U.S. Supreme Court Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) Weeks v. United
States No. 461 Argued December 2, 3,
1913 Decided February
24,1914 232
U.S. 383 ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MISSOURI Syllabus Under the Fourth Amendment, Federal courts and officers are
under such limitations and restraints in the exercise of their
power and authority as to forever secure the people, their persons,
houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and
seizures under the guise of law.

															The protection of the Fourth Amendment reaches all alike,
whether accused of crime or not; and the duty of giving it force
and effect is obligatory on all entrusted with the enforcement of
Federal laws.

															The tendency of those executing Federal criminal laws to obtain
convictions by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions
in violation of Federal rights is not to be sanctioned by the
courts which are charged with the support of constitutional
rights.

															The Federal courts cannot, as against a seasonable application
for their return, in a criminal prosecution, retain for the
purposes of evidence against the accused his letters and
correspondence seized in his house during his absence and without
his authority by a United States marshal holding no warrant for his
arrest or for the search of his premises.

															While the efforts of courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment are praiseworthy, they are not to be aided by
sacrificing the great fundamental rights secured by the
Constitution.

															While an incidental seizure of incriminating papers, made in the
execution of a legal warrant, and their use as evidence, may be
justified, and a collateral issue will not be raised to ascertain
the source of competent evidence, Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 ,
that rule does not justify the retention of letters seized in
violation of the protection given by the Fourth Amendment where an
application in the cause for their return has been made by the
accused before trial.

															The court has power to deal with papers and documents in the
possession of the District Attorney and other officers of the court
and to direct their return to the accused if wrongfully seized.

															Where letters and papers of the accused were taken from his
premises by an official of the United States, acting under color of
office but Page 232 U. S. 384 without any search warrant and in violation of the
constitutional rights of accused under the Fourth Amendment, and a
seasonable application for return of the letters and papers has
been refused and they are used in evidence over his objection,
prejudicial error is committed, and the judgment should be
reversed.

															The Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of
state officers. Its limitations reach the Federal Government and
its agencies. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616 .

															The facts, which involve the validity under the Fourth Amendment
of a verdict and sentence and the extent to which the private
papers of the accused taken without search warrant can be used as
evidence against him, are stated in the opinion. Page 232 U. S. 386 MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court:

															An indictment was returned against the plaintiff in error,
defendant below, and herein so designated, in the district court of
the United States for the western district of Missouri, containing
nine counts. The seventh count, upon which a conviction was had,
charged the use of the mails for the purpose of transporting
certain coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a
lottery or gift enterprise, in violation of § 213 of the Criminal
Code. Sentence of fine and imprisonment was imposed. This writ of
error is to review that judgment.

															The defendant was arrested by a police officer, so far as the
record shows, without warrant, at the Union Station in Kansas City,
Missouri, where he was employed by an express company. Other police
officers had gone to the house of the defendant, and being told by
a neighbor where the key was kept, found it and entered the house.
They searched the defendant's room and took possession of various
papers and articles found there, which were afterwards turned over
to the United States marshal. Later in the same day, police
officers returned with the marshal, who thought he might find
additional evidence and, being admitted by someone in the house,
probably a boarder, in response to a rap, the marshal searched the
defendant's room and carried away certain letters and envelops
found in the drawer of a chiffonier. Neither the marshal nor the
police officer had a search warrant. Page 232 U. S. 387 The defendant filed in the cause before the time for trial the
following petition:

															"Petition to Return Private Papers, Books, and Other
Property."

															"Now comes defendant and states that he is a citizen and
resident of Kansas City, Missouri, and that he resides, owns, and
occupies a home at 1834 Penn street in said city:"

															"That, on the 21st day of December, 1911, while plaintiff was
absent at his daily vocation, certain officers of the government,
whose names are to plaintiff unknown, unlawfully and without
warrant or authority so to do, broke open the door to plaintiff's
said home and seized all of his books, letters, money, papers,
notes, evidences of indebtedness, stock, certificates, insurance
policies, deeds, abstracts, and other muniments of title, bonds,
candies, clothes, and other property in said home, and this in
violation of §§ 11 and 23 to the Constitution of Missouri, and of
the 4th and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States;"

															"That the district attorney, marshal, and clerk of the United
States court for the western district of Missouri took the
above-described property so seized into their possession, and have
failed and refused to return to defendant portion of same,
to-wit:"

															"One (1) leather grip, value about $7; one (1) tin box valued at
$3; one (1) Pettis county, Missouri, bond, value $500; three (3)
mining stock certificates which defendant is unable to more
particularly describe, valued at $12,000; and certain stock
certificates in addition thereto, issued by the San Domingo Mining,
Loan, & Investment Company; about $75 in currency; one (1)
newspaper published about 1790, an heirloom; and certain other
property which plaintiff is now unable to describe."

															"That said property is being unlawfully and improperly Page 232 U. S. 388 held by said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, in violation
of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States
and the state of Missouri."

															"That said district attorney purposes to use said books,
letters, papers, certificates of stock, etc., at the trial of the
above-entitled cause, and that, by reason thereof and of the facts
above set forth, defendant's rights under the amendments aforesaid
to the Constitutions of Missouri and the United States have been
and will be violated unless the court order the return prayed
for;"

															"Wherefore, defendant prays that said district attorney,
marshal, and clerk be notified, and that the court direct and order
said district attorney, marshal, and clerk, to return said property
to said defendant."

															Upon consideration of the petition, the court entered in the
cause an order directing the return of such property as was not
pertinent to the charge against the defendant, but denied the
petition as to pertinent matter, reserving the right to pass upon
the pertinency at a later time. In obedience to the order, the
district attorney returned part of the property taken and retained
the remainder, concluding a list of the latter with the statement
that

															"all of which last above described property is to be used in
evidence in the trial of the above-entitled cause, and pertains to
the alleged sale of lottery tickets of the company above
named."

															After the jury had been sworn and before any evidence had been
given, the defendant again urged his petition for the return of his
property, which was denied by the court. Upon the introduction of
such papers during the trial, the defendant objected on the ground
that the papers had been obtained without a search warrant, and by
breaking open his home, in violation of the 4th and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which
objection was overruled by the court. Among the papers retained and
put in evidence were a number of Page 232 U. S. 389 lottery tickets and statements with reference to the lottery,
taken at the first visit of the police to the defendant's room, and
a number of letters written to the defendant in respect to the
lottery, taken by the marshal upon his search of defendant's
room.

															The defendant assigns error, among other things, in the court's
refusal to grant his petition for the return of his property, and
in permitting the papers to be used at the trial.

															It is thus apparent that the question presented involves the
determination of the duty of the court with reference to the motion
made by the defendant for the return of certain letters, as well as
other papers, taken from his room by the United States marshal,
who, without authority of process, if any such could have been
legally issued, visited the room of the defendant for the declared
purpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the charge
against the accused, and, having gained admission to the house,
took from the drawer of a chiffonier there found certain letters
written to the defendant, tending to show his guilt. These letters
were placed in the control of the district attorney, and were
subsequently produced by him and offered in evidence against the
accused at the trial. The defendant contends that such
appropriation of his private correspondence was in violation of
rights secured to him by the 4th and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States. We shall deal with the 4th
Amendment, which provides:

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."

															The history of this Amendment is given with particularity in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for Page 232 U. S. 390 the court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616 . As was there shown, it took its origin in the
determination of the framers of the Amendments to the Federal
Constitution to provide for that instrument a Bill of Rights,
securing to the American people, among other things, those
safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under
the general warrants issued under authority of the government, by
which there had been invasions of the home and privacy of the
citizens, and the seizure of their private papers in support of
charges, real or imaginary, make against them. Such practices had
also received sanction under warrants and seizures under the
so-called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies. See 2 Watson, Const. 1414 et seq. Resistance to
these practices had established the principle which was enacted
into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's
house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general
authority to search and seize his goods and papers. Judge Cooley,
in his Constitutional Limitations, pp. 425, 426, in treating of
this feature of our Constitution said:

															"The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle' is made a part
of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon as of high
value to the citizen."

															"Accordingly," says Lieber in his work on Civil Liberty and
Self-Government, 62, in speaking of the English law in this
respect,

															"no man's house can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be
carried away after it has thus been forced, except in cases of
felony; and then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and
take great care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is
jealously insisted upon."

															In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 , 96 U. S. 733 ,
this court recognized the principle of protection as applicable to
letters and sealed packages in the mail, and held that,
consistently Page 232 U. S. 391 with this guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures, such
matter could only be opened and examined upon warrants issued on
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be
seized, "as is required when papers are subjected to search in
one's own household."

															In the Boyd case, supra, after citing Lord
Camden's judgment in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's
State Trials 1029, Mr. Justice Bradley said (630):

															"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther
than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its
adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part
of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and
the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offense, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where
that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offense -- it is the invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment."

															In Bram v. United States, 168 U.
S. 532 , this court, in speaking by the present Chief
Justice of Boyd's Case, dealing with the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, said (544):

															"It was in that case demonstrated that both of these Amendments
contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a
constitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty
which had been secured in the mother country only after years of
struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness
of their integrity, free from the possibilities of future
legislative change."

															The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts Page 232 U. S. 392 of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of
their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to
the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the
people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and
the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all
intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the
laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.

															What, then, is the present case? Before answering that inquiry
specifically, it may be well, by a process of exclusion, to state
what it is not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of
the government always recognized under English and American law to
search the person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover
and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been
uniformly maintained in many cases. 1 Bishop.Criminal Procedure §
211; Wharton, Crim. Plead. & Practice 8th ed. § 60; Dillon
v. O'Brien, 16 Cox C.C. 245. Nor is it the case of testimony
offered at a trial where the court is asked to stop and consider
the illegal means by which proofs, otherwise competent, were
obtained -- of which we shall have occasion to treat later in this
opinion. Nor is it the case of burglar's tools or other proofs of
guilt found upon his arrest within the control of the accused. Page 232 U. S. 393 The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves
the right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the
purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused,
seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by a
United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none
for the search of his premises. The accused, without awaiting his
trial, made timely application to the court for an order for the
return of these letters, as well or other property. This
application was denied, the letters retained and put in evidence,
after a further application at the beginning of the trial, both
applications asserting the rights of the accused under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. If letters and private
documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established be years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land. The United States marshal could
only have invaded the house of the accused when armed with a
warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon sworn
information, and describing with reasonable particularity the thing
for which the search was to be made. Instead, he acted without
sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to bring further
proof to the aid of the government, and, under color of his office,
undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation
of the constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such
circumstances, without sworn information and particular
description, not even an order of court would Page 232 U. S. 394 have justified such procedure; much less was it within the
authority of the United States marshal to thus invade the house and
privacy of the accused. In Adams v. New York, 192 U.
S. 585 , this court said that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to secure the citizen in person and property against
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the
law, acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection
is equally extended to the action of the government and officers of
the law acting under it. ( Boyd Case, supra ) To sanction
such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against
such unauthorized action.

															The court before which the application was made in this case
recognized the illegal character of the seizure, and ordered the
return of property not in its judgment competent to be offered at
the trial, but refused the application of the accused to turn over
the letters, which were afterwards put in evidence on behalf of the
government. While there is no opinion in the case, the court in
this proceeding doubtless relied upon what is now contended by the
government to be the correct rule of law under such circumstances
-- that the letters having come into the control of the court, it
would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but,
if competent, would keep them and permit their use in evidence.
Such proposition, the government asserts, is conclusively
established by certain decisions of this court, the first of which
is Adams v. New York, supra. In that case, the plaintiff
in error had been convicted in the Supreme Court of the State of
New York for having in his possession certain gambling
paraphernalia used in the game known as policy, in violation of the
Penal Code of New York. At the trial, certain papers, which had
been seized by police officers executing a search warrant for the
discovery and Page 232 U. S. 395 seizure of policy slips, and which had been found in addition to
the policy slips, were offered in evidence over his objection. The
conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals of New York (176
N.Y. 351), and the case was brought here for alleged violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. Pretermitting the question whether these Amendments applied
to the action of the states, this court proceeded to examine the
alleged violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and put its
decision upon the ground that the papers found in the execution of
the search warrant, which warrant had a legal purpose in the
attempt to find gambling paraphernalia, was competent evidence
against the accused, and their offer in testimony did not violate
his constitutional privilege against unlawful search or seizure,
for is was held that such incriminatory documents thus discovered
were not the subject of an unreasonable search and seizure, and, in
effect, that the same were incidentally seized in the lawful
execution of a warrant, and not in the wrongful invasion of the
home of a citizen and the unwarranted seizure of his papers and
property. It was further held, approving in that respect the
doctrine laid down in 1 Greenleaf, § 254a, that it was no valid
objection to the use of the papers that they had been thus seized,
and that the courts in the course of a trial would not make an
issue to determine that question, and many state cases were cited
supporting that doctrine.

															The same point had been ruled in People v. Adams, 176
N.Y. 351, from which decision the case was brought to this court,
where it was held that if the papers seized in addition to the
policy slips were competent evidence in the case, as the court held
they were, they were admissible in evidence at the trial, the court
saying (p. 358):

															"The underlying principle obviously is that the court, when
engaged in trying a criminal cause, will not take notice of Page 232 U. S. 396 the manner in which witnesses have possessed themselves of
papers or other articles of personal property which are material
and properly offered in evidence."

															This doctrine thus laid down by the New York Court of Appeals
and approved by this Court, that a court will not, in trying a
criminal cause, permit a collateral issue to be raised as to the
source of competent testimony, has the sanction of so many state
cases that it would be impracticable to cite or refer to them in
detail. Many of them are collected in the note to State v.
Turner, 136 Am. St. Rep. 129, 135 et seq. After
citing numerous cases, the editor says:

															"The underlying principle of all these decisions obviously is
that the court, when engaged in the trial of a criminal action,
will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possessed
himself of papers or other chattels, subjects of evidence which are
material and properly offered in evidence. People v. Adams,
supra. Such an investigation is not involved necessarily in
the litigation in chief, and to pursue it would be to halt in the
orderly progress of a cause, and consider incidentally a question
which has happened to cross the path of such litigation, and which
is wholly independent thereof."

															It is therefore evident that the Adams Case affords no
authority for the action of the court in this case, when applied to
in due season for the return of papers seized in violation of the
Constitutional Amendment. The decision in that case rests upon
incidental seizure made in the execution of a legal warrant, and in
the application of the doctrine that a collateral issue will not be
raised to ascertain the source from which testimony, competent in a
criminal case, comes.

															The government also relies upon Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 , in
which the previous cases of Boyd v. United States, Adams v. New
York, supra; 154 U. S. S.
397� Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.
S. 447 , and Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Baird, 194 U. S. 25 , are
reviewed, and wherein it was held that a subpoena duces tecum@
requiring a corporation to produce all its contracts and
correspondence with no less than six other companies, as well as
all letters received by the corporation from thirteen other
companies, located in different parts of the United States, was an
unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment, and it
was there stated that (201 U.S. p. 201 U. S.
76 )

															"an order for the production of books and papers may constitute
an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment.
While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law,
and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner,
still, as was held in the Boyd Case, the substance of the
offense is the compulsory production of private papers, whether
under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against
which the person, be he individual or corporation, is entitled to
protection."

															If such a seizure under the authority of a warrant supposed to
be legal constitutes a violation of the constitutional protection, a fortiori does the attempt of an officer of the United
States, the United States marshal, acting under color of his
office, without even the sanction of a warrant, constitute an
invasion of the rights within the protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.

															Another case relied upon is American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284 , in
which it was held that the seizure by the United States marshal in
a copyright case of certain pictures under a writ of replevin did
not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. The other case
from this court relied upon is Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 , in
which it was held that testimony tending to show that a certain
blouse which was in evidence as incriminating him, had been put
upon the prisoner, and fitted him, did not violate his
constitutional right. We Page 232 U. S. 398 are at a loss to see the application of these cases to the one
in hand.

															The right of the court to deal with papers and documents in the
possession of the district attorney and other officers of the
court, and subject to its authority, was recognized in Wise v.
Henkel, 220 U. S. 556 .
That papers wrongfully seized should be turned over to the accused
has been frequently recognized in the early, as well as later,
decisions of the courts. 1 Bishop on Criminal Procedure § 210; Rex v. Barnett, 3 C. & P. 600; Rex v. Kinsey, 7 C. & P. 447; United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318; United States v. McHie, 194 Fed. 894, 898.

															We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question
were taken from the house of the accused by an official of the
United States, acting under color of his office, in direct
violation of the constitutional rights of the defendant; that,
having made a seasonable application for their return, which was
heard and passed upon by the court, there was involved in the order
refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of
the accused, and that the court should have restored these letters
to the accused. In holding them and permitting their use upon the
trial, we think prejudicial error was committed. As to the papers
and property seized by the policemen, it does not appear that they
acted under any claim of Federal authority such as would make the
amendment applicable to such unauthorized seizures. The record
shows that what they did by way of arrest and search and seizure
was done before the finding of the indictment in the Federal court
-- under what supposed right or authority does not appear. What
remedies the defendant may have against them we need not inquire,
as the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual misconduct of
such officials. Its limitations reach the Federal government and
its agencies. Boyd case, 116 U.S., supra, and see
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 Page 232 U. S. 399 It results that the judgment of the court below must be
reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion. Reversed.


U.S. Supreme Court Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429 (1991) Florida v. Bostick No. 89-1717 Argued Feb. 26, 1991 Decided June 20, 1991 501 U.S.
419 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
FLORIDA Syllabus As part of a drug interdiction effort, Broward County Sheriff's
Department officers routinely board buses at scheduled stops and
ask passengers for permission to search their luggage. Two officers
boarded respondent Bostick's bus and, without articulable
suspicion, questioned him and requested his consent to search his
luggage for drugs, advising him of his right to refuse. He gave his
permission, and the officers, after finding cocaine, arrested
Bostick on drug trafficking charges. His motion to suppress the
cocaine on the ground that it had been seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment was denied by the trial court. The Florida Court
of Appeal affirmed, but certified a question to the State Supreme
Court. That court, reasoning that a reasonable passenger would not
have felt free to leave the bus to avoid questioning by the police,
adopted a per se rule that the sheriff's practice of
"working the buses" is unconstitutional. Held: 1. The Florida Supreme Court erred in adopting a per se rule that every encounter on a bus is a seizure. The appropriate
test is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances
surrounding the encounter, a reasonable passenger would feel free
to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter. Pp. 501 U. S.
433 -437.

															(a) A consensual encounter does not trigger Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 19 , n.
16. Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask the individual questions, Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1 , 469 U. S. 5 -6, ask
to examine identification, INS v. Delgdo, 466 U.
S. 210 , 466 U. S. 216 ,
and request consent to search luggage, Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 , 460 U. S. 501 ,
provided they do not convey a message that compliance with their
requests is required. Thus, there is no doubt that, if this same
encounter had taken place before Bostick boarded the bus or in the
bus terminal, it would not be a seizure. Pp. 501 U. S.
434 -435.

															(b) That this encounter took place on a bus is but one relevant
factor in determining whether or not it was of a coercive nature.
The state court erred in focusing on the "free to leave" language
of Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.
S. 567 , 486 U. S. 573 ,
rather than on the principle that those words were intended to
capture. This inquiry is not an accurate measure of an encounter's
coercive effect when a person is seated on a bus about to depart,
has no desire to leave, and would not feel free to leave Page 501 U. S. 430 even if there were no police present. The more appropriate
inquiry is whether a reasonable passenger would feel free to
decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Thus, this case is analytically indistinguishable from INS v.
Delgado, supra. There, no seizure occurred when INS agents
visited factories at random, stationing some agents at exits while
others questioned workers, because, even though workers were not
free to leave without being questioned, the agents' conduct gave
them no reason to believe that they would be detained if they
answered truthfully or refused to answer. Such a refusal, alone,
does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification
needed for detention or seizure. Id. at 466 U. S.
216 -217. Pp. 501 U. S.
435 -437.

															2. This case is remanded for the Florida courts to evaluate the
seizure question under the correct legal standard. The trial court
made no express findings of fact, and the State Supreme Court
rested its decision on a single fact -- that the encounter took
place on a bus -- rather than on the totality of the circumstances.
Rejected, however, is Bostick's argument that he must have been
seized because no reasonable person would freely consent to a
search of luggage containing drugs, since the "reasonable person"
test presumes an innocent person. Pp. 501 U. S.
437 -440. 554 So. 2d
1153 (Fla.1989), reversed and remanded.

															O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ.,
joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN
and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 501 U. S.
440 . Page 501 U. S. 431 JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We have held that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers
to approach individuals at random in airport lobbies and other
public places to ask them questions and to request consent to
search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would
understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate. This case
requires us to determine whether the same rule applies to police
encounters that take place on a bus. I Drug interdiction efforts have led to the use of police
surveillance at airports, train stations, and bus depots. Law
enforcement officers stationed at such locations routinely approach
individuals, either randomly or because they suspect in some vague
way that the individuals may be engaged in criminal activity, and
ask them potentially incriminating questions. Broward County has
adopted such a program. County Sheriff's Department officers
routinely board buses at scheduled stops and ask passengers for
permission to search their luggage.

															In this case, two officers discovered cocaine when they searched
a suitcase belonging to Terrance Bostick. The underlying facts of
the search are in dispute, but the Florida Supreme Court, whose
decision we review here, stated explicitly the factual premise for
its decision:

															"'Two officers, complete with badges, insignia and one of them
holding a recognizable zipper pouch, containing a pistol, boarded a
bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Fort
Lauderdale. Eyeing the passengers, the officers admittedly without
articulable suspicion, picked out the defendant passenger and asked
to inspect his ticket and identification. The ticket, from Miami to
Atlanta, matched the defendant's identification and both were
immediately returned to him as unremarkable. However, the two
police officers persisted, and explained their presence as
narcotics agents on the Page 501 U. S. 432 lookout for illegal drugs. In pursuit of that aim, they then
requested the defendant's consent to search his luggage. Needless
to say, there is a conflict in the evidence about whether the
defendant consented to the search of the second bag in which the
contraband was found and as to whether he was informed of his right
to refuse consent. However, any conflict must be resolved in favor
of the state, it being a question of fact decided by the trial
judge.'" 554 So. 2d
1153 , 1154-1155 (1989), quoting 510 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla.
App.1987) (Letts, J., dissenting in part).

															Two facts are particularly worth noting. First, the police
specifically advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse
consent. Bostick appears to have disputed the point, but, as the
Florida Supreme Court noted explicitly, the trial court resolved
this evidentiary conflict in the State's favor. Second, at no time
did the officers threaten Bostick with a gun. The Florida Supreme
Court indicated that one officer carried a zipper pouch containing
a pistol -- the equivalent of carrying a gun in a holster -- but
the court did not suggest that the gun was ever removed from its
pouch, pointed at Bostick, or otherwise used in a threatening
manner. The dissent's characterization of the officers as
"gun-wielding inquisitor[s]," post at 501 U. S. 448 ,
is colorful, but lacks any basis in fact.

															Bostick was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine. He
moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that it had been
seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court
denied the motion, but made no factual findings. Bostick
subsequently entered a plea of guilty, but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

															The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed, but considered
the issue sufficiently important that it certified a question to
the Florida Supreme Court. 510 So. 2d at 322. Page 501 U. S. 433 The Supreme Court reasoned that Bostick had been seized because
a reasonable passenger in his situation would not have felt free to
leave the bus to avoid questioning by the police. 554 So. 2d at
1154. It rephrased and answered the certified question so as to
make the bus setting dispositive in every case. It ruled
categorically that

															"''an impermissible seizure result[s] when police mount a drug
search on buses during scheduled stops and question boarded
passengers without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby
obtaining consent to search the passengers' luggage.'" Ibid. The Florida Supreme Court thus adopted a per
se rule that the Broward County Sheriff's practice of "working
the buses" is unconstitutional. * The result of
this decision is that police in Florida, as elsewhere, may approach
persons at random in most public places, ask them questions and
seek consent to a search, see id. at 1156; but they may
not engage in the same behavior on a bus. Id. at 1157. We
granted certiorari, 498 U.S. 894 (1990), to determine whether the
Florida Supreme Court's per se rule is consistent with our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. II The sole issue presented for our review is whether a police
encounter on a bus of the type described above necessarily
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The State concedes, and we accept for purposes of this decision,
that the officers lacked the reasonable Page 501 U. S. 434 suspicion required to justify a seizure and that, if a seizure
took place, the drugs found in Bostick's suitcase must be
suppressed as tainted fruit.

															Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply
because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions. So long as a reasonable person would feel free "to
disregard the police and go about his business," California v.
Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621 , 501 U. S. 628 (1991), the encounter is consensual, and no reasonable suspicion is
required. The encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny
unless it loses its consensual nature. The Court made precisely
this point in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 19 , n.
16 (1968):

															"Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred."

															Since Terry, we have held repeatedly that mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure. In Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion), for example, we explained that

															"law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by
merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by
offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary
answers to such questions." Id. at 460 U. S. 497 ; see id. at 460 U. S. 523 ,
n. 3 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

															There is no doubt that, if this same encounter had taken place
before Bostick boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal,
it would not rise to the level of a seizure. The Court has dealt
with similar encounters in airports, and has found them to be "the
sort of consensual encounter[s] that implicat[e] no Fourth
Amendment interest." Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S.
1 , 469 U. S. 5 -6
(1984). We have stated that even Page 501 U. S. 435 when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, see INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 , 466 U. S. 216 (1984); Rodriguez, supra, 469 U.S. at 469 U. S. 5 -6; ask
to examine the individual's identification, see Delgado,
supra, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 216 ; Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 501 (plurality opinion); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 , 446 U. S.
557 -558 (1980); and request consent to search his or her
luggage, see Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 501 (plurality opinion) -- as long as the police do not convey a
message that compliance with their requests is required.

															Bostick insists that this case is different because it took
place in the cramped confines of a bus. A police encounter is much
more intimidating in this setting, he argues, because police tower
over a seated passenger and there is little room to move around.
Bostick claims to find support in language from Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567 , 486 U. S. 573 (1988), and other cases, indicating that a seizure occurs when a
reasonable person would believe that he or she is not "free to
leave." Bostick maintains that a reasonable bus passenger would not
have felt free to leave under the circumstances of this case
because there is nowhere to go on a bus. Also, the bus was about to
depart. Had Bostick disembarked, he would have risked being
stranded and losing whatever baggage he had locked away in the
luggage compartment.

															The Florida Supreme Court found this argument persuasive, so
much so that it adopted a per se rule prohibiting the
police from randomly boarding buses as a means of drug
interdiction. The state court erred, however, in focusing on
whether Bostick was "free to leave," rather than on the principle
that those words were intended to capture. When police attempt to
question a person who is walking down the street or through an
airport lobby, it makes sense to inquire whether a reasonable
person would feel free to continue walking. But when the person is
seated on a bus and has no desire to leave, the degree to which a
reasonable person Page 501 U. S. 436 would feel that he or she could leave is not an accurate measure
of the coercive effect of the encounter.

															Here, for example, the mere fact that Bostick did not feel free
to leave the bus does not mean that the police seized him. Bostick
was a passenger on a bus that was scheduled to depart. He would not
have felt free to leave the bus even if the police had not been
present. Bostick's movements were "confined" in a sense, but this
was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says
nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue was
coercive.

															In this respect, the Court's decision in INS v. Delgado,
supra, is dispositive. At issue there was the INS' practice of
visiting factories at random and questioning employees to determine
whether any were illegal aliens. Several INS agents would stand
near the building's exits, while other agents walked through the
factory questioning workers. The Court acknowledged that the
workers may not have been free to leave their worksite, but
explained that this was not the result of police activity:

															"Ordinarily, when people are at work, their freedom to move
about has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law
enforcement officials, but by the workers' voluntary obligations to
their employers." Id. 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 218 .
We concluded that there was no seizure because, even though the
workers were not free to leave the building without being
questioned, the agents' conduct should have given employees

															"no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave
truthful answers to the questions put to them or if they simply
refused to answer." Ibid. The present case is analytically indistinguishable from Delgado. Like the workers in that case, Bostick's freedom
of movement was restricted by a factor independent of police
conduct -- i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus.
Accordingly, the "free to leave" analysis on which Bostick relies
is inapplicable. In such a situation, the appropriate inquiry is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. This Page 501 U. S. 437 formulation follows logically from prior cases and breaks no new
ground. We have said before that the crucial test is whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the
encounter, the police conduct would "have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business." Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at 486 U. S. 569 . See also Hodari D., supra, 499 U.S. at 499 U. S. 628 .
Where the encounter takes place is one factor, but it is not the
only one. And, as the Solicitor General correctly observes, an
individual may decline an officer's request without fearing
prosecution. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae 25. We have consistently held that a refusal to
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of
objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. See
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 466 U. S.
216 -217; Royer, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 498 (plurality opinion); Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S.
47 , 443 U. S. 52 -53
(1979).

															The facts of this case, as described by the Florida Supreme
Court, leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred. Two officers
walked up to Bostick on the bus, asked him a few questions, and
asked if they could search his bags. As we have explained, no
seizure occurs when police ask questions of an individual, ask to
examine the individual's identification, and request consent to
search his or her luggage -- so long as the officers do not convey
a message that compliance with their requests is required. Here,
the facts recited by the Florida Supreme Court indicate that the
officers did not point guns at Bostick or otherwise threaten him,
and that they specifically advised Bostick that he could refuse
consent.

															Nevertheless, we refrain from deciding whether or not a seizure
occurred in this case. The trial court made no express findings of
fact, and the Florida Supreme Court rested its decision on a single
fact -- that the encounter took place on a bus -- rather than on
the totality of the circumstances. We remand so that the Florida
courts may evaluate the seizure question under the correct legal
standard. We do reject, however, Bostick's argument that he must
have been seized Page 501 U. S. 438 because no reasonable person would freely consent to a search of
luggage that he or she knows contains drugs. This argument cannot
prevail because the "reasonable person" test presupposes an innocent person. See Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 519 ,
n. 4 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) ("The fact that [respondent] knew
the search was likely to turn up contraband is, of course,
irrelevant; the potential intrusiveness of the officers' conduct
must be judged from the viewpoint of an innocent person in [his]
position"). Accord, Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 486 U. S. 574 ("This reasonable person' standard . . . ensures that the scope
of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind
of the particular individual being approached"). The dissent characterizes our decision as holding that police
may board buses and, by an " intimidating show of
authority," post at 501 U. S. 447 (emphasis added), demand of passengers their "voluntary"
cooperation. That characterization is incorrect. Clearly, a bus
passenger's decision to cooperate with law enforcement officers
authorizes the police to conduct a search without first obtaining a
warrant only if the cooperation is voluntary. "Consent"
that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not
consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights
when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would
prefer to refuse. The question to be decided by the Florida courts
on remand is whether Bostick chose to permit the search of his
luggage.

															The dissent also attempts to characterize our decision as
applying a lesser degree of constitutional protection to those
individuals who travel by bus, rather than by other forms of
transportation. This, too, is an erroneous characterization. Our
Fourth Amendment inquiry in this ease -- whether a reasonable
person would have felt free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter -- applies equally to police
encounters that take place on trains, planes, and city streets. It
is the dissent that would single out this particular Page 501 U. S. 439 mode of travel for differential treatment by adopting a per
se rule that random bus searches are unconstitutional.

															The dissent reserves its strongest criticism for the proposition
that police officers can approach individuals as to whom they have
no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating
questions. But this proposition is by no means novel; it has been
endorsed by the Court any number of times. Terry, Royer,
Rodriguez, and Delgado are just a few examples. As we
have explained, today's decision follows logically from those
decisions, and breaks no new ground. Unless the dissent advocates
overruling a long, unbroken line of decisions dating back more than
20 years, its criticism is not well taken.

															This Court, as the dissent correctly observes, is not empowered
to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the Government may
more effectively wage a "war on drugs." See post at 501 U. S. 440 , 501 U. S.
450 -451. If that war is to be fought, those who fight it
must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those
individuals are suspected of having committed a crime. By the same
token, this Court is not empowered to forbid law enforcement
practices simply because it considers them distasteful. The Fourth
Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it does
not proscribe voluntary cooperation. The cramped confines of a bus
are one relevant factor that should be considered in evaluating
whether a passenger's consent is voluntary. We cannot agree,
however, with the Florida Supreme Court that this single factor
will be dispositive in every case.

															We adhere to the rule that, in order to determine whether a
particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider
all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine
whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable
person that the person was not free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. That rule applies to
encounters that take place on a city street or in an airport lobby,
and it applies equally to Page 501 U. S. 440 encounters on a bus. The Florida Supreme Court erred in adopting
a per se rule.

															The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. It is so ordered. * The dissent acknowledges that the Florida Supreme Court's
answer to the certified question reads like a per se rule,
but dismisses as "implausible" the notion that the court would
actually apply this rule to "trump" a careful analysis of all the
relevant facts. Post at 501 U. S. 445 .
Implausible as it may seem, that is precisely what the Florida
Supreme Court does. It routinely grants review in bus search cases
and quashes denials of motions to suppress expressly on the basis
of its answer to the certified question in this case. See,
e.g., McBride v. State, 554 So. 2d
1160 (1989); Mendez v. State, 554 So. 2d
1161 (1989); Shaw v. State, 555 So. 2d 351 (1989); Avery v. State, 555 So. 2d 351 (1989); Serpa v.
State, 555 So. 2d 1210 (1989); Jones v.
State, 559 So. 2d
1096 (1990).

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS
join, dissenting.

															Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a "war on drugs." No one
disputes that it is the job of law enforcement officials to devise
effective weapons for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a
law enforcement technique is not proof of its constitutionality.
The general warrant, for example, was certainly an effective means
of law enforcement. Yet it was one of the primary aims of the
Fourth Amendment to protect citizens from the tyranny of being
singled out for search and seizure without particularized suspicion
notwithstanding the effectiveness of this method. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S.
625 -630 (1886); see also Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145 , 331 U. S. 171 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In my view, the law
enforcement technique with which we are confronted in this case --
the suspicionless police sweep of buses in intrastate or interstate
travel -- bears all of the indicia of coercion and unjustified
intrusion associated with the general warrant. Because I believe
that the bus sweep at issue in this case violates the core values
of the Fourth Amendment, I dissent. I At issue in this case is a "new and increasingly common tactic
in the war on drugs": the suspicionless police sweep of buses in
interstate or intrastate travel. United States v. Lewis, 287 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 307, 921 F.2d 1294, 1295 (1990); see
United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (CA4 1990)
(describing technique in Charlotte, North Carolina); United
States v. Madison, 936 F.2d 90, 91, (CA2 1991) (describing Page 501 U. S. 441 technique in Port Authority terminal in New York City); United States v. Chandler, 744 F.
Supp. 333 , 335 (DC 1990) ("[I]t has become routine to subject
interstate travelers to warrantless searches and intimidating
interviews while sitting aboard a bus stopped for a short layover
in the Capital"); 554 So. 2d
1153 , 1156-1157 (Fla.1989) (describing Florida police policy of
" working the buses'"); see also ante at 501 U. S. 431 .
Typically under this technique, a group of state or federal
officers will board a bus while it is stopped at an intermediate
point on its route. Often displaying badges, weapons or other
indicia of authority, the officers identify themselves and announce
their purpose to intercept drug traffickers. They proceed to
approach individual passengers, requesting them to show
identification, produce their tickets, and explain the purpose of
their travels. Never do the officers advise the passengers that
they are free not to speak with the officers. An "interview" of
this type ordinarily culminates in a request for consent to search
the passenger's luggage. See generally United States v. Lewis,
supra, at 308, 921 F.2d at 1296; United States v. Flowers,
supra, at 708-709; United States v. Madison, supra, at 91; 554 So. 2d at 1154. These sweeps are conducted in "dragnet" style. The police
admittedly act without an "articulable suspicion" in deciding which
buses to board and which passengers to approach for interviewing.
[ Footnote 1 ] By proceeding
systematically in this Page 501 U. S. 442 fashion, the police are able to engage in a tremendously high
volume of searches. See, e.g., Florida v. Kerwick, 512 So.
2d 347, 348-349 (Fla. App.1987) (single officer employing sweep
technique able to search over 3,000 bags in nine-month period). The
percentage of successful drug interdictions is low. See United
States v. Flowers, supra, at 710 (sweep of 100 buses resulted
in seven arrests).

															To put it mildly, these sweeps "are inconvenient, intrusive, and
intimidating." United States v. Chandler, 744 F. Supp. at
335. They occur within cramped confines, with officers typically
placing themselves in between the passenger selected for an
interview and the exit of the bus. See, e.g., id. at 336.
Because the bus is only temporarily stationed at a point short of
its destination, the passengers are in no position to leave as a
means of evading the officers' questioning. Undoubtedly, such a
sweep holds up the progress of the bus. See United States v.
Fields, 909 F.2d 470, 474 n. 2 (CA11 1990); cf. United
States v. Rembert, 694 F.
Supp. 163 , 175 (WDNC 1988) (reporting testimony of officer that
he makes " every effort in the world not to delay the bus,'" but
that the driver does not leave terminal until sweep is complete).
Thus, this "new and increasingly common tactic," United States
v. Lewis, supra, 287 U.S.App.D.C. at 307, 921 F.2d at 1295,
burdens the experience of traveling by bus with a degree of
governmental interference to which, until now, our society has been
proudly unaccustomed. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v.
Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 6, 663 P.2d
992 , 997 (1983) (Feldman, J., concurring) ("The thought that an
American can be compelled to `show his papers' before exercising
his right to walk the streets, drive the highways, or board the
trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals"). Page 501 U. S. 443 This aspect of the suspicionless sweep has not been lost on many
of the lower courts called upon to review the constitutionality of
this practice. Remarkably, the courts located at the heart of the
"drug war" have been the most adamant in condemning this technique.
As one Florida court put it:

															"'[T]he evidence in this cause has evoked images of other days,
under other flags, when no man traveled his nation's roads or
railways without fear of unwarranted interruption, by individuals
who held temporary power in the Government. The spectre of American
citizens being asked, by badge-wielding police, for identification,
travel papers -- in short, a raison d'etre -- is foreign
to any fair reading of the Constitution, and its guarantee
of human liberties. This is not Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's
Moscow, nor is it white supremacist South Africa. Yet in Broward
County, Florida, these police officers approach every person on
board buses and trains ('that time permits') and check
identification [and] tickets, [and] ask to search luggage -- all in
the name of 'voluntary cooperation' with law enforcement. . .
.'"

															554 So. 2d at 1158, quoting State v. Kerwick, supra, at
348-349 (quoting trial court order). The District Court for the
District of Columbia spoke in equally pointed words:

															"It seems rather incongruous at this point in the world's
history that we find totalitarian states becoming more like our
free society while we in this nation are taking on their former
trappings of suppressed liberties and freedoms." * * * * "The random indiscriminate stopping and questioning of
individuals on interstate busses seems to have gone too far. If
this Court approves such 'bus stops' and allows prosecutions to be
based on evidence seized as a result of such 'stops,' then we will
have stripped our Page 501 U. S. 444 citizens of basic Constitutional protections. Such action would
be inconsistent with what this nation has stood for during its 200
years of existence. If passengers on a bus passing through the
Capital of this great nation cannot be free from police
interference where there is absolutely no basis for the police
officers to stop and question them, then the police will be free to
accost people on our streets without any reason or cause. In this
'anything goes' war on drugs, random knocks on the doors of our
citizens' homes seeking 'consent' to search for drugs cannot be far
away. This is not America." United States v. Lewis, 728 F.
Supp. 784 , 788-789, rev'd, 287 U.S.App.D.C. 306, 921
F.2d 1294 (1990). See also United States v.
Alexander, 755 F.
Supp. 448 , 453 (DC 1991); United States v.
Madison, 744 F.
Supp. 490 , 495-497 (SDNY 1990), rev'd, 936 F.2d 90
(CA2 1991); United States v. Chandler, supra, at 335-336; United States v. Mark, 742 F. Supp.
17 , 18-19 (DC 1990); United States v.
Alston, 742 F. Supp.
13 , 15 (DC 1990); United States v.
Cothran, 729 F.
Supp. 153 , 156-158 (DC 1990), rev'd, 287 U.S.App.D.C.
306, 921 F.2d 1294 (1990); United States v.
Felder, 732 F.
Supp. 204 , 209 (DC 1990).

															The question for this Court, then, is whether the suspicionless,
dragnet-style sweep of buses in intrastate and interstate travel is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. The majority suggests that
this latest tactic in the drug war is perfectly compatible with the
Constitution. I disagree. II I have no objection to the manner in which the majority frames
the test for determining whether a suspicionless bus sweep amounts
to a Fourth Amendment "seizure." I agree that the appropriate
question is whether a passenger who is approached during such a
sweep "would feel free to decline the officers' requests or
otherwise terminate the encounter." Page 501 U. S. 445 Ante at 501 U. S. 436 .
What I cannot understand is how the majority can possibly suggest
an affirmative answer to this question.

															The majority reverses what it characterizes as the Florida
Supreme Court's " per se rule" against suspicionless
encounters between the police and bus passengers, see ante at 501 U. S. 433 , 501 U. S.
435 -440, suggesting only in dictum its "doubt" that a
seizure occurred on the facts of this case, see ante at 501 U. S. 437 .
However, the notion that the Florida Supreme Court decided this
case on the basis of any " per se rule" independent of the facts of this case is wholly a product
of the majority's imagination. As the majority acknowledges, the
Florida Supreme Court "stated explicitly the factual premise for
its decision." Ante at 501 U. S. 431 .
This factual premise contained all of the details of the
encounter between respondent and the police. See 554 So.
2d at 1154; ante at 501 U. S.
431 -432. The lower court's analysis of whether
respondent was seized drew heavily on these facts, and the court
repeatedly emphasized that its conclusion was based on " all the
circumstances " of this case. 554 So. 2d at 1157 (emphasis
added); see ibid. (" Here, the circumstances
indicate that the officers effectively seized'
[respondent]" (emphasis added)). The majority's conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court,
contrary to all appearances, ignored these facts is based
solely on the failure of the lower court to expressly incorporate
all of the facts into its reformulation of the certified question
on which respondent took his appeal. See ante at 501 U. S. 433 .
[ Footnote 2 ] The majority never
explains the basis of its implausible assumption that the Florida
Supreme Court intended its phrasing of the certified question to
trump its opinion's careful treatment of the facts in this case.
Certainly, when this Court issues an opinion, it does not
intend lower courts and Page 501 U. S. 446 parties to treat as irrelevant the analysis of facts that the
parties neglected to cram into the question presented in the
petition for certiorari. But in any case, because the issue whether
a seizure has occurred in any given factual setting is a question
of law, see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.
S. 544 , 446 U. S.
554 -555 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); United
States v. Maragh, 282 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 258-259, 894 F.2d 415,
417-418 (CADC), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990), nothing
prevents this Court from deciding on its own whether a seizure
occurred based on all of the facts of this case as they
appear in the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court.

															These facts exhibit all of the elements of coercion associated
with a typical bus sweep. Two officers boarded the Greyhound bus on
which respondent was a passenger while the bus, en route from Miami
to Atlanta, was on a brief stop to pick up passengers in Fort
Lauderdale. The officers made a visible display of their badges and
wore bright green "raid" jackets bearing the insignia of the
Broward County Sheriff's Department; one held a gun in a
recognizable weapons pouch. See 554 So. 2d at 1154, 1157.
These facts alone constitute an intimidating "show of authority." See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.
S. 567 , 486 U. S. 575 (1988) (display of weapon contributes to coercive environment); United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 554 (opinion of Stewart, J.) ("threatening presence of several
officers" and "display of a weapon"); id. at 446 U. S. 555 (uniformed attire). Once on board, the officers approached
respondent, who was sitting in the back of the bus, identified
themselves as narcotics officers and began to question him. See 554 So. 2d at 1154. One officer stood in front of
respondent's seat, partially blocking the narrow aisle through
which respondent would have been required to pass to reach the exit
of the bus. See id. at 1157.

															As far as is revealed by facts on which the Florida Supreme
Court premised its decision, the officers did not advise respondent
that he was free to break off this "interview." Inexplicably, the
majority repeatedly stresses the trial court's Page 501 U. S. 447 implicit finding that the police officers advised respondent
that he was free to refuse permission to search his travel bag. See ante at 501 U. S. 432 , 501 U. S.
437 -438. This aspect of the exchange between respondent
and the police is completely irrelevant to the issue before us. For
as the State concedes, and as the majority purports to "accept," id. at 501 U. S.
433 -434, if respondent was unlawfully seized
when the officers approached him and initiated questioning, the
resulting search was likewise unlawful no matter how well advised
respondent was of his right to refuse it. See Florida v.
Royer, 460 U. S. 491 , 460 U. S. 501 , 460 U. S.
507 -508 (1983) (plurality opinion); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963). Consequently, the issue is not whether a passenger in
respondent's position would have felt free to deny consent to the
search of his bag, but whether such a passenger -- without being
apprised of his rights -- would have felt free to terminate the
antecedent encounter with the police.

															Unlike the majority, I have no doubt that the answer to this
question is no. Apart from trying to accommodate the officers,
respondent had only two options. First, he could have remained
seated while obstinately refusing to respond to the officers'
questioning. But in light of the intimidating show of authority
that the officers made upon boarding the bus, respondent reasonably
could have believed that such behavior would only arouse the
officers' suspicions and intensify their interrogation. Indeed,
officers who carry out bus sweeps like the one at issue here
frequently admit that this is the effect of a passenger's refusal
to cooperate. See, e.g., United States v. Cothran, 729 F.
Supp. at 156; United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. at
205. The majority's observation that a mere refusal to answer
questions, "without more," does not give rise to a reasonable basis
for seizing a passenger, ante at 437, is utterly beside
the point, because a passenger unadvised of his rights and
otherwise unversed in constitutional law has no reason to
know that the police cannot hold his refusal to cooperate
against him. Page 501 U. S. 448 Second, respondent could have tried to escape the officers'
presence by leaving the bus altogether. But because doing so would
have required respondent to squeeze past the gun-wielding
inquisitor who was blocking the aisle of the bus, this hardly seems
like a course that respondent reasonably would have viewed as
available to him. [ Footnote 3 ]
The majority lamely protests that nothing in the stipulated facts
shows that the questioning officer " point[ed] [his] gu[n]
at [respondent] or otherwise threatened him" with the
weapon. Ante at 501 U. S. 437 (emphasis added). Our decisions recognize the obvious point,
however, that the choice of the police to "display" their weapons
during an encounter exerts significant coercive pressure on the
confronted citizen. E.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at 486 U. S. 575 ; United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at 446 U. S. 554 .
We have never suggested that the police must go so far as to put a
citizen in immediate apprehension of being shot before a
court can take account of the intimidating effect of being
questioned by an officer with weapon in hand.

															Even if respondent had perceived that the officers would let him leave the bus, moreover, he could not reasonably
have been expected to resort to this means of evading their
intrusive questioning. For so far as respondent knew, the bus's
departure from the terminal was imminent. Unlike a person
approached by the police on the street, see Michigan v.
Chesternut, supra, or at a bus or airport terminal after
reaching his destination, see United States v. Mendenhall,
supra, a passenger approached by the police at an intermediate
point in a long bus journey cannot simply leave the scene and
repair to a safe haven to avoid unwanted probing by law enforcement
officials. The vulnerability that an intrastate or interstate
traveler experiences when confronted by the police outside of his
"own familiar territory" surely aggravates Page 501 U. S. 449 the coercive quality of such an encounter. See Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 , 412 U. S. 247 (1973).

															The case on which the majority primarily relies, INS v.
Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984), is distinguishable in every relevant respect. In Delgado, this Court held that workers approached by law
enforcement officials inside of a factory were not "seized" for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court was careful to point
out, however, that the presence of the agents did not furnish the
workers with a reasonable basis for believing that they were not
free to leave the factory, as at least some of them did. See
id. at 218-219, and n. 7. Unlike passengers confronted by law
enforcement officials on a bus stopped temporarily at an
intermediate point in its journey, workers approached by law
enforcement officials at their workplace need not abandon personal
belongings and venture into unfamiliar environs in order to avoid
unwanted questioning. Moreover, the workers who did not leave the
building in Delgado remained free to move about the entire factory, see id. at 466 U. S. 218 ,
a considerably less confining environment than a bus. Finally,
contrary to the officer who confronted respondent, the law
enforcement officials in Delgado did not conduct their
interviews with guns in hand. See id. at 466 U. S.
212 .

															Rather than requiring the police to justify the coercive tactics
employed here, the majority blames respondent for his own sensation
of constraint. The majority concedes that respondent "did not feel
free to leave the bus" as a means of breaking off the interrogation
by the Broward County officers. Ante at 501 U. S. 436 .
But this experience of confinement, the majority explains, "was the
natural result of his decision to take the bus." Ibid. (emphasis added). Thus, in the majority's view,
because respondent's "freedom of movement was restricted by a
factor independent of police conduct -- i.e., by his being
a passenger on a bus," ante at 0436436, respondent was not
seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Page 501 U. S. 450 This reasoning borders on sophism, and trivializes the values
that underlie the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, a person's
"voluntary decision" to place himself in a room with only one exit
does not authorize the police to force an encounter upon him by
placing themselves in front of the exit. It is no more acceptable
for the police to force an encounter on a person by exploiting his
"voluntary decision" to expose himself to perfectly legitimate
personal or social constraints. By consciously deciding to single
out persons who have undertaken interstate or intrastate travel,
officers who conduct suspicionless, dragnet-style sweeps put
passengers to the choice of cooperating or of exiting their buses
and possibly being stranded in unfamiliar locations. It is exactly
because this "choice" is no "choice" at all that police engage this
technique.

															In my view, the Fourth Amendment clearly condemns the
suspicionless, dragnet-style sweep of intrastate or interstate
buses. Withdrawing this particular weapon from the government's
drug war arsenal would hardly leave the police without any means of
combatting the use of buses as instrumentalities of the drug trade.
The police would remain free, for example, to approach passengers
whom they have a reasonable, articulable basis to suspect of
criminal wrongdoing. [ Footnote
4 ] Alternatively, they could continue to confront passengers
without suspicion so long as they took simple steps, like advising
the passengers confronted of their right to decline to be
questioned, to dispel the aura of coercion and intimidation that
pervades such encounters. There is no reason to expect that such
requirements would render the Nation's buses law enforcement-free
zones. III The majority attempts to gloss over the violence that today's
decision does to the Fourth Amendment with empty admonitions. "If
th[e] [war on drugs] is to be fought," the majority Page 501 U. S. 451 intones, "those who fight it must respect the rights of
individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of
having committed a crime." Ante at 501 U. S. 439 .
The majority's actions, however, speak louder than its words.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															That is to say, the police who conduct these sweeps decline to
offer a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing
sufficient to justify a warrantless "stop" or "seizure" of the
confronted passenger. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 20 -22, 392 U. S. 30 -31
(1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.
S. 491 , 460 U. S.
498 -499 (1983) (plurality opinion). It does not follow,
however, that the approach of passengers during a sweep is
completely random. Indeed, at least one officer who routinely
confronts interstate travelers candidly admitted that race is a
factor influencing his decision whom to approach. See United
States v. Williams, No. 1:89CR0135 (ND Ohio. June 13, 1989),
p. 3 ("Detective Zaller testified that the factors initiating the
focus upon the three young black males in this case included: (1)
that they were young and black. . . ."), aff'd, No.
89-4083 (CA6, Oct.19, 1990), p. 7 [916 F.2d 714 (table)] (the
officers "knew that the couriers, more often than not, were young
black males"), vacated and remanded, 500 U.S. 901 (1991).
Thus, the basis of the decision to single out particular passengers
during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be inarticulable than unspeakable. [ Footnote 2 ]

															As reformulated, this question read:

															"Does an impermissible seizure result when police mount a drug
search on buses during scheduled stops and question boarded
passengers without articulable reasons for doing so, thereby
obtaining consent to search the passengers' luggage?"

															554 So. 2d at 1154.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															As the majority's discussion makes plain, see ante at 501 U. S. 432 , 501 U. S. 437 ,
the officer questioning respondent clearly carried a weapons pouch
during the interview. See also 554 So. 2d at 1 157.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Insisting that police officers explain their decision to single
out a particular passenger for questioning would help prevent their
reliance on impermissible criteria such as race. See n 1, supra.