U.S. Supreme Court Arizona v. Roberson, 486
U.S. 675 (1988) Arizona v. Roberson No. 87-354 Argued March 29, 1988 Decided June 15, 1988 486
U.S. 675 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF ARIZONA Syllabus Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 , 451 U. S.
484 -485, held that a suspect who has

															"expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication."

															After being arrested at the scene of a burglary, and being
advised by the arresting officer of his constitutional rights, as
declared in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.
S. 436 , to remain silent and to have an attorney present
during any interrogation, respondent replied that he "wanted a
lawyer before answering any questions," which fact was duly
reported in the officer's written report. Three days later, while
respondent was still in custody, a different officer, unaware that
respondent had earlier requested counsel who had not yet been
provided, advised him of his rights and interrogated him about a
different burglary, obtaining an incriminating statement concerning
that crime. In the prosecution for that offense, the Arizona trial
court suppressed the statement in reliance upon a State Supreme
Court decision that refused to distinguish Edwards with
respect to a suspect who was reinterrogated about an unrelated
offense after he had requested counsel, ruling that the fact that
the further interrogation in Edwards had involved the same
offense was not legally significant for Fifth Amendment purposes.
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression. Held: The Edwards rule applies to bar
police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for
counsel in the context of a separate investigation. Pp. 486 U. S.
680 -688.

															(a) The bright-line, prophylactic Edwards rule benefits
the accused and the State alike. It protects against the inherently
compelling pressures of custodial interrogation suspects who feel
incapable of undergoing such questioning without the advice of
counsel, by creating a presumption that any subsequent waiver of
the right to counsel at the authorities' behest was coercive, and
not purely voluntary. Moreover, it provides clear and unequivocal
guidelines that inform police and prosecutors with specificity what
they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and that inform
courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible. Pp. 486 U. S.
680 -682.

															(b) This Court's decisions do not compel an exception to Edwards for post-request police-initiated custodial
interrogation relating to a separate Page 486 U. S. 676 investigation. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S.
96 ; Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.
S. 523 ; Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.
S. 564 ; and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.
S. 159 , distinguished. Pp. 486 U. S.
682 -685.

															(c) The nature and factual setting of this case do not compel an
exception to the Edwards rule. The argument that the
existence of separate investigations in itself precludes the type
of badgering that led to the decision in Edwards is not
persuasive. It is by no means clear that police engaged in separate
investigations will be any less eager than police involved in only
one inquiry to question a suspect in custody. Moreover, to a
suspect who has indicated his inability to cope with custodial
interrogation by requesting counsel, any further interrogation
without counsel will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak
the suspect may be feeling. The giving of fresh sets of Miranda warnings will not necessarily "reassure" a suspect
who has been denied requested counsel that his rights have remained
untrammeled. In fact, in a case such as this, in which three days
elapsed between the unsatisfied request for counsel and the
separate-offense interrogation, there is a serious risk that the
mere repetition of the warnings would not overcome the presumption
of coercion created by prolonged police custody. Furthermore, the
fact that it may be in an uncounseled suspect's interests to know
about, and give a statement concerning, the separate offense does
not compel an exception to Edwards, since the suspect,
having requested counsel, can determine how to deal with the
separate investigations with counsel's advice, and since the police
are free to inform the suspect of the facts of the second
investigation, as long as they do not interrogate him, and he is
free to initiate further communication. Finally, the fact that the
officer who conducted respondent's second interrogation did not
know that he had requested counsel cannot justify the failure to
honor that request, since Edwards focuses on the state of
mind of the suspect, and not of the police, and since the officer
could have discovered the request simply by reading the arresting
officer's report. Pp. 486 U. S.
685 -688.

															Affirmed.

															STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and SCALIA, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
joined, post, p. 486 U. S. 688 .
O'CONNOR, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Page 486 U. S. 677 JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.
S. 477 , 451 U. S.
484 -485 (1981), we held that a suspect who has

															"expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police."

															In this case, Arizona asks us to craft an exception to that rule
for cases in which the police want to interrogate a suspect about
an offense that is unrelated to the subject of their initial
interrogation. Several years ago, the Arizona Supreme Court
considered, and rejected, a similar argument, stating:

															"The only difference between Edwards and the appellant
is that Edwards was questioned about the same offense Page 486 U. S. 678 after a request for counsel, while the appellant was
reinterrogated about an unrelated offense. We do not believe that
this factual distinction holds any legal significance for fifth
amendment purposes." State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 97, 669 P.2d 68 , 75
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984). We agree with
the Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion. I On April 16, 1985, respondent was arrested at the scene of a
just-completed burglary. The arresting officer advised him that he
had a constitutional right to remain silent and also the right to
have an attorney present during any interrogation. See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 384 U. S.
467 -479 (1966). Respondent replied that he "wanted a
lawyer before answering any questions." [ Footnote 1 ] This fact was duly recorded in the
officer's written report of the incident. In due course, respondent
was convicted of the April 16, 1985, burglary.

															On April 19, 1985, while respondent was still in custody
pursuant to the arrest three days earlier, a different officer
interrogated him about a different burglary that had occurred on
April 15. That officer was not aware of the fact that respondent
had requested the assistance of counsel three days earlier. After
advising respondent of his rights, the officer obtained an
incriminating statement concerning the April 15 burglary. In the
prosecution for that offense, the trial court suppressed that
statement. In explaining his ruling, the trial judge relied
squarely on the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion in State v.
Routhier, 137 Ariz. at 97, 669 P.2d at 75, characterizing the
rule of the Edwards case as "clear and unequivocal."
[ Footnote 2 ] Page 486 U. S. 679 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression order in a
brief opinion, stating:

															"In Routhier, as in the instant case, the accused was
continuously in police custody from the time of asserting his Fifth
Amendment right through the time of the impermissible questioning.
The coercive environment never dissipated."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. 24. The Arizona Supreme Court denied a
petition for review. Id. at 25. We granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict with certain other state court decisions.
[ Footnote 3 ] 484 U.S. 975
(1987). We now affirm. Page 486 U. S. 680 II A major purpose of the Court's opinion in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. at 384 U. S.
441 -442, was "to give concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow."

															"As we have stressed on numerous occasions, '[o]ne of the
principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity
of its application. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420 , 468 U. S. 430 (1984); See also New York v. Quarles , [ 467 U.S.
649 , 467 U. S. 662 -664 (1984)]
(concurring opinion); Fare v. Michael C. , 442
U.S. [707, 442 U. S. 718 (1979)]." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412 , 475 U. S. 425 (1986).

															The rule of the Edwards case came as a corollary to Miranda's admonition that "[i]f the individual states that
he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an
attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 474 .
In such an instance, we had concluded in Miranda, "[i]f the interrogation continues without the presence of an
attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel." Id. at 384 U. S. 475 .
In Edwards, we

															"reconfirm[ed] these views and, to lend them substance,
emphasize[d] that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its
progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an
accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to
counsel."

															451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 485 .
We concluded that reinterrogation may only occur if "the accused
himself initiates Page 486 U. S. 681 further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police." Ibid. Thus, the prophylactic protections that the Miranda warnings provide to counteract the "inherently
compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation and to "permit a
full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination," 384 U.S. at 384 U. S. 467 ,
are implemented by the application of the Edwards corollary that, if a suspect believes that he is not capable of
undergoing such questioning without advice of counsel, then it is
presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the
authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is
itself the product of the "inherently compelling pressures" and not
the purely voluntary choice of the suspect. As JUSTICE WHITE has
explained,

															"the accused having expressed his own view that he is not
competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a
later decision at the authorities' insistence to make a statement
without counsel's presence may properly be viewed with
skepticism." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 , 423 U. S. 110 ,
n. 2 (1975) (concurring in result).

															We have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a bright-line rule
in cases following Edwards as well as Miranda. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 , 475 U. S. 634 (1986); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S.
91 , 469 U. S. 98 (1984) (per curiam); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.
S. 638 , 465 U. S. 646 (1984); see also Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S.
51 (1985); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.
S. 1039 , 462 U. S.
1044 (1983) (plurality opinion) (REHNQUIST, J.). In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 , 442 U. S. 718 (1979), we explained that the

															"relatively rigid requirement that interrogation must cease upon
the accused's request for an attorney . . . has the virtue of
informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they
may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing
courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity, which
benefits the accused and the State alike, has been thought to
outweigh the burdens that the decision Page 486 U. S. 682 in Miranda imposes on law enforcement agencies and the
courts by requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly
probative evidence even though the confession might be voluntary
under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis. [ Footnote 4 ]"

															The Edwards rule thus serves the purpose of providing
"clear and unequivocal" guidelines to the law enforcement
profession. Surely there is nothing ambiguous about the requirement
that, after a person in custody has expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, he

															"is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police."

															451 U.S. at 451 U. S.
484 -485. III Petitioner contends that the bright-line, prophylactic Edwards rule should not apply when the police-initiated
interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel occurs in
the context of a separate investigation. According to petitioner,
both our cases and the nature of the factual setting compel this
distinction. We are unpersuaded. Page 486 U. S. 683 Petitioner points to our holding in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 423 U. S.
103 -104 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
at 479), that, when a suspect asserts his right to cut off
questioning, the police may " scrupulously honor'" that right
by "immediately ceas[ing] the interrogation, resum[ing] questioning
only after the passage of a significant period of time and the
provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restrict[ing] the second
interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier
interrogation."

															423 U.S. at 423 U. S. 106 .
The police in this case followed precisely that course, claims the
State. However, as Mosley made clear, a suspect's decision
to cut off questioning, unlike his request for counsel, does not
raise the presumption that he is unable to proceed without a
lawyer's advice. See id. at 423 U. S. 101 ,
n. 7; id. at 423 U. S. 110 ,
n. 2 (WHITE, J., concurring in result), quoted supra at 486 U. S.
681 .

															Petitioner points as well to Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523 , 479 U. S. 525 (1987), which concerned a suspect who had

															"told the officers that he would not give a written statement
unless his attorney was present but had 'no problem' talking about
the incident."

															We held that this was a limited request for counsel, that
Barrett himself had drawn a distinction between oral and written
statements, and thus that the officers could continue to question
him. Petitioner argues that Roberson's request for counsel was
similarly limited, this time to the investigation pursuant to which
the request was made. This argument is flawed both factually and
legally. As a matter of fact, according to the initial police
report, respondent stated that "he wanted a lawyer before answering any questions." [ Footnote
5 ] As a matter of law, the presumption raised by a suspect's
request for counsel -- that he considers himself unable to deal
with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal
assistance -- does not disappear simply because the police have
approached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel,
about a separate investigation. Page 486 U. S. 684 That a suspect's request for counsel should apply to any
questions the police wish to pose follows, we think, not only from Edwards and Miranda, but also from a case decided
the same day as Barrett. In Colorado v. Spring, 479 U. S. 564 , 479 U. S. 577 (1987), we held that

															"a suspect's awareness of all the possible subjects of
questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to
determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege."

															In the face of the warning that anything he said could be used
as evidence against him, Spring's willingness to answer questions,
without limiting such a waiver, see Connecticut v. Barrett,
supra, indicated that he felt comfortable enough with the
pressures of custodial interrogation both to answer questions and
to do so without an attorney. Since there is "no qualification of
[the] broad and explicit warning" that " anything [a
suspect] says may be used against him," 479 U.S. at 479 U. S. 577 (emphasis in original), Spring's decision to talk was properly
considered to be equally unqualified. Conversely, Roberson's
unwillingness to answer any questions without the advice of
counsel, without limiting his request for counsel, indicated that
he did not feel sufficiently comfortable with the pressures of
custodial interrogation to answer questions without an attorney.
This discomfort is precisely the state of mind that Edwards presumes to persist unless the suspect himself
initiates further conversation about the investigation; unless he
otherwise states, see Connecticut v. Barrett, supra, there
is no reason to assume that a suspect's state of mind is in any way
investigation-specific, see Colorado v. Spring, supra. Finally, petitioner raises the case of Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 , 474 U. S. 161 (1985), which held that Moulton's

															"Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel was violated
by the admission at trial of incriminating statements made by him
to his codefendant, a secret government informant, after indictment
and at a meeting of the two to plan defense strategy for the
upcoming trial."

															That case did not involve any Page 486 U. S. 685 Miranda issue because Moulton was not in custody. In
our opinion, we rejected an argument that the statements should be
admissible because the police were seeking information regarding
both the crime for which Moulton had already been indicted and a
separate, inchoate scheme. Following Massiah v. United
States, 377 U. S. 201 , 377 U. S. 207 (1964), we recognized, though, that the continuing investigation of
uncharged offenses did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel. Our recognition of that fact,
however, surely lends no support to petitioner's argument that, in
the Fifth Amendment context,

															"statements about different offenses, developed at different
times, by different investigators, in the course of two wholly
independent investigations, should not be treated the same."

															Brief for Petitioner 32. This argument overlooks the difference
between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. The former arises from
the fact that the suspect has been formally charged with a
particular crime, and thus is facing a state apparatus that has
been geared up to prosecute him. The latter is protected by the
prophylaxis of having an attorney present to counteract the
inherent pressures of custodial interrogation, which arise from the
fact of such interrogation and exist regardless of the number of
crimes under investigation or whether those crimes have resulted in
formal charges.

															In sum, our cases do not support petitioner's position. IV Petitioner's attempts at distinguishing the factual setting here
from that in Edwards are equally unavailing. Petitioner
first relies on the plurality opinion in Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 1044 (REHNQUIST, J.), which stated that Edwards laid down

															"a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police
custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in
which the defendant in Edwards Page 486 U. S. 686 was."

															Petitioner reasons that

															"the chances that an accused will be questioned so repeatedly
and in such quick succession that it will 'undermine the will' of
the person questioned, or will constitute 'badger[ing],' are so
minute as not to warrant consideration, if the officers are truly
pursuing separate investigations."

															Brief for Petitioner 16. It is by no means clear, though, that
police engaged in separate investigations will be any less eager
than police involved in only one inquiry to question a suspect in
custody. Further, to a suspect who has indicated his inability to
cope with the pressures of custodial interrogation by requesting
counsel, any further interrogation without counsel's having been
provided will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the
suspect may be feeling. Thus, we also disagree with petitioner's
contention that fresh sets of Miranda warnings will
"reassure" a suspect who has been denied the counsel he has clearly
requested that his rights have remained untrammeled. See
ibid. Especially in a case such as this, in which a period of
three days elapsed between the unsatisfied request for counsel and
the interrogation about a second offense, there is a serious risk
that the mere repetition of the Miranda warnings would not
overcome the presumption of coercion that is created by prolonged
police custody. [ Footnote
6 ] Page 486 U. S. 687 The United States, as amicus curiae supporting
petitioner, suggests that a suspect in custody might have

															"good reasons for wanting to speak with the police about the
offenses involved in the new investigation, or at least to learn
from the police what the new investigation is about, so that he can
decide whether it is in his interest to make a statement about that
matter without the assistance of counsel."

															Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11. The simple
answer is that the suspect, having requested counsel, can determine
how to deal with the separate investigations with counsel's advice.
Further, even if the police have decided temporarily not to provide
counsel, see n. 6, supra, they are free to inform
the suspect of the facts of the second investigation, as long as
such communication does not constitute interrogation, see Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980). As we have made clear, any "further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police" that the suspect
himself initiates, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 485 ,
are perfectly valid.

															Finally, we attach no significance to the fact that the officer
who conducted the second interrogation did not know that respondent
had made a request for counsel. In addition to the fact that Edwards focuses on the state of mind of the suspect, and
not of the police, custodial interrogation must be conducted
pursuant to established procedures, and those procedures, in turn,
must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to
determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel. In
this case, respondent's request had been properly memorialized in a
written report, but the officer who conducted the interrogation
simply failed to examine that report. Whether a contemplated
reinterrogation concerns the same or a different offense, or
whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are
involved in the second investigation, the same need to
determine Page 486 U. S. 688 whether the suspect has requested counsel exists. [ Footnote 7 ] The police department's failure
to honor that request cannot be justified by the lack of diligence
of a particular officer. Cf. Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150 , 405 U. S. 154 (1972).

															The judgment of the Arizona Court of Appeals is Affirmed. JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Tr. 26 (Apr. 3, 1986).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"Routhier was based on Edwards versus Arizona, which
held that, once the defendant has invoked his right to counsel, he
may not be reinterrogated unless counsel has been made available to
him or he initiates the conversation."

															"The Routhier court states that whether the defendant
is reinterrogated about the same offense or an unrelated offense
makes no difference for Fifth Amendment purposes."

															"The Routhier court further stated that Edwards is clear and unequivocal, there is to be no
further interrogation by authorities once the right to counsel is
invoked. The Court in that case finding that the assertion of the
right to counsel is an assertion by the accused that he is not
competent to deal with authorities without legal advice. And that
the resumption of questioning by the police without the requested
attorney being provided, strongly suggests to the accused that he
has no choice but to answer."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. 15-16.

															[ Footnote 3 ] See State v. Dampier, 314 N. C. 292, 333 S.E.2d
230 (1985) ( Edwards inapplicable to interrogation by
authorities from different State concerning unrelated matter); McFadden v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d
924 (1983) ( Edwards inapplicable when authorities from
different county question suspect about different crime); see
also Lofton v. State, 471 So. 2d 665 (Fla.App.) (no Edwards violation when suspect is represented by attorney
in unrelated matter, then questioned without counsel present), review denied, 480 So. 2d 1294 (Fla.1985); State v.
Newton, 682 P.2d 295 (Utah 1984) (same); State v. Cornethan, 38 Wash. App. 231,
684 P.2d 1355 (1984) (alternative holding: Edwards inapplicable to interrogation in unrelated investigation; court
also holds that representation by attorney in related matter does
not suffice as request for counsel for Edwards purposes); cf. State v. Harriman, 434 So. 2d 551 (La. App.) (adopts
petitioner's view here, but only after holding that suspect had
initiated conversation regarding second investigation), writ
denied, 440 So. 2d 729 (La.1983); but see United States ex
rel. Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117, 124-126 (CA7), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987) (same rule as Arizona ); Luman v. State, 447 So. 2d 428
(Fla.App.1984) (same); Radovsky v. State, 296 Md. 386, 464
A.2d 239 (1983) (same); see also Boles v. Foltz, 816 F.2d
1132, 1137-1141 (CA6) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (same; majority does
not reach issue), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987); cf. United States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (CA10
1983) (knowledge of request for counsel "is imputed to all law
enforcement officers who subsequently deal with the suspect"); State v. Arceneaux, 425 So. 2d
740 (La.1983) (same).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															It is significant that our explanation of the basis for the
" per se aspect of Miranda " in Fare v. Michael
C., 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 719 ,
applies to the application of the Edwards rule in a case
such as this. As we stated in Fare:

															"The rule in Miranda . . . was based on this Court's
perception that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our
legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth
Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation.
Because of this special ability of the lawyer to help the client
preserve his Fifth Amendment rights once the client becomes
enmeshed in the adversary process, the Court found that 'the right
to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system'
established by the Court. [384 U.S.] at 384 U. S.
469 . Moreover, the lawyer's presence helps guard against
overreaching by the police and ensures that any statements actually
obtained are accurately transcribed for presentation into evidence. Id. at 384 U. S. 470 ."

															"The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based
on the unique role the lawyer plays in the adversary system of
criminal justice in this country."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
719 .

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Tr. 26 (Apr. 3, 1986) (emphasis added); see id. at 23;
Tr. 12 (Oct. 17, 1985, a.m.).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The United States, as amicus curiae supporting
petitioner, suggests similarly that

															"respondent's failure to reiterate his request for counsel to
[the officer involved in the second investigation], even after
[that officer] gave respondent complete Miranda warnings,
could not have been the result of any doubt on respondent's part
that the police would honor a request for counsel if one were
made."

															Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10. This
conclusion is surprising, considering that respondent had not been
provided with the attorney he had already requested, despite having
been subjected to police-initiated interrogation with respect to
the first investigation as well. See n. 7, infra. We reiterate here, though, that the "right" to counsel to protect
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not
absolute; that is,

															"[i]f authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel
during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the
field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without
violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do
not question him during that time." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , 384 U. S. 474 (1966).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Indeed, the facts of this case indicate that different officers
investigating the same offense are just as likely to bypass proper
procedures as an officer investigating a different offense,
inasmuch as the record discloses no less than five violations of
the Edwards rule, four concerning the April 16 burglary
and only one concerning the April 15 burglary. See Tr.
23-24, 49 (Apr. 3, 1986); Tr. 8-12 (Oct. 17, 1985, p.m.). It is
only the last violation that is at issue in this case.

															JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.

															The majority frames the case as one in which we are asked to
"craft an exception" to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.
S. 477 (1981). Ante at 486 U. S. 677 .
The implication from this, it would seem, is that the burden of
proof falls on those who say no constitutional or preventative
purpose is served by prohibiting the police from asking a suspect,
once he has requested counsel, if he chooses to waive that right in
a new and independent investigation of a different crime. But the
rule of Edwards is our rule, not a constitutional command;
and it is our obligation to justify its expansion. Our
justification must be consistent with the practical realities of
suspects' rights and police investigations. With all respect, I
suggest the majority does not have a convincing case. The
majority's rule is not necessary to protect the rights of suspects,
and it will in many instances deprive our nationwide law
enforcement network of a legitimate investigative technique now
routinely used to resolve major crimes. Page 486 U. S. 689 When a suspect is in custody for even the most minor offense,
his name and fingerprints are checked against master files. It is a
frequent occurrence that the suspect is wanted for questioning with
respect to crimes unrelated to the one for which he has been
apprehended. The rule announced today will bar law enforcement
officials, even those from some other city or other jurisdiction,
from questioning a suspect about an unrelated matter if he is in
custody and has requested counsel to assist in answering questions
put to him about the crime for which he was arrested.

															This is the first case in which we are asked to apply Edwards to separate and independent investigations. The
statements deemed inadmissible in Edwards and in our later
cases applying its doctrine were statements relating to the same
investigation in which the right to counsel was invoked. See
Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U. S. 523 (1987); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U. S.
91 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.
S. 638 (1984); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.
S. 1039 (1983); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U. S.
42 (1982). The majority's extension of the Edwards rule to separate and independent investigations is
unwarranted.

															The petitioner in Edwards, arrested on serious charges,
first submitted to interrogation, but then requested an attorney.
Questions ceased for a while, but when two detectives came to the
jail the next morning, a guard advised him that he must talk with
them. The petitioner in Edwards waived his right to
silence and implicated himself in the crime. We reversed the
conviction, holding that an accused who expresses his desire to
face further questioning with counsel present will not be subject
to further interrogation until counsel is made available, unless
the accused initiates the exchange himself.

															Our ultimate concern in Edwards, and in the cases which
follow it, is whether the suspect knows and understands his rights
and is willing to waive them, and whether courts can be assured
that coercion did not induce the waiver. That Page 486 U. S. 690 concern does not dictate the result reached by the Court today,
for the dangers present in Edwards and later cases are
insubstantial here.

															The rule in Edwards "was in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an
accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in
the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was." Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, at 462 U. S.
1044 (plurality opinion). Where the subsequent
questioning is confined to an entirely independent investigation,
there is little risk that the suspect will be badgered into
submission.

															The Court reasons that it is "by no means clear" that "police
engaged in separate investigations will be any less eager than
police involved in only one inquiry to question a suspect in
custody." Ante at 686. That misses the point. Unless there
are so many separate investigations that fresh teams of police are
regularly turning up to question the suspect, the danger of
badgering is minimal, and insufficient to justify a rigid per
se rule. Whatever their eagerness, the police in a separate
investigation may not commence any questioning unless the suspect
is readvised of his Miranda rights and consents to the
interrogation, and they are required by Edwards to cease
questioning him if he invokes his right to counsel. Consequently,
the legitimate interest of the suspect in not being subjected to
coercive badgering is already protected. The reason for the Edwards rule is not that confessions are disfavored, but
that coercion is feared. The rule announced today, however,
prohibits the police from resuming questions, after a second Miranda warning, when there is no more likelihood of
coercion than when the first interrogation began.

															The Court suggests that the suspect may believe his rights are
fictitious if he must assert them a second time, but the support
for this suggestion is weak. The suspect, having observed that his
earlier invocation of rights was effective in terminating
questioning and having been advised that further questioning may
not relate to that crime, would understand Page 486 U. S. 691 that he may invoke his rights again with respect to the new
investigation, and so terminate questioning regarding that
investigation as well. Indeed, the new warnings and explanations
will reinforce his comprehension of a suspect's rights.

															I note that the conduct of the police in this case was hardly
exemplary; they reinitiated questioning of respondent regarding the
first investigation after he had asserted his right to counsel in
that investigation. The statements he gave in response, however,
properly were excluded at trial for all purposes except
impeachment. Any sense of coercion generated by this violation
which carried over into the questioning on the second offense would
of course be taken into account by a court reviewing whether the
waiver of Miranda rights in the second investigation was
voluntary, and the per se rule announced today is
therefore not necessary to respond to such misconduct.

															Allowing authorities who conduct a separate investigation to
read the suspect his Miranda rights and ask him whether he
wishes to invoke them strikes an appropriate balance, which
protects the suspect's freedom from coercion without unnecessarily
disrupting legitimate law enforcement efforts. Balance is essential
when the Court fashions rules which are preventative and do not
themselves stem from violations of a constitutional right. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 , 417 U. S. 444 (1974). By contrast with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
for instance, the rule here operates even absent constitutional
violation, see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.
S. 298 , 470 U. S.
306 -307 (1985), and we should be cautious in extending
it. The Court expresses a preference for bright lines, but the line
it draws here is far more restrictive than necessary to protect the
interests at stake.

															By prohibiting the police from questioning the suspect regarding
a separate investigation, the Court chooses to presume that a
suspect has made the decision that he does not wish to talk about
that investigation without counsel present, Page 486 U. S. 692 although that decision was made when the suspect was unaware of
even the existence of a separate investigation. The underlying
premise seems to be that there are two types of people: those who
never talk without a lawyer and those who always talk without a
lawyer. The more realistic view of human nature suggests that a
suspect will want the opportunity, when he learns of the separate
investigations, to decide whether he wishes to speak to the
authorities in a particular investigation with or without
representation.

															In other contexts, we have taken a more realistic approach to
separate and independent investigations. In Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U. S. 159 (1985), we held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel barred
admission of statements elicited from a criminal defendant by a
government informant when the statements related to the charge on
which the defendant had been indicted. We were careful to note,
however, that the rule would have been otherwise had the statements
related to a different charge.

															"[T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the
evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at
that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in
the investigation of criminal activities." Id. at 474 U. S. 180 .
Similarly, we held in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S.
96 (1975), that a suspect who had been arrested on
charges of committing robbery and who had invoked his right to
silence could be questioned later about an unrelated murder, if
first read his Miranda rights. The Court correctly points
out that neither of these cases necessarily control the one before
us; Moulton involved the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
and Mosley involved the Fifth Amendment right to silence,
while this case involves the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Moulton and Mosley nevertheless reflected an
understanding that the invocation of a criminal suspect's
constitutional rights could be respected, and the opportunities for
unfair coercion restricted, without the establishment of a
broad-brush Page 486 U. S. 693 rule by which the assertion of a right in one investigation is
automatically applied to a separate and independent one.

															In considering whether to extend the Edwards rule to
this case, the choice is not between holding, as the Court does,
that such statements will never be admissible, and holding that
such statements will always be admissible. The choice is between
the Court's absolute rule establishing an irrebuttable presumption
of coercion, and one which relies upon known and tested warnings,
applied to each investigation as required by Edwards and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), to insure that a waiver is voluntary. The problems to which Edwards was addressed are not present here in any
substantial degree. Today's rule will neither serve the interest of
law enforcement nor give necessary protection to the rights of
those suspected of crime. I respectfully dissent.