NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 19–715 and 19–760

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., PETITIONERS

															19–715 v. MAZARS USA, LLP, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

															DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., PETITIONERS

															19–760 v. DEUTSCHE BANK AG, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[July 9, 2020]

															Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court.

															Over the course of five days in April 2019,
three committees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued
four subpoenas seeking information about the finances of President
Donald J. Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. We have
held that the House has authority under the Constitution to issue
subpoenas to assist it in carrying out its legislative
responsibilities. The House asserts that the financial information
sought here—encompassing a decade’s worth of transactions by the
President and his family—will help guide legislative reform in
areas ranging from money laundering and terrorism to foreign
involvement in U. S. elections. The President contends that
the House lacked a valid legislative aim and instead sought these
records to harass him, expose personal matters, and conduct law
enforcement activities beyond its authority. The question presented
is whether the subpoenas exceed the authority of the House under
the Constitution.

															We have never addressed a congressional subpoena
for the President’s information. Two hundred years ago, it was
established that Presidents may be subpoenaed during a federal
criminal proceeding, United States v. Burr , 25 F.
Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, Cir. J.), and
earlier today we extended that ruling to state criminal
proceedings, Trump v. Vance , ante , p. ___.
Nearly fifty years ago, we held that a federal prosecutor could
obtain information from a President despite assertions of executive
privilege, United States v. Nixon , 418
U.S. 683 (1974), and more recently we ruled that a private
litigant could subject a President to a damages suit and
appropriate discovery obligations in federal court, Clinton v. Jones , 520 U.S.
681 (1997).

															This case is different. Here the President’s
information is sought not by prosecutors or private parties in
connection with a particular judicial proceeding, but by committees
of Congress that have set forth broad legislative objectives.
Congress and the President—the two political branches established
by the Constitution—have an ongoing relationship that the Framers
intended to feature both rivalry and reciprocity. See The
Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer , 343 U.S.
579 , 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). That distinctive
aspect necessarily informs our analysis of the question before
us.

															I

															A

															Each of the three committees sought
overlapping sets of financial documents, but each supplied
different justifications for the requests.

															The House Committee on Financial Services issued
two subpoenas, both on April 11, 2019. App. 128, 154, 226. The
first, issued to Deutsche Bank, seeks the financial information of
the President, his children, their immediate family members, and
several affiliated business entities. Specifically, the subpoena
seeks any document related to account activity, due diligence,
foreign transactions, business statements, debt schedules,
statements of net worth, tax returns, and suspicious activity
identified by Deutsche Bank. The second, issued to Capital One,
demands similar financial information with respect to more than a
dozen business entities associated with the President. The Deutsche
Bank subpoena requests materials from “2010 through the present,”
and the Capital One subpoena covers “2016 through the present,” but
both subpoenas impose no time limitations for certain documents,
such as those connected to account openings and due diligence. Id., at 128, 155.

															According to the House, the Financial Services
Committee issued these subpoenas pursuant to House Resolution 206,
which called for “efforts to close loopholes that allow corruption,
terrorism, and money laundering to infiltrate our country’s
financial system.” H. Res. 206, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., 5
(Mar. 13, 2019). Such loopholes, the resolution explained, had
allowed “illicit money, including from Russian oligarchs,” to flow
into the United States through “anonymous shell companies” using
investments such as “luxury high-end real estate.” Id. , at
3. The House also invokes the oversight plan of the Financial
Services Committee, which stated that the Committee intends to
review banking regulation and “examine the implementation,
effectiveness, and enforcement” of laws designed to prevent money
laundering and the financing of terrorism. H. R. Rep. No.
116–40, p. 84 (2019). The plan further provided that the Committee
would “consider proposals to prevent the abuse of the financial
system” and “address any vulnerabilities identified” in the real
estate market. Id. , at 85.

															On the same day as the Financial Services
Committee, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued an
identical subpoena to Deutsche Bank—albeit for different reasons.
According to the House, the Intelligence Committee subpoenaed
Deutsche Bank as part of an investigation into foreign efforts to
undermine the U. S. political process. Committee Chairman Adam
Schiff had described that investigation in a previous statement,
explaining that the Committee was examining alleged attempts by
Russia to influence the 2016 election; potential links between
Russia and the President’s campaign; and whether the President and
his associates had been compromised by foreign actors or interests.
Press Release, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Chairman Schiff Statement on House Intelligence Committee
Investigation (Feb. 6, 2019). Chairman Schiff added that the
Committee planned “to develop legislation and policy reforms to
ensure the U. S. government is better positioned to counter
future efforts to undermine our political process and national
security.” Ibid. Four days after the Financial Services and
Intelligence Committees, the House Committee on Oversight and
Reform issued another subpoena, this time to the President’s
personal accounting firm, Mazars USA, LLP. The subpoena demanded
information related to the President and several affiliated
business entities from 2011 through 2018, including statements of
financial condition, independent auditors’ reports, financial
reports, underlying source documents, and communications between
Mazars and the President or his businesses. The subpoena also
requested all engagement agreements and contracts “[w]ithout regard
to time.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in 19–715, p. 230.

															Chairman Elijah Cummings explained the basis for
the subpoena in a memorandum to the Oversight Committee. According
to the chairman, recent testimony by the President’s former
personal attorney Michael Cohen, along with several documents
prepared by Mazars and supplied by Cohen, raised questions about
whether the President had accurately represented his financial
affairs. Chairman Cummings asserted that the Committee had “full
authority to investigate” whether the President: (1) “may have
engaged in illegal conduct before and during his tenure in office,”
(2) “has undisclosed conflicts of interest that may impair his
ability to make impartial policy decisions,” (3) “is complying with
the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution,” and (4) “has
accurately reported his finances to the Office of Government Ethics
and other federal entities.” App. in No. 19–5142 (CADC), p. 107.
“The Committee’s interest in these matters,” Chairman Cummings
concluded, “informs its review of multiple laws and legislative
proposals under our jurisdiction.” Ibid. B

															Petitioners—the President in his personal
capacity, along with his children and affiliated businesses—filed
two suits challenging the subpoenas. They contested the subpoena
issued by the Oversight Committee in the District Court for the
District of Columbia ( Mazars , No. 19–715), and the subpoenas
issued by the Financial Services and Intelligence Committees in the
Southern District of New York ( Deutsche Bank , No. 19–760).
In both cases, petitioners contended that the subpoenas lacked a
legitimate legislative purpose and violated the separation of
powers. The President did not, however, resist the subpoenas by
arguing that any of the requested records were protected by
executive privilege. For relief, petitioners asked for declaratory
judgments and injunctions preventing Mazars and the banks from
complying with the subpoenas. Although named as defendants, Mazars
and the banks took no positions on the legal issues in these cases,
and the House committees intervened to defend the subpoenas.

															Petitioners’ challenges failed. In Mazars , the District Court granted judgment for the House,
380 F. Supp. 3d 76 (DC 2019), and the D. C. Circuit
affirmed, 940 F.3d 710 (2019). In upholding the subpoena issued by
the Oversight Committee to Mazars, the Court of Appeals found that
the subpoena served a “valid legislative purpose” because the
requested information was relevant to reforming financial
disclosure requirements for Presidents and presidential candidates. Id. , at 726–742 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judge
Rao dissented. As she saw it, the “gravamen” of the subpoena was
investigating alleged illegal conduct by the President, and the
House must pursue such wrongdoing through its impeachment powers,
not its legislative powers. Id. , at 773–774. Otherwise, the
House could become a “roving inquisition over a co-equal branch of
government.” Id. , at 748. The D. C. Circuit denied
rehearing en banc over several more dissents. 941 F.3d 1180,
1180–1182 (2019).

															In Deutsche Bank , the District Court
denied a preliminary injunction, 2019 WL 2204898 (SDNY, May 22,
2019), and the Second Circuit affirmed “in substantial part,” 943
F.3d 627, 676 (2019). While acknowledging that the subpoenas are
“surely broad in scope,” the Court of Appeals held that the
Intelligence Committee properly issued its subpoena to Deutsche
Bank as part of an investigation into alleged foreign influence
over petitioners and Russian interference with the U. S.
political process. Id. , at 650, 658–659. That investigation,
the court concluded, could inform legislation to combat foreign
meddling and strengthen national security. Id. , at 658–659,
and n. 59.

															As to the subpoenas issued by the Financial
Services Committee to Deutsche Bank and Capital One, the Court of
Appeals concluded that they were adequately related to potential
legislation on money laundering, terrorist financing, and the
global movement of illicit funds through the real estate market. Id. , at 656–659. Rejecting the contention that the subpoenas
improperly targeted the President, the court explained in part that
the President’s financial dealings with Deutsche Bank made it
“appropriate” for the House to use him as a “case study” to
determine “whether new legislation is needed.” Id. , at
662–663, n. 67.[ 1 ]

															Judge Livingston dissented, seeing no “clear
reason why a congressional investigation aimed generally at closing
regulatory loopholes in the banking system need focus on over a
decade of financial information regarding this President, his
family, and his business affairs.” Id. , at 687.

															We granted certiorari in both cases and stayed
the judgments below pending our decision. 589 U. S. ___
(2019).

															II

															A

															The question presented is whether the
subpoenas exceed the authority of the House under the Constitution.
Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presidential
documents have not ended up in court. Instead, they have been
hashed out in the “hurly-burly, the give-and-take of the political
process between the legislative and the executive.” Hearings on S.
2170 et al. before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 87 (1975) (A. Scalia, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel).

															That practice began with George Washington and
the early Congress. In 1792, a House committee requested Executive
Branch documents pertaining to General St. Clair’s campaign against
the Indians in the Northwest Territory, which had concluded in an
utter rout of federal forces when they were caught by surprise near
the present-day border between Ohio and Indiana. See T. Taylor,
Grand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations 19–23
(1955). Since this was the first such request from Congress,
President Washington called a Cabinet meeting, wishing to take care
that his response “be rightly conducted” because it could “become a
precedent.” 1 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 189 (P. Ford ed.
1892).

															The meeting, attended by the likes of Alexander
Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Henry Knox, ended
with the Cabinet of “one mind”: The House had authority to
“institute inquiries” and “call for papers” but the President could
“exercise a discretion” over disclosures, “communicat[ing] such
papers as the public good would permit” and “refus[ing]” the rest. Id. , at 189–190. President Washington then dispatched
Jefferson to speak to individual congressmen and “bring them by
persuasion into the right channel.” Id. , at 190. The
discussions were apparently fruitful, as the House later narrowed
its request and the documents were supplied without recourse to the
courts. See 3 Annals of Cong. 536 (1792); Taylor, supra , at
24.

															Jefferson, once he became President, followed
Washington’s precedent. In early 1807, after Jefferson had
disclosed that “sundry persons” were conspiring to invade Spanish
territory in North America with a private army, 16 Annals of Cong.
686–687, the House requested that the President produce any
information in his possession touching on the conspiracy (except
for information that would harm the public interest), id. ,
at 336, 345, 359. Jefferson chose not to divulge the entire
“voluminous” correspondence on the subject, explaining that much of
it was “private” or mere “rumors” and “neither safety nor justice”
permitted him to “expos[e] names” apart from identifying the
conspiracy’s “principal actor”: Aaron Burr. Id. , at 39–40.
Instead of the entire correspondence, Jefferson sent Congress
particular documents and a special message summarizing the
conspiracy. Id. , at 39–43; see generally Vance , ante , at 3–4. Neither Congress nor the President asked the
Judiciary to intervene.[ 2 ]

															Ever since, congressional demands for the
President’s information have been resolved by the political
branches without involving this Court. The Reagan and Clinton
presidencies provide two modern examples:

															During the Reagan administration, a House
subcommittee subpoenaed all documents related to the Department of
the Interior’s decision whether to designate Canada a reciprocal
country for purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act. President
Reagan directed that certain documents be withheld because they
implicated his confidential relationship with subordinates. While
withholding those documents, the administration made “repeated
efforts” at accommodation through limited disclosures and testimony
over a period of several months. 6 Op. of Office of Legal Counsel
751, 780 (1982). Unsatisfied, the subcommittee and its parent
committee eventually voted to hold the Secretary of the Interior in
contempt, and an innovative compromise soon followed: All documents
were made available, but only for one day with no photocopying,
minimal notetaking, and no participation by non-Members of
Congress. Id. , at 780–781; see H. R. Rep. No. 97–898, pp.
3–8 (1982).

															In 1995, a Senate committee subpoenaed notes
taken by a White House attorney at a meeting with President
Clinton’s personal lawyers concerning the Whitewater controversy.
The President resisted the subpoena on the ground that the notes
were protected by attorney-client privilege, leading to “long and
protracted” negotiations and a Senate threat to seek judicial
enforcement of the subpoena. S. Rep. No. 104–204, pp. 16–17
(1996). Eventually the parties reached an agreement, whereby
President Clinton avoided the threatened suit, agreed to turn over
the notes, and obtained the Senate’s concession that he had not
waived any privileges. Ibid. ; see L. Fisher, Congressional
Research Service, Congressional Investigations: Subpoenas and
Contempt Power 16–18 (2003).

															Congress and the President maintained this
tradition of negotiation and compromise—without the involvement of
this Court—until the present dispute. Indeed, from President
Washington until now, we have never considered a dispute over a
congressional subpoena for the President’s records. And, according
to the parties, the appellate courts have addressed such a subpoena
only once, when a Senate committee subpoenaed President Nixon
during the Watergate scandal. See infra , at 13 (discussing Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon , 498 F.2d 725 (CADC 1974) (en banc)). In that case,
the court refused to enforce the subpoena, and the Senate did not
seek review by this Court.

															This dispute therefore represents a significant
departure from historical practice. Although the parties agree that
this particular controversy is justiciable, we recognize that it is
the first of its kind to reach this Court; that disputes of this
sort can raise important issues concerning relations between the
branches; that related disputes involving congressional efforts to
seek official Executive Branch information recur on a regular
basis, including in the context of deeply partisan controversy; and
that Congress and the Executive have nonetheless managed for over
two centuries to resolve such disputes among themselves without the
benefit of guidance from us. Such longstanding practice “ ‘is a
consideration of great weight’ ” in cases concerning “the
allocation of power between [the] two elected branches of
Government,” and it imposes on us a duty of care to ensure that we
not needlessly disturb “the compromises and working arrangements
that [those] branches . . . themselves have reached.” NLRB v. Noel Canning , 573 U.S.
513 , 524–526 (2014) (quoting The Pocket Veto Case , 279 U.S.
655 , 689 (1929)). With that in mind, we turn to the question
presented.

															B

															Congress has no enumerated constitutional
power to conduct investigations or issue subpoenas, but we have
held that each House has power “to secure needed information” in
order to legislate. McGrain v. Daugherty , 273 U.S.
135 , 161 (1927). This “power of inquiry—with process to enforce
it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.” Id. , at 174. Without information, Congress would
be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate “wisely or
effectively.” Id. , at 175. The congressional power to obtain
information is “broad” and “indispensable.” Watkins v. United States , 354 U.S.
178 , 187, 215 (1957). It encompasses inquiries into the
administration of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and
“surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for
the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.” Id. ,
at 187.

															Because this power is “justified solely as an
adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to several
limitations. Id. , at 197. Most importantly, a congressional
subpoena is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of,
a legitimate task of the Congress.” Id. , at 187. The
subpoena must serve a “valid legislative purpose,” Quinn v. United States , 349 U.S.
155 , 161 (1955); it must “concern[ ] a subject on which
legislation ‘could be had,’ ” Eastland v. United States
Servicemen’s Fund , 421 U.S.
491 , 506 (1975) (quoting McGrain , 273 U. S., at
177).

															Furthermore, Congress may not issue a subpoena
for the purpose of “law enforcement,” because “those powers are
assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the
Judiciary.” Quinn , 349 U. S., at 161. Thus Congress may
not use subpoenas to “try” someone “before [a] committee for any
crime or wrongdoing.” McGrain , 273 U. S., at 179.
Congress has no “ ‘general’ power to inquire into private
affairs and compel disclosures,” id. , at 173–174, and “there
is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure,” Watkins , 354 U. S., at 200. “Investigations conducted
solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to
‘punish’ those investigated are indefensible.” Id. , at
187.

															Finally, recipients of legislative subpoenas
retain their constitutional rights throughout the course of an
investigation. See id. , at 188, 198. And recipients have
long been understood to retain common law and constitutional
privileges with respect to certain materials, such as
attorney-client communications and governmental communications
protected by executive privilege. See, e.g. , Congressional
Research Service, supra, at 16–18 (attorney-client
privilege); Senate Select Committee , 498 F. 2d, at 727,
730–731 (executive privilege).

															C

															The President contends, as does the Solicitor
General appearing on behalf of the United States, that the usual
rules for congressional subpoenas do not govern here because the
President’s papers are at issue. They argue for a more demanding
standard based in large part on cases involving the Nixon
tapes—recordings of conversations between President Nixon and close
advisers discussing the break-in at the Democratic National
Committee’s headquarters at the Watergate complex. The tapes were
subpoenaed by a Senate committee and the Special Prosecutor
investigating the break-in, prompting President Nixon to invoke
executive privilege and leading to two cases addressing the showing
necessary to require the President to comply with the subpoenas.
See Nixon , 418
U.S. 683 ; Senate Select Committee , 498 F.2d 725.

															Those cases, the President and the Solicitor
General now contend, establish the standard that should govern the
House subpoenas here. Quoting Nixon , the President asserts
that the House must establish a “demonstrated, specific need” for
the financial information, just as the Watergate special prosecutor
was required to do in order to obtain the tapes. 418 U. S., at
713. And drawing on Senate Select Committee —the D. C.
Circuit case refusing to enforce the Senate subpoena for the
tapes—the President and the Solicitor General argue that the House
must show that the financial information is “demonstrably critical”
to its legislative purpose. 498 F. 2d, at 731.

															We disagree that these demanding standards apply
here. Unlike the cases before us, Nixon and Senate Select
Committee involved Oval Office communications over which the
President asserted executive privilege. That privilege safeguards
the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within
the Executive Branch; it is “fundamental to the operation of
Government.” Nixon , 418 U. S., at 708. As a result,
information subject to executive privilege deserves “the greatest
protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.” Id. , at 715. We decline to transplant that protection root
and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information,
which by definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch
deliberations.

															The standards proposed by the President and the
Solicitor General—if applied outside the context of privileged
information—would risk seriously impeding Congress in carrying out
its responsibilities. The President and the Solicitor General would
apply the same exacting standards to all subpoenas for the
President’s information, without recognizing distinctions between
privileged and nonprivileged information, between official and
personal information, or between various legislative objectives.
Such a categorical approach would represent a significant departure
from the longstanding way of doing business between the branches,
giving short shrift to Congress’s important interests in conducting
inquiries to obtain the information it needs to legislate
effectively. Confounding the legislature in that effort would be
contrary to the principle that:

															“It is the proper duty of a representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk
much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice,
and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless
Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the
acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the
government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being
served.” United States v. Rumely , 345 U.S.
41 , 43 (1953) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															Legislative inquiries might involve the
President in appropriate cases; as noted, Congress’s
responsibilities extend to “every affair of government.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
President’s approach does not take adequate account of these
significant congressional interests, we do not adopt it.

															D

															The House meanwhile would have us ignore that
these suits involve the President. Invoking our precedents
concerning investigations that did not target the President’s
papers, the House urges us to uphold its subpoenas because they
“relate[ ] to a valid legislative purpose” or “concern[ ]
a subject on which legislation could be had.” Brief for Respondent
46 (quoting Barenblatt v. United States , 360 U.S.
109 , 127 (1959), and Eastland , 421 U. S., at 506).
That approach is appropriate, the House argues, because the cases
before us are not “momentous separation-of-powers disputes.” Brief
for Respondent 1.

															Largely following the House’s lead, the courts
below treated these cases much like any other, applying precedents
that do not involve the President’s papers. See 943 F. 3d, at
656–670; 940 F. 3d, at 724–742. The Second Circuit concluded
that “this case does not concern separation of powers” because the
House seeks personal documents and the President sued in his
personal capacity. 943 F. 3d, at 669. The D. C. Circuit,
for its part, recognized that “separation-of-powers concerns still
linger in the air,” and therefore it did not afford deference to
the House. 940 F. 3d, at 725–726. But, because the House
sought only personal documents, the court concluded that the case
“present[ed] no direct interbranch dispute.” Ibid. The House’s approach fails to take adequate
account of the significant separation of powers issues raised by
congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. Congress
and the President have an ongoing institutional relationship as the
“opposite and rival” political branches established by the
Constitution. The Federalist No. 51, at 349. As a result,
congressional subpoenas directed at the President differ markedly
from congressional subpoenas we have previously reviewed, e.g. , Barenblatt , 360 U. S., at 127; Eastland , 421 U. S., at 506, and they bear little
resemblance to criminal subpoenas issued to the President in the
course of a specific investigation, see Vance , ante ,
p. ___; Nixon , 418
U.S. 683 . Unlike those subpoenas, congressional subpoenas for
the President’s information unavoidably pit the political branches
against one another. Cf. In re Sealed Case , 121 F.3d
729, 753 (CADC 1997) (“The President’s ability to withhold
information from Congress implicates different constitutional
considerations than the President’s ability to withhold evidence in
judicial proceedings.”).

															Far from accounting for separation of powers
concerns, the House’s approach aggravates them by leaving
essentially no limits on the congressional power to subpoena the
President’s personal records. Any personal paper possessed by a
President could potentially “relate to” a conceivable subject of
legislation, for Congress has broad legislative powers that touch a
vast number of subjects. Brief for Respondent 46. The President’s
financial records could relate to economic reform, medical records
to health reform, school transcripts to education reform, and so
on. Indeed, at argument, the House was unable to identify any type of information that lacks some relation to
potential legislation. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 52–53, 62–65.

															Without limits on its subpoena powers, Congress
could “exert an imperious controul” over the Executive Branch and
aggrandize itself at the President’s expense, just as the Framers
feared. The Federalist No. 71, at 484 (A. Hamilton); see id. , No. 48, at 332–333 (J. Madison); Bowsher v. Synar , 478 U.S.
714 , 721–722, 727 (1986). And a limitless subpoena power would
transform the “established practice” of the political branches. Noel Canning , 573 U. S., at 524 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Instead of negotiating over information requests,
Congress could simply walk away from the bargaining table and
compel compliance in court.

															The House and the courts below suggest that
these separation of powers concerns are not fully implicated by the
particular subpoenas here, but we disagree. We would have to be
“blind” not to see what “[a]ll others can see and understand”: that
the subpoenas do not represent a run-of-the-mill legislative effort
but rather a clash between rival branches of government over
records of intense political interest for all involved. Rumely , 345 U. S., at 44 (quoting Child Labor Tax
Case , 259 U.S.
20 , 37 (1922) (Taft, C. J.)).

															The interbranch conflict here does not vanish
simply because the subpoenas seek personal papers or because the
President sued in his personal capacity. The President is the only
person who alone composes a branch of government. As a result,
there is not always a clear line between his personal and official
affairs. “The interest of the man” is often “connected with the
constitutional rights of the place.” The Federalist No. 51, at 349.
Given the close connection between the Office of the President and
its occupant, congressional demands for the President’s papers can
implicate the relationship between the branches regardless whether
those papers are personal or official. Either way, a demand may aim
to harass the President or render him “complaisan[t] to the humors
of the Legislature.” Id. , No. 71, at 483. In fact, a
subpoena for personal papers may pose a heightened risk of such
impermissible purposes, precisely because of the documents’
personal nature and their less evident connection to a legislative
task. No one can say that the controversy here is less significant
to the relationship between the branches simply because it involves
personal papers. Quite the opposite. That appears to be what makes
the matter of such great consequence to the President and
Congress.

															In addition, separation of powers concerns are
no less palpable here simply because the subpoenas were issued to
third parties. Congressional demands for the President’s
information present an interbranch conflict no matter where the
information is held—it is, after all, the President’s information.
Were it otherwise, Congress could sidestep constitutional
requirements any time a President’s information is entrusted to a
third party—as occurs with rapidly increasing frequency. Cf. Carpenter v. United States , 585 U. S. ___, ___,
___ (2018) (slip op., at 15, 17). Indeed, Congress could declare
open season on the President’s information held by schools,
archives, internet service providers, e-mail clients, and financial
institutions. The Constitution does not tolerate such ready
evasion; it “deals with substance, not shadows.” Cummings v. Missouri , 4 Wall. 277, 325 (1867).

															E

															Congressional subpoenas for the President’s
personal information implicate weighty concerns regarding the
separation of powers. Neither side, however, identifies an approach
that accounts for these concerns. For more than two centuries, the
political branches have resolved information disputes using the
wide variety of means that the Constitution puts at their disposal.
The nature of such interactions would be transformed by judicial
enforcement of either of the approaches suggested by the parties,
eroding a “[d]eeply embedded traditional way[ ] of conducting
government.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. , 343
U. S., at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

															A balanced approach is necessary, one that takes
a “considerable impression” from “the practice of the government,” McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); see Noel Canning , 573 U. S., at 524–526, and “resist[s]”
the “pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to
exceed the outer limits of its power,” INS v. Chadha , 462 U.S.
919 , 951 (1983). We therefore conclude that, in assessing
whether a subpoena directed at the President’s personal information
is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress,” Watkins , 354 U. S., at 187, courts must
perform a careful analysis that takes adequate account of the
separation of powers principles at stake, including both the
significant legislative interests of Congress and the “unique
position” of the President, Clinton , 520 U. S., at 698
(internal quotation marks omitted). Several special considerations
inform this analysis.

															First, courts should carefully assess whether
the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of
involving the President and his papers. “ ‘[O]ccasion[s] for
constitutional confrontation between the two branches’ should be
avoided whenever possible.” Cheney v. United States Dist.
Court for D. C. , 542 U.S.
367 , 389–390 (2004) (quoting Nixon , 418 U. S., at
692). Congress may not rely on the President’s information if other
sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it needs
in light of its particular legislative objective. The President’s
unique constitutional position means that Congress may not look to
him as a “case study” for general legislation. Cf. 943 F. 3d,
at 662–663, n. 67.

															Unlike in criminal proceedings, where “[t]he
very integrity of the judicial system” would be undermined without
“full disclosure of all the facts,” Nixon , 418 U. S., at
709, efforts to craft legislation involve predictive policy
judgments that are “not hamper[ed] . . . in quite the
same way” when every scrap of potentially relevant evidence is not
available, Cheney , 542 U. S., at 384; see Senate
Select Committee , 498 F. 2d, at 732. While we certainly
recognize Congress’s important interests in obtaining information
through appropriate inquiries, those interests are not sufficiently
powerful to justify access to the President’s personal papers when
other sources could provide Congress the information it needs.

															Second, to narrow the scope of possible conflict
between the branches, courts should insist on a subpoena no broader
than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative
objective. The specificity of the subpoena’s request “serves as an
important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into the
operation of the Office of the President.” Cheney , 542
U. S., at 387.

															Third, courts should be attentive to the nature
of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena
advances a valid legislative purpose. The more detailed and
substantial the evidence of Congress’s legislative purpose, the
better. See Watkins , 354 U. S., at 201, 205 (preferring
such evidence over “vague” and “loosely worded” evidence of
Congress’s purpose). That is particularly true when Congress
contemplates legislation that raises sensitive constitutional
issues, such as legislation concerning the Presidency. In such
cases, it is “impossible” to conclude that a subpoena is designed
to advance a valid legislative purpose unless Congress adequately
identifies its aims and explains why the President’s information
will advance its consideration of the possible legislation. Id. , at 205–206, 214–215.

															Fourth, courts should be careful to assess the
burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena. We have held that
burdens on the President’s time and attention stemming from
judicial process and litigation, without more, generally do not
cross constitutional lines. See Vance , ante, at
12–14; Clinton , 520 U. S., at 704–705. But burdens
imposed by a congressional subpoena should be carefully
scrutinized, for they stem from a rival political branch that has
an ongoing relationship with the President and incentives to use
subpoenas for institutional advantage.

															Other considerations may be pertinent as well;
one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for
an exhaustive list.

															When Congress seeks information “needed for
intelligent legislative action,” it “unquestionably” remains “the
duty of all citizens to cooperate.” Watkins , 354
U. S., at 187 (emphasis added). Congressional subpoenas for
information from the President, however, implicate special concerns
regarding the separation of powers. The courts below did not take
adequate account of those concerns. The judgments of the Courts of
Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and the Second Circuit are
vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 The Court of Appeals
directed a “limited” remand for the District Court to consider
whether it was necessary to disclose certain “sensitive personal
details” (such as documents reflecting medical services received by
employees of the Trump business entities) and a “few” documents
that might not relate to the committees’ legislative purposes. 943
F.3d 627, 667–668, 675 (2019). The Court of Appeals ordered that
all other documents be “promptly transmitted” to the committees. Id. , at 669. 2 By contrast, later that
summer, the Judiciary was called on to resolve whether
President Jefferson could be issued a subpoena duces tecum arising from Burr’s criminal trial. See United States v. Burr , 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807); see also Trump v. Vance , ante , at 5–7. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 19–715 and 19–760

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., PETITIONERS

															19–715 v. MAZARS USA, LLP, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

															DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., PETITIONERS

															19–760 v. DEUTSCHE BANK AG, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[July 9, 2020]

															Justice Thomas, dissenting.

															Three Committees of the U. S. House of
Representatives issued subpoenas to several accounting and
financial firms to obtain the personal financial records of the
President, his family, and several of his business entities. The
Committees do not argue that these subpoenas were issued pursuant
to the House’s impeachment power. Instead, they argue that the
subpoenas are a valid exercise of their legislative powers.

															Petitioners challenge the validity of these
subpoenas. In doing so, they call into question our precedents to
the extent that they allow Congress to issue legislative subpoenas
for the President’s private, nonofficial documents. I would hold
that Congress has no power to issue a legislative subpoena for
private, nonofficial documents—whether they belong to the President
or not. Congress may be able to obtain these documents as part of
an investigation of the President, but to do so, it must proceed
under the impeachment power. Accordingly, I would reverse the
judgments of the Courts of Appeals.

															I

															I begin with the Committees’ claim that the
House’s legislative powers include the implied power to issue
legislative subpoenas. Although the Founders understood that the
enumerated powers in the Constitution included implied powers, the
Committees’ test for the scope of those powers is too broad.

															“The powers of the legislature are defined, and
limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten,
the constitution is written.” Marbury v. Madison , 1
Cranch 137, 176 (1803). The structure of limited and enumerated
powers in our Constitution denotes that “[o]ur system of government
rests on one overriding principle: All power stems from the consent
of the people.” U. S. Term Limits , Inc. v. Thornton , 514 U.S.
779 , 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As a result, Congress
may exercise only those powers given by the people of the States
through the Constitution.

															The Founders nevertheless understood that an
enumerated power could necessarily bring with it implied powers.
The idea of implied powers usually arises in the context of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the power to
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.” Art. I, §8, cl. 18. As I have
previously explained, the Necessary and Proper Clause simply “made
explicit what was already implicit in the grant of each enumerated
power.” United States v. Comstock , 560 U.S.
126 , 161 (2010) (dissenting opinion). That is, “the grant of a
general power includes the grant of incidental powers for carrying
it out.” Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”:
Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 Va. L. Rev. 687, 741 (2016).

															The scope of these implied powers is very
limited. The Constitution does not sweep in powers “of inferior
importance, merely because they are inferior.” McCulloch v. Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 408 (1819). Instead, Congress “can
claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution,
and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly
given, or given by necessary implication.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee , 1 Wheat. 304, 326 (1816). In sum, while the
Committees’ theory of an implied power is not categorically wrong,
that power must be necessarily implied from an enumerated
power.

															II

															At the time of the founding, the power to
subpoena private, nonofficial documents was not included by
necessary implication in any of Congress’ legislative powers. This
understanding persisted for decades and is consistent with the
Court’s first decision addressing legislative subpoenas, Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S.
168 (1881). The test that this Court created in McGrain v. Daugherty , 273 U.S.
135 (1927), and the majority’s variation on that standard
today, are without support as applied to private, nonofficial
documents.[ 1 ]

															A

															The Committees argue that Congress wields the
same investigatory powers that the British Parliament did at the
time of the founding. But this claim overlooks one of the
fundamental differences between our Government and the British
Government: Parliament was supreme. Congress is not.

															I have previously explained that “the founding
generation did not subscribe to Blackstone’s view of parliamentary
supremacy.” Department of Transportation v. Association
of American Railroads , 575 U.S. 43, 74 (2015) (opinion
concurring in judgment). “Parliament’s violations of the law of the
land had been a significant complaint of the American Revolution.” Id., at 74–75. “And experiments in legislative supremacy in
the States had confirmed the idea that even the legislature must be
made subject to the law.” Id. , at 75.

															James Wilson, signer of the Constitution and
future Justice, explained this difference to the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention: “Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain
[the supreme power] is lodged in the British Parliament; and I
believe there is no writer on the other side of the Atlantic” who
thought otherwise. 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 471 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (Documentary History). In the
United States, however, “the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
authority, remains with the people.” Id. , at 472. And
“[t]he Constitution plainly sets forth the ‘few and defined’ powers
that Congress may exercise.” Comstock , 560 U. S., at
159 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also McCulloch , 4 Wheat.,
at 405; Marbury , 1 Cranch, at 176. This significant
difference means that Parliament’s powers and Congress’ powers are
not necessarily the same.

															In fact, the plain text of the Constitution
makes clear that they are not. The Constitution expressly denies to
Congress some of the powers that Parliament exercised. Article I,
for example, prohibits bills of attainder, §9, cl. 3, which
Parliament used to “sentenc[e] to death one or more specific
persons.” United States v. Brown , 381 U.S.
437 , 441 (1965). A legislature can hardly be considered supreme
if it lacks the power to pass bills of attainder, which Justice
Story called the “highest power of sovereignty.” 3 Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States §1338, p. 210 (1833).
Relatedly, the Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws,
§9, cl. 3, reinforcing the fact that Congress’ power to punish
is limited.[ 2 ] And in a system
in which Congress is not supreme, the individual protections in the
Bill of Rights, such as the prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures, meaningfully constrain Congress’ power to compel
documents from private citizens. Cf. 1 St. George Tucker,
Blackstone’s Commentaries 203–205, n. § (1803); see also D.
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period,
1789–1801, p. 268 (1997).

															Furthermore, Kilbourn —this Court’s first
decision on the constitutionality of legislative
subpoenas—emphasized that Parliament had more powers than Congress.
There, the congressional respondents relied on Parliament’s
investigatory power to support a legislative subpoena for testimony
and documents. The Court rejected the analogy because the judicial
powers of the House of Commons—the lower house of
Parliament—exceeded the judicial functions of the House of
Representatives. Kilbourn , supra, at 189. At bottom, Kilbourn recognized that legislative supremacy was
decisively rejected in the framing and ratification of our
Constitution, which casts doubt on the Committees’ claim that they
have power to issue legislative subpoenas to private parties.

															B

															The subpoenas in these cases also cannot be
justified based on the practices of 18th-century American
legislatures. Amici supporting the Committees resist this
conclusion, but the examples they cite materially differ from the
legislative subpoenas at issue here.

															First, amici cite investigations in which
legislatures sought to compel testimony from government officials
on government matters. The subjects included military affairs,
taxes, government finances, and the judiciary. Potts, Power of
Legislative Bodies To Punish for Contempt, 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 691, 708, 709, 710, 716–717 (1926) (Potts); see also
E. Eberling, Congressional Investigations: A Study of the Origin
and Development of the Power of Congress To Investigate and Punish
for Contempt 18 (1928) (Eberling). But the information sought in
these examples was official, not private. Underscoring this
distinction, at least one revolutionary-era State Constitution
permitted the legislature to “call for all public or
official papers and records, and send for persons, whom they
may judge necessary in the course of their inquiries, concerning
affairs relating to the public interest.” Md. Const., Art. X
(1776) (emphasis added).

															Second, 18th-century legislatures conducted
nonlegislative investigations. For example, the New York colonial
legislature tasked one committee with investigating a nuisance
complaint and gave it the “power to send for persons, papers and
records.” Eberling 18; see also id. , at 19 (investigation of
a government contract obtained by alleged wrongdoing); Potts 716
(investigation of armed resistance). But to describe this category
is to distinguish it. Here, the Committees assert only a
legislative purpose.

															Third, colonial and state legislatures
investigated and punished insults, libels, and bribery of members.
For example, the Pennsylvania colonial assembly investigated
“injurious charges, and slanderous Aspersions against the Conduct
of the late Assembly” made by two individuals. Id. , at 710
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. , at 717;
Eberling 20–21. But once again, to describe this category is to
distinguish it because the subpoenas here are justified only as
incidental to the power to legislate, not the power to punish
libels or bribery. In short, none of the examples from 18th-century
colonial and state history support a power to issue a legislative
subpoena for private, nonofficial documents.

															C

															Given that Congress has no exact precursor in
England or colonial America, founding-era congressional practice is
especially informative about the scope of implied legislative
powers. Thus, it is highly probative that no founding-era Congress
issued a subpoena for private, nonofficial documents. Although
respondents could not identify the first such legislative subpoena
at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 56, Congress began issuing them
by the end of the 1830s. However, the practice remained
controversial in Congress and this Court throughout the first
century of the Republic.

															1

															In an attempt to establish the power of
Congress to issue legislative subpoenas, the Committees point to an
investigation of Government affairs and an investigation under one
of Congress’ enumerated privileges. Both precedents are materially
different from the subpoenas here.

															In 1792, the House authorized a Committee to
investigate a failed military expedition led by General Arthur St.
Clair. 3 Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the
United States §1725, pp. 79–80 (1907) (Hinds). The Committee was
“empowered to call for such persons, papers and records as may be
necessary to assist their inquiries.” Ibid. But the
Committee never subpoenaed private, nonofficial documents, which is
telling. Whereas a subpoena for Government documents does not
implicate concerns about property rights or the Fourth Amendment
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” a
subpoena for private, nonofficial documents raises those questions.
Thus, the power to subpoena private documents, which the Committee
did not exercise, is a far greater power and much less likely to be
implied in Congress’ legislative powers.

															In 1832, the House investigated Representative
Samuel Houston for assaulting Representative William Stanberry.
Stanberry had accused Houston of collusion with Secretary of War
John Eaton in connection with a bid for a Government contract, and
the House initiated an investigation into the truthfulness of
Stanberry’s accusation. 8 Cong. Deb. 2550, 3022–3023 (1832). The
House subpoenaed witnesses to testify, and one of them brought
official correspondence between the Secretary of War and the
President. H. R. Rep. No. 502, 22d Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 66–67
(1832). But official documents are obviously different from
nonofficial documents. Moreover, the subpoenas were issued pursuant
to the House’s enumerated privilege of punishing its own Members,
Art. I, §5, not as part of its legislative powers. Because these
subpoenas were not issued pursuant to a legislative power, they do
not aid the Committees’ case.

															2

															As late as 1827, a majority of the House
declined to authorize the Committee on Manufactures to subpoena
documents, amid concerns that it was unprecedented. During the
debate over the resolution, one opponent remarked that “[t]here is
no instance under this Government, within my recollection, where
this power has been given for the mere purpose of enabling a
committee of this House to adjust the details of an ordinary bill.”
4 Cong. Deb. 865–866 (Rep. Strong); see also id. , at 862
(referring to “authority to bring any citizens of the United States
. . . whom they might choose to send for, and compel them
to give answers to every inquiry which should be addressed to them”
as “very extraordinary”). Another opponent stated that the
Committee had requested a power that had “not heretofore been
thought necessary to enable that Committee to acquire correct
information.” Id. , at 866 (Rep. Storrs). A third called it
“not only novel and extraordinary, but wholly unnecessary.” Id. , at 874 (Rep. Stewart); see also id. , at 884–885
(Rep. Wright). No supporter of the resolution offered a specific
precedent for doing so, and the House ultimately authorized the
Committee to send for persons only. Id. , at 889–890.

															This debate is particularly significant because
of the arguments made by both sides. Proponents made essentially
the same arguments the Committees raise here—that the power to send
for persons and papers was necessary to inform Congress as it
legislated. Id. , at 871 (Rep. Livingston). Opponents argued
that this power was not part of any legislative function. Id. , at 865–866 (Rep. Strong). They also argued that the
House of Commons provided no precedent because Congress was a body
of limited and enumerated powers. Id. , at 882 (Rep. Wood).
And in the end, the opponents prevailed. Thus, through 1827, the
idea that Congress had the implied power to issue subpoenas for
private documents was considered “novel,” “extraordinary,” and
“unnecessary.” Id. , at 874.

															3

															By the end of the 1830s, Congress began
issuing legislative subpoenas for private, nonofficial documents.
See Eberling 123–126. Still, the power to demand information from
private parties during legislative investigations remained
controversial.

															In 1832, the House authorized a Committee to
“inspect the books, and to examine into the proceedings of the Bank
of the United States, to report thereon, and to report whether the
provisions of its charter have been violated or not.” 8 Cong. Deb.
2160, 2164. The House gave the Committee “power to send for persons
and papers.” Id., at 2160 . The power to inspect the
books of the Bank of the United States is not itself a clear
example of a legislative subpoena for private, nonofficial
documents, because the Bank was a federally chartered corporation
and was required to allow Congress to inspect its books. App. to 8
Cong. Deb. 54 (1833). The investigation itself appears to have
ranged more widely, however, leading Congressman John Quincy Adams
to criticize

															“investigations which must necessarily
implicate not only the president and directors of the bank, and
their proceedings, but the rights, the interests, the fortunes, and
the reputation of individuals not responsible for those
proceedings, and whom neither the committee nor the House had the
power to try, or even accuse before any other tribunal.” Ibid. Adams continued that such an investigation
“bears all the exceptionable and odious properties of general
warrants and domiciliary visits.” Ibid. He also objected
that the Committee’s investigation of the Bank was tantamount to
punishment and thus was in tension with the constitutional
prohibitions on “passing any bill of attainder [or] ex post
facto law.” Id., at 60. Thus, even when Congress
authorized a Committee to send for private papers, the
constitutionality of doing so was questioned.

															An 1859 Senate investigation, which the Court of
Appeals cited as precedent, underscores that legislative subpoenas
to private parties were a 19th-century innovation. Following
abolitionist John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry, Senate Democrats
opened an investigation apparently designed to embarrass opponents
of slavery. As part of the investigation, they called private
individuals to testify. Senator Charles Sumner, a leading opponent
of slavery, railed against the proceedings:

															“I know it is said that this power is
necessary in aid of legislation . I deny the necessity. Convenient , at times, it may be; but necessary , never . We do not drag the members of the Cabinet or the
President to testify before a committee in aid of
legislation ; but I say, without hesitation, they can claim no
immunity which does not belong equally to the humblest citizen.”
Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 3007 (1860).

															Sumner also addressed the matter of Parliament’s
powers, calling them “more or less inapplicable” because “[w]e live
under a written Constitution, with certain specified powers; and
all these are restrained by the tenth amendment.” Ibid. For
Sumner, as for Adams, the power to issue legislative subpoenas to
private parties was a “dangerous absurdity” with no basis in the
text or history of the Constitution. Ibid. [ 3 ]

															4

															When this Court first addressed a legislative
subpoena, it refused to uphold it. After casting doubt on
legislative subpoenas generally, the Court in Kilbourn v. Thompson , 103 U.S.
168 , held that the subpoena at issue was unlawful because it
sought to investigate private conduct.

															In 1876, the House created a special Committee
to investigate the failure of a major bank, which caused the loss
of federal funds and related to financial speculation in the
District of Columbia. Id. , at 171. The Committee issued a
subpoena to Kilbourn, an employee of the bank. Id., at 172.
When he refused to answer questions or produce documents, the House
held him in contempt and arrested him. Id. , at 173. After
his release, he sued the Speaker, several Committee members, and
the Sergeant at Arms for damages.

															The Court discussed the arguments for an
“impli[ed]” power to issue legislative subpoenas. Id. , at
183. As the Court saw it, there were two arguments: “1, its
exercise by the House of Commons of England . . . and,
2d, the necessity of such a power to enable the two Houses of
Congress to perform the duties and exercise the powers which the
Constitution has conferred on them.” Ibid. The Court rejected the first argument. It found
“no difference of opinion as to [the] origin” of the House of
Commons’ subpoena power:

															“[T]he two Houses of Parliament were each
courts of judicature originally, which, though divested by usage,
and by statute, probably, of many of their judicial functions, have
yet retained so much of that power as enables them, like any other
court, to punish for a contempt of these privileges and authority
that the power rests.” Id., at 184.

															Even after the division of Parliament into two
houses, “[t]o the Commons was left the power of impeachment, and,
perhaps, others of a judicial character, and jointly they
exercised, until a very recent period, the power of passing bills
of attainder for treason and other high crimes which are in their
nature punishment for crime declared judicially by the High Court
of Parliament.” Ibid. By contrast, the House of
Representatives “is in no sense a court, . . . exercises
no functions derived from its once having been a part of the
highest court of the realm,” and has no judicial functions beyond
“punishing its own members and determining their election.” Id. , at 189. The Court thus rejected the notion that
Congress inherited from Parliament an implied power to issue
legislative subpoenas.

															The Court did not reach a conclusion on the
second theory that a legislative subpoena power was necessary for
Congress to carry out its legislative duties. But it observed that,
based on British judicial opinions, not “much aid [is] given to the
doctrine, that this power exists as one necessary to enable either
House of Congress to exercise successfully their function of
legislation.” Ibid. The Court referred to a collection of
18th- and 19th-century English decisions grounding the
Parliamentary subpoena power in that body’s judicial origins. Id., at 184–189 (citing Burdett v. Abbott , 104
Eng. Rep. 501 (K. B. 1811); Brass Crosby’s Case , 95
Eng. Rep. 1005 (C. P. 1771); Stockdale v. Hansard , 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (K. B. 1839); and Kielley v. Carson , 13 Eng. Rep. 225 (P. C.
1841)). The Court placed particular emphasis on Kielley , in
which the Privy Council held that the Legislative Assembly of
Newfoundland lacked a power to punish for contempt. The Privy
Council expressly stated that the House of Commons could punish for
contempt

															“ ‘not because it is a representative
body with legislative functions, but by virtue of ancient usage and
prescription . . . which forms a part of the common law
of the land, and according to which the High Court of Parliament
before its division, and the Houses of Lords and Commons since, are
invested with many privileges, that of punishment for contempt
being one.’ ” Kilbourn , 103 U. S., at 188–189.

															This Court also noted that the Privy Council
“discusse[d] at length the necessity of this power in a legislative
body for its protection, and to enable it to discharge its
law-making functions, and decide[d] against the proposition.” Id. , at 189. Although the Court did not have occasion to
decide whether the legislative subpoena in that case was necessary
to the exercise of Congress’ legislative powers, its discussion
strongly suggests the subpoena was unconstitutional.[ 4 ]

															The Court instead based its decision on the fact
that the subpoena at issue “ma[de] inquiry into the private affairs
of the citizen.” Id. , at 190. Such a power, the Court
reasoned, “is judicial and not legislative,” id. , at 193,
and “no judicial power is vested in the Congress or either branch
of it, save in the cases” of punishing Members, compelling Members’
attendance, judging elections and qualifications, and impeachment
and trial, id. , at 192–193. Notably, the Court found no
indication that the House “avowed to impeach the secretary,” or
else “the whole aspect of the case would have been changed.” Id. , at 193. Even though the Court decided Kilbourn narrowly, it clearly entertained substantial doubts about the
constitutionality of legislative subpoenas for private
documents.

															D

															Nearly half a century later, in McGrain v. Daugherty , the Court reached the question reserved in Kilbourn —whether Congress has the power to issue legislative
subpoenas. It rejected Kilbourn ’s reasoning and upheld the
power to issue legislative subpoenas as long as they were relevant
to a legislative power. Although McGrain involved oral
testimony, the Court has since extended this test to subpoenas for
private documents. The Committees rely on McGrain , but this
line of cases misunderstands both the original meaning of Article I
and the historical practice underlying it.

															1

															Shortly before Attorney General Harry
Daugherty resigned in 1924, the Senate opened an investigation into
his “ ‘alleged failure’ ” to prosecute monopolists, the
protagonists of the Teapot Dome scandal, and “ ‘many
others.’ ” McGrain , 273 U. S . , at 151. The
investigating Committee issued subpoenas to Daugherty’s brother,
Mally, who refused to comply and was arrested in Ohio for failure
to testify. Id. , at 152–154. Mally petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus, and the District Court discharged him, based largely
on Kilbourn . Ex parte Daugherty , 299 F. 620 (SD
Ohio 1924). The Deputy Sergeant at Arms who arrested Mally directly
appealed to this Court, which reversed.

															The Court concluded that, “[i]n actual
legislative practice[,] power to secure needed information by
[investigating and compelling testimony] has long been treated as
an attribute of the power to legislate.” McGrain , 273
U. S., at 161. The Court specifically found that “[i]t was so
regarded in the British Parliament and in the Colonial legislatures
before the American Revolution” and that “a like view has prevailed
and been carried into effect in both houses of Congress and in most
of the state legislatures.” Ibid. But the authority cited by
the Court did not support that proposition. The Court cited the
1792 investigation of St. Clair’s defeat, in which it appears no
subpoena was issued, supra, at 7–8, and the 1859 Senate
investigation of John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry, which led to
an impassioned debate. 273 U. S., at 162–164. Thus, for the
reasons explained above, the examples relied on in McGrain are materially different from issuing a legislative subpoena for
private, nonofficial documents. See supra, at 7,
10–11.[ 5 ]

															The Court acknowledged Kilbourn, but
erroneously distinguished its discussion regarding the
constitutionality of legislative subpoenas as immaterial dicta. McGrain , supra , at 170–171 (quoting Kilbourn , supra, at 189). The Court concluded that “the two houses of
Congress, in their separate relations, possess not only such powers
as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such
auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the
express powers effective.” McGrain , supra, at
173.

															Instead of relying on Kilbourn ’s
analysis, McGrain developed a test that rested heavily on
functional considerations. The Court wrote that “[a] legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change.” 273 U. S., at 175. Because
“mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete,” “some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what
is needed.” Ibid. The Court thus concluded that Congress could
issue legislative subpoenas, provided that “the purpose for which
the witness’s testimony was sought was to obtain information in aid
of the legislative function.” Id., at 176. The Court has
since applied this test to subpoenas for papers without any further
analysis of the text or history of the Constitution. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund , 421 U.S.
491 , 504–505 (1975). The majority today modifies that test for
cases involving the President, but it leaves the core of the power
untouched. Ante , at 18–20.

															2

															The opinion in McGrain lacks any
foundation in text or history with respect to subpoenas for
private, nonofficial documents. It fails to recognize that
Congress, unlike Parliament, is not supreme. It does not cite any
specific precedent for issuing legislative subpoenas for private
documents from 18th-century colonial or state practice. And it
identifies no founding-era legislative subpoenas for private
documents.[ 6 ]

															Since McGrain , the Court has pared back
Congress’ authority to compel testimony and documents. It has held
that certain convictions of witnesses for contempt of Congress
violated the Fifth Amendment. See Watkins v. United
States , 354 U.S.
178 (1957) (Due Process Clause); Quinn v. United
States , 349 U.S.
155 (1955) (Self-Incrimination Clause); see also Barenblatt v. United States , 360
U.S. 109 , 153–154 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). It has also
affirmed the reversal of a conviction on the ground that the
Committee lacked authority to issue the subpoena. See United
States v. Rumely , 345 U.S.
41 (1953). And today, it creates a new four-part, nonexhaustive
test for cases involving the President. Ante , at 18–20.
Rather than continue our trend of trying to compensate for McGrain , I would simply decline to apply it in these cases
because it is readily apparent that the Committees have no
constitutional authority to subpoena private, nonofficial
documents.

															III

															If the Committees wish to investigate alleged
wrongdoing by the President and obtain documents from him, the
Constitution provides Congress with a special mechanism for doing
so: impeachment.[ 7 ]

															A

															It is often acknowledged, “if only
half-heartedly honored,” that one of the motivating principles of
our Constitution is the separation of powers. Association of
American Railroads , 575 U. S., at 74 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment). The Framers recognized that there are
three forms of governmental power: legislative, executive and
judicial. The Framers also created three branches: Congress, the
President, and the Judiciary. The three powers largely align with
the three branches. To a limited extent, however, the Constitution
contains “a partial intermixture of those departments for special
purposes.” The Federalist No. 66, p. 401 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton). One of those special purposes is the system of checks
and balances, and impeachment is one of those checks.

															The Constitution grants the House “the sole
Power of Impeachment,” Art. I, §2, cl. 5, and it specifies
that the President may be impeached for “Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” Art. II, §4. The founding
generation understood impeachment as a check on Presidential
abuses. In response to charges that impeachment “confounds
legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body,” Alexander
Hamilton called it “an essential check in the hands of [Congress]
upon the encroachments of the executive.” The Federalist No. 66,
at 401–402. And, in the Virginia ratifying convention, James
Madison identified impeachment as a check on Presidential abuse of
the treaty power. 10 Documentary History 1397.

															B

															The power to impeach includes a power to
investigate and demand documents. Impeachments in the States often
involved an investigation. In 1781, the Virginia Legislature began
what Edmund Randolph called an “impeachment” of then-Governor
Thomas Jefferson. P. Hoffer & N. Hull, Impeachment in America,
1635–1805, p. 85 (1984). This “most publicized and far-reaching
impeachment inquiry for incompetence” included an “ ‘inquir[y]
into the conduct of the executive of this state for the last two
months.’ ” Ibid. The legislatures of New Jersey, id. , at 92, and Pennsylvania, id. , at 93–95,
similarly investigated officials through impeachment
proceedings.

															Reinforcing this understanding, the founding
generation repeatedly referred to impeachment as an “inquest.” See
4 Debates on the Constitution 44 (J. Elliot ed. 1854) (speech of A.
Maclaine) (referring to the House as “the grand inquest of the
Union at large”); The Federalist No. 65, at 397 (Hamilton)
(referring to the House as “a method of National Inquest”); 2
Records of the Federal Convention 154 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (record
from the Committee of Detail stating that “[t]he House of
Representatives shall be the grand Inquest of this Nation; and all
Impeachments shall be made by them”); see also Mass. Const., ch. 1,
§3, Art. VI (1780) (referring to the Massachusetts House of
Representatives as “the Grand Inquest of this Commonwealth”). At
the time, an “inquest” referred to an “[i]nquiry, especially that
made by a Jury” or “the Jury itself.” N. Bailey, Universal
Etymological Dictionary (22d ed. 1770).

															The Founders were also aware of the
contemporaneous impeachment of Warren Hastings in England, in which
the House of Commons heard witnesses before voting to impeach. P.
Marshall, The Impeachment of Warren Hastings 40–41, 58 (1965). In
the first impeachment under the new Constitution, Congressmen cited
the Hastings impeachment as precedent for several points, including
the power to take testimony before impeaching. 7 Annals of Cong.
456 (1797) (Rep. Rutledge); id. , at 459 (Rep. Sitgreaves); id., at 460 (Rep. Gallatin).

															Other evidence from the 1790s confirms that the
power to investigate includes the power to demand documents. When
the House of Representatives sought documents related to the Jay
Treaty from President George Washington, he refused to provide them
on the ground that the House had no legislative powers relating to
the ratification of treaties. 5 Annals of Cong. 760–762 (1796). But
he carefully noted that “[i]t does not occur that the inspection of
the papers asked for can be relative to any purpose under the
cognizance of the House of Representatives, except that of an
impeachment; which the resolution has not expressed.” Id., at 760. In other words, he understood that the House can demand
documents as part of its power to impeach.

															This Court has also long recognized the power of
the House to demand documents. Even as it questioned the power to
issue legislative subpoenas, the Court in Kilbourn acknowledged the ability to “compel the attendance of witnesses,
and their answer to proper questions” when “the question of
. . . impeachment is before either body acting in its
appropriate sphere on that subject.” 103 U. S., at 190.

															I express no view today on the boundaries of the
power to demand documents in connection with impeachment
proceedings. But the power of impeachment provides the House with
authority to investigate and hold accountable Presidents who commit
high crimes or misdemeanors. That is the proper path by which the
Committees should pursue their demands.

															IV

															For nearly two centuries, until the 1970s,
Congress never attempted to subpoena documents to investigate
wrongdoing by the President outside the context of impeachment.
Congress investigated Presidents without opening impeachment
proceedings. See, e.g., 2 Hinds §1596, at 1043–1045
(President James Buchanan). But it never issued a subpoena for
private, nonofficial documents as part of those non-impeachment
inquiries. Perhaps most strikingly, one proposed request for
official documents from the President was amended after objection
so that it “ ‘requested’ ” them rather than
“ ‘direct[ing]’ ” the President to provide them. 3 id. , §1895, at 193.

															Insisting that the House proceed through its
impeachment power is not a mere formality. Unlike contempt, which
is governed by the rules of each chamber, impeachment and removal
constitutionally requires a majority vote by the House and a
two-thirds vote by the Senate. Art. I, §2, cl. 5; §3,
cl. 6. In addition, Congress has long thought it necessary to
provide certain procedural safeguards to officials facing
impeachment and removal. See, e.g. , 3 Annals of Cong. 903
(1793) (Rep. W. Smith). Finally, initiating impeachment proceedings
signals to the public the gravity of seeking the removal of a
constitutional officer at the head of a coordinate branch. 940 F.3d
710, 776 (CADC 2019) (Rao, J., dissenting).

															*  *  *

															Congress’ legislative powers do not authorize
it to engage in a nationwide inquisition with whatever resources it
chooses to appropriate for itself. The majority’s solution—a
nonexhaustive four-factor test of uncertain origin—is better than
nothing. But the power that Congress seeks to exercise here has
even less basis in the Constitution than the majority supposes. I
would reverse in full because the power to subpoena private,
nonofficial documents is not a necessary implication of Congress’
legislative powers. If Congress wishes to obtain these documents,
it should proceed through the impeachment power. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent. Notes 1 I express no opinion
about the constitutionality of legislative subpoenas for other
kinds of evidence. 2 The Constitution also
enumerates a limited set of congressional privileges. Although I
express no opinion on the question, at least one early commentator
thought the canon of expressio unius meant that
Congress had no unenumerated privileges, such as the power to hold
nonmembers in contempt. 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s
Commentaries 200, n. § (1803). 3 I note as well that
Sumner expressly distinguished legislative subpoenas from subpoenas
issued during “those inquiries which are in their nature
preliminary to an impeachment.” Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3007 (1860). 4 According to Justice
Miller’s private letters, “a majority of the Court, including
Miller himself, were of the opinion that neither House nor Senate
had power to punish for contempt witnesses who refused to testify
before investigating committees.” T. Taylor, Grand Inquest: The
Story of Congressional Investigations 49 (1955). Only Justice
Miller’s desire to “ ‘decid[e] no more than is
necessary’ ” caused the Court to avoid the broader question. Ibid. 5 The Court also cited
decisions between 1858 and 1913 from state courts and a Canadian
court, none of which are persuasive evidence about the original
meaning of the U. S. Constitution. McGrain , 273
U. S., at 165–167. 6 The Court further
observed that Congress has long exercised the power to hold
nonmembers in contempt for reasons other than failure to comply
with a legislative subpoena. McGrain , supra, at
168–169. The earliest case it cited, Anderson v. Dunn , 6 Wheat. 204 (1821), relied on arguments about
Congress’ power of self-protection, id., at 226–227. Members
of Congress defending the use of contempt for these other purposes
made similar arguments about self-protection. 5 Annals of Cong.
181–182 (1795) (Rep. W. Smith); id., at 189 (Rep. I. Smith).
But the failure to respond to a subpoena does not pose a
fundamental threat to Congress’ ability to exercise its
powers. 7 I express no view on
whether there are any limitations on the impeachment power that
would prevent the House from subpoenaing the documents at
issue. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															Nos. 19–715 and 19–760

															_________________

															DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., PETITIONERS

															19–715 v. MAZARS USA, LLP, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

															DONALD J. TRUMP, et al., PETITIONERS

															19–760 v. DEUTSCHE BANK AG, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[July 9, 2020]

															Justice Alito, dissenting.

															Justice Thomas makes a valuable argument about
the constitutionality of congressional subpoenas for a President’s
personal documents. In these cases, however, I would assume for the
sake of argument that such subpoenas are not categorically barred.
Nevertheless, legislative subpoenas for a President’s personal
documents are inherently suspicious. Such documents are seldom of
any special value in considering potential legislation, and
subpoenas for such documents can easily be used for improper
non-legislative purposes. Accordingly, courts must be very
sensitive to separation of powers issues when they are asked to
approve the enforcement of such subpoenas.

															In many cases, disputes about subpoenas for
Presidential documents are fought without judicial involvement. If
Congress attempts to obtain such documents by subpoenaing a
President directly, those two heavyweight institutions can use
their considerable weapons to settle the matter. See ante ,
at 10 (opinion of the Court) (“Congress and the President
maintained this tradition of negotiation and compromise—without the
involvement of this Court—until the present dispute”). But when
Congress issues such a subpoena to a third party, Congress must
surely appreciate that the Judiciary may be pulled into the
dispute, and Congress should not expect that the courts will allow
the subpoena to be enforced without seriously examining its
legitimacy.

															Whenever such a subpoena comes before a court,
Congress should be required to make more than a perfunctory showing
that it is seeking the documents for a legitimate legislative
purpose and not for the purpose of exposing supposed Presidential
wrongdoing. See ante , at 12. The House can inquire about
possible Presidential wrongdoing pursuant to its impeachment power,
see ante , at 17–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting), but the
Committees do not defend these subpoenas as ancillary to that
power.

															Instead, they claim that the subpoenas were
issued to gather information that is relevant to legislative
issues, but there is disturbing evidence of an improper law
enforcement purpose. See 940 F.3d 710, 767–771 (CADC 2019) (Rao,
J., dissenting). In addition, the sheer volume of documents sought
calls out for explanation. See 943 F.3d 627, 676–681 (CA2 2019)
(Livingston, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

															The Court recognizes that the decisions below
did not give adequate consideration to separation of powers
concerns. Therefore, after setting out a non-exhaustive list of
considerations for the lower courts to take into account, ante , at 18–20, the Court vacates the judgments of the
Courts of Appeals and sends the cases back for reconsideration. I
agree that the lower courts erred and that these cases must be
remanded, but I do not think that the considerations outlined by
the Court can be properly satisfied unless the House is required to
show more than it has put forward to date.

															Specifically, the House should provide a
description of the type of legislation being considered, and while
great specificity is not necessary, the description should be
sufficient to permit a court to assess whether the particular
records sought are of any special importance. The House should also
spell out its constitutional authority to enact the type of
legislation that it is contemplating, and it should justify the
scope of the subpoenas in relation to the articulated legislative
needs. In addition, it should explain why the subpoenaed
information, as opposed to information available from other
sources, is needed. Unless the House is required to make a showing
along these lines, I would hold that enforcement of the subpoenas
cannot be ordered. Because I find the terms of the Court’s remand
inadequate, I must respectfully dissent.