U.S. Supreme Court Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
U.S. 302 (1980) Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague No. 79938 Argued October 6,
1980 Decided January 13,
1981 449
U.S. 302 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MINNESOTA Syllabus Respondent's husband died of injuries suffered when a motorcycle
on which he was a passenger was struck by an automobile. The
accident occurred in Wisconsin near the Minnesota border. The
operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin residents, as was the
decedent, who, however, had been employed in Minnesota and had
commuted daily to work from Wisconsin. Neither vehicle operator
carried valid insurance, but the decedent held a policy issued by
petitioner covering three automobiles owned by him and containing
an uninsured motorist clause insuring him against loss incurred
from accidents with uninsured motorists, but limiting such coverage
to $15,000 for each automobile. After the accident, respondent
moved to and became a resident of Minnesota, and was subsequently
appointed in that State as personal representative of her husband's
estate. She then brought an action in a Minnesota court seeking a
declaration under Minnesota law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist
coverage on each of her late husband's three automobiles could be
"stacked" to provide total coverage of $45,000. Petitioner defended
on the ground that whether the three uninsured motorist coverages
could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin law, since the
insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin, the accident occurred
there, and all persons involved were Wisconsin residents at the
time of the accident. The trial court, interpreting Wisconsin law
to disallow stacking, concluded that Minnesota's choice of law
rules required the application of Minnesota law permitting
stacking, and granted summary judgment for respondent. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Held: The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 449 U. S.
307 -320; 449 U. S.
322 -331. 289 N.W.2d
43 , affirmed.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that Minnesota has a significant
aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence,
creating state interests, such that application of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, and, accordingly, the
choice of law by the Minnesota Supreme Court does not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Pp. 449 U. S.
307 -320. Page 449 U. S. 303 (a) Respondent's decedent was a member of Minnesota's workforce.
The State of employment has police power responsibilities towards
nonresident employees that are analogous to those it has towards
residents, as such employees use state services and amenities and
may call upon state facilities in appropriate circumstances. Also,
the State's interest in its commuting nonresident employees, such
as respondent's decedent, reflects a state concern for the safety
and wellbeing of its workforce and the concomitant effect on
Minnesota employers. That the decedent was not killed while
commuting to work or while in Minnesota does not dictate a
different result, since vindication of the rights of the estate of
a Minnesota employee is an important state concern. Nor does the
decedent's residence in Wisconsin constitutionally mandate
application of Wisconsin law to the exclusion of forum law.
Employment status is not a sufficiently less important status than
residence, when combined with the decedent's daily commute across
state lines and the other Minnesota contacts present, to prohibit
the choice of law result in this case on constitutional grounds.
Pp. 449 U. S.
313 -317.

															(b) Petitioner was at all times present and doing business in
Minnesota. By virtue of such presence, petitioner can hardly claim
unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise
that the state courts might apply forum law to litigation in which
the company is involved. Moreover, such presence gave Minnesota an
interest in regulating the company's insurance obligations insofar
as they affected both a Minnesota resident and court-appointed
representative (respondent) and a longstanding member of
Minnesota's workforce (respondent's decedent). Pp. 449 U. S.
317 -318.

															(c) Respondent became a Minnesota resident prior to institution
of the instant litigation. Such residence and subsequent
appointment in Minnesota as personal representative of her late
husband's estate constitute a Minnesota contact which gives
Minnesota an interest in respondent's recovery. Pp. 449 U. S.
318 -319.

															JUSTICE STEVENS concluded:

															1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Minnesota,
the forum State, to apply Wisconsin law to the contract
interpretation question presented. Although the Minnesota courts'
decision to apply Minnesota law was unsound as a matter of
conflicts law, no threat to Wisconsin's sovereignty ensued from
allowing the substantive question as to the meaning of the
insurance contract to be determined by the law of another State.
Pp. 449 U. S.
322 -326.

															2. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
prevent Minnesota from applying its own law. Neither the "stacking"
rule itself nor Minnesota's application of it to these litigants
raised any Page 449 U. S. 304 serious question of fairness. Nor did the Minnesota courts'
decision to apply this rule violate due process because that
decision frustrated the contracting parties' reasonable
expectations. The decision was consistent with due process because
it did not result unfairness to either litigant, not because
Minnesota had an interest in the plaintiff as resident or the
decedent as employee. Pp. 449 U. S.
326 -331.

															BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 449 U. S. 320 .
POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., and
REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 449 U. S. 332 .
STEWART, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.

															JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE BLACKMUN joined.

															This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [ Footnote 1 ] or the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Art.
IV, § 1, [ Footnote 2 ] of the
United States Constitution bars the Minnesota Supreme Court's
choice of substantive Minnesota law to govern the effect of a
provision in an insurance policy issued to respondent's decedent.
44 U.S. 1070 (1980). Page 449 U. S. 305 I Respondent's late husband, Ralph Hague, died of injuries
suffered when a motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck
from behind by an automobile. The accident occurred in Pierce
County, Wis., which is immediately across the Minnesota border from
Red Wing, Minn. The operators of both vehicles were Wisconsin
residents, as was the decedent, who, at the time of the accident,
resided with respondent in Hager City, Wis., which is one and
one-half miles from Red Wing. Mr. Hague had been employed in Red
Wing for the 15 years immediately preceding his death and had
commuted daily from Wisconsin to his place of employment.

															Neither the operator of the motorcycle nor the operator of the
automobile carried valid insurance. However, the decedent held a
policy issued by petitioner Allstate Insurance Co. covering three
automobiles owned by him and containing an uninsured motorist
clause insuring him against loss incurred from accidents with
uninsured motorists. The uninsured motorist coverage was limited to
§15,000 for each automobile. [ Footnote 3 ]

															After the accident, but prior to the initiation of this lawsuit,
respondent moved to Red Wing. Subsequently, she married a Minnesota
resident and established residence with her new husband in Savage,
Minn. At approximately the same time, a Minnesota Registrar of
Probate appointed respondent personal representative of her
deceased husband's estate. Following her appointment, she brought
this action in Minnesota District Court seeking a declaration under
Minnesota law that the $15,000 uninsured motorist coverage on each
of her late husband's three automobiles could be "stacked" to
provide total coverage of $45,000. Petitioner defended on the
ground that whether the three uninsured motorist Page 449 U. S. 306 coverages could be stacked should be determined by Wisconsin
law, since the insurance policy was delivered in Wisconsin, the
accident occurred in Wisconsin, and all persons involved were
Wisconsin residents at the time of the accident.

															The Minnesota District Court disagreed. Interpreting Wisconsin
law to disallow stacking, the court concluded that Minnesota's
choice of law rules required the application of Minnesota law
permitting stacking. The court refused to apply Wisconsin law as
"inimical to the public policy of Minnesota," and granted summary
judgment for respondent. [ Footnote
4 ]

															The Minnesota Supreme Court, sitting en banc, affirmed the
District Court. [ Footnote 5 ]
The court, also interpreting Wisconsin law to prohibit stacking,
[ Footnote 6 ] applied Minnesota
law after analyzing the relevant Minnesota contacts and interests
within the analytical framework developed by Professor Leflar.
[ Footnote 7 ] See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267 (1966). The state court, therefore, examined the
conflict of laws issue in terms of (1) predictability of result,
(2) maintenance of interstate order, (3) simplification of the
judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental
interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law. Although
stating that the Minnesota contacts might not be, "in themselves,
sufficient to mandate application of [Minnesota] law," [ Footnote 8 ] 289 N.W.2d
43 , 49 Page 449 U. S. 307 (1978), under the first four factors, the court concluded that
the fifth factor -- application of the better rule of law --
favored selection of Minnesota law. The court emphasized that a
majority of States allow stacking, and that legal decisions
allowing stacking "are fairly recent and well considered in light
of current uses of automobiles." Ibid. In addition, the
court found the Minnesota rule superior to Wisconsin's "because it
requires the cost of accidents with uninsured motorists to be
spread more broadly through insurance premiums than does the
Wisconsin rule." Ibid. Finally, after rehearing en banc,
[ Footnote 9 ] the court
buttressed its initial opinion by indicating "that contracts of
insurance on motor vehicles are in a class by themselves," since an
insurance company "knows the automobile is a movable item which
will be driven from state to state." 289 N.W.2d at 50 (1979). From
this premise, the court concluded that application of Minnesota law
was "not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to violate due process." Ibid. II It is not for this Court to say whether the choice of law
analysis suggested by Professor Leflar is to be preferred or
whether we would make the same choice of law decision if sitting as
the Minnesota Supreme Court. Our sole function is to determine
whether the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of its own substantive
law in this case exceeded federal constitutional limitations.
Implicit in this inquiry is the recognition, long accepted by this
Court, that a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a
particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional
terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction. See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 , 348 U. S. 72 -73
(1954); n. 11, infra. See generally Clay v. Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. , 377 U.S. Page 449 U. S. 308 179, 377 U. S.
181 -182 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Clay II ).
As a result, the forum State may have to select one law from among
the laws of several jurisdictions having some contact with the
controversy.

															In deciding constitutional choice of law questions, whether
under the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
[ Footnote 10 ] this Court has
traditionally examined the contacts of the State, whose law was
applied, with the parties and with the occurrence or transaction
giving rise to the litigation. See Clay II, supra at 377 U. S. 183 .
In order to ensure that the choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair, see Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 , 294 U. S. 542 (1935), the Court has invalidated the choice of law of a State
which has had no significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the
occurrence or transaction. [ Footnote 11 ] Page 449 U. S. 309 Two instructive examples of such invalidation are Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930), and John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936). In both cases, the selection of forum law rested
exclusively on the presence of one nonsignificant forum
contact. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick involved interpretation of an
insurance policy which had been issued in Mexico, by a Mexican
insurer, to a Mexican citizen, covering a Mexican risk. The policy
was subsequently assigned to Mr. Dick, who was domiciled in Mexico
and "physically present and acting in Mexico," 281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 408 ,
although he remained a nominal permanent resident of Texas. The
policy restricted coverage to losses occurring in certain Mexican
waters and, indeed, the loss occurred in those waters. Dick brought
suit Page 449 U. S. 310 in Texas against a New York reinsurer. Neither the Mexican
insurer nor the New York reinsurer had any connection to Texas.
[ Footnote 12 ] The Court held
that application of Texas law to void the insurance contract's
limitation' of actions clause violated due process. [ Footnote 13 ]

															The relationship of the forum State to the parties and the
transaction was similarly attenuated in John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Yates. There, the insurer, a Massachusetts
corporation, issued a contract of insurance on the life of a New
York resident. The contract was applied for, issued, and delivered
in New York, where the insured and his spouse resided. After the
insured died in New York, his spouse moved to Georgia and brought
suit on the policy in Georgia. Under Georgia law, the jury was
permitted to take into account oral modifications when deciding
whether an insurance policy application contained material
misrepresentations. Under New York law, however, such
misrepresentations were to be evaluated solely on the basis of the
written application. The Georgia court applied Georgia law. This
Court reversed, finding application of Georgia law to be
unconstitutional. Dick and Yates stand for the proposition that,
if a State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and
the Page 449 U. S. 311 occurrence or transaction, application of its law is
unconstitutional. [ Footnote
14 ] Dick concluded that nominal residence -- standing
alone -- was inadequate; Yates held that a post-occurrence
change of residence to the forum State -- standing alone -- was
insufficient to justify application of forum law. Although
instructive as extreme examples of selection of forum law, neither Dick nor Yates governs this case. For, in
contrast to those decisions, here, the Minnesota contacts with the
parties and the occurrence are obviously significant. Thus, this
case is like Alaska Packers, Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 330 U. S. 469 (1947), and Clay II -- cases where this Court sustained
choice of law decisions based on the contacts of the State, whose
law was applied, with the parties and occurrence.

															In Alaska Packers, the Court upheld California's
application of its Workmen's Compensation Act, where the most
significant contact of the worker with California was his execution
of an employment contract in California. The worker, a nonresident
alien from Mexico, was hired in California for seasonal work in a
salmon canning factory in Alaska. As part of the employment
contract, the employer, who was doing business in California,
agreed to transport the worker to Alaska and to return him to
California when the work was completed. Even though the employee
contracted to be bound by the Alaska Workmen's Compensation Law and
was injured in Alaska, he sought an award under the California
Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court held that the choice of
California law was not "so arbitrary or unreasonable as to amount
to a denial of due process," 294 U.S. at 249 U. S. 542 ,
because "[w]ithout a remedy in California, [he] would be
remediless," ibid., and because of California's interest
that the worker not become a public charge, ibid. [ Footnote 15 ] Page 449 U. S. 312 In Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., supra, a
District of Columbia resident, employed by a District of Columbia
employer and assigned by the employer for the three years prior to
his death to work in Virginia, was killed in an automobile crash in
Virginia in the course of his daily commute home from work. The
Court found the District's contacts with the parties and the
occurrence sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements, based
on the employee's residence in the District, his commute between
home and the Virginia workplace, and his status as an employee of a
company "engaged in electrical construction work in the District of
Columbia and surrounding areas." Id. at 330 U. S. 471 .
[ Footnote 16 ]

															Similarly, Clay II upheld the constitutionality of the
application of forum law. There, a policy of insurance had issued
in Illinois to an Illinois resident. Subsequently the insured moved
to Florida and suffered a property loss in Florida. Relying
explicitly on the nationwide coverage of the policy and the
presence of the insurance company in Florida and implicitly on the
plaintiff's Florida residence and the occurrence of the property
loss in Florida, the Court sustained the Florida court's choice of
Florida law.

															The lesson from Dick and Yates, which found
insufficient forum contacts to apply forum law, and from Alaska
Packers, Cardillo, and Clay II, which found adequate
contacts to sustain the choice of forum law, [ Footnote 17 ] is that for a State's
substantive Page 449 U. S. 313 law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner,
that State must have a significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
Application of this principle to the facts of this case persuades
us that the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of its own law did not
offend the Federal Constitution. III Minnesota has three contacts with the parties and the occurrence
giving rise to the litigation. In the aggregate, these contacts
permit selection by the Minnesota Supreme Court of Minnesota law
allowing the stacking of Mr. Hague's uninsured motorist
coverages.

															First, and, for our purposes, a very important contact, Mr.
Hague was a member of Minnesota's workforce, having been employed
by a Red Wing, Minn., enterprise for the 15 Page 449 U. S. 314 years preceding his death. While employment status may implicate
a state interest less substantial than does resident status, that
interest is nevertheless important. The State of employment has
police power responsibilities towards the nonresident employee that
are analogous, if somewhat less profound, than towards residents.
Thus, such employees use state services and amenities and may call
upon state facilities in appropriate circumstances.

															In addition, Mr. Hague commuted to work in Minnesota, a contact
which was important in Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 330 U.S. at 330 U. S.
475 -476 (daily commute between residence in District of
Columbia and workplace in Virginia), and was presumably covered by
his uninsured motorist coverage during the commute. [ Footnote 18 ] The State's interest in its
commuting nonresident employees reflects a state concern for the
safety and wellbeing of its workforce and the concomitant effect on
Minnesota employers.

															That Mr. Hague was not killed while commuting to work or while
in Minnesota does not dictate a different result. To hold that the
Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of Minnesota law violated the
Constitution for that reason would require too narrow a view of
Minnesota's relationship with the parties and the occurrence giving
rise to the litigation. An automobile accident need not occur
within a particular jurisdiction for that jurisdiction to be
connected to the occurrence. [ Footnote 19 ] Page 449 U. S. 315 Similarly, the occurrence of a crash fatal to a Minnesota
employee in another State is a Minnesota contact. [ Footnote 20 ] If Mr. Hague had only been
injured and missed work for a few weeks, the effect on the
Minnesota employer would have been palpable, and Minnesota's
interest in having its employee made whole would be evident. Mr.
Hague's death affects Minnesota's interest still more acutely, even
though Mr. Hague will not return to the Minnesota workforce.
Minnesota's workforce is surely affected by the level of protection
the State extends to it, either directly or indirectly. Vindication
of the rights of the estate of a Minnesota employee, therefore, is
an important state concern.

															Mr. Hague's residence in Wisconsin does not -- as Allstate seems
to argue -- constitutionally mandate application of Wisconsin law
to the exclusion of forum law. [ Footnote 21 ] If, in the instant Page 449 U. S. 316 case, the accident had occurred in Minnesota between Mr. Hague
and an uninsured Minnesota motorist, if the insurance contract had
been executed in Minnesota covering a Minnesota registered company
automobile which Mr.Hague was permitted to drive, and if a
Wisconsin court sought to apply Wisconsin law, certainly Mr.
Hague's residence in Wisconsin, his commute between Wisconsin and
Minnesota, and the insurer's presence in Wisconsin should be
adequate to apply Wisconsin's law. [ Footnote 22 ] See generally Cardillo v.
Liberty Page 449 U. S. 317 Mutual Ins. Co., supra; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 (1935); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 408 ,
n. 5. Employment status is not a sufficiently less important status
than residence, see generally Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408 (1955); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
supra, when combined with Mr. Hague's daily commute across
state lines and the other Minnesota contacts present, to prohibit
the choice of law result in this case on constitutional
grounds.

															Second, Allstate was at all times present and doing business in
Minnesota. [ Footnote 23 ] By
virtue of its presence, Allstate can hardly claim unfamiliarity
with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the state
courts might apply forum law to litigation Page 449 U. S. 318 in which the company is involved.

															"Particularly since the company was licensed to do business in
[the forum], it must have known it might be sued there, and that
[the forum] courts would feel bound by [forum] law. [ Footnote 24 ]" Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 363 U.
S. 207 , 363 U. S. 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). [ Footnote 25 ] Moreover, Allstate's presence in Minnesota
gave Minnesota an interest in regulating the company's insurance
obligations insofar as they affected both a Minnesota resident and
court-appointed representative -- respondent -- and a longstanding
member of Minnesota's workforce -- Mr. Hague. See Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313 , 318 U. S. 316 (1943).

															Third, respondent became a Minnesota resident prior to
institution of this litigation. The stipulated facts reveal that
she first settled in Red Wing, Minn., the town in which Page 449 U. S. 319 her late husband had worked. [ Footnote 26 ] She subsequently moved to Savage, Minn.,
after marrying a Minnesota resident who operated an automobile
service station in Bloomington, Minn. Her move to Savage occurred
"almost concurrently," 289 N.W.2d at 45, with the initiation of the
instant case. [ Footnote 27 ]
There is no suggestion that Mrs. Hague moved to Minnesota in
anticipation of this litigation or for the purpose of finding a
legal climate especially hospitable to her claim. [ Footnote 28 ] The stipulated facts, sparse
as they are, negate any such inference.

															While John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936), held that a post-occurrence change of residence to the
forum State was insufficient, in and of itself, to confer power on
the forum State to choose its law, that case did not hold that such
a change of residence was irrelevant. Here, of course, respondent's
bona fide residence in Minnesota was not the sole contact Minnesota
had with this litigation. And in connection with her residence in
Minnesota, respondent was appointed personal representative of Mr.
Hague's estate by the Registrar of Probate for the County of
Goodhue, Minn. Respondent's residence and subsequent appointment in
Minnesota as personal representative of her late husband's estate
constitute a Minnesota contact which gives Minnesota an interest in
respondent's recovery, an interest which the court below identified
as full compensation for "resident accident victims" to keep them
"off welfare rolls" and able "to meet financial obligations." 289
N.W.2d at 49. Page 449 U. S. 320 In sum, Minnesota had a significant aggregation [ Footnote 29 ] of contacts with the parties
and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application
of its law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
Accordingly, the choice of Minnesota law by the Minnesota Supreme
Court did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Affirmed.

															JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no State "shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Art. IV, §1, provides:

															"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Ralph Hague paid a separate premium for each automobile
including an additional separate premium for each uninsured
motorist coverage.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															App. C to Pet. for Cert. A-29.

															[ Footnote 5 ] 289 N.W.2d
43 (1978) .

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Respondent has suggested that this case presents a "false
conflict." The court below rejected this contention and applied
Minnesota law. Even though the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of
Minnesota law followed a discussion of whether this case presents a
false conflict, the fact is that the court chose to apply Minnesota
law. Thus, the only question before this Court is whether that
choice was constitutional.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Minnesota had previously adopted the conceptual model developed
by Professor Leflar in Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d
408 (1973).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The court apparently was referring to sufficiency as a matter of
choice of law, and not as a matter of constitutional limitation on
its choice of law decision .

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															289 N.W.2d at 50 (1979).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															This Court has taken a similar approach in deciding choice of
law cases under both the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. In each instance, the Court has examined the
relevant contacts and resulting interests of the State whose law
was applied. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.
S. 410 , 440 U. S. 424 (1979). Although at one time the Court required a more exacting
standard under the Full Faith and Credit Clause than under the Due
Process Clause for evaluating the constitutionality of choice of
law decisions, see Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 , 294 U. S.
549 -550 (1935) (interest of State whose law was applied
was no less than interest of State whose law was rejected), the
Court has since abandoned the weighing of interests requirement. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408 (1955); see Nevada v. Hall, supra; Weintraub, Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law,
44 Iowa L.Rev. 449 (1959). Different considerations are, of course,
at issue when full faith and credit is to be accorded to acts,
records, and proceedings outside the choice of law area, such as in
the case of sister state court judgments.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Prior to the advent of interest analysis in the state courts as
the "dominant mode of analysis in modern choice of law theory,"
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 33, 80, n. 259 (1978); cf. Richards v. United
States, 369 U. S. 1 , 369 U. S. 11 -13,
and nn. 26-27 (1962) (discussing trend toward interest analysis in
state courts), the prevailing choice of law methodology focused on
the jurisdiction where a particular event occurred. See,
e.g., Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934). For example, in
cases characterized as contract cases, the law of the place of
contracting controlled the determination of such issues as
capacity, fraud, consideration, duty, performance, and the like. Id. § 332; see Beale, What Law Governs the
Validity of a Contract, 23 Harv.L.Rev. 260, 270-271 (1910). In the
tort context, the law of the place of the wrong usually governed
traditional choice of law analysis. Restatement, supra, §
378; see Richards v. United States, supra at 369 U. S.
11 -12. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U. S. 143 (1934), can, perhaps, best be explained as an example of that
period. In that case, the Court struck down application by the
Mississippi courts of Mississippi law which voided the limitations
provision in a fidelity bond written in Tennessee between a
Connecticut insurer and Delta, both of which were doing business in
Tennessee and Mississippi. By its terms, the bond covered
misapplication of funds "by any employee in any position,
anywhere. . . .'" Id. at 293 U. S. 145 .
After Delta discovered defalcations by one of its Mississippi-based
employees, a lawsuit was commenced in Mississippi. That case, however, has scant relevance for today. It implied a
choice of law analysis which, for all intents and purposes, gave an
isolated event -- the writing of the bond in Tennessee --
controlling constitutional significance, even though there might
have been contacts with another State (there Mississippi) which
would make application of its law neither unfair nor unexpected. See Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78
Mich.L.Rev. 872, 874, and n. 11 (1980).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															Dick sought to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by
garnishing the reinsurance obligation of the New York reinsurer.
The reinsurer had never transacted business in Texas, but it

															"was cited by publication, in accordance with a Texas statute;
attorneys were appointed for it by the trial court; and they filed
on its behalf an answer which denied liability."

															281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 402 .
There would be no jurisdiction in the Texas courts to entertain
such a lawsuit today. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.
S. 320 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.
S. 186 (1977); Silberman, supra at 62-65.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The Court noted that the result might have been different if
there had been some connection to Texas upon "which the State could
properly lay hold as the basis of the regulations there imposed."
281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 408 ,
n. 5; see Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 , 348 U. S. 71 (1954).

															[ Footnote 14 ] See generally Weintraub, supra, n. 10, at
455-457.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															The Court found no violation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, since California's interest was considered to be no less
than Alaska's, 294 U.S. at 294 U. S. 547 -548, 294 U. S.
549 -550, even though the injury occurred in Alaska while
the employee was performing his contract obligations there. While Alaska Packers balanced the interests of California and
Alaska to determine the full faith and credit issue, such balancing
is no longer required. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 440 U. S. 424 ; n 10, supra. [ Footnote 16 ]

															The precise question raised was whether the Virginia
Compensation Commission "had sole jurisdiction over the claim." 330
U.S. at 330 U. S.
472 -473. In finding that application of the District's
law did not violate either due process or full faith and credit
requirements, the Court in effect treated the question as a
constitutional choice of law issue.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The Court has upheld choice of law decisions challenged on
constitutional grounds in numerous other decisions. See Nevada
v. Hall, supra (upholding California's application of
California law to automobile accident in California between two
California residents and a Nevada official driving car owned by
State of Nevada while engaged in official business in California); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U. S. 408 (1955) (upholding Arkansas' choice of Arkansas law where Missouri
employee executed employment contract with Missouri employer and
was injured on job in Arkansas but was removed immediately to a
Missouri hospital); Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954)
(allowing application of Louisiana direct action statute by
Louisiana resident against insurer even though policy was written
and delivered in another State, where plaintiff was injured in
Louisiana); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493 (1939) (holding Full Faith and Credit Clause not violated where
California applied own Workmen's Compensation Act in case of injury
suffered by Massachusetts employee temporarily in California in
course of employment). Thus, Nevada v. Hall, supra, and Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., supra, upheld application of forum law where the relevant contacts
consisted of plaintiff's residence and the place of the injury. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
supra, and Carroll v. Lanza, supra, relied on the
place of the injury arising from the respective employee's
temporary presence in the forum State in connection with his
employment.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The policy issued to Mr. Hague provided that Allstate would pay
to the insured, or his legal representative, damages "sustained by
the insured, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of [an] uninsured automobile. . . ." No
suggestion has been made that Mr. Hague's uninsured motorist
protection is unavailable because he was not killed while driving
one of his insured automobiles.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Numerous cases have applied the law of a jurisdiction other than
the situs of the injury where there existed some other link between
that jurisdiction and the occurrence. See, e.g., Cardillo v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U. S. 469 (1947); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 (1935); Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (CA2), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H.
351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569,
249 N.E.2d 394 (1969); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															The injury or death of a resident of State A in State B is a
contact of State A with the occurrence in State B. See cases cited in n 19, supra. [ Footnote 21 ]

															Petitioner's statement that the instant dispute involves the
interpretation of insurance contracts which were "underwritten,
applied for, and paid for by Wisconsin residents and issued
covering cars garaged in Wisconsin," Brief for Petitioner 6, is
simply another way of stating that Mr. Hague was a Wisconsin
resident. Respondent could have replied that the insurance contract
was underwritten, applied for and paid for by a Minnesota worker,
and issued covering cars that were driven to work in Minnesota and
garaged there for a substantial portion of the day. The former
statement is hardly more significant than the latter, since the
accident, in any event, did not involve any of the automobiles
which were covered under Mr. Hague's policy. Recovery is sought
pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage.

															In addition, petitioner's statement that the contracts were
"underwritten . . . by Wisconsin residents" is not supported by the
stipulated facts if petitioner means to include itself within that
phrase. Indeed, the policy, which is part of the record, recites
that Allstate signed the policy in Northbrook, Ill. Under some
versions of the hoary rule of lex loci contracts, and depending on
the precise sequence of events, a sequence which is unclear from
the record before us, the law of Illinois arguably might apply to
govern contract construction, even though Illinois would have less
contact with the parties and the occurrence than either Wisconsin
or Minnesota. No party sought application of Illinois law on that
basis in the court below.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															Of course, Allstate could not be certain that Wisconsin law
would necessarily govern any accident which occurred in Wisconsin,
whether brought in the Wisconsin courts or elsewhere. Such an
expectation would give controlling significance to the wooden lex loci delicti doctrine. While the place of the accident
is a factor to be considered in choice of law analysis, to apply
blindly the traditional, but now largely abandoned, doctrine,
Silberman, supra, n 11, at 80, n. 259; see n 11, supra, would fail to distinguish between
the relative importance of various legal issues involved in a
lawsuit, as well as the relationship of other jurisdictions to the
parties and the occurrence or transaction. If, for example, Mr.
Hague had been a Wisconsin resident and employee who was injured in
Wisconsin and was then taken by ambulance to a hospital in Red
Wing, Minn., where he languished for several weeks before dying,
Minnesota's interest in ensuring that its medical creditors were
paid would be obvious. Moreover, under such circumstances, the
accident itself might be reasonably characterized as a bi-state
occurrence beginning in Wisconsin and ending in Minnesota. Thus,
reliance by the insurer that Wisconsin law would necessarily govern
any accident that occurred in Wisconsin, or that the law of another
jurisdiction would necessarily govern any accident that did not
occur in Wisconsin, would be unwarranted. See n. 11 supra; cf. Rosenthal v.
Warren, supra, (Massachusetts hospital could not have
purchased insurance with expectation that Massachusetts law would
govern damages recovery as to New York patient who died in hospital
and whose widow brought suit in New York).

															If the law of a jurisdiction other than Wisconsin did govern,
there was a substantial likelihood, with respect to uninsured
motorist coverage, that stacking would be allowed. Stacking was the
rule in most States at the time the policy was issued. Indeed, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Employers Mutual Casualty
Co., 63 Wis.2d 558, 563-566, and nn. 2, 3, 217 N.W.2d
670 , 672, 674, and nn. 2, 3 (1974), identified 29 States,
including Minnesota, whose law it interpreted to allow stacking,
and only 9 States whose law it interpreted to prohibit stacking.
Clearly then, Allstate could not have expected that an
anti-stacking rule would govern any particular accident in which
the insured might be involved, and thus cannot claim unfair
surprise from the Minnesota Supreme Court's choice of forum
law.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															The Court has recognized that examination of a State's contacts
may result in divergent conclusions for jurisdiction and choice of
law purposes. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S. 84 , 436 U. S. 98 (1978) (no jurisdiction in California but California law "arguably
might" apply); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 215 (no jurisdiction in Delaware, although Delaware interest "may
support the application of Delaware law"); cf. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U. S. 254 ,
and n. 27 (1958) (no jurisdiction in Florida; the "issue is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law," an issue which the Court
found no need to decide). Nevertheless, "both inquiries are
often closely related, and to a substantial degree depend upon,
similar considerations.'" Shaffner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
224 -225 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Here, of course, jurisdiction in the Minnesota courts is
unquestioned, a factor not without significance in assessing the
constitutionality of Minnesota's choice of its own substantive law. Cf. id. at 433 U. S. 225 ("the decision that it is fair to bind a defendant by a State's
laws and rules should prove to be highly relevant to the fairness
of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction for
adjudicating the controversy"). [ Footnote 24 ]

															There is no element of unfair surprise or frustration of
legitimate expectations as a result of Minnesota's choice of its
law. Because Allstate was doing business in Minnesota and was
undoubtedly aware that Mr. Hague was a Minnesota employee, it had
to have anticipated that Minnesota law might apply to an accident
in which Mr. Hague was involved. See Clay II, 377 U.
S. 179 , 377 U. S. 182 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. at 348 U. S. 72 -73; Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294
U.S. at 294 U. S.
538 -543; cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. at 281 U. S. 404 (neither insurer nor reinsurer present in forum State). Indeed,
Allstate specifically anticipated that Mr. Hague might suffer an
accident either in Minnesota or elsewhere in the United States,
outside of Wisconsin, since the policy it issued offered
continental coverage. Cf. id. at 281 U. S. 403 (coverage limited to losses occurring in certain Mexican waters
which were outside of jurisdiction whose law was applied). At the
same time, Allstate did not seek to control construction of the
contract, since the policy contained no choice of law clause
dictating application of Wisconsin law. See Clay II, supra at 377 U. S. 182 (nationwide coverage of policy and lack of choice of law
clause).

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Justice Black's dissent in the first Clay decision, a
decision which vacated and remanded a lower court determination to
obtain an authoritative construction of state law that might moot
the constitutional question, subsequently commanded majority
support in the second Clay decision. Clay II,
supra at 377 U. S.
180 -183.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															The stipulated facts do not reveal the date on which Mrs. Hague
first moved to Red Wing.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															These proceedings began on May 28, 1976. Mrs. Hague was
remarried on June 19, 1976.

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															The dissent suggests that considering respondent's
post-occurrence change of residence as one of the Minnesota
contacts will encourage forum shopping. Post at 449 U. S. 337 .
This overlooks the fact that her change of residence was bona fide,
and not motivated by litigation considerations.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															We express no view whether the first two contacts, either
together or separately, would have sufficed to sustain the choice
of Minnesota law made by the Minnesota Supreme Court.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

															As I view this unusual case -- in which neither precedent nor
constitutional language provides sure guidance -- two separate
questions must be answered. First, does the Full Faith and Credit
Clause [ Footnote 2/1 ] require
Minnesota, the forum State, to apply Wisconsin law? Second, does
the Due Process Clause [ Footnote
2/2 ] of the Fourteenth Amendment prevent Minnesota from
applying its own law? The first inquiry implicates the federal
interest in ensuring that Minnesota respect the sovereignty of the
State of Wisconsin; the second implicates the litigants' interest
in a fair adjudication of their rights. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 449 U. S. 321 I realize that both this Court's analysis of choice of law
questions [ Footnote 2/4 ] and
scholarly criticism of those decisions [ Footnote 2/5 ] have treated these two inquiries as though
they were indistinguishable. [ Footnote
2/6 ] Page 449 U. S. 322 Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the two constitutional
provisions protect different interests, and that proper analysis
requires separate consideration of each, I The Full Faith and Credit Clause is one of several provisions in
the Federal Constitution designed to transform the several States
from independent sovereignties into a single, unified Nation. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.
S. 261 , 448 U. S.
271 -272 (1980) (plurality opinion); Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 , 296 U. S.
276 -277 (1935). [ Footnote
2/7 ] The Full Faith and Credit Clause implements this design by
directing that a State, when acting as the forum for litigation
having multistate aspects or implications, respect the legitimate
interests of other States and avoid infringement upon their
sovereignty. The Clause does not, however, rigidly Page 449 U. S. 323 require the forum State to apply foreign law whenever another
State has a valid interest in the litigation. See Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U. S. 410 , 440 U. S. 424 (1979); Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 , 294 U. S.
546 -548 (1935); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493 , 306 U. S.
501 -502 (1939). [ Footnote
2/8 ] On the contrary, in view of the fact that the forum State
is also a sovereign in its own right, in appropriate cases, it may
attach paramount importance to its own legitimate interests.
[ Footnote 2/9 ] Accordingly, the
fact that a choice of law decision may be unsound as a matter of
conflicts law does not necessarily implicate the federal concerns
embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rather, in my
opinion, the Clause should not invalidate a state court's choice of
forum law unless that choice threatens the federal interest in
national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate
interests of another State. [ Footnote
2/10 ] Page 449 U. S. 324 In this case, I think the Minnesota courts' decision to apply
Minnesota law was plainly unsound as a matter of normal conflicts
law. Both the execution of the insurance contract and the accident
giving rise to the litigation took place in Wisconsin. Moreover,
when both of those events occurred, the plaintiff, the decedent,
and the operators of both vehicles were all residents of Wisconsin.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that any threat to national unity or
Wisconsin's sovereignty ensues from allowing the substantive
question presented by this case to be determined by the law of
another State.

															The question on the merits is one of interpreting the meaning of
the insurance contract. Neither the contract itself nor anything
else in the record reflects any express understanding of the
parties with respect to what law would be applied or with respect
to whether the separate uninsured motorist coverage for each of the
decedent's three cars could be "stacked." Since the policy provided
coverage for accidents that might occur in other States, it was
obvious to the parties at the time of contracting that it might
give rise to the application of the law of States other than
Wisconsin. Therefore, while Wisconsin may have an interest in
ensuring that contracts formed in Wisconsin in reliance upon
Wisconsin law are interpreted in accordance with that law, that
interest is not implicated in this case. [ Footnote 2/11 ] Page 449 U. S. 325 Petitioner has filed to establish that Minnesota's refusal to
apply Wisconsin law poses any direct [ Footnote 2/12 ] or indirect threat to Wisconsin's
sovereignty. [ Footnote 2/13 ] In
the absence of any such Page 449 U. S. 326 threat, I find it unnecessary to evaluate the forum State's
interest in the litigation in order to reach the conclusion that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require the Minnesota
courts to apply Wisconsin law to the question of contract
interpretation presented in this case. II It may be assumed that a choice of law decision would violate
the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were
fundamentally unfair to either litigant. I question whether a
judge's decision to apply the law of his own State could ever be
described as wholly irrational. For judges are presumably familiar
with their own state law, and may find it difficult and time
consuming to discover and apply correctly the law of another State.
[ Footnote 2/14 ] The forum State's
interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice is
therefore sufficient, in my judgment, to attach a presumption of
validity to a forum State's decision to apply its own law to a
dispute over which it has jurisdiction.

															The forum State's interest in the efficient operation of its
judicial system is clearly not sufficient, however, to justify the
application of a rule of law that is fundamentally unfair to one of
the litigants. Arguably, a litigant could demonstrate such
unfairness in a variety of ways. Concern about the fairness of the
forum's choice of its own rule might arise Page 449 U. S. 327 if that rule favored residents over nonresidents, if it
represented a dramatic departure from the rule that obtains in most
American jurisdictions, or if the rule itself was unfair on its
face or as applied. [ Footnote
2/15 ]

															The application of an otherwise acceptable rule of law may
result in unfairness to the litigants if, in engaging in the
activity which is the subject of the litigation, they could not
reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later be
judged by this rule of law. A choice of law decision that
frustrates the justifiable expectations of the parties can be
fundamentally unfair. This desire to prevent unfair surprise to a
litigant has been the central concern in this Court's review of
choice of law decisions under the Due Process Clause. [ Footnote 2/16 ]

															Neither the "stacking" rule itself nor Minnesota's application
of that rule to these litigants raises any serious question of
fairness. As the plurality observes, "[s]tacking was Page 449 U. S. 328 the rule in most States at the time the policy was issued." Ante at 449 U. S. 316 ,
n. 22. [ Footnote 2/17 ] Moreover,
the rule is consistent with the economics of a contractual
relationship in which the policyholder paid three separate premiums
for insurance coverage for three automobiles, including a separate
premium for each uninsured motorist coverage. [ Footnote 2/18 ] Nor am I persuaded that the
decision of the Minnesota courts to apply the "stacking" rule in
this case can be said to violate due process because that decision
frustrates the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties.

															Contracting parties can, of course, make their expectations
explicit by providing in their contract either that the law of a
particular jurisdiction shall govern questions of contract
interpretation [ Footnote 2/19 ] or
that a particular substantive rule, for instance "stacking," shall
or shall not apply. [ Footnote
2/20 ] In the absence Page 449 U. S. 329 of such express provisions, the contract nonetheless may
implicitly reveal the expectations of the parties. For example, if
a liability insurance policy issued by a resident of a particular
State provides coverage only with respect to accidents within that
State, it is reasonable to infer that the contracting parties
expected that their obligations under the policy would be governed
by that State's law. [ Footnote
2/21 ]

															In this case, no express indication of the parties' expectations
is available. The insurance policy provided coverage for accidents
throughout the United States; thus, at the time of contracting, the
parties certainly could have anticipated that the law of States
other than Wisconsin would govern particular claims arising under
the policy. [ Footnote 2/22 ] By
virtue of doing business Page 449 U. S. 330 in Minnesota, Allstate was aware that it could be sued in the
Minnesota courts; Allstate also presumably was aware that Minnesota
law, as well as the law of most States, permitted "stacking."
Nothing in the record requires that a different inference be drawn.
Therefore, the decision of the Minnesota courts to apply the law of
the forum in this case does not frustrate the reasonable
expectations of the contracting parties, and I can find no
fundamental unfairness in that decision requiring the attention of
this Court. [ Footnote 2/23 ] Page 449 U. S. 331 In terms of fundamental fairness, it seems to me that two
factors relied upon by the plurality -- the plaintiff's
post-accident move to Minnesota and the decedent's Minnesota
employment -- are either irrelevant to or possibly even tend to
undermine the plurality's conclusion. When the expectations of the
parties at the time of contracting are the central due process
concern, as they are in this case, an unanticipated post-accident
occurrence is clearly irrelevant for due process purposes. The fact
that the plaintiff became a resident of the forum State after the
accident surely cannot justify a ruling in her favor that would not
be made if the plaintiff were a nonresident. Similarly, while the
fact that the decedent regularly drove into Minnesota might be
relevant to the expectations of the contracting parties, [ Footnote 2/24 ] the fact that he did so
because he was employed in Minnesota adds nothing to the due
process analysis. The choice of law decision of the Minnesota
courts is consistent with due process because it does not result in
unfairness to either litigant, not because Minnesota now has an
interest in the plaintiff as resident or formerly had an interest
in the decedent as employee. III Although I regard the Minnesota courts' decision to apply forum
law as unsound as a matter of conflicts law, and there Page 449 U. S. 332 is little in this record other than the presumption in favor of
the forum's own law to support that decision, I concur in the
plurality's judgment. It is not this Court's function to establish
and impose upon state courts a federal choice of law rule, nor is
it our function to ensure that state courts correctly apply
whatever choice of law rules they have themselves adopted.
[ Footnote 2/25 ] Our authority may
be exercised in the choice of law area only to prevent a violation
of the Full Faith and Credit or the Due Process Clause. For the
reasons stated above, I find no such violation in this case.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Article IV, § 1, provides:

															"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part:

															"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . ."

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The two questions presented by the choice of law issue arise
only after it is assumed or established that the defendant's
contacts with the forum State are sufficient to support personal
jurisdiction. Although the choice of law concerns -- respect for
another sovereign and fairness to the litigants -- are similar to
the two functions performed by the jurisdictional inquiry, they are
not identical. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286 , 444 U. S.
291 -292 (1980), we stated:

															"The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to
perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects
the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." See also Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78
Colum.L.Rev. 1587, 1589-1590 (1978). While it has been suggested
that this same minimum contacts analysis be used to define the
constitutional limitations on choice of law, see, e.g., Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 Mich.L.Rev. 872
(1980), the Court has made it clear over the years that the
personal jurisdiction and choice of law inquiries are not the same. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S.
84 , 436 U. S. 98 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.
S. 186 , 433 U. S. 215 (1977); id. at 433 U. S.
224 -226 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting in part); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U. S. 235 , 357 U.S. 253 -254 (1958); id. at 357 U. S. 258 (Black, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Although the Court has struck down a state court's choice of
forum law on both due process, see, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930), and full faith and credit grounds, see, e.g., John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.
S. 178 (1936), no clear analytical distinction between
the two constitutional provisions has emerged. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause, of course, was inapplicable in Home Ins.
Co. because the law of a foreign nation, rather than of a
sister State, was at issue; a similarly clear explanation for the
Court's reliance upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause in John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. cannot be found. Indeed, John
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. is probably best understood as a due
process case. See Reese, supra at 1589, and n.
17; Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on
a State's Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L.Rev. 449, 457-458 (1959).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] See R. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 5, p. 7, § 55,
pp. 106-107 (3d ed.1977). The Court's frequent failure to
distinguish between the two Clauses in the choice of law context
may underlie the suggestions of various commentators that either
the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause be
recognized as the single appropriate source for constitutional
limitations on choice of law. Compare Martin,
Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 Cornell L.Rev. 185
(1976) (full faith and credit), with Reese, supra, (due process); see also Kirgis, The Roles
of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62
Cornell L.Rev. 94 (1976).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Even when the Court has explicitly considered both provisions in
a single case, the requirements of the Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit Clauses have been measured by essentially the same
standard. For example, in Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954), the Court separately considered the due process and full
faith and credit questions. See id. at 348 U. S. 70 -73.
However, in concluding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did
not bar the Louisiana courts from applying Louisiana law in that
case, the Court substantially relied upon its preceding analysis of
the requirements of due process. Id. at 348 U. S. 73 . By
way of contrast, in Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U. S. 532 , 294 U. S.
544 -550 (1935), the Court's full faith and credit
analysis differed significantly from its due process analysis.
However, as noted in the plurality opinion, ante at 449 U.S. 308 , n. 10, the
Court has since abandoned the full faith and credit standard
represented by Alaska Packers. [ Footnote 2/7 ] See also Sumner, The Full Faith and Credit Clause --
Its History and Purpose, 34 Or.L.Rev. 224, 242 (1955); Weintraub, supra at 477; R. Leflar, supra, § 73, P. 143.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															As the Court observed in Alaska Packers, supra, an
overly rigid application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would
produce anomalous results:

															"A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit
clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to
the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute
of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but
cannot be in its own."

															294 U.S. at 294 U. S.
547 .

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															For example, it is well established that "the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law
in violation of its own legitimate public policy." . Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U. S. 410 , 440 U. S. 422 (1979) (footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															The kind of state action the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
designed to prevent has been described in a variety of ways by this
Court. In Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.
S. 408 , 349 U. S. 413 (1955), the Court indicated that the Clause would be invoked to
restrain "any policy of hostility to the public Acts" of another
State. In Nevada v. Hall, supra at 440 U. S. 424 ,
n. 24, we approved action which "pose[d] no substantial threat to
our constitutional system of cooperative federalism." And in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.
S. 261 , 448 U. S. 272 (1980), the plurality opinion described the purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as the prevention of "parochial
entrenchment on the interests of other State."

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															While the justifiable expectations of the litigants are a major
concern for purposes of due process scrutiny of choice of law
decisions, see 449 U. S. infra, the decision in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936), suggests that this concern may also implicate state
interests cognizable under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In John Hancock Mutual Life Ins., the Court struck down on
full faith and credit grounds a Georgia court's choice of Georgia
law over a conflicting New York statute in a suit on a New York
life insurance contract brought after the insured's death in New
York. Central to the decision in that case was the Court's apparent
concern that application of Georgia law would result in unfair
surprise to one of the contracting parties. The Court found that
the New York statute was "a rule of substantive law which became a
term of the contract, as much so as the amount of the premium to be
paid or the time for its payment." Id. at 299 U. S. 182 (footnote omitted). This statute "determine[d] the substantive
rights of the parties as fully as if a provision to that effect had
been embodied in writing in the policy." Id. at 299 U. S.
182 -183. The insurer had no reason to expect that the
New York statute would not control all claims arising under the
life insurance policy. The parties to a life insurance contract
normally would not expect the place of death to have any bearing
upon the proper construction of the policy; by way of contrast, in
the case of a liability policy, the place of the tort might well be
relevant. For that reason, in a life insurance contract
relationship, it is likely that neither party would expect the law
of any State other than the place of contracting to have any
relevance in possible subsequent litigation. See generally C. Carnahan, Conflict of Laws and Life Insurance Contracts § 15,
pp. 51-52, § 47, pp. 264-265, 267-268, § 60, pp. 325-327 (2d
ed.1958) .

															Paul Freund has aptly characterized John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. as perhaps this Court's "most ambitious application of
the full faith and credit clause." Freund, Chief Justice Stone and
the Conflict of Laws, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 1210, 1233 (1946). Like Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.
S. 145 (1932), on which the Court relied, see 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 183 , John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. was one of a series of
constitutional decisions in the 1930's that have been limited by
subsequent cases. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. at 349 U. S. 412 ; Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., supra at 448 U. S.
272 -273, n. 18 (plurality opinion). See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L.Rev. 657,
675 (1959).

															[ Footnote 2/12 ] Compare Nevada v. Hall, supra, in which the Court
permitted a California court to disregard Nevada's statutory
limitation on damages available against the State. The Court found
this direct intrusion upon Nevada's sovereignty justified because
the Nevada statute was "obnoxious" to California's public policy. Id. at 424.

															[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															It is clear that a litigant challenging the forum's application
of its own law to a lawsuit properly brought in its courts bears
the burden of establishing that this choice of law infringes upon
interests protected by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See
Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
at 294 U. S.
547 -548.

															It is equally clear that a state court's decision to apply its
own law cannot violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause where the
application of forum law does not impinge at all upon the interests
of other States. Cf. Reese, supra, n. 3, at
1601.

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															This task can be particularly difficult for a trial judge who
does not have ready access to a law library containing the statutes
and decisions of all 50 States. If that judge is able to apply law
with which he is thoroughly familiar or can easily discover,
substantial savings can accrue to the State's judicial system.
Moreover, an erroneous interpretation of the governing rule is less
likely when the judge is applying a familiar rule. Cf. Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
225 -226 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting in part) (such concerns
indicate that a State's ability to apply its own law to a
transaction should be relevant for purposes of evaluating its power
to exercise jurisdiction over the parties to that transaction).

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															Discrimination against nonresidents would be constitutionally
suspect even if the Due Process Clause were not a check upon a
State's choice of law decisions. See Currie &
Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter,
Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges
and Immunities, 69 Yale L.J. 1323 (1980); Note, Unconstitutional
Discrimination in Choice of Law, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 272 (1977).
Moreover, both discriminatory and substantively unfair rules of law
may be detected and remedied without any special choice of law
analysis; familiar constitutional principles are available to deal
with both varieties of unfairness. See, e.g., Martin, supra, 449
U.S. 302 fn2/5|>n. 5, at 199.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ]

															Upon careful analysis, most of the decisions of this Court that
struck down on due process grounds a state court's choice of forum
law can be explained as attempts to prevent a State with a minimal
contact with the litigation from materially enlarging the
contractual obligations of one of the parties where that party had
no reason to anticipate the possibility of such enlargement. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.
S. 397 (1930); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.
S. 143 (1934); cf. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936) (similar concern under Full Faith and Credit Clause, see 449
U.S. 302 fn2/11|>n. 11, supra ). See
generally Weintraub, supra, 449
U.S. 302 fn2/4|>n. 4, at 457-460.

															[ Footnote 2/17 ] See also Nelson v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 63
Wis.2d 558, 563-566, and nn. 2, 3, 217 N.W.2d
670 , 672-674, and nn. 2, 3 (1974), discussed ante at 449 U. S.
316 -317, n. 22.

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															The "stacking" rule provides that all of the uninsured motorist
coverage purchased by an insured party may be aggregated, or
"stacked," to create a fund available to provide a recovery for a
single accident.

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															For example, in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra at 281 U. S. 403 ,
and n. 1, the insurance policy was subject, by its express terms,
to Mexican law.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ] Home Ins. Co., supra, again provides a useful example.
In that case, the insurance policy expressly provided a l-year
limitations period for claims arising thereunder. Id. at 281 U. S. 403 .
Similarly, the insurance policy at issue in Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., supra at 292 U. S. 146 ,
also prescribed a specific limitations period.

															While such express provisions are obviously relevant, they are
not always dispositive. In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., 377 U. S. 179 (1964), the Court allowed the lower court's choice of forum law to
override an express contractual limitations period. The Court
emphasized the fact that the insurer had issued the insurance
policy with the knowledge that it would cover the insured property
wherever it was taken. Id. at 377 U. S.
181 -182. The Court also noted that the insurer had not
attempted to provide in the policy that the law of another State
would control. Id. at 377 U. S.
182 .

															In Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. at 348 U. S. 68 ,
the insurance policy expressly provided that an injured party could
not maintain a direct action against the insurer until after the
insured's liability had been determined. The Court found that
neither the Due Process Clause nor the Full Faith and Credit Clause
prevented the Louisiana courts from applying forum law to permit a
direct action against the insurer prior to determination of the
insured's liability. As in Clay, the Court noted that the
policy provided coverage for injuries anywhere in the United
States. 348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 71 -72.
An additional, although unarticulated, factor in Watson was the fact that the litigant urging that forum law be applied was
not a party to the insurance contract. While contracting parties
may be able to provide in advance that a particular rule of law
will govern disputes between them, their expectations are clearly
entitled to less weight when the rights of third-party litigants
are at issue.

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															In Home Ins. Co., supra, the insurance policy was
issued in Mexico by a Mexican corporation and covered the insured
vessel only in certain Mexican waters. Id. at 281 U. S.
403 .

															[ Footnote 2/22 ]

															In Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., supra at 377 U. S. 182 ,
and Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., supra at 348 U. S. 71 -72,
the Court considered it significant, in upholding the lower courts'
choice of forum law, that the insurance policies provided coverage
throughout the United States. See 449
U.S. 302 fn2/20|>n. 20, supra. Of course, in both Clay and Watson, the loss to which the insurance
applied actually occurred in the forum State, whereas the accident
in this case occurred in Wisconsin, not Minnesota. However, as the
dissent recognizes, post at 449 U. S.
336 -337, because the question on the merits is one of
contract interpretation, rather than tort liability, the actual
site of the accident is not dispositive with respect to the due
process inquiry. More relevant is the fact that the parties, at the
time of contracting, anticipated that an accident covered by the
policy could occur in a "stacking" State. The fact that this
particular accident did not occur in Minnesota does not undercut
the expectations formed by the parties at the time of
contracting.

															In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., supra, the Court struck down a state court's choice
of forum law despite the fact that the insurance contract's
coverage was not limited by state boundaries. While Hartford
Accident may indeed have "scant relevance for today," ante at 449 U. S. 309 ,
n. 11, it is nonetheless consistent with a due process analysis
based upon fundamental fairness to the parties. One of the statutes
applied by the Mississippi courts in Hartford Accident was
offensively broad, providing that "[a]ll contracts of insurance on
property, lives or interests in this state shall be deemed to be
made therein." 292 U.S. at 292 U. S. 148 . No similar statute is involved in this
case. In addition, the Mississippi courts applied the law of the
forum to override an express contractual provision, and thus
frustrated the expectations of the contracting parties. In the
present case, the insurance contract contains no similar
declaration of the intent of the parties.

															[ Footnote 2/23 ]

															Comparison of this case with Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930), confirms my conclusion that the application of Minnesota
law in this case does not offend the Due Process Clause. In Home Ins. Co., the contract expressly provided that a
particular limitations period would govern claims arising under the
insurance contract, and that Mexican law was to be applied in
interpreting the contract; in addition, the contract was limited in
effect to certain Mexican waters. The parties could hardly have
made their expectations with respect to the applicable law more
plain. In this case, by way of contrast, nothing in the contract
suggests that Wisconsin law should be applied or that Minnesota's
"stacking" rule should not be applied. In this case, unlike Home Ins. Co., the court's choice of forum law results in
no unfair surprise to the insurer.

															[ Footnote 2/24 ]

															Even this factor may not be of substantial significance. At the
time of contracting, the parties were aware that the insurance
policy was effective throughout the United States, and that the law
of any State, including Minnesota, might be applicable to
particular claims. The fact that the decedent regularly drove to
Minnesota, for whatever purpose, is relevant only to the extent
that it affected the parties' evaluation, at the time of
contracting, of the likelihood that Minnesota law would actually be
applied at some point in the future. However, because the
applicability of Minnesota law was perceived as possible at the
time of contracting, it does not seem especially significant for
due process purposes that the parties may also have considered it
likely that Minnesota law would be applied. This factor merely
reinforces the expectation revealed by the policy's national
coverage.

															[ Footnote 2/25 ]

															In Kryger v. Wilson, 24 U. S. 171 , 24 U. S. 176 (1916), after rejecting a due process challenge to a state court's
choice of law, the Court stated:

															"The most that the plaintiff in error can say is that the state
court made a mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of
laws in deciding that the cancellation of a land contact is
governed by the law of the situs, instead of the place of making
and performance. But that, being purely a question of local common
law, is a matter with which this court is not concerned."

															JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE
REHNQUIST Join, dissenting.

															My disagreement with the plurality is narrow. I accept with few
reservations 449 U. S. which sets forth the basic principles that guide us in reviewing
state choice of law decisions under the Constitution. The Court
should invalidate a forum State's decision to apply its own law
only when there are no significant contacts between the State and
the litigation. This modest check on state power is mandated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of Art. IV, § 1. I do not believe, however, that
the plurality adequately analyzes the policies such review must
serve. In consequence, it has found significant what appear to me
to be trivial contacts between the forum State and the
litigation. Page 449 U. S. 333 I At least since Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.
S. 408 (1955), the Court has recognized that both the
Due Process and the Full Faith and Credit Clauses are satisfied if
the forum has such significant contacts with the litigation that it
has a legitimate state interest in applying its own law. The
significance of asserted contacts must be evaluated in light of the
constitutional policies that oversight by this Court should serve.
Two enduring policies emerge from our cases.

															First, the contacts between the forum State and the litigation
should not be so "slight and casual" that it would be fundamentally
unfair to a litigant for the forum to apply its own State's law. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.
S. 179 , 377 U. S. 182 (1964). The touchstone here is the reasonable expectation of the
parties. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 Iowa L.Rev. 449,
445-457 (1959) (Weintraub). Thus, in Clay, the insurer
sold a policy to Clay " with knowledge that he could take his
property anywhere in the world he saw fit without losing the
protection of his insurance.'" 377 U.S. at 182, quoting Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U. S. 207 , 363 U. S. 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). When the insured moved to Florida
with the knowledge of the insurer, and a loss occurred in that
State, this Court found no unfairness in Florida's applying its own
rule of decision to permit recovery on the policy. The insurer
"must have known it might be sued there." Ibid. See
also Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U. S. 66 (1954). [ Footnote 3/1 ] Page 449 U. S. 334 Second, the forum State must have a legitimate interest in the
outcome of the litigation before it. Pacific Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493 (1939). The Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses the
accommodation of sovereign power among the various States. Under
limited circumstances, it requires one State to give effect to the
statutory law of another State. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410 , 440 U. S. 423 (1979). To be sure, a forum State need not give effect to another
State's law if that law is in "violation of its own legitimate
public policy." Id. at 440 U. S. 422 .
Nonetheless, for a forum State to further its legitimate public
policy by applying its own law to a controversy, there must be some
connection between the facts giving rise to the litigation and the
scope of the State's lawmaking jurisdiction.

															Both the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses ensure
that the States do not "reach out beyond the limits imposed on them
by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.
S. 286 , 444 U. S. 292 (1980) (addressing Fourteenth Amendment limitation on state court
jurisdiction). As the Court stated in Pacific Ins. Co.,
supra: "[T]he full faith and credit clause does not require one state
to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and
events within it, the conflicting statute of another
state." Id. at 306 U. S. 502 (emphasis added). The State has a legitimate interest in applying a
rule of decision to the litigation only if the facts to which the
rule will be applied have created effects within the State, toward
which the State's public policy is directed. To assess the
sufficiency of asserted contacts between the forum and the
litigation, the court must determine if the contacts form a
reasonable link between the litigation and a state policy. In
short, examination of contacts addresses whether "the state Page 449 U. S. 335 has an interest in the application of its policy in this
instance." Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, in B. Currie
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 188, 189 (1963) (Currie).
If it does, the Constitution is satisfied. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.
S. 178 (1936), illustrates this principle. A life
insurance policy was executed in New York, on a New York insured
with a New York beneficiary. The insured died in New York; his
beneficiary moved to Georgia and sued to recover on the policy. The
insurance company defended on the ground that the insured, in the
application for the policy, had made materially false statements
that rendered it void under New York law. This Court reversed the
Georgia court's application of its contrary rule that all questions
of the policy's validity must be determined by the jury. The Court
found a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, because,
"[i]n respect to the accrual of the right asserted under the
contract . . . , there was no occurrence, nothing done, to which
the law of Georgia could apply." Id. at 299 U. S. 182 .
In other words, the Court determined that Georgia had no legitimate
interest in applying its own law to the legal issue of liability.
Georgia's contacts with the contract of insurance were nonexistent.
[ Footnote 3/2 ] See Home Ins.
Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 , 281 U. S. 408 (1930).

															In summary, the significance of the contacts between a forum
State and the litigation must be assessed in light of Page 449 U. S. 336 these two important constitutional policies. [ Footnote 3/3 ] A contact, or a pattern of contacts,
satisfies the Constitution when it protects the litigants from
being unfairly surprised if the forum State applies its own law,
and when the application of the forum's law reasonably can be
understood to further a legitimate public policy of the forum
State. II Recognition of the complexity of the constitutional inquiry
requires that this Court apply these principles with restraint.
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, I do not
believe, however, that Minnesota had sufficient contacts with the
"persons and events" in this litigation to apply its rule
permitting stacking. I would agree that no reasonable expectations
of the parties were frustrated. The risk insured by petitioner was
not geographically limited. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. at 377 U. S. 182 .
The close proximity of Hager City, Wis., to Minnesota, and the fact
that Hague commuted daily to Red Wing, Minn., for many years,
should have led the insurer to realize that there was a reasonable
probability that the risk would materialize in Minnesota. Under our
precedents, it is plain that Minnesota could have applied its own
law to an accident occurring within its borders. See ante at 449 U. S. 318 ,
n. 24. The fact that the accident did not, in fact, occur in
Minnesota is not controlling, because the expectations of the
litigants before the cause of Page 449 U. S. 337 action accrues provide the pertinent perspective. See Weintraub 455; n. 1, supra. The more doubtful question in this case is whether application
of Minnesota's substantive law reasonably furthers a legitimate
state interest. The plurality attempts to give substance to the
tenuous contacts between Minnesota and this litigation. Upon
examination, however, these contacts are either trivial or
irrelevant to the furthering of any public policy of Minnesota.

															First, the post-accident residence of the plaintiff beneficiary
is constitutionally irrelevant to the choice of law question. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, supra. The
plurality today insists that Yates only held that a
post-occurrence move to the forum State could not, "in and of
itself," confer power on the forum to apply its own law, but did
not establish that such a change of residence was irrelevant. Ante at 449 U. S. 319 .
What the Yates Court held, however, was that "there was no
occurrence, nothing done, to which the law of Georgia
could apply." 299 U.S. at 299 U. S. 182 (emphasis added). Any possible ambiguity in the Court's view of the
significance of a post-occurrence change of residence is dispelled
by Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, supra, cited by the Yates Court, where it was held squarely that Dick's
post-accident move to the forum State was "without significance."
281 U.S. at 281 U. S.
408 .

															This rule is sound. If a plaintiff could choose the substantive
rules to be applied to an action by moving to a hospitable forum,
the invitation to forum shopping would be irresistible. Moreover,
it would permit the defendant's reasonable expectations at the time
the cause of action accrues to be frustrated, because it would
permit the choice of law question to turn on a post-accrual
circumstance. Finally, post-accrual residence has nothing to do
with facts to which the forum State proposes to apply its rule; it
is unrelated to the substantive legal issues presented by the
litigation.

															Second, the plurality finds it significant that the insurer does
business in the forum State. Ante at 449 U. S.
317 -318. The State Page 449 U. S. 338 does have a legitimate interest in regulating the practices of
such an insurer. But this argument proves too much. The insurer
here does business in all 50 States. The forum State has no
interest in regulating that conduct of the insurer unrelated to
property, persons, or contracts executed within the forum State.
[ Footnote 3/4 ] See Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313 , 318 U. S. 319 (1943). The plurality recognizes this flaw, and attempts to bolster
the significance of the local presence of the insurer by combining
it with the other factors deemed significant: the presence of the
plaintiff and the fact that the deceased worked in the forum State.
This merely restates the basic question in the case.

															Third, the plurality emphasizes particularly that the insured
worked in the forum State. [ Footnote
3/5 ] Ante at 449 U. S.
313 -317. The fact that the insured was a nonresident
employee in the forum Page 449 U. S. 339 State provides a significant contact for the furtherance of some
local policies. See, e.g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 306 U. S. 493 (1939) (forum State's interest in compensating workers for
employment-related injuries occurring within the State); Alaska
Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.
S. 532 , 294 U. S. 549 (1935) (forum State's interest in compensating the
employment-related injuries of a worker hired in the State). The
insured's place of employment is not, however, significant in this
case. Neither the nature of the insurance policy, the events
related to the accident, nor the immediate question of stacking
coverage is in any way affected or implicated by the insured's
employment status. The plurality's opinion is understandably vague
in explaining how trebling the benefits to be paid to the estate of
a nonresident employee furthers any substantial state interest
relating to employment. Minnesota does not wish its workers to die
in automobile accidents, but permitting stacking will not further
this interest. The substantive issue here is solely one of
compensation, and whether the compensation provided by this policy
is increased or not will have no relation to the State's employment
policies or police power. See 449
U.S. 302 fn3/5|>n. 5, supra. Neither taken separately nor in the aggregate do the contacts
asserted by the plurality today indicate that Minnesota's
application of its substantive rule in this case will further any
legitimate state interest. [ Footnote
3/6 ] The plurality focuses Page 449 U. S. 340 only on physical contacts vel non, and, in doing, so
pays scant attention to the more fundamental reasons why our
precedents require reasonable policy-related contacts in choice of
law cases. Therefore, I dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.
S. 397 (1930), is a case where the reasonable
expectations of a litigant were frustrated. The insurance contract
confined the risk to Mexico, where the loss occurred and where both
the insurer and the insured resided until the claim accrued. This
Court found a violation of the Due Process Clause when Texas, the
forum State, applied a local rule to allow the insured to gain a
recovery unavailable under Mexican law. Because of the geographic
limitation on the risk, and because there were no contacts with the
forum State until the claim accrued, the insurer could have had no
reasonable expectation that Texas law would be applied to interpret
its obligations under the contract. See Weintraub 455.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															"It is manifest that Georgia had no interest in the application
to this case of any policy to be found in its laws. When the
contract was entered into, and at all times until the insured died,
the parties and the transaction were beyond the legitimate reach of
whatever policy Georgia may have had. Any interest asserted by
Georgia must relate to the circumstance that the action is tried
there, and must arise not from any policy directed to the business
of life insurance but from some policy having to do with the
business of the courts. This was apparently recognized even by the
Georgia court; hence the disingenuous characterization of the
matter as one of 'procedure,' rather than of 'substance.'"

															Currie 236. See also id. at 232-233.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															The plurality today apparently recognizes that the significance
of the contacts must be evaluated in light of the policies our
review serves. It acknowledges that the sufficiency of the same
contacts sometimes will differ in jurisdiction and choice of law
questions. Ante at 449 U. S. 317 ,
n. 23. The plurality, however, pursues the rationale for the
requirement of sufficient contacts in choice of law cases no
further than to observe that the forum's application of its own law
must be "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Ante at 449 U. S. 313 .
But this general prohibition does not distinguish questions of
choice of law from those of jurisdiction, or from much of the
jurisprudence of the Fourteenth Amendment.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															The petitioner in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936), did business in Georgia, the forum State, at the time of
that case. See The Insurance Almanac 715 (1935). Also,
Georgia extensively regulated insurance practices within the State
at that time. See Ga.Code § 56-101 et seq. (1933). This Court did not hint in Yates that this fact
was of the slightest significance to the choice of law question,
although it would have been crucial for the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The plurality exacts double service from this fact, by finding a
separate contact in that the insured commuted daily to his job. Ante at 449 U. S.
314 -315. This is merely a repetition of the facts that
the insured lived in Wisconsin and worked in Minnesota. The State
does have an interest in the safety of motorists who use its roads.
This interest is not limited to employees, but extends to all
nonresident motorists on its highways. This safety interest,
however, cannot encompass, either in logic or in any practical
sense, the determination whether a nonresident's estate can stack
benefit coverage in a policy written in another State regarding an
accident that occurred on another State's roads. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.
S. 469 (1947), hardly establishes commutation as an
independent contact; the case merely approved the application of a
forum State's law to an industrial accident occurring in a
neighboring State when the employer and the employee both resided
in the forum State.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															The opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS concurring in the judgment
supports my view that the forum State's application of its own law
to this case cannot be justified by the existence of relevant
minimum contacts. As JUSTICE STEVENS observes, the principal
factors relied on by the plurality are "either irrelevant to or
possibly even tend to undermine the [plurality's] conclusion." Ante at 449 U. S. 331 .
The interesting analysis he proposes to uphold the State's judgment
is, however, difficult to reconcile with our prior decisions, and
may create more problems than it solves. For example, it seems
questionable to measure the interest of a State in a controversy by
the degree of conscious reliance on that State's law by private
parties to a contract. Ante at 449 U. S. 324 .
Moreover, scrutinizing the strength of the interests of a nonforum
State may draw this Court back into the discredited practice of
weighing the relative interests of various States in a particular
controversy. See ante at 449 U.S. 308 , n. 10 (plurality
opinion).