OCTOBER TERM, 1996

															Syllabus

															BENNETT ET AL. v. SPEAR ET AL.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 95-813. Argued November 13, 1996-Decided March 19, 1997

															The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) requires the Secretary
of the Interior to specify animal species that are "threatened" or
"endangered" and designate their "critical habitat," 16 U. S. C. §
1533, and requires federal agencies to ensure that any action they
authorize, fund, or carry out is not likely to jeopardize a listed
species or adversely modify its critical habitat, § 1536(a)(2). If
an agency determines that a proposed action may adversely affect
such a species, it must formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service, which must provide it with a written statement (the
Biological Opinion) explaining how the proposed action will affect
the species or its habitat. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Service
concludes that such action will result in jeopardy or adverse
habitat modification, § 1536(a)(2), the Biological Opinion must
outline any "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service
believes will avoid that consequence, § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the
Biological Opinion concludes that no jeopardy or adverse habitat
modification will result, or if it offers reasonable and prudent
alternatives, the Service must issue a written statement (known as
the Incidental Take Statement) specifying the terms and conditions
under which an agency may take the species. § 1536(b)(4). After the
Bureau of Reclamation notified the Service that the operation of
the Klamath Irrigation Project might affect two endangered species
of fish, the Service issued a Biological Opinion, concluding that
the proposed long-term operation of the project was likely to
jeopardize the species and identifying as a reasonable and prudent
alternative the maintenance of minimum water levels on certain
reservoirs. The Bureau notified the Service that it would operate
the project in compliance with the Biological Opinion. Petitioners,
irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of
ranches in those districts, filed this action against respondents,
the Service's director and regional directors and the Secretary,
claiming that the jeopardy determination and imposition of minimum
water levels violated § 1536, and constituted an implicit critical
habitat determination for the species in violation of §
1533(b)(2)'s requirement that the designation's economic impact be
considered. They also claimed that the actions violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which prohibits agency actions
that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with 155 law. 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). The District Court dismissed the
complaint, concluding that petitioners lacked standing because they
asserted "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests" that
did not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by
the ESA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "zone of
interests" test—which requires that a plaintiff's grievance
arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated
by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in
the suit-limits the class of persons who may obtain judicial review
not only under the APA, but also under the ESA's citizen-suit
provision, 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g); and that only plaintiffs alleging
an interest in the preservation of endangered species fall
within the zone of interests protected by the ESA. Held: Petitioners have standing to seek judicial review
of the Biological Opinion. pp. 161-179.

															(a) The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners
lacked standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring their
claims under the ESA's citizen-suit provision. The test is a
prudential standing requirement of general application, see, e.
g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 , 751, that
applies unless expressly negated by Congress. By providing that
"any person may commence a civil suit," § 1540(g)(1) negates the
test. The quoted phrase is an authorization of remarkable breadth
when compared with the language Congress ordinarily uses. The
Court's readiness to take the term "any person" at face value is
greatly augmented by the interrelated considerations that the
legislation's overall subject matter is the environment and that §
1540(g)'s obvious purpose is to encourage enforcement by so-called
"private attorneys general." See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 , 210-211.
The "any person" formulation applies to all § 1540(g) causes of
action, including actions against the Secretary asserting
overenforcement of § 1533; there is no textual basis for saying
that the formulation's expansion of standing requirements applies
to environmentalists alone. Pp. 161-166.

															(b) Three alternative grounds advanced by the Government-(1)
that petitioners fail to meet Article III standing requirements;
(2) that § 1540(g) does not authorize judicial review of the types
of claims petitioners advanced; and (3) that judicial review is
unavailable under the APA-do not support affirmance. Petitioners'
complaint alleges an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the
Biological Opinion and redressable by a favorable judicial ruling
and, thus, meets Article III standing requirements at this stage of
the litigation. Their § 1533 claim is clearly reviewable under §
1540(g)(1)(C), which authorizes suit against the Secretary for an
alleged failure to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty 156 Syllabus

															under § 1533. Their § 1536 claims are obviously not reviewable
under subsection (C), however. Nor are they reviewable under
subsection (A), which authorizes injunctive actions against any
person "who is alleged to be in violation" of the ESA or its
regulations. Viewed in the context of the entire statute,
subsection (A)'s reference to any ESA "violation" cannot be
interpreted to include the Secretary's maladministration of the
Act. The § 1536 claims are nonetheless reviewable under the APA.
The ESA does not preclude such review, and the claim that
petitioners will suffer economic harm because of an erroneous
jeopardy determination is plainly within the zone of interests
protected by § 1536, the statutory provision whose violation forms
the basis for the complaint, see Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871 . In
addition, the Biological Opinion constitutes final agency action
for APA purposes. It marks the consummation of the agency's
decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 , 113. It is
also an action from which "legal consequences will flow," Port
of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400
U. S. 62 , 71, because the Biological Opinion and accompanying
Incidental Take Statement alter the legal regime to which the
Bureau is subject, authorizing it to take the endangered species if
(but only if) it complies with the prescribed conditions. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 , and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462 ,
distinguished. Pp. 166-179. 63 F.3d
915 , reversed and remanded.

															SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gregory K. Wilkinson argued the cause for
petitioners.

															With him on the briefs was William F. Schroeder. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for
respondents. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Malcolm L. Stewart,
Anne S. Almy, Robert L. Klarquist, and Evelyn S. Ying. * *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Roderick E. Walston, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Charles W Getz TV, Assistant
Attorney General, and Linus Masouredis, Deputy Attorney
General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Grant Woods of Arizona, Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A.
Norton of Colorado, Margery S. Bronster of 157 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This is a challenge to a biological opinion issued by the Fish
and Wildlife Service in accordance with the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et
seq., concerning the operation of the Klamath Irrigation
Project by the Bureau of Reclamation, and the project's impact on
two varieties of endangered fish. The question for decision is
whether the petitioners, who have competing economic and other
interests in Klamath Project water, have standing to seek judicial
review of the biological opinion under the citizen-suit provision
of the ESA, § 1540(g)(1), and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 80 Stat. 392, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 701 et
seq. I

															The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate
regulations listing those species of animals that are "threatened"
or "endangered" under specified criteria, and

															Hawaii, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Jeremiah W Nixon of
Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Jan Graham of Utah, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for
the State of Texas by Dan Morales, Attorney General, Jorge Vega, First Assistant Attorney General, and Javier
P. Guajardo and Sam Goodhope, Special Assistant
Attorneys General; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al.
by Timothy S. Bishop, Michael F. Rosenblum,
John J. Rademacher, Richard L. Krause, and Nancy N. McDonough; for the American Forest & Paper
Association et al. by Steven P. Quarles, Clifton S. Elgarten, Thomas R. Lundquist, and William R. Murray; for the American Homeowners Foundation et al. by Nancie G. Marzulla; for the Association of California Water Agencies
et al. by Thomas W Birmingham, Clifford W Schulz, Janet K.
Goldsmith, and William T. Chisum; for the National
Association of Home Builders of the United States et al. by Glen
Franklin Koontz, Thomas C. Jackson, and Nick
Cammarota; for the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition et al.
by Lawrence R. Liebesman and Kenneth S. Kamlet; for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by Robin
L. Rivett and M. Reed Hopper; and for the Washington
Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul
D. Kamenar, and Craig S. Harrison. 158 to designate their "critical habitat." 16 U. S. C. § 1533. The
ESA further requires each federal agency to "insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the
Secretary ... to be critical." § 1536(a)(2). If an agency
determines that action it proposes to take may adversely affect a
listed species, it must engage in formal consultation with the Fish
and Wildlife Service, as delegate of the Secretary, ibid.; 50 CFR § 402.14 (1995), after which the Service must provide the
agency with a written statement (the Biological Opinion) explaining
how the proposed action will affect the species or its habitat, 16
U. S. C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). If the Service concludes that the
proposed action will "jeopardize the continued existence of any
[listed] species or threatened species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of [critical habitat]," § 1536(a)(2), the
Biological Opinion must outline any "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" that the Service believes will avoid that
consequence, § 1536(b)(3)(A). Additionally, if the Biological
Opinion concludes that the agency action will not result in
jeopardy or adverse habitat modification, or if it offers
reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid that consequence, the
Service must provide the agency with a written statement (known as
the Incidental Take Statement) specifying the "impact of such
incidental taking on the species," any "reasonable and prudent
measures that the [Service] considers necessary or appropriate to
minimize such impact," and setting forth "the terms and conditions
... that must be complied with by the Federal agency ... to
implement [those measures]." § 1536(b)(4).

															The Klamath Project, one of the oldest federal reclamation
schemes, is a series of lakes, rivers, dams, and irrigation canals
in northern California and southern Oregon. The project was
undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior 159 pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, as
amended, 43 U. S. C. § 371 et seq., and the Act of Feb. 9,
1905, 33 Stat. 714, and is administered by the Bureau of
Reclamation, which is under the Secretary's jurisdiction. In 1992,
the Bureau notified the Service that operation of the project might
affect the Lost River Sucker (Deltistes luxatus) and
Shortnose Sucker (Chasmistes brevirostris), species of fish
that were listed as endangered in 1988, see 53 Fed. Reg.
27130-27133 (1988). After formal consultation with the Bureau in
accordance with 50 CFR § 402.14 (1995), the Service issued a
Biological Opinion which concluded that the" 'longterm operation of
the Klamath Project was likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of the Lost River and shortnose suckers.'" App. to Pet.
for Cert. 3. The Biological Opinion identified "reasonable and
prudent alternatives" the Service believed would avoid jeopardy,
which included the maintenance of minimum water levels on Clear
Lake and Gerber reservoirs. The Bureau later notified the Service
that it intended to operate the project in compliance with the
Biological Opinion.

															Petitioners, two Oregon irrigation districts that receive
Klamath Project water and the operators of two ranches within those
districts, filed the present action against the director and
regional director of the Service and the Secretary of the Interior.
N either the Bureau nor any of its officials is named as defendant.
The complaint asserts that the Bureau "has been following
essentially the same procedures for storing and releasing water
from Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs throughout the twentieth
century," id., at 36; that "[t]here is no scientifically or
commercially available evidence indicating that the populations of
endangered suckers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs have
declined, are declining, or will decline as a result" of the
Bureau's operation of the Klamath Project, id., at 37; that
"[t]here is no commercially or scientifically available evidence
indicating that the restrictions on lake levels imposed in the
Biological Opinion 160 will have any beneficial effect on the ... populations of
suckers in Clear Lake and Gerber reservoirs," id., at 39;
and that the Bureau nonetheless "will abide by the restrictions
imposed by the Biological Opinion," id., at 32.

															Petitioners' complaint included three claims for relief that are
relevant here. The first and second claims allege that the
Service's jeopardy determination with respect to Clear Lake and
Gerber reservoirs, and the ensuing imposition of minimum water
levels, violated § 7 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1536. The third
claim is that the imposition of minimum water elevations
constituted an implicit determination of critical habitat for the
suckers, which violated § 4 of the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1533(b)(2),
because it failed to take into consideration the designation's
economic impact.1 Each of the claims also states that the relevant
action violated the AP A's prohibition of agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law." 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A).

															The complaint asserts that petitioners' use of the reservoirs
and related waterways for "recreational, aesthetic and commercial
purposes, as well as for their primary sources of irrigation
water," will be "irreparably damaged" by the actions complained of,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 34, and that the restrictions on water
delivery "recommended" by the Biological Opinion "adversely affect
plaintiffs by substantially reducing the quantity of available
irrigation water," id., at 40. In essence, petitioners claim
a competing interest in the water the Biological Opinion declares
necessary for the preservation of the suckers.

															The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. It concluded that petitioners did not have

															1 Petitioners also raised a fourth claim: that the de
facto designation of critical habitat violated the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 853, as amended, 42 U.
S. C. § 4332(2)(C), because it was not preceded by
preparation of an environmental assessment. The Court of Appeals'
dismissal of that claim has not been challenged. 161 standing because their "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial
interests ... do not fall within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by ESA." Id., at 28. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d
915 (1995). It held that the "zone of interests" test limits
the class of persons who may obtain judicial review not only under
the AP A, but also under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA, 16
U. S. C. § 1540(g), and that "only plaintiffs who allege an
interest in the preservation of endangered species fall
within the zone of interests protected by the ESA," 63 F. 3d, at
919 (emphasis in original). We granted certiorari. 517 U. S. 1102
(1996).

															In this Court, petitioners raise two questions: first, whether
the prudential standing rule known as the "zone of interests" test
applies to claims brought under the citizensuit provision of the
ESA; and second, if so, whether petitioners have standing under
that test notwithstanding that the interests they seek to vindicate
are economic rather than environmental. In this Court, the
Government has made no effort to defend the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals. Instead, it advances three alternative grounds for
affirmance: (1) that petitioners fail to meet the standing
requirements imposed by Article III of the Constitution; (2) that
the ESA's citizen-suit provision does not authorize judicial review
of the types of claims advanced by petitioners; and (3) that
judicial review is unavailable under the AP A because the
Biological Opinion does not constitute final agency action.

															II

															We first turn to the question the Court of Appeals found
dispositive: whether petitioners lack standing by virtue of the
zone-of-interests test. Although petitioners contend that their
claims lie both under the ESA and the APA, we look first at the ESA
because it may permit petitioners to recover their litigation
costs, see 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(4), and because the AP A by its
terms independently authorizes re- 162 view only when "there is no other adequate remedy in a court," 5
U. S. C. § 704.

															The question of standing "involves both
constitutionallimitations on federal-court jurisdiction and
prudential limitations on its exercise." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.
S. 490 , 498 (1975) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953)). To satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of
Article III, which is the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of
standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he
has suffered "injury in fact," that the injury is "fairly
traceable" to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 , 560-561
(1992); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464 , 471-472
(1982). In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III,
"the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of prudential
principles that bear on the question of standing." Id., at
474-475. Like their constitutional counterparts, these "judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction," Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 , 751
(1984), are "founded in concern about the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society," Warth,
supra, at 498; but unlike their constitutional counterparts,
they can be modified or abrogated by Congress, see 422 U. S., at
501. Numbered among these prudential requirements is the doctrine
of particular concern in this case: that a plaintiff's grievance
must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee
invoked in the suit. See Allen, supra, at 751; Valley
Forge, supra, at 474-475.

															The "zone of interests" formulation was first employed in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397
U. S. 150 (1970). There, certain data processors sought to
invalidate a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency authorizing
national banks to sell data processing 163 services on the ground that it violated, inter alia, §4
of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, which
prohibited bank service corporations from engaging in "any activity
other than the performance of bank services for banks." The Court
of Appeals had held that the banks' data-processing competitors
were without standing to challenge the alleged violation of § 4. In
reversing, we stated the applicable prudential standing requirement
to be "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." Data Processing, supra, at 153. Data
Processing, and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U. S. 159 (1970), applied the zone-of-interests
test to suits under the APA, but later cases have applied it also
in suits not involving review of federal administrative action, see Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U. S. 439 , 449
(1991); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U. S. 318 ,
320-321, n. 3 (1977); see also Note, A Defense of the "Zone of
Interests" Standing Test, 1983 Duke L. J. 447, 455-456, and nn.
40-49 (1983) (cataloging lower court decisions), and have
specifically listed it among other prudential standing requirements
of general application, see, e. g., Allen, supra, at 751; Valley Forge, supra, at 474-475. We have made clear,
however, that the breadth of the zone of interests varies according
to the provisions of law at issue, so that what comes within the
zone of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial
review of administrative action under the" 'generous review
provisions' " of the AP A may not do so for other purposes, Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 , 400, n. 16
(1987) (quoting Data Processing, supra, at 156).

															Congress legislates against the background of our prudential
standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.
See Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S.
340, 345-348 (1984). Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,
Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 , 532-533,
and n. 28 164 (1983). The first question in the present case is whether the
ESA's citizen-suit provision, set forth in pertinent part in the
margin,2 negates the zone-of-interests test (or, perhaps more
accurately, expands the zone of interests). We think it does. The
first operative portion of the provision says that "any person may
commence a civil suit"-an authorization of remarkable breadth when
compared with the language Con-

															2 "(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection
any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf-

															"(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or
regulation issued under the authority thereof; or "(C) against the Secretary where there is alleged a
failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section
1533 of this title which is not discretionary with the
Secretary.

															"The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to
the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to
enforce any such provision or regulation, or to order the Secretary
to perform such act or duty, as the case may be ....

															"(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subparagraph (1)(A) of
this section-

															"(i) prior to sixty days after written notice of the violation
has been given to the Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any
such provision or regulation;

															"(ii) if the Secretary has commenced action to impose a penalty
pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; or

															"(iii) if the United States has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a criminal action ... . to redress a violation of any
such provision or

															regulation.

															"(3)(B) In any such suit under this subsection in which the
United States is not a party, the Attorney General, at the request
of the Secretary, may intervene on behalf of the United States as a
matter of right.

															"(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought
pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)
to any party, whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate." 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g). 165 gress ordinarily uses. Even in some other environmental
statutes, Congress has used more restrictive formulations, such as
"[any person] having an interest which is or may be adversely
affected," 33 U. S. C. § 1365(g) (Clean Water Act); see also 30 U.
S. C. § 1270(a) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act)
(same); "[a]ny person suffering legal wrong," 15 U. S. C. §
797(b)(5) (Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act); or
"any person having a valid legal interest which is or may be
adversely affected ... whenever such action constitutes a case or
controversy," 42 U. S. C. § 9124(a) (Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Act). And in contexts other than the environment,
Congress has often been even more restrictive. In statutes
concerning unfair trade practices and other commercial matters, for
example, it has authorized suit only by "[a]ny person injured in
his business or property," 7 U. S. C. § 2305(c); see also 15 U. S.
C. § 72 (same), or only by "competitors, customers, or subsequent
purchasers," § 298(b).

															Our readiness to take the term "any person" at face value is
greatly augmented by two interrelated considerations: that the
overall subject matter of this legislation is the environment (a
matter in which it is common to think all persons have an interest)
and that the obvious purpose of the particular provision in
question is to encourage enforcement by so-called "private
attorneys general" -evidenced by its elimination of the usual
amount-in-controversy and diversity-ofcitizenship requirements, its
provision for recovery of the costs of litigation (including even
expert witness fees), and its reservation to the Government of a
right of first refusal to pursue the action initially and a right
to intervene later. Given these factors, we think the conclusion of
expanded standing follows a fortiori from our decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205 (1972),
which held that standing was expanded to the full extent permitted
under Article III by § 810(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82
Stat. 85, 42 U. S. C. § 3610(a) (1986 ed.), that authorized 166 "[a]ny person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice" to sue for violations of the Act.
There also we relied on textual evidence of a statutory scheme to
rely on private litigation to ensure compliance with the Act. See
409 U. S., at 210-211. The statutory language here is even clearer,
and the subject of the legislation makes the intent to permit
enforcement by everyman even more plausible.

															It is true that the plaintiffs here are seeking to prevent
application of environmental restrictions rather than to implement
them. But the "any person" formulation applies to all the causes of
action authorized by § 1540(g)-not only to actions against private
violators of environmental restrictions, and not only to actions
against the Secretary asserting underenforcment under § 1533, but
also to actions against the Secretary asserting overenforcement
under § 1533. As we shall discuss below, the citizen-suit provision
does favor environmentalists in that it covers all private
violations of the ESA but not all failures of the Secretary to meet
his administrative responsibilities; but there is no textual basis
for saying that its expansion of standing requirements applies to
environmentalists alone. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in
concluding that petitioners lacked standing under the
zone-of-interests test to bring their claims under the ESA's
citizen-suit provision.

															III

															The Government advances several alternative grounds upon which
it contends we may affirm the dismissal of petitioners' suit.
Because the District Court and the Court of Appeals found the
zone-of-interests ground to be dispositive, these alternative
grounds were not reached below. A respondent is entitled, however,
to defend the judgment on any ground supported by the record, see Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491 , 500
(1985); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 516 U. S. 367 ,
379, n. 5 (1996). The asserted grounds were 167 raised below, and have been fully briefed and argued here; we
deem it an appropriate exercise of our discretion to consider them
now rather than leave them for disposition on remand.

															A

															The Government's first contention is that petitioners' complaint
fails to satisfy the standing requirements imposed by the "case" or
"controversy" provision of Article III. This "irreducible
constitutional minimum" of standing requires: (1) that the
plaintiff have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a
judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) that there be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of-the injury must be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the
result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 560-561.

															Petitioners allege, among other things, that they currently
receive irrigation water from Clear Lake, that the Bureau "will
abide by the restrictions imposed by the Biological Opinion," App.
to Pet. for Cert. 32, and that "[t]he restrictions on lake levels
imposed in the Biological Opinion adversely affect [petitioners] by
substantially reducing the quantity of available irrigation water," id., at 40. The Government contends, first, that these
allegations fail to satisfy the "injury in fact" element of Article
III standing because they demonstrate only a diminution in the aggregate amount of available water, and do not necessarily
establish (absent information concerning the Bureau's water
allocation practices) that petitioners will receive less
water. This contention overlooks, however, the proposition that
each element of Article III standing "must be supported in the same
way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden 168 of proof, i. e., with the manner and degree of evidence
required at the successive stages of the litigation." Defenders
of Wildlife, supra, at 561. Thus, while a plaintiff must "set
forth" by affidavit or other evidence "specific facts" to survive a
motion for summary judgment, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), and must
ultimately support any contested facts with evidence adduced at
trial, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of
injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a
motion to dismiss we 'presum[e] that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 561 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871 , 889
(1990)). Given petitioners' allegation that the amount of available
water will be reduced and that they will be adversely affected
thereby, it is easy to presume specific facts under which
petitioners will be injured-for example, the Bureau's distribution
of the reduction pro rata among its customers. The complaint
alleges the requisite injury in fact.

															The Government also contests compliance with the second and
third Article III standing requirements, contending that any injury
suffered by petitioners is neither "fairly traceable" to the
Service's Biological Opinion, nor "redressable" by a favorable
judicial ruling, because the "action agency" (the Bureau) retains
ultimate responsibility for determining whether and how a proposed
action shall go forward. See 50 CFR § 402.15(a) (1995) ("Following
the issuance of a biological opinion, the Federal agency shall
determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the action in
light of its section 7 obligations and the Service's biological
opinion"). "If petitioners have suffered injury," the Government
contends, "the proximate cause of their harm is an (as yet
unidentified) decision by the Bureau regarding the volume of water
allocated to petitioners, not the biological opinion itself." Brief
for Respondents 22. This wrongly equates injury "fairly traceable"
to the defendant with injury as to 169 which the defendant's actions are the very last step in the
chain of causation. While, as we have said, it does not suffice if
the injury complained of is" 'thee] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court,'" Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 560-561 (emphasis
added) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization, 426 U.
S. 26 , 41-42 (1976)), that does not exclude injury produced by
determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone
else.

															By the Government's own account, while the Service's Biological
Opinion theoretically serves an "advisory function," 51 Fed. Reg.
19928 (1986), in reality it has a powerful coercive effect on the
action agency: "The statutory scheme ... presupposes that the biological
opinion will playa central role in the action agency's
decisionmaking process, and that it will typically be based on an
administrative record that is fully adequate for the action
agency's decision insofar as ESA issues are concerned .... [A]
federal agency that chooses to deviate from the recommendations
contained in a biological opinion bears the burden of
'articulat[ing] in its administrative record its reasons for
disagreeing with the conclusions of a biological opinion.' 51 Fed.
Reg. 19,956 (1986). In the government's experience, action agencies
very rarely choose to engage in conduct that the Service has
concluded is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a
listed species." Brief for Respondents 20-21. What this concession omits to say, moreover, is that the action
agency must not only articulate its reasons for disagreement (which
ordinarily requires species and habitat investigations that are not
within the action agency's expertise), but that it runs a
substantial risk if its (inexpert) reasons turn out to be wrong. A
Biological Opinion of the sort rendered here alters the legal
regime to which the action agency is subject. When it "offers
reasonable and prudent alterna- 170 tives" to the proposed action, a Biological Opinion must include
a so-called "Incidental Take Statement"-a written statement
specifying, among other things, those "measures that the [Service]
considers necessary or appropriate to minimize [the action's impact
on the affected species]" and the "terms and conditions ... that
must be complied with by the Federal agency ... to implement [such]
measures." 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(4). Any taking that is in
compliance with these terms and conditions "shall not be considered
to be a prohibited taking of the species concerned." § 1536(0)(2). Thus, the Biological Opinion's Incidental Take
Statement constitutes a permit authorizing the action agency to
"take" the endangered or threatened species so long as it respects
the Service's "terms and conditions." The action agency is
technically free to disregard the Biological Opinion and proceed
with its proposed action, but it does so at its own peril (and that
of its employees), for "any person" who knowingly "takes" an
endangered or threatened species is subject to substantial civil
and criminal penalties, including imprisonment. See §§ 1540(a) and
(b) (authorizing civil fines of up to $25,000 per violation and
criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and imprisonment for one year);
see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for
Great Ore., 515
U. S. 687 , 708 (1995) (upholding interpretation of the term
"take" to include significant habitat degradation).

															The Service itself is, to put it mildly, keenly aware of the
virtually determinative effect of its biological opinions. The
Incidental Take Statement at issue in the present case begins by
instructing the reader that any taking of a listed species is
prohibited unless "such taking is in compliance with this
incidental take statement," and warning that "[t]he measures
described below are nondiscretionary, and must be taken by [the
Bureau]." App. 92-93. Given all of this, and given petitioners'
allegation that the Bureau had, until issuance of the Biological
Opinion, operated the Klamath Project in the same manner throughout
the 20th century, it is not 171 difficult to conclude that petitioners have met their
burdenwhich is relatively modest at this stage of the litigation-of
alleging that their injury is "fairly traceable" to the Service's
Biological Opinion and that it will "likely" be redressedi. e., the Bureau will not impose such water level
restrictions-if the Biological Opinion is set aside.

															B

															Next, the Government contends that the ESA's citizen-suit
provision does not authorize judicial review of petitioners'
claims. The relevant portions of that provision provide that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf- "(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to
be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation
issued under the authority thereof; or "(C) against the Secretary [of Commerce or the Interior] where
there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or
duty under section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary
with the Secretary." 16 U. S. C. § 1540(g)(1). The Government argues that judicial review is not available
under subsection (A) because the Secretary is not "in violation" of
the ESA, and under subsection (C) because the Secretary has not
failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty under § 1533.

															1

															Turning first to subsection (C): that it covers only violations
of § 1533 is clear and unambiguous. Petitioners' first and second
claims, which assert that the Secretary has violated § 1536, are
obviously not reviewable under this provision. However, as
described above, the third claim alleges 172 that the Biological Opinion implicitly determines critical
habitat without complying with the mandate of § 1533(b)(2) that the
Secretary "tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, and any
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as
critical habitat." This claim does come within subsection (C).

															The Government seeks to avoid this result by appealing to the
limitation in subsection (C) that the duty sought to be enforced
not be "discretionary with the Secretary." But the terms of §
1533(b)(2) are plainly those of obligation rather than discretion:
"The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make
revisions thereto, ... on the basis of the best scientific data
available and after taking into consideration the economic impact,
and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as
critical habitat." (Emphasis added.) It is true that this is
followed by the statement that, except where extinction of the
species is at issue, "[t]he Secretary may exclude any area
from critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such
exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part of
the critical habitat." Ibid. (emphasis added). However, the
fact that the Secretary's ultimate decision is reviewable only for
abuse of discretion does not alter the categorical requirement that, in arriving at his decision, he "tak[e]
into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant
impact," and use "the best scientific data available." Ibid. It is rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the
substance of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to
ignore the required procedures of decisionmaking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 , 94-95
(1943). Since it is the omission of these required procedures that
petitioners complain of, their § 1533 claim is reviewable under §
1540(g)(1)(C).

															2

															Having concluded that petitioners' § 1536 claims are not
reviewable under subsection (C), we are left with the ques- 173 tion whether they are reviewable under subsection (A), which
authorizes injunctive actions against any person "who is alleged to
be in violation" of the ESA or its implementing regulations. The
Government contends that the Secretary's conduct in implementing or
enforcing the ESA is not a "violation" of the ESA within the
meaning of this provision. In its view, § 1540(g)(1)(A) is a means
by which private parties may enforce the substantive provisions of
the ESA against regulated parties-both private entities and
Government agencies-but is not an alternative avenue for judicial
review of the Secretary's implementation of the statute. We
agree.

															The opposite contention is simply incompatible with the
existence of § 1540(g)(1)(C), which expressly authorizes suit
against the Secretary, but only to compel him to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under § 1533. That provision would be
superfluous-and, worse still, its careful limitation to § 1533
would be nullified-if § 1540(g)(1)(A) permitted suit against the
Secretary for any "violation" of the ESA. It is the
"'cardinal principle of statutory construction' ... [that] [i]t is
our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of
a statute' ... rather than to emasculate an entire section." United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528 , 538 (1955)
(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, 30 (1937), and Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
U. S. 147 , 152 (1883)). Application of that principle here
clearly requires us to conclude that the term "violation" does not
include the Secretary's failure to perform his duties as
administrator of the ESA.

															Moreover, the ESA uses the term "violation" elsewhere in
contexts in which it is most unlikely to refer to failure by the
Secretary or other federal officers and employees to perform their
duties in administering the ESA. Section 1540(a), for example,
authorizes the Secretary to impose substantial civil penalties on
"[a]ny person who knowingly violates ... any provision of [the
ESA]," and entrusts the Secretary with the power to "remi[t] or
mitigat[e]" any such penalty. We know 174 of no precedent for applying such a provision against those who
administer (as opposed to those who are regulated by) a substantive
law. Nor do we think it likely that the statute meant to subject
the Secretary and his officers and employees to criminal liability
under § 1540(b), which makes it a crime for "[a]ny person [to]
knowingly violat[e] any provision of [the ESA]," or that §
1540(e)(3), which authorizes law enforcement personnel to "make
arrests without a warrant for any violation of [the ESA]," was
intended to authorize warrantless arrest of the Secretary or his
delegates for "knowingly" failing to use the best scientific data
available.

															Finally, interpreting the term "violation" to include any errors
on the part of the Secretary in administering the ESA would effect
a wholesale abrogation of the AP A's "final agency action"
requirement. Any procedural default, even one that had not yet
resulted in a final disposition of the matter at issue, would form
the basis for a lawsuit. We are loathe to produce such an
extraordinary regime without the clearest of statutory direction,
which is hardly present here.

															Viewed in the context of the entire statute, § 1540(g) (l)(A)'s
reference to any "violation" of the ESA cannot be interpreted to
include the Secretary's maladministration of the ESA. Petitioners'
claims are not subject to judicial review under §
1540(g)(1)(A).

															IV

															The foregoing analysis establishes that the principal statute
invoked by petitioners, the ESA, does authorize review of their §
1533 claim, but does not support their claims based upon the
Secretary's alleged failure to comply with § 1536. To complete our
task, we must therefore inquire whether these § 1536 claims may
nonetheless be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act,
which authorizes a court to "set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," 5 U. S. C. §
706. 175 A

															No one contends (and it would not be maintainable) that the
causes of action against the Secretary set forth in the ESA's
citizen-suit provision are exclusive, supplanting those provided by
the AP A. The AP A, by its terms, provides a right to judicial
review of all "final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court," § 704, and applies universally "except
to the extent that-(l) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2)
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law," § 701(a).
Nothing in the ESA's citizen-suit provision expressly precludes
review under the AP A, nor do we detect anything in the statutory
scheme suggesting a purpose to do so. And any contention that the
relevant provision of 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2) is discretionary
would fly in the face of its text, which uses the imperative
"shall."

															In determining whether the petitioners have standing under the
zone-of-interests test to bring their AP A claims, we look not to
the terms of the ESA's citizen-suit provision, but to the
substantive provisions of the ESA, the alleged violations of which
serve as the gravamen of the complaint. See National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U. S., at 886. The classic formulation of the
zone-of-interests test is set forth in Data Processing, 397
U. S., at 153: "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." The Court of Appeals concluded that this test was not
met here, since petitioners are neither directly regulated by the
ESA nor seek to vindicate its overarching purpose of species
preservation. That conclusion was error.

															Whether a plaintiff's interest is "arguably ... protected ... by
the statute" within the meaning of the zone-ofinterests test is to
be determined not by reference to the overall purpose of the Act in
question (here, species preservation), but by reference to the
particular provision of law 176 upon which the plaintiff relies. It is difficult to understand
how the Ninth Circuit could have failed to see this from our cases.
In Data Processing itself, for example, we did not require
that the plaintiffs' suit vindicate the overall purpose of the Bank
Service Corporation Act of 1962, but found it sufficient that their
commercial interest was sought to be protected by the
anticompetition limitation contained in § 4 of the Act-the specific
provision which they alleged had been violated. See Data
Processing, supra, at 155-156. As we said with the utmost
clarity in National Wildlife Federation, "the plaintiff must
establish that the injury he complains of ... falls within the
'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory
provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his
complaint." 497 U. S., at 883 (emphasis added). See also Air
Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U. S. 517 , 523-524
(1991) (same).

															In the claims that we have found not to be covered by the ESA's
citizen-suit provision, petitioners allege a violation of § 7 of
the ESA, 16 U. S. C. § 1536, which requires, inter alia, that each agency "use the best scientific and commercial data
available," § 1536(a)(2). Petitioners contend that the available
scientific and commercial data show that the continued operation of
the Klamath Project will not have a detrimental impact on the
endangered suckers, that the imposition of minimum lake levels is
not necessary to protect the fish, and that by issuing a Biological
Opinion which makes unsubstantiated findings to the contrary the
defendants have acted arbitrarily and in violation of § 1536(a)(2).
The obvious purpose of the requirement that each agency "use the
best scientific and commercial data available" is to ensure that
the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis of speculation
or surmise. While this no doubt serves to advance the ESA's overall
goal of species preservation, we think it readily apparent that
another objective (if not indeed the primary one) is to avoid
needless economic dislocation 177 produced by agency officials zealously but unintelligently
pursuing their environmental objectives. That economic consequences
are an explicit concern of the ESA is evidenced by § 1536(h), which
provides exemption from § 1536(a)(2)'s no-jeopardy mandate where
there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action and the benefits of the agency action clearly outweigh the
benefits of any alternatives. We believe the "best scientific and
commercial data" provision is similarly intended, at least in part,
to prevent uneconomic (because erroneous) jeopardy determinations.
Petitioners' claim that they are victims of such a mistake is
plainly within the zone of interests that the provision
protects.

															B

															The Government contends that petitioners may not obtain judicial
review under the AP A on the theory that the Biological Opinion
does not constitute "final agency action," 5 U. S. C. § 704,
because it does not conclusively determine the manner in which
Klamath Project water will be allocated: "Whatever the practical likelihood that the [Bureau] would adopt
the reasonable and prudent alternatives (including the higher lake
levels) identified by the Service, the Bureau was not legally
obligated to do so. Even if the Bureau decided to adopt the higher
lake levels, moreover, nothing in the biological opinion would
constrain the [Bureau's] discretion as to how the available water
should be allocated among potential users." Brief for Respondents
33. This confuses the question whether the Secretary's action is
final with the separate question whether petitioners' harm is
"fairly traceable" to the Secretary's action (a question we have
already resolved against the Government, see Part III-A, supra). As a general matter, two conditions must be
satisfied for agency action to be "final": First, the action
must 178 mark the "consummation" of the agency's decisionmaking process, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103 , 113
(1948)-it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory
nature. And second, the action must be one by which "rights or
obligations have been determined," or from which "legal
consequences will flow," Port of Boston Marine Terminal
Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62 , 71 (1970).
It is uncontested that the first requirement is met here; and the
second is met because, as we have discussed above, the Biological
Opinion and accompanying Incidental Take Statement alter the legal
regime to which the action agency is subject, authorizing it to
take the endangered species if (but only if) it complies with the
prescribed conditions. In this crucial respect the present case is
different from the cases upon which the Government relies, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788 (1992), and Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462 (1994). In
the former case, the agency action in question was the Secretary of
Commerce's presentation to the President of a report tabulating the
results of the decennial census; our holding that this did not
constitute "final agency action" was premised on the observation
that the report carried "no direct consequences" and served "more
like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding
determination." 505 U. S., at 798. And in the latter case, the
agency action in question was submission to the President of base
closure recommendations by the Secretary of Defense and the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Commission; our holding that this was
not "final agency action" followed from the fact that the
recommendations were in no way binding on the President, who had
absolute discretion to accept or reject them. 511 U. S., at
469-471. Unlike the reports in Franklin and Dalton, which were purely advisory and in no way affected the legal rights
of the relevant actors, the Biological Opinion at issue here has
direct and appreciable legal consequences.

															*** 179 The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's
dismissal of petitioners' claims for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners' complaint alleges facts sufficient to meet the
requirements of Article III standing, and none of their ESA claims
is precluded by the zone-of-interests test. Petitioners' § 1533
claim is reviewable under the ESA's citizensuit provision, and
petitioners' remaining claims are reviewable under the AP A.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered.


Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

															Syllabus

															OHIO FORESTRY ASSOCIATION, INC. v. SIERRA CLUB ET AL.

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT No. 97-16. Argued February 25, 1998-Decided May 18, 1998 Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA),
the United States Forest Service developed a Land and Resource
Management Plan (Plan) for Ohio's Wayne National Forest. Although
the Plan makes logging in the forest more likely-it sets logging
goals, selects the areas suited to timber production, and
determines which probable methods of timber harvest are
appropriate-it does not itself authorize the cutting of any trees.
Before the Service can permit logging, the NFMA and applicable
regulations require it to: (a) propose a particular site and
specific harvesting method, (b) ensure that the project is
consistent with the Plan, (c) provide affected parties with notice
and an opportunity to be heard, (d) conduct an environmental
analysis of the project, and (e) make a final decision to permit
logging, which affected persons may challenge in administrative and
court appeals. Furthermore, the Service must revise the Plan as
appropriate. When the Plan was first proposed, the Sierra Club and
another environmental organization (collectively Sierra Club)
pursued various administrative remedies to bring about the Plan's
modification, and then brought this suit challenging the Plan's
lawfulness on the ground that it permits too much logging and too
much clearcutting. The District Court granted the Forest Service
summary judgment, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. The latter court
found the dispute justiciable because, inter alia, it was
"ripe for review" and held that the Plan violated the NFMA. Held: This dispute is not justiciable, because it is not
ripe for court review. Pp.732-739.

															(a) In deciding whether an agency decision is ripe, this Court
has examined the fitness of the particular issues for judicial
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 , 149. Such
an examination in this case reveals that the relevant factors,
taken together, foreclose court review. First, withholding review
will not cause the plaintiffs significant "hardship." Ibid. The challenged Plan provisions do not create adverse effects of a
strictly legal kind; for example, they do not establish a legal
right to cut trees or abolish any legal authority to object to
trees being cut. Cf. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299 ,
309-310. 727 Nor would delaying review cause the Sierra Club significant
practical harm. Given the procedural requirements the Service must
observe before it can permit logging, the Sierra Club need not
bring its challenge now, but may await a later time when harm is
more imminent and certain. Cf. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.
S., at 152-154. Nor has the Sierra Club pointed to any other way in
which the Plan could now force it to modify its behavior to avoid
future adverse consequences, as, for example, agency regulations
can sometimes force immediate compliance through fear of future
sanctions. Cf., e. g., id., at 152-153. Second, court review
now could interfere with the system that Congress specified for the
Forest Service to reach logging decisions. From that agency's
perspective, immediate review could hinder its efforts to refine
its policies through revision of the Plan or application of the
Plan in practice. Cf., e. g., id., at 149. Here, the
possibility that further consideration will actually occur before
the Plan is implemented is real, not theoretical. Third, the courts
would benefit from further factual development of the issues. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S.
59 ,82. Review now would require timeconsuming consideration of
the details of an elaborate, technically based Plan, which predicts
consequences that may affect many different parcels of land in a
variety of ways, and which effects themselves may change over time.
That review would have to take place without benefit of the focus
that particular logging proposals could provide. And, depending
upon the agency's future actions to revise the Plan or modify the
expected implementation methods, review now may turn out to have
been unnecessary. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of
Cal., 449 U. S.
232 , 242. Finally, Congress has not specifically provided for
preimplementation judicial review of such plans, unlike certain
agency rules, cf., e. g., Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871 , 891, and
forest plans are unlike environmental impact statements prepared
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 because
claims involving such statements can never get any riper. Pp.
732-737.

															(b) The Court cannot consider the Sierra Club's argument that
the Plan will hurt it immediately in many ways not yet mentioned.
That argument makes its first appearance in this Court in the
briefs on the merits and is, therefore, not fairly presented. Pp.
738-739. 105 F.3d
248 , vacated and remanded.

															BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the federal
respondents in support of petitioner, under this Court's Rule 728 12.6. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Waxman,
Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, and Deputy Solicitor General
Kneedler.

															Steven P. Quarles argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Clifton S. Elgarten, Thomas R. Lundquist, and
William R. Murray. Frederick M. Gittes argued the cause for respondents.

															With him on the brief were Patti A. Goldman, Todd D. True, and
Alex Levinson. *

															JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The Sierra Club challenges the lawfulness of a federal land and
resource management plan adopted by the United States Forest
Service for Ohio's Wayne National Forest on the ground that the
plan permits too much logging and too much clearcutting. We
conclude that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial
review.

															I

															The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) requires the
Secretary of Agriculture to "develop, maintain, and, as
appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for units of
the National Forest System." 90 Stat. 2949, as renumbered and
amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1604(a). The System itself is vast. It
includes 155 national forests, 20 national grasslands, 8 land
utilization projects, and other lands that together occupy nearly
300,000 square miles of land located in 44 States, Puerto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands. § 1609(a); 36 CFR § 200.1(c)(2) (1997); Office
of the

															*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for
the Alabama Forestry Association et al. by Charles Rothfeld; for Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics et al. by Michael Axline; for the Pacific Legal Foundation by Robin
L. Rivett; for the Southeastern Ohio Oil & Gas Association
by James S. Huggins and M. Dale Leeper; and
for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. William V. Luneburg filed a brief for the Institute for
Fisheries Resources et al. as amici curiae. 729 Federal Register, United States Government Manual 135
(1997/1998). The National Forest Service, which manages the System,
develops land and resource management plans pursuant to NFMA, and
uses these forest plans to "guide all natural resource management
activities," 36 CFR § 219.1(b) (1997), including use of the land
for "outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and
fish, and wilderness." 16 U. S. C. § 1604(e)(1). In developing the
plans, the Service must take both environmental and commercial
goals into account. See, e. g., § 1604(g); 36 CFR § 219.1(a)
(1997).

															This case focuses upon a plan that the Forest Service has
developed for the Wayne National Forest located in southern Ohio.
When the Service wrote the plan, the forest consisted of 178,000
federally owned acres (278 sq. mi.) in three forest units that are
interspersed among privately owned lands, some of which the Forest
Service plans to acquire over time. See Land and Resource
Management Plan, Wayne National Forest, United States Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service, Eastern Region (1987) 1-3,3-1, A-13 to
A-17 (hereinafter Plan). The Plan permits logging to take place on
126,000 (197 sq. mi.) of the federally owned acres. Id., at
4-7, 4-180. At the same time, it sets a ceiling on the total amount
of wood that can be cut-a ceiling that amounts to about 75 million
board feet over 10 years, and which, the Plan projects, would lead
to logging on about 8,000 acres (12.5 sq. mi.) during that decade. Id., at 4-180. According to the Plan, logging on about 5,000
(7.8 sq. mi.) of those 8,000 acres would involve clearcutting, or
other forms of what the Forest Service calls "even-aged" tree
harvesting. Id., at 3-5,4-180.

															Although the Plan sets logging goals, selects the areas of the
forest that are suited to timber production, 16 U. S. C. § 1604(k),
and determines which "probable methods of timber harvest" are
appropriate, § 1604(f)(2), it does not itself authorize the cutting
of any trees. Before the Forest Service can permit the logging, it
must: (a) propose a specific area in 730 which logging will take place and the harvesting methods to be
used, Plan 4-20 to 4-25; 53 Fed. Reg. 26835-26836 (1988); (b)
ensure that the project is consistent with the Plan, 16 U. S. C. §
1604(i); 36 CFR § 219.10(e) (1997); (c) provide those affected by
proposed logging notice and an opportunity to be heard, 106 Stat.
1419 (note following 16 U. S. C. § 1612); 36 CFR pt. 215, §
217.1(b) (1997); Plan 5-2; (d) conduct an environmental analysis
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
42 U. S. C. §4332 et seq.; Plan 4-14, to evaluate the
effects of the specific project and to contemplate alternatives, 40
CFR §§ 1502.14, 1508.9(b) (1997); Plan 1-2; and (e) subsequently
make a final decision to permit logging, which affected persons may
challenge in an administrative appeals process and in court, see
106 Stat. 1419-1420 (note folowing 16 U. S. C. § 1612); 5 U. S. C.
§ 701 et seq. See also 53 Fed. Reg. 26834-26835 (1988); 58
Fed. Reg. 19370-19371 (1993). Furthermore, the statute requires the
Forest Service to "revise" the Plan "as appropriate." 16 U. S. C. §
1604(a). Despite the considerable legal distance between the
adoption of the Plan and the moment when a tree is cut, the Plan's
promulgation nonetheless makes logging more likely in that it is a
logging precondition; in its absence logging could not take place.
See ibid. (requiring promulgation of forest plans); § 1604(i)
(requiring all later forest uses to conform to forest plans).

															When the Forest Service first proposed its Plan, the Sierra Club
and the Citizens Council on Conservation and Environmental Control
each objected. In an effort to bring about the Plan's modification,
they (collectively Sierra Club), pursued various administrative
remedies. See Administrative Decision of the Chief of the Forest
Service (Nov. 14, 1990), Pet. for Cert. 66a; Appeal Decision, Wayne
National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan (Jan. 14, 1992),
id., at 78a. The Sierra Club then brought this lawsuit in federal
court, initially against the Chief of the Forest Service, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Regional Forester, and the 731 Forest Supervisor. The Ohio Forestry Association, some of whose
members harvest timber from the Wayne National Forest or process
wood products obtained from the forest, later intervened as a
defendant.

															The Sierra Club's second amended complaint sets forth its legal
claims. That complaint initially states facts that describe the
Plan in detail and allege that erroneous analysis leads the Plan
wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting. Second Amended Complaint
"13-47 (hereinafter Complaint), App. 16-23. The Complaint then sets
forth three claims for relief.

															The first claim for relief says that the "defendants in
approving the plan for the Wayne [National Forest] and in directing
or permitting below-cost timber sales accomplished by means of
clearcutting" violated various laws including the NFMA, the NEPA,
and the Administrative Procedure Act. Complaint' 49, id., at
24.

															The second claim says that the "defendants' actions in directing
or permitting below-cost timber sales in the Wayne [National
Forest] under the plan violate [their] duties as public trustees."
Complaint' 52, ibid.

															The third claim says that, in selecting the amount of the forest
suitable for timber production, the defendants followed regulations
that failed properly to identify "economically unsuitable lands."
Complaint" 54-58, id., at 25-26. It adds that, because the Forest
Service's regulations thereby permitted the Service to place
"economically unsuitable lands" in the category of land where
logging could take place, the regulations violated their
authorizing statute, NFMA, 16 U. S. C. § 1600 et seq., and
were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not in
accordance with law," pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. Complaint' 60, App. 26.

															The Complaint finally requests as relief: (a) a declaration that
the Plan "is unlawful as are the below-cost timber sales and
timbering, including clearcutting, authorized by the 732 plan," (b) an "injunction prohibiting the defendants from
permitting or directing further timber harvest and/or below-cost
timber sales" pending Plan revision, (c) costs and attorney's fees,
and (d) "such other further relief as may be appropriate."
Complaint" (a)-(d), id., at 26-27.

															The District Court reviewed the Plan, decided that the Forest
Service had acted lawfully in making the various determinations
that the Sierra Club had challenged, and granted summary judgment
for the Forest Service. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845
F. Supp. 485, 503 (SD Ohio 1994). The Sierra Club appealed. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the dispute was
justiciable, finding both that the Sierra Club had standing to
bring suit, and that since the suit was "ripe for review," there
was no need to wait "until a site-specific action occurs." Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d
248 , 250 (1997). The Court of Appeals disagreed with the
District Court about the merits. It held that the Plan improperly
favored clearcutting and therefore violated NFMA. Id., at
251-252. We granted certiorari to determine whether the dispute
about the Plan presents a controversy that is justiciable now, and
if so, whether the Plan conforms to the statutory and regulatory
requirements for a forest plan.

															II

															Petitioner alleges that this suit is nonjusticiable both because
the Sierra Club lacks standing to bring this case and because the
issues before us-over the Plan's specifications for logging and
clearcutting-are not yet ripe for adjudication. We find that the
dispute is not justiciable, because it is not ripe for court
review. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens For Better Environment,
ante, at 100-101, n. 3.

															As this Court has previously pointed out, the ripeness
requirement is designed "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract 733 disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect
the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative
decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way
by the challenging parties." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U. S. 136 , 148-149 (1967). In deciding whether an agency's decision is, or is not, ripe for
judicial review, the Court has examined both the "fitness of the
issues for judicial decision" and the "hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." Id., at 149. To do so in
this case, we must consider: (1) whether delayed review would cause
hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would
inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and
(3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual
development of the issues presented. These considerations, taken
together, foreclose review in the present case.

															First, to "withhol[d] court consideration" at present will not
cause the parties significant "hardship" as this Court has come to
use that term. Ibid. For one thing, the provisions of the
Plan that the Sierra Club challenges do not create adverse effects
of a strictly legal kind, that is, effects of a sort that
traditionally would have qualified as harm. To paraphrase this
Court's language in United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299 , 309-310
(1927) (opinion of Brandeis, J.), they do not command anyone to do
anything or to refrain from doing anything; they do not grant,
withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority;
they do not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability; they
create no legal rights or obligations. Thus, for example, the Plan
does not give anyone a legal right to cut trees, nor does it
abolish anyone's legal authority to object to trees being cut.

															Nor have we found that the Plan now inflicts significant
practical harm upon the interests that the Sierra Club advances-an
important consideration in light of this Court's 734 modern ripeness cases. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories,
supra, at 152-154. As we have pointed out, before the Forest
Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site,
propose a specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental
review, permit the public an opportunity to be heard, and (if
challenged) justify the proposal in court. Supra, at
729-730. The Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to
bring its legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and
more certain. Any such later challenge might also include a
challenge to the lawfulness of the present Plan if (but only if)
the present Plan then matters, i. e., if the Plan plays a
causal role with respect to the future, then-imminent, harm from
logging. Hence we do not find a strong reason why the Sierra Club
must bring its challenge now in order to get relief. Cf. Abbott
Laboratories, supra, at 152.

															Nor has the Sierra Club pointed to any other way in which the
Plan could now force it to modify its behavior in order to avoid
future adverse consequences, as, for example, agency regulations
can sometimes force immediate compliance through fear of future
sanctions. Cf. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 152-153
(finding challenge ripe where plaintiffs must comply with Federal
Drug Administration labeling rule at once and incur substantial
economic costs or risk later serious criminal and civil penalties
for unlawful drug distribution); Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 , 417-419
(1942) (finding challenge ripe where plaintiffs must comply with
burdensome Federal Communications Commission rule at once or risk
later loss of license and consequent serious harm).

															The Sierra Club does say that it will be easier, and certainly
cheaper, to mount one legal challenge against the Plan now, than to
pursue many challenges to each site-specific logging decision to
which the Plan might eventually lead. It does not explain, however,
why one initial site-specific victory (if based on the Plan's
unlawfulness) could not, through 735 preclusion principles, effectively carry the day. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871 , 894
(1990). And, in any event, the Court has not considered this kind
of litigation cost saving sufficient by itself to justify review in
a case that would otherwise be unripe. The ripeness doctrine
reflects a judgment that the disadvantages of a premature review
that may prove too abstract or unnecessary ordinarily outweigh the
additional costs of-even repetitivepostimplementation litigation.
See, e. g., ibid. ("The caseby-case approach ... is
understandably frustrating to an organization such as respondent,
which has as its objective across-the-board protection of our
Nation's ... forests .... But this is the traditional, and remains
the normal, mode of operation of the courts"); FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232 , 244
(1980); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing
Co., 415 U. S.
1 , 24 (1974); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public
Servo Comm'n, 304
U. S. 209 , 222 (1938).

															Second, from the agency's perspective, immediate judicial review
directed at the lawfulness of logging and clearcutting could hinder
agency efforts to refine its policies: (a) through revision of the
Plan, e. g., in response to an appropriate proposed
site-specific action that is inconsistent with the Plan, see 53
Fed. Reg. 23807, 26836 (1988), or (b) through application of the
Plan in practice, e. g., in the form of site-specific
proposals, which are subject to review by a court applying purely
legal criteria. Cf. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 149;
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 , 201
(1983). Cf. Standard Oil Co., supra, at 242 (premature
review "denies the agency an opportunity to correct its own
mistakes and to apply its expertise"). And, here, the possibility
that further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is
implemented is not theoretical, but real. See, e. g., 60
Fed. Reg. 18886, 18901 (1995) (forest plans often not fully
implemented), id., at 18905-18907 (discussing process for amending
forest plans); 58 Fed. Reg. 19369, 19370-19371 736 (1993) (citing administrative appeals indicating that plans are
merely programmatic in nature and that plan cannot foresee all
effects on forest); Appeal Nos. 92-09-11-0008, 92-09-110009
(Lodging II) (successful Sierra Club administrative appeals against
Wayne timber harvesting site-specific projects). Hearing the Sierra
Club's challenge now could thus interfere with the system that
Congress specified for the agency to reach forest logging
decisions.

															Third, from the courts' perspective, review of the Sierra Club's
claims regarding logging and clearcutting now would require
time-consuming judicial consideration of the details of an
elaborate, technically based plan, which predicts consequences that
may affect many different parcels of land in a variety of ways, and
which effects themselves may change over time. That review would
have to take place without benefit of the focus that a particular
logging proposal could provide. Thus, for example, the court below
in evaluating the Sierra Club's claims had to focus upon whether
the Plan as a whole was "improperly skewed," rather than focus upon
whether the decision to allow clearcutting on a particular site was
improper, say, because the site was better suited to another use or
logging there would cumulatively result in too many trees being
cut. See 105 F. 3d, at 250-251. And, of course, depending upon the
agency's future actions to revise the Plan or modify the expected
methods of implementation, review now may turn out to have been
unnecessary. See Standard Oil Co., supra, at 242.

															This type of review threatens the kind of "abstract
disagreements over administrative policies," Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U. S., at 148, that the ripeness doctrine
seeks to avoid. In this case, for example, the Court of Appeals
panel disagreed about whether or not the Forest Service suffered
from a kind of general "bias" in favor of timber production and
clearcutting. Review where the consequences had been "reduced to
more manageable proportions," and where the 737 "factual components [were] fleshed out, by some concrete action"
might have led the panel majority either to demonstrate that bias
and its consequences through record citation (which it did not do)
or to abandon the claim. National Wildlife Federation,
supra, at 891. All this is to say that further factual
development would "significantly advance our ability to deal with
the legal issues presented" and would "aid us in their resolution." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S.
59 , 82 (1978).

															Finally, Congress has not provided for preimplementation
judicial review of forest plans. Those plans are tools for agency
planning and management. The Plan is consequently unlike agency
rules that Congress has specifically instructed the courts to
review "pre-enforcement." Cf. Na tional Wildlife Federation,
supra, at 891; 15 U. S. C. § 2618 (Toxic Substances Control Act)
(providing preenforcement review of agency action); 30 U. S. C. §
1276(a) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977)
(same); 42 U. S. C. § 6976 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976) (same); § 7607(b) (Clean Air Act) (same); 43 U. S. C. §
1349(c)(3) (Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578 , 592-593
(1980). Nor does the Plan, which through standards guides future
use of forests, resemble an environmental impact statement prepared
pursuant to NEPA. That is because in this respect NEPA, unlike the
NFMA, simply guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular
result. Compare 16 U. S. C. § 1604(e) (requiring that forest plans
provide for multiple coordinated use of forests, including
timber and wilderness) with 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (requiring that
agencies prepare environmental impact statements where major agency
action would significantly affect the environment). Hence a person
with standing who is injured by a failure to comply with the NEPA
procedure may complain of that failure at the time the failure
takes place, for the claim can never get riper. 738 III

															The Sierra Club makes one further important contrary argument.
It says that the Plan will hurt it in many ways that we have not
yet mentioned. Specifically, the Sierra Club says that the Plan
will permit "many intrusive activities, such as opening trails to
motorcycles or using heavy machinery," which "will go forward
without any additional consideration of their impact on wilderness
recreation." Brief for Respondents 34. At the same time, in areas
designated for logging, "affirmative measures to promote
undisturbed backcountry recreation, such as closing roads and
building additional hiking trails," will not take place. Ibid. These are harms, says the Sierra Club, that will not
take place at a distant future time. Rather, they will take place
now.

															This argument suffers from the legally fatal problem that it
makes its first appearance here in this Court in the briefs on the
merits. The Complaint, fairly read, does not include such claims.
Instead, it focuses on the amount and method of timber harvesting.
The Sierra Club has not referred us to any other court documents in
which it protests the Plan's approval of motorcycles or machinery,
the Plan's failure to close roads or to provide for the building of
trails, or other disruptions that the Plan might cause those who
use the forest for hiking. As far as we can tell, prior to the
argument on the merits here, the harm to which the Sierra Club
objected consisted of too much, and the wrong kind of, logging.

															The matter is significant because the Government concedes that
if the Sierra Club had previously raised these other kinds of harm,
the ripeness analysis in this case with respect to those provisions
of the Plan that produce the harm would be significantly different.
The Government's brief in the Court of Appeals said: "If, for example, a plan incorporated a final decision to close
a specific area to off-road vehicles, the plan itself 739 could result in imminent concrete injury to a party with an
interest in the use of off-road vehicles in that area." Brief for
Federal Appellees in No. 94-3407 (CA6), p. 20. And, at oral argument, the Solicitor General agreed that if the
Sierra Club's claim was that the "plan was allowing motorcycles
into a bird-watching area or something [like that], that would be
immediately justiciable." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. Thus, we believe
these other claims that the Sierra Club now raises are not fairly
presented here, and we cannot consider them.

															IV

															For these reasons, we find the respondents' suit not ripe for
review. We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we
remand this case with instructions to dismiss.

															It is so ordered.