U.S. Supreme Court Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) Terry v. Ohio No. 67 Argued December 12, 1967 Decided June 10, 1968 392 U.S.
1 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This case presents serious questions concerning the role of the
Fourth Amendment in the confrontation on the street between the
citizen and the policeman investigating suspicious
circumstances.

															Petitioner Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon
and sentenced to the statutorily prescribed term of one to three
years in the penitentiary. [ Footnote 1 ] Following [5 ]

															the denial of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution
introduced in evidence two revolvers and a number of bullets seized
from Terry and a codefendant, Richard Chilton, [ Footnote 2 ] by Cleveland Police Detective
Martin McFadden. At the hearing on the motion to suppress this
evidence, Officer McFadden testified that, while he was patrolling
in plain clothes in downtown Cleveland at approximately 2:30 in the
afternoon of October 31, 1963, his attention was attracted by two
men, Chilton and Terry, standing on the corner of Huron Road and
Euclid Avenue. He had never seen the two men before, and he was
unable to say precisely what first drew his eye to them. However,
he testified that he had been a policeman for 39 years and a
detective for 35, and that he had been assigned to patrol this
vicinity of downtown Cleveland for shoplifters and pickpockets for
30 years. He explained that he had developed routine habits of
observation over the years, and that he would "stand and watch
people or walk and watch people at many intervals of the day." He
added: "Now, in this case, when I looked over, they didn't look
right to me at the time."

															His interest aroused, Officer McFadden took up a post of
observation in the entrance to a store 300 to 400 feet [6 ]

															away from the two men. "I get more purpose to watch them when I
seen their movements," he testified. He saw one of the men leave
the other one and walk southwest on Huron Road, past some stores.
The man paused for a moment and looked in a store window, then
walked on a short distance, turned around and walked back toward
the corner, pausing once again to look in the same store window. He
rejoined his companion at the corner, and the two conferred
briefly. Then the second man went through the same series of
motions, strolling down Huron Road, looking in the same window,
walking on a short distance, turning back, peering in the store
window again, and returning to confer with the first man at the
corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five
and six times apiece -- in all, roughly a dozen trips. At one
point, while the two were standing together on the corner, a third
man approached them and engaged them briefly in conversation. This
man then left the two others and walked west on Euclid Avenue.
Chilton and Terry resumed their measured pacing, peering, and
conferring. After this had gone on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two
men walked off together, heading west on Euclid Avenue, following
the path taken earlier by the third man.

															By this time, Officer McFadden had become thoroughly suspicious.
He testified that, after observing their elaborately casual and
oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window on Huron Road, he
suspected the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," and that he
considered it his duty as a police officer to investigate further.
He added that he feared "they may have a gun." Thus, Officer
McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and saw them stop in front of
Zucker's store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them
earlier on the street corner. Deciding that the situation was ripe
for direct action, Officer McFadden approached the three men,
identified [7 ]

															himself as a police officer and asked for their names. At this
point, his knowledge was confined to what he had observed. He was
not acquainted with any of the three men by name or by sight, and
he had received no information concerning them from any other
source. When the men "mumbled something" in response to his
inquiries, Officer McFadden grabbed petitioner Terry, spun him
around so that they were facing the other two, with Terry between
McFadden and the others, and patted down the outside of his
clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat, Officer
McFadden felt a pistol. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but
was unable to remove the gun. At this point, keeping Terry between
himself and the others, the officer ordered all three men to enter
Zucker's store. As they went in, he removed Terry's overcoat
completely, removed a .38 caliber revolver from the pocket and
ordered all three men to face the wall with their hands raised.
Officer McFadden proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of
Chilton and the third man, Katz. He discovered another revolver in
the outer pocket of Chilton's overcoat, but no weapons were found
on Katz. The officer testified that he only patted the men down to
see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands
beneath the outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt
their guns. So far as appears from the record, he never placed his
hands beneath Katz' outer garments. Officer McFadden seized
Chilton's gun, asked the proprietor of the store to call a police
wagon, and took all three men to the station, where Chilton and
Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons.

															On the motion to suppress the guns, the prosecution took the
position that they had been seized following a search incident to a
lawful arrest. The trial court rejected this theory, stating that
it "would be stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension"
to find that Officer [8 ]

															McFadden had had probable cause to arrest the men before he
patted them down for weapons. However, the court denied the
defendants' motion on the ground that Officer McFadden, on the
basis of his experience, "had reasonable cause to believe . . .
that the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously, and
some interrogation should be made of their action." Purely for his
own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat
down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable cause
to believe might be armed. The court distinguished between an
investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the
outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of
crime. The frisk, it held, was essential to the proper performance
of the officer's investigatory duties, for, without it, "the answer
to the police officer may be a bullet, and a loaded pistol
discovered during the frisk is admissible."

															After the court denied their motion to suppress, Chilton and
Terry waived jury trial and pleaded not guilty. The court adjudged
them guilty, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Judicial
District, Cuyahoga County, affirmed. State v. Terry , 5
Ohio App.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). The Supreme Court of Ohio
dismissed their appeal on the ground that no "substantial
constitutional question" was involved. We granted certiorari, 387
U.S. 929 (1967), to determine whether the admission of the
revolvers in evidence violated petitioner's rights under the Fourth
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth. Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U. S. 643 (1961). We
affirm the conviction. I The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ."
This inestimable right of [9 ]

															personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets
of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose
of his secret affairs. For as this Court has always recognized, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford , 141 U. S. 250 , 251
(1891). We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places," Katz v. United States , 389 U. S. 347 , 351
(1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
"expectation of privacy," id. at 361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and
incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it
is asserted. For "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches
and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." Elkins
v. United States , 364 U. S. 206 , 222
(1960). Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio , 379 U. S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States , 364 U. S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States , 361 U. S. 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re , 332 U. S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925). The
question is whether, in all the circumstances of this on-the-street
encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an
unreasonable search and seizure.

															We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this
question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues
regarding a sensitive area of police activity -- issues which have
never before been squarely [10 ]

															presented to this Court. Reflective of the tensions involved are
the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor
on both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to
"stop and frisk" -- as it is sometimes euphemistically termed --
suspicious persons.

															On the one hand, it is frequently argued that, in dealing with
the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city
streets, the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information they
possess. For this purpose, it is urged that distinctions should be
made between a "stop" and an "arrest" (or a "seizure" of a person),
and between a "frisk" and a "search." [ Footnote 3 ] Thus, it is argued, the police should be
allowed to "stop" a person and detain him briefly for questioning
upon suspicion that he may be connected with criminal activity.
Upon suspicion that the person may be armed, the police should have
the power to "frisk" him for weapons. If the "stop" and the "frisk"
give rise to probable cause to believe that the suspect has
committed a crime, then the police should be empowered to make a
formal "arrest," and a full incident "search" of the person. This
scheme is justified in part upon the notion that a "stop" and a
"frisk" amount to a mere "minor inconvenience and petty indignity,"
[ Footnote 4 ] which can properly
be imposed upon the [11 ]

															citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the
basis of a police officer's suspicion. [ Footnote 5 ]

															On the other side, the argument is made that the authority of
the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and
search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence
of the Fourth Amendment. [ Footnote
6 ] It is contended with some force that there is not -- and
cannot be -- a variety of police activity which does not depend
solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen, and yet which
stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an
arrest. The heart of the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a
severe requirement of specific justification for any intrusion upon
protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed system
of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the
commands of the Constitution. Acquiescence by the courts in the
compulsion inherent [12 ]

															in the field interrogation practices at issue here, it is urged,
would constitute an abdication of judicial control over, and indeed
an encouragement of, substantial interference with liberty and
personal security by police officers whose judgment is necessarily
colored by their primary involvement in "the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United
States , 333 U. S.
10 , 14 (1948). This, it is argued, can only serve to exacerbate
police-community tensions in the crowded centers of our Nation's
cities. [ Footnote 7 ]

															In this context, we approach the issues in this case mindful of
the limitations of the judicial function in controlling the myriad
daily situations in which policemen and citizens confront each
other on the street. The State has characterized the issue here as
"the right of a police officer . . . to make an on-the-street stop,
interrogate and pat down for weapons (known in street vernacular as
'stop and frisk'). [ Footnote
8 ]" But this is only partly accurate. For the issue is not the
abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and
seizure. Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as
a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. See
Weeks v. United States , 232 U. S. 383 , 391-393
(1914). Thus, its major thrust is a deterrent one, see
Linkletter v. Walker , 381 U. S. 618 , 629-635
(1965), and experience has taught that it is the only effective
deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that,
without it, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures would be a mere "form of words." Mapp v.
Ohio , 367 U. S.
643 , 655 (1961). The rule also serves another vital function --
"the imperative of judicial integrity." Elkins [13 ] v. United States , 364 U. S. 206 , 222
(1960). Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not
be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions. Thus, in our system, evidentiary rulings provide
the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and
exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional
guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling
admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the
necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the
evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds
the constitutional imprimatur.

															The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of
judicial control. It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the
ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves
unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections. Moreover,
in some contexts, the rule is ineffective as a deterrent. Street
encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich
in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of
pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile
confrontations of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss
of life. Moreover, hostile confrontations are not all of a piece.
Some of them begin in a friendly enough manner, only to take a
different turn upon the injection of some unexpected element into
the conversation. Encounters are initiated by the police for a wide
variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire
to prosecute for crime. [ Footnote
9 ] Doubtless some [14 ]

															police "field interrogation" conduct violates the Fourth
Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone such
activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the
exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be
where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the
police, [ Footnote 10 ] it is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are
willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving
some other goal.

															Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is
invoked demands a constant awareness of these limitations. The
wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community,
of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently
complain, [ Footnote 11 ] will
not be [15 ]

															stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal
trial. Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be
used effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury
and frustration of efforts to prevent crime. No judicial opinion
can comprehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we
can only judge the facts of the case before us. Nothing we say
today is to be taken as indicating approval of police conduct
outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under our decision,
courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard
against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary
justification which the Constitution requires. When such conduct is
identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary, and its fruits
must be excluded from evidence in criminal trials. And, of course,
our approval of legitimate and restrained investigative conduct
undertaken on the basis of ample factual justification should in no
way discourage the employment of other remedies than the
exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may
prove inappropriate.

															Having thus roughly sketched the perimeters of the
constitutional debate over the limits on police investigative
conduct in general and the background against which this case
presents itself, we turn our attention to the quite narrow question
posed by the facts before us: whether it is always unreasonable for
a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search
for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest. [16 ]

															Given the narrowness of this question, we have no occasion to
canvass in detail the constitutional limitations upon the scope of
a policeman's power when he confronts a citizen without probable
cause to arrest him. II Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter
the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. That is, we must decide
whether and when Officer McFadden "seized" Terry, and whether and
when he conducted a "search." There is some suggestion in the use
of such terms as "stop" and "frisk" that such police conduct is
outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment because neither action
rises to the level of a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of
the Constitution. [ Footnote
12 ] We emphatically reject this notion. It is quite plain that
the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not
eventuate in a trip to the stationhouse and prosecution for crime
-- "arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized
that, whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it is
nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest
that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is
not a "search." Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that such
a procedure [17 ]

															performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands
helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty
indignity." [ Footnote 13 ] It
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not
to be undertaken lightly. [ Footnote 14 ]

															The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between
a "stop" and an "arrest," or "seizure" of the person, and between a
"frisk" and a "search," is twofold. It seeks to isolate from
constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between
the policeman and the citizen. And, by suggesting a rigid
all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the
Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope,
as well as the initiation, of police action as a means of
constitutional regulation. [ Footnote 15 ] This Court has held, in [18 ]

															the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may
violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity
and scope. Kremen v. United States , 353 U. S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co.
v. [19 ] United States , 282 U. S. 344 , 356-358
(1931); see United States v. Di Re , 332 U. S. 581 , 586-587
(1948). The scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and
justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible. Warden v. Hayden , 387 U. S. 294 , 310 (1967)
(MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring); see, e.g., Preston v. United
States , 376 U.
S. 364 , 367-368 (1964); Agnello v. United States , 269 U. S. 20 ,
30-31 (1925).

															The distinctions of classical "stop-and-frisk" theory thus serve
to divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment -- the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.
"Search" and "seizure" are not talismans. We therefore reject the
notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as
a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of
something called a "technical arrest" or a "full-blown search."

															In this case, there can be no question, then, that Officer
McFadden "seized" petitioner and subjected him to a "search" when
he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his
clothing. We must decide whether, at that point, it was reasonable
for Officer McFadden to have interfered with petitioner's personal
security as he did. [ Footnote
16 ] And, in determining whether the seizure and search were
"unreasonable," our inquiry [20 ]

															is a dual one -- whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place. III If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether
"probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which
took place. However, that is not the case. We do not retreat from
our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure, see, e.g., Katz v. United States , 389 U. S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio , 379 U. S. 89 , 96 (1964); Chapman v. United States , 365 U. S. 610 (1961), or
that, in most instances, failure to comply with the warrant
requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances, see,
e.g., Warden v. Hayden , 387 U. S. 294 (1967) (hot
pursuit); cf. Preston v. United States , 376 U. S. 364 , 367-368
(1964). But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct --
necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat -- which historically has
not been, and, as a practical matter, could not be, subjected to
the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case
must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures. [ Footnote 17 ]

															Nonetheless, the notions which underlie both the warrant
procedure and the requirement of probable cause remain fully
relevant in this context. In order to assess the reasonableness of
Officer McFadden's conduct as a general proposition, it is
necessary "first to focus upon [21 ]

															the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the
private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal Court , 387 U. S. 523 , 534-535,
536-537 (1967). And, in justifying the particular intrusion, the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. [ Footnote 18 ] The scheme of the Fourth Amendment
becomes meaningful only when it is assured that, at some point, the
conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected
to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate
the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of
the particular circumstances. [ Footnote 19 ] And, in making that assessment, it is
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard:
would the facts [22 ]

															available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the
action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United
States , 267 U.
S. 132 (1925); Beck v. Ohio , 379 U. S. 89 , 96-97
(1964). [ Footnote 20 ]
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused
to sanction. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, supra; Rios v. United
States , 364 U.
S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States , 361 U. S. 98 (1959). And
simple "'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not
enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio,
supra , at 97.

															Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the
nature and extent of the governmental interests involved. One
general interest is, of course, that of effective crime prevention
and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest. It was this legitimate investigative function
Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach
petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and
Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in
itself, but which, taken together, warranted further investigation.
There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street
corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything
suspicious about people [23 ]

															in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly
or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. But
the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a
street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which
it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or
anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times;
where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a
conference between the two men on the corner; where they are joined
in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly, and
where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple
of blocks away. It would have been poor police work indeed for an
officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from
stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this
behavior further.

															The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer
McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious
behavior, but, rather, whether there was justification for
McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him
for weapons in the course of that investigation. We are now
concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating
crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be
unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks
in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long
tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many
law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and
thousands more are wounded. [24 ]

															Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the
injuries are inflicted with guns and knives. [ Footnote 21 ]

															In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need
for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack
probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in
believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to
the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary
measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a
weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.

															We must still consider, however, the nature and quality of the
intrusion on individual rights which must be accepted if police
officers are to be conceded the right to search for weapons in
situations where probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking.
Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes
a severe, [25 ]

															though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it
must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience. Petitioner contends that such an intrusion is
permissible only incident to a lawful arrest, either for a crime
involving the possession of weapons or for a crime the commission
of which led the officer to investigate in the first place.
However, this argument must be closely examined.

															Petitioner does not argue that a police officer should refrain
from making any investigation of suspicious circumstances until
such time as he has probable cause to make an arrest; nor does he
deny that police officers, in properly discharging their
investigative function, may find themselves confronting persons who
might well be armed and dangerous. Moreover, he does not say that
an officer is always unjustified in searching a suspect to discover
weapons. Rather, he says it is unreasonable for the policeman to
take that step until such time as the situation evolves to a point
where there is probable cause to make an arrest. When that point
has been reached, petitioner would concede the officer's right to
conduct a search of the suspect for weapons, fruits or
instrumentalities of the crime, or "mere" evidence, incident to the
arrest.

															There are two weaknesses in this line of reasoning, however.
First, it fails to take account of traditional limitations upon the
scope of searches, and thus recognizes no distinction in purpose,
character, and extent between a search incident to an arrest and a
limited search for weapons. The former, although justified in part
by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from
assault with a concealed weapon, Preston v. United States , 376 U. S. 364 ,
367 (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid. , and
can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the
person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause
to [26 ]

															arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Warden v. Hayden , 387 U. S. 294 , 310 (1967)
(MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring). Thus, it must be limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used
to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be
characterized as something less than a "full" search, even though
it remains a serious intrusion.

															A second, and related, objection to petitioner's argument is
that it assumes that the law of arrest has already worked out the
balance between the particular interests involved here -- the
neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative
circumstance and the sanctity of the individual. But this is not
so. An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon
individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the
interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different.
An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is
intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed,
and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the
individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or
conviction ultimately follows. [ Footnote 22 ] The protective search for weapons, on the
other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable,
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that,
because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is
apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person
has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally
unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions
short of an arrest. Moreover, a perfectly reasonable apprehension
of danger may arise long before the officer is possessed of
adequate information to justify taking a person into custody
for [27 ]

															the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. Petitioner's
reliance on cases which have worked out standards of reasonableness
with regard to "seizures" constituting arrests and searches
incident thereto is thus misplaced. It assumes that the interests
sought to be vindicated and the invasions of personal security may
be equated in the two cases, and thereby ignores a vital aspect of
the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types of conduct
under the Fourth Amendment. See Camara v. Municipal Court,
supra. Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in
this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a
narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons
for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain
that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably
prudent man, in the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief
that his safety or that of others was in danger. Cf. Beck v.
Ohio , 379 U. S.
89 , 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United States , 338 U. S. 160 , 174-176
(1949); Stacey v. Emery , 97 U. S. 642 , 645 (1878).
[ Footnote 23 ] And in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts
in light of his experience. Cf. Brinegar v. United States
supra. IV We must now examine the conduct of Officer McFadden in this case
to determine whether his search and seizure of petitioner were
reasonable, both at their inception [28 ]

															and as conducted. He had observed Terry, together with Chilton
and another man, acting in a manner he took to be preface to a
"stick-up." We think, on the facts and circumstances Officer
McFadden detailed before the trial judge, a reasonably prudent man
would have been warranted in believing petitioner was armed, and
thus presented a threat to the officer's safety while he was
investigating his suspicious behavior. The actions of Terry and
Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men
were contemplating a daylight robbery -- which, it is reasonable to
assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons -- and
nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until
the time he confronted them and identified himself as a police
officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.
Although the trio had departed the original scene, there was
nothing to indicate abandonment of an intent to commit a robbery at
some point. Thus, when Officer McFadden approached the three men
gathered before the display window at Zucker's store, he had
observed enough to make it quite reasonable to fear that they were
armed, and nothing in their response to his hailing them,
identifying himself as a police officer, and asking their names
served to dispel that reasonable belief. We cannot say his decision
at that point to seize Terry and pat his clothing for weapons was
the product of a volatile or inventive imagination, or was
undertaken simply as an act of harassment; the record evidences the
tempered act of a policeman who, in the course of an investigation,
had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and
others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so.

															The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of
course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were
warranted at all. The Fourth Amendment proceeds as much by
limitations upon the [29 ]

															scope of governmental action as by imposing preconditions upon
its initiation. Compare Katz v. United States , 389 U. S. 347 , 354-356
(1967). The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption
that "limitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the
quest itself." United States v. Poller , 43 F.2d 911, 914
(C.A.2d Cir.1930); see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker , 381 U. S. 618 ,
629-635 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio , 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States , 364 U. S. 206 , 216-221
(1960). Thus, evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered
by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related
in scope to the justification for their initiation. Warden v.
Hayden , 387 U.
S. 294 , 310 (1967) (MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring).

															We need not develop at length in this case, however, the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective
seizure and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be
developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual
cases. See Sibron v. New York, post , p. 40, decided today.
Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a search without a
warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need
to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. See Preston v. United States , 376 U. S. 364 , 367
(1964). The sole justification of the search in the present
situation is the protection of the police officer and others
nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other
hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.

															The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem
in light of these standards. Officer McFadden patted down the outer
clothing of petitioner and his two companions. He did not place his
hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments
until he had [30 ]

															felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the
guns. He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of
his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which
might have been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined his search
strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men
were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons. He
did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence
of criminal activity he might find. V We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly
admitted in evidence against him. At the time he seized petitioner
and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it
was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take
swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat
of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his
search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular
items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have
to be decided on its own facts. We merely hold today that, where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this
behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. [31 ]

															Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment,
and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence
against the person from whom they were taken. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the judgment and the opinion except
where the opinion quotes from and relies upon this Court's opinion
in Katz v. United States and the concurring opinion in Warden v. Hayden. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

															While I unreservedly agree with the Court's ultimate holding in
this case, I am constrained to fill in a few gaps, as I see them,
in its opinion. I do this because what is said by this Court today
will serve as initial guidelines for law enforcement authorities
and courts throughout the land as this important new field of law
develops.

															A police officer's right to make an on-the-street "stop" and an
accompanying "frisk" for weapons is, of course, bounded by the
protections afforded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Court holds, and I agree, that, while the right does not depend
upon possession by the officer of a valid warrant, nor upon the
existence of probable cause, such activities must be reasonable
under the circumstances as the officer credibly relates them in
court. Since the question in this and most cases is whether
evidence produced by a frisk is admissible, the problem is to
determine what makes a frisk reasonable.

															If the State of Ohio were to provide that police officers could,
on articulable suspicion less than probable cause, forcibly frisk
and disarm persons thought to be carrying concealed weapons, I
would have little doubt that action taken pursuant to such
authority could be constitutionally reasonable. Concealed weapons
create an immediate [32 ]

															and severe danger to the public, and though that danger might
not warrant routine general weapons checks, it could well warrant
action on less than a "probability." I mention this line of
analysis because I think it vital to point out that it cannot be
applied in this case. On the record before us, Ohio has not clothed
its policemen with routine authority to frisk and disarm on
suspicion; in the absence of state authority, policemen have no
more right to "pat down" the outer clothing of passers-by, or of
persons to whom they address casual questions, than does any other
citizen. Consequently, the Ohio courts did not rest the
constitutionality of this frisk upon any general authority in
Officer McFadden to take reasonable steps to protect the citizenry,
including himself, from dangerous weapons.

															The state courts held, instead, that, when an officer is
lawfully confronting a possibly hostile person in the line of duty,
he has a right, springing only from the necessity of the situation,
and not from any broader right to disarm, to frisk for his own
protection. This holding, with which I agree and with which I think
the Court agrees, offers the only satisfactory basis I can think of
for affirming this conviction. The holding has, however, two
logical corollaries that I do not think the Court has fully
expressed.

															In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to
protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer
must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter,
to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at
liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a
policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own
protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him, but to be
in his presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again,
possessed by every citizen) to address questions to other persons,
for ordinarily the person [33 ]

															addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk
away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's
protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk
in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to
investigate a suspected crime.

															Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk
must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as
here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence. Just as a
full search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional
justification, a limited frisk incident to a lawful stop must often
be rapid and routine. There is no reason why an officer, rightfully
but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime,
should have to ask one question and take the risk that the answer
might be a bullet.

															The facts of this case are illustrative of a proper stop and an
incident frisk. Officer McFadden had no probable cause to arrest
Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would
reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that
Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. His justifiable
suspicion afforded a proper constitutional basis for accosting
Terry, restraining his liberty of movement briefly, and addressing
questions to him, and Officer McFadden did so. When he did, he had
no reason whatever to suppose that Terry might be armed, apart from
the fact that he suspected him of planning a violent crime.
McFadden asked Terry his name, to which Terry "mumbled something."
Whereupon McFadden, without asking Terry to speak louder and
without giving him any chance to explain his presence or his
actions, forcibly frisked him.

															I would affirm this conviction for what I believe to be the same
reasons the Court relies on. I would, however, make explicit what I
think is implicit in affirmance on [34 ]

															the present facts. Officer McFadden's right to interrupt Terry's
freedom of movement and invade his privacy arose only because
circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an
effort to prevent or investigate a crime. Once that forced
encounter was justified, however, the officer's right to take
suitable measures for his own safety followed automatically.

															Upon the foregoing premises, I join the opinion of the
Court.

															MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

															I join the opinion of the Court, reserving judgment, however, on
some of the Court's general remarks about the scope and purpose of
the exclusionary rule which the Court has fashioned in the process
of enforcing the Fourth Amendment.

															Also, although the Court puts the matter aside in the context of
this case, I think an additional word is in order concerning the
matter of interrogation during an investigative stop. There is
nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from
addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special
circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or
frisked, but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However,
given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it
seems to me the person may be briefly detained against his will
while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the
person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be
compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation. In my view, it is temporary detention, warranted by
the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the protective frisk for
weapons. Perhaps the frisk itself, where proper, will have
beneficial results whether questions are asked or not. If weapons
are found, an arrest will follow. [35 ]

															If none is found, the frisk may nevertheless serve preventive
ends because of its unmistakable message that suspicion has been
aroused. But if the investigative stop is sustainable at all,
constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if pertinent
questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the
process.

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

															I agree that petitioner was "seized" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. I also agree that frisking petitioner and his
companions for guns was a "search." But it is a mystery how that
"search" and that "seizure" can be constitutional by Fourth
Amendment standards unless there was "probable cause" [ Footnote 1 ] to believe that (1) a
crime had been committed or (2) a crime was in the process of being
committed or (3) a crime was about to be committed.

															The opinion of the Court disclaims the existence of "probable
cause." If loitering were in issue and that [36 ]

															was the offense charged, there would be "probable cause" shown.
But the crime here is carrying concealed weapons; [ Footnote 2 ] and there is no basis for
concluding that the officer had "probable cause" for believing that
that crime was being committed. Had a warrant been sought, a
magistrate would, therefore, have been unauthorized to issue one,
for he can act only if there is a showing of "probable cause." We
hold today that the police have greater authority to make a
"seizure" and conduct a "search" than a judge has to authorize such
action. We have said precisely the opposite over and over again.
[ Footnote 3 ] [37 ]

															In other words, police officers up to today have been permitted
to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts
within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional
standard of probable cause. At the time of their "seizure" without
a warrant, they must possess facts concerning the person arrested
that would have satisfied a magistrate that "probable cause" was
indeed present. The term "probable cause" rings a bell of certainty
that is not sounded by phrases such as "reasonable suspicion."
Moreover, the meaning of "probable cause" is deeply imbedded in our
constitutional history. As we stated in Henry v. United
States , 361 U. S.
98 , 100-102: "The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in
our history. The general warrant, in which the name of the person
to be arrested was left blank, and the writs of assistance, against
which James Otis inveighed, both perpetuated the oppressive
practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion.
Police control took the place of judicial control, since no showing
of 'probable cause' before a magistrate was required."

															" * * * *" "That philosophy [rebelling against these practices] later was
reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early American
decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show,
common rumor or report, suspicion, or even 'strong reason to
suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant [38 ] for arrest. And that principle has survived to this day. . .
."

															". . . It is important, we think, that this requirement [of
probable cause] be strictly enforced, for the standard set by the
Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If the
officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it
turns out that the citizen is innocent. . . . And while a search
without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a
lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an
incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. . . . This
immunity of officers cannot fairly be enlarged without jeopardizing
the privacy or security of the citizen." The infringement on personal liberty of any "seizure" of a
person can only be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment if we
require the police to possess "probable cause" before they seize
him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction between an
officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the
officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man
that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a particular crime. "In dealing with probable cause, . . .
as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States , 338 U. S. 160 , 175.

															To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a
long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is
desirable to cope with modern forms of lawlessness. But if it is
taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a
constitutional amendment. [39 ]

															Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the
Fifth, [ Footnote 4 ] is
rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond
the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable
grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has
been launched or is about to be launched.

															There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our
history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional
guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic
pressure has probably never been greater than it is today.

															Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the
police can pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his
jib, if they can "seize" and "search" him in their discretion, we
enter a new regime. The decision to enter it should be made only
after a full debate by the people of this country. Footnotes [ Footnote 1 ]

															Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.01 (1953) provides in part that "[n]o
person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous
weapon concealed on or about his person." An exception is made for
properly authorized law enforcement officers.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Terry and Chilton were arrested, indicted, tried, and convicted
together. They were represented by the same attorney, and they made
a joint motion to suppress the guns. After the motion was denied,
evidence was taken in the case against Chilton. This evidence
consisted of the testimony of the arresting officer and of Chilton.
It was then stipulated that this testimony would be applied to the
case against Terry, and no further evidence was introduced in that
case. The trial judge considered the two cases together, rendered
the decisions at the same time, and sentenced the two men at the
same time. They prosecuted their state court appeals together
through the same attorney, and they petitioned this Court for
certiorari together. Following the grant of the writ upon this
joint petition, Chilton died. Thus, only Terry's conviction is here
for review.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Both the trial court and the Ohio Court of Appeals in this case
relied upon such a distinction. State v. Terry , 5 Ohio
App.2d 122, 125-130, 214 N.E.2d 114, 117-120 (1966). See also,
e.g., People v. Rivera , 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied , 379 U.S. 978 (1965);
Aspen, Arrest and Arrest Alternatives: Recent Trends, 1966
U.Ill.L.F. 241, 249-254; Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
Va.L.Rev. 315 (1942); Note, Stop and Frisk in California, 18
Hastings L.J. 623, 629-632 (1967).

															[ Footnote 4 ] People v. Rivera, supra , n 3, at 447, 201 N.E.2d at 36, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 464.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The theory is well laid out in the Rivera opinion: "[T]he evidence needed to make the inquiry is not of the same
degree of conclusiveness as that required for an arrest. The
stopping of the individual to inquire is not an arrest and the
ground upon which the police may make the inquiry may be less
incriminating than the ground for an arrest for a crime known to
have been committed. . . ."

															" * * * *" "And as the right to stop and inquire is to be justified for a
cause less conclusive than that which would sustain an arrest, so
the right to frisk may be justified as an incident to inquiry upon
grounds of elemental safety and precaution which might not
initially sustain a search. Ultimately, the validity of the frisk
narrows down to whether there is or is not a right by the police to
touch the person questioned. The sense of exterior touch here
involved is not very far different from the sense of sight or
hearing -- senses upon which police customarily act." People v.
Rivera , 14 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34, 35, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458, 461, 463 (1964), cert. denied , 379 U.S. 978
(1965). [ Footnote 6 ] See, e.g. , Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or
Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 402
(1960).

															[ Footnote 7 ] See n 11, infra. [ Footnote 8 ]

															Brief for Respondent 2.

															[ Footnote 9 ] See L. Tiffany, D. McIntyre D. Rotenberg, Detection of
Crime: Stopping and Questioning, Search and Seizure, Encouragement
and Entrapment 186 (1967). This sort of police conduct may, for
example, be designed simply to help an intoxicated person find his
way home, with no intention of arresting him unless he becomes
obstreperous. Or the police may be seeking to mediate a domestic
quarrel which threatens to erupt into violence. They may accost a
woman in an area known for prostitution as part of a harassment
campaign designed to drive prostitutes away without the
considerable difficulty involved in prosecuting them. Or they may
be conducting a dragnet search of all teenagers in a particular
section of the city for weapons because they have heard rumors of
an impending gang fight.

															[ Footnote 10 ] See Tiffany, McIntyre & Rotenberg, supra , n 9, at 100-101; Comment, 47
Nw.U.L.Rev. 493, 497-499 (1952).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice found that, "[i]n many communities, field interrogations
are a major source of friction between the police and minority
groups." President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 183
(1967). It was reported that the friction caused by "[m]isuse of
field interrogations" increases "as more police departments adopt
'aggressive patrol,' in which officers are encouraged routinely to
stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to them,
who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not
readily evident." Id. at 184. While the frequency with
which "frisking" forms a part of field interrogation practice
varies tremendously with the locale, the objective of the
interrogation, and the particular officer, see Tiffany,
McIntyre & Rotenberg, supra , n 9, at 47-48, it cannot help but be a severely
exacerbating factor in police-community tensions. This is
particularly true in situations where the "stop and frisk" of
youths or minority group members is "motivated by the officers'
perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an
aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to
undermine police control of the streets." Ibid. [ Footnote 12 ]

															In this case, for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that
"we must be careful to distinguish that the 'frisk' authorized
herein includes only a 'frisk' for a dangerous weapon. It by no
means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or
anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such
a search is controlled by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment,
and probable cause is essential." State v. Terry , 5 Ohio
App.2d 122, 130, 214 N.E.2d 114, 120 (1966). See also, e.g.,
Ellis v. United States , 105 U.S.App.D.C. 86, 88, 264 F.2d 372,
374 (1959); Comment, 65 Col.L.Rev. 848, 860, and n. 81 (1965).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Consider the following apt description:

															"[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of
the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the
prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the
feet." Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45
J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954).

															[ Footnote 14 ] See n 11, supra , and accompanying text.

															We have noted that the abusive practices which play a major,
though by no means exclusive, role in creating this friction are
not susceptible of control by means of the exclusionary rule, and
cannot properly dictate our decision with respect to the powers of
the police in genuine investigative and preventive situations.
However, the degree of community resentment aroused by particular
practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality of
the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security
caused by those practices.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															These dangers are illustrated in part by the course of
adjudication in the Court of Appeals of New York. Although its
first decision in this area, People v. Rivera , 14 N.Y.2d
441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied ,
379 U.S. 978 (1965), rested squarely on the notion that a "frisk"
was not a "search," see nn. 3-5 supra , it was compelled to recognize, in People v. Taggart , 20 N.Y.2d 335, 342, 229 N.E.2d 581,
586, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8 (1967), that what it had actually authorized
in Rivera and subsequent decisions, see, e.g., People
v. Pugach , 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833
(1964), cert. denied , 380 U.S. 936 (1965), was a "search"
upon less than probable cause. However, in acknowledging that no
valid distinction could be maintained on the basis of its cases,
the Court of Appeals continued to distinguish between the two in
theory. It still defined "search" as it had in Rivera --
as an essentially unlimited examination of the person for any and
all seizable items -- and merely noted that the cases had upheld
police intrusions which went far beyond the original limited
conception of a "frisk." Thus, principally because it failed to
consider limitations upon the scope of searches in individual cases
as a potential mode of regulation, the Court of Appeals in three
short years arrived at the position that the Constitution must, in
the name of necessity, be held to permit unrestrained rummaging
about a person and his effects upon mere suspicion. It did
apparently limit its holding to "cases involving serious personal
injury or grave irreparable property damage," thus excluding those
involving "the enforcement of sumptuary laws, such as gambling, and
laws of limited public consequence, such as narcotics violations,
prostitution, larcenies of the ordinary kind, and the like." People v. Taggart, supra , at 340, 214 N.E.2d at 584, 283
N.Y.S.2d at 6.

															In our view, the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth
Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon
personal security, and to make the scope of the particular
intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central
element in the analysis of reasonableness. Cf. Brinegar v.
United States , 338 U. S. 160 , 183 (1949)
(Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting). Compare Camara v. Municipal
Court , 387 U. S.
523 , 537 (1967). This seems preferable to an approach which
attributes too much significance to an overly technical definition
of "search," and which turns in part upon a judge-made hierarchy of
legislative enactments in the criminal sphere. Focusing the inquiry
squarely on the dangers and demands of the particular situation
also seems more likely to produce rules which are intelligible to
the police and the public alike than requiring the officer in the
heat of an unfolding encounter on the street to make a judgment as
to which laws are "of limited public consequence."

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional
propriety of an investigative "seizure" upon less than probable
cause for purposes of "detention" and/or interrogation. Obviously,
not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens
involves "seizures" of persons. Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.
We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record whether any such
"seizure" took place here prior to Officer McFadden's initiation of
physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, and
we thus may assume that, up to that point, no intrusion upon
constitutionally protected rights had occurred.

															[ Footnote 17 ] See generally Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law
of Arrest, 54 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 393, 396 403 (1963).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															This demand for specificity in the information upon which police
action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. See Beck v. Ohio , 379 U. S. 89 , 96-97
(1964); Ker v. California , 374 U. S. 23 , 34-37
(1963); Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U. S. 471 , 479-484
(1963); Rios v. United States , 364 U. S. 253 , 261-262
(1960); Henry v. United States , 361 U. S. 98 , 100-102
(1959); Draper v. United States , 358 U. S. 307 , 312-314
(1959); Brinegar v. United States , 338 U. S. 160 , 175-178
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 , 15-17
(1948); United States v. Di Re , 332 U. S. 581 , 593-595
(1948); Husty v. United States , 282 U. S. 694 , 700-701
(1931); Dumbra v. United States , 268 U. S. 435 , 441
(1925); Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 132 , 159-162
(1925); Stacey v. Emery , 97 U. S. 642 ,6 45
(1878).

															[ Footnote 19 ] See, e.g., Katz v. United States , 389 U. S. 347 , 354-357
(1967); Berger v. New York , 388 U. S. 41 , 54-60
(1967); Johnson v. United States , 333 U. S. 10 , 13-15
(1948); cf. Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U. S. 471 , 479-480
(1963). See also Aguilar v. Texas , 378 U. S. 108 , 110-115
(1964).

															[ Footnote 20 ] See also cases cited in n 18, supra. [ Footnote 21 ]

															Fifty-seven law enforcement officers were killed in the line of
duty in this country in 1966, bringing the total to 335 for the
seven-year period beginning with 1960. Also in 1966, there were
23,851 assaults on police officers, 9,113 of which resulted in
injuries to the policemen. Fifty-five of the 57 officers killed in
1966 died from gunshot wounds, 41 of them inflicted by handguns
easily secreted about the person. The remaining two murders were
perpetrated by knives. See Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States -- 1966,
at 45-48, 152 and Table 51.

															The easy availability of firearms to potential criminals in this
country is well known, and has provoked much debate. See,
e.g. , President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society
239-243 (1967). Whatever the merits of gun control proposals, this
fact is relevant to an assessment of the need for some form of
self-protective search power.

															[ Footnote 22 ] See generally W. LaFave, Arrest -- The Decision to Take
a Suspect into Custody 1-13 (1965).

															[ Footnote 23 ] See also cases cited in n. 18 , supra. [ Footnote 1 ]

															The meaning of "probable cause" has been developed in cases
where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been or is being committed. See, e.g., 70 U.
S. 3 Wall. 155; Stacey v. Emery , 97 U. S. 642 ; Director
General v. Kastenbaum , 263 U. S. 25 ; Carroll
v. United States , 267 U. S. 132 ; United
States v. Di Re , 332 U. S. 581 ; Brinegar v. United States , 338 U. S. 160 ; Draper
v. United States , 358 U. S. 307 ; Henry
v. United States , 361 U. S. 98 . In such
cases, of course, the officer may make an "arrest" which results in
charging the individual with commission of a crime. But while
arresting persons who have already committed crimes is an important
task of law enforcement, an equally if not more important function
is crime prevention and deterrence of would-be criminals. "[T]here
is no war between the Constitution and common sense," Mapp v.
Ohio , 367 U. S.
643 , 657. Police officers need not wait until they see a person
actually commit a crime before they are able to "seize" that
person. Respect for our constitutional system and personal liberty
demands in return, however, that such a "seizure" be made only upon
"probable cause."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Ohio Rev.Code § 2923.01.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															This Court has always used the language of "probable cause" in
determining the constitutionality of an arrest without a warrant. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 132 , 156,
161-162; Johnson v. United States , 333 U. S. 10 , 13-15; McDonald v. United States , 335 U. S. 451 , 455-456; Henry v. United States , 361 U. S. 98 ; Wong Sun
v. United States , 371 U. S. 471 , 479-484.
To give power to the police to seize a person on some grounds
different from or less than "probable cause" would be handing them
more authority than could be exercised by a magistrate in issuing a
warrant to seize a person. As we stated in Wong Sun v. United
States , 371 U.
S. 471 , with respect to requirements for arrests without
warrants:

															"Whether or not the requirements of reliability and
particularity of the information on which an officer may act are
more stringent where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely
cannot be less stringent than where an arrest warrant is
obtained." Id. at 479. And we said in Brinegar v. United
States , 338 U.
S. 160 , 176:

															"These long-prevailing standards [for probable cause] seek to
safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with
privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give
fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection.
Because many situations which confront officers in the course of
executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be
allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be
those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a
practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise
that has been found for accommodating these often opposing
interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of
the officers' whim or caprice." And see Johnson v. United States , 333 U. S. 10 , 14-15; Wrightson v. United States , 95 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 393-394,
222 F.2d 556, 559-560 (1955).

															[ Footnote 4 ] See Boyd v. United States , 116 U. S. 616 , 633:

															"For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which, in
criminal cases, is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, and compelling
a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which
is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question
as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."


U.S. Supreme Court Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30 (1970) Vale v. Louisiana No. 727 Argued March 4-5,
1970 Decided June 22, 1970 399 U.S.
30 APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF
LOUISIANA Syllabus Police officers, possessing warrants for appellant's arrest,
were watching the house where he resided. They observed what they
suspected was an exchange of narcotics between a known addict and
appellant outside the house, after appellant had gone into the
house and brought something out to the addict. They arrested
appellant at the front steps and announced that they would search
the house. A search of the then-unoccupied house disclosed
narcotics in a bedroom. The Louisiana Supreme Court, affirming
appellant's conviction for possessing heroin, held that the search
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as it occurred "in the
immediate vicinity of the arrest" and was "substantially
contemporaneous therewith." Consideration by this Court of the
question of jurisdiction was postponed to the hearing of the case
on the merits. Held: The warrantless search of appellant's house
violated the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 399 U. S.
33 -35.

															(a) Even if Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 , holding that the warrantless search of a house
can be justified as incident to a lawful arrest only if confined to
the area within the arrestee's reach, were given retroactive effect
(a question not decided here), there is no precedent of this Court
to sustain the validity of this search. P. 399 U. S.
33 .

															(b) If a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to an
arrest, the arrest must take place inside the house. Pp. 399 U. S.
33 -34.

															(c) A warrantless search of a dwelling is constitutionally valid
only in "a few specifically established and well delineated
exceptions," none of which the State has shown here, and the search
cannot be justified solely because narcotics, which are easily
destroyed, are involved. Pp. 399 U. S.
34 -35.

															Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 252 La. 1056, 215
So. 2d 811 , reversed and remanded. Page 399 U. S. 31 MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The appellant, Donald Vale, was convicted in a Louisiana court
on a charge of possessing heroin and was sentenced as a multiple
offender to 15 years' imprisonment at hard labor. The Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting the claim that
evidence introduced at the trial was the product of an unlawful
search and seizure. 252 La. 1056, 215 So. 2d
811 . We granted Vale's motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, postponed consideration of the question of
jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits, and limited
review to the search and seizure question. 396 U.S. 813. * The evidence adduced at the pretrial hearing on a motion to
suppress showed that, on April 24, 1967, officers possessing two
warrants for Vale's arrest and having information that he was
residing at a specified address proceeded there in an unmarked car
and set up a surveillance of the house. The evidence of what then
took Page 399 U. S. 32 place was summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court as
follows:

															"After approximately 15 minutes, the officers observed a green
1958 Chevrolet drive up and sound the horn and after backing into a
parking place, again blew the horn. At this juncture, Donald Vale,
who was well known to Officer Brady, having arrested him twice in
the previous month, was seen coming out of the house and walk up to
the passenger side of the Chevrolet where he had a close brief
conversation with the driver; and after looking up and down the
street returned inside of the house. Within a few minutes, he
reappeared on the porch, and again cautiously looked up and down
the street before proceeding to the passenger side of the
Chevrolet, leaning through the window. From this, the officers were
convinced a narcotics sale had taken place. They returned to their
car and immediately drove toward Donald Vale, and, as they reached
within approximately three car's lengths from the accused (Donald
Vale), he looked up and, obviously recognizing the officers, turned
around, walking quickly toward the house. At the same time, the
driver of the Chevrolet started to make his get away when the car
was blocked by the police vehicle. The three officers promptly
alighted from the car, whereupon Officers Soule and Laumann called
to Donald Vale to stop as he reached the front steps of the house,
telling him he was under arrest. Officer Brady, at the same time,
seeing the driver of the Chevrolet, Arizzio Saucier, whom the
officers knew to be a narcotic addict, place something hurriedly in
his mouth, immediately placed him under arrest and joined his
co-officers. Because of the transaction Page 399 U. S. 33 they had just observed they, informed Donald Vale they were
going to search the house, and thereupon advised him of his
constitutional rights. After they all entered the front room,
Officer Laumann made a cursory inspection of the house to ascertain
if anyone else was present, and, within about three minutes, Mrs.
Vale and James Vale, mother and brother of Donald Vale, returned
home carrying groceries, and were informed of the arrest and
impending search."

															252 La. at. 1067-1068, 215 So. 2d at 815. (Footnote omitted.)
The search of a rear bedroom revealed a quantity of narcotics.

															The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the search of the house
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because it occurred "in the
immediate vicinity of the arrest" of Donald Vale and was
"substantially contemporaneous therewith. . . ." 252 La. at 1070,
215 So. 2d at 816. We cannot agree. Last Term, in Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752 , we
held that, when the search of a dwelling is sought to be justified
as incident to a lawful arrest, it must constitutionally be
confined to the area within the arrestee's reach at the time of his
arrest -- "the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S. at 395 U. S. 763 .
But even if Chimel is not accorded retroactive effect -- a
question on which we do not now express an opinion -- no precedent
of this Court can sustain the constitutional validity of the search
in the case before us.

															A search may be incident to an arrest " only if it is
substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to
the immediate vicinity of the arrest.'" Shipley v.
California, 395 U. S. 818 , 395 U. S. 819 ; Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 , 376 U. S. 486 .
If a search of a house is to be upheld Page 399 U. S. 34 as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside the
house, cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S.
20 , 269 U. S. 32 ,
not somewhere outside -- whether two blocks away, James v.
Louisiana, 382 U. S. 36 ,
twenty feet away, Shipley v. California, supra, or on the
sidewalk near the front steps.

															"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is
concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a
search of that place without a warrant." Agnello v. United States, supra, at 269 U. S. 33 .
That basic rule "has never been questioned in this Court." Stoner v. California, supra, at 376 U. S. 487 n. 5.

															The Louisiana Supreme Court thought the search independently
supportable because it involved narcotics, which are easily
removed, hidden, or destroyed. It would be unreasonable, the
Louisiana court concluded,

															"to require the officers under the facts of the case to first
secure a search warrant before searching the premises, as time is
of the essence inasmuch as the officers never know whether there is
anyone on the premises to be searched who could very easily destroy
the evidence."

															252 La. at 1070, 215 So. 2d at 816. Such a rationale could not
apply to the present case, since by their own account the arresting
officers satisfied themselves that no one else was in the house
when they first entered the premises. But entirely apart from that
point, our past decisions make clear that only in "a few
specifically established and well delineated" situations, Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 ,
may a warrantless search of a dwelling withstand constitutional
scrutiny, even though the authorities have probable cause to
conduct it. The burden rests on the State to show the existence of
such an exceptional situation. Chimel v. California,
supra, at 395 U. S. 762 ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 , 342 U. S. 51 ; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.
S. 451 , 335 U. S. 456 .
And the record before us discloses none. Page 399 U. S. 35 There is no suggestion that anyone consented to the search. Cf. Zap v. United States, 328 U.
S. 624 , 328 U. S. 628 .
The officers were not responding to an emergency. United States
v. Jeffers, supra, at 342 U. S. 52 ; McDonald v. United States, supra, at 335 U. S. 454 .
They were not in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 387 U. S.
298 -299; Chapman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 610 , 365 U. S. 615 ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 15 .
The goods ultimately seized were not in the process of destruction. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 , 384 U. S.
770 -771; United States v. Jeffers, supra; McDonald
v. United States, supra, at 335 U. S. 455 .
Nor were they about to be removed from the jurisdiction. Chapman v. United States, supra; Johnson v. United States,
supra; United States v. Jeffers, supra. The officers were able to procure two warrants for Vale's
arrest. They also had information that he was residing at the
address where they found him. There is thus no reason, so far as
anything before us appears, to suppose that it was impracticable
for them to obtain a search warrant as well. Cf. McDonald v.
United States, supra, at 335 U. S.
454 -455; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699 , 334 U. S.
705 -706; Johnson v. United States, supra; Taylor v.
United States, 286 U. S. 1 , 286 U. S. 6 ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.
S. 344 , 282 U. S. 358 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 156 ; cf. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , 374 U. S. 42 (opinion of Clark, J.). We decline to hold that an arrest on the
street can provide its own "exigent circumstance" so as to justify
a warrantless search of the arrestee's house.

															The Louisiana courts committed constitutional error in admitting
into evidence the fruits of the illegal search. Shipley v.
California, supra, at 395 U. S. 819 ; James v. Louisiana, supra, at 382 U. S. 37 ; Ker v. California, supra, at 374 U. S. 30 -34; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 .
Accordingly, the judgment is Page 399 U. S. 36 reversed, and the case is remanded to the Louisiana Supreme
Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															* In his Notice of Appeal, Vale asserted that the Louisiana
Supreme Court in affirming the conviction had relied upon a state
statute, Article 225 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
(1967), which provides in pertinent part:

															"A peace officer making an arrest shall take from the person
arrested all weapons and incriminating articles which he may have
about his person."

															Although the state court referred to this statute in the course
of its opinion, we do not understand its decision to be grounded on
the statute. We therefore dismiss the appeal and treat the papers
as a petition for certiorari, which is hereby granted. 28 U.S.C. §
2103.

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,
dissenting.

															The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
only "unreasonable searches."* A warrant has never been thought to
be an absolute requirement for a constitutionally proper search.
Searches, whether with or without a warrant, are to be judged by
whether they are reasonable, and, as I said, speaking for the Court
in Preston v. United States, 376 U.
S. 364 , 376 U. S.
366 -367 (1964), common sense dictates that
reasonableness varies with the circumstances of the search. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949). The Louisiana Supreme Court held not only that the police
action here was reasonable, but also that failure to conduct an
immediate search would have been unreasonable. 252 La. 1056, 1070, 215
So. 2d 811 , 816. With that view I am in complete agreement for
the following reasons.

															The police, having warrants for Vale's arrest, were watching his
mother's house from a short distance away. Not long after they
began their vigil, a car arrived, Page 399 U. S. 37 sounded its horn, and backed into a parking space near the
house. The driver did not get out, but instead honked the car horn
again. Vale, who had been arrested twice the month before and
against whom an indictment for a narcotics offense was then
pending, came out of his mother's house and talked to the driver of
the car. At the conclusion of the conversation, Vale looked both
ways, up and down the street, and then went back inside the house.
When he reappeared, he stopped before going to the car and stood,
as one of the officers testified, "[l]ooking back and forth like to
see who might be coming or who was in the neighborhood." He then
walked to the car and leaned in.

															From this behavior, the officers were convinced that a narcotics
transaction was taking place at that very moment. They drove down
the street toward Vale and the parked car. When they came within a
few car lengths of the two men Vale saw them and began to walk
quickly back toward the house. At the same time, the driver of the
car attempted to pull away. The police brought both parties to the
transaction to a stop. They then saw that the driver of the car was
one Saucier, a known narcotics addict. He hurriedly placed
something in his mouth, and apparently swallowed it. The police
placed both Vale and Saucier under arrest.

															At this point, the police had probable cause to believe that
Vale was engaged in a narcotics transfer, and that a supply of
narcotics would be found in the house, to which Vale had returned
after his first conversation, from which he had emerged furtively
bearing what the police could readily deduce was a supply of
narcotics, and toward which he hurried after seeing the police. But
the police did not know then who else might be in the house. Vale's
arrest took place near the house, and anyone observing from inside
would surely have been alerted to destroy the stocks of contraband
which Page 399 U. S. 38 the police believed Vale had left there. The police had already
seen Saucier, the narcotics addict, apparently swallow what Vale
had given him. Believing that some evidence had already been
destroyed and that other evidence might well be, the police were
faced with the choice of risking the immediate destruction of
evidence or entering the house and conducting a search. I cannot
say that their decision to search was unreasonable. Delay in order
to obtain a warrant would have given an accomplice just the time he
needed.

															That the arresting officers did, in fact, believe that others
might be in the house is attested to by their actions upon entering
the door left open by Vale. The police at once checked the small
house to determine if anyone else was present. Just as they
discovered the house was empty, however, Vale's mother and brother
arrived. Now what had been a suspicion became a certainty: Vale's
relatives were in possession, and knew of his arrest. To have
abandoned the search at this point and left the house with Vale
would not have been the action of reasonable police officers. As
MR. JUSTICE WHITE said, dissenting in Chimel v.
California, 395 U. S. 752 , 395 U. S. 775 (1969):

															"For the police to search the house while the evidence they had
probable cause to search out and seize was still there cannot be
considered unreasonable."

															In my view, whether a search incident to a lawful arrest is
reasonable should still be determined by the facts and
circumstances of each case. Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 , 374 U. S. 34 -36
(1963); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56 , 339 U. S. 63 -64
(1950). For the reasons given above, I am convinced that the search
here was reasonable even though Vale had not yet crossed the
threshold of the house toward which he was headed. Page 399 U. S. 39 Moreover, the circumstances here were sufficiently exceptional
to justify a search, even if the search was not strictly
"incidental" to an arrest. The Court recognizes that searches to
prevent the destruction or removal of evidence have long been held
reasonable by this Court. Preston v. United States, supra;
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , 335 U. S. 455 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925). Whether the "exceptional circumstances"
justifying such a search exist or not is a question that may be, as
it is here, quite distinct from whether or not the search was
incident to a valid arrest. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 , 342 U. S. 51 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 (1948). It is thus unnecessary to determine whether
the search was valid as incident to the arrest under either Chimel v. California, supra, or under the
pre- Chimel standard as interpreted in Shipley v.
California, 395 U. S. 818 (1969). It is only necessary to find that, given Vale's arrest in a
spot readily visible to anyone in the house and the probable
existence of narcotics inside, it was reasonable for the police to
conduct an immediate search of the premises.

															The Court, however, finds the search here unreasonable. First,
the Court suggests that the contraband was not "in the process of
destruction." None of the cases cited by the Court supports the
proposition that "exceptional circumstances" exist only when the
process of destruction has already begun. On the contrary, we
implied that those circumstances did exist when "evidence or
contraband was threatened with removal or destruction." Johnson v. United States, supra, at 333 U. S. 15 (emphasis added). See also Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 , 365 U. S. 615 (1961); Hernandez v. United States, 363 F.2d 624 (C.A. 9th
Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966). Page 399 U. S. 40 Second, the Court seems to argue that the search was
unreasonable because the police officers had time to obtain a
warrant. I agree that the opportunity to obtain a warrant is one of
the factors to be weighed in determining reasonableness. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.
S. 699 (1948); United States v. Rabinowitz,
supra, at 339 U. S. 66 (BLACK, J., dissenting). But the record conclusively shows that
there was no such opportunity here. As I noted above, once the
officers had observed Vale's conduct in front of the house, they
had probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed and
that immediate action was necessary. At no time after the events in
front of Mrs. Vale's house would it have been prudent for the
officers to leave the house in order to secure a warrant.

															The Court asserts, however, that, because the police obtained
two warrants for Vale's arrest, there is "no reason . . . to
suppose that it was impracticable for them to obtain a search
warrant as well." The difficulty is that the two arrest warrants on
which the Court seems to rely so heavily were not issued because of
any present misconduct of Vale's; they were issued because the bond
had been increased for an earlier narcotics charge then pending
against Vale. When the police came to arrest Vale, they knew only
that his bond had been increased. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that, absent the increased bond, there would have been
probable cause for an arrest, much less a search. Probable cause
for the search arose for the first time when the police observed
the activity of Vale and Saucier in and around the house.

															I do not suggest that all arrests necessarily provide the basis
for a search of the arrestee's house. In this case, there is far
more than a mere street arrest. The police also observed Vale's use
of the house as a base of operations for his commercial business,
his attempt to Page 399 U. S. 41 return hurriedly to the house on seeing the officers, and the
apparent destruction of evidence by the man with whom Vale was
dealing. Furthermore, the police arrival and Vale's arrest were
plainly visible to anyone within the house, and the police had
every reason to believe that someone in the house was likely to
destroy the contraband if the search were postponed.

															This case raises mot graphically the question how does a
policeman protect evidence necessary to the State if he must leave
the premises to get a warrant, allowing the evidence he seeks to be
destroyed. The Court's answer to that question makes unnecessarily
difficult the conviction of those who prey upon society.

															* The Fourth Amendment says:

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."