U.S. Supreme Court Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417 (1990) Hodgson v. Minnesota Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309 Argued Nov. 29, 1989 Decided June 25, 1990 497
U.S. 417 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 144.343 provides that no abortion
shall be performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least
48 hours after both of her parents have been notified. The
two-parent notice requirement is mandatory unless, inter
alia, the woman declares that she is a victim of parental
abuse or neglect, in which event notice of her declaration must be
given to the proper authorities. Subdivision 6 provides that, if a
court enjoins the enforcement of subdivision 2, the same two-parent
notice requirement is effective unless a court of competent
jurisdiction orders the abortion to proceed without notice upon
proof by the minor that she is "mature and capable of giving
informed consent" or that an abortion without notice to both
parents would be in her best interest. Two days before the
statute's effective date, a group consisting of doctors, clinics,
pregnant minors, and the mother of a pregnant minor filed suit in
the District Court, alleging that the statute violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court declared the statute unconstitutional in its entirety,
and enjoined its enforcement. The Court of Appeals, sitting in
banc, reversed. Although it rejected the State's submission that
subdivision 2's two-parent notice requirement was constitutional
without any bypass procedure, the court held that subdivision 6 was
valid and that its bypass procedure saved the statute as a whole.
The court also rejected the argument that the 48-hour waiting
period imposed a significant burden on the minor's abortion
right. Held: The judgment is affirmed.

															853 F.2d 1452 (CA8 1988), affirmed.

															Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
to Parts I, II, IV, and VII, concluding that subdivision 2 of §
144.343 violates the Constitution insofar as it requires two-parent
notification.

															(a) Since none of this Court's abortion decisions dealing with
parental consent or notification statutes focused on the possible
significance of making the consent or notice applicable to both
parents instead of just Page 497 U. S. 418 one, the District Court's extensive and unchallenged findings on
the question are significant. On the basis of extensive trial
testimony, the District Court found, inter alia, that the
two-parent notification requirement had particularly harmful
effects on both the minor and the custodial parent when the parents
were divorced or separated, especially in the context of an abusive
or dysfunctional family; that the requirement also had adverse
effects in families in which the minor lives with both parents,
particularly where family violence is a serious problem; that the
requirement actually impairs family communication in many
instances, since minors who otherwise would inform one parent were
unwilling to do so when such notification would involve going to
court for a bypass in any event; that few minors can take advantage
of the abuse exception because of the obligation to report the
information to the authorities and the attendant loss of privacy;
and that the two-parent requirement did not further the State's
interests in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family
integrity. The court also found that, in many cases, the statutory
48-hour waiting period was extended to a week or more by scheduling
considerations, thereby increasing the risk associated with the
abortion to a statistically significant degree. Pp. 497 U. S.
436 -444.

															(b) The requirement that both parents be notified,
whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed
responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably
further any legitimate state interest. Any such interest in
supporting the authority of a parent, who is presumed to act in the
minor's best interest, to assure that the abortion decision is
knowing, intelligent, and deliberate, would be fully served by a
one-parent notification requirement as to functioning families,
where notice to either parent would normally constitute notice to
both. As to the many families in which the parent notified would
not notify the other parent, the State has no legitimate interest
in questioning the first parent's judgment or in presuming him or
her incompetent to make decisions regarding the child's health and
welfare. Moreover, as the record demonstrates, the two-parent
requirement actually disserves the state interest in protecting and
assisting the minor with respect to the thousands of dysfunctional
families affected by the statute, where the requirement proved
positively harmful. There is no merit to the argument that the
two-parent requirement is justified because, in the ideal family,
the minor should make her decision only after consultation with
both parents, who should naturally be concerned with her welfare.
The State has no legitimate interest in conforming family life to a
state-designed ideal by requiring family members to talk together.
Nor can the State's interest in protecting a parent's interest in
shaping a child's values and lifestyle overcome the liberty
interests of a minor acting with the consent of a single parent or
court. The combined force of the separate Page 497 U. S. 419 interest of one parent and the minor's privacy interest
outweighs the separate interest of the second parent, and the
justification for any rule requiring parental involvement in the
abortion decision rests entirely on the best interests of the
child. The fact that the two-parent requirement is virtually an
oddity among state and federal consent provisions governing
childrens' health, welfare, and education further demonstrates its
unreasonableness and the ease with which the State can adopt less
burdensome means to protect the minor's welfare. Pp. 497 U. S.
450 -455.

															Justice STEVENS, joined by Justice O'CONNOR, concluded in Parts
V and VI that:

															1. Three separate but related interests are relevant to the
constitutionality of the 48-hour waiting period and the two-parent
notification requirement. First, the State has a strong and
legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose
immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair
their ability to exercise their rights wisely. That interest
justifies a state-imposed requirement that the minor notify and
consult with a parent before terminating her pregnancy. See,
e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 497 U. S.
510 -511. Second, parents have an interest in controlling
their childrens' education and upbringing, and a natural parent's
stake in the relationship with a child may rise to the level of a
protected liberty interest if the parent has demonstrated his
commitment by assuming personal, financial, or custodial
responsibility for the child. Third, the family has a privacy
interest in its childrens' upbringing and education which is
constitutionally protected against undue state interference. When
government intrudes on the family's choices, the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation must be carefully examined. Pp. 497 U. S.
444 -448.

															2. To the extent that subdivision 2 of the state statute
requires that a minor wait 48 hours after notifying a single parent
of her intention to obtain an abortion, it reasonably furthers the
legitimate state interest in ensuring that the minor's decision is
knowing and intelligent. The State may properly enact laws designed
to aid a parent who has assumed "primary responsibility" for a
minor's wellbeing in discharging that responsibility, and the
48-hour delay provides the parent the opportunity to consult with
his or her spouse and a family physician, to inquire into the
competency of the abortion doctor, and to discuss the decision's
religious and moral implications with the minor and provide needed
guidance and counsel as to how the decision will affect her future.
The delay imposes only a minimal burden on the minor's rights. The
statute does not impose any period of delay if the parents or a
court, acting in loco parentis, provide consent to the
procedure. Moreover, the record reveals that Page 497 U. S. 420 the waiting period may run concurrently with the time necessary
to make an appointment for the abortion. Pp. 497 U.S. 448 -449.

															Justice O'CONNOR concluded that subdivision 6 of the state
statute -- two-parent notification plus judicial bypass -- passes
constitutional muster because the interference with the family's
internal operation required by subdivision 2's two-parent notice
requirement simply does not exist where the minor can avoid
notifying one or both parents by using the bypass procedure. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 , 428 U. S. 90 -91.
P. 497 U. S.
461 .

															Justice KENNEDY, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and
Justice SCALIA, concluded:

															1. The state statute's 48-hour waiting period is necessary to
enable notified parents to consult with their daughter or her
physician, if they so wish, results in little or no delay, and is
therefore constitutional. Pp. 497 U. S.
496 -497.

															2. Subdivision 6 of the statute -- which requires two-parent
notification unless the pregnant minor obtains a judicial bypass --
is constitutional. By creating a judicial mechanism to identify,
and exempt from the strictures of the law, those cases in which the
minor is mature or in which parental notification is not in her
best interest, subdivision 6 precisely addresses the concern
underlying the Court's invalidation of subdivision 2: the
possibility that, in some cases, two-parent notification would not
work to the benefit of minors or their parents. In providing for
the bypass, moreover, Minnesota has simply attempted to fit its
legislation into the framework supplied by this Court's previous
cases, particularly Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.
S. 622 , which stands for the proposition that a
two-parent consent law is constitutional if it provides for a
sufficient judicial bypass alternative. See id. at 443 U. S. 643 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 443 U. S.
656 -657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The conclusion that
subdivision 6 must be sustained is compelled not only by Bellotti but also by H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 , in
which the Court held that a two-parent notice statute without a
bypass was constitutional as applied to immature minors whose best
interests would be served by notice. If that is the case, but if
such a law is not constitutional as applied to minors who are
mature or whose best interests are not so served, a judicial bypass
is an expeditious and efficient means by which to separate the
applications of the law which are constitutional from those which
are not. Pp. 497 U. S.
497 -501.

															STEVENS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV, and VII,
in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, an
opinion with respect to Part III, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, an
opinion with Page 497 U. S. 421 respect to Parts V and VI, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, and a
dissenting opinion with respect to Part VIII. O'CONNOR, J., filed
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 497 U. S. 458 .
MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 497 U. S. 461 .
SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part, post, p. 497 U. S. 479 .
KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and
SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 497 U. S.
480 . Page 497 U. S. 422 Justice STEVENS announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IV,
and VII, an opinion with respect to Part III in which Justice
BRENNAN joins, an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI in which
Justice O'CONNOR joins, and a dissenting opinion with respect to
Part VIII.

															A Minnesota statute, Minn.Stat. §§ 144.343(2)(7) (1988),
provides, with certain exceptions, that no abortion shall be
performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours
after both of her parents have been notified. In subdivisions 2-4
of the statute, the notice is mandatory unless (1) the attending
physician certifies that an immediate abortion is necessary to
prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to provide
the required notice; (2) both of her parents have consented in
writing; or (3) the woman declares that she is a victim of parental
abuse or neglect, in which event notice of her declaration must be
given to the proper authorities. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Page 497 U. S. 423 Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held this provision
unconstitutional. In No. 88-1309, we granted the State's petition
to review that holding. Subdivision 6 of the same statute provides
that, if a court enjoins the enforcement of subdivision 2, the same
notice requirement shall be effective unless the pregnant woman
obtains a court order permitting the abortion to proceed. By a vote
of 7-3, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of
subdivision 6. In No. 88-1125, we granted the plaintiffs' petition
to review that holding.

															For reasons that follow, we now conclude that the requirement of
notice to both of the pregnant minor's parents is not reasonably
related to legitimate state interests, and that subdivision 2 is
unconstitutional. A different majority of the Court, for reasons
stated in separate opinions, concludes that subdivision 6 is
constitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
in its entirety is affirmed. I The parental notice statute was enacted in 1981 as an amendment
to the Minors' Consent to Health Services Act. The earlier statute,
which remains in effect as subdivision 1 of § 144.343 and as §
144.346, had modified the common law requirement of parental
consent for any medical procedure performed on minors. It
authorized "any minor" to give effective consent without any
parental involvement for the treatment of "pregnancy and conditions
associated therewith, venereal disease, alcohol and other drug
abuse." [ Footnote 1 ] Page 497 U. S. 424 The statute, unlike others of its age, [ Footnote 2 ] applied to abortion services.

															The 1981 amendment qualified the authority of an "unemancipated
minor" [ Footnote 3 ] to give
effective consent to an abortion by requiring that either her
physician or an agent notify "the parent" personally or by
certified mail at least 48 hours before the procedure is performed.
[ Footnote 4 ] The term "parent"
is defined in subdivision 3 to mean "both parents of the pregnant
woman if they are both living." No exception is made for Page 497 U. S. 425 a divorced parent, a noncustodial parent, or a biological parent
who never married or lived with the pregnant woman's mother.
[ Footnote 5 ] The statute does
provide however, that if only one parent is living, or "if the
second one cannot be located through reasonably diligent effort,"
notice to one parent is Page 497 U. S. 426 sufficient. [ Footnote 6 ] It
also makes exceptions for cases in which emergency treatment prior
to notice "is necessary to prevent the woman's death," both parents
have already given their consent in writing, or the proper
authorities are advised that the minor is a victim of sexual or
physical abuse. [ Footnote 7 ]
The statute subjects a person performing an abortion in violation
of its terms to criminal sanctions and to civil liability in an
action brought by any person "wrongfully denied notification."
[ Footnote 8 ] Page 497 U. S. 427 Subdivision 6 authorizes a judicial bypass of the two-parent
notice requirement if subdivision 2 is ever "temporarily or
permanently" enjoined by judicial order. If the pregnant minor can
convince "any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction" that she
is "mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed
abortion," or that an abortion without notice to both parents would
be in her best interest, the court can authorize the physician to
proceed without notice. The statute provides that the bypass
procedure shall be confidential, that it shall be expedited, that
the minor has a right to court-appointed counsel, and that she
shall be afforded free access to the court "24 hours a day, seven
days a week." An order denying an abortion can be appealed on an
expedited basis, but an order authorizing an abortion without
notification is not subject to appeal. [ Footnote 9 ] Page 497 U. S. 428 The statute contains a severability provision, but it does not
include a statement of its purposes. The Minnesota Attorney General
has advised us that those purposes are apparent from the statutory
text, and that they

															"include the recognition and fostering of parent-child
relationships, promoting counsel to a child in a difficult and
traumatic choice, and providing for notice to those who are
naturally most concerned for the child's welfare. [ Footnote 10 ]"

															The District Court found that the primary purpose of the
legislation was to protect the wellbeing of minors by encouraging
them to discuss with their parents the decision whether to
terminate their pregnancies. [ Footnote 11 ] It also found that the legislature was
motivated by a Page 497 U. S. 429 desire to deter and dissuade minors from choosing to terminate
their pregnancies. [ Footnote
12 ] The Attorney General, however, disclaims any reliance on
this purpose. [ Footnote
13 ] II This litigation was commenced on July 30, 1981, two days before
the effective date of the parental notification statute. The
plaintiffs include two Minnesota doctors who specialize in
obstetrics and gynecology, four clinics providing abortion and
contraceptive services in metropolitan areas in Minnesota, six
pregnant minors representing a class of pregnant minors, and the
mother of a pregnant minor. Plaintiffs alleged that the statute
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and various provisions of the Minnesota
Constitution.

															Based on the allegations in their verified complaint, the
District Court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining Page 497 U. S. 430 the enforcement of subdivision 2 of the statute. After a
hearing, the court entered a preliminary injunction which still
remains in effect. App. 31. The District Court refused, however, to
rule on the validity of the judicial bypass procedure in advance of
trial. [ Footnote 14 ]

															In 1986, after a 5-week trial, the District Court concluded that
both the two-parent notification requirement and the 48-hour
waiting period were invalid. It further concluded that the
definition of the term "parent," which is carried over into the
notification requirement, was not severable from the remainder of
the statute. The court declared the entire statute unconstitutional
and enjoined the defendants from enforcing it.

															A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court
first held that a compulsory notification requirement is invalid if
it does not provide the pregnant minor with the option of an
alternative court procedure in which she can demonstrate either her
maturity or that performance of an abortion without notification
would be in her best interests. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
88-1125, p. 62a. Second, relying heavily on the findings of the
District Court concerning the impact of a two-parent notice
requirement on families in which the parents are divorced,
separated, or unmarried, the panel also concluded that the
unconstitutional notification requirement could not be saved by the
judicial bypass. The court reasoned that a mature minor and her
custodial parent are in a better position than a court to determine
whether notifying the noncustodial parent would be in the child's
best interests and that they should not be forced to submit to a
"Hobson's choice" between an unconstitutional notice requirement
and a burdensome court bypass. [ Footnote 15 ] The panel further Page 497 U. S. 431 held that the two-parent notice requirement was not severable.
[ Footnote 16 ]

															The panel opinion was vacated, and the Court of Appeals reheard
the case en banc. 853 F.2d 1452 (CA8 1988). The court unanimously
and summarily rejected the State's submission that the two-parent
notice requirement was constitutional without any bypass procedure. Id. at 1456-1457. The majority concluded, however, that
subdivision 6 of the statute was valid. It agreed with the District
Court that the development of a full factual record may demonstrate
that a facially valid statute is "unconstitutional in operation," id. at 1459, and that

															"the detailed factual findings concerning the general
difficulties of obtaining an abortion in Minnesota and the trauma
of the bypass procedure, compared to its effectiveness, raise
considerable questions about the practical Page 497 U. S. 432 wisdom of this statute." Ibid. In the majority's opinion, however, those
questions were for the legislature to consider because the statute
served valid state interests: the interest in

															"'encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and
advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether
or not to bear a child,' [ Footnote 17 ]"

															as well as the independent interest of the parents in the
upbringing of their children. [ Footnote 18 ]

															After noting that the State did not challenge the District
Court's findings, id. at 1462, the court concluded that
these findings placed undue emphasis on one-parent and no-parent
households. For even though the two-parent notice requirement may
not further the interests of the pregnant minor in such cases, the
rights of "best-interest" and mature minors were nevertheless
protected by the bypass procedure. More importantly,

															"as applied to all pregnant minors, regardless of their family
circumstances, the district court did not consider whether parental
and family interests (as distinguished from the interests of the
minor alone) justified the two-parent notice requirement." Id. at 1463. The court wrote:

															"The district court enjoined the entire statute because of the
impact of the two-parent notice requirement primarily upon one
group of pregnant minors, without considering the effect of the
bypass or the parental and family interests which have been
recognized by the Supreme Court. In concentrating upon the impact
of the statute on the pregnant minor not living with both parents,
and on the mature or non best-interest pregnant Page 497 U. S. 433 minor, the district court gave only limited consideration to the
50% or more pregnant minors who live with both parents and to
pregnant minors who are immature and whose best interests may
require parental involvement. The district court's determination
that an undue burden on the one group renders the statute
unconstitutional for all is contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision that a notice-consent/bypass procedure plainly serves
important state interests and is narrowly drawn to protect only
those interests. . . . Considering the statute as a whole and as
applied to all pregnant minors, the two-parent notice requirement
does not unconstitutionally burden the minor's abortion right." Id. at 1464-1465 (citation omitted). The Court of
Appeals also rejected the argument that the 48-hour waiting period
imposed a significant burden on the minor's abortion right, finding
that the waiting period could run concurrently with the scheduling
of an appointment for the procedure. Accordingly, the court
reversed the judgment of the District Court without reaching the
question of severability. [ Footnote 19 ]

															In dissent, two members of the court criticized the majority for
ignoring "the evidence amassed in a five-week trial," for relying
on the judicial bypass procedure "to uphold an unconstitutional
two-parent notification requirement," and for creating "a new
right, apparently of constitutional dimension, for noncustodial
parents to receive notice of their minor children's activities." Id. at 1466. One of the dissenters joined a third
dissenter in expressing the opinion that "a single-parent
notification requirement would withstand constitutional challenge." Id. at 1472. We granted certiorari, 492 U.S. 917
(1989). Page 497 U. S. 434 III There is a natural difference between men and women: only women
have the capacity to bear children. A woman's decision to beget or
to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.
S. 297 , 448 U. S.
316 -318 (1980); Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U. S. 678 , 431 U. S. 685 , 431 U. S. 687 (1977); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 , 414 U. S.
639 -640 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.
S. 113 , 410 U. S.
152 -153 (1973); id. at 410 U. S.
168 -170 (Stewart, J., concurring); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U. S. 438 , 405 U. S. 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.
S. 479 , 381 U. S.
502 -503 (1965) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). That
Clause, as interpreted in those cases, protects the woman's right
to make such decisions independently and privately, see Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589 , 429 U. S.
598 -600, and n. 23 (1977), free of unwarranted
governmental intrusion.

															"Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant
woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S.
153 , is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed,
considering her probable education, employment skills, financial
resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be
exceptionally burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of
having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for
parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the
traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities
of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a
minor the right to make an important decision will have
consequences so grave and indelible." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 , 443 U. S. 642 (1979) ( Bellotti II ).

															As we stated in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 , 428 U. S. 74 (1976), the right to make this decision "do[es] not mature and come
into being magically only when Page 497 U. S. 435 one attains the state-defined age of majority." Thus, the
constitutional protection against unjustified state intrusion into
the process of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to
pregnant minors as well as adult women.

															In cases involving abortion, as in cases involving the right to
travel or the right to marry, the identification of the
constitutionally protected interest is merely the beginning of the
analysis. State regulation of travel and of marriage is obviously
permissible even though a State may not categorically exclude
nonresidents from its borders, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 631 (1969), or deny prisoners the right to marry, Turner v.
Safley, 482 U. S. 78 , 482 U. S. 94 -99
(1987). But the regulation of constitutionally protected decisions,
such as where a person shall reside or whom he or she shall marry,
must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than
disagreement with the choice the individual has made. Cf.
Turner v. Safley, supra; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S.
1 , 388 U. S. 12 (1967). In the abortion area, a State may have no obligation to
spend its own money, or use its own facilities, to subsidize
nontherapeutic abortions for minors or adults. See, e.g., Maher
v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977); cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 ,
508-511 (1989); id. at 492 U. S.
523 -524 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment). A State's value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion may provide adequate support for decisions involving such
allocation of public funds, but not for simply substituting a state
decision for an individual decision that a woman has a right to
make for herself. Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause would be a nullity. A state policy favoring
childbirth over abortion is not, in itself, a sufficient
justification for overriding the woman's decision or for placing
"obstacles -- absolute or otherwise -- in the pregnant woman's path
to an abortion." Maher, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S. 474 ; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 448 U. S.
315 -316. Page 497 U. S. 436 In these cases, the State of Minnesota does not rest its defense
of this statute on any such value judgment. Indeed, it
affirmatively disavows that state interest as a basis for upholding
this law. [ Footnote 20 ]
Moreover, it is clear that the state judges who have interpreted
the statute in over 3,000 decisions implementing its bypass
procedures have found no legislative intent to disfavor the
decision to terminate a pregnancy. On the contrary, in all but a
handful of cases, they have approved such decisions. [ Footnote 21 ] Because the Minnesota
statute unquestionably places obstacles in the pregnant minor's
path to an abortion, the State has the burden of establishing its
constitutionality. Under any analysis, the Minnesota statute cannot
be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not reasonably related
to legitimate state interests. Cf. Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. at 482 U. S. 97 ; Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 704 (opinion of Powell, J.); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.
S. 179 , 410 U. S.
194 -195 (1973). IV The Court has considered the constitutionality of statutes
providing for parental consent or parental notification in six
abortion cases decided during the last 14 years. [ Footnote 22 ] Although the Massachusetts
statute reviewed in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.
S. 132 (1976) ( Bellotti I ), and Bellotti
II required the consent of both parents, and the Utah statute
reviewed in H.L. Page 497 U. S. 437 v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981), required notice to "the parents," [ Footnote 23 ] none of the opinions in any of
those cases focused on the possible significance of making the
consent or the notice requirement applicable to both parents
instead of just one. In contrast, the arguments in these cases, as
well as the extensive findings of the District Court, are directed
primarily at that distinction. It is therefore appropriate to
summarize these findings before addressing the constitutionality of
the 48-hour waiting period or the two-parent notification
requirement, particularly since none of the findings has been
challenged in either this Court or the Court of Appeals.

															Approximately one out of every two marriages ends in divorce. 648 F.
Supp. 756 , 768 (Minn.1986). Unrebutted evidence indicates that
only 50% of minors in the State of Minnesota reside with both
biological parents. Ibid.; App. 125-126. This conclusion
is substantially corroborated by a study indicating that 9% of the
minors in Minnesota live with neither parent and 33% live with only
one parent. 648 F. Supp. at 768. [ Footnote 24 ] Page 497 U. S. 438 The District Court found -- on the basis of extensive testimony
at trial -- that the two-parent notification requirement had
particularly harmful effects on both the minor and the custodial
parent when the parents were divorced or separated. Relations
between the minor and absent parent were not reestablished as a
result of the forced notification, thereby often producing
disappointment in the minor "when an anticipated reestablishment of
her relationship with the absent parent d[id] not occur."
Moreover,

															"[t]he reaction of the custodial parent to the requirement of
forced notification is often one of anger, resentment and
frustration at the intrusion of the absent parent,"

															and fear that notification will threaten the custody rights of
the parent or otherwise promote intra-family violence. Tragically,
those fears were often realized:

															"Involuntary involvement of the second biological parent is
especially detrimental when the minor comes from an abusive,
dysfunctional family. Notification of the minor's pregnancy and
abortion decision can provoke violence, even where the parents are
divorced or separated. Studies have shown that violence and
harassment may continue well beyond the divorce, especially when
children are involved."

															". . . Furthermore, a mother's perception in a dysfunctional
family that there will be violence if the father learns of the
daughter's pregnancy is likely to be an accurate perception." Id. at 769. The District Court further found:

															"Twenty to twenty-five percent of the minors who go to court
either are accompanied by one parent who knows and consents to the
abortion or have already told one parent of their intent to
terminate their pregnancy. The vast majority of these voluntarily
informed parents Page 497 U. S. 439 are women who are divorced or separated from spouses whom they
have not seen in years. Going to court to avoid notifying the other
parent burdens the privacy of both the minor and the accompanying
parent. The custodial parents are angry that their consent is not
sufficient, and fear that notification will bring the absent parent
back into the family in an intrusive and abusive way." Ibid. The District Court also found that the two-parent notification
requirement had adverse effects in families in which the minor
lives with both parents. These effects were particularly pronounced
in the distressingly large number of cases in which family violence
is a serious problem. The court found that many minors in Minnesota
"live in fear of violence by family members" and "are, in fact,
victims of rape, incest, neglect and violence." [ Footnote 25 ] The District Court found that
few minors can take advantage of the exception for a minor who
declares that she is a victim of sexual or physical abuse because
of the obligation to report the information to the authorities and
the attendant loss of privacy. See Findings 46 and 47, Page 497 U. S. 440 648 F. Supp. at 764. [ Footnote 26 ] This concern about family violence helps to
explain why the District Court found that in many instances the
requirement that both parents be notified actually impairs family
communication. Minors who otherwise would inform one parent were
unwilling to do so when such notification likely would also involve
the parent in the torturous ordeal of explaining to a court why the
second parent should not be notified. The court found:

															"Minors who ordinarily would notify one parent may be dissuaded
from doing so by the two-parent requirement. A minor who must go to
court for authorization in any event may elect not to tell either
parent. In these instances, the requirement that minors notify both
biological parents actually reduces parent-child
communication." Id. at 769. [ Footnote 27 ]

															The great majority of bypass petitions are filed in the three
metropolitan counties in Minnesota, where courts schedule bypass
hearings on a regular basis and have in place procedures for
hearing emergency petitions. Id. at 762. Courts in the
nonmetropolitan areas are acquainted with the statute and, for the
most part, apply it conscientiously, but a number of counties are
served by judges who are unwilling to hear bypass petitions. Id. at 763. Aside from the unavoidable Page 497 U. S. 441 notification of court officials, the confidentiality of minors
has been maintained. Ibid. During the period between August 1, 1981, and March 1, 1986,
3,573 judicial bypass petitions were filed in Minnesota courts. All
but 15 were granted. [ Footnote
28 ] The judges who adjudicated over 90% of these petitions
testified; none of them identified any positive effects of the law.
[ Footnote 29 ] The court
experience produced fear, tension, anxiety, and shame among
minors, Page 497 U. S. 442 causing some who were mature, and some whose best interests
would have been served by an abortion, to "forgo the bypass option
and either notify their parents or carry to term." Finding 44, 648
F. Supp. at 763. Among parents who supported their daughters in the
bypass proceedings, the court experience evoked similar reactions.
[ Footnote 30 ]

															Scheduling petitions in the Minnesota court typically required
minors to wait only two or three days for hearings. The District
Court found, however, that the statutory waiting period of 48 hours
was frequently compounded by a number of other factors that
"commonly" created a delay of 72 hours, id. at 764-765,
and, "in many cases" a delay of a week or more in effecting a
decision to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 765. A delay of
that magnitude increased the medical risk associated with the
abortion procedure to "a statistically significant degree." Finding
43, 648 F. Supp. at 763. While recognizing that a mandatory delay
following the notice to a minor's parent served the State's
interest in protecting pregnant minors, the court found that that
interest could be served by a shorter waiting period. Id. at 779-780.

															At least 37 witnesses testified to the issue whether the statute
furthered the State's interest in protecting pregnant minors. Only
two witnesses testified that a two-parent notification statute did
minors more good than harm; neither of these witnesses had direct
experience with the Minnesota statute. Summarizing its findings on
the question whether the statute as a whole furthered the State's
interests, the District Court wrote:

															"Of the remaining witnesses who spoke to the issue whether
Minn.Stat. § 144.343 effectuates the State's interest in protecting
pregnant minors, all but four of Page 497 U. S. 443 these are personally involved in the statute's implementation in
Minnesota. They are judges, public defenders, guardians ad
litem, and clinic counselors. None of these witnesses
testified that the statute has a beneficial effect upon the minors
whom it affects. Some testified the law has a negligible effect
upon intra-family communication and upon the minors' decisionmaking
process. Others testified the statute has a deleterious effect on
the wellbeing of the minors to whom it applies because it increases
the stress attendant to the abortion decision without creating any
corresponding benefit. Thus five weeks of trial have produced no
factual basis upon which this court can find that Minn.Stat. §
144.343(2)-(7) on the whole furthers in any meaningful way the
state's interest in protecting pregnant minors or assuring family
integrity." Id. at 775. Focusing specifically on the statutory
requirement that both parents be notified, the District Court
concluded:

															"The court finds that this requirement places a significant
burden upon pregnant minors who do not live with both parents.
Particularly in these cases, notification of an abusive, or even a
disinterested, absent parent has the effect of reintroducing that
parent's disruptive or unhelpful participation into the family at a
time of acute stress. Similarly, the two-parent notification
requirement places a significant obstacle in the path of minors in
two-parent homes who voluntarily have consulted with one parent but
not with the other out of fear of psychological, sexual, or
physical abuse toward either the minor or the notified parent. In
either case, the alternative of going to court to seek
authorization to proceed without notifying the second parent
introduces a traumatic distraction into her relationship with the
parent whom the minor has notified. The anxiety attending either
option tends to interfere with and burden the parent-child
communication Page 497 U. S. 444 the minor voluntarily initiated with the custodial parent."

															" * * * *" ". . . Indeed, 20 to 25% of minors seeking judicial
authorization to proceed with an abortion without parental
notification are accompanied to court by one parent, or at least
have obtained the approval of one parent. In these cases, the
necessity either to notify the second parent despite the agreement
of both the minor and the notified parent that such notification is
undesirable, or to obtain a judicial waiver of the notification
requirement, distracts the minor and her parent and disrupts their
communication. Thus, the need to notify the second parent or to
make a burdensome court appearance actively interferes with the
parent-child communication voluntarily initiated by the child,
communication assertedly at the heart of the State's purpose in
requiring notification of both parents. In these cases, requiring
notification of both parents affirmatively discourages parent-child
communication." Id. at 777-778. V Three separate but related interests -- the interest in the
welfare of the pregnant minor, the interest of the parents, and the
interest of the family unit -- are relevant to our consideration of
the constitutionality of the 48-hour waiting period and the
two-parent notification requirement.

															The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of
its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of
judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
634 -639 (opinion of Powell, J.); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 , 321 U. S.
166 -167 (1944). [ Footnote 31 ] That interest, which justifies Page 497 U. S. 445 state-imposed requirements that a minor obtain his or her
parent's consent before undergoing an operation, marrying, or
entering military service, see Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584 , 442 U. S.
603 -604 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 95 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 428 U. S.
102 -103 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part), extends also to the minor's decision to terminate her
pregnancy. Although the Court has held that parents may not
exercise "an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" over that
decision, Danforth, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 74 , it
has never challenged a State's reasonable judgment that the
decision should be made after notification to and consultation with
a parent. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
post, at 497 U. S.
510 -511; Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 , 462 U. S. 428 ,
n. 10, 439 (1983); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S.
409 -410; Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
640 -641 (opinion of Powell, J.); Danforth, 428
U.S. at 428 U. S. 75 . As
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, pointed out in his
concurrence in Danforth: "There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried
pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making
the very important decision whether or not to bear a child." Id. at 91.

															Parents have an interest in controlling the education and
upbringing of their children, but that interest is "a counterpart
of the responsibilities they have assumed." Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 , 463 U. S. 257 (1983); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 9442 U.S. 602602
(citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *447; Page 497 U. S. 446 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *190); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 , 268 U. S. 535 (1925). The fact of biological parentage generally offers a person
only "an opportunity . . . to develop a relationship with his
offspring." Lehr, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 262 ; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.
S. 380 , 441 U. S. 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). But the demonstration of
commitment to the child through the assumption of personal,
financial, or custodial responsibility may give the natural parent
a stake in the relationship with the child rising to the level of a
liberty interest. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.
S. 645 , 405 U. S. 651 (1972); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 463 U. S. 261 ; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110 , 491 U. S.
157 -160 (1989) (WHITE, J., dissenting); cf.
Caban, 441 U.S. at 441 U. S. 393 ,
n. 14. But see Michael H., 491 U.S. at 491 U. S.
123 -127 (plurality opinion).

															While the State has a legitimate interest in the creation and
dissolution of the marriage contract, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 , 419 U. S. 404 (1975); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 , 125 U. S. 205 (1888), the family has a privacy interest in the upbringing and
education of children and the intimacies of the marital
relationship which is protected by the Constitution against undue
state interference. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205 , 406 U. S.
233 -234 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. at 381 U. S.
495 -496 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 , 367 U. S.
551 -552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gilbert v.
Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 , 254 U. S.
335 -336 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 491 U. S. 132 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609 , 468 U. S.
618 -620 (1984); Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 , 414 U. S.
639 -640 (1974). The family may assign one parent to
guide the children's education and the other to look after their
health. [ Footnote 32 ]

															"The statist notion that governmental power should supersede
parental authority in Page 497 U. S. 447 all cases because some parents abuse and
neglect children is repugnant to American tradition." Parham, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 603 .
We have long held that there exists a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 166 .
Thus, when the government intrudes on choices concerning the
arrangement of the household, this Court has carefully examined the
"governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation." Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 , 431 U. S. 499 (1977) (plurality opinion); id. at 431 U. S. 507 ,
510-511 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 , 262 U. S.
399 -400 (1923).

															A natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient commitment to
his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the children
free from undue state interference. As Justice WHITE explained in
his opinion for the Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972):

															"The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the
family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have
been deemed 'essential,' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390 , 262 U. S. 399 (1923), 'basic
civil rights of man,' Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S.
535 , 316 U. S. 541 (1942), and
'[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,' May v.
Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 , 345 U. S.
533 (1953)."

															"It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."

															" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S.
158 , 321 U. S. 166 (1944). The
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska,
supra, [262 U.S.] at 262 U. S. 399 , the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, supra, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold
v. Page
497 U. S. 448 Connecticut, 381 U. S.
479 , 381 U. S. 496 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring)." Id. at 405 U. S. 651 .
[ Footnote 33 ] VI We think it is clear that a requirement that a minor wait 48
hours after notifying a single parent of her intention to get an
abortion would reasonably further the legitimate state interest in
ensuring that the minor's decision is knowing and intelligent. We
have held that when a parent or another person has assumed "primary
responsibility" for a minor's wellbeing, the State may properly
enact "laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 , 390 U. S. 639 (1968). To the extent that subdivision 2 of the Minnesota statute
requires notification of only one parent, it does just that. The
brief waiting period provides the parent the opportunity to consult
with his or her spouse and a family physician, and it permits the
parent to inquire into the competency of the doctor performing the
abortion, discuss the religious or moral implications of the
abortion decision, and provide the daughter needed guidance and
counsel in Page 497 U. S. 449 evaluating the impact of the decision on her future. See
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1552 (CA7 1985) (Coffey,
J., dissenting), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484 U. S. 171 (1987).

															The 48-hour delay imposes only a minimal burden on the right of
the minor to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Although the District Court found that scheduling factors, weather,
and the minor's school and work commitments may combine, in many
cases, to create a delay of a week or longer between the initiation
of notification and the abortion, 648 F. Supp. at 765, there is no
evidence that the 48-hour period itself is unreasonable or longer
than appropriate for adequate consultation between parent and
child. The statute does not impose any period of delay once the
parents or a court, acting in loco parentis, express their
agreement that the minor is mature or that the procedure would be
in her best interest. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals noted and the
record reveals, [ Footnote
34 ] the 48-hour waiting period may run concurrently with the
time necessary to make an appointment for the procedure, thus
resulting in little or no delay. [ Footnote 35 ] Page 497 U. S. 450 VII It is equally clear that the requirement that both parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or
have assumed responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does
not reasonably further any legitimate state interest. The usual
justification for a parental consent or notification provision is
that it supports the authority of a parent who is presumed to act
in the minor's best interest, and thereby assures that the minor's
decision to terminate her pregnancy is knowing, intelligent, and
deliberate. To the extent that such an interest is legitimate, it
would be fully served by a requirement that the minor notify one
parent, who can then seek the counsel of his or her mate or any
other party when such advice and support is deemed necessary to
help the child make a difficult decision. In the ideal family
setting, of course, notice to either parent would normally
constitute notice to both. A statute requiring two-parent
notification would not further any state interest in those
instances. In many families, however, the parent notified by the
child would not notify the other parent. In those cases, the State
has no legitimate interest in questioning one parent's judgment
that notice to the other parent would not assist the minor or in
presuming that the parent who has assumed parental duties is
incompetent to make decisions regarding the health and welfare of
the child.

															Not only does two-parent notification fail to serve any state
interest with respect to functioning families, it disserves the
state interest in protecting and assisting the minor with respect
to dysfunctional families. The record reveals that in the thousands
of dysfunctional families affected by this statute, the two-parent
notice requirement proved positively harmful to the minor and her
family. The testimony Page 497 U. S. 451 at trial established that this requirement, ostensibly designed
for the benefit of the minor, resulted in major trauma to the
child, and often to a parent as well. In some cases, the parents
were divorced and the second parent did not have custody or
otherwise participate in the child's upbringing. App. 244-245; id. at 466; id. at 115. In these circumstances,
the privacy of the parent and child was violated, even when they
suffered no other physical or psychological harm. In other
instances, however, the second parent had either deserted or abused
the child, id. at 462, 464, had died under tragic
circumstances, id. at 120-121, or was not notified because
of the considered judgment that notification would inflict
unnecessary stress on a parent who was ill. Id. at 204,
465. [ Footnote 36 ] In these
circumstances, the statute was not merely ineffectual in achieving
the State's goals, but actually counterproductive. The focus on
notifying the second parent distracted both the parent and minor
from the minor's imminent abortion decision.

															The State does not rely primarily on the best interests of the
minor in defending this statute. Rather, it argues that, in the
ideal family, the minor should make her decision only Page 497 U. S. 452 after consultation with both parents, who should naturally be
concerned with the child's welfare, and that the State has an
interest in protecting the independent right of the parents "to
determine and strive for what they believe to be best for their
children." Minn.Br. 26. Neither of these reasons can justify the
two-parent notification requirement. The second parent may well
have an interest in the minor's abortion decision, making full
communication among all members of a family desirable in some
cases, but such communication may not be decreed by the State. The
State has no more interest in requiring all family members to talk
with one another than it has in requiring certain of them to live
together. In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.
S. 494 (1977), we invalidated a zoning ordinance which
"slic[ed] deeply into the family itself," id. at 498,
permitting the city to "standardiz[e] its children -- and its
adults -- by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family
patterns." Id. at 431 U. S. 506 . Although the ordinance was supported by
state interests other than the state interest in substituting its
conception of family life for the family's own view, the
ordinance's relation to those state interests was too "tenuous" to
satisfy constitutional standards. By implication, a state interest
in standardizing its children and adults, making the "private realm
of family life" conform to some state-designed ideal, is not a
legitimate state interest at all. See also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 262 U. S. 399 -400 (right to establish a home and bring
up children may not be interfered with by legislative action which
is without "reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the State to effect").

															Nor can any state interest in protecting a parent's interest in
shaping a child's values and lifestyle overcome the liberty
interests of a minor acting with the consent of a single parent or
court. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (1979); Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976). In Danforth, the majority identified the only
state interest in requiring parental consent Page 497 U. S. 453 as that in "the safeguarding of the family unit and of parental
authority," and held that that state interest was insufficient to
support the requirement that mature minors receive parental
consent. The Court summarily concluded that

															"[a]ny independent interest the parent may have in the
termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty
than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to
have become pregnant." Id. at 428 U. S. 75 . It
follows that the combined force of the separate interest of one
parent and the minor's privacy interest must outweigh the separate
interest of the second parent.

															In Bellotti I and Bellotti II, we also
identified the difference between parental interests and the
child's best interest. Although the District Court invalidated the
Massachusetts statute there under review on the grounds that it
permitted a parent or the court, acting in loco parentis, to refuse consent based on the parent's own interests, the state
Attorney General argued that the parental right consisted
" exclusively of the right to assess independently, for their
minor child, what will serve that child's best interest.'" 428 U.S.
at 428 U. S. 144 .
Because we believed that the Attorney General's interpretation
"would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional
challenge," id. at 148, we ordered the District Court to
certify the state-law question to the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. Id. at 428 U. S.
151 -152. On review in this Court for the second time,
after the Supreme Judicial Court stated unambiguously that the
"good cause" standard required the judge to grant consent to an
abortion found to be in the minor's best interest, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 630 , 443 U. S. 644 ,
we confirmed that such a construction satisfied "some of the
concerns" about the statute's constitutionality, id. at 443 U. S. 644 ,
and thereby avoided "much of what was objectionable in the statute
successfully challenged in Danforth. " Id. at 443 U. S. 645 .
Indeed, the constitutional defects that Justice Powell identified
in the statute -- its failure to allow a minor who is found to be
mature and fully competent to make the abortion Page 497 U. S. 454 decision independently and its requirement of parental
consultation even when an abortion without notification would be in
the minor's best interests -- are predicated on the assumption that
the justification for any rule requiring parental involvement in
the abortion decision rests entirely on the best interests of the
child. Id. at 443 U. S. 651 .
[ Footnote 37 ]

															Unsurprisingly, the Minnesota two-parent notification
requirement is an oddity among state and federal consent provisions
governing the health, welfare, and education of children. A minor
desiring to enlist in the armed services or the Reserve Officers'
Training Corps (ROTC) need only obtain the consent of "his parent
or guardian." 10 U.S.C. § 505(a); 2104(b)(4); 2107(b)(4). The
consent of "a parent or guardian" is also sufficient to obtain a
passport for foreign travel from the United States Department of
State, 22 CFR § 51.27 (1989), and to participate as a subject in
most forms of medical research. 45 CFR §§ 46.404, 46.405 (1988). In
virtually every State, the consent of one parent is enough to
obtain a driver's license or operator's permit. The same may be
said with respect to the decision to submit to any medical or
surgical procedure other than an abortion. [ Footnote 38 ] Indeed, the only other Minnesota
statute that the State has identified which requires two-parent
consent Page 497 U. S. 455 is that authorizing the minor to change his name. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 30, 32; Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 88-1309, p. 5
(citing Minn. Stat. § 259.10 (1988)). These statutes provide
testimony to the unreasonableness of the Minnesota two-parent
notification requirement and to the ease with which the State can
adopt less burdensome means to protect the minor's welfare. Cf.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U. S. 456 , 486 U. S. 464 (1988); Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S.
78 , 482 U. S. 98 (1987). We therefore hold that this requirement violates the
Constitution. VIII The Court holds that the constitutional objection to the
two-parent notice requirement is removed by the judicial bypass
option provided in subdivision 6 of the Minnesota statute. I
respectfully dissent from that holding.

															A majority of the Court has previously held that a statute
requiring one parent's consent to a minor's abortion will be upheld
if the State provides an

															"alternate procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate
that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision
herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in
her best interests." Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 , 462 U. S. 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 462 U. S. 505 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.). Indeed, in Bellotti II, four
Members of the Court expressed the same opinion about a statute
requiring the consent of both parents. See 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
643 -644. Neither of those precedents should control our
decision today.

															In Bellotti II, eight Members of the Court joined the
judgment holding the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional. Thus,
the Court did not hold that the judicial bypass set forth in that
statute was valid; it held just the opposite. Moreover, the
discussion of the minimum requirements for a valid judicial bypass
in Justice Powell's opinion was joined by only four Members of the
Court. Indeed, neither the arguments of the parties, nor any of the
opinions in the case, Page 497 U. S. 456 considered the significant difference between a statute
requiring the involvement of both parents in the abortion decision
and a statute that merely requires the involvement of one. Thus,
the doctrine of stare decisis does not require that the
standards articulated in Justice Powell's opinion be applied to a
statute that mandates the involvement of both parents.

															Unlike Bellotti II, the judgment in Ashcroft sustained the constitutionality of the statute containing a
judicial bypass as an alternative to the requirement of one
parent's consent to a minor's abortion. The distinctions between
notice and consent and between notification of both parents rather
than just one arguably constitute a sufficient response to an
argument resting on stare decisis. Further analysis is
necessary, however, because, at least on the surface, the consent
requirement would appear to be more onerous than a requirement of
mere notice.

															The significance of the distinction between a statute requiring
the consent of one parent and a statute requiring notice to both
parents must be tested by the relationship of the respective
requirements to legitimate state interests. We have concluded that
the State has a strong and legitimate interest in providing a
pregnant minor with the advice and support of a parent during the
decisional period. A general rule requiring the minor to obtain the
consent of one parent reasonably furthers that interest. An
exception from the general rule is necessary to protect the minor
from an arbitrary veto that is motivated by the separate concerns
of the parent, rather than the best interest of the child. Cf.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
604 -608. But the need for an exception does not
undermine the conclusion that the general rule is perfectly
reasonable -- just as a rule requiring the consent of either parent
for any other medical procedure would surely be reasonable if an
exception were made for those emergencies in which, for example, a
parent might deny life-saving Page 497 U. S. 457 treatment to a child on religious grounds. See id. at 442 U. S.
602 -603.

															For reasons already set forth at length, a rule requiring
consent or notification of both parents is not reasonably related
to the state interest in giving the pregnant minor the benefit of
parental advice. The State has not called our attention to, nor am
I aware of, any other medical situation in Minnesota or elsewhere
in which the provision of treatment for a child has been
conditioned on notice to, or consent by, both parents rather than
just one. Indeed, the fact that one-parent consent is the virtually
uniform rule for any other activity which affects the minor's
health, safety or welfare emphasizes the aberrant quality of the
two-parent notice requirement.

															A judicial bypass that is designed to handle exceptions from a
reasonable general rule, and thereby preserve the constitutionality
of that rule, is quite different from a requirement that a minor --
or a minor and one of her parents -- must apply to a court for
permission to avoid the application of a rule that is not
reasonably related to legitimate state goals. A requirement that a
minor acting with the consent of both parents apply to a court for
permission to effectuate her decision clearly would constitute an
unjustified official interference with the privacy of the minor and
her family. The requirement that the bypass procedure must be
invoked when the minor and one parent agree that the other parent
should not be notified represents an equally unjustified
governmental intrusion into the family's decisional process. When
the parents are living together and have joint custody over the
child, the State has no legitimate interest in the communication
between father and mother about the child.

															"[W]here the parents are divorced, the minor and/or custodial
parent, and not a court, is in the best position to determine
whether notifying the noncustodial parent would be in the child's
best interests."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 88-1125, p. 69a. As the Court of
Appeals panel originally Page 497 U. S. 458 concluded, the

															"minor and custodial parent, . . . by virtue of their major
interest and superior position, should alone have the opportunity
to decide to whom, if anyone, notice of the minor's abortion
decision should be given." Ibid. (citation omitted). I agree with that
conclusion.

															" * * * *" The judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety is
affirmed. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Subdivision 1 of § 144.343 presently provides:

															"Any minor may give effective consent for medical, mental and
other health services to determine the presence of or to treat
pregnancy and conditions associated therewith, venereal disease,
alcohol and other drug abuse, and the consent of no other person is
required."

															The statute permits the health professional treating the minor
to notify parents only when a failure to do so would jeopardize the
minor's health. Minn.Stat. § 144.346 (1988).

															[ Footnote 2 ] See Haw.Rev.Stat. § 577A-2 (1976); Mo.Rev. Stat. §
431.062 (Supp.1971). See generally Pilpel & Zuckerman,
Abortion and the Rights of Minors, in Abortion, Society and the Law
275, 279-280 (D. Walbert & J. Butler eds. 1973).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Although there is no statutory definition of emancipation in
Minnesota, see Streitz v. Streitz, 363
N.W.2d 135 , 137 (Minn.App.1985), we have no reason to question
the State's representation that Minn.Stat. §§ 144.341 and 144.342
(1988) apply to the minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
Brief for Respondents in No. 881125, p. 2, n. 2. Those sections
provide that a minor who is living separate and apart from her
parents or who is either married or has borne a child may give
effective consent to medical services without the consent of any
other person.

															The notification statute also applies to a woman for whom a
guardian or conservator has been appointed because of a finding of
incompetency. § 144.343(2). This portion of the statute is not
challenged in this case.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Subdivision 2 provides:

															"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13.02, subdivision 8,
no abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemancipated
minor . . . until at least 48 hours after written notice of the
pending operation has been delivered in the manner specified in
subdivisions 2 to 4."

															"(a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at the usual
place of abode of the parent and delivered personally to the parent
by the physician or an agent."

															"(b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice
shall be made by certified mail addressed to the parent at the
usual place of abode of the parent with return receipt requested
and restricted delivery to the addressee which means postal
employee can only deliver the mail to the authorized addressee.
Time of delivery shall be deemed to occur at 12 o'clock noon on the
next day on which regular mail delivery takes place, subsequent to
mailing."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Minnesota statute is the most intrusive in the Nation. Of
the 38 States that require parental participation in the minor's
decision to terminate her pregnancy, 27 make express that the
participation of only one parent is required. An additional three
States, Idaho, Tennessee, and Utah, require an unmarried minor to
notify "the parents or guardian" but do not specify whether
"parents" refers to either member of the parental unit or whether
notice to one parent constitutes constructive notice to both. See Idaho Code § 18-609(6) (1987); Tenn.Code Ann. §
39-15-202(f) (Supp.1989); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304(2) (1990). In
contrast, Arkansas does require an unmarried minor to notify both
parents but provides exceptions where the second parent "cannot be
located through reasonably diligent effort," or a parent's
"whereabouts are unknown," the parent has not been in contact with
the minor's custodial parent or the minor for at least one year, or
the parent is guilty of sexual abuse. Ark.Code Ann. §§ 2016-802, 20
16-808 (Supp. 1989). Delaware requires the consent only of parents
who are residing in the same household; if the minor is not living
with both of her parents, the consent of one parent is sufficient.
Del.Code.Ann. Tit. 24, § 1790(b)(3) (1987). Illinois law does not
require the consent of a parent who has deserted the family or is
not available. Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, � 81-54(3) (1989). Kentucky
requires an unmarried minor to obtain the consent of a legal
guardian or "both parents, if available," but provides that if both
parents are not available, the consent of the available parent
shall suffice. Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 311 .732(2)(a), (b) (Michie
1990). Under Massachusetts law, an unmarried minor need obtain the
consent of only one parent if the other parent "is unavailable to
the physician within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner,"
or if the parents are divorced and the other parent does not have
custody. Mass.Gen.Laws § 112, § 12S (1988). Mississippi law
requires only the consent of the parent with primary custody, care
and control of the minor if the parents are divorced or unmarried
and living apart and, in all other cases, the consent of only one
parent if the other parent is not available in a reasonable time or
manner. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-41-53(2) (Supp.1989). Finally, North
Dakota requires only the consent of the custodial parent if the
parents are separated and divorced, or the legal guardian if the
minor is subject to guardianship. N.D.Cent.Code § 14-02.1-03.1
(1981).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Subdivision 3 provides, in part:

															"For purposes of this section, 'parent' means both parents of
the pregnant woman if they are both living, one parent of the
pregnant woman if only one is living or if the second one cannot be
located through reasonably diligent effort, or the guardian or
conservator if the pregnant woman has one."

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Subdivision 4 provides:

															"No notice shall be required under this section if:"

															"(a) The attending physician certifies in the pregnant woman's
medical record that the abortion is necessary to prevent the
woman's death and there is insufficient time to provide the
required notice; or"

															"(b) The abortion is authorized in writing by the person or
persons who are entitled to notice; or"

															"(c) The pregnant minor woman declares that she is a victim of
sexual abuse, neglect, or physical abuse as defined in section
626.556. Notice of that declaration shall be made to the proper
authorities as provided in section 626.556, subdivision 3."

															Under Minn.Stat. § 626.556 (1988), if the minor declares that
she is the victim of abuse, the notified physician or physician's
agent must report the abuse to the local welfare or law enforcement
agency within 24 hours, §§ 626.556(3)(a), (3)(e), whereupon the
welfare agency

															"shall immediately conduct an assessment and offer protective
social services for purposes of preventing further abuses,
safeguarding and enhancing the welfare of the abused or neglected
minor, and preserving family life whenever possible."

															§ 626.556(10)(a). If the agency interviews the victim, it must
notify the parent of the fact of the interview at the conclusion of
the investigation unless it obtains a court order. §
626.556(10)(c). lndividuals who are subjects of the investigation
have a right of access to the record of the investigation. §
626.556(11).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Subdivision 5 provides:

															"Performance of an abortion in violation of this section shall
be a misdemeanor and shall be grounds for a civil action by a
person wrongfully denied notification. A person shall not be held
liable under this section if the person establishes by written
evidence that the person relied upon evidence sufficient to
convince a careful and prudent person that the representations of
the pregnant woman regarding information necessary to comply with
this section are bona fide and true, or if the person has attempted
with reasonable diligence to deliver notice, but has been unable to
do so."

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Subdivision 6 provides:

															"If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently
restrained or enjoined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be
enforced as though the following paragraph were incorporated as
paragraph (c) of that subdivision, provided, however, that if such
temporary or permanent restraining order or injunction is ever
stayed or dissolved, or otherwise ceases to have effect,
subdivision 2 shall have full force and effect, without being
modified by the addition to the following substitute paragraph
which shall have no force or effect until or unless an injunction
or restraining order is again in effect."

															"(c)(i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow the
notification of one or both of her parents or guardian or
conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction shall,
upon petition, or motion, and after an appropriate hearing,
authorize a physician to perform the abortion if said judge
determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving
informed consent to the proposed abortion. If said judge determines
that the pregnant woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman
does not claim to be mature, the judge shall determine whether the
performance of an abortion upon her without notification of her
parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests
and shall authorize a physician to perform the abortion without
such notification if said judge concludes that the pregnant woman's
best interests would be served thereby."

															"(ii) Such a pregnant woman may participate in proceedings in
the court on her own behalf and the court may appoint a guardian ad
litem for her. The court shall, however, advise her that she has a
right to court appointed counsel, and shall, upon her request,
provide her with such counsel."

															"(iii) Proceedings in the court under this section shall be
confidential and shall be given such precedence over other pending
matters so that the court may reach a decision promptly and without
delay so as to serve the best interests of the pregnant woman. A
judge of the court who conducts proceedings under this section
shall make in writing specific factual findings and legal
conclusions supporting the decision and shall order a record of the
evidence to be maintained including the judge's own findings and
conclusions."

															"(iv) An expedited confidential appeal shall be available to any
such pregnant woman for whom the court denies an order authorizing
an abortion without notification. An order authorizing an abortion
without notification shall not be subject to appeal. No filing fees
shall be required of any such pregnant woman at either the trial or
the appellate level. Access to the trial court for the purposes of
such a petition or motion, and access to the appellate courts for
purposes of making an appeal from denial of the same, shall be
afforded such a pregnant woman 24 hours a day, seven days a
week."

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Brief for Petitioner in No. 88-1309, p. 4 (hereinafter
Minn.Br.); see also id. at 8-9.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															"The Minnesota legislature had several purposes in mind when it
amended Minn.Stat. § 144.343 in 1981. The primary purpose was to
protect the wellbeing of minors by encouraging minors to discuss
with their parents the decision whether to terminate their
pregnancies. Encouraging such discussion was intended to achieve
several salutary results. Parents can provide emotional support and
guidance and thus forestall irrational and emotional
decisionmaking. Parents can also provide information concerning the
minor's medical history of which the minor may not be aware.
Parents can also supervise post-abortion care. In addition, parents
can support the minor's psychological wellbeing and thus mitigate
adverse psychological sequelae that may attend the abortion
procedure." 648 F.
Supp. 756 , 765-766 (Minn. 1 986).

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The District Court's finding 59 reads as follows:

															"The court finds that a desire to deter and dissuade minors from
choosing to terminate their pregnancies also motivated the
legislature. Testimony before a legislative committee considering
the proposed notification requirement indicated that influential
supporters of the measure hoped it 'would save lives' by
influencing minors to carry their pregnancies to term rather than
aborting." Id. at 766.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															"The court also found that a desire to dissuade minors from
choosing to terminate their pregnancies also motivated the
legislature. Finding 59, Hodgson Appendix 25a. This
finding was based on no more than the testimony before a
legislative committee of some supporters of the act who hoped it
'would save lives.' There is no direct evidence, however, that this
was the motive of any legislator."

															Minn.Br. 4, n. 2.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															On January 23, 1985, the court granted partial summary judgment
in favor of defendants on several of the plaintiffs' claims, but
reserved ruling on the constitutionality of subdivision 6 as
applied until after trial.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															"Where the underlying notification provision is unconstitutional
because, with respect to children of broken families, it fails to
further the state's significant interests, however, a mature minor
or minor whose best interests are contrary to notifying the
noncustodial parent is forced to either suffer the unconstitutional
requirement or submit to the burdensome court bypass procedure.
Such a Hobson's choice fails to further any significant interest.
Just as there must be a constitutional judicial alternative to a
notice requirement, so there must be a constitutional notice or
consent alternative to the court bypass."

															"The second reason for our conclusion that the court bypass
procedure does not save the two-parent notification requirement is
that, where the parents are divorced, the minor and/or custodial
parent, and not a court, is in the best position to determine
whether notifying the noncustodial parent would be in the child's
best interests. In situations where the minor has a good
relationship with the noncustodial parent but the custodial parent
does not, there is nothing to prevent the minor from consulting
with the noncustodial parent if she so desires. The minor and
custodial parent, however, by virtue of their major interest and
superior position, should alone have the opportunity to decide to
whom, if anyone, notice of the minor's abortion decision should be
given."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 88-1125, pp. 68a-69a (citations
omitted).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															The panel did not reach the question of the constitutionality or
severability of the mandatory 48-hour waiting period. A concurring
judge agreed with the panel that a requirement that a pregnant
minor seeking an abortion notify a noncustodial parent could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny, and was not saved by a court
bypass procedure. Id. at 72a.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															853 F.2d, at 1460, quoting from Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 , 443 U. S.
640 -641 (1979) ( Bellotti II ).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The court also suggested that the statute furthered the "state
interest in providing an opportunity for parents to supply
essential medical and other information to a physician," 853 F.2d,
at 1461, but the State has not argued here that that interest
provides an additional basis for upholding the statute.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The court also rejected the argument that the statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause by singling out abortion as the only
pregnancy-related medical procedure requiring notification. Id. at 1466. The equal protection challenge is not renewed
here.

															[ Footnote 20 ] See n. 14, supra. [ Footnote 21 ]

															The District Court found:

															"During the period for which statistics have been compiled,
3,573 bypass petitions were filed in Minnesota courts. Six
petitions were withdrawn before decision. Nine petitions were
denied and 3,558 were granted."

															Finding No. 55, 648 F.Supp., at 765.

															[ Footnote 22 ] Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 , 428 U. S. 72 -75
(1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.
S. 132 (1976) ( Bellotti I ); Bellotti
II, 443 U. S. 622 (1979); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.
S. 398 (1981); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 ,
439-442 (1983); and Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City,
Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 , 462 U. S.
490 -493 (1983); id. at 462 U. S. 505 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															The Utah statute reviewed in Matheson required the physician to
"[n]otify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon
whom the abortion is to be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304(2)
(1990). Unlike the Minnesota statute under review today, the Utah
statute did not define the term "parents." The statute is ambiguous
as to whether the term refers to each parent individually or rather
to the parental unit, which could be represented by either the
mother or the father, and neither the argument nor the discussion
in Matheson indicated that notice to both parents was
required. State law, to the extent it addresses the issue, is to
the contrary: although Utah law provides that a noncustodial parent
retains the right to consent to marriage, enlistment, and the
performance of major medical or surgical treatment, the right to
notice of the minor's abortion is not among the parent's specific
residual rights and duties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(13)
(Supp.1989).

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															The figures are not dissimilar to those throughout the Nation. See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 12-13 ("It is estimated
that by age 17, 70 percent of white children born in 1980 will have
spent at least some time with only one parent, and 94 percent of
black children will have lived in one-parent homes".) (citing
Hofferth, Updating Children's Life Course, 47 J. Marriage and Fam.
93 (1985)).

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															"Studies indicating that family violence occurs in two million
families in the United States substantially underestimate the
actual number of such families. In Minnesota alone, reports
indicate that there are an average of 31,200 incidents of assault
on women by their partners each year. Based on these statistics,
state officials suggest that the 'battering' of women by their
partners 'has come to be recognized as perhaps the most frequently
committed violent crime in the state' of Minnesota. These numbers
do not include incidents of psychological or sexual abuse,
low-level physical abuse, abuse of any sort of the child of a
batterer, or those incidents which are not reported. Many minors in
Minnesota live in fear of violence by family members; many of them
are, in fact, victims of rape, incest, neglect and violence. It is
impossible to accurately assess the magnitude of the problem of
family violence in Minnesota because members of dysfunctional
families are characteristically secretive about such matters and
minors are particularly reluctant to reveal violence or abuse in
their families. Thus the incidence of such family violence is
dramatically underreported."

															648 F. Supp. at 768-769.

															[ Footnote 26 ]

															"Minors who are victims of sexual or physical abuse often are
reluctant to reveal the existence of the abuse to those outside the
home. More importantly, notification to government authorities
creates a substantial risk that the confidentiality of the minor's
decision to terminate her pregnancy will be lost. Thus, few minors
choose to declare they are victims of sexual or physical abuse
despite the prevalence of such abuse in Minnesota, as
elsewhere." Id. at 764.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															As one of the guardians ad litem testified,

															"We have had situations reported to me by my other guardians as
well as teenagers that I talked to myself who have said that they
will consider telling one parent, usually mom, sometimes dad, but
since they would have to go to court anyway, because they are
absolutely sure they don't want the other parent to know, they
don't tell either one."

															App. 239 (Testimony of Susanne Smith).

															[ Footnote 28 ] See n 21, supra. [ Footnote 29 ]

															One testified that minors found the bypass procedure "a very
nerve-racking experience," Finding 60, 648 F. Supp. at 766; another
testified that the minor's "level of apprehension is twice what I
normally see in court." Ibid. A Massachusetts judge who
heard similar petitions in that State expressed the opinion that
"going to court was absolutely' traumatic for minors . . . at a
very, very difficult time in their lives." Ibid. One judge
stated that he did not "perceive any useful public purpose to what
I am doing in these cases," and that he did not "see anything that
is being accomplished that is useful to anybody." Testimony of
Gerald C. Martin, App. in No. 86-5423 (CA8), pp.
A-488-A-489. The public defenders and guardians ad litem gave
similar testimony. See Testimony of Cynthia Daly (public
defender) App. 187 (bypass "was another hoop to jump through and a
very damaging and stress-producing procedure that didn't do any
good"); Testimony of Susanne Smith (guardian ad litem ), id. at 234. ("The teenagers that we see in the guardian's
office are very nervous, very scared. Some of them are terrified
about court processes. They are often exhausted. . . . They are
upset about and tell us that they are upset about the fact that
they have to explain very intimate details of their personal lives
to strangers. They talk about feeling that they don't belong in the
court system, that they are ashamed, embarrassed and somehow that
they are being punished for the situation they are in"); Testimony
of Heather Sweetland (public defender) App. in No. 86-5423 (CA8),
p. A-585 ("Most of the women that are my clients in these hearings
are scared . . . Some of them will relax slightly, but the majority
of them are very nervous").

															Doctor Hodgson, one of the plaintiffs in this case, testified
that, when her minor patients returned from the court process,

															"some of them are wringing wet with perspiration. They're
markedly relieved, many of them. They -- they dread the court
procedure often more than the actual abortion procedure. And it --
it's frequently necessary to give them a sedative of some kind
beforehand."

															App. 468.

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															According to the testimony at trial, parents who participated in
the bypass procedure -- many of whom had never before been in court
-- were "real upset" about having to appear in court, id. at 167, and were "angry, they were worried about their kid and they
were nervous too." Id. at 186.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															"Properly understood . . . the tradition of parental authority
is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty;
rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the
latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive
of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a
free society meaningful and rewarding." Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
638 -639 (opinion of Powell, J.). See also Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 , 492 U. S.
394 -396 (1989) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815 , 487 U. S.
825 -826, n. 23 (1988) (plurality opinion).

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															Under common law principles, one parent has authority to act as
agent for the other in matters of their child's upbringing and
education. See E. Spencer, Law of Domestic Relations 432
(1911); T. Reeve, Law of Baron and Femme 295 (1816).

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															"Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its
preeminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that
life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to
its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 , 367 U. S.
551 -552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

															Far more than contraceptives, at issue in Poe and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), the married couple has a well-recognized interest in
protecting the sanctity of their communications from undue
interference by the State. See, e.g., 38 U.
S. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 38 U. S. 223 (1839) ("This rule is founded upon the deepest and soundest
principles of our nature. Principles which have grown out of those
domestic relations, that constitute the basis of civil society and
which are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence which
should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and
dearest relations of life. To break down or impair the great
principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife would
be to destroy the best solace of human existence"); 2 W. Best,
Principles of Law of Evidence 994-995 (1st Am. ed. 1876); 1 S.
Greenleaf, Law of Evidence 286 287 (12th ed. 1866); 1 M. Phillips,
Law of Evidence 69-80 (3d ed. 1849).

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															The record contains the telephone training manual of one clinic
which contemplates that notification will be made on the date the
patient contacts the clinic to arrange an abortion so that the
appointment can be scheduled for a few days later. Since that
clinic typically has a 1- to 2-day backlog, App. 146-147, the
statutory waiting period creates little delay.

															[ Footnote 35 ] Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 449 ,
upon which the plaintiffs rely, is not to the contrary. There we
invalidated a provision that required that mature women, capable of
consenting to an abortion, wait 24 hours after giving consent
before undergoing an abortion. The only legitimate state interest
asserted was that the "woman's decision be informed." Id. at 462 U. S. 450 .
We decided that

															"if a woman, after appropriate counseling, is prepared to give
her written informed consent and proceed with the abortion, a State
may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that
decision." Id. at 462 U. S.
450 -451. By contrast, in this case, the State asserts a
legitimate interest in protecting minor women from their own
immaturity. As we explain in the text, the right of the minor to
make an informed decision to terminate her pregnancy is not
defeated by the 48-hour waiting period. It is significant that the
statute does not impose a waiting period if a substitute competent
decisionmaker -- a parent or court -- gives affirmative consent to
the abortion.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															The most common reason for not notifying the second parent was
that that parent was a child or spouse-batterer, App. at 204, and
notification would have provoked further abuse. For example, Judge
Allen Oleisky, whose familiarity with the Minnesota statute is
based on his having heard over 1,000 petitions from minors, id. at 154, testified that battering is a frequent crime
in Minnesota, that parents seek an exemption from the notification
requirement because they have been battered or are afraid of
assault, and that notification of the father would "set the whole
thing off again in some cases." Id. at 166-167. See
also id. at 237, 245, 339.

															That testimony is confirmed by the uncontradicted testimony of
one of plaintiffs' experts that notice of a daughter's
pregnancy

															"would absolutely enrage [a batterer]. It would be much like
showing a red cape to a bull. That kind of information just plays
right into his worst fears and his most vulnerable spots. The
sexual jealousy, his dislike of his daughter's going out with
anybody else, would make him very angry and would probably create
severe abuse as well as long-term communication difficulties." Id. at 194 (Testimony of Lenore Walker).

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															Justice KENNEDY recognizes that parental rights are coupled with
parental responsibilities, post at 497 U.S. 483 , and that

															"a State [may] legislate on the premise that parents, as a
general rule, are interested in their children's welfare and will
act in accord with it," post at 497 U. S. 485 .
That, of course, is precisely our point. What the State may not do
is legislate on the generalized assumptions that a parent in an
intact family will not act in his or her child's best interests and
will fail to involve the other parent in the child's upbringing
when that involvement is appropriate.

															[ Footnote 38 ] See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 8 (state law
typically allows a minor parent -- whatever her age -- to consent
to the health care of her child); Brief for the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. as Amici
Curiae 25 ("In areas that do not deal with sexuality or
substance abuse, states require, at most, a single parent's consent
before performing medical procedures on a minor").

															Justice O'CONNOR, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment in part. I I join all but Parts III and VIII of Justice STEVENS' opinion.
While I agree with some of the central points made in Part III, I
cannot join the broader discussion. I agree that the Court has
characterized

															"[a] woman's decision to beget or to bear a child [as] a
component of her liberty that is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution." Ante at 497 U. S. 434 . See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 , 431 U. S. 685 , 431 U. S. 687 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.
S. 479 , 381 U. S.
502 -503 (1965) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). This
Court extended that liberty interest to minors in Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U. S. 622 , 443 U. S. 642 (1979) ( Bellotti II ), and Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52 , 428 U. S. 74 (1976), albeit with some important limitations:

															"[P]arental notice and consent are qualifications that typically
may be imposed by the State on a minor's right to make important
decisions. As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range
consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental
consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the
minor." Bellotti II, supra, at 443 U. S.
640 -641; see also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 , 450 U. S. 423 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); cf. 487 U.
S. Page 497 U. S.
459 Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815 , 487 U. S. 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make
the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct, while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361 , 492 U. S. 395 (1989) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ("[M]inors are treated differently
from adults in our laws, which reflects the simple truth derived
from communal experience, that juveniles as a class have not the
level of maturation and responsibility that we presume in adults
and consider desirable for full participation in the rights and
duties of modern life").

															It has been my understanding in this area that

															"[i]f the particular regulation does not 'unduly burde[n]' the
fundamental right, . . . then our evaluation of that regulation is
limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates
to a legitimate state purpose." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 , 462 U. S. 453 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting); see also Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.
S. 490 , 530 (1989) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). It is with that understanding that I agree
with Justice STEVENS' statement that the

															"statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not
reasonably related to legitimate state interests. Cf. Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. at 482 U. S. 97 ; Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S.
704 (opinion of Powell, J.); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S.
179 , 410 U. S. 194 -195, 199
(1973)." Ante at 497 U. S.
436 .

															I agree with Justice STEVENS that Minnesota has offered no
sufficient justification for its interference with the family's
decisionmaking processes created by subdivision 2 -- two-parent
notification. Subdivision 2 is the most stringent notification
statute in the country. See ante at 497 U. S. 425 ,
n. 5. The only other state that defines the generic term "parents," see, e.g., Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-201, Art. III(6) (Supp.
1989) (adoption statute) (" Parents' Page 497 U. S.
460 means either the singular or plural of the word `parent'"); see also ante at 497 U. S. 437 ,
n. 23, as "both parents" is Arkansas, and that statute provides for
numerous exceptions to the two-parent notification requirement and
permits bypassing notification where notification would not be in
the best interests of the minor. See Ark.Code §§
20-16-802, 20-16-804, 20-16-808 (Supp.1989). The Minnesota exception to notification for minors who are
victims of neglect or abuse is, in reality, a means of notifying
the parents. As Justice STEVENS points out, see ante at 497 U. S. 426 ,
n. 7, to avail herself of the neglect or abuse exception, the minor
must report the abuse. A report requires the welfare agency to
immediately "conduct an assessment." Minn.Stat. § 626.556(10)(a)
(1988). If the agency interviews the victim, it must notify the
parent of the fact of the interview; if the parent is the subject
of an investigation, he has a right of access to the record of the
investigation. §§ 626.556(10)(c); 626.556(11); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 19 ("[I]t turns out that the reporting statute in
Minnesota requires that, after it's reported to the welfare
department, the welfare department has to do an assessment and tell
the parents about the assessment. This could all be done in a
timeframe even before the abortion occurs"). The combination of the
abused minor's reluctance to report sexual or physical abuse, see ante at 497 U. S. 440 ,
n. 26, with the likelihood that invoking the abuse exception for
the purpose of avoiding notice will result in notice, makes the
abuse exception less than effectual.

															Minnesota's two-parent notice requirement is all the more
unreasonable when one considers that only half of the minors in the
State of Minnesota reside with both biological parents. See
ante at 497 U. S. 437 .
A third live with only one parent. Ibid. Given its broad
sweep and its failure to serve the purposes asserted by the State
in too many cases, I join the Court's striking of subdivision
2. Page 497 U. S. 461 II In a series of cases, this Court has explicitly approved
judicial bypass as a means of tailoring a parental consent
provision so as to avoid unduly burdening the minor's limited right
to obtain an abortion. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.
S. 132 , 428 U. S.
147 -148 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
642 -644. In Danforth, the Court stated that
the

															"primary constitutional deficiency lies in [the notification
statute's] imposition of an absolute limitation on the minor's
right to obtain an abortion. . . . [A] materially different
constitutional issue would be presented under a provision requiring
parental consent or consultation in most cases but providing for
prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the
parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor
is mature enough to give an informed consent without parental
concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor's best
interest. Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an
absolute condition upon the minor's right, but would assure in most
instances consultation between the parent and child."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 90 -91.
Subdivision 6 passes constitutional muster because the interference
with the internal operation of the family required by subdivision 2
simply does not exist where the minor can avoid notifying one or
both parents by use of the bypass procedure.

															Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice BLACKMUN
join, concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part.

															I concur in Parts I, II, IV, and VII of Justice STEVENS' opinion
for the Court in No. 88-1309. [ Footnote
2/1 ] Although I do Page 497 U. S. 462 not believe that the Constitution permits a State to require a
minor to notify or consult with a parent before obtaining an
abortion, compare ante at 497 U. S. 445 with infra at 497 U. S.
463 -472, I am in substantial agreement with the
remainder of the reasoning in 497 U. S. For
the reasons stated by Justice STEVENS, ante at 497 U. S.
450 -455, Minnesota's two-parent notification requirement
is not even reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.
Therefore, that requirement surely would not pass the strict
scrutiny applicable to restrictions on a woman's fundamental right
to have an abortion.

															I dissent from the judgment of the Court in No. 89-1125,
however, that the judicial bypass option renders the parental
notification and 48-hour delay requirements constitutional. See
ante at 497 U. S.
497 -501 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J.); post at 497 U. S.
497 -501 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). The bypass procedure
cannot save those requirements because the bypass itself is
unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. At the very
least, this scheme substantially burdens a woman's right to privacy
without advancing a compelling state interest. More significantly,
in some instances it usurps a young woman's control over her own
body by giving either a parent or a court the power effectively to
veto her decision to have an abortion. I This Court has consistently held since Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that the constitutional right of privacy "is broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." Id. at 410 U. S. 153 .
We have also repeatedly stated that "[a] woman's right to make that
choice freely is fundamental." Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.
S. 747 , 476 U. S. 772 (1986). Accord, Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U. S. 416 , 462 U. S. 420 ,
n. 1 (1983); Roe, supra, 410 U.S. at Page 497 U. S. 463 410 U. S. 155 .
As we reiterated in American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, supra, "Few decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly
private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a
woman's decision -- with the guidance of her physician and within
the limits specified in Roe -- whether to end her
pregnancy." Id. 476 U.S. at 476 U. S. 772 .
Accordingly, we have subjected state laws limiting that right to
the most exacting scrutiny, requiring a State to show that such a
law is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling interest. Roe,
supra, 410 U.S. at 410 U. S. 155 ; Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 427 .
Only such strict judicial scrutiny is sufficiently protective of a
woman's right to make the intensely personal decision whether to
terminate her pregnancy. Roe remains the law of the land. See Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.
S. 490 , 492 U. S. 521 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 492 U. S. 525 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 492 U. S. 537 , 492 U. S. 560 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Indeed,
today's decision reaffirms the vitality of Roe, as five
Justices have voted to strike down a state law restricting a
woman's right to have an abortion. Accordingly, to be
constitutional, state restrictions on abortion must meet the
rigorous test set forth above. II I strongly disagree with the Court's conclusion that the State
may constitutionally force a minor woman either to notify both
parents (or in some cases only one parent [ Footnote 2/2 ]) and then wait 48 hours before proceeding
with an abortion, or disclose her intimate affairs to a judge and
ask that he grant her permission to have an abortion. See
post at 497 U. S.
497 -501 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Cf. ante at 497 U.S. 448 -449 (opinion
of STEVENS, J.) (finding that requiring minor to wait 48 hours
after notifying one parent reasonably furthers legitimate state
interest). Page 497 U. S. 464 First, the parental notification and delay requirements
significantly restrict a young woman's right to reproductive
choice. I base my conclusion not on my intuition about the needs
and attitudes of young women, but on a sizable and impressive
collection of empirical data documenting the effects of parental
notification statutes and of delaying an abortion. Second, the
burdensome restrictions are not narrowly tailored to serve any
compelling state interest. Finally, for the reasons discussed in
Part 497 U. S. infra, the judicial bypass procedure does not save the
notice and delay requirements. A Neither the scope of a woman's privacy right nor the magnitude
of a law's burden is diminished because a woman is a minor. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 , 443 U. S. 642 (1979) ( Bellotti II ) (plurality opinion); Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52 , 428 U. S. 74 (1976). Rather, a woman's minority status affects only the nature
of the State's interests. Although the Court considers the burdens
that the two-parent notification requirement imposes on a minor
woman's exercise of her right to privacy, ante at 497 U. S.
450 -451, and n. 36, it fails to recognize that forced
notification of only one parent also significantly burdens a young
woman's right to have an abortion, see ante at 497 U.S. 459 -460 (opinion
of O'CONNOR, J.); post at 497 U. S.
491 -497 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Cf. ante at 497 U.S. 448 -449 (opinion
of STEVENS, J.).

															A substantial proportion of pregnant minors voluntarily consult
with a parent regardless of the existence of a notification
requirement. See, e.g., Torres, Forrest, & Eisman,
Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family
Planning and Abortion Services, 12 Family Planning Perspectives
284, 287, 288, 290 (1980) (51% of minors discussed abortion with
parents in the absence of a parental consent or notification
requirement). Minors 15 years old or younger are even more likely
voluntarily to discuss the abortion decision with their parents. Id. at 290 (69% of such minors voluntarily Page 497 U. S. 465 discuss abortion with parents). For these women, the
notification requirement by itself does not impose a significant
burden. But for those young women who would choose not to inform
their parents, the burden is evident: the notification requirement
destroys their right to avoid disclosure of a deeply personal
matter. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.
S. 589 , 429 U. S.
599 -600 (1977).

															A notification requirement can also have severe physical and
psychological effects on a young woman. First, forced notification
of one parent, like forced notification of both parents, can be
extremely traumatic for a young woman, depending on the nature of
her relationship with her parents. Cf. ante at 497 U. S.
450 -451, and n. 36. The disclosure of a daughter's
intention to have an abortion often leads to a family crisis,
characterized by severe parental anger and rejection. Osofsky &
Osofsky, Teenage Pregnancy: Psychosocial Considerations, 21
Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 1161 1164-1165 (1978). The
impact of any notification requirement is especially devastating
for minors who live in fear of physical, psychological, or sexual
abuse. See, e.g., Clary, Minor Women Obtaining Abortions:
A Study of Parental Notification in a Metropolitan Area, 72
American J. of Pub. Health 283, 284 (1982) (finding that many
minors chose not to inform parents voluntarily because of fear of
negative consequences such as physical punishment or other
retaliation). See also Tr. 911 (testimony of Dr. Elissa
Benedek) (stating that usually minors accurately predict parental
reaction to news about daughters' pregnancies). Cf. ante at 497 U. S.
438 -440, and n. 25. Certainly, child abuse is not
limited to families with two parents.

															Second, the prospect of having to notify a parent causes many
young women to delay their abortions, thereby increasing the health
risks of the procedure. See Cates, Schulz & Grimes,
The Risks Associated with Teenage Abortion, 309 New England J. of
Medicine 621, 623 (1983) (finding that for women 19 years old and
younger, the number of deaths per 100,000 abortions was 0.2 for the
first 8 weeks of pregnancy, Page 497 U. S. 466 0.6 for weeks 9-12, 3.4 for weeks 13-16, and 7.8 for week 17 and
after). See also H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.
S. 398 , 450 U. S. 439 (1981) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The risks posed by this delay
are especially significant because adolescents already delay
seeking medical care until relatively late in their pregnancies,
when risks are higher. See 1 National Research Council,
Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and
Childbearing 114 (C. Hayes ed. 1987).

															In addition, a notification requirement compels many minors
seeking an abortion to travel to a State without such a requirement
to avoid notifying a parent. Cartoof & Klerman, Parental
Consent for Abortion: Impact of the Massachusetts Law, 76 American
J. of Pub. Health 397, 399 (1986) (finding that one-third of minors
seeking abortions traveled outside of State to avoid Massachusetts'
parental notice requirement). Other women may resort to the horrors
of self-abortion or illegal abortion rather than tell a parent.
Torres, Forrest, & Eisman, supra, at 288 (9% of minors
attending family planning clinics said they would have a
self-induced or illegal abortion rather than tell a parent); H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 450 U. S. 439 ,
and n. 26 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See also Greydanus
& Railsback, Abortion in Adolescence, 1 Seminars in Adolescent
Medicine 213, 214 (1985) (noting 100-times greater death rate for
women who obtain illegal abortions than for those who obtain legal
ones). [ Footnote 2/3 ] Still others
would forgo an abortion entirely and carry the fetus to term,
Torres, Forrest, & Eisman, supra, at 289, 291 (9% of
minors in family planning clinics said they would carry fetus Page 497 U. S. 467 to term rather than inform parents of decision to abort),
subjecting themselves to the much greater health risks of pregnancy
and childbirth and to the physical, psychological, and financial
hardships of unwanted motherhood. See Greydanus &
Railsback, supra, at 214 (noting that minor's overall risk
of dying from childbirth is over nine times greater than risk of
dying from legal abortion); Lewis, Minors' Competence to Consent to
Abortion, 42 American Psychologist 84, 87 (1987) ("[P]regnancy
continuation poses far greater psychological, physical, and
economic risks to the adolescent than does abortion") (citation
omitted). See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 642 (plurality opinion) ("[C]onsidering her probable education,
employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity,
unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor").
Clearly, then, requiring notification of one parent significantly
burdens a young woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.

															The 48-hour delay after notification further aggravates the harm
caused by the pre-notification delay that may flow from a minor's
fear of notifying a parent. Moreover, the 48-hour delay burdens the
rights of all minors, including those who would voluntarily consult
with one or both parents. [ Footnote
2/4 ] Justice STEVENS' assertion that the 48-hour delay "imposes
only a minimal burden," ante at 497 U. S. 449 ; see also post at 497 U. S. 496 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), ignores the increased health risks and
costs that this delay entails. The District Court specifically
found as a matter of fact that "[d]elay of any length in performing
an abortion increases the statistical risk of mortality and
morbidity." 648 F.
Supp. 756 , 765 (Minn 1986). Even a brief delay can have a
particularly detrimental impact if it pushes the abortion into the
second trimester, when the operation is substantially more risky
and costly. Ibid. See Page 497 U. S. 468 also C. Tietze & S. Henshaw, Induced Abortion: A
World Review 1986, pp. 103-104 (6th ed. 1986) (rate of major
complications nearly doubles in the week following the end of the
first trimester and increases significantly thereafter). Moreover,
the District Court found that the 48-hour delay

															"frequently is compounded by scheduling factors such as clinic
hours, transportation requirements, weather, a minor's school and
work commitments, and sometimes a single parent's family and work
commitments,"

															often resulting in an effective delay of a week or more. 648 F.
Supp. at 765. [ Footnote 2/5 ] The
increased risk caused by a delay of that magnitude, the District
Court found, is statistically significant at any point in the
pregnancy. Ibid. Certainly no pregnant woman facing these
heightened risks to her health would dismiss them as "minimal."
[ Footnote 2/6 ] Page 497 U. S. 469 C Because the parental notification and delay requirements burden
a young woman's right freely to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy, the State must show that these requirements are
justified by a compelling state interest and are closely tailored
to further that interest. The main purpose of the notification
requirement is to

															"protect the wellbeing of minors by encouraging minors to
discuss with their parents the decision whether to terminate their
pregnancies" Id. at 766. The 44-hour delay, in turn, is designed to
provide parents with adequate time to consult with their daughters. Ante at 497 U.S.
448 -449 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); post at 497 U. S. 496 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). As Justice STEVENS states, such
consultation is intended to ensure that the minor's decision is
"knowing and intelligent." Ante at 497 U.S. 448 . I need not determine
whether the State's interest ultimately outweighs young women's
privacy interests, however, because the strictures here are not
closely tailored to further the State's asserted goal.

															For the many young women who would voluntarily consult with a
parent before having an abortion, see supra at 497 U. S.
464 -465, the notification and delay requirements are
superfluous, and so do not advance the State's interest. The
requirements affect only those women who would not otherwise notify
a parent. But compelled notification is unlikely to result in
productive consultation in families in which a daughter does not
feel comfortable consulting her parents about intimate or sexual
matters. See Melton, Legal Regulation of Adolescent
Abortion: Unintended Effects, 42 American Psychologist 79, 81
(1987) (stating that, in many families, compelled parental
notification is unlikely to result in meaningful discussion about
the daughter's predicament); Tr. 1357-1358 (testimony of Dr. Steven
Butzer) (stating that involuntary disclosure is disruptive to
family and has "almost universally negative" effects, in accord
with minor's expectations). Page 497 U. S. 470 Moreover, in those families with a history of child abuse, a
pregnant minor forced to notify a parent is more likely to be
greeted by physical assault or psychological harassment than open
and caring conversation about her predicament. See Tr. 316
(testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker) (stating that forced notification
in dysfunctional families is likely to sever communication patterns
and increase the risk of violence); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. at 450 U. S. 446 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Forced notification in such situations
would amount to punishing the daughter for the lack of a stable and
communicative family environment, when the blame for that situation
lies principally, if not entirely, with the parents. Parental
notification in the less-than-ideal family, therefore, would not
lead to an informed decision by the minor. [ Footnote 2/7 ]

															The State also claims that the statute serves the interest of
protecting parents' independent right "to shape the[ir]
child[ren]'s values and lifestyle[s]" and "to determine and strive
for what they believe to be best for their children." Brief for
Petitioners in No. 88-1309, p. 26. If this is so, the statute is
surely under-inclusive, as it does not require parental
notification where the minor seeks medical treatment for pregnancy,
venereal disease, or alcohol and other drug abuse. See Minn.Stat. § 144.343(1) (1988). Are we to believe that Page 497 U. S. 471 Minnesota parents have no interest in their children's wellbeing
in these other contexts?

															In any event, parents' right to direct their children's
upbringing is a right against state interference with family
matters. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.
S. 158 , 321 U. S. 166 (1944) (noting that this Court's decisions "have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205 , 406 U. S. 232 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 510 , 268 U. S.
534 -535 (1925). Yet, ironically, the State's
requirements here affirmatively interfere in family life by trying
to force families to conform to the State's archetype of the ideal
family. Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.
S. 494 , 431 U. S. 506 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution prevents [the state] from standardizing
its children -- and its adults -- by forcing all to live in certain
narrowly defined family patterns"); ante at 497 U. S. 452 .
It is a strange constitutional alchemy that would transform a
limitation on state power into a justification for governmental
intrusion into family interactions. Moreover, as a practical
matter, "state intervention is hardly likely to resurrect parental
authority that the parents themselves are unable to preserve." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 448 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See also Planned Parenthood of
Central Mo., 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 75 (finding it unlikely that parental veto power over abortion "will
enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very
existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure").

															Even if the State's interest is construed as merely the facilitation of the exercise of parental authority, the
notification and delay requirements are not narrowly drawn.
Parental authority is not limitless. Certainly where parental
involvement threatens to harm the child, the parent's authority
must yield. Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, 321 U.S. at 321 U. S.
169 -170; H.L. v. Matheson, supra, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 449 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Yet the notification and delay
requirements facilitate Page 497 U. S. 472 the exercise of parental authority even where it may physically
or psychologically harm the child. See supra at 497 U. S.
470 .

															Furthermore, the exercise of parental authority in some
instances will take the form of obstructing the minor's decision to
have an abortion. A parent who objects to the abortion, once
notified, can exert strong pressure on the minor -- in the form of
stern disapproval, withdrawal of financial support, or physical or
emotional abuse -- to block her from getting an abortion. See
Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 647 (plurality opinion) ("[M]any parents hold strong views on the
subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those
living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents'
efforts to obstruct . . . an abortion"). See also H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 438 -439 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In such
circumstances, the notification requirement becomes, in effect, a
consent requirement. As discussed below, infra at 497 U. S. 473 ,
the State may not permit any person, including a parent, to veto a
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.

															Because the notification and delay requirements effectively give
parents the opportunity to exercise an unconstitutional veto in
some situations, those requirements are not narrowly tailored to
the State's interest in facilitating legitimate exercises
of parental authority. III The parental notification and 48-hour delay requirements, then,
do not satisfy the strict scrutiny applicable to laws restricting a
woman's constitutional right to have an abortion. The judicial
bypass procedure cannot salvage those requirements because that
procedure itself is unconstitutional. A The State argues that the bypass procedure saves the
notification and delay requirements because it provides an
alternative way to obtain a legal abortion for minors who would be
harmed by those requirements. This Court has upheld a Page 497 U. S. 473 one-parent consent requirement where the State provided an
alternative judicial procedure

															"'whereby a pregnant minor [could] demonstrate that she [was]
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that,
despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best
interests.'" Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 , 462 U. S. 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 439-440).

															I continue to believe, however, that a judicial bypass procedure
of this sort is itself unconstitutional because it effectively
gives a judge "an absolute veto over the decision of the physician
and his patient." Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City,
supra, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 504 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 655 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("The provision of an
absolute veto to a judge . . . is to me particularly troubling. . .
. It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that
the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance
of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties")
(footnote omitted); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo.,
supra, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 74 ("[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the
consent"). No person may veto any minor's decision, made in
consultation with her physician, to terminate her pregnancy. An
"immature" minor has no less right to make decisions regarding her
own body than a mature adult.

															Minnesota's bypass provision allows a judge to authorize an
abortion if he determines either that a woman is sufficiently
mature to make the decision on her own or, if she is not
sufficiently mature, that an abortion without parental notification
would serve her best interests. Minn.Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988). Of
course, if a judge refuses to authorize Page 497 U. S. 474 an abortion, a young woman can then reevaluate whether she wants
to notify a parent. But many women will carry the fetus to term
rather than notify a parent. See supra at 497 U. S.
466 -467. Other women may decide to inform a parent, but
then confront parental pressure or abuse so severe as to obstruct
the abortion. For these women, the judge's refusal to authorize an
abortion effectively constitutes an absolute veto.

															The constitutional defects in any provision allowing someone to
veto a woman's abortion decision are exacerbated by the vagueness
of the standards contained in this statute. The statute gives no
guidance on how a judge is to determine whether a minor is
sufficiently "mature" and "capable" to make the decision on her
own. See Minn.Stat. § 144.343(6)(c)(i) (1988) (judge shall
authorize abortion if he "determines that the pregnant woman is
mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed
abortion"). Cf. Lewis, 42 American Psychologist, at 84, 87
(noting the absence of a judicial standard for assessing maturity).
The statute similarly is silent as to how a judge is to determine
whether an abortion without parental notification would serve an
immature minor's "best interests." § 144.343(6)(c)(i) (judge shall
authorize abortion for immature minor without notification "if said
judge concludes that the pregnant woman's best interests would be
served thereby"). Is the judge expected to know more about the
woman's medical needs or psychological makeup than her doctor?
Should he consider the woman's financial and emotional status to
determine the quality of life the woman and her future child would
enjoy in this world? Neither the record nor the Court answers such
questions. As Justice STEVENS wrote in Bellotti II, the
best interest standard

															"provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision
must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores
whose enforcement upon the minor -- particularly when contrary to
her own informed and reasonable decision -- is fundamentally at
odds with privacy interests underlying the constitutional
protection Page 497 U. S. 475 afforded to her decision."

															443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
655 -656 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). It is
difficult to conceive of any reason, aside from a judge's personal
opposition to abortion, that would justify a finding that an
immature woman's best interests would be served by forcing her to
endure pregnancy and childbirth against her will. B Even if I did not believe that a judicial bypass procedure was
facially unconstitutional, the experience of Minnesota's procedure
in operation demonstrates that the bypass provision before us
cannot save the parental notification and delay requirements. This
Court has addressed judicial bypass procedures only in the context
of facial challenges. See Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas
City, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
490 -493 (opinion of Powell, J.); Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
439 -442; Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
643 -644 (plurality opinion). The Court has never
considered the actual burdens a particular bypass provision imposes
on a woman's right to choose an abortion. Such consideration
establishes that, even if judges authorized every abortion sought
by petitioning minors, Minnesota's judicial bypass is far too
burdensome to remedy an otherwise unconstitutional statute.

															The District Court found that the bypass procedure imposed
significant burdens on minors. First,

															"scheduling practices in Minnesota courts typically require
minors to wait two or three days between their first contact with
the court and the hearing on their petitions. This delay may
combine with other factors to result in a delay of a week or
more."

															648 F.Supp. at Page 497 U. S. 476 763. As noted above, supra, at 497 U. S.
467 -468, a delay of only a few days can significantly
increase the health risks to the minor; a week-long delay
inevitably does. Furthermore, in several counties in Minnesota, no
judge is willing to hear bypass petitions, forcing women in those
areas to travel long distances to obtain a hearing. 648 F. Supp. at
763; Donovan, Judging Teenagers: How Minors Fare When They Seek
Court-Authorized Abortions, 15 Family Planning Perspectives 259,
264 (1983) (50% of Minnesota minors utilizing bypass were not
residents of city in which court was located); Melton, 42 American
Psychologist, at 80 ("In Minnesota, where judges in rural counties
have often recused themselves from participation in the abortion
hearings, minors sometimes have to travel a round-trip of more than
500 miles for the hearing"). The burden of such travel, often
requiring an overnight stay in a distant city, is particularly
heavy for poor women from rural areas. Furthermore, a young woman's
absence from home, school, or work during the time required for
such travel and for the hearing itself can jeopardize the woman's
confidentiality. See ibid. The District Court also found that the bypass procedure can be
extremely traumatic for young women.

															"The experience of going to court for a judicial authorization
produces fear and tension in many minors. Minors are apprehensive
about the prospect of facing an authority figure who holds in his
hands the power to veto their decision to proceed without notifying
one or both parents. Many minors are angry and resentful at being
required to justify their decision before complete strangers.
Despite the confidentiality of the proceeding, many minors resent
having to reveal intimate details of their personal and family
lives to these strangers. Finally, many minors are left feeling
guilty and ashamed about their lifestyle and their decision to
terminate their pregnancy. Some mature minors and some minors in
whose best interests it is to proceed without notifying their
parents are so daunted by the judicial proceeding that they forego
the bypass option and either notify their parents or carry to
term."

															"Some minors are so upset by the bypass proceeding that they
consider it more difficult than the medical procedure itself.
Indeed the anxiety resulting from the bypass Page 497 U. S. 477 proceeding may linger until the time of the medical procedure
and thus render the latter more difficult than necessary."

															648 F. Supp. at 763-764. [ Footnote
2/8 ]

															Yet, despite the substantial burdens imposed by these
proceedings, the bypass is, in effect, a "rubber stamp," id. at 766 (testimony of Honorable William Sweeney); only
an extremely small number of petitions are denied, id. at
765. See also Melton, supra, at 80 ("Available
research indicates that judicial bypass proceedings are merely pro forma. Although they represent substantial intrusion
on minors' privacy and take up significant amounts of court time,
there is no evidence that they promote more reasoned decisionmaking
or screen out adolescents who may be particularly immature or
vulnerable. . . . The hearings typically last less than 15 minutes.
. . . Despite the complex issues involved (maturity and the best
interests of the minor), experts are rarely if ever called to
testify"). The judges who have adjudicated over 90% of the bypass
petitions between 1981 and 1986 could not identify any positive
effects of the bypass procedure. See 648 F. Supp. at 766; ante at 497 U. S.
441 -442, and n. 29. The large number of women who
undergo the bypass process do not receive any sort of counseling
from the court -- which is not surprising, given the court's
limited role and lack of expertise in that area. The bypass process
itself thus cannot serve the state interest of promoting informed
decisionmaking by all minors. If the State truly were concerned
about ensuring Page 497 U. S. 478 that all minors consult with a knowledgeable and caring adult,
it would provide for some form of counseling rather than for a
judicial procedure in which a judge merely gives or withholds his
consent. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Thus, regardless of one's view of the facial validity of a
bypass procedure, Minnesota's procedure in practice imposes an
excessive burden on young women's right to choose an abortion. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 655 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he need to commence
judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal abortion would
impose a burden at least as great as, and probably greater than,
that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent
of a parent"). Furthermore, the process does not serve the State's
interest of ensuring that minors' decisions are informed. Surely,
then, a State could not require that all minor women seeking an
abortion obtain judicial approval. [ Footnote 2/10 ] The Court's holding that the burdensome
bypass procedure saves the State's burdensome notification and
delay requirements Page 497 U. S. 479 thus strikes me as the equivalent of saying that two wrongs make
a right. I cannot accept such a novel judicial calculus. IV A majority of the Court today strikes down an unreasonable and
vastly overbroad requirement that a pregnant minor notify both her
parents of her decision to obtain an abortion. With that decision I
agree. At the same time, though, a different majority holds that a
State may require a young woman to notify one or even both parents
and then wait 48 hours before having an abortion, as long as the
State provides a judicial bypass procedure. From that decision I
vehemently dissent. This scheme forces a young woman in an already
dire situation to choose between two fundamentally unacceptable
alternatives: notifying a possibly dictatorial or even abusive
parent and justifying her profoundly personal decision in an
intimidating judicial proceeding to a black-robed stranger. For
such a woman, this dilemma is more likely to result in trauma and
pain than in an informed and voluntary decision.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															1 concur in 497 U. S. regardless of the interest of the first parent. Cf. ante at 497 U. S.
452 -453.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The statute provides for one-parent notification where only one
parent is living or where the second parent "cannot be located
through reasonably diligent effort." Minn.Stat. § 144.343(3)
(1988).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Dr. Jane Hodgson testified before the District Court that one
14-year-old patient, in order to keep her pregnancy private, tried
to induce an abortion with the help of her friends by inserting a
metallic object into her vagina, thereby tearing her body, scarring
her cervix, and causing bleeding. When that attempt failed to
induce an abortion, the patient, then four or five months pregnant,
finally went to an abortion clinic. Because of the damage to the
patient's cervix, doctors had to perform a hysterotomy, meaning
that that woman must have a Cesarean section to deliver a child in
the future. App. 462.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															As Justice STEVENS notes, ante at 497 U. S. 449 ,
the 48-hour delay does not apply if a parent or court consents to
the abortion.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Although these other factors would constrain a young woman's
ability to schedule an abortion even in the absence of the 48-hour
delay requirement, the addition of the immutable statutory delay
reduces both the woman's and the clinic's scheduling flexibility,
and thus can exacerbate the effect of the other factors. For
instance, a woman might contact a clinic on Monday and find that
her schedule and the clinic's allow for only a Tuesday appointment
for that week. Without the 48-hour delay requirement, the woman
could be treated the next day; with the statutory delay, however,
the woman would be forced to wait a week.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Justice STEVENS concludes that the 48-hour delay requirement
actually results in "little or no delay," because the statutory
period "may run concurrently with the time necessary to make an
appointment for the procedure." Ante at 497 U. S. 449 . See also post at 497 U. S. 496 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) ("48-hour waiting period . . . results in
little or no delay"); 853 F.2d 1452, 1465 (CA8 1988) (en banc).
Justice STEVENS bases this conclusion on the testimony of the
co-administrator of one abortion clinic that a one- or two-day
scheduling backlog was typical. Ante at 497 U. S. 449 ,
n. 34. "One or two days" however, obviously means that the backlog
is not necessarily 48 hours. Furthermore, that witness also stated
that if "a woman says that she must be seen on a particular day,
our policy is we will always see her." App. 147. But because of the
mandated 48-hour delay, the clinic cannot honor a woman's request
for an abortion until at least two full days have elapsed. The
testimony therefore is hardly sufficient to justify ignoring the
District Court's factual finding with regard to the effects of the
delay requirement.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															The State also asserts that the requirements permit parents to
provide doctors with relevant information about their daughters'
medical history and "to assist with ensuring that proper after-care
procedures are followed." Brief of Petitioners in No. 88-1309, pp.
34-36. See also ante at 497 U.S. 448 (opinion of Justice
STEVENS) (delay period "permits the parent to inquire into the
competency of the doctor performing the abortion"). If these are
actual state interests, it seems peculiar that the State does not
try to facilitate similar parental involvement in minors' treatment
for pregnancy and childbirth, see infra, this page, which
pose far greater risks to the minor's health than abortion, see
supra, 497 U. S.
466 -467. In any event, compelled notification is
unlikely to result in helpful parental involvement in those
families in which a parent reacts to the news of the daughter's
predicament by rejecting or abusing the young woman. See
supra, this page.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Dr. Hodgson testified that some minors dread the court procedure
so much that they become "wringing wet with perspiration" and
frequently require a sedative beforehand. App. 468. One judge who
has heard a significant number of bypass petitions testified that
the court experience is "very nervewracking" for young women. 648
F. Supp. at 766. Another testified that pregnant minors'

															"level of apprehension is twice what I normally see in court. .
. . You see all the typical things that you would see with somebody
under incredible amounts of stress -- answering monosyllabically,
tone of voice, tenor of voice, shaky, wringing of hands, you know,
one young lady had her -- her hands were turning blue and it was
warm in my office." Ibid. [ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Maine, for example, requires that a minor obtain the consent of
a parent, guardian, or adult family member, undergo a judicial
bypass, or receive counseling from the physician or a counselor
according to specified criteria. See Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.,
Tit. 22, § 1597-A (Supp. 1989). Wisconsin requires abortion
providers to encourage parental notification unless they determine
that the minor has a valid reason for not notifying her parents.
Wisc.Stat. § 146.78 (1987-1988). In the latter situation, the
provider must encourage -- but not require -- the minor to notify
"another family member, close family friend, school counselor,
social worker or other appropriate person." § 146.78(5)(c). I
express no opinion on the constitutionality or efficacy of these
schemes, but raise them only as examples of alternatives that seem
more closely related than a judicial bypass procedure to the goal
of ensuring that the minor's decision is informed.

															In any event, most abortion clinics already provide extensive
counseling. See 1 National Research Council, Risking the
Future: Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and Childbearing 191-192
(C. Hayes ed. 1987) (90% of abortion clinics routinely provide
counseling for all first-abortion patients, and all clinics make
counseling available to all patients on request).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															Indeed, the State conceded in oral argument before the Eighth
Circuit, sitting en banc, that a judicial approval provision by
itself would be unconstitutional. See 853 F.2d at 1469
(Lay, C.J., dissenting).

															Justice SCALIA, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.

															As I understand the various opinions today: One Justice holds
that two-parent notification is unconstitutional (at least in the
present circumstances) without judicial bypass, but constitutional
with bypass, ante at 497
U.S. 459 -461 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); four Justices would hold that two-parent
notification is constitutional with or without bypass, post at 497 U. S.
488 -497 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part); four Justices would hold that two-parent
notification is unconstitutional with or without bypass, though the
four apply two different standards, ante at 497 U. S.
455 -458 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), ante at 497 U. S.
472 -479 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Page 497 U. S. 480 six Justices hold that one-parent notification with bypass is
constitutional, though for two different sets of reasons, Ohio
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, at 497 U. S.
510 -517; post at 497 U. S.
522 -524 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); and three
Justices would hold that one-parent notification with bypass is
unconstitutional, post at 497 U. S.
526 -527 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). One will search in
vain the document we are supposed to be construing for text that
provides the basis for the argument over these distinctions, and
will find in our society's tradition regarding abortion no hint
that the distinctions are constitutionally relevant, much less any
indication how a constitutional argument about them ought to be
resolved. The random and unpredictable results of our consequently
unchanneled individual views make it increasingly evident, Term
after Term, that the tools for this job are not to be found in the
lawyer's -- and hence not in the judge's -- workbox. I continue to
dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion Code, and from
the illusion that we have authority to do so.

															Justice KENNEDY, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and
Justice SCALIA join, concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.

															"'There can be little doubt that the State furthers a
constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried
pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making
the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is
a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional
stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and
emotional support.'" Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.
S. 622 , 443 U. S.
640 -641 (1979) (plurality opinion) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S.
52 , 428 U. S. 91 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 , 450 U. S.
409 -411 (1981); id. at 450 U. S.
422 -423 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Danforth, supra, 428 U.S. at 428 U. S. 94 -95
(WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 428 U. S.
102 -103 (STEVENS, J., concurring in Page 497 U. S. 481 part and dissenting in part). Today the Court holds that a
statute requiring a minor to notify both parents that she plans to
have an abortion is not a permissible means of furthering the
interest described with such specificity in Bellotti II. This conclusion, which no doubt will come as a surprise to most
parents, is incompatible with our constitutional tradition and any
acceptable notion of judicial review of legislative enactments. I
dissent from the portion of the Court's judgment affirming the
Court of Appeals' conclusion that Minnesota two-parent notice
statute is unconstitutional.

															The Minnesota statute also provides, however, that if the
two-parent notice requirement is invalidated, the same notice
requirement is effective unless the pregnant minor obtains a court
order permitting the abortion to proceed. Minn.Stat. § 144.343(6)
(1988). The Court of Appeals sustained this portion of the statute,
in effect a two-parent notice requirement with a judicial bypass.
Five Members of the Court, the four who join this opinion and
Justice O'CONNOR, agree with the Court of Appeals' decision on this
aspect of the statute. As announced by Justice STEVENS, who
dissents from this part of the Court's decision, the Court of
Appeals' judgment on this portion of the statute is therefore
affirmed. I The provisions of the statute before us are straightforward. In
essence, the statute provides that, before a physician in Minnesota
may perform an abortion on an unemancipated minor, the physician or
the physician's agent must notify both of the minor's parents, if
each one can be located through reasonable effort, either
personally or by certified mail at least 48 hours before the
abortion is performed. Minn. Stat. §§ 144.343(2)-(3) (1988).
Notification is not required if the abortion is necessary to
prevent the minor's death; or if both parents have consented to the
abortion; or if the minor declares that she is the victim of sexual
abuse, neglect, or physical abuse. § 144.343(4). Failure to
comply Page 497 U. S. 482 with these requirements is a misdemeanor, and the statute
authorizes a civil action against the noncomplying physician by the
minor's parents. § 144.343(5).

															The statute also provides that, if a court enjoins the notice
requirement of subdivision 2, parental notice under the subdivision
shall still be required unless the minor obtains a court order
dispensing with it. Under the statute, the court is required to
authorize the physician to perform the abortion without parental
notice if the court determines that the minor is "mature and
capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion" or
that "the performance of an abortion upon her without notification
of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best
interests." § 144.343(6). II The State identifies two interests served by the law. The first
is the State's interest in the welfare of pregnant minors. The
second is the State's interest in acknowledging and promoting the
role of parents in the care and upbringing of their children.
Justice STEVENS, writing for two Members of the Court, acknowledges
the legitimacy of the first interest, but decides that the second
interest is somehow illegitimate, at least as to whichever parent a
minor chooses not to notify. I cannot agree that the Constitution
prevents a State from keeping both parents informed of the medical
condition or medical treatment of their child under the terms and
conditions of this statute.

															The welfare of the child has always been the central concern of
laws with regard to minors. The law does not give to children many
rights given to adults, and provides, in general, that children can
exercise the rights they do have only through and with parental
consent. Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584 , 442 U. S. 621 (1979) (STEWART, J., concurring in judgment). Legislatures
historically have acted on the basis of the qualitative differences
in maturity between children and adults, see Schall v.
Martin, 467 U. S. 253 , 467 U. S.
265 -267 (1984); Thompson Page 497 U. S. 483 v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 815 , 487 U. S.
853 -854 (1988) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment)
(collecting cases); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.
S. 361 , 492 U. S. 384 (1989) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), and not without reason. Age is a
rough but fair approximation of maturity and judgment, and a State
has an interest in seeing that a child, when confronted with
serious decisions such as whether or not to abort a pregnancy, has
the assistance of her parents in making the choice. If anything is
settled by our previous cases dealing with parental notification
and consent laws, it is this point. See Bellotti II, 443
U.S. at 443 U. S.
640 -641; Matheson, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S.
409 -411; id. at 450 U. S.
422 -423 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).

															Protection of the right of each parent to participate in the
upbringing of her or his own children is a further discrete
interest that the State recognizes by the statute. The common law
historically has given recognition to the right of parents, not
merely to be notified of their children's actions, but to speak and
act on their behalf. Absent a showing of neglect or abuse, a father
"possessed the paramount right to the custody and control of his
minor children, and to superintend their education and nurture." J.
Schouler, Law of Domestic Relations 337 (3d. ed. 1882); see
also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *452-*453; 2 J. Kent,
Commentaries on American Law *203-*206; G. Field, Legal Relations
of Infants 63-80 (1888). In this century, the common law of most
States has abandoned the idea that parental rights are vested
solely in fathers, with mothers being viewed merely as agents of
their husbands, cf. ante at 497 U. S. 446 ,
n. 32; it is now the case that each parent has parental rights and
parental responsibilities. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, ch.
4, § 18, p. 115 (5th ed. 1984). Limitations have emerged on the
prerogatives of parents to act contrary to the best interests of
the child with respect to matters such as compulsory schooling and
child labor. As a general matter, however, it remains Page 497 U. S. 484 "cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.
S. 158 , 321 U. S. 166 (1944).

															"The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children. This primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 , 406 U. S. 232 (1972); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 , 268 U. S. 535 (1925).

															A State pursues a legitimate end under the Constitution when it
attempts to foster and preserve the parent-child relation by giving
all parents the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture
of their children. We have held that parents have a liberty
interest, protected by the Constitution, in having a reasonable
opportunity to develop close relations with their children. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 , 455 U. S.
753 -754 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.
S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 , 405 U. S.
651 -652 (1972). We have recognized, of course, that
there are limits to the constitutional right of parents to have
custody of or to participate in decisions affecting their children.
If a parent has relinquished the opportunity to develop a relation
with the child, and his or her only link to the child is
biological, the Constitution does not require a State to allow
parental participation. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 , 463 U. S.
261 -265 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 , 434 U. S.
254 -256 (1978). But the fact that the Constitution does
not protect the parent-child relationship in all circumstances does
not mean that the State cannot attempt to foster parental
participation where the Constitution does not demand that it do so.
A State may seek to protect and facilitate the parent-child bond on
the assumption that parents will act in their child's best
interests. See Parham v. J.R., supra, at 442 U. S.
602 -603; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.
S. 629 , 390 U. S. 639 (1968). Indeed, Page 497 U. S. 485 we have held that a State cannot terminate parental rights based
upon a presumption that a class of parents is unfit without
affording individual parents an opportunity to rebut the
presumption. See Stanley, supra, at 405 U. S.
654 -658; Santosky, supra, 455 U.S. at 455 U. S. 753 ("The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents . . ."). If a State cannot
legislate on the broad assumption that classes of parents are unfit
and undeserving of parental rights without affording an opportunity
to rebut the assumption, it is at least permissible for a State to
legislate on the premise that parents, as a general rule, are
interested in their children's welfare and will act in accord with
it.

															The Court's descriptions of the State's interests in this case
are caricatures, both of the law and of our most revered
institutions. The Court labels these interests as ones in
"standardizing its children and adults,".and in ensuring that each
family, to the extent possible, "conform to some state-designed
ideal." Ante at 497 U. S. 452 ; see also ante at 497 U. S. 471 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (accusing Minnesota of "trying to force
families to conform to the State's archetype of the ideal family").
Minnesota asserts no such purpose, by explicit statement or by any
permissible inference. All that Minnesota asserts is an interest in
seeing that parents know about a vital decision facing their child.
That interest is a valid one without regard to whether the child is
living with either one or both parents, or to the attachment
between the minor's parents. How the family unit responds to such
notice is, for the most part, beyond the State's control. The State
would no doubt prefer that all parents, after being notified under
the statute, would contact their daughters and assist them in
making their decisions with the child's best interests at heart;
but it has not, contrary to the Court's intimation, "decreed"
communication, nor could it. What Page 497 U. S. 486 the State can do is make the communication possible by at least
informing parents of their daughter's intentions.

															Minnesota has done no more than act upon the common-sense
proposition that, in assisting their daughter in deciding whether
to have an abortion, parents can best fulfill their roles if they
have the same information about their own child's medical condition
and medical choices as the child's doctor does; and that to deny
parents this knowledge is to risk, or perpetuate, estrangement or
alienation from the child when she is in the greatest need of
parental guidance and support. The Court does the State, and our
constitutional tradition, sad disservice by impugning the
legitimacy of these elemental objectives.

															Given the societal interest that underlies parental notice and
consent laws, it comes as no surprise that most States have enacted
statutes requiring that, in general, a physician must notify or
obtain the consent of at least one of her parents or legal guardian
before performing an abortion on a minor. See Wardle,
"Time Enough": Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and
the Prudent Pace of Justice, 41 Fla.L.Rev. 881, 963-965 (1989)
(collecting statutes). Five States, including Minnesota, appear to
require, as a general rule, the notification of both parents before
a physician may perform an abortion on a minor. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 20-16-801 through 20-16-808 (Supp. 1989); Idaho
Code § 18-610(6) (1987); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-4-202 (1982); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1990). Another six States appear to require,
with varying exceptions, the consent of both parents. See Del.Code Ann., Title 24, § 1790(b)(3) (1987); Ill.Rev. Stat., ch.
38, � 81-54(3) (1989); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 311.732 (Michie 1990);
Mass. Gen.Laws § 112, § 12S (1988); Miss.Code. Ann. § 41-41-53
(Supp.1989); N.D.Cent. Code § 14-02.1-03.1 (1981). Whether these
statutes are more or less restrictive than the Minnesota statute is
not the issue, although I pause to note that, because the Court's
decision today turns upon its perception that the law's
requirements, Page 497 U. S. 487 despite its exceptions, are the most "stringent" in the country, see ante at 497 U.S.
459 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment), the Court's decision has no import for the validity of
these other statutes. What is important is that Minnesota is not
alone in acknowledging the vitality of these governmental interests
and adopting laws that, in the legislature's judgment, are best
suited to serving them while protecting the minor's welfare.

															On a more general level, the current trend among state
legislatures is to enact joint custody laws making it the norm for
divorced or separated parents to share the legal responsibility and
authority for making decisions concerning their children's care,
education, religion, and medical treatment. See 2 H.
Clark, Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 20.5 (2d
ed. 1987); Folberg, Joint Custody Law -- The Second Wave, 23
J.Family L. 1, 14-55 (1984-1985) (collecting statutes). Under
Minnesota law, for example, there exists a presumption in divorce
proceedings that joint custody, if requested by either or both
parents, is in the best interests of the child. See Minn.Stat. § 518.17(2) (Supp.1989). Even if joint custody is not
awarded, Minnesota law provides that each parent, unless the court
specifically directs otherwise to protect the welfare of a parent
or the child,

															"has the right of access to, and to receive copies of, school,
medical, dental, religious training, and other important records
and information about the minor children;"

															the responsibility to "keep the other party informed as to the
name and address of the school of attendance of the minor
children"; the responsibility to "notify the other party of [an
accident or serious illness of a minor child], and the name of the
health care provider and the place of treatment"; and "the right to
reasonable access and telephone contact with the minor children."
Minn.Stat. § 518.17(3) (1988). Minnesota's two-parent notification
law does no more than apply these general principles to the
specific case of abortion. Page 497 U. S. 488 Federal law contains similar provisions regulating the health
and welfare of children that require the notification or consent of
both parents. For example, one condition for obtaining a grant
under the Adolescent Family Life Act is that an applicant must
provide assurances that it will

															"notify the parents or guardians of any unemancipated minor
requesting services [relating to family planning] from the
applicant and . . . will obtain the permission of such parents or
guardians with respect to the provision of such services."

															42 U.S.C. § 300z-5(a)(22)(A)(i) (1982 ed.); see §
300z-5(a)(22)(A)(ii) (requiring only notice to parents or guardians
if the unemancipated minor is pregnant). See also 42
U.S.C. § 5671(d) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (authorizing funding for
certain experimental juvenile drug and alcohol treatment programs
if safeguards are established for obtaining the informed consent of
the "parents or guardians" of minors); 50 U.S.C.App. § 454(c)(4)
(1982 ed.) (permitting induction of 17-year-olds into the Armed
Forces with the written consent of his "parents or guardian"); 45
CFR § 46.408 (1989) (requiring consent of both parents before a
minor may participate in medical research posing more than a
"minimal" risk of harm). With all respect, I submit the Court today
errs when it states that Minnesota's two-parent notice law is an
"oddity among state and federal consent provisions." Ante at 497 U. S.
454 . III At least two Members of the Court concede, as they must, that a
State has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the pregnant
minor and that, in furtherance of this interest, the State may
require the minor to notify, and consult with, one of her parents. See ante at 497 U. S.
444 -446 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); cf. ante at 497 U. S. 469 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). The Court nonetheless holds the Minnesota
statute unconstitutional because it requires the minor to notify
not one parent, but both parents, a requirement that the Court says
bears Page 497 U. S. 489 no reasonable relation to the minor's welfare. See ante at 497 U. S.
450 -455; cf. ante at 497 U. S.
469 -472 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). The Court also concludes
that Minnesota does not have a legitimate interest in facilitating
the participation of both parents in the care and upbringing of
their children. Given the substantial protection that minors have
under Minnesota law generally, and under the statute in question,
the judicial bypass provisions of the law are not necessary to its
validity. The two-parent notification law enacted by Minnesota is,
in my view, valid without the judicial bypass provision of
subdivision 6. A We have been over much of this ground before. It is beyond
dispute that in many families, whether the parents are living
together or apart, notice to both parents serves the interests of
the parents and the minor, and that the State can legislate with
this fact in mind. In H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.
S. 398 (1981), we considered the constitutionality of a
statute which required a physician, before performing an abortion
on a minor, to " [n]otify, if possible, the [minor's] parents or guardian.'" Id. at 450 U. S. 400 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-304 (1978)) (emphasis added). We
held that the statute, as applied to unmarried, dependent, and
immature minors, "plainly serves important state interests, is narrowly drawn to
protect only those interests, and does not violate any guarantees
of the Constitution."

															450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 413 .
Our holding was made with knowledge of the contentions, supported
by citations to medical and sociological literature, that are
proffered again today for the proposition that notification imposes
burdens on minors. See id. at 450 U. S.
436 -441 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We nonetheless
rejected arguments that a requirement of parental notification was
the equivalent of a requirement of parental consent, id. at 411; that the statute was unconstitutional because it required
notification only as to abortions, and not as to other medical Page 497 U. S. 490 procedures, id. at 450 U. S. 412 ;
and that the statute was unconstitutional because it might deter
some minors from seeking abortions, id. at 450 U. S.
413 .

															Our decision was based upon the well-accepted premise that we
must defer to a reasonable judgment by the state legislature when
it determines what is sound public policy. Justice STEVENS's
opinion concurring in the Court's judgment relied upon an explicit
statement of this principle. Concluding that the Utah statute
requiring notification of both parents was valid as to all
unmarried minors, both mature and immature, Justice STEVENS
reasoned that the State's interest in ensuring that a young woman
considering an abortion receive appropriate consultation was
"plainly sufficient to support a state legislature's determination
that such appropriate consultation should include parental advice." Id. at 450 U. S. 423 .
The Court today departs from this rule. It now suggests that a
general requirement that both parents be notified is
unconstitutional because of its own conclusion that the law is
unnecessary when notice produces favorable results, see
ante at 497 U. S. 450 ,
and irrational in all of the instances when it produces unfavorable
results, see ante at 497 U. S.
450 -451. In Matheson, Justice STEVENS rejected
these same arguments as insufficient to establish that the Utah
statute was unconstitutional:

															"Of course, a conclusion that the Utah statute is invalid would
not prevent young pregnant women from voluntarily seeking the
advice of their parents prior to making the abortion decision. But
the State may legitimately decide that such consultation should be
made more probable by ensuring that parents are informed of their
daughter's decision[.]"

															" * * * *" "Utah's interest in its parental-notice statute is not
diminished by the fact that there can be no guarantee that
meaningful parent-child communication will actually occur.
Good-faith compliance with the statute's requirements Page 497 U. S. 491 would tend to facilitate communication between daughters and
parents regarding the abortion decision. The possibility that
some parents will not react with compassion and understanding upon
being informed of their daughter's predicament or that, even if
they are receptive, they will incorrectly advise her, does not
undercut the legitimacy of the State's attempt to establish a
procedure that will enhance the probability that a pregnant young
woman exercise as wisely as possible her right to make the abortion
decision. "

															450 U.S. at 450 U. S.
423 -424 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis
added). Justice STEVENS' reasoning was correct then and it remains
correct today. B In applying the standards established in our prior decisions to
the case at hand,

															"we must keep in mind that when we are concerned with extremely
sensitive issues, such as the one involved here, "the appropriate
forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We
should not forget that legislatures are ultimate guardians of
the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree
as the courts.' Missouri, K & T R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267 , 194 U. S. 270 (1904) (Holmes, J.)." Maher, 432 U.S. at 432 U. S.
479 -480 (footnote omitted)." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 , 462 U. S. 465 (1983) (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). The Minnesota Legislature, like
the legislatures of many States, has found it necessary to address
the issue of parental notice in its statutory laws. In my view it
has acted in a permissible manner.

															All must acknowledge that it was reasonable for the legislature
to conclude that, in most cases, notice to both parents will work
to the minor's benefit. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 640 ,
n. 20 (parental involvement, if compassionate and supportive, is
highly desirable). This is true not only in what the Court calls
the "ideal family setting," where both parents and the minor live
under one roof, Page 497 U. S. 492 but also where the minor no longer lives with both parents. The
Court does not deny that many absent parents maintain significant
ties with their children, and seek to participate in their lives,
to guide, to teach, and to care for them. It is beyond dispute that
these attachments, in cases not involving mistreatment or abuse,
are essential to the minor's wellbeing, and that parental notice is
supportive of this kind of family tie. Although it may be true that
notice to one parent will often result in notice to both, the State
need not rely upon the decision of one parent to notify the other,
particularly where both parents maintain ties with their daughter
but not with each other, and when both parents share
responsibilities and duties with respect to the child.

															I acknowledge that, in some cases, notifying both parents will
not produce desirable results despite the fact that no actual
instance is in the record before us, as the two-parent notification
requirement was enjoined before it went into effect. Cf.
ante at 497 U. S. 438 (stating as a matter of historical fact that the "two-parent
notification requirement had particularly harmful effects
on both the minor and the custodial parent" and that fears that
notification of an absent parent would produce harmful results
" were often realized") (emphasis added). We need not
decide today, however, whether the Constitution permits a State to
require that a physician notify both biological parents before
performing an abortion on any minor, for the simple reason that
Minnesota has not enacted such a law.

															The Minnesota statute in fact contains exceptions to ensure that
the statutory notice requirement does not apply if it proves a
serious threat to the minor's health or safety. First, the statute
does not require notice at all costs; to comply with the law, a
physician need only use "reasonably diligent effort" to locate and
notify both of the minor's parents. If the second parent cannot be
located, as may be the case if the parent has deserted the family
or ceased to maintain contact with the minor or the other parent,
the only notice required is to the first parent. Minn.Stat. §
144.343(3) (1988). Page 497 U. S. 493 Second, even where both parents can be located, notice is not
required if the physician certifies that the abortion is necessary
to prevent the woman's death and there is insufficient time to
provide the required notice, § 144.343(4)(a); if the minor's
parents have authorized the abortion in writing, § 144.343(4)(b);
or if the minor declares that she is the victim of sexual abuse,
neglect, or physical abuse, § 144.343(4)(c). Under Minnesota law,
"neglect" of a minor means the failure of a parent

															"to supply a child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or
medical care when reasonably able to do so or failure to protect a
child from conditions or actions which imminently and seriously
endanger the child's physical or mental health when reasonably able
to do so,"

															Minn.Stat. § 626.556(2)(c) (Supp.1989); physical abuse is
defined as "any physical injury inflicted by a person responsible
for the child's care on a child other than by accidental means," §
626.556(2)(d); and sexual abuse includes any sexual contact by a
parent or other person responsible for the child's care or in a
position of authority with respect to the child. § 626.556(2)(a). I
cannot believe that these exceptions are too narrow to eliminate
from the statute's coverage those instances in which notice would
place the minor in danger of parental violence or other conduct
that is a real threat to the physical or mental health of the
child.

															The Court challenges the efficacy of this last exception because
it believes that the statutory requirement that a physician report
a minor's declaration of abuse to appropriate authorities, see § 144.343(4)(c), will deter minors from using the
exception. This is not a proper basis for declaring the law
invalid. Laws are not declared unconstitutional because of some
general reluctance to follow a statutory scheme the legislature
finds necessary to accomplish a legitimate state objective. Beyond
any question, it is reasonable for the State to require that
physicians report declarations of abuse to ensure that mistreatment
is known to authorities responsible for the protection of minors.
This Page 497 U. S. 494 requirement is but a single manifestation of the broad duty in
Minnesota to report suspected cases of child abuse to the proper
authorities. See Minn.Stat. § 626.556(1) (1988) (declaring
it to be the public policy of the State "to protect children whose
health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse,
neglect or sexual abuse" and "to strengthen the family and make the
home, school, and community safer for children by promoting
responsible child care in all settings").

															No one can contend that a minor who is pregnant is somehow less
deserving of the State's protection. It is reasonable to provide
that any minor who contends that she cannot notify her parent or
parents because she is the victim of neglect or abuse allow the
State to use its power to investigate her declaration and protect
her from harm. Any parent, moreover, who responds to notice by
threatening or harming the minor or the other parent may be
prosecuted by the State to the full extent of its laws. See Minn.Stat. § 518B.01 (1988) (Domestic Abuse Act);
Minn.Stat. §§ 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224 (1988 and Supp.
1989) (assault statutes); §§ 609.341 through 609.345 (sexual abuse
statutes); § 609.378 (criminal neglect statute). Just as it relies
upon such laws as its first line of defense for dealing with all
other instances of abuse in family situations, so too is the State
entitled to rely upon them here.

															Notwithstanding the exceptions and protections we have
discussed, it does remain possible, of course, that in some
instances notifying one or both parents will not be in the minor's
best interests. Allegations of a similar possibility, based upon
sociological evidence similar to that presented in this case, was
made by the appellant in Matheson. See Brief for
Appellant 10-11; Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc., et al., as Amici Curiae 1631 in Matheson, O.T.1980, No. 79-5903. The Court there held that
the parental notification law was valid, at least as to immature
minors, for the simple reason that a Page 497 U. S. 495 law is not invalid if it fails to further the governmental
interest in every instance. This point formed the cornerstone of
Justice STEVENS's concurring opinion in Matheson, see 450
U.S. at 450 U. S.
423 -424, and it finds its most explicit statement in the
Court's opinion in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
602 -603:

															"The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More importantly, historically, it has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best
interests of their children. . . . "

															"As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and
reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the
incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attest to this. That
some parents may at times be acting against the best interests of
their children . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a
reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that
teach that parents generally do act in the child's best
interests."

															The only cases in which a majority of the Court has deviated
from this principle are those in which a State sought to condition
a minor's access to abortion services upon receipt of her parent's
consent to do so. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), the Court invalidated a Missouri law requiring that a
physician obtain the consent of one parent before performing an
abortion. The Court's reasoning was unmistakable:

															"[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give
a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the
consent." Id. at 428 U. S. 74 .
The Court today, ignoring this statement, relies heavily upon
isolated passages from Danforth, see ante at 497 U. S.
452 -453, and other cases involving parental consent
laws, Page 497 U. S. 496 see, e.g., ante at 497 U. S. 453 (citing Bellotti II ). Justice MARSHALL, on the other hand,
expressly equates laws requiring parental consent with laws
requiring parental notification, see ante at 497 U. S.
471 -472 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).

															The difference between notice and consent was apparent to us
before, and is apparent now. Unlike parental consent laws, a law
requiring parental notice does not give any third party the legal
right to make the minor's decision for her, or to prevent her from
obtaining an abortion should she choose to have one performed. We
have acknowledged this distinction as "fundamental," and as one
"substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional challenge." Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 428 U.
S. 132 , 428 U. S. 145 , 428 U. S. 148 (1976); see also Matheson, supra, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 411 ,
n. 17. The law before us does not place an absolute obstacle before
any minor seeking to obtain an abortion, and it represents a
considered weighing of the competing interests of minors and their
parents.

															"It cannot be doubted that, as long as a state statute is within
'the bounds of reason and [does not] assum[e] the character of a
merely arbitrary fiat . . . [then] [t]he State . . . must decide
upon measures that are needful for the protection of its people. .
. . '" Akron, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S. 459 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (quoting Purity Extract & Tonic
Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192 , 226 U. S.
204 -205 (1912)). Like all laws of general application,
the Minnesota statute cannot produce perfect results in every
situation to which it applies; but the State is under no obligation
to enact perfect laws. The statute before us, including the 48-hour
waiting period, which is necessary to enable notified parents to
consult with their daughter or their daughter's physician, if they
so wish, and results in little or no delay, represents a
permissible, reasoned attempt to preserve the parents' role in a
minor's decision to have an abortion without placing any absolute
obstacles before a minor who is determined to elect an abortion for
her own interest as she sees it. Section 144.343, without the Page 497 U. S. 497 judicial bypass provision of subdivision 6, is constitutional. I
would reverse the contrary judgment of the Court. of Appeals. IV Because a majority of the Court holds that the two-parent notice
requirement contained in subdivision 2 is unconstitutional, it is
necessary for the Court to consider whether the same notice
requirement is constitutional if the minor has the option of
obtaining a court order permitting the abortion to proceed in lieu
of the required notice. Minn.Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988). Assuming,
as I am bound to do for this part of the analysis, that the notice
provisions standing alone are invalid, I conclude that the
two-parent notice requirement with the judicial bypass alternative
is constitutional.

															The Court concludes that Minnesota's two-parent notice law
without a judicial bypass is unconstitutional because of the
possibility that, in some cases, the rule would not work to the
benefit of minors or their parents. If one were to attempt to
design a statute that would address the Court's concerns, one would
do precisely what Minnesota has done in § 144.343(6): create a
judicial mechanism to identify, and exempt from the strictures of
the law, those cases in which the minor is mature or in which
notification of the minor's parents is not in the minor's best
interests. The bypass procedure comports in all respects with our
precedents. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
643 -644; Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City,
Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 , 462 U. S. 491 (1983) (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 462 U. S. 505 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, post, p. 497 U. S. 502 .

															In providing for the bypass, Minnesota has done nothing other
than attempt to fit its legislation into the framework that we have
supplied in our previous cases. The simple fact is that our
decision in Bellotti II stands for the proposition that a
two-parent consent law is constitutional if it provides Page 497 U. S. 498 for a sufficient judicial bypass alternative, and it requires us
to sustain the statute before us here. In Bellotti II, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a statute which required
a physician to obtain, in most circumstances, the consent of both
of a minor's parents before performing an abortion on the minor. See 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
625 -626 (citing Mass.Gen.Laws. Ann., ch. 112, § 12S
(West Supp.1979)). Although eight Members of the Court concluded
that the statute was unconstitutional, five indicated that they
would uphold a two-parent consent statute with an adequate judicial
bypass.

															For four of the eight Justices forming the majority in Bellotti II, the failure of the statute lay in its
inadequate bypass procedure, not its requirement that both of the
minor's parents consent to the abortion. See 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 643 (opinion of Powell, J.). Justice Powell's opinion specifically
stated that

															"if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion, it also must
provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the
abortion can be obtained," ibid. (emphasis added), and then stated the minimum
requirements for such a procedure. In response to the dissent's
contention that his opinion was advisory, Justice Powell stated
that the four Members of the Court thought it necessary

															"to provide some guidance as to how a State constitutionally may
provide for adult involvement -- either by parents or a state
official such as a judge -- in the abortion decision of minors. In
view of the importance of the issue raised, and the protracted
litigation to which these parties already have been subjected, we
think it would be irresponsible simply to invalidate [the
Massachusetts law] without stating our views as to the controlling
principles." Id. at 443 U. S. 652 ,
n. 32. See also id. at 443 U. S.
651 -652 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring) (joining Justice
Powell's opinion because "unless and until [the Court is willing to
overrule Danforth ], literally thousands of judges Page 497 U. S. 499 cannot be left with nothing more than the guidance offered by a
truly fragmented holding of this Court").

															Justice WHITE dissented from the Court's judgment that the
Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional. In his view, no bypass
was necessary, so it must follow that a two-parent consent statute
with an adequate bypass procedure would have been valid. See
id. at 443 U. S.
656 -657 (dissenting opinion). In sum, five Members of
the Court in Bellotti II found, either by express
statement or by implication, that it was permissible under the
Constitution for a State to require the consent of two parents, as
long as it provides a consent substitute in the form of an adequate
judicial bypass procedure.

															I cannot accept Justice STEVENS' suggestion today that the
plurality, in announcing these rules, did not "consider" the fact
that it was doing so in the context of a two-parent consent
requirement, see ante at 34. The statute was explicit in
its command that both parents consent to the abortion. See 443 U.S. at 443 U. S.
625 -626. The plurality indicated that it was aware of
this fact, see id. at 443 U. S. 630 ,
and n. 10, and the dissent drew a specific contrast between the
two-parent consent requirement then before the Court and the
one-parent consent requirement before the Court in Danforth. See id. at 443 U. S. 653 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Aware of all of these
circumstances, the plurality stated the controlling principles with
specific reference to laws requiring the consent of "one or both"
parents. Id. at 443 U. S. 643 .
The plurality's considered reasoning, coupled with the dissenting
views of Justice WHITE, was intended to set forth the dispositive
principles of law for deciding the constitutionality of parental
consent laws. The Court has relied upon these principles in
deciding the constitutionality of laws requiring notice or the
consent of one parent, see Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. at 462 U. S.
439 -442 (consent); Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, post at 497 U. S.
511 -514 (notice). As Bellotti II dealt with the
far more demanding Page 497 U. S. 500 requirement of two-parent consent, and approved of such a
requirement when coupled with a judicial bypass alternative, I must
conclude that these same principles validate a two-parent notice
requirement when coupled with a judicial bypass alternative.

															A second precedent that compels the conclusion that a two-parent
notice law with a judicial bypass alternative is constitutional is
our decision in Matheson. There we held that a two-parent
notice statute without a bypass was constitutional as applied to
immature minors whose best interests would be served by notice.
Like the statute before the Court in Matheson, the
Minnesota statute, as amended by subdivision 6, requires a
physician to notify the parents of those immature minors whose best
interest will be served by the communication.

															If a two-parent notification law may be constitutional as
applied to immature minors whose best interests are served by the
law, but not as applied to minors who are mature or whose best
interests are not so served, a judicial bypass is an expeditious
and efficient means by which to separate the applications of the
law which are constitutional from those which are not. Justice
STEVENS' characterization of the judicial bypass procedure
discussed in our past cases as a necessary "exception" to a
"reasonable general rule," such as a one-parent consent
requirement, see ante at 497 U. S. 456 , 497 U. S. 457 ,
is far off the mark. If a judicial bypass is mandated by the
Constitution at all, it must be because a general consent rule is
unreasonable in at least some of its applications, and the bypass
is necessary to save the statute. See, e.g., Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 443 U. S. 643 ;
Matheson, 450 U.S. at 450 U. S. 420 (Powell, J., concurring). No reason can be given for refusing to
apply a similar analysis to the less demanding case of a notice
statute. It follows that a similar result should obtain: a law that
requires notice to one or both parents is constitutional with a
bypass. I thus concur in that portion of the judgment announced,
but not agreed with, by Justice STEVENS Page 497 U. S. 501 which affirms the Court of Appeals' conclusion that § 144.343(6)
is constitutional. V In this case, the Court rejects a legislature's judgment that
parents should at least be aware of their daughter's intention to
seek an abortion, even if the State does not empower the parents to
control the child's decision. That judgment is rejected, although
it rests upon a tradition of a parental role in the care and
upbringing of children that is as old as civilization itself. Our
precedents do not permit this result.

															It is true that, for all too many young women, the prospect of
two parents, perhaps even one parent, sustaining her with support
that is compassionate and committed is an illusion. Statistics on
drug and alcohol abuse by parents and documentations of child
neglect and mistreatment are but fragments of the evidence showing
the tragic reality that becomes day-to-day life for thousands of
minors. But the Court errs in serious degree when it commands its
own solution to the cruel consequences of individual misconduct,
parental failure, and social ills. The legislative authority is
entitled to attempt to meet these wrongs by taking reasonable
measures to recognize and promote the primacy of the family tie, a
concept which this Court now seems intent on declaring a
constitutional irrelevance.