred, and, second, an
explanation of why a remedy for both is appropriate. While I do not
believe that the current record justifies suppression of the
challenged evidence, neither does it justify affirmance of
petitioners' convictions. We must consider the substantial
contention, supported by the findings of the District Court and
left unaddressed by the opinion of this Court, that the
authorities' access to the evidence introduced against petitioners
at trial was made possible only through exploitation of both
constitutional violations. Because I believe that contention must
be addressed before petitioners' convictions are finally affirmed,
I would remand for further proceedings. The Court's disposition, I
fear, will provide government agents with an affirmative incentive
to engage in unconstitutional violations of the privacy of the
home. The Court's disposition is, therefore, inconsistent with a
primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule -- to
ensure that all private citizens -- not just these petitioners --
have some meaningful protection against future violations of their
rights. I The events that occurred on February 12 and 13, 1981, were the
culmination of an investigation of petitioners that had been under
way for over two weeks. On the evening of February 12, agents of
the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force arrested Rivudalla-Vidal
and Parra, who told them that Segura probably had cocaine in his
apartment. At that point, the agents concluded that they had
probable cause to search petitioners' apartment, and contacted the
United States Attorney's office. An Assistant United States
Attorney informed the agents that, at that hour, 6:30 p.m., it was
too late to obtain a search warrant, and advised them instead to go
to the apartment, arrest Segura, and "secure the Page 468 U. S. 818 premises" pending the issuance of a warrant. [ Footnote 2/1 ] The agents arrived at the apartment
about an hour later and positioned themselves on a fire escape,
where they could observe anyone entering or leaving the apartment.
They also put their ears to the door, but heard nothing. [ Footnote 2/2 ] After three hours of waiting,
the agents left their perch and went outside the building, where
they continued waiting for Segura to show up. The District Court
described what followed:

															"Around 11:15 p.m., Segura appeared, and as he began to enter
the locked door at the lobby, he was apprehended and placed in
handcuffs under arrest. The agents, led by Shea, informed him that
they wanted to go upstairs to 3D, to which Segura replied that he
did not live in the building or in that apartment. Forcibly
bringing him to the third floor, the agents began down the hallway,
at which point Segura again resisted. Shea again forced him down
the hallway to the door of 3D, an Page 468 U. S. 819 apartment which is located in the rear of the building, with no
view of the front of the building where the arrest took place. Shea
knocked on the door of 3D, with Segura standing, handcuffed, in
front of him. Luz Colon, unknown to Shea at the time as such,
opened the door. Detective Shea, without more, walked into the
apartment with Segura in custody. He was then followed by two other
agents, and five minutes later, by Palumbo. Neither Shea nor any
other agent had an arrest warrant, or a search warrant. Nor did any
of the officers ask for or receive consent to enter apartment
3D."

															App. 10-11.

															The agents arrested Colon and three other persons found in the
apartment. Colon was unknown to the agents at the time. [ Footnote 2/3 ] The agents made a cursory
search of the apartment and saw various items of narcotics
paraphernalia in plain view. [ Footnote
2/4 ] The agents left that evidence -- the "prewarrant evidence"
-- in the apartment, but they took the arrestees to
headquarters.

															At least two of the agents spent the night in the apartment and
remained in it throughout the following day while their colleagues
booked the arrestees and presumably persevered in their efforts to
obtain a warrant to search the apartment. Finally, at 6 p.m. on
February 13, the remaining agents were informed that a search
warrant had just been issued, and at that point they conducted a
thorough search. The District Court concluded:

															"There was thus a lapse of some 18-20 hours from the entry into
the apartment to the execution of the search warrant, during which
time the officers remained inside the apartment and in complete
control of it." Id. at 11. Upon searching the apartment, the agents
found one kilo of cocaine, over $50,000, several rounds of
.38-caliber ammunition, and records of narcotics transactions. Page 468 U. S. 820 II The Court frames the appropriate inquiry in this case as whether
the evidence obtained when the search warrant was executed was a
"fruit" of illegal conduct. Ante at 468 U. S. 804 .
As a predicate to that inquiry, the illegal conduct must, of
course, be identified.

															The District Court found that no exigent circumstances justified
the agents' initial warrantless entry into petitioners' apartment.
App. 11-13. The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding, and the
Government did not seek review of it by this Court. Thus, it is
uncontested that the warrantless entry of petitioners' apartment
was unconstitutional. [ Footnote
2/5 ] It is equally clear that the subsequent 18-20-hour
occupation of the apartment was independently unconstitutional for
two separate reasons.

															First, the occupation was an unreasonable "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A "search" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is
infringed. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Nowhere
are expectations of privacy greater than in the home. As the Court
has repeatedly noted, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297 , 407 U. S. 313 (1972). [ Footnote 2/7 ] Of course,
the invasion of privacy Page 468 U. S. 821 occasioned by a physical entry does not cease after the initial
entry. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 (1978), we held that, although the police
lawfully entered Mincey's home to arrest him, the Constitution
forbade them to remain in the home and to search it. The Court
reasoned that, despite the lawful initial entry, Mincey retained a
constitutionally protected privacy interest in his home that could
not be infringed without a warrant. See id. at 437 U. S.
390 -391. Similarly, in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), we could

															"see no reason why, simply because some interference with an
individual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken
place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite
the absence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise
require." Id. at 395 U. S.
766 -767, n. 12. [ Footnote
2/8 ] Here, by remaining in the home after the initial entry,
the agents exacerbated the invasion of petitioners' protected
privacy interests. Even assuming the most innocent of motives, the
agents' occupation of petitioners' living quarters inevitably
involved scrutiny of a variety of personal effects throughout the
apartment. [ Footnote 2/9 ]
Petitioners privacy interests were unreasonably infringed by the
agents' prolonged Page 468 U. S. 822 occupation of their home. THE CHIEF JUSTICE simply ignores this
point, assuming that there is no constitutional distinction between
surveillance of the home from the outside and physical occupation
from the inside. THE CHIEF JUSTICE's assumption is, of course,
untenable; there is a fundamental difference when there is a

															"breach of the entrance to an individual's home. The Fourth
Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of
settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an
individual's home -- a zone which finds its roots in clear and
specific constitutional terms: 'The right of the people to be
secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.'" Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S. 589 (1980).

															Second, the agents' occupation was also an unreasonable
"seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A "seizure"
occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests. [ Footnote 2/10 ] There can be no doubt here that
petitioners' possessory interests with respect to their apartment
were subject to meaningful governmental interference. The agents
not only excluded petitioners from access to their own apartment,
and thereby prevented them from exercising any possessory right at
all to the apartment and its contents, but they also exercised
complete dominion and control over the apartment and its contents.
[ Footnote 2/11 ] Our cases
virtually compel the conclusion that the contents of the
apartment Page 468 U. S. 823 were seized. We have held that, when the police take custody of
a person, they concomitantly acquire lawful custody of his personal
effects, see Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.
S. 640 , 462 U. S. 648 (1983); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.
S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); and when they take custody of a car, they are also in
lawful custody of its contents, see South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). Surely it follows that, when the authorities take custody
of an apartment, they also take custody of its contents. [ Footnote 2/12 ]

															This seizure was constitutionally unreasonable. Even a seizure
reasonable at its inception can become unreasonable because of its
duration. United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 , 462 U. S.
709 -710 (1983). Even if exigent circumstances justified
the entry into and impoundment of the premises pending a warrant --
and no one even argues that such circumstances existed -- the
duration of the seizure would nevertheless have been unreasonable.
While exigent circumstances may justify police conduct that would
otherwise be unreasonable if undertaken without a warrant, such
conduct must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
justify its initiation," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 25 -26
(1968). [ Footnote 2/13 ] The cases
THE CHIEF JUSTICE cites, ante at 468 U. S.
807 -810, for the proposition that the government may
impound premises for the amount of time necessary to procure a
warrant thus have no application to this case whatsoever. [ Footnote 2/14 ] There is no contention Page 468 U. S. 824 that a period of 18-20 hours was even remotely necessary to
procure a warrant. The contrast between the 90-minute duration of
the seizure of a piece of luggage held unreasonable in Place and
the 18-20-hour duration of the seizure of the apartment and its
contents in this case graphically illustrates the unreasonable
character of the agents' conduct. Moreover, unlike Place, which involved a seizure lawful at its inception, this seizure was
constitutionally unreasonable from the moment it began. It was
conducted without a warrant and in the absence of exigent
circumstances. [ Footnote 2/15 ] It
has been clear since at least Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), that the police may neither search nor seize the contents
of a home without a warrant. [ Footnote 2/16 ] There is simply no basis for concluding
that this 18-20-hour warrantless invasion of petitioners' home
complied with the Fourth Amendment. Because the agents unreasonably
delayed in seeking judicial authorization for their seizure of
petitioners' apartment, that seizure was unreasonable. Page 468 U. S. 825 Nevertheless, in what I can only characterize as an astonishing
holding, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concludes
that the 18-20-hour seizure of the apartment was not unreasonable.
He advances three reasons for that conclusion, none of which has
any merit.

															First, he seeks to justify the delay because

															"the officers focused first on the task of processing those whom
they had arrested before turning to the task of securing the
warrant." Ante at 468 U. S. 812 .
But there is no evidence that this task presented any difficulties;
indeed, since the arrest of the occupants itself was
unconstitutional, it is truly ironic that THE CHIEF JUSTICE uses
one wrong to justify another. Of greater significance, the District
Court expressly found that the length of the delay was
unreasonable, and that the Government had made no attempt to
justify it; that finding was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and in
this Court the Government expressly concedes that the delay was
unreasonable. [ Footnote 2/17 ]

															Second, THE CHIEF JUSTICE suggests that it is relevant that the
officers did not act in "bad faith." Ante at 468 U. S. 798 , 468 U. S. 812 .
This is done despite the fact that there is no finding as to
whether the agents acted in good or bad faith; the reason is that
the litigants have never raised the issue. More important, Page 468 U. S. 826 this Court has repeatedly held that a police officer's good or
bad faith in undertaking a search or seizure is irrelevant to its
constitutional reasonableness, [ Footnote 2/18 ] and does so again today. [ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Finally, and "most important" to his conclusion, THE CHIEF
JUSTICE suggests that there was no significant interference with
petitioners' possessory interests in their apartment, because they
were in custody anyway. Ante at 468 U. S. 813 .
The cases are legion holding that a citizen retains a protected
possessory interest in his home and the effects within it which may
not be infringed without a warrant even though that person is in
custody. Mincey and Chimel are but two instances
of that general rule -- the defendants in both cases were in
custody, yet both were held to have protected possessory interests
in their homes and the effects within them that could not be
infringed without a warrant. Even when a person is in custody after
an arrest based on probable cause, he still, of course, owns his
house and his right to exclude others -- including federal
narcotics agents -- remains inviolate. What is even more strange
about THE CHIEF JUSTICE's conclusion is that it permits the
authorities to benefit from the fact that they had unlawfully
arrested Colon. Colon was in her own home when she was arrested
without a warrant. That was unconstitutional. [ Footnote 2/20 ] If the agents had decided to obey
the Constitution and not arrest Colon, then she would not have
"relinquished control" over the property, and presumably it would
have been unreasonable for the agents to have remained on the
premises under THE CHIEF JUSTICE's analysis. However, because the
agents conducted an unlawful arrest in addition to their
previous Page 468 U. S. 827 unlawful entry, an otherwise unreasonable occupation becomes
"reasonable." THE CHIEF JUSTICE's approach is as reasonable as was
the agents' conduct. Only in that sense does it achieve its
purpose.

															Thus, on the basis of the record evidence and the findings of
the District Court, it is clear that the 18-20-hour occupation of
petitioners' apartment was a second independent violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Not only was it the fruit of the initial illegal
entry into that apartment, but it also constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure of the apartment. The District Court concluded
that both violations should be remedied by suppression of all of
the evidence found in the apartment. The Court of Appeals agreed
that suppression of the prewarrant evidence was the proper remedy
for the first violation, but prescribed no remedy for the second.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE does not agree that there was a second violation,
and the Court concludes that the unconstitutional conduct that did
occur was neutralized by the ultimate issuance of a valid warrant.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court correctly recognizes that
the law requires suppression of the evidence if it was " "come
at by exploitation of [the initial] illegality,"'" instead of "`"by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint."'" Ante at 468 U. S. 804 -805 (quoting Wong Sn v. United
States, 371 U. S. 471 , 371 U. S. 488 (1963)). The Court fails, however, to discuss the reason for that
rule or how it should apply to the facts of this case. III Every time a court holds that unconstitutionally obtained
evidence may not be used in a criminal trial, it is acutely aware
of the social costs that such a holding entails. [ Footnote 2/21 ] Only Page 468 U. S. 828 the most compelling reason could justify the repeated imposition
of such costs on society. That reason, of course, is to prevent
violations of the Constitution from occurring. [ Footnote 2/22 ]

															As the Court has repeatedly stated, a principal purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.
S. 465 , 428 U. S. 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.
S. 433 , 428 U. S.
446 -447 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 , 422 U. S.
536 -539 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 , 414 U. S.
347 -348 (1974).

															"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose
is to deter -- to compel respect for the constitutional Page 468 U. S. 829 guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing
the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.
S. 206 , 364 U. S. 217 (1960).

															The deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule sometimes,
but not always, requires that it be applied to the indirect
consequences of a constitutional violation. If the government could
utilize evidence obtained through exploitation of illegal conduct,
it would retain an incentive to engage in that conduct.

															"To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized [as
illegal] but to put no curb on their full indirect use would only
invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty.'" Nardone v. United States, 308 U.
S. 338 , 308 U. S. 340 (1939).

															We have not, however, mechanically applied the rule to every
item of evidence that has a causal connection with police
misconduct.

															"The notion of the 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark
the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police
action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 , 422 U. S. 609 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring in part). [ Footnote 2/23 ]

															This point is well illustrated by our cases concerning the use
of confessions obtained as the result of unlawful arrests. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963), we rejected a rule that any evidence that
would not have been obtained but for the illegal actions of the
police should be suppressed. See id. at 371 U. S.
487 -488, 371 U. S. 491 .
Yet in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.
S. 590 (1975), while continuing to reject a "but-for"
rule, see id. at 422 U. S. 603 ,
we held that the taint of an unlawful arrest could not be purged
merely by warning the arrestee of his right to remain silent and to
consult with Page 468 U. S. 830 counsel as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 (1966). We explained:

															"If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to
attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of
how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the
effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.
Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for
questioning or 'investigation,' would be encouraged by the
knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made
admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment
violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect,
a 'cure-all,' and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful
searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to 'a form of
words.'"

															422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
602 -603 (citation and footnote omitted).

															These holdings make it clear that taint questions do not depend
merely on questions of causation; causation is a necessary, but not
a sufficient, condition for exclusion. In addition, it must be
shown that exclusion is required to remove the incentive for the
police to engage in the unlawful conduct. When it is, exclusion is
mandated if the Fourth Amendment is to be more than "a form of
words." IV The Court concludes that the evidence introduced against
petitioners at trial was obtained from a source that was
"independent" of the prior illegality -- the search warrant. The
Court explains that, since the police had a legal basis for
obtaining and executing the search warrant, the fruits of the
authorized search were not produced by exploitation of the prior
illegality. Ante at 468 U. S.
814 -815. There are significant analytical difficulties
lurking in the Court's approach. First, the Court accepts the
distinction between the evidence Page 468 U. S. 831 obtained pursuant to the warrant and the evidence obtained
during the initial illegal entry. Ante at 468 U. S. 814 ; see also ante at 468 U. S. 812 (opinion of BURGER, C.J.). I would not draw a distinction between
the prewarrant evidence and the postwarrant evidence. The warrant
embraced both categories equally, and if there had been no unlawful
entry, there is no more reason to believe that the evidence in
plain view would have remained in the apartment and would have been
obtained when the warrant was executed than the evidence that was
concealed. The warrant provided an "independent" justification for
seizing all the evidence in the apartment -- that in plain view
just as much as the items that were concealed. The "plain view"
items were not actually removed from the apartment until the
warrant was executed; [ Footnote
2/24 ] thus, there was no more interference with petitioners'
possessory interest in those items than with their interest in the
concealed items. If the execution of a valid warrant takes the
poison out of the hidden fruit, I should think that it would also
remove the taint from the fruit in plain view. [ Footnote 2/25 ]

															Second, the Court's holding is inadequate to resolve the claims
raised by petitioners. The Court states that the fruits of the
judicially authorized search were untainted because

															"[n]o information obtained during the initial entry or
occupation of the apartment was needed or used by the agents to
secure the warrant." Ante at 468 U. S. 814 .
That is sufficient to dispose only of a claim that petitioners do
not make -- that the information which led to the issuance of the
search warrant was tainted. It does not dispose of the claim
that Page 468 U. S. 832 petitioners do make -- that the agents' access to the
fruits of the authorized search, rather than the information which led to that search, was a product of
illegal conduct. On this question, the length of the delay in
obtaining the warrant is surely relevant.

															If Segura had not returned home at all that night, or during the
next day, it is probable that the occupants of the apartment would
have become concerned, and might at least have destroyed the
records of their illegal transactions, or removed some of the
evidence. If one of the occupants had left the apartment and taken
evidence with him or her during the 18-20-hour period prior to the
execution of the search warrant, then obviously that evidence would
not have been accessible to the agents when the warrant finally was
executed. [ Footnote 2/26 ] The
District Court concluded that there was a possibility that the
evidence's availability when the warrant was executed hinged solely
on the illegal impoundment. It found:

															"The evidence would not inevitably have been discovered. In
fact, Colon might well have destroyed the evidence had she not been
illegally excluded [from the apartment]."

															App. 15. This finding indicates that there is substantial doubt
as to whether all of the evidence that was actually seized would
have been discovered if there had been no illegal entry and
occupation.

															The majority insists that the idea that access to evidence is a
relevant consideration is "unsound" because it would "extend" the
exclusionary rule and "further protect' criminal activity," ante at 468 U. S. 816 .
However, this very point is far from Page 468 U. S. 833 novel; it actually has been the long-settled rule. It is
implicit in virtually every case in which we have applied the
exclusionary rule. In the seminal case, Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914), federal agents illegally entered Weeks' house and seized
evidence. The Court ordered the evidence suppressed precisely
because, absent the illegality, the agents would never have
obtained access to the evidence. See id. at 232 U. S.
393 -394. More recently, in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), we held that suppression was required because the agents
were not authorized to enter the house; it was the Fourth Amendment
violation that enabled them to obtain access to the evidence.
Indeed, we have regularly invoked the exclusionary rule because the
evidence would have eluded the police absent the illegality.
[ Footnote 2/27 ] Here, too, if the
evidence would not have been available to the agents at the time
they finally executed the warrant had they not illegally entered
and impounded petitioners' apartment, then it cannot be said that
the agents' access to the evidence was "independent" of the prior
illegality.

															The unlawful delay provides the same justification for
suppression as does the unlawful entry: both violations precluded
the possibility that evidence would have been moved out of the
reach of the agents. We approved of exactly that principle only
last Term, in United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 (1983). There, luggage was detained for some 90
minutes until a trained narcotics detection dog arrived. The dog
then sniffed the luggage, signaled the presence of narcotics, a Page 468 U. S. 834 warrant was obtained on the strength of the dog's reaction, and
when the warrant was executed, narcotics were discovered. The Court
held that, while the initial seizure was lawful, it became
unreasonable because of its duration. Thus, absent the illegality,
the authorities would have had to give the luggage back to Place,
who would have then taken it away. [ Footnote 2/28 ] The evidence was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment because it was the unlawful delay
that prevented the evidence from disappearing before it could be
obtained by the authorities. That is precisely the claim made
by petitioners here.

															When it finally does confront petitioners' claim concerning the
relationship between the unlawful occupation of their apartment and
the evidence obtained at the conclusion of that occupation, ante at 468 U. S.
815 -816, the Court rejects it for two reasons. First, it
finds the possibility that the evidence would not have been in the
apartment had it not been impounded to be speculative. However, the
District Court found a distinct, nonspeculative possibility that
the evidence would not have been available to the police had they
not entered the apartment illegally. The Court is obligated to
respect that finding unless found to be clearly erroneous, which it
is not. Indeed, it is equally speculative to assume that the
occupants of the apartment would not have become concerned enough
to take some action had Segura been missing for 18-20 hours.
[ Footnote 2/29 ] Second, the Court
thinks it "prudentially unsound" Page 468 U. S. 835 to suppress the evidence, noting a certain irony in extending
the protection of the Constitution simply because criminals may
destroy evidence if given the chance. This analysis confuses two
separate issues however: (1) whether the initial entry was
justified by exigent circumstances; and (2) whether the discovery
of the evidence can be characterized as "inevitable"
notwithstanding the 18-hour delay. There is no dispute that the
risk of immediate destruction did not justify the entry.
The argument petitioners make is not that there was some immediate
threat of destruction of evidence, but that there was a substantial
possibility that, over the course of 18-20 hours, at least some of
the evidence would have been removed or destroyed. [ Footnote 2/30 ] Page 468 U. S. 836 For me, however, the controlling question should not be answered
merely on the basis of such speculation, but rather by asking
whether the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule would be
served or undermined by suppression of this evidence. That is the
appropriate "prudential" consideration identified in our
exclusionary rule cases. The District Court found that there was a
distinct possibility that the evidence was preserved only through
an illegal occupation of petitioners' apartment. That possibility
provides a sufficient reason for asking whether the deterrent
rationale of the exclusionary rule is applicable to the second
constitutional violation committed by the police in this case. V The importance of applying the exclusionary rule to the police
conduct in this case is underscored by its facts. The 18-20-hour
occupation of petitioners' home was blatantly unconstitutional. At
the same time, the law enforcement justification for engaging in
such conduct is exceedingly weak. There can be no justification for
inordinate delay in securing a warrant. Thus, applying the
exclusionary rule to such conduct would impair no legitimate
interest in law enforcement. Moreover, the deterrence rationale of
the rule is plainly applicable. The agents impounded this apartment
precisely because they wished to avoid risking a loss of access to
the evidence within it. Thus, the unlawful benefit they acquired
through the impoundment was not so "attenuated" as to make it
unlikely that the deprivation of that benefit through the
exclusionary rule would have a deterrent effect. To the contrary,
it was exactly the benefit identified by the District Page 468 U. S. 837 Court -- avoiding a risk of loss of evidence -- that motivated
the agents in this case to violate the Constitution. Thus, the
policies underlying the exclusionary rule demand that some
deterrent be created to this kind of unconstitutional conduct. Yet
the majority's disposition of this case creates none. Under the
majority's approach, the agents could have remained indefinitely --
impounding the apartment for a week or a month -- without being
deprived of the advantage derived from the unlawful impoundment. We
cannot expect such an approach to prevent similar violations of the
Fourth Amendment in the future.

															In my opinion the exclusionary rule should be applied to both of
the constitutional violations to deprive the authorities of the
advantage they gained as a result of their unconstitutional entry
and impoundment of petitioners' apartment. The deterrence rationale
of the exclusionary rule requires suppression unless the Government
can prove that the evidence in fact would have remained in the
apartment had it not been unlawfully impounded. The risk of
uncertainty as to what would have happened absent the illegal
conduct posed by the facts of this case should be borne by the
party that created that uncertainty, the Government. That is the
teaching of our exclusionary rule cases. See Taylor v.
Alabama, 457 U. S. 687 , 457 U. S. 690 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200 , 442 U. S. 218 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
604 .

															Further proceedings are necessary in this case if petitioners'
claim is to be properly evaluated. The District Court found only
that there was a demonstrable possibility that the evidence
obtained during the execution of the search warrant would have been
destroyed absent the illegal entry and impoundment. While this
finding is sufficient to establish prima facie that the
Government exploited the illegality by avoiding a risk of losing
the evidence in the apartment, the existence of a mere possibility
cannot be equated with an ultimate finding that such exploitation
did in fact occur. The Page 468 U. S. 838 District Court made no specific finding as to whether the
Government had demonstrated that the evidence obtained pursuant to
the search warrant would have remained in the apartment had the
agents not illegally entered and impounded it. It may be that an
evidentiary hearing would be necessary to supplement the record on
this point. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the Court of
Appeals with instructions that it be remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings. VI The Government did not contest the blatant unconstitutionality
of the agents' conduct in this case. Nevertheless, today's holding
permits federal agents to benefit from that conduct by avoiding the
risk that evidence would be unavailable when the search warrant was
finally executed. The majority's invocation of the "enormous price"
of the exclusionary rule, and its stated unwillingness to "protect
criminal activity," ante at 468 U. S. 816 ,
is the most persuasive support that the Court provides for its
holding. Of course, the Court is quite right to be ever mindful of
the cost of excessive attention to procedural safeguards. But an
even-handed approach to difficult cases like this requires
attention to countervailing considerations as well. There are two
that I would stress.

															First, we should consider the impact of the Court's holding on
the leaders of the law enforcement community who have achieved
great success in creating the kind of trained, professional
officers who deservedly command the respect of the communities they
serve. The image of the "keystone cop" whose skills seldom
transcended the ham-handed employment of the "third degree" is
largely a matter of memory for those of us who lived through the
1920's, 1930's and 1940's. For a congeries of reasons, among which
unquestionably is the added respect for the constitutional rights
of the individual engendered by cases like Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.
S. 643 (1961), the professionalism that has always
characterized the Federal Page 468 U. S. 839 Bureau of Investigation is now typical of police forces
throughout the land. A rule of law that is predicated on the absurd
notion that a police officer does not have the skill required to
obtain a valid search warrant in less than 18 or 20 hours, or that
fails to deter the authorities from delaying unreasonably their
attempt to obtain a warrant after they have entered a home, is
demeaning to law enforcement, and can only encourage sloppy,
undisciplined procedures.

															Second, the Court's rhetoric cannot disguise the fact that, when
it not only tolerates but also provides an affirmative incentive
for warrantless and plainly unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions
into the home, the resulting erosion of the sanctity of the home is
a "price" paid by the innocent and guilty alike. [ Footnote 2/31 ] More than half a century ago,
Justice Holmes explained why the Government cannot be permitted to
benefit from its violations of the Constitution.

															"The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning
the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to avail itself of
the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not
have had. " Page 468 U. S. 840 "The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that
although, of course, its seizure was an outrage which the
Government now regrets, . . . the protection of the Constitution
covers the physical possession, but not any advantages that the
Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the
forbidden act. . . . In our opinion, such is not the law. It
reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. The essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before
the Court, but that it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.
S. 385 , 251 U. S.
391 -392 (1920) (citation omitted).

															If we are to give more than lipservice to protection of the core
constitutional interests that were twice violated in this case,
some effort must be made to isolate and then remove the advantages
the Government derived from its illegal conduct.

															I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															THE CHIEF JUSTICE seems to think that this problem was caused by
the unavailability of a magistrate to issue a warrant at this hour, ante, at 468 U. S.
812 -813. However, as the Government candidly admits, the
fault here lies not with the judiciary, but with the United States
Attorney's office for failing to exercise due diligence in
attempting to procure a warrant. One of the agents testified that
the Assistant United States Attorney told him only that
" perhaps a Magistrate could not be found at that
particular time in the evening." Tr. 154 (emphasis supplied). The
Assistant United States Attorney testified that he did not even
attempt to locate a magistrate or obtain a search warrant. Id. at 441-442. As the Government concedes in its
brief:

															"It is not clear why a greater effort was not made to obtain a
search warrant when the officers first sought one, and we do not
condone the failure to do so. . . . We note that, subsequent to the
events in this case, the United States Attorney circulated an
internal memorandum reemphasizing that search warrants should be
sought when at all possible, regardless of the hour, in order to
avoid the need for warrantless entries to secure premises."

															Brief for United States 40, n. 23.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Based on the information they had been given prior to their
arrival at the apartment, the agents believed, correctly as it
turned out, that Segura was not in the apartment. Tr. 394.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] Id. at 366, 392.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															However, none of this evidence could be seen until after the
agents had entered the apartment. Id. at 405.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															In Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 (1970), we held that, absent a demonstrable threat of imminent
destruction of evidence, the authorities may not enter a residence
in order to preserve that evidence without a warrant. See also
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 , 342 U. S. 51 -52
(1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451 , 335 U. S.
454 -455 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S. 13 -15
(1948). The illegality is even more plain in this case, because the
entry was effected by force late at night.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.
S. 170 , 466 U. S. 177 (1984); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.
S. 765 , 463 U. S. 771 (1983); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.
S. 276 , 460 U. S.
280 -281 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.
S. 735 , 442 U. S.
739 -741 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 9 (1968).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ] See also e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.
S. 740 , 466 U. S. 748 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.
S. 287 , 464 U. S.
296 -297 (1984) (plurality opinion); Steagald v.
United States, 451 U. S. 204 , 451 U. S. 212 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 , 445 U. S.
583 -590 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 403 U. S. 481 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S.
455 -456; Johnson V. United States, 333 U.S. at 333 U. S.
13 -14.

															v. United States, 451 U. S. 204 , 451 U. S. 212 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S.
583 -590 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 , 403 U. S. 481 (1971); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at 335 U. S.
455 -456; Johnson V. United States, 333 U.S. at 333 U. S.
13 -14.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ] See also 395 U.S. at 395 U. S.
764 -765:

															"It is argued in the present case that it is 'reasonable' to
search a man's house when he is arrested in it. But that argument
is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding the
acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on
considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment interests. Under such
an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area
would approach the evaporation point. It is not easy to explain
why, for instance, it is less subjectively 'reasonable' to search a
man's house when he is arrested on his front lawn or just down the
street -- than it is when he happens to be in the house at the time
of arrest."

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															At oral argument, the Government conceded that the agents'
occupation of the apartment constituted a "continuing search" for
exactly this reason. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 31.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ] See United States v. Karo, ante at 468 U. S.
712 -713; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U. S. 109 , 466 U. S.
120 -121, 124-125 (1984); United States v.
Place, 462 U. S. 696 , 462 U. S.
707 -708 (1983); id. at 462 U. S. 716 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 , 460 U. S.
747 -748 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in
judgment).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															While Segura was lawfully in custody during this period, Colon
and her three companions were not. They were unknown to the agents
prior to the illegal entry, and, as the District Court noted, would
have been able to remain in the apartment free from governmental
interference had the unlawful entry not occurred.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															THE CHIEF JUSTICE's parsimonious approach to Fourth Amendment
rights is vividly illustrated by the fact that, as though he were
preparing an adversary's brief, he is unwilling even to acknowledge
explicitly that the apartment and its contents were seized, but
only "assum[es]" that was the case. Ante at 468 U. S.
806 .

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 , 437 U. S. 393 (1978); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.
S. 338 , 429 U. S.
358 -359 (1977); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 34 -35; Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 395 U. S.
762 -763 (1969).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															THE CHIEF JUSTICE's misuse of Place, ante at 468 U. S. 813 ,
n. 8, is quite remarkable. He suggests that Place approved
the almost 3-day detention of Place's luggage before a warrant was
obtained, when in fact the Court had no occasion to reach that
issue because it held that the initial 90-minute detention of the
luggage pending a "sniff test" using a trained narcotics-detecting
dog was unreasonable. See 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 710 .
Other than this reference to Place, THE CHIEF JUSTICE's
diligent search for support for his holding has produced nothing
but dissenting opinions and a law review article. See ante at 468 U. S.
809 -810, n. 7. Dean Griswold's article, however, did not
even purport to answer the question presented by this case. See Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969 -- Is It a Means or
an End?, 29 Md.L.Rev. 307, 317 (1969).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															Since these premises were impounded "from the inside," I assume
impoundment would be permissible even absent exigent circumstances
when it occurs "from the outside" -- when the authorities merely
seal off premises pending the issuance of a warrant but do not
enter.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ] See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.
S. 204 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.
S. 385 (1978); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S.
30 (1970). In fact, except for an aberrational
warrantless "search incident to an arrest" exception recognized in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56 (1950), and repudiated by Chimel, this rule
has been settled since Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 , 269 U. S. 32 -33
(1925). See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.
S. 699 (1948).

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															The only explanation the Government has offered for the delay is
that most of February 13 was taken up with "processing" the
arrests. Brief for United States 5, n. 4. At oral argument, the
Government conceded that the delay was unreasonable. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 27. At the suppression hearing in the District Court, one of
the agents testified that the warrant application was not even
presented to a Magistrate until 5 p.m. on February 13. He
explained: "Well, it's very hard to get secretarial services
today." Tr. 162-163. The Assistant United States Attorney
responsible for procuring the warrant testified similarly. Id. at 445. The attorney did not explain why he did not
simply write out the two-page application by hand, or seek a
telephonic warrant under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(c)(2). The District Court found that the delay was unreasonable,
App. 15-16, a finding that the Court of Appeals did not disturb.
The Government does not challenge that finding in this Court.

															[ Footnote 2/18 ] See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 22 ; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 , 379 U. S. 97 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98 , 361 U. S. 102 (1959).

															[ Footnote 2/19 ] United States v. Leon, post at 468 U. S. 915 ,
n. 13.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ] Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980).

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															Justice Holmes commented on this dilemma:

															"[W]e must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we
cannot have, and make up our minds which to choose. It is desirable
that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all
available evidence should be used. It also is desirable that the
Government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes when
they are the means by which the evidence is to be obtained. If it
pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see
why it may not as well pay them for getting it in the same way, and
I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it
knowingly accepts and pays and announces that, in future, it will
pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and, for my part, I think it
a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.
S. 438 , 277 U. S. 470 (1928) (dissenting opinion).

															[ Footnote 2/22 ]

															Justice Stewart has written:

															"[T]he Framers did not intend the Bill of Rights to be no more
than unenforceable guiding principles -- no more than a code of
ethics under an honor system. The proscriptions and guarantees in
the amendments were intended to create legal rights and
duties."

															"The Bill of Rights is but one component of our legal system --
the one that limits the government's reach. The primary
responsibility for enforcing the Constitution's limits on
government, at least since the time of Marbury v. Madison, has been vested in the judicial branch. In general, when law
enforcement officials violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights,
they do so in attempting to obtain evidence for use in criminal
proceedings. To give effect to the Constitution's prohibition
against illegal searches and seizures, it may be necessary for the
judiciary to remove the incentive for violating it. Thus, it may be
argued that, although the Constitution does not explicitly provide
for exclusion, the need to enforce the Constitution's limits on
government -- to preserve the rule of law -- requires an
exclusionary rule."

															Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule, 83
Colum.L.Rev. 1365, 1383-1384 (1983) (footnotes omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/23 ] See 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(a) (1978);
Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112
U.Pa.L.Rev. 378, 388-390 (1964); Pitler, "The Fruit of the
Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 Calif.L.Rev. 579,
586-589 (1968).

															[ Footnote 2/24 ]

															Tr. 259.

															[ Footnote 2/25 ]

															I recognize that the legality of the seizure of the evidence
that was in plain view when the officers entered is not before us,
but I find it necessary to discuss it since it affects the analysis
of the issue that is in dispute. THE CHIEF JUSTICE does so as well;
he relies on the deterrent effect of the suppression of the
evidence found in plain view in responding to petitioners' argument
that the Court of Appeals' decision will encourage illegal entries
in the course of securing premises from the inside. Ante at 468 U. S.
812 .

															[ Footnote 2/26 ]

															It is by no means impossible that at least one of the occupants
might have been able to leave the apartment. None of them was known
to the agents, and if the agents were located outside the apartment
building, they would not have known that a person leaving the
building would have come from petitioners' apartment. There were
quite a few apartments on each floor of the apartment building. Tr.
253. Moreover, as the District Court noted, the agents could not
see petitioners' apartment from their position in the front of the
building.

															[ Footnote 2/27 ]

															The element of access, rather than information, is central to
virtually the whole of our jurisprudence under the Warrant Clause
of the Fourth Amendment. In all of our cases suppressing evidence
because it was obtained pursuant to a warrantless search, we have
focused not on the authorities' lack of appropriate information to
authorize the search, but rather on the fact that that information
was not presented to a magistrate. Thus, suppression is the
consequence not of a lack of information, but of the fact that the
authorities' access to the evidence in question was not properly
authorized, and hence was unconstitutional.

															[ Footnote 2/28 ]

															Even more recently, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.
S. 740 (1984), we again employed this concept. The Court
held that police could not justify under the Fourth Amendment the
warrantless arrest of Welsh, who was suspected of drunken driving,
in his own home, "simply because evidence of the petitioner's
blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained
a warrant." Id. at 466 U. S. 754 (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/29 ]

															The Court of Appeals, with which this Court agrees, noted that
the District Court's ruling depended on "speculative assumptions,"
such as that the agents would not have kept the apartment under
surveillance after Segura's arrest had they not illegally entered
it, that Colon would have �destroyed the evidence, rather than
merely removed it from the apartment, or that the evidence could
have been destroyed unobtrusively. However, each of these
"assumptions" is supported by the evidence. First, the agents would
have had no reason to keep the apartment under surveillance
subsequent to the arrests of all the persons that they had
surveilled, Parra, Rivudalla-Vidal, and Segura. Second, even if
Colon had merely removed the evidence from the apartment, there is
reason to believe the agents would not have intercepted her. See 468
U.S. 796 fn2/26|>n. 26, supra. Third, since the
agents were outside the apartment, and would have had no reason to
remain on the scene after Segura's arrest, they would not have been
around to notice had evidence been removed or destroyed
unobtrusively. Moreover, even if it would have been difficult to
remove or destroy some of the evidence, such as the triple-beam
scale petitioners owned, that does not mean that all of the
evidence would have remained in the apartment over the course of an
18-20-hour period. The Court of Appeals' assumptions to the
contrary are just as "speculative" as the finding of the District
Court.

															[ Footnote 2/30 ]

															The cases in the lower courts the majority cites in support of
its holding, ante at 468 U. S. 814 ,
n. 9, are plainly distinguishable. In United States v.
Perez, 700 F.2d 1232, 1237-1238 (CA8 1983), the court remanded
for a hearing as to whether the search and seizure authorized by a
warrant was tainted by prior illegality. In United States v.
Kinney, 638 F.2d 941, 945 (CA6), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 918 (1981), the court found no taint, but in that case there
was no occupation of the searched premises prior to obtaining the
warrant, and hence no claim of the type made here. The same is true
of the other cases the Court cites, United States v.
Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174, 1180-1181 (CA11 1982); United States
v. Fitzharris, 633 F.2d 416 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981); United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d
324, 338 (CA2), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834 (1980). As the
Court concedes, United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886 (CA9
1983), and United States v. Allard, 634 F.2d 1182 (CA9
1980), are contrary to its holding.

															[ Footnote 2/31 ]

															The words that this case calls to my mind are not those of Nardone ante at 468 U. S. 816 ,
but rather those in two of Justice Jackson's dissents. With respect
to the claim that the Fourth Amendment "protect[s] criminal
activity," he wrote:

															"Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention
of the courts, and then only those where the search and seizure
yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least
sufficiently compromised to be indicted. . . . Courts can protect
the innocent against such invasions only indirectly, and through
the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who
frequently are guilty. . . . So a search against Brinegar's car
must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 , 338 U. S. 181 (1949). And with respect to the "price" exacted by the exclusionary
rule, he wrote:

															"[T]he forefathers thought this was not too great a price to pay
for that decent privacy of home, papers and effects which is
indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect. They may have
overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their command at
naught." Harris v. United States, 331 U.
S. 145 , 331 U. S. 198 (1947).