U.S. Supreme Court Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967) Camara v. Municipal Court of the
City and County of San Francisco No. 92 Argued February 15,
1967 Decided June 5, 1967 387
U.S. 523 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT Syllabus Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing
Code for refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors
to secure his consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the
ground-floor quarters which he leased and residential use of which
allegedly violated the apartment building's occupancy permit.
Claiming the inspection ordinance unconstitutional for failure to
require a warrant for inspections, appellant while awaiting trial,
sued in a State Superior Court for a writ of prohibition, which the
court denied. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.
S. 360 , and similar cases, the District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. The State Supreme Court denied a petition for
hearing. Held: 1. The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has
refused to permit a warrantless code enforcement inspection of his
personal residence. Frank v. Maryland, supra, pro tanto overruled. Pp. 387 U. S.
528 -534.

															(a) The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is
enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through its
prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions
by governmental officials. P. 387 U. S.
528 .

															(b) With certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented
warrantless search of private property is "unreasonable." Pp. 387 U. S.
528 -529.

															(c) Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland,
supra, Fourth Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral"
where municipal fire, health, and housing inspection programs are
involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of physical
conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs,
moreover, are enforceable by criminal process, as is refusal to
allow an inspection. Pp. 387 U. S.
529 -531.

															(d) Warrantless administrative searches cannot be justified on
the grounds that they make minimal demands on occupants; Page 387 U. S. 524 that warrant in such cases are unfeasible; or that area
inspection programs could not function under reasonable search
warrant requirements. Pp. 387 U. S.
531 -533.

															2. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be
issued for area code enforcement inspections is not dependent on
the inspector's belief that a particular dwelling violates the
code, but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's
appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to
guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will
necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Pp. 387 U. S.
534 -539.

															3. Search warrants which are required in nonemergency situations
should normally be sought only after entry is refused. Pp. 387 U. S.
539 -540.

															4. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to
insist that the inspectors obtain a search warrant. P. 387 U. S.
540 . 237 Cal. App.
2d 128 , 46 Cal. Rptr. 585, vacated and remanded. Page 387 U. S. 525 MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 ,
this Court upheld, by a five-to-four vote, a state court conviction
of a homeowner who refused to permit a municipal health inspector
to enter and inspect his premises without a search warrant. In Eaton v. Price, 364 U. S. 263 , a
similar conviction was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Since
those closely divided decisions, more intensive efforts at all
levels of government to contain and eliminate urban blight have led
to increasing use of such inspection techniques, while numerous
decisions of this Court have more fully defined the Fourth
Amendment's effect on state and municipal action. E.g., Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 ; Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 . In
view of the growing nationwide importance of the problem, we noted
probable jurisdiction in this case and in See v. City of
Seattle, post, p. 387 U. S. 541 , to
reexamine whether administrative inspection programs, as presently
authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those
rights are enforced against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 385 U.S. 808.

															Appellant brought this action in a California Superior Court
alleging that he was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of
violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a
warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of
prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the
ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its
face. The Superior Court denied the writ, the District Court of
Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a
petition for hearing. Appellant properly raised and had considered
by the California courts the federal constitutional questions he
now presents to this Court.

															Though there were no judicial findings of fact in this
prohibition proceeding, we shall set forth the parties' factual
allegations. On November 6, 1963, an inspector Page 387 U. S. 526 of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a
routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city's
Housing Code. [ Footnote 1 ] The
building's manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of
the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal
residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not
allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted
appellant and demanded that he permit an inspection of the
premises. Appellant refused to allow the inspection because the
inspector lacked a search warrant.

															The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant,
and appellant again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was
then mailed ordering appellant to appear at the district attorney's
office. When appellant failed to appear, two inspectors returned to
his apartment on November 22. They informed appellant that he was
required by law to permit an inspection under § 503 of the Housing
Code:

															"Sec. 503 RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Authorized employees of the
City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for
the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper
credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any
building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty
imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. " Page 387 U. S. 527 Appellant nevertheless refused the inspectors access to his
apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was
filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in
violation of § 507 of the Code. [ Footnote 2 ] Appellant was arrested on December 2 and
released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was
denied, appellant filed this petition for a writ of
prohibition.

															Appellant has argued throughout this litigation that § 503 is
contrary to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it
authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without
a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a
violation of the Housing Code exists therein. Consequently,
appellant contends, he may not be prosecuted under § 507 for
refusing to permit an inspection unconstitutionally authorized by §
503. Relying on Frank v. Maryland, Eaton v. Price, and
decisions in other States, [ Footnote 3 ] the District Page 387 U. S. 528 Court of Appeal held that § 503 does not violate Fourth
Amendment rights because it

															"is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil,
rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a
right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be
exercised under unreasonable conditions."

															Having concluded that Frank v. Maryland, to the extent
that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled,
we reverse. I The Fourth Amendment provides that,

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."

															The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a
right of the people which "is basic to a free society." Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 , 338 U. S. 27 . As
such, the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , 374 U. S.
30 .

															Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract
prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" into
workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a
difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this
Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history
and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except
in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent Page 387 U. S. 529 is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 ; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451 ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 . As the Court explained in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10 , 333 U. S.
14 :

															"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also
a grave concern not only to the individual, but to a society, which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to
the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent."

															In Frank v. Maryland, this Court upheld the conviction
of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private
premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected
public nuisance. Although Frank can arguably be
distinguished from this case on its facts, [ Footnote 4 ] the Frank opinion has generally
been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the rule
that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. See Eaton v. Price, supra. The District Court
of Appeal so interpreted Frank in this case, and that
ruling is the core of appellant's challenge here. We proceed to a
reexamination of the factors which Page 387 U. S. 530 persuaded the Frank majority to adopt this construction
of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches.

															To the Frank majority, municipal fire, health, and
housing inspection programs

															"touch at most upon the periphery of the important interests
safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against
official intrusion,"

															359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367 ,
because the inspections are merely to determine whether physical
conditions exist which do not comply with minimum standards
prescribed in local regulatory ordinances. Since the inspector does
not ask that the property owner open his doors to a search for
"evidence of criminal action" which may be used to secure the
owner's criminal conviction, historic interests of
"self-protection" jointly protected by the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments [ Footnote 5 ] are
said not to be involved, but only the less intense "right to be
secure from intrusion into personal privacy." Id. at 359 U. S.
365 .

															We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition
of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical
policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.
For this reason alone, Frank differed from the great bulk
of Fourth Amendment cases which have been considered by this Court.
But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in
these inspection cases are merely "peripheral." It is surely
anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
suspected of criminal behavior. [ Footnote 6 ] For instance, even the most law-abiding
citizen Page 387 U. S. 531 has a very tangible interest in limiting the circumstances under
which the sanctity of his home may be broken by official authority,
for the possibility of criminal entry under the guise of official
sanction is a serious threat to personal and family security. And
even accepting Frank's rather remarkable premise,
inspections of the kind we are here considering do, in fact,
jeopardize "self-protection" interests of the property owner. Like
most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced
by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by
the inspector leads to a criminal complaint. [ Footnote 7 ] Even in cities where discovery of a
violation produces only an administrative compliance order,
[ Footnote 8 ] refusal to comply
is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is verified by a
second inspection, again without a warrant. [ Footnote 9 ] Finally, as this case demonstrates,
refusal to permit an inspection is itself a crime, punishable by
fine or even by jail sentence.

															The Frank majority suggested, and appellee reasserts,
two other justifications for permitting administrative health and
safety inspections without a warrant. First, it is argued that
these inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand
on the individual occupant." 359 U.S. at 359 U. S. 367 .
The ordinances authorizing inspections are hedged with safeguards,
and at any rate the inspector's particular decision to enter must
comply with the constitutional standard of reasonableness even if
he may enter without a warrant. [ Footnote 10 ] In addition, the argument Page 387 U. S. 532 proceeds, the warrant process could not function effectively in
this field. The decision to inspect an entire municipal area is
based upon legislative or administrative assessment of broad
factors such as the area's age and condition. Unless the magistrate
is to review such policy matters, he must issue a "rubber stamp"
warrant which provides no protection at all to the property
owner.

															In our opinion, these arguments unduly discount the purposes
behind the warrant machinery contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.
Under the present system, when the inspector demands entry, the
occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal
code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of
knowing the lawful limits of the inspector's power to search, and
no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under
proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by
a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency
decision to canvass an area. Yet only by refusing entry and risking
a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the
inspector's decision to search. And even if the occupant possesses
sufficient fortitude to take this risk, as appellant did here, he
may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection than
that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The
practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to
the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the
discretion to invade private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant
the need to Page 387 U. S. 533 search. See cases cited p. 387 U. S. 529 supra. We simply cannot say that the protections provided
by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad
statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review,
particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk
of a criminal penalty.

															The final justification suggested for warrantless administrative
searches is that the public interest demands such a rule: it is
vigorously argued that the health and safety of entire urban
populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, housing,
and sanitation standards, and that the only effective means of
enforcing such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all
physical structures. Of course, in applying any reasonableness
standard, including one of constitutional dimension, an argument
that the public interest demands a particular rule must receive
careful consideration. But we think this argument misses the mark.
The question is not, at this stage, at least, whether these
inspections may be made, but whether they may be made without a
warrant. For example, to say that gambling raids may not be made at
the discretion of the police without a warrant is not necessarily
to say that gambling raids may never be made. In assessing whether
the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether
the public interest justifies the type of search in question, but
whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant,
which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.
S. 757 , 384 U. S.
770 -771. It has nowhere been urged that fire, health,
and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals
within the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement.
Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive. Page 387 U. S. 534 In summary, we hold that administrative searches of the kind at
issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected
by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches, when authorized and
conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual,
and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in
other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are
insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Because of the nature of the municipal
programs under consideration, however, these conclusions must be
the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry. The Frank majority gave recognition to the unique character of these
inspection programs by refusing to require search warrants; to
reject that disposition does not justify ignoring the question
whether some other accommodation between public need and individual
rights is essential. II The Fourth Amendment provides that, "no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause." Borrowing from more typical Fourth Amendment
cases, appellant argues not only that code enforcement inspection
programs must be circumscribed by a warrant procedure, but also
that warrants should issue only when the inspector possesses
probable cause to believe that a particular dwelling contains
violations of the minimum standards prescribed by the code being
enforced. We disagree.

															In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant
to search be obtained, "probable cause" is the standard by which a
particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional
mandate of reasonableness. To apply this standard, it is obviously
necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which
allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally
protected Page 387 U. S. 535 interests of the private citizen. For example, in a criminal
investigation, the police may undertake to recover specific stolen
or contraband goods. But that public interest would hardly justify
a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that
these goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods,
even with a warrant, is "reasonable" only when there is "probable
cause" to believe that they will be uncovered in a particular
dwelling.

															Unlike the search pursuant to a criminal investigation, the
inspection programs at issue here are aimed at securing city-wide
compliance with minimum physical standards for private property.
The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the
unintentional development of conditions which are hazardous to
public health and safety. Because fires and epidemics may ravage
large urban areas, because unsightly conditions adversely affect
the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous courts have
upheld the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce
such minimum standards even upon existing structures. [ Footnote 11 ] In determining whether
a particular inspection is reasonable -- and thus in determining
whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant for that
inspection -- the need for the inspection must be weighed in terms
of these reasonable goals of code enforcement.

															There is unanimous agreement among those most familiar with this
field that the only effective way to seek universal compliance with
the minimum standards required by municipal codes is through
routine periodic Page 387 U. S. 536 inspections of all structures. [ Footnote 12 ] It is here that the probable cause debate is
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is
unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a
whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in each particular
building. Appellee contends that, if the probable cause standard
urged by appellant is adopted, the area inspection will be
eliminated as a means of seeking compliance with code standards,
and the reasonable goals of code enforcement will be dealt a
crushing blow.

															In meeting this contention, appellant argues, first, that his
probable cause standard would not jeopardize area inspection
programs because only a minute portion of the population will
refuse to consent to such inspections, and second, that individual
privacy, in any event, should be given preference to the public
interest in conducting such inspections. The first argument, even
if true, is irrelevant to the question whether the area inspection
is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
second argument is, in effect, an assertion that the area
inspection is an unreasonable search. Unfortunately, there can be
no ready test for determining reasonableness Page 387 U. S. 537 other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails. But we think that a number of persuasive
factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code
enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history
of judicial and public acceptance. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. at 359 U. S.
367 -371. Second, the public interest demands that all
dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful
that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable
results. Many such conditions -- faulty wiring is an obvious
example -- are not observable from outside the building, and indeed
may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally,
because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at
the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively
limited invasion of the urban citizen's privacy. Both the majority
and the dissent in Frank emphatically supported this
conclusion:

															"Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to
inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic
area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of
indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a
power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of
the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts.
The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has
seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health
officials, and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but
an insignificant few. Certainly the nature of our society has not
vitiated the need for inspections first thought necessary 158 years
ago, nor has experience revealed any abuse or inroad on freedom in
meeting this need by means that history and dominant public opinion
have sanctioned."

															359 U.S. at 359 U. S.
372 . Page 387 U. S. 538 ". . . This is not to suggest that a health official need show
the same kind of proof to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one
must who would search for the fruits or instrumentalities of crime.
Where considerations of health and safety are involved, the facts
that would justify an inference of 'probable cause' to make an
inspection are clearly different from those that would justify such
an inference where a criminal investigation has been undertaken.
Experience may show the need for periodic inspections of certain
facilities without a further showing of cause to believe that
substandard conditions dangerous to the public are being
maintained. The passage of a certain period without inspection
might of itself be sufficient in a given situation to justify the
issuance of a warrant. The test of 'probable cause' required by the
Fourth Amendment can take into account the nature of the search
that is being sought. 359 U.S. at 359 U. S.
383 (MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting)."

															Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable"
search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, it is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant
to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative
standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling. Such standards, which will vary
with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the building ( e.g., a
multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area,
but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the
condition of the particular dwelling. It has been suggested that so
to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in
criminal cases would be to authorize a "synthetic search warrant,"
and thereby to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth
Amendment. Frank v. Maryland, 359 Page 387 U. S. 539 U.S. at 359 U. S. 373 .
But we do not agree. The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee
that a decision to search private property is justified by a
reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the
ultimate standard. If a valid public interest justifies the
intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a
suitably restricted search warrant. Cf. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co.
v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 .
Such an approach neither endangers time-honored doctrines
applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the
probable cause requirement in this area. It merely gives full
recognition to the competing public and private interests here at
stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind
the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government
invasions of privacy. See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S.
273 -274 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN). III Since our holding emphasizes the controlling standard of
reasonableness, nothing we say today is intended to foreclose
prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has
traditionally upheld in emergency situations. See North
American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.
S. 306 (seizure of unwholesome food); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (compulsory smallpox vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board
of Health, 186 U. S. 380 (health quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610,
165 N.E. 498 (summary destruction of tubercular cattle). On the
other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is
no compelling urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a
particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their
property without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter, and in
light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify
the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should
normally be sought only after entry is refused unless Page 387 U. S. 540 there has been a citizen complaint or there is other
satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the
requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any change in
what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations,
of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. IV In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his
refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without
a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in
fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an attempt
to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was
obtained, and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need
for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the
inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the
consent of the landlord, through the building's manager, but
appellee does not contend that such consent was sufficient to
authorize inspection of appellant's premises. Cf. Stoner v.
California, 376 U. S. 483 ; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 610 ; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451 . Assuming the facts to be as the parties have
alleged, we therefore conclude that appellant had a constitutional
right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and
that appellant may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing
to consent to the inspection. It appears from the opinion of the
District Court of Appeal that, under these circumstances, a writ of
prohibition will issue to the criminal court under California
law.

															The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, see post, p. 387 U. S.
546 .]

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The inspection was conducted pursuant to § 86(3) of the San
Francisco Municipal Code, which provides that apartment house
operators shall pay an annual license fee in part to defray the
cost of periodic inspections of their buildings. The inspections
are to be made by the Bureau of Housing Inspection "at least once a
year and as often thereafter as may be deemed necessary." The
permit of occupancy, which prescribes the apartment units which a
building may contain, is not issued until the license is
obtained.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"Sec. 507 PENALTY FOR VIOLATION. Any person, the owner or his
authorized agent who violates, disobeys, omits, neglects, or
refuses to comply with, or who resists or opposes the execution of
any of the provisions of this Code, or any order of the
Superintendent, the Director of Public Works, or the Director of
Public Health made pursuant to this Code, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00), or by imprisonment,
not exceeding six (6) months or by both such fine and imprisonment,
unless otherwise provided in this Code, and shall be deemed guilty
of a separate offense for every day such violation, disobedience,
omission, neglect or refusal shall continue."

															[ Footnote 3 ] Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956); City of St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d
948 (Mo.1960); State ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio
St. 123, 151 N.E.2d 523 (1958), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 364 U. S. 263 (1960). See also State v. Rees, 258 Iowa 813, 139 N.W.2d 406 (1966); Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222
N.E.2d 681 (1966), appeal docketed Jan. 5, 1967, No.
1179, Misc., O.T. 1966; People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304,
200 N.E.2d 441 (1964).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															In Frank, the Baltimore ordinance required that the
health inspector "have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists in
any house, cellar or enclosure" before he could demand entry
without a warrant, a requirement obviously met in Frank because the inspector observed extreme structural decay and a pile
of rodent feces on the appellant's premises. Section 503 of the San
Francisco Housing Code has no such "cause" requirement, but neither
did the Ohio ordinance at issue in Eaton v. Price, a case
which four Justices thought was controlled by Frank. 364
U.S. at 364 U. S. 264 , 364 U. S. 265 ,
n. 2 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

															[ Footnote 5 ] See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616 . Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 , 384 U. S.
766 -772.

															[ Footnote 6 ] See Abel v. United States, 362 U.
S. 217 , 362 U. S.
254 -256 (MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting); District
of Columbia v. Little, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 178 F.2d 13, aff'd, 339 U. S. 1 .

															[ Footnote 7 ] See New York, N.Y. Administrative Code § D26-8.0
(1964).

															[ Footnote 8 ] See Washington, D.C. Housing Regulations § 2104.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															This is the more prevalent enforcement procedure. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 801,
813-816.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The San Francisco Code requires that the inspector display
proper credentials, that he inspect "at reasonable times," and that
he not obtain entry by force, at least when there is no emergency.
The Baltimore ordinance in Frank required that the
inspector "have cause to suspect that a nuisance exists." Some
cities notify residents in advance, by mail or posted notice, of
impending area inspections. State courts upholding these
inspections without warrants have imposed a general reasonableness
requirement. See cases cited, n 3, supra. [ Footnote 11 ] See Abbate Bros. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. 2d
337 , 142 N.E.2d
691 ; City of Louisville v. Thompson, 339
S.W.2d 869 (Ky.); Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 7
N.E.2d 120; Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155
N.E.2d 775 ; Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C.
538, 88 S.E.2d
683 ; Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis.2d 318, 99
N.W.2d 156.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and
Conservation, 25 Law & Contemp.Prob. 705, 718 and n. 43;
Schwartz, Crucial Areas in Administrative Law, 34 Geo.Wash.L.Rev.
401, 423 and n. 93; Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement
of Substandard Housing, 53 Calif.L.Rev. 304, 316-317; Note,
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 801, 807,
851; Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 1115, 1124-1125.
Section 311(a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 79
Stat. 478, 42 U.S. C. § 1468 (1964 ed., Supp. I), authorizes grants
of federal funds

															"to cities, other municipalities, and counties for the purpose
of assisting such localities in carrying out programs of
concentrated code enforcement in deteriorated or deteriorating
areas in which such enforcement, together with those public
improvements to be provided by the locality, may be expected to
arrest the decline of the area."


U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956) United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co. No. 94 Argued February 28-29,
1956 Decided May 21, 1956 351
U.S. 192 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus After rulemaking proceedings under the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, in which respondent appeared, filed written
objections and argued orally, the Federal Communications Commission
amended its rules so as to provide, in effect, that it would issue
no license for an additional television broadcast station to any
party already having five such stations. On the same day, applying
this rule, the Commission dismissed, without hearing, respondent's
application for a license for an additional television broadcast
station, because respondent already had five such stations. Under
the Communications Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and 5
U.S.C. § 1034, respondent applied to the Court of Appeals for
review of the Commission's order amending its rule. Held: 1. Though the question of respondent's right to appeal was not
raised by either party or by the Court of Appeals, it may be
considered by this Court. P. 351 U. S.
197 .

															2. Respondent had standing to bring this action. Pp. 351 U. S.
198 -200.

															(a) The process of rulemaking having been completed, the amended
rules constituted final agency action within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Pp. 351 U. S.
198 -199.

															(b) The amended rules presently "aggrieve" respondent. Pp. 351 U. S.
199 -200.

															3. Section 309(b) of the Communications Act, which requires a
"full hearing" before denial of an application for a license, does
not prevent the Commission from adopting the rules here involved
limiting the number of broadcast stations that will be licensed to
any one party. Pp. 351 U. S.
200 -206.

															(a) Section 309 (b) entitles each applicant for a license to a
"full hearing," including the right to present his case or defense
by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and
to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and
true disclosure of the facts. P. 351 U. S.
202 .

															(b) However, § 309(b) does not withdraw from the Commission the
rulemaking authority necessary for the orderly conduct of its
business. Pp. 351 U. S.
202 -203. Page 351 U. S. 193 (c) Nor does § 309(b) bar rules that declare a present intent to
limit the number of stations consistent with a permissible
"concentration of control." Pp. 351 U. S.
203 -205.

															(d) The Act and rules are to be read as providing a "full
hearing" for applicants who have reached the existing limit of
stations, upon presentation of proper applications that set out
adequate reasons why the rules should be waived or amended. The
Act, considered as a whole, requires no more. P. 351 U. S.
205 .

															95 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 220 F.2d 204, reversed and remanded.

															MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The Federal Communications Commission issued, on August 19,
1948, a notice of proposed rulemaking under the authority of 47
U.S.C. §§ 303(r), 311, 313 and 314 (Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. ). It was proposed, so far
as is pertinent to this case, to amend Rules 3.35, 3.240, and 3.636
relating to Multiple Ownership of standard, FM and television
broadcast stations. Those rules provide that licenses for
broadcasting stations will not be granted if the applicant,
directly or indirectly, has an interest in other stations beyond a
limited number. The purpose of the limitations is to avoid
overconcentration of broadcasting facilities.

															As required by 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b), the notice permitted
"interested" parties to file statements or briefs. Such parties
might also intervene in appeals. 47 U.S.C. § 402(d) and (e).
Respondent, licensee of a number of radio and television stations,
filed a statement objecting to the proposed changes, as did other
interested broadcasters. Page 351 U. S. 194 Respondent based its objections largely on the fact that the
proposed rules did not allow one person to hold as many FM and
television stations as standard stations. Storer argued that such
limitations might cause irreparable financial damage to owners of
standard stations if an obsolescent standard station could not be
augmented by FM and television facilities.

															In November, 1953, the Commission entered an order amending the
Rules in question without significant changes from the proposed
forms. [ Footnote 1 ] A review
was sought Page 351 U. S. 195 in due course by respondent in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit under 5 U.S.C. § 1034, [ Footnote 2 ] 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), [ Footnote 3 ] and 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a),
(c). [ Footnote 4 ] Respondent
alleged it owned or controlled, within the meaning of the Multiple
Ownership Rules, seven standard radio, five FM radio, and five
television broadcast stations. It asserted that the Rules
complained of were in conflict with the statutory mandates that
applicants should be granted licenses if the public interest would
be served and that applicants must have a hearing before denial of
an application. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) and (b). [ Footnote 5 ] Page 351 U. S. 196 Respondent also claimed:

															"The Rules, in considering the ownership of one (1%) percent or
more of the voting stock of a broadcast licensee corporation as
equivalent to ownership, operation or control of the station, are
unreasonable and bear no rational relationship to the national
Anti-Trust policy."

															This latter claim was important to respondent because,
allegedly, 20% of its voting stock was in scattered ownership, and
was traded in by licensed dealers. This stock was thus beyond its
control.

															Respondent asserted it was a "party aggrieved" and a "person
suffering legal wrong" or adversely affected under the several
statutes that authorize review of FCC action. See notes 2 3 and | 3 and S.
192fn4|>4, supra. It stated its injuries from the Rules
thus:

															"Storer is adversely affected and aggrieved by the Order of the
Commission adopted on November 25, 1953, amending the Multiple
Ownership Rules, in that:"

															"(a) Storer is denied the right of a full and fair hearing to
determine whether its ownership of an interest in more than seven
(7) standard radio and five (5) television broadcast stations, in
light of and upon a showing of all material circumstances, will Page 351 U. S. 197 thereby serve the public interest, convenience and
necessity."

															"(b) The acquisition of Storer's voting stock by the public
under circumstances beyond the control of Storer, may and could be
violative of the Multiple Ownership rules, as amended, and result
in a forfeiture of licenses now held by Storer, with resultant loss
and injury to Storer and to all other Storer stockholders."

															On the day the amendments to the Rules were adopted, a pending
application of Storer for an additional television station at Miami
was dismissed on the basis of the Rules.

															While the question of respondent's right to appeal has not been
raised by either party or by the Court of Appeals, our jurisdiction
is now mooted. It may be considered. Federal Communications
Commission v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.
S. 239 , 319 U. S. 246 .
Jurisdiction depends upon standing to seek review, and upon
ripeness. If respondent could not rightfully seek review from the
order adopting the challenged regulations, it must await action to
its disadvantage under them, and neither the Court of Appeals nor
this Court has jurisdiction of the controversy. Under the
above-cited Code sections, review of Commission action is granted
any party aggrieved or suffering legal wrong by that action.
[ Footnote 6 ] Page 351 U. S. 198 We think respondent had standing to sue at the time it exercised
its privilege. The process of rulemaking was complete. It was final
agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) and (g), by which Storer claimed
to be "aggrieved." When the authority to appeal was substantially
the same, we held that an appellant who complained of the grant of
a license to a competitor because it would reduce its own income
had standing to appeal against a contention, admittedly sound, that
such economic injury to appellant was not a proper issue before the
Commission. We said:

															"Congress had some purpose in enacting section 402(b)(2). It may
have been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by
the issue of a license would by the only person having a sufficient
interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of
law in the action of the Commission in granting the license. It is
within the power of Congress to confer such standing to prosecute
an appeal." Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U. S. 470 , 309 U. S. 477 .
We added that such an appellant could raise any relevant question
of law in respect to the order.

															Again, in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United
States, 316 U. S. 407 ,
this Court considered the problem of standing to review Commission
action under the then existing § 402(a), 48 Stat. 1093, and the
Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat. 219. CBS there sought review of
the adoption of Chain Broadcasting Regulations by the Commission.
Against the contention that the adoption of regulations did not
command CBS to do or refrain from doing anything (dissent, 316 U.S.
at 316 U. S.
429 ), this Court held that the order promulgating
regulations was Page 351 U. S. 199 reviewable because it presently affected existing contractual
relationships. It said:

															"The regulations are not any the less reviewable because their
promulgation did not operate of their own force to deny or cancel a
license. It is enough that failure to comply with them penalizes
licensees, and appellant, with whom they contract. If an
administrative order has that effect, it is reviewable, and it does
not cease to be so merely because it is not certain whether the
Commission will institute proceedings to enforce the penalty
incurred under its regulations for non-compliance." Id. at 316 U. S.
417 -418. The Court said that the regulations "presently
determine rights." Id. at 316 U. S.
421 .

															"Appellant's standing to maintain the present suit in equity is
unaffected by the fact that the regulations are not directed to
appellant and do not, in terms, compel action by it or impose
penalties upon it because of its action or failure to act. It is
enough that, by setting the controlling standards for the
Commission's action, the regulations purport to operate to alter
and affect adversely appellant's contractual rights and business
relations with station owners whose applications for licenses the
regulations will cause to be rejected and whose licenses the
regulations may cause to be revoked." Id. at 316 U. S. 422 . See Federal Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting
Co., 347 U. S. 284 , 347 U. S. 289 ,
and E; Dorado Oil Works v. United States, 328 U. S.
12 , 328 U. S.
18 -19.

															The regulations here under consideration presently aggrieve the
respondent. The Commission exercised a power of rulemaking which
controls broadcasters. The Rules now operate to control the
business affairs of Storer. Unless it obtains a modification of
this declared administrative Page 351 U. S. 200 policy, Storer cannot enlarge the number of its standard of FM
stations. It seems, too, that the note to Rule 3.636 ( n 1, supra ) endangers Storer's
stations as alleged in its petition for review. See this
opinion, supra, p. 351 U. S. 197 ,
at (b). Commission hearings are affected now by the Rules. Storer
cannot cogently plan its present or future operations. [ Footnote 7 ] It cannot plan to enlarge
the number of its standard or FM stations, and, at any moment, the
purchase of Storer's voting stock by some member of the public
could endanger its existing structure. These are grievances
presently restricting Storer's operations. In the light of the
legislation allowing review of the Commission's actions, we hold
that Storer has standing to bring this action.

															In its petition for review, Storer prayed the court to vacate
the provisions of the Multiple Ownership Rules insofar as they
denied to an applicant already controlling the allowable number of
stations a "full and fair hearing" to determine whether additional
licenses to the applicant would be in the public interest.
[ Footnote 8 ] The Court of
Appeals struck out, as contrary to § 309(a) and (b) of the
Communications Act ( n 5, supra ), the words italicized in Rule 3.636 ( n 1, supra ) and the similar words in
Rules 3.35 and 3.240. The case was remanded to the Commission with
directions to eliminate these words. 95 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 220 F.2d
204. We granted certiorari, 350 U.S. 816 Page 351 U. S. 201 .

															The Commission asserts that its power to make regulations gives
it the authority to limit concentration of stations under a single
control. [ Footnote 9 ] It argues
that rules may go beyond the technical aspects of radio, that rules
may validly give concreteness to a standard of public interest, and
that the right to a hearing does not exist where an applicant
admittedly does not meet those standards, as there would be no
facts to ascertain. The Commission shows that its regulations
permit applicants to seek amendments and waivers of, or exceptions
to, its Rules. [ Footnote 10 ]
It adds:

															"This does not mean, of course, that the mere filing of an
application for a waiver . . . would necessarily require the
holding of a hearing, for, if that were the case, a rule would no
longer be a rule. It means Page 351 U. S. 202 only that it might be an abuse of discretion to fail to hear a
request for a waiver which showed, on its face, the existence of
circumstances making application of the rule inappropriate."

															Respondent defends the position of the Court of Appeals. It
urges that an application cannot be rejected under 47 U.S.C. § 309
without a "full hearing" to applicant. We agree that a "full
hearing" under § 309 means that every party shall have the right to
present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to
submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as
may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c). Such a hearing is essential for
wise and just application of the authority of administrative boards
and agencies.

															We do not read the hearing requirement, however, as withdrawing
from the power of the Commission the rulemaking authority necessary
for the orderly conduct of its business. As conceded by Storer,

															"Section 309(b) does not require the Commission to hold a
hearing before denying a license to operate a station in ways
contrary to those that the Congress has determined are in the
public interest. [ Footnote
11 ]"

															The challenged Rules contain limitations Page 351 U. S. 203 against licensing not specifically authorized by statute. But
that is not the limit of the Commission's rulemaking authority. 47
U.S.C. § 154(i) and § 303(r) grant general rulemaking power not
inconsistent with the Act or law.

															This Commission, like other agencies, deals with the public
interest. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications
Commission, 316 U. S. 4 , 316 U. S. 14 . Its
authority covers new and rapidly developing fields. Congress sought
to create regulation for public protection with careful provision
to assure fair opportunity for open competition in the use of
broadcasting facilities. Accordingly, we cannot interpret § 309(b)
as barring rules that declare a present intent to limit the number
of stations consistent with a permissible "concentration of
control." It is but a rule that announces the Commission's attitude
on public protection against such concentration. [ Footnote 12 ] The Communications Act must be
read as a whole and with appreciation of the responsibilities of
the body charged with its fair and efficient operation. The growing
complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place regulation
of businesses like communication in specialized agencies with broad
powers. Courts are slow to interfere with their conclusions when
reconcilable with statutory directions. [ Footnote 13 ] We think the Multiple Ownership Rules, as
adopted, are reconcilable with the Communications Page 351 U. S. 204 Act as a whole. An applicant files his application with
knowledge of the Commission's attitude toward concentration of
control.

															In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 ,
similar rules prohibiting certain methods of chain broadcasting
were upheld despite a claim that the Rules caused licenses to be
denied without "examination of written applications presented . . .
as required by §§ 308 and 309." Id. at 319 U. S. 230 .
[ Footnote 14 ] The National Broadcasting case validated numerous regulations
couched in the prohibitory language of the present regulations. The
one in the margin will serve as an example. [ Footnote 15 ]

															In the National Broadcasting case, we called attention
to the necessity for flexibility in the Rules there involved. Page 351 U. S. 205 The

															"Commission provided that 'networks will be given full
opportunity, on proper application for new facilities or renewal of
existing licenses, to call to our attention any reasons why the
principle should be modified or held inapplicable.'" Id. at 319 U. S. We
said:

															"The Commission therefore did not bind itself inflexibly to the
licensing policies expressed in the Regulations. In each case that
comes before it, the Commission must still exercise an ultimate
judgment whether the grant of a license would serve the 'public
interest, convenience, or necessity.' If time and changing
circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by
application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the
Commission will act in accordance with its statutory
obligations." Id. at 319 U. S. 225 .
That flexibility is here under the present § 309(a) and (b) and the
FCC's regulations. See n 10, supra. We read the Act and Regulations as
providing a "full hearing" for applicants who have reached the
existing limit of stations, upon their presentation of applications
conforming to Rules 1.361(c) and 1.702, that set out adequate
reasons why the Rules should be waived or amended. The Act,
considered as a whole, requires no more. We agree with the
contention of the Commission that a full hearing, such as is
required by § 309(b), note 5 supra, would not be necessary on all such applications. As
the Commission has promulgated its Rules after extensive
administrative hearings, it is necessary for the accompanying
papers to set forth reasons, sufficient if true, to justify a
change or waiver of the Rules. We do not think Congress intended
the Commission to waste time on applications that do not state a
valid basis for a hearing. If any applicant is aggrieved by a
refusal, the way for review is open. Page 351 U. S. 206 We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the
case to that court so that it may consider respondent's other
objections to the Multiple Ownership Rules. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in the result.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Section 3.636 will illustrate the problem:

															"§ 3.636 Multiple ownership. (a) No license for a
television broadcast station shall be granted to any party
(including all parties under common control) if:"

															"(1) Such party directly or indirectly owns, operates, or
controls another television broadcast station which serves
substantially the same area; or"

															"(2) Such party, or any stockholder, officer or director of such
party, directly or indirectly owns, operates, controls, or has any
interest in, or is an officer or director of any other television
broadcast station if the grant of such license would result in a
concentration of control of television broadcasting in a manner
inconsistent with public interest, convenience, or necessity. In
determining whether there is such a concentration of control,
consideration will be given to the facts of each case with
particular reference to such factors as the size, extent, and
location of areas served, the number of people served, and the
extent of other competitive service to the areas in question. The Commission, however, will in any event consider that there
would be such a concentration of control contrary to the public
interest, convenience or necessity for any party or any of its
stockholders, officers, or directors to have a direct or indirect
interest in, or be stockholders, officers, or directors of more
than five television broadcast stations. *"

															(The italicized material is common to all three Rules.)

															*

															"In applying the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section to
the stockholders of a corporation which has more than 50 voting
stockholders, only those stockholders need be considered who are
officers or directors or who directly or indirectly own 1 per cent
or more of the outstanding voting stock."

															47 CFR, Rev. 1953. The standard and FM Rules limited stations to
seven.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"Any party aggrieved by a final order reviewable under this
chapter may, within sixty days after entry of such order, file in
the court of appeals, wherein the venue as prescribed by section
1033 of this title lies, a petition to review such order. . .
."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															"(a) Any proceeding to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any
order of the Commission under this chapter (except those appealable
under subsection (b) of this section) shall be brought as provided
by and in the manner prescribed in chapter 19A of Title 5."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is by law committed to agency discretion --"

															"(a) Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within
the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to judicial
review thereof."

															" * * * *" "(c) Every agency action made reviewable by statute, and every
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in
any court shall be subject to judicial review. . . ."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															47 U.S.C. § 309:

															"Examination; action by Commission."

															"(a) If upon examination of any application provided for in
section 308 of this title the Commission shall find that public
interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the
granting thereof, it shall grant such application."

															"(b) Notification of denial; contents; reply; hearing;
intervention."

															"If, upon examination of any such application, the Commission is
unable to make the finding specified in subsection (a) of this
section, it shall forthwith notify the applicant and other known
parties in interest of the grounds and reasons for its inability to
make such finding. . . . Following such notice, the applicant shall
be given an opportunity to reply. If the Commission, after
considering such reply, shall be unable to make the finding
specified in subsection (a) of this section, it shall formally
designate the application for hearing on the grounds or reasons
then obtaining and shall notify the applicant . . . specifying with
particularity the matters and things in issue. . . . Any hearing
subsequently held upon such application shall be a full hearing in
which the applicant and all other parties in interest shall be
permitted to participate but in which both the burden of proceeding
with the introduction of evidence upon any issue specified by the
Commission, as well as the burden of proof upon all such issues,
shall be upon the applicant."

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Legal wrong, as a ground for standing to appeal, was introduced
by the Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(a). 60 Stat. 243. In
explanation the reports of the Senate, No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 26, and the House, No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 42, define
"legal wrong":

															"The phrase 'legal wrong' means such a wrong as is specified in
section 10(e). It means that something more than mere adverse
personal effect must be shown in order to prevail -- that is, that
the adverse effect must be an illegal effect."

															Section 10(e) of the bill required reviewing courts to "hold
unlawful any action . . . (3) contrary to statutes or statutory
right." Section 10(e) of the Act is now in substantially the same
language. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e).

															[ Footnote 7 ] Cf. Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U. S.
40 , 351 U. S.
43 -44.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Storer also attacked the 1% ownership provision that appears as
a note to Rule 3.636, n 1, supra. This was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals.
95 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 220 F.2d 204. Its judgment leaves that portion
of the Rule unaffected. As there was no cross-petition for
certiorari, we leave open the question of its validity.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															"The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules
and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its function."

															47 U.S.C. § 154(i).

															"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission
from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires, shall --"

															" * * * *" "(f) Make such regulations not inconsistent with law as it may
deem necessary to prevent interference between stations and to
carry out the provisions of this chapter:"

															" * * * *" "(r) Make such rules and regulations and prescribe such
restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. . . ."

															47 U.S.C. § 303.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															47 CFR, Rev.1953, § 1.361(c):

															"(c) Applications which, because of the nature of the particular
rule, regulation, or requirement involved, are patently not in
accordance with the Commission's rules, regulations, or other
requirements will be considered defective, and will be dismissed
unless accompanied by a request of the applicant for waiver of, or
exception to, any rule, regulation, or requirements with which the
application is in conflict. Such requests shall show the nature of
the waiver or exception desired and set forth the reasons in
support thereof."

															Section 1.702:

															" Petition for amendment or waiver of rules. Any
interested person may petition for issuance, amendment, repeal or
waiver of any rule or regulation. Such petition shall show the text
of the proposed rule, or its change, and set forth the reason in
support of the petition." See also 47 CFR, 1941 Supp., §§ 1.72, 1.81.

															[ Footnote 11 ] See 47 U.S.C. §§ 310 and 311. Cf. Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 326 U.
S. 327 , 326 U. S. 333 ,
n. 9, and 47 CFR, Rev. 1953 § 1.724; Felman v. United
States, 339 U.S. 973; Federal Communications Comm'n v.
American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284 .

															[ Footnote 12 ] See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 , 319 U. S. 196 .
We said last Term that determination of improper concentration of
control was for appraisal by the Commission after hearing. Federal Communications Commission v. Allentown Broadcasting
Co., 349 U. S. 358 , 349 U. S.
363 -364.

															[ Footnote 13 ] See Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragan, 329 U. S. 143 , 329 U. S. 153 ; O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U.
S. 504 , 340 U. S.
508 .

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Point III of the National Broadcasting Company brief argued the
matter under this heading, "The Commission Cannot Escape Its Duty
to Evaluate and Decide Each License Application on Its Own Facts."
At that time, § 309(a) had the hearing provision. It read:

															"SEC. 309. (a) If, upon examination of any application for a
station license or for the renewal or modification of a station
license, the Commission shall determine that public interest,
convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting thereof,
it shall authorize the issuance, renewal, or modification thereof
in accordance with said finding. In the event the Commission, upon
examination of any such application does not reach such decision
with respect thereto, it shall notify the applicant thereof, shall
fix and give notice of a time and place for hearing thereon, and
shall afford such applicant an opportunity to be heard under such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe."

															48 Stat. 1085.

															Change to the present form was merely for more certainty and
clarification, to avoid the possibility of arbitrary Commission
action. See S.Rep. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															"No license shall be granted to a standard broadcast station
having any contract, arrangement, or understanding, express or
implied, with a network organization under which the station is
prevented or hindered from, or penalized for, broadcasting the
programs of any other network organization." Id. at 319 U. S. 200 ;
47 CFR, 1941 Supp., § 3.101.

															MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															The Court has properly deemed it necessary to question sua
sponte the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain
this case, [ Footnote 2/1 ] but I am
unable to agree with its decision that such jurisdiction existed.
In my view, Storer was not a "party aggrieved by a final order" of
the Commission, within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 1034, and hence
was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment below and remand
the case to the Court of Appeals with directions to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction. Page 351 U. S. 207 1. These regulations do not, in my view, constitute an "order"
within the meaning of § 1034. They simply establish certain
standards to be followed by the Commission in the future exercise
of its licensing powers; they do not require any licensee to do or
to refrain from doing anything, attach no consequences to his
action or inaction, and determine no questions as to his legal
status. As such, they are quite unlike the Chain Broadcasting
regulations which were held to be a reviewable "order" in Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 , in
a proceeding comparable to this one. Those regulations were held
reviewable not because every Commission action in the form of a
regulation was considered to be an "order," but for the specific
reason that they proscribed certain kinds of contracts between
licensees and the national networks and, by prescribing the
sanction of license cancellation for noncompliance, operated to
coerce action by the licensees and to determine the legal status of
the networks' contracts. Of their own force and with no further
administrative action's being taken, the regulations induced
licensees to cancel existing network contracts, and deterred them
from entering into new ones. That coercive effect of the
regulations on present conduct, the very characteristic which led
the Court to regard the Chain Broadcasting regulations as an
"order" despite their form, is totally lacking here. [ Footnote 2/2 ] Page 351 U. S. 208 2. A second obstacle to review of the regulations here is that,
even if they be deemed an "order," Storer has not shown that it is
"aggrieved" by them.

															In assessing the character of Storer's grievance, we must put
aside the Commission's order, made simultaneously with its
promulgation of the challenged regulations, which denied a pending
application by Storer for a sixth television license. That order
was reviewable only by a direct appeal within 30 days under 47
U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), Federal Communications Commission v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 311 U.
S. 132 , and became final and conclusive upon Storer's
failure to appeal from it. Since that order cannot be reviewed, and
no relief from it may be granted in this proceeding, it is only of
the prospective effect of the regulations, not their past
application, that Storer may complain. And it is by that effect
that Storer must show it is "aggrieved."

															In its petition for review, Storer alleged that it was aggrieved
by the regulations in that:

															"(a) Storer is denied the right of a full and fair hearing to
determine whether its ownership of an interest in more than seven
(7) standard radio and five (5) television broadcast stations, in
light of and upon a showing of all material circumstances, will
thereby serve the public interest, convenience and necessity."

															"The acquisition of Storer's voting stock by the public under
circumstances beyond the control of Storer, may and could be
violative of the Multiple Ownership rules, as amended, and result
in a forfeiture of licenses now held by Storer, with resultant loss
and injury to Storer and to all other Storer stockholders."

															However these allegations are read, they assert no more than
that the Commission may, in the future, take action Page 351 U. S. 209 pursuant to the regulations to deny or revoke a license. Of
course, if such action should ever be taken, Storer would then be
"aggrieved." But, by the same token, it would then have a complete
remedy through a direct appeal from such action under § 402(b).
Until such time as the regulations are applied to it, however,
Storer will not have been "aggrieved," and hence will not be
entitled to review. Indeed, in this case, we do not even reach
often difficult problem whether an alleged injury is sufficient or
of such a nature as to entitle the complaining party to review;
here, we have that rare case in which no present injury of any kind
is even alleged.

															It is said, however, that the regulations "now operate to
control the business affairs of Storer," despite the absence of any
such allegation by Storer. Since the Regulations do not have any
coercive effect, I take that to mean only that Storer, if it
exercises prudent business judgment, will take into account the
announced policy of the Commission in deciding whether or not to
apply for an additional license. No doubt that is true, but I fail
to see show Storer has been "aggrieved" by being told in advance
one of the factors that will govern the disposition of any future
license application on its part. If anything, Storer is now able to
make a more enlightened judgment as to the probabilities of success
in obtaining a further license.

															3. So clear is it, in fact, that Storer has not been "aggrieved"
by the mere issuance of the regulations that the Court's grant of
review in this case must be premised not upon the effect of the
regulations themselves, but simply upon Storer's interest in
knowing whether or not a future application of them would be valid.
The result is that the statutory procedure for obtaining relief
from a present injury caused by an order has been converted into
something quite different -- namely, a procedure for obtaining a
declaratory judgment as to the validity of a Page 351 U. S. 210 future application of new regulations. Not only is such a
proceeding not authorized by the statute, however, but Storer would
not have standing to invoke it even if it were.

															That declaratory relief from future orders is not contemplated
by § 1034 seems clear. That section authorizes review only of an
"order" only if the order is "final," and only at the instance of
one aggrieved "by" the challenged order itself. The regulations
here are not an "order"; if they were, it would not be "final,"
since further administrative action must be taken before Storer
will be affected, and Storer's grievance, if any, will be caused
not "by" the regulations, but only by their future application.
Moreover, quite apart from these obstacles, the procedure provided
for by § 1034 is inappropriate for anticipatory equitable relief.
That section requires, for example, that petitions for review be
filed within 60 days after the order is issued. While such a time
limitation is clearly appropriate to a procedure for relief from an
injury already suffered, there seems no justification for so
limiting the availability of declaratory relief from future action.
Why should declaratory relief be denied as the threat of the future
injury becomes more imminent, or be granted to those who have a
sufficient interest to seek review immediately while being denied
to those who later acquire a similar or even greater interest?
Finally, no reason is apparent why existing procedures for
declaratory judgments are not adequate; to construe § 1034 as an
alternative declaratory judgment procedure simply produces the
incongruous result of authorizing declaratory relief in the Courts
of Appeals within 60 days after the order is issued and in the
District Courts thereafter.

															In the second place, even if § 1034 is to be construed as
authorizing declaratory relief, I see no reason why the usual
requirements for invoking equity jurisdiction should not be as
applicable to such a proceeding as they are to Page 351 U. S. 211 an ordinary declaratory judgment action or to a proceeding to
set aside a Commission order under the Urgent Deficiencies Act, the
predecessor to § 1034, under which the CBS case arose. In that
case, CBS' right to equitable relief in advance of the application
of the regulations was expressly based on the irreparable injury it
would suffer -- the wholesale cancellation of its contracts with
licensees -- before any further administrative action was taken,
and for which there was no other adequate remedy. Unless these
requirements for equitable relief are to be abandoned, there can be
no right to relief here, for Storer alleges no threatened injury of
any kind other than the possibility of future administrative action
for which there would be a complete remedy by appeal.

															It is said, however -- again without support of any allegations
by Storer -- that Storer "cannot cogently plan its present or
future operations" unless it is advised whether or not the
regulations are valid. But plans for expansion of communications
facilities have always had to be made subject to the contingency
that the Commission might refuse to grant the necessary license for
any one of a number of reasons. Storer's position in this respect
is now no different than it was before the regulations were issued:
any plan to acquire a new station must simply take into account,
among the several contingencies, the likelihood that a denial of a
license under the regulations would be upheld on appeal. What this
argument comes down to, therefore, is that Storer needs to know
whether or not it can validly be denied a license under the
regulations so that, if it can, it need not make an application.
That is, the injury that Storer will have suffered if the decision
on the validity of the regulations is postponed until Storer in
fact applies for a license is the expense of making that very
application, the same injury that is suffered by all unsuccessful
license applicants. Until today, I should not have thought argument
was necessary to reject such Page 351 U. S. 212 a basis for declaratory relief. Declaratory relief has been
denied persons whose only alternative was to risk both dismissal
from public employment and the imposition of criminal penalties, United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S.
75 , yet it is granted here to relieve Storer of the mere
burden of making an application for a license. [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															4. The holding of the Court today amounts to this: that
regulations which impose no duty and determine no rights may be
reviewed at the instance of a person who alleges no injury to
settle whether a future application of the regulations that may
never occur would be valid. The lack of support for this decision
is disclosed by the Court's primary reliance on CBS, [ Footnote 2/4 ] a case which, in my
view, not only fails to support the Court's conclusion but is
persuasive, if not controlling, authority for precisely the
opposite result. [ Footnote 2/5 ] In
my opinion, the implications of the Page 351 U. S. 213 decision undermine much of the settled law on reviewability of
administrative action, and it is the more unfortunate because made
without the benefit of briefs or argument by the parties. I cannot
concur in that part the Court's opinion.

															The Court having decided, however, that the Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction, I concur with the Court on the merits.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Although the question of reviewability was not raised below or
argued here, there can be no doubt of the power of the Court to
consider the issue sua sponte, since it goes to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and of this Court. Cf.
Federal Communications Commission v. National Broadcasting
Co., 319 U. S. 239 , 319 U. S. 246 ; Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U.
S. 125 , 307 U. S. 128 ,
n. 3; American Federation of Labor v. Labor Board, 308 U. S. 401 , 308 U. S. 404 .
The jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals to review orders of the
Federal Communications Commission, other than those granting or
denying licenses, is granted by the Act of December 29, 1950, 64
Stat. 1129, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1031-1042. Section 1032, which confers the
jurisdiction, provides that "[s]uch jurisdiction shall be invoked
by the filing of a petition as provided in section 1034." Section
1034, in turn, provides that

															"Any party aggrieved by a final order . . . may, within sixty
days after entry of such order, file in the court of appeals . . .
a petition to review such order."

															In short, the court's jurisdiction may be invoked only upon the
petition of a "party aggrieved by a final order."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Insofar as the Multiple Ownership regulations provide for the
revocation of existing licenses upon the purchase by a licensee of
a stock interest in more than the maximum number of stations, they
could arguably be deemed an "order" forbidding licensees, under
pain of license revocation, to engage in stock transactions the
result of which would violate the numerical limitations. Storer is
not complaining, however, of any such deterrent effect of the
regulations, and does not allege that it desires either to buy or
to sell stock in any licensee. It objects only to the possibility
of a future loss of a license should persons beyond its control --
and, by hypothesis, not deterred by the regulations -- purchase its
stock. See paragraph (b) of Storer's allegations, p. 351 U. S. 208 , infra. [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The recent holding of this Court in East Texas Motor Freight
Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, ante, p. 351 U. S. 49 , does
not support the result reached here. In that case, the declaratory
interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act -- sought by way of
review of the Commission's interpretative regulations in a
proceeding under the Urgent Deficiencies Act -- was considered
justified because of the possibility of criminal penalties being
imposed for violations of the Act and the risk of loss of
substantial investments in operations that might subsequently be
enjoined by the Commission. No such necessity for declaratory
relief is even alleged here; there is no threat of criminal
prosecutions, and, since a license is always a condition precedent
to acquisition of a new station, there is no danger of the loss of
investments to be made prior to the future administrative
action.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Of the other cases cited by the Court, only Federal
Communications Commission v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284 ,
involved a similar situation, and there, the jurisdictional problem
was neither raised by the parties nor noted by the Court.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Throughout the opinion in the CBS case, the Court
emphasized the exceptional circumstances which justified immediate
review of the Chain Broadcasting regulations and distinguished them
from regulations of the sort here involved. See, e.g., 316
U.S. at 316 U. S.
424 -425:

															"We need not stop to discuss here the great variety of
administrative rulings which, unlike this one, are not reviewable
-- either because they do not adjudicate rights or declare them
legislatively, or because there are adequate administrative
remedies which must be pursued before resorting to judicial
remedies, or because there is no occasion to resort to equitable
remedies. But we should not for that reason fail to discriminate
between them and this case, in which, because of its peculiar
circumstances, all the elements prerequisite to judicial review are
present. The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in
an overrefined technique, but in the need of the review to protect
from the irreparable injury threatened in the exceptional case by
administrative rulings which attach legal consequences to action
taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may
follow, the results of which the regulations purport to
control."

															MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

															While I agree that the amendatory Rules promulgated by the
Federal Communications Commission relating to Multiple Ownership of
standard, FM and television stations constitute a reviewable
"order" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 1034, my Brother HARLAN's
reasoning convinces me that the respondent was not on the record
before us a "party aggrieved" under that section. Therefore, the
court below should not have entertained the petition to review the
Commission's order.

															Procedural and jurisdictional limitations on judicial action by
the federal courts are not playthings of lawyers, nor obstructions
on the road of justice. Whether formulated by the Constitution,
congressional enactments, or settled judicial precedents, they are
means designed to keep the courts within appropriate limits, and to
enforce Page 351 U. S. 214 rights according to general standards, and not have them depend
on the impact of the individual case. To be sure, dealing as we are
with general standards, differences of views regarding their scope
and applicability are bound to arise from time to time. Who is a
"party aggrieved" or a "party in interest" turns on the context,
often confused and dubious, of a particular set of circumstances,
and therefore raises issues on which judges not unnaturally divide,
as they do on other unmathematical problems of the law. See
Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U.
S. 295 .

															To the laity, such matters may seem technicalities in a
derogatory sense of the term. But this is only one phase of an
attitude of mind that thinks ill of law which does not accord with
private wishes. When informed by a legal adviser that to carry out
his desires would encounter "technical legal difficulties," a
strenuous President of the United States impatiently observed that
"all law is technicality." But even professionally competent
officials are at times impatient with decisions that fail to
adjudicate substantive issues on which light is sought. It seems to
me important, therefore, not to minimize the function of
jurisdictional limitations upon adjudication by expressing views on
the merits. There are, of course, exceptional situations where it
is proper for a dissenter to go to the merits when a majority of
the Court removes from the case threshold objections of procedure
and jurisdiction. See e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 341 .
This is not such a case.