U.S. Supreme Court Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981) Widmar v. Vincent No. 80-689 Argued October 6,
1981 Decided December 8,
1981 454
U.S. 263 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus The University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university,
makes its facilities generally available for the activities of
registered student groups. A registered student religious group
that had previously received permission to conduct its meetings in
University facilities was informed that it could no longer do so
because of a University regulation prohibiting the use of
University buildings or grounds "for purposes of religious worship
or religious teaching." Members of the group then brought suit in
Federal District Court, alleging that the regulation violated, inter alia, their rights to free exercise of religion and
freedom of speech under the First Amendment. The District Court
upheld the regulation as being not only justified, but required, by
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of
Appeals reversed, viewing the regulation as a content-based
discrimination against religious speech, for which it could find no
compelling justification, and holding that the Establishment Clause
does not bar a policy of equal access, in which facilities are open
to groups and speakers of all kinds. Held: The University's exclusionary policy violates the
fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be
content-neutral. Pp. 454 U. S.
267 -277.

															(a) Having created a forum generally open for use by student
groups, the University, in order to justify discriminatory
exclusion from such forum based on the religious content of a
group's intended speech, must satisfy the standard of review
appropriate to content-based exclusions; i.e., it must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest, and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Pp. 454 U. S.
267 -270.

															(b) Although the University's interest in complying with its
constitutional obligations under the Establishment Clause may be
characterized as compelling, an "equal access" policy would not be
incompatible with that Clause. A policy will not offend the
Establishment Clause if it can pass the following three-pronged
test: (1) It has a secular legislative purpose; (2) its principal
or primary effect would be neither to advance nor to inhibit
religion; and (3) it does not foster "an excessive government
entanglement with religion." Here, it is conceded that an "equal
access" Page 454 U. S. 264 policy would meet the first and third prongs of the test. In the
context of this case and in the absence of any evidence that
religious groups will dominate the University's forum, the
advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary effect."
An "equal access" policy would therefore satisfy the test's second
prong as well. Pp. 454 U. S.
270 -275.

															(c) The State's interest in achieving greater separation of
church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment
Clause is not sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based
discrimination against religious speech of the student group in
question. Pp. 454 U. S.
275 -276.

															635 F.2d 1310, affirmed.

															POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C.J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR,
JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 454 U. S. 277 .
WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 454 U. S.
282 .

															JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the court.

															This case presents the question whether a state university,
which makes its facilities generally available for the
activities Page 454 U. S. 265 of registered student groups, may close its facilities to a
registered student group desiring to use the facilities for
religious worship and religious discussion. I It is the stated policy of the University of Missouri at Kansas
City [ Footnote 1 ] to encourage
the activities of student organizations. The University officially
recognizes over 100 student groups. It routinely provides
University facilities for the meetings of registered organizations.
Students pay an activity fee of $41 per semester (1978-1979) to
help defray the costs to the University.

															From 1973 until 1977, a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its
meetings in University facilities. [ Footnote 2 ] In 1977, however, the University informed the
group that it could no longer meet in University buildings. The
exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted by the Board of
Curators in 1972, that prohibits the use of University buildings or
grounds "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."
[ Footnote 3 ] Page 454 U. S. 266 Eleven University students, all members of Cornerstone, brought
suit to challenge the regulation in the Federal District Court for
the Western District of Missouri. [ Footnote 4 ] They alleged that the University's
discrimination against religious activity and discussion violated
their rights to free exercise of religion, equal protection, and
freedom of speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.

															Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court
upheld the challenged regulation. Chess v.
Widmar, 480 F.
Supp. 907 (1979). It found the regulation not only justified,
but required, by the Establishment Clause of the Federal
Constitution. Id. at 916. Under Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the court reasoned, the State Page 454 U. S. 267 could not provide facilities for religious use without giving
prohibited support to an institution of religion. 480 F. Supp. at
915-916. The District Court rejected the argument that the
University could not discriminate against religious speech on the
basis of its content. It found religious speech entitled to less
protection than other types of expression. Id. at 918.

															The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Chess
v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (1980). Rejecting the analysis of the
District Court, it viewed the University regulation as a
content-based discrimination against religious speech, for which it
could find no compelling justification. Id. at 1315-1320.
The court held that the Establishment Clause does not bar a policy
of equal access, in which facilities are open to groups and
speakers of all kinds. Id. at 1317. According to the Court
of Appeals, the "primary effect" of such a policy would not be to
advance religion, but rather to further the neutral purpose of
developing students' " social and cultural awareness as well as
[their] intellectual curiosity.'" Ibid. (quoting from the
University bulletin's description of the student activities
program, reprinted in id. at 1312, n. 1). We granted certiorari. 450 U.S. 909. We now affirm. II Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the
University has created a forum generally open for use by student
groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation to
justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms. [ Footnote
5 ] The Constitution Page 454 U. S. 268 forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create
the forum in the first place. See, e.g., Madison Joint School
District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U. S. 167 , 429 U. S. 175 ,
and n. 8 (1976) (although a State may conduct business in private
session, "[w]here the State has opened a forum for direct citizen
involvement," exclusions bear a heavy burden of justification); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.
S. 546 , 420 U. S.
555 -559 (1975) (because municipal theater was a public
forum, city could not exclude a production without satisfying
constitutional safeguards applicable to prior restraints).

															The University's institutional mission, which it describes as
providing a "secular education" to its students, Brief for
Petitioners 44, does not exempt its actions from constitutional
scrutiny. With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases
leave no doubt that the First Amendment Page 454 U. S. 269 rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state
universities. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.
S. 169 , 408 U. S. 180 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U. S. 503 , 393 U. S. 506 (1969); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.
S. 479 , 364 U. S. 487 (1960).

															Here, UMKC has discriminated against student groups and speakers
based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in
religious worship and discussion. These are forms of speech and
association protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.
S. 558 (1948). [ Footnote
6 ] In order to justify discriminatory Page 454 U. S. 270 exclusion from a public forum based on the religious content of
a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy
the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest, and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 , 447 U. S. 461 , 447 U. S.
464 -465 (1980). [ Footnote 7 ] III In this case, the University claims a compelling interest in
maintaining strict separation of church and State. It derives this
interest from the "Establishment Clauses" of both the Federal and
Missouri Constitutions. A The University first argues that it cannot offer its facilities
to religious groups and speakers on the terms available to Page 454 U. S. 271 other groups without violating the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution of the United States. [ Footnote 8 ] We agree that the interest of the University
in complying with its constitutional obligations may be
characterized as compelling. It does not follow, however, that an
"equal access" policy would be incompatible with this Court's
Establishment Clause cases. Those cases hold that a policy will not
offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-pronged
test:

															"First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally,
the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S.
612 -613 (1971). See Committee for Public Education
v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646 , 444 U. S. 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.
S. 736 , 426 U. S. 748 (1976).

															In this case, two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals held that an open forum
policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech,
[ Footnote 9 ] would have a
secular purpose [ Footnote
10 ] and would Page 454 U. S. 272 avoid entanglement with religion. [ Footnote 11 ] But the District Court concluded, and the
University argues here, that allowing religious groups to share the
limited public forum would have the "primary effect" of advancing
religion. [ Footnote 12 ] Page 454 U. S. 273 The University's argument misconceives the nature of this case.
The question is not whether the creation of a religious forum would
violate the Establishment Clause. The University has opened its
facilities for use by student groups, and the question is whether
it can now exclude groups because of the content of their speech. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972). [ Footnote 13 ] In
this context, we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the
public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance
religion.

															We are not oblivious to the range of an open forum's likely
effects. It is possible -- perhaps even foreseeable -- that
religious groups will benefit from access to University facilities.
But this Court has explained that a religious organization's
enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does not violate the
prohibition against the "primary advancement" of religion. Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 , Page 454 U. S. 274 413 U. S. 771 (1973); see, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U. S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.
S. 420 , 366 U. S. 422 (1961).

															We are satisfied that any religious benefits of an open forum at
UMKC would be "incidental" within the meaning of our cases. Two
factors are especially relevant.

															First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. As
the Court of Appeals quite aptly stated, such a policy "would no
more commit the University . . . to religious goals" than it is
"now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic
Society, the Young Socialist Alliance," or any other group eligible
to use its facilities. 635 F.2d at 1317. [ Footnote 14 ]

															Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious,
as well as religious, speakers; there are over 100 recognized
student groups at UMKC. The provision of benefits to so broad a
spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.
S. 229 , 433 U. S.
240 -241 (1977); Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist, supra, at 413 U. S.
781 -782, and n. 38. If the Establishment Clause barred
the extension of general benefits to religious groups, "a church
could not be protected by the police and fire departments, Page 454 U. S. 275 or have its public sidewalk kept in repair." Roemer v.
Maryland Public Works Bd., supra, at 426 U. S. 747 (plurality opinion); quoted in Committee for Public Education
v. Regan, 444 U.S. at 444 U. S. 658 , n. 6. [ Footnote 15 ] At least in the absence of empirical
evidence that religious groups will dominate UMKC's open forum, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that the advancement of religion
would not be the forum's "primary effect." B Arguing that the State of Missouri has gone further than the
Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect state support for
religion, [ Footnote 16 ] the
University claims a compelling interest in complying with the
applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution. [ Footnote 17 ]

															The Missouri courts have not ruled whether a general policy of
accommodating student groups, applied equally to those wishing to
gather to engage in religious and nonreligious speech, would offend
the State Constitution. We need not, however, determine how the
Missouri courts would decide this issue. It is also unnecessary for
us to decide whether, under the Supremacy Clause, [ Footnote 18 ] a state interest, derived from
its own constitution, could ever outweigh free Page 454 U. S. 276 speech interests protected by the First Amendment. We limit our
holding to the case before us.

															On one hand, respondents' First Amendment rights are entitled to
special constitutional solicitude. Our cases have required the most
exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate
speech on the basis of its content. See, e.g., Carey v.
Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S.
92 (1972). On the other hand, the state interest
asserted here -- in achieving greater separation of church and
State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the
Federal Constitution -- is limited by the Free Exercise Clause,
and, in this case, by the Free Speech Clause as well. In this
constitutional context, we are unable to recognize the State's
interest as sufficiently "compelling" to justify content-based
discrimination against respondents' religious speech. IV Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of
the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations. [ Footnote 19 ]
Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic
judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources or "to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 , 354 U. S. 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); see University
of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.
S. 265 , 438 U. S.
312 -313 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court). [ Footnote 20 ] Finally, Page 454 U. S. 277 we affirm the continuing validity of cases, e.g., Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S.
188 -189, that recognize a university's right to exclude
even First Amendment activities that violate reasonable campus
rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other
students to obtain an education.

															The basis for our decision is narrow. Having created a forum
generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce a
content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary
policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation
of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable
to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.

															For this reason, the decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The University of Missouri at Kansas City (UMKC) is one of four
campuses of the University of Missouri, an institution of the State
of Missouri.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Cornerstone is an organization of evangelical Christian students
from various denominational backgrounds. According to an affidavit
filed in 1977, "perhaps twenty students . . . participate actively
in Cornerstone and form the backbone of the campus organization."
Affidavit of Florian Chess (Sept. 29, 1977), quoted in Chess v.
Widmar, 480 F.
Supp. 907 , 911 (WD Mo.1979). Cornerstone held its on-campus
meetings in classrooms and in the student center. These meetings
were open to the public, and attracted up to 125 students. A
typical Cornerstone meeting included prayer, hymns, Bible
commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The pertinent regulations provide as follows:

															"4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels
as herein provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship
or religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. . . .
The general prohibition against use of University buildings and
grounds for religious worship or religious teaching is a policy
required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by the
Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other
construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the
offering of prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at
public functions held in University facilities. . . ."

															"4.0314.0108 Regular chapels established on University grounds
may be used for religious services but not for regular recurring
services of any groups. Special rules and procedures shall be
established for each such chapel by the Chancellor. It is
specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any
religious group."

															There is no chapel on the campus of UMKC. The nearest University
chapel is at the Columbia campus, approximately 125 miles east of
UMKC.

															Although the University had routinely approved Cornerstone
meetings before 1977, the District Court found that University
officials had never

															"authorized a student organization to utilize a University
facility for a meeting where they had full knowledge that the
purposes of the meeting include[d] religious worship or religious
teaching." Chess v. Widmar, supra, at 910.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Respondent Clark Vincent and Florian Chess, a named plaintiff in
the action in the District Court, were among the students who
initiated the action on October 13, 1977. Named as defendants were
the petitioner Gary Widmar, the Dean of Students at UMKC, and the
University's Board of Curators.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															This Court has recognized that the campus of a public
university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum. See generally Police Dept.
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.
S. 536 (1965). "The college classroom, with its
surrounding environs, is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.'" Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 , 408 U. S. 180 (1972). Moreover, the capacity of a group or individual "to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus
debate . . . [would be] limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty
members, and other students." Id. at 408 U. S.
181 -182. We therefore have held that students enjoy
First Amendment rights of speech and association on the campus, and
that the "denial [to particular groups] of use of campus facilities
for meeting and other appropriate purposes" must be subjected to
the level of scrutiny appropriate to any form of prior restraint. Id. at 408 U. S. 181 , 408 U. S.
184 .

															At the same time, however, our cases have recognized that First
Amendment rights must be analyzed "in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent School District, 393 U.
S. 503 , 393 U. S. 506 (1969). We continue to adhere to that view. A university differs in
significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks,
or even municipal theaters. A university's mission is education,
and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's
authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that
mission upon the use of its campus and facilities. We have not
held, for example, that a campus must make all of its facilities
equally available to students and nonstudents alike, or that a
university must grant free access to all of its grounds or
buildings.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The dissent argues that "religious worship" is not speech
generally protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the First
Amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. If "religious worship" were protected "speech," the
dissent reasons, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any
independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice
took the form of speech." Post at 454 U. S. 284 .
This is a novel argument. The dissent does not deny that speech about religion is speech entitled to the general
protections of the First Amendment. See post at 454 U. S.
283 -284, and n. 2, 286. It does not argue that
descriptions of religious experiences fail to qualify as "speech."
Nor does it repudiate last Term's decision in Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., which
assumed that religious appeals to nonbelievers constituted
protected "speech." Rather, the dissent seems to attempt a
distinction between the kinds of religious speech explicitly
protected by our cases and a new class of religious "speech
act[s]," post at 454 U. S. 285 ,
constituting "worship." There are at least three difficulties with
this distinction.

															First, the dissent fails to establish that the distinction has
intelligible content. There is no indication when "singing hymns,
reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles," post at 454 U. S. 283 ,
cease to be "singing, teaching, and reading" all apparently forms
of "speech," despite their religious subject matter -- and become
unprotected "worship."

															Second, even if the distinction drew an arguably principled
line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial
competence to administer. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U. S. 67 , 345 U. S. 70 (1953). Merely to draw the distinction would require the university
-- and ultimately the courts -- to inquire into the significance of
words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying
circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend
inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner
forbidden by our cases. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U. S. 664 , 397 U. S. 668 (1970).

															Finally, the dissent fails to establish the relevance of the
distinction on which it seeks to rely. The dissent apparently
wishes to preserve the vitality of the Establishment Clause. See post at 454 U. S.
284 -286. But it gives no reason why the Establishment
Clause, or any other provision of the Constitution, would require
different treatment for religious speech designed to win religious
converts, see Heffron, supra, than for religious worship
by persons already converted. It is far from clear that the State
gives greater support in the latter case than in the former.

															[ Footnote 7 ] See also Healy v. James, supra, at 408 U. S.
184 :

															"It is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial
of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities
described above. While a college has a legitimate interest in
preventing disruption on the campus, which . . . may justify such
restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate the
appropriateness of that action."

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. . . ." U.S.Const., Amdt. 1. The Establishment Clause has
been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 (1940).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															As the dissent emphasizes, the Establishment Clause requires the
State to distinguish between "religious" speech -- speech,
undertaken or approved by the State, the primary effect of which is
to support an establishment of religion -- and "nonreligious"
speech -- speech, undertaken or approved by the State, the primary
effect of which is not to support an establishment of religion.
This distinction is required by the plain text of the Constitution.
It is followed in our cases. E.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). The dissent attempts to equate this distinction with its
view of an alleged constitutional difference between religious
"speech" and religious "worship." See post at 454 U. S. 286 ,
and n. 3. We think that the distinction advanced by the dissent
lacks a foundation in either the Constitution or in our cases, and
that it is judicially unmanageable.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															It is the avowed purpose of UMKC to provide a forum in which
students can exchange ideas. The University argues that use of the
forum for religious speech would undermine this secular aim. But,
by creating a forum, the University does not thereby endorse or
promote any of the particular ideas aired there. Undoubtedly many
views are advocated in the forum with which the University desires
no association.

															Because this case involves a forum already made generally
available to student groups, it differs from those cases in which
this Court has invalidated statutes permitting school facilities to
be used for instruction by religious groups, but not by others. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.
S. 203 (1948). In those cases, the school may appear to
sponsor the views of the speaker.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															We agree with the Court of Appeals that the University would
risk greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its exclusion
of "religious worship" and "religious speech." See Chess v.
Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1318 (CA8 1980). Initially, the
University would need to determine which words and activities fall
within "religious worship and religious teaching." This alone could
prove "an impossible task in an age where many and various beliefs
meet the constitutional definition of religion." O'Hair v.
Andrus, 198 U.S.App.D.C.198, 203, 613 F.2d 931, 936 (1979)
(footnote omitted); see L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 14-6 (1978). There would also be a continuing need to monitor
group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															In finding that an "equal access" policy would have the primary
effect of advancing religion, the District Court in this case
relied primarily on Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 672 (1971). In Tilton, this Court upheld the
grant of federal financial assistance to sectarian colleges for
secular purposes, but circumscribed the terms of the grant to
ensure its constitutionality. Although Congress had provided that
federally subsidized buildings could not be used for sectarian or
religious worship for 20 years, the Court considered this
restriction insufficient:

															"If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example,
converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious
interests, the original federal grant will, in part, have the
[constitutionally impermissible] effect of advancing religion." Id. at 403 U. S. 683 .
From this statement, the District Court derived the proposition
that state funds may not be used to provide or maintain buildings
used by religious organizations.

															We do not believe that Tilton can be read so broadly.
In Tilton, the Court was concerned that a sectarian
institution might convert federally funded buildings to religious
uses or otherwise stamp them with the imprimatur of religion. But
nothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the State's
capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and other
discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have
acknowledged the right of religious speakers to use public forums
on equal terms with others. See, e.g., Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.
S. 640 (1981); Saia v. New York, 334 U.
S. 558 (1948).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															This case is different from cases in which religious groups
claim that the denial of facilities not available to other
groups deprives them of their rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. Here, the University's forum is already available to other
groups, and respondents' claim to use that forum does not rest
solely on rights claimed under the Free Exercise Clause.
Respondents' claim also implicates First Amendment rights of speech
and association, and it is on the bases of speech and association
rights that we decide the case. Accordingly, we need not inquire
into the extent, if any, to which free exercise interests are
infringed by the challenged University regulation. Neither do we
reach the questions that would arise if state accommodation of free
exercise and free speech rights should, in a particular case,
conflict with the prohibitions of the Establishment Clause.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															University students are, of course, young adults. They are less
impressionable than younger students, and should be able to
appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality toward
religion. See Tilton v. Richardson, supra, at 403 U. S.
685 -686. The University argues that the Cornerstone
students themselves admitted in affidavits that

															"[s]tudents know that, if something is on campus, then it is a
student organization, and they are more likely to feel comfortable
attending a meeting."

															Affidavit of Florian Frederick Chess, App. 18, 19. In light of
the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt
students could draw any reasonable inference of University support
from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's
student handbook already notes that the University's name will not
"be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs,
products, or opinions of any organization or its members."
1980-1981 UMKC Student Handbook 25.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															This Court has similarly rejected

															"the recurrent argument that all aid [to parochial schools] is
forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to
spend its other resources on religious ends." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 , 413 U. S. 743 (1973).

															[ Footnote 16 ] See, e.g., Americans United v. Rogers, 638 S.W.2d 711,
720 (Mo.) (en banc) (holding Missouri Constitution requires
stricter separation of church and State than does Federal
Constitution), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 816-816, 163 S.W.2d 609,
613-614 (Mo.1942) (en banc) (same).

															[ Footnote 17 ] See Mo. Const., Art. 1, 6, 7; Art. 9, 8. In Luetkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 364 F.
Supp. 376 (WD Mo.1973), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974),
the District Court found Missouri had a compelling interest in
compliance with its own Constitution.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															U.S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.

															[ Footnote 19 ] See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.
S. 104 , 408 U. S. 116 (1972) ("The nature of a place, the pattern of its normal
activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and
manner that are reasonable,'" quoting Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1027, 1042 (1969)). [ Footnote 20 ]

															In his opinion concurring in the judgment, post at 454 U. S.
277 -287, JUSTICE STEVENS expresses concern that use of
the terms "compelling state interest" and "public forum" may
"undermine the academic freedom of public universities." As the
text above makes clear, this concern is unjustified. See
also n 5, supra. Our holding is limited to the context of a public forum created by
the University itself.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.

															As the Court recognizes, every university must "make academic
judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources," ante at 454 U. S. 276 .
The Court appears to hold, however, that those judgments must
"serve a compelling state interest" whenever they are based, even
in part, on the content of speech. Ante at 454 U. S.
269 -270. This conclusion apparently flows from the
Court's suggestion that a student activities program -- from which
the public may be excluded, ante at 454 U. S.
267 -268, n. 5 -- must be managed as though it were a
"public forum." [ Footnote 2/1 ] In
my opinion, the use of the terms "compelling Page 454 U. S. 278 state interest" and "public forum" to analyze the question
presented in this case may needlessly undermine the academic
freedom of public universities.

															Today most major colleges and universities are operated by
public authority. Nevertheless, their facilities are not open to
the public in the same way that streets and parks are. University
facilities -- private or public -- are maintained primarily for the
benefit of the student body and the faculty. In performing their
learning and teaching missions, the managers of a university
routinely make countless decisions based on the content of
communicative materials. They select books for inclusion in the
library, they hire professors on the basis of their academic
philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the curriculum,
and they reward scholars for what they have written. In addition,
in encouraging students to participate in extracurricular
activities, they necessarily make decisions concerning the content
of those activities.

															Because every university's resources are limited, an educational
institution must routinely make decisions concerning the use of the
time and space that is available for extracurricular activities. In
my judgment, it is both necessary and appropriate for those
decisions to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity. I
should think it obvious, for example, that, if two groups of 25
students requested the use of a room at a particular time -- one to
view Mickey Mouse cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur
performance of Hamlet -- the First Amendment would not require that
the room be reserved for the group that submitted its application
first. Nor do I see why a university should have to establish a
"compelling state interest" to defend its decision to permit one
group to use the facility and not the other. In my opinion, a
university should be allowed to decide for itself whether a program
that illuminates the genius of Walt Disney should be given
precedence over one that may duplicate material adequately covered
in the classroom. Judgments of Page 454 U. S. 279 this kind should be made by academicians, not by federal judges,
[ Footnote 2/2 ] and their standards
for decision should not be encumbered with ambiguous phrases like
"compelling state interest." [ Footnote
2/3 ] Page 454 U. S. 280 Thus, I do not subscribe to the view that a public university
has no greater interest in the content of student activities than
the police chief has in the content of a soapbox oration on Capitol
Hill. A university legitimately may regard some subjects as more
relevant to its educational mission than others. But the
university, like the police officer, may not allow its agreement or
disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to
determine whether access to a forum will be granted. If a state
university is to deny recognition to a student organization -- or
is to give it a lesser right to use school facilities than other
student groups -- it must have a valid reason for doing so. Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 .
[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															In this case, I agree with the Court that the University has not
established a sufficient justification for its refusal to allow the
Cornerstone group to engage in religious worship on the campus. The
primary reason advanced for the discriminatory treatment is the
University's fear of violating the Establishment Clause. But since
the record discloses no danger Page 454 U. S. 281 that the University will appear to sponsor any particular
religion, and since student participation in the Cornerstone
meetings is entirely voluntary, the Court properly concludes that
the University's fear is groundless. With that justification put to
one side, the University has not met the burden that is imposed on
it by Healy. Nor does the University's reliance on the Establishment Clause
of the Missouri State Constitution provide a sufficient
justification for the discriminatory treatment in this case.
[ Footnote 2/5 ] As I have said, I
believe that the University may exercise a measure of control over
the agenda for student use of school facilities, preferring some
subjects over others, without needing to identify so-called
"compelling state interests." Quite obviously, however, the
University could not allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians
to meet while denying Democrats or Mormons the same privilege.
[ Footnote 2/6 ] It seems apparent
that the policy under attack would allow groups of young
philosophers to meet to discuss their skepticism that a Supreme
Being exists, or a group of political scientists to meet to debate
the accuracy of the view that religion is the "opium of the
people." If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical
doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use by a group desiring to
express a belief in God must also be permitted. The fact that their
expression of faith includes ceremonial conduct is not, in my
opinion, a sufficient reason for suppressing their discussion
entirely.

															Accordingly, although I do not endorse the Court's reasoning, I
concur in its judgment. Page 454 U. S. 282 [ Footnote 2/1 ]

															As stated by the Court,

															"[i]n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public
forum based on the religious content of a group's intended speech,
the University must therefore satisfy the standard of review
appropriate to content-based exclusions." Ante at 454 U. S.
269 -270. See also ante, n 20 ("Our holding is limited to the context of
a public forum created by the University itself").

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.
S. 234 , Justice Frankfurter forcefully spoke of "the
grave harm resulting from governmental intrusion into the
intellectual life of a university. . . ." Id. at 354 U. S. 261 (concurring in result). Justice Frankfurter quoted with approval
portions of an address by T. H. Huxley:

															"'It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It
is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential
freedoms' of a university -- to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study.'" Id. at 354 U. S. 263 .
Although these comments were not directed at a public university's
concern with extracurricular activities, it is clear that the
"atmosphere" of a university includes such a critical aspect of
campus life. See also University of California Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 , 438 U. S. 312 (opinion of POWELL, J.) ("Academic freedom, though not a
specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed
as a special concern of the First Amendment"); Note, Academic
Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 Harv.L.Rev.
879 (1979). Cf. Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of
Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, reprinted
in The Concept of Academic Freedom 59, 77-81 (E. Pincoffs
ed.1972).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															In Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173 ,
JUSTICE BLACKMUN expressed concern with

															"what seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as
tests such easy phrases as 'compelling [state] interest' and 'least
drastic [or restrictive] means.' I have never been able fully to
appreciate just what a 'compelling state interest' is. If it means
'convincingly controlling,' or 'incapable of being overcome' upon
any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces
an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me,
'least drastic means' is a slippery slope, and also the signal of
the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be
unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a
little less 'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any
situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation
down." Id. at 440 U. S.
188 -189 (concurring opinion) (citation omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															In Healy, the Court stated:

															"The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had the burden
of showing entitlement to recognition by the College. While
petitioners have not challenged the procedural requirement that
they file an application in conformity with the rules of the
College, they do question the view of the courts below that final
rejection could rest on their failure to convince the
administration that their organization was unaffiliated with the
National [Students for a Democratic Society]. For reasons to be
stated later in this opinion, we do not consider the issue of
affiliation to be a controlling one. But, apart from any particular
issue, once petitioners had filed an application in conformity with
the requirements, the burden was upon the College administration to
justify its decision of rejection. It is to be remembered that the
effect of the College's denial of recognition was a form of prior
restraint, denying to petitioners' organization the range of
associational activities described above. While a college has a
legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which,
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that interest,
may justify such restraint, a 'heavy burden' rests on the college
to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action."

															408 U.S. at 408 U. S.
183 -184 (footnotes and citations omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The University's asserted determination to keep Church and State
completely separate, pursuant to the alleged dictates of the
Missouri Constitution, is not without qualification. The very
regulations at issue provide that

															"[n]o regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of
prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public
functions held in University facilities. . . ." See ante at 454 U. S. 266 ,
n. 3.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ] See Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment:
A Revisionist View, 68 Geo.L.J. 727 (1980).

															JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the majority
rejects petitioners' argument that the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution prohibits the use of university buildings for
religious purposes. A state university may permit its property to
be used for purely religious services without violating the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. With this, I agree. See Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.
S. 756 , 413 U. S. 813 (1973) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 , 403 U. S. 661 (1971) (opinion of WHITE, J.). The Establishment Clause, however,
sets limits only on what the State may do with respect to religious
organizations; it does not establish what the State is required to do. I have long argued that Establishment
Clause limits on state action which incidentally aids religion are
not as strict as the Court has held. The step from the permissible
to the necessary, however, is a long one. In my view, just as there
is room under the Religion Clauses for state policies that may have
some beneficial effect on religion, there is also room for state
policies that may incidentally burden religion. In other words, I
believe the States to be a good deal freer to formulate policies
that affect religion in divergent ways than does the majority. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 , 374 U. S.
422 -423 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The majority's
position will inevitably lead to those contradictions and tensions
between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses warned against
by Justice Stewart in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 374 U. S.
416 .

															The University regulation at issue here provides in pertinent
part:

															"No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching by either student or nonstudent groups. Student
congregations of local Page 454 U. S. 283 churches or of recognized denominations or sects, although not
technically recognized campus groups, may use the facilities . . .
under the same regulations that apply to recognized campus
organizations, provided that no University facilities may be used
for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."

															Although there may be instances in which it would be difficult
to determine whether a religious group used university facilities
for "worship" or "religious teaching," rather than for secular
ends, this is not such a case. The regulation was applied to
respondents' religious group, Cornerstone, only after the group
explicitly informed the University that it sought access to the
facilities for the purpose of offering prayer, singing hymns,
reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles. Cornerstone
described their meetings as follows:

															"Although these meetings would not appear to a casual observer
to correspond precisely to a traditional worship service, there is
no doubt that worship is an important part of the general
atmosphere." Chess v. Widmar, 480 F.
Supp. 907 , 910 (1979). [ Footnote
3/1 ] The issue here is only whether the University Page 454 U. S. 284 regulation as applied and interpreted in this case is
impermissible under the Federal Constitution. If it is
impermissible, it is because it runs afoul of either the Free
Speech or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

															A large part of respondents' argument, accepted by the court
below and accepted by the majority, is founded on the proposition
that, because religious worship uses speech, it is protected by the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 3/2 ] Not only is it protected, they argue, but
religious worship qua speech is not different from any
other variety of protected speech as a matter of constitutional
principle. I believe that this proposition is plainly wrong. Were
it right, the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent
meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form
of speech.

															Although the majority describes this argument as "novel," ante at 454 U. S. 269 ,
n. 6, I believe it to be clearly supported by our previous cases.
Just last Term, the Court found it sufficiently Page 454 U. S. 285 obvious that the Establishment Clause prohibited a State from
posting a copy of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall that a
statute requiring such a posting was summarily struck down. Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). That case necessarily presumed that the State could not
ignore the religious content of the written message, nor was it
permitted to treat that content as it would, or must, treat other
-- secular -- messages under the First Amendment's protection of
speech. Similarly, the Court's decisions prohibiting prayer in the
public schools rest on a content-based distinction between
varieties of speech: as a speech act, apart from its content, a
prayer is indistinguishable from a biology lesson. See Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962). Operation of the Free Exercise Clause is equally dependent,
in certain circumstances, on recognition of a content-based
distinction between religious and secular speech. Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), the Court struck down, as violative of the Free Exercise
Clause, a state requirement that made a declaration of belief in
God a condition of state employment. A declaration is again a
speech act, but it was the content of the speech that brought the
case within the scope of the Free Exercise Clause.

															If the majority were right that no distinction may be drawn
between verbal acts of worship and other verbal acts, all of these
cases would have to be reconsidered. Although I agree that the line
may be difficult to draw in many cases, surely the majority cannot
seriously suggest that no line may ever be drawn. [ Footnote 3/3 ] If that were the case, the majority
would Page 454 U. S. 286 have to uphold the University's right to offer a class entitled
"Sunday Mass." Under the majority's view, such a class would be, as
a matter of constitutional principle, indistinguishable from a
class entitled "The History of the Catholic Church." [ Footnote 3/4 ]

															There may be instances in which a State's attempt to disentangle
itself from religious worship would intrude upon secular speech
about religion. In such a case, the State's action would be subject
to challenge under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
This is not such a case. This case involves religious worship only;
the fact that that worship is accomplished through speech does not
add anything to respondents' argument. That argument must rely upon
the claim that the State's action impermissibly interferes with the
free exercise of respondents' religious practices. Although this is
a close question, I conclude that it does not.

															Plausible analogies on either side suggest themselves.
Respondents argue, and the majority agrees, that, by permitting any
student group to use its facilities for communicative purposes
other than religious worship, the University has created a "public
forum." Ante at 454 U. S.
267 -268. With ample Page 454 U. S. 287 support, they argue that the State may not make content-based
distinctions as to what groups may use, or what messages may be
conveyed in, such a forum. See Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.
S. 536 (1965). The right of the religious to
nondiscriminatory access to the public forum is well established. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 (1951); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). Moreover, it is clear that there are bounds beyond which
the University could not go in enforcing its regulation: I do not
suppose it could prevent students from saying grace before meals in
the school cafeteria, or prevent distribution of religious
literature on campus. [ Footnote
3/5 ]

															Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that allowing use of their
facilities for religious worship is constitutionally
indistinguishable from directly subsidizing such religious
services: it would "fun[d] a specifically religious activity in an
otherwise substantially secular setting." Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 , 413 U. S. 743 (1973). They argue that the fact that secular student groups are
entitled to the in-kind subsidy at issue here does not establish
that a religious group is entitled to the same subsidy. They could
convincingly argue, for example, that a state university that pays
for basketballs for the basketball team is not thereby required to
pay for Bibles for a group like Cornerstone. [ Footnote 3/6 ] Page 454 U. S. 288 A third analogy suggests itself, one that falls between these
two extremes. There are a variety of state policies which
incidentally benefit religion that this Court has upheld without
implying that they were constitutionally required of the State. See Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.
S. 236 (1968) (state loan of textbooks to parochial
school students); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.
S. 306 (1962) (release of students from public schools,
during school hours, to perform religious activities away from the
school grounds); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947)
(state provision of transportation to parochial school students).
Provision of university facilities on a uniform basis to all
student groups is not very different from provision of textbooks or
transportation. From this perspective, the issue is not whether the
State must, or must not, open its facilities to religious worship;
rather, it is whether the State may choose not to do so.

															Each of these analogies is persuasive. Because they lead to
different results, however, they are of limited help in reaching a
decision here. They also demonstrate the difficulty in reconciling
the various interests expressed in the Religion Clauses. In my
view, therefore, resolution of this case is best achieved by
returning to first principles. This requires an assessment of the
burden on respondents' ability freely to exercise their religious
beliefs and practices and of the State's interest in enforcing its
regulation.

															Respondents complain that compliance with the regulation would
require them to meet "about a block and a half" from campus under
conditions less comfortable than those previously available on
campus. [ Footnote 3/7 ] I view this
burden on free exercise Page 454 U. S. 289 as minimal. Because the burden is minimal, the State need do no
more than demonstrate that the regulation furthers some permissible
state end. The State's interest in avoiding claims that it is
financing or otherwise supporting religious worship -- in
maintaining a definitive separation between church and State -- is
such an end. That the State truly does mean to act toward this end
is amply supported by the treatment of religion in the State
Constitution. [ Footnote 3/8 ] Thus,
I believe the interest of the State is sufficiently strong to
justify the imposition of the minimal burden on respondents'
ability freely to exercise their religious beliefs.

															On these facts, therefore, I cannot find that the application of
the regulation to prevent Cornerstone from holding religious
worship services in University facilities violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. I would not hold, as the majority does,
that, if a university permits students and others to use its
property for secular purposes, it must also furnish facilities to
religious groups for the purposes of worship and the practice of
their religion. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ]

															Cornerstone was denied access to University facilities because
it intended to use those facilities for regular religious services
in which "worship is an important part of the general atmosphere."
There is no issue here as to the application of the regulation to
"religious teaching." Reaching this issue is particularly
inappropriate in this case because nothing in the record indicates
how the University has interpreted the phrase "religious teaching,"
or even whether it has ever been applied to activity that was not
clearly "religious worship." The District Court noted that
plaintiffs did not contend that they were "limited, in any way,
from holding on-campus meetings that do not include
religious worship services." 480 F. Supp. at 913. At oral argument,
counsel for the University indicated that the regulation would not
bar discussion of biblical texts under circumstances that did not
constitute "religious worship." Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. The sole
question in this case involves application of the regulation to
prohibit regular religious worship services in University
buildings.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															Given that the majority's entire argument turns on this
description of religious services as speech, it is surprising that
the majority assumes this proposition to require no argument. The
majority assumes the conclusion by describing the University's
action as discriminating against "speakers based on their desire to
. . . engage in religious worship and discussion." Ante at 454 U. S. 269 .
As noted above, it is not at all clear that the University has
discriminated or intends to discriminate against "religious
discussion" -- as a preliminary matter, it is not even clear what
the majority means by "religious discussion" or how it entered the
case. That religious worship is a form of speech the majority takes
to have been established by three cases. Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.
S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.
S. 558 (1948). None of these cases stand for this
proposition. Heffron and Saia involved the
communication of religious views to a nonreligious, public
audience. Talk about religion and about religious beliefs, however,
is not the same as religious services of worship. Niemotko was an equal protection challenge to a discriminatory denial of one
religious group's access to a public park. The Court specifically
stated that it was not addressing the question of whether the State
could uniformly deny all religious groups access to public parks.
340 U.S. at 340 U. S.
272 .

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Indeed, while footnote 6 of the
majority opinion suggests that no intelligible distinction may be
drawn between worship and other forms of speech footnote 9 recognizes that the Establishment
Clause "requires" that such a line be drawn The majority does
not adequately explain why the State is "required" to observe a
line in one context, but prohibited from voluntarily recognizing it
in another context.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															Counsel for respondents was somewhat more forthright in
recognizing the extraordinary breadth of his argument than is the
majority. Counsel explicitly stated that, once the distinction
between speech and worship is collapsed, a university that
generally provides student groups access to its facilities would be
constitutionally required to allow its facilities to be used as a
church for the purpose of holding "regular church services." Tr. of
Oral Arg. 26. Similarly, although the majority opinion limits its
discussion to student groups, counsel for respondents recognized
that the First Amendment argument relied upon would apply equally
to nonstudent groups. He recognized that respondents' submission
would require the University to make available its buildings to the
Catholic Church and other denominations for the purpose of holding
religious services, if University facilities were made available to
nonstudent groups. Id. at 39. In other words, the
University could not avoid the conversion of one of its buildings
into a church, as long as the religious group meets the same
neutral requirements of entry -- e.g., rent -- as are
imposed on other groups.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															There are obvious limits on the scope of this analogy. I know of
no precedent holding that, simply because a public forum is open to
all kinds of speech -- including speech about religion -- it must
be open to regular religious worship services as well. I doubt that
the State need stand by and allow its public forum to become a
church for any religious sect that chooses to stand on its right of
access to that forum.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															There are, of course, limits to this subsidy argument. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and Thomas v. Indiana Employment Security
Division, 450 U. S. 707 (1981), demonstrate that in certain circumstances the State may be
required to "subsidize," at least indirectly, religious practices,
under circumstance in which it does not and need not subsidize
similar behavior founded on secular motives.

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															Respondents also complain that the University action has made
their religious message less attractive by suggesting that it is
not appropriate fare for the college campus. I give no weight to
this, because it is indistinguishable from an argument that
respondents are entitled to the appearance of an endorsement of
their beliefs and practices from the University.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															Since 1820, the Missouri Constitution has contained provisions
requiring a separation of church and State. The Missouri Supreme
Court has held that the state constitutional provisions are "not
only more explicit, but more restrictive, than the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution." Paster v.
Tussey, 512 S.W.2d
97 , 102 (1974).