U.S. Supreme Court International Boxing Club v. United
States, 358
U.S. 242 (1959) International Boxing Club of New
York, Inc. v. United States No. 18 Argued November 13,
1958 Decided January 12,
1959 358
U.S. 242 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK Syllabus 1. The Government's civil complaint charging appellants with a
combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade and
commerce among the States in the promotion, broadcasting, and
televising of professional world championship boxing contests, as
well as a conspiracy to monopolize and monopolization of the same,
in violation of § 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, was sustained by this
Court as stating a cause of action, and the case was remanded for
trial on the merits. 348 U. S. 348 U.S.
236. After a trial, the District Court, in an opinion incorporating
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the
principles laid down by this Court, found that the allegations of
the complaint had been sustained, and adjudged that appellants had
violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Held: the District Court's findings are not clearly
erroneous, and its judgment on the merits is affirmed. Pp. 358 U. S.
244 -252.

															(a) The District Court's finding that the relevant market was
the promotion of championship boxing contests, in contrast to all
professional boxing contests, was not clearly erroneous, and it is
sustained. Pp. 358 U. S.
249 -252.

															2. After further hearings on the nature and extent of the relief
necessary to protect the public interest, the District Court
entered a final judgment dissolving the two international boxing
clubs, directing the individual appellants to divest themselves of
their stock in Madison Square Garden, and granting injunctive
relief designed to open up the market in the business of promoting
professional world championship boxing matches. Held: the relief granted was not beyond the allowable
discretion of the District Court, and its judgment is affirmed. Pp. 358 U. S.
253 -263.

															(a) At the time of the final decree, the Joe Louis agreements
had lapsed; the exclusive contract practice had been abandoned at
least temporarily; the leases on Yankee Stadium, the Polo Grounds,
and St. Nicholas Arena in New York had been given up; and the
appellants had no control over the new heavyweight champion; Page 358 U. S. 243 but this Court agrees with the District Court that the
additional evidence taken by it showed that appellants still
possessed all of the power of monopoly and restraint. Pp. 358 U. S.
254 -255.

															(b) Even if the individual appellants' stock in Madison Square
Garden was lawfully acquired and was not the fruit of the
conspiracy, it had been utilized to effect the purposes of the
conspiracy, and could be so used again, and the record supports the
District Court's conclusion that they should be required to divest
themselves of this stock in order to break up the unlawful
combination and restore competition in championship boxing contests
-- without being granted the alternative options requested by them.
Pp. 358 U. S.
255 -259.

															(c) Since the two international boxing clubs were formed
pursuant to the conspiracy, and were the means used to effectuate
it, the requirement that they be dissolved was justified. Pp. 358 U. S.
259 -261.

															(d) The District Court having found that one of the means used
in effectuating the conspiracy was the ownership and control of
arenas and stadia, the requirement of the decree that Madison
Square Carden and the Chicago Stadium be rented to any qualified
promoter at a reasonable rental, subject to specified conditions,
was justified. Pp. 358 U. S.
261 -262.

															(e) Practical considerations justify the prohibition against
exclusive contracts with contestants, even though they apply not
only to championship bouts, but to all professional boxing
contests, thus going beyond the "relevant market" considered for
the purposes of determining the Sherman Act violations. P. 358 U. S.
262 . 150 F.
Supp. 397 , affirmed. Page 358 U. S. 244 MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This civil Sherman Act [ Footnote
1 ] case was here four years ago on direct appeal from a
dismissal by the District Court, which had held that the Act did
not apply to the business of professional boxing. We reversed,
finding that

															"the complaint states a cause of action [under the Act], and
that the Government is entitled to an opportunity to prove its
allegations,"

															and remanded the case for trial on the merits. United States
v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.
S. 236 (1955). The complaint charged the appellants with
a combination and conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade and
commerce among the States in the promotion, broadcasting, and
televising of professional world championship boxing contests, as
well as a conspiracy to monopolize and monopolization of the same.
After a trial, the District Court, in an opinion incorporating
detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the
principles laid down in our earlier opinion, found that the
allegations of the complaint had been sustained. 150 F.
Supp. 397 . After further hearings on the nature and extent of
the relief necessary to protect the public interest, the court
entered its final judgment dissolving two of the corporate
appellants, directing divestiture of certain stock owned by the
individual appellants, and granting injunctive relief designed to
open up the market in the business of promoting professional world
championship boxing matches. 171 F. Supp. 841.

															The appellants, while not attacking any specific finding as
clearly erroneous, claim that the proof did not show that they
violated Section 1 or 2 of the Act. In this regard, appellants
level their strongest blows at the District Court's definition of
the relevant market. Out of the entire field of professional
boxing, the District Court carved a market in championship contests
alone, holding Page 358 U. S. 245 it to be the relevant market at which the conspiracy was aimed.
In the alternative, appellants insist that the relief granted the
Government was "unnecessarily punitive," even if liability is
assumed. On a direct appeal to this Court, we noted probable
jurisdiction, 356 U.S. 910 (1958). We have concluded that the
findings of the District Court are not clearly erroneous, and that,
in view of our former holding on the sufficiency of the complaint,
the judgment on the merits was properly entered. As to the relief
granted, we find that the court did not exceed the limits of
allowable discretion in framing a decree "that will, so far as
practicable, cure the ill effects of the illegal conduct, and
assure the public freedom from its continuance." United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76 , 340 U. S. 88 (1950).

															Our previous decision herein having decided that the promotion
of professional championship boxing contests on an interstate basis
constituted trade and commerce among the States, within the meaning
of the Sherman Act, there is no contest here either on the findings
or the law on that point. Since, on that appeal, we discussed in
some detail the allegations of the complaint, which the trial court
has now found amply proven by the evidence, we shall only summarize
the findings here. THE FINDINGS The conspiracy began in January, 1949, when appellants Norris
and Wirtz, who owned and controlled the Chicago Stadium, the
Detroit Olympia Arena, and the St. Louis Arena, made an agreement
with Joe Louis, the then heavyweight boxing champion of the world.
Wishing to retire, Louis agreed to give up his title after
obtaining from each of the four leading contenders [ Footnote 2 ] exclusive promotion rights
including rights to radio, television, and Page 358 U. S. 246 movie revenues. Upon securing these exclusive contracts, Louis
assigned them to the appellant International Boxing Club, Illinois,
which was organized by Norris and Wirtz for the purpose of
promoting boxing for the combination in Illinois. They paid Louis
$150,000 cash plus an employment contract and a 20% stock interest
in I.B.C., Illinois.

															In March, 1949, Norris and Wirtz approached appellant Madison
Square Garden, in which they had for many years owned 50,000 shares
of stock. It was the "foremost sports arena in New York City, and
is the best known arena of its kind in the United States, if not
the world." [ Footnote 3 ]
However, its facilities were tied up by an exclusive lease it had
granted to Mike Jacobs' interests -- the leading professional
boxing promoter in the field at that time. Norris and Wirtz
proposed that they should all "work together now and keep the
events for our buildings, and not create a competitive situation
that would be harmful to all." In order to effectuate this program,
appellant Madison Square Garden bought out Mike Jacobs' interest,
including, in addition to his lease on Madison Square Garden, his
exclusive leases to Yankee Stadium and the St. Nicholas Arena and
his contract with the then welterweight champion Sugar Ray
Robinson. These contracts were assigned to International Boxing
Club, New York, organized for the purpose of promoting boxing for
the combination in New York.

															Once Jacobs' interests had been acquired, there remained only
one substantial competitor in the field of Page 358 U. S. 247 promoting championship boxing matches. That was Tournament of
Champions, Inc., owned in part by the Columbia Broadcasting System.
It owned an exclusive lease on the Polo Grounds, as well as an
exclusive promotion contract covering the next two fights of the
then middleweight champion of the world. In May, 1949, Madison
Square Garden bought all of the stock of Tournament of Champions at
a cost of $100,000 plus 25% of the net profits on the next two
middleweight championship matches. The assets thus acquired were
likewise assigned to I.B.C., New York. By a simultaneous separate
agreement, Columbia Broadcasting System agreed for a five-year
period not to invest in or promote any professional boxing matches
in return for a first refusal right to the broadcasting of certain
boxing matches staged for a like period in Madison Square
Garden.

															This series of agreements, consummated within four months' time,
gave appellants exclusive control of the promotion of boxing
matches in three championship divisions, i.e., heavyweight, middleweight, and welterweight. Not satisfied with
this temporary control, however, appellants perpetuated their hold
on championship bouts by requiring each contender for the title to
grant to them an exclusive promotion contract to his championship
fights, including film and broadcasting, for a period of from three
to five years. Over the facilities for the staging of contests
appellants exercised like control, owning or managing the "key"
arenas and stadia in the Nation. [ Footnote 4 ]

															Tightening the ropes around the ring thus built, Norris and
Wirtz increased their stockholdings in Madison Square Garden to
where they controlled it and were able Page 358 U. S. 248 to "dictate its policies and boxing activities." This has
continued their control over I.B.C., New York, the stock of which
is now wholly owned by Madison Square Garden. [ Footnote 5 ] They are the sole stockholders of
Chicago Stadium Corporation, which, in turn, is the sole
stockholder of I.B.C., Illinois. Their control over this boxing
empire is revealed by the fact that Norris is president of each of
the four top corporations, i.e., Madison Square Garden,
I.B.C., New York, Chicago Stadium Corporation, and I.B.C.,
Illinois. He and Wirtz are directors in all four, while I.B.C.,
Illinois and I.B.C., New York, which have owned all of the
promotion contracts with the contenders, have a joint board of
directors.

															The effect of the conspiracy is obvious. Using the facilities of
I.B.C., Illinois and I.B.C., New York, appellants entered into
exclusive promotion contracts with title aspirants, requiring
exclusive handling agreements in the event the contender became
champion. In amassing their empire, appellants obtained control of
champions in three divisions. The choice given a contender
thereafter was clear, i.e., to sign with appellants or not
to fight. With appellants in control of the key arenas and stadia
of the country through Madison Square Garden, Chicago Stadium
Corporation, and others, an event could not be successfully staged
in any of these areas, the most fruitful in the Nation, without
their Page 358 U. S. 249 consent. The exercise of this power brought immediate results.
From June, 1949, when appellants staged their first championship
fight, until May 15, 1953, the date of the amended complaint, they
staged or controlled the promotion of 36 of the 44 championship
battles held in this country, giving them approximately 81% of that
field. In two of the classifications, heavyweight and middleweight,
the combine staged all of the contests. The power of the combine to
exclude competitors in the championship field is graphically shown
by their promotion of 25 out of 27 fights in all divisions, a total
of 93%, during the two-and-a-half-year period ending with the
filing of the amended complaint. This power extended to the sale of
film and broadcasting rights -- most valuable adjuncts to
successful promotion in the business.

															Appellants launch a vigorous attack on the finding that the
relevant market was the promotion of championship boxing contests,
in contrast to all professional boxing events. They rely primarily
on United States v. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U. S. 377 (1956). That case, involving an alleged monopoly of the market in
cellophane, held that the relevant market was not cellophane alone,
but the entire field of flexible packaging materials. In testing
for the relevant market in Sherman Act cases, the Court said:

															". . . no more definite rule can be declared than that
commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same
purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,'
monopolization of which may be illegal." du Pont, supra, at 351 U. S. 395 .
The appellants argue that the "physical identity of the products
here would seem necessarily to put them in one and the same
market." They say that any boxing contest, whether championship or
not, always includes one ring, two boxers and one referee, fighting
under the same rules before a greater or lesser number of
spectators, Page 358 U. S. 250 either present at ringside or through the facilities of
television, radio, or moving pictures.

															We do not feel that this conclusion follows. As was also said in du Pont, supra, at 351 U. S.
404 :

															"The 'market' . . . will vary with the part of commerce under
consideration. The tests are constant. That market is composed of
products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes
for which they are produced -- price, use, and qualities
considered."

															With this in mind, the lower court in the instant case found
that there exists a "separate, identifiable market" for
championship boxing contests. This general finding is supported by
detailed findings to the effect that the average revenue from all
sources for appellants' championship bouts was $154,000, compared
to $40,000 for their nonchampionship programs; that television
rights to one championship fight brought $100,000, in contrast to
$45,000 for a nontitle fight seven months later between the same
two fighters; that the average "Nielsen" ratings [ Footnote 6 ] over a two-and-one-half-year
period were 74.9% for appellants' championship contests, and 57.7%
for their nonchampionship programs (reflecting a difference of
several million viewers between the two types of fights); that,
although the revenues from movie rights for six of appellants'
championship bouts totaled over $600,000, no full-length motion
picture rights were sold for a nonchampionship contest; and that
spectators pay "substantially more" for tickets to championship
fights than for Page 358 U. S. 251 nontitle fights. In addition, numerous representatives of the
broadcasting, motion picture and advertising industries testified
to the general effect that a

															"particular and special demand exists among radio broadcasting
and telecasting [and motion picture] companies for the rights to
broadcast and telecast [and make and distribute films of]
championship contests, in contradistinction to similar rights to
nonchampionship contests. [ Footnote
7 ]"

															In view of these findings, we cannot say that the lower court
was "clearly erroneous" in concluding that nonchampionship fights
are not "reasonably interchangeable for the same purpose" as
championship contests. A determination of the "part of the trade or
commerce" encompassed by the Sherman Act involves distinctions in
degree, as well as distinctions in kind. One prime example of this
is the application of the Act to trade or commerce in a localized
geographical area. See, e.g., Schine Theatres v. United
States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.
S. 100 (1948); cf. Times-Picayune v. United
States, 345 U. S. 594 (1953); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.
S. 495 (1948). The case which most squarely governs this
case is United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.
S. 131 (1948). There, the charge involved, inter
alia, extensive motion picture theatre holdings. The District
Court had refused to order a divestiture of such holdings on the
grounds that no "national monopoly" had been intended or obtained.
This Court felt that such a finding was not dispositive of the
issue, saying:

															"First, there is no finding as to the presence or absence of
monopoly on the part of the five majors Page 358 U. S. 252 [defendants] in the first-run field for the entire
country, in the first-run field in the 92 largest cities
of the country, or in the first-run field in separate
localities. Yet the first-run field, which constitutes the
cream of the exhibition business, is the core of the present cases.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws unreasonable restraints
irrespective of the amount of trade or commerce involved
( United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S.
150 , 310 U. S. 224 -225, n. 59),
and § 2 condemns monopoly of 'any part' of trade or commerce." Paramount, supra, at 334 U. S.
172 -173. (Emphasis in the original.) Similarly,
championship boxing is the "cream" of the boxing business, and, as
has been shown above, is a sufficiently separate part of the trade
or commerce to constitute the relevant market for Sherman Act
purposes. [ Footnote 8 ]

															We have also examined the remainder of this characteristically
lengthy record. When the case was here previously, appellants did
not deny that the allegations of the complaint stated a cause of
action against them, provided their activity came within the
meaning of the Sherman Act. We held that the complaint stated a
cause of action. The District Court has now found these allegations
to have been proven. With the case in this posture, appellants have
an almost insurmountable burden. They must show that the findings,
or at least the basic ones, are "clearly erroneous." Rule 52(a),
Rules of Civil Procedure. This they have not been able to do. It
follows that the decree entered on the merits adjudging the
appellants to have violated both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act must
be affirmed. Page 358 U. S. 253 THE RELIEF In approaching the question of relief, we must remember that our
function is not to sit as a trial court. Besser Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 343 U. S. 444 , 343 U. S.
449 -450 (1952); United States v. National Lead
Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947); cf. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 , 323 U. S. 185 (1944). As was said in International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U. S. 392 , 332 U. S.
400 -401 (1947):

															"The framing of [antitrust] decrees should take place in the
District, rather than in Appellate, Courts. They are invested with
large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of
the particular case."

															The yardstick which the trial court should apply in
monopolization cases is well stated by the Court in Schine
Theatres v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 , 334 U. S.
128 -129 (1948). The decree should (1) put "an end to the
combination or conspiracy when that is itself the violation"; (2)
deprive "the antitrust defendants of the benefits of their
conspiracy"; and (3) "break up or render impotent the monopoly
power which violates the Act."

															The relief granted by a trial court in an antitrust case and
brought here on direct appeal, thus bypassing the usual appellate
review, has always had the most careful scrutiny of this Court.
Though the records are usually most voluminous, and their review
exceedingly burdensome, we have painstakingly undertaken it to make
certain that justice has been done. See, e.g., United States v.
Paramount Pictures, supra; Schine Theatres v. United States, supra;
United States v. National Lead Co., supra. That we have done
here. We have finally concluded that the relief granted was not
beyond the allowable discretion of the District Court. Page 358 U. S. 254 The Bounds of the Relief Ordered At the time of the final decree, the Joe Louis agreements had
elapsed; the exclusive contract practice had been at least
temporarily abandoned; the leases on Yankee Stadium, the Polo
Grounds, and St. Nicholas Arena in New York had been given up, and
the appellants had no control over the new heavyweight champion,
Floyd Patterson. Nevertheless, the additional evidence taken by the
District Court showed that they still possessed all of the power of
monopoly and restraint. In this we agree. The appellants had
exercised a strangle hold on the industry for a long period. It was
evident at the time of the decree that, statistically, they still
dominated the staging of championship bouts, and completely
controlled the filming and broadcasting of those contests. They had
gained this leadership through the elimination by purchase of all
of their major competitors in the field; by the control of
contending boxers through exclusive agreements; and by the staging
of events through the ownership or lease of key stadia and arenas.
This illegal activity gave appellants an odorous monopoly
background which was known and still feared in the boxing world. In
addition, Norris and Wirtz still possessed the major tools, so well
used previously, necessary to continue their control. They owned or
controlled the key arena and stadium in New York and Chicago, the
most lucrative communities in boxing; they continued to control all
of the championship bouts staged there; they commanded the filming
and broadcasting of all championship fights -- the cream of the
business -- wherever staged; and though, on the surface, they owned
no stock directly in the two I.B.C. corporations, each was the
wholly owned subsidiary of corporations which Norris and Wirtz did
control and manage.

															In this setting, the District Court ordered Norris and Wirtz to
divest themselves, within a give-year period, of Page 358 U. S. 255 all stock which they owned "directly or indirectly" in Madison
Square Garden. In addition, both of the International Boxing Clubs,
Illinois and New York, were ordered dissolved. The Chicago Stadium
and Madison Square Garden were each enjoined from staging more than
two championship bouts annually. All exclusive agreements for the
promotion of boxing events, including nonchampionship, were banned.
Madison Square Garden was ordered for a period of five years to
lease its premises when available at a "fair and reasonable" rental
to any duly qualified promoter applying in writing therefor.
Failure to agree on terms would require submission to the courts
for determination. Like requirement was imposed on Chicago Stadium
Corporation, provided Norris and Wirtz control continued.

															The District Court Judge concluded that it was necessary to
include each of these provisions in the decree in order to put an
end to the combination, deprive the appellants of the benefit of
their conspiracy, and break up their monopoly power. At the
conclusion of the final hearing on relief, he observed that, prior
to 1949, the Norris-Wirtz group was in Chicago, while the Madison
Square Garden enterprise was in New York. They were "two separate
entities," one promoting contests in the mid-West and the other in
New York. He declared that,

															"in order to destroy this monopoly, we have to return the
situation as nearly as possible to the economic conditions as they
existed in 1949,"

															and, further,

															"I can see no way in this case . . . that a proper decree can be
formulated unless that power that Wirtz and Norris have in Madison
Square Garden is curtailed. They have to get out of the
control." The Order of Divestiture Appellants contend that, since the stock owned by Norris and
Wirtz was not acquired pursuant to the conspiracy, was not the
fruit of illegal activity, and was not Page 358 U. S. 256 proven to be the lever by which Madison Square Garden was
persuaded to join the conspiracy, divestiture was but punishment,
rather than a necessary corrective remedy. They further say that
the sale, even though made in the manner outlined in the decree,
[ Footnote 9 ] would result in
great loss to Norris and Wirtz. They contend that it was arbitrary
for the District Court not to permit them to exercise an option, as
proposed by them, of a choice between Madison Square Garden and the
Chicago Stadium, both of which they still control.

															It may be that the stock in Madison Square Garden was not the
fruit of the conspiracy; but, even if lawfully acquired, it may be
utilized as part of the conspiracy to effect its ends. See
United States v. Paramount Pictures, supra, at 334 U. S. 152 .
Moreover, since the inception of the conspiracy, Norris and Wirtz
have increased their holdings to over 219,000 shares. It was this
stock ownership and their control of stock voting power that the
trial court found dictated the election of the officers and
directors of Madison Square Garden, and gave to Norris and Wirtz
the unquestioned control and management of its activities. Although
reluctant at first to require a divestiture of this stock, the
trial judge ultimately became convinced that it was the sine
qua non of the relief. During the hearing he said:

															"The great evil I found was the combination that Wirtz and
Norris caused and created by joining up with Madison Square Garden.
I regard Wirtz and Norris as one, and Madison Square Garden as
another, a separate entity and business interest. The
evil Page 358 U. S. 257 primarily sprung from their combination, their concerted
efforts and action. That has to be broken up. "

															(Emphasis supplied.)

															What is perhaps equally significant is that, through the
exercise of this power, Norris and Wirtz elected the officers and
board of directors of I.B.C., New York -- a joint board with
I.B.C., Illinois, which they also controlled through the Chicago
Stadium Corporation. This joint board was the bridge over which the
conspiracy was made effective. Over it, the control of the
promotion of championship boxing contests was secured. That this
control remained effective up to the very date of the final
hearing, June 24, 1957, is shown by the following statement by the
court on that date:

															"The unlawful combination of the defendants still possesses and
exercises its monopolistic control in the field of championship
contests. It appears that, since May 15, 1953, there have been held
in the United States 37 championship contests, excluding one
bantamweight contest. The defendants admit that they had
promotional control over 24 of the 37 championship contests which
were held or of 65 per cent of the market, but we find that the
defendants were not financial strangers to the other 13
championship contests which were held in cities other than New York
and Chicago. Because the defendants are licensed by state
authorities to promote only in New York and Illinois, they could
not be the persons actually designated as the promoter of the 13
championship contests, but all five of the championship contests
which originated in cities other than Chicago or New York on Friday
nights were televised on IBC's New York Friday night television
series."

															"We find, too, that all of the 37 championship contests in this
period from May 15, 1953, save Page 358 U. S. 258 only the five outdoor contests, were televised on either the
defendants' Wednesday or Friday night television series, and that
the profits of the sale of the telecasting rights inured to the
benefit of the defendants."

															As this was some two and a half years after our opinion in the
former appeal on January 31, 1955, it appears that appellants had
continued exercising their unlawful control long after they well
knew that this activity was within the coverage of the Sherman Act.
In view of the fact that no denial was made on that appeal of the
sufficiency of the Government's complaint, it is reasonable to
assume that appellants, subsequent to our opinion, knew that their
conduct violated the Sherman Act, obedience to which is so
important to our free enterprise system. Still they continued their
illegal activity. In fact, from all appearances, it is continuing
to this day. Such conduct, in addition to the interlocking nature
of the ownership at the time of the final decree, fully justified
the District Court's conclusion that the

															"dissolution of the combination can only be accomplished by an
immediate and complete severance of the interlocking ownership of
Norris and Wirtz in Madison Square Garden. . . . [T]here must be a
complete divestiture of the stockholdings of Norris and Wirtz in
the Garden. The Government has established Norris and Wirtz control
the Garden Corporation."

															Moreover, this was the only effective means at hand by which
competition in championship events might be restored. It was
intended to return the parties as near as possible to the status quo existing prior to the conspiracy.

															For these reasons, we do not see why it was incumbent upon the
court to give Norris and Wirtz certain options requested at the
time of the decree. We shall mention only two. The first was that
they have the right to exercise a choice of retaining either
Madison Square Gaden Page 358 U. S. 259 or the Chicago Stadium. But this would not be conducive to the
reestablishment of competition between the two interests, which the
District Court considered a necessity. Nor would it eliminate the
"great evil" the trial court found in the Norris-Wirtz-Garden
combination. Another requested option was that Norris and Wirtz be
permitted to retain their control of Madison Square Garden, and the
latter be enjoined from promoting championship boxing events. But
this would have eliminated the world's principal boxing center --
"the premier sports arena in the world," as appellants
characterized it -- from promoting such events in competition with
Norris and Wirtz.

															In short, the Government, in its effort to free the professional
boxing business of monopoly and unreasonable restraints, would have
won the battle but lost the war under either of the proffered
alternatives. As this Court said in United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173 , 323 U. S.
189 -190 (1944):

															"Common control was one of the instruments in bringing about
unity of purpose and unity of action and in making the conspiracy
effective. If that affiliation continues, there will be tempting
opportunity . . . to act in combination. . . . The proclivity in
the past to use that affiliation for an unlawful end warrants
effective assurance that no such opportunity will be available in
the future." The Dissolution of the Two International Boxing
Clubs Admittedly, these corporations were formed pursuant to, and were
the means used to effectuate, the conspiracy. As the trial judge
said:

															"These corporations are the promotional arms of the defendants,
conceived and used to enable defendants Page 358 U. S. 260 to restrain and monopolize promotion of championship boxing
contests. Their assets are of but nominal value except for the
goodwill attaching to their names by virtue of the conspiracy."

															The conditions existing here even subsequent to our former
opinion confirm the need for such dissolution. Both corporations
continued to share equally the profits the combination reaped from
the staging of championship boxing contests. This also included
revenues from championship contests promoted by others, but
televised by the combination. They continue even now as the bridge
between the choice arenas Norris and Wirtz own or control and the
boxers with whom they have exclusive promotion contracts. Through
interlocking officers and directorates, the two I.B.C.'s thus
effectively hold the combination together. It is antitrust policy
to decree dissolution "where the creation of the combination is
itself the violation." United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.,
supra, at 323 U. S. 189 ,
and cases there cited. This is one of those situations where the
injunctive process affords too little relief too late.

															Appellants argue that this is punitive -- that the parent
companies, under the decree, are left free to organize new
corporations to handle their respective boxing promotions, and,
hence, dissolution is a useless act. The trial court felt, however,
and we agree, that continued operation under the old I.B.C.
charters might lead to a situation nominis umbra not
conducive to the elimination of the old illegal practices. New
corporations, if formed, would start off with clean slates, free
from numerous written and oral agreements and understandings now
existent and known throughout the industry. Hence, dissolution
might well have the salutary effect of completely clearing new
horizons that the trial judge was attempting to create in the
boxing world, especially when effected in conjunction Page 358 U. S. 261 with the stock divestiture provision. Moreover, there would be
little inconvenience and nominal expense even if, as appellants
contend, they, "as a practical matter, must [form new corporations]
if they are to promote any boxing at all." This we think a poor
excuse for not completely eliminating, by dissolution, these old
trappings of monopoly and restraint. The Compulsory Leasing Provisions The District Court, having found that one of the means used in
effectuating the conspiracy was the ownership and control of arenas
and stadia, entered a compulsory leasing provision in the decree as
to Madison Square Garden and the Chicago Stadium Corporation.
[ Footnote 10 ]

															The appellants' main concern with this provision of the decree
is the requirement that, in the event the terms of a lease cannot
be agreed upon, the matter will be submitted to the District Court.
Appellants fear that this is not only an undesirable, but an
impractical, activity for a District Court. But they have suggested
no alternative to relieve the court of this burden. Obviously, such
a provision may result in some disputes which must be settled.
Until experience in the enforcement of the provision proves the
reference to be too burdensome, we see no reason to disturb it. If
experience proves it unworkable, the parties, under the decree, may
apply to the court for Page 358 U. S. 262 appropriate relief. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U. S. 143 , 342 U. S.
156 -157 (1951); International Salt Co. v. United
States, supra, at 332 U. S.
401 . Exclusive Contracts With Contestants Appellants object to the prohibition against exclusive contracts
applying to all professional boxing contests. They question the
Government's enlarging its base from championship bouts to all
professional boxing. But, human nature being what it is, there is
sound reason to say that exclusive contracts with boxers in
nontitle contests would surely affect those same boxers when and if
they arrive at the title. Such arrangements would give appellants,
so experienced in the boxing field, a decided advantage over the
independent promoter. Such a prohibition is fully justified, at
least until the effects of the conspiracy are fully dissipated. For
the same reason, we see no fault in the five-year prohibition
against exclusive rights to a return bout.

															The trial court recognized that these restrictions went beyond
the "relevant market" which has been considered for purposes of
determining the Sherman Act violations, but felt that "[t]he relief
here must be broader than the championship field, because the evil
to be remedied is broader." This Court has recognized that,
sometimes, "relief, to be effective, must go beyond the narrow
limits of the proven violation." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., supra, at 340 U. S. 90 ; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U. S. 593 , 341 U. S. 600 (1951). When this sort of relief is granted, we must, of course, be
especially wary lest the trial court overstep the correspondingly
narrower limits of its discretion; but, for the reasons set out
above, we feel that no such misuse of the trial court's power is
present here.

															We have considered the other objections of appellants to the
decree, and find them unsubstantial as presently Page 358 U. S. 263 posed. In the event experience proves that some of the
provisions are so severe as to require modification or amendment,
the parties may apply to the District Court as provided in
paragraph 25 of the decree. The judgment should be affirmed. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE STEWART took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. [ Footnote 2 ]

															Ezzard Charles, Joe Walcott, Lee Savold, and Gus Lesnevich.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The importance of Madison Square Garden in the present context
is shown by the fact that of all the championship contests staged
during the 12 years immediately preceding 1949, 45% were held in
New York City, of which 75% were in Madison Square Garden. The
balance of the New York championship bouts, with one exception,
were held in Yankee Stadium, the Polo Grounds, or St. Nicholas
Arena.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Between 1937 and 1948, 50% of all championship contests were
staged in either Madison Square Garden, Yankee Stadium, the Polo
Grounds, St. Nicholas Arena, Chicago Stadium, Detroit Olympia
Arena, or the St. Louis Arena.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															At the time the I.B.C.'s were formed, Joe Louis owned 20% of the
stock of each and the other 80% was spit evenly between Norris and
Wirtz, on one hand, and Madison Square Garden, on the other. At
some point thereafter, Louis ceased to be a stockholder, and his
share was split evenly between Norris-Wirtz and Madison Square
Garden. At the time of the final decree, apparently as the result
of an effort to make a showing of separateness of control, the
Norris-Wirtz interests owned all of the stock in I.B.C., Illinois,
and Madison Square Garden owned all of the stock in I.B.C., New
York. The trial court found that the two interests nevertheless
still shared equally in the combined profits of both I.B.C.'s.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															According to the District Court, the

															"Nielsen Average Audience rating is a percentage which purports
to show the number of residential television sets that were tuned
in to the program expressed as a percentage of the total
residential television sets, whether turned off or on, which were
in areas into which the program was telecast."

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Approximately 25% of the revenue produced by the appellants'
championship fights during the period covered by the complaint was
derived through the sale of radio, television and motion picture
rights.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															By analogy, it bears those sufficiently "peculiar
characteristics" found in automobile fabrics and finishes such as
to bring them within the Clayton Act's "line of commerce." United States v. du Pont & Co., 353 U.
S. 586 , 353 U. S.
593 -595 (1957).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Norris and Wirtz were given five years to sell their stock in
Madison Square Garden, which stock is listed on the New York Stock
Exchange. During this time, the stock is to be held by two trustees
named by the court. If the stock is not sold within five years, the
trustees are ordered to sell it within the next two years.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															This provision of the decree, applying only to championship
contests, ordered appellants to lease their respective buildings
upon seasonable written request by a qualified promoter, if the
proposed rent is reasonable, if the applicant furnishes adequate
security, and if at the time of the application the building is
neither already under lease to another for the specified day nor in
conflict at that time with "any well established event" which has
been regularly conducted therein. If the parties cannot agree on
what constitutes adequate security or a reasonable rental, either
party may apply to the court for a determination thereof.

															MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting in part.

															While I have heretofore expressed views in favor of the almost
controlling deference to be paid to a District Court's considered
formulation of the provisions appropriate to a decree designed to
remedy adjudicated violations of the antitrust laws, those views
have not prevailed, see the opinions in United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 , and
this Court has felt free to modify and eliminate provisions of an
antitrust decree, particularly when a single judge has imposed an
unconventional and drastic remedy. The main issue dealt with in MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN's dissent, while a narrow one, is, in my view,
important. While divestiture has been decreed by the district
judge, the mandatory disposition of the stock has been delayed for
five years, and the stock placed in trusteeship. During this
five-year period, a series of detailed controls have been imposed,
under the supervision of the District Court, in order to prevent
appellants Norris and Wirtz from exercising the power their stock
ownership has given them over the operations of Madison Square
Garden. The ownership itself has been sterilized. I think it not an
unreasonable forecast that, even were we to postpone for five years
the decision whether to order the divestiture or continue the
trusteeship, appellants Norris and Wirtz would not find it
profitable to continue their sterilized ownership of the Garden
stock. However, Page 358 U. S. 264 there is no compelling reason to order them to do what sound
business judgment may compel. One has the right to assume that, in
view of this Court's unanimous affirmance of the findings below
that appellants were in violation of the Sherman Law, they will
scrupulously obey the decree, and not even by the subtlest
indirection seek to avoid our decision. Therefore, I think it is
needless now to determine that divestiture must take place five
years hence, rather than wait upon the event in order to determine
whether divestiture should then be ordered.

															Accordingly, I join MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's opinion.

															MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE
WHITTAKER join, dissenting in part.

															I am unable to subscribe to the Court's approval of those parts
of the decree below which ordered (1) the divestiture of the
stockholdings of Norris and Wirtz in Madison Square Garden
Corporation and (2) the dissolution of the New York and Illinois
International Boxing Clubs. On the other aspects of the case, I
agree with the results the Court has reached. DIVESTITURE As a starting point, I accept the conclusion of the District
Court that competition in the promotion and exhibition of
professional championship boxing could not be effectively restored
so long as Norris and Wirtz remained in control of Madison Square
Garden's activities in this field. Because of the preeminence of
the Garden as a site for boxing contests, the District Court found
that its control by Norris and Wirtz constituted the fulcrum of the
antitrust violations which were adjudged. That finding is supported
by the evidence, and, in turn, justifies the court's conclusion
that the elimination of their Page 358 U. S. 265 influence in the Garden was prerequisite to restoring
competition.

															It by no means follows, however, that the order divesting Norris
and Wirtz of their Garden stockholdings was an appropriate method
of accomplishing that objective in the circumstances of this case.
Unless past pronouncements of this Court cautioning against the
indiscriminate use of divestiture as a remedy in antitrust cases, see Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U. S. 593 , are
to be taken less seriously than they should be, it seems to me that
the Court has too lightly given approval to the use of that drastic
measure here. First. It is not at all clear to me just why the
District Court, which, in the early stages of the hearings on
relief, expressed itself strongly against divestiture, ultimately
reached the conclusion that such a course was necessary. Indeed,
the record can be read as indicating the court's belief that the
five-year trusteeship of the stock, though designed to alleviate
some of the hardships of a forced sale, would, at the same time,
effectively remove Norris and Wirtz from control over the Garden's
affairs, and therefore, in conjunction with the other provisions of
the decree, result in restoring competitive conditions, whether or
not the correlative requirement of sale was carried out within the
five-year period. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
The decree itself supports this Page 358 U. S. 266 reading. For, despite the evident realization that the stock
might not be sold within five years, the provisions of the decree
especially aimed at opening up competition for the use of the
Garden are all geared to this period. If, in fact, the District
Court thought this five-year insulation of Norris and Wirtz from
managerial and policymaking activities at the Garden would combine
with the other restrictions to restore competition, justification
for divestiture must then be found in a purpose to prevent a
relapse into noncompetitive conditions after the five years have
elapsed, something which the District Court quite properly
considered to be a function of the decree. On this premise, I am at
a loss to see why continuance of the trusteeship, and, if
necessary, the concomitant restrictions of the Garden's activities,
should not have been considered adequate to serve that end. Second. If I am mistaken in thus divining the thinking
of the District Court, I still consider that, in the circumstances
of this case, divestiture was at least ordered prematurely.
Determination whether that drastic remedy was required should have
been postponed until the expiration of the trusteeship period, so
that the necessity for its application could then be judged in
light of the effectiveness of the other sanctions of the decree. I
recognize that various contingencies can be conjured up to support
the view that divestiture, rather than trusteeship, holds the more
solid promise of assuring the preservation of competition.
Nevertheless, I think that rejection of a continuance of the
trusteeship in favor of divestiture should, in the peculiar setting
of this case, be based on experience, rather than speculative
apprehension. Page 358 U. S. 267 Three factors seem to me especially compelling toward such a
course. In the first place, this cannot properly be considered a
case of reprehensible immoral conduct or willful lawbreaking.
[ Footnote 2/2 ] Not until January
31, 1955, when this Court handed down its opinion in United
States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.
S. 236 , did it become known that professional boxing was
even subject to the federal antitrust laws. In view of this Court's
earlier decisions in the baseball cases, Federal Baseball Club
v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 , and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.
S. 356 , I think it reasonable to say that, in 1949, when
this alleged conspiracy began, most well informed lawyers believed
that professional boxing, like professional baseball, was beyond
antitrust stricture. Hence, the appellants had every reason to
believe their actions were innocent when taken. Putting the matter
somewhat differently, we should be slow in lending approval to the
use of such a drastic remedy as this in a case where the appellants
have never had the opportunity to demonstrate their willingness to
comply with the law once they have learned that it applies to their
activities. In my opinion, the thrust of this factor is not blunted
by arguing, as the Court does, that appellants should voluntarily
have done something to unscramble their relationships during the
two and a half years that elapsed between the Court's decision in
the original International Boxing case and the entry of
the present decree. That sort of squeeze play should not be
expected of those already involved in a lawsuit. Page 358 U. S. 268 Further, divestiture here is brought to bear upon a large
investment, much of which was acquired long before the conduct
charged in this case began, and the balance of which was obtained
prior to the announcement of the International Boxing decision. The "unlawful fruits" doctrine accordingly offers no
justification for this divestiture. Although recognizing this to be
true, the Court states that the Garden stock was nonetheless
utilized as means of accomplishing the antitrust violations. But
this is just another way of saying that divestiture is a necessary
element of effective relief; it affords no independent
justification for the employment of that remedy.

															Lastly, the divestiture order reaches far beyond the subject
matter of the action. It permanently removes Norris and Wirtz from
all interest in the Garden, over 90% of whose activities are
entirely unrelated to professional boxing. Third. It is true, of course, that the trial court's
considered judgment on what is necessary to dissipate the effects
and prevent recurrence of an adjudged antitrust violation is
entitled to much deference from this Court. But, by the same token,
this Court, before it is asked to put its stamp of approval on such
a drastic remedy as divestiture, is entitled to have a clear and
unambiguous expression of the district court's reasoning in
choosing such a course. Especially is this so where, as here, this
Court is the sole reviewing authority, and, in consequence, has not
had the benefit of an intermediate review of the issues by a Court
of Appeals. In my opinion, this record leaves much to be desired in
this regard. The most I can make of it, taking the case for
divestiture most favorably to the Government, is that the District
Court would have been justified in reserving that issue for
consideration at the time the five-year trusteeship of the Norris
and Wirtz stock expired. Certainly no adequate case for a present
order of divestiture has been made out. In this view of Page 358 U. S. 269 the matter, it becomes unnecessary to discuss at this time the
various "options" alternative to divestiture which were rejected by
the District Court. DISSOLUTION I can find no adequate basis for the order dissolving the two
International Boxing Clubs. My difficulty with this aspect of the
relief is sufficiently shown by the fact that, as I read the
record, it would be permissible for Madison Square Garden and the
Norris and Wirtz interests in Chicago to create new corporations
carrying exactly the same name as the two present organizations.
The only justification offered by the Government for this aspect of
the decree is that the two clubs were instrumentalities of the
antitrust conspiracy, and that their dissolution was but an
expedient for insuring that all of their illegal agreements had
been put to an end. But since all such agreements, both written and
oral, are already canceled by other provisions of the decree, and
since there is no suggestion that the sweeping relief granted by
the District Court has any loopholes which would permit these
organizations to function improperly, this justification is hardly
convincing. In these circumstances, dissolution appears to me to be
not only punitive, but futile, something not promotive of sound
antitrust law enforcement.

															I would remand the case to the District Court with instructions
to modify its decree by striking the provisions for compulsory sale
of the Norris and Wirtz stock in the Madison Square Garden
Corporation, reserving the issue of divestiture for further
proceedings at the end of the five-year trusteeship period, and
eliminating the requirement of dissolution of the two International
Boxing Clubs.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Apart from its divestiture and dissolution provisions, the
decree imposes wide-ranging and pervasive restrictions on
appellants' activities in boxing promotion and exhibition. It
renders void all exclusive contracts which they may presently have
with boxers. It prohibits the making of new exclusive contracts,
with the exception that, after five years, exclusive provision may
be made for return bouts. Similarly, exclusive leases with stadia
not owned by appellants are proscribed. So, too, are such
arrangements with television and radio broadcasters. Further,
appellants are restrained, for a period of five years, from
promoting more than four championship boxing programs annually, two
by Madison Square Garden and two, cumulatively, by Norris and
Wirtz. During that five-year period also, the compulsory leasing
provisions discussed in the Court's opinion are to be in effect.
Finally, the decree removes Norris and Wirtz as officers and
directors of Madison Square Garden, and enjoins them from holding
such positions in the future.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The District Court put the matter in this way:

															"I don't charge them [Norris and Wirtz] with malicious
intentional and moral wrongdoing, nor do I proceed to formulate the
decree on such a basis. They are guilty, if anything, of a moral,
prohibitive wrong, which was in doubt as to whether it was even
prohibitive at the time some of these acts were done, and serious
doubt, but most people held it was not."