OCTOBER TERM, 1998

															Syllabus

															WYOMING v. HOUGHTON

															CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF WYOMING No. 98-184. Argued January 12, 1999-Decided April 5, 1999 During a routine traffic stop, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer
noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket, which
the driver admitted using to take drugs. The officer then searched
the passenger compartment for contraband, removing and searching
what respondent, a passenger in the car, claimed was her purse. He
found drug paraphernalia there and arrested respondent on drug
charges. The trial court denied her motion to suppress all evidence
from the purse as the fruit of an unlawful search, holding that the
officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband, and,
by extension, any containers therein that could hold such
contraband. Respondent was convicted. In reversing, the Wyoming
Supreme Court ruled that an officer with probable cause to search a
vehicle may search all containers that might conceal the object of
the search; but, if the officer knows or should know that a
container belongs to a passenger who is not suspected of criminal
activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search
unless someone had the opportunity to conceal contraband within it
to avoid detection. Applying that rule here, the court concluded
that the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Held: Police officers with probable cause to search a
car, as in this case, may inspect passengers' belongings found in
the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search. In
determining whether a particular governmental action violates the
Fourth Amendment, this Court inquires first whether the action was
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under common law when the
Amendment was framed, see, e. g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U. S. 927 , 931. Where that inquiry yields no answer, the Court
must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional
reasonableness standards by balancing an individual's privacy
interests against legitimate governmental interests, see, e. g., Vernonia School Dist. -'+ 7 J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 ,
652-653. This Court has concluded that the Framers would have
regarded as reasonable the warrantless search of a car that police
had probable cause to believe contained contraband, Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , as well as
the warrantless search of containers within the automobile, United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 . Neither Ross nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a
distinction based on ownership. The analytical principle underlying Ross's rule is also fully consistent with the balance of
this 296 Syllabus

															Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Even if the historical
evidence were equivocal, the balancing of the relative interests
weighs decidedly in favor of searching a passenger's belongings.
Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of
privacy with regard to the property they transport in cars. See, e. g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 , 590. The
degree of intrusiveness of a package search upon personal privacy
and personal dignity is substantially less than the degree of
intrusiveness of the body searches at issue in United States v. Di Re, 332
U. S. 581 , and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 . In contrast
to the passenger's reduced privacy expectations, the governmental
interest in effective law enforcement would be appreciably impaired
without the ability to search the passenger's belongings, since an
automobile's ready mobility creates the risk that evidence or
contraband will be permanently lost while a warrant is obtained, California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386 ; since a
passenger may have an interest in concealing evidence of wrongdoing
in a common enterprise with the driver, cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.
S. 408 , 413-414; and since a criminal might be able to hide
contraband in a passenger's belongings as readily as in other
containers in the car, see, e. g., Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U. S. 98, 102. The Wyoming Supreme Court's "passenger
property" rule would be unworkable in practice. Finally, an
exception from the historical practice described in Ross protecting only a passenger's property, rather than property
belonging to anyone other than the driver, would be less
sensible than the rule that a package may be searched, whether or
not its owner is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it
might contain the object of the search. Pp. 299-307.

															956 P. 2d 363, reversed.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and BREYER, JJ.,
joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.
307. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined, post, p.309. Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General of
Wyoming, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
were Gay Woodhouse, Acting Attorney General, and D.
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

															Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor
General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, and Deputy
Solicitor General Dreeben. 297 Donna D. Domonkos, by appointment of the Court, 525 U. S.
980, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Sylvia Lee Hackl and Michael Dinnerstein.* JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents the question whether police officers violate
the Fourth Amendment when they search a passenger's personal
belongings inside an automobile that they have probable cause to
believe contains contraband.

															I

															In the early morning hours of July 23, 1995, a Wyoming Highway
Patrol officer stopped an automobile for speeding and driving with
a faulty brake light. There were three

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of Kentucky et al. by Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General of Kentucky, Matthew Nelson, Assistant
Attorney General, Dan Schweitzer, and John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, and by the Attorneys General
for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of
Alabama, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of
Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, M. Jane
Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Gus F. Diaz of Guam, Margery S. Bronster of Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Richard P. Ieyoub of
Louisiana, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran,
Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of
Mississippi, Jeremiah W (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Joseph
P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Peter Verniero of New
Jersey, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North
Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, W A. Drew
Edmondson of Oklahoma, Charles M. Condon of South
Carolina, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, and Jan
Graham of Utah; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; and
for the National Association of Police Organizations by Stephen
R. McSpadden. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for
the Legal Aid Society of New York City et al. by M. Sue
Wycoff; for the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers by Paul Mogin and Lisa B. Kemler; and for the
Rutherford Institute by Steven H. Aden and John W
Whitehead. 298 passengers in the front seat of the car: David Young (the
driver), his girlfriend, and respondent. While questioning Young,
the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in Young's shirt pocket.
He left the occupants under the supervision of two backup officers
as he went to get gloves from his patrol car. Upon his return, he
instructed Young to step out of the car and place the syringe on
the hood. The officer then asked Young why he had a syringe; with
refreshing candor, Young replied that he used it to take drugs.

															At this point, the backup officers ordered the two female
passengers out of the car and asked them for identification.
Respondent falsely identified herself as "Sandra James" and stated
that she did not have any identification. Meanwhile, in light of
Young's admission, the officer searched the passenger compartment
of the car for contraband. On the back seat, he found a purse,
which respondent claimed as hers. He removed from the purse a
wallet containing respondent's driver's license, identifying her
properly as Sandra K. Houghton. When the officer asked her why she
had lied about her name, she replied: "In case things went
bad."

															Continuing his search of the purse, the officer found a brown
pouch and a black wallet-type container. Respondent denied that the
former was hers, and claimed ignorance of how it came to be there;
it was found to contain drug paraphernalia and a syringe with 60
ccs of methamphetamine. Respondent admitted ownership of the black
container, which was also found to contain drug paraphernalia, and
a syringe (which respondent acknowledged was hers) with 10 ccs of
methamphetamine-an amount insufficient to support the felony
conviction at issue in this case. The officer also found fresh
needle-track marks on respondent's arms. He placed her under
arrest.

															The State of Wyoming charged respondent with felony possession
of methamphetamine in a liquid amount greater than three-tenths of
a gram. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-71031(c)(iii) (Supp. 1996). After
a hearing, the trial court de- 299 nied her motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the purse
as the fruit of a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court held that the officer had probable cause to
search the car for contraband, and, by extension, any containers
therein that could hold such contraband. A jury convicted
respondent as charged.

															The Wyoming Supreme Court, by divided vote, reversed

															the conviction and announced the following rule: "Generally, once probable cause is established to search a
vehicle, an officer is entitled to search all containers therein
which may contain the object of the search. However, if the officer
knows or should know that a container is the personal effect of a
passenger who is not suspected of criminal activity, then the
container is outside the scope of the search unless someone had the
opportunity to conceal the contraband within the personal effect to
avoid detection." 956 P. 2d 363, 372 (1998). The court held that the search of respondent's purse violated
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because the officer "knew or
should have known that the purse did not belong to the driver, but
to one of the passengers," and because "there was no probable cause
to search the passengers' personal effects and no reason to believe
that contraband had been placed within the purse." Ibid. We
granted certiorari, 524 U. S. 983 (1998).

															II

															The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." In determining whether a
particular governmental action violates this provision, we inquire
first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927, 931 (1995); California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621 , 624
(1991). Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must 300 evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of
reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. See, e. g., Vernonia School Dist. J,7J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 , 652-653
(1995).

															It is uncontested in the present case that the police officers
had probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs in the car. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925),
similarly involved the warrantless search of a car that law
enforcement officials had probable cause to believe contained
contraband-in that case, bootleg liquor. The Court concluded that
the Framers would have regarded such a search as reasonable in
light of legislation enacted by Congress from 1789 through 1799-as
well as subsequent legislation from the founding era and
beyond-that empowered customs officials to search any ship or
vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe that
it contained goods subject to a duty. Id., at 150-153. See
also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 , 806
(1982); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 623-624
(1886). Thus, the Court held that "contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be
searched for without a warrant" where probable cause exists. Carroll, supra, at 153.

															We have furthermore read the historical evidence to show that
the Framers would have regarded as reasonable (if there was
probable cause) the warrantless search of containers within an automobile. In Ross, supra, we upheld as reasonable the
warrantless search of a paper bag and leather pouch found in the
trunk of the defendant's car by officers who had probable cause to
believe that the trunk contained drugs. JUSTICE STEVENS, writing
for the Court, observed: "It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court
relied in Carro II concerned the enforcement of laws
imposing duties on imported merchandise .... Presumably such
merchandise was shipped then in con- 301 tainers of various kinds, just as it is today. Since Congress
had authorized warrantless searches of vessels and beasts for
imported merchandise, it is inconceivable that it intended a
customs officer to obtain a warrant for every package discovered
during the search; certainly Congress intended customs officers to
open shipping containers when necessary and not merely to examine
the exterior of cartons or boxes in which smuggled goods might be
concealed. During virtually the entire history of our
country-whether contraband was transported in a horse-drawn
carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile-it has been
assumed that a lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of
any container that might conceal the object of the search." I
d., at 820, n. 26. Ross summarized its holding as follows: "If probable
cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it
justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search." Id., at 825 (emphasis added). And our later cases describing Ross have characterized it as applying broadly to all containers within a car, without qualification as to ownership.
See, e. g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 , 572 (1991)
("[T]his Court in Ross took the critical step of saying that
closed containers in cars could be searched without a warrant
because of their presence within the automobile"); United
States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478, 479-480 (1985) (Ross "held that if police officers have probable cause to
search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless
search of any containers found inside that may conceal the object
of the search").

															To be sure, there was no passenger in Ross, and it was
not claimed that the package in the trunk belonged to anyone other
than the driver. Even so, if the rule of law that Ross announced were limited to contents belonging to the driver, or
contents other than those belonging to passengers, one would have
expected that substantial limitation to be ex- 302 pressed. And, more importantly, one would have expected that
limitation to be apparent in the historical evidence that formed
the basis for Ross's holding. In fact, however, nothing in
the statutes Ross relied upon, or in the practice under
those statutes, would except from authorized warrantless search
packages belonging to passengers on the suspect ship, horse-drawn
carriage, or automobile.

															Finally, we must observe that the analytical principle
underlying the rule announced in Ross is fully consistent-as
respondent's proposal is not-with the balance of our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Ross concluded from the historical
evidence that the permissible scope of a warrantless car search "is
defined by the object of the search and the places in which there
is probable cause to believe that it may be found." 456 U. S., at
824. The same principle is reflected in an earlier case involving
the constitutionality of a search warrant directed at premises
belonging to one who is not suspected of any crime: "The critical
element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the
property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized
are located on the property to which entry is sought." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547 , 556
(1978). This statement was illustrated by citation and description
of Carroll, 267 U. S., at 158-159, 167. 436 U. S., at
556-557.

															In sum, neither Ross itself nor the historical evidence
it relied upon admits of a distinction among packages or containers
based on ownership. When there is probable cause to search for
contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers-like
customs officials in the founding era-to examine packages and
containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for
each one. A passenger's personal belongings, just like the driver's
belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove
compartment, are "in" the car, and the officer has probable cause
to search for contraband in the car. 303 Even if the historical evidence, as described by Ross, were thought to be equivocal, we would find that the balancing of
the relative interests weighs decidedly in favor of allowing
searches of a passenger's belongings. Passengers, no less than
drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to
the property that they transport in cars, which "trave[l] public
thoroughfares," Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 , 590
(1974), "seldom serv[e] as ... the repository of personal effects," ibid., are subjected to police stop and examination to
enforce "pervasive" governmental controls "[a]s an everyday
occurrence," South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 368
(1976), and, finally, are exposed to traffic accidents that may
render all their contents open to public scrutiny.

															In this regard-the degree of intrusiveness upon personal privacy
and indeed even personal dignity-the two cases the Wyoming Supreme
Court found dispositive differ substantially from the package
search at issue here. United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948),
held that probable cause to search a car did not justify a body
search of a passenger. And Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 (1979), held that a search warrant for a tavern and its bartender
did not permit body searches of all the bar's patrons. These cases
turned on the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded
against searches of one's person. "Even a limited search of the
outer clothing ... constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion
upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 24-25 (1968).
Such traumatic consequences are not to be expected when the police
examine an item of personal property found in a car. 1

															1 The dissent begins its analysis, post, at 309-310
(opinion of STEVENS, J.), with an assertion that this case is
governed by our decision in United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948), which held, as the dissent describes it, that the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not justify
"searches of the passenger's pockets and the space between his
shirt and underwear," post, at 309. It attributes that
holding to "the settled dis- 304 Whereas the passenger's privacy expectations are, as we have
described, considerably diminished, the governmental interests at
stake are substantial. Effective law enforcement would be
appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger's
personal belongings when there is reason to believe contraband or
evidence of criminal wrongdoing is hidden in the car. As in all
car-search cases, the "ready mobility" of an automobile creates a
risk that the evidence or contraband will be permanently lost while
a warrant is obtained. California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386 , 390
(1985). In addition, a car passenger-unlike the unwitting tavern
patron in Ybarra-will often be engaged in a common
enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in

															tinction between drivers and passengers," rather than to a
distinction between search of the person and search of property,
which the dissent claims is "newly minted" by today's opinion-a
"new rule that is based on a distinction between property contained
in clothing worn by a passenger and property contained in a
passenger's briefcase or purse." Post, at 309, 309-310.

															In its peroration, however, the dissent quotes extensively from
Justice Jackson's opinion in Di Re, which makes it very
clear that it is precisely this distinction between search
of the person and search of property that the case relied upon:

															"The Government says it would not contend that, armed with a
search warrant for a residence only, it could search all persons
found in it. But an occupant of a house could be used to conceal
this contraband on his person quite as readily as can an occupant
of a car." 332 U. S., at 587 (quoted post, at 312).

															Does the dissent really believe that Justice Jackson was saying
that a house search could not inspect property belonging to
persons found in the house-say a large standing safe or violin case
belonging to the owner's visiting godfather? Of course that is not
what Justice Jackson meant at all. He was referring precisely to that "distinction between property contained in
clothing worn by a passenger and property contained in a
passenger's briefcase or purse" that the dissent disparages, post, at 309. This distinction between searches of the
person and searches of property is assuredly not "newly
minted," see post, at 310. And if the dissent thinks
"pockets" and "clothing" do not count as part of the person, it
must believe that the only searches of the person are strip
searches. 305 concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408 , 413-414
(1997). A criminal might be able to hide contraband in a
passenger's belongings as readily as in other containers in the
car, see, e. g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98 , 102
(1980)-perhaps even surreptitiously, without the passenger's
knowledge or permission. (This last possibility provided the basis
for respondent's defense at trial; she testified that most of the
seized contraband must have been placed in her purse by her
traveling companions at one or another of various times, including
the time she was "half asleep" in the car.)

															To be sure, these factors favoring a search will not always be
present, but the balancing of interests must be conducted with an
eye to the generality of cases. To require that the investigating
officer have positive reason to believe that the passenger and
driver were engaged in a common enterprise, or positive reason to
believe that the driver had time and occasion to conceal the item
in the passenger's belongings, surreptitiously or with friendly
permission, is to impose requirements so seldom met that a
"passenger's property" rule would dramatically reduce the ability
to find and seize contraband and evidence of crime. Of course these
requirements would not attach (under the Wyoming Supreme Court's
rule) until the police officer knows or has reason to know that the
container belongs to a passenger. But once a "passenger's property"
exception to car searches became widely known, one would expect
passenger-confederates to claim everything as their own. And one
would anticipate a bog of litigation-in the form of both civil
lawsuits and motions to suppress in criminal trials-involving such
questions as whether the officer should have believed a passenger's
claim of ownership, whether he should have inferred ownership from
various objective factors, whether he had probable cause to believe
that the passenger was a confederate, or to believe that the driver
might have introduced the contraband 306 into the package with or without the passenger's knowledge.2
When balancing the competing interests, our determinations of
"reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment must take account of
these practical realities. We think they militate in favor of the
needs of law enforcement, and against a personal-privacy interest
that is ordinarily weak.

															Finally, if we were to invent an exception from the historical
practice that Ross accurately described and summarized, it
is perplexing why that exception should protect only property
belonging to a passenger, rather than (what seems much more
logical) property belonging to anyone other than the driver.
Surely Houghton's privacy would have been invaded to the same
degree whether she was present or absent when her purse was
searched. And surely her presence in the car with the driver
provided more, rather than less, reason to believe that the two
were in league. It may ordinarily be easier to identify the
property as belonging to someone other than the driver when the
purported owner is present to identify it-but in the many cases
(like Ross itself) where the car is seized, that
identification may occur later, at the sta-

															2 The dissent is "confident in a police officer's ability to
apply a rule requiring a warrant or individualized probable cause
to search belongings that are ... obviously owned by and in the
custody of a passenger," post, at 311. If this is the
dissent's strange criterion for warrant protection ("obviously owned by and in the custody of") its preceding
paean to the importance of preserving passengers' privacy rings a
little hollow on rehearing. Should it not be enough if the
passenger says he owns the briefcase, and the officer has no
concrete reason to believe otherwise? Or would the dissent consider that an example of "obvious" ownership? On reflection, it
seems not at all obvious precisely what constitutes obviousness-and
so even the dissent's on-the-cheap protection of passengers'
privacy interest in their property turns out to be unclear, and
hence unadministrable. But maybe the dissent does not mean to
propose an obviously-owned-by-and-in-the-custody-of test after all,
since a few sentences later it endorses, simpliciter, "a
rule requiring a warrant or individualized probable cause to search
passenger belongings," post, at 312. For the reasons
described in text, that will not work. 307 tion house; and even at the site of the stop one can readily
imagine a package clearly marked with the owner's name and phone
number, by which the officer can confirm the driver's denial of
ownership. The sensible rule (and the one supported by history and
case law) is that such a package may be searched, whether or not
its owner is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it may
contain the contraband that the officer has reason to believe is in
the car.

															***

															We hold that police officers with probable cause to search a car
may inspect passengers' belongings found in the car that are
capable of concealing the object of the search. The judgment of the
Wyoming Supreme Court is reversed.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE BREYER, concurring.

															I join the Court's opinion with the understanding that history
is meant to inform, but not automatically to determine, the answer
to a Fourth Amendment question. Ante, at 299300. I also
agree with the Court that when a police officer has probable cause
to search a car, say, for drugs, it is reasonable for that officer
also to search containers within the car. If the police must
establish a container's ownership prior to the search of that
container (whenever, for example, a passenger says "that's mine"),
the resulting uncertainty will destroy the workability of the
bright-line rule set forth in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982). At the same time, police officers with probable cause to
search a car for drugs would often have probable cause to search
containers regardless. Hence a bright-line rule will authorize only
a limited number of searches that the law would not otherwise
justify.

															At the same time, I would point out certain limitations upon the
scope of the bright-line rule that the Court de- 308 scribes. Obviously, the rule applies only to automobile
searches. Equally obviously, the rule applies only to containers
found within automobiles. And it does not extend to the search of a
person found in that automobile. As the Court notes, and as United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 586-587
(1948), relied on heavily by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, makes clear,
the search of a person, including even "'a limited search of the
outer clothing,'" ante, at 303 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 24-25 (1968)), is a very different matter in respect to
which the law provides "significantly heightened protection." Ante, at 303; cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 , 91 (1979); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 62-64
(1968).

															Less obviously, but in my view also important, is the fact that
the container here at issue, a woman's purse, was found at a
considerable distance from its owner, who did not claim ownership
until the officer discovered her identification while looking
through it. Purses are special containers. They are repositories of
especially personal items that people generally like to keep with
them at all times. So I am tempted to say that a search of a purse
involves an intrusion so similar to a search of one's person that
the same rule should govern both. However, given this Court's prior
cases, I cannot argue that the fact that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the Court has
warned against trying to make that kind of distinction. United
States v. Ross, supra, at 822. But I can say that it
would matter if a woman's purse, like a man's billfold, were
attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of "outer
clothing," Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 24, which under
the Court's cases would properly receive increased protection. See post, at 312-313 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Di Re, supra, at 587). In this case,
the purse was separate from the person, and no one has claimed
that, under those circumstances, the type of container makes a
difference. For that reason, I join the Court's opinion. 309 JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE GINSBURG
join, dissenting.

															After Wyoming's highest court decided that a state highway
patrolman unlawfully searched Sandra Houghton's purse, the State of
Wyoming petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The State asked that
we consider the propriety of searching an automobile passenger's belongings when the government has developed
probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband based on the driver's conduct. The State conceded that the trooper who
searched Houghton's purse lacked a warrant, consent, or "probable
cause specific to the purse or passenger." Pet. for Cert. i. In
light of our established preference for warrants and individualized
suspicion, I would respect the result reached by the Wyoming
Supreme Court and affirm its judgment.

															In all of our prior cases applying the automobile exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, either the defendant
was the operator of the vehicle and in custody of the object of the
search, or no question was raised as to the defendant's ownership
or custody.l In the only automobile case confronting the search of
a passenger defendant United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948)-the
Court held that the exception to the warrant requirement did not
apply. Id., at 583-587 (addressing searches of the
passenger's pockets and the space between his shirt and underwear,
both of which uncovered counterfeit fuel rations). In Di Re, as
here, the information prompting the search directly implicated the
driver, not the passenger. Today, instead of adhering to the
settled distinction between drivers and passengers, the Court
fashions a new rule that is based on a distinction between property
contained in clothing worn by

															1 See, e. g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991);
California v. Carney, 471
U. S. 386 (1985); United States v. Johns, 469 U. S. 478 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(c), pp. 487-488, and n. 113 (3d
ed. 1996); id., § 7.2(d), at 506, n. 167. 310 a passenger and property contained in a passenger's briefcase or
purse. In cases on both sides of the Court's newly minted test, the
property is in a "container" (whether a pocket or a pouch) located
in the vehicle. Moreover, unlike the Court, I think it quite plain
that the search of a passenger's purse or briefcase involves an
intrusion on privacy that may be just as serious as was the
intrusion in Di Re. See, e. g., New Jersey v. T. L.
0., 469 U. S.
325 , 339 (1985); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 , 733
(1878).

															Even apart from Di Re, the Court's rights-restrictive approach
is not dictated by precedent. For example, in United States v. Ross, 456
U. S. 798 (1982), we were concerned with the interest of the
driver in the integrity of "his automobile," id., at 823, and we
categorically rejected the notion that the scope of a warrantless
search of a vehicle might be "defined by the nature of the
container in which the contraband is secreted," id., at 824.
"Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places
in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Ibid. We thus disapproved of a possible container-based
distinction between a man's pocket and a woman's pocketbook.
Ironically, while we concluded in Ross that "[p]robable
cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi
contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the
entire cab," ibid., the rule the Court fashions would
apparently permit a warrantless search of a passenger's briefcase
if there is probable cause to believe the taxidriver had a syringe
somewhere in his vehicle.

															Nor am I persuaded that the mere spatial association between a
passenger and a driver provides an acceptable basis for presuming
that they are partners in crime or for ignoring privacy interests
in a purse.2 Whether or not the Fourth

															2 See United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 587 (1948)
("We are not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a
suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which
he would otherwise be entitled"); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U. S. 305 ,
308 (1997) (emphasizing in- 311 Amendment required a warrant to search Houghton's purse, cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 153
(1925), at the very least the trooper in this case had to have
probable cause to believe that her purse contained contraband. The
Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that he did not. 956 P. 2d 363, 372
(1998); see App. 20-21.

															Finally, in my view, the State's legitimate interest in
effective law enforcement does not outweigh the privacy concerns at
issue.3 I am as confident in a police officer's ability to apply a
rule requiring a warrant or individualized probable cause to search
belongings that are-as in this case-obviously owned by and in the
custody of a passenger as is the Court in a
"passenger-confederate[']s" ability to circumvent the rule. Ante, at 305. Certainly the ostensible clarity of the
Court's rule is attractive. But that virtue is insufficient
justification for its adoption. Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U. S.

															dividualized suspicion); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 , 91,
94-96 (1979) (explaining that "a person's mere propinquity to
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not,
without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person,"
and discussing Di Re); Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47,
52 (1979); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 62-63
(1968); see also United States v. Padilla, 508 U. S. 77 , 82 (1993) (per curiam) ("Expectations of privacy and property
interests govern the analysis of Fourth Amendment search and
seizure claims. Participants in a criminal conspiracy may have such
expectations or interests, but the conspiracy itself neither adds
to nor detracts from them").

															3 To my knowledge, we have never restricted ourselves to a
two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and
governmental interests at stake must be considered only if
18th-century common law "yields no answer." Ante, at 299.
Neither the precedent cited by the Court, nor the majority's
opinion in this case, mandate that approach. In a later discussion,
the Court does attempt to address the contemporary privacy and
governmental interests at issue in cases of this nature. Ante, at 303-306. Either the majority is unconvinced by its
own recitation of the historical materials, or it has determined
that considering additional factors is appropriate in any event.
The Court does not admit the former; and of course the latter,
standing alone, would not establish uncertainty in the common law
as the prerequisite to looking beyond history in Fourth Amendment
cases. 312 321,329 (1987); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 393
(1978). Moreover, a rule requiring a warrant or individualized
probable cause to search passenger belongings is every bit as
simple as the Court's rule; it simply protects more privacy.

															I would decide this case in accord with what we have said
about passengers and privacy, rather than what we might have said in cases where the issue was not squarely presented. See ante, at 301-302. What Justice Jackson wrote for the Court
50 years ago is just as sound today: "The Government says it would not contend that, armed with a
search warrant for a residence only, it could search all persons
found in it. But an occupant of a house could be used to conceal
this contraband on his person quite as readily as can an occupant
of a car. Necessity, an argument advanced in support of this
search, would seem as strong a reason for searching guests of a
house for which a search warrant had issued as for search of guests
in a car for which none had been issued. By a parity of reasoning
with that on which the Government disclaims the right to search
occupants of a house, we suppose the Government would not contend
that if it had a valid search warrant for the car only it could
search the occupants as an incident to its execution. How then
could we say that the right to search a car without a warrant
confers greater latitude to search occupants than a search by
warrant would permit? "We see no ground for expanding the ruling in the Carroll case to justify this arrest and search as incident to the search of
a car. We are not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a
suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which
he would otherwise be entitled." Di Re, 332 U. S., at 587. Accord, Ross, 456 U. S., at 823, 825 (the proper scope of
a warrantless automobile search based on probable cause is "no
broader" than the proper scope of a search authorized 313 by a warrant supported by probable cause).4 Instead of applying
ordinary Fourth Amendment principles to this case, the majority
extends the automobile warrant exception to allow searches of
passenger belongings based on the driver's misconduct. Thankfully,
the Court's automobile-centered analysis limits the scope of its
holding. But it does not justify the outcome in this case.

															I respectfully dissent.

															4 In response to this dissent the Court has crafted an
imaginative footnote suggesting that the Di Re decision
rested, not on Di Re's status as a mere occupant of the vehicle and
the importance of individualized suspicion, but rather on the
intrusive character of the search. See ante, at 303-304, n.
1. That the search of a safe or violin case would be less intrusive
than a strip search does not, however, persuade me that the Di
Re case would have been decided differently if Di Re had been a
woman and the gas coupons had been found in her purse.
Significantly, in commenting on the Carroll case immediately
preceding the paragraphs that I have quoted in the text, the Di
Re Court stated: "But even the National Prohibition Act did not
direct the arrest of all occupants but only of the person in charge
of the offending vehicle, though there is better reason to assume
that no passenger in a car loaded with liquor would remain innocent
of knowledge of the car's cargo than to assume that a passenger
must know what pieces of paper are carried in the pockets of the
driver." United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S., at
586-587.


OCTOBER TERM, 1999

															Syllabus

															BOND v. UNITED STATES

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 98-9349. Argued February 29, 2000-Decided April 17, 2000

															Border Patrol Agent Cantu boarded a bus in Texas to check the
immigration status of its passengers. As he walked off the bus, he
squeezed the soft luggage which passengers had placed in the
overhead storage space. He squeezed a canvas bag above petitioner's
seat and noticed that it contained a "brick-like" object. After
petitioner admitted owning the bag and consented to its search,
Agent Cantu discovered a "brick" of methamphetamine. Petitioner was
indicted on federal drug charges. He moved to suppress the drugs,
arguing that Agent Cantu conducted an illegal search of his bag.
The District Court denied the motion and found petitioner guilty.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that
Agent Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Held: Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of petitioner's
carry-on bag violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
unreasonable searches. A traveler's personal luggage is clearly an
"effect" protected by the Amendment, see United States v. Place, 462 U.
S. 696 , 707, and it is undisputed that petitioner possessed a
privacy interest in his bag. The Government's assertion that by
exposing his bag to the public, petitioner lost a reasonable
expectation that his bag would not be physically manipulated is
rejected. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207 , and Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445 , are
distinguishable, because they involved only visual, as opposed to
tactile, observation. Physically invasive inspection is simply more
intrusive than purely visual inspection. Under this Court's Fourth
Amendment analysis, a court first asks whether the individual, by
his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that
is, whether he has shown that "he [sought] to preserve [something]
as private." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 , 740. Here,
petitioner sought to preserve privacy by using an opaque bag and
placing it directly above his seat. Second, a court inquires
whether the individual's expectation of privacy is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Ibid. Although a bus passenger clearly expects that other passengers or
bus employees may handle his bag, he does not expect that they will
feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is exactly what the
agent did here. Pp. 336-339. 167 F.3d
225 , reversed. 335 REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ.,
joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA,
J., joined, post, p.339. M. Carolyn Fuentes argued the cause for petitioner.

															With her on the briefs were Lucien B. Campbell and Henry Jeffrey A. Lamken argued the cause for the United
States.

															With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant
Attorney General Robinson, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben. * CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents the question whether a law enforcement
officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on
luggage violated the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
unreasonable searches. We hold that it did.

															Petitioner Steven Dewayne Bond was a passenger on a Greyhound
bus that left California bound for Little Rock, Arkansas. The bus
stopped, as it was required to do, at the permanent Border Patrol
checkpoint in Sierra Blanca, Texas. Border Patrol Agent Cesar Cantu
boarded the bus to check the immigration status of its passengers.
After reaching the back of the bus, having satisfied himself that
the passengers were lawfully in the United States, Agent Cantu
began walking toward the front. Along the way, he squeezed the soft
luggage which passengers had placed in the overhead storage space
above the seats.

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by William J. Mertens and Barbara Bergman; and for the Pro Bono Criminal Assistance Project by David L.
Heilberg. Stephen R. McSpadden filed a brief for the National
Association of Police Organizations as amicus curiae urging
affirmance. 336 Petitioner was seated four or five rows from the back of the
bus. As Agent Cantu inspected the luggage in the compartment above
petitioner's seat, he squeezed a green canvas bag and noticed that
it contained a "brick-like" object. Petitioner admitted that the
bag was his and agreed to allow Agent Cantu to open it.1 Upon
opening the bag, Agent Cantu discovered a "brick" of
methamphetamine. The brick had been wrapped in duct tape until it
was oval-shaped and then rolled in a pair of pants.

															Petitioner was indicted for conspiracy to possess, and
possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine in violation
of 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U. S. C. § 841(a)(1). He moved to suppress the
drugs, arguing that Agent Cantu conducted an illegal search of his
bag. Petitioner's motion was denied, and the District Court found
him guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 57 months in prison.
On appeal, he conceded that other passengers had access to his bag,
but contended that Agent Cantu manipulated the bag in a way that
other passengers would not. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, stating that the fact that Agent Cantu's manipulation of
petitioner's bag was calculated to detect contraband is irrelevant
for Fourth Amendment purposes. 167 F.3d
225 , 227 (CA5 1999) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207 (1986)). Thus, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding that Agent
Cantu's manipulation of the bag was not a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. 167 F. 3d, at 227. We granted certiorari,
528 U. S. 927 (1999), and now reverse.

															The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " A
traveler's personal luggage is clearly an "effect" protected by the
Amendment. See United States v.

															1 The Government has not argued here that petitioner's consent
to Agent Cantu's opening the bag is a basis for admitting the
evidence. 337 Place, 462
U. S. 696 , 707 (1983). Indeed, it is undisputed here that
petitioner possessed a privacy interest in his bag.

															But the Government asserts that by exposing his bag to the
public, petitioner lost a reasonable expectation that his bag would
not be physically manipulated. The Government relies on our
decisions in California v. Ciraolo, supra, and Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445 (1989), for
the proposition that matters open to public observation are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. In Ciraolo, we held that
police observation of a backyard from a plane flying at an altitude
of 1,000 feet did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Similarly, in Riley, we relied on Ciraolo to hold
that police observation of a greenhouse in a home's curtilage from
a helicopter passing at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. We reasoned that the property was "not
necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical
invasion," and determined that because any member of the public
could have lawfully observed the defendants' property by flying
overhead, the defendants' expectation of privacy was "not
reasonable and not one 'that society is prepared to honor.''' See Riley, supra, at 449 (explaining and relying on Ciraolo's reasoning).

															But Ciraolo and Riley are different from this case
because they involved only visual, as opposed to tactile,
observation. Physically invasive inspection is simply more
intrusive than purely visual inspection. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1968), we stated
that a "careful [tactile] exploration of the outer surfaces of a
person's clothing all over his or her body" is a "serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity
and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly." Although Agent Cantu did not "frisk" petitioner's person,
he did conduct a probing tactile examination of petitioner's
carry-on luggage. Obviously, petitioner's bag was not part of his
person. But travelers are particularly concerned 338 about their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to transport
personal items that, for whatever reason, they prefer to keep close
at hand.

															Here, petitioner concedes that, by placing his bag in the
overhead compartment, he could expect that it would be exposed to
certain kinds of touching and handling. But petitioner argues that
Agent Cantu's physical manipulation of his luggage "far exceeded
the casual contact [petitioner] could have expected from other
passengers." Brief for Petitioner 18-19. The Government counters
that it did not.

															Our Fourth Amendment analysis embraces two questions.

															First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether he has
shown that "he [sought] to preserve [something] as private." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 , 740 (1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, petitioner sought to
preserve privacy by using an opaque bag and placing that bag
directly above his seat. Second, we inquire whether the
individual's expectation of privacy is "one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." Ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted).2 When a bus passenger places a bag in an
overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus employees may
move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus passenger clearly
expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will,

															2 The parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the
law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that
officer's actions violate the Fourth Amendment. Brief for
Petitioner 14; Brief for United States 33-34; see Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 , 813 (1996)
(stating that "we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment
challenges based on the actual motivations of individual
officers"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207 , 212 (1986)
(rejecting respondent's challenge to "the authority of government
to observe his activity from any vantage point or place if the
viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and not the
result of a casual, accidental observation"). This principle
applies to the agent's acts in this case as well; the issue is not
his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions. 339 as a matter of course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner.
But this is exactly what the agent did here. We therefore hold that
the agent's physical manipulation of petitioner's bag violated the
Fourth Amendment.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

															Reversed.

															JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, dissenting.

															Does a traveler who places a soft-sided bag in the shared
overhead storage compartment of a bus have a "reasonable
expectation" that strangers will not push, pull, prod, squeeze, or
otherwise manipulate his luggage? Unlike the majority, I believe
that he does not.

															Petitioner argues-and the majority points out-that, even if bags
in overhead bins are subject to general "touching" and "handling,"
this case is special because "Agent Cantu's physical manipulation
of [petitioner's] luggage 'far exceeded the casual contact [he]
could have expected from other passengers.'" Ante, at 338.
But the record shows the contrary. Agent Cantu testified that
border patrol officers (who routinely enter buses at designated
checkpoints to run immigration checks) "conduct an inspection of
the overhead luggage by squeezing the bags as we're going out."
App. 9. On the occasion at issue here, Agent Cantu "felt a green
bag" which had "a brick-like object in it." Id., at 10. He
explained that he felt "the edges of the brick in the bag," id., at 12, and that it was a "[b]rick-like object ... that,
when squeezed, you could feel an outline of something of [a]
different mass inside of it," id., at 11. Although the agent
acknowledged that his practice was to "squeeze [bags] very hard,"
he testified that his touch ordinarily was not "[h]ard enough to
break something inside that might be fragile." Id., at 15.
Petitioner also testified that Agent Cantu "reached for my bag, and
he shook it a little, and squeezed it." Id., at 18. 340 How does the "squeezing" just described differ from the
treatment that overhead luggage is likely to receive from strangers
in a world of travel that is somewhat less gentle than it used to
be? I think not at all. See United States v. McDonald, 100 F.3d
1320 , 1327 (CA7 1996) (" '[A]ny person who has travelled
on a common carrier knows that luggage placed in an overhead
compartment is always at the mercy of all people who want to
rearrange or move previously placed luggage' "); Eagan, Familiar
Anger Takes Flight with Airline Tussles, Boston Herald, Aug. 15,
1999, p. 8 ("It's dog-eat-dog trying to cram half your home into
overhead compartments"); Massingill, Airlines Ride on the Wings of
HighFlying Economy and Travelers Pay Price in Long Lines, Cramped
Airplanes, Kansas City Star, May 9, 1999, p. F4 ("[H]undreds of
passengers fill overhead compartments with bulky carry-on bags that
they have to cram, recram, and then remove"); Flinn, Confessions of
a Once-Only Carry-On Guy, San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 6, 1998, p.
T2 (flight attendant "rearranged the contents of three different
overhead compartments to free up some room" and then "shoved and
pounded until [the] bag squeezed in"). The trial court, which heard
the evidence, saw nothing unusual, unforeseeable, or special about
this agent's squeeze. It found that Agent Cantu simply "felt the
outside of Bond's softside green cloth bag," and it viewed the
agent's activity as "minimally intrusive touching." App. 23 (Order
Denying Motion to Suppress). The Court of Appeals also noted that,
because "passengers often handle and manipulate other passengers'
luggage," the substantially similar tactile inspection here was
entirely "foreseeable." 167 F.3d
225 , 227 (CAS 1999). The record and these factual findings are sufficient to resolve
this case. The law is clear that the Fourth Amendment protects
against government intrusion that upsets an "'actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy''' that is objectively "'reasonable.''' Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 , 740 (1979)
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 361 341 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Privacy itself implies the
exclusion of uninvited strangers, not just strangers who work for
the Government. Hence, an individual cannot reasonably expect
privacy in respect to objects or activities that he "knowingly
exposes to the public." Id., at 351.

															Indeed, the Court has said that it is not objectively reasonable to expect privacy if "[a]ny member of the public ...
could have" used his senses to detect "everything that thee]
officers observed." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207 , 213-214
(1986). Thus, it has held that the fact that strangers may look
down at fenced-in property from an aircraft or sift through garbage
bags on a public street can justify a similar police intrusion. See ibid.; Florida v. Riley, 488 U. S. 445, 451 (1989)
(plurality opinion); California v. Greenwood, 486 U. S. 35 ,
40-41 (1988); cf. Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 , 740 (1983)
(police not precluded from" 'ben[ding] down'" to see since "[t]he
general public could peer into the interior of [the car] from any
number of angles"). The comparative likelihood that strangers will
give bags in an overhead compartment a hard squeeze would seem far
greater. See Riley, supra, at 453 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring
in judgment) (reasonableness of privacy expectation depends on
whether intrusion is a "sufficiently routine part of modern life").
Consider, too, the accepted police practice of using dogs to sniff
for drugs hidden inside luggage. See, e. g., United States v. Place, 462
U. S. 696 , 699 (1983). Surely it is less likely that
nongovernmental strangers will sniff at another's bags (or, more to
the point, permit their dogs to do so) than it is that such actors
will touch or squeeze another person's belongings in the process of
making room for their own.

															Of course, the agent's purpose here-searching for
drugs-differs dramatically from the intention of a driver or fellow
passenger who squeezes a bag in the process of making more room for
another parcel. But in determining whether an expectation of
privacy is reasonable, it is the effect, not the purpose,
that matters. See ante, at 338, n. 2 342 ("[T]he issue is not [the agent's] state of mind, but the
objective effect of his actions"); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 , 813
(1996); United States v. Dunn, 480 U. S. 294 , 304-305
(1987). Few individuals with something to hide wish to expose that
something to the police, however careless or indifferent they may
be in respect to discovery by other members of the public. Hence, a
Fourth Amendment rule that turns on purpose could prevent police
alone from intruding where other strangers freely tread. And the
added privacy protection achieved by such an approach would not
justify the harm worked to law enforcement-at least that is what
this Court's previous cases suggest. See Greenwood, supra, at 41 ("[T]he police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been
observed by any member of the public"); Ciraolo, supra, at
212-213 (rejecting respondent's argument that the police should be
restricted solely because their actions are "motivated by a law
enforcement purpose, and not the result of a casual, accidental
observation").

															Nor can I accept the majority's effort to distinguish "tactile"
from "visual" interventions, see ante, at 337, even assuming
that distinction matters here. Whether tactile manipulation (say,
of the exterior of luggage) is more intrusive or less intrusive
than visual observation (say, through a lighted window) necessarily
depends on the particular circumstances.

															If we are to depart from established legal principles, we should
not begin here. At best, this decision will lead to a
constitutional jurisprudence of "squeezes," thereby complicating
further already complex Fourth Amendment law, increasing the
difficulty of deciding ordinary criminal matters, and hindering the
administrative guidance (with its potential for control of
unreasonable police practices) that a less complicated
jurisprudence might provide. Cf. Whren, supra, at 815
(warning against the creation of trivial Fourth Amendment
distinctions). At worst, this case will deter law en- 343 forcement officers searching for drugs near borders from using
even the most nonintrusive touch to help investigate publicly
exposed bags. At the same time, the ubiquity of non-governmental
pushes, prods, and squeezes (delivered by driver, attendant,
passenger, or some other stranger) means that this decision cannot
do much to protect true privacy. Rather, the traveler who wants to
place a bag in a shared overhead bin and yet safeguard its contents
from public touch should plan to pack those contents in a suitcase
with hard sides, irrespective of the Court's decision today.

															For these reasons, I dissent.


OPINION OF THE COURT MARYLAND V. PRINGLE 540 U. S. ____ (2003) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 02-809 MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH JERMAINE
PRINGLE

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of
maryland

															[December 15, 2003]

															   Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the opinion of the Court.

															   In the early morning hours a
passenger car occupied by three men was stopped for speeding by a
police officer. The officer, upon searching the car, seized $763 of
rolled-up cash from the glove compartment and five glassine baggies
of cocaine from between the back-seat armrest and the back seat.
After all three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the
officer arrested each of them. We hold that the officer had
probable cause to arrest Pringle—one of the three men.

															   At 3:16 a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore
County Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding. There
were three occupants in the car: Donte Partlow, the driver and
owner, respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, and Otis
Smith, the back-seat passenger. The officer asked Partlow for his
license and registration. When Partlow opened the glove compartment
to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a large
amount of rolled-up money in the glove compartment. The officer
returned to his patrol car with Partlow’s license and registration
to check the computer system for outstanding violations. The
computer check did not reveal any violations. The officer returned
to the stopped car, had Partlow get out, and issued him an oral
warning.

															   After a second patrol car arrived, the officer
asked Partlow if he had any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle.
Partlow indicated that he did not. Partlow then consented to a
search of the vehicle. The search yielded $763 from the glove
compartment and five plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine
from behind the back-seat armrest. When the officer began the
search the armrest was in the upright position flat against the
rear seat. The officer pulled down the armrest and found the drugs,
which had been placed between the armrest and the back seat of the
car.

															   The officer questioned all three men about the
ownership of the drugs and money, and told them that if no one
admitted to ownership of the drugs he was going to arrest them all.
The men offered no information regarding the ownership of the drugs
or money. All three were placed under arrest and transported to the
police station.

															   Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),
and gave an oral and written confession in which he acknowledged
that the cocaine belonged to him, that he and his friends were
going to a party, and that he intended to sell the cocaine or
“[u]se it for sex.” App. 26. Pringle maintained that the other
occupants of the car did not know about the drugs, and they were
released.

															   The trial court denied Pringle’s motion to
suppress his confession as the fruit of an illegal arrest, holding
that the officer had probable cause to arrest Pringle. A jury
convicted Pringle of possession with intent to distribute cocaine
and possession of cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years’
incarceration without the possibility of parole. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed. 141 Md. App. 292, 785
A. 2d 790 (2001).

															   The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided
vote, reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to show
Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, “the
mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when [Pringle] was a
front seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner is
insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest for
possession.” 370 Md. 525, 545, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1027 (2002). We
granted certiorari, 538 U. S. 921 (2003),
and now reverse.

															   Under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961),
the people are “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, … and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause … .” U. S.
Const., Amdt. 4. Maryland law authorizes police officers to execute
warrantless arrests, inter alia , for felonies committed in
an officer’s presence or where an officer has probable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed or is being committed in
the officer’s presence. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §594B (1996)
(repealed 2001). A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public
place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s
presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is
supported by probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 , 424
(1976); see Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318 , 354
(2001) (stating that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe
that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense
in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment,
arrest the offender”).

															   It is uncontested in the present case that the
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies
containing suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a
felony had been committed. Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §287 (1996)
(repealed 2002) (prohibiting possession of controlled dangerous
substances). The sole question is whether the officer had probable
cause to believe that Pringle committed that crime.[ Footnote 1 ]

															   The long-prevailing standard of probable cause
protects “citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,” while giving “fair
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 176 (1949). On many
occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a
“ ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ ” that deals with
“ ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175–176); see, e.g. , Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690 , 695
(1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 , 7–8 (1989).
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates ,
462 U. S., at 232.

															   The probable-cause standard is incapable of
precise definition or quantification into percentages because it
deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances. See ibid.; Brinegar , 338 U. S., at
175. We have stated, however, that “[t]he substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt,” ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with
respect to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85 , 91 (1979).
In Illinois v. Gates, we noted:

															“As early as Locke v. United
States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall
observed, in a closely related context: ‘[T]he term “probable
cause,” according to its usual acceptation, means less than
evidence which would justify condemnation … . It imports a
seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.’ More
recently, we said that ‘the quanta … of proof ’
appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to
the decision to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U. S., at
173. Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials,
have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.” 462 U. S., at
235.

															   To determine whether an officer
had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether these historical
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer, amount to” probable cause, Ornelas , supra , at 696.

															   In this case, Pringle was one of three men
riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up
cash in the glove compartment directly in front of
Pringle.[ Footnote 2 ] Five
plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat
armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the
three men failed to offer any information with respect to the
ownership of the cocaine or the money.

															   We think it an entirely reasonable inference
from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had
knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.
Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable
cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of
cocaine, either solely or jointly.

															   Pringle’s attempt to characterize this case as
a guilt-by-association case is unavailing. His reliance on Ybarra v. Illinois, supra, and United
States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 (1948), is
misplaced. In Ybarra , police officers obtained a warrant
to search a tavern and its bartender for evidence of possession of
a controlled substance. Upon entering the tavern, the officers
conducted patdown searches of the customers present in the tavern,
including Ybarra. Inside a cigarette pack retrieved from Ybarra’s
pocket, an officer found six tinfoil packets containing heroin. We
stated:

															“[A] person’s mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40 , 62–63
(1968). Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure
of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there
exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the
premises where the person may happen to be.” 444 U. S., at 91.

															We held that the search warrant did not permit body
searches of all of the tavern’s patrons and that the police could
not pat down the patrons for weapons, absent individualized
suspicion. Id. , at 92.

															   This case is quite different from Ybarra . Pringle and his two companions were in a
relatively small automobile, not a public tavern. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295 (1999), we
noted that “a car passenger—unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra —will often be engaged in a common enterprise with
the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or
the evidence of their wrongdoing.” Id., at 304–305. Here
we think it was reasonable for the officer to infer a common
enterprise among the three men. The quantity of drugs and cash in
the car indicated the likelihood of drug dealing, an enterprise to
which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent person with
the potential to furnish evidence against him.    In Di Re , a federal investigator had been told by an
informant, Reed, that he was to receive counterfeit gasoline ration
coupons from a certain Buttitta at a particular place. The
investigator went to the appointed place and saw Reed, the sole
occupant of the rear seat of the car, holding gasoline ration
coupons. There were two other occupants in the car: Buttitta in the
driver’s seat and Di Re in the front passenger’s seat. Reed
informed the investigator that Buttitta had given him counterfeit
coupons. Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched. After
noting that the officers had no information implicating Di Re and
no information pointing to Di Re’s possession of coupons, unless
presence in the car warranted that inference, we concluded that the
officer lacked probable cause to believe that Di Re was involved in
the crime. 332 U. S., at 592–594. We said “[a]ny inference that
everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must disappear if
the Government informer singles out the guilty person.” Id. , at 594. No such singling out occurred in this case;
none of the three men provided information with respect to the
ownership of the cocaine or money.

															   We hold that the officer had probable cause to
believe that Pringle had committed the crime of possession of a
controlled substance. Pringle’s arrest therefore did not contravene
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 Maryland law defines “possession” as “the
exercise of actual or constructive dominion or control over a thing
by one or more persons.” Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §277(s) (1996)
(repealed 2002). Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland dismissed
the $763 seized from the glove compartment as a factor in the
probable-cause determination, stating that “[m]oney, without more,
is innocuous.” 370 Md. 524, 546, 805 A. 2d 1016, 1028 (2002).
The court’s consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as
a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light
of our precedents. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 230–231 (1983) (opining
that the totality of the circumstances approach is consistent with
our prior treatment of probable cause); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 175–176 (1949)
(“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been
or is being committed”). We think it is abundantly clear from the
facts that this case involves more than money alone.