U.S. Supreme Court Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85 (1983) Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. No. 81-1578 Argued January 10,
1983 Decided June 24, 1983 463 U.S.
85 ast|>* 463 U.S.
85 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Syllabus New York's Human Rights Law forbids discrimination in employee
benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy, and its Disability
Benefits Law requires employers to pay sick-leave benefits to
employees unable to work because of pregnancy. Section 514(a) of
the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
provides, with enumerated exceptions, that ERISA shall supersede
"any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate
to any employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA. ERISA does not
mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does
not itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee
benefits. Prior to the effective date of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), which made discrimination based
on pregnancy unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, appellee employers had welfare benefit plans subject to ERISA
that did not provide benefits to employees disabled by pregnancy.
Appellees brought three separate declaratory judgment actions in
Federal District Court, alleging that the Human Rights Law was
preempted by ERISA. Appellee airlines also alleged that the
Disability Benefits Law was preempted. The District Court in each
case held that the Human Rights Law was preempted, at least insofar
as it required the provision of pregnancy benefits prior to the
effective date of the PDA. As to appellee airlines' challenge to
the Disability Benefits Law, the District Court construed § 4(b)(3)
of ERISA as exempting from ERISA coverage those provisions of an
employee benefit plan maintained to comply with state disability
insurance laws, and, because it concluded that appellees would have
provided pregnancy benefits solely to comply with the Disability
Benefits Law, the court dismissed the portion of the complaint
seeking relief from that law. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to
the Human Page 463 U. S. 86 Rights Law. With respect to the Disability Benefits Law, the
Court of Appeals held that § 4(b)(3)'s exemption from preemption
applied only when a benefit plan, "as an integral unit," is
maintained solely to comply with the disability law. The Court of
Appeals remanded for a determination whether appellee airlines
provided benefits through such plans, in which event the Disability
Benefits Law would be enforceable, or through portions of
comprehensive plans, in which case ERISA regulation would be
exclusive. Held: 1. Given § 514(a)'s plain language, and ERISA's structure and
legislative history, both the Human Rights Law and the Disability
Benefits Law "relate to any employee benefit plan" within the
meaning of § 514(a). Pp. 463 U. S.
95 -100.

															2. The Human Rights Law is preempted with respect to ERISA
benefit plans only insofar as it prohibits practices that are
lawful under federal law. Pp. 463 U. S.
100 -106.

															(a) Section 514(d) of ERISA provides that § 514(a) shall not "be
construed to . . . modify [or] impair . . . any law of the United
States." To the extent that the Human Rights Law provides a means
of enforcing Title VII's commands, preemption of the Human Rights
Law would modify and impair federal law within the meaning of §
514(d). State fair employment laws and administrative remedies play
a significant role in the federal enforcement scheme under Title
VII. If ERISA were interpreted to preempt the Human Rights Law
entirely with respect to covered benefit plans, the State no longer
could prohibit employment practices relating to such plans and the
state agency no longer would be authorized to grant relief. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission thus would be unable to
refer claims involving covered plans to the state agency. This
would frustrate the goal of encouraging joint state/federal
enforcement of Title VII. Pp. 463 U. S.
100 -102.

															(b) Insofar as state laws prohibit employment practices that are
lawful under Title VII, however, preemption would not impair Title
VII within the meaning of § 514(d). While § 514(d) may operate to
exempt state laws upon which federal laws, such as Title VII,
depend for their enforcement, the combination of Congress'
enactment of § 514(a)'s all-inclusive preemption provision and its
enumeration of narrow, specific exceptions to that provision
militate against expanding § 514(d) into a more general saving
clause. Section 514(d)'s limited legislative history is entirely
consistent with Congress' goal of ensuring that employers would not
face conflicting or inconsistent state and local regulation of
employee benefit plans. Pp. 463 U. S.
103 -106.

															3. The Disability Benefits Law is not preempted by ERISA. Pp. 463 U. S.
106 -108. Page 463 U. S. 87 (a) Section 4(b)(3) of ERISA, which exempts from ERISA coverage
"any employee benefit plan . . . maintained solely for the purpose
of complying with applicable . . . disability insurance laws,"
excludes "plans," not portions of plans, from ERISA coverage.
Hence, those portions of appellee airlines' multibenefit plans
maintained to comply with the Disability Benefits Law are not
exempt from ERISA and are not subject to state regulation. Section
4(b)(3)'s use of the word "solely" demonstrates that the purpose of
the entire plan must be to comply with an applicable disability
insurance law. Thus, only separately administered disability plans
maintained solely to comply with the Disability Benefits Law are
exempt from ERISA coverage under § 4(b)(3). Pp. 463 U. S.
106 -108.

															(b) A State may require an employer to maintain a separate
disability plan, but the fact that state law permits employers to
meet their state law obligations by including disability benefits
in a multibenefit ERISA plan does not make the state law wholly
unenforceable as to employers who choose that option. P. 463 U. S.
108 .

															650 F.2d 1287 and 666 F.2d 21; and 666 F.2d 27 and 666 F.2d 26,
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

															BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Page 463 U. S. 88 JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															New York's Human Rights Law forbids discrimination in
employment, including discrimination in employee benefit plans on
the basis of pregnancy. The State's Disability Benefits Law
requires employers to pay sick leave benefits to employees unable
to work because of pregnancy or other nonoccupational disabilities.
The question before us is whether these New York laws are preempted
by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. I A The Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982
and Supp.1982-1983), is a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute
prohibiting, among other practices, employment discrimination on
the basis of sex. § 296.1 (a). [ Footnote 1 ] The New York Court of Appeals has held that a
private employer whose employee benefit plan treats pregnancy
differently from other nonoccupational disabilities engages in sex
discrimination within the meaning of the Human Rights Law. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal
Board, 41 N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393 (1976). In contrast, two
weeks before the decision in Brooklyn Union Gas, this
Court ruled that discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78
Stat. 253, as amended, Page 463 U. S. 89 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125 (1976). [ Footnote 2 ] Congress
overcame the Gilbert ruling by enacting § 1 of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which added subsection (k) to § 701
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [ Footnote 3 ] See Newport News Shipbuilding an Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669 , 462 U. S. 678 (1983). Until that Act took effect on April 29, 1979, see § 2(b), 92 Stat. 2076, the Human Rights Law in this respect had a
reach broader than Title VII.

															The Disability Benefits Law, N.Y.Work.Comp.Law §§ 200-242
(McKinney 1965 and Supp.1982-1983), requires employers to pay
certain benefits to employees unable to work because of
nonoccupational injuries or illness. Disabled employees generally
are entitled to receive the lesser of $95 per week or one-half
their average weekly wage, for a maximum of 26 weeks in any 1-year
period. §§ 204.2, 205.1. Until August 1977, the Disability Benefits
Law provided that employees were not entitled to benefits for
pregnancy-related disabilities. § 205.3 (McKinney 1965). From
August, 1977, to June, 1981, employers were required to provide
eight weeks of benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities. Page 463 U. S. 90 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 675, § 29 (formerly codified as
N.Y.Work.Comp. Law § 205.3). This limitation was repealed in 1981, see 1981 N.Y. Laws, ch. 352, § 2, and the Disability
Benefits Law now requires employers to provide the same benefits
for pregnancy as for any other disability. [ Footnote 4 ] B The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et
seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), subjects to federal regulation
plans providing employees with fringe benefits. ERISA is a
comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. See Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U. S. 359 , 446 U. S.
361 -362 (1980); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U. S. 504 , 451 U. S. 510 (1981). The term "employee benefit plan" is defined as including
both pension plans and welfare Page 463 U. S. 91 plans. [ Footnote 5 ] The
statute imposes participation, funding, and vesting requirements on
pension plans. §§ 201-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1976 ed. and
Supp. V). It also sets various uniform standards, including rules
concerning reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary responsibility, for
both pension and welfare plans. §§ 101-111, 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§
10211031, 1101-1114 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). ERISA does not mandate
that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself
proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits.

															Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), preempts "any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA. [ Footnote 6 ] State laws regulating insurance, banking,
or securities are exempt from this preemption provision, as are
generally applicable state criminal laws. §§ 514(b)(2)(A) and
(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(b)(2)(A) and (b)(4). Section 514(d), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(d), moreover, provides that

															"[n]othing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend,
modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United
States . . . or any rule or regulation issued under any such
law."

															And § 4(b)(3) Page 463 U. S. 92 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(3), exempts from ERISA coverage
employee benefit plans that are

															"maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable
workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or
disability insurance laws." II Appellees in this litigation, Delta Air Lines, Inc., and other
airlines (Airlines), Burroughs Corporation (Burroughs), and
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan), provided their
employees with various medical and disability benefits through
welfare plans subject to ERISA. These plans, prior to the effective
date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, did not provide benefits
to employees disabled by pregnancy as required by the New York
Human Rights Law and the State's Disability Benefits Law. Appellees
brought three separate federal declaratory judgment actions against
appellant state agencies and officials, [ Footnote 7 ] alleging that the Human Rights Law was
preempted by ERISA. The Airlines in their action alleged that the
Disability Benefits Law was similarly preempted. [ Footnote 8 ]

															The United States District Court in each case held that the
Human Rights Law was preempted, at least insofar as it Page 463 U. S. 93 required the provision of pregnancy benefits prior to the
effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. [ Footnote 9 ] With respect to the Airlines'
challenge to the Disability Benefits Law, the District Court
construed § 4(b)(3) of ERISA as exempting from the federal statute
"those provisions of an employee plan which are maintained to
comply with" state disability insurance laws. Delta Air Lines,
Inc. v. Kramarsky, 485 F.
Supp. 300 , 307 (SDNY 1980). Because it concluded that the
Airlines would have provided pregnancy benefits solely to comply
with the Disability Benefits Law, the court dismissed the portion
of their complaint seeking relief from that law.

															The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed as to the Human Rights Law. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21 (1981); Metropolitan Life Page 463 U. S. 94 Insurance Co. v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 26 (1981); Burroughs Corp. v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 27 (1981).
[ Footnote 10 ] Relying on
this Court's decision in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U. S. 504 (1981), and on its own ruling in Pervel Industries, Inc. v.
Connecticut Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 603 F.2d 214 (1979), order aff'g, 468 F.
Supp. 490 (Conn.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980), the court held that § 514(a) of ERISA operated to preempt
the Human Rights Law, and that § 514(d) did not save that law from
preemption. [ Footnote 11 ]
With respect to the Disability Benefits Law, the Court of Appeals
had concluded earlier that § 4(b)(3)'s exemption from preemption
applied only when a benefit plan, "as Page 463 U. S. 95 an integral unit," is maintained solely to comply with a
disability law. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650
F.2d 1287, 1304 (1981). The court remanded for inquiries into
whether the Airlines provided disability benefits through plans
constituting separate administrative units, in which event the
Disability Benefits Law would be enforceable, or through portions
of comprehensive benefit plans, in which case ERISA regulation
would be exclusive.

															Because courts have disagreed about the scope of ERISA's
preemption provisions, [ Footnote
12 ] and because of the continuing importance of the issues
presented, [ Footnote 13 ] we
noted probable jurisdiction in all three cases. 456 U.S. 924
(1982). III In deciding whether a federal law preempts a state statute, our
task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal
statute at issue.

															"Preemption may be either express or implied, and 'is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.' Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S.
519 , 430 U. S. 525 (1977)." Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 , 458 U. S.
152 -153 (1982). See Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton , 462 U.S. Page 463 U. S. 96 176, 462 U. S.
180 -182 (1983); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm'n, 461 U. S. 190 , 461 U. S.
203 -204 (1983). In these cases, we address the scope of
several provisions of ERISA that speak expressly to the question of
preemption. The issues are whether the Human Rights Law and
Disability Benefits Law "relate to" employee benefit plans within
the meaning of § 514(a), see n 6, supra, and, if so, whether any exception in
ERISA saves them from preemption. [ Footnote 14 ]

															We have no difficulty in concluding that the Human Rights Law
and Disability Benefits Law "relate to" employee benefit plans. The
breadth of § 514(a)'s preemptive reach is apparent from that
section's language. [ Footnote
15 ] A law "relates to" an Page 463 U. S. 97 employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it
has a connection with or reference to such a plan. [ Footnote 16 ] Employing this definition, the
Human Rights Law, which prohibits employers from structuring their
employee benefit plans in a manner that discriminates on the basis
of pregnancy, and the Disability Benefits Law, which requires
employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly "relate to"
benefit plans. [ Footnote 17 ]
We must give effect to this plain language unless there is good
reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more
restrictive meaning. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102 , 447 U. S. 108 (1980); see North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.
S. 300 , Page 463 U. S. 98 460 U. S. 312 (1983); Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103 , 460 U. S. 110 (1983).

															In fact, however, Congress used the words "relate to" in §
514(a) in their broad sense. To interpret § 514(a) to preempt only
state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans
would be to ignore the remainder of § 514. It would have been
unnecessary to exempt generally applicable state criminal statutes
from preemption in § 514(b), for example, if § 514(a) applied only
to state laws dealing specifically with ERISA plans.

															Nor, given the legislative history, can § 514(a) be interpreted
to preempt only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered
by ERISA -- reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and
the like. The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited
preemption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the
specific subjects covered by ERISA. [ Footnote 18 ] The Conference Committee rejected these
provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that the
section's preemptive scope was as broad as its language. See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1280, p. 383 (1974); S.Conf.Rep.
No. 93-1090, p. 383 (1974). [ Footnote 19 ] Statements by the bill's Page 463 U. S. 99 sponsors during the subsequent debates stressed the breadth of
federal preemption. Representative Dent, for example, stated:

															"Finally, I wish to make note of what is, to many, the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal
authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit
plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the
protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of
conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation."

															120 Cong.Rec. 29197 (1974). Senator Williams echoed these
sentiments:

															"It should be stressed that, with the narrow exceptions
specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions
of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for
Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or
inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans.
This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality
thereof, which have the force or effect of law." Id. at 29933. [ Footnote 20 ] Page 463 U. S. 100 Given the plain language of § 514(a), the structure of the Act,
and its legislative history, we hold that the Human Rights Law and
the Disability Benefits Law "relate to any employee benefit plan"
within the meaning of ERISA's § 514(a). [ Footnote 21 ] IV We next consider whether any of the narrow exceptions to §
514(a) saves these laws from preemption. A Appellants argue that the Human Rights Law is exempt from
preemption by § 514(d), which provides that § 514(a) Page 463 U. S. 101 shall not "be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States." According to
appellants, preemption of state fair employment laws would impair
and modify Title VII because it would change the means by which it
is enforced.

															State laws obviously play a significant role in the enforcement
of Title VII. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp., 456 U. S. 461 , 456 U. S.
468 -469, 456 U. S. 472 , 456 U. S. 477 (1982); id. at 456 U. S. 504 (dissenting opinion); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v.
Carey, 447 U. S. 54 , 447 U. S. 63 -65
(1980). Title VII expressly preserves nonconflicting state laws in
its § 708:

															"Nothing in this title shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any
person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by
any present or future law of any State or political subdivision of
a State, other than any such law which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment
practice under this title."

															78 Stat. 262, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. [ Footnote 22 ] Moreover, Title VII requires recourse to
available state administrative remedies. When an employment
practice prohibited by Title VII is alleged to have occurred in a
State or locality which prohibits the practice and has established
an Page 463 U. S. 102 agency to enforce that prohibition, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) refers the charges to the state
agency. The EEOC may not actively process the charges

															"before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated."

															§ 706(c), 86 Stat. 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); see Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522 (1972). In its subsequent proceedings, the EEOC accords
"substantial weight" to the state administrative determination. §
706(b), 86 Stat. 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

															Given the importance of state fair employment laws to the
federal enforcement scheme, preemption of the Human Rights Law
would impair Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights Law
provides a means of enforcing Title VII's commands. Before the
enactment of ERISA, an employee claiming discrimination in
connection with a benefit plan would have had his complaint
referred to the New York State Division of Human Rights. If ERISA
were interpreted to preempt the Human Rights Law entirely with
respect to covered benefit plans, the State no longer could
prohibit the challenged employment practice, and the state agency
no longer would be authorized to grant relief. The EEOC thus would
be unable to refer the claim to the state agency. This would
frustrate the goal of encouraging joint state/federal enforcement
of Title VII; an employee's only remedies for discrimination
prohibited by Title VII in ERISA plans would be federal ones. Such
a disruption of the enforcement scheme contemplated by Title VII
would, in the words of § 514(d), "modify" and "impair" federal law.
[ Footnote 23 ] Page 463 U. S. 103 Insofar as state laws prohibit employment practices that are
lawful under Title VII, however, preemption would not impair Title
VII within the meaning of § 514(d). Although Title VII does not
itself prevent States from extending their nondiscrimination laws
to areas not covered by Title VII, see § 708, 78 Stat.
262, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7, it in no way depends on such extensions
for its enforcement. Title VII would prohibit precisely the same
employment practices, and be enforced in precisely the same manner,
even if no State made additional employment practices unlawful.
Quite simply, Title VII is neutral on the subject of all employment
practices it does not prohibit. [ Footnote 24 ] We fail to see how federal Page 463 U. S. 104 law would be impaired by preemption of a state law prohibiting
conduct that federal law permitted.

															ERISA's structure and legislative history, while not
particularly illuminating with respect to § 514(d), caution against
applying it too expansively. As we have detailed above, Congress
applied the principle of preemption "in its broadest sense to
foreclose any non-Federal regulation of employee benefit plans,"
creating only very limited exceptions to preemption. 120 Cong.Rec.
29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent); see id. at 29933
(remarks of Sen. Williams). Sections 4(b)(3) and 514(b), which list
specific exceptions, do not refer to state fair employment laws.
While § 514(d) may operate to exempt provisions of state laws upon
which federal laws depend for their enforcement, the combination of
Congress' enactment of an all-inclusive preemption provision and
its enumeration of narrow, specific exceptions to that provision
makes us reluctant to expand § 514(d) into a more general saving
clause.

															The references to employment discrimination in the legislative
history of ERISA provide no basis for an expansive construction of
§ 514(d). During floor debates, Senator Mondale questioned whether
the Senate bill should be amended to require nondiscrimination in
ERISA plans. Senator Williams replied that no such amendment was
necessary or desirable. He noted that Title VII already prohibited
discrimination in benefit plans, and stated:

															"I believe that the thrust toward centralized administration of
nondiscrimination in employment must be maintained. And I believe
this can be done by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
under terms of existing law."

															119 Cong.Rec. 30409 (1973). Senator Mondale,

															"with the understanding that nondiscrimination in pension and
profit-sharing plans is fully required under the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act," id. at 30410, chose not to offer a nondiscrimination
amendment. This colloquy was repeated on the floor of the House by
Representatives Abzug and Dent. 120 Cong.Rec. 4726 (1974). Page 463 U. S. 105 These exchanges demonstrate only the obvious: that § 514(d) does
not preempt federal law. The speakers referred to federal law, the
EEOC, and the need for centralized enforcement. The limited
legislative history dealing with § 514(d) is entirely consistent
with Congress' goal of ensuring that employers would not face
"conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee
benefit plans," 120 Cong.Rec. 29933 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Williams). Congress might well have believed, had it considered the
precise issue before us, that ERISA plans should be subject only to
the nondiscrimination provisions of Title VII, and not also to
state laws prohibiting other forms of discrimination. By
establishing benefit plan regulation "as exclusively a federal
concern," Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 523 ,
Congress minimized the need for interstate employers to administer
their plans differently in each State in which they have employees.
[ Footnote 25 ]

															We recognize that our interpretation of § 514(d) as requiring
partial preemption of state fair employment laws may cause certain
practical problems. Courts and state agencies, rather than
considering whether employment practices are Page 463 U. S. 106 unlawful under a broad state law, will have to determine whether
they are prohibited by Title VII. If they are not, the state law
will be superseded and the agency will lack authority to act. It
seems more than likely, however, that state agencies and courts are
sufficiently familiar with Title VII to apply it in their
adjudicative processes. Many States look to Title VII law as a
matter of course in defining the scope of their own laws. [ Footnote 26 ] In any event, these
minor practical difficulties do not represent the kind of
"impairment" or "modification" of federal law that can
save a state law from preemption under § 514(d). To the extent that
our construction of ERISA causes any problems in the administration
of state fair employment laws, those problems are the result of
congressional choice, and should be addressed by congressional
action. To give § 514(d) the broad construction advocated by
appellants would defeat the intent of Congress to provide
comprehensive preemption of state law. B The Disability Benefits Law presents a different problem.
Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts state laws that relate to benefit
plans "described in section 4(a) and not exempt under section
4(b)." Consequently, while the Disability Benefits Law plainly is a
state law relating to employee benefit plans, it is not preempted
if the plans to which it relates are exempt from ERISA under §
4(b). Section 4(b)(3) exempts "any employee benefit plan . . .
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable . .
. disability insurance laws." The Disability Benefits Law is a
"disability insurance law," of course; the difficulty is that at
least some of the benefit Page 463 U. S. 107 plans offered by the Airlines provide benefits not required by
that law. The question is whether, with respect to those among the
Airlines using multibenefit plans, the Disability Benefits Law's
requirement that employers provide particular benefits remains
enforceable.

															As the Court of Appeals recognized, § 4(b)(3) excludes "plans,"
not portions of plans, from ERISA coverage; those portions of the
Airlines' multibenefit plans maintained to comply with the
Disability Benefits Law, therefore, are not exempt from ERISA, and
are not subject to state regulation. There is no reason to believe
that Congress used the word "plan" in § 4(b) to refer to individual
benefits offered by an employee benefit plan. To the contrary, §
4(b)(3)'s use of the word "solely" demonstrates that the purpose of
the entire plan must be to comply with an applicable disability
insurance law. As the Court noted in Alessi, plans that
not only provide benefits required by such a law, but also "more
broadly serve employee needs as a result of collective bargaining,"
are not exempt. 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 523 ,
n. 20. The test is not one of the employer's motive -- any employer
could claim that it provided disability benefits altruistically, to
attract good employees, or to increase employee productivity, as
well as to obey state law -- but whether the plan, as an
administrative unit, provides only those benefits required by the
applicable state law.

															Any other rule, it seems to us, would make little sense. Under
the District Court's approach, for which appellants argue here, one
portion of a multibenefit plan would be subject only to state
regulation, while other portions would be exclusively within the
federal domain. An employer with employees in several States would
find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern of
regulation in each State, depending on what benefits the State
mandated under disability, workmen's compensation, and unemployment
compensation laws. The administrative impracticality of permitting
mutually exclusive pockets of federal and state Page 463 U. S. 108 jurisdiction within a plan is apparent. We see no reason to
torture the plain language of § 4(b)(3) to achieve this result.
Only separately administered disability plans maintained solely to
comply with the Disability Benefits Law are exempt from ERISA
coverage under § 4(b)(3).

															This is not to say, however, that the Airlines are completely
free to circumvent the Disability Benefits Law by adopting plans
that combine disability benefits inferior to those required by that
law with other types of benefits. Congress surely did not intend,
at the same time it preserved the role of state disability laws, to
make enforcement of those laws impossible. A State may require an
employer to maintain a disability plan complying with state law as
a separate administrative unit. Such a plan would be exempt under §
4(b)(3). The fact that state law permits employers to meet their
state law obligations by including disability insurance benefits in
a multibenefit ERISA plan, see N.Y. Work.Comp.Law App. §
355.6 (McKinney Supp.1982-1983), does not make the state law wholly
unenforceable as to employers who choose that option.

															In other words, while the State may not require an employer to
alter its ERISA plan, it may force the employer to choose between
providing disability benefits in a separately administered plan and
including the state-mandated benefits in its ERISA plan. If the
State is not satisfied that the ERISA plan comports with the
requirements of its disability insurance law, it may compel the
employer to maintain a separate plan that does comply. The Court of
Appeals erred, therefore, in holding that appellants are not at all
free to enforce the Disability Benefits Law against those appellees
that provide disability benefits as part of multibenefit plans. V We hold that New York's Human Rights Law is preempted with
respect to ERISA benefit plans only insofar as it prohibits
practices that are lawful under federal law. To Page 463 U. S. 109 this extent, the judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
To the extent the Court of Appeals held any more of the Human
Rights Law preempted, we vacate its judgments and remand the
cases.

															We further hold that the Disability Benefits Law is not
preempted by ERISA, although New York may not enforce its
provisions through regulation of ERISA-covered benefit plans. We
therefore vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment in the Airlines'
case on this ground and remand that case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

															No costs are allowed. It s so ordered. * Together with Shaw, Acting Commissioner, New York State
Division of Human Rights v. Burroughs Corp.; and Shaw,
Acting Commissioner, New York State Division of Human Rights, et
al. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., also on appeal from
the same court ( see this Court's Rule 10.6).

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															Section 296.1 (McKinney 1982) provides:

															"1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:"

															"(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability, or marital
status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or
to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or
privileges of employment."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The New York court in Brooklyn Union Gas noted the Gilbert decision, but declined to follow it in
interpreting the analogous provision of the Human Rights Law. 41
N.Y.2d at 86, n. 1, 359 N.E.2d at 395, n. 1. Most state courts have
done the same. See Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v.
State, 289 N.W.2d
396 , 399, n. 2 (Minn.1979) (collecting cases), appeal
dism'd, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Subsection (k) provides in relevant part:

															"The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work,
and nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The current version of the Disability Benefits Law provides in
relevant part:

															"§ 204. Disability during employment"

															"1. Disability benefits shall be payable to an eligible employee
for disabilities . . . beginning with the eighth consecutive day of
disability and thereafter during the continuance of disability,
subject to the limitations as to maximum and minimum amounts and
duration and other conditions and limitations in this section and
in sections two hundred five and two hundred six. . . ."

															"2. The weekly benefit which the disabled employee is entitled
to receive for disability commencing on or after July first,
nineteen hundred seventy-four shall be one-half of the employee's
average weekly wage, but in no case shall such benefit exceed
ninety-five dollars nor be less than twenty dollars; except that,
if the employee's average weekly wage is less than twenty dollars,
his benefit shall be such average weekly wage. . . ."

															"§ 205. Disabilities and disability periods for which benefits
are not payable"

															"No employee shall be entitled to benefits under this
article:"

															"1. For more than twenty-six weeks during a period of fifty-two
consecutive calendar weeks or during any one period of
disability."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). An "employee pension benefit
plan" provides income deferral or retirement income. § 3(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(2). An "employee welfare benefit plan" includes any
program that provides benefits for contingencies such as illness,
accident, disability, death, or unemployment. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(1).

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Section 514(a) provides:

															"Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this title and title IV shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and not exempt
under section 4(b)."

															The term "State law" includes "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any
State." § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). The term "State"
includes

															"a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any agency or
instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans
covered by this title."

															§ 514(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(2).

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															The Airlines brought their action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York and named as defendants
the New York State Division of Human Rights, the Division's
Commissioner, the Division's General Counsel, the New York State
Workmen's Compensation Board, and the Board's Chairman. App. 28.
Burroughs brought its action in the Western District of New York
against only the Commissioner of the Division of Human Rights. Id. at 81. Metropolitan, suing in the Southern District of
New York, named the Commissioner, the Division, and the New York
State Human Rights Appeal Board. Id. at 88.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Airlines also contended that the Human Rights Law and
Disability Benefits Law were preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §
206(d); Exec.Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.); and
Title VII. These claims were resolved against the Airlines, see
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 666 F.2d 21, 26, n. 2 (CA2
1981); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287,
1296-1302 (CA2 1981), and are not before us.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The opinion in the Airlines' case is reported as Delta Air
Lines Inc. v. Kramarsky, 485 F.
Supp. 300 (SDNY 1980); the District Court opinions in the two
other cases are not reported. In the Airlines' case, the District
Court enjoined appellants from enforcing the Human Rights Law
against the Airlines' benefit plans with respect to the period from
December 20, 1976 (the date of the New York Court of Appeals'
decision in Brooklyn Union Gas ) to April 29, 1979 (the
effective date of the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act). See App. to Juris.Statement A75. As of the latter date,
the court held, the Airlines' claims for relief were moot, because
federal law required the Airlines to include pregnancy disabilities
in their employee benefit plans. 485 F. Supp. at 302.

															In Burroughs' case, the District Court enjoined prosecution of
Burroughs for its refusal to compensate New York employees for
pregnancy-related disability claims between January 1, 1975 (the
effective date of ERISA) and April 1, 1979 (which the court
mistakenly believed to be the effective date of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act). App. to Juris.Statement A103-A104. In
Metropolitan's case, the District Court enjoined enforcement of the
Human Rights Law with respect to employee benefit plans subject to
ERISA. The court's order was not limited to pregnancy benefits, and
did not refer specifically to any time period. Id. at
A119-A120.

															The cases, of course, are not moot with respect to the period
before the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
since enforcement of the Human Rights Law would subject appellees
to liability.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The three cases were not consolidated on appeal, but were argued
the same day. The court treated the Airlines' appeal as the "lead"
case.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															Initially, the Court of Appeals had reversed the District
Courts' holdings that ERISA preempted the Human Rights Law. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1287 (1981); Burroughs Corp. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d 1308 (1981); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Kramarsky, 650 F.2d
1309 (1981). Although Pervel ordinarily would have been
controlling, the court concluded that it was bound by this Court's
dismissals, for want of a substantial federal question, of the
appeals in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v.
State, 289 N.W.2d
396 (Minn.1979), appeal dism'd, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980),
and Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 187 Mont. 22, 608 P.2d
1047 (1979), appeal dism'd, 445 U.S. 921 (1980). In those
cases, the state courts had determined that state fair employment
laws similar to the Human Rights Law were not preempted by
ERISA.

															The Court of Appeals observed that this Court had denied
certiorari in Pervel, which reached the opposite result,
only a week before dismissing the appeal in Minnesota
Mining. Understandably viewing this sequence of events as
"rather mystifying," 650 F.2d at 1296, the court noted that
dismissals of appeals are binding precedents for the lower courts, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332 , 422 U. S.
343 -345, and n. 14 (1975), while denials of certiorari
have no precedential force. After this Court's decision in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.
S. 504 (1981), the Court of Appeals granted rehearing
and returned to its Pervel reasoning, holding that Alessi was a "doctrinal development," see Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S.
344 -345, that warranted departure from the precedent set
by the Court's summary dispositions. 666 F.2d at 25-26.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. State,
supra; Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Commissioner of Labor & Industry, supra; see also Bucyrus-Erie
Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations, 599 F.2d 205 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031
(1980).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the kind of
discrimination at issue here is now unlawful regardless of state
law. The controversy about the Human Rights Law has not thereby
become less significant, however; the Human Rights Law and other
state fair employment laws may contain proscriptions broader than
Title VII in other respects, see, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Law. §
296.1(a) (McKinney 1982) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
based on marital status), and there is uncertainty about whether
state fair employment laws may be enforced to the extent they
prohibit the same practices as Title VII.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															The Court's decision today in Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, ante, p. 463 U. S. 1 , does
not call into question the lower courts' jurisdiction to decide
these cases. Franchise Tax Board was an action seeking a
declaration that state laws were not preempted by ERISA.
Here, in contrast, companies subject to ERISA regulation seek
injunctions against enforcement of state laws they claim are preempted by ERISA, as well as declarations that those
laws are preempted.

															It is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over
suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal
rights. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.
S. 123 , 209 U. S.
160 -162 (1908). A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief
from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is
preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus presents a federal
question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 to resolve. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co., 255 U. S. 180 , 255 U. S.
199 -200 (1921); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149 , 211 U. S. 152 (1908); see also Franchise Tax Board, ante at 463 U. S. 19 -22,
and n. 20; Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Declaratory Suits
Challenging State Action, 79 Colum.L.Rev. 983, 996-1000 (1979).
This Court, of course, frequently has resolved preemption disputes
in a similar jurisdictional posture. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.
S. 519 (1977); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52 (1941).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															The Court recently considered § 514(a) in Alessi,
supra. In that case, a New Jersey statute prohibited a method
of computing pension benefits which, the Court found, Congress
intended to permit when it enacted ERISA. Finding that Congress
"meant to establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a
federal concern," 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 523 ,
and that the New Jersey law "eliminates one method for calculating
pension benefits -- integration -- that is permitted by federal
law," id. at 451 U. S. 524 ,
the Court held that the law was preempted. The Court relied not on
§ 514(a)'s language and legislative history, but on the state law's
frustration of congressional intent. That kind of tension is not
present in these cases; while federal law did not prohibit
pregnancy discrimination during the relevant period, Congress, in
enacting ERISA, demonstrated no desire to permit it. Alessi's recognition of the exclusive federal role in
regulating benefit plans, therefore, is instructive, but not
dispositive. See also Franchise Tax Board v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, ante at 463 U. S. 24 , n.
26 (describing § 514(a) as a "virtually unique preemption
provision"); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234 , 438 U. S. 248 ,
n. 21 (1978) (dictum).

															[ Footnote 16 ] See Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed.1979) ("Relate.
To stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain;
refer; to bring into association with or connection with"). See
also Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U. S. 689 , 289 U. S. 695 (1933).

															[ Footnote 17 ] Accord, Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Department of Industry, Labor
& Human Relations, 599 F.2d at 208-210; Pervel
Industries, Inc. v. Connecticut Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, 468 F.
Supp. 490 , 492 (Conn.1978), affirmance order, 603 F.2d
214 (CA2 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980).

															Of course, § 514(a) preempts state laws only insofar as they
relate to plans covered by ERISA. The Human Rights Law, for
example, would be unaffected insofar as it prohibits employment
discrimination in hiring, promotion, salary, and the like.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															The bill that passed the House, H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §
514(a) (1974), 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (Committee Print compiled by the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare), pp. 4057-4058 (1976)
(Legislative History), provided that ERISA would supersede state
laws "relat[ing] to the reporting and disclosure responsibilities,
and fiduciary responsibilities, of persons acting on behalf of any
employee benefit plan to which part 1 applies." The bill that
passed the Senate, H.R. 2, 93d Cong,2d Sess., § 699(a) (1974), 3
Legislative History 3820, provided for preemption of state laws
"relat[ing] to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act."

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															In deciding to preempt state laws relating to benefit plans,
rather than those laws relating to subjects covered by ERISA, the
Conference Committee rejected a much narrower administration
proposal. The administration's recommendations to the conferees
described the preemption provision of the House and Senate bills as
"extremely vague" and "too broad," respectively, and suggested
language making explicit the areas of state law to be preempted.
Administration Recommendations to the House and Senate Conferees on
H.R. 2 to Provide for Pension Reform 107-108, 3 Legislative History
5145-5146. The version of § 514(a) that emerged from Conference
bore no resemblance to the administration proposal. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev.
23, 39-40, and n. 121 (1978).

															[ Footnote 20 ] See also 120 Cong.Rec. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Javits):

															"Both [original] House and Senate bills provided for preemption
of State law, but -- with one major exception appearing in the
House bill -- defined the perimeters of preemption in relation to
the areas regulated by the bill. Such a formulation raised the
possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action
that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well as opening the
door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily
contrived to deal with some particular aspect of private welfare or
pension benefit plans not clearly connected to the Federal
regulatory scheme."

															"Although the desirability of further regulation -- at either
the State or Federal level -- undoubtedly warrants further
attention, on balance, the emergence of a comprehensive and
pervasive Federal interest and the interests of uniformity with
respect to interstate plans required -- but for certain exceptions
-- the displacement of State action in the field of private
employee benefit programs."

															Senator Javits noted that the conferees had assigned the
Congressional Pension Task Force the responsibility of studying and
evaluating ERISA preemption in order to determine whether
modifications in the preemption policy would be necessary. Ibid. See ERISA §§ 3021, 3022(a)(4), 88 Stat. 999
(formerly codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1222(a)(5)). After a
period of monitoring by the Task Force, and hearings by the
Subcommittee on Labor Standards of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, a Report was issued evaluating ERISA's preemption
provisions. The Report expressed approval of ERISA's broad
preemption of state law, explaining that "the Federal interest and
the need for national uniformity are so great that enforcement of
state regulation should be precluded." H.R.Rep. No. 94-1785, p. 47
(1977). The Report recommended only that the exceptions described
in § 514(b) be narrowed still further. Ibid. [ Footnote 21 ]

															Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that
the law "relates to" the plan. Cf. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (CA2 1979) (state
garnishment of a spouse's pension income to enforce alimony and
support orders is not preempted). The present litigation plainly
does not present a borderline question, and we express no views
about where it would be appropriate to draw the line.

															[ Footnote 22 ] See also § 1104, 78 Stat. 268, 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4. The
Court of Appeals properly rejected the simplistic "double saving
clause" argument -- that, because ERISA does not preempt Title VII,
and Title VII does not preempt state fair employment laws, ERISA
does not preempt such laws. 666 F.2d at 25-26. Title VII does not
transform state fair employment laws into federal laws that §
514(d) saves from ERISA preemption. Furthermore, since Title VII's
saving clause applies to all state laws with which it is not in
conflict, rather than just to nondiscrimination laws, and since
many federal laws contain nonpreemption provisions, the double
saving clause argument, taken to its logical extreme, would save
almost all state laws from preemption. The question whether
preemption of state fair employment laws would "impair" Title VII,
in light of Title VII's reliance on state laws and agencies, is the
more difficult question we address in the text.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															Preemption of this sort not only would eliminate a forum for
resolving disputes that, in certain situations, may be more
convenient than the EEOC, but also would substantially increase the
EEOC's workload. Because the EEOC would be unable to refer claims
to state agencies for initial processing, those claims that would
have been settled at the state level would require the EEOC's
attention. Claims that would not have been settled at the state
level, but would have produced an administrative record, would come
to the EEOC without such a record. The EEOC's options for coping
with this added burden, barring discoveries of reserves in the
agency budget, would be to devote less time to each individual case
or to accept longer delays in handling cases. The inevitable result
of complete preemption, in short, would be less effective
enforcement of Title VII.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															Appellants argue that preemption of the Human Rights Law's
prohibition of pregnancy discrimination would impair Title VII,
because that law encourages States to enact fair employment laws
providing greater substantive protection than Title VII. See,
e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7, 11. We have found no statutory
language or legislative history suggesting that the federal
interest in state fair employment laws extends any farther than
saving such laws from preemption by Title VII itself. As the court
stated in Pervel, 468 F. Supp. at 493, "Title VII did not
create new authority for state antidiscrimination laws; it simply
left them where they were before the enactment of Title VII."

															The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does
not assist appellants. Although the House Report observed that many
employers already were subject to state laws prohibiting pregnancy
discrimination, H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, pp. 9-11 (1978); see S.Rep. No. 95-331, pp. 10-11 (1977), this observation subsequent to
ERISA's enactment conveys no information about the intent of the
Congress that passed ERISA. The conferees did not even mention
ERISA; evidently, they simply failed to consider whether ERISA
plans were subject to state laws prohibiting pregnancy
discrimination.

															[ Footnote 25 ]

															An employer with employees in many States might find that the
most efficient way to provide benefits to those employees is
through a single employee benefit plan. Obligating the employer to
satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting requirements of
particular state fair employment laws, as well as the requirements
of Title VII, would make administration of a uniform nationwide
plan more difficult. The employer might choose to offer a number of
plans, each tailored to the laws of particular States; the
inefficiency of such a system presumably would be paid for by
lowering benefit levels. Alternatively, assuming that the state
laws were not in conflict, the employer could comply with the laws
of all States in a uniform plan. To offset the additional expenses,
the employer presumably would reduce wages or eliminate those
benefits not required by any State. Another means by which the
employer could retain its uniform nationwide plan would be by
eliminating classes of benefits that are subject to state
requirements with which the employer is unwilling to comply.
ERISA's comprehensive preemption of state law was meant to minimize
this sort of interference with the administration of employee
benefit plans.

															[ Footnote 26 ] See, e.g., Arizona Civic Rights Division v. Olson, 132
Ariz. 20, 24 n. 2, 643 P.2d 723, 727, n. 2 (1982); Scarborough
v. Arnold, 117 N.H. 803, 807, 379 A.2d 790, 793 (1977); Snell v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 198 Mont. 56, 62,
643 P.2d 841, 844 (1982); Orr v. Clyburn, 277 S.C. 536,
539, 290 S.E.2d
804 , 806 (1982); Albertson's, Inc. v. Washington. State
Human Rights Comm'n, 14 Wash. App. 697, 699-700, 544 P.2d 98,
100 (1976).