U.S. Supreme Court Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) Dames & Moore v.
Regan No. 80-2078 Argued June 24, 1981 Decided July 2, 1981 453
U.S. 654 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Syllabus In response to the seizure of American personnel as hostages at
the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, President Carter, pursuant to
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), declared a
national emergency on November 14, 1979, and blocked the removal or
transfer of all property and interests in property of the
Government of Iran which were subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. The Treasury Department then issued implementing
regulations providing that,

															"[u]nless licensed or authorized . . . , any attachment,
judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial
process is null and void with respect to any property in which, on
or since [November 14, 1979,] there existed an interest of
Iran,"

															and that any licenses or authorizations granted could be
"amended, modified, or revoked at any time." The President then
granted a general license that authorized certain judicial
proceedings, including prejudgment attachments, against Iran, but
did not allow the entry of any judgment or decree. On December 19,
1979, petitioner filed suit in Federal District Court against the
Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and a
number of Iranian banks, alleging that it was owed a certain amount
of money for services performed under a contract with the Atomic
Energy Organization. The District Court issued orders of attachment
against the defendants' property, and property of certain Iranian
banks was then attached to secure any judgment that might be
entered against them. Subsequently, on January 19, 1981, the
Americans held hostage were released by Iran pursuant to an
agreement with the United States. Under this agreement, the United
States was obligated to terminate all legal proceedings in United
States courts involving claims of United States nationals against
Iran, to nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein,
and to bring about the termination of such claims through binding
arbitration in an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The President
at the same time issued implementing Executive Orders revoking all
licenses that permitted the exercise of "any right, power, or
privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, nullifying all non-Iranian
interests in such assets acquired after the blocking order of
November Page 453 U. S. 655 14, 1979, and requiring banks holding Iranian assets to transfer
them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to be held or
transferred as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury. On
February 24, 1981, President Reagan issued an Executive Order which
ratified President Carter's Executive Orders and "suspended" all
claims that may be presented to the Claims Tribunal, but which
provided that the suspension of a claim terminates if the Claims
Tribunal determines that it has no jurisdiction over the claim.
Meanwhile, the District Court granted summary judgment for
petitioner and awarded it the amount claimed under the contract
plus interest, but stayed execution of the judgment pending appeal
by the defendants, and ordered that all prejudgment attachments
against the defendants be vacated and that further proceedings
against the bank defendants be stayed. Petitioner then filed an
action in Federal District Court against the United States and the
Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to prevent enforcement of the
various Executive Orders and regulations implementing the agreement
with Iran. It was alleged that the actions of the President and the
Secretary of the Treasury were beyond their statutory and
constitutional powers, and, in any event, were unconstitutional to
the extent they adversely affect petitioner's final judgment
against Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization, its execution of
that judgment, its prejudgment attachments, and its ability to
continue to litigate against the Iranian banks. The District Court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, but entered an injunction pending appeal
to the Court of Appeals prohibiting the United States from
requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to any
writ of attachment issued by any court in petitioner's favor. This
Court then granted certiorari before judgment. Held: 1. The President was authorized to nullify the attachments and
order the transfer of Iranian assets by the provision of the IEEPA,
50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B), which empowers the President to
"compel," "nullify," or "prohibit" any "transfer" with respect to,
or transactions involving, any property subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, in which any foreign country has any
interest. Pp. 453 U. S.
669 -674.

															(a) Nothing in the legislative history of either § 1702 or §
5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), from which § 1702
was directly drawn, requires reading out of § 1702 all meaning to
the words "transfer," "compel," or "nullify," and limiting the
President's authority in this case only to continuing the freeze,
as petitioner claims. To the contrary, both the legislative history
and cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain the President's broad
authority when acting under Page 453 U. S. 656 such congressional grant of power. And the changes brought about
by the enactment of the IEEPA did not in any way affect the
President's authority to take the specific action taken here. By
the time petitioner brought the instant action, the President had
already entered the freeze order, and petitioner proceeded against
the blocked assets only after the Treasury Department had issued
revocable licenses authorizing such proceedings and attachments.
The attachments obtained by petitioner, being subject to
revocation, were specifically made subordinate to further actions
which the President might take under the IEEPA. Pp. 453 U. S.
671 -673.

															(b) Blocking orders, such as the one here, permit the President
to maintain foreign assets at his disposal for use in negotiating
the resolution of a declared national emergency, and the frozen
assets serve as a "bargaining chip" to be used by the President
when dealing with a hostile country. To limit the President's
authority, as petitioner urges, would mean that claimants could
minimize or eliminate this "bargaining chip" through attachments or
similar encumbrances. Pp. 453 U. S.
673 -674.

															(c) Petitioner's interest in its attachments was conditional and
revocable, and as such, the President's action nullifying the
attachments and ordering the transfer of the assets did not effect
a taking of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment absent
just compensation. P. 453 U. S. 674 ,
n. 6.

															(d) Because the President's action in nullifying the attachments
and ordering the transfer of assets was taken pursuant to specific
congressional authorization, it is

															"supported by the strongest presumptions and the widest latitude
of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 , 343 U. S. 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Under the circumstances of this case,
petitioner has not sustained that burden. P. 453 U. S.
674 .

															2. On the basis of the inferences to be drawn from the character
of the legislation, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, which
Congress has enacted in the area of the President's authority to
deal with international crises, and from the history of
congressional acquiescence in executive claims settlement, the
President was authorized to suspend claims pursuant to the
Executive Order in question here. Pp. 453 U. S.
675 -688.

															(a) Although neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act constitutes
specific authorization for the President's suspension of the
claims, these statutes are highly relevant as an indication of
congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in
circumstances such as those presented in this case. Pp. 453 U. S.
675 -679.

															(b) The United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign
authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign
countries. Page 453 U. S. 657 Although those settlements have sometimes been made by treaty,
there has also been a longstanding practice of settling such claims
by executive agreement without the advice and consent of the
Senate, and this practice continues at the present time. Pp. 453 U. S.
679 -680.

															(c) That Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claims
settlement by executive agreement is best demonstrated by Congress'
enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1919, which
created the International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, and gave it jurisdiction to make final and
binding decisions with respect to claims by United States nationals
against settlement funds. And the legislative history of the IEEPA
further reveals that Congress has accepted the authority of the
President to enter into settlement agreements. Pp. 453 U. S.
680 -682.

															(d) In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also
recognized that the President has some measure of power to enter
into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and consent
of the Senate. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 . Pp. 453 U. S.
682 -683.

															(e) Petitioner's argument that all settlement claims prior to
1952, when the United States had adhered to the doctrine of
absolute sovereign immunity should be discounted because of the
evolution of sovereign immunity, is refuted by the fact that, since
1952, there have been at least 10 claim settlements by executive
agreement. Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases should be disregarded,
congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that time
supports the President's power to act here. Pp. 453 U. S.
683 -684.

															(f) By enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), which granted personal and subject matter jurisdiction to
federal district courts over commercial suits by claimants against
foreign states that waived immunity, Congress did not divest the
President of the authority to settle claims. The President, by
suspending petitioner's claim, has not circumscribed the
jurisdiction of the United States courts in violation of Art. III,
but has simply effected a change in the substantive law governing
the lawsuit. The FSIA was designed to remove one particular barrier
to suit, namely, sovereign immunity, and cannot be read as
prohibiting the President from settling claims of United States
nationals against foreign governments. Pp. 453 U. S.
684 -686.

															(g) Long continued executive practice, known to and acquiesced
in by Congress, raises a presumption that the President's action
has been taken pursuant to Congress' consent. Such practice is
present here, and such a presumption is also appropriate. P. 453 U. S.
686 .

															(h) The conclusion that the President's action in suspending
petitioner's Page 453 U. S. 658 claim did not exceed his powers is buttressed by the fact the
President has provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal,
to settle the claims of the American nationals. Moreover, Congress
has not disapproved the action taken here. Pp. 453 U. S.
686 -688.

															(i) While it is not concluded that the President has plenary
power to settle claims, even against foreign governmental entities,
nevertheless, where, as here, the settlement of claims has been
determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between this country and another, and
Congress has acquiesced in the President's action, it cannot be
said that the President lacks the power to settle such claim. P. 453 U. S.
688 .

															3. The possibility that the President's actions with respect to
the suspension of the claims may effect a taking of petitioner's
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment in the absence of just
compensation makes ripe for adjudication the question whether
petitioner will have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims. And
there is no jurisdictional obstacle to an appropriate action in
that court under the Tucker Act. Pp. 453 U. S.
688 -690.

															Affirmed.

															REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN,
JJ., joined; in all but n. 6 of which POWELL, J., joined; and in
all but Part V of which STEVENS, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an
opinion concurring in part, post, p. 453 U. S. 690 .
POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part, post, p. 453 U. S.
690 . Page 453 U. S. 659 JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The questions presented by this case touch fundamentally upon
the manner in which our Republic is to be governed. Throughout the
nearly two centuries of our Nation's existence under the
Constitution, this subject has generated considerable debate. We
have had the benefit of commentators such a John Jay, Alexander
Hamilton, and James Madison writing in The Federalist Paper at the
Nation's very inception, the benefit of astute foreign observers of
our system such as Page 453 U. S. 660 Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce writing during the first
century of the Nation's existence, and the benefit of many other
treatises, as well as more than 400 volumes of reports of decisions
of this Court. As these writings reveal, it is doubtless both
futile and perhaps dangerous to find any epigrammatical explanation
of how this country has been governed. Indeed, as Justice Jackson
noted,

															"[a] judge . . . may be surprised at the poverty of really
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power as they actually present themselves." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 , 343 U. S. 634 (1952) (concurring opinion).

															Our decision today will not dramatically alter this situation,
for the Framers "did not make the judiciary the overseer of our
government." Id. at 343 U. S. 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). We are confined to a resolution of
the dispute presented to us. That dispute involves various
Executive Orders and regulations by which the President nullified
attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States,
directed that these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspended
claims against Iran that may be presented to an International
Claims Tribunal. This action was taken in an effort to comply with
an Executive Agreement between the United States and Iran. We
granted certiorari before judgment in this case, and set an
expedited briefing and argument schedule, because lower courts had
reached conflicting conclusions on the validity of the President's
actions and, as the Solicitor General informed us, unless the
Government acted by July 19, 1981, Iran could consider the United
States to be in breach of the Executive Agreement.

															But before turning to the facts and law which we believe
determine the result in this case, we stress that the expeditious
treatment of the issues involved by all of the courts which have
considered the President's actions makes us acutely aware of the
necessity to rest decision on the narrowest possible ground capable
of deciding the case. Ashwander v.
TVA , Page 453 U. S. 661 297 U. S. 288 , 297 U. S. 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This does not mean that reasoned
analysis may give way to judicial fiat. It does mean that the
statement of Justice Jackson -- that we decide difficult cases
presented to us by virtue of our commissions, not our competence --
is especially true here. We attempt to lay down no general
"guidelines" covering other situations not involved here, and
attempt to confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary
to decision of the case.

															Perhaps it is because it is so difficult to reconcile the
foregoing definition of Art. III judicial power with the broad
range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided
by Congress or the Executive, without either challenge or
interference by the Judiciary, that the decisions of the Court in
this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential
value for subsequent cases. The tensions present in any exercise of
executive power under the tripartite system of Federal Government
established by the Constitution have been reflected in opinions by
Members of this Court more than once. The Court stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.
S. 304 , 299 U. S.
319 -320 (1936):

															"[W] e are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in
the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations -- a power which does not require
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution."

															And yet, 16 years later, Justice Jackson, in his concurring
opinion in Youngstown, supra, which both parties agree
brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as
there is in this area, focused not on the "plenary and
exclusive Page 453 U. S. 662 power of the President," but rather responded to a claim of
virtually unlimited powers for the Executive by noting:

															"The example of such unlimited executive power that must have
most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by
George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of
Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new
Executive in his image."

															343 U.S. at 343 U. S.
641 .

															As we now turn to the factual and legal issues in this case, we
freely confess that we are obviously deciding only one more episode
in the never-ending tension between the President exercising the
executive authority in a world that presents each day some new
challenge with which he must deal, and the Constitution under which
we all live and which no one disputes embodies some sort of system
of checks and balances. I On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized
and our diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage. In
response to that crisis, President Carter, acting pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 91 Stat. 1626, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1976 ed., Supp. III) (hereinafter IEEPA),
declared a national emergency on November 14, 1979, [ Footnote 1 ] and blocked the removal or
transfer of

															"all property and interests in property of the Government of
Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central
Bank of Iran which are or become subject to Page 453 U. S. 663 the jurisdiction of the United States. . . ."

															Exec.Order No. 12170, 3 CFR 457 (1980), note following 50 U.S.C.
1701 (1976 ed. Supp. III). [ Footnote 2 ] President Carter authorized the Secretary of
the Treasury to promulgate regulations carrying out the blocking
order. On November 15, 1979, the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control issued a regulation providing that,

															"[u]nless licensed or authorized . . . any attachment, judgment,
decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial process is
null and void with respect to any property in which, on or since
[November 14, 1979,] there existed an interest of Iran."

															31 CFR § 535.203(e) (1980). The regulations also made clear that
any licenses or authorizations granted could be "amended, modified,
or revoked at any time." § 535.805. [ Footnote 3 ]

															On November 26, 1979, the President granted a general license
authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran, but which
did not allow the "entry of any judgment or of any decree or order
of similar or analogous effect. . . ." § 535.504(a). On December
19, 1979, a clarifying regulation was issued stating that "the
general authorization for judicial proceedings contained in §
535.504(a) includes prejudgment attachment." § 535.418.

															On December 19, 1979, petitioner Dames & Moore filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Central District of
California against the Government of Iran, the Atomic Page 453 U. S. 664 Energy Organization of Iran, and a number of Iranian banks. In
its complaint, petitioner alleged that its wholly owned subsidiary,
Dames & Moore International, S.R.L., was a party to a written
contract with the Atomic Energy Organization, and that the
subsidiary's entire interest in the contract had been assigned to
petitioner. Under the contract, the subsidiary was to conduct site
studies for a proposed nuclear power plant in Iran. As provided in
the terms of the contract, the Atomic Energy Organization
terminated the agreement for its own convenience on June 30, 1979.
Petitioner contended, however, that it was owed $3,436,694.30 plus
interest for services performed under the contract prior to the
date of termination. [ Footnote
4 ] The District Court issued orders of attachment directed
against property of the defendants, and the property of certain
Iranian banks was then attached to secure any judgment that might
be entered against them. On January 20, 1981, the Americans held
hostage were released by Iran pursuant to an Agreement entered into
the day before and embodied in two Declarations of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria. Declaration of the Government of
the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (App. to Pet. for
Cert. 21-29), and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims
by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ( id. at 335).
The Agreement Page 453 U. S. 665 stated that

															"[i]t is the purpose of [the United States and Iran] . . . to
terminate all litigation as between the Government of each party
and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the settlement
and termination of all such claims through binding
arbitration." Id. at 21-22. In furtherance of this goal, the
Agreement called for the establishment of an Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal which would arbitrate any claims not settled within
six months. Awards of the Claims Tribunal are to be "final and
binding," and "enforceable . . . in the courts of any nation in
accordance with its laws." Id. at 32. Under the Agreement,
the United States is obligated

															"to terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts
involving claims of United States persons and institutions against
Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and
judgments obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation
based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such
claims through binding arbitration." Id. at 22. In addition, the United States must "act to
bring about the transfer" by July 19, 1981, of all Iranian assets
held in this country by American banks. Id. at 24-25. One
billion dollars of these assets will be deposited in a security
account in the Bank of England, to the account of the Algerian
Central Bank, and used to satisfy awards rendered against Iran by
the Claims Tribunal. Ibid. On January 19, 1981, President Carter issued a series of
Executive Orders implementing the terms of the agreement.
Exec.Orders Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed.Reg. 7913-7932. These Orders
revoked all licenses permitting the exercise of "any right, power,
or privilege" with regard to Iranian funds, securities, or
deposits; "nullified" all non-Iranian interests in such assets
acquired subsequent to the blocking order of November 14, 1979; and
required those banks holding Iranian assets to transfer them "to
the Federal Reserve Bank of New Page 453 U. S. 666 York, to be held or transferred as directed by the Secretary of
the Treasury." Exec.Order No. 12279, 46 Fed.Reg. 7919.

															On February 24. 1081, President Reagan issued an Executive Order
in which he "ratified" the January 19th Executive Orders.
Exec.Order No. 12294, 46 Fed.Reg. 14111. Moreover, he "suspended"
all "claims which may be presented to the . . . Tribunal," and
provided that such claims "shall have no legal effect in any action
now pending in any court of the United States." Ibid. The
suspension of any particular claim terminates if the Claims
Tribunal determines that it has no jurisdiction over that claim;
claims are discharged for all purposes when the Claims Tribunal
either awards some recovery and that amount is paid or determines
that no recovery is due. Ibid. Meanwhile, on January 27, 1981, petitioner moved for summary
judgment in the District Court against the Government of Iran and
the Atomic Energy Organization, but not against the Iranian banks.
The District Court granted petitioner's motion and awarded
petitioner the amount claimed under the contract, plus interest.
Thereafter, petitioner attempted to execute the judgment by
obtaining writs of garnishment and execution in state court in the
State of Washington, and a sheriff's sale of Iranian property in
Washington was noticed to satisfy the judgment. However, by order
of May 28, 1981, as amended by order of June 8, the District Court
stayed execution of its judgment pending appeal by the Government
of Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization. The District Court also
ordered that all prejudgment attachments obtained against the
Iranian defendants be vacated, and that further proceedings against
the bank defendants be stayed in light of the Executive Orders
discussed above. App. to Pet. for Cert. 106-107.

															On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed this action in the District
Court for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United
States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to Page 453 U. S. 667 prevent enforcement of the Executive Orders and Treasury
Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran. In its
complaint, petitioner alleged that the actions of the President and
the Secretary of the Treasury implementing the Agreement with Iran
were beyond their statutory and constitutional powers, and, in any
event, were unconstitutional to the extent they adversely affect
petitioner's final judgment against the Government of Iran and the
Atomic Energy Organization, its execution of that judgment in the
State of Washington, its prejudgment attachments, and its ability
to continue to litigate against the Iranian banks. Id. at
1-12. On May 28, 1981, the District Court denied petitioner's
motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed petitioner's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Id. at 106-107. Prior to the District Court's
ruling, the United States Courts of Appeals for the First and the
District of Columbia Circuits upheld the President's authority to
issue the Executive Orders and regulations challenged by
petitioner. See Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water
& Power Authority, 651 F.2d 800 (CA1 1981); American
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211
U.S.App.D.C. 468, 657 F.2d 430 (1981).

															On June 3, 1981, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the
District Court's order, and the appeal was docketed in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 4, the
Treasury Department amended its regulations to mandate "the
transfer of bank deposits and certain other financial assets of
Iran in the United States to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
by noon, June 19." App. to Pet. for Cert. 151-152. The District
Court, however, entered an injunction pending appeal prohibiting
the United States from requiring the transfer of Iranian property
that is subject to "any writ of attachment, garnishment, judgment,
levy, or other judicial lien" issued by any court in favor of
petitioner. Id. at 168. Arguing that this is a case of
"imperative public importance," petitioner then sought a writ of
certiorari before Page 453 U. S. 668 judgment. Pet. for Cert. 10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (e);
this Court's Rule 18. Because the issues presented here are of
great significance and demand prompt resolution, we granted the
petition for the writ, adopted an expedited briefing schedule, and
set the case for oral argument on June 24, 1981. 452 U.S. 932
(1981). II The parties and the lower courts, confronted with the instant
questions, have all agreed that much relevant analysis is contained
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.
S. 579 (1952). Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
that case, involving the validity of President Truman's effort to
seize the country's steel mills in the wake of a nationwide strike,
recognized that "[t]he President's power, if any, to issue the
order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself." Id. at 343 U. S. 585 .
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion elaborated in a general way
the consequences of different types of interaction between the two
democratic branches in assessing Presidential authority to act in
any given case. When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization from Congress, he exercises not only his
powers but also those delegated by Congress. In such a case, the
executive action

															"would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Id. at 343 U. S. 637 .
When the President acts in the absence of congressional
authorization, he may enter "a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain." Ibid. In such a case, the
analysis becomes more complicated, and the validity of the
President's action, at least so far as separation of powers
principles are concerned, hinges on a consideration of all the
circumstances which might shed light on the views of the
Legislative Branch toward such action, including "congressional Page 453 U. S. 669 inertia, indifference or quiescence." Ibid. Finally,
when the President acts in contravention of the will of Congress,
"his power is at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his
actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject." Id. at 343 U. S.
637 -638.

															Although we have in the past found, and do today find, Justice
Jackson's classification of executive actions into three general
categories analytically useful, we should be mindful of Justice
Holmes' admonition, quoted by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown, supra, at 343 U. S. 597 (concurring opinion), that "[t]he great ordinances of the
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white." Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.
S. 189 , 277 U. S. 209 (1928) (dissenting opinion). Justice Jackson himself recognized
that his three categories represented "a somewhat over-simplified
grouping," 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 635 ,
and it is doubtless the case that executive action in any
particular instance falls not neatly in one of three pigeonholes,
but rather at some point along a spectrum running from explicit
congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition.
This is particularly true as respects cases such as the one before
us, involving responses to international crises the nature of which
Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any
detail. III In nullifying post-November 14, 1979, attachments and directing
those persons holding blocked Iranian funds and securities to
transfer them to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for ultimate
transfer to Iran, President Carter cited five sources of express or
inherent power. The Government, however, has principally relied on
§ 203 of the IEEPA, 91 Stat. 1626, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1976
ed., Supp. III), as authorization for these actions. Section
1702(a)(1) provides in part:

															"At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of
this title, the President may, under such regulations Page 453 U. S. 670 as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or
otherwise -- "

															"(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit -- "

															"(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,"

															"(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or
to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national
thereof,"

															"(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities,
and"

															"(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation
of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest;"

															"by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States."

															The Government contends that the acts of "nullifying" the
attachments and ordering the "transfer" of the frozen assets are
specifically authorized by the plain language of the above statute.
The two Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue agreed
with this contention. In Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan
Water & Power Authority, the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit explained:

															"The President relied on his IEEPA powers in November, 1979,
when he 'blocked' all Iranian assets in this country, and again in
January, 1981, when he 'nullified' interests acquired in blocked
property, and ordered that property's transfer. The President's
actions in this regard are in keeping with the language of IEEPA:
initially he 'prevent[ed] and prohibit[ed]' 'transfers' of Iranian
assets; later he 'direct[ed] and compel[led]' the Page 453 U. S. 671 'transfer' and 'withdrawal' of the assets, 'nullify[ing]'
certain 'rights' and 'privileges' acquired in them."

															"Main argues that IEEPA does not supply the President with power
to override judicial remedies, such as attachments and injunctions,
or to extinguish 'interests' in foreign assets held by United
States citizens. But we can find no such limitation in IEEPA's
terms. The language of IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. It
provides broadly that the President may void or nullify the"

															"exercising [by any person of] any right,
power or privilege with respect to . . . any property in which any
foreign country has any interest. . . ."

															"50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)."

															651 F.2d at 806-807 (emphasis in original). In American
Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit employed a similar
rationale in sustaining President Carter's action:

															"The Presidential revocation of the license he issued permitting
prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets is an action that falls
within the plain language of the IEEPA. In vacating the
attachments, he acted to"

															"nullify [and] void . . . any . . . exercising any right, power,
or privilege with respect to . . . any property in which any
foreign country . . . has any interest . . . by any person . . .
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."

															211 U.S.App.D.C. at 477, 657 F.2d at 439 (footnote omitted).

															Petitioner contends that we should ignore the plain language of
this statute because an examination of its legislative history, as
well as the history of § 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act
(hereinafter TWEA), 40 Stat. 411, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 5(b)
(1976 ed. and Supp. III), from which the pertinent language of §
1702 is directly drawn, Page 453 U. S. 672 reveals that the statute was not intended to give the President
such extensive power over the assets of a foreign state during
times of national emergency. According to petitioner, once the
President instituted the November 14, 1979, blocking order, § 1702
authorized him "only to continue the freeze or to discontinue
controls." Brief for Petitioner 32.

															We do not agree, and refuse to read out of § 1702 all meaning to
the words "transfer," "compel," or "nullify." Nothing in the
legislative history of either § 1702 or § 5(b)of the TWEA requires
such a result. To the contrary, we think both the legislative
history and cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain such a
result. To the contrary, we think both the legislative history and
cases interpreting the TWEA fully sustain the broad authority of
the Executive when acting under this congressional grant of power. See, e.g., Orvis v. Brownell 345 U.
S. 183 (1953). [ Footnote
5 ] Although Congress intended Page 453 U. S. 673 to limit the President's emergency power in peacetime, we do not
think the changes brought about by the enactment of the IEEPA in
any way affected the authority of the President to take the
specific actions taken here. We likewise note that, by the time
petitioner instituted this action, the President had already
entered the freeze order. Petitioner proceeded against the blocked
assets only after the Treasury Department had issued revocable
licenses authorizing such proceedings and attachments. The Treasury
Regulations provided that, "unless licensed," any attachment is
null and void, 31 CFR § 535.203(e) (1980), and all licenses "may be
amended, modified, or revoked at any time." § 535.805. As such, the
attachments obtained by petitioner were specifically made
subordinate to further actions which the President might take under
the IEEPA. Petitioner was on notice of the contingent nature of its
interest in the frozen assets.

															This Court has previously recognized that the congressional
purpose in authorizing blocking orders is "to put control of
foreign assets in the hands of the President. . . ." Propper v.
Clark, 337 U. S. 472 , 337 U. S. 493 (1949). Such orders permit the President to maintain the foreign
assets at his disposal for use in negotiating the resolution of a
declared national emergency. The frozen assets serve as a
"bargaining chip" to be used by the President when dealing with a
hostile country. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept
petitioner's argument, because the practical effect of it is to
allow individual claimants throughout the country to minimize or
wholly eliminate this "bargaining chip" through attachments,
garnishments, or similar encumbrances on property. Neither the
purpose the Page 453 U. S. 674 statute was enacted to serve nor its plain language supports
such a result. [ Footnote 6 ]

															Because the President's action in nullifying the attachments and
ordering the transfer of the assets was taken pursuant to specific
congressional authorization, it is

															"supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Under the circumstances of this case, we
cannot say that petitioner has sustained that heavy burden. A
contrary ruling would mean that the Federal Government as a whole
lacked the power exercised by the President, see id. at 343 U. S.
636 -637, and that we are not prepared to say. Page 453 U. S. 675 IV Although we have concluded that the IEEPA constitutes specific
congressional authorization to the President to nullify the
attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets, there remains
the question of the President's authority to suspend claims pending
in American courts. Such claims have, of course, an existence apart
from the attachments which accompanied them. In terminating these
claims through Executive Order No. 12294, the President purported
to act under authority of both the IEEPA and 22 U.S.C. § 1732, the
so-called "Hostage Act." [ Footnote
7 ] 46 Fed.Reg. 14111 (1981).

															We conclude that, although the IEEPA authorized the
nullification of the attachments, it cannot be read to authorize
the suspension of the claims. The claims of American citizens
against Iran are not, in themselves, transactions involving Iranian
property or efforts to exercise any rights with respect to such
property. An in personam lawsuit, although it might
eventually be reduced to judgment and that judgment might be
executed upon, is an effort to establish liability and fix damages,
and does not focus on any particular property within the
jurisdiction. The terms of the IEEPA therefore do not authorize the
President to suspend claims in American courts. This is the view of
all the courts which have considered the question. Chas. T.
Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651
F.2d at 809-814; American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 211 U.S.App.D.C. at 481, n. 15, 657 F.2d at 443, n.
15; The Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines
Corp., 518 F.
Supp. 69 , 79 (SDNY Page 453 U. S. 676 1981); Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Social Security
Organization of Iran, 508 F.
Supp. 1350 , 131 (ND Tex.1981). The Hostage Act, passed in 1868,
provides:

															"Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of
the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or
under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty
of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons
of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in
violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President
shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the
release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the
President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he
may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release;
and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as
practicable be communicated by the President to Congress."

															Rev.Stat. § 2001, 22 U.S.C. § 1732.

															We are reluctant to conclude that this provision constitutes
specific authorization to the President to suspend claims in
American courts. Although the broad language of the Hostage Act
suggests it may cover this case, there are several difficulties
with such a view. The legislative history indicates that the Act
was passed in response to a situation unlike the recent Iranian
crisis. Congress in 1868 was concerned with the activity of certain
countries refusing to recognize the citizenship of naturalized
Americans traveling abroad and repatriating such citizens against
their will. See, e.g., Cong.Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.,
4331 (1868) (Sen. Fessenden); id. at 4354 (Sen. Conness); see also 22 U.S.C. § 1731. These countries were not
interested in returning the citizens in exchange for any sort of
ransom. This also explains the reference in the Act to imprisonment
"in violation of the rights of American citizenship." Although the
Iranian hostage-taking violated international law and common
decency, Page 453 U. S. 677 the hostages were not seized out of any refusal to recognize
their American citizenship -- they were seized precisely because of their American citizenship. The legislative
history is also somewhat ambiguous on the question whether Congress
contemplated Presidential action such as that involved here, or
rather simply reprisals directed against the offending foreign
country and its citizens. See, e.g., Cong.Globe, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess., 4205 (1868); American Int'l Group, Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, supra, at 490-491, 657 F.2d at
452-453 (opinion of Mikva, J.).

															Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor the Hostage Act
constitutes specific authorization of the President's action
suspending claims, however, is not to say that these statutory
provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the validity
of the President's action. We think both statutes highly relevant
in the looser sense of indicating congressional acceptance of a
broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
presented in this case. As noted in Part III, supra, at 453 U. S.
670 -672, the IEEPA delegates broad authority to the
President to act in times of national emergency with respect to
property of a foreign country. The Hostage Act similarly indicates
congressional willingness that the President have broad discretion
when responding to the hostile acts of foreign sovereigns. As
Senator Williams, draftsman of the language eventually enacted as
the Hostage Act, put it:

															"If you propose any remedy at all, you must invest the Executive
with some discretion, so that he may apply the remedy to a case as
it may arise. As to England or France, he might adopt one policy to
relieve a citizen imprisoned by either one of those countries; as
to the Barbary powers, he might adopt another policy; as to the
islands of the ocean, another. With different countries that have
different systems of government, he might adopt different
means."

															Cong.Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 4359 (1868). Page 453 U. S. 678 Proponents of the bill recognized that it placed a "loose
discretion" in the President's hands, id. at 4238 (Sen.
Stewart), but argued that "[s]omething must be intrusted to the
Executive," and that "[t]he President ought to have the power to do
what the exigencies of the case require to rescue [a] citizen from
imprisonment." Id. at 4233, 4357 (Sen. Williams). An
original version of the Act, which authorized the President to
suspend trade with a foreign country and even arrest citizens of
that country in the United States in retaliation, was rejected
because

															"there may be a great variety of cases arising where other and
different means would be equally effective, and where the end
desired could be accomplished without resorting to such dangerous
and violent measures." Id. at 4233 (Sen. Williams).

															Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the
Hostage Act directly authorizes the President's suspension of
claims for the reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of
Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether
the President is acting alone, or at least with the acceptance of
Congress. As we have noted, Congress cannot anticipate and
legislate with regard to every possible action the President may
find it necessary to take, or every possible situation in which he
might act. Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate
authority does not, "especially . . . in the areas of foreign
policy and national security," imply "congressional disapproval" of
action taken by the Executive. Haig v. Agee, ante at 453 U. S. 291 .
On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to
the question of the President's authority in a particular case
which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion may be considered to "invite" "measures on independent
presidential responsibility," Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S. 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). At least this is so where there is no
contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there
is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the
sort Page 453 U. S. 679 engaged in by the President. It is to that history which we now
turn.

															Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims
by nationals of one country against the government of another
country are "sources of friction" between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 , 315 U. S. 225 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered
into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals.
As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling
claims by nationals of one state against the government of another
"are established international practice reflecting traditional
international theory." L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the
Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United
States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle
the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. Though those
settlements have sometimes been made by treaty, there has also been
a longstanding practice of settling such claims by executive
agreement, without the advice and consent of the Senate. [ Footnote 8 ] Under such agreements, the
President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United
States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum
payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be
sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United
States claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of
obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government
negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also
undisputed Page 453 U. S. 680 that the

															"United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its
citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with
them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as
distinguished from those of the nation as a whole."

															Henkin, supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213 (1965)
(President "may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state . .
. [even] without the consent of the [injured] national"). It is
clear that the practice of settling claims continues today. Since
1952, the President has entered into at least 10 binding
settlements with foreign nations, including an $80 million
settlement with the People's Republic of China. [ Footnote 9 ]

															Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress
has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by
executive agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress'
enactment of the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, 64
Stat. 13, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 et seq. (1976 ed.
and Supp. IV). The Act had two purposes: (1) to allocate to United
States nationals funds received in the course of an executive
claims settlement with Yugoslavia, and (2) to provide a procedure
whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be
distributed. To achieve these ends Congress created the
International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission, and gave it jurisdiction to make final and binding
decisions with respect to claims by United States nationals against
settlement funds. 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a). By creating a procedure to
implement future settlement agreements, Congress placed its stamp
of approval on such agreements. Indeed, the legislative history of
the Act observed that the United States was seeking settlements Page 453 U. S. 681 with countries other than Yugoslavia, and that the bill
contemplated settlements of a similar nature in the future.
H.R.Rep. No. 770, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 4, 8 (1949).

															Over the years, Congress has frequently amended the
International Claims Settlement Act to provide for particular
problems arising out of settlement agreements, thus demonstrating
Congress' continuing acceptance of the President's claim settlement
authority. With respect to the Executive Agreement with the
People's Republic of China, for example, Congress established an
allocation formula for distribution of the funds received pursuant
to the Agreement. 22 U.S.C. § 1627(f) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). As with
legislation involving other executive agreements, Congress did not
question the fact of the settlement or the power of the President
to have concluded it. In 1976, Congress authorized the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the merits of claims by
United States nationals against East Germany, prior to any
settlement with East Germany, so that the Executive would "be in a
better position to negotiate an adequate settlement . . . of these
claims." S.Rep. No. 94-1188, p. 2 (1976); 22 U.S.C. § 1644b.
Similarly, Congress recently amended the International Claims
Settlement Act to facilitate the settlement of claims against
Vietnam. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1645, 1645a(5) (1976 ed., Supp. IV). The
House Report stated that the purpose of the legislation was to
establish an official inventory of losses of private United States
property in Vietnam so that recovery could be achieved "through
future direct Government-to-Government negotiation of private
property claims." H.R.Rep. No. 96-915, pp. 2-3 (1980). Finally, the
legislative history of the IEEPA further reveals that Congress has
accepted the authority of the Executive to enter into settlement
agreements. Though the IEEPA was enacted to provide for some
limitation on the President's emergency powers, Congress stressed
that

															"[n]othing in this act is intended . . . to interfere with the
authority Page 453 U. S. 682 of the President to [block assets], or to impede the settlement
of claims of U.S. citizens against foreign countries."

															S.Rep. No. 9566, p. 6 (1977); 50 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(1) (1976 ed.,
Supp. III). [ Footnote
10 ]

															In addition to congressional acquiescence in the President's
power to settle claims, prior cases of this Court have also
recognized that the President does have some measure of power to
enter into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and
consent of the Senate. In United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942), for example, the Court upheld the validity of the Litvinov
Assignment, which was part of an Executive Agreement whereby the
Soviet Union assigned to the United States amounts owed to it by
American nationals so that outstanding claims of other American
nationals could Page 453 U. S. 683 be paid. The Court explained that the resolution of such claims
was integrally connected with normalizing United States' relations
with a foreign state:

															"Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as
settlement of claims of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest
implied power of the President. . . . No such obstacle can be
placed in the way of rehabilitation of relations between this
country and another nation unless the historic conception of the
powers and responsibilities . . . is to be drastically
revised." Id. at 315 U. S.
229 -230. Similarly, Judge Learned Hand recognized:

															"The constitutional power of the President extends to the
settlement of mutual claims between a foreign government and the
United States, at least when it is an incident to the recognition
of that government; and it would be unreasonable to circumscribe it
to such controversies. The continued mutual amity between the
nation and other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory
compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such
compromises has existed from the earliest times and been exercised
by the foreign offices of all civilized nations." Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (CA2
1951).

															Petitioner raises two arguments in opposition to the proposition
that Congress has acquiesced in this longstanding practice of
claims settlement by executive agreement. First, it suggests that
all pre-1952 settlement claims, and corresponding court cases such
as Pink, should be discounted because of the evolution of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Petitioner observes that, prior
to 1952, the United States adhered to the doctrine of absolute
sovereign immunity, so that, absent action by the Executive, there
simply would be no remedy for a United States national against a
foreign government. When the United States in 1952 adopted a more
restrictive Page 453 U. S. 684 notion of sovereign immunity, by means of the so-called "Tate"
letter, it is petitioner's view that United States nationals no
longer needed executive aid to settle claims, and that, as a
result, the President's authority to settle such claims in some
sense "disappeared." Though petitioner's argument is not wholly
without merit, it is refuted by the fact that, since 1952, there
have been at least 10 claims settlements by executive agreement.
Thus, even if the pre-1952 cases should be disregarded,
congressional acquiescence in settlement agreements since that time
supports the President's power to act here.

															Petitioner next asserts that Congress divested the President of
the authority to settle claims when it enacted the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (hereinafter FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§
1330, 1602 et seq. The FSIA granted personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in the federal district courts over commercial
suits brought by claimants against those foreign states which have
waived immunity. 28 U.S.C. 1330. Prior to the enactment of the
FSIA, a foreign government's immunity to suit was determined by the
Executive Branch on a case-by-case basis. According to petitioner,
the principal purpose of the FSIA was to depoliticize these
commercial lawsuits by taking them out of the arena of foreign
affairs -- where the Executive Branch is subject to the pressures
of foreign states seeking to avoid liability through a grant of
immunity -- and by placing them within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts. Petitioner thus insists that the President, by
suspending its claims, has circumscribed the jurisdiction of the
United States courts in violation of Art. III of the
Constitution.

															We disagree. In the first place, we do not believe that the
President has attempted to divest the federal courts of
jurisdiction. Executive Order No. 12294 purports only to "suspend"
the claims, not divest the federal court of "jurisdiction." As we
read the Executive Order, those claims not within the jurisdiction
of the Claims Tribunal will "revive" Page 453 U. S. 685 and become judicially enforceable in United States courts. This
case, in short, illustrates the difference between modifying
federal court jurisdiction and directing the courts to apply a
different rule of law. See United States v. Schooner
Peggy , 1 Cranch 103 (1801). The President has
exercised the power, acquiesced in by Congress, to settle claims
and, as such, has simply effected a change in the substantive law
governing the lawsuit. Indeed, the very example of sovereign
immunity belies petitioner's argument. No one would suggest that a
determination of sovereign immunity divests the federal courts of
"jurisdiction." Yet petitioner's argument, if accepted, would have
required courts prior to the enactment of the FSIA to reject as an
encroachment on their jurisdiction the President's determination of
a foreign state's sovereign immunity.

															Petitioner also reads the FSIA much too broadly. The principal
purpose of the FSIA was to codify contemporary concepts concerning
the scope of sovereign immunity and withdraw from the President the
authority to make binding determinations of the sovereign immunity
to be accorded foreign states. See Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v.
Khuzestan Water & Power Authority, 651 F.2d at 813-814; American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U.S.App.D.C. at 482, 67 F.2d at 444. The FSIA was thus designed
to remove one particular barrier to suit, namely sovereign
immunity, and cannot be fairly read as prohibiting the President
from settling claims of United States nationals against foreign
governments. It is telling that the Congress which enacted the FSIA
considered, but rejected, several proposals designed to limit the
power of the President to enter into executive agreements,
including claims settlement agreements. [ Footnote 11 ] Page 453 U. S. 686 It is quite unlikely that the same Congress that rejected
proposals to limit the President's authority to conclude executive
agreements sought to accomplish that very purpose sub
silentio through the FSIA. And, as noted above, just one year
after enacting the FSIA, Congress enacted the IEEPA, where the
legislative history stressed that nothing in the IEEPA was to
impede the settlement of claims of United States citizens. It would
be surprising for Congress to express this support for settlement
agreements had it intended the FSIA to eliminate the President's
authority to make such agreements.

															In light of all of the foregoing -- the inferences to be drawn
from the character of the legislation Congress has enacted in the
area, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, and from the history
of acquiescence in executive claims settlement -- we conclude that
the President was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant to
Executive Order No. 12294. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 343 U. S.
610 -611,

															"a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be
treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President by
§ 1 of Art. II."

															Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but

															"long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been
[taken] in pursuance of its consent. . . ." United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.
S. 459 , 236 U. S. 474 (1915). See Haig v. Agee, ante at 453 U. S.
291 -292. Such practice is present here, and such a
presumption is also appropriate. In light of the fact that Congress
may be considered to have consented to the President's action in
suspending claims, we cannot say that action exceeded the
President's powers.

															Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the means Page 453 U. S. 687 chosen by the President to settle the claims of American
nationals provided an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal which
is capable of providing meaningful relief. The Solicitor General
also suggests that the provision of the Claims Tribunal will
actually enhance the opportunity for claimants to recover
their claims, in that the Agreement removes a number of
jurisdictional and procedural impediments faced by claimants in
United States courts. Brief for Federal Respondents 13-14. Although
being overly sanguine about the chances of United States claimants
before the Claims Tribunal would require a degree of naivete which
should not be demanded even of judges, the Solicitor General's
point cannot be discounted. Moreover, it is important to remember
that we have already held that the President has the statutory authority to nullify attachments and to transfer
the assets out of the country. The President's power to do so does
not depend on his provision of a forum whereby claimants can
recover on those claims. The fact that the President has provided
such a forum here means that the claimants are receiving something
in return for the suspension of their claims, namely, access to an
international tribunal before which they may well recover something
on their claims. Because there does appear to be a real
"settlement" here, this case is more easily analogized to the more
traditional claim settlement cases of the past.

															Just as importantly, Congress has not disapproved of the action
taken here. Though Congress has held hearings on the Iranian
Agreement itself, [ Footnote
12 ] Congress has not enacted legislation, or even passed a
resolution, indicating its displeasure with the Agreement. Quite
the contrary, the relevant Senate Page 453 U. S. 688 Committee has stated that the establishment of the Tribunal is
"of vital importance to the United States." S.Rep. No. 97-71, p. 5
(1981). [ Footnote 13 ] We are
thus clearly not confronted with a situation in which Congress has
in some way resisted the exercise of Presidential authority.

															Finally, we reemphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do
not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle
claims, even as against foreign governmental entities. As the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit stressed,

															"[t]he sheer magnitude of such a power, considered against the
background of the diversity and complexity of modern international
trade, cautions against any broader construction of authority than
is necessary." Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water Power
Authority, 651 F.2d at 814. But where, as here, the settlement
of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the
resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country
and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Congress
acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims. V We do not think it appropriate at the present time to address
petitioner's contention that the suspension of claims, if
authorized, would constitute a taking of property in violation of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the
absence of just compensation. [ Footnote 14 ] Both petitioner and Page 453 U. S. 689 the Government concede that the question whether the suspension
of the claims constitutes a taking is not ripe for review. Brief
for Petitioner 34, n. 32; Brief for Federal Respondents 65. Accord, Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Authority, supra, at 814-815; American Int'l Group,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U.S.App.D.C. at 485. 657
F.2d at 447. However, this contention, and the possibility that the
President's actions may effect a taking of petitioner's property,
make ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976 ed., Supp. III), in such an event. That the
fact and extent of the taking in this case is yet speculative is
inconsequential, because "there must be, at the time of taking, reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation.'" Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102 , 419 U. S.
124 -125 (1974), quoting Cherokee Nation v. Southern
Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641 , 135 U. S. 659 (1890); see also Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U. S. 330 , 342 U. S.
335 -336 (1952); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S.
59 , 438 U. S. 94 , n.
39 (1978). It has been contended that the "treaty exception" to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1502, might
preclude the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over any
takings claim the petitioner might bring. At oral argument,
however, the Government conceded that § 1502 would not act as a bar
to petitioner's action in the Court of Claims. Tr. of Oral Arg.
392, 47. We agree. See United States v. Weld, 127 U. S.
51 (1888); United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427 (1893); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 209 Ct.Cl.
446, 534 F.2d 889 (1976). Accordingly, to the extent petitioner
believes it has suffered an unconstitutional taking by the
suspension of the claims, we see no jurisdictional Page 453 U. S. 690 obstacle to an appropriate action in the United States Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act.

															The judgment of the District Court is accordingly affirmed, and
the mandate shall issue forthwith. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Title 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1976 ed., Supp. III) states that the
President's authority under the Act

															"may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary
threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national
emergency with respect to such threat."

															Petitioner does not challenge President Carter's declaration of
a national emergency.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Title 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (1976 ed., Supp. III) empowers
the President to

															"investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit any acquisition, holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation
of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest. . .
."

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Title 31 CFR § 535.805 (1980) provides in full:

															"The provisions of this part and any rulings, licenses,
authorizations, instructions, orders, or forms issued thereunder
may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time."

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The contract stated that any dispute incapable of resolution by
agreement of the parties would be submitted to conciliation, and
that, if either party was unwilling to accept the results of
conciliation, "the matter shall be decided finally by resort to the
courts of Iran." Pet. for Cert. 7, n. 2. In its complaint, which
was based on breach of contract and related theories, petitioner
alleged that it had sought a meeting with the Atomic Energy
Organization for purposes of settling matters relating to the
contract, but that the Organization "has continually postponed
[the] meeting, and obviously does not intend that it take place."
Complaint in Dame & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of
Iran, No. CV 79-04918 LEW (Px) (CD Cal.), � 27.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															Petitioner argues that, under the TWEA, the President was given
two powers: (1) the power temporarily to freeze or block the
transfer of foreign owned assets, and (2) the power summarily to
seize and permanently vest title to foreign-owned assets. It is
contended that only the "vesting" provisions of the TWEA gave the
President the power permanently to dispose of assets, and,
when Congress enacted the IEEPA in 1977, it purposefully did not
grant the President this power. According to petitioner, the
nullification of the attachments and the transfer of the assets
will permanently dispose of the assets, and would not even be
permissible under the TWEA. We disagree. Although it is true the
IEEPA does not give the President the power to "vest" or to take
title to the assets, it does not follow that the President is not
authorized under both the IEEPA and the TWEA to otherwise
permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done here.
Petitioner errs in assuming that the only power granted by the
language used in both § 1702 and § 5(b) of the TWEA is the power
temporarily to freeze assets. As noted above, the plain language of
the statute defies such a holding. Section 1701 authorizes the
President to "direct and compel" the "transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, . . . or exportation of . . . any property in which
any foreign country has any interest. . . ."

															We likewise reject the contention that Orvis v.
Brownell and Zittman v. McGrath, 341 U.
S. 446 (1951), grant petitioner the right to retain its
attachments on the Iranian assets. To the contrary, we think Orvis supports the proposition that an American claimant
may not use an attachment that is subject to a revocable license
and that has been obtained after the entry of a freeze order to
limit in any way the actions the President may take under § 1702
respecting the frozen assets. An attachment so obtained is in every
sense subordinate to the President's power under the IEEPA.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Although petitioner concedes that the President could have
forbidden attachments, it nevertheless argues that, once he allowed
them, the President permitted claimants to acquire property
interests in their attachments. Petitioner further argues that only
the licenses to obtain the attachments were made revocable, not the
attachments themselves. It is urged that the January 19, 1981,
order revoking all licenses only affected petitioner's right to
obtain future attachments. We disagree. As noted above, the
regulations specifically provided that any attachment is null and
void "unless licensed," and all licenses may be revoked at any
time. Moreover, common sense defies petitioner's reading of the
regulations. The President could hardly have intended petitioner
and other similarly situated claimants to have the power to take
control of the frozen assets out of his hands.

															Our construction of petitioner's attachments as being
"revocable," "contingent," and "in every sense subordinate to the
President's power under the IEEPA," in effect answers petitioner's
claim that, even if the President had the authority to nullify the
attachments and transfer the assets, the exercise of such would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property, in violation of
the Fifth Amendment absent just compensation. We conclude that,
because of the President's authority to prevent or condition
attachments, and because of the orders he issued to this effect,
petitioner did not acquire any "property" interest in its
attachments of the sort that would support a constitutional claim
for compensation.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Judge Mikva, in his separate opinion in American Int'l
Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 468,
490, 657 F.2d 430, 452 (1981), argued that the moniker "Hostage
Act" was newly coined for purposes of this litigation. Suffice it
to say that we focus on the language of 22 U.S.C. § 1732, not any
shorthand description of it. See W. Shakespeare, Romeo and
Juliet, Act II, scene 2, line 43 ("What's in a name?").

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															At least since the case of the "Wilmington Packet" in 1799,
Presidents have exercised the power to settle claims of United
States nationals by executive agreement. See Lillich, The
Gravel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 69 Am.J.Int'l L.
837, 844 (1975). In fact, during the period of 1817-1917, "no fewer
than eighty executive agreements were entered into by the United
States looking toward the liquidation of claims of its citizens."
W. McClure, International Executive Agreements 53 (1941). See
also 14 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 247
(1970).

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Those agreement are [1979] 30 U.S.T.1957 (People's Republic of
China); [1976] 27 U.S.T. 3933 (Peru); [1976] 27 U.S.T. 4214
(Egypt); [1974] 25 U.S.T. 227 (Peru); [1973] 24 U.S.T. 522
(Hungary); [1969] 20 U.S.T. 2654 (Japan); [1965] 16 U.S.T. 1
(Yugoslavia); [1963] 14 U.S.T. 969 (Bulgaria); [1960] 11 U.S.T.
1953 (Poland); [1960] 11 U.S.T. 317 (Rumania).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Indeed, Congress has consistently failed to object to this
longstanding practice of claim settlement by executive agreement,
even when it has had an opportunity to do so. In 1972, Congress
entertained legislation relating to congressional oversight of such
agreements. But Congress took only limited action, requiring that
the text of significant executive agreements be transmitted to
Congress. 1 U.S.C. § 112b. In Haig v. Agee, ante p. 453 U. S. 280 , we
noted that,

															"[d]espite the longstanding and officially promulgated view that
the Executive has the power to withhold passports for reasons of
national security and foreign policy, Congress in 1978,"

															"though it once again enacted legislation relating to passports,
left completely untouched the broad rulemaking authority granted in
the earlier Act." Ante at 453 U. S. 301 ,
quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 , 381 U. S. 12 (1965). Likewise in this case, Congress, though legislating in the
area, has left "untouched" the authority of the President to enter
into settlement agreements.

															The legislative history of 1 U.S.C. § 112b further reveals that
Congress has accepted the President's authority to settle claims.
During the hearings on the bill, Senator Case, the sponsor of the
Act, stated with respect to executive claim settlements:

															"I think it is a most interesting [area] in which we have
accepted the right of the President, one individual, acting through
his diplomatic force, to adjudicate and settle claims of American
nationals against foreign countries. But that is a fact."

															Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings on S.
596 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess., 74 (1971).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The rejected legislation would typically have required
congressional approval of executive agreements before they could be
considered effective. See Congressional Oversight of
Executive Agreements: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 before the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 9th Cong., 1st Sess., 243-261, 302-311 (1975);
Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings before
the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs
of the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess., 167, 246 (1976).

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Hearings on the Iranian Agreements before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); Hearings on the Iranian Asset Settlement before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); Hearings on the Algerian Declarations before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Contrast congressional reaction to the Iranian Agreements with
congressional reaction to a 1973 Executive Agreement with
Czechoslovakia. There the President sought to settle over $105
million in claims against Czechoslovakia for $20.5 million.
Congress quickly demonstrated its displeasure by enacting
legislation requiring that the Agreement be renegotiated. See Lillich, supra, n 8, at 839-840. Though Congress has shown itself capable
of objecting to executive agreements, it has rarely done so, and
has not done so in this case.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Though we conclude that the President has settled petitioner's
claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the settlement has
terminated petitioner's possible taking claim against the United
States. We express no views on petitioner's claims that it has
suffered a taking.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part.

															In my judgment, the possibility that requiring this petitioner
to prosecute its claim in another forum will constitute an
unconstitutional "taking" is so remote that I would not address the
jurisdictional question considered in 453 U.
S. However, I join the remainder of the opinion.

															JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

															I join the Court's opinion except its decision that the
nullification of the attachments did not effect a taking of
property interests giving rise to claims for just compensation. Ante at 453 U. S. 674 ,
n. 6. The nullification of attachments presents a separate question
from whether the suspension and proposed settlement of claims
against Iran may constitute a taking. I would leave both "taking"
claims open for resolution on a case-by-case basis in actions
before the Court of Claims. The facts of the hundreds of claims
pending against Iran are not known to this Court, and may differ
from the facts in this case. I therefore dissent from the Court's
decision with respect to attachments. The decision may well be
erroneous, [ Footnote 2/1 ] and it
certainly is premature with respect to many claims. Page 453 U. S. 691 I agree with the Court's opinion with respect to the suspension
and settlement of claims against Iran and its instrumentalities.
The opinion makes clear that some claims may not be adjudicated by
the Claims Tribunal, and that others may not be paid in full. The
Court holds that parties whose valid claims are not adjudicated or
not fully paid may bring a "taking" claim against the United States
in the Court of Claims, the jurisdiction of which this Court
acknowledges. The Government must pay just compensation when it
furthers the Nation's foreign policy goals by using as "bargaining
chips" claims lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject
to the jurisdiction of our courts. [ Footnote 2/2 ] The extraordinary powers of the President
and Congress upon which our decision rests cannot, in the
circumstances of this case, displace the Just Compensation Clause
of the Constitution.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															Even though the Executive Orders purported to make attachments
conditional, there is a substantial question whether the Orders
themselves may have effected a taking by making conditional the
attachments that claimants against Iran otherwise could have
obtained without condition. Moreover, because it is settled that an
attachment entitling a creditor to resort to specific property for
the satisfaction of a claim is a property right compensable under
the Fifth Amendment, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40 (1960); Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.
S. 555 (1935), there is a question whether the
revocability of the license under which petitioner obtained its
attachments suffices to render revocable the attachments
themselves. See Marschalk Co. v. Iran National Airlines
Corp., 518 F. Supp.
69 (SDNY 1981).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															As the Court held in Armstrong v. United States, supra, at 364 U. S.
49 :

															"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."

															The Court unanimously reaffirmed this understanding Of the Just
Compensation Clause in the recent case Of Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 , 447 U. S.
260 -261 (1980).