NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–1339

															_________________

															SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS
ROBINS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[May 16, 2016]

															Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															This case presents the question whether
respondent Robins has standing to maintain an action in federal
court against petitioner Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
of 1970 (FCRA or Act), 84Stat. 1127, as amended, 15
U. S. C. §1681 et seq. Spokeo operates a “people search engine.” If an
individual visits Spokeo’s Web site and inputs a person’s name, a
phone number, or an e-mail address, Spokeo conducts a computerized
search in a wide variety of databases and provides information
about the subject of the search. Spokeo performed such a search for
information about Robins, and some of the information it gathered
and then disseminated was incorrect. When Robins learned of these
inaccuracies, he filed a complaint on his own behalf and on behalf
of a class of similarly situated individuals.

															The District Court dismissed Robins’ complaint
for lack of standing, but a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Ninth Circuit noted, first, that Robins had alleged that
“Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the
statu-tory rights of other people,” and, second, that “Robins’s
personal interests in the handling of his credit information are
individualized rather than collective.” 742 F. 3d 409, 413
(2014). Based on these two observations, the Ninth Circuit held
that Robins had adequately alleged injury in fact, a requirement
for standing under Article III of the Constitution. Id., at
413–414.

															This analysis was incomplete. As we have
explained in our prior opinions, the injury-in-fact requirement
requires a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both “concrete and particularized.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. , 528 U. S.
167 –181 (2000) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s analysis
focused on the second characteristic (particularity), but it
overlooked the first (concreteness). We therefore vacate the
decision below and remand for the Ninth Circuit to consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement.

															I

															The FCRA seeks to ensure “fair and accurate
credit reporting.” §1681(a)(1). To achieve this end, the Act
regulates the creation and the use of “consumer report[s]”[ 1 ] by “consumer reporting
agenc[ies]”[ 2 ] for certain
specified purposes, including credit transactions, insurance,
licensing, consumer-initiated business transactions, and
employment. See §§1681a(d)(1)(A)–(C); §1681b. Enacted long before
the advent of the Internet, the FCRA applies to companies that
regularly disseminate information bearing on an individual’s
“credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.”
§1681a(d)(1).

															The FCRA imposes a host of requirements
concerning the creation and use of consumer reports. As relevant
here, the Act requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of”
consumer reports, §1681e(b); to notify providers and users of
consumer information of their responsibilities under the Act,
§1681e(d); to limit the circumstances in which such agencies
provide consumer reports “for employment purposes,” §1681b(b)(1);
and to post toll-free numbers for consumers to request reports,
§1681j(a).

															The Act also provides that “[a]ny person who
willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with
respect to any [individual[ 3 ]]
is liable to that [individual]” for, among other things, either
“actual damages” or statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 per
violation, costs of the action and attorney’s fees, and possibly
punitive damages. §1681n(a).

															Spokeo is alleged to qualify as a “consumer
reporting agency” under the FCRA.[ 4 ] It operates a Web site that allows users to search for
information about other individuals by name, e-mail address, or
phone number. In response to an inquiry submitted online, Spokeo
searches a wide spectrum of databases and gathers and provides
information such as the individual’s address, phone number, marital
status, approximate age, occupation, hobbies, finances, shopping
habits, and musical preferences. App. 7, 10–11. According to
Robins, Spokeo markets its services to a variety of users,
including not only “employers who want to evaluate prospective
employees,” but also “those who want to investigate prospective
romantic partners or seek other personal information.” Brief for
Respondent 7. Persons wishing to perform a Spokeo search need not
disclose their identities, and much information is available for
free.

															At some point in time, someone (Robins’
complaint does not specify who) made a Spokeo search request for
information about Robins, and Spokeo trawled its sources and
generated a profile. By some means not detailed in Robins’
complaint, he became aware of the contents of that profile and
discovered that it contained inaccurate information. His profile,
he asserts, states that he is married, has children, is in his
50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate
degree. App. 14. According to Robins’ complaint, all of this
information is incorrect.

															Robins filed a class-action complaint in the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California, claiming, among other things, that Spokeo willfully
failed to comply with the FCRA requirements enumerated above.

															The District Court initially denied Spokeo’s
motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but later
reconsidered and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. App. to
Pet. for Cert. 23a. The court found that Robins had not “properly
pled” an injury in fact, as required by Article III. Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Relying on Circuit precedent,[ 5 ] the court began by stating that “the violation of a
statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer
standing.” 742 F. 3d, at 412. The court recognized that “the
Constitution limits the power of Congress to confer standing.” Id., at 413. But the court held that those limits were
honored in this case because Robins alleged that “Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other
people,” and because his “personal interests in the handling of his
credit information are individualized rather than collective.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). The court thus concluded that
Robins’ “alleged violations of [his] statutory rights [were]
sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article
III.” Id., at 413–414.

															We granted certiorari. 575 U. S. ___
(2015).

															II

															A

															The Constitution confers limited authority on
each branch of the Federal Government. It vests Congress with
enumerated “legislative Powers,” Art. I, §1; it confers upon
the President “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, §1,
cl. 1; and it endows the federal courts with “[t]he judicial
Power of the United States,” Art. III, §1. In order to remain
faithful to this tripartite structure, the power of the Federal
Judiciary may not be permitted to intrude upon the powers given to
the other branches. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006) ; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555 –560 (1992).

															Although the Constitution does not fully explain
what is meant by “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,”
Art. III, § 1, it does specify that this power extends only to
“Cases” and “Controversies,” Art. III, §2. And “ ‘[n]o
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our
system of government than the constitutional limitation of
federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.’ ” Raines v. Byrd , 521 U. S.
811, 818 (1997) .

															Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the
traditional understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine
developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not
exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood. See id., at 820. The doctrine limits the category of litigants
empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress
for a legal wrong. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. ,
454 U. S. 464, 473 (1982) ; Warth v. Seldin , 422
U. S. 490 –499 (1975). In this way, “[t]he law of Article III
standing . . . serves to prevent the judicial process
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA , 568 U. S. ___, ___
(2013) (slip op., at 9); Lujan , supra , at 576–577,
and confines the federal courts to a properly judicial role, see Warth , supra , at 498.

															Our cases have established that the “irreducible
constitutional minimum” of standing consists of three elements. Lujan , 504 U. S. , at 560. The plaintiff must
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id., at
560–561; Friends of the Earth, Inc. , 528 U. S., at
180–181. The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,
bears the burden of establishing these elements. FW/PBS,
Inc. v. Dallas , 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990) . Where,
as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must
“clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” each element. Warth , supra , at 518.[ 6 ]

															B

															This case primarily concerns injury in fact,
the “[f ]irst and foremost” of standing’s three elements. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment , 523
U. S. 83, 103 (1998) . Injury in fact is a constitutional
requirement, and “[i]t is settled that Congress cannot erase
Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Raines, supra, at 820, n. 3; see Summers v. Earth Island Institute , 555 U. S. 488, 497 (2009) ; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood , 441
U. S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may
Congress abrogate the Art. III minima”).

															To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must
show that he or she suffered “an invasion of a legally protected
interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan , 504
U. S., at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). We discuss
the particularization and concreteness requirements below.

															1

															For an injury to be “particularized,” it “must
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Ibid. , n. 1; see also, e.g. , Cuno , supra, at 342 (“ ‘plaintiff must allege personal
injury’ ”); Whitmore v. Arkansas , 495 U. S.
149, 155 (1990) (“ ‘distinct’ ”); Allen v. Wright , 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984) (“personal”); Valley Forge , supra , at 472 (standing requires that
the plaintiff “ ‘personally has suffered some actual or
threatened injury’ ”); United States v. Richardson , 418 U. S. 166, 177 (1974) (not
“undifferenti-ated”); Public Citizen, Inc. v. National
Hwy. Traffic Safety Admin. , 489 F. 3d 1279, 1292–1293
(CADC 2007) (collecting cases).[ 7 ]

															Particularization is necessary to establish
injury in fact, but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must
also be “concrete.” Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, however,
that independent requirement was elided. As previously noted, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins’ complaint alleges “concrete, de facto ” injuries for essentially two reasons. 742
F. 3d, at 413. First, the court noted that Robins “alleges
that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the
statutory rights of other people.” Ibid. Second, the court
wrote that “Robins’s personal interests in the handling of his
credit information are individualized rather than
collective .” Ibid . (emphasis added). Both of these
observations concern particularization, not concreteness. We have
made it clear time and time again that an injury in fact must be
both concrete and particularized. See, e.g. , Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U. S. ___, ___
(2014) (slip op., at 8); Summers , supra, at 493; Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. , 554
U. S. 269, 274 (2008) ; Massachusetts v. EPA ,
549 U. S. 497, 517 (2007) .

															A “concrete” injury must be “ de facto ”;
that is, it must actually exist. See Black’s Law Dictionary 479
(9th ed. 2009). When we have used the adjective “concrete,” we have
meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—“real,” and not
“abstract.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 472
(1971); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 305 (1967).
Concreteness, therefore, is quite different from
particularization.

															2

															“Concrete” is not, however, necessarily
synonymous with “tangible.” Although tangible injuries are perhaps
easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous
cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete. See, e.g. , Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555
U. S. 460 (2009) (free speech); Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah , 508 U. S. 520 (1993) (free
exercise).

															In determining whether an intangible harm
constitutes injury in fact, both history and the judgment of
Congress play important roles. Because the doctrine of standing
derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that
requirement in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a
close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.
See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States
ex rel. Stevens , 529 U. S. 765 –777 (2000). In addition,
because Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms
that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment is also
instructive and important. Thus, we said in Lujan that
Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable
injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were
previously inadequate in law.” 504 U. S., at 578. Similarly,
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case explained that “Congress
has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation
that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.” Id., at 580 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).

															Congress’ role in identifying and elevating
intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants
a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to
sue to vindicate that right. Article III standing requires a
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation. For
that reason, Robins could not, for example, allege a bare
procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. See Summers ,
555 U. S., at 496 (“[D]eprivation of a procedural right
without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation
. . . is insufficient to create Article III standing”);
see also Lujan , supra , at 572.

															This does not mean, however, that the risk of
real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness. See ,
e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA , 568
U. S. ____. For example, the law has long permitted recovery
by certain tort victims even if their harms may be difficult to
prove or measure. See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Torts
§§569 (libel), 570 (slander per se ) (1938). Just as the
common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some
circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a
plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified. See Federal Election
Comm’n v. Akins , 524 U. S. 11 –25 (1998)
(confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to obtain
information” that Congress had decided to make public is a
sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III); Public
Citizen v. Department of Justice , 491 U. S. 440,
449 (1989) (holding that two advocacy organizations’ failure to
obtain information subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to
provide standing to sue”).

															In the context of this particular case, these
general principles tell us two things: On the one hand, Congress
plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by
adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk. On the other
hand, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging
a bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the FCRA’s
procedural requirements may result in no harm. For example, even if
a consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required notice to
a user of the agency’s consumer information, that information
regardless may be entirely accurate. In addition, not all
inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm. An
example that comes readily to mind is an incorrect zip code. It is
difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip
code, without more, could work any concrete harm.[ 8 ]

															Because the Ninth Circuit failed to fully
appreciate the distinction between concreteness and
particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete. It did not
address the question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the
particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a
degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement. We
take no position as to whether the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate
conclusion—that Robins adequately alleged an injury in fact—was
correct.

															*  *  *

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 The Act defines the term
“consumer report” as: 2 “The term ‘consumer
reporting agency’ means any person which, for monetary fees, dues,
or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or
in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any
means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of
preparing or furnishing consumer reports.”
§1681a(f ). 3 This statutory provision
uses the term “consumer,” but that term is defined to mean “an
individual.” §1681a(c). 4 For purposes of this
opinion, we assume that Spokeo is a consumer reporting
agency. 5 See Edwards v. First American Corp ., 610 F. 3d 514 (CA9 2010), cert.
granted sub nom. First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards , 564 U. S. 1018 (2011) , cert. dism’d as
improvidently granted, 567 U. S. ___ (2012) ( per
curiam ). 6 “That a suit may be a
class action . . . adds nothing to the question of
standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must
allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that
injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the
class to which they belong.’ ” Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Organization , 426 U. S. 26, 40, n. 20
(1976) (quoting Warth , 422 U. S., at 502). 7 The fact that an injury
may be suffered by a large number of people does not of itself make
that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance. The victims’
injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely shared, to be
sure, but each individual suffers a particularized
harm. 8 We express no view about
any other types of false information that may merit similar
treatment. We leave that issue for the Ninth Circuit to consider on
remand. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–1339

															_________________

															SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS
ROBINS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[May 16, 2016]

															Justice Thomas, concurring.

															The Court vacates and remands to have the Court
of Appeals determine “whether the particular procedural violations
alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the
concreteness requirement.” Ante, at 11. In defining what
constitutes a concrete injury, the Court explains that “concrete”
means “ ‘real,’ ” and “not ‘abstract,’ ” but is not
“necessarily synonymous with ‘tan-gible.’ ” Ante , at
8–9.

															I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately
to explain how, in my view, the injury-in-fact requirement applies
to different types of rights. The judicial power of common-law
courts was historically limited depending on the nature of the
plaintiff’s suit. Common-law courts more readily entertained suits
from private plaintiffs who alleged a violation of their own
rights, in contrast to private plaintiffs who asserted claims
vindicating public rights. Those limitations persist in modern
standing doctrine.

															I

															A

															Standing doctrine limits the “judicial power”
to “ ‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally
amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.’ ” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex
rel. Stevens , 529 U. S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ ment, 523 U. S.
83, 102 (1998) ). To understand the limits that standing imposes on
“the judicial Power,” therefore, we must “refer directly to the
traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers of common-law
courts.” Honig v. Doe , 484 U. S. 305, 340 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). These limitations preserve separationof
powers by preventing the judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that
are primarily political in nature. This concern is generally absent
when a private plaintiff seeks to enforce only his personal rights
against another private party.

															Common-law courts imposed different limitations
on a plaintiff’s right to bring suit depending on the type of right
the plaintiff sought to vindicate. Historically,common-law courts
possessed broad power to adjudicate suits involving the alleged
violation of private rights, even when plaintiffs alleged only the
violation of those rights and nothing more. “Private rights” are
rights “belonging to individuals, considered as individuals.” 3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *2 (hereinafter Blackstone). “Private
rights” have traditionally included rights of personal security
(including security of reputation), property rights, and contract
rights. See 1 id. , at *130–*139; Woolhander & Nelson,
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689, 693
(2004). In a suit for the violation of a private right, courts
historically presumed that the plaintiff suffered a de facto injury merely from having his personal, legal rights invaded. Thus,
when one man placed his foot on another’s property, the property
owner needed to show nothing more to establish a traditional case
or controversy. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
K. B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765). Many traditional
remedies for private-rights causes of action—such as for trespass,
infringement of intellectual property, and unjust enrichment—are
not contingent on a plaintiff’s allegation of damages beyond the
violation of his private legal right. See Brief for Restitution and
Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae 6–18; see also Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (Me.
1838) (stating that a legal injury “imports damage in the nature of
it” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

															Common-law courts, however, have required a
further showing of injury for violations of “public rights”—rights
that involve duties owed “to the whole community, considered as a
community, in its social aggregate capacity.” 4 Blackstone *5. Such
rights include “free navigation of waterways, passage on public
highways, and general compliance with regulatory law.” Woolhander
& Nelson, 102 Mich. L. Rev., at 693. Generally, only the
government had the authority to vindicate a harm borne by the
public at large, such as the violation of the criminal laws. See id., at 695–700. Even in limited cases where private
plaintiffs could bring a claim for the violation of public rights,
they had to allege that the violation caused them “some
extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the [community].” 3
Blackstone *220 (discussing nuisance); see also Commonwealth v. Webb , 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen. Ct. 1828).[ 1 ] An action to redress a public nuisance,
for example, was historically considered an action to vindicate the
violation of a public right at common law, lest “every subject in
the kingdom” be able to “harass the offender with separate
actions.” 3 Blackstone *219; see also 4 id., at *167 (same).
But if the plaintiff could allege “special damage” as the result of
a nuisance, the suit could proceed. The existence of special,
individualized damage had the effect of creating a private action
for compensatory relief to an otherwise public-rights claim. See 3 id., at *220. Similarly, a plaintiff had to allege
individual damage in disputes over the use of public lands. E.g. , Robert Marys’s Case , 9 Co. Rep. 111b, 112b, 77
Eng. Rep. 895, 898–899 (K. B. 1613) (commoner must establish not
only injuria [legal injury] but also damnum [damage]
to challenge another’s overgrazing on the commons).

															B

															These differences between legal claims brought
by private plaintiffs for the violation of public and private
rights underlie modern standing doctrine and explain the Court’s
description of the injury-in-fact requirement. “Injury in fact” is
the first of three “irreducible” requirements for Article III
standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504
U. S. 555, 560 (1992) . The injury-in-fact requirement often
stymies a private plaintiff’s attempt to vindicate the infringement
of public rights. The Court has said time and again that,
when a plaintiff seeks to vindicate a public right, the plaintiff
must allege that he has suffered a “concrete” injury particular to
himself. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War , 418 U. S. 208 –223 (1974) (explaining this where
plaintiffs sought to enforce the Incompatibility Clause,
Art. I, §6, cl. 2, against Members of Congress holding
reserve commissions in the Armed Forces); see also Lujan , supra , at 572–573 (evaluating standing where plaintiffs
sought to enforce the Endangered Species Act); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc. , 528 U. S. 167 –184 (2000) (Clean Water Act). This
requirement applies with special force when a plaintiff files suit
to require an executive agency to “follow the law”; at that point,
the citizen must prove that he “has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that
[challenged] action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.” Ex parte
Levitt , 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937) ( per
curiam ). Thus, in a case where private plaintiffs sought to
compel the U. S. Forest Service to follow certain procedures
when it regulated “small fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage
projects,” we held that “deprivation of a procedural right without
some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation
. . . is insufficient to create Article III standing,”
even if “accorded by Congress.” Summers v. Earth Island
Institute , 555 U. S. 488 –497 (2009).

															But the concrete-harm requirement does not apply
as rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own
private rights. Our contemporary decisions have not required a
plaintiff to assert an actual injury beyond the violation of his
personal legal rights to satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement.
See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus , 435 U. S. 247, 266
(1978) (holding that nominal damages are appropriate when a
plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been infringed but he cannot
show further injury).

															The separation-of-powers concerns underlying our
public-rights decisions are not implicated when private
indi-viduals sue to redress violations of their own private rights.
But, when they are implicated, standing doctrine keeps courts out
of political disputes by denying private litigants the right to
test the abstract legality of government action. See Schlesinger , supra , at 222. And by limiting Congress’
ability to delegate law enforcement authority to private plaintiffs
and the courts, standing doctrine preserves executive discretion.
See Lujan , supra , at 577 (“ ‘To permit Congress
to convert the undifferenti-ated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’ ”). But where one private party has alleged that
another private party violated his private rights, there is
generally no danger that the private party’s suit is an
impermissible attempt to police the activity of the political
branches or, more broadly, that the legislative branch has
impermissibly delegated law enforcement authority from the
executive to a private individual. See Hessick, Standing, Injury in
Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 317–321
(2008).

															C

															When Congress creates new private causes of
action to vindicate private or public rights, these Article III
principles circumscribe federal courts’ power to adjudicate a suit
alleging the violation of those new legal rights. Congress can
create new private rights and authorize private plaintiffs to sue
based simply on the violation of those private rights. See Warth v. Seldin , 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975) . A
plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutorily created private right
need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of that private
right. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455
U. S. 363 –374 (1982) (recognizing standing for a violation of
the Fair Housing Act); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA , 306 U. S. 118 –138 (1939) (recognizing that
standing can exist where “the right invaded is a legal right,—one
of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against
tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege”). A plaintiff seeking to vindicate a public right
embodied in a federal statute, however, must demonstrate that the
violation of that public right has caused him a concrete,
individual harm distinct from the general population. See Lujan , supra , at 578 (noting that, whatever the scope
of Congress’ power to create new legal rights, “it is clear that in
suits against the Government, at least, the concrete injury
requirement must remain”). Thus, Congress cannot authorize private
plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names,
absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm
particular to him.

															II

															Given these principles, I agree with the
Court’s decision to vacate and remand. The Fair Credit Reporting
Act creates a series of regulatory duties. Robins has no standing
to sue Spokeo, in his own name, for violations of the duties that
Spokeo owes to the public collectively, absent some showing that he
has suffered concrete and particular harm. See supra, at
4–5. These consumer protection requirements include, for example,
the requirement to “post a toll-free telephone number on [Spokeo’s]
website through which consumers can request free annual file
disclosures.” App. 23, First Amended Complaint ¶74; see 15
U. S. C. §1681j; 16 CFR §610.3(a)(1) (2010).

															But a remand is required because one claim in
Robins’ complaint rests on a statutory provision that could
argu-ably establish a private cause of action to vindicate the
violation of a privately held right. Section 1681e(b) requires
Robins to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom
the report relates. ” §1681e(b) (emphasis added). If Congress
has created a private duty owed personally to Robins to protect his information, then the violation of the legal duty
suffices for Article III injury in fact. If that provision,
however, vests any and all consumers with the power to police the
“reasonable procedures” of Spokeo, without more, then Robins has no
standing to sue for its violation absent an allegation that he has
suffered individualized harm. On remand, the Court of Appeals can
consider the nature of this claim. Notes 1 The well-established
exception for qui tam actions allows private plaintiffs
to sue in the government’s name for the violation of a public
right. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens , 529 U. S. 765 –774
(2000). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–1339

															_________________

															SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS
ROBINS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[May 16, 2016]

															Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Sotomayor
joins, dissenting.

															In the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA
or Act), 15 U. S. C. §1681 et seq. , Congress
required consumer reporting agencies, whenever preparing a consumer
report, to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom
the report relates.” §1681e(b). To promote adherence to the Act’s
procedural requirements, Congress granted adversely affected
consumers a right to sue noncomplying reporting agencies. §1681n
(willful noncompliance); §1681o (negligent noncompliance).[ 1 ] Thomas Robins instituted suit
against Spokeo, Inc., alleging that Spokeo was a reporting agency
governed by the FCRA, and that Spokeo maintains on its Web site an
inaccurate consumer report about Robins. App. 13.

															In particular, Robins alleged that Spokeo posted
“a picture . . . purport[ing] to be an image of Robins
[that] was not in fact [of him],” and incorrectly reported that
Robins “was in his 50s, . . . married, . . .
employed in a professional or technical field, and . . .
has children.” Id. , at 14. Robins further alleged that
Spokeo’s profile of him continues to misrepresent “that he has a
graduate degree, that his economic health is ‘Very Strong[,]’ and
that his wealth level [is in] the ‘Top 10%.’ ” Ibid. Spokeo displayed that erroneous information, Robins asserts, when
he was “out of work” and “actively seeking employment.” Ibid. Because of the misinformation, Robins stated, he
encountered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his] employment
prospects.” Ibid. [ 2 ] As
Robins elaborated on brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear
overqualified for jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher
salary than employers would be willing to pay, and less mobile
because of family responsibilities. See Brief for Respondent
44.

															I agree with much of the Court’s opinion.
Robins, the Court holds, meets the particularity requirement for
standing under Article III. See ante, at 8, 11 (remanding
only for concreteness inquiry). The Court acknowledges that
Congress has the authority to confer rights and delineate claims
for relief where none existed before. Ante, at 9; see Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins , 524 U. S. 11
–20 (1998) (holding that inability to procure information to which
Congress has created a right in the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971 qualifies as concrete injury satisfying Article III’s
standing requirement); Public Citizen v. Department of
Justice , 491 U. S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding that plaintiff
advocacy organizations’ inability to obtain information that
Congress made subject to disclosure under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to
provide standing to sue”); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U. S. 363, 373 (1982) (identifying, as
Article III injury, violation of plaintiff’s right, secured by the
Fair Housing Act, to “truthful information concerning the
availability of housing”).[ 3 ]
Congress’ connection of procedural requirements to the prevention
of a substantive harm, the Court appears to agree, is “instructive
and important.” Ante, at 9; see Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife , 504 U. S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“As Government
programs and policies become more complex and far reaching, we must
be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action
. . . .”); Brief for Restitution and Remedies
Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (“Congress cannot
authorize individual plaintiffs to enforce generalized rights that
belong to the whole public. But Congress can create new individual
rights, and it can enact effective remedies for those rights.”).
See generally Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613
(1999).

															I part ways with the Court, however, on the
necessity of a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized
injury was “concrete.” See ante, at 11. Judged by what we
have said about “concreteness,” Robins’ allegations carry him
across the threshold. The Court’s opinion observes that time and
again, our decisions have coupled the words “concrete and particularized.” Ante, at 8 (citing as examples, Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus , 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014)
(slip op., at 8); Summers v. Earth Island Institute ,
555 U. S. 488, 493 (2009) ; Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. , 554 U. S. 269, 274 (2008) ; Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U. S. 497, 517 (2007)
). True, but true too, in the four cases cited by the Court, and
many others, opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the
terms “concrete” and “particularized.”

															Inspection of the Court’s decisions suggests
that the particularity requirement bars complaints raising
generalized grievances, seeking relief that no more benefits the
plaintiff than it does the public at large. See, e.g.,
Lujan , 504 U. S., at 573–574 (a plaintiff “seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large does not state an Article III case or controversy”
(punctuation omitted)); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. ,
310 U. S. 113, 125 (1940) (plaintiffs lack standing because
they failed to show injury to “a particular right of their own, as
distinguished from the public’s interest in the administration of
the law”). Robins’ claim does not present a question of that
character. He seeks redress, not for harm to the citizenry, but for
Spokeo’s spread of misinformation specifically about him.

															Concreteness as a discrete requirement for
standing, the Court’s decisions indicate, refers to the reality of
an injury, harm that is real, not abstract, but not necessarily
tangible. See ante, at 8–9; ante, at 1 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Illustrative opinions include Akins , 524
U. S., at 20 (“[C]ourts will not pass upon abstract,
intellectual problems, but adjudicate concrete, living contests
between adversaries.” (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted)); Diamond v. Charles , 476 U. S. 54, 67
(1986) (plaintiff’s “abstract concern does not substitute for the
concrete injury required by Art[icle] III” (internal quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted)); Los Angeles v. Lyons ,
461 U. S. 95, 101 (1983) (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate a
personal stake in the outcome . . . . Abstract
injury is not enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babbitt v. Farm Workers , 442 U. S. 289 –298
(1979) (“The difference between an abstract question and a ‘case or
controversy’ is one of degree, of course, and is not discernable by
any precise test. The basic inquiry is whether the conflicting
contentions of the parties present a real, substantial controversy
between parties having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite
and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract.” (citation, some
internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted)); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization , 426 U. S. 26,
40 (1976) (“organization’s abstract concern . . . does
not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III”); California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz , 416 U. S.
21, 69 (1974) (“There must be . . . concrete
adverseness”; “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi , 326 U. S. 88, 93 (1945) (controversy must be
“definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract”); Coleman v. Miller , 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (“[I]t [is] not for courts to pass
upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems but only
. . . concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries
call[ing] for the arbitrament of law.”).

															Robins would not qualify, the Court observes, if
he alleged a “bare” procedural violation, ante, at 10, one
that results in no harm, for example, “an incorrect zip code,” ante, at 11. Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins
complains of misinformation about his education, family situation,
and economic status, inaccurate representations that could affect
his fortune in the job market. See Brief for Center for Democracy
& Technology et al. as Amici Curiae 13 (Spokeo’s
inaccuracies bore on Robins’ “ability to find employment by
creating the erroneous impression that he was overqualified for the
work he was seeking, that he might be unwilling to relocate for a
job due to family commitments, or that his salary demands would
exceed what prospective employers were prepared to offer him.”);
Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici
Curiae 35 (“An applicant can lose [a] job for being
over-qualified; a suitor can lose a woman if she reads that he is
married.”). The FCRA’s procedural requirements aimed to prevent
such harm. See 115 Cong. Rec. 2410–2415 (1969). I therefore see no
utility in returning this case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore
what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely: Spokeo’s
misinformation “cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment
prospects.” App. 14.

															*  *  *

															For the reasons stated, I would affirm the
Ninth Circuit’s judgment. Notes 1 Congress added the right
of action for willful violations in 1996 as part of the Consumer
Credit Reporting Reform Act, 110Stat. 3009–426. 2 Because this case remains
at the pleading stage, the court of first instance must assume the
truth of Robins’ factual allegations. In particular, that court
must assume, subject to later proof, that Spokeo is a consumer
reporting agency under 15 U. S. C. §1681a(f ) and
that, in preparing consumer reports, Spokeo does not employ
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy, in
violation of the FCRA. 3 Just as the right to
truthful information at stake in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U. S. 363 (1982) , was closely tied to the
Fair Housing Act’s goal of eradicating racial discrimination in
housing, so the right here at stake is closely tied to the FCRA’s
goal of protecting consumers against dissemination of inaccurate
credit information about them.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 19–968

															_________________

															CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, et al., PETITIONERS v. STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[March 8, 2021]

															Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must
maintain a personal interest in the dispute. The doctrine of
standing generally assesses whether that interest exists at the
outset, while the doctrine of mootness considers whether it exists
throughout the proceedings. To demonstrate standing, the plaintiff
must not only establish an injury that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct but must also seek a remedy that redresses that
injury. And if in the course of litigation a court finds that it
can no longer provide a plaintiff with any effectual relief, the
case generally is moot. This case asks whether an award of nominal
damages by itself can redress a past injury. We hold that it
can.

															I

															According to the complaint, Chike Uzuegbunam
is an evangelical Christian who believes that an important part of
exercising his religion includes sharing his faith. In 2016,
Uzuegbunam decided to share his faith at Georgia Gwinnett College,
a public college where he was enrolled as a student. At an outdoor
plaza on campus near the library where students often gather,
Uzuegbunam engaged in conversations with interested students and
handed out religious literature.

															A campus police officer soon informed Uzuegbunam
that campus policy prohibited distributing written religious
materials in that area and told him to stop. Uzuegbunam complied
with the officer’s order. To learn more about this policy, he then
visited the college’s Director of the Office of Student Integrity,
who was directly responsible for promulgating and enforcing the
policy. When asked if Uzuegbunam could continue speaking about his
religion if he stopped distributing materials, the official said
no. The official explained that Uzuegbunam could speak about his
religion or distribute materials only in two designated “free
speech expression areas,” which together make up just 0.0015
percent of campus. And he could do so only after securing the
necessary permit. Uzuegbunam then applied for and received a permit
to use the free speech zone.

															Twenty minutes after Uzuegbunam began speaking
on the day allowed by his permit, another campus police officer
again told him to stop, this time saying that people had complained
about his speech. Campus policy prohibited using the free speech
zone to say anything that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of
person(s).” App. to Pet. for Cert. 151(a). The officer told
Uzuegbunam that his speech violated this policy because it had led
to complaints. The officer threatened Uzuegbunam with disciplinary
action if he continued. Uzuegbunam again complied with the order to
stop speaking. Another student who shares Uzuegbunam’s faith,
Joseph Bradford, decided not to speak about religion because of
these events.

															Both students sued a number of college officials
in charge of enforcing the college’s speech policies, arguing that
those policies violated the First Amendment. As relevant here, they
sought nominal damages and injunctive relief. Respondents initially
attempted to defend the policy, stating that Uzuegbunam’s
discussion of his religion “arguably rose to the level of ‘fighting
words.’ ” Id., at 155(a). But the college officials
quickly abandoned that strategy and instead decided to get rid of
the challenged policies. They then moved to dismiss, arguing that
the suit was moot, because of the policy change. The students
agreed that injunctive relief was no longer available, but they
disagreed that the case was moot. They contended that their case
was still live because they had also sought nominal damages. The
District Court dismissed the case, holding that the students’ claim
for nominal damages was insufficient by itself to establish
standing.

															The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 781 Fed. Appx.
824 (2019). It stated that a request for nominal damages can save a
case from mootness in certain circumstances, such as where a person
pleads but fails to prove an amount of compensatory damages. But,
because the students did not request compensatory damages, their
plea for nominal damages could not by itself establish
standing.

															We granted certiorari to consider whether a
plaintiff who sues over a completed injury and establishes the
first two elements of standing (injury and traceability) can
establish the third by requesting only nominal damages. 591
U. S. ___ (2020). We now reverse.

															II

															To satisfy the “ ‘irreducible
constitutional minimum’ ” of Article III standing, a plaintiff
must not only establish (1) an injury in fact (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, but he must also seek
(3) a remedy that is likely to redress that injury. Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016); see also Gill v. Whitford , 585 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018)
(slip op., at 13–14). There is no dispute that Uzuegbunam has
established the first two elements. The only question is whether
the remedy he sought—nominal damages—can redress the constitutional
violation that Uzuegbunam alleges occurred when campus officials
enforced the speech policies against him.

															A

															In determining whether nominal damages can
redress a past injury, we look to the forms of relief awarded at
common law. “Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to
‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ is properly understood to mean ‘cases
and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and
resolved by, the judicial process.’ ” Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens , 529 U.S.
765 , 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment , 523 U.S.
83 , 102 (1998)); cf. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura , 477 U.S.
299 , 306 (1986) (relief for “§1983 plaintiffs . . .
is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the
common law of torts”). The parties here agree that courts at common
law routinely awarded nominal damages. They, instead, dispute what
kinds of harms those damages could redress.

															Both sides agree that nominal damages
historically could provide prospective relief. The award of nominal
damages was one way for plaintiffs at common law to “obtain a form
of declaratory relief in a legal system with no general declaratory
judgment act.” D. Laycock & R. Hasen, Modern American Remedies
636 (5th ed. 2019). For example, a trespass to land or water rights
might raise a prospective threat to a property right by creating
the foundation for a future claim of adverse possession or
prescriptive easement. Blanchard v. Baker , 8 Me. 253,
268 (1832) (“If an unlawful diversion [of water] is suffered for
twenty years, it ripens into a right, which cannot be
controverted”). By obtaining a declaration of trespass, a property
owner could “vindicate his right by action” and protect against
those future threats. Ibid. Courts at common law would not
declare property boundaries in the abstract, “but the suit for
nominal damages allowed them to do so indirectly.” Laycock, supra, at 636.

															The parties disagree, however, about whether
nominal damages alone could provide retrospective relief. Stressing
the declaratory function, respondents argue that nominal damages by
themselves redressed only continuing or threatened injury, not past
injury.

															But cases at common law paint a different
picture. Early courts required the plaintiff to prove actual
monetary damages in every case: “[I]njuria & damnum [injury and
damage] are the two grounds for the having [of] all actions, and
without these, no action lieth.” Cable v. Rogers , 3
Bulst. 311, 312, 81 Eng. Rep. 259 (K. B. 1625). Later courts,
however, reasoned that every legal injury necessarily causes
damage, so they awarded nominal damages absent evidence of other
damages (such as compensatory, statutory, or punitive damages), and
they did so where there was no apparent continuing or threatened
injury for nominal damages to redress. See, e.g., Barker v. Green , 2 Bing. 317, 130 Eng. Rep. 327 (C.
P. 1824) (nominal damages awarded for 1-day delay in arrest because
“if there was a breach of duty the law would presume some damage”); Hatch v. Lewis , 2 F. & F. 467, 479, 485–486, 175
Eng. Rep. 1145, 1150, 1153 (N. P. 1861) (ineffective
assistance by criminal defense attorney that does not prejudice the
client); Dods v. Evans , 15 C. B. N. S. 621, 624,
627, 143 Eng. Rep. 929, 930–931 (C. P. 1864) (breach of
contract); Marzetti v. Williams , 1 B. & Ad. 415,
417–418, 423–428, 109 Eng. Rep. 842, 843, 845–847 (K. B. 1830)
(bank’s 1-day delay in paying on a check); id., at 424, 109
Eng. Rep., at 845 (recognizing that breach of contract could create
a continuing injury but determining that the fact of breach of
contract by itself justified nominal damages).

															The latter approach was followed both before and
after ratification of the Constitution. An early case about voting
rights effectively illustrates this common-law understanding. Faced
with a suit pleading denial of the right to vote, the court
rejected the plaintiff ’s claim because, among other reasons,
the plaintiff had not established actual damages. Ashby v. White , 2 Raym. Ld. 938, 941–943, 948, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 129,
130, 133 (K. B. 1703). Dissenting, Lord Holt argued that the common
law inferred damages whenever a legal right was violated. Observing
that the law recognized “not merely pecuniary” injury but also
“personal injury,” Lord Holt stated that “every injury imports a
damage” and that a plaintiff could always obtain damages even if he
“does not lose a penny by reason of the [violation].” Id. ,
at 955, 92 Eng. Rep., at 137. Although Lord Holt was in the
minority, the House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus
validating Lord Holt’s position, 3 Salk. 17, 91 Eng. Rep. 665
(K. B. 1703), and this principle “laid down . . . by Lord
Holt” was followed “in many subsequent cases,” Embrey v. Owen , 6 Exch. 353, 368, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585 (1851).

															The dissent correctly notes that English courts
differed in some respects from courts under our system, but Lord
Holt’s position also prevailed in courts on this side of the
Atlantic. Applying what he called Lord Holt’s “incontrovertible”
reasoning, Justice Story explained that a prevailing plaintiff “is
entitled to a verdict for nominal damages” whenever “no other [kind
of damages] be proved.” Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co. , 29 F. Cas. 506, 508–509 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838).
Because the common law recognized that “every violation imports
damage,” Justice Story reasoned that “[t]he law tolerates no
farther inquiry than whether there has been the violation of a
right.” Ibid. Justice Story also made clear that this logic
applied to both retrospective and prospective relief. Id., at 507 (stating that nominal damages are available “wherever there
is a wrong” and that, “[a] fortiori, this doctrine applies where
there is not only a violation of a right of the plaintiff, but the
act of the defendant, if continued, may become the foundation, by
lapse of time, of an adverse right”).

															The dissent discounts Justice Story’s statement,
saying that he took a potentially contradictory position elsewhere
and asserted that both actual damages and a violation of a legal
right are required. Post, at 7–8 (opinion of Roberts,
C. J.). But in the same source the dissent cites, Justice
Story said that nominal damages are “presumed” “[w]here the breach
of duty is clear.” Commentaries on the Law of Agency §217, p. 211
(1839). Justice Story adopted the same position a few years later. Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co. , 29 F. Cas. 934, 936
(No. 17,516) (CC Me. 1843) (stating that it is “well-known and
well-settled” that “wherever a wrong is done to a right,” at
minimum “nominal damages will be given”). And other jurists
declared that “[t]he principle that every injury legally imports
damage, was decisively settled, in the case of Ashby .” Parker v. Griswold , 17 Conn. *288, *304–*306 (1845)
(citing many cases on both sides of the Atlantic, including Webb and Marzetti ). This history is hardly one of
“indeterminate sources.” Post, at 8.

															Admittedly, the rule allowing nominal damages
for a violation of any legal right, though “decisively settled,” Parker, 17 Conn., at *304, was not universally followed—as
is true for most common-law doctrines. And some courts only
followed the rule in part, recognizing the availability of nominal
damages but holding that the improper denial of nominal damages
could be harmless error. Yet, even among these courts, many adopted
the rule in full whenever a person proved that there was a
violation of an “important right.” E.g., Hecht v. Harrison , 5 Wyo. 279, 290, 40 P. 306 , 309–310 (1895); accord, Reid v. Johnson , 132 Ind. 416, 419, 31 N.E. 1107, 1108 (1892)
(“substantial right”). Nonetheless, the prevailing rule, “well
established” at common law, was “that a party whose rights are
invaded can always recover nominal damages without furnishing any
evidence of actual damage.” 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of Damages 71,
n. a (7th ed. 1880); see also id., at 72 (citing Lord
Holt’s opinion in Ashby ).

															That this rule developed at common law is
unsurprising in the light of the noneconomic rights that
individuals had at that time. A contrary rule would have meant, in
many cases, that there was no remedy at all for those rights, such
as due process or voting rights, that were not readily reducible to
monetary valuation. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §3.3(2) (3d ed.
2018) (nominal damages are often awarded for a right “not economic
in character and for which no substantial non-pecuniary award is
available”); see also Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S.
247 , 266–267 (1978) (awarding nominal damages for a violation
of procedural due process). By permitting plaintiffs to pursue
nominal damages whenever they suffered a personal legal injury, the
common law avoided the oddity of privileging small-dollar economic
rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary
rights.

															B

															Respondents and the dissent attempt to
discount this historical line of cases by contending that something
other than nominal damages provided redressability. They argue
instead that courts could award nominal damages only when a
plaintiff pleaded compensatory damages but failed to prove a
specific amount. In those circumstances, they say, the plea for
compensatory damages is what satisfied the redressability
requirement, and courts awarded nominal damages merely as a
technical matter. We do not agree.

															To begin with, the cases themselves did not
require a plea for compensatory damages as a condition for
receiving nominal damages. Lord Holt spoke in categorical terms:
“[E]very injury imports a damage,” so a plaintiff who proved a
legal violation could always obtain some form of damages because he
“must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain [the
right].” Ashby , 2 Raym. Ld., at 953–955, 92 Eng. Rep., at
136–137. Justice Story’s language was no less definitive: “The law
tolerates no farther inquiry than whether there has been the
violation of a right.” Webb , 29 F. Cas., at 508. When a
right is violated, that violation “imports damage in the nature of
it” and “the party injured is entitled to a verdict for nominal
damages.” Id. , at 508.

															Respondents and the dissent thus get the
relationship between nominal damages and compensatory damages
backwards. Nominal damages are not a consolation prize for the
plaintiff who pleads, but fails to prove, compensatory damages.
They are instead the damages awarded by default until the plaintiff
establishes entitlement to some other form of damages, such as
compensatory or statutory damages. See, e.g., Dods ,
15 C. B. N. S., at 621, 627, 143 Eng. Rep., at 929, 931
(prevailing plaintiff entitled to nominal damages as a matter of
law even where jury neglected to find them); see also Stachura , 477 U. S., at 308 (rejecting the argument
that courts could presume, without proof, damages greater than
nominal).

															The argument that a claim for compensatory
damages is a prerequisite for an award of nominal damages also
rests on the flawed premise that nominal damages are purely
symbolic, a mere judicial token that provides no actual benefit to
the plaintiff. That contention is not without some support. See, e.g., Stanton v . New York & Eastern R.
Co. , 59 Conn. 272, 282, 22 A. 300, 303 (1890) (“Nominal damages
mean no damages at all. They exist only in name, and not in
amount”); but cf. ibid. (still recognizing that nominal
damages are appropriate when a right is violated). But this view is
against the weight of the history discussed above, and we have
already expressly rejected it. Despite being small, nominal damages
are certainly concrete. The dissent says that “an award of nominal
damages does not change [a plaintiff’s] status or condition at
all.” Post, at 3. But we have already held that a person who
is awarded nominal damages receives “relief on the merits of his
claim” and “may demand payment for nominal damages no less than he
may demand payment for millions of dollars in compensatory
damages.” Farrar v. Hobby , 506
U.S. 103 , 111, 113 (1992). Because nominal damages are in fact
damages paid to the plaintiff, they “affec[t] the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff ” and thus independently
provide redress. Hewitt v. Helms , 482 U.S.
755 , 761 (1987) (emphasis deleted); accord, Mission Product
Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC , 587 U. S. ___,
___ (2019) (slip op., at 6) (“If there is any chance of money
changing hands, [the] suit remains live”). True, a single dollar
often cannot provide full redress, but the ability “to effectuate a
partial remedy” satisfies the redressability requirement. Church
of Scientology of Cal . v. United States , 506 U.S.
9 , 13 (1992).

															The next difficulty faced by respondents and the
dissent is their inability to square their argument with
established principles of standing. Because redressability is an
“ ‘irreducible’ ” component of standing, Spokeo ,
578 U. S., at 338, no federal court has jurisdiction to enter
a judgment unless it provides a remedy that can redress the
plaintiff ’s injury. Yet early courts routinely awarded
nominal damages alone. Certainly, no one seems to think that those
judgments were without legal effect. Those nominal damages
necessarily must have provided redress. Respondents contend that a
request for compensatory damages at the pleading stage was what
provided the basis for nominal damages at the judgment stage. But a
plaintiff must maintain a personal interest in the dispute at every
stage of litigation, including when judgment is entered, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S.
555 , 561 (1992), and must do so “separately for each form of
relief sought,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. , 528
U.S. 167 , 185 (2000). As soon as a plea for compensatory
damages fails at the factfinding stage of litigation, that plea can
no longer support jurisdiction for a favorable judgment. The
dissent’s contrary assertion is unaccompanied by any citation.

															Likewise, any analogy to attorney’s fees and
costs fails. A request for attorney’s fees or costs cannot
establish standing because those awards are merely a “byproduct” of
a suit that already succeeded, not a form of redressability. Steel Co. , 523 U. S., at 107; see also Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp. , 494 U.S.
472 , 480 (1990). In contrast, nominal damages are redress, not
a byproduct.

															III

															Because nominal damages were available at
common law in analogous circumstances, we conclude that a request
for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of
standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed
violation of a legal right.

															The dissent worries that after today the
Judiciary will be required to weigh in on legal questions “whenever
a plaintiff asks for a dollar.” Post, at 9. But petitioners
still would have satisfied redressability if instead of one dollar
in nominal damages they sought one dollar in compensation for a
wasted bus fare to travel to the free speech zone. The dissent
“would place a higher value on Article III” than a dollar. Post, at 1; but see Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. , 554 U.S.
269 , 305 (2008) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“Article III
is worth a dollar”). But Congress abolished the statutory
amount-in-controversy requirement for federal-question jurisdiction
in 1980. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act, 94Stat.
2369. And we have never held that one applies as a matter of
constitutional law.

															This is not to say that a request for nominal
damages guarantees entry to court. Our holding concerns only
redressability. It remains for the plaintiff to establish the other
elements of standing (such as a particularized injury); plead a
cognizable cause of action, Planck v. Anderson , 5
T. R. 37, 41, 101 Eng. Rep. 21, 23 (K. B. 1792) (“if no
[actual] damage be sustained, the creditor has no cause of action”
for some claims); and meet all other relevant requirements. We hold
only that, for the purpose of Article III standing, nominal damages
provide the necessary redress for a completed violation of a legal
right.

															Applying this principle here is straightforward.
For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that Uzuegbunam
experienced a completed violation of his constitutional rights when
respondents enforced their speech policies against him. Because
“every violation [of a right] imports damage,” Webb , 29
F. Cas., at 509, nominal damages can redress Uzuegbunam’s
injury even if he cannot or chooses not to quantify that harm in
economic terms.[ 1 ]*

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 *We do not decide whether
Bradford can pursue nominal damages. Nominal damages go only to
redressability and are unavailable where a plaintiff has failed to
establish a past, completed injury. The District Court should
determine in the first instance whether the enforcement against
Uzuegbunam also violated Bradford’s constitutional
rights. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 19–968

															_________________

															CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, et al., PETITIONERS v. STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[March 8, 2021]

															Justice Kavanaugh, concurring.

															I agree with the Court that, as a matter of
history and precedent, a plaintiff’s request for nominal damages
can satisfy the redressability requirement for Article III standing
and can keep an otherwise moot case alive. I write separately
simply to note that I agree with The Chief Justice and the
Solicitor General that a defendant should be able to accept the
entry of a judgment for nominal damages against it and thereby end
the litigation without a resolution of the merits. Post , at
11 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29–30. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 19–968

															_________________

															CHIKE UZUEGBUNAM, et al., PETITIONERS v. STANLEY C. PRECZEWSKI, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eleventh circuit

															[March 8, 2021]

															Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting.

															Petitioners Chike Uzuegbunam and Joseph Bradford
want to challenge the constitutionality of speech restrictions at
Georgia Gwinnett College. There are just a few problems: Uzuegbunam
and Bradford are no longer students at the college. The challenged
restrictions no longer exist. And the petitioners have not alleged
actual damages. The case is therefore moot because a federal court
cannot grant Uzuegbunam and Bradford “any effectual relief
whatever.” Chafin v. Chafin , 568
U.S. 165 , 172 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															The Court resists this conclusion, holding that
the petitioners can keep pressing their claims because they have
asked for “nominal damages.” In the Court’s view, nominal damages
can save a case from mootness because any amount of money—no matter
how trivial—“can redress a past injury.” Ante, at 1. But an
award of nominal damages does not alleviate the harms suffered by a
plaintiff, and is not intended to. If nominal damages can preserve
a live controversy, then federal courts will be required to give
advisory opinions whenever a plaintiff tacks on a request for a
dollar. Because I would place a higher value on Article III, I
respectfully dissent.

															I

															In urging the ratification of the
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton famously wrote that “the
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous” of “the different departments of power.” The
Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This
was so, Hamilton explained, because the Judiciary “will be least in
a capacity to annoy or injure” “the political rights of the
Constitution.” Ibid. Whereas “[t]he executive not only
dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community,” and
“[t]he legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes the
rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated,” the Judiciary “may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL but merely judgment.” Ibid. But that power of judgment can nonetheless bind
the Executive and Legislature—and the States. It is modest only if
confined to its proper sphere. As John Marshall emphasized during
his one term in the House of Representatives, “[i]f the judicial
power extended to every question under the constitution” or
“to every question under the laws and treaties of the United
States,” then “[t]he division of power [among the branches of
Government] could exist no longer, and the other departments would
be swallowed up by the judiciary.” 4 Papers of John Marshall 95
(C. Cullen ed. 1984) (quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S.
332 , 341 (2006)). To maintain adequate separation between the
Judiciary, on the one hand, and the political branches and the
States, on the other, Article III of the Constitution authorizes
federal courts to decide only “Cases” and “Controversies”—that is,
“cases of a Judiciary nature.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, p. 430 (M. Farrand ed. 1966) (J. Madison).

															The case-or-controversy requirement imposes
fundamental restrictions on who can invoke federal jurisdiction and
what types of disputes federal courts can resolve. As pertinent
here, “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual
relief whatever to the prevailing party,” Chafin , 568
U. S., at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted), the case is
moot, and the court has no power to decide it, see Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S.
1 , 18 (1998). To decide a moot case would be to give an
advisory opinion, in violation of “the oldest and most consistent
thread in the federal law of justiciability.” Flast v. Cohen , 392 U.S.
83 , 96 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															By insisting that judges be able to provide
meaningful redress to litigants, Article III ensures that federal
courts exercise their authority only “as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals.” Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman , 143 U.S.
339 , 345 (1892); see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. , 454 U.S.
464 , 471 (1982) (“The constitutional power of federal courts
cannot be defined, and indeed has no substance, without reference
to the necessity ‘to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in
actual controversies.’ ” (quoting Liverpool, New York &
Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of
Emigration , 113 U.S.
33 , 39 (1885))). When plaintiffs like Uzuegbunam and Bradford
allege neither actual damages nor the prospect of future injury, an
award of nominal damages does not change their status or condition
at all. Such an award instead represents a judicial determination
that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law is correct—nothing
more. The court in such a case is acting not as an Article III
court, but as a moot court, deciding cases “in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society.” Director, Office of Workers’
Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates , 459 U.S.
297 , 305 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).

															II

															The Court sees no problem with turning judges
into advice columnists. In its view, the common law and (to a
lesser extent) our cases require that federal courts open their
doors to any plaintiff who asks for a dollar. I part ways with the
Court regarding both the framework it applies and the result it
reaches.

															Begin with the framework. The Court’s initial
premise is that we must “look to the forms of relief awarded at
common law” in order to decide “whether nominal damages can redress
a past injury.” Ante, at 4. Because the Court finds that
“nominal damages were available at common law in analogous
circumstances” to the ones before us, it “conclude[s] that a
request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of
standing where a plaintiff ’s claim is based on a completed
violation of a legal right.” Ante, at 11.

															Any lessons that we learn from the common law,
however, must be tempered by differences in constitutional design.
The structure and function of 18th-century English courts were in
many respects irreconcilable with “the role assigned to the
judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power.” Flast, 392
U. S., at 95. Perhaps most saliently, in England “all
jurisdictions of courts [were] either mediately or immediately
derived from the crown,” 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 257 (1765), an organizational principle the Framers
explicitly rejected by separating the Executive from the Judiciary.
This difference in organization yielded a difference in operation.
To give just one example, “English judicial practice with which
early Americans were familiar had long permitted the Crown to
solicit advisory opinions from judges.” R. Fallon, J. Manning, D.
Meltzer, & D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 52 (7th ed. 2015). We would not look to such
practice for guidance today if a plaintiff came into court arguing
that advisory opinions were in fact an appropriate form of Article
III redress. We would know that they are not. We likewise should
know that a bare request for nominal damages is not justiciable
because the plaintiff cannot “benefit in a tangible way from the
court’s intervention.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment , 523 U.S.
83 , 103, n. 5 (1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

															We should of course consult founding-era
decisions when discerning the boundaries of our jurisdiction, for
the Framers sought to limit the judicial power to “Cases” and
“Controversies,” as those terms were understood at the time. See Coleman v. Miller , 307 U.S.
433 , 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). No question. But
that does not mean that the requirements of Article III are
“satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United
States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request
for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in
terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal
process.” Valley Forge , 454 U. S., at 471. A focus on
common law analogues cannot obscure the significance of the
establishment of an independent Judiciary—a “remarkable
transformation” from a system with courts operating as “appendages
of crown power.” Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review, 22
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1293, 1304 (1988). That transformation
carries with it the need to cabin the jurisdiction of the Judiciary
to ensure it does not trespass on the province of the political
branches.

															It is in any event entirely unclear whether
common law courts would have awarded nominal damages in a case like
the one before us. There is no dispute that “nominal damages
historically could provide prospective relief,” because such
awards allowed “plaintiffs at common law to ‘obtain a form of
declaratory relief in a legal system with no general declaratory
judgment act.’ ” Ante, at 4 (quoting D. Laycock &
R. Hasen, Modern American Remedies 636 (5th ed. 2019); emphasis
added); see Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment—A Needed Procedural
Reform, 28 Yale L. J. 1, 25–29 (1918) (describing the
development of declaratory judgments in England in the second half
of the 19th century). Yet the petitioners in this case no longer
seek prospective relief. Although they initially asked for a
declaratory judgment and a preliminary injunction, they abandoned
those requests once the college rescinded the challenged
policies.

															The Court is correct to note that plaintiffs at
common law often received nominal damages for past violations of
their rights. Those awards, however, were generally limited to
situations in which prevailing plaintiffs tried and failed to prove
actual damages. See 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §3.3(2),
p. 296 (2d ed. 1993) (describing nominal damages awards as “a
rescue operation”). Notwithstanding the Court’s protestations to
the contrary, nominal damages in such cases were in fact a
“consolation prize,” ante, at 9, awarded as a hook to allow
prevailing plaintiffs to at least recover attorney’s fees and
costs. See W. Hale, Handbook on the Law of Damages 30–31 (1896)
(“The importance of the right to recover nominal damages often
consists in its effect on costs.”); 1 T. Sedgwick, Measure of
Damages §96, p. 164 (9th ed. 1912) (“[T]hey are a mere peg to
hang costs on.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
petitioners in this case have asked to recover their fees and
costs, but they never sought actual damages, so the common law
provides little relevant support.

															On this last point, the Court acknowledges in
several places that the historical record is mixed as to whether
legal violations were actionable at all without a showing of
compensable harm. See ante, at 5, 7. And the Court does not
cite any case in which plaintiffs sought only nominal damages for
purely retrospective injuries. The Court instead relies on several
decisions that contained live damages claims, see Barker v. Green , 2 Bing. 317, 130 Eng. Rep. 327 (C. P. 1824)
(“actual damage was the gist of the action”); Hatch v. Lewis , 2 F. & F. 467, 469, 175 Eng. Rep. 1145, 1146
(N. P. 1861) (defendants’ ineffective assistance allegedly
caused plaintiff to be “deprived of the profits and emoluments he
might otherwise have obtained”); Dods v. Evans , 15
C. B. N. S. 621, 143 Eng. Rep. 929 (C. P. 1864)
(action for damages), or involved prospective harm to the
plaintiff ’s reputation, see Marzetti v. Williams , 1 B. & Ad. 415, 420, 109 Eng. Rep. 842, 844
(K. B. 1830) (bank’s failure to timely pay “was injurious to
the character of the plaintiff in his trade”); see also C. Addison,
Law of Torts 46–47 (1860) (defamation actionable without proof of
damage).

															The Court also appeals to “categorical” and
“definitive” statements by Lord Chief Justice Holt and Justice
Story, that “every injury imports a damage,” Ashby v. White , 2 Raym. Ld. 938, 955, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137
(K. B. 1703), and that “[t]he law tolerates no farther
inquiry than whether there has been the violation of a right,” Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co. , 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No.
17,322) (CC Me. 1838). Ante, at 8–9. These statements,
however, bear less weight than the Court suggests. Lord Holt was
alone in dissent in Ashby (no shame there), and although his
opinion has been cited favorably by subsequent cases and
commentary, his colleagues disagreed with him. The Court writes
that “the House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus
validating Lord Holt’s position,” ante, at 6, but the House
of Lords likely paid scant attention to Lord Holt’s analysis. It
appears instead that the majority decision was reversed as
collateral damage in a Whig-Tory political dispute, and “little
weight was given to reasoning or eloquence.” 2 J. Campbell, Lives
of the Chief Justices of England 160 (1849). (Ashby had tried to
vote for a Whig candidate, and his ballot had been rejected as part
of a Tory election-rigging scheme. Id., at 156–157.)
Regardless, the House of Lords held that Ashby “should recover his
damages assessed by the jury” at trial, suggesting that the fact of
injury alone did not “import” them. Ashby v. White , 1
Bro. P. C. 62, 64, 1 Eng. Rep. 417, 418 (1703).

															Justice Story is no more helpful to the
Court—despite the supposedly “definitive” nature of his statement
in Webb —as he took the position elsewhere in his writings
that a legal violation alone was not sufficient to ground a
lawsuit. See Commentaries on the Law of Agency §236, p. 200
(1839) (“[T]he rule applies, that though it is a wrong, it is
without any damage; and, to maintain an action, both must concur;
for damnum absque injuria , and injuria absque damno ,
are equally objections to any recovery.”). Perhaps Justice Story’s
conflicting statements can be reconciled, see ante, at 7;
Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell
L. Rev. 275, 283, n. 38 (2008), but neither his commentary nor
Lord Holt’s dissent provides firm footing for the position that a
plaintiff could seek nominal damages without alleging actual
damages or prospective harm.

															At bottom, the Court relies on a handful of
indeterminate sources to justify a radical expansion of the
judicial power. The Court acknowledges that “the rule allowing
nominal damages for a violation of any legal right . . .
was not universally followed,” ante, at 7, but even this
concession understates the equivocal nature of the historical
record. I would require more before bursting the bounds of Article
III.

															The Court spends little time trying to reconcile
its analysis with modern justiciability principles. It cites in
passing our decisions in Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S.
247 (1978), Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura , 477 U.S.
299 (1986), and Farrar v. Hobby , 506 U.S.
103 (1992), but those cases made no mention of Article III, and
none involved a standalone claim for nominal damages. The Court
also contends that nominal damages must provide redress because
courts would otherwise lack jurisdiction to award them, even where
a plaintiff tries and fails to prove actual damages. See ante, at 10. But a claim for actual damages preserves a live
controversy, see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft , 436 U.S.
1 , 8–9 (1978), and a court does not lose jurisdiction just
because that claim ultimately fails.

															Finally, the Court argues that nominal damages
provide Article III relief because they “affec[t] the behavior of
the defendant towards the plaintiff ” by requiring “money
changing hands.” Ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks
omitted). If this were the standard, then the prospect of
attorney’s fees and costs would confer standing at the beginning of
a lawsuit and prevent mootness throughout—a proposition we have
squarely rejected. See Lewis v. Continental Bank
Corp. , 494 U.S.
472 , 480 (1990). The Court posits that “nominal damages are
redress,” whereas fees and costs “are merely a byproduct of a suit
that already succeeded.” Ante, at 11 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This classification just begs the question of what
qualifies as redress. To satisfy Article III, redress must
alleviate the plaintiff ’s alleged injury in some way, either
by compensating the plaintiff for a past loss or by preventing an
ongoing or future harm. Nominal damages do not serve these ends
where a plaintiff alleges only a completed violation of his rights.
They are not intended to approximate the value of tangible or
intangible harms, or the deterrent effect required to prevent
future misconduct. And they are not calculated with reference to
either of these purposes. Because such an award performs no
remedial function—and because “[r]elief that does not remedy the
injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court,” Steel Co. , 523 U. S., at 107—nominal damages cannot
preserve a live controversy where a case is otherwise moot.

															III

															Today’s decision risks a major expansion of
the judicial role. Until now, we have said that federal courts can
review the legality of policies and actions only as a necessary
incident to resolving real disputes. Going forward, the Judiciary
will be required to perform this function whenever a plaintiff asks
for a dollar. For those who want to know if their rights have been
violated, the least dangerous branch will become the least
expensive source of legal advice.

															In an effort to downplay these consequences, the
Court argues that plaintiffs who seek nominal damages will often be
able to seek actual damages as well. In this case, for example, the
Court notes that Uzuegbunam and Bradford “would have satisfied
redressability if instead of one dollar in nominal damages they
sought one dollar in compensation for a wasted bus fare to travel
to the free speech zone.” Ante, at 11. Maybe they would
have, and maybe they should have. The Court is mistaken, however,
to equate a small amount of actual damages with the token award of
nominal damages. The former redresses a compensable harm and
satisfies Article III, while the latter is a legal fiction with “no
existence in point of quantity.” J. Mayne, Law of Damages 27 (1856)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Dobbs, Law of Remedies
§3.3(2), at 294 (“Nominal damages are damages in name only
. . . .”).

															The Court also insists that not every “request
for nominal damages guarantees entry to court.” Ante, at 11.
Yet its holding admits of no limiting principle. As then-Judge
McConnell remarked in an insightful concurrence on the issue before
us, “[i]t is hard to conceive of a case in which a plaintiff would
be unable to append a claim for nominal damages, and thus insulate
the case from the possibility of mootness.” Utah Animal Rights
Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 371 F.3d 1248 , 1266 (CA10 2004). The Court today reinforces
this point by emphasizing that “ every violation of a right
imports damage,” ante, at 12 (emphasis added; alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted)—even though we have
definitively and recently held that a plaintiff must allege a
concrete injury even where his rights have been violated, see Thole v. U. S. Bank N. A. , 590 U. S.
___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 5) (“This Court has rejected the
argument that ‘a plaintiff automatically satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to
vindicate that right.’ ” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016))).

															The best that can be said for the Court’s
sweeping exception to the case-or-controversy requirement is that
it may itself admit of a sweeping exception: Where a plaintiff asks
only for a dollar, the defendant should be able to end the case by
giving him a dollar, without the court needing to pass on the
merits of the plaintiff ’s claims. Although we recently
reserved the question whether a defendant can moot a case by
depositing the full amount requested by the plaintiff, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez , 577 U.S. 153, 166
(2016), our cases have long suggested that he can, see, e.g., California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.
Co. , 149 U.S.
308 , 313–314 (1893). The United States agrees, arguing in its
brief in “support” of the petitioners that “the defendant should be
able to end the litigation without a resolution of the
constitutional merits, simply by accepting the entry of judgment
for nominal damages against him.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 29. The defendant can even file an offer of
judgment for one dollar, rendering the plaintiff liable for any
subsequent costs if he receives only nominal damages. See Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 68(d). This is a welcome caveat, and it may ultimately
save federal courts from issuing reams of advisory opinions. But it
also highlights the flimsiness of the Court’s view of the
separation of powers. The scope of our jurisdiction should not
depend on whether the defendant decides to fork over a buck.

															*  *  *

															Five years after Hamilton wrote Federalist
No. 78, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson sent a letter on
behalf of President George Washington to Chief Justice John Jay and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, asking for advice
about the Nation’s rights and obligations regarding the ongoing war
in Europe. Washington’s request must have struck him as reasonable
enough, since English sovereigns regularly sought advice from their
courts. Yet the Justices declined the entreaty, citing “the lines
of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three
departments of the government.” 3 Correspondence and Public Papers
of John Jay 488 (H. Johnston ed. 1891). For over two centuries, the
Correspondence of the Justices has stood as a reminder that federal
courts cannot give answers simply because someone asks.

															The Judiciary is authorized “to say what the law
is” only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret the rule.” Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)
(emphasis added). Today’s decision abandons that principle. When a
plaintiff brings a nominal damages claim in the absence of past
damages or future harm, it is not “necessary to give an opinion
upon a question of law.” San Pablo , 149 U. S., at 314.
It is instead a “gratuitous” exercise of the judicial power, Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization , 426 U.S.
26 , 38 (1976), and expanding that power encroaches on the
political branches and the States. Perhaps defendants will wise up
and moot such claims by paying a dollar, but it is difficult to see
that outcome as a victory for Article III. Rather than encourage
litigants to fight over farthings, I would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.