U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982) United States v. Ross No. 80-09 Argued March 1, 1982 Decided June 1, 1982 456
U.S. 798 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus Acting on information from an informant that a described
individual was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of a certain car
parked at a specified location, District of Columbia police
officers immediately drove to the location, found the car there,
and, a short while later, stopped the car and arrested the driver
(respondent), who matched the informant's description. One of the
officers opened the car's trunk, found a closed brown paper bag,
and after opening the bag, discovered glassine bags containing
white powder (later determined to be heroin). The officer then
drove the car to headquarters, where another warrantless search of
the trunk revealed a zippered leather pouch containing cash.
Respondent was subsequently convicted of possession of heroin with
intent to distribute -- the heroin and currency found in the
searches having been introduced in evidence after respondent's
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence had been denied. The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that, while the officers had probable
cause to stop and search respondent's car -- including its trunk --
without a warrant, they should not have opened either the paper bag
or the leather pouch found in the trunk without first obtaining a
warrant. Held: Police officers who have legitimately stopped an
automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband
is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search
of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate could authorize
by warrant. Pp. 456 U. S.
804 -825.

															(a) The "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 ,
applies to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. In this
class of cases, a search is not unreasonable if based on objective
facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a
warrant has not actually been obtained. Pp. 456 U. S.
804 -809.

															(b) However, the rationale justifying the automobile exception
does not apply so as to permit a warrantless search of any movable
container that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance and
that is found in a public place even when the container is placed
in a vehicle (not otherwise believed to be carrying contraband). United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 ; Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 . Pp. 456 U. S.
809 -814. Page 456 U. S. 799 (c) Where police officers have probable cause to search an
entire vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of every part
of the vehicle and its contents, including all containers and
packages, that may conceal the object of the search. The scope of
the search is not defined by the nature of the container in which
the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to
believe that it may be found. For example, probable cause to
believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van
will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Pp. 456 U. S.
817 -824.

															(d) The doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude
rejection here of the holding in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 , and
some of the reasoning in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. Pp. 456 U. S.
824 -825.

															210 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 655 F.2d 1159, reversed and remanded.

															STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 456 U. S. 825 ,
and POWELL, J., post, p. 456 U. S. 826 ,
filed concurring opinions. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, post, p. 456 U. S. 826 .
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J.,
joined, post, p. 456 U. S.
827 .

															JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , the Court held that a warrantless search of an
automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to
believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court in Carroll did not explicitly Page 456 U. S. 800 address the scope of the search that is permissible. In this
case, we consider the extent to which police officers -- who have
legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to
believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it -- may
conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the
vehicle whose contents are not in plain view. We hold that they may
conduct a search of the vehicle that is as thorough as a magistrate
could authorize in a warrant "particularly describing the place to
be searched." [ Footnote 1 ] I In the evening of November 27, 1978, an informant who had
previously proved to be reliable telephoned Detective Marcum of the
District of Columbia Police Department and told him that an
individual known as "Bandit" was selling narcotics kept in the
trunk of a car parked at 439 Ridge Street. The informant stated
that he had just observed "Bandit" complete a sale, and that
"Bandit" had told him that additional narcotics were in the trunk.
The informant gave Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and
stated that the car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with
District of Columbia license plates.

															Accompanied by Detective Cassidy and Sergeant Gonzales, Marcum
immediately drove to the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in
front of 439 Ridge Street. A license check disclosed that the car
was registered to Albert Ross; a computer check on Ross revealed
that he fit the informant's description and used the alias
"Bandit." In two passes through the neighborhood the officers did
not observe anyone matching the informant's description. To avoid
alerting persons on the street, they left the area. Page 456 U. S. 801 The officers returned five minutes later and observed the maroon
Malibu turning off Ridge Street onto Fourth Street. They pulled
alongside the Malibu, noticed that the driver matched the
informant's description, and stopped the car. Marcum and Cassidy
told the driver -- later identified as Albert Ross, the respondent
in this action -- to get out of the vehicle. While they searched
Ross, Sergeant Gonzales discovered a bullet on the car's front
seat. He searched the interior of the car and found a pistol in the
glove compartment. Ross then was arrested and handcuffed. Detective
Cassidy took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where he found a
closed brown paper bag. He opened the bag and discovered a number
of glassine bags containing a white powder. Cassidy replaced the
bag, closed the trunk, and drove the car to headquarters.

															At the police station, Cassidy thoroughly searched the car. In
addition to the "lunch-type" brown paper bag, Cassidy found in the
trunk a zippered red leather pouch. He unzipped the pouch and
discovered $3,200 in cash. The police laboratory later determined
that the powder in the paper bag was heroin. No warrant was
obtained.

															Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Prior to trial, he
moved to suppress the heroin found in the paper bag and the
currency found in the leather pouch. After an evidentiary hearing,
the District Court denied the motion to suppress. The heroin and
currency were introduced in evidence at trial, and Ross was
convicted.

															A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction. It held that the police had probable cause to stop and
search Ross' car and that, under Carroll v. United States,
supra, and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42 , the officers lawfully could search the automobile --
including its trunk -- without a warrant. The court considered
separately, however, the warrantless search of the two containers
found in the trunk. On the basis of Arkansas
v. Sanders , Page 456 U. S. 802 442 U. S. 753 , the
court concluded that the constitutionality of a warrantless search
of a container found in an automobile depends on whether the owner
possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.
Applying that test, the court held that the warrantless search of
the paper bag was valid, but the search of the leather pouch was
not. The court remanded for a new trial at which the items taken
from the paper bag, but not those from the leather pouch, could be
admitted. [ Footnote 2 ]

															The entire Court of Appeals then voted to rehear the case en
banc. A majority of the court rejected the panel's conclusion that
a distinction of constitutional significance existed between the
two containers found in respondent's trunk; it held that the police
should not have opened either container without first obtaining a
warrant. The court reasoned:

															"No specific, well delineated exception called to our attention
permits the police to dispense with a warrant to open and search
'unworthy' containers. Moreover, we believe that a rule under which
the validity of a warrantless search would turn on judgments about
the durability of a container would impose an unreasonable and
unmanageable burden on police and courts. For these reasons, and
because the Fourth Amendment protects all persons, not just those
with the resources or fastidiousness to place their effects in
containers that decisionmakers would rank in the luggage line, we
hold that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement forbids the
warrantless opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the same
extent that it forbids the warrantless opening of a small unlocked
suitcase or a zippered leather pouch."

															210 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 344, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (1981) (footnote
omitted). Page 456 U. S. 803 The en banc Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the
argument that it was reasonable for the police to open both the
paper bag and the leather pouch because they were entitled to
conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle in which the two
containers were found. The majority concluded that this argument
was foreclosed by Sanders. Three dissenting judges interpreted Sanders differently. [ Footnote 3 ] Other
courts also have read the Sanders opinion in different
ways. [ Footnote 4 ] Moreover,
disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of Sanders was at least partially responsible for the fact
that Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420 , was decided last Term without a Court
opinion.

															There is, however, no dispute among judges about the importance
of striving for clarification in this area of the law. For
countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public Page 456 U. S. 804 streets every day, and our cases demonstrate that it is not
uncommon for police officers to have probable cause to believe that
contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle. In every such case, a
conflict is presented between the individual's constitutionally
protected interest in privacy and the public interest in effective
law enforcement. No single rule of law can resolve every conflict,
but our conviction that clarification is feasible led us to grant
the Government's petition for certiorari in this case and to invite
the parties to address the question whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsidered. 454 U.S. 891. II We begin with a review of the decision in Carroll itself. In the fall of 1921, federal prohibition agents obtained
evidence that George Carroll and John Kiro were "bootleggers" who
frequently traveled between Grand Rapids and Detroit in an
Oldsmobile Roadster. [ Footnote
5 ] On December 15, 1921, the agents unexpectedly encountered Carroll and Kiro driving west on that route in that car.
The officers gave pursuit, stopped the roadster on the highway, and
directed Carroll and Kiro to get out of the car.

															No contraband was visible in the front seat of the Oldsmobile,
and the rear portion of the roadster was closed. One of the agents
raised the rumble, seat but found no liquor. He raised the seat
cushion and again found nothing. The officer then struck at the
"lazyback" of the seat and noticed that it was "harder than
upholstery ordinarily is in those backs." Page 456 U. S. 805 267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 174 .
He tore open the seat cushion and discovered 68 bottles of gin and
whiskey concealed inside. No warrant had been obtained for the
search.

															Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting intoxicating
liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act. On review of
those convictions, this Court ruled that the warrantless search of
the roadster was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. In an extensive opinion written by Chief Justice Taft,
the Court held:

															"On reason and authority, the true rule is that, if the search
and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that
is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to
the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search
and seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in
the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
interests, as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens." Id. at 267 U. S.
149 .

															The Court explained at length the basis for this rule. The Court
noted that, historically, warrantless searches of vessels, wagons,
and carriages -- as opposed to fixed premises such as a home or
other building -- had been considered reasonable by Congress. After
reviewing legislation enacted by Congress between 1789 and 1799,
[ Footnote 6 ] the Court
stated:

															"Thus, contemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the following
Second and Fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity
for a search warrant between Page 456 U. S. 806 goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house
or similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and
concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out
of reach of a search warrant." Id. at 267 U. S. 151 .
The Court reviewed additional legislation passed by Congress,
[ Footnote 7 ] and again noted
that

															"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the
beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Id. at 267 U. S.
153 .

															Thus, since its earliest days Congress had recognized the
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the
transportation of contraband goods. [ Footnote 8 ] It is this impracticability, viewed in
historical perspective, that provided the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in
transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is
necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit Page 456 U. S. 807 substance. In this class of cases, the Court held that a
warrantless search of an automobile is not unreasonable. [ Footnote 9 ]

															In defining the nature of this "exception" to the general rule
that, "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used," id. at 267 U. S. 156 ,
the Court in Carroll emphasized the importance of the
requirement that Page 456 U. S. 808 officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband.

															"Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be
searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider under what
circumstances such search may be made. It would be intolerable and
unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and
indignity of such a search. Travelers may be so stopped in crossing
an international boundary because of national self-protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be
lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the country,
entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent
official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that
their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." Id. at 267 U. S.
153 -154. Moreover, the probable cause determination must
be based on objective facts that could justify the issuance of a
warrant by a magistrate, and not merely on the subjective good
faith of the police officers.

															"'[A]s we have seen, good faith is not enough to constitute
probable cause. That faith must be grounded on facts within
knowledge of the [officer] which. in the judgment of the court.
would make his faith reasonable.'" Id. at 267 U. S.
161 -162 (quoting Director General of Railroads v.
Kastenbaum, 263 U. S. 25 , 263 U. S. 28 ).
[ Footnote 10 ] Page 456 U. S. 809 In short, the exception to the warrant requirement established
in Carroll -- the scope of which we consider in this case
-- applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by
probable cause. [ Footnote
11 ] In this class of cases, a search is not unreasonable if
based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even
though a warrant has not actually been obtained. [ Footnote 12 ] III The rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automobile
that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably applies
with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be
carrying an illicit substance. That argument, Page 456 U. S. 810 however, was squarely rejected in United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 . Chadwick involved the warrantless search of a 200-pound
footlocker secured with two padlocks. Federal railroad officials in
San Diego became suspicious when they noticed that a brown
footlocker loaded onto a train bound for Boston was unusually heavy
and leaking talcum powder, a substance often used to mask the odor
of marihuana. Narcotics agents met the train in Boston and a
trained police dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance
inside the footlocker. The agents did not seize the footlocker,
however, at this time; they waited until respondent Chadwick
arrived and the footlocker was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's
automobile. Before the engine was started, the officers arrested
Chadwick and his two companions. The agents then removed the
footlocker to a secured place, opened it without a warrant, and
discovered a large quantity of marihuana.

															In a subsequent criminal proceeding, Chadwick claimed that the
warrantless search of the footlocker violated the Fourth Amendment.
In the District Court, the Government argued that, as soon as the
footlocker was placed in the automobile, a warrantless search was
permissible under Carroll. The District Court rejected
that argument, [ Footnote 13 ]
and the Government did not pursue it on appeal. [ Footnote 14 ] Rather, the Government
contended in this Court that the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applied only to searches of homes and Page 456 U. S. 811 other "core" areas of privacy. The Court unanimously rejected
that contention. [ Footnote
15 ] Writing for the Court, THE CHIEF JUSTICE stated:

															"[I]f there is little evidence that the Framers intended the
Warrant Clause to operate outside the home, there is no evidence at
all that they intended to exclude from protection of the Clause all
searches occurring outside the home. The absence of a contemporary
outcry against warrantless searches in public places was because,
aside from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless searches
were not a large issue in colonial America. Thus, silence in the
historical record tells us little about the Framers' attitude
toward application of the Warrant Clause to the search of
respondents' footlocker. What we do know is that the Framers were
men who focused on the wrongs of that day, but who intended the
Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would far
outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 8 -9
(footnote omitted).

															The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the
argument that the warrantless search was "reasonable" because a
footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized that "a
person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are
substantially greater than in an automobile," id. at 433 U. S. 13 , and
noted that the practical problems associated with the temporary
detention of a piece of luggage during the period of time necessary
to obtain a warrant are significantly less than those associated
with the detention of an automobile. Id. at 433 U. S. 13 , n.
7. In ruling that the warrantless search of the Page 456 U. S. 812 footlocker was unjustified, the Court reaffirmed the general
principle that closed packages and containers may not be searched
without a warrant. Cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S.
727 ; United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.
S. 249 . In sum, the Court in Chadwick declined
to extend the rationale of the "automobile exception" to permit a
warrantless search of any movable container found in a public
place. [ Footnote 16 ]

															The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 , were similar to those in Chadwick. In Sanders, a Little Rock police officer received information
from a reliable informant that Sanders would arrive at the local
airport on a specified flight that afternoon carrying a green
suitcase containing marihuana. The officer went to the airport.
Sanders arrived on schedule, and retrieved a green suitcase from
the airline baggage service. Sanders gave the suitcase to a waiting
companion, who placed it in the trunk of a taxi. Sanders and his
companion drove off in the cab; police officers followed and
stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport. The officers
opened the trunk, seized the suitcase, and searched it on the scene
without a warrant. As predicted, the suitcase contained
marihuana.

															The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless search of
the suitcase was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment, and this
Court affirmed. As in Chadwick, the mere fact that the
suitcase had been placed in the trunk of the vehicle did not render
the automobile exception of Carroll applicable; the police
had probable cause to seize the suitcase before it was placed in
the trunk of the cab, and did not Page 456 U. S. 813 have probable cause to search the taxi itself. [ Footnote 17 ] Since the suitcase had been
placed in the trunk, no danger existed that its contents could have
been secreted elsewhere in the vehicle. [ Footnote 18 ] As THE CHIEF JUSTICE noted in his opinion
concurring in the judgment:

															"Because the police officers had probable cause to believe that
respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana before it was
placed in the trunk of the taxicab, their duty to obtain a search
warrant before opening it is clear under United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977). . . ."

															". . . Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being
transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, not the
automobile in which it was being carried, that was the suspected
locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile
and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase was resting in the
trunk of the automobile at the time of respondent's arrest does not
turn this into an 'automobile' exception case. The Court need say
no more."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
766 -767. The Court in Sanders did not, however,
rest its decision solely on the authority of Chadwick. In
rejecting the State's Page 456 U. S. 814 argument that the warrantless search of the suitcase was
justified on the ground that it had been taken from an automobile
lawfully stopped on the street, the Court broadly suggested that a
warrantless search of a container found in an automobile could
never be sustained as part of a warrantless search of the
automobile itself. [ Footnote
19 ] The Court did not suggest that it mattered whether probable
cause existed to search the entire vehicle. It is clear, however,
that in neither Chadwick nor Sanders did the
police have probable cause to search the vehicle or anything within
it except the footlocker in the former case and the green suitcase
in the latter. Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420 , however, was a case in which suspicion was not
directed at a specific container. In that case, the Court for the
first time was forced to consider whether police officers who are
entitled to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile stopped
on a public roadway may open a container found within the vehicle.
In the early morning of January 5, 1975, police officers stopped
Robbins' station wagon because he was driving erratically. Robbins
got out of the car, but later returned to obtain the vehicle's
registration papers. When he opened the car door, the officers
smelled marihuana smoke. One of the officers searched Robbins and
discovered a vial of liquid; in a search of the interior of the car
the officer found marihuana. The police officers then opened the
tailgate of the station wagon and raised the cover of a recessed
luggage compartment. In Page 456 U. S. 815 the compartment, they found two packages wrapped in green opaque
plastic. The police unwrapped the packages and discovered a large
amount of marihuana in each.

															Robbins was charged with various drug offenses, and moved to
suppress the contents of the plastic packages. The California Court
of Appeal held that "[s]earch of the automobile was proper when the
officers learned that appellant was smoking marijuana when they
stopped him," [ Footnote 20 ]
and that the warrantless search of the packages was justified
because

															"the contents of the packages could have been inferred from
their outward appearance, so that appellant could not have held a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
contents." People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d
34 , 40, 162 Cal. Rptr.
780 , 783 (1980).

															This Court reversed. Writing for a plurality, Justice Stewart
rejected the argument that the outward appearance of the packages
precluded Robbins from having a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their contents. He also squarely rejected the argument
that there is a constitutional distinction between searches of
luggage and searches of "less worthy" containers. Justice Stewart
reasoned that all containers are equally protected by the Fourth
Amendment unless their contents are in plain view. The plurality
concluded that the warrantless search was impermissible because Chadwick and Sanders had established that

															"a closed piece of luggage found in a lawfully searched car is
constitutionally protected to the same extent as are closed pieces
of luggage found anywhere else."

															453 U.S. at 453 U. S.
425 .

															In an opinion concurring in the judgment, JUSTICE POWELL, the
author of the Court's opinion in Sanders, stated that

															"[t]he plurality's approach strains the rationales of our prior
cases, and imposes substantial burdens on law enforcement without
vindicating any significant values of privacy."

															453 Page 456 U. S. 816 U.S. at 453 U. S. 429 .
[ Footnote 21 ] He noted that
possibly "the controlling question should be the scope of the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement," id. at 453 U. S. 435 ,
and explained that, under that view,

															"when the police have probable cause to search an automobile,
rather than only to search a particular container that fortuitously
is located in it, the exigencies that allow the police to search
the entire automobile without a warrant support the warrantless
search of every container found therein. See post at 453 U. S. 451 , and n. 13
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). This analysis is entirely consistent
with the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders, neither of which is an 'automobile case,' because the police there
had probable cause to search the double-locked footlocker and the
suitcase respectively before either came near an automobile." Ibid. The parties in Robbins had not pressed
that argument, however, Page 456 U. S. 817 and JUSTICE POWELL concluded that institutional constraints made
it inappropriate to reexamine basic doctrine without full adversary
presentation. He concurred in the judgment, since it was supported
-- although not compelled -- by the Court's opinion in Sanders, and stated that a future case might present a
better opportunity for thorough consideration of the basic
principles in this troubled area.

															That case has arrived. Unlike Chadwick and Sanders, in this case, police officers had probable cause
to search respondent's entire vehicle. [ Footnote 22 ] Unlike Robbins, in this case,
the parties have squarely addressed the question whether, in the
course of a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile, police
are entitled to open containers found within the vehicle. We now
address that question. Its answer is determined by the scope of the
search that is authorized by the exception to the warrant
requirement set forth in Carroll. IV In Carroll itself, the whiskey that the prohibition
agents seized was not in plain view. It was discovered only after
an officer opened the rumble seat and tore open the upholstery of
the lazyback. The Court did not find the scope of the search
unreasonable. Having stopped Carroll and Kiro on a public road and
subjected them to the indignity of a vehicle Page 456 U. S. 818 search -- which the Court found to be a reasonable intrusion on
their privacy because it was based on probable cause that their
vehicle was transporting contraband -- prohibition agents were
entitled to tear open a portion of the roadster itself. The scope
of the search was no greater than a magistrate could have
authorized by issuing a warrant based on the probable cause that
justified the search. Since such a warrant could have authorized
the agents to open the rear portion of the roadster and to rip the
upholstery in their search for concealed whiskey, the search was
constitutionally permissible.

															In Chambers v. Maroney, the police found weapons and
stolen property "concealed in a compartment under the dashboard."
399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 44 . No
suggestion was made that the scope of the search was impermissible.
It would be illogical to assume that the outcome of Chambers -- or the outcome of Carroll itself --
would have been different if the police had found the secreted
contraband enclosed within a secondary container and had opened
that container without a warrant. If it was reasonable for
prohibition agents to rip open the upholstery in Carroll, it certainly would have been reasonable for them to look into a
burlap sack stashed inside; if it was reasonable to open the
concealed compartment in Chambers, it would have been
equally reasonable to open a paper bag crumpled within it. A
contrary rule could produce absurd results inconsistent with the
decision in Carroll itself.

															In its application of Carroll, this Court, in fact, has
sustained warrantless searches of containers found during a lawful
search of an automobile. In Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 , the
Court upheld a warrantless seizure of whiskey found during a search
of an automobile, some of which was discovered in "whiskey bags"
that could have contained other goods. [ Footnote 23 ] In Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 ,
federal officers Page 456 U. S. 819 seized and searched packages of unstamped liquor found in the
trunk of an automobile searched without a warrant. As described by
a police officer who participated in the search:

															"I turned the handle and opened the trunk, and found the trunk
completely filled with packages wrapped in brown paper and tied
with twine; I think somewhere around thirty packages, each one
containing six bottles. [ Footnote 24 ]"

															In these cases, it was not contended that police officers needed
a warrant to open the whiskey bags or to unwrap the brown paper
packages. These decisions nevertheless "have much weight, as they
show that this point neither occurred to the bar or the bench." Bank of the United States v.
Deveaux , 5 Cranch 61, 88 (Marshall, C.J.). The fact
that no such argument was even made illuminates the profession's
understanding of the scope of the search permitted under Carroll. Indeed, prior to the decisions in Chadwick and Sanders, courts routinely had held
that containers and packages found during a legitimate warrantless
search of an automobile also could be searched without a warrant.
[ Footnote 25 ] Page 456 U. S. 820 As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based on
the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the
perspective of history. It is therefore significant that the
practical consequences of the Carroll decision would be
largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless search
of an automobile did not include containers and packages found
inside the vehicle. Contraband goods rarely are strewn across the
trunk or floor of a car; since, by their very nature, such goods
must be withheld from public view, they rarely can be placed in an
automobile unless they are enclosed within some form of container.
[ Footnote 26 ] The Court in Carroll held that "contraband goods concealed and
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be
searched for without a warrant." 267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 153 (emphasis added). As we noted in Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 , 361 U. S. 104 ,
the decision in Carroll "merely relaxed the requirements
for a warrant on grounds of practicability." It neither broadened
nor limited the scope of a lawful search based on probable
cause.

															A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the
entire area in which the object of the search may be found, and is
not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry Page 456 U. S. 821 or opening may be required to complete the search. [ Footnote 27 ] Thus, a warrant that
authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also
provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers
in which the weapon might be found. A warrant to open a footlocker
to search for marihuana would also authorize the opening of
packages found inside. A warrant to search a vehicle would support
a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object
of the search. When a legitimate search is under way, and when its
purpose and its limits have been precisely defined, nice
distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the case
of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats,
trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give
way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the
task at hand. [ Footnote
28 ] Page 456 U. S. 822 This rule applies equally to all containers, as indeed we
believe it must. One point on which the Court was in virtually
unanimous agreement in Robbins was that a constitutional
distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers would be
improper. [ Footnote 29 ] Even
though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases
in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange
crates were placed on one side of the line or the other, [ Footnote 30 ] the central purpose of
the Fourth Amendment forecloses such a distinction. For just as the
most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the
same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, [ Footnote 31 ] so also may a traveler
who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper
bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive
with the locked attache case.

															As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth
Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container Page 456 U. S. 823 that conceals its contents from plain view. 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 427 (plurality opinion). But the protection afforded by the Amendment
varies in different settings. The luggage carried by a traveler
entering the country may be searched at random by a customs
officer; the luggage may be searched no matter how great the
traveler's desire to conceal the contents may be. A container
carried at the time of arrest often may be searched without a
warrant and even without any specific suspicion concerning its
contents. A container that may conceal the object of a search
authorized by a warrant may be opened immediately; the individual's
interest in privacy must give way to the magistrate's official
determination of probable cause.

															In the same manner, an individual's expectation of privacy in a
vehicle and its contents may not survive if probable cause is given
to believe that the vehicle is transporting contraband. Certainly
the privacy interests in a car's trunk or glove compartment may be
no less than those in a movable container. An individual
undoubtedly has a significant interest that the upholstery of his
automobile will not be ripped or a hidden compartment within it
opened. These interests must yield to the authority of a search,
however, which -- in light of Carroll -- does not itself
require the prior approval of a magistrate. The scope of a
warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower -- and no
broader -- than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant
supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval of the
magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate
could authorize. [ Footnote
32 ] Page 456 U. S. 824 The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not
defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is
secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an
upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented
aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a
warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or
evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab. V Our decision today is inconsistent with the disposition in Robbins v. California and with the portion of the opinion
in Arkansas v. Sanders on which the plurality in Robbins relied. Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare
decisis does not preclude this action. Although we have
rejected some of the reasoning in Sanders, we adhere to
our holding in that case; although we reject the precise holding in Robbins, there was no Court opinion supporting a single
rationale for its judgment, and the reasoning we adopt today was
not presented by the parties in that case. Moreover, it is clear
that no legitimate reliance interest can be frustrated by our
decision today. [ Footnote
33 ] Of greatest importance, we are convinced that the rule we
apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment that the Court has followed with substantial consistency
throughout our history.

															We reaffirm the basic rule of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
stated by Justice Stewart for a unanimous Court in Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 437 U. S.
390 : Page 456 U. S. 825 "The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and
seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that"

															"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."

															" Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347 , 389 U. S. 357 (footnotes
omitted)."

															The exception recognized in Carroll is unquestionably
one that is "specifically established and well delineated." We hold
that the scope of the warrantless search authorized by that
exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could
legitimately authorize by warrant. If probable cause justifies the
search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the
object of the search.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."

															U.S.Const., Amdt. 4.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The court rejected the Government's argument that the
warrantless search of the leather pouch was justified as incident
to respondent's arrest. App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The Government
has not challenged this holding.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Judge Tamm, the author of the original panel opinion, reiterated
the view that Sanders prohibited the warrantless search of
the leather pouch. but not the search of the paper bag. Judge Robb
agreed that this result was compelled by Sanders, although
he stated that, in his opinion,

															"the right to search an automobile should include the right to
open any container found within the automobile, just as the right
to search a lawfully arrested prisoner carries with it the right to
examine the contents of his wallet and any envelope found in his
pocket, and the right to search a room includes authority to open
and search all the drawers and containers found within the
room."

															210 U.S.App.D.C. at 363, 655 F.2d at 1180. Judge MacKinnon
concurred with Judge Tamm that Sanders did not prohibit
the warrantless search of the paper bag. Concerning the leather
pouch, he agreed with Judge Wilkey, who dissented on the ground
that Sanders should not be applied retroactively.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Many courts have held that Sanders requires that a
warrant be obtained only for personal luggage and other
"luggage-type" containers. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (CA6 1980); United States v.
Jimenez, 626 F.2d 39 (CA7 1980). One court has held that Sanders does not apply if the police have probable cause
to search an entire vehicle, and not merely an isolated container
within it. Cf. State v. Bible, 389 So.
2d 42 (La.1980), vacated and remanded, 453 U.S. 918; State v. Hernandez, 408 So. 2d
911 (La.1981); see also 210 U.S.App.D.C. at 363, 655
F.2d at 1180 (Robb, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															On September 29, 1921, Carroll and Kiro met the agents in Grand
Rapids and agreed to sell them three cases of whiskey. The sale was
not consummated, however, possibly because Carroll learned the
agents' true identity. In October, the agents discovered Carroll
and Kiro driving the Oldsmobile Roadster on the road to Detroit,
which was known as an active center for the introduction of illegal
liquor into this country. The agents followed the roadster as far
as East Lansing, but there abandoned the chase.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															The legislation authorized customs officials to search any ship
or vessel without a warrant if they had probable cause to believe
that it concealed goods subject to duty. The same legislation
required a warrant for searches of dwelling places. 267 U.S. at 267 U. S.
150 -151.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															In particular, the Court noted an 1815 statute that permitted
customs officers not only to board and search vessels without a
warrant,

															"but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person on which or whom they should suspect there was merchandise
which was subject to duty or had been introduced into the United
States in any manner contrary to law." Id. at 267 U. S.
151 .

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															In light of this established history, individuals always had
been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on
facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains
contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate's prior
evaluation of those facts.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based on the fact that the only course
available to the police was an immediate search. As Justice Harlan
later recognized, although a failure to seize a moving automobile
believed to contain contraband might deprive officers of the
illicit goods, once a vehicle itself has been stopped, the exigency
does not necessarily justify a warrantless search. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 399 U. S. 62 -64
(opinion of Harlan, J.). The Court in Chambers, however --
with only Justice Harlan dissenting -- refused to adopt a rule that
would permit a warrantless seizure but prohibit a warrantless
search. The Court held that, if police officers have probable cause
to justify a warrantless seizure of an automobile on a public
roadway, they may conduct an immediate search of the contents of
that vehicle.

															"For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between, on
the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate, and, on the other hand,
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 399 U. S.
52 .

															The Court also has held that, if an immediate search on the
street is permissible without a warrant, a search soon thereafter
at the police station is permissible if the vehicle is impounded. Chambers, supra; Texas v. White, 423 U. S.
67 . These decisions are based on the practicalities of
the situations presented and a realistic appraisal of the
relatively minor protection that a contrary rule would provide for
privacy interests. Given the scope of the initial intrusion caused
by a seizure of an automobile -- which often could leave the
occupants stranded on the highway -- the Court rejected an
inflexible rule that would force police officers in every case
either to post guard at the vehicle while a warrant is obtained or
to tow the vehicle itself to the station. Similarly, if an
immediate search on the scene could be conducted, but not one at
the station if the vehicle is impounded, police often simply would
search the vehicle on the street -- at no advantage to the
occupants, yet possibly at certain cost to the police. The rules as
applied in particular cases may appear unsatisfactory. They
reflect, however, a reasoned application of the more general rule
that, if an individual gives the police probable cause to believe a
vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed
on his way without official interference.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															After reviewing the relevant authorities at some length, the
Court concluded that the probable cause requirement was satisfied
in the case before it. The Court held that

															"the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the
automobile which they stopped and searched."

															267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 162 . Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.
S. 160 , 338 U. S.
176 -177; Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98 , 361 U. S.
102 .

															[ Footnote 11 ] See Husty v. United States, 282 U.
S. 694 ; Scher v. United States, 305 U.
S. 251 ; Brinegar v. United States, supra; Henry v.
United States, supra; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U. S. 216 ; Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Texas v. White, supra; Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U. S. 1 .

															Warrantless searches of automobiles have been upheld in a
variety of factual contexts quite different from that presented in Carroll. Cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S.
58 ; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 ; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 . Many of these searches do not require a showing
of probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband. We are not
called upon to -- and do not -- consider in this case the scope of
the warrantless search that is permitted in those cases.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															As the Court in Carroll concluded:

															"We here find the line of distinction between legal and illegal
seizures of liquor in transport in vehicles. It is certainly a
reasonable distinction. It gives the owner of an automobile or
other vehicle seized under Section 26, in absence of probable
cause, a right to have restored to him the automobile, it protects
him under the Weeks [ Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S.
383 ] and Amos [ Amos v. United States, 255 U. S.
313 ] cases from use of the liquor as evidence against
him, and it subjects the officer making the seizures to damages. On
the other hand, in a case showing probable cause, the Government
and its officials are given the opportunity, which they should
have, to make the investigation necessary to trace reasonably
suspected contraband goods and to seize them."

															267 U.S. at 267 U. S.
156 .

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															The District Court noted:

															"In this case, there was no nexus between the search and the
automobile, merely a coincidence. The challenged search in this
case was one of a footlocker, not an automobile. The search took
place not in an automobile, but in [the federal building]. The only
connection that the automobile had to this search was that, prior
to its seizure, the footlocker was placed on the floor of an
automobile's open trunk." United State v. Chadwick, 393 F.
Supp. 763 , 772 (Mass.1975).

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															This Court specifically noted:

															"The Government does not contend that the footlocker's brief
contact with Chadwick's car makes this an automobile search, but it
is argued that the rationale of our automobile search cases
demonstrates the reasonableness of permitting warrantless searches
of luggage; the Government views such luggage as analogous to motor
vehicles for Fourth Amendment purposes."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S.
11 -12.

															[ Footnote 15 ] See id. at 433 U. S. 17 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															The Court concluded that there is a significant difference
between the seizure of a sealed package and a subsequent search of
its contents; the search of the container in that case was "a far
greater intrusion into Fourth Amendment values than the impoundment
of the footlocker." Id. at 433 U. S. 14 , n.
8. A temporary seizure of a package or piece of luggage often may
be accomplished without as significant an intrusion upon the
individual -- and without as great a burden on the police as in the
case of the seizure of an automobile. See n 9, supra. [ Footnote 17 ]

															The Arkansas Supreme Court carefully reviewed the facts of the
case and concluded:

															"The information supplied to the police by the confidential
informant is adequate to support the State's claim that the police
had probable cause to believe that appellant's green suitcase
contained a controlled substance when the police confiscated the
suitcase and opened it." Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 599, 559 S.W.2d 70, 706
(1977). The court also noted: "The evidence in this case supports
the conclusion that the relationship between the suitcase and the
taxicab is coincidental." Id. at 600, n. 2, 559 S.W.2d at
706, n. 2.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															Moreover, none of the practical difficulties associated with the
detention of a vehicle on a public highway that made the immediate
search in Carroll reasonable could justify an immediate
search of the suitcase, since the officers had no interest in
detaining the taxi or its driver.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The Court stated that

															"the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers
and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized
from an automobile."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 764 ,
n. 13. This general rule was limited only by the observation
that

															"[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during the
course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example, a kit of burglar
tools or a gun case), by their very nature, cannot support any
reasonable expectation of privacy, because their content can be
inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases,
the contents of a package will be open to 'plain view,' thereby
obviating the need for a warrant." Ibid. [ Footnote 20 ] People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d
34 , 39, 162 Cal. Rptr.
780 , 782 (1980).

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															"While the plurality's blanket warrant requirement does not even
purport to protect any privacy interest, it would impose
substantial new burdens on law enforcement. Confronted with a cigar
box or a Dixie cup in the course of a probable cause search of an
automobile for narcotics, the conscientious policeman would be
required to take the object to a magistrate, fill out the
appropriate forms, await the decision, and finally obtain the
warrant. Suspects or vehicles normally will be detained while the
warrant is sought. This process may take hours, removing the
officer from his normal police duties. Expenditure of such time and
effort, drawn from the public's limited resources for detecting or
preventing crimes, is justified when it protects an individual's
reasonable privacy interests. In my view, the plurality's
requirement cannot be so justified. The aggregate burden of
procuring warrants whenever an officer has probable cause to search
the most trivial container may be heavy, and will not be
compensated by the advancement of important Fourth Amendment
values."

															453 U.S. at 453 U. S.
433 -434 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).

															The substantial burdens on law enforcement identified by JUSTICE
POWELL would, of course, not be affected by the character of the
container found during an automobile search. No comparable
practical problems arise when the official suspicion is confined to
a particular piece of luggage, as in Chadwick and Sanders. Cf. n 19, supra. [ Footnote 22 ]

															The en banc Court of Appeals stated that, "[b]ased on the tip
the police received, Ross's car was properly stopped and searched,
and the pouch and bag were properly seized." 210 U.S.App.D.C. at
361, 655 F.2d at 1168 (footnote omitted). The court explained:

															"[W]e believe it clear that the police had ample and reasonable
cause to stop Ross and to search his car. The informer had supplied
accurate information on prior occasions, and he was an eyewitness
to sales of narcotics by Ross. He said he had just seen Ross take
narcotics from the trunk of his car in making a sale, and heard him
say he possessed additional narcotics." Id. at 361, n. 22, 655 F.2d at 1168, n. 22. The court
further noted: "In this case, the informant told the police that
Ross had narcotics in the trunk of his car. No specific container
was identified." Id. at 359, 655 F.2d at 1166.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															At the suppression hearing, defense counsel asked the police
officer who had conducted the search: "Isn't it possible to put
other goods in a bag that has the resemblance of a whiskey bag?"
The officer responded: "I suppose it is. I did not think of that at
that time. I knew it was whiskey, I was sure it was." App. O.T.
1930, No. 477, p. 27.

															[ Footnote 24 ]

															App. O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 33. The brief of then Solicitor
General Robert Jackson noted that the items searched

															"were wrapped in very heavy brown wrapping paper with at least
two wrappings and with a heavy cord around them cross-wise, so that
they could readily be lifted."

															Brief for United States, O.T. 1938, No. 49, p. 6.

															[ Footnote 25 ] See, e.g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147,
149-150 (CA5 1974) (en banc); United States v. Vento, 533
F.2d 838, 867, n. 101 (CA3 1976); United States v.
Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104 (CA2 1975); United States v.
Issod, 508 F.2d 990, 993 (CA7 1974); United States v.
Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 994 (CA9 1973); United States v.
Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (CA10 1973). Many courts continued to
apply this rule following the decision in Chadwick. Cf. United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 526-527 (CA3
1979); United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1144-1145
(CA5 1978); United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637,
640-641 (CA9 1977). In ruling that police could search luggage and
other containers found during a legitimate warrantless search of an
automobile, courts often assumed that the "automobile exception" of Carroll applied whenever a container in an automobile was
believed to contain contraband. That view, of course, has since
been qualified by Chadwick and Sanders. [ Footnote 26 ]

															It is noteworthy that the early legislation on which the Court
relied in Carroll concerned the enforcement of laws
imposing duties on imported merchandise. See nn. 6 and | 6 and S. 798fn7|>7, supra. Presumably, such
merchandise was shipped then in containers of various kinds, just
as it is today. Since Congress had authorized warrantless searches
of vessels and beasts for imported merchandise, it is inconceivable
that it intended a customs officer to obtain a warrant for every
package discovered during the search; certainly Congress intended
customs officers to open shipping containers when necessary, and
not merely to examine the exterior of cartons or boxes in which
smuggled goods might be concealed. During virtually the entire
history of our country -- whether contraband was transported in a
horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern automobile -- it
has been assumed that a lawful search of a vehicle would include a
search of any container that might conceal the object of the
search.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															In describing the permissible scope of a search of a home
pursuant to a warrant, Professor LaFave notes:

															"Places within the described premises are not excluded merely
because some additional act of entry or opening may be
required."

															"In countless cases in which warrants described only the land
and the buildings, a search of desks, cabinets, closets and similar
items has been permitted."

															2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 152 (1978) (quoting Massey
v. Commonwealth, 305
S.W.2d 755 , 756 (Ky.1957)).

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															The practical considerations that justify a warrantless search
of an automobile continue to apply until the entire search of the
automobile and its contents has been completed. Arguably, the
entire vehicle itself (including its upholstery) could be searched
without a warrant, with all wrapped articles and containers found
during that search then taken to a magistrate. But prohibiting
police from opening immediately a container in which the object of
the search is most likely to be found, and instead forcing them
first to comb the entire vehicle, would actually exacerbate the
intrusion on privacy interests. Moreover, until the container
itself was opened, the police could never be certain that the
contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered portion of the
vehicle; thus, in every case in which a container was found, the
vehicle would need to be secured while a warrant was obtained. Such
a requirement would be directly inconsistent with the rationale
supporting the decisions in Carroll and Chambers. Cf. nn. 19 and | 19 and S. 798fn22|>22, supra. [ Footnote 29 ] Cf. 453 U.S. at 453 U. S.
426 -427 (plurality opinion); id. at 453 U. S. 436 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); id. at 453 U. S. 443 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); id. at 453 U. S. 447 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth
Amendment protects only those containers that objectively manifest
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the
propriety of a warrantless search necessarily would turn on much
more than the fabric of the container. A paper bag stapled shut and
marked "private" might be found to manifest a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box stacked on top of
two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless
search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the
surrounding circumstances.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															"'The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind
may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the King of England cannot enter -- all his force dares not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement!'" Miller v. United States, 357 U.
S. 301 , 357 U. S. 307 (quoting remarks attributed to William Pitt); cf. Payton v. New
York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S. 601 ,
n. 54.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															In choosing to search without a warrant on their own assessment
of probable cause, police officers, of course, lose the protection
that a warrant would provide to them in an action for damages
brought by an individual claiming that the search was
unconstitutional. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.
S. 167 . Although an officer may establish that he acted
in good faith in conducting the search by other evidence, a warrant
issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish it.

															[ Footnote 33 ]

															Any interest in maintaining the status quo that might
be asserted by persons who may have structured their business of
distributing narcotics or other illicit substances on the basis of
judicial precedents clearly would not be legitimate.

															JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring.

															My dissents in prior cases have indicated my continuing
dissatisfaction and discomfort with the Court's vacillation in what
is rightly described as "this troubled area." Ante at 456 U. S. 817 . See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 , 433 U. S. 17 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 , 442 U. S. 768 (1979); Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420 , 453 U. S. 436 (1981).

															I adhere to the views expressed in those dissents. It is
important, however, not only for the Court as an institution, but
also for law enforcement officials and defendants, that the
applicable legal rules be clearly established. JUSTICE STEVENS'
opinion for the Court now accomplishes much in this respect, and it
should clarify a good bit of the confusion that has existed. In
order to have an authoritative ruling, I join the Court's opinion
and judgment. Page 456 U. S. 826 JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.

															In my opinion in Robbins v. California, 453 U.
S. 420 , 453 U. S. 429 (1981), concurring in the judgment, I stated that the judgment was
justified, though not compelled, by the Court's opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979). I did not agree, however, with the "bright line" rule
articulated by the plurality opinion. Rather, I repeated the view I
long have held that one's "reasonable expectation of privacy" is a
particularly relevant factor in determining the validity of a
warrantless search. I have recognized that, with respect to
automobiles in general, this expectation can be only a limited one. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, at 442 U. S. 761 ; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.
S. 266 , 413 U. S. 279 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring). I continue to think that, in many
situations, one's reasonable expectation of privacy may be a
decisive factor in a search case.

															It became evident last Term, however, from the five opinions
written in Robbins -- in none of which THE CHIEF JUSTICE
joined -- that it is essential to have a Court opinion in
automobile search cases that provides "specific guidance to police
and courts in this recurring situation." Robbins v. California,
supra, at 453 U. S. 435 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). The Court's opinion today,
written by JUSTICE STEVENS and now joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
four other Justices, will afford this needed guidance. It is fair
also to say that, given Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42 (1970), the Court's decision does not depart
substantially from Fourth Amendment doctrine in automobile cases.
Moreover, in enunciating a readily understood and applied rule,
today's decision is consistent with the similar step taken last
Term in New York v. Belton, 453 U.
S. 454 (1981).

															I join the Court's opinion.

															JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

															I would not overrule Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981). For the reasons stated by Justice Stewart in that Page 456 U. S. 827 case, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I
also agree with much of JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent in this
case.

															JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins,
dissenting.

															The majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on
warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement itself. By equating a police officer's
estimation of probable cause with a magistrate's, the Court utterly
disregards the value of a neutral and detached magistrate. For, as
we recently, and unanimously, reaffirmed:

															"The warrant traditionally has represented an independent
assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed without
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, and that
the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime.
Thus, an issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral
and detached, and he must be capable of determining whether
probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search. This
Court long has insisted that inferences of probable cause be drawn
by"

															"a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.
S. 345 , 407 U. S. 350 (1972), quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948). A police officer on the beat hardly satisfies these
standards. In adopting today's new rule, the majority opinion shows
contempt for these Fourth Amendment values, ignores this Court's
precedents, is internally inconsistent, and produces anomalous and
unjust consequences. I therefore dissent. I According to the majority, whenever police have probable cause
to believe that contraband may be found within an Page 456 U. S. 828 automobile that they have stopped on the highway, [ Footnote 2/1 ] they may search not only the
automobile but also any container found inside it, without
obtaining a warrant. The scope of the search, we are told, is as
broad as a magistrate could authorize in a warrant to search the
automobile. The majority makes little attempt to justify this rule
in terms of recognized Fourth Amendment values. The Court simply
ignores the critical function that a magistrate serves. And
although the Court purports to rely on the mobility of an
automobile and the impracticability of obtaining a warrant, it
never explains why these concerns permit the warrantless search of
a container, which can easily be seized and immobilized while
police are obtaining a warrant.

															The new rule adopted by the Court today is completely
incompatible with established Fourth Amendment principles, and
takes a first step toward an unprecedented "probable cause"
exception to the warrant requirement. In my view, under accepted
standards, the warrantless search of the containers in this case
clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. A "[I]t is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and
well delineated exceptions.'" Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 , 437 U. S. 390 (1978), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 (1967). The warrant requirement is crucial to protecting Fourth
Amendment rights because of the importance of having the probable
cause determination made in the first instance by a neutral and
detached magistrate. Time and Page 456 U. S. 829 again, we have emphasized that the warrant requirement provides
a number of protections that a post hoc judicial
evaluation of a policeman's probable cause does not.

															The requirement of prior review by a detached and neutral
magistrate limits the concentration of power held by executive
officers over the individual, and prevents some overbroad or
unjustified searches from occurring at all. See United States
v. United States District Court, 407 U.
S. 297 , 407 U. S. 317 (1972); Abel v. United States, 362 U.
S. 217 , 362 U. S. 252 (1960) (BRENNAN, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Black and Douglas,
JJ., dissenting). Prior review may also "prevent hindsight from
coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or
seizure." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.
S. 543 , 428 U. S. 565 (1976); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S.
89 , 379 U. S. 96 (1964). Furthermore, even if a magistrate would have authorized the
search that the police conducted, the interposition of a
magistrate's neutral judgment reassures the public that the orderly
process of law has been respected:

															"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead
of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, supra, at 333 U. S. 13 -14. See also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.
S. 307 , 436 U. S. 323 (1978); United States v. United States District Court,
supra, at 407 U. S. 321 .
The safeguards embodied in the warrant requirement apply as
forcefully to automobile searches as to any others.

															Our cases do recognize a narrow exception to the warrant
requirement for certain automobile searches. Throughout our
decisions, two major considerations have been advanced to justify
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Page 456 U. S. 830 We have upheld only those searches that are actually justified
by those considerations.

															First, these searches have been justified on the basis of the
exigency of the mobility of the automobile. See, e.g., Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925). This "mobility" rationale is something of
a misnomer, cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 , 413 U. S.
442 -443 (1973), since the police ordinarily can remove
the car's occupants and secure the vehicle on the spot. However,
the inherent mobility of the vehicle often creates situations in
which the police's only alternative to an immediate search may be
to release the automobile from their possession. [ Footnote 2/2 ] This alternative creates an
unacceptably high risk of losing the contents of the vehicle, and
is a principal basis for the Court's automobile exception to the
warrant requirement. See Chambers, supra, at 399 U. S. 51 , n.
9.

															In many cases, however, the police will, prior to searching the
car, have cause to arrest the occupants and bring them to the
station for booking. In this situation, the police can ordinarily
seize the automobile and bring it to the station. Because the
vehicle is now in the exclusive control of the authorities, any
subsequent search cannot be justified by the mobility of the car.
Rather, an immediate warrantless search of the vehicle is permitted
because of the second major justification for the automobile
exception: the diminished expectation of privacy in an
automobile.

															Because an automobile presents much of its contents in open view
to police officers who legitimately stop it on a public way, is
used for travel, and is subject to significant government Page 456 U. S. 831 regulation, this Court has determined that the intrusion of a
warrantless search of an automobile is constitutionally less
significant than a warrantless search of more private areas. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 , 442 U. S. 761 (1979) (collecting cases). This justification has been invoked for
warrantless automobile searches in circumstances where the exigency
of mobility was clearly not present. See, e.g., South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 428 U. S.
367 -368 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, at 413 U. S.
441 -442. By focusing on the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy, this Court has refused to require a warrant
in situations where the process of obtaining such a warrant would
be more intrusive than the actual search itself. Cf. Katz v.
United States, supra. A defendant may consider the seizure of
the car a greater intrusion than an immediate search. See
Chambers, supra, at 399 U. S. 51 -52.
Therefore, even where police can bring both the defendant and the
automobile to the station safely and can house the car while they
seek a warrant, the police are permitted to decide whether instead
to conduct an immediate search of the car. In effect, the
warrantless search is permissible because a warrant requirement
would not provide significant protection of the defendant's Fourth
Amendment interests. B The majority's rule is flatly inconsistent with these
established Fourth Amendment principles concerning the scope of the
automobile exception and the importance of the warrant requirement.
Historically, the automobile exception has been limited to those
situations where its application is compelled by the justifications
described above. Today, the majority makes no attempt to base its
decision on these justifications. This failure is not surprising,
since the traditional rationales for the automobile exception
plainly do not support extending it to the search of a container
found inside a vehicle. Page 456 U. S. 832 The practical mobility problem -- deciding what to do with both
the car and the occupants if an immediate search is not conducted
-- is simply not present in the case of movable containers, which
can easily be seized and brought to the magistrate. See
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
762 -766, and nn. 10, 14. The "lesser expectation of
privacy" rationale also has little force. A container, as opposed
to the car itself, does not reflect diminished privacy interests. See id. at 442 U. S. 762 , 442 U. S.
764 -765. Moreover, the practical corollary that this
Court has recognized -- that depriving occupants of the use of a
car may be a greater intrusion than an immediate search -- is of
doubtful relevance here, since the owner of a container will rarely
suffer significant inconvenience by being deprived of its use while
a warrant is being obtained.

															Ultimately, the majority, unable to rely on the justifications
underlying the automobile exception, simply creates a new "probable
cause" exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles. We
have soundly rejected attempts to create such an exception in the
past, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971), and we should do so again today.

															In purported reliance on Carroll v. United States,
supra, the Court defines the permissible scope of a search by
reference to the scope of a probable cause search that a magistrate
could authorize. Under Carroll, however, the mobility of
an automobile is what is critical to the egality of a warrantless
search. Of course, Carroll properly confined the search to
the probable cause limits that would also limit a magistrate, but
it did not suggest that the search could be as broad as a
magistrate could authorize upon a warrant. A magistrate could
authorize a search encompassing containers, even though the
mobility rationale does not justify such a broad search. Indeed,
the Court's reasoning might have justified the search of the entire
car in Coolidge despite the fact that the car was not
"mobile" at all. Thus, in blithely suggesting that Carroll "neither broadened nor limited the scope of a lawful search based
on probable cause," Page 456 U. S. 833 ante at 456 U. S. 820 ,
the majority assumes what has never been the law: that the scope of
the automobile mobility exception to the warrant requirement is as
broad as the scope of a "lawful" probable cause search of an
automobile, i.e., one authorized by a magistrate.

															The majority's sleight of hand ignores the obvious differences
between the function served by a magistrate in making a
determination of probable cause and the function of the automobile
exception. It is irrelevant to a magistrate's function whether the
items subject to search are mobile, may be in danger of
destruction, or are impractical to store, or whether an immediate
search would be less intrusive than a seizure without a warrant. A
magistrate's only concern is whether there is probable cause to
search them. Where suspicion has focused not on a particular item,
but only on a vehicle, home, or office, the magistrate might
reasonably authorize a search of closed containers at the location
as well. But an officer on the beat who searches an automobile
without a warrant is not entitled to conduct a broader search than
the exigency obviating the warrant justifies. After all, what
justifies the warrantless search is not probable cause alone, but probable cause coupled with the mobility of the
automobile. Because the scope of a warrantless search
should depend on the scope of the justification for dispensing with
a warrant, the entire premise of the majority's opinion fails to
support its conclusion.

															The majority's rule masks the startling assumption that a
policeman's determination of probable cause is the functional
equivalent of the determination of a neutral and detached
magistrate. This assumption ignores a major premise of the warrant
requirement -- the importance of having a neutral and detached
magistrate determine whether probable cause exists. See
supra at 456 U. S.
828 -829. The majority's explanation that the scope of
the warrantless automobile search will be "limited" to what a
magistrate could authorize is thus inconsistent with our cases,
which firmly establish that an on-the-spot Page 456 U. S. 834 determination of probable cause is never the same as a
decision by a neutral and detached magistrate. C Our recent decisions in United States v. Chadwick,\ 433 U. S. 1 (1977),
Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, and Robbins v.
California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981), clearly affirm that movable containers are different from
automobiles for Fourth Amendment purposes. In Chadwick, the Court drew a constitutional distinction between luggage and
automobiles in terms of substantial differences in expectations of
privacy. 433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 12 .
Moreover, the Court held that the mobility of such containers does
not justify dispensing with a warrant, since federal agents had
seized the luggage and safely transferred it to their custody under
their exclusive control. Sanders explicitly held that

															"the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to
personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it
applies to such luggage in other locations."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 766 .
And Robbins reaffirmed the Sanders rationale as
applied to wrapped packages found in the unlocked luggage
compartment of a vehicle. 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 425 .
[ Footnote 2/3 ]

															In light of these considerations, I conclude that any movable
container found within an automobile deserves precisely the same
degree of Fourth Amendment warrant protection that it would deserve
if found at a location outside the automobile. See
Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
763 -765, and n. 13; Chadwick, supra, at 433 U. S. 17 , n.
1 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Chadwick , as the majority
notes, "reaffirmed the general principle that closed packages and
containers may not be Page 456 U. S. 835 searched without a warrant." Ante at 456 U. S. 812 .
Although there is no need to describe the exact contours of that
protection in this dissenting opinion, it is clear enough that
closed, opaque containers -- regardless of whether they are
"worthy" or are always used to store personal items -- are
ordinarily fully protected. Cf. Sanders, supra, at 442 U. S. 764 ,
n. 13. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															Here, because respondent Ross had placed the evidence in
question in a closed paper bag, the container could be seized, but
not searched, without a warrant. No practical exigencies required
the warrantless searches on the street or at the station: Ross had
been arrested and was in custody when both searches occurred, and
the police succeeded in transporting the bag to the station without
inadvertently spilling its contents. [ Footnote 2/5 ] II In announcing its new rule, the Court purports to rely on
earlier automobile search cases, especially Carroll v. United
States. The Court's approach, however, far from being
"faithful to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that the
Court has followed with substantial consistency throughout our
history," ante at 456 U. S. 824 , is plainly contrary to the letter and the
spirit of our prior automobile search cases. Moreover, the new rule
produces anomalous and unacceptable consequences. Page 456 U. S. 836 A The majority's argument that its decision is supported by our
decisions in Carroll and Chambers is misplaced.
The Court in Carroll upheld a warrantless search of an
automobile for contraband on the basis of the impracticability of
securing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of
contraband goods. The Court did not, however, suggest that
obtaining a warrant for the search of an automobile is always
impracticable. [ Footnote 2/6 ]

															"In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used. . . . In cases where seizure
is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts
unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable
cause."

															267 U.S. at 267 U. S. 156 (emphasis added). [ Footnote 2/7 ] As
this Court reaffirmed in Chambers, 399 U.S. Page 456 U. S. 837 at 399 U. S.
50 ,

															"[n]either Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this
Court require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the
search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the
extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords."

															Notwithstanding the reasoning of these cases, the majority
argues that Carroll and Chambers support its
decisions because integral compartments of a car are functionally
equivalent to containers found within a car, and because the
practical advantages to the police of the Carroll doctrine

															"would be largely nullified if the permissible scope of a
warrantless search of an automobile did not include containers and
packages found inside the vehicle." Ante at 456 U. S. 820 .
Neither of these arguments is persuasive. First, the Court's
argument that allowing warrantless searches of certain integral
compartments of the car in Carroll and Chambers, while protecting movable containers within the car, would be
"illogical" and "absurd," ante at 456 U. S. 818 ,
ignores the reason why this Court has allowed warrantless searches
of automobile compartments. Surely an integral compartment within a
car is just as mobile, and presents the same practical problems of
safekeeping, as the car itself. This cannot be said of movable
containers located within the car. The fact that there may be a
high expectation of privacy in both containers and compartments is
irrelevant, since the privacy rationale is not, and cannot be, the
justification for the warrantless search of compartments.

															The Court's second argument, which focuses on the practical
advantages to police of the Carroll doctrine, fares no
better. The practical considerations which concerned the Carroll Court involved the difficulty of immobilizing a
vehicle while a warrant must be obtained. The Court had no occasion
to address whether containers present the same practical
difficulties as the car itself or integral compartments of the car.
They do not. See supra at 456 U. S. 832 . Carroll hardly suggested, as the Court implies, ante at 456 U. S. 820 ,
that a warrantless Page 456 U. S. 838 search is justified simply because it assists police in
obtaining more evidence.

															Although it can find no support for its rule in this Court's
precedents or in the traditional justifications for the automobile
exception, the majority offers another justification. In a
footnote, the majority suggests that "practical considerations"
militate against securing containers found during an automobile
search and taking them to the magistrate. Ante at 456 U. S. 821 ,
n. 28. The Court confidently remarks:

															"[P]rohibiting police from opening immediately a container in
which the object of the search is most likely to be found, and
instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle, would
actually exacerbate the intrusion on privacy interests. Moreover,
until the container itself was opened, the police could never be
certain that the contraband was not secreted in a yet undiscovered
portion of the vehicle." Ibid. The vehicle would have to be seized while a
warrant was obtained, a requirement inconsistent with Carroll and Chambers. Ante at 456 U. S. 821 ,
n. 28.

															This explanation is unpersuasive. As this Court explained in Sanders, and as the majority today implicitly concedes,
the burden to police departments of seizing a package or personal
luggage simply does not compare to the burden of seizing and
safeguarding automobiles. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 765 ,
n. 14; ante at 456 U. S. 811 ,
and n. 16. Other aspects of the Court's explanation are also
implausible. The search will not always require a "combing" of the
entire vehicle, since police may be looking for a particular item,
and may discover it promptly. If, instead, they are looking more
generally for evidence of a crime, the immediate opening of the
container will not protect the defendant's privacy; whether or not
it contains contraband, the police will continue to search for new
evidence. Finally, the defendant, not the police, should be
afforded the choice whether he prefers the immediate opening of his
suitcase or other container to the delay incident to seeking a
warrant. Cf. Sanders, supra, at 442 U. S. 764 ,
n. 12. The more reasonable Page 456 U. S. 839 presumption, if a presumption is to replace the defendant's
consent, is surely that the immediate search of a closed container
will be a greater invasion of the defendant's privacy interests
than a mere temporary seizure of the container. [ Footnote 2/8 ] B Finally, the majority's new rule is theoretically unsound, and
will create anomalous and unwarranted results. These consequences
are readily apparent from the Court's attempt to reconcile its new
rule with the holdings of Chadwick and Sanders. [ Footnote 2/9 ] The Court suggests
that probable cause to search only a container does not justify a
warrantless search of an automobile in which it is placed, absent
reason to believe that the contents could be secreted elsewhere in
the vehicle. This, the majority asserts, is an indication that the
new rule is carefully limited to its justification, and is not
inconsistent with Chadwick and Sanders. But why
is such a container more private, less difficult for police to
seize and store, or in any other relevant respect more properly
subject to the warrant Page 456 U. S. 840 requirement, than a container that police discover in a probable
cause search of an entire automobile? [ Footnote 2/10 ] This rule plainly has peculiar and
unworkable consequences: the Government

															"must show that the investigating officer knew enough, but not
too much, that he had sufficient knowledge to establish probable
cause, but insufficient knowledge to know exactly where the
contraband was located."

															210 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 384, 655 F.2d 1159, 1201 (1981) (en banc)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).

															Alternatively, the majority may be suggesting that Chadwick and Sanders may be explained because the
connection of the container to the vehicle was incidental in these
two cases. That is, because police had preexisting probable cause
to seize and search the containers, they were not entitled to wait
until the item was placed in a vehicle to take advantage of the
automobile exception. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 519-525 (1978). I
wholeheartedly agree that police cannot employ a pretext to escape
Fourth Amendment prohibitions, and cannot rely on an exigency that
they could easily have avoided. This interpretation, however, might
well be an exception that swallows up the majority's rule. In
neither Chadwick nor Sanders did the Court
suggest that the delay of the police was a pretext for taking
advantage of the automobile exception. For all that appears, the
Government may have had legitimate reasons for not searching as
soon as they had probable cause. In any event, asking police to
rely Page 456 U. S. 841 on such an uncertain line in distinguishing between legitimate
and illegitimate searches for containers in automobiles hardly
indicates that the majority's approach has brought clarification to
this area of the law. Ante at 456 U. S. 804 ; see Robbins, 453 U.S. at 453 U. S. 435 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). [ Footnote 2/11 ] III The Court today ignores the clear distinction that Chadwick established between movable containers and
automobiles. It also rejects all of the relevant reasoning of Sanders [ Footnote 2/12 ]
and offers a substitute rationale that appears inconsistent with
the result. See supra at 456 U. S. 832 . Sanders is therefore effectively overruled. And the Court
unambiguously overrules "the disposition" of Robbins, ante at 456 U. S. 824 ,
though it gingerly avoids stating that it is overruling the case
itself.

															The only convincing explanation I discern for the majority's
broad rule is expediency: it assists police in conducting Page 456 U. S. 842 automobile searches, ensuring that the private containers into
which criminal suspects often place goods will no longer be a
Fourth Amendment shield. See ante at 456 U. S. 820 .
"When a legitimate search is under way," the Court instructs
us,

															"nice distinctions between . . . glove compartments, upholstered
seats, trunks, and wrapped packages . . . must give way to the
interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand." Ante at 456 U. S. 821 .
No "nice distinctions" are necessary, however, to comprehend the
well recognized differences between movable containers (which, even
after today's decision, would be subject to the warrant requirement
if located outside an automobile), and the automobile itself,
together with its integral parts. Nor can I pass by the majority's
glib assertion that the "prompt and efficient completion of the
task at hand" is paramount to the Fourth Amendment interests of our
citizens. I had thought it well established that "the mere fact
that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never, by
itself, justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. at 437 U. S. 393 .
[ Footnote 2/13 ]

															This case will have profound implications for the privacy of
citizens traveling in automobiles, as the Court well
understands.

															"For countless vehicles are stopped on highways and public
streets every day, and our cases demonstrate that it is not
uncommon for police officers to have probable cause to believe that
contraband may be found in a stopped vehicle." Ante at 456 U. S.
803 -804. A closed paper bag, a toolbox, a knapsack, a
suitcase, and an attache case can alike be searched without the
protection of the judgment of a neutral magistrate, based only on
the rarely disturbed decision of a police officer that he has
probable cause to search for contraband in the vehicle. [ Footnote 2/14 ] The Court derives
satisfaction from Page 456 U. S. 843 the fact that its rule does not exalt the rights of the wealthy
over the rights of the poor. Ante at 456 U. S. 822 .
A rule so broad that all citizens lose vital Fourth Amendment
protection is no cause for celebration.

															I dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court confines its holding today to automobiles stopped on
the highway which police have probable cause to believe contain
contraband. I do not understand the Court to address the
applicability of the automobile exception rule announced today to
parked cars. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The fact that the police are able initially to remove the
occupants from the car does not remove the justification for an
immediate search. If police could not conduct an immediate search
of a stopped automobile, they would often be left with the
difficult task of deciding what to do with the occupants while a
warrant is obtained. In the case of a parked automobile, by
contrast, if the automobile is unoccupied, this problem is not
presented. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
supra. [ Footnote 2/3 ]

															The plurality stated:

															"[ Chadwick and Sanders ] made clear, if it was
not clear before, that a closed piece of luggage found in a
lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same
extent as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 453 U. S.
425 .

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															This rule may present some linedrawing problems, but no greater
than those presented when a movable container is in the arms of a
citizen walking down the street. There is no justification for
relying on marginal difficulties of definition to reject a warrant
requirement in one situation but not the other.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															The Government argues that less secure containers such as paper
bags can easily spill their contents; thus, no privacy interest of
the defendant is protected if police are required to seize the
container and bring it to the station. Whatever the force of this
argument in other contexts, here police succeeded in reclosing the
bag after the initial search and transporting it to the station
without incident.

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															The Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925), seems to have assumed that the police
could not arrest the occupants of the automobile, since the offense
was a misdemeanor and was not deemed to have been committed in the
officers' presence. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure
511 (1978). Accordingly, police were faced with an exigency often
not encountered today in searches of stopped automobiles: in order
to seize the car pending the securing of a warrant, they would have
to leave the occupants stranded.

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															In Carroll, of course, no movable container was
searched. Although in other early cases, containers may, in fact,
have been searched, see ante at 456 U. S.
818 -819, the parties did not litigate in this Court the
question whether containers deserve separate protection.

															The Court's suggestion that the absence of such an argument
"illuminates the profession's understanding of the scope of the
search permitted under Carroll, " ante at 456 U. S. 819 ,
is an unusual approach to constitutional interpretation. I would
hesitate to rely upon the "profession's understanding" of the
Fourteenth Amendment or of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), in the early part of this century as justification for not
granting Negroes constitutional protection. See Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Moreover, for a number of reasons, including the broad
scope of the permitted search incident to arrest prior to Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969), and the uncertain meaning of a "search" prior to Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), the profession formerly advanced different arguments
against automobile searches than it advances today.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Seizures of automobiles can be distinguished because of the
greater interest of defendants in continuing possession of their
means of transportation; in the case of automobiles, a seizure is
more likely to be a greater intrusion than an immediate search. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 , 399 U. S. 51 -52
(1970).

															[ Footnote 2/9 ]

															Both cases would appear to fall within the majority's new rule.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1 (1977), federal agents had probable cause to search a
footlocker. Although the footlocker had been placed in the trunk of
a car and the occupants were about to depart, the Court refused to
rely on the automobile exception to uphold the search. (It is true
that the United States did not argue in this Court that the search
was justified pursuant to that exception, but the theory was hardly
so novel that this Court could not have responsibly relied upon
it.) In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.
S. 753 (1979), too, the suitcase was mobile, and police
had probable cause to search it; it was carried in an automobile
for several blocks before the automobile was stopped and the
suitcase was seized and searched. Again, however, this Court
invalidated the search.

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															In a footnote, the Court appears to suggest a more pragmatic
rationale for distinguishing Chadwick and Sanders -- that no practical problems comparable to those engendered by a
general search of a vehicle would arise if the official suspicion
is confined to a particular piece of luggage. Ante at 456 U. S. 816 ,
n. 21. This suggestion is illogical. A general search might
disclose only a single item worth searching; conversely,
preexisting suspicion might attach to a number of items later
placed in a car. Surely the protection of the warrant requirement
cannot depend on a numerical count of the items subject to
search.

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															Unless one of these alternative explanations is adopted, the
Court's attempt to distinguish the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders is not only unpersuasive, but appears to
contradict the Court's own theory. The Court suggests that, in each
case, the connection of the container to the vehicle was simply
coincidental, and notes that the police did not have probable cause
to search the entire vehicle. But the police assuredly did have
probable cause to search the vehicle for the container. The Court states that the scope of the permitted warrantless search
is determined only by what a magistrate could authorize. Ante at 456 U. S. 823 .
Once police found that container, according to the Court's own
rule, they should have been entitled to search at least the
container without a warrant. There was probable cause to search,
and the car was mobile in each case.

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															The Court suggests that it rejects "some of the reasoning in Sanders. " Ante at 456 U. S. 824 .
But the Court in Sanders unambiguously stated:

															"[W]e hold that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same
degree it applies to such luggage in other locations."

															442 U.S. at 442 U. S. 766 .
The Court today instead adopts the reasoning of the opinion of THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, joined by JUSTICE STEVENS, who refused to join the
majority opinion because of the breadth of it. rationale. Ibid. [ Footnote 2/13 ]

															Of course, efficiency and promptness can never be substituted
for due process and adherence to the Constitution. Is not a
dictatorship the most "efficient" form of government?

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															The Court purports to restrict its rule to areas that the police
have probable cause to search, as "defined by the object of the
search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that it may be found." Ante at 456 U. S. 824 .
I agree, of course, that the probable cause component of the
automobile exception must be strictly construed. I fear, however,
that the restriction that the Court emphasizes may have little
practical value. See 210 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 351, n. 21, 655
F.2d 1159, 1168, n. 21 (1981) (en banc). If police open a container
within a car and find contraband, they may acquire probable cause
to believe that other portions of the car, and other containers
within it, will contain contraband. In practice, the Court's rule
may amount to a wholesale authorization for police to search any
car from top to bottom when they have suspicion, whether localized
or general, that it contains contraband.