U.S. Supreme Court Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456 (1981) Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co. No. 79-1171 Argued November 3,
1980 Decided January 21,
1981 449
U.S. 456 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
MINNESOTA Syllabus For the stated purposes of promoting resource conservation,
easing solid waste disposal problems, and conserving energy, the
Minnesota Legislature enacted a statute banning the retail sale of
milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but
permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable
containers, such as paperboard cartons. Respondents filed suit in
Minnesota District Court, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
statute on constitutional grounds. The District Court held that the
statute violated, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause. Finding that
"the evidence conclusively demonstrate[d] that the discrimination
against plastic nonrefillables [was] not rationally related to the
Act's objectives," the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed on the
equal protection ground without reaching the Commerce Clause
issue. Held: 1. The ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers bears a
rational relation to the State's objectives, and must be sustained
under the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 449 U. S.
461 -470.

															(a) The Equal Protection Clause does not deny Minnesota the
authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to cause
environmental problems merely because another already established
type is permitted to continue in use. Whether in fact the statute
will promote more environmentally desirable milk packaging is not
the question. The Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if the
Minnesota Legislature could rationally have decided that its ban on
plastic milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally
desirable alternatives. Pp. 449 U. S.
465 -466.

															(b) The fact that the state legislature, having concluded that
nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk containers pose environmental
hazards, decided to ban the most recent entry in the field, and
thus, in effect, "grandfathered" paperboard containers, at least
temporarily, does not make the ban on plastic containers arbitrary
or irrational. Cf. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.
S. 297 . Pp. 449 U. S.
466 -468.

															(c) Where the evidence as to whether the statute would help to
conserve energy was "at least debatable," the Minnesota Supreme
Court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the
legislature by finding, contrary to the legislature, that the
production of plastic nonrefillable Page 449 U. S. 457 containers required less energy than production of paper
containers. Pp. 449 U. S.
468 -69.

															(d) Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in finding,
contrary to the legislature's finding based on a reputable study,
that plastic milk jugs take up less space in landfills and present
fewer solid waste disposal problems than do paperboard containers.
Pp. 449 U. S.
469 -470.

															2. The statute does not violate the Commerce Clause as
constituting an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Pp. 449 U. S.
470 -474.

															(a) The statute does not discriminate between interstate and
intrastate commerce, but regulates evenhandedly by prohibiting all
milk retailers from selling their products in plastic containers,
without regard to whether the milk, the containers, or the sellers
are from outside the State. Pp. 449 U. S.
471 -472.

															(b) The incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce by the
statute is not excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. Milk products may continue to move freely across the
Minnesota border, and since most dairies package their products in
more than one type of container, the inconvenience of having to
conform to different packaging requirements in Minnesota and the
surrounding States should be slight. Even granting that the
out-of-state plastics industry is burdened relatively more heavily
than the Minnesota pulpwood industry, this burden is not "clearly
excessive" in light of the substantial state interest in promoting
conservation of energy and other natural resources and easing solid
waste disposal problems. These local benefits amply support
Minnesota's decision under the Commerce Clause. Pp. 449 U. S.
472 -474. 289 N.W.2d
79 , reversed.

															BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, post, p. 449 U. S. 474 .
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 449 U. S. 477 .
REHNQUIST, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. Page 449 U. S. 458 JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court:

															In 1977, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a statute banning the
retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable
containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk cartons. 1977
Minn. Laws, ch. 268, Minn.Stat. § 116 F. 21 (1978). Respondents
[ Footnote 1 ] contend that the
statute violates the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses of the
Constitution. I The purpose of the Minnesota statute is set out as § 1:

															"The legislature finds that the use of nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers for the packaging of milk and other milk
products presents a solid waste management problem for the state,
promotes energy waste, and depletes natural resources. The
legislature therefore, in Page 449 U. S. 459 furtherance of the policies stated in Minnesota Statutes,
Section 116 F. 01, [ Footnote 2 ]
determines that the use of nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers
for packaging milk and other milk products should be discouraged,
and that the use of returnable and reusable packaging for these
products is preferred, and should be encouraged."

															1977 Minn.Laws, ch. 268, § 1, codified as Minn.Stat. § 116 F. 21
(1978). Section 2 of the Act forbids the retail sale of milk and
fluid milk products, other than sour cream, cottage cheese, and
yogurt, in nonreturnable, nonrefillable rigid or semirigid
containers composed at least 50% of plastic. [ Footnote 3 ]

															The Act was introduced with the support of the state Pollution
Control Agency, Department of Natural Resources, Department of
Agriculture, Consumer Services Division, and Energy Agency,
[ Footnote 4 ] and debated
vigorously in both houses of the state legislature. Proponents of
the legislation argued that it would promote resource conservation,
ease solid waste disposal problems, and conserve energy. Relying on
the results of studies and other information, [ Footnote 5 ] they stressed the need to Page 449 U. S. 460 stop introduction of the plastic nonreturnable container before
it became entrenched in the market. Opponents of the Act, also
presenting empirical evidence, argued that the Act would not
promote the goals asserted by the proponents, but would merely
increase costs of retail milk products and prolong the use of
ecologically undesirable paperboard milk cartons.

															After the Act was passed, respondents filed suit in Minnesota
District Court, seeking to enjoin its enforcement. The court
conducted extensive evidentiary hearings into the Act's probable
consequences, and found the evidence "in sharp conflict." App.
A-25. Nevertheless, finding itself "as factfinder . . . obliged to
weigh and evaluate this evidence," ibid., the court
resolved the evidentiary conflicts in favor of respondents, and
concluded that the Act "will not succeed in effecting the
Legislature's published policy goals. . . ." Id. at A-21.
The court further found that, contrary to the statement of purpose
in § 1, the "actual basis" for the Act

															"was to promote the economic interests of certain segments of
the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of the
economic interests of other segments of the dairy industry and the
plastics industry." Id. at A-19. The court therefore declared the Act
"null, void, and unenforceable" and enjoined its enforcement,
basing the judgment on substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1 § 7, of the
Minnesota Constitution; equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment; and prohibition of unreasonable burdens on interstate
commerce under Art. I, § 8, of the United States Constitution. App.
A-23.

															The State appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, which
affirmed the District Court on the federal equal protection and due
process grounds, without reaching the Commerce Clause or state law
issues. 289 N.W.2d
79 (1979). Unlike the District Court, the State Supreme Court
found that the purpose of the Act was

															"to promote the state interests Page 449 U. S. 461 of encouraging the reuse and recycling of materials and reducing
the amount and type of material entering the solid waste
stream,"

															and acknowledged the legitimacy of this purpose. Id. at
82. Nevertheless, relying on the District Court's findings of fact,
the full record, and an independent review of documentary sources,
the State Supreme Court held that "the evidence conclusively
demonstrates that the discrimination against plastic nonrefillables
is not rationally related to the Act's objectives." Ibid. We granted certiorari, 445 U.S. 949, and now reverse. II The parties agree that the standard of review applicable to this
case under the Equal Protection Clause is the familiar "rational
basis" test. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S.
93 , 440 U. S. 97 (1979); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.
S. 297 , 427 U. S. 303 (1976). [ Footnote 6 ] Moreover,
they agree that the purposes of the Act Page 449 U. S. 462 cited by the legislature -- promoting resource conservation,
easing solid waste disposal problems, and conserving energy -- are
legitimate state purposes. Thus, the controversy in this Page 449 U. S. 463 case centers on the narrow issue whether the legislative
classification between plastic and nonplastic nonreturnable milk
containers is rationally related to achievement of the statutory
purposes. [ Footnote 7 ] A Respondents apparently have not challenged the theoretical
connection between a ban on plastic nonreturnables and the purposes
articulated by the legislature; instead, they have argued that
there is no empirical connection between the two. They
produced impressive supporting evidence at trial to prove that the
probable consequences of the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk
containers will be to deplete natural resources, exacerbate solid
waste disposal problems, and waste energy, because consumers unable
to purchase milk in plastic Page 449 U. S. 464 containers will turn to paperboard milk cartons, allegedly a
more environmentally harmful product.

															But States are not required to convince the courts of the
correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather,

															"those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the
court that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by
the governmental decisionmaker."

															" Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. at 111. See also
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S.
421 , 342 U. S. 425 (1952); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U. S.
258 , 300 U. S. 264 -265
(1937)."

															Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal
Protection Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim
that it is irrational, United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U. S. 144 , 304 U. S.
153 -154 (1938), [ Footnote 8 ] they cannot prevail so long as

															"it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the
legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that
the question is at least debatable." Id. at 304 U. S. 154 .
Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting the classification, litigants may not procure
invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in
court that the legislature was mistaken.

															The District Court candidly admitted that the evidence was "in
sharp conflict," App. A-25, but resolved the conflict in favor of
respondents and struck down the statute. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota, however, did not reverse on the basis of this patent
violation of the principles governing rationality analysis under
the Equal Protection Clause. Rather, the court analyzed the statute
afresh under the Equal Protection Clause, and reached the
conclusion that the statute is Page 449 U. S. 465 constitutionally invalid. The State contends that, in this
analysis, the court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that
of the legislature. We turn now to that argument. B The State identifies four reasons why the classification between
plastic and nonplastic nonreturnables is rationally related to the
articulated statutory purposes. If any one of the four
substantiates the State's claim, we must reverse the Minnesota
Supreme Court and sustain the Act.

															First, the State argues that elimination of the popular plastic
milk jug will encourage the use of environmentally superior
containers. There is no serious doubt that the plastic containers
consume energy resources and require solid waste disposal, nor that
refillable bottles and plastic pouches are environmentally
superior. Citing evidence that the plastic jug is the most popular,
and the gallon paperboard carton the most cumbersome and least well
regarded package in the industry, the State argues that the ban on
plastic nonreturnables will buy time during which environmentally
preferable alternatives may be further developed and promoted.

															As Senator Spear argued during the Senate debate:

															"[T]his bill is designed to prevent the beginning of another
system of non-returnables that is going to be very, very difficult
[to stop] once it begins. It is true that our alternative now is
not a returnable system in terms of milk bottles. Hopefully we are
eventually going to be able to move to that kind of a system, but
we are never going to move to a returnable system so long as we
allow another nonreturnable system with all the investment and all
of the vested interest that that is going to involve to begin."

															Transcript of the Full Senate Floor Discussion of H.F. 45, p. 6
(May 20, 1977), reprinted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit J. Accord,
id. at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Luther). Page 449 U. S. 466 The Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed this asserted state
interest as "speculative and illusory." 289 N.W.2d at 86. The court
expressed doubt that the Minnesota Legislature or Pollution Control
Agency would take any further steps to promote environmentally
sound milk packaging, and stated that there is no evidence that
paperboard cartons will cease to be used in Minnesota. Ibid. We find the State's approach fully supportable under our
precedents. This Court has made clear that a legislature need not
"strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way," Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608 , 294 U. S. 610 (1935), and that a legislature

															"may implement [its] program step by step, . . . adopting
regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and
deferring complete elimination of the evil to future
regulations."

															" New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S.
303 . See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S.
641 , 384 U. S. 657 (1966); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S.
483 , 348 U. S. 489 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S.
106 , 336 U. S. 110 (1949). The
Equal Protection Clause does not deny the State of Minnesota the
authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to cause
environmental problems, merely because another type, already
established in the market, is permitted to continue in use. Whether
in fact the Act will promote more environmentally desirable milk
packaging is not the question: the Equal Protection Clause is
satisfied by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could rationally have decided that its ban on plastic
nonreturnable milk jugs might foster greater use of environmentally
desirable alternatives."

															Second, the State argues that its ban on plastic nonreturnable
milk containers will reduce the economic dislocation foreseen from
the movement toward greater use of environmentally superior
containers. The State notes that plastic nonreturnables have only
recently been introduced on a wide scale in Minnesota, and that, at
the time the legislature was Page 449 U. S. 467 considering the Act, many Minnesota dairies were preparing to
invest large amounts of capital in plastic container production. As
Representative Munger, chief sponsor of the bill in the House of
Representatives, explained:

															"Minnesota's dairy market is on the verge of making a major
change over from essentially a paperboard container system to a
system of primarily single use, throwaway plastic bottles. The
major dairies in our state have ordered the blow-mold equipment to
manufacture in plant the nonreturnable plastic milk bottle. Members
of the House, I feel now is an ideal time for this legislation when
only one dairy in our state is firmly established in manufacturing
and marketing the throwaway plastic milk bottle."

															Transcript of the Debate of the Minnesota House of
Representatives on H.F. 45, p. 2 (Mar. 10, 1977), reprinted as
Plaintiffs' Exhibit J. See also Transcript of the Full
Senate Floor Discussion on H.F. 45, p. 6 (May 20, 1977), reprinted
as Plaintiffs' Exhibit J (statement of Sen. Milton); id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Schaaf); id. at 10-11 (statement
of Sen. Perpich).

															Moreover, the State explains, to ban both the plastic and the
paperboard nonreturnable milk container at once would cause an
enormous disruption in the milk industry, because few dairies are
now able to package their products in refillable bottles or plastic
pouches. Thus, by banning the plastic container while continuing to
permit the paperboard container, the State was able to prevent the
industry from becoming reliant on the new container, while avoiding
severe economic dislocation.

															The Minnesota Supreme Court did not directly address this
justification, but we find it supported by our precedents as well.
In New Orleans v. Dukes, supra, we upheld a city
regulation banning pushcart food vendors, but exempting from the
ban two vendors who had operated in the city for over eight years.
Noting that the "city could reasonably decide Page 449 U. S. 468 that newer businesses were less likely to have built up
substantial reliance interests in continued operation," we held
that the city "could rationally choose initially to eliminate
vendors of more recent vintage." Id. at 427 U. S. 305 . Accord, United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins.
Corp., 400 U. S. 4 , 400 U. S. 6 (1970). This case is not significantly different. The state
legislature concluded that nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk
containers pose environmental hazards, and decided to ban the most
recent entry into the field. The fact that the legislature in
effect "grandfathered" paperboard containers, at least temporarily,
does not make the Act's ban on plastic nonreturnables arbitrary or
irrational.

															Third, the State argues that the Act will help to conserve
energy. It points out that plastic milk jugs are made from plastic
resin, an oil and natural gas derivative, whereas paperboard milk
cartons are primarily composed of pulpwood, which is a renewable
resource. This point was stressed by the Act's proponents in the
legislature. Senator Luther commented:

															"We have been through an energy crisis in Minnesota. We know
what it is like to go without and what we are looking at here is a
total blatant waste of petroleum and natural gas. . . ."

															Transcript of the Full Senate Floor Discussion on H. F. 45, p.
12 (May 20, 1977), reprinted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit J.
Representative Munger said in a similar vein:

															"A sweep to the plastic throwaway bottle in the gallon size
container alone would use enough additional natural gas and
petroleum to heat 3,100 homes each year in Minnesota when compared
to a refillable system and 1,400 compared to the present paperboard
system. Plastic containers are made from a non-renewable resource,
while the paperboard is made from Minnesota's forest products."

															Transcript of the Debate of the Minnesota House of
Representatives on H.F. 45, p. 2 (Mar. 10, 1977), reprinted as
Plaintiffs' Exhibit J. Page 449 U. S. 469 The Minnesota Supreme Court held, in effect, that the
legislature misunderstood the facts. The court admitted that the
results of a reliable study [ Footnote 9 ] support the legislature's conclusion that less
energy is consumed in the production of paperboard containers than
in the production of plastic nonreturnables, but, after crediting
the contrary testimony of respondents' expert witness and altering
certain factual assumptions, [ Footnote 10 ] the court concluded that "production of
plastic nonrefillables requires less energy than production of
paper containers." 289 N.W.2d at 85.

															The Minnesota Supreme Court may be correct that the Act is not a
sensible means of conserving energy. But we reiterate that "it is
up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility
of legislation." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.
S. 726 , 372 U. S. 729 (1963). Since, in view of the evidence before the legislature, the
question clearly is "at least debatable," United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 304 U. S. 154 ,
the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in substituting its judgment for
that of the legislature.

															Fourth, the State argues that the Act will ease the State's
solid waste disposal problem. Most solid consumer wastes in
Minnesota are disposed of in landfills. A reputable study before
the Minnesota Legislature indicated that plastic milk jugs occupy a
greater volume in landfills than other nonreturnable milk
containers. [ Footnote 11 ]
This was one of the legislature's major concerns. For example, in
introducing the bill to the House of Representatives,
Representative Munger asked rhetorically: Page 449 U. S. 470 "Why do we need this legislation?" Part of his answer to the
query as that "the plastic non-refillable containers will increase
the problems of solid waste in our state." Transcript of the Debate
of the Minnesota House of Representatives on H.F. 45, p. 1 (Mar.
10, 1977), reprinted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit J.

															The Minnesota Supreme Court found that plastic milk jugs in fact
take up less space in landfills and present fewer solid waste
disposal problems than do paperboard containers. 289 N.W.2d at
82-85. But its ruling on this point must be rejected for the same
reason we rejected its ruling concerning energy conservation: it is
not the function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of
legislative facts for that of the legislature.

															We therefore conclude that the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk
containers bears a rational relation to the State's objectives, and
must be sustained under the Equal Protection Clause. [ Footnote 12 ] III The District Court also held that the Minnesota statute is
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause [ Footnote 13 ] because it imposes an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. [ Footnote 14 ] We cannot agree. Page 449 U. S. 471 When legislating in areas of legitimate local concern, such as
environmental protection and resource conservation, States are
nonetheless limited by the Commerce Clause. See Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27 , 447 U. S. 36 (1980); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U. S. 333 , 432 U. S. 350 (1977); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761 , 325 U. S. 767 (1945). If a state law purporting to promote environmental purposes
is in reality "simple economic protectionism," we have applied a
"virtually per se rule of invalidity." Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 , 437 U. S. 624 (1978). [ Footnote 15 ] Even
if a statute regulates "evenhandedly," and imposes only
"incidental" burdens on interstate commerce, the courts must
nevertheless strike it down if "the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.
S. 137 , 397 U. S. 142 (1970). Moreover,

															"the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities." Ibid. Minnesota's statute does not effect "simple protectionism," but
"regulates evenhandedly" by prohibiting all milk retailers from
selling their products in plastic, nonreturnable milk containers,
without regard to whether the milk, the containers, Page 449 U. S. 472 or the sellers are from outside the State. This statute is
therefore unlike statutes discriminating against interstate
commerce, which we have consistently struck down. E.g., Lewis
v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., supra, (Florida statutory
scheme prohibiting investment advisory services by bank holding
companies with principal offices out of the State); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting the export of natural minnows
from the State); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, (New
Jersey statute prohibiting importation of solid and liquid wastes
into the State); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n,
supra (North Carolina statute imposing additional costs on
Washington, but not on North Carolina, apple shippers) .

															Since the statute does not discriminate between interstate and
intrastate commerce, the controlling question is whether the
incidental burden imposed on interstate commerce by the Minnesota
Act is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra at 397 U. S. 142 .
We conclude that it is not.

															The burden imposed on interstate commerce by the statute is
relatively minor. Milk products may continue to move freely across
the Minnesota border, and since most dairies package their products
in more than one type of containers, [ Footnote 16 ] the inconvenience of having to conform to
different packaging requirements in Minnesota and the surrounding
States should be slight. See Pacific States Box & Basket
Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 , 296 U. S. 184 (1935). Within Minnesota, business will presumably shift from
manufacturers of plastic nonreturnable containers to producers of
paperboard cartons, refillable bottles, Page 449 U. S. 473 and plastic pouches, but there is no reason to suspect that the
gainers will be Minnesota firms, or the losers out-of-state firms.
Indeed, two of the three dairies, the sole milk retailer, and the
sole milk container producer challenging the statute in this
litigation are Minnesota firms. [ Footnote 17 ]

															Pulpwood producers are the only Minnesota industry likely to
benefit significantly from the Act at the expense of out-of-state
firms. Respondents point out that plastic resin, the raw material
used for making plastic nonreturnable milk jugs, is produced
entirely by non-Minnesota firms, while pulpwood, used for making
paperboard, is a major Minnesota product. Nevertheless, it is clear
that respondents exaggerate the degree of burden on out-of-state
interests, both because plastics will continue to be used in the
production of plastic pouches, plastic returnable bottles, and
paperboard itself, and because out-of-state pulpwood producers will
presumably absorb some of the business generated by the Act.

															Even granting that the out-of-state plastics industry is
burdened relatively more heavily than the Minnesota pulpwood
industry, we find that this burden is not "clearly excessive" in
light of the substantial state interest in promoting conservation
of energy and other natural resources and easing solid waste
disposal problems, which we have already reviewed in the context of
equal protection analysis. See supra at 449 U. S.
465 -470. We find these local benefits ample to support
Minnesota's decision under the Commerce Clause. Moreover, we find
that no approach with "a lesser impact on interstate activities," Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., supra at 397 U. S. 142 ,
is available. Respondents have suggested several alternative
statutory schemes, but these alternatives are either more
burdensome on commerce than the Act (as, for example, banning all
nonreturnables) or less likely to be effective (as, for
example, Page 449 U. S. 474 providing incentives for recycling). See Brief for
Respondents 32-33.

															In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.
S. 117 (1978), we upheld a Maryland statute barring
producers and refiners of petroleum products -- all of which were
out-of-state businesses -- from retailing gasoline in the State. We
stressed that the Commerce Clause "protects the interstate market,
not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or burdensome
regulations." Id. at 437 U. S.
127 -128. A nondiscriminatory regulation serving
substantial state purposes is not invalid simply because it causes
some business to shift from a predominantly out-of-state industry
to a predominantly in-state industry. Only if the burden on
interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State's legitimate
purposes does such a regulation violate the Commerce Clause.

															The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is Reversed. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Respondents, plaintiffs below, are a Minnesota dairy that owns
equipment for producing plastic nonreturnable milk jugs, a
Minnesota dairy that leases such equipment, a non-Minnesota company
that manufactures such equipment, a Minnesota company that produces
plastic nonreturnable milk jugs, a non-Minnesota dairy that sells
milk products in Minnesota in plastic nonreturnable milk jugs, a
Minnesota milk retailer, a non-Minnesota manufacturer of
polyethylene resin that sells such resin in many States, including
Minnesota, and a plastics industry trade association.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Minnesota Stat. § 116 F. 01 (1978) provides in relevant
part:

															" Statement of policy. The legislature seeks to
encourage both the reduction of the amount and type of material
entering the solid waste stream and the reuse and recycling of
materials. Solid waste represents discarded materials and energy
resources, and it also represents an economic burden to the people
of the state. The recycling of solid waste materials is one
alternative for the conservation of material and energy resources,
but it is also in the public interest to reduce the amount of
materials requiring recycling or disposal."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Minnesota is apparently the first State so to regulate milk
containers. 289 N.W.2d
79 , 81, n. 6 (1979).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Transcript of the Debate of the Minnesota House of
Representatives on H.F. 45, p. 1 (Mar. 10, 1977), reprinted as
Plaintiffs' Exhibit J.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The principal empirical study cited in legislative debate, see, e.g., Transcript of the Full Senate Floor Discussion
on H.F. 45, p. 12 (May 20, 1977), reprinted as Plaintiffs' Exhibit
J (statement of Sen. Luther), is Midwest Research Institute,
Resource and Environmental Profile Analysis of Five Milk Container
Systems, admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit I.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															JUSTICE STEVENS' dissenting opinion argues that the Minnesota
Supreme Court, when reviewing a challenge to a Minnesota statute on
equal protection grounds, is not bound by the limits applicable to
federal courts, but may independently reach conclusions contrary to
those of the legislature concerning legislative facts bearing on
the wisdom or utility of the legislation. This argument, though
novel, is without merit. A state court may, of course, apply a more
stringent standard of review as a matter of state law under the
State's equivalent to the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. E.g., Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 ,
401-402 (Alaska 1970); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d
728 , 764-765, 557 P.2d 929, 950-951 (1976), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw.
361, 368-369, 520 P.2d 51 ,
58-59 (1974); see Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977). And as
the dissent correctly notes, post at 449 U. S.
479 -481, the States are free to allocate the lawmaking
function to whatever branch of state government they may choose. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72 , 360 U. S. 77 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.
S. 234 , 354 U. S.
256 -257 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71 , 187 U. S. 83 -84
(1902). But when a state court reviews state legislation challenged
as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not free to impose
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law than
this Court has imposed. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.
S. 714 , 420 U. S. 719 (1975).

															The standard of review under equal protection rationality
analysis -- without regard to which branch of the state government
has made the legislative judgment -- is governed by federal
constitutional law, and a state court's application of that
standard is fully reviewable in this Court on writ of certiorari.
28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). JUSTICE STEVENS concedes the flaw in his
argument when he admits that "a state court's decision invalidating
state legislation on federal constitutional grounds may be reversed
by this Court if the state court misinterpreted the relevant
federal constitutional standard." Post at 449 U. S. 489 .
And contrary to his argument that today's judgment finds "no
precedent in this Court's decisions," post at 449 U. S. 482 ,
we have frequently reversed State Supreme Court decisions
invalidating state statutes or local ordinances on the basis of
equal protection analysis more stringent than that sanctioned by
this Court. E.g., Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U. S. 100 (1977); Arlington County Board v. Richards, 434 U. S.
5 (1977); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U. S. 356 (1973). See also North Dakota Pharmacy Board v. Snyder's Drug
Stores, Inc., 414 U. S. 156 (1973); Dean v. Gadsen Times Publishing Corp., 412 U. S. 543 (1973); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S.
39 (1971). Never have we suggested that our review of
the judgments in such cases differs in any relevant respect because
they were reached by state courts, rather than federal courts.

															Indeed, JUSTICE STEVENS has changed his own view. Previously, he
has stated that state court decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment granting litigants "more protection than the Federal
Constitution requires," are in error. Idaho Dept. of Employment
v. Smith, supra at 434 U. S. 104 (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part). This is in agreement with the
conclusion of one commentator:

															"In reviewing state court resolutions of federal constitutional
issues, the Supreme Court has not differentiated between those
decisions which sustain and those which reject claims of federal
constitutional right. In both instances, once having granted
review, the Court has simply determined whether the state court's
federal constitutional decision is 'correct,' meaning, in this
context, whether it is the decision that the Supreme Court would
independently reach."

															Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1212, 1243 (1978) (footnote
omitted). Thus, JUSTICE STEVENS' argument in the dissenting opinion
that today's treatment of the instant case is extraordinary and
unprecedented, see post at 449 U. S. 482 ,
and n. 7, is simply wrong.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Respondents, citing the District Court's Finding of Fact No. 12,
App. A-19, also assert that the actual purpose for the Act was
illegitimate: to "isolate from interstate competition the interests
of certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries."
Brief for Respondents 23. We accept the contrary holding of the
Minnesota Supreme Court that the articulated purpose of the Act is
its actual purpose. See 289 N.W.2d at 82. In equal
protection analysis, this Court will assume that the objectives
articulated by the legislature are actual purposes of the statute
unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to conclude
that they "could not have been a goal of the legislation." See
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 , 420 U. S. 648 ,
n. 16 (1975). Here, a review of the legislative history supports
the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that the principal
purposes of the Act were to promote conservation and ease solid
waste disposal problems. The contrary evidence cited by
respondents, see Brief for Respondents 29-31, is easily
understood, in context, as economic defense of an Act genuinely
proposed for environmental reasons. We will not invalidate a state
statute under the Equal Protection Clause merely because some
legislators sought to obtain votes for the measure on the basis of
its beneficial side effects on state industry.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															We express no view whether the District Court could have
dismissed this case on the pleadings or granted summary judgment
for the State on the basis of the legislative history, without
hearing respondents' evidence. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 , 440 U. S.
109 -112 (1979); Bayside Fish Flour Co. v.
Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 (1936).

															[ Footnote 9 ] See n 5, supra. [ Footnote 10 ]

															The court adopted the higher of two possible measurements of
energy consumption from paperboard production, apparently because
the lower figure contemplated the use of waste products, such as
sawdust, for energy production. In addition, the court substituted
a lower measurement of the energy consumption from plastic
nonreturnable production for that used in the study. 289 N.W.2d at
885.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															This was the conclusion of the Midwest Research Institute study, see n. 5, supra. Brief for Petitioner 21.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The District Court also held that the Act violated substantive
due process, and was apparently affirmed by the State Supreme Court
on this ground. Conclusion of Law No. 1, App. A-23; 289 N.W.2d at
87, n. 20. From our conclusion under equal protection, however, it
follows a fortiori that the Act does not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 , 372 U. S.
124 -125 (1978); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															"The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States. . . . " U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8, cl.
3.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															The Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach the Commerce Clause
issue. 289 N.W.2d at 87, n. 20. The parties and amici have
fully briefed and argued the question, and because of the obvious
factual connection between the rationality analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause and the balancing of interests under the Commerce
Clause, we will reach and decide the question. See New York
City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.
S. 568 , 440 U. S. 583 ,
n. 24 (1979).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															A court may find that a state law constitutes "economic
protectionism" on proof either of discriminatory effect, see
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, or of discriminatory purpose, see Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
at 432 U. S.
352 -353. Respondents advance a "discriminatory purpose"
argument, relying on a finding by the District Court that the
Act's

															"actual basis was to promote the economic interests of certain
segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense
of the economic interests of other segments of the dairy industry
and the plastics industry."

															App. A-19. We have already considered and rejected this argument
in the equal protection context, see n 7, supra, and do so in this context as
well.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Respondent Wells Dairy, an Iowa firm, sells 60% of its milk in
plastic nonreturnable containers, and the remainder in other types
of packages, including paperboard cartons. Tr. 419, 426, 439. The
Chairman of the Board of respondent Marigold Foods, Inc., a
Minnesota dairy, admitted at trial that his firm would continue to
sell milk in plastic nonreturnable containers in other States,
despite the passage of the Act. Id. at 474.

															[ Footnote 17 ] See n. 1, supra. The existence of major
in-state interests adversely affected by the Act is a powerful
safeguard against legislative abuse. South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.
S. 177 , 303 U. S. 187 (1938).

															JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															The Minnesota statute at issue bans the retail sale of milk in
plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permits such
sale in paperboard milk cartons. Respondents challenged the
validity of the statute under both the Equal Protection and
Commerce Clauses. The Minnesota District Court agreed with
respondents on both grounds. The Supreme Court of Minnesota also
agreed that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, but
found it unnecessary to reach the Commerce Clause issue.

															This Court today reverses the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
finding no merit in either of the alleged grounds of invalidity. I
concur in the view that the statute survives equal protection
challenge, and therefore join the Judgment of reversal on this Page 449 U. S. 475 ground. I also agree with most of Parts I and II of the Court's
opinion.

															I would not, however, reach the Commerce Clause issue, but would
remand it for consideration by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. The
District Court expressly found:

															"12. Despite the purported policy statement published by the
legislature as its basis for enacting Chapter 268, the actual basis
was to promote the economic interests of certain segments of the
local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of the economic
interests of other segments of the dairy industry and the plastics
industry."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. A-24. At a subsequent point in its
opinion, and in even more explicit language, the District Court
reiterated its finding that the purpose of the statute related to
interstate commerce. [ Footnote 2/1 ]
These findings were highly relevant to the question whether the
statute discriminated against interstate commerce. See
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 , 437 U. S. 624 (1978) ("The crucial inquiry . . . must be directed to determining
whether [the statute] is basically a protectionist measure, or
whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate
local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental"). Indeed, the trial court's findings normally would
require us to conclude that the Minnesota Legislature was engaging
in such discrimination, as they were not rejected by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. That court simply invalidated the statute on equal
protection grounds, and had no reason to consider the claim of
discrimination against interstate commerce. Page 449 U. S. 476 The Minnesota Supreme Court did accept the avowed legislative purpose of the statute. It stated:

															"The Act is intended to promote the policies stated in Minn.St.
116 F. 01; therefore, it is intended to promote the state interest
of encouraging the reuse and recycling of materials and reducing
the amount and type of material entering the solid waste
stream." 289 N.W.2d
79 , 82 (1979). The Court today reads this statement as an
implied rejection of the trial court's specific finding that
the

															"actual [purpose] was to promote the economic interests of
certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries at the
expense of the economic interests"

															of the nonresident dairy and plastics industry. In my view,
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court was merely assuming that the
statute was intended to promote its stated purposes. It was
entirely appropriate for that court to accept, for purposes of
equal protection analysis, the purpose expressed in the statute. See ante at 449 U. S. 463 ,
n. 7. When the court did so, however, there is no reason to
conclude that it intended to express or imply any view on any issue
it did not consider. In drawing its conclusions, the court included
no discussion whatever of the Commerce Clause issue and, certainly,
no rejection of the trial court's express and repeated findings
concerning the legislature's actual purpose. [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															I conclude therefore that this Court has no basis for inferring a rejection of the quite specific factfindings
by the trial court. The Court's decision today, holding that
Chapter 268 does not violate the Commerce Clause, is flatly
contrary Page 449 U. S. 477 to the only relevant specific findings of fact. Although we are
not barred from reaching the Commerce Clause issue, in doing so, we
also act without the benefit of a decision by the highest court of
Minnesota on the question. In these circumstances, it is both
unnecessary and, in my opinion, inappropriate for this Court to
decide the Commerce Clause issue. See, e.g., FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536 , 363 U. S. 542 (1960); United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S.
78 , 322 U. S. 88 (1944). Because no reason has been offered for a departure from our
customary restraint, I would remand the case with instructions to
consider specifically whether the statute discriminated
impermissibly against interstate commerce.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Finding 23 of the District Court was as follows:

															"23. Despite the purported policy reasons published by the
Legislature as bases for enacting Chapter 268, actual bases
were to isolate from interstate competition the interests of
certain segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries. The
economic welfare of such local interests can be promoted without
the remedies prescribed in Chapter 268."

															App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															Commerce Clause analysis differs from analysis under the
"rational basis" test. Under the Commerce Clause, a court is
empowered to disregard a legislature's statement of purpose if it
considers it a pretext. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 , 340 U. S. 354 (1951) ("A different view, that the ordinance is valid simply
because it professes to be a health measure, would mean that the
Commerce Clause, of itself, imposes no limitations on state action
other than those laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the
rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose
to discriminate against interstate goods").

															JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

															While the Court in this case seems to do nothing more than apply
well established equal protection and Commerce Clause principles to
a particular state statute, in reality, its reversal of the
Minnesota Supreme Court is based upon a newly discovered principle
of federal constitutional law. According to this principle, which
is applied but not explained by the majority, the Federal
Constitution defines not only the relationship between Congress and
the federal courts, but also the relationship between state
legislatures and state courts. Because I can find no support for
this novel constitutional doctrine in either the language of the
Federal Constitution or the prior decisions of this Court, I
respectfully dissent. I The keystone of the Court's equal protection analysis is its
pronouncement that "it is not the function of the courts to
substitute their evaluation of legislative facts for that of the
legislature." Ante at 449 U. S. 470 .
[ Footnote 3/1 ] If the pronouncement
concerned Page 449 U. S. 478 the function of federal courts, it would be amply
supported by reason and precedent. For federal tribunals are courts
of limited jurisdiction, whose powers are confined by the Federal
Constitution, by statute, and by the decisions of this Court. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the Court's pronouncement is
supported by citation only to precedents dealing with the function
that a federal court may properly perform when it is
reviewing the constitutionality of a law enacted by Congress or by
a state legislature. [ Footnote
3/2 ] Page 449 U. S. 479 But what.is the source -- if indeed there be one -- of this
Court's power to make the majestic announcement that it is not the
function of a state court to substitute its evaluation of
legislative facts for that of a state legislature? I should have
thought the allocation of functions within the structure of a state
government would be a matter for the State to determine. I know of
nothing in the Federal Constitution that prohibits a State from
giving lawmaking power to its courts. [ Footnote 3/3 ] Page 449 U. S. 480 Nor is there anything in the Federal Constitution that prevents
a state court from reviewing factual determinations made by a state
legislature or any other state agency. [ Footnote 3/4 ] If a state statute expressly authorized a
state tribunal to sit as a Council of Revision with full power to
modify or to amend Page 449 U. S. 481 the work product of its legislature, that statute would not
violate any federal rule of which I am aware. The functions that a
state court shall perform within the structure of state government
are unquestionably matters of state law.

															One of the few propositions that this Court has respected with
unqualified consistency -- until today -- is the rule that a
federal court is bound to respect the interpretation of state law
announced by the highest judicial tribunal in a State. [ Footnote 3/5 ] In this case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that the state trial court acted properly
when it reviewed the factual basis for the state legislation, and
implicitly the Minnesota Supreme Court also has held that its own
review of the legislative record was proper. Moreover, it also has
determined as a matter of state law how it properly should resolve
conflicts in the evidence presented to the state legislature, as
supplemented by the additional evidence presented to the trial
court in this case. [ Footnote 3/6 ]
In my opinion, the factual conclusions Page 449 U. S. 482 drawn by the Minnesota courts concerning the deliberations of
the Minnesota Legislature are entitled to just as much deference as
if they had been drafted by the state legislature itself and
incorporated in a preamble to the state statute. The State of
Minnesota has told us in unambiguous language that this statute is
not rationally related to any environmental objective; it seems to
me to be a matter of indifference, for purposes of applying the
federal Equal Protection Clause, whether that message to us from
the State of Minnesota is conveyed by the State Supreme Court, or
by the state legislature itself.

															I find it extraordinary that this federal tribunal feels free to
conduct its own de novo review of a state legislative
record in search of a rational basis that the highest court of the
State has expressly rejected. There is no precedent in this Court's
decisions for such federal oversight of a State's lawmaking
process. [ Footnote 3/7 ] Of course,
if a federal trial court had reviewed the Page 449 U. S. 483 factual basis for a state law, conflicts in the evidence would
have to be resolved in favor of the State. [ Footnote 3/8 ] But when a state court has conducted the
review, it is not our business to disagree Page 449 U. S. 484 with the state tribunal's evaluation of the State's own
lawmaking process. Even if the state court should tell us that a
state statute has a meaning that we believe the state Page 449 U. S. 485 legislature plainly did not intend, we are not free to take our
own view of the matter. [ Footnote
3/9 ]

															Once it is recognized that this Court may not review the
question of state law presented by the Minnesota courts' decision
to reevaluate the evidence presented to the legislature, the result
we must reach in this case is apparent. Because the factual
conclusions drawn by the Minnesota courts are clearly supported by
the record, [ Footnote 3/10 ] the
only federal issue that this case presents is whether a
discriminatory statute that is Page 449 U. S. 486 admittedly irrational violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court implicitly acknowledges that
the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the proper rule of federal law
when it answered that question. [ Footnote 3/11 ] Whatever we may think about the
environmental consequences of this discriminatory law, it follows
inexorably that it is our duty as federal judges to affirm the
judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court. II In light of my conclusion that the Minnesota Supreme Court's
equal protection decision must be affirmed, I need not address the
Commerce Clause question resolved by the majority. Ante at 449 U. S.
470 -474. Nonetheless, I believe that the majority's
treatment of that question compels two observations.

															First, in my opinion, the Court errs in undertaking to decide
the Commerce Clause question at all. The state trial court
addressed the question and found that the statute was designed by
the Minnesota Legislature to promote the economic interests of the
local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of competing
economic groups. [ Footnote 3/12 ]
On appeal, the Page 449 U. S. 487 Minnesota Supreme Court expressly declined to consider this
aspect of the trial court's decision, and accordingly made no
comment at all upon the merits of the Commerce Clause question. 289 N.W.2d
79 , 87, n. 20 (1979). Generally, when reviewing state court
decisions, this Court will not decide questions which the highest
court of a State has properly declined to address. The majority
offers no persuasive explanation for its unusual action in this
case. [ Footnote 3/13 ] In the
absence Page 449 U. S. 488 of some substantial justification for this action, I would not
deprive the Minnesota Supreme Court of the first opportunity to
review this aspect of the decision of the Minnesota trial
court.

															Second, the Court's Commerce Clause analysis suffers from the
same flaw as its equal protection analysis. The Court rejects the
findings of the Minnesota trial court not because they are clearly
erroneous, but because the Court is of the view that the Minnesota
courts are not authorized to exercise such a broad power of review
over the Minnesota Legislature. See ante at 449 U. S. 471 ,
n. 15. After rejecting the trial court's findings, the Court goes
on to find that any burden the Minnesota statute may impose upon
interstate commerce is not excessive in light of the substantial
state interests furthered by the statute. Ante at 449 U. S. 473 .
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly found that the
statute is not rationally related to the substantial state
interests identified by the majority. [ Footnote 3/14 ] Because I believe, as explained in 449 U. S. supra, that the Court's intrusion upon the lawmaking
process of the State of Minnesota is without constitutional
sanction or precedential support, it is clear to me that the
findings of the Minnesota Supreme Court must be respected by this
Court. Accordingly, the essential predicate for the majority's
conclusion that the "local benefits [are] ample to support
Minnesota's decision under the Commerce Clause," ante at 449 U. S. 473 ,
is absent. III The majority properly observes that a state court, when applying
the provisions of the Federal Constitution, may not Page 449 U. S. 489 apply a constitutional standard more stringent than that
announced in the relevant decisions of this Court. See
ante at 449 U. S.
461 -463, n. 6. It follows from this observation that a
state court's decision invalidating state legislation on federal
constitutional grounds may be reversed by this Court if the state
court misinterpreted the relevant federal constitutional standard.
In this case, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the
correct federal equal protection standard and properly declined to
consider the Commerce Clause. The majority reverses this decision
because it disagrees with the Minnesota courts' perception of their
role in the State's lawmaking process, not because of any error in
the application of federal law. In my opinion, this action is
beyond the Court's authority. I therefore respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 3/1 ] See also ante at 449 U. S. 464 ,
where the Court states that

															"States are not required to convince the courts of the
correctness of their legislative judgments'; and ibid., where the Court states that 'litigants may not procure invalidation
of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the
legislature was mistaken."

															[ Footnote 3/2 ]

															The majority cites Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S.
93 (1979); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.
S. 726 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U. S. 421 (1952); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938); and Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.
S. 258 (1937), in support of its conclusion that it is
not the function of the Minnesota courts to reevaluate facts
considered by the Minnesota Legislature. See ante at 449 U. S. 464 , 449 U. S. 469 .
However, even a cursory examination of these cases reveals that
they provide no support for the Court's decision in this case.

															In four of the cited cases, the Court reviewed the actions of
lower federal, not state, courts. These cases thus shed no light
upon the role a state court properly may play in reviewing actions
of the state legislature. In Vance v. Bradley and United States v. Carolene Products, Federal District
Courts had invalidated federal statutes on federal constitutional
grounds. In both cases, this Court reversed because the District
Courts had exceeded the scope of their powers by reevaluating the
factual bases for the congressional enactments. See Vance,
supra, at 440 U. S.
111 -112; Carolene Products, supra, at 440 U. S. 152 , 440 U. S. 154 .
In Ferguson v. Skrupa, a Federal District Court had
invalidated a Kansas statute on federal constitutional grounds.
This Court reversed, finding that the District Court had exceeded
constitutional limitations by substituting its judgment for that of
the Kansas Legislature. See 372 U.S. at 372 U. S.
729 -731. The Court also indicated in Ferguson that its own power to supervise the actions of state legislatures
is narrowly circumscribed. Id. at 372 U. S.
730 -731. Finally, in Henderson Co. v. Thompson, a Federal District Court had sustained a Texas statute in the face
of a constitutional challenge. In affirming that decision, the
Court simply observed that "[t]he needs of conservation are to be
determined by the Legislature." 300 U.S. at 300 U. S.
264 .

															In only one of the cases cited by the majority did the Court
review a state court judgment. In Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, a Missouri statute was challenged on due process,
equal protection, and Contract Clause theories. The Missouri
Supreme Court had upheld the statute, and this Court affirmed. In
the course of its opinion, the Court stated that it was
not free to reevaluate the legislative judgment or act as "a
superlegislature." 342 U.S. at 342 U. S. 423 , 342 U. S. 425 .
The Court did not comment at all upon the extent of the Missouri
Supreme Court's authority to supervise the activities of the
Missouri Legislature. Nothing in the Day-Brite Lighting opinion can be construed as the source of the Court's newly found
power to determine for the States which lawmaking powers may be
allocated to their courts and which to their legislatures.

															[ Footnote 3/3 ]

															Responding to an argument that the lawmaking power of the
Virginia Legislature had been improperly assigned to another arm of
the State's government, Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court in Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.
S. 608 , 300 U. S.
612 -613 (1937), stated:

															"The Constitution of the United States, in the circumstances
here exhibited, has no voice upon the subject. The statute
challenged as invalid is one adopted by a state. This removes
objections that might be worthy of consideration if we were dealing
with an act of Congress. How power shall be distributed by a state
among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a
question for the state itself. Nothing in the distribution here
attempted supplies the basis for an exception. The statute is not a
denial of a republican form of government. Constitution, Art. IV, §
4. Even if it were, the enforcement of that guarantee, according to
the settled doctrine, is for Congress, not the courts. Pacific
States Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S.
118 ; Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S.
565 ; Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Park
District, 281 U. S. 74 , 281 U. S.
79 , 241 U. S. 80 . Cases such as Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S.
388 , and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U. S. 495 , cited by
appellants, are quite beside the point. What was in controversy
there was the distribution of power between President and Congress,
or between Congress and administrative officers or commissions, a
controversy affecting the structure of the national government as
established by the provisions of the national constitution."

															"So far as the objection to delegation is founded on the
Constitution of Virginia, it is answered by a decision of the
highest court of the state. In Reynolds v. Milk
Commission, 163 Va. 957; 179 S.E. 507, the Supreme Court of
Appeals passed upon the validity of the statute now in question. .
. . A judgment by the highest court of a state as to the meaning
and effect of its own constitution is decisive and controlling
everywhere." See also Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S.
71 , 187 U. S. 83 -84
(1902); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.
S. 234 , 354 U. S.
256 -257 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result).

															[ Footnote 3/4 ]

															In Ferguson v. Skrupa, supra, the Court indicated that
the Federal Constitution does prevent the federal courts from
reviewing factual determinations made by a state legislature. In
rejecting the substantive due process cases of an earlier era, the
Court stated:

															"Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it
is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and
utility of legislation."

															372 U.S. at 372 U. S. 729 .
The Court went on to explain this constitutional limitation:

															"We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. .
. . Legislative bodies have broad scope to experiment with economic
problems, and this Court does not sit to"

															"subject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the
basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection
which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to secure." Id. at 372 U. S. 730 (footnote omitted).

															The Court's conclusion in Ferguson that the Constitution imposes
limitations upon the power of the federal courts to review
legislative judgments was clearly correct, and was consistent with
the structure of the Federal Constitution and "the system of
government created" therein. The Constitution defines the
relationship among the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government and prescribes for each branch certain limited powers.
The Federal Constitution, however, is silent with respect to the
powers of the coordinate branches of state governments and the
relationship among those branches.

															[ Footnote 3/5 ]

															Although this proposition is so well established as to require
no citation of authority, abundant authority is readily available. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.
S. 369 , 441 U. S. 376 ,
n. 7 (1979); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.
S. 767 , 431 U. S. 772 (1977); Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U. S. 668 , 426 U. S. 674 ,
n. 9 (1976); Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v.
Hortonville Education Assn., 426 U. S. 482 , 426 U. S. 488 (1976); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.
S. 684 , 421 U. S. 691 (1975); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.
S. 250 , 415 U. S. 256 (1974); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.
S. 470 , 412 U. S. 477 (1973); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.
S. 505 , 400 U. S. 507 (1971).

															[ Footnote 3/6 ]

															In its memorandum in this case, the state trial court initially
observed that it was not free to "substitute its judgment for that
of the legislature as to the wisdom or desirability of the act."
App. A-24. With respect to the facts considered by the legislature,
however, the trial court found that, "as factfinder, [it was]
obliged to weigh and evaluate this evidence, much of which was in
sharp conflict." Id. at A-25.

															In its opinion affirming the trial court's decision, the
Minnesota Supreme Court took a similar view of the function to be
performed by the Minnesota courts when reviewing Minnesota
legislation:

															"We are aware of the deference that is accorded to the
legislature when the present type of statute is analyzed on equal
protection grounds. Nevertheless, our inquiry into the
constitutional propriety of the present classification separating
paper containers from plastic nonrefillables is dependent upon
facts. Based upon the relevant findings of fact by the trial court,
supported by the record, and upon our own independent review of
documentary sources, we believe the evidence conclusively
demonstrates that the discrimination against plastic nonrefillables
is not rationally related to the Act's objectives." 289 N.W.2d
79 , 82 (1979).

															[ Footnote 3/7 ]

															In its footnote 6, ante at 449 U. S.
461 -463, the Court takes issue with my suggestion t.hat
its action in this case is unprecedented by citing four cases in
which the Court reversed State Supreme Court decision invalidating
provisions of state law on federal equal protection grounds. See Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.
S. 100 (1977) (per curiam); Arlington County Board
v. Richards, 434 U. S. 5 (1977)
(per curiam); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S.
24 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U. S. 356 (1973). In each of those cases, however, this Court concluded that
the state court had applied an incorrect legal standard; in none
did this Court reassess the factual predicate for the state court
decision.

															In Idaho Dept. of Employment, the Idaho Supreme Court had
invalidated a statutory classification not because it generally
failed to further legitimate state goals, but rather because the
court had found that the classification was imperfect, since some
members of the class denied unemployment benefits were in fact as
available for full-time employment as members of the class entitled
to benefits under the Idaho statute. See Smith v. Department of
Employment, 98 Idaho 43, 43-44, 557 P.2d 637, 637-638 (1976),
citing Kerr v. Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 385, 545
P.2d 473 (1976). This Court did not disagree with the Idaho court's
finding that the classification was imperfect, but merely held that
this imperfection was legally insufficient to invalidate the
statute under the Equal Protection Clause. 434 U.S. at 434 U. S.
101 -102. In Arlington County Board v. Richards, the Virginia Supreme Court had recognized the rational basis test
as the appropriate equal protection standard, but then had
proceeded to apply a more stringent standard to the municipal
ordinance at issue. The court had expressly noted that the
municipal ordinance "may relieve the [parking] problems to which it
was directed." However, the court concluded that the means employed
by the county to deal with these problems -- a classification based
upon residency -- created an unconstitutional "invidious
discrimination." See Arlington County Board v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 651, 231 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1977). This Court reversed,
rejecting the conclusion that the ordinance's residency
classification resulted in an invidious discrimination. 434 U.S. at 434 U. S. 7 . In Richardson v. Ramirez, a voting rights case, the
California Supreme Court was reversed not because it had reexamined
the factual determinations of the California Legislature, but
because this Court found that the statutory discrimination at issue
was expressly authorized by § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 418
U.S. at 418 U. S. 41 -56.
Finally, in Lake Shore Auto Parts v. Lehnhausen, the
Illinois Supreme Court had held, in essence, that a classification
used in determining liability for a property tax must, as a
constitutional matter, be based upon the nature of the property at
issue, and not upon the corporate or noncorporate character of the
property's owner. See Lake Shore Auto Parts v.
Korzen, 49 Ill. 2d
137 , 149-151, 273 N.E.2d
592 , 598-599 (1971). This Court rejected this principle,
finding it inconsistent with prior decisions clearly establishing
that distinctions between individuals and corporations in tax
legislation violated no constitutional rights. 410 U.S. at 410 U. S.
359 -365.

															As the majority observes, the Court in each of these cases
reversed the state court decisions because the state courts had
applied an equal protection standard more stringent than that
sanctioned by this Court. Quite frankly, in my opinion, it would
have been sound judicial policy in all four of those cases to allow
the state courts to accord even greater protection within their
respective jurisdictions than the Federal Constitution commands. See my dissent in Idaho Dept. of Employment,
supra at 434 U. S. 104 .
But what is especially relevant here is the fact that in none of
those cases had the state courts found, after a full evidentiary
hearing, that the factual predicate for the state law at issue was
simply not true. The Minnesota courts in this case made such a
finding after the development of an extensive record. The Minnesota
courts then applied the correct federal legal standard to the facts
revealed by this record, and concluded that the statutory
classification was not rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose. As I read the cases cited by the majority, they are simply
inapposite in this case. My own research has uncovered no instance
in which the Court has reversed the decision of the highest court
of a State, as it does in this case, because the state court
exceeded some federal constitutional limitation upon its power to
review the factual determinations of the state legislature. The
Court has never before, to my knowledge, undertaken to define, as a
matter of federal law, the appropriate relationship between a state
court and a state legislature.

															[ Footnote 3/8 ]

															In most of the cases in which the Court has indicated that
courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature, the Court was reviewing decisions of the lower federal
courts. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.
S. 297 , 427 U. S. 303 (1976) (per curiam); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 , 426 U. S. 812 (1976); United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins.
Corp., 400 U. S. 4 , 400 U. S. 6 (1970)
(per curiam); Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 393 U. S. 129 , 393 U. S. 136 ,
138-139 (1968); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 , 348 U. S.
487 -488 (1955); Secretary of Agriculture v. Central
Roig Refining Co., 338 U. S. 604 , 338 U. S.
618 -619 (1950); Daniel v. Family Insurance Co., 336 U. S. 220 , 336 U. S. 224 (1949); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.
S. 583 , 306 U. S. 594 (1939); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
Inc., 303 U. S. 177 , 303 U. S.
190 -191 (1938); Bayside Fish Flour Co. v.
Gentry, 297 U. S. 422 , 297 U. S.
427 -428, 297 U. S. 430 (1936); Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U. S. 251 , 297 U. S. 263 (1936); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.
S. 374 , 286 U. S.
388 -389 (1932); Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582 , 279 U. S. 584 ,
586 (1929); Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.
S. 297 , 248 U. S. 303 (1919). In those instances in which the Court was reviewing state
court decisions, its statements with respect to the limited role of
the judiciary in reviewing state legislation clearly concerned its
own authority to act as a "superlegislature," not the authority of
a state court to do so where permitted by state law. See, e.g.,
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.
S. 117 , 437 U. S. 124 (1978); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 , 336 U. S. 109 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.
S. 236 , 313 U. S. 246 (1941); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.
S. 325 , 274 U. S. 328 (1927); Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.
S. 526 , 242 U. S. 531 (1917); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.
S. 394 , 239 U. S.
413 -414 (1915); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.
S. 446 , 238 U. S.
452 -453 (1915); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San
Francisco, 216 U. S. 358 , 216 U. S. 365 (1910).

															[ Footnote 3/9 ]

															This Court will defer to the interpretation of state law
announced by the highest court of a State even where a more
reasonable interpretation is apparent, see, e.g., O'Brien v.
Skinner, 414 U. S. 524 , 414 U. S. 531 (1974), a contrary construction might save a state statute from
constitutional invalidity, see, e.g., Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829 , 435 U. S. 837 ,
n. 9 (1978), or it appears that the state court has attributed an
unusually inflexible command to its legislature, see, e.g.,
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v Regents, 360 U.
S. 684 , 360 U. S.
688 -689 (1959).

															[ Footnote 3/10 ]

															As the majority notes, the evidence considered by the Minnesota
courts was conflicting, ante at 449 U. S. 460 , 449 U. S. 464 , 449 U. S. 469 ,
and the respondents "produced impressive supporting evidence at
trial" indicating that the decision of the Minnesota Legislature
was factually unsound. Ante at 449 U. S. 463 .
In light of this record, this Court clearly cannot reverse the
concurrent factual findings of two state courts.

															Moreover, since there is no significant difference between
plastic containers and paper containers in terms of environmental
impact, and since no one contends that the Minnesota statute will
reduce the consumption of dairy products, it is not difficult to
understand the state judges' skeptical scrutiny of a legislative
ban on the use of one kind of container without imposing any
present or future restriction whatsoever on the use of the
other.

															[ Footnote 3/11 ]

															It is true that the Court carefully avoids an express
acknowledgment that the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the correct
legal standard. Not one word in the Court's opinion, however,
suggests that the Court has any disagreement with the state court's
understanding of the proper federal rule.

															[ Footnote 3/12 ]

															The trial court made the following findings of fact.

															"12. Despite the purported policy statement published by the
Legislature as its basis for enacting Chapter 268, the actual basis
was to promote the economic interests of certain segments of the
local dairy and pulpwood industries at the expense of the economic
interests of other segments of the dairy industry and the plastics
industry."

															" * * * *" "23. Despite the purported policy reasons published by the
Legislature as bases for enacting Chapter 268, actual bases were to
isolate from interstate competition the interests of certain
segments of the local dairy and pulpwood industries. The economic
welfare of such local interests can be promoted without the
remedies prescribed in Chapter 268."

															App. A-19, A-22. These findings were repeated in the memorandum
filed by the trial court in this case:

															"The relevant legislative history of Chapter 268 support
[ sic ] a conclusion that the real basis for it was to serve
certain economic interests (paper, pulpwood, and some dairies) at
the expense of other competing economic groups (plastic and certain
dairies) by prohibiting the plastic milk bottle." Id. at A-24.

															[ Footnote 3/13 ]

															According to the majority, its decision to address the Commerce
Clause question is justified

															"because of the obvious factual connection between the
rationality analysis under the Equal Protection Clause and the
balancing of interests under the Commerce Clause." Ante at 449 U. S. 470 ,
n. 14. The majority cites New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U. S. 568 (1979), in support of this rationale. This justification is
inadequate, in my opinion, for two reasons.

															First, in light of the trial court's factual finding that the
Minnesota Legislature enacted the statute for protectionist, rather
than environmental, reasons, see 449
U.S. 456 fn3/12|>n. 12, supra, the Equal Protection
Clause and Commerce Clause inquiries are not necessarily as similar
as the Court suggests. As the majority acknowledges, if a state law
which purports to promote environmental goals is actually
protectionist in design, a virtually automatic rule of invalidity,
not a balancing of interests test, is applied. See ante at 449 U. S. 471 . See also New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 427 U. S. 304 ,
n. 5.

															Second, in Beazer, the Court reviewed the decision of a
lower federal court, not a state supreme court. While this Court,
in its discretion, may elect to deprive lower federal courts of the
opportunity to decide particular statutory questions, it seems to
me that respect for the Minnesota Supreme Court as the highest
court of a sovereign State dictates that we not casually divest it
of authority to decide a constitutional question on which it
properly declined to comment when this case was first before it.
Such deference is especially appropriate here because the Court's
analysis of the Commerce Clause issue requires rejection of the
state trial court's findings of fact.

															[ Footnote 3/14 ]

															As noted in 449 U. S. supra, the Court rejects the Minnesota Supreme Court's
findings not because they are without support in the record -- they
clearly are adequately supported, see 449
U.S. 456 fn3/10|>n. 10, supra -- but because it
feels that the Minnesota Supreme Court was without authority to do
anything other than endorse the factual conclusions of the
Minnesota Legislature.


OCTOBER TERM, 1999

															Syllabus

															VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK ET AL. v. OLECH

															CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT

															No. 98-1288. Argued January 10, 2000-Decided February 23,
2000

															When respondent Olech and her late husband first asked
petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their
property to the municipal water supply, the Village conditioned the
connection on the Olechs granting it a 33-foot easement. Although
it subsequently reduced the easement to the 15 feet required of
other property owners, Olech sued, claiming that the Village's
demand for an additional 18-foot easement violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and asserting that the
easement was irrational and arbitrary, that the Village was
motivated by ill will resulting from the Olechs' success in an
unrelated lawsuit against the Village, and that the Village acted
either with the intent to deprive Olech of her rights or in
reckless disregard of her rights. The District Court dismissed the
suit for failure to state a claim, but the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that Olech's spiteful ill will allegation stated
a claim. Held: The Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause
of action on behalf of a "class of one" where the plaintiff does
not allege membership in a class or group, but alleges that she has
been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for such treatment.
See, e. g., Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 441 .
The Clause secures every person within a State's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by a statute's express terms or by its improper
execution. Id., at 445. Here, Olech's allegations that the
Village intentionally demanded a 33-foot easement from her when it
required only 15 feet from similarly situated property owners, that
the demand was irrational and arbitrary, and that the Village
ultimately connected her property in return for a 15-foot
easement-quite apart from the Village's subjective motive-state a
claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. Thus,
the Court does not reach the alternative "subjective ill will"
theory on which the Seventh Circuit relied. 160 F.3d
386 , affirmed. James L. DeAno argued the cause and filed briefs for
petitioners. 563 Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman,
Acting Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Deputy Solicitor General
Underwood, and Mark B. Stern. John R. Wimmer argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondent. *

															PER CURIAM.

															Respondent Grace Olech and her late husband Thaddeus asked
petitioner Village of Willowbrook (Village) to connect their
property to the municipal water supply. The Village at first
conditioned the connection on the Olechs granting the Village a
33-foot easement. The Olechs objected, claiming that the Village
only required a 15-foot easement from other property owners seeking
access to the water supply. After a 3-month delay, the Village
relented and agreed to provide water service with only a 15-foot
easement.

															Olech sued the Village, claiming that the Village's demand of an
additional 18-foot easement violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Olech asserted that the 33-foot easement
demand was "irrational and wholly arbitrary"; that the Village's
demand was actually motivated by ill will resulting from the
Olechs' previous filing of an unrelated, successful lawsuit against
the Village; and that the Village acted either with the intent to
deprive Olech of her rights or in reckless disregard of her rights.
App. 10, 12.

															The District Court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a cognizable
claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Relying on Circuit
precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Sev- * Richard Ruda, James I. Crowley, and Donald B.
Ayer filed a brief for the International City/County Management
Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

															Harvey Grossman, Steven R. Shapiro, and Richard J. O'Brien filed a brief for the ACLU as amicus curiae urging
affirmance. 564 enth Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff can allege an
equal protection violation by asserting that state action was
motivated solely by a "'spiteful effort to "get" him for reasons
wholly unrelated to any legitimate state objective.'" 160 F.3d
386 , 387 (1998) (quoting Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.
3d 176, 180 (CA7 1995)). It determined that Olech's
complaint sufficiently alleged such a claim. 160 F. 3d, at 388. We
granted certiorari to determine whether the Equal Protection Clause
gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a "class of one" where
the plaintiff did not allege membership in a class or group. * 527
U. S. 1067 (1999).

															Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims
brought by a "class of one," where the plaintiff alleges that she
has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment. See Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U. S.
441 (1923); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989). In
so doing, we have explained that" '[t]he purpose of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every
person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents.'" Sioux City Bridge Co., supra, at 445 (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 ,
352 (1918)).

															*We note that the complaint in this case could be read to allege
a class of five. In addition to Grace and Thaddeus Olech, their
neighbors Rodney and Phyllis Zimmer and Howard Brinkman requested
to be connected to the municipal water supply, and the Village
initially demanded the 33-foot easement from all of them. The
Zimmers and Mr. Brinkman were also involved in the previous,
successful lawsuit against the Village, which allegedly created the
ill will motivating the excessive easement demand. Whether the
complaint alleges a class of one or of five is of no consequence
because we conclude that the number of individuals in a class is
immaterial for equal protection analysis. 565 That reasoning is applicable to this case. Olech's complaint can
fairly be construed as alleging that the Village intentionally
demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition of connecting her
property to the municipal water supply where the Village required
only a 15-foot easement from other similarly situated property
owners. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41 , 45-46
(1957). The complaint also alleged that the Village's demand was
"irrational and wholly arbitrary" and that the Village ultimately
connected her property after receiving a clearly adequate 15-foot
easement. These allegations, quite apart from the Village's
subjective motivation, are sufficient to state a claim for relief
under traditional equal protection analysis. We therefore affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but do not reach the
alternative theory of "subjective ill will" relied on by that
court.

															It is so ordered.

															JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in the result.

															The Solicitor General and the village of Willowbrook have
expressed concern lest we interpret the Equal Protection Clause in
this case in a way that would transform many ordinary violations of
city or state law into violations of the Constitution. It might be
thought that a rule that looks only to an intentional difference in
treatment and a lack of a rational basis for that different
treatment would work such a transformation. Zoning decisions, for
example, will often, perhaps almost always, treat one landowner
differently from another, and one might claim that, when a city's
zoning authority takes an action that fails to conform to a city
zoning regulation, it lacks a "rational basis" for its action (at
least if the regulation in question is reasonably clear).

															This case, however, does not directly raise the question whether
the simple and common instance of a faulty zoning decision would
violate the Equal Protection Clause. That is because the Court of
Appeals found that in this case respond- 566 ent had alleged an extra factor as well-a factor that the Court
of Appeals called "vindictive action," "illegitimate animus," or
"ill will." 160 F.3d
386 , 388 (CA7 1998). And, in that respect, the court
said this case resembled Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d
176 (CA71995), because the Esmail plaintiff had
alleged that the municipality's differential treatment "was the
result not of prosecutorial discretion honestly (even if
ineptly-even if arbitrarily) exercised but of an illegitimate
desire to 'get' him." 160 F. 3d, at 388.

															In my view, the presence of that added factor in this case is
sufficient to minimize any concern about transforming
run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional right.
For this reason, along with the others mentioned by the Court, I
concur in the result. 567 The next page is purposely numbered 801. The numbers between 566
and 801 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to
publish the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making
the official citations available upon publication of the
preliminary prints of the United States Reports. 568 OCTOBER 4, 1999 Certiorari Granted-Vacated and Remanded

															No. 98-9308. CROSS V. CALIFORNIA. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App.

															Dist.; and

															No. 98-9504. COOPER V. CALIFORNIA. Ct. App. Cal., 1st
App.

															Dist. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and
cases remanded for further consideration in light of Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 116 (1999).

															Miscellaneous Orders

															No. D-1961. IN RE DISBARMENT OF WEISSER. Disbarment entered.
[For earlier order herein, see 524 U. S. 913.]

															No. D-2073. IN RE DISBARMENT OF NUNES. Disbarment entered. [For
earlier order herein, see 526 U. S. 1128.]

															No. D-2076. IN RE DISBARMENT OF PATT. Disbarment entered. [For
earlier order herein, see 526 U. S. 1143.]

															No. D-2088. IN RE DISBARMENT OF ROBINS. Disbarment entered. [For
earlier order herein, see 527 U. S. 1020.]

															No. D-2101. IN RE DISBARMENT OF JACOBS. Patricia Dianne Jacobs,
of Washington, D. C., is suspended from the practice of law
in this Court, and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days,
requiring her to show cause why she should not be disbarred from
the practice of law in this Court.

															No. D-2102. IN RE DISBARMENT OF EAGLE. Saul L. Eagle, of New
York, N. Y., is suspended from the practice of law in this Court,
and a rule will issue, returnable within 40 days, requiring him to
show cause why he should not be disbarred from the practice of law
in this Court.

															No. D-2103. IN RE DISBARMENT OF MANEY. William Kenneth Maney, of
Johnson City, N. Y., is suspended from the practice 801