U.S. Supreme Court Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) Plyler v. Doe No. 80-1538 Argued December 1,
1981 Decided June 15, 1982 457
U.S. 202 ast|>* 457
U.S. 202 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Held: A Texas statute which withholds from local school
districts any state funds for the education of children who were
not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorizes
local school districts to deny enrollment to such children,
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

															Pp. 457 U. S.
210 -230.

															(a) The illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases
challenging the statute may claim the benefit of the Equal
Protection Clause, which provides that no State shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a
"person" in any ordinary sense of that term. This Court's prior
cases recognizing that illegal aliens are "persons" protected by
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
which Clauses do not include the phrase "within its jurisdiction,"
cannot be distinguished on the asserted ground that persons who
have entered the country illegally are not "within the
jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within its
boundaries and subject to its laws. Nor do the logic and history of
the Fourteenth Amendment support such a construction. Instead, use
of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" confirms the understanding
that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to anyone,
citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and
reaches into every corner of a State's territory. Pp. 457 U. S.
210 -216.

															(b) The discrimination contained in the Texas statute cannot be
considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
State. Although undocumented resident aliens cannot be treated as a
"suspect class," and although education is not a "fundamental
right," so as to require the State to justify the statutory
classification by showing that it serves a compelling governmental
interest, nevertheless the Texas statute imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status. These children can neither affect their parents'
conduct nor their own undocumented status. The deprivation Page 457 U. S. 203 of public education is not like the deprivation of some other
governmental benefit. Public education has a pivotal role in
maintaining the fabric of our society and in sustaining our
political and cultural heritage; the deprivation of education takes
an inestimable toll on the social, economic, intellectual, and
psychological wellbeing of the individual, and poses an obstacle to
individual achievement. In determining the rationality of the Texas
statute, its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children may
properly be considered. Pp. 457 U. S.
216 -224.

															(c) The undocumented status of these children vel non does not establish a sufficient rational basis for denying them
benefits that the State affords other residents. It is true that,
when faced with an equal protection challenge respecting a State's
differential treatment of aliens, the courts must be attentive to
congressional policy concerning aliens. But in the area of special
constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in the
absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the
legislative record, no national policy is perceived that might
justify the State in denying these children an elementary
education. Pp. 457 U. S.
224 -226.

															(d) Texas' statutory classification cannot be sustained as
furthering its interest in the "preservation of the state's limited
resources for the education of its lawful residents." While the
State might have an interest in mitigating potentially harsh
economic effects from an influx of illegal immigrants, the Texas
statute does not offer an effective method of dealing with the
problem. Even assuming that the net impact of illegal aliens on the
economy is negative, charging tuition to undocumented children
constitutes an ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal
immigration, at least when compared with the alternative of
prohibiting employment of illegal aliens. Nor is there any merit to
the suggestion that undocumented children are appropriately singled
out for exclusion because of the special burdens they impose on the
State's ability to provide high-quality public education. The
record does not show that exclusion of undocumented children is
likely to improve the overall quality of education in the State.
Neither is there any merit to the claim that undocumented children
are appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence
within the United States renders them less likely than other
children to remain within the State's boundaries and to put their
education to productive social or political use within the State.
Pp. 457 U. S.
227 -230.

															No. 80-1638, 628 F.2d 448, and No. 80-1934, affirmed.

															BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. MARSHALL,
J., post, p. 457 U. S. 230 ,
BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 457 U. S. 231 ,
and POWELL, J., post, p. 457 U. S. 236 ,
filed concurring opinions. BURGER, C.J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 457 U. S.
242 . Page 457 U. S. 205 JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The question presented by these cases is whether, consistent
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Texas
may deny to undocumented school-age children the free public
education that it provides to children who are citizens of the
United States or legally admitted aliens. I Since the late 19th century, the United States has restricted
immigration into this country. Unsanctioned entry into the United
States is a crime, 8 U.S.C. § 1325, and those who have entered
unlawfully are subject to deportation, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1252 (1976
ed. and Supp. IV). But despite the existence of these legal
restrictions, a substantial number of persons have succeeded in
unlawfully entering the United States, and now live within various
States, including the State of Texas.

															In May, 1975, the Texas Legislature revised its education laws
to withhold from local school districts any state funds for the
education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the
United States. The 1975 revision also authorized local school
districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children
not "legally admitted" to the country. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.031
(Vernon Supp.1981). [ Footnote
1 ] These cases involve constitutional challenges to those
provisions. Page 457 U. S. 206 No. 8158 Plyler v. Doe This is a class action, filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas in September, 1977, on
behalf of certain school-age children of Mexican origin residing in
Smith County, Tex., who could not establish that they had been
legally admitted into the United States. The action complained of
the exclusion of plaintiff children from the public schools of the
Tyler Independent School District. [ Footnote 2 ] The Superintendent and members of the Board of
Trustees of the School District were named as defendants; the State
of Texas intervened as a party-defendant. After certifying a class
consisting of all undocumented school-age children of Mexican
origin residing within the School District, the District Court
preliminarily enjoined defendants from denying a free education to
members of the plaintiff class. In December, 1977, the court
conducted an extensive hearing on plaintiffs' motion for permanent
injunctive relief. Page 457 U. S. 207 In considering this motion, the District Court made extensive
findings of fact. The court found that neither § 21.031 nor the
School District policy implementing it had "either the purpose or
effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas." 458 F.
Supp. 569 , 575 (1978). Respecting defendants' further claim
that § 21.031 was simply a financial measure designed to avoid a
drain on the State's fisc, the court recognized that the increases
in population resulting from the immigration of Mexican nationals
into the United States had created problems for the public schools
of the State, and that these problems were exacerbated by the
special educational needs of immigrant Mexican children. The court
noted, however, that the increase in school enrollment was
primarily attributable to the admission of children who were legal
residents. Id. at 575-576. It also found that, while the
"exclusion of all undocumented children from the public schools in
Texas would eventually result in economies at some level," id. at 576, funding from both the State and Federal
Governments was based primarily on the number of children enrolled.
In net effect, then, barring undocumented children from the schools
would save money, but it would "not necessarily" improve "the
quality of education." Id. at 577. The court further
observed that the impact of § 21.031 was borne primarily by a very
small subclass of illegal aliens, "entire families who have
migrated illegally and -- for all practical purposes -- permanently
to the United States." Id. at 578. [ Footnote 3 ] Finally, the court noted that, under
current laws and practices, "the illegal alien of today may well be
the legal alien of tomorrow," [ Footnote 4 ] and that, without an education, these
undocumented Page 457 U. S. 208 children,

															"[a]lready disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of
English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial prejudices, . . .
will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic
class." Id. at 577.

															The District Court held that illegal aliens were entitled to the
protection of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that § 21.031 violated that Clause. Suggesting
that

															"the state's exclusion of undocumented children from its public
schools . . . may well be the type of invidiously motivated state
action for which the suspect classification doctrine was
designed,"

															the court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether the
statute would survive a "strict scrutiny" analysis because, in any
event, the discrimination embodied in the statute was not supported
by a rational basis. Id. at 585. The District Court also
concluded that the Texas statute violated the Supremacy Clause.
[ Footnote 5 ] Id. at
590-592.

															The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the District
Court's injunction. 628 F.2d 448 (1980). The Court of Appeals held
that the District Court had erred in finding the Texas statute
preempted by federal law. [ Footnote
6 ] With respect to Page 457 U. S. 209 equal protection, however, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all
essential respects the analysis of the District Court, id. at 454-458, concluding that § 21.031 was "constitutionally infirm
regardless of whether it was tested using the mere rational basis
standard or some more stringent test," id. at 458. We
noted probable jurisdiction. 451 U.S. 968 (1981). No. 8194 I n re Alien Children Education Litigation

															During 1978 and 1979, suits challenging the constitutionality of
21.031 and various local practices undertaken on the authority of
that provision were filed in the United States District Courts for
the Southern, Western, and Northern Districts of Texas. Each suit
named the State of Texas and the Texas Education Agency as
defendants, along with local officials. In November, 1979, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, on motion of the State,
consolidated the claims against the state officials into a single
action to be heard in the District Court for the Southern District
of Texas. A hearing was conducted in February and March, 1980. In
July, 1980, the court entered an opinion and order holding that §
21.031 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In re Alien Children Education
Litigation, 501 F.
Supp. 544 . [ Footnote 7 ] The
court held that

															"the absolute deprivation of education should trigger strict
judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is
the result of complete inability to pay for the desired
benefit." Id. at 582. The court determined that the State's
concern for fiscal integrity was not a compelling state interest, id. at 582-583; that exclusion of these children had not
been shown to be necessary to improve education within the State, id. at 583; and that the educational needs of the children
statutorily excluded were not different from the needs of children
not excluded, ibid. The court therefore concluded that Page 457 U. S. 210 § 21.031 was not carefully tailored to advance the asserted
state interest in an acceptable manner. Id. at 583-584.
While appeal of the District Court's decision was pending, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in No. 80-1538. Apparently
on the strength of that opinion, the Court of Appeals, on February
23, 1981, summarily affirmed the decision of the Southern District.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 452 U.S. 937 (1981), and
consolidated this case with No. 80-1538 for briefing and argument.
[ Footnote 8 ] II The Fourteenth Amendment provides that

															"[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

															(Emphasis added.) Appellants argue at the outset that
undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not
"persons within the jurisdiction" of the State of Texas, and that
they therefore have no right to the equal protection of Texas law.
We reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration
laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that
term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shaughnessv v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206 , 345 U. S. 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.
S. 228 , 163 U. S. 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356 , 118 U. S. 369 (1886). Indeed, we have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment
protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from
invidious discrimination by the Federal Government. Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 , 426 U. S. 77 (1976). [ Footnote 9 ] Page 457 U. S. 211 Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that
the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its
protection to persons within its jurisdiction, while the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain
no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants' view, persons
who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the
jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's
boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic
of the Fourteenth Amendment support that constricting construction
of the phrase "within its jurisdiction." [ Footnote 10 ] We have never suggested that the class of
persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection
guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due
process. To the contrary, we have recognized Page 457 U. S. 212 that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical
class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state
authority.

															"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to
the protection of citizens. It says:"

															"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

															" These provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality, and the
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
laws." Yick Wo, supra, at 118 U. S. 369 (emphasis added).

															In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the
United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal
Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the
boundaries of a State. Wong Wing, supra, at 163 U. S. 238 .
[ Footnote 11 ] Our cases
applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial
theme: [ Footnote 12 ] Page 457 U. S. 213 "Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection
of equal laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that
is, within its own jurisdiction. It is there that the equality of
legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed by the
Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities,
each responsible for its own laws establishing the rights and
duties of persons within its borders." Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.
S. 337 , 305 U. S. 350 (1938).

															There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that "due
process" is somehow of greater stature than "equal protection," and
therefore available to a larger class of persons. To the contrary,
each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an elementary
limitation on state power. To permit a State to employ the phrase
"within its jurisdiction" in order to identify subclasses of
persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction, thereby
relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws are
designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the
principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection
Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all
caste-based and invidious class-based legislation. That objective
is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to
classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from
its protection. Page 457 U. S. 214 Although the congressional debate concerning § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was limited, that debate clearly confirms the
understanding that the phrase "within its jurisdiction" was
intended in a broad sense to offer the guarantee of equal
protection to all within a State's boundaries, and to all upon whom
the State would impose the obligations of its laws. Indeed, it
appears from those debates that Congress, by using the phrase
"person within its jurisdiction," sought expressly to ensure that
the equal protection of the laws was provided to the alien
population. Representative Bingham reported to the House the draft
resolution of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction
(H.R. 63) that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment. [ Footnote 13 ] Cong.Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1033 (1866). Two days later, Bingham posed the following
question in support of the resolution:

															"Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States? Is it not essential
to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all
persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the
rights of life and liberty and property?" Id. at 1090.

															Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen,
and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, was no less
explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, and the
intention to make its provisions applicable to all who "may happen
to be" within the jurisdiction of a State: Page 457 U. S. 215 "The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment
disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United
States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to
him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes
all class legislation in the States and does away with the
injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another. . . . It will, if adopted by the States,
forever disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon
those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens
of the United States, and to all person who may happen to be
within their jurisdiction. " Id. at 2766 (emphasis added).

															Use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" thus does not
detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen
or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and
reaches into every corner of a State's territory. That a person's
initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was
unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot
negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's
territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the
full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal
laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction -- either voluntarily,
or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of
the United States -- he is entitled to the equal protection of the
laws that a State may choose to establish.

															Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in
these cases may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection only begins the inquiry. The more
difficult question is whether the Equal Protection Clause has been
violated by the refusal of the State of Texas to reimburse local
school boards for the education of children who cannot demonstrate
that their presence within the Page 457 U. S. 216 United States is lawful, or by the imposition by those school
boards of the burden of tuition on those children. It is to this
question that we now turn. III The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike." F. S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412 , 253 U. S. 415 (1920). But so too, "[t]he Constitution does not require things
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as
though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.
S. 141 , 310 U. S. 147 (1940). The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and
what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the States. A
legislature must have substantial latitude to establish
classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem
perceived, that accommodate competing concerns both public and
private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability
of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection
Clause to most forms of state action, we thus seek only the
assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair
relationship to a legitimate public purpose.

															But we would not be faithful to our obligations under the
Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to
every classification. The Equal Protection Clause was intended as a
restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental
constitutional premises. Thus, we have treated as presumptively
invidious those classifications that disadvantage a "suspect
class," [ Footnote 14 ] or
that impinge upon Page 457 U. S. 217 the exercise of a "fundamental right." [ Footnote 15 ] With respect to such
classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal
protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its
classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain
forms of legislative classification, while not facially invidious,
nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in
these limited circumstances, we have sought the assurance that the
classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the
ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be
viewed as furthering a Page 457 U. S. 218 substantial interest of the State. [ Footnote 16 ] We turn to a consideration of the
standard appropriate for the evaluation of § 21.031. A Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry
into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an
effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has
resulted in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of
illegal migrants -- numbering in the millions -- within our
borders. [ Footnote 17 ] This
situation raises the specter of a permanent Page 457 U. S. 219 caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to
remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the
benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful
residents. [ Footnote 18 ] The
existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems
for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of
equality under law. [ Footnote
19 ]

															The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special
members of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view
that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very
presence within the United States is the product of their own
unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply Page 457 U. S. 220 with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on
the minor children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those
who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our
law should be prepared to bear the consequences, including, but not
limited to, deportation. But the children of those illegal entrants
are not comparably situated. Their "parents have the ability to
conform their conduct to societal norms," and presumably the
ability to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the
children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect neither
their parents' conduct nor their own status." Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 , 430 U. S. 770 (1977). Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct
of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing
the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children does not
comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.

															"[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the . . .
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth,
and penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual -- as well as
unjust -- way of deterring the parent." Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.
S. 164 , 406 U. S. 175 (1972) (footnote omitted).

															Of course, undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper
legislative goal. Nor is undocumented status an absolutely
immutable characteristic, since it is the product of conscious,
indeed unlawful, action. But § 21.031 is directed against children,
and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal
characteristic over which children can have little control. It is
thus difficult to conceive of a rational justification for
penalizing these children for their presence within the United
States. Yet that appears to be precisely the effect of §
21.031. Page 457 U. S. 221 Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the
Constitution. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 , 411 U. S. 35 (1973). But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit"
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.
Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic
institutions and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life
of the child mark the distinction. The "American people have always
regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 , 262 U. S. 400 (1923). We have recognized "the public schools as a most vital
civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government," Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 , 374 U. S. 230 (1963) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), and as the primary vehicle for
transmitting "the values on which our society rests." Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U. S. 68 , 441 U. S. 76 (1979).

															"[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we
are to preserve freedom and independence." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 , 406 U. S. 221 (1972). And these historic

															"perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system have been confirmed by the observations of social
scientists." Ambach v. Norwick, supra, at 441 U. S. 77 . In
addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals
might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all.
In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric
of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the
values and skills upon which our social order rests.

															In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our
political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some
isolated group of children poses an affront to one of the goals Page 457 U. S. 222 of the Equal Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental
barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the
basis of individual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children
of any disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by
which that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is
held by the majority. But more directly, "education prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
society." Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, at 406 U. S. 221 .
Illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and
write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education
each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that
deprivation on the social, economic, intellectual, and
psychological wellbeing of the individual, and the obstacle it
poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to
reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of
basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 20 ] What we said 28 years ago in Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), still holds true:

															"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school Page 457 U. S. 223 attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms." Id. at 347 U. S.
493 . B These well-settled principles allow us to determine the proper
level of deference to be afforded § 21.031. Undocumented aliens
cannot be treated as a suspect class, because their presence in
this country in violation of federal law is not a "constitutional
irrelevancy." Nor is education a fundamental right; a State need
not justify by compelling necessity every variation in the manner
in which education is provided to its population. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, at 411 U. S. 28 -39.
But more is involved in these cases than the abstract question
whether § 21.031 discriminates against a suspect class, or whether
education is a fundamental right. Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their
disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the
rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education,
we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic
institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they
will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our
Nation. In determining Page 457 U. S. 224 the rationality of § 21. 031, we may appropriately take into
account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who
are its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the
discrimination contained in § 21.031 can hardly be considered
rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State. IV It is the State's principal argument, and apparently the view of
the dissenting Justices, that the undocumented status of these
children vel non establishes a sufficient rational basis
for denying them benefits that a State might choose to afford other
residents. The State notes that, while other aliens are admitted
"on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under
nondiscriminatory laws," Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 , 334 U. S. 420 (1948), the asserted right of these children to an education can
claim no implicit congressional imprimatur. [ Footnote 21 ] Indeed, in the State's view,
Congress' apparent disapproval of the presence of these children
within the United States, and the evasion of the federal regulatory
program that is the mark of undocumented status, provides authority
for its decision to impose upon them special disabilities. Faced
with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of
aliens, we agree that the courts must be attentive to congressional
policy; the exercise of congressional power might well affect the
State's prerogatives to afford differential treatment to a
particular class of aliens. But we are unable to find in the
congressional immigration scheme any statement of policy that might
weigh significantly Page 457 U. S. 225 in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning the
State's authority to deprive these children of an education.

															The Constitution grants Congress the power to "establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization." Art. I., § 8, cl. 4. Drawing upon
this power, upon its plenary authority with respect to foreign
relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power
of a sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a
complex scheme governing admission to our Nation and status within
our borders. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S.
67 (1976); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S.
588 -589 (1952). The obvious need for delicate policy
judgments has counseled the Judicial Branch to avoid intrusion into
this field. Mathews, supra, at 426 U. S. 81 .
But this traditional caution does not persuade us that unusual
deference must be shown the classification embodied in § 21.031.
The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of
aliens. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52 (1941). This power is "committed to the political
branches of the Federal Government." Mathews, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 81 .
Although it is "a routine and normally legitimate part" of the
business of the Federal Government to classify on the basis of
alien status, id. at 426 U. S. 85 ,
and to "take into account the character of the relationship between
the alien and this country," id. at 426 U. S. 80 ,
only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State. See Id. at 426 U. S. 84 -85; Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 , 432 U. S. 7 , n. 8
(1977)

															As we recognized in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.
S. 351 (1976), the States do have some authority to act
with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors
federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. In De
Canas, the State's program reflected Congress' intention to
bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of
permission to work in this country. Id. at 424 U. S. 361 .
In contrast, there is no indication that the disability imposed by
§ 21.031 corresponds to any identifiable congressional policy.
The Page 457 U. S. 226 State does not claim that the conservation of state educational
resources was ever a congressional concern in restricting
immigration. More importantly, the classification reflected in §
21.031 does not operate harmoniously within the federal
program.

															To be sure, like all persons who have entered the United States
unlawfully, these children are subject to deportation. 8 U.S.C. §§
1251, 1252 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). But there is no assurance that
a child subject to deportation will ever be deported. An illegal
entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside
in this country, or even to become a citizen. See, e.g., 8
U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). In light of
the discretionary federal power to grant relief from deportation, a
State cannot realistically determine that any particular
undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation
proceedings have been completed. It would, of course, be most
difficult for the State to justify a denial of education to a child
enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.

															We are reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold
from these children, for so long as they are present in this
country through no fault of their own, access to a basic education.
In other contexts, undocumented status, coupled with some
articulable federal policy, might enhance state authority with
respect to the treatment of undocumented aliens. But in the area of
special constitutional sensitivity presented by these cases, and in
the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the
present legislative record, we perceive no national policy that
supports the State in denying these children an elementary
education. The State may borrow the federal classification. But to
justify its use as a criterion for its own discriminatory policy,
the State must demonstrate that the classification is reasonably
adapted to " the purposes for which the state desires to use
it. " Oyama v. California, 332 U.
S. 633 , 332 U. S.
664 -665 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). We therefore turn to the state objectives that are said to
support § 21.031. Page 457 U. S. 227 V Appellants argue that the classification at issue furthers an
interest in the "preservation of the state's limited resources for
the education of its lawful residents." [ Footnote 22 ] Brief for Appellants 26. Of course, a
concern for the preservation of resources, standing alone, can
hardly justify the classification used in allocating those
resources. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 365 , 403 U. S.
374 -375 (1971). The State must do more than justify its
classification with a concise expression of an intention to
discriminate. Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572 , 426 U. S. 605 (1976). Apart from the asserted state prerogative to act against
undocumented children solely on the basis of their undocumented
status -- an asserted prerogative that carries only minimal force
in the circumstances of these cases -- we discern three colorable
state interests that might support § 21.031. Page 457 U. S. 228 First, appellants appear to suggest that the State may seek to
protect itself from an influx of illegal immigrants. While a State
might have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic
effects of sudden shifts in population, [ Footnote 23 ] § 21.031 hardly offers an effective
method of dealing with an urgent demographic or economic problem.
There is no evidence in the record suggesting that illegal entrants
impose any significant burden on the State's economy. To the
contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens
underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the
local economy and tax money to the state fisc. 458 F. Supp. at 578;
501 F. Supp. at 570-571. The dominant incentive for illegal entry
into the State of Texas is the availability of employment; few if
any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to the
State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education.
[ Footnote 24 ] Thus, even
making the doubtful assumption that the net impact of illegal
aliens on the economy of the State is negative, we think it clear
that "[c]harging tuition to undocumented children constitutes a
ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal
immigration," at least when compared with the alternative of Page 457 U. S. 229 prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens. 458 F. Supp. at
585. See 628 F.2d at 461; 501 F. Supp. at 579, and n.
88.

															Second, while it is apparent that a State may "not . . . reduce
expenditures for education by barring [some arbitrarily chosen
class of] children from its schools," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 633 (1969), appellants suggest that undocumented children are
appropriately singled out for exclusion because of the special
burdens they impose on the State's ability to provide high-quality
public education. But the record in no way supports the claim that
exclusion of undocumented children is likely to improve the overall
quality of education in the State. [ Footnote 25 ] As the District Court in No. 801934 noted,
the State failed to offer any

															"credible supporting evidence that a proportionately small
diminution of the funds spent on each child [which might result
from devoting some state funds to the education of the excluded
group] will have a grave impact on the quality of education."

															501 F. Supp. at 583. And, after reviewing the State's school
financing mechanism, the District Court in No. 80-1538 concluded
that barring undocumented children from local schools would not
necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those
schools. 458 F. Supp. at 577. Of course, even if improvement in the
quality of education were a likely result of barring some number of children from the schools of the State, the
State must support its selection of this group as the
appropriate target for exclusion. In terms of educational cost and
need, however, undocumented children are "basically
indistinguishable" from legally resident alien children. Id. at 589; 501 F. Supp. at 583, and n. 104.

															Finally, appellants suggest that undocumented children are
appropriately singled out because their unlawful presence Page 457 U. S. 230 within the United States renders them less likely than other
children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put
their education to productive social or political use within the
State. Even assuming that such an interest is legitimate, it is an
interest that is most difficult to quantify. The State has no
assurance that any child, citizen or not, will employ the education
provided by the State within the confines of the State's borders.
In any event, the record is clear that many of the undocumented
children disabled by this classification will remain in this
country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or
citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand
precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation
and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of
unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever
savings might be achieved by denying these children an education,
they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to
these children, the State, and the Nation. VI If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children
the free public education that it offers to other children residing
within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that
it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was
made here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
each of these cases is Affirmed. * Together with No. 80-1934, Texas et al. v. Certain Named
and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children et al., also on appeal
from the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															That section provides, in pertinent part:

															"(a) All children who are citizens of the United States or
legally admitted aliens and who are over the age of five years and
under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of any
scholastic year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available
School Fund for that year."

															"(b) Every child in this state who is a citizen of the United
States or a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five
years and not over the age of 21 years on the first day of
September of the year in which admission is sought shall be
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in
which he resides or in which his parent, guardian, or the person
having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for
admission."

															"(c) The board of trustees of any public free school district of
this state shall admit into the public free schools of the district
free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of the United
States or legally admitted aliens and who are over five and not
over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if
such person or his parent, guardian or person having lawful control
resides within the school district."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Despite the enactment of § 21.031 in 1975, the School District
had continued to enroll undocumented children free of charge until
the 1977-1978 school year. In July, 1977, it adopted a policy
requiring undocumented children to pay a "full tuition fee" in
order to enroll. Section 21.031 had not provided a definition of "a
legally admitted alien." Tyler offered the following
clarification:

															"A legally admitted alien is one who has documentation that he
or she is legally in the United States, or a person who is in the
process of securing documentation from the United States
Immigration Service, and the Service will state that the person is
being processed and will be admitted with proper
documentation."

															App. to Juris.Statement in No. 80-1538, p. A-38.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The court contrasted this group with those illegal aliens who
entered the country alone in order to earn money to send to their
dependents in Mexico, and who, in many instances, remained in this
country for only a short period of time. 458 F. Supp. at 578.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Gilbert Cardenas, testified that "fifty
to sixty per cent . . . of current legal alien workers were
formerly illegal aliens." Id. at 577. A defense witness,
Rolan Heston, District Director of the Houston District of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, testified that

															"undocumented children can and do live in the United States for
years, and adjust their status through marriage to a citizen or
permanent resident." Ibid. The court also took notice of congressional
proposals to "legalize" the status of many unlawful entrants. Id. at 577-578. See also n 17, infra. [ Footnote 5 ]

															The court found § 21.031 inconsistent with the scheme of
national regulation under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
with federal laws pertaining to funding and discrimination in
education. The court distinguished De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), by emphasizing that the state bar on employment of illegal
aliens involved in that case mirrored precisely the federal policy,
of protecting the domestic labor market, underlying the immigration
laws. The court discerned no express federal policy to bar illegal
immigrants from education. 458 F. Supp. at 590-592.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The Court of Appeals noted that De Canas v. Bica,
supra, had not foreclosed all state regulation with respect to
illegal aliens, and found no express or implied congressional
policy favoring the education of illegal aliens. The court
therefore concluded that there was no preemptive conflict between
state and federal law. 628 F.2d at 451-454.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The court concluded that § 21.031 was not preempted by federal
laws or international agreements. 501 F. Supp. at 584-596.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Appellees in both cases continue to press the argument that §
21.031 is preempted by federal law and policy. In light of our
disposition of the Fourteenth Amendment issue, we have no occasion
to reach this claim.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															It would be incongruous to hold that the United States, to which
the Constitution assigns a broad authority over both naturalization
and foreign affairs, is barred from invidious discrimination with
respect to unlawful aliens, while exempting the States from a
similar limitation. See 426 U.S. at 426 U. S.
84 -86.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning
of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States. . .
." (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.
S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of
the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in
which the term "jurisdiction" was used. He further noted that it
was

															"impossible to construe the words 'subject to the jurisdiction
thereof,' in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as
less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,' in the
concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons
'within the jurisdiction' of one of the States of the Union are not
'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.'" Id. at 169 U. S.
687 .

															Justice Gray concluded that

															"[e]very citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled
here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently
subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States." Id. at 169 U. S. 693 .
As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on
geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles
of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with
respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between
resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and
resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. See C. Bouve,
Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 425-427
(1912).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															In his separate opinion, Justice Field addressed the
relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:

															"The term 'person,' used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough
to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the
republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same
protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes
obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and,
as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those
laws. . . . The contention that persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of the
law was heard with pain on the argument at the bar -- in face of
the great constitutional amendment which declares that no State
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. at 163 U. S.
242 -243 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

															[ Footnote 12 ] Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.
S. 185 (1958), relied on by appellants, is not to the
contrary. In that case, the Court held, as a matter of statutory
construction, that an alien paroled into the United States pursuant
to 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5) (1952 ed.), was not "within the United States" for the
purpose of availing herself of § 243(h), which authorized the
withholding of deportation in certain circumstance. The conclusion
reflected the longstanding distinction between exclusion
proceedings, involving the determination of admissibility, and
deportation proceedings. The undocumented children who are
appellees here, unlike the parolee in Leng May Ma, supra, could apparently be removed from the country only pursuant to
deportation proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). See 1A C.
Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.16b,
p. 3-161 (1981).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Representative Bingham's views are also reflected in his
comments on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. He repeatedly referred
to the need to provide protection, not only to the freedmen, but to
"the alien and stranger," and to "refugees . . . and all men."
Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1292 (1866).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain
classifications as "suspect." Some classifications are more likely
than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice, rather than
legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.
Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as
incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person
is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under
the law. Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant
to any proper legislative goal. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184 , 379 U. S. 192 (1964); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S.
81 , 320 U. S. 100 (1943). Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups,
have historically been "relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 , 411 U. S. 28 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 365 , 403 U. S. 372 (1971); see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 , 304 U. S.
152 -153, n. 4 (1938). The experience of our Nation has
shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some
groups. Our response to that experience is reflected in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing
special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of
circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or
caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
abolish.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															In determining whether a class-based denial of a particular
right is deserving of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause, we look to the Constitution to see if the right infringed
has its source, explicitly or implicitly, therein. But we have also
recognized the fundamentality of participation in state "elections
on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction," Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 , 405 U. S. 336 (1972), even though "the right to vote, per se, is not a
constitutionally protected right." San Antonio Independent
School Dist., supra, at 411 U. S. 35 , n.
78. With respect to suffrage, we have explained the need for strict
scrutiny as arising from the significance of the franchise as the
guardian of all other rights. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , 383 U. S. 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 , 377 U. S. 562 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.
S. 356 , 118 U. S. 370 (1886).

															[ Footnote 16 ] See Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U. S. 259 (1978). This technique of "intermediate" scrutiny permits us to
evaluate the rationality of the legislative judgment with reference
to well-settled constitutional principles.

															"In expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to discern
'principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the
community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to
lift them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a
particular time and place.'" University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.
S. 265 , 438 U. S. 299 (1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.), quoting A. Cox, The Role of the
Supreme Court in American Government 114 (1976). Only when concerns
sufficiently absolute and enduring can be clearly ascertained from
the Constitution and our cases do we employ this standard to aid us
in determining the rationality of the legislative choice.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															The Attorney General recently estimated the number of illegal
aliens within the United States at between 3 and 6 million. In
presenting to both the Senate and House of Representatives several
Presidential proposals for reform of the immigration laws --
including one to "legalize" many of the illegal entrants currently
residing in the United States by creating for them a special status
under the immigration laws -- the Attorney General noted that this
subclass is largely composed of persons with a permanent attachment
to the Nation, and that they are unlikely to be displaced from our
territory:

															"We have neither the resources, the capability, nor the
motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of
whom have become, in effect, members of the community. By granting
limited legal status to the productive and law-abiding members of
this shadow population, we will recognize reality and devote our
enforcement resources to deterring future illegal arrivals."

															Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees,
and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary and
the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1981)
(testimony of William French Smith, Attorney General).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															As the District Court observed in No. 80-1538, the confluence of
Government policies has resulted in

															"the existence of a large number of employed illegal aliens,
such as the parents of plaintiffs in this case, whose presence is
tolerated, whose employment is perhaps even welcomed, but who are
virtually defenseless against any abuse, exploitation, or callous
neglect to which the state or the state's natural citizens and
business organizations may wish to subject them."

															458 F. Supp. at 585.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															We reject the claim that "illegal aliens" are a "suspect class."
No case in which we have attempted to define a suspect class, see, e.g., n. 14, supra, has addressed the status
of persons unlawfully in our country. Unlike most of the
classifications that we have recognized as suspect, entry into this
class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of
voluntary action. Indeed, entry into the class is itself a crime.
In addition, it could hardly be suggested that undocumented status
is a "constitutional irrelevancy." With respect to the actions of
the Federal Government, alienage classifications may be intimately
related to the conduct of foreign policy, to the federal
prerogative to control access to the United States, and to the
plenary federal power to determine who has sufficiently manifested
his allegiance to become a citizen of the Nation. No State may
independently exercise a like power. But if the Federal Government
has, by uniform rule, prescribed what it believes to be appropriate
standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may,
of course, follow the federal direction. See De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															Because the State does not afford noncitizens the right to vote,
and may bar noncitizens from participating in activities at the
heart of its political community, appellants argue that denial of a
basic education to these children is of less significance than the
denial to some other group. Whatever the current status of these
children, the courts below concluded that many will remain here
permanently, and that some indeterminate number will eventually
become citizens. The fact that many will not is not decisive, even
with respect to the importance of education to participation in
core political institutions. "[T]he benefits of education are not
reserved to those whose productive utilization of them is a
certainty. . . ." 458 F. Supp. at 581, n. 14. In addition, although
a noncitizen

															"may be barred from full involvement in the political arena, he
may play a role -- perhaps even a leadership role -- in other areas
of import to the community." Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S. 1 , 432 U. S. 12 (1977). Moreover, the significance of education to our society is
not limited to its political and cultural fruits. The public
schools are an important socializing institution, imparting those
shared values through which social order and stability are
maintained.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															If the constitutional guarantee of equal protection was
available only to those upon whom Congress affirmatively granted
its benefit, the State's argument would be virtually unanswerable.
But the Equal Protection Clause operates of its own force to
protect anyone "within [the State's] jurisdiction" from the State's
arbitrary action. See 457 U. S. supra. The question we examine in text is whether the
federal disapproval of the presence of these children
assists the State in overcoming the presumption that denial of
education to innocent children is not a rational response to
legitimate state concerns.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															Appellant School District sought at oral argument to
characterize the alienage classification contained in § 21.031 as
simply a test of residence. We are unable to uphold § 21.031 on
that basis. Appellants conceded that, if, for example, a Virginian
or a legally admitted Mexican citizen entered Tyler with his
school-age children, intending to remain only six months, those
children would be viewed as residents entitled to attend Tyler
schools. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-32. It is thus clear that Tyler's
residence argument amounts to nothing more than the assertion that
illegal entry, without more, prevents a person from becoming a
resident for purposes of enrolling his children in the public
schools. A State may not, however, accomplish what would otherwise
be prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause merely by defining a
disfavored group as nonresident. And illegal entry into the country
would not, under traditional criteria, bar a person from obtaining
domicile within a State. C. Bouve, Exclusion and Expulsion of
Aliens in the United States 340 (1912). Appellants have not shown
that the families of undocumented children do not comply with the
established standards by which the State historically tests
residence. Apart from the alienage limitation, § 21.031(b) requires
a school district to provide education only to resident children.
The school districts of the State are as free to apply to
undocumented children established criteria for determining
residence as they are to apply those criteria to any other child
who seeks admission.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Although the State has no direct interest in controlling entry
into this country, that interest being one reserved by the
Constitution to the Federal Government, unchecked unlawful
migration might impair the State's economy generally, or the
State's ability to provide some important service. Despite the
exclusive federal control of this Nation's borders, we cannot
conclude that the States are without any power to deter the influx
of persons entering the United States against federal law, and
whose numbers might have a discernible impact on traditional state
concerns. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. at 424 U. S.
354 -356.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															The courts below noted the ineffectiveness of the Texas
provision as a means of controlling the influx of illegal entrants
into the State. See 628 F.2d at 460-461; 458 F. Supp. at
585; 501 F. Supp. at 578 ("The evidence demonstrates that
undocumented persons do not immigrate in search for a free public
education. Virtually all of the undocumented persons who come into
this country seek employment opportunities, and not educational
benefits. . . . There was overwhelming evidence . . . of the
unimportance of public education as a stimulus for immigration")
(footnote omitted).

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															Nor does the record support the claim that the educational
resources of the State are so direly limited that some form of
"educational triage" might be deemed a reasonable (assuming that it
were a permissible) response to the State's problems. Id. at 579-581.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.

															While I join the Court opinion, I do so without in any way
retreating from my opinion in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 , 411 U. S. 70 -133
(1973) (dissenting opinion). I continue to believe that an
individual's interest in education is fundamental, and that this
view is amply supported

															"by the unique status accorded public education by our society,
and by the close relationship between education and some of our
most basic constitutional values. " Page 457 U. S. 231 Id. at 411 U. S. 111 .
Furthermore, I believe that the facts of these cases demonstrate
the wisdom of rejecting a rigidified approach to equal protection
analysis, and of employing an approach that allows for varying
levels of scrutiny depending upon

															"the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn." Id. at 411 U. S. 99 . See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 , 397 U. S.
519 -521 (1970) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). It continues
to be my view that a class-based denial of public education is
utterly incompatible with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.

															I join the opinion and judgment of the Court.

															Like JUSTICE POWELL, I believe that the children involved in
this litigation "should not be left on the streets uneducated." Post at 457 U. S. 238 .
I write separately, however, because, in my view, the nature of the
interest at stake is crucial to the proper resolution of these
cases.

															The "fundamental rights" aspect of the Court's equal protection
analysis -- the now-familiar concept that governmental
classifications bearing on certain interests must be closely
scrutinized -- has been the subject of some controversy. Justice
Harlan, for example, warned that

															"[v]irtually every state statute affects important rights. . . .
[T]o extend the 'compelling interest' rule to all cases in which
such rights are affected would go far toward making this Court a
'superlegislature.'" Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 , 394 U. S. 661 (1969) (dissenting opinion). Others have noted that strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause is unnecessary when
classifications infringing enumerated constitutional rights are
involved, for

															"a state law that impinges upon a substantive right or liberty
created or conferred by the Constitution is, of course,
presumptively invalid, whether or not the law's purpose or effect
is to create any classifications." San Antonio Page 457 U. S. 232 Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S.
1 , 411 U. S. 61 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 394 U. S. 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Still others have suggested that
fundamental rights are not properly a part of equal protection
analysis at all, because they are unrelated to any defined
principle of equality. [ Footnote
2/1 ]

															These considerations, combined with doubts about the judiciary's
ability to make fine distinctions in assessing the effects of
complex social policies, led the Court in Rodriguez to
articulate a firm rule: fundamental rights are those that
"explicitly or implicitly [are] guaranteed by the Constitution."
411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 33 -34.
It therefore squarely rejected the notion that "an ad hoc determination as to the social or economic importance" of a given
interest is relevant to the level of scrutiny accorded
classifications involving that interest, id. at 411 U. S. 32 , and
made clear that "[i]t is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws." Id. at 411 U. S. 33 .

															I joined JUSTICE POWELL's opinion for the Court in Rodriguez, and I continue to believe that it provides the
appropriate model for resolving most equal protection disputes.
Classifications infringing substantive constitutional rights
necessarily will be invalid, if not by force of the Equal
Protection Clause, then through operation of other provisions of
the Constitution. Conversely, classifications bearing on
nonconstitutional interests -- even those involving "the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings," Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S. 485 (1970) -- generally are not subject to special treatment under the
Equal Protection Clause, because they are not distinguishable in
any relevant way from other regulations in "the area of economics
and social welfare." Ibid. With all this said, however, I believe the Court's experience
has demonstrated that the Rodriguez formulation does Page 457 U. S. 233 not settle every issue of "fundamental rights" arising under the
Equal Protection Clause. Only a pedant would insist that there are
no meaningful distinctions among the multitude of social and
political interests regulated by the States, and Rodriguez does not stand for quite so absolute a proposition. To the
contrary, Rodriguez implicitly acknowledged that certain
interests, though not constitutionally guaranteed, must be accorded
a special place in equal protection analysis. Thus, the Court's
decisions long have accorded strict scrutiny to classifications
bearing on the right to vote in state elections, and Rodriguez confirmed the "constitutional underpinnings of
the right to equal treatment in the voting process." 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 34 , n.
74. Yet "the right to vote, per se, is not a
constitutionally protected right," id. at 411 U. S. 35 , n.
78. See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , 383 U. S. 665 (1966); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 59 , n.
2 (Stewart, J., concurring). Instead, regulation of the electoral
process receives unusual scrutiny because "the right to exercise
the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of
other basic civil and political rights." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 , 377 U. S. 562 (1964). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.
S. 330 , 405 U. S. 336 (1972). In other words, the right to vote is accorded extraordinary
treatment because it is, in equal protection terms, an
extraordinary right: a citizen [ Footnote 2/2 ] cannot hope to achieve any meaningful
degree of individual political equality if granted an inferior
right of participation in the political process. Those denied the
vote are relegated, by state fiat, in a most basic way to
second-class status.

															It is arguable, of course, that the Court never should have
applied fundamental rights doctrine in the fashion outlined above.
Justice Harlan, for one, maintained that strict equal protection
scrutiny was appropriate only when racial or analogous Page 457 U. S. 234 classifications were at issue. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. at 394 U. S.
658 -663 (dissenting opinion). See Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. at 377 U.S.
590 -591 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But it is too late to
debate that point, and I believe that accepting the principle of
the voting cases -- the idea that state classifications bearing on
certain interests pose the risk of allocating rights in a fashion
inherently contrary to any notion of "equality" -- dictates the
outcome here. As both JUSTICE POWELL and THE CHIEF JUSTICE observe,
the Texas scheme inevitably will create "a subclass of illiterate
persons," post at 457 U. S. 241 (POWELL, J., concurring); see
post at 457 U. S. 242 , 457 U. S. 254 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting); where I differ with THE CHIEF JUSTICE
is in my conclusion that this makes the statutory scheme
unconstitutional, as well as unwise.

															In my view, when the State provides an education to some and
denies it to others, it immediately and inevitably creates class
distinctions of a type fundamentally inconsistent with those
purposes, mentioned above, of the Equal Protection Clause. Children
denied an education are placed at a permanent and insurmountable
competitive disadvantage, for an uneducated child is denied even
the opportunity to achieve. And when those children are members of
an identifiable group, that group -- through the State's action --
will have been converted into a discrete underclass. Other benefits
provided by the State, such as housing and public assistance, are,
of course, important; to an individual in immediate need, they may
be more desirable than the right to be educated. But
classifications involving the complete denial of education are, in
a sense, unique, for they strike at the heart of equal protection
values by involving the State in the creation of permanent class
distinctions. Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 411 U. S. 115 ,
n. 74 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). In a sense, then, denial of an
education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the
former relegates the individual to second-class social status; the
latter places him at a permanent political disadvantage. Page 457 U. S. 235 This conclusion is fully consistent with Rodriguez. The
Court there reserved judgment on the constitutionality of a state
system that "occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to any of its children," noting that

															"no charge fairly could be made that the system [at issue in Rodriguez ] fails to provide each child with an opportunity
to acquire . . . basic minimal skills." Id. at 411 U. S. 37 . And
it cautioned that, in a case

															"involv[ing] the most persistent and difficult questions of
educational policy, . . . [the] Court's lack of specialized
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference
with the informed judgments made at the state and local
levels." Id. at 411 U. S. 42 .
Thus Rodriguez held, and the Court now reaffirms, that "a
State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in
the manner in which education is provided to its population." Ante at 457 U. S. 223 .
Similarly, it is undeniable that education is not a "fundamental
right" in the sense that it is constitutionally guaranteed. Here,
however, the State has undertaken to provide an education to most
of the children residing within its borders. And, in contrast to
the situation in Rodriguez, it does not take an advanced
degree to predict the effects of a complete denial of education
upon those children targeted by the State's classification. In such
circumstances, the voting decisions suggest that the State must
offer something more than a rational basis for its classification.
[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															Concededly, it would seem ironic to discuss the social necessity
of an education in a case that concerned only undocumented aliens
"whose very presence in the state and this country is illegal." Post at 457 U. S. 250 (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). But because of the nature of the
federal immigration laws and the preeminent role of the Federal
Government in Page 457 U. S. 236 regulating immigration, the class of children here is not a
monolithic one. Thus, the District Court in the Alien Children
Education case found as a factual matter that a significant
number of illegal aliens will remain in this country permanently, 501 F.
Supp. 544 , 558-559 (SD Tex.1980); that some of the children
involved in this litigation are "documentable," id. at
573; and that "[m]any of the undocumented children are not
deportable. None of the named plaintiffs is under an order of
deportation." Id. at 583, n. 103. As the Court's alienage
cases demonstrate, these children may not be denied rights that are
granted to citizens, excepting only those rights bearing on
political interests. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U. S.
1 (1977). And, as JUSTICE POWELL notes, the structure of
the immigration statutes makes it impossible for the State to
determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and which
eventually will be deported. Post at 457 U. S.
240 -241, n. 6. Indeed, any attempt to do so would
involve the State in the administration of the immigration laws.
Whatever the State's power to classify deportable aliens, then --
and whatever the Federal Government's ability to draw more precise
and more acceptable alienage classifications -- the statute at
issue here sweeps within it a substantial number of children who
will in fact, and who may well be entitled to, remain in the United
States. Given the extraordinary nature of the interest involved,
this makes the classification here fatally imprecise. And, as the
Court demonstrates, the Texas legislation is not otherwise
supported by any substantial interests.

															Because I believe that the Court's carefully worded analysis
recognizes the importance of the equal protection and preemption
interests I consider crucial, I join its opinion as well as its
judgment.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ] See, e.g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 1023, 1075-1083
(1979).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															I use the term "citizen" advisedly. The right to vote, of
course, is a political interest of concern to citizens. The right
to an education, in contrast, is a social benefit of relevance to a
substantial number of those affected by Texas' statutory scheme, as
is discussed below.

															[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The Court concludes that the provision at issue must be
invalidated "unless it furthers some substantial goal of the
State." Ante at 457 U. S. 224 .
Since the statute fails to survive this level of scrutiny, as the
Court demonstrates, there is no need to determine whether a more
probing level of review would be appropriate.

															JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

															I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to
emphasize the unique character of the cases before us. Page 457 U. S. 237 The classification in question severely disadvantages children
who are the victims of a combination of circumstances. Access from
Mexico into this country, across our 2,000-mile border, is readily
available and virtually uncontrollable. Illegal aliens are
attracted by our employment opportunities, and perhaps by other
benefits as well. This is a problem of serious national
proportions, as the Attorney General recently has recognized. See ante at 457 U. S.
218 -219, n. 17. Perhaps because of the intractability of
the problem, Congress -- vested by the Constitution with the
responsibility of protecting our borders and legislating with
respect to aliens -- has not provided effective leadership in
dealing with this problem. [ Footnote
3/1 ] It therefore is certain that illegal aliens will
continue Page 457 U. S. 238 to enter the United States and, as the record makes clear, an
unknown percentage of them will remain here. I agree with the Court
that their children should not be left on the streets
uneducated.

															Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does find
support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of
illegitimates. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U. S. 164 , 406 U. S. 175 (1972), we said: "[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the head of an
infant" for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and
"contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing."

															In these cases, the State of Texas effectively denies to the
school-age children of illegal aliens the opportunity to attend the
free public schools that the State makes available to all
residents. They are excluded only because of a status resulting
from the violation by parents or guardians of our immigration laws
and the fact that they remain in our country unlawfully. The
appellee children are innocent in this respect. They can "affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762 , 430 U. S. 770 (1977)

															Our review in a case such as these is properly heightened.
[ Footnote 3/2 ] See id. at 430 U. S. 767 . Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976). The classification at issue deprives a group of children of
the opportunity for education afforded all other children simply
because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation
of law by their parents. These children thus have been Page 457 U. S. 239 singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative
classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of
future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the
fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique
circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State's
interests be substantial and that the means bear a "fair and
substantial relation" to these interests. [ Footnote 3/3 ] See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.
S. 259 , 439 U. S. 265 (1978) ("classifications based on illegitimacy . . . are invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially
related to permissible state interests"); id. at 439 U. S. 271 ("[a]s the State's interests are substantial, we now consider the
means adopted").

															In my view, the State's denial of education to these children
bears no substantial relation to any substantial state interest.
Both of the District Courts found that an uncertain but significant
percentage of illegal alien children will remain in Texas as
residents, and many eventually will become citizens. The discussion
by the Court, ante at 457 U. S. of
the State's purported interests demonstrates that they are poorly
served by the educational exclusion. Indeed, the interests relied
upon by the State would seem to be insubstantial in view of the
consequences to the State itself of wholly uneducated persons
living indefinitely within its borders. By contrast, access to the
public schools is made available to the children of lawful
residents without regard to the temporary Page 457 U. S. 240 nature of their residency in the particular Texas school
district. [ Footnote 3/4 ] The Court
of Appeals and the District Courts that addressed these cases
concluded that the classification could not satisfy even the bare
requirements of rationality. One need not go so far to conclude
that the exclusion of appellees' class [ Footnote 3/5 ] of children from state-provided education
is a type of punitive discrimination based on status that is
impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.

															In reaching this conclusion, I am not unmindful of what must be
the exasperation of responsible citizens and government authorities
in Texas and other States similarly situated. Their responsibility,
if any, for the influx of aliens is slight compared to that imposed
by the Constitution on the Federal Government. [ Footnote 3/6 ] So long as the ease of entry remains
inviting, Page 457 U. S. 241 and the power to deport is exercised infrequently by the Federal
Government, the additional expense of admitting these children to
public schools might fairly be shared by the Federal and State
Governments. But it hardly can be argued rationally that anyone
benefits from the creation within our borders of a subclass of
illiterate persons, many of whom will remain in the State, adding
to the problems and costs of both State and National Governments
attendant upon unemployment, welfare, and crime. Page 457 U. S. 242 [ Footnote 3/1 ]

															Article I, 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution provides: "The Congress
shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization." The Federal Government has

															"broad constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be
admitted to the United States, the period they may remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms
and conditions of their naturalization." Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.
S. 410 , 334 U. S. 419 (1948). See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.
S. 365 , 403 U. S. 378 (1971) (regulation of aliens is "constitutionally entrusted to the
Federal Government"). The Court has traditionally shown great
deference to federal authority over immigration and to federal
classifications based upon alienage. See, e.g., Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U. S. 787 , 430 U. S. 792 (1977) ("it is important to underscore the limited scope of
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation"); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 , 342 U. S.
588 -589 (1952) ("It is pertinent to observe that any
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form
of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference"). Indeed, even equal protection
analysis in this area is based to a large extent on an underlying
theme of preemption and exclusive federal power over immigration. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, at 334 U. S. 420 (the Federal Government has admitted resident aliens to the country
"on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under
nondiscriminatory laws," and the States may not alter the terms of
this admission). Compare Graham v. Richardson, supra, and
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634 (1973), with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S.
67 (1976), and Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88 (1976). Given that the States' power to regulate in this area is so
limited, and that this is an area of such peculiarly strong federal
authority, the necessity of federal leadership seems evident.

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															I emphasize the Court's conclusion that strict scrutiny is not
appropriately applied to this classification. This exacting
standard of review has been reserved for instances in which a
"fundamental" constitutional right or a "suspect" classification is
present. Neither is present in these cases, as the Court holds.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															THE CHIEF JUSTICE argues in his dissenting opinion that this
heightened standard of review is inconsistent with the Court's
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
But in Rodriguez, no group of children was singled out by
the State and then penalized because of their parents' status.
Rather, funding for education varied across the State because of
the tradition of local control. Nor, in that case, was any group of
children totally deprived of all education, as in these cases. If
the resident children of illegal aliens were denied welfare
assistance, made available by government to all other children who
qualify, this also -- in my opinion -- would be an impermissible
penalizing of children because of their parents' status.

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															The State provides free public education to all lawful residents
whether they intend to reside permanently in the State or only
reside in the State temporarily. See ante at 457 U. S. 227 ,
n. 22. Of course, a school district may require that illegal alien
children, like any other children, actually reside in the school
district before admitting them to the schools. A requirement of de facto residency, uniformly applied, would not violate
any principle of equal protection.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															The classes certified in these cases included all undocumented
school-age children of Mexican origin residing in the school
district, see ante at 457 U. S. 206 ,
or the State. See In re Alien Children Education
Litigation, 501 F.
Supp. 544 , 553 (SD Tex.1980). Even so, it is clear that neither
class was thought to include mature Mexican minors who were solely
responsible for violating the immigration laws. In 458 F.
Supp. 569 (ED Tex.1978), the court characterized plaintiffs as
"entire families who have migrated illegally." Id. at 578.
Each of the plaintiff children in that case was represented by a
parent or guardian. Similarly, the court in In re Alien
Children Education Litigation found that "[u]ndocumented
children do not enter the United States unaccompanied by their
parents." 501 F. Supp. at 573. A different case would be presented
in the unlikely event that a minor, old enough to be responsible
for illegal entry and yet still of school age, entered this country
illegally on his own volition.

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															In addition, the States' ability to respond on their own to the
problems caused by this migration may be limited by the principles
of preemption that apply in this area. See, e.g., Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941). In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.
S. 351 (1976), the Court found that a state law making
it a criminal offense to employ illegal aliens was not preempted by
federal authority over aliens and immigration. The Court found
evidence that Congress intended state regulation in this area. Id. at 424 U. S. 361 ("there is evidence . . . that Congress intends that States may, to
the extent consistent with federal law, regulate the employment of
illegal aliens"). Moreover, under federal immigration law, only
immigrant aliens and nonimmigrant aliens with special permission
are entitled to work. See 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield,
Immigration Law and Procedure, 1.34a, 1.36, 2.6b (1981). Because
federal law clearly indicates that only certain specified aliens
may lawfully work in the country, and because these aliens have
documentation establishing this right, the State in De
Canas was able to identify with certainty which aliens had a
federal permission to work in this country. The State did not need
to concern itself with an alien's current or future deportability.
By contrast, there is no comparable federal guidance in the area of
education. No federal law invites state regulation; no federal
regulations identify those aliens who have a right to attend public
schools. In addition, the Texas educational exclusion requires the
State to make predictions as to whether individual aliens
eventually will be found to be deportable. But it is impossible for
a State to determine which aliens the Federal Government will
eventually deport, which the Federal Government will permit to
stay, and which the Federal Government will ultimately naturalize.
Until an undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal
Government, no State can be assured that the alien will not be
found to have a federal permission to reside in the country,
perhaps even as a citizen. Indeed, even the Immigration and
Naturalization Service cannot predict with certainty whether any
individual alien has a right to reside in the country until
deportation proceedings have run their course. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV).

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, JUSTICE
REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting.

															Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would
agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an enlightened
society to deprive any children -- including illegal aliens -- of
an elementary education. I fully agree that it would be folly --
and wrong -- to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up
of illiterate persons, many having a limited or no command of our
language. [ Footnote 4/1 ] However,
the Constitution does not constitute us as "Platonic Guardians,"
nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down laws
because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy,
"wisdom," or "common sense." See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.
S. 153 , 437 U. S.
194 -195 (1978). We trespass on the assigned function of
the political branches under our structure of limited and separated
powers when we assume a policymaking role as the Court does
today.

															The Court makes no attempt to disguise that it is acting to make
up for Congress' lack of "effective leadership" in dealing with the
serious national problems caused by the influx of uncountable
millions of illegal aliens across our borders. [ Footnote 4/2 ] Page 457 U. S. 243 See ante at 457 U. S.
237 -238 (POWELL, J., concurring). The failure of
enforcement of the immigration laws over more than a decade and the
inherent difficulty and expense of sealing our vast borders have
combined to create a grave socioeconomic dilemma. It is a dilemma
that has not yet even been fully assessed, let alone addressed.
However, it is not the function of the Judiciary to provide
"effective leadership" simply because the political branches of
government fail to do so.

															The Court's holding today manifests the justly criticized
judicial tendency to attempt speedy and wholesale formulation of
"remedies" for the failures -- or simply the laggard pace -- of the
political processes of our system of government. The Court employs,
and, in my view, abuses, the Fourteenth Amendment in an effort to
become an omnipotent and omniscient problem solver. That the
motives for doing so are noble and compassionate does not alter the
fact that the Court distorts our constitutional function to make
amends for the defaults of others. I In a sense, the Court's opinion rests on such a unique
confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for
little beyond the results in these particular cases. Yet the extent
to which the Court departs from principled constitutional
adjudication is nonetheless disturbing.

															I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who,
after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically
"within the jurisdiction" of a state. However, as the Court
concedes, this "only begins the inquiry." Ante at 457 U. S. 215 .
The Equal Protection Clause does not mandate identical treatment of
different categories of persons. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 , 406 U. S. 549 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 , 404 U. S. 75 (1971); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 , 310 U. S.
147 -148 (1940).

															The dispositive issue in these cases, simply put, is whether,
for purposes of allocating its finite resources, a state has a
legitimate reason to differentiate between persons Page 457 U. S. 244 who are lawfully within the state and those who are unlawfully
there. The distinction the State of Texas has drawn -- based not
only upon its own legitimate interests but on classifications
established by the Federal Government in its immigration laws and
policies -- is not unconstitutional. A The Court acknowledges that, except in those cases when state
classifications disadvantage a "suspect class" or impinge upon a
"fundamental right," the Equal Protection Clause permits a state
"substantial latitude" in distinguishing between different groups
of persons. Ante at 457 U. S.
216 -217. Moreover, the Court expressly -- and correctly
-- rejects any suggestion that illegal aliens are a suspect class, ante at 457 U. S. 219 ,
n.19, or that education is a fundamental right, ante at 457 U. S. 221 , 457 U. S. 223 .
Yet by patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed
quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the
Court spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these
cases.

															In the end, we are told little more than that the level of
scrutiny employed to strike down the Texas law applies only when
illegal alien children are deprived of a public education, see
ante at 457 U. S.
223 -224. [ Footnote 4/3 ]
If ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented
approach, this case is a prime example. (1) The Court first suggests that these illegal alien children,
although not a suspect class, are entitled to special solicitude
under the Equal Protection Clause because they lack "control" over
or "responsibility" for their unlawful entry into this country. Ante at 457 U. S. 220 , 457 U. S.
223 -224. Similarly, the Court appears to take the
position that § 21.031 is presumptively "irrational" because it has
the effect of imposing "penalties" Page 457 U. S. 245 on "innocent" children. Ibid. See also ante at 457 U. S.
238 -239 (POWELL, J., concurring). [ Footnote 4/4 ] However, the Equal Protection Clause does
not preclude legislators from classifying among persons on the
basis of factors and characteristics over which individuals may be
said to lack "control." Indeed, in some circumstances, persons
generally, and children in particular, may have little control over
or responsibility for such things as their ill health, need for
public assistance, or place of residence. Yet a state legislature
is not barred from considering, for example, relevant differences
between the mentally healthy and the mentally ill, or between the
residents of different counties [ Footnote 4/5 ] simply because these may be factors
unrelated to individual choice or to any "wrongdoing." The Equal
Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational
classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from
prejudice and hostility; it is not an all-encompassing "equalizer"
designed to eradicate every distinction for which persons are not
"responsible." Page 457 U. S. 246 The Court does not presume to suggest that appellees' purported
lack of culpability for their illegal status prevents them from
being deported or otherwise "penalized" under federal law. Yet
would deportation be any less a "penalty" than denial of privileges
provided to legal residents? [ Footnote
4/6 ] Illegality of presence in the United States does not --
and need not -- depend on some amorphous concept of "guilt" or
"innocence" concerning an alien's entry. Similarly, a state's use
of federal immigration status as a basis for legislative
classification is not necessarily rendered suspect for its failure
to take such factors into account.

															The Court's analogy to cases involving discrimination against
illegitimate children -- see ante at 457 U. S. 220 ; ante at 457 U. S.
238 -239 (POWELL, J., concurring) -- is grossly
misleading. The State has not thrust any disabilities upon
appellees due to their "status of birth." Cf. Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164 , 406 U. S. 176 (1972). Rather, appellees' status is predicated upon the
circumstances of their concededly illegal presence in this country,
and is a direct result of Congress' obviously valid exercise of its
"broad constitutional powers" in the field of immigration and
naturalization. U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4; see Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 , 334 U. S. 419 (1948). This Court has recognized that, in allocating governmental
benefits to a given class of aliens, one "may take into account the
character of the relationship between the alien and this country." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 , 426 U. S. 80 (1976). When that "relationship" is a federally prohibited one,
there can, of course, be no presumption that a state has a
constitutional duty to include illegal aliens among the recipients
of its governmental benefits. [ Footnote
4/7 ] Page 457 U. S. 247 (2) The second strand of the Court's analysis rests on the premise
that, although public education is not a constitutionally
guaranteed right, "neither is it merely some governmental benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation." Ante at 457 U. S. 221 .
Whatever meaning or relevance this opaque observation might have in
some other context [ Footnote 4/8 ]
it simply has no bearing on the issues at hand. Indeed, it is never
made clear what the Court's opinion means on this score. The importance of education is beyond dispute. Yet we have held
repeatedly that the importance of a governmental service does not
elevate it to the status of a "fundamental right" for purposes of
equal protection analysis. San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez , 411 U. S. 1 , 411 U. S. 301 (1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S.
56 , 405 U. S. 73 -74
(1972). In San Antonio Independent School Dist., supra, JUSTICE POWELL, speaking for the Court, expressly rejected the
proposition that state laws dealing with public education are
subject to special scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Moreover, the Court points to no meaningful way to distinguish
between education and other governmental benefits Page 457 U. S. 248 in this context. Is the Court suggesting that education is more
"fundamental" than food, shelter, or medical care?

															The Equal Protection Clause guarantees similar treatment of
similarly situated persons, but it does not mandate a
constitutional hierarchy of governmental services. JUSTICE POWELL,
speaking for the Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist.,
supra, at 411 U. S. 31 , put
it well in stating that, to the extent this Court raises or lowers
the degree of "judicial scrutiny" in equal protection cases
according to a transient Court majority's view of the societal
importance of the interest affected, we "assum[e] a legislative
role, and one for which the Court lacks both authority and
competence." Yet that is precisely what the Court does today. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.
S. 618 , 394 U. S.
655 -661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

															The central question in these cases, as in every equal
protection case not involving truly fundamental rights "explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution," San Antonio
Independent School Dist., supra, at 411 U. S. 33 -34,
is whether there is some legitimate basis for a legislative
distinction between different classes of persons. The fact that the
distinction is drawn in legislation affecting access to public
education -- as opposed to legislation allocating other important
governmental benefits, such as public assistance, health care, or
housing -- cannot make a difference in the level of scrutiny
applied. B Once it is conceded -- as the Court does -- that illegal aliens
are not a suspect class, and that education is not a fundamental
right, our inquiry should focus on and be limited to whether the
legislative classification at issue bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate state purpose. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 , 440 U. S. 97 (1979); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.
S. 471 , 397 U. S.
486 -487 (1970); see ante at 457 U. S. 216 .
[ Footnote 4/9 ] Page 457 U. S. 249 The State contends primarily that § 21.031 serves to prevent
undue depletion of its limited revenues available for education,
and to preserve the fiscal integrity of the State's
school-financing system against an ever-increasing flood of illegal
aliens -- aliens over whose entry or continued presence it has no
control. Of course such fiscal concerns alone could not justify
discrimination against a suspect class or an arbitrary and
irrational denial of benefits to a particular group of persons. Yet
I assume no Member of this Court would argue that prudent
conservation of finite state revenues is, per se , an
illegitimate goal. Indeed, the numerous classifications this Court
has sustained in social welfare legislation were invariably related
to the limited amount of revenues available to spend on any given
program or set of programs. See, e.g., Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. at 406 U. S.
549 -551; Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 397 U. S. 487 .
The significant question here is whether the requirement of tuition
from illegal aliens who attend the public schools -- as well as
from residents of other states, for example -- is a rational and
reasonable means of furthering the State's legitimate fiscal ends.
[ Footnote 4/10 ] Page 457 U. S. 250 Without laboring what will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it
simply is not "irrational" for a state to conclude that it does not
have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose
very presence in the state and this country is illegal as it does
to provide for persons lawfully present. By definition, illegal
aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state may
reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with
governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in
the state. [ Footnote 4/11 ] In De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 , 424 U. S. 357 (1976), we held that a State may protect its

															"fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the
deleterious effects on its economy resulting from the employment of
illegal aliens."

															And, only recently, this Court made clear that a State has a
legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its
schools and "the right of its own bona fide residents to
attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 , 412 U. S. 453 (1973) (emphasis added). See also Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647 , 435 U. S.
663 -668 (1978). The Court has failed to offer even a
plausible explanation why illegality of residence Page 457 U. S. 251 in this country is not a factor that may legitimately bear upon
the bona fides of state residence and entitlement to the benefits
of lawful residence. [ Footnote
4/12 ]

															It is significant that the Federal Government has seen fit to
exclude illegal aliens from numerous social welfare programs, such
as the food stamp program, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(f) (1976 ed. and Supp.
IV) and 7 CFR § 273.4 (1981), the old-age assistance, aid to
families with dependent children, aid to the blind, aid to the
permanently and totally disabled, and supplemental security income
programs, 45 CFR § 233.50 (1981), the Medicare hospital insurance
benefits program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-2 and 42 CFR § 405.205(b)
(1981), and the Medicaid hospital insurance benefits for the aged
and disabled program, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 o and 42 CFR §
405.103(a)(4) (1981). Although these exclusions do not conclusively
demonstrate the constitutionality of the State's use of the same
classification for comparable purposes, at the very least they tend
to support the rationality of excluding illegal alien residents of
a state from such programs so as to preserve the state's finite
revenues for the benefit of lawful residents. See Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. at 426 U. S. 80 ; see also 457
U.S. 202 fn4/7|>n. 7, supra. The Court maintains -- as if this were the issue -- that
"barring undocumented children from local schools would not
necessarily improve the quality of education provided in those Page 457 U. S. 252 schools." Ante at 457 U. S. 229 . See 458 F.
Supp. 569 , 577 (ED Tex.1978). [ Footnote 4/13 ] However, the legitimacy of barring
illegal aliens from programs such as Medicare or Medicaid does not
depend on a showing that the barrier would "improve the quality" of
medical care given to persons lawfully entitled to participate in
such programs. Modern education, like medical care, is enormously
expensive, and there can be no doubt that very large added costs
will fall on the State or its local school districts as a result of
the inclusion of illegal aliens in the tuition-free public schools.
The State may, in its discretion, use any savings resulting from
its tuition requirement to "improve the quality of education" in
the public school system, or to enhance the funds available for
other social programs, or to reduce the tax burden placed on its
residents; each of these ends is legitimate.'" The State need
not show, as the Court implies, that the incremental cost of
educating illegal aliens will send it into bankruptcy, or have a
"`grave impact on the quality of education,'" ante at 457 U. S. 229 ;
that is not dispositive under a "rational basis" scrutiny. In the
absence of a constitutional imperative to provide for the education
of illegal aliens, the State may "rationally" choose to take
advantage of whatever savings will accrue from limiting access to
the tuition-free public schools to its own lawful residents,
excluding even citizens of neighboring States. [ Footnote 4/14 ] Denying a free education to illegal alien children is not a
choice I would make were I a legislator. Apart from compassionate
considerations, the long-range costs of excluding any children from
the public schools may well outweigh the costs of educating them.
But that is not the issue; the fact Page 457 U. S. 253 that there are sound policy arguments against the Texas
Legislature's choice does not render that choice an
unconstitutional one. II The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill,
nor does it vest judges with a mandate to try to remedy every
social problem. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 74 . See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 , 377 U.S. 624 625 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, when this Court rushes in to
remedy what it perceives to be the failings of the political
processes, it deprives those processes of an opportunity to
function. When the political institutions are not forced to
exercise constitutionally allocated powers and responsibilities,
those powers, like muscles not used, tend to atrophy. Today' cases,
I regret to say, present yet another example of unwarranted
judicial action which, in the long run, tends to contribute to the
weakening of our political processes. [ Footnote 4/15 ]

															Congress, "vested by the Constitution with the responsibility of
protecting our borders and legislating with respect to aliens," ante at 457 U. S. 237 (POWELL, J., concurring), bears primary responsibility for
addressing the problems occasioned by the millions of illegal
aliens flooding across our southern border. Similarly, it is for
Congress, and not this Court, to Page 457 U. S. 254 assess the "social costs borne by our Nation when select groups
are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our
social order rests." Ante at 457 U. S. 221 ; see ante at 457 U. S.
223 -224. While the "specter of a permanent caste" of
illegal Mexican residents of the United States is indeed a
disturbing one, see ante at 457 U. S.
218 -219, it is but one segment of a larger problem,
which is for the political branches to solve. I find it difficult
to believe that Congress would long tolerate such a
self-destructive result -- that it would fail to deport these
illegal alien families or to provide for the education of their
children. Yet instead of allowing the political processes to run
their course -- albeit with some delay -- the Court seeks to do
Congress' job for it, compensating for congressional inaction. It
is not unreasonable to think that this encourages the political
branches to pass their problems to the Judiciary.

															The solution to this seemingly intractable problem is to defer
to the political processes, unpalatable as that may be to some.

															[ Footnote 4/1 ]

															It does not follow, however, that a state should bear the costs
of educating children whose illegal presence in this country
results from the default of the political branches of the Federal
Government. A state has no power to prevent unlawful immigration,
and no power to deport illegal aliens; those powers are reserved
exclusively to Congress and the Executive. If the Federal
Government, properly chargeable with deporting illegal aliens,
fails to do so, it should bear the burdens of their presence here.
Surely if illegal alien children can be identified for purposes of
this litigation, their parents can be identified for purposes of
prompt deportation.

															[ Footnote 4/2 ]

															The Department of Justice recently estimated the number of
illegal aliens within the United States at between 3 and 6 million.
Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1981)
(testimony of Attorney General Smith). Other estimates run as high
as 12 million. See Strout, Closing the Door on
Immigration, Christian Science Monitor, May 21, 1982, p. 22, col.
4.

															[ Footnote 4/3 ]

															The Court implies, for example, that the Fourteenth Amendment
would not require a state to provide welfare benefits to illegal
aliens.

															[ Footnote 4/4 ]

															Both the opinion of the Court and JUSTICE POWELL's concurrence
imply that appellees are being "penalized" because their parents
are illegal entrants. Ante at 457 U. S. 220 ; ante at 457 U. S.
238 -239, and 457 U. S. 239 ,
n. 3 (POWELL, J., concurring). However, Texas has classified
appellees on the basis of their own illegal status, not that of
their parents. Children born in this country to illegal alien
parents, including some of appellees' siblings, are not excluded
from the Texas schools. Nor does Texas discriminate against
appellees because of their Mexican origin or citizenship. Texas
provides a free public education to countless thousands of Mexican
immigrants who are lawfully in this country.

															[ Footnote 4/5 ]

															Appellees "lack control" over their illegal residence in this
country in the same sense as lawfully resident children lack
control over the school district in which their parents reside. Yet
in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973),
we declined to review under "heightened scrutiny" a claim that a
State discriminated against residents of less wealthy school
districts in its provision of educational benefits. There was no
suggestion in that case that a child's "lack of responsibility" for
his residence in a particular school district had any relevance to
the proper standard of review of his claims. The result was that
children lawfully here but residing in different counties received
different treatment.

															[ Footnote 4/6 ]

															Indeed, even children of illegal alien parents born in the
United States can be said to be "penalized" when their parents are
deported.

															[ Footnote 4/7 ]

															It is true that the Constitution imposes lesser constraints on
the Federal Government than on the states with regard to
discrimination against lawfully admitted aliens. E.g.,
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S.
88 (1976). This is because "Congress and the President
have broad power over immigration and naturalization which the
States do not possess," Hampton, supra, at 426 U. S. 95 ,
and because state discrimination against legally resident aliens
conflicts with and alters

															"the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission,
naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or the
several states." Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.
S. 410 , 334 U. S. 419 (1948). However, the same cannot be said when Congress has decreed
that certain aliens should not be admitted to the United States at
all.

															[ Footnote 4/8 ]

															In support of this conclusion, the Court's opinion strings
together quotations drawn from cases addressing such diverse
matters as the right of individuals under the Due Process Clause to
learn a foreign language, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.
S. 390 (1923); the First Amendment prohibition against
state-mandated religious exercises in the public schools, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.
S. 203 (1963); and state impingements upon the free
exercise of religion, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.
S. 205 (1972). However, not every isolated utterance of
this Court retains force when wrested from the context in which it
was made.

															[ Footnote 4/9 ]

															This "rational basis standard" was applied by the Court of
Appeals. 628 F.2d 448, 458-461 (1980).

															[ Footnote 4/10 ]

															The Texas law might also be justified as a means of deterring
unlawful immigration. While regulation of immigration is an
exclusively federal function, a state may take steps, consistent
with federal immigration policy, to protect its economy and ability
to provide governmental services from the "deleterious effects" of
a massive influx of illegal immigrants. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976); ante at 457 U. S. 228 ,
n. 23. The Court maintains that denying illegal aliens a free
public education is an "ineffectual" means of deterring unlawful
immigration, at least when compared to a prohibition against the
employment of illegal aliens. Ante at 457 U. S.
228 -229. Perhaps that is correct, but it is not
dispositive; the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate that a
state choose either the most effective and all-encompassing means
of addressing a problem or none at all. Dandridge v.
Wiliams, 397 U. S. 471 , 397 U. S.
486 -487(1970). Texas might rationally conclude that more
significant "demographic or economic problem[s]," ante at 457 U. S. 228 ,
are engendered by the illegal entry into the State of entire
families of aliens for indefinite periods than by the periodic
sojourns of single adults who intend to leave the State after
short-term or seasonal employment. It blinks reality to maintain
that the availability of governmental services such as education
plays no role in an alien family's decision to enter, or remain in,
this country; certainly, the availability of a free bilingual
public education might well influence an alien to bring his
children, rather than travel alone for better job
opportunities.

															[ Footnote 4/11 ]

															The Court suggests that the State's classification is improper
because "[a]n illegal entrant might be granted federal permission
to continue to reside in this country, or even to become a
citizen." Ante at 457 U. S. 226 . However, once an illegal alien is given
federal permission to remain, he is no longer subject to exclusion
from the tuition-free public schools under § 21.031. The Court
acknowledges that the Tyler Independent School District provides a
free public education to any alien who has obtained, or is in
the process of obtaining, documentation from the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See ante at 457 U. S. 206 ,
n. 2. Thus, Texas has not taken it upon itself to determine which
aliens are or are not entitled to United States residence. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN's assertion that the Texas statute will be applied to
aliens "who may well be entitled to . . . remain in the United
States," ante at 457 U. S. 236 (concurring opinion), is wholly without foundation.

															[ Footnote 4/12 ]

															The Court's opinion is disingenuous when it suggests that the
State has merely picked a "disfavored group" and arbitrarily
defined its members as nonresidents. Ante at 457 U. S. 227 ,
n. 22. Appellees' "disfavored status" stems from the very fact that
federal law explicitly prohibits them from being in this country.
Moreover, the analogies to Virginians or legally admitted Mexican
citizens entering Texas, ibid., are spurious. A
Virginian's right to migrate to Texas, without penalty, is
protected by the Constitution, see, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); and a lawfully admitted alien's right to enter the State is
likewise protected by federal law. See Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). Cf. Zobel v. Williams, ante, p. 457 U. S. 55 .

															[ Footnote 4/13 ]

															The District Court so concluded primarily because the State
would decrease its funding to local school districts in proportion
to the exclusion of illegal alien children. 458 F. Supp. at
577.

															[ Footnote 4/14 ]

															I assume no Member of the Court would challenge Texas' right to
charge tuition to students residing across the border in Louisiana
who seek to attend the nearest school in Texas.

															[ Footnote 4/15 ]

															Professor Bickel noted that judicial review can have a "tendency
over time seriously to weaken the democratic process." A. Bickel,
The Least Dangerous Branch 21 (1962). He reiterated James Bradley
Thayer's observation that

															"'the exercise of [the power of judicial review], even when
unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely, that
the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and
the people thus lose the political experience, and the moral
education and stimulus that comes from fighting the question out in
the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors. The tendency of
a common and easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too
common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to
deaden its sense of moral responsibility.'" Id. at 22 (quoting J. Thayer, John Marshall 106-107
(1901)).