NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1435

															_________________

															MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE, et al.,
PETITIONERS v. JOE MANSKY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eighth circuit

															[June 14, 2018]

															Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of
the Court.

															Under Minnesota law, voters may not wear a
political badge, political button, or anything bearing political
insignia inside a polling place on Election Day. The question
presented is whether this ban violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.

															I

															A

															Today, Americans going to their polling places
on Election Day expect to wait in a line, briefly interact with an
election official, enter a private voting booth, and cast an
anonymous ballot. Little about this ritual would have been familiar
to a voter in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. For one thing,
voters typically deposited pri- vately prepared ballots at the
polls instead of completing official ballots on-site. These
pre-made ballots often took the form of “party tickets”—printed
slates of candidate selections, often distinctive in appearance,
that political parties distributed to their supporters and pressed
upon others around the polls. See E. Evans, A History of the
Australian Ballot System in the United States 6–11 (1917) (Evans);
R. Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
14–15 (2004) (Bensel).

															The physical arrangement confronting the voter
was also different. The polling place often consisted simply of a
“voting window” through which the voter would hand his ballot to an
election official situated in a separate room with the ballot box.
Bensel 11, 13; see, e.g., C. Rowell, Digest of
Contested-Election Cases in the Fifty-First Congress 224 (1891)
(report of Rep. Lacey) (considering whether “the ability to reach
the window and actually tender the ticket to the [election] judges”
is “essential in all cases to constitute a good offer to vote”);
Holzer, Election Day 1860, Smithsonian Magazine (Nov. 2008), pp.
46, 52 (describing the interior voting window on the third floor of
the Springfield, Illinois courthouse where Abraham Lincoln voted).
As a result of this arrangement, “the actual act of voting was
usually performed in the open,” frequently within view of
interested onlookers. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot
Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–1908, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1220,
1221 (1970) (Rusk); see Evans 11–13.

															As documented in Burson v. Freeman , 504 U. S. 191 (1992), “[a]pproaching the
polling place under this system was akin to entering an open
auction place.” Id., at 202 (plurality opinion). The room
containing the ballot boxes was “usually quiet and orderly,” but
“[t]he public space outside the window . . . was
chaotic.” Bensel 13. Electioneering of all kinds was permitted. See id. , at 13, 16–17; R. Dinkin, Election Day: A Documentary
History 19 (2002). Crowds would gather to heckle and harass voters
who appeared to be supporting the other side. Indeed, “[u]nder the
informal conventions of the period, election etiquette required
only that a ‘man of ordinary courage’ be able to make his way to
the voting window.” Bensel 20–21. “In short, these early elections
were not a very pleasant spectacle for those who believed in
democratic government.” Burson, 504 U. S., at 202
(plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															By the late nineteenth century, States began
implementing reforms to address these vulnerabilities and improve
the reliability of elections. Between 1888 and 1896, nearly every
State adopted the secret ballot. See id., at 203–205.
Because voters now needed to mark their state-printed ballots
on-site and in secret, voting moved into a sequestered space where
the voters could “deliberate and make a decision in . . .
privacy.” Rusk 1221; see Evans 35; 1889 Minn. Stat. ch. 3, §§27–28,
p. 21 (regulating, as part of Minnesota’s secret ballot law, the
arrangement of voting compartments inside the polling place). In
addition, States enacted “viewpoint-neutral restrictions on
election-day speech” in the immediate vicinity of the polls. Burson, 504 U. S., at 214–215 (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment) (by 1900, 34 of 45 States had such restrictions).
Today, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have laws curbing
various forms of speech in and around polling places on Election
Day.

															Minnesota’s such law contains three
prohibitions, only one of which is challenged here. See Minn. Stat.
§211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017). The first sentence of §211B.11(1) forbids
any person to “display campaign material, post signs, ask, solicit,
or in any manner try to induce or persuade a voter within a polling
place or within 100 feet of the building in which a polling place
is situ- ated” to “vote for or refrain from voting for a candidate
or ballot question.” The second sentence prohibits the distribution
of “political badges, political buttons, or other political
insignia to be worn at or about the polling place.” The third
sentence—the “political apparel ban”—states that a “political
badge, political button, or other political insignia may not be
worn at or about the polling place.” Versions of all three
prohibitions have been on the books in Minnesota for over a
century. See 1893 Minn. Laws ch. 4, §108, pp. 51–52; 1912 Minn.
Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 3, p. 24; 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 578, Art.
3, §11, p. 594 (reenacting the prohibitions as part of
§211B.11).

															There is no dispute that the political apparel
ban applies only within the polling place, and covers
articles of clothing and accessories with “political insignia” upon
them. Minnesota election judges—temporary government employees
working the polls on Election Day—have the authority to decide
whether a particular item falls within the ban. App. to Pet. for
Cert. I–1. If a voter shows up wearing a prohibited item, the
election judge is to ask the individual to conceal or remove it. Id., at I–2. If the individual refuses, the election judge
must allow him to vote, while making clear that the incident “will
be recorded and referred to appropriate authorities.” Ibid. Violators are subject to an administrative process before the
Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings, which, upon finding a
violation, may issue a reprimand or impose a civil penalty. Minn.
Stat. §§211B.32, 211B.35(2) (2014). That administrative body may
also refer the complaint to the county attorney for prosecution as
a petty misdemeanor; the maximum penalty is a $300 fine.
§§211B.11(4) (Supp. 2017), 211B.35(2) (2014), 609.02(4a)
(2016).

															B

															Petitioner Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) is
a nonprofit organization that “seeks better government through
election reforms.” Pet. for Cert. 5. Petitioner Andrew Cilek
is a registered voter in Hennepin County and the executive director
of MVA; petitioner Susan Jeffers served in 2010 as a Ramsey County
election judge. Five days before the November 2010 election, MVA,
Jeffers, and other likeminded groups and individuals filed a
lawsuit in Federal District Court challenging the political apparel
ban on First Amendment grounds. The groups—calling themselves
“Election Integrity Watch” (EIW)—planned to have supporters wear
buttons to the polls printed with the words “Please I. D. Me,” a
picture of an eye, and a telephone number and web address for EIW.
(Minnesota law does not require individuals to show identification
to vote.) One of the individual plaintiffs also planned to wear a
“Tea Party Patriots” shirt. The District Court denied the
plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction and allowed the apparel ban to remain in
effect for the upcoming election.

															In response to the lawsuit, officials for
Hennepin and Ramsey Counties distributed to election judges an
“Election Day Policy,” providing guidance on the enforcement of the
political apparel ban. The Minnesota Secretary of State also
distributed the Policy to election officials throughout the State.
The Policy specified that examples of apparel falling within the
ban “include, but are not limited to”:

															“• Any item including the name of a political
party in Minnesota, such as the Republican,
[Democratic-Farmer-Labor], Independence, Green or Libertar- ian
parties.

															• Any item including the name of a candidate at
any election.

															• Any item in support of or opposition to a
ballot question at any election.

															• Issue oriented material designed to influence
or impact voting (including specifically the ‘Please I. D. Me’
buttons).

															• Material promoting a group with recognizable
political views (such as the Tea Party, MoveOn.org, and so on).”
App. to Pet. for Cert. I–1 to I–2.

															As alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint
and supporting declarations, some voters associated with EIW ran
into trouble with the ban on Election Day. One individual was asked
to cover up his Tea Party shirt. Another refused to conceal his
“Please I. D. Me” button, and an election judge recorded his name
and address for possible referral. And petitioner Cilek—who was
wearing the same button and a T-shirt with the words “Don’t Tread
on Me” and the Tea Party Patriots logo—was twice turned away from
the polls altogether, then finally permitted to vote after an
election judge recorded his information.

															Back in court, MVA and the other plaintiffs (now
joined by Cilek) argued that the ban was unconstitutional both on
its face and as applied to their apparel. The District Court
granted the State’s motions to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 708 F. 3d 1051
(2013). In evaluating MVA’s facial challenge, the Court of Appeals
observed that this Court had previously upheld a state law
restricting speech “related to a political campaign” in a 100-foot
zone outside a polling place; the Court of Appeals determined that
Minnesota’s law likewise passed constitutional muster. Id., at 1056–1058 (quoting Burson , 504 U. S., at 197
(plurality opinion)). The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal
of the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, however, finding that the
District Court had improperly considered matters outside the
pleadings. 708 F. 3d, at 1059. Judge Shepherd concurred in
part and dissented in part. In his view, Minnesota’s broad
restriction on political apparel did not “rationally and
reasonably” serve the State’s asserted interests. Id., at
1062. On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment for
the State on the as-applied challenge, and this time the Court of
Appeals affirmed. Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 849
F. 3d 749 (2017).

															MVA, Cilek, and Jeffers (hereinafter MVA)
petitioned for review of their facial First Amendment claim only.
We granted certiorari. 583 U. S. ___ (2017).

															II

															The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging
the freedom of speech.” Minnesota’s ban on wearing any “political
badge, political button, or other political insignia” plainly
restricts a form of expression within the protection of the First
Amendment.

															But the ban applies only in a specific location:
the interior of a polling place. It therefore implicates our
“ ‘forum based’ approach for assessing restrictions that the
government seeks to place on the use of its property.” International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee , 505 U. S. 672, 678 (1992) ( ISKCON ).
Generally speaking, our cases recognize three types of
government-controlled spaces: traditional public forums, designated
public forums, and nonpublic forums. In a traditional public
forum—parks, streets, sidewalks, and the like—the government may
impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on private
speech, but restrictions based on content must satisfy strict
scrutiny, and those based on viewpoint are prohibited. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U. S. 460,
469 (2009). The same standards apply in designated public
forums—spaces that have “not traditionally been regarded as a
public forum” but which the government has “intentionally opened up
for that purpose.” Id., at 469–470. In a nonpublic forum, on
the other hand—a space that “is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication”—the government has much more
flexibility to craft rules limiting speech. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn. , 460 U. S. 37, 46
(1983). The government may reserve such a forum “for its intended
purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Ibid. This Court employs a distinct standard of review
to assess speech restrictions in nonpublic forums because the
government, “no less than a private owner of property,” retains the
“power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated.” Adderley v. Florida ,
385 U. S. 39, 47 (1966). “Nothing in the Constitution requires
the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise
their right to free speech on every type of Government property
without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption
that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc. , 473 U. S.
788, 799–800 (1985). Accordingly, our decisions have long
recognized that the government may impose some content-based
restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums, including restrictions
that exclude political advocates and forms of political advocacy.
See id., at 806–811; Greer v. Spock , 424
U. S. 828, 831–833, 838–839 (1976); Lehman v. Shaker
Heights , 418 U. S. 298, 303–304 (1974) (plurality opin-
ion); id., at 307–308 (Douglas, J., concurring in
judgment).

															A polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a
nonpublic forum. It is, at least on Election Day,
government-controlled property set aside for the sole purpose of
voting. The space is “a special enclave, subject to greater
restriction.” ISKCON , 505 U. S., at 680. Rules strictly
govern who may be present, for what purpose, and for how long. See
Minn. Stat. §204C.06 (2014). And while the four-Justice plurality
in Burson and Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment
parted ways over whether the public sidewalks and streets surrounding a polling place qualify as a nonpublic forum,
neither opinion suggested that the interior of the building was
anything but. See 504 U. S., at 196–197, and n. 2
(plurality opinion); id. , at 214–216 (opinion of Scalia,
J.).

															We therefore evaluate MVA’s First Amendment
challenge under the nonpublic forum standard. The text of the
apparel ban makes no distinction based on the speaker’s political
persuasion, so MVA does not claim that the ban discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint on its face. The question accordingly is whether
Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is “reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum”: voting. Cornelius , 473
U. S., at 806.

															III

															A

															We first consider whether Minnesota is
pursuing a permissible objective in prohibiting voters from wearing
particular kinds of expressive apparel or accessories while inside
the polling place. The natural starting point for evaluating a
First Amendment challenge to such a restriction is this Court’s
decision in Burson , which upheld a Tennessee law imposing a
100-foot campaign-free zone around polling place entrances. Under
the Tennessee law—much like Minnesota’s buffer-zone provision—no
person could solicit votes for or against a candidate, party, or
ballot measure, distribute campaign materials, or
“display . . . campaign posters, signs or other
campaign materials” within the restricted zone. 504 U. S., at
193–194 (plurality opinion). The plurality found that the law
withstood even the strict scrutiny applicable to speech
restrictions in traditional public forums. Id., at 211. In
his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia argued that
the less rigorous “reasonableness” standard of review should apply,
and found the law “at least reasonable” in light of the plurality’s
analysis. Id. , at 216.

															That analysis emphasized the problems of fraud,
voter intimidation, confusion, and general disorder that had
plagued polling places in the past. See id., at 200–204
(plurality opinion). Against that historical backdrop, the
plurality and Justice Scalia upheld Tennessee’s determination,
supported by overwhelming consensus among the States and “common
sense,” that a campaign-free zone outside the polls was “necessary”
to secure the advantages of the secret ballot and protect the right
to vote. Id., at 200, 206–208, 211. As the plurality
explained, “[t]he State of Tennessee has decided that [the] last 15
seconds before its citizens enter the polling place should be their
own, as free from interference as possible.” Id., at 210.
That was not “an unconstitutional choice.” Ibid. MVA disputes the relevance of Burson to
Minnesota’s apparel ban. On MVA’s reading, Burson considered
only “active campaigning” outside the polling place by campaign
workers and others trying to engage voters approaching the polls.
Brief for Petitioners 36–37. Minne- sota’s law, by contrast,
prohibits what MVA characterizes as “passive, silent”
self-expression by voters themselves when voting. Reply Brief 17.
MVA also points out that the plurality focused on the extent to
which the restricted zone combated “voter intimidation and election
fraud,” 504 U. S., at 208—concerns that, in MVA’s view, have
little to do with a prohibition on certain types of voter
apparel.

															Campaign buttons and apparel did come up in the Burson briefing and argument, but neither the plurality nor
Justice Scalia expressly addressed such applications of the
law.[ 1 ] Nor did either opinion
specifically consider the interior of the polling place as opposed
to its environs, and it is true that the plurality’s reasoning
focused on campaign activities of a sort not likely to occur in an
area where, for the most part, only voters are permitted while
voting. At the same time, Tennessee’s law swept broadly to ban even
the plain “display” of a campaign-related message, and the Court
upheld the law in full. The plurality’s conclusion that the State
was warranted in designating an area for the voters as “their own”
as they enter the polling place suggests an interest more
significant, not less, within that place. Id., at
210.

															In any event, we see no basis for rejecting
Minnesota’s determination that some forms of advocacy should be
excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as “an island of
calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their choices.”
Brief for Respondents 43. Casting a vote is a weighty civic act,
akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a representative’s vote on
a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not campaigning.
The State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling
place should reflect that distinction.

															To be sure, our decisions have noted the
“nondisruptive” nature of expressive apparel in more mundane
settings. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews
for Jesus, Inc. , 482 U. S. 569, 576 (1987) (so
characterizing “the wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a
political message” in an airport); Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School Dist. , 393 U. S. 503, 508
(1969) (students wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War
engaged in “silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by
any disorder or disturbance”). But those observations do not speak
to the unique context of a polling place on Election Day. Members
of the public are brought together at that place, at the end of
what may have been a divisive election season, to reach considered
decisions about their government and laws. The State may reasonably
take steps to ensure that partisan discord not follow the voter up
to the voting booth, and distract from a sense of shared civic
obligation at the moment it counts the most. That interest may be
thwarted by displays that do not raise significant concerns in
other situations.

															Other States can see the matter differently, and
some do.[ 2 ] The majority,
however, agree with Minnesota that at least some kinds of
campaign-related clothing and accessories should stay
outside. [ 3 ] That broadly
shared judgment is entitled to respect. Cf. Burson , 504
U. S., at 206 (plurality opinion) (finding that a “widespread
and time-tested consensus” supported the constitutionality of
campaign buffer zones).

															Thus, in light of the special purpose of the
polling place itself, Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain
apparel there because of the message it conveys, so that voters may
focus on the important decisions immediately at hand.

															B

															But the State must draw a reasonable line.
Although there is no requirement of narrow tailoring in a nonpublic
forum, the State must be able to articulate some sensible basis for
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out. See Cornelius , 473 U. S., at 808–809. Here, the unmoored
use of the term “political” in the Minnesota law, combined with
haphazard interpretations the State has provided in official
guidance and representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s
restriction to fail even this forgiving test.

															Again, the statute prohibits wearing a
“political badge, political button, or other political insignia.”
It does not define the term “political.” And the word can be
expansive. It can encompass anything “of or relating to government,
a government, or the conduct of governmental affairs,” Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 1755 (2002), or anything “[o]f,
relating to, or dealing with the structure or affairs of
government, politics, or the state,” American Heritage Dictionary
1401 (3d ed. 1996). Under a literal reading of those definitions, a
button or T-shirt merely imploring others to “Vote!” could
qualify.

															The State argues that the apparel ban should not
be read so broadly. According to the State, the statute does not
prohibit “any conceivably ‘political’ message” or cover “all
‘political’ speech, broadly construed.” Brief for Respondents 21,
23. Instead, the State interprets the ban to proscribe “only words
and symbols that an objectively reasonable observer would perceive
as conveying a message about the electoral choices at issue in
[the] polling place.” Id., at 13; see id., at 19 (the
ban “applies not to any message regarding government or its
affairs, but to messages relating to questions of governmental
affairs facing voters on a given election day”).

															At the same time, the State argues that the
category of “political” apparel is not limited to campaign
apparel. After all, the reference to “campaign material” in the
first sentence of the statute—describing what one may not “display”
in the buffer zone as well as inside the polling place—implies that
the distinct term “political” should be understood to cover a
broader class of items. As the State’s counsel explained to the
Court, Minnesota’s law “expand[s] the scope of what is prohibited
from campaign speech to additional political speech.” Tr. of Oral
Arg. 50.

															We consider a State’s “authoritative
constructions” in interpreting a state law. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement , 505 U. S. 123, 131 (1992). But
far from clarifying the indeterminate scope of the political
apparel provision, the State’s “electoral choices” construction
introduces confusing line-drawing problems. Cf. Jews for
Jesus, 482 U. S., at 575–576 (a resolution banning all “
First Amendment activities” in an airport could not be saved by a
“murky” construction excluding “airport-related” activity).

															For specific examples of what is banned under
its standard, the State points to the 2010 Election Day Pol-
icy—which it continues to hold out as authoritative guidance
regarding implementation of the statute. See Brief for Respondents
22–23. The first three examples in the Policy are clear enough:
items displaying the name of a political party, items displaying
the name of a candidate, and items demonstrating “support of or
opposition to a ballot question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2.

															But the next example—“[i]ssue oriented material
designed to influence or impact voting,” id., at I–2—raises
more questions than it answers. What qualifies as an “issue”? The
answer, as far as we can tell from the State’s briefing and
argument, is any subject on which a political candidate or party
has taken a stance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37 (explaining that the
“electoral choices” test looks at the “issues that have been
raised” in a campaign “that are relevant to the election”). For
instance, the Election Day Policy specifically notes that the
“Please I. D. Me” buttons are prohibited. App. to Pet. for Cert.
I–2. But a voter identification requirement was not on the ballot
in 2010, see Brief for Respondents 47, n. 24, so a Minnesotan
would have had no explicit “electoral choice” to make in that
respect. The buttons were nonetheless covered, the State tells us,
because the Republican candidates for Governor and Secretary of
State had staked out positions on whether photo identification
should be required. Ibid. ; see App. 58–60.[ 4 ]

															A rule whose fair enforcement requires an
election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and
positions of every candidate and party on the ballot is not reason-
able. Candidates for statewide and federal office and major
political parties can be expected to take positions on a wide array
of subjects of local and national import. See, e.g., Democratic Platform Committee, 2016 Democratic Party Platform
(approved July 2016) (stating positions on over 90 issues);
Republican Platform Committee, Republican Platform 2016 (approved
July 2016) (similar). Would a “Support Our Troops” shirt be banned,
if one of the candidates or parties had expressed a view on
military funding or aid for veterans? What about a “#MeToo” shirt,
referencing the movement to increase awareness of sexual harassment
and assault? At oral argument, the State indicated that the ban
would cover such an item if a candidate had “brought up” the topic.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 64–65.

															The next broad category in the Election Day
Policy—any item “promoting a group with recognizable political
views,” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2—makes matters worse. The State
construes the category as limited to groups with “views” about “the
issues confronting voters in a given election.” Brief for
Respondents 23. The State does not, however, confine that category
to groups that have endorsed a candidate or taken a position on a
ballot question.

															Any number of associations, educational
institutions, businesses, and religious organizations could have an
opinion on an “issue[ ] confronting voters in a given
election.” For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
AARP, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ben & Jerry’s all have
stated positions on matters of public concern.[ 5 ] If the views of those groups align or conflict
with the position of a candidate or party on the ballot, does that
mean that their insignia are banned? See id., at 24,
n. 15 (representing that “AFL–CIO or Chamber of Commerce
apparel” would be banned if those organizations “had objectively
recognizable views on an issue in the election at hand”). Take
another example: In the run-up to the 2012 election, Presidential
candidates of both major parties issued public statements regarding
the then-existing policy of the Boy Scouts of America to exclude
members on the basis of sexual orientation.[ 6 ] Should a Scout leader in 2012 stopping to vote on
his way to a troop meeting have been asked to cover up his
uniform?

															The State emphasizes that the ban covers only
apparel promoting groups whose political positions are sufficiently
“well-known.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. But that requirement, if
anything, only increases the potential for erratic application.
Well known by whom? The State tells us the lodestar is the “typical
observer” of the item. Brief for Respondents 21. But that measure
may turn in significant part on the background knowledge and media
consumption of the particular election judge applying it.

															The State’s “electoral choices” standard,
considered together with the nonexclusive examples in the Election
Day Policy, poses riddles that even the State’s top lawyers
struggle to solve. A shirt declaring “All Lives Matter,” we are
told, could be “perceived” as political. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. How
about a shirt bearing the name of the National Rifle Association?
Definitely out. Id. , at 39–40. That said, a shirt displaying
a rainbow flag could be worn “ unless there was an issue on
the ballot” that “related somehow . . . to gay rights.” Id. , at 38 (emphasis added). A shirt simply displaying the
text of the Second Amendment? Prohibited. Id. , at 40. But a
shirt with the text of the First Amendment? “It would be
allowed.” Ibid. “[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have
never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive
activ- ity.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491
U. S. 781, 794 (1989). But the State’s difficulties with its
restriction go beyond close calls on borderline or fanciful cases.
And that is a serious matter when the whole point of the exercise
is to prohibit the expression of political views.

															It is “self-evident” that an indeterminate
prohibition carries with it “[t]he opportunity for abuse,
especially where [it] has received a virtually open-ended
interpretation.” Jews for Jesus , 482 U. S., at 576; see Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. , 452 U. S. 640, 649 (1981) (warning of the “more
covert forms of discrimination that may result when arbitrary
discretion is vested in some governmental authority”). Election
judges “have the authority to decide what is political” when
screening individuals at the entrance to the polls. App. to Pet.
for Cert. I–1. We do not doubt that the vast majority of election
judges strive to enforce the statute in an evenhanded manner, nor
that some degree of discretion in this setting is necessary. But
that discretion must be guided by objective, workable standards.
Without them, an election judge’s own politics may shape his views
on what counts as “political.” And if voters experience or witness
episodes of unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the ban, the
State’s interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction
and disruption would be undermined by the very measure intended to
further it.

															That is not to say that Minnesota has set upon
an impossible task. Other States have laws proscribing displays
(including apparel) in more lucid terms. See, e.g., Cal.
Elec. Code Ann. §319.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2018) (prohibiting “the
visible display . . . of information that advocates for
or against any candidate or measure,” including the “display of a
candidate’s name, likeness, or logo,” the “display of a ballot
measure’s number, title, subject, or logo,” and “[b]uttons, hats,”
or “shirts” containing such information); Tex. Elec. Code Ann.
§61.010(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting the wearing of “a badge,
insignia, emblem, or other similar communicative device relating to
a candidate, measure, or political party appearing on the ballot,
or to the conduct of the election”). We do not suggest that such
provisions set the outer limit of what a State may proscribe, and
do not pass on the constitutionality of laws that are not before
us. But we do hold that if a State wishes to set its polling places
apart as areas free of partisan discord, it must employ a more
discernible approach than the one Minnesota has offered
here.[ 7 ]

															*  *  *

															Cases like this “present[ ] us with a
particularly difficult reconciliation: the accommodation of the
right to engage in political discourse with the right to vote.” Burson , 504 U. S., at 198 (plurality opinion).
Minnesota, like other States, has sought to strike the balance in a
way that affords the voter the opportunity to exercise his civic
duty in a setting removed from the clamor and din of
electioneering. While that choice is generally worthy of our
respect, Minnesota has not supported its good intentions with a law
capable of reasoned application.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered.

															APPENDIX

															State Laws Prohibiting Accessories or Apparel in
the Polling Place[ 8 ]* Notes 1 The State of Tennessee
represented that its prohibition on campaign displays extended both
to items of apparel and to voters. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 90–1056,
p. 33 (argument of Atty. Gen. Burson) (explaining that the statute
banned “[t]ee-shirts,” “campaign buttons,” and “hats” because such
items “implicate and invite the same problems,” and that voters
would be “asked to take campaign button[s] off as they go in”); see
Brief for State of Tennessee et al. as Amici Curiae 3,
28–30, and n. 3 (making the same representation in the present
case). The Burson plaintiff also emphasized that the
Tennessee law would cover apparel, including apparel worn by
voters, see Brief for Respondent in No. 90–1056, p. 3; Tr. of
Oral Arg. in No. 90–1056, p. 21, and Justice Stevens in
dissent referred to the application of the law to campaign buttons,
see Burson, 504 U. S., at 218–219, 224. 2 See, e.g., Ala.
Secretary of State, 2018 Alabama Voter Guide 14 (voters may wear
“campaign buttons or T-shirts with political advertisements”); 2018
Va. Acts ch. 700, §1 (prohibitions on exhibiting campaign material
“shall not be construed” to prohibit a voter “from wearing a shirt,
hat, or other apparel on which a candidate’s name or a political
slogan appears or from having a sticker or button attached to his
apparel on which a candidate’s name or a political slogan
appears”); R. I. Bd. of Elections, Rules and Regulations for
Polling Place Conduct 3 (2016) (voters may “display or wear any
campaign or political party button, badge or other document or item
designed or tending to aid, injure or defeat any candidate for
public office or any political party or any question,” but they
must “immediately exit the polling location without unreasonable
delay” after voting). 3 See Appendix, infra . 4 The State also maintains
that the “Please I. D. Me” buttons were properly banned because the
buttons were designed to confuse other voters about whether they
needed photo identification to vote. Brief for Respondents 46–47.
We do not doubt that the State may prohibit messages intended to
mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures. But that
interest does not align with the State’s construction of
“political” to refer to messages “about the electoral choices at
issue in [the] polling place.” Id., at 13. 5 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, Campaign for Smart Justice (2018),
online at
http://www.aclu.org/issues/mass-incarceration/smart-justice/campaign-smart-justice
(taking positions on criminal justice reform) (all Internet
materials as last visited June 11, 2018); AARP, Government &
Elections, online at
https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/government-elections/
(listing positions on Social Secu-rity and health care); World
Wildlife Fund, A Win on Capitol Hill (Apr. 17, 2018), online at
https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/a-win-on-capitol-hill
(describing the organization’s position on federal funding for
international conservation programs); Ben & Jerry’s, Issues We
Care About, online at
https://www.benjerry.com/values/issues-we-care-about (sharing the
corporation’s views on campaign finance reform, international
conflict, and civil rights). 6 C. Camia, Obama, Romney
Opposed to Boy Scouts Ban on Gays, USA Today OnPolitics (updated
Aug. 08, 2012), online at
http : / / content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2012/08/barack-obama-boy-scouts-gays-mitt-romney-/1. 7 The State argues that, in
the event this Court concludes that there is a “substantial
question” about the proper interpretation of §211B.11(1), we should
postpone our decision and certify that issue to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Brief for Respondents 57; see Minn. Stat.
§480.065(3) (2016). The dissent takes up this cause as well. See post, at 1 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.). The decision to
certify, however, “rests in the sound discretion of the federal
court.” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman , 581
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment)
(slip op., at 8). We decline to exercise that discretion in this
instance. Minnesota’s request for certification comes very late in
the day: This litigation had been ongoing in the federal courts for
over seven years before the State made its certification request in
its merits brief before this Court. See Stenberg v. Carhart , 530 U. S. 914, 945 (2000) (noting, in denying
certification, that the State had never asked the lower federal
courts to certify). And the State has not offered sufficient reason
to believe that certification would obviate the need to address the
constitutional question. Our analysis today reflects the State’s
proffered interpretation; nothing in that analysis would change if
the State’s interpretation were also adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court. Nor has the State (or the dissent) suggested a
viable alternative construction that the Minnesota Supreme Court
might adopt instead. See Brief for Respondents 56–58; post, at 5–8. 8 * Based on statutory or
regulatory language and official resources, where
available. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1435

															_________________

															MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE, et al.,
PETITIONERS v. JOE MANSKY, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eighth circuit

															[June 14, 2018]

															Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer
joins, dissenting.

															I agree with the Court that “[c]asting a vote is
a weighty civic act” and that “State[s] may reasonably take steps
to ensure that partisan discord not follow the voter up to the
voting booth,” including by “prohibit[ing] certain apparel [in
polling places] because of the message it conveys.” Ante, at
11–12. I disagree, however, with the Court’s decision to declare
Minnesota’s political apparel ban unconstitutional on its face
because, in its view, the ban is not “capable of reasoned
application,” ante, at 19, when the Court has not first
afforded the Minnesota state courts “ ‘a reasonable
opportunity to pass upon’ ” and construe the statute, Babbitt v. Farm Workers , 442 U. S. 289, 308
(1979). I would certify this case to the Minnesota Supreme Court
for a definitive interpretation of the political apparel ban under
Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017), which likely would obviate
the hypothetical line-drawing problems that form the basis of the
Court’s decision today.

															I

															As the Court acknowledges, Minnesota adopted
its political apparel ban late in the 19th century against the
backdrop of often “ ‘chaotic’ ” voting conditions where
“[c]rowds would gather to heckle and harass voters who appeared to
be supporting the other side.” Ante, at 2. Polling places
became “highly charged ethnic, religious, and ideological
battleground[s] in which individuals were stereotyped as friend or
foe,” even “on the basis of clothing.” R. Bensel, The American
Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Century 21 (2004). As a result,
States began adopting reforms “to address these vulnerabilities and
improve the reliability of elections.” Ante, at 3.

															Minnesota thus enacted the political apparel ban
at issue in this case, which prohibits an individual from wearing
“[a] political badge, political button, or other political insignia
. . . at or about the polling place.” §211B.11(1).
Respondents maintain that this prohibition, together with other
election-day regulations, furthers Minnesota’s compelling interests
in (1) “maintaining peace, order and decorum in the polling place,”
(2) “protecting voters from confusion and undue influence such as
intimidation,” and (3) “preserving the integrity of its election
process.” Brief for Respondents 41 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); see Burson v. Freeman , 504
U. S. 191, 193, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion) (recognizing
such interests as compelling).

															The majority accords due respect to the weight
of these state interests in concluding that there is “no basis for
rejecting Minnesota’s determination that some forms of advocacy
should be excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as ‘an
island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their
choices.’ ” Ante, at 11. Polling places today may not
much resemble the chaotic scenes of the turn of the 20th century,
but they remain vulnerable to interpersonal conflicts and partisan
efforts to influence voters.[ 1 ]
Even acts of interference that are “undetected or less than blatant
. . . may nonetheless drive the voter away before
remedial action can be taken.” Burson , 504 U. S., at
207; see also Brief for Campaign Legal Center as Amicus
Curiae 9 (noting that, “[a]bsent a ban on political
paraphernalia, [poll] workers might unintentionally exhibit
unconscious bias against voters who wear the ‘wrong’
paraphernalia”).

															In holding that a polling place constitutes a
nonpublic forum and that a State must establish only that its
limitations on speech inside the polling place are reasonable, see ante, at 8–9, the Court goes a long way in preserving
States’ discretion to determine what measures are appropriate to
further important interests in maintaining order and decorum,
preventing confusion and intimidation, and protecting the integrity
of the voting process. The Court errs, however, in declaring
Minnesota’s political apparel ban unconstitutional under that
standard, without any guidance from the State’s highest court on
the proper interpretation of that state law. Ante, at 13,
19, n. 7.

															II

															The Court invalidates Minnesota’s political
apparel ban based on its inability to define the term “political”
in §211B.11(1), so as to discern “some sensible basis for
distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out” of a
polling place. Ante, at 12–13. The majority believes that
the law is not “capable of reasoned application,” ante, at
19, but it reaches that conclusion without taking the preferential
step of first asking the state courts to provide “an accurate
picture of how, exactly, the statute works,” Expressions Hair
Design v. Schneiderman , 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 5). It is a
“cardinal principle” that, “when confronting a challenge to the
constitutionality of a . . . statute,” courts “will first
ascertain whether a construction . . . is fairly possible
that will contain the statute within constitutional bounds,” and in
the context of a challenge to a state statute, federal courts
should be particularly hesitant to speculate as to possible
constructions of the state law when “the state courts stand willing
to address questions of state law on certification.” Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona , 520 U. S. 43,
78–79 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Minn. Stat.
§480.065(3) (2016) (authorizing the Minnesota Supreme Court to
answer certified questions). Certification “save[s] time, energy,
and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.” Lehman Brothers v. Schein , 416 U. S. 386, 391
(1974). Neither of the majority’s proffered reasons for declining
to certify this case justifies its holding.

															First, the Court notes that respondents’
“request for certification comes very late in the day,” as the
litigation already had been ongoing for more than seven years
before the request. Ante, at 19, n. 7. But
certification is not an argument subject to forfeiture by the
parties. It is a tool of the federal courts that serves to avoid
“friction-generating error” where a federal court attempts to
construe a statute “not yet reviewed by the State’s highest court.” Arizonans for Official English , 520 U. S., at 79. This
Court has certified questions to a state court “sua sponte,
even though the parties had not sought such relief and even though
the district court and the court of appeals previously had resolved
the disputed point of state law.” S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop,
E. Hartnett, & D. Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §9.4,
p. 611 (10th ed. 2013) (citing Elkins v. Moreno ,
435 U. S. 647, 660–663, 668–669 (1978)); see also Massachusetts v. Feeney , 429 U. S. 66 (1976)
( per curiam ) (certifying a question to the Supreme Judicial
Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts “on [the Court’s] own
motion”). Respondents’ delay in asking for certification does
nothing to alter this Court’s responsibility as a matter of
state-federal comity to give due deference to the state courts in
interpreting their own laws.

															Second, the majority maintains that respondents
have “not offered sufficient reason to believe that certification
would obviate the need to address the constitutional question,” as
“nothing in [its] analysis would change if [respondents’]
interpretation were also adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court.” Ante, at 19, n. 7. The majority also relies on its view
that respondents have not “suggested a viable alternative
construction that the Minnesota Supreme Court might adopt instead.” Ibid. To presume that the Minnesota Supreme Court would
adopt respondents’ interpretation wholesale or that it could not
provide a construction of its own that is “capable of reasoned
application,” ante, at 19, however, reflects precisely the
“gratuitous” “ ‘[s]peculation . . . about the
meaning of a state statute’ ” that this Court has discouraged, Arizonans for Official English , 520 U. S., at 79.

															It is at least “fairly possible” that the state
court could “ascertain . . . a construction
. . . that will contain the statute within constitutional
bounds.” Id., at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, the issue comes down to the meaning of the adjective
“political,” as used to describe what constitutes a “political
badge, political button, or other political insignia.” §211B.11(1).
The word “political” is, of course, not inherently incapable of
definition. This Court elsewhere has encountered little difficulty
discerning its meaning in the context of statutes subject to First
Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Civil Service Comm’n v. Letter Carriers , 413 U. S. 548, 550–551 (1973)
(rejecting First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness challenge to
§9(a) of the Hatch Act, then codified at 5 U. S. C.
§7324(a)(2), which prohibited federal employees from taking
“ ‘an active part in political management or in political
campaigns’ ”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413
U. S. 601, 602 (1973) (rejecting First Amendment overbreadth
and vagueness challenge to a similar Oklahoma law that “restricts
the political activities of the State’s classified civil
servants”).

															Even here, the majority recognizes a substantial
amount of speech that “clear[ly]” qualifies as “political,” such as
“items displaying the name of a political party, items displaying
the name of a candidate, and items demonstrating support of or
opposition to a ballot question.” Ante, at 14 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The fact that the majority has some
difficulty deciphering guidance to §211B.11(1) that also proscribes
“[i]ssue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting”
and “[m]aterial promoting a group with recognizable political
views,” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2; see ante, at 14–17, does
not mean that the statute as a whole is not subject to a
construction that falls within constitutional bounds. As this Court
has made clear in the context of the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, the “mere fact” that petitioners “can conceive of some
impermissible applications of [the] statute is not sufficient to
render it” unconstitutional. United States v. Williams , 553 U. S. 285, 303 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). That is especially so where the state court is
capable of clarifying the boundaries of state law in a manner that
would permit the Court to engage in a comprehensive constitutional
analysis. See, e.g., Virginia v. American
Booksellers Assn., Inc. , 484 U. S. 383 (1988) (certifying
questions to the Virginia Supreme Court for clarification as to
whether a state statute was readily susceptible to a narrowing
construction that would not violate the First Amendment); Commonwealth v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc. , 236
Va. 168, 372 S. E. 2d 618 (1988) (responding to certification
with such a narrowing construction).

															Furthermore, the Court also should consider the
history of Minnesota’s “implementation” of the statute in
evaluating the facial challenge here. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement , 505 U. S. 123, 131 (1992). That
history offers some assurance that the statute has not been
interpreted or applied in an unreasonable manner. There is no
evidence that any individual who refused to remove a political item
has been prohibited from voting, and respondents maintain that no
one has been referred for prosecution for violating the provision.
See Brief for Respondents 4, n. 2. Since the political apparel
ban was enacted in the late 19th century, this is the first time
the statute has been challenged on the basis that certain speech is
not “political.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. Even then, petitioners’
as-applied challenge was rejected by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See Minnesota
Majority v. Mansky , 62 F. Supp. 3d 870, 878 (Minn.
2014); Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 2015 WL
13636675, *12 (D Minn., Mar. 23, 2015); Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 849 F. 3d 749, 752–753 (CA8 2017).
Petitioners did not seek review of those claims in this Court. See
Pet. for Cert. i. On the whole, the historical application of the
law helps illustrate that the statute is not so “indeterminate” so
as to “carr[y] with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse.’ ” Ante, at 17.

															III

															Especially where there are undisputedly many
constitutional applications of a state law that further weighty
state interests, the Court should be wary of invalidating a law
without giving the State’s highest court an opportunity to pass
upon it. See Babbitt , 442 U. S., at 309; Arizonans
for Official English , 520 U. S., at 79. Because the Court
declines to take the obvious step of certification in this case, I
respectfully dissent. Notes 1 See, e.g., J.
Johnson, Fight Breaks Out at Polling Place (Nov. 8, 2016)
(describing a fight in which a voter sprayed pepper spray at a
campaign volunteer who allegedly had been handing out campaign
materials),
http://www.wpbf.com/article/fight-breaks-out-at-polling-place/8258506
(all Internet materials as last visited June 8, 2018); R. Reilly, A
Guy in a Trump Shirt Carried a Gun Outside of a Virginia Polling
Place. Authorities Say That’s Fine (Nov. 4, 2016) (describing a man
wearing a shirt bearing the name of a candidate and carrying a
weapon outside of a polling place),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-supporter - gun -voter-intimidation-virginia_us_581cf16ee4b0aac624846eb5;
Houston Chronicle, Nov. 5, 2012, p. 2 (reporting that
individuals wearing shirts bearing the name of a racial equality
organization allegedly were “disruptive,” “took over” a polling
place, and were “electioneering and voicing support” for a
particular candidate); Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 8, 2006, p. A5
(reporting arrest of a poll worker who was “charged with assault
and interfering with an election after allegedly choking a voter
and pushing him out the door”); Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 2, 2005,
p. B1 (reporting “[s]houting matches and rowdy behavior” and
“harass[ment] and intimidat[ion] at the polls”).