OPINION OF THE COURT STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL 562 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-400 VINCENT E. STAUB, PETITIONER v. PROCTOR
HOSPITAL

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the seventh circuit

															[March 1, 2011]

															   Justice Scalia delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   We consider the circumstances
under which an employer may be held liable for employment
discrimination based on the discriminatory animus of an employee
who influenced, but did not make, the ultimate employment
decision.

															I

															   Petitioner Vincent Staub worked
as an angiography technician for respondent Proctor Hospital until
2004, when he was fired. Staub and Proctor hotly dispute the facts
surrounding the firing, but because a jury found for Staub in his
claim of employment discrimination against Proctor, we describe the
facts viewed in the light most favorable to him.

															   While employed by Proctor, Staub
was a member of the United States Army Reserve, which required him
to attend drill one weekend per month and to train full time for
two to three weeks a year. Both Janice Mulally, Staub’s immediate
supervisor, and Michael Korenchuk, Mulally’s supervisor, were
hostile to Staub’s military obligations. Mulally scheduled Staub
for additional shifts without notice so that he would “ ‘pa[y]
back the department for everyone else having to bend over backwards
to cover [his] schedule for the Reserves.’ ” 560 F. 3d
647, 652 (CA7 2009). She also informed Staub’s co-worker, Leslie
Sweborg, that Staub’s “ ‘military duty had been a strain on
th[e] department,’ ” and asked Sweborg to help her “ ‘get
rid of him.’ ” Ibid. Korenchuk referred to Staub’s
military obligations as “ ‘a b[u]nch of smoking and joking and
[a] waste of taxpayers[’] money.’ ” Ibid. He was also
aware that Mulally was “ ‘out to get’ ” Staub. Ibid. In January 2004, Mulally issued Staub a
“Corrective Action” disciplinary warning for purportedly violating
a company rule requiring him to stay in his work area whenever he
was not working with a patient. The Corrective Action included a
directive requiring Staub to report to Mulally or Korenchuk
“ ‘when [he] ha[d] no patients and [the angio] cases [we]re
complete[d].’ ” Id., at 653. According to Staub,
Mulally’s justification for the Corrective Action was false for two
reasons: First, the company rule invoked by Mulally did not exist;
and second, even if it did, Staub did not violate it.

															   On April 2, 2004, Angie Day, Staub’s
co-worker, complained to Linda Buck, Proctor’s vice president of
human resources, and Garrett McGowan, Proctor’s chief operating
officer, about Staub’s frequent unavailability and abruptness.
McGowan directed Korenchuk and Buck to create a plan that would
solve Staub’s “ ‘availability’ problems.” Id., at
654. But three weeks later, before they had time to do so,
Korenchuk informed Buck that Staub had left his desk without
informing a supervisor, in violation of the January Corrective
Action. Staub now contends this accusation was false: he had left
Korenchuk a voice-mail notification that he was leaving his desk.
Buck relied on Korenchuk’s accusation, however, and after reviewing
Staub’s personnel file, she decided to fire him. The termination
notice stated that Staub had ignored the directive issued in the
January 2004 Corrective Action.

															   Staub challenged his firing through Proctor’s
grievance process, claiming that Mulally had fabricated the
allegation underlying the Corrective Action out of hostility toward
his military obligations. Buck did not follow up with Mulally about
this claim. After discussing the matter with another personnel
officer, Buck adhered to her decision.

															   Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.
S. C. §4301 et seq., claiming that his discharge was
motivated by hostility to his obligations as a military reservist.
His contention was not that Buck had any such hostility but that
Mulally and Korenchuk did, and that their actions influenced Buck’s
ultimate employment decision. A jury found that Staub’s “military
status was a motivating factor in [Proctor’s] decision to discharge
him,” App. 68a, and awarded $57,640 in damages.

															   The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 560 F. 3d
647. The court observed that Staub had brought a “ ‘cat’s paw’
case,” meaning that he sought to hold his employer liable for the
animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate
employment decision. Id., at 655–656.[ Footnote 1 ] It explained that under Seventh
Circuit precedent, a “cat’s paw” case could not succeed unless the
nondecisionmaker exercised such “ ‘singular influence’ ”
over the decisionmaker that the decision to terminate was the
product of “blind reliance.” Id., at 659. It then noted
that “Buck looked beyond what Mulally and Korenchuk said,” relying
in part on her conversation with Day and her review of Staub’s
personnel file. Ibid. The court “admit[ted] that Buck’s
investigation could have been more robust,” since it “failed to
pursue Staub’s theory that Mulally fabricated the write-up.” Ibid. But the court said that the “ ‘singular
influence’ ” rule “does not require the decisionmaker to be a
paragon of independence”: “It is enough that the decisionmaker is
not wholly dependent on a single source of information and conducts
her own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
undisputed evidence established that Buck was not wholly dependent
on the advice of Korenchuk and Mulally, the court held that Proctor
was entitled to judgment. Ibid. We granted certiorari. 559 U. S. ___
(2010).

															II

															   The Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) provides in relevant part as
follows:

															   “A person who is a member of … or
has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall
not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in
employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer
on the basis of that membership, … or obligation.” 38 U. S. C.
§4311(a).

															It elaborates further:

															   “An employer shall be considered
to have engaged in actions prohibited … under subsection (a), if
the person’s membership … is a motivating factor in the employer’s
action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have
been taken in the absence of such membership.” §4311(c).

															The statute is very similar to Title VII, which
prohibits employment discrimination “because of … race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin” and states that such
discrimination is established when one of those factors “was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U. S. C.
§§2000e–2(a), (m).

															   The central difficulty in this case is
construing the phrase “motivating factor in the employer’s action.”
When the company official who makes the decision to take an adverse
employment action is personally acting out of hostility to the
employee’s membership in or obligation to a uniformed service, a
motivating factor obviously exists. The problem we confront arises
when that official has no discriminatory animus but is influenced
by previous company action that is the product of a like animus in
someone else.

															   In approaching this question, we start from
the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the
background of general tort law. See Burlington N. & S.
F. R. Co. v. United States , 556 U. S. ___,
___ (2009) (slip op., at 13–14); Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Burr , 551 U. S. 47 , 68–69
(2007); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U. S. 742 , 764 (1998). Intentional
torts such as this, “as distinguished from negligent or reckless
torts, … generally require that the actor intend ‘the consequences ’ of an act,’ not simply ‘the act
itself.’ ” Kawaauhau v. Geiger , 523 U. S. 57 , 61–62
(1998).

															   Staub contends that the fact that an
unfavorable entry on the plaintiff’s personnel record was caused to
be put there, with discriminatory animus, by Mulally and Korenchuk,
suffices to establish the tort, even if Mulally and Korenchuk did
not intend to cause his dismissal. But discrimination was no part
of Buck’s reason for the dismissal; and while Korenchuk and Mulally
acted with discriminatory animus, the act they committed—the mere
making of the reports—was not a denial of “initial employment,
reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of
employment,” as liability under USERRA requires. If dismissal was
not the object of Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s reports, it may have
been their result, or even their foreseeable consequence, but that
is not enough to render Mulally or Korenchuk responsible.

															   Here, however, Staub is seeking to hold liable
not Mulally and Korenchuk, but their employer. Perhaps, therefore,
the discriminatory motive of one of the employer’s agents (Mulally
or Korenchuk) can be aggregated with the act of another agent
(Buck) to impose liability on Proctor. Again we consult general
principles of law, agency law, which form the background against
which federal tort laws are enacted. See Meyer v. Holley , 537
U. S. 280 , 285 (2003); Burlington , supra , at
754–755. Here, however, the answer is not so clear. The Restatement
of Agency suggests that the malicious mental state of one agent
cannot generally be combined with the harmful action of another
agent to hold the principal liable for a tort that requires both.
See Restatement (Second) Agency §275, Illustration 4 (1958). Some
of the cases involving federal torts apply that rule. See United States v. Science Applications Int’l
Corp. , 626 F. 3d 1257, 1273–1276 (CADC 2010); Chaney v. Dreyfus Service Corp. , 595 F. 3d
219, 241 (CA5 2010); United States v. Philip Morris
USA Inc. , 566 F. 3d 1095, 1122 (CADC 2009). But another
case involving a federal tort, and one involving a federal crime,
hold to the contrary. See United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. , 352 F. 3d 908,
918–919 (CA4 2003); United States v. Bank of New
England, N. A. , 821 F. 2d 844, 856 (CA1 1987).
Ultimately, we think it unnecessary in this case to decide what the
background rule of agency law may be, since the former line of
authority is suggested by the governing text, which requires that
discrimination be “a motivating factor” in the adverse
action . When a decision to fire is made with no unlawful
animus on the part of the firing agent, but partly on the basis of
a report prompted (unbeknownst to that agent) by discrimination,
discrimination might perhaps be called a “factor” or a “causal
factor” in the decision; but it seems to us a considerable stretch
to call it “a motivating factor.”

															   Proctor, on the other hand, contends that the
employer is not liable unless the de facto decisionmaker
(the technical decisionmaker or the agent for whom he is the “cat’s
paw”) is motivated by discriminatory animus. This avoids the
aggregation of animus and adverse action, but it seems to us not
the only application of general tort law that can do so. Animus and
responsibility for the adverse action can both be attributed to the
earlier agent (here, Staub’s supervisors) if the adverse action is
the intended consequence of that agent’s discriminatory conduct. So
long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons, that the
adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be liable
under USERRA. And it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise
of judgment by the decisionmaker does not prevent the earlier
agent’s action (and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory
animus) from being the proximate cause of the harm. Proximate cause
requires only “some direct relation between the injury asserted and
the injurious conduct alleged,” and excludes only those “link[s]
that are too remote, purely contingent, or indirect.” Hemi
Group, LLC v. City of New York , 559 U. S. 1 , ___ (2010)
(slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted).[ Footnote 2 ] We do not think that the
ultimate decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment automatically renders
the link to the supervisor’s bias “remote” or “purely contingent.”
The decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a
proximate cause of the employment decision, but it is common for
injuries to have multiple proximate causes. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain , 542 U. S. 692 , 704
(2004). Nor can the ultimate decisionmaker’s judgment be deemed a
superseding cause of the harm. A cause can be thought “superseding”
only if it is a “cause of independent origin that was not
foreseeable.” Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc. , 517 U. S. 830 ,
837 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															   Moreover, the approach urged upon us by
Proctor gives an unlikely meaning to a provision designed to
prevent employer discrimination. An employer’s authority to reward,
punish, or dismiss is often allocated among multiple agents. The
one who makes the ultimate decision does so on the basis of
performance assessments by other supervisors. Proctor’s view would
have the improbable consequence that if an employer isolates a
personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the
decision to take adverse employment actions in that official, and
asks that official to review the employee’s personnel file before
taking the adverse action, then the employer will be effectively
shielded from discriminatory acts and recommendations of
supervisors that were designed and intended to produce the
adverse action. That seems to us an implausible meaning of the
text, and one that is not compelled by its words. Proctor suggests that even if the
decisionmaker’s mere exercise of independent judgment does not
suffice to negate the effect of the prior discrimination, at least
the decisionmaker’s independent investigation (and rejection) of
the employee’s allegations of discriminatory animus ought to do so.
We decline to adopt such a hard-and-fast rule. As we have already
acknowledged, the requirement that the biased supervisor’s action
be a causal factor of the ultimate employment action incorporates
the traditional tort-law concept of proximate cause. See, e.g., Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. , 547 U. S. 451 ,
457–458 (2006); Sosa , supra, at 703. Thus, if the
employer’s investigation results in an adverse action for reasons
unrelated to the supervisor’s original biased action (by the terms
of USERRA it is the employer’s burden to establish that), then the
employer will not be liable. But the supervisor’s biased report may
remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it
into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart
from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified. We are
aware of no principle in tort or agency law under which an
employer’s mere conduct of an independent investigation has a
claim-preclusive effect. Nor do we think the independent
investigation somehow relieves the employer of “fault.” The
employer is at fault because one of its agents committed an action
based on discriminatory animus that was intended to cause, and did
in fact cause, an adverse employment decision.

															   Justice Alito claims that our failure to adopt
a rule immunizing an employer who performs an independent
investigation reflects a “stray[ing] from the statutory text.” Post , at 2 (opinion concurring in judgment). We do not
understand this accusation. Since a supervisor is an agent of the
employer, when he causes an adverse employment action the employer
causes it; and when discrimination is a motivating factor in his
doing so, it is a “motivating factor in the employer’s action,”
precisely as the text requires. Justice Alito suggests that the
employer should be held liable only when it “should be regarded as
having delegated part of the decisionmaking power” to the biased
supervisor. Ibid. But if the independent investigation
relies on facts provided by the biased supervisor—as is necessary
in any case of cat’s-paw liability—then the employer (either
directly or through the ultimate decisionmaker) will have
effectively delegated the factfinding portion of the investigation
to the biased supervisor. Contrary to Justice Alito’s suggestion,
the biased supervisor is not analogous to a witness at a bench
trial. The mere witness is not an actor in the events that are the
subject of the trial. The biased supervisor and the ultimate
decisionmaker, however, acted as agents of the entity that the
plaintiff seeks to hold liable; each of them possessed supervisory
authority delegated by their employer and exercised it in the
interest of their employer. In sum, we do not see how “fidelity to
the statutory text,” ibid. , requires the adoption of an
independent-investigation defense that appears nowhere in the text.
And we find both speculative and implausible Justice Alito’s
prediction that our Nation’s employers will systematically disfavor
members of the armed services in their hiring decisions to avoid
the possibility of cat’s-paw liability, a policy that would violate
USERRA in any event.

															   We therefore hold that if a supervisor
performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment
action,[ Footnote 3 ] and if that
act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then
the employer is liable under USERRA. [ Footnote 4 ] III Applying our
analysis to the facts of this case, it is clear that the Seventh
Circuit’s judgment must be reversed. Both Mulally and Korenchuk
were acting within the scope of their employment when they took the
actions that allegedly caused Buck to fire Staub. A “reprimand …
for workplace failings” constitutes conduct within the scope of an
agent’s employment. Faragher v. Boca Raton , 524 U. S. 775 ,
798–799 (1998). As the Seventh Circuit recognized, there was
evidence that Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were motivated by
hostility toward Staub’s military obligations. There was also
evidence that Mulally’s and Korenchuk’s actions were causal factors
underlying Buck’s decision to fire Staub. Buck’s termination notice
expressly stated that Staub was terminated because he had “ignored”
the directive in the Corrective Action. Finally, there was evidence
that both Mulally and Korenchuk had the specific intent to cause
Staub to be terminated. Mulally stated she was trying to
“ ‘get rid of ’ ” Staub, and Korenchuk was aware
that Mulally was “ ‘out to get’ ” Staub. Moreover,
Korenchuk informed Buck, Proctor’s personnel officer responsible
for terminating employees, of Staub’s alleged noncompliance with
Mulally’s Corrective Action, and Buck fired Staub immediately
thereafter; a reasonable jury could infer that Korenchuk intended
that Staub be fired. The Seventh Circuit therefore erred in holding
that Proctor was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. It is less clear
whether the jury’s verdict should be reinstated or whether Proctor
is entitled to a new trial. The jury instruction did not hew
precisely to the rule we adopt today; it required only that the
jury find that “military status was a motivating factor in
[Proctor’s] decision to discharge him.” App. 68a. Whether the
variance between the instruction and our rule was harmless error or
should mandate a new trial is a matter the Seventh Circuit may
consider in the first instance. *  *  * The judgment of
the Seventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so
ordered. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case. Footnote
1 The term “cat’s paw” derives
from a fable conceived by Aesop, put into verse by La Fontaine in
1679, and injected into United States employment discrimination law
by Posner in 1990. See Shager v. Upjohn Co. , 913
F. 2d 398, 405 (CA7). In the fable, a monkey induces a cat by
flattery to extract roasting chestnuts from the fire. After the cat
has done so, burning its paws in the process, the monkey makes off
with the chestnuts and leaves the cat with nothing. A coda to the
fable (relevant only marginally, if at all, to employment law)
observes that the cat is similar to princes who, flattered by the
king, perform services on the king’s behalf and receive no
reward. Footnote
2 Under the traditional
doctrine of proximate cause, a tortfeasor is sometimes, but not
always, liable when he intends to cause an adverse action and a
different adverse action results. See Restatement (Second) Torts
§§435, 435B and Comment a (1963 and 1964). That issue is
not presented in this case since the record contains no evidence
that Mulally or Korenchuk intended any particular adverse action
other than Staub’s termination. Footnote
3 Under traditional tort law,
“ ‘intent’ … denote[s] that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it.” Id., §8A. Footnote
4 Needless to say, the employer
would be liable only when the supervisor acts within the scope of
his employment, or when the supervisor acts outside the scope of
his employment and liability would be imputed to the employer under
traditional agency principles. See Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U. S. 742 , 758 (1998). We express
no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a co-worker,
rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that
influenced the ultimate employment decision. We also observe that
Staub took advantage of Proctor’s grievance process, and we express
no view as to whether Proctor would have an affirmative defense if
he did not. Cf. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders , 542
U. S. 129 , 148–149 (2004). ALITO, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT STAUB V. PROCTOR HOSPITAL 562 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 09-400 VINCENT E. STAUB, PETITIONER v. PROCTOR
HOSPITAL

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the seventh circuit

															[March 1, 2011]

															   Justice Alito, with whom Justice
Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.

															   I agree with the Court that the
decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, but I would do
so based on the statutory text, rather than principles of agency
and tort law that do not speak directly to the question presented
here.

															   The relevant statutory provision states:

															“An employer shall be considered to have engaged in
[prohibited discrimination against a member of one of the uniformed
services] if the person’s membership … is a motivating factor
in the employer’s action , unless the employer can prove that
the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership
… .” 38 U. S. C. §4311(c)(1) (emphasis added).

															   For present purposes, the key
phrase is “a motivating factor in the employer’s action.” A
“motivating factor” is a factor that “provide[s] … a motive.” See
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1475 (1971) (defining
“motivate”). A “motive,” in turn, is “something within a person …
that incites him to action.” Ibid . Thus, in order for
discrimination to be “a motivating factor in [an] employer’s
action,” discrimination must be present “within,” i.e. , in
the mind of, the person who makes the decision to take that action.
And “the employer’s action” here is the decision to fire
petitioner. Thus, petitioner, in order to recover, was required to
show that discrimination motivated that action.

															   The Court, however, strays from the statutory
text by holding that it is enough for an employee to show that
discrimination motivated some other action and that this
latter action, in turn, caused the termination decision. That is
simply not what the statute says.

															   The Court fears this interpretation of the
statute would allow an employer to escape liability by assigning
formal decisionmaking authority to an officer who may merely
rubberstamp the recommendation of others who are motivated by
antimilitary animus. See ante , at 8. But fidelity to the
statutory text does not lead to this result. Where the officer with
formal decisionmaking authority merely rubberstamps the
recommendation of others, the employer, I would hold, has actually
delegated the decisionmaking responsibility to those whose
recommendation is rubberstamped. I would reach a similar conclusion
where the officer with the formal decisionmaking authority is put
on notice that adverse information about an employee may be based
on antimilitary animus but does not undertake an independent
investigation of the matter. In that situation, too, the employer
should be regarded as having delegated part of the decisionmaking
power to those who are responsible for memorializing and
transmitting the adverse information that is accepted without
examination. The same cannot be said, however, where the officer
with formal decisionmaking responsibility, having been alerted to
the possibility that adverse information may be tainted, undertakes
a reasonable investigation and finds insufficient evidence to
dispute the accuracy of that information.

															    Nor can the employer be said to have
“effectively delegated” decisionmaking authority any time a
decisionmaker “relies on facts provided by [a] biased supervisor.”
See ante , at 10. A decisionmaker who credits information
provided by another person—for example, a judge who credits the
testimony of a witness in a bench trial—does not thereby delegate a
portion of the decisionmaking authority to the person who provides
the information.

															   This interpretation of §4311(c)(1) heeds the
statutory text and would provide fair treatment for both employers
and employees who are members of the uniformed services. It would
also encourage employers to establish internal grievance procedures
similar to those that have been adopted following our decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U. S. 742 (1998),
and Faragher v. Boca Raton , 524 U. S. 775 (1998).
Such procedures would often provide relief for employees without
the need for litigation, and they would provide protection for
employers who proceed in good faith.

															   The Court’s contrary approach, by contrast, is
almost certain to lead to confusion and is likely to produce
results that will not serve the interests of either employers or
employees who are members of the uniformed services. The Court’s
holding will impose liability unfairly on employers who make every
effort to comply with the law, and it may have the perverse effect
of discouraging employers from hiring applicants who are members of
the Reserves or the National Guard. In addition, by leaving open
the possibility that an employer may be held liable if it
innocently takes into account adverse information provided, not by
a supervisor, but by a low-level employee, see ante , at
10–11, n. 4, the Court increases the confusion that its
decision is likely to produce.

															   For these reasons, I cannot accept the Court’s
interpretation of §4311(c)(1), but I nevertheless agree that the
decision below must be reversed. There was sufficient evidence to
support a finding that at least Korenchuk was actually delegated
part of the decisionmaking authority in this case. Korenchuk was
the head of the unit in which Staub worked and it was Korenchuk who
told Buck that Staub left his work area without informing his
supervisors. There was evidence that Korenchuk’s accusation formed
the basis of Buck’s decision to fire Staub, and that Buck simply
accepted the accusation at face value. According to one version of
events, Buck fired Staub immediately after Korenchuk informed her
of Staub’s alleged misconduct, and she cited only that misconduct
in the termination notice provided to Staub. See 5 Record 128–129,
267–268, 380–386; App. 74a. All of this is enough to show that
Korenchuk was in effect delegated some of Buck’s termination
authority. There was also evidence from which it may be inferred
that displeasure with Staub’s Reserve responsibilities was a
motivating factor in Korenchuk’s actions.

															 See 5 Record 343–344 (testimony that
Korenchuk made negative remarks about Staub’s Reserve duties before
firing him in 1998); id. , at 124–126, 352 (testimony that
Korenchuk informed Staub of the revenue lost while he was on Active
Duty in 2003, that Korenchuk was aware in January 2004 that Staub
might be called to Active Duty again, and that “[b]udget was a big
issue with [Korenchuk]”).