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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–666

															_________________

															Situ Kamu Wilkinson, PETITIONER v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[March 19, 2024]

															Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															To be eligible for cancellation of removal and
adjustment to lawful permanent resident status, a noncitizen must
meet four statutory criteria. The last requires a showing that the
noncitizen’s removal would result in “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” to a U. S.-citizen or permanent-resident
family member. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(b)(1)(D). Petitioner
Situ Kamu Wilkinson argues that his removal would cause exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to his U. S.-citizen son, who
suffers from a serious medical condition and relies on Wilkinson
for emotional and financial support. An Immigration Judge (IJ) held
that this hardship did not rise to the level required by statute
and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Third
Circuit dismissed Wilkinson’s petition for review, holding that it
lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s hardship determination.

															The question in this case is whether the IJ’s
hardship determination is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D), which
gives Courts of Appeals jurisdiction to review “questions of law.”
This Court holds that it is. The application of a statutory legal
standard (like the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
standard) to an established set of facts is a quintessential mixed
question of law and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr held that such questions are reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D). 589
U.S. 221, 225 (2020). Accordingly, this Court reverses.

															I

															A

															When an IJ finds a noncitizen removable for
violating the immigration laws, Congress provides several avenues
for discretionary relief. Relevant here, an IJ may “cancel removal”
of a noncitizen who meets certain statutory criteria. Immigration
and Nationality Act, 66Stat. 163, as added and amended, 8
U. S. C. §§1229b(a)–(b). Cancellation of removal permits
a noncitizen to remain in the country lawfully. An IJ deciding a
noncitizen’s request for cancellation of removal proceeds in two
steps. First, the IJ must decide whether the noncitizen is eligible
for cancellation under the relevant statutory criteria. Second, an
IJ decides whether to exercise his discretion favorably and grant
the noncitizen relief in the particular case.[ 1 ] A noncitizen bears the burden of proving that
he both “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements” and
“merits a favorable exercise of discretion.” §1229a(c)(4)(A).

															Congress enumerated certain statutory criteria
to govern the first step of an IJ’s cancellation-of-removal
determination. For a noncitizen who never received lawful permanent
residence ( i . e ., a green card), those criteria are
stringent. He is eligible for cancellation of removal only if he
meets four requirements: (1) he “has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years”
before he applies; (2) he “has been a person of good moral
character during such period”; (3) he has not been convicted of
certain criminal offenses; and (4) he “establishes that removal
would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his]
spouse, parent, or child,” who is a U. S. citizen or lawful
permanent resident. §§1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). After determining whether
a noncitizen meets these criteria, an IJ proceeds to step two and
decides whether to exercise discretion to cancel the order of
removal in a particular case.

															B

															Wilkinson was born in Trinidad and Tobago.
After police officers beat, robbed, and threatened to kill him in
2003, Wilkinson fled to the United States on a tourist visa. He has
remained in this country ever since, beyond the expiration of his
visa. In 2013, Wilkinson had a son, M., with his girlfriend
Kenyatta Watson. Both M. and Watson are U. S. citizens.

															Wilkinson lived in Pennsylvania and worked to
support M. and Watson. M. lived with Wilkinson and Watson for the
first two years of his life. Then, because Wilkinson could not take
care of his son and work at the same time, he and Watson decided M.
would have a better quality of life in New Jersey with his mother
and her mother. Wilkinson took the train to visit his son every
weekend and provided almost half his monthly wages ($1,200 per
month) in informal child support. M. suffers from severe asthma,
which requires hospital treatment multiple times a year. Wilkinson
helped M. with his inhaler and medications and knew his regimen
well. Watson suffers from depression and does not work, so she also
relies on Wilkinson’s financial and childcare support.

															Wilkinson worked as a handyman and a laborer in
construction. In 2019, police found drugs in a house where he had
been hired to work on repairs. Despite Wilkinson’s protests that
neither the house nor the drugs were his, the police arrested him.
When Wilkinson appeared in a Pennsylvania courthouse to contest the
charges, he was arrested and detained by federal immigration
officers. The criminal charges were ultimately withdrawn.

															M. was seven years old when Immigration and
Customs Enforcement detained his father. Afterwards, M. began to
exhibit behavioral issues. M. became sad, acted out, and broke
things. M.’s teacher texted Watson every day saying that M. was no
longer focused and needed to talk to a counselor. Wilkinson called
his son every other day from immigration detention. When M. hung up
the phone, he cried and said he wanted his father to come home.

															C

															Wilkinson conceded before the IJ that he was
removable under §1227(a)(1)(B) for overstaying his tourist visa. He
asked for relief from that removal, claiming eligibility for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture. Relevant here, he also applied for cancellation of
removal based on hardship to his U. S.-citizen son, M. The
U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stipulated that
Wilkinson met the first three statutory criteria for eligibility
(namely, continuous physical presence, good moral character, and
lack of specific criminal bars) but contested the last: exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to M. Wilkinson, Watson, and M.’s
grandmother all testified in support of Wilkinson’s applications
for relief.

															In evaluating Wilkinson’s applications, the IJ
found Wilkinson credible (despite DHS’s attempts to impeach him),
and credited the testimonies of each witness in full. The IJ then
turned to cancellation of removal and recited the standard for
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship adopted by the BIA. To
meet this standard, a noncitizen “must demonstrate that a
qualifying relative would suffer hardship that is substantially
different from or beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to
result from their removal, but need not show that such hardship
would be ‘unconscionable.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a
(quoting In re Monreal-Aguinaga , 23
I. & N. Dec. 56, 62 (BIA 2021)). In evaluating
whether a noncitizen meets this standard, IJs must consider a range
of factors, including the age and health of the qualifying family
member. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a–27a (citing In re
Andaloza-Rivas , 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323–324 (BIA
2002); Monreal-Aguinaga , 23 I. & N. Dec., at
63). “[A]ll hardship factors should be considered in the aggregate
to determine whether the qualifying relative will suffer hardship
that rises to the level of ‘exceptional and extremely
unusual.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a (quoting Monreal-Aguinaga , 23 I. & N. Dec., at 64).

															The IJ then applied this standard to the
established facts. He found that M.’s asthma was a serious medical
condition and that Wilkinson provided emotional and financial care
to his son. He found that M. had been struggling since Wilkinson’s
detention. Nevertheless, the IJ held that M. did not meet the
statutory standard for exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.
The IJ reasoned that M. received medical insurance from the
government and that he and his family might qualify for other
public assistance if necessary. Although Wilkinson provided
emotional support, the IJ noted that M. had lived without
Wilkinson’s “daily presence” for most of M.’s life. App. to Pet.
for Cert. 28a. The IJ recognized that M. and his mother would
suffer some financial hardship from Wilkinson’s removal. Yet the IJ
reasoned that Wilkinson had not provided evidence that he would be
unable to work and support his family from Trinidad and Tobago. The
IJ also noted that M.’s mother was able to work even though she had
primarily been caring for M. He reasoned that M.’s grandmother, who
had helped care for M. before, could continue to do so.

															Based on “the aggregate of the factors” that he
“weighed,” the IJ found that any financial or emotional hardship
was not “beyond that which would normally be expected from the
removal of a parent and provider.” Id., at 29a (citing Monreal-Aguinaga , 23 I. & N. Dec., at 65).
Ultimately, the IJ held that “the evidence of hardship” in the case
did not rise to the level of “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. Because he held that
Wilkinson was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal,
the IJ did “not reach determining whether or not to exercise [his]
discretion to grant the application for cancellation of removal.” Ibid . The IJ denied Wilkinson’s application. Wilkinson
appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA affirmed without
issuing an opinion.

															Wilkinson petitioned the Third Circuit for
review, arguing that the court had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
hardship determination as a mixed question of law and fact. The
Third Circuit held that because the hardship determination was
“discretionary,” it lacked jurisdiction to review it. Id .,
at 3a (citing §1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Patel v. Garland ,
596 U.S. 328 (2022)). It therefore dismissed that part of
Wilkinson’s petition.

															Wilkinson asked this Court to grant certiorari
to resolve whether the IJ’s “determination that a given set of
established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ is a mixed question of
law and fact reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D)
. . . or whether this determination is a
discretionary judgment call unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).”
Pet. for Cert. i. This Court granted certiorari. 600 U. S. ___
(2023). The Courts of Appeals are split on this question.[ 2 ] This Court now holds that the
application of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship
standard to a given set of facts is reviewable as a question of law
under §1252(a)(2)(D).

															II

															Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that a court of
appeals may consider final orders of removal via petitions raising
“constitutional claims or questions of law.” In Guerrero-Lasprilla , this Court held that “the statutory
phrase ‘questions of law’ includes the application of a legal
standard to undisputed or established facts,” also referred to as
mixed questions of law and fact. 589 U. S., at 227. The
statutory criterion of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
is a legal standard that an IJ must, at the first step, apply to a
set of established facts. This Court therefore holds that it is a
“questio[n] of law” over which §1252(a)(2)(D) provides judicial
review.

															The hardship determination in this case was not
discretionary. Because the IJ held that M.’s hardship did not
satisfy the statutory eligibility criteria, he never reached the
second step and exercised his unreviewable discretion to cancel or
decline to cancel Wilkinson’s removal. The Third Circuit therefore
erred in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s
determination in this case.

															A

															Section 1252 generally grants federal courts
the power to review final orders of removal. §1252(a)(1). It then
strips courts of jurisdiction for certain categories of removal
order. §1252(a)(2). Finally, it restores jurisdiction to review
“constitutional claims or questions of law.”
§1252(a)(2)(D).[ 3 ]

															Relevant here, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts
of jurisdiction over “judgment[s] regarding the granting of
[discretionary] relief under section . . . 1229b.”
Section 1229b governs cancellation of removal. Section
1252(a)(2)(B)(i) therefore strips courts of jurisdiction over a
“judgment” on cancellation of removal. The Third Circuit held that
it had no jurisdiction over the part of Wilkinson’s petition
related to the hardship determination on this basis.

															That holding ignores §1252(a)(2)(D), which
restores jurisdiction to review “questions of law.” Two clear rules
govern the interaction between §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (which strips
jurisdiction over judgments regarding discretionary relief )
and §1252(a)(2)(D) (which restores it for legal questions), laid
out in two of this Court’s previous cases: Guerrero-Lasprilla and Patel . Guerrero-Lasprilla held that petitions raising mixed
questions of law and fact are always reviewable as questions of law
under §1252(a)(2)(D). 589 U. S., at 225. Patel held
that questions of fact underlying denials of discretionary relief
are unreviewable under both §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and §1252(a)(2)(D).
596 U. S., at 343, 347. Those two rules resolve this case.

															In Guerrero-Lasprilla , §1252(a)(2)(C)
stripped courts of jurisdiction over two noncitizens’ orders of
removal via a different provision targeting certain criminal
convictions. Those noncitizens had sought to reopen their
immigration cases after being removed because a change in the law
regarding their criminal convictions rendered them newly eligible
for discretionary relief. Although the 90-day time limit to reopen
their cases had expired, they argued that the limit should be
“equitably tolled.” 589 U. S., at 225–226. The BIA denied
their request, concluding that each had failed to demonstrate the
requisite due diligence. When the noncitizens petitioned the Fifth
Circuit for review of that decision, the court held that it lacked
jurisdiction to decide the question. The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that whether a noncitizen acted diligently in attempting to reopen
removal proceedings for purposes of equitable tolling was a
question of fact, not a “questio[n] of law” that would restore
jurisdiction under §1252(a)(2)(D).

															This Court reversed. The Court held that
“questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) included mixed questions of
law and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla , 589 U. S., at 225.
The “application of a legal standard to undisputed or established
facts” is a mixed question. Ibid . Whether the BIA had
correctly applied the equitable tolling due diligence standard to
the facts was therefore a question of law reviewable by a court of
appeals.

															In so doing, this Court rejected the
Government’s primary argument that “questions of law” referred only
to mixed questions that are primarily legal rather than primarily
factual. Such an interpretation, the Court reasoned, would “forbid
review of any [BIA] decision applying a properly stated legal
standard, irrespective of how mistaken that application might be.” Id ., at 236. This Court also rejected the Government’s
alternative argument that “questions of law” should be limited to
“ ‘pure’ ” questions of law based on the statutory
context, history, and relevant precedent. Id ., at 230–234.
Finally, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that
interpreting “questions of law” to cover all mixed questions would
“undercut Congress’ efforts to severely limit and streamline
judicial review.” Id ., at 235. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) had no
effect on the unreviewability of factual determinations which, as
the Court noted, are “an important category in the removal
context.” Ibid. The issue of questions of fact came before this
Court in Patel . There, the noncitizen checked a box in his
application for a state driver’s license indicating that he was a
U. S. citizen when he was not. 596 U. S., at 333. Because
of that misrepresentation, he became statutorily inadmissible to
adjust his status to permanent resident. Later, in removal
proceedings, the noncitizen conceded he was removable but argued
that he mistakenly checked the box and lacked the statutory mens
rea . The IJ found him not credible, based partly on the fact
that he had a strong incentive to deceive state officials about his
citizenship status to obtain a state driver’s license. The
noncitizen appealed, arguing that the basis for the credibility
determination was clearly wrong: Under state law, he was entitled
to a driver’s license without being a citizen. The BIA determined
that the IJ’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and
dismissed the appeal. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the petition
for review, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which strips courts of jurisdiction to review
“ ‘any judgment regarding the granting of relief ’ ”
under the adjustment-of-status provision. Id ., at 335. The
court concluded that both whether petitioner had testified credibly
and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent himself as
a citizen were factual determinations that fell within
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdictional bar.

															This Court affirmed. The Court held that these
factual findings, which formed the basis for the denial of relief,
fell within §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s jurisdiction-stripping provision.
Further, §1252(a)(2)(D) did not restore jurisdiction, because
“questions of fact” are indisputably not “questions of law.” Ibid. Relying on Guerrero-Lasprilla , the Court noted
that questions of fact were the “major remaining category” for
which Congress could still strip courts of jurisdiction. 596
U. S., at 339–340.

															B

															Wilkinson does not dispute that
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i) generally strips courts of jurisdiction to review
cancellation-of-removal decisions. He argues, instead, that
§1252(a)(2)(D) restores jurisdiction in this case because the
threshold question whether a noncitizen is statutorily eligible for
cancellation of removal requires a court to assess whether an IJ
correctly applied the statutory standard to a given set of facts.
This Court agrees that the application of the statutory
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard to a given
set of facts presents a mixed question of law and fact. Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion. Guerrero-Lasprilla held that “the
statutory term ‘questions of law’ ” in §1252(a)(2)(D)
“includes the application of a legal standard to established
facts.” 589 U. S., at 234. That term included the application
of the due diligence standard for equitable tolling to a given set
of facts. Similarly, the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” standard in §1229b(b)(1)(D) is a legal standard that an
IJ applies to facts. The standard may require an IJ to closely
examine and weigh a set of established facts, but it is not a
factual inquiry. It is, inescapably, a mixed question of law and
fact.

															Mixed questions “are not all alike.” U. S. Bank N. A. v. Village at Lakeridge,
LLC , 583 U.S. 387, 395–396 (2018). A mixed question may require
“primarily legal or factual work.” Id ., at 396. It may
“require courts to expound on the law . . . by amplifying
or elaborating on a broad legal standard.” Ibid. Or it may
“immerse courts in case-specific factual issues—compelling them to
marshal and weigh evidence.” Ibid. That a mixed question
requires a court to immerse itself in facts does not transform the
question into one of fact. It simply suggests a more deferential
standard of review.

															As interpreted by the BIA, the application of
the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard requires
an IJ to evaluate a number of factors in determining whether any
hardship to a U. S.-citizen or permanent-resident family
member is “substantially different from, or beyond, that which
would normally be expected from the deportation” of a “close family
membe[r ].” Monreal-Aguinaga , 23 I. & N.
Dec., at 65. That application concededly requires a close
examination of the facts. Yet that was also true of the due
diligence standard in Guerrero-Lasprilla , which required a
court to evaluate whether a noncitizen was adequately conscientious
in his pursuit of a filing deadline. A mixed question that requires
close engagement with the facts is still a mixed question, and it
is therefore a “questio[n] of law” that is reviewable under
§1252(a)(2)(D).

															Under Patel , of course, a court is still
without jurisdiction to review a factual question raised in an
application for discretionary relief. As in Patel , that
would include the IJ’s underlying factual determination that
Wilkinson was credible, or the finding that M. had a serious
medical condition. When an IJ weighs those found facts and applies
the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard, however,
the result is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewable
under §1252(a)(2)(D).

															C

															The Government’s counterarguments largely seek
to re-litigate Guerrero-Lasprilla . This Court is
unpersuaded.

															First, the Government argues that the statutory
standard is not a legal standard at all. It asks this Court to
limit Guerrero-Lasprilla solely to judicially created
standards like the “due diligence” standard for equitable tolling.
Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla or this Court’s other
precedents supports such a distinction. This Court has frequently
observed that the application of a “statutory standard” presents a
mixed question of law and fact. See, e . g ., Pullman-Standard v. Swint , 456
U.S. 273 , 289, n. 19 (1982) (defining a mixed question as
asking whether “the historical facts . . . satisfy the
statutory standard”); Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S.
690 , 696–697 (1996) (same); U. S. Bank , 583
U. S., at 394 (same). Guerrero-Lasprilla itself
reflected this understanding. See 589 U. S., at 232 (reasoning
that §1252(a)(2)(D) was intended to preserve the kind of review
traditionally available in a habeas proceeding, including review of
the “erroneous application or interpretation of statutes” (emphasis
deleted; internal quotation marks omitted)). This Court sees no
reason to treat the statutory hardship standard here any
differently from a judicially created “due diligence” standard.

															Second, the Government argues that a 1928 case, Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States , 277 U.S.
551 , and the statutory history of the hardship requirement
preclude review. In Williamsport , the Court evaluated a
wartime tax-relief provision that was in effect from 1919 to 1921.
That provision allowed the Internal Revenue Service Commissioner to
use a “ ‘special method’ ” for determining a company’s
tax burden if computation under the regular scheme would work
“ ‘an exceptional hardship.’ ” Id ., at 558. The
statute granted the Commissioner power to act, for the most part,
without any justification. The Commissioner did not have to make
findings of fact, and had to create a “meagre record” only if he
ordered a special assessment. Id ., at 559. This Court
therefore concluded that the IRS’s “exceptional hardship”
determination was a question of administrative discretion not
subject to judicial review. Ibid. Williamsport has no relevance to the
question presented here. The Government provides no basis for why
this Court should port the interpretation of “exceptional hardship”
from a 1919 tax-relief provision to a 1996 immigration-relief
provision. An IJ applying the “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” standard must create an extensive record of his
decisionmaking, including detailed fact-finding and the application
of BIA precedent. Additionally, Williamsport did not
evaluate the term “exceptional hardship” against the background of
a jurisdiction-restoring provision like §1252(a)(2)(D), enacted in
2005.

															The Government’s argument from the statutory
history of the “hardship requirement” is no more persuasive. Brief
for Respondent 26. The precursor to cancellation of removal was
suspension of deportation. That relief was available only to a
“person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General , result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
to the noncitizen himself or a qualifying relative.
§§244(a)(1)–(5), 66Stat. 214–216 (emphasis added). The Government
argues that this Court should read that discretion back into the
current version of the statute.

															The Government’s request to reinstate statutory
language removed by Congress is particularly unavailing because
Congress chose to retain similar language in provisions governing
other forms of discretionary relief subject to §1252(a)(2)(B)’s bar
on judicial review. See, e . g ., §1182(h)(1)(B)
(allowing relief “if it is established to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General that the [noncitizen’s] denial of admission would
result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen”);
§1182(i)(1) (allowing relief “if it is established to the
satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission
. . . of such [noncitizen] would result in extreme
hardship to the citizen . . . spouse or parent”);
§1255( l )(1) (allowing relief if “in the opinion of the
Secretary of [DHS], in consultation with the Attorney General, as
appropriate . . . the [noncitizen] would suffer extreme
hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal”). Congress
could have, but did not, do the same with the hardship requirement
in §1229b(b)(1).

															The Government’s final argument is one this
Court already rejected in Guerrero-Lasprilla : that a
primarily factual mixed question is a question of fact. Such a rule
would require a court of appeals evaluating its jurisdiction to
determine in every instance whether a particular legal standard
presented a primarily factual or primarily legal inquiry. Nothing
in §1252(a)(2)(D) or its statutory context suggests that “questions
of law” is so limited. See 589 U. S., at 227–228. This Court
declined to require the courts of appeals to engage in that complex
line-drawing exercise in Guerrero-Lasprilla , and it declines
to do so here.

															*  *  *

															Today’s decision announces nothing more
remarkable than the fact that this Court meant what it said in Guerrero-Lasprilla : Mixed questions of law and fact, even
when they are primarily factual, fall within the statutory
definition of “questions of law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) and are
therefore reviewable. That holding does not render §1252(a)(2)’s
jurisdiction-stripping provisions meaningless. As this Court said
in Guerrero-Lasprilla and reiterated in Patel , those
provisions still operate to exclude “agency fact-finding from
review.” Guerrero-Lasprilla , 589 U. S., at 234–235; Patel , 596 U. S., at 339 (“[J]udicial review of
factfinding is unavailable”). The facts underlying any
determination on cancellation of removal therefore remain
unreviewable. For instance, an IJ’s factfinding on credibility, the
seriousness of a family member’s medical condition, or the level of
financial support a noncitizen currently provides remain
unreviewable. Only the question whether those established facts
satisfy the statutory eligibility standard is subject to judicial
review.[ 4 ] Because this mixed
question is primarily factual, that review is deferential.

															For these reasons, the Court reverses the Third
Circuit’s “jurisdictional” decision, vacates its judgment, and
remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 This second step is not
perfunctory. Congress has imposed a statutory cap of 4,000
noncitizens each fiscal year who can have discretion exercised in
their favor. 8 U. S. C. §1229b(e). 2 Three Circuits have held
that courts of appeals have jurisdiction over hardship
determinations because they are mixed questions of law and fact.
See Arreola-Ochoa v. Garland , 34 F. 4th 603, 610 (CA7
2022); Singh v. Rosen , 984 F.3d 1142, 1150 (CA6
2021); Gonzalez Galvan v. Garland , 6 F. 4th 552, 555
(CA4 2021). Six Circuits have indicated that courts of appeals have
no jurisdiction over the BIA’s hardship determinations. See Gonzalez-Rivas v. Garland , 53 F. 4th 1129, 1132 (CA8
2022); Flores-Alonso v. United States Atty. Gen. , 36
F. 4th 1095, 1100 (CA11 2022) ( per curiam ); Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland , 43 F. 4th 477, 481
(CA5 2022) ( per curiam ); Aguilar-Osorio v. Garland , 991 F.3d 997, 999 (CA9 2021)
( per curiam ); Hernandez-Morales v. Attorney
Gen. U. S. , 977 F.3d 247, 249 (CA3 2020); Galeano-Romero v. Barr , 968 F.3d 1176, 1183–1184
(CA10 2020). 3 This scheme is the result
of this Court’s decision in INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S.
289 (2001), which construed earlier versions of the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions as permitting review in habeas
corpus proceedings “to avoid the serious constitutional questions
that would be raised by a contrary interpretation.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 589 U.S. 221, 232 (2020)
(citing St. Cyr , 533 U. S., at 299–305). Congress
enacted §1252(a)(2)(D) to ensure the constitutionality of its
jurisdiction-stripping provisions. See 589 U. S., at
232–234. 4 Similarly, if the IJ
decides a noncitizen is eligible for cancellation of removal
at step one, his step-two discretionary determination on whether or
not to grant cancellation of removal in the particular case
is not reviewable as a question of law. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–666

															_________________

															Situ Kamu Wilkinson, PETITIONER v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[March 19, 2024]

															Justice Jackson, concurring in the
judgment.

															The Immigration and Nationality Act plainly
constrains judicial review of discretionary-relief determinations.
It first strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment
regarding the granting of relief ” under provisions including
8 U. S. C. §1229b, which governs cancellation of removal.
See §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Then, the Act restores judicial review for
only a subset of claims—“constitutional claims or questions of law”
raised in a petition for review in the courts of appeals.
§1252(a)(2)(D). Through these provisions, Congress made clear that
courts should play a minimal role in the discretionary-relief
process.

															In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 589
U.S. 221 (2020), the Court interpreted the phrase “questions of
law” in §1252(a)(2)(D) to include mixed questions of law and fact, i . e ., “the application of a legal standard to
undisputed or established facts.” Id ., at 225. Today, the
Court removes any doubt that the phrase “questions of law”
encompasses all mixed questions, even those that are
“primarily factual.” Ante, at 15. Thus, an immigration
judge’s determination that a “noncitizen’s removal would result in
‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ ” presents a
judicially reviewable mixed question. Ante, at 1 (quoting
§1229b(b)(1)(D)). Pointing to our precedent, the Court holds that
“ Guerrero-Lasprilla compels this conclusion.” Ante ,
at 11.

															I am skeptical that Congress intended “questions
of law” as used in §1252(a)(2)(D) to sweep so broadly, given the
statutory scheme. The legislative history of the provision, though
not conclusive, provides additional evidence to the contrary. See
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 109–72, p. 175 (2005) (noting that “[t]he
purpose” of the provision was “to permit judicial review over
. . . constitutional and statutory-construction
questions , not discretionary or factual questions” (emphasis
added)). As the dissent observes, under a maximalist reading of
“questions of law,” the exception to limited judicial review is
poised to swallow the rule. See post , at 2–4 (opinion of
Alito, J.). If that reading is correct, Congress went through
an awful lot to achieve relatively little.

															I had not yet joined the Court when it decided Guerrero-Lasprilla . But I agree that Guerrero-Lasprilla controls this case. The fundamental
principle of stare decisis —“that today’s Court should stand
by yesterday’s decisions”—has “enhanced force” when a decision
interprets a statute. Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment,
LLC , 576 U.S.
446 , 455–456 (2015). Congress remains free to revise the
statute, and it should do so if we have strayed from its intent
concerning the scope of judicial review set forth in
§1252(a)(2)(D).

															I concur in today’s judgment with the
understanding that the jurisdiction-stripping provision is not
“meaningless.” Ante, at 15. When reviewing denials of
discretionary relief, courts should respect the choice of Congress,
reflecting the will of the People, to limit judicial interference.
Courts cannot review the facts underlying a hardship determination
in the cancellation-of-removal context, and they should carefully
distinguish between application of the “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” legal standard, such as it is, and those
unreviewable facts. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–666

															_________________

															Situ Kamu Wilkinson, PETITIONER v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[March 19, 2024]

															Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting.

															I joined the opinion of the Court in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , 589 U.S. 221 (2020), and
continue to believe that it was correctly decided. I agree with
Justice Alito’s dissent in this case, however, that the Court errs
in reading the language in Guerrero-Lasprilla “as broadly as
possible,” indeed “to the outer limits of its possible reach.” Post , at 6, 5. Nothing in Guerrero-Lasprilla requires
such a reading, and I accordingly join Justice Alito’s dissent. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–666

															_________________

															Situ Kamu Wilkinson, PETITIONER v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the third circuit

															[March 19, 2024]

															Justice Alito, with whom The Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

															In the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110Stat. 3009–546, Congress
sought to control illegal immigration and streamline the procedures
for removing illegal aliens who had been convicted of criminal
offenses. A key provision of the Act is 8 U. S. C.
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the
granting” of certain forms of discretionary relief. After IIRIRA’s
enactment, this Court flagged a “substantial constitutional
questio[n]” that would arise if federal habeas courts were stripped
of jurisdiction to review “pure question[s] of law.” INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S.
289 , 300 (2001). Congress responded by enacting an amendment
clarifying that §1252(a)(2)(B) did not “preclud[e] review of
constitutional claims or questions of law.” §1252(a)(2)(D).

															I

															In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr ,
589 U.S. 221 (2020), this Court addressed the meaning of this
amendment. The case concerned two criminal aliens who were ordered
removed and then failed to ask to have their removal proceedings
reopened by the 90-day statutory deadline. They argued, however,
that the deadline should be equitably tolled. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) rejected that argument, and the issue
before us was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
review such a decision under §1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D).

															The answer to that question depended on whether
the correctness of the BIA’s decisions was a “questio[n] of law”
within the meaning of §1252(a)(2)(D). The aliens urged us to decide
the case on “narrow grounds.” Brief for Petitioners in Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr , O. T. 2019, No. 18–776
etc., p. 15. They did not dispute the relevant facts, see 589
U. S., at 226, but argued that the BIA had applied the wrong
legal test in holding that they had not acted with sufficient
diligence to justify equitable tolling—specifically, that the BIA
had demanded a demonstration of “ ‘maximum feasible
diligence’ ” rather than “ ‘reasonable diligence,’ ”
which they claimed was the right test. Brief for Petitioners in Guerrero-Lasprilla , at 15.

															The Court ruled for the aliens and in doing so
stated broadly that “questions of law” include all questions that
involve the application of the law to a particular set of facts.
589 U. S., at 228. Under this statement, the phrase “questions
of law” has a stunning sweep. It encompasses all sorts of
discretionary rulings that depend almost entirely on the relevant
facts, as a few examples of mundane trial court rulings illustrate.
For one, take a trial court’s denial of a request for a continuance
or a decision about the length of a trial day or the days of the
week during which a jury is required to sit. See Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S.
1 , 11 (1983). Such decisions are governed by a legal standard,
albeit a very permissive one: the decisions cannot be “unreasoning
and arbitrary.” Ibid. But in the rare case in which such a
decision is reversed on appeal, the appellate court is unlikely to
say that the trial court made an error of law because it mistakenly
thought a continuance would be unreasonable and arbitrary. Instead,
the question on appeal would almost certainly be based on an
assessment of the facts.

															Here is another example. Under the broad
language of Guerrero-Lasprilla , juries decide questions of
law whenever they return a verdict in a criminal or civil case. If,
for example, a jury in a criminal case finds that a defendant
violated a statute that requires “knowing” conduct, the jury
decides a question of law because it applies the law (as set out in
the court’s instructions on the meaning of “knowing” conduct, see, e.g ., 2B K. O’Malley, J. Grenig, & W. Lee, Federal Jury
Practice and Instructions, Criminal §70:07 (6th ed. 2010), to the
facts as they see them. Likewise, in a routine negligence case, the
jury applies the law (as explained in the court’s instructions on
the meaning of “negligence,” see, e.g ., 3A id ., Civil
§155:30 (2012), to the facts shown at trial.

															When Congress responded to St. Cyr by
enacting §1252(a)(2)(D), did it mean to adopt this maximalist
understanding of “questions of law”? St. Cyr never suggested
that Congress was obligated to go that far, and if Congress had
wanted to achieve the end that results from the Court’s broad
statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla , Congress might as well
have repealed §1252(a)(2)(B) outright. Under the Guerrero-Lasprilla formulation, the net effect of
§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D) is as follows. Before the
enactment of those provisions, pure findings of fact were subject
to review, but under a very deferential standard—namely, they could
be overturned only if “ ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.’ ” Nasrallah v. Barr , 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020). Afterwards, pure findings of
fact were not reviewable at all. Is it plausible that this
pipsqueak of a change was Congress’s cure for what it saw as undue
delay in the conclusion of removal proceedings for criminal aliens?
I hardly think so.

															II

															I dissented in Guerrero-Lasprilla because I feared that the Court’s sweeping language would lead to
“absurd results in light of the statute’s structure” and would
“transform §1252(a)(2)(D)’s narrow exception into a broad provision
permitting judicial review of all criminal aliens’ challenges to
their removal proceedings except the precious few that raise only
pure questions of fact.” 589 U. S., at 238, 240 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Alito, J., dissenting). Under this reading, “the
exception” for “questions of law” “all but swallows the rule.” Id ., at 241.

															We are permitted to exercise at least a modicum
of “ ‘common sense’ ” when we interpret a statute, see West Virginia v. EPA , 597 U.S. 697, 722 (2022), and Guerrero-Lasprilla’ s broad language defies common sense. If
the Congress that enacted §1252(a)(2)(D) had wanted to bring about
the result that the broad statements in Guerrero-Lasprilla suggest, it could have simply repealed §1252(a)(2)(B) and stated in
§1252(a)(2)(D) that courts cannot review pure questions of fact.
Qualifying the broad prohibition in §1252(a)(2)(D) by adding an
exception that all but eliminates the prohibition would have been a
very odd way of achieving that result. What the Court says that
Congress did—combining the broad prohibition in §1252(a)(2)(B) with
the nearly congruent exception in §1252(a)(2)(D)—would be the
equivalent of a city council adopting an ordinance banning all dogs
from a park with an exception for all dogs that weigh under 125
pounds. Or the council passes an ordinance prohibiting all persons
from riding a bicycle without a helmet but then adopts an exception
for all persons under the age of 90. When Congress enacted
§1252(a)(2)(D), it was not engaging in such silliness.

															III

															Accepting of the judgment in Guerrero-Lasprilla— that the BIA’s understanding of the scope
of equitable estoppel is a question of law—does not require that we
take the language in the Court’s opinion to the outer limits of its
possible reach. But that is what the Court has now done. As Justice
Breyer, the author of the opinion in Guerrero-Lasprilla ,
recognized in an earlier opinion for the Court, the concept of a
question of law does not always encompass all applications of the
law to a set of facts. In Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht , 587 U.S. 299 (2019), the decision hung on the
question whether the Food and Drug Administration would have
approved a change in a drug’s label. The Court recognized that this
question contained both legal and factual elements, but the Court
did not hold that the question was one of law simply because it
involved the application of law to a set of facts. Id ., at
316–318. Rather, the Court considered which element was most likely
to be contested and asked whether the answer to the question
whether the FDA would have approved the change would generally turn
on a judgment about the law or the facts. Ibid .

															If that same mode of analysis is applied here,
the answer is clear—and it is the opposite of the one given by the
Court. Whether “removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” to the “spouse, parent, or child” of the alien
subject to removal is overwhelmingly a question of fact.
§1229b(b)(1)(D). The only legal component consists of the meaning
of the everyday terms “hardship,” “exceptional,” and “unusual.”

															The facts of this case illustrate the degree to
which the factual element involved in the question at hand
overwhelms the slim legal component. Below, petitioner argued that
the Immigration Judge misunderstood “the depth of the emotional
relationship between Petitioner and his Child,” the amount of “care
and support that Petitioner’s Child would receive if Petitioner is
removed,” and “the Child’s uncommon and difficult situation, in
light of his family’s unwillingness to provide him access to care
for his mental health needs.” Brief for Petitioner in No. 21–3166
(CA3), pp. 16–17. All those issues are entirely factual, and there
is no legal principle that can help an immigration judge, the BIA,
or a court assess whether any “hardship” resulting from
petitioner’s removal would be “exceptional and extremely unusual.”
That question must be decided by the application of what the
decision-maker knows from experience about human nature and family
relationships. Consequently, the question should not be classified
as a “question of law” under §1252(a)(2)(D).

															The Court, however, reads Guerrero-Lasprilla as broadly as possible. As it sees
things, all “[m]ixed questions” are “questions of law,” even if
they are “primarily factual.” Ante , at 15. And since the
question here is overwhelmingly factual, what the Court seems to
mean by “primarily” is anything that falls short of 100%.

															That is not what Congress meant when it enacted
§1252(a)(2)(B) and §1252(a)(2)(D), and I therefore respectfully
dissent.


U.S. Supreme Court Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41 (1957) Conley v. Gibson No. 7 Argued October 21,
1957 Decided November 18,
1957 355 U.S.
41 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Petitioners, who are Negro members of a union designated as
their bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act, brought a class
suit against the union, its brotherhood and certain of their
officers to compel them to represent petitioners without
discrimination in protection of their employment and seniority
rights under a contract between the union and the Railroad. They
alleged that the Railroad had purported to abolish 45 jobs held by
petitioners and other Negroes, but had employed whites in the same
jobs (except in a few instances in which it had rehired Negroes to
fill their old jobs with loss of seniority) and that, despite
repeated pleas, the union had done nothing to protect petitioners
from such discriminatory discharges. The District Court dismissed
the suit on the ground that the National Railroad Adjustment Board
had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. It was error to dismiss the complaint for want of
jurisdiction. Section 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act confers
upon the Adjustment Board exclusive jurisdiction only over
"disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers," whereas this is a suit by employees against their
bargaining agent to enforce their statutory right not to be
discriminated against by it in bargaining. Pp. 355 U. S.
44 -45.

															2. The Railroad was not an indispensable party to this suit, and
failure to join it was not a ground for dismissing the suit. P. 355 U. S.
45 .

															3. The complaint adequately set forth a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Pp. 355 U. S.
45 -48.

															(a) The fact that, under the Railway Labor Act, aggrieved
employees can file their own grievances with the Adjustment Board
or sue the employer for breach of contract is no justification for
the union's alleged discrimination in refusing to represent
petitioners. P. 355 U. S.
47 .

															(b) Failure of the complaint to set forth specific facts to
support its general allegations of discrimination was not a
sufficient Page 355 U. S. 42 ground for dismissal of the suit, since the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the
facts upon which he bases his claim. Pp. 355 U. S.
47 -48.

															229 F.2d 436, reversed.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Once again, Negro employees are here under the Railway Labor Act
[ Footnote 1 ] asking that their
collective bargaining agent be compelled to represent them fairly.
In a series of cases beginning with Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 ,
this Court has emphatically and repeatedly ruled that an exclusive
bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and without
discrimination because of race, and has held that the courts have
power to protect employees against such invidious discrimination.
[ Footnote 2 ]

															This class suit was brought in a Federal District Court in Texas
by certain Negro members of the Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks, petitioners here, on behalf of themselves and
other Negro employees similarly situated against the Brotherhood,
its Local Union No. 28 and certain officers of both. In summary,
the complaint Page 355 U. S. 43 made the following allegations relevant to our decision:
Petitioners were employees of the Texas and New Orleans Railroad at
its Houston Freight House. Local 28 of the Brotherhood was the
designated bargaining agents under the Railway Labor Act for the
bargaining unit to which petitioners belonged. A contract existed
between the Union and the Railroad which gave the employees in the
bargaining unit certain protection from discharge and loss of
seniority. In May, 1954, the Railroad purported to abolish 45 jobs
held by petitioners or other Negroes, all of whom were either
discharged or demoted. In truth, the 45 jobs were not abolished at
all, but instead filled by whites as the Negroes were ousted,
except for a few instances where Negroes were rehired to fill their
old jobs, but with loss of seniority. Despite repeated pleas by
petitioners, the Union, acting according to plan, did nothing to
protect them against these discriminatory discharges and refused to
give them protection comparable to that given white employees. The
complaint then went on to allege that the Union had failed in
general to represent Negro employees equally and in good faith. It
charged that such discrimination constituted a violation of
petitioners' right under the Railway Labor Act to fair
representation from their bargaining agent. And it concluded by
asking for relief in the nature of declaratory judgment, injunction
and damages.

															The respondents appeared and moved to dismiss the complaint on
several grounds: (1) the National Railroad Adjustment Board had
exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy; (2) the Texas and New
Orleans Railroad, which had not been joined, was an indispensable
party defendant; and (3) the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be given. The District Court granted the motion
to dismiss holding that Congress had given the Adjustment Board
exclusive jurisdiction over Page 355 U. S. 44 the controversy. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
apparently relying on the same ground, affirmed. 229 F.2d 436.
Since the case raised an important question concerning the
protection of employee rights under the Railway Labor Act we
granted certiorari. 352 U.S. 818.

															We hold that it was error for the courts below to dismiss the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They took the position that § 3
First (i) of the Railway Labor Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction
on the Adjustment Board because the case, in their view, involved
the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement. But § 3 First (i), by its own terms, applies only to
"disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier
or carriers." [ Footnote 3 ] This
case involves no dispute between employee and employer, but, to the
contrary, is a suit by employees against the bargaining agent to
enforce their statutory right not to be unfairly discriminated
against by it in bargaining. [ Footnote 4 ] The Adjustment Board has no Page 355 U. S. 45 power under § 3 First (i) or any other provision of the Act to
protect them from such discrimination. Furthermore, the contract
between the Brotherhood and the Railroad will be, at most, only
incidentally involved in resolving this controversy between
petitioners and their bargaining agent.

															Although the District Court did not pass on the other reasons
advanced for dismissal of the complaint, we think it timely and
proper for us to consider them here. They have been briefed and
argued by both parties, and the respondents urge that the decision
below be upheld, if necessary, on these other grounds.

															As in the courts below, respondents contend that the Texas and
New Orleans Railroad Company is an indispensable party which the
petitioners have failed to join as a defendant. On the basis of the
allegations made in the complaint and the relief demanded by
petitioners, we believe that contention is unjustifiable. We cannot
see how the Railroad's rights or interests will be affected by this
action to enforce the duty of the bargaining representative to
represent petitioners fairly. This is not a suit, directly or
indirectly, against the Railroad. No relief is asked from it, and
there is no prospect that any will or can be granted which will
bind it. If an issue does develop which necessitates joining the
Railroad, either it or the respondents will then have an adequate
opportunity to request joinder.

															Turning to respondents' final ground, we hold that, under the
general principles laid down in the Steele, Graham, and Howard, cases the complaint adequately set forth a claim
upon which relief could be granted. In appraising the sufficiency
of the complaint, we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts Page 355 U. S. 46 in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
[ Footnote 5 ] Here, the
complaint alleged, in part, that petitioners were discharged
wrongfully by the Railroad and that the Union, acting according to
plan, refused to protect their jobs as it did those of white
employees or to help them with their grievances all because they
were Negroes. If these allegations are proven, there has been a
manifest breach of the Union's statutory duty to represent fairly
and without hostile discrimination all of the employees in the
bargaining unit. This Court squarely held in Steele and
subsequent cases that discrimination in representation because of
race is prohibited by the Railway Labor Act. The bargaining
representative's duty not to draw "irrelevant and invidious"
[ Footnote 6 ] distinctions among
those it represents does not come to an abrupt end, as the
respondents seem to contend, with the making of an agreement
between union and employer. Collective bargaining is a continuing
process. Among other things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in
the contract and other working rules, resolution of new problems
not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee
rights already secured by contract. The bargaining representative
can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions
than it can in negotiating a collective agreement. [ Footnote 7 ] A contract may be fair and
impartial on its face, yet administered in such a way, with the
active or tacit consent of the union, as to be flagrantly
discriminatory against some members of the bargaining unit. Page 355 U. S. 47 The respondents point to the fact that under the Railway Labor
Act aggrieved employees can file their own grievances with the
Adjustment Board or sue the employer for breach of contract.
Granting this, it still furnishes no sanction for the Union's
alleged discrimination in refusing to represent petitioners. The
Railway Labor Act, in an attempt to aid collective action by
employees, conferred great power and protection on the bargaining
agent chosen by a majority of them. As individuals or small groups,
the employees cannot begin to possess the bargaining power of their
representative in negotiating with the employer or in presenting
their grievances to him. Nor may a minority choose another agent to
bargain in their behalf. We need not pass on the Union's claim that
it was not obliged to handle any grievances at all, because we are
clear that, once to undertook to bargain or present grievances for
some of the employees it represented, it could not refuse to take
similar action in good faith for other employees just because they
were Negroes.

															The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set
forth specific facts to support its general allegations of
discrimination, and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The
decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules
require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" [ Footnote 8 ] that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to the
Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified "notice pleading"
is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the
other pretrial procedures Page 355 U. S. 48 established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of
both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed
facts and issues. [ Footnote 9 ]
Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that "all pleadings shall
be so construed as to do substantial justice," we have no doubt
that petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave
the respondents fair notice of its basis. The Federal Rules reject
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome, and accept the principle
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on
the merits. Cf. Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U. S. 197 .

															The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the
District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. [ Footnote 2 ] Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210 ; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232 ; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.
S. 768 ; cf. Wallace Corp. v. Labor Board, 323 U. S. 248 ; Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, 350 U.S.
892.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															In full, § 3 First (i) reads:

															"The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a
carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and
unadjusted on the date of approval of this Act (June 21, 1934),
shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief
operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such
disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the
disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either
party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a
full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon
the disputes."

															48 Stat. 1191, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															For this reason, the decision in Slocum v. Delaware, L.
& W.R. Co., 339 U. S. 239 , is
not applicable here. The courts below also relied on Hayes v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 184 F.2d 337, certiorari
denied, 340 U.S. 942, but, for the reasons set forth in the
text, we believe that case was decided incorrectly.

															[ Footnote 5 ] See, e.g., Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 108
F.2d 302; Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774; Continental Collieries v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631.

															[ Footnote 6 ] Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 , 323 U. S.
203 .

															[ Footnote 7 ] See Dillard v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 199 F.2d
948; Hughes Tool Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 147 F.2d 69, 74.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Rule 8(a)(2).

															[ Footnote 9 ] See, e.g., Rule 12(e) (motion for a more definite
statement); Rule 12(f) (motion to strike portions of the pleading);
Rule 12(c) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Rule 16
(pretrial procedure and formulation of issue); Rules 26-37
(depositions and discovery); Rule 56 (motion for summary judgment):
Rule 15 (right to amend).