U.S. Supreme Court Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640 (1983) Illinois v. Lafayette No. 81-1859 Argued April 20, 1983 Decided June 20, 1983 462
U.S. 640 CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT Syllabus After respondent was arrested for disturbing the peace, he was
taken to the police station. There, without obtaining a warrant and
in the process of booking him and inventorying his possessions, the
police removed the contents of a shoulder bag respondent had been
carrying, and found amphetamine pills. Respondent was subsequently
charged with violating the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, and,
at a pretrial hearing, the trial court ordered suppression of the
pills. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the
shoulder bag search did not constitute a valid search incident to a
lawful arrest or a valid inventory search of respondent's
belongings. Held: The search of respondent's shoulder bag was a
valid inventory search. Pp. 462 U. S.
643 -648.

															(a) Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, it is reasonable for
police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful
arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police
station incident to booking and jailing the suspect. The
justification for such searches does not rest on probable cause,
and hence the absence of a warrant is immaterial to the
reasonableness of the search. Here, every consideration of orderly
police administration -- protection of a suspect's property,
deterrence of false claims of theft against the police, security,
and identification of the suspect -- benefiting both the police and
the public points toward the appropriateness of the examination of
respondent's shoulder bag. Pp. 462 U. S.
643 -647.

															(b) The fact that the protection of the public and of
respondent's property might have been achieved by less intrusive
means does not, in itself, render the search unreasonable. Even if
some less intrusive means existed, it would be unreasonable to
expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make
fine and subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items
may be searched, and which must be sealed without examination as a
unit. Pp. 462 U. S.
647 -648.

															99 Ill.App.3d 830, 425 N.E.2d 1383, reversed and remanded.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 462 U. S.
649 Page 462 U. S. 641 CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The question presented is whether, at the time an arrested
person arrives at a police station, the police may, without
obtaining a warrant, search a shoulder bag carried by that
person. I On September 1, 1980, at about 10 p.m., Officer Maurice Mietzner
of the Kankakee City Police arrived at the Town Cinema in Kankakee,
Ill., in response to a call about a disturbance. There he found
respondent involved in an altercation with the theater manager. He
arrested respondent for disturbing the peace, handcuffed him, and
took him to the police station. Respondent carried a purse-type
shoulder bag on the trip to the station.

															At the police station, respondent was taken to the booking room;
there, Officer Mietzner removed the handcuffs from respondent and
ordered him to empty his pockets and place Page 462 U. S. 642 the contents on the counter. After doing so, respondent took a
package of cigarettes from his shoulder bag and placed the bag on
the counter. Mietzner then removed the contents of the bag, and
found 10 amphetamine pills inside the plastic wrap of a cigarette
package.

															Respondent was subsequently charged with violating § 402(b) of
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 56 1/2,
� 1402(b) (1981), on the basis of the controlled substances found
in his shoulder bag. A pretrial suppression hearing was held at
which the State argued that the search of the shoulder bag was a
valid inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976). Officer Mietzner testified that he examined the bag's
contents because it was standard procedure to inventory
"everything" in the possession of an arrested person. App. 15, 16.
He testified that he was not seeking and did not expect to find
drugs or weapons when he searched the bag, and he conceded that the
shoulder bag was small enough that it could have been placed and
sealed in a bag, container, or locker for protective purposes. Id. at 15. After the hearing, but before any ruling, the
State submitted a brief in which it argued for the first time that
the search was valid as a delayed search incident to arrest.
Thereafter, the trial court ordered the suppression of the
amphetamine pills. Id. at 22.

															On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. 99 Ill.App.3d
830, 425 N.E.2d 1383 (3d Dist.1981). It first held that the State
had waived the argument that the search was incident to a valid
arrest by failing to raise that argument at the suppression
hearing. Id. at 832, 425 N.E.2d at 1385. However, the
court went on to discuss and reject the State's argument:

															"[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the State has not
waived this argument, the stationhouse search of the shoulder bag
did not constitute a valid search incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at 833, 425 N.E.2d at 1385.

															The state court also held that the search was not a valid
inventory of respondent's belongings. It purported to
distinguish Page 462 U. S. 643 South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, on the basis that
there is a greater privacy interest in a purse-type shoulder bag
than in an automobile, and that the State's legitimate interests
could have been met in a less intrusive manner, by "sealing [the
shoulder bag] within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a
secured locker." 99 Ill.App.3d at 834-835, 425 N.E.2d at 1386. The
Illinois court concluded:

															"Therefore, the postponed warrantless search of the
[respondent's] shoulder bag was neither incident to his lawful
arrest nor a valid inventory of his belongings, and thus, violated
the fourth amendment." Id. at 835, 425 N.E.2d at 1386.

															The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary review. App. to
Pet. for Cert. lb. We granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 986 (1982),
because of the frequency with which this question confronts police
and courts, and we reverse. II The question here is whether, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, it is reasonable for police to search the personal
effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine
administrative procedure at a police station house incident to
booking and jailing the suspect. The justification for such
searches does not rest on probable cause, and hence the absence of
a warrant is immaterial to the reasonableness of the search.
Indeed, we have previously established that the inventory search
constitutes a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement. See South Dakota v. Opperman, supra. The Illinois court
and respondent rely on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977),
and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979); in the former, we noted that "probable cause to search is
irrelevant" in inventory searches, and went on to state:

															"This is so because the salutary functions of a warrant simply
have no application in that context; the constitutional Page 462 U. S. 644 reasonableness of inventory searches must be determined on other
bases."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 10 , n.
5. [ Footnote 1 ] A so-called
inventory search is not an independent legal concept, but rather an
incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding
incarceration. To determine whether the search of respondent's
shoulder bag was unreasonable, we must "balanc[e] its intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 , 440 U. S. 654 (1979).

															In order to see an inventory search in proper perspective, it is
necessary to study the evolution of interests along the continuum
from arrest to incarceration. We have held that, immediately upon
arrest, an officer may lawfully search the person of an arrestee, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 (1973); he may also search the area within the
arrestee's immediate control, Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969). We explained the basis for this doctrine in United
States v. Robinson, supra, where we said:

															"A police officer's determination as to how and where to search
the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not
require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each
step in the search. The authority to search the person incident to
a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and
to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later
decide was the probability in a particular arrest Page 462 U. S. 645 situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon
the person of the suspect. A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of
the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that, in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a
full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable'
search under that Amendment. "

															414 U.S. at 414 U. S. 235 (emphasis added).

															An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station
or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station, that is
no more than a continuation of the custody inherent in the arrest
status. Nonetheless, the factors justifying a search of the person
and personal effects of an arrestee upon reaching a police station
but prior to being placed in confinement are somewhat different
from the factors justifying an immediate search at the time and
place of arrest.

															The governmental interests underlying a station-house search of
the arrestee's person and possessions may in some circumstances be
even greater than those supporting a search immediately following
arrest. Consequently, the scope of a station-house search will
often vary from that made at the time of arrest. Police conduct
that would be impractical or unreasonable -- or embarrassingly
intrusive -- on the street can more readily -- and privately -- be
performed at the station. For example, the interests supporting a
search incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an
arrestee on the street, but the practical necessities of routine
jail administration may even justify taking a prisoner's clothes
before confining him, although that step would be rare. This was
made clear in United States v. Edwards, 415 U.
S. 800 , 415 U. S. 804 (1974):

															"With or without probable cause, the authorities were entitled
[at the station house] not only to search [the Page 462 U. S. 646 arrestee's] clothing but also to take it from him and keep it in
official custody. [ Footnote
2 ]"

															At the station house, it is entirely proper for police to remove
and list or inventory property found on the person or in the
possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed. A range of
governmental interests supports an inventory process. It is not
unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal
property taken from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons
have been known to make false claims regarding what was taken from
their possession at the station house. A standardized procedure for
making a list or inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the
station house not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft
or careless handling of articles taken from the arrested person.
Arrested persons have also been known to injure themselves -- or
others -- with belts, knives, drugs, or other items on their person
while being detained. Dangerous instrumentalities -- such as razor
blades, bombs, or weapons -- can be concealed in innocent-looking
articles taken from the arrestee's possession. The bare recital of
these mundane realities justifies reasonable measures by police to
limit these risks either while the items are in police possession
or at the time they are returned to the arrestee upon his release.
Examining all the items removed from the arrestee's person or
possession and listing or inventorying them is an entirely
reasonable administrative procedure. It is immaterial whether the
police actually fear any particular package or container; the need
to protect against such risks arises independently of a particular
officer's subjective concerns. See United States v. Robinson,
supra, at 414 U. S. 235 .
Finally, inspection of an arrestee's personal property may assist
the police in ascertaining or verifying his identity. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3, pp. 306-307 (1978). In
short, Page 462 U. S. 647 every consideration of orderly police administration benefiting
both police and the public points toward the appropriateness of the
examination of respondent's shoulder bag prior to his
incarceration.

															Our prior cases amply support this conclusion. In South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), we upheld a search of the contents of the glove compartment
of an abandoned automobile lawfully impounded by the police. We
held that the search was reasonable because it served legitimate
governmental interests that outweighed the individual's privacy
interests in the contents of his car. Those measures protected the
owner's property while it was in the custody of the police, and
protected police against possible false claims of theft. We found
no need to consider the existence of less intrusive means of
protecting the police and the property in their custody -- such as
locking the car and impounding it in safe storage under guard.
Similarly, standardized inventory procedures are appropriate to
serve legitimate governmental interests at stake here.

															The Illinois court held that the search of respondent's shoulder
bag was unreasonable because

															"preservation of the defendant's property and protection of
police from claims of lost or stolen property 'could have been
achieved in a less intrusive manner.' For example, . . . the
defendant's shoulder bag could easily have been secured by sealing
it within a plastic bag or box and placing it in a secured
locker."

															99 Ill.App.3d at 835, 425 N.E.2d at 1386 (citation omitted).
Perhaps so, but the real question is not what "could have been
achieved," but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps; it
is not our function to write a manual on administering routine,
neutral procedures of the station house. Our role is to assure
against violations of the Constitution.

															The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does
not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative
"less intrusive" means. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973), for example, we upheld the search of Page 462 U. S. 648 the trunk of a car to find a revolver suspected of being there.
We rejected the contention that the public could equally well have
been protected by the posting of a guard over the automobile. In
language equally applicable to this case, we held,

															"[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in the
abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does
not, by itself, render the search unreasonable." Id. at 413 U. S. 447 . See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S. 557 ,
n. 12 (1976). We are hardly in a position to second-guess police
departments as to what practical administrative method will best
deter theft by, and false claims against, its employees and
preserve the security of the station house. It is evident that a
station-house search of every item carried on or by a person who
has lawfully been taken into custody by the police will amply serve
the important and legitimate governmental interests involved.

															Even if less intrusive means existed of protecting some
particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect
police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and
subtle distinctions in deciding which containers or items may be
searched and which must be sealed as a unit. Only recently, in New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), we stated that

															"'[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.'" Id. at 453 U. S. 458 ,
quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.
S. 200 , 442 U. S.
213 -214 (1979). See also United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 , 456 U. S. 821 (1982).

															Applying these principles, we hold that it is not "unreasonable"
for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or
article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory
procedures. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 462 U. S. 649 The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed, and
the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															See also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.
S. 800 (1974). In that case, we addressed Cooper v.
California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967), where the Court sustained a warrantless search of an
automobile that occurred a week after its owner had been arrested.
We explained Cooper in the following manner:

															"It was no answer to say that the police could have obtained a
search warrant, for the Court held the test to be not whether it
was reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the
search itself was reasonable, which it was."

															415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 807 (emphasis added).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															We were not addressing in Edwards, and do not discuss
here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may
or may not be appropriate.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The record is unclear as to whether respondent was to have been
incarcerated after being booked for disturbing the peace. That is
an appropriate inquiry on remand.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring in
the judgment.

															I agree that the police do not need a warrant or probable cause
to conduct an inventory search prior to incarcerating a suspect,
and I therefore concur in the judgment. The practical necessities
of securing persons and property in a jailhouse setting justify an
inventory search as part of the standard procedure incident to
incarceration.

															A very different case would be presented if the State had relied
solely on the fact of arrest to justify the search of respondent's
shoulder bag. A warrantless search incident to arrest must be
justified by a need to remove weapons or prevent the destruction of
evidence. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.
S. 218 , 414 U. S. 251 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 , 395 U. S. 763 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56 , 339 U. S. 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Officer Mietzner did not in
fact deem it necessary to search the bag when he arrested
respondent, and I seriously doubt that such a search would have
been lawful. A search at the time of respondent's arrest could not
have been justified by a need to prevent the destruction of
evidence, for there is no evidence or fruits of the offense --
disturbing the peace -- of which respondent was suspected.
Moreover, although a concern about weapons might have justified
seizure of the bag, such a concern could not have justified the
further step of searching the bag following its seizure. Cf.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 , 433 U. S. 15 (1977); id. at 433 U. S. 17 , and
n. 2 (BRENNAN, J., concurring).