OPINION OF THE COURT FONT SCAPS="1">GROH V. RAMIREZ 540 U. S. ____ (2004) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 02-811 JEFF GROH, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH R. RAMIREZ
et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit

															[February 24, 2004]

															   Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   Petitioner conducted a search of
respondents’ home pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the
“persons or things to be seized.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. The
questions presented are (1) whether the search violated the Fourth
Amendment, and (2) if so, whether petitioner nevertheless is
entitled to qualified immunity, given that a Magistrate Judge
(Magistrate), relying on an affidavit that particularly described
the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the
search.

															I

															   Respondents, Joseph Ramirez and
members of his family, live on a large ranch in Butte-Silver Bow
County, Montana. Petitioner, Jeff Groh, has been a Special Agent
for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) since 1989.
In February 1997, a concerned citizen informed petitioner that on a
number of visits to respondents’ ranch the visitor had seen a large
stock of weaponry, including an automatic rifle, grenades, a
grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher.[ Footnote 1 ] Based on that information, petitioner
prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the
ranch. The application stated that the search was for “any
automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive
devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers,
rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the
purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices
or launchers.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Petitioner supported the
application with a detailed affidavit, which he also prepared and
executed, that set forth the basis for his belief that the listed
items were concealed on the ranch. Petitioner then presented these
documents to a Magistrate, along with a warrant form that
petitioner also had completed. The Magistrate signed the warrant
form.

															   Although the application
particularly described the place to be searched and the contraband
petitioner expected to find, the warrant itself was less specific;
it failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to
seize. In the portion of the form that called for a description of
the “person or property” to be seized, petitioner typed a
description of respondents’ two-story blue house rather than the
alleged stockpile of firearms.[ Footnote 2 ] The warrant did not incorporate by reference
the itemized list contained in the application. It did, however,
recite that the Magistrate was satisfied the affidavit established
probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed on the
premises, and that sufficient grounds existed for the warrant’s
issuance.[ Footnote 3 ]

															   The day after the Magistrate issued the
warrant, petitioner led a team of law enforcement officers,
including both federal agents and members of the local sheriff’s
department, in the search of respondents’ premises. Although
respondent Joseph Ramirez was not home, his wife and children were.
Petitioner states that he orally described the objects of the
search to Mrs. Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone.
According to Mrs. Ramirez, however, petitioner explained only that
he was searching for “ ‘an explosive device in a box.’ ” Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County , 298
F. 3d 1022, 1026 (CA9 2002). At any rate, the officers’ search
uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. When the officers left,
petitioner gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant, but not
a copy of the application, which had been sealed. The following
day, in response to a request from respondents’ attorney,
petitioner faxed the attorney a copy of the page of the application
that listed the items to be seized. No charges were filed against
the Ramirezes.

															   Respondents sued petitioner and the other
officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971),
and Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, raising eight claims,
including violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 17–27. The
District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants. The
court found no Fourth Amendment violation, because it considered
the case comparable to one in which the warrant contained an
inaccurate address, and in such a case, the court reasoned, the
warrant is sufficiently detailed if the executing officers can
locate the correct house. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a– 22a. The
court added that even if a constitutional violation occurred, the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the failure
of the warrant to describe the objects of the search amounted to a
mere “typographical error.” Id ., at 22a–24a.

															   The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
with respect to all defendants and all claims, with the exception
of respondents’ Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner. 298
F. 3d, at 1029–1030. On that claim, the court held that the
warrant was invalid because it did not “describe with particularity
the place to be searched and the items to be seized,” and that oral
statements by petitioner during or after the search could not cure
the omission. Id ., at 1025–1026. The court observed that
the warrant’s facial defect “increased the likelihood and degree of
confrontation between the Ramirezes and the police” and deprived
respondents of the means “to challenge officers who might have
exceeded the limits imposed by the magistrate.” Id ., at
1027. The court also expressed concern that “permitting officers to
expand the scope of the warrant by oral statements would broaden
the area of dispute between the parties in subsequent litigation.” Ibid . The court nevertheless concluded that all of the
officers except petitioner were protected by qualified immunity.
With respect to petitioner, the court read our opinion in United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), as precluding
qualified immunity for the leader of a search who fails to “read
the warrant and satisfy [himself] that [he] understand[s] its scope
and limitations, and that it is not defective in some obvious way.”
298 F. 3d, at 1027. The court added that “[t]he leaders of the
search team must also make sure that a copy of the warrant is
available to give to the person whose property is being searched at
the commencement of the search, and that such copy has no missing
pages or other obvious defects.” Ibid . (footnote omitted).
We granted certiorari. 537 U. S. 1231 (2003).

															II

															   The warrant was plainly invalid.
The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ” (Emphasis added.) The
warrant in this case complied with the first three of these
requirements: It was based on probable cause and supported by a
sworn affidavit, and it described particularly the place of the
search. On the fourth requirement, however, the warrant failed
altogether. Indeed, petitioner concedes that “the warrant … was
deficient in particularity because it provided no description of
the type of evidence sought.” Brief for Petitioner 10.

															   The fact that the application adequately described the “things to be seized”
does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The
Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the
warrant, not in the supporting documents. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 , 988, n. 5 (1984)
(“[A] warrant that fails to conform to the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional”); see also United States v. Stefonek , 179 F. 3d 1030,
1033 (CA7 1999) (“The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant particularly describe the things to be seized, not
the papers presented to the judicial officer … asked to issue the
warrant”). And for good reason: “The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function,” McDonald v. United
States, 335 U. S. 451 , 455
(1948), and that high function is not necessarily vindicated when
some other document, somewhere, says something about the objects of
the search, but the contents of that document are neither known to
the person whose home is being searched nor available for her
inspection. We do not say that the Fourth Amendment forbids a
warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Indeed, most Courts
of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with
reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant
uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting
document accompanies the warrant. See, e.g. , United
States v. McGrew , 122 F. 3d 847, 849–850 (CA9
1997); United States v. Williamson , 1 F. 3d
1134, 1136, n. 1 (CA10 1993); United States v. Blakeney , 942 F. 2d 1001, 1025–1026 (CA6 1991); United States v. Maxwell , 920 F. 2d
1028, 1031 (CADC 1990); United States v. Curry ,
911 F. 2d 72, 76–77 (CA8 1990); United States v. Roche , 614 F. 2d 6, 8 (CA1 1980). But in this case
the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference, nor
did either the affidavit or the application (which had been placed
under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further
explore the matter of incorporation.

															   Petitioner argues that even though the warrant
was invalid, the search nevertheless was “reasonable” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. He notes that a Magistrate
authorized the search on the basis of adequate evidence of probable
cause, that petitioner orally described to respondents the items to
be seized, and that the search did not exceed the limits intended
by the Magistrate and described by petitioner. Thus, petitioner
maintains, his search of respondents’ ranch was functionally
equivalent to a search authorized by a valid warrant.

															   We disagree. This warrant did not simply omit
a few items from a list of many to be seized, or misdescribe a few
of several items. Nor did it make what fairly could be
characterized as a mere technical mistake or typographical error.
Rather, in the space set aside for a description of the items to be
seized, the warrant stated that the items consisted of a “single
dwelling residence … blue in color.” In other words, the warrant
did not describe the items to be seized at all . In this
respect the warrant was so obviously deficient that we must regard
the search as “warrantless” within the meaning of our case law. See Leon, 468 U. S., at 923; cf . Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 , 85 (1987); Steele v. United States, 267 U. S. 498 , 503–504
(1925). “We are not dealing with formalities.” McDonald, 335 U. S., at 455. Because “ ‘the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion’ ” stands “ ‘[a]t the very core’ of the Fourth
Amendment,” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 , 31 (2001)
(quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365
U. S. 505 , 511 (1961)), our cases have firmly established the
“ ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable,” Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 586
(1980) (footnote omitted). Thus, “absent exigent circumstances, a
warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is
unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is
probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found
within.” Id. , at 587–588 (footnote omitted). See Kyllo , 533 U. S., at 29; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U. S. 177 , 181
(1990); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 761–763
(1969); McDonald, 335 U. S., at 454; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948).

															   We have clearly stated that the presumptive
rule against warrantless searches applies with equal force to
searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the
warrant. In Sheppard , for instance, the petitioner argued
that even though the warrant was invalid for lack of particularity,
“the search was constitutional because it was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 468 U. S., at 988, n. 5. In
squarely rejecting that position, we explained:

															“The uniformly applied rule is that a search
conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is
unconstitutional. Stanford v. Texas , 379 U. S. 476 (1965); United
States v. Cardwell , 680 F. 2d 75, 77–78 (CA9
1982); United States v. Crozier , 674 F. 2d
1293, 1299 (CA9 1982); United States v. Klein ,
565 F. 2d 183, 185 (CA1 1977); United States v. Gardner , 537 F. 2d 861, 862 (CA6 1976); United
States v. Marti , 421 F. 2d 1263, 1268–1269 (CA2
1970). That rule is in keeping with the well-established principle
that ‘except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a
search of private property without proper consent is “unreasonable”
unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.’ Camara v. Municipal Court , 387 U. S. 523 , 528–529 (1967). See Steagald v. United States , 451 U. S. 204 , 211–212
(1981); Jones v. United States , 357 U. S. 493 , 499
(1958).” Ibid. Petitioner asks us to hold
that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant lacking particularity
should be exempt from the presumption of unreasonableness if the
goals served by the particularity requirement are otherwise
satisfied. He maintains that the search in this case satisfied
those goals—which he says are “to prevent general searches, to
prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another, and to prevent warrants from being issued on vague or
dubious information,” Brief for Petitioner 16—because the scope of
the search did not exceed the limits set forth in the application.
But unless the particular items described in the affidavit are also
set forth in the warrant itself (or at least incorporated by
reference, and the affidavit present at the search), there can be
no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable
cause to search for, and to seize, every item mentioned in the
affidavit. See McDonald , 335 U. S., at 455 (“Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police. This was done … so that an objective
mind might weigh the need to invade [the citizen’s] privacy in
order to enforce the law”). In this case, for example, it is at
least theoretically possible that the Magistrate was satisfied that
the search for weapons and explosives was justified by the showing
in the affidavit, but not convinced that any evidentiary basis
existed for rummaging through respondents’ files and papers for
receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of such items.
Cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476 , 485–486 (1965). Or,
conceivably, the Magistrate might have believed that some of the
weapons mentioned in the affidavit could have been lawfully
possessed and therefore should not be seized. See 26 U. S. C.
§5861 (requiring registration, but not banning possession of,
certain firearms). The mere fact that the Magistrate issued a
warrant does not necessarily establish that he agreed that the
scope of the search should be as broad as the affiant’s request.
Even though petitioner acted with restraint in conducting the
search, “the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by
the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 356 (1967).[ Footnote 4 ]

															   We have long held, moreover, that the purpose
of the particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention
of general searches. See Garrison , 480 U. S., at 84. A
particular warrant also “assures the individual whose property is
searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to
search.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , 9 (1977)
(citing Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County
of San Francisco , 387 U. S. 523 , 532 (1967)), abrogated
on other grounds, California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991).
See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 236
(1983) (“[P]ossession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest
or search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive
police conduct”).[ Footnote
5 ]

															   Petitioner argues that even if the goals of
the particularity requirement are broader than he acknowledges,
those goals nevertheless were served because he orally described to
respondents the items for which he was searching. Thus, he submits,
respondents had all of the notice that a proper warrant would have
accorded. But this case presents no occasion even to reach this
argument, since respondents, as noted above, dispute petitioner’s
account. According to Mrs. Ramirez, petitioner stated only that he
was looking for an “ ‘explosive device in a box.’ ” 298
F. 3d, at 1026. Because this dispute is before us on
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment, App. to Pet. for Cert.
13a, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [her] favor,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242 , 255
(1986) (citation omitted). The posture of the case therefore
obliges us to credit Mrs. Ramirez’s account, and we find that
petitioner’s description of “ ‘an explosive device in a
box’ ” was little better than no guidance at all. See Stefonek , 179 F. 3d, at 1032–1033 (holding that a
search warrant for “ ‘evidence of crime’ ” was “[s]o
open-ended” in its description that it could “only be described as
a general warrant”).

															   It is incumbent on the officer executing a
search warrant to ensure the search is lawfully authorized and
lawfully conducted.[ Footnote 6 ]
Because petitioner did not have in his possession a warrant
particularly describing the things he intended to seize, proceeding
with the search was clearly “unreasonable” under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the search was
unconstitutional.

															III

															   Having concluded that a
constitutional violation occurred, we turn to the question whether
petitioner is entitled to qualified immunity despite that
violation. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 , 609
(1999). The answer depends on whether the right that was
transgressed was “ ‘clearly established’ ”—that is,
“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U. S. 194 , 202 (2001).

															   Given that the particularity
requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no
reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did
not comply with that requirement was valid. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 , 818–819
(1982) (“If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense
ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public
official should know the law governing his conduct”). Moreover,
because petitioner himself prepared the invalid warrant, he may not
argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate’s assurance that
the warrant contained an adequate description of the things to be
seized and was therefore valid. Cf. Sheppard , 468 U. S.,
at 989–990. In fact, the guidelines of petitioner’s own department
placed him on notice that he might be liable for executing a
manifestly invalid warrant. An ATF directive in force at the time
of this search warned: “Special agents are liable if they exceed
their authority while executing a search warrant and must be sure
that a search warrant is sufficient on its face even when issued by
a magistrate.” Searches and Examinations, ATF Order O 3220.1(7)(d)
(Feb. 13, 1997). See also id., at 3220.1(23)(b) (“If any
error or deficiency is discovered and there is a reasonable
probability that it will invalidate the warrant, such warrant shall
not be executed. The search shall be postponed until a satisfactory
warrant has been obtained”).[ Footnote 7 ] And even a cursory reading of the warrant in
this case—perhaps just a simple glance—would have revealed a
glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer would have
known was constitutionally fatal.

															   No reasonable officer could claim to be
unaware of the basic rule, well established by our cases, that,
absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of the home is
presumptively unconstitutional. See Payton , 445 U. S., at
586–588. Indeed, as we noted nearly 20 years ago in Sheppard: “The uniformly applied rule is that a search
conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is
unconstitutional.” 468 U. S., at 988, n. 5.[ Footnote 8 ] Because not a word in any of our
cases would suggest to a reasonable officer that this case fits
within any exception to that fundamental tenet, petitioner is
asking us, in effect, to craft a new exception. Absent any support
for such an exception in our cases, he cannot reasonably have
relied on an expectation that we would do so.

															   Petitioner contends that the search in this
case was the product, at worst, of a lack of due care, and that our
case law requires more than negligent behavior before depriving an
official of qualified immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335 , 341 (1986). But as we
observed in the companion case to Sheppard , “a warrant may
be so facially deficient— i.e. , in failing to particularize
the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U. S., at 923. This is such a case.[ Footnote 9 ]

															    Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 Possession of these items, if unregistered,
would violate 18 U. S. C. §922( o )(1) and 26 U.
S. C. §5861. Footnote 2 The warrant stated: “[T]here is now concealed
[on the specified premises] a certain person or property, namely
[a] single dwelling residence two story in height which is blue in
color and has two additions attached to the east. The front
entrance to the residence faces in a southerly direction.” App. to
Pet. for Cert. 26a. Footnote 3 The affidavit was sealed. Its sufficiency is
not disputed. Footnote 4 For this reason petitioner’s argument that
any constitutional error was committed by the Magistrate, not
petitioner, is misplaced. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), we suggested
that “the judge, not the police officers,” may have committed “[a]n
error of constitutional dimension,” id ., at 990, because
the judge had assured the officers requesting the warrant that he
would take the steps necessary to conform the warrant to
constitutional requirements, id ., at 986. Thus, “it was
not unreasonable for the police in [that] case to rely on the
judge’s assurances that the warrant authorized the search they had
requested.” Id ., at 990, n. 6. In this case, by
contrast, petitioner did not alert the Magistrate to the defect in
the warrant that petitioner had drafted, and we therefore cannot
know whether the Magistrate was aware of the scope of the search he
was authorizing. Nor would it have been reasonable for petitioner
to rely on a warrant that was so patently defective, even if the
Magistrate was aware of the deficiency. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 , 915, 922, n. 23
(1984). Footnote 5 It is true, as petitioner points out, that
neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires the executing officer to serve the
warrant on the owner before commencing the search. Rule 41(f)(3)
provides that “[t]he officer executing the warrant must: (A) give a
copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the
person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken;
or (B) leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where
the officer took the property.” Quite obviously, in some
circumstances—a surreptitious search by means of a wiretap, for
example, or the search of empty or abandoned premises—it will be
impracticable or imprudent for the officers to show the warrant in
advance. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 355, n. 16 (1967); Ker v. California , 374 U. S. 23 , 37–41
(1963). Whether it would be unreasonable to refuse a request to
furnish the warrant at the outset of the search when, as in this
case, an occupant of the premises is present and poses no threat to
the officers’ safe and effective performance of their mission, is a
question that this case does not present. Footnote 6 The Court of Appeals’ decision is consistent
with this principle. Petitioner mischaracterizes the court’s
decision when he contends that it imposed a novel proofreading
requirement on officers executing warrants. The court held that
officers leading a search team must “mak[e] sure that they have a
proper warrant that in fact authorizes the search and seizure they
are about to conduct.” 298 F. 3d 1022, 1027 (CA9 2002). That
is not a duty to proofread; it is, rather, a duty to ensure that
the warrant conforms to constitutional requirements. Footnote 7 We do not suggest that an official is
deprived of qualified immunity whenever he violates an internal
guideline. We refer to the ATF Order only to underscore that
petitioner should have known that he should not execute a patently
defective warrant. Footnote 8 Although both Sheppard and Leon involved the application of the “good faith”
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general exclusionary rule, we
have explained that “the same standard of objective reasonableness
that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335 , 344 (1986) (citation
omitted). Footnote 9 Justice Kennedy argues in dissent that we
have not allowed “ ‘ample room for mistaken judgments,’ ” post , at 6 (quoting Malley , 475 U. S., at 343),
because “difficult and important tasks demand the officer’s full
attention in the heat of an ongoing and often dangerous criminal
investigation,” post , at 3. In this case, however,
petitioner does not contend that any sort of exigency existed when
he drafted the affidavit, the warrant application, and the warrant,
or when he conducted the search. This is not the situation,
therefore, in which we have recognized that “officers in the
dangerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing
search warrants” require “some latitude.” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 , 87 (1987).

															   Nor are we according “the correctness of paper
forms” a higher status than “substantive rights.” Post , at
6. As we have explained, the Fourth Amendment’s particularity
requirement assures the subject of the search that a magistrate has
duly authorized the officer to conduct a search of limited scope.
This substantive right is not protected when the officer fails to
take the time to glance at the authorizing document and detect a
glaring defect that Justice Kennedy agrees is of constitutional
magnitude, post , at 1. KENNEDY, J., DISSENTING FONT SCAPS="1">GROH V. RAMIREZ 540 U. S. ____ (2004) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 02-811 JEFF GROH, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH R. RAMIREZ
et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit

															[February 24, 2004]

															   Justice Kennedy, with whom The
Chief Justice joins, dissenting.

															   I agree with the Court that the
Fourth Amendment was violated in this case. The Fourth Amendment
states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The
warrant issued in this case did not particularly describe the
things to be seized, and so did not comply with the Fourth
Amendment. I disagree with the Court on whether the officer who
obtained the warrant and led the search team is entitled to
qualified immunity for his role in the search. In my view, the
officer should receive qualified immunity.

															   An officer conducting a search is entitled to
qualified immunity if “a reasonable officer could have believed”
that the search was lawful “in light of clearly established law and
the information the searching officers possessed.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 , 641
(1987). As the Court notes, this is the same objective
reasonableness standard applied under the “good faith” exception to
the exclusionary rule. See ante , at 13, n. 8 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335 , 344
(1986)). The central question is whether someone in the officer’s
position could reasonably but mistakenly conclude that his conduct
complied with the Fourth Amendment. Creighton, supra, at
641. See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194 , 206
(2001); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U. S. 224 , 227
(1991) (per curiam). An officer might reach such a mistaken
conclusion for several reasons. He may be unaware of existing law
and how it should be applied. See, e.g., Saucier , supra . Alternatively, he may misunderstand important facts
about the search and assess the legality of his conduct based on
that misunderstanding. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995). Finally, an officer
may misunderstand elements of both the facts and the law. See, e.g., Creighton , supra . Our qualified
immunity doctrine applies regardless of whether the officer’s error
is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed
questions of law and fact. Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 , 507
(1978) (noting that qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in
judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”).

															   The present case involves a straightforward
mistake of fact. Although the Court does not acknowledge it
directly, it is obvious from the record below that the officer
simply made a clerical error when he filled out the proposed
warrant and offered it to the Magistrate Judge. The officer used
the proper description of the property to be seized when he
completed the affidavit. He also used the proper description in the
accompanying application. When he typed up the description a third
time for the proposed warrant, however, the officer accidentally
entered a description of the place to be searched in the part of
the warrant form that called for a description of the property to
be seized. No one noticed the error before the search was executed.
Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, the
mistake apparently remained undiscovered until the day after the
search when respondents’ attorney reviewed the warrant for defects.
The officer, being unaware of his mistake, did not rely on it in
any way. It is uncontested that the officer trained the search team
and executed the warrant based on his mistaken belief that the
warrant contained the proper description of the items to be
seized.

															   The question is whether the officer’s mistaken
belief that the warrant contained the proper language was a
reasonable belief. In my view, it was. A law enforcement officer
charged with leading a team to execute a search warrant for illegal
weapons must fulfill a number of serious responsibilities. The
officer must establish probable cause to believe the crime has been
committed and that evidence is likely to be found at the place to
be searched; must articulate specific items that can be seized, and
a specific place to be searched; must obtain the warrant from a
magistrate judge; and must instruct a search team to execute the
warrant within the time allowed by the warrant. The officer must
also oversee the execution of the warrant in a way that protects
officer safety, directs a thorough and professional search for the
evidence, and avoids unnecessary destruction of property. These
difficult and important tasks demand the officer’s full attention
in the heat of an ongoing and often dangerous criminal
investigation.

															   An officer who complies fully with all of
these duties can be excused for not being aware that he had made a
clerical error in the course of filling out the proposed warrant.
See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U. S. 79 , 87 (1987)
(recognizing “the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes
that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of
making arrests and executing search warrants”). An officer who
drafts an affidavit, types up an application and proposed warrant,
and then obtains a judge’s approval naturally assumes that he has
filled out the warrant form correctly. Even if the officer checks
over the warrant, he may very well miss a mistake. We all tend
toward myopia when looking for our own errors. Every lawyer and
every judge can recite examples of documents that they wrote,
checked, and doublechecked, but that still contained glaring
errors. Law enforcement officers are no different. It would be
better if the officer recognizes the error, of course. It would be
better still if he does not make the mistake in the first place. In
the context of an otherwise proper search, however, an officer’s
failure to recognize his clerical error on a warrant form can be a
reasonable mistake.

															   The Court reaches a different result by
construing the officer’s error as a mistake of law rather than a
mistake of fact. According to the Court, the officer should not
receive qualified immunity because “no reasonable officer could
believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with [the
particularity] requirement was valid.” Ante , at 12. The
majority is surely right that a reasonable officer must know that a
defective warrant is invalid. This much is obvious, if not
tautological. It is also irrelevant, for the essential question
here is whether a reasonable officer in petitioner’s position would
necessarily know that the warrant had a clerical error in the first
place. The issue in this case is whether an officer can reasonably
fail to recognize a clerical error, not whether an officer who
recognizes a clerical error can reasonably conclude that a
defective warrant is legally valid.

															   The Court gives little attention to this
important and difficult question. It receives only two sentences at
the very end of the Court’s opinion. In the first sentence, the
Court quotes dictum from United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 , 923
(1984), to the effect that “ ‘a warrant may be so facially
deficient— i.e., in failing to particularize the place to
be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’ ” Ante , at
13–14. In the second sentence, the Court informs us without
explanation that “[t]his is such a case.” Ante, at 14.
This reasoning is not convincing.

															   To understand the passage from Leon that the Court relies upon, it helps to recognize that most
challenges to defective search warrants arise when officers rely on
the defect and conduct a search that should not have occurred. The
target of the improper search then brings a civil action
challenging the improper search, or, if charges have been filed,
moves to suppress the fruits of the search. The inquiry in both
instances is whether the officers’ reliance on the defect was
reasonable. See, e.g. , Garrison, supra, (apartment wrongly searched because the searching officers did not
realize that there were two apartments on the third floor and
obtained a warrant to search the entire floor); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995) (person wrongly
arrested and searched because a court employee’s clerical error led
officer to believe a warrant existed for person’s arrest); McLeary v. Navarro , 504 U. S. 966 (1992)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (house wrongly
searched because informant told officers the suspect lived in the
second house on the right, but the suspect lived in the third house
on the right).

															   The language the Court quotes from Leon comes from a discussion of when “an officer [who] has
obtained a [defective] warrant and abided by its terms” has acted
reasonably. 468 U. S., at 922. The discussion notes that there are
some cases in which “no reasonably well trained officer should rely
on the warrant.” Id. , at 923. The passage also includes
several examples, among them the one that the Court relies on in
this case: “depending on the circumstances of the particular case,
a warrant may be so facially deficient— i.e ., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be
seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to
be valid.” Ibid .

															   The Court interprets this language to mean
that a clerical mistake can be so obvious that an officer who fails
to recognize the mistake should not receive qualified immunity.
Read in context, however, the quoted language is addressed to a
quite different issue. The most natural interpretation of the
language is that a clerical mistake can be so obvious that the
officer cannot reasonably rely on the mistake in the course of
executing the warrant. In other words, a defect can be so clear
that an officer cannot reasonably “abid[e] by its terms” and
execute the warrant as written. Id., at 922.

															   We confront no such issue here, of course. No
one suggests that the officer reasonably could have relied on the
defective language in the warrant. This is a case about an officer
being unaware of a clerical error, not a case about an officer
relying on one. The respondents do not make the usual claim that
they were injured by a defect that led to an improper search.
Rather, they make an unusual claim that they were injured simply
because the warrant form did not contain the correct description of
the property to be seized, even though no property was seized. The
language from Leon is not on point.

															   Our Court has stressed that “the purpose of
encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure” can be served best
by rejecting overly technical standards when courts review
warrants. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 , 237
(1983). We have also stressed that qualified immunity “provides
ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Malley, 475 U. S., at 341. The
Court’s opinion is inconsistent with these principles. Its analysis
requires our Nation’s police officers to concentrate more on the
correctness of paper forms than substantive rights. The Court’s new
“duty to ensure that the warrant conforms to constitutional
requirements” sounds laudable, ante , at 11, n. 6, but
would be more at home in a regime of strict liability than within
the “ample room for mistaken judgments” that our qualified immunity
jurisprudence traditionally provides. Malley, supra, at
343 . For these reasons, I dissent. THOMAS, J., DISSENTING FONT SCAPS="1">GROH V. RAMIREZ 540 U. S. ____ (2004) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 02-811 JEFF GROH, PETITIONER v. JOSEPH R. RAMIREZ
et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the ninth circuit

															[February 24, 2004]

															   Justice Thomas, with whom Justice
Scalia joins, and with whom The Chief Justice joins as to Part III,
dissenting.

															   The Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” The precise relationship between the Amendment’s
Warrant Clause and Unreasonableness Clause is unclear. But neither
Clause explicitly requires a warrant. While “it is of course
textually possible to consider [a warrant requirement] implicit
within the requirement of reasonableness,” California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 , 582
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), the text of the Fourth
Amendment certainly does not mandate this result. Nor does the
Amendment’s history, which is clear as to the Amendment’s principal
target (general warrants), but not as clear with respect to when
warrants were required, if ever. Indeed, because of the very
different nature and scope of federal authority and ability to
conduct searches and arrests at the founding, it is possible that
neither the history of the Fourth Amendment nor the common law
provides much guidance.

															   As a result, the Court has vacillated between
imposing a categorical warrant requirement and applying a general
reasonableness standard. Compare Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17 , 20 (1984) (per curiam) , with United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 , 65 (1950).
The Court has most frequently held that warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable, see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 357
(1967); Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 583
(1980), but has also found a plethora of exceptions to presumptive
unreasonableness, see, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 762–763
(1969) (searches incident to arrest); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 , 800
(1982) (automobile searches); United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 , 315–317
(1972) (searches of “pervasively regulated” businesses); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San
Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 , 534–539
(1967) (administrative searches); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 298
(1967) (exigent circumstances); California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386 , 390–394
(1985) (mobile home searches); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U. S. 640 , 648
(1983) (inventory searches); Almeida&nbhyph;Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 , 272
(1973) (border searches). That is, our cases stand for the
illuminating proposition that warrantless searches are per
se unreasonable, except, of course, when they are not.

															   Today the Court holds that the warrant in this
case was “so obviously deficient” that the ensuing search must be
regarded as a warrantless search and thus presumptively
unreasonable. Ante , at 6–7. However, the text of the
Fourth Amendment, its history, and the sheer number of exceptions
to the Court’s categorical warrant requirement seriously undermine
the bases upon which the Court today rests its holding. Instead of
adding to this confusing jurisprudence, as the Court has done, I
would turn to first principles in order to determine the
relationship between the Warrant Clause and the Unreasonableness
Clause. But even within the Court’s current framework, a search
conducted pursuant to a defective warrant is constitutionally
different from a “warrantless search.” Consequently, despite the
defective warrant, I would still ask whether this search was
unreasonable and would conclude that it was not. Furthermore, even
if the Court were correct that this search violated the
Constitution (and in particular, respondents’ Fourth Amendment
rights), given the confused state of our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the reasonableness of petitioner’s actions, I
cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that petitioner is not
entitled to qualified immunity. For these reasons, I respectfully
dissent.

															I

															   “[A]ny Fourth Amendment case may
present two separate questions: whether the search was conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued in accordance with the second Clause,
and, if not, whether it was nevertheless ‘reasonable’ within the
meaning of the first.” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 , 961
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). By categorizing the search here
to be a “warrantless” one, the Court declines to perform a
reasonableness inquiry and ignores the fact that this search is
quite different from searches that the Court has considered to be
“warrantless” in the past. Our cases involving “warrantless”
searches do not generally involve situations in which an officer
has obtained a warrant that is later determined to be facially
defective, but rather involve situations in which the officers
neither sought nor obtained a warrant. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635 (1987)
(officer entitled to qualified immunity despite conducting a
warrantless search of respondents’ home in the mistaken belief that
a robbery suspect was hiding there); Payton v. New
York, supra, (striking down a New York statute authorizing the
warrantless entry into a private residence to make a routine felony
arrest). By simply treating this case as if no warrant had even
been sought or issued, the Court glosses over what should be the
key inquiry: whether it is always appropriate to treat a search
made pursuant to a warrant that fails to describe particularly the
things to be seized as presumptively unreasonable.

															   The Court bases its holding that
a defect in the particularity of the warrant by itself renders a
search “warrantless” on a citation of a single footnote in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984). In Sheppard , the Court, after noting that “the sole issue …
in th[e] case is whether the officers reasonably believed that the
search they conducted was authorized by a valid warrant,” id ., at 988, rejected the petitioner’s argument that
despite the invalid warrant, the otherwise reasonable search was
constitutional, id. , at 988, n. 5. The Court
recognized that under its case law a reasonableness inquiry would
be appropriate if one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
applied. But the Court declined to consider whether such an
exception applied and whether the search actually violated the
Fourth Amendment because that question presented merely a
“fact-bound issue of little importance.” Ibid. Because the
Court in Sheppard did not conduct any sort of inquiry into
whether a Fourth Amendment violation actually occurred, it is clear
that the Court assumed a violation for the purposes of its
analysis. Rather than rely on dicta buried in a footnote in Sheppard , the Court should actually analyze the arguably
dispositive issue in this case.

															   The Court also rejects the argument that the
details of the warrant application and affidavit save the warrant,
because “ ‘[t]he presence of a search warrant serves a high
function.’ ” Ante , at 5 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , 455
(1948)). But it is not only the physical existence of the warrant
and its typewritten contents that serve this high function. The
Warrant Clause’s principal protection lies in the fact that the
“Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen
and the police … . so that an objective mind might weigh the
need to invade [the searchee’s] privacy in order to enforce the
law.” Ibid. The Court has further explained,

															“The point of the Fourth Amendment … is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption
that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers
in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to
a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers… . When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent.” Johnson v. United
States, 333
U. S. 10 , 13–14 (1948) (footnotes omitted).

															But the actual contents of the warrant are simply
manifestations of this protection. Hence, in contrast to the case
of a truly warrantless search, a warrant (due to a mistake) does
not specify on its face the particular items to be seized but the
warrant application passed on by the magistrate judge contains such
details, a searchee still has the benefit of a determination by a
neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to search a
particular place and to seize particular items. In such a
circumstance, the principal justification for applying a rule of
presumptive unreasonableness falls away.

															   In the instant case, the items to be seized
were clearly specified in the warrant application and set forth in
the affidavit, both of which were given to the Judge (Magistrate).
The Magistrate reviewed all of the documents and signed the warrant
application and made no adjustment or correction to this
application. It is clear that respondents here received the
protection of the Warrant Clause, as described in Johnson and McDonald . Under these circumstances, I would not hold
that any ensuing search constitutes a presumptively unreasonable
warrantless search. Instead, I would determine whether, despite the
invalid warrant, the resulting search was reasonable and hence
constitutional.

															II

															   Because the search was not
unreasonable, I would conclude that it was constitutional. Prior to
execution of the warrant, petitioner briefed the search team and
provided a copy of the search warrant application, the supporting
affidavit, and the warrant for the officers to review. Petitioner
orally reviewed the terms of the warrant with the officers,
including the specific items for which the officers were authorized
to search. Petitioner and his search team then conducted the search
entirely within the scope of the warrant application and warrant;
that is, within the scope of what the Magistrate had authorized.
Finding no illegal weapons or explosives, the search team seized
nothing. Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298
F. 3d 1022, 1025 (CA9 2002). When petitioner left, he gave
respondents a copy of the search warrant. Upon request the next
day, petitioner faxed respondent a copy of the more detailed
warrant application. Indeed, putting aside the technical defect in
the warrant, it is hard to imagine how the actual search could have
been carried out any more reasonably.

															   The Court argues that this
eminently reasonable search is nonetheless unreasonable because
“there can be no written assurance that the Magistrate actually
found probable cause to search for, and to seize, every item
mentioned in the affidavit” “unless the particular items described
in the affidavit are also set forth in the warrant itself.” Ante , at 8. The Court argues that it was at least possible
that the Magistrate intended to authorize a much more limited
search than the one petitioner requested. Ibid . As a
theoretical matter, this may be true. But the more reasonable
inference is that the Magistrate intended to authorize everything
in the warrant application, as he signed the application and did
not make any written adjustments to the application or the warrant
itself.

															   The Court also attempts to bolster its focus
on the faulty warrant by arguing that the purpose of the
particularity requirement is not only to prevent general searches,
but also to assure the searchee of the lawful authority for the
search. Ante , at 10. But as the Court recognizes, neither
the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41
requires an officer to serve the warrant on the searchee before the
search. Ante , at 10, n. 5. Thus, a search should not
be considered per se unreasonable for failing to apprise
the searchee of the lawful authority prior to the search,
especially where, as here, the officer promptly provides the
requisite information when the defect in the papers is detected.
Additionally, unless the Court adopts the Court of Appeals’ view
that the Constitution protects a searchee’s ability to “be on the
lookout and to challenge officers,” while the officers are actually
carrying out the search, 298 F. 3d, at 1027, petitioner’s
provision of the requisite information the following day is
sufficient to satisfy this interest.

															III

															   Even assuming a constitutional
violation, I would find that petitioner is entitled to qualified
immunity. The qualified immunity inquiry rests on “the ‘objective
legal reasonableness’ of the action, Harlow [v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 , 819
(1982)], assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly
established’ at the time it was taken.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S., at 639. The outcome of this inquiry
“depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the
relevant ‘legal rule’ is … identified. For example, the right to
due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process
Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates
that Clause … violates a clearly established right.” Ibid. To apply the standard at such a high level of generality would
allow plaintiffs “to convert the rule of qualified immunity … into
a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging
violation of extremely abstract rights.” Ibid . The Court
in Anderson criticized the Court of Appeals for
considering the qualified immunity question only in terms of the
petitioner’s “right to be free from warrantless searches of one’s
home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there
are exigent circumstances.” Id ., at 640. The Court of
Appeals should have instead considered “the objective (albeit
fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have
believed Anderson’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light of
clearly established law and the information the searching officers
possessed.” Id. , at 641.

															   The Court errs not only by
defining the question at too high a level of generality but also by
assessing the question without regard to the relevant
circumstances. Even if it were true that no reasonable officer
could believe that a search of a home pursuant to a warrant that
fails the particularity requirement is lawful absent exigent
circumstances—a proposition apparently established by dicta buried
in a footnote in Sheppard —petitioner did not know when he
carried out the search that the search warrant was invalid—let
alone legally nonexistent. Petitioner’s entitlement to qualified
immunity, then, turns on whether his belief that the search warrant
was valid was objectively reasonable. Petitioner’s belief surely
was reasonable.

															   The Court has stated that “depending on the
circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially
deficient … that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume
it to be valid.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S., at 923. This language makes clear that this exception to Leon ’s good-faith exception does not apply in every
circumstance. And the Court does not explain why it should apply
here. As an initial matter, the Court does not even argue that the
fact that petitioner made a mistake in preparing the warrant was
objectively unreasonable, nor could it. Given the sheer number of
warrants prepared and executed by officers each year, combined with
the fact that these same officers also prepare detailed and
sometimes somewhat comprehensive documents supporting the warrant
applications, it is inevitable that officers acting reasonably and
entirely in good faith will occasionally make such errors.

															   The only remaining question is whether
petitioner’s failure to notice the defect was objectively
unreasonable. The Court today points to no cases directing an
officer to proofread a warrant after it has been passed on by a
neutral magistrate, where the officer is already fully aware of the
scope of the intended search and the magistrate gives no reason to
believe that he has authorized anything other than the requested
search. Nor does the Court point to any case suggesting that where
the same officer both prepares and executes the invalid warrant, he
can never rely on the magistrate’s assurance that the warrant is
proper. Indeed, in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U. S. 981 (1984), the Court
suggested that although an officer who is not involved in the
warrant application process would normally read the issued warrant
to determine the object of the search, an executing officer who is
also the affiant might not need to do so. Id. , at 989,
n. 6.

															   Although the Court contends that it does not
impose a proofreading requirement upon officers executing warrants, ante , at 11, n. 6, I see no other way to read its
decision, particularly where, as here, petitioner could have done
nothing more to ensure the reasonableness of his actions than to
proofread the warrant. After receiving several allegations that
respondents possessed illegal firearms and explosives, petitioner
prepared an application for a warrant to search respondents’ ranch,
along with a supporting affidavit detailing the history of
allegations against respondents, petitioner’s investigation into
these allegations, and petitioner’s verification of the sources of
the allegations. Petitioner properly filled out the warrant
application, which described both the place to be searched and the
things to be seized, and obtained the Magistrate’s signature on
both the warrant application and the warrant itself. Prior to
execution of the warrant, petitioner briefed the search team to
ensure that each officer understood the limits of the search.
Petitioner and his search team then executed the warrant within
those limits. And when the error in the search warrant was
discovered, petitioner promptly faxed the missing information to
respondents. In my view, petitioner’s actions were objectively
reasonable, and thus he should be entitled to qualified
immunity.

															   For the foregoing reasons, I
respectfully dissent.


OPINION OF THE COURT ARIZONA V. JOHNSON 555 U. S. ____ (2009) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 07-1122 ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. LEMON MONTREA
JOHNSON

															on writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of
arizona, division two

															[January 26, 2009]

															   Justice Ginsburg delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   This case concerns the authority
of police officers to “stop and frisk” a passenger in a motor
vehicle temporarily seized upon police detection of a traffic
infraction. In a pathmarking decision, Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court considered
whether an investigatory stop (temporary detention) and frisk
(patdown for weapons) may be conducted without violating the Fourth
Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court
upheld “stop and frisk” as constitutionally permissible if two
conditions are met. First, the investigatory stop must be lawful.
That requirement is met in an on-the-street encounter, Terry determined, when the police officer reasonably
suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed
a criminal offense. Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the
police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is
armed and dangerous.

															   For the duration of a traffic stop, we
recently confirmed, a police officer effectively seizes “everyone
in the vehicle,” the driver and all passengers. Brendlin v. California , 551 U. S. 249 , 255 (2007).
Accordingly, we hold that, in a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition—a lawful investigatory stop—is met
whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its
occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police
need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the
vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of
the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as
in the case of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal
activity, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the
person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.

															I

															   On April 19, 2002, Officer Maria
Trevizo and Detectives Machado and Gittings, all members of
Arizona’s gang task force, were on patrol in Tucson near a
neighborhood associated with the Crips gang. At approximately 9
p.m., the officers pulled over an automobile after a license plate
check revealed that the vehicle’s registration had been suspended
for an insurance-related violation. Under Arizona law, the
violation for which the vehicle was stopped constituted a civil
infraction warranting a citation. At the time of the stop, the
vehicle had three occupants—the driver, a front-seat passenger, and
a passenger in the back seat, Lemon Montrea Johnson, the respondent
here. In making the stop the officers had no reason to suspect
anyone in the vehicle of criminal activity. See App. 29–30.

															   The three officers left their
patrol car and approached the stopped vehicle. Machado instructed
all of the occupants to keep their hands visible. Id. , at
14. He asked whether there were any weapons in the vehicle; all
responded no. Id. , at 15. Machado then directed the driver
to get out of the car. Gittings dealt with the front-seat
passenger, who stayed in the vehicle throughout the stop. See id. , at 31. While Machado was getting the driver’s license
and information about the vehicle’s registra- tion and insurance,
see id. , at 42–43, Trevizo attended to Johnson.

															   Trevizo noticed that, as the police
approached, Johnson looked back and kept his eyes on the officers. Id. , at 12. When she drew near, she observed that Johnson
was wearing clothing, including a blue bandana, that she considered
consistent with Crips membership. Id. , at 17. She also
noticed a scanner in Johnson’s jacket pocket, which “struck [her]
as highly unusual and cause [for] concern,” because “most people”
would not carry around a scanner that way “unless they’re going to
be involved in some kind of criminal activity or [are] going to try
to evade the police by listening to the scanner.” Id. , at
16. In response to Trevizo’s questions, Johnson provided his name
and date of birth but said he had no identification with him. He
volunteered that he was from Eloy, Arizona, a place Trevizo knew
was home to a Crips gang. Johnson further told Trevizo that he had
served time in prison for burglary and had been out for about a
year. 217 Ariz. 58, 60, 170 P. 3d 667, 669 (App. 2007).

															   Trevizo wanted to question Johnson away from
the front-seat passenger to gain “intelligence about the gang
[Johnson] might be in.” App. 19. For that reason, she asked him to
get out of the car. Ibid. Johnson complied. Based on
Trevizo’s observations and Johnson’s answers to her questions while
he was still seated in the car, Trevizo suspected that “he might
have a weapon on him.” Id. , at 20. When he exited the
vehicle, she therefore “patted him down for officer safety.” Ibid. During the patdown, Trevizo felt the butt of a gun
near Johnson’s waist. 217 Ariz., at 60, 170 P. 3d, at 669. At
that point Johnson began to struggle, and Trevizo placed him in
handcuffs. Ibid. Johnson was charged in state court with ,
inter alia , possession of a weapon by a prohibited possessor.
He moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an unlawful
search. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the stop
was lawful and that Trevizo had cause to suspect Johnson was armed
and dangerous. See App. 74–78. A jury convicted Johnson of the
gun-possession charge. See 217 Ariz., at 60–61, 170 P. 3d, at
669–670.

															   A divided panel of the Arizona Court of
Appeals reversed Johnson’s conviction. Id. , at 59, 170
P. 3d, at 668. Recognizing that “Johnson was [lawfully] seized
when the officers stopped the car,” id. , at 62, 170
P. 3d, at 671, the court nevertheless concluded that prior to
the frisk the detention had “evolved into a separate, consensual
encounter stemming from an unrelated investigation by Trevizo of
Johnson’s possible gang affiliation,” id. , at 64, 170
P. 3d, at 673. Absent “reason to believe Johnson was involved
in criminal activity,” the Arizona appeals court held, Trevizo “had
no right to pat him down for weapons, even if she had reason to
suspect he was armed and dangerous.” Ibid. Judge Espinosa dissented. He found it “highly
unrealistic to conclude that merely because [Trevizo] was courteous
and Johnson cooperative, the ongoing and virtually simultaneous
chain of events [had] somehow ‘evolved into a consensual encounter’
in the few short moments involved.” Id. , at 66, 170
P. 3d, at 675. Throughout the episode, he stressed, Johnson
remained “seized as part of [a] valid traffic stop.” Ibid. Further, he maintained, Trevizo “had a reasonable basis to consider
[Johnson] dangerous,” id. , at 67, 170 P. 3d, at 676,
and could therefore ensure her own safety and that of others at the
scene by patting down Johnson for weapons.

															   The Arizona Supreme Court denied review. No.
CR–07–0290–PR, 2007 Ariz. LEXIS 154 (Nov. 29, 2007). We granted
certiorari, 554 U. S. ___ (2008), and now reverse the judgment of
the Arizona Court of Appeals.

															II

															A

															   We begin our consideration of the
constitutionality of Officer Trevizo’s patdown of Johnson by
looking back to the Court’s leading decision in Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S. 1 (1968). Terry involved a stop for interrogation of men whose conduct had
attracted the attention of a patrolling police officer. The
officer’s observation led him reasonably to suspect that the men
were casing a jewelry shop in preparation for a robbery. He
conducted a patdown, which disclosed weapons concealed in the men’s
overcoat pockets. This Court upheld the lower courts’
determinations that the interrogation was warranted and the
patdown, permissible. See id. , at 8. Terry established the
legitimacy of an investigatory stop “in situations where [the
police] may lack probable cause for an arrest.” Id. , at
24. When the stop is justified by suspicion (reasonably grounded,
but short of probable cause) that criminal activity is afoot, the
Court explained, the police officer must be positioned to act
instantly on reasonable suspicion that the persons temporarily
detained are armed and dangerous. Ibid . Recognizing that a
limited search of outer clothing for weapons serves to protect both
the officer and the public, the Court held the patdown reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. , at 23–24, 27, 30–31.

															   “[M]ost traffic stops,” this Court has
observed, “resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief
detention authorized in Terry .” Berkemer v. McCarty , 468 U. S. 420 , 439, n.
29 (1984). Furthermore, the Court has recognized that traffic stops
are “especially fraught with danger to police officers.” Michigan v. Long , 463 U. S. 1032 , 1047
(1983). “ ‘The risk of harm to both the police and the
occupants [of a stopped vehicle] is minimized,’ ” we have
stressed, “ ‘if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation.’ ” Maryland v. Wilson , 519
U. S. 408 , 414 (1997) (quoting Michigan v. Summers , 452 U. S. 692 , 702–703
(1981)); see Brendlin , 551 U. S., at 258. Three decisions
cumulatively portray Terry ’s application in a traffic-stop
setting: Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam); Maryland v. Wilson , 519
U. S. 408 (1997); and Brendlin v. California , 551 U. S. 249 (2007).

															   In Mimms , the Court held that “once a
motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation,
the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle
without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of
unreasonable searches and seizures.” 434 U. S., at 111, n. 6.
The government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer
safety, the Court said, outweighs the “ de minimis ”
additional intrusion of requiring a driver, already lawfully
stopped, to exit the vehicle. Id. , at 110–111. Citing Terry as controlling, the Court further held that a
driver, once outside the stopped vehicle, may be patted down for
weapons if the officer reasonably concludes that the driver “might
be armed and presently dangerous.” 434 U. S., at 112. Wilson held that the Mimms rule applied to passengers as well as to drivers. Specifically, the
Court instructed that “an officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.”
519 U. S., at 415. “[T]he same weighty interest in officer safety,”
the Court observed, “is present regardless of whether the occupant
of the stopped car is a driver or passenger.” Id. , at
413.

															   It is true, the Court acknowledged, that in a
lawful traffic stop, “[t]here is probable cause to believe that the
driver has committed a minor vehicular offense,” but “there is no
such reason to stop or detain the passengers.” Ibid. On
the other hand, the Court emphasized, the risk of a violent
encounter in a traffic-stop setting “stems not from the ordinary
reaction of a motorist stopped for a speeding violation, but from
the fact that evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered
during the stop.” Id. , at 414. “[T]he motivation of a
passenger to employ violence to prevent apprehension of such a
crime,” the Court stated, “is every bit as great as that of the
driver.” Ibid. Moreover, the Court noted, “as a practical
matter, the passengers are already stopped by virtue of the stop of
the vehicle,” id. , at 413–414, so “the additional
intrusion on the passenger is minimal,” id. , at 415.

															   Completing the picture, Brendlin held
that a passenger is seized, just as the driver is, “from the moment
[a car stopped by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the
road.” 551 U. S., at 263. A passenger therefore has standing to
challenge a stop’s constitutionality. Id. , at 256–259.

															   After Wilson , but before Brendlin , the Court had stated, in dictum, that officers
who conduct “routine traffic stop[s]” may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a
driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may
be armed and dangerous.” Knowles v. Iowa , 525 U. S. 113 ,
117–118 (1998). That forecast, we now confirm, accurately captures
the combined thrust of the Court’s decisions in Mimms , Wilson , and Brendlin .

															B

															   The Arizona Court of Appeals
recognized that, initially, Johnson was lawfully detained incident
to the legitimate stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger.
See 217 Ariz., at 64, 170 P. 3d, at 673. But, that court
concluded, once Officer Trevizo undertook to question Johnson on a
matter unrelated to the traffic stop, i.e. , Johnson’s gang
affiliation, patdown authority ceased to exist, absent reasonable
suspicion that Johnson had engaged, or was about to engage, in
criminal activity. See id. , at 65, 170 P. 3d, at 674.
In support of the Arizona court’s portrayal of Trevizo’s
interrogation of Johnson as “consensual,” Johnson emphasizes
Trevizo’s testimony at the suppression hearing. Responding to the
prosecutor’s questions, Trevizo affirmed her belief that Johnson
could have “refused to get out of the car” and “to turn around for
the pat down.” App. 41.

															   It is not clear why the
prosecutor, in opposing the suppression motion, sought to portray
the episode as consensual. Cf. Florida v. Bostick , 501 U. S. 429 (1991)
(holding that police officers’ search of a bus passenger’s luggage
can be based on consent). In any event, Trevizo also testified that
she never advised Johnson he did not have to answer her questions
or otherwise cooperate with her. See App . 45. And during
cross-examination, Trevizo did not disagree when defense counsel
asked “in fact you weren’t seeking [Johnson’s] permission … ?” Id. , at 36. As the dissenting judge observed, “consensual”
is an “unrealistic” characterization of the Trevizo-Johnson
interaction. “[T]he encounter … took place within minutes of the
stop”; the patdown followed “within mere moments” of Johnson’s exit
from the vehicle; beyond genuine debate, the point at which Johnson
could have felt free to leave had not yet occurred. See 217 Ariz.,
at 66, 170 P. 3d, at 675.[ Footnote 1 ]

															   A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle
is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The
temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues,
and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the
stop ends when the police have no further need to control the
scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave.
See Brendlin , 551 U. S., at 258. An officer’s inquiries
into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop,
this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into
something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries
do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. See Muehler v. Mena , 544 U. S. 93 , 100–101
(2005).

															   In sum, as stated in Brendlin , a
traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that
he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police
and move about at will. See 551 U. S., at 257. Nothing occurred in
this case that would have conveyed to Johnson that, prior to the
frisk, the traffic stop had ended or that he was otherwise free “to
depart without police permission.” Ibid. Officer Trevizo
surely was not constitutionally required to give Johnson an
opportunity to depart the scene after he exited the vehicle without
first ensuring that, in so doing, she was not permitting a
dangerous person to get behind her.[ Footnote 2 ]

															*  *  *

															   For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 The Court of Appeals majority did not assert
that Johnson reasonably could have felt free to leave. Instead, the
court said “a reasonable person in Johnson’s position would have
felt free to remain in the vehicle.” 217 Ariz. 58, 64, 170
P. 3d 667, 673 (2007). That position, however, appears at odds
with our decision in Maryland v. Wilson , 519
U. S. 408 (1997). See supra , at 6–7. Footnote 2 The Arizona Court of Appeals assumed,
“without deciding, that Trevizo had reasonable suspicion that
Johnson was armed and dangerous.” 217 Ariz., at 64, 170 P. 3d,
at 673. We do not foreclose the appeals court’s consideration of
that issue on remand.