NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the United States Reports.
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–193

															_________________

															Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, PETITIONER v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eighth circuit

															[April 17, 2024]

															Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that
her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from
one job to another because she is a woman. She sued the City of St.
Louis under Title VII, alleging that she had suffered sex
discrimination with respect to the “terms [or] conditions” of her
employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The courts below
rejected the claim on the ground that the transfer did not cause
Muldrow a “significant” employment disadvantage. Other courts have
used similar standards in addressing Title VII suits arising from
job transfers.

															Today, we disapprove that approach. Although an
employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a
Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a
significance test. Title VII’s text nowhere establishes that high
bar.

															I

															From 2008 through 2017, Sergeant Muldrow
worked as a plainclothes officer in the St. Louis Police
Department’s specialized Intelligence Division. During her tenure
there, she investigated public corruption and human trafficking
cases, oversaw the Gang Unit, and served as head of the Gun Crimes
Unit. By virtue of her Division position, Muldrow was also
deputized as a Task Force Officer with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation—a status granting her, among other things, FBI
credentials, an unmarked take-home vehicle, and the authority to
pursue investigations outside St. Louis. In 2017, the outgoing
commander of the Intelligence Division told her newly appointed
successor that Muldrow was a “workhorse”—still more, that “if there
was one sergeant he could count on in the Division,” it was
Muldrow. 2020 WL 5505113, *1 (ED Mo., Sept. 11, 2020).

															But the new Intelligence Division commander,
Captain Michael Deeba, instead asked the Department to transfer
Muldrow out of the unit. Deeba wanted to replace Muldrow—whom he
sometimes called “Mrs.” rather than the customary “Sergeant”—with a
male police officer. See id., at *1–*2. That officer, Deeba
later testified, seemed a better fit for the Division’s “very
dangerous” work. Id ., at *2; App. 139. The Department
approved the transfer against Muldrow’s wishes. It reassigned her
to a uniformed job in the Department’s Fifth District.

															While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same
in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did
not. Instead of working with high-ranking officials on the
departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division,
Muldrow now supervised the day-to-day activities of neighborhood
patrol officers. Her new duties included approving their arrests,
reviewing their reports, and handling other administrative matters;
she also did some patrol work herself. Because she no longer served
in the Intelligence Division, she lost her FBI status and the car
that came with it. And the change of jobs made Muldrow’s workweek
less regular. She had worked a traditional Monday-through-Friday
week in the Intelligence Division. Now she was placed on a
“rotating schedule” that often involved weekend shifts. 2020 WL
5505113, *2.

															Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge
the transfer. Her complaint alleged that the City, in ousting her
from the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d] against” her
based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of her
employment. §2000e–2(a)(1). In later deposition testimony, Muldrow
set out her view of what the transfer had cost her. She had been
moved out of a “premier position [in] the Police Department” into a
less “prestigious” and more “administrative” uniformed role. App.
105, 114, 120. She had fewer “opportunities” to work on “important
investigations,” as well as to “network” with commanding officers. Id ., at 104. And she lost material benefits—her weekday work
schedule and take-home car. Or as she summarized the situation: “I
went from straight days, weekends off with a take-home car and more
visibility and responsibility within the Department to a rotating
schedule with few weekends off, assigned to . . .
uniformed patrol,” with “responsibilities being limited to that of
administrative work” and “supervising officers on patrol.” Id ., at 120. Title VII, Muldrow asserted in her suit,
prevented the City from making those changes to her employment
because of her sex.

															The District Court, viewing the matter
differently, granted the City summary judgment. Under Circuit
precedent, the court explained, Muldrow needed to show that her
transfer effected a “significant” change in working conditions
producing “material employment disadvantage.” 2020 WL 5505113,
*8–*9. And Muldrow, the court held, could not meet that
heightened-injury standard. “[S]he experienced no change in salary
or rank.” Id., at *9. Her loss of “the networking
[opportunities] available in Intelligence” was immaterial because
she had not provided evidence that it had harmed her “career
prospects.” Id., at *8. And given her continued “supervisory
role,” she had not “suffered a significant alteration to her work
responsibilities.” Id., at *9. Finally, the District Court
concluded that the switch to a rotating schedule (including weekend
work) and the loss of a take-home vehicle could not fill the gap.
Although mentioning those changes “in her statement of facts,”
Muldrow had not relied on them in “her argument against summary
judgment.” Ibid. , n. 20. And anyway, the court stated,
they “appear to be minor alterations of employment, rather than
material harms.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. It agreed that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the
transfer caused a “materially significant disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th
680, 688 (2022). Like the District Court, the Eighth Circuit
emphasized that the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her
title, salary, or benefits.” Id., at 688–689. And the
Circuit, too, maintained that the change in her job
responsibilities was “insufficient” to support a Title VII claim. Id., at 689. In the Fifth District, the court reasoned,
Muldrow still had a “supervisory role” and participated in
investigating serious crimes. Id., at 688. So the court
thought Muldrow’s view of the new job—“more administrative and less
prestigious”—was unsupported by record evidence and not
“persuasive.” Ibid. The court did not address Muldrow’s new
schedule or her loss of a car, apparently thinking those matters
either forfeited or too slight to mention. Overall, the court held,
Muldrow’s claim could not proceed because she had experienced “only
minor changes in working conditions.” Ibid. We granted certiorari, 600 U. S. ___
(2023), to resolve a Circuit split over whether an employee
challenging a transfer under Title VII must meet a heightened
threshold of harm—be it dubbed significant, serious, or something
similar.[ 1 ] We now vacate the
judgment below because the text of Title VII imposes no such
requirement.

															II

															A

															Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer
“to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Muldrow’s suit, as described
above, alleges that she was transferred to a lesser position
because she is a woman. That transfer, as both parties agree,
implicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s employment,
changing nothing less than the what, where, and when of her police
work. See Brief for Muldrow 19; Brief for City 1, 45–46. So the
statutory language applicable to this case prohibits
“discriminat[ing] against” an individual “with respect to” the
“terms [or] conditions” of employment because of that individual’s
sex.

															That language requires Muldrow to show that the
transfer brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an
employment term or condition. Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc. , 523 U.S.
75 , 80 (1998). The words “discriminate against,” we have
explained, refer to “differences in treatment that injure”
employees. Bostock v. Clayton County , 590 U.S. 644,
681 (2020). Or otherwise said, the statute targets practices that
“treat[ ] a person worse” because of sex or other protected
trait. Id., at 658. And in the typical transfer case, that
“worse” treatment must pertain to—must be “with respect
to”—employment “terms [or] conditions.” §2000e–2(a)(1). The “terms
[or] conditions” phrase, we have made clear, is not used “in the
narrow contractual sense”; it covers more than the “economic or
tangible.” Oncale , 523 U. S., at 78; Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S.
57 , 64 (1986). Still, the phrase circumscribes the injuries
that can give rise to a suit like this one. To make out a Title VII
discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting
an identifiable term or condition of employment.

															What the transferee does not have to show,
according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was
“significant.” 30 F. 4th, at 688. Or serious, or substantial, or
any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the
employee must exceed a heightened bar. See supra, at 4, and
4–5, n. 1. “Discriminate against” means treat worse, here
based on sex. See, e.g. , Bostock , 590 U. S., at
657–658, 681. But neither that phrase nor any other says anything
about how much worse. There is nothing in the provision to
distinguish, as the courts below did, between transfers causing
significant disadvantages and transfers causing not-so-significant
ones. And there is nothing to otherwise establish an elevated
threshold of harm. To demand “significance” is to add words—and
significant words, as it were—to the statute Congress enacted. It
is to impose a new requirement on a Title VII claimant, so that the
law as applied demands something more of her than the law as
written.

															And that difference can make a real difference
for complaining transferees. Many forced transfers leave workers
worse off respecting employment terms or conditions. (After all, a
transfer is not usually forced when it leaves the employee better
off.) But now add another question—whether the harm is significant.
As appellate decisions reveal, the answers can lie in the eye of
the beholder—and can disregard varied kinds of disadvantage. Take
just a few examples from the caselaw. An engineering technician is
assigned to work at a new job site—specifically, a 14-by-22-foot
wind tunnel; a court rules that the transfer does not have a
“significant detrimental effect.” Boone v. Goldin , 178 F.3d 253 , 256 (CA4 1999). A shipping worker is required to
take a position involving only nighttime work; a court decides that
the assignment does not “constitute a significant change in
employment.” Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. ,
701 F.3d 620, 635 (CA10 2012). And a school principal is forced
into a non-school-based administrative role supervising fewer
employees; a court again finds the change in job duties not
“significant.” Cole v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 834
Fed. Appx. 820, 821 (CA4 2021) ( per curiam ). All those
employees suffered some injury in employment terms or conditions
(allegedly because of race or sex). Their claims were rejected
solely because courts rewrote Title VII, compelling workers to make
a showing that the statutory text does not require.[ 2 ]

															B

															The City, in defense of that added
requirement, makes three main arguments—one about the text, one
about our precedent, and one about policy. None justifies the use
of a “significance” standard.

															The textual claim invokes the ejusdem
generis canon—the idea that a general phrase following an
enumeration of things should be read to encompass only things of
the same basic kind. Recall the prohibition at issue here: An
employer may not, based on sex, “fail or refuse to hire” or
“discharge” any person or “otherwise . . . discriminate
against [her] with respect to [her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.” §2000e–2(a)(1); see supra , at 5. Refusing to hire or discharging a person, the
City notes, causes a significant disadvantage; so the subsequent
“otherwise” phrase, the City claims, can apply only to things
causing an equal level of harm. See Brief for City 16, 25–27. But
the City fails to explain why the presence of significant
disadvantage must be part of the list’s common denominator. The
text itself provides a different shared trait. Each kind of
prohibited discrimination occurs by way of an employment
action—whether pertaining to hiring, or firing, or compensating, or
(as here) altering terms or conditions through a transfer. That is
a more than sufficient basis to unite the provision’s several parts
and avoid ejusdem generis problems. There is no need for
courts to introduce a significant-harm requirement.

															The City’s argument from precedent fares no
better. It relies on Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White , 548 U.S.
53 (2006), which addressed Title VII’s separate
anti-retaliation provision. Under that section, an employer may not
take action against an employee for bringing or aiding a Title VII
charge. See §2000e–3(a). The Court held that the provision applies
only when the retaliatory action is “materially adverse,” meaning
that it causes “significant” harm. Id ., at 68. The City
thinks we should import the same standard into the
anti-discrimination provision at issue. See Brief for City 18–19.
But that would create a mismatch. White adopted the standard
for reasons peculiar to the retaliation context. The test was meant
to capture those (and only those) employer actions serious enough
to “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.” 548 U. S., at 68. If an action
causes less serious harm, the Court reasoned, it will not deter
Title VII enforcement; and if it will not deter Title VII
enforcement, it falls outside the purposes of the ban on
retaliation. See id. , at 63, 68. But no such (frankly
extra-textual) reasoning is applicable to the discrimination bar.
Whether an action causes significant enough harm to deter any
employee conduct is there beside the point. White itself
noted the difference: The anti-discrimination provision, we
explained, simply “seeks a workplace where individuals are not
discriminated against” because of traits like race and sex. Id., at 63. The provision thus flatly “prevent[s] injury to
individuals based on” status, ibid. , without distinguishing
between significant and less significant harms.

															Finally, the City’s policy objections cannot
override Title VII’s text. In the City’s view, a significant-injury
requirement is needed to prevent transferred employees from
“swamp[ing] courts and employers” with insubstantial lawsuits
requiring “burdensome discovery and trials.” Brief for City 45, 49
(capitalization and boldface omitted). But there is reason to doubt
that the floodgates will open in the way feared. As we have
explained, the anti-discrimination provision at issue requires that
the employee show some injury. See supra , at 5–6. It
requires that the injury asserted concern the terms or conditions
of her employment. See ibid. Perhaps most notably, it
requires that the employer have acted for discriminatory
reasons—“because of ” sex or race or other protected trait.
§2000e–2(a)(1). And in addressing that issue, a court may consider
whether a less harmful act is, in a given context, less suggestive
of intentional discrimination. So courts retain multiple ways to
dispose of meritless Title VII claims challenging transfer
decisions. But even supposing the City’s worst predictions come
true, that would be the result of the statute Congress drafted. As
we noted in another Title VII decision, we will not “add words to
the law” to achieve what some employers might think “a desirable
result.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores,
Inc. , 575 U.S.
768 , 774 (2015). Had Congress wanted to limit liability for job
transfers to those causing a significant disadvantage, it could
have done so. By contrast, this Court does not get to make that
judgment.

															III

															In light of everything said above, the Court
of Appeals’ treatment of Muldrow’s suit cannot survive. The court
required Muldrow to show that the allegedly discriminatory transfer
out of the Intelligence Division produced a significant employment
disadvantage. See supra , at 4. As we have explained, that is
the wrong standard. Muldrow need show only some injury respecting
her employment terms or conditions. The transfer must have left her
worse off, but need not have left her significantly so. And
Muldrow’s allegations, if properly preserved and supported, meet
that test with room to spare. Recall her principal allegations. She
was moved from a plainclothes job in a prestigious specialized
division giving her substantial responsibility over priority
investigations and frequent opportunity to work with police
commanders. She was moved to a uniformed job supervising one
district’s patrol officers, in which she was less involved in
high-visibility matters and primarily performed administrative
work. Her schedule became less regular, often requiring her to work
weekends; and she lost her take-home car. If those allegations are
proved, she was left worse off several times over. It does not
matter, as the courts below thought (and Justice Thomas echoes),
that her rank and pay remained the same, or that she still could
advance to other jobs. See supra, at 3–4; post, at 2.
Title VII prohibits making a transfer, based on sex, with the
consequences Muldrow described.

															We recognize, however, that the decisions below
may have rested in part on issues of forfeiture and proof. The
District Court noted, for example, that Muldrow had failed to
discuss in her argument against summary judgment the changes in her
work schedule and vehicle access; and perhaps following that lead,
the Court of Appeals did not address those harms. See supra ,
at 3–4. In addition, both courts suggested that some of the
allegations Muldrow made about the nature of the work she did in
her old and new jobs lacked adequate evidentiary support. See ibid . We leave such matters for the courts below to address.
All we require is that they use the proper Title VII standard, and
not demand that Muldrow demonstrate her transfer caused
“significant” harm.

															We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Compare, e . g ., 30 F. 4th 680, 688 (CA8 2022) (case below)
(“materially significant disadvantage”); Caraballo-Caraballo v. Correctional Admin. , 892 F.3d 53, 61 (CA1 2018)
(“materially changes” employment conditions in a manner “more
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities”); Williams v. R. H. Donnelley,
Corp. , 368 F.3d 123 , 128 (CA2 2004) (“materially significant
disadvantage”); James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton,
Inc. , 368 F.3d 371 , 376 (CA4 2004) (“significant detrimental
effect”); O’Neal v. Chicago , 392 F.3d 909 , 911 (CA7 2004) (“materially adverse”); Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools , 164 F.3d 527 , 532 (CA10 1998) (“significant change”); and Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cty. Sheriff ’s Office ,
525 F.3d 1013, 1033 (CA11 2008) (“serious and material change”),
with Chambers v. District of Columbia , 35 F. 4th
870, 872, 876–877 (CADC 2022) (en banc) (overruling precedent that
demanded an “objectively tangible harm” and rejecting a “material
adversity” requirement). 2 Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion appears to disagree in two respects. He
initially disputes that courts have applied a heightened-harm
requirement in demanding that a plaintiff show something like
“materially significant disadvantage.” See post, at 1
(opinion concurring in judgment). And as a corollary, he denies
that courts will have to change their treatment of Title VII claims
once they start to apply the simple injury standard set out in this
opinion. See post, at 2–3. In light of those views, we
underscore two points. First, this decision changes the legal
standard used in any circuit that has previously required
“significant,” “material,” or “serious” injury. It lowers the bar
Title VII plaintiffs must meet. Second, because it does so, many
cases will come out differently. The decisions described above are
examples, intended to illustrate how claims that failed under a
significance standard should now succeed. And as we will discuss,
the decision below is another such example, putting to one side
case-specific issues of forfeiture and proof. See infra , at
10–11. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–193

															_________________

															Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, PETITIONER v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eighth circuit

															[April 17, 2024]

															Justice Thomas, concurring in the
judgment.

															I agree with Justice Alito that the Courts of
Appeals all appear to articulate the same principle, but with
slightly varying verbal formulations: A plaintiff bringing a claim
under 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) must show harm that is
more than trifling. Post, at 1–2 (opinion concurring in
judgment). And, there is little practical difference between that
principle and the Court’s holding. Ante, at 1 (holding that
an employee “must show some harm”).

															I am not convinced, however, that the Court
accurately characterizes the Eighth Circuit’s decision. I do not
read the Eighth Circuit to have necessarily imposed a
heightened-harm requirement in the form of a “significance” test.
The Eighth Circuit defined an adverse employment action as “a
tangible change in working conditions that produces a material
employment disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688 (2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). It further explained that “minor changes
in duties or working conditions, even unpalatable or unwelcome
ones, which cause no materially significant disadvantage, do not
rise to the level of an adverse employment action.” Ibid. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words,
a plaintiff must have suffered an actual disadvantage as compared
to minor changes— i.e. , more than a trifling harm. That
standard aligns with the Court’s observation that a plaintiff must
show “some ‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or
condition.” Ante, at 5 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc ., 523 U.S.
75 , 80 (1998)).

															The Court insists that the Eighth Circuit must
have demanded more given the weight of Muldrow’s allegations.
Specifically, the Court underscores Muldrow’s claims that the City
of St. Louis “moved [her] from a plainclothes job in a
prestigious specialized division” with a take-home car and a
regular schedule, to a “uniformed job supervising one district’s
patrol officers,” with no take-home car and an irregular schedule. Ante , at 10. But, most of those allegations are forfeited or
attributable to a nonparty, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
See 2020 WL 5505113, *9, n. 20 (ED Mo., Sept. 11, 2020)
(observing that Muldrow did not raise arguments based on “having to
return her take-home [car],” “changes to her schedule, including
having to work weekends,” or “having to work in plain clothes”); 30
F. 4th, at 689 (concluding that “the FBI had the sole
authority to revoke” Muldrow’s plainclothes and take-home car
privileges). Before the Eighth Circuit, Muldrow argued only that
the City moved her to a job that was “more administrative and less
prestigious.” Id. , at 688. Her “only evidence” in support of
that argument was “her own deposition testimony,” which neither the
District Court nor the Eighth Circuit found persuasive. Ibid . And, Muldrow’s testimony certainly did not establish
any “proof of harm resulting from [her] reassignment.” Ibid. After the transfer, Muldrow’s “pay and rank remained the same, she
was given a supervisory role, and she was responsible for
investigating violent crimes, such as homicides and robberies.” Ibid . Muldrow even conceded that the transfer “did not harm
her future career prospects.” Ibid . At most, then, Muldrow
“expresse[d] a mere preference for one position over the other.” Id ., at 689.

															Muldrow failed to prove that there was any
nontrifling change in her job’s prestige—which was her lone theory
of harm. Id ., at 688–689. The Eighth Circuit rejected
Muldrow’s adverse employment action claim accordingly. I fail to
see how the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning—that a plaintiff must offer
colorable evidence of harm—is equivalent to the heightened-harm
requirement the Court concludes the Eighth Circuit applied. Ante, at 10 (agreeing that “[t]he transfer must have left
[Muldrow] worse off ”).

															All that said, I recognize that the terms
“material” and “significant” can (but do not always) imply a
heightened-harm requirement. Although I find it unlikely, it is
possible that the Eighth Circuit had such a stringent test in mind
when it stated that a plaintiff must show a “ ‘materially
significant disadvantage.’ ” 30 F. 4th, at 688. I thus
agree to vacate and remand to the extent the Eighth Circuit’s
analysis is inconsistent with a more-than-trifling-harm
requirement. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–193

															_________________

															Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, PETITIONER v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eighth circuit

															[April 17, 2024]

															Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment.

															I agree with the judgment in this case. Assuming
without deciding that all the facts mentioned by the Court are
relevant and properly presented, petitioner’s transfer altered the
“terms” or “conditions” of her employment, 42 U. S. C.
§2000e–2(a)(1), and therefore she can prevail if she can prove that
she was transferred because of her sex.

															I do not join the Court’s unhelpful opinion. For
decades, dozens of lower court judges, with a wealth of experience
handling Title VII cases, have held that not every unwanted
employment experience affects an employee’s “terms” or “conditions”
of employment. The lower courts have used various verbal
formulations to express this point, and the Court, dubious about
the words they had selected, granted review to provide guidance.
Now, after briefing and argument, that guidance is as follows:
Title VII plaintiffs must show that the event they challenge
constituted a “harm” or “injury,” but that the event need not be
“significant” or “substantial.” See ante , at 10–11.

															I have no idea what this means, and I can just
imagine how this guidance will be greeted by lower court judges.
The primary definition of “harm” is “physical or mental damage,”
and an “injury” is defined as “an act that damages, harms, or
hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of suffering or harm.”
Webster’s Third International Dictionary 1034, 1164 (1976). These
definitions incorporate at least some degree of significance or
substantiality. We do not typically say that we were harmed or
injured by every unwanted experience. What would we think if a
friend said, “I was harmed because the supermarket had run out of
my favorite brand of peanut butter,” or, “I was injured because I
ran into three rather than the usual two red lights on the way home
from work”?

															I see little if any substantive difference
between the terminology the Court approves and the terminology it
doesn’t like. The predictable result of today’s decision is that
careful lower court judges will mind the words they use but will
continue to do pretty much just what they have done for years. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 22–193

															_________________

															Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, PETITIONER v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the eighth circuit

															[April 17, 2024]

															Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in the
judgment.

															Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes
it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The
question presented in this case is whether transferring an
employee—for example, changing an employee’s job responsibilities
or job location—on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin violates Title VII. The answer is yes.

															I therefore agree with the straightforward
opinion jointly authored by Judge Tatel and Judge Ginsburg for the
en banc D. C. Circuit. See Chambers v. District of
Columbia , 35 F. 4th 870 (2022). As that court explained,
even when a transfer does not change an employee’s compensation, a
transfer does change the employee’s terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. See id. , at 874–879. Therefore, a
transfer made on the basis of the employee’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin violates Title VII. See id. , at
874–875.

															As I see it and as the D. C. Circuit saw
it, the issue here is not complicated. Suppose that an employer
says to an employee in the Columbus office: “We are transferring
you to the Cincinnati office because you are black. But your
compensation will not change.” Does that violate Title VII? Of
course it does. To begin with, the employer has treated the
employee differently because of race. To be sure, the fact that a
transfer may not involve a change in compensation can affect the
amount of any damages, as Muldrow’s attorney acknowledged. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 41–42. But a transfer changes the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment. Therefore, a discriminatory transfer
violates the statute. “The plain text of Title VII requires no
more.” Chambers , 35 F. 4th, at 875.[ 1 ]

															Unlike the D. C. Circuit, some Courts of
Appeals have held that discriminatory transfers are not prohibited
by Title VII unless the transfer also causes significant employment
disadvantage. Ante , at 4–5, n. 1. Today, this Court
definitively rejects those rulings. Ante , at 6, 7,
n. 2. I fully agree with the Court on that point.

															But the Court’s opinion then goes on to require
that a plaintiff in a discriminatory-transfer case show at least
“some harm” beyond the harm of being transferred on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Ante , at 6.
I disagree with the Court’s new some-harm requirement. No court has
adopted a some-harm requirement, and no party or amicus advocated that requirement to this Court. More to the point, the
text of Title VII does not require a separate showing of some harm.
The discrimination is harm. The only question then is whether the
relevant employment action changes the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment. A transfer does so.
Therefore, as the D. C. Circuit explained, a transfer on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is
actionable under Title VII. Chambers , 35 F. 4th, at
874–879.

															All of that said, the Court’s new some-harm
requirement appears to be a relatively low bar. Importantly, the
Court emphasizes that “some harm” is less than significant harm,
serious harm, or substantial harm. Ante , at 6. Therefore,
anyone who has been transferred because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin should easily be able to show some
additional harm—whether in money, time, satisfaction, schedule,
convenience, commuting costs or time, prestige, status, career
prospects, interest level, perks, professional relationships,
networking opportunities, effects on family obligations, or the
like. So even though I respectfully disagree with the Court’s new
some-harm requirement, I expect that the Court’s approach and my
preferred approach will land in the same place and lead to the same
result in 99 out of 100 discriminatory-transfer cases, if not in
all 100. Notes 1 To be sure, the
employment action in a transfer case must actually be a transfer
(or denied transfer), which requires a change (or denied change) in
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
See Brief for District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae 17–18. There may be edge cases about what qualifies as a transfer.
But as the Solicitor General notes, a change in an employee’s job
location or job responsibilities readily qualifies. See Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 11, 22.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the
United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter
of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington,
D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print
goes to press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1276

															_________________

															DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC., PETITIONER v. PAUL SOMERS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[February 21, 2018]

															Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Endeavoring to root out corporate fraud,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116Stat. 745
(Sarbanes-Oxley), and the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 124Stat. 1376 (Dodd-Frank). Both Acts
shield whistleblowers from retaliation, but they differ in
important respects. Most notably, Sarbanes-Oxley applies to all
“employees” who report misconduct to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission), any other federal agency, Congress,
or an internal supervisor. 18 U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1).
Dodd-Frank delineates a more circumscribed class; it defines
“whistleblower” to mean a person who provides “information relating
to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” 15
U. S. C. §78u–6(a)(6). A whistleblower so defined is
eligible for an award if original information he or she provides to
the SEC leads to a successful enforcement action. §78u–6(b)–(g).
And, most relevant here, a whistleblower is protected from
retaliation for, inter alia , “making disclosures that are
required or protected under” Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal anti-retaliation proscription at
18 U. S. C. §1513(e), or any other law subject to the
SEC’s jurisdiction. 15 U. S. C. §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii).

															The question presented: Does the
anti-retaliation provision of Dodd-Frank extend to an individual
who has not reported a violation of the securities laws to the SEC
and therefore falls outside the Act’s definition of
“whistleblower”? Pet. for Cert. (I). We answer that question “No”:
To sue under Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation provision, a person must
first “provid[e] . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”
§78u–6(a)(6).

															I

															A

															“To safeguard investors in public companies
and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse
of Enron Corporation,” Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002. Lawson v. FMR LLC , 571 U. S. 429 , ___ (2014)
(slip op., at 1). Most pertinent here, Sarbanes-Oxley created new
protections for employees at risk of retaliation for reporting
corporate misconduct. See 18 U. S. C. §1514A. Section
1514A prohibits certain companies from discharging or otherwise
“discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and conditions
of employment because” the employee “provid[es] information
. . . or otherwise assist[s] in an investigation
regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably believes
constitutes a violation” of certain criminal fraud statutes, any
SEC rule or regulation, or “any provision of Federal law relating
to fraud against shareholders.” §1514A(a)(1). An employee qualifies
for protection when he or she provides information or assistance
either to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, Congress,
or any “person with supervisory authority over the employee.”
§1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C).[ 1 ]

															To recover under §1514A, an aggrieved employee
must exhaust administrative remedies by “filing a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor.” §1514A(b)(1)(A); see Lawson , 571
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–6). Congress prescribed a
180-day limitation period for filing such a complaint.
§1514A(b)(2)(D). If the agency “does not issue a final decision
within 180 days of the filing of [a] complaint, and the [agency’s]
delay is not due to bad faith on the claimant’s part, the claimant
may proceed to federal district court for de novo review.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 6) (citing §1514A(b)). An
employee who prevails in a proceeding under §1514A is “entitled to
all relief necessary to make the employee whole,” including
reinstatement, backpay with interest, and any “special damages
sustained as a result of the discrimination,” among such damages,
litigation costs. §1514A(c).

															B

															1

															At issue in this case is the Dodd-Frank
anti-retaliation provision enacted in 2010, eight years after the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Passed in the wake of the 2008
financial crisis, Dodd-Frank aimed to “promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system.” 124Stat. 1376.

															Dodd-Frank responded to numerous perceived
shortcomings in financial regulation. Among them was the SEC’s need
for additional “power, assistance and money at its disposal” to
regulate securities markets. S. Rep. No. 111–176, pp. 36, 37
(2010). To assist the Commission “in identifying securities law
violations,” the Act established “a new, robust whistleblower
program designed to motivate people who know of securities law
violations to tell the SEC.” Id., at 38. And recognizing
that “whistleblowers often face the difficult choice between
telling the truth and . . . committing ‘career
suicide,’ ” Congress sought to protect whistleblowers from
employment discrimination. Id., at 111, 112.

															Dodd-Frank implemented these goals by adding a
new provision to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: 15
U. S. C. §78u–6. Section 78u–6 begins by defining a
“whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to
the Commission , in a manner established, by rule or regulation,
by the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). That definition,
the statute directs, “shall apply” “[i]n this section”— i.e., throughout §78u–6. §78u–6(a).

															Section 78u–6 affords covered whistleblowers
both incentives and protection. First, the section creates an award
program for “whistleblowers who voluntarily provid[e] original
information to the Commission that le[ads] to the successful
enforcement of [a] covered judicial or administrative action.”
§78u–6(b)(1). A qualifying whistleblower is entitled to a cash
award of 10 to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions collected in
the enforcement action. See §78u–6(b)(1)(A)–(B).

															Second, §78u–6(h) prohibits an employer from
discharging, harassing, or otherwise discriminating against a
“whistleblower” “because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower” in three situations: first, “in providing
information to the Commission in accordance with [§78u–6],”
§78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i); second, “in initiating, testifying in, or
assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the
Commission based upon” information provided to the SEC in
accordance with §78u–6, §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii); and third, “in making
disclosures that are required or protected under” either
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the criminal
anti-retaliation prohibition at 18 U. S. C.
§1513(e),[ 2 ] or “any other law,
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,”
§78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Clause (iii), by cross-referencing
Sarbanes-Oxley and other laws, protects disclosures made to a
variety of individuals and entities in addition to the SEC. For
example, the clause shields an employee’s reports of wrongdoing to
an internal supervisor if the reports are independently safeguarded
from retaliation under Sarbanes-Oxley. See supra, at
2–3.[ 3 ]

															The recovery procedures under the
anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley differ
in critical respects. First, unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, which contains
an administrative-exhaustion requirement and a 180-day
administrative complaint-filing deadline, see 18 U. S. C.
§1514A(b)(1)(A), (2)(D), Dodd-Frank permits a whistleblower to sue
a current or former employer directly in federal district court,
with a default limitation period of six years, see
§78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i), (iii)(I)(aa). Second, Dodd-Frank instructs a
court to award to a prevailing plaintiff double backpay with
interest, see §78u–6(h)(1)(C)(ii), while Sarbanes-Oxley limits
recovery to actual backpay with interest, see 18 U. S. C.
§1514A(c)(2)(B). Like Sarbanes-Oxley, however, Dodd-Frank
authorizes reinstatement and compensation for litigation costs,
expert witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Compare
§78u–6(h)(1)(C)(i), (iii), with 18 U. S. C.
§1514A(c)(2)(A), (C).[ 4 ]

															2

															Congress authorized the SEC “to issue such
rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to
implement the provisions of [§78u–6] consistent with the purposes
of this section.” §78u–6(j). Pursuant to this author- ity, the SEC
published a notice of proposed rulemaking to “Implemen[t] the
Whistleblower Provisions” of Dodd-Frank. 75 Fed. Reg. 70488 (2010).
Proposed Rule 21F–2(a) defined a “whistleblower,” for purposes of
both the award and anti-retaliation provisions of §78u–6, as one or
more individuals who “provide the Commission with information
relating to a potential violation of the securities laws.” Id., at 70519 (proposed 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)). The proposed
rule, the agency noted, “tracks the statutory definition of a
‘whistleblower’ ” by requiring information reporting to the
SEC itself. 75 Fed. Reg. 70489.

															In promulgating the final Rule, however, the
agency changed course. Rule 21F–2, in finished form, contains two
discrete “whistleblower” definitions. See 17 CFR §240.21F–2(a)–(b)
(2017). For purposes of the award program, the Rule states that
“[y]ou are a whistleblower if . . . you provide the
Commission with information . . . relat[ing] to a
possible violation of the Federal securities laws.”
§240.21F–2(a)(1) (emphasis added). The information must be provided
to the SEC through its website or by mailing or faxing a specified
form to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower. See ibid. ;
§240.21F–9(a)(1)–(2).

															“For purposes of the anti-retaliation
protections,” however, the Rule states that “[y]ou are a
whistleblower if . . . [y]ou possess a reasonable belief
that the information you are providing relates to a possible
securities law violation” and “[y]ou provide that information in a
manner described in” clauses (i) through (iii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A).
17 CFR §240.21F–2(b)(1)(i)–(ii). “The anti-retaliation protections
apply,” the Rule emphasizes, “whether or not you satisfy the
requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award.”
§240.21F–2(b)(1)(iii). An individual may therefore gain
anti-retaliation protection as a “whistleblower” under Rule 21F–2
without providing information to the SEC, so long as he or she
provides information in a manner shielded by one of the
anti-retaliation provision’s three clauses. For example, a report
to a company supervisor would qualify if the report garners
protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation
provision.[ 5 ]

															C

															Petitioner Digital Realty Trust, Inc. (Digital
Realty) is a real estate investment trust that owns, acquires, and
develops data centers. See Brief for Petitioner 3. Digital Realty
employed respondent Paul Somers as a Vice President from 2010 to
2014. See 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 (ND Cal. 2015).
Somers alleges that Digital Realty terminated him shortly after he
reported to senior management suspected securities-law violations
by the company. See ibid. Although nothing impeded him from
alerting the SEC prior to his termination, he did not do so. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. Nor did he file an administrative complaint
within 180 days of his termination, rendering him ineligible for
relief under Sarbanes-Oxley. See ibid. ; 18
U. S. C. §1514A(b)(2)(D).

															Somers brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California alleging, inter alia , a claim of whistleblower retaliation under
Dodd-Frank. Digital Realty moved to dismiss that claim, arguing
that “Somers does not qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ under
[§78u–6(h)] because he did not report any alleged law violations to
the SEC.” 119 F. Supp. 3d, at 1094. The District Court
denied the motion. Rule 21F–2, the court observed, does not
necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining “whistleblower”
status under Dodd-Frank. See id., at 1095–1096. Finding the
statutory scheme ambiguous, the court accorded deference to the
SEC’s Rule under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U. S. 837
(1984) . See 119 F. Supp. 3d, at 1096–1106.

															On interlocutory appeal, a divided panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 850 F. 3d
1045 (2017). The majority acknowledged that Dodd-Frank’s
definitional provision describes a “whistleblower” as an individual
who provides information to the SEC itself. Id., at 1049.
But applying that definition to the anti-retaliation provision, the
majority reasoned, would narrow the third clause of §78u–6(h)(1)(A)
“to the point of absurd- ity”: The statute would protect employees
only if they “reported possible securities violations both
internally and to the SEC.” Ibid. Such dual reporting, the
majority believed, was unlikely to occur. Ibid. Therefore,
the majority concluded, the statute should be read to protect
employees who make disclosures privileged by clause (iii) of
§78u–6(h)(1)(A), whether or not those employees also provide
information to the SEC. Id., at 1050. In any event, the
majority held, the SEC’s resolution of any statutory ambiguity
warranted deference. Ibid. Judge Owens dissented. In his
view, the statutory definition of whistleblower was clear, left no
room for interpretation, and plainly governed. Id., at
1051.

															Two other Courts of Appeals have weighed in on
the question before us. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has held that employees must provide information to the SEC to
avail themselves of Dodd-Frank’s anti-retaliation safeguard. See Asadi v. G. E. Energy (USA), L. L. C. ,
720 F. 3d 620, 630 (2013). A divided panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion,
over a dissent by Judge Jacobs. See Berman v. NEO@OGILVY
LLC , 801 F. 3d 145, 155 (2013). We granted certiorari to
resolve this conflict, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), and now reverse
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.

															II

															“When a statute includes an explicit
definition, we must follow that definition,” even if it varies from
a term’s ordinary meaning. Burgess v. United States ,
553 U. S. 124, 130 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This principle resolves the question before us.

															A

															Our charge in this review proceeding is to
determine the meaning of “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h), Dodd-Frank’s
anti-retaliation provision. The definition section of the statute
supplies an unequivocal answer: A “whistleblower” is “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission .”
§78u–6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Leaving no doubt as to the
definition’s reach, the statute instructs that the “definitio[n]
shall apply” “[i]n this section,” that is , throughout
§78u–6. §78u–6(a)(6) . The whistleblower definition operates in
conjunction with the three clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) to spell out
the provision’s scope. The definition first describes who is
eligible for protection—namely, a whistleblower who provides
pertinent information “to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). The three
clauses of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) then describe what conduct , when
engaged in by a whistle- blower, is shielded from employment
discrimination. See §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). An individual who
meets both measures may invoke Dodd-Frank’s protections. But an
individual who falls outside the protected category of
“whistleblowers” is ineligible to seek redress under the statute,
regardless of the conduct in which that individual engages.

															Reinforcing our reading, another
whistleblower-protection provision in Dodd-Frank imposes no
requirement that information be conveyed to a government agency.
Title 10 of the statute, which created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB), prohibits discrimination against a
“covered employee” who, among other things, “provide[s]
. . . information to [his or her] employer, the Bureau,
or any other State, local, or Federal, government authority or law
enforcement agency relating to” a violation of a law subject to the
CFPB’s jurisdiction. 12 U. S. C. §5567(a)(1). To qualify
as a “covered employee,” an individual need not provide information
to the CFPB, or any other entity. See §5567(b) (“covered employee”
means “any individual performing tasks related to the offering or
provision of a consumer financial product or service”).

															“[W]hen Congress includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another[,] . . .
this Court presumes that Congress intended a difference in
meaning.” Loughrin v. United States , 573 U. S.
___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Congress placed a government-reporting
requirement in §78u–6(h), but not elsewhere in the same statute.
Courts are not at liberty to dispense with the condition—tell the
SEC—Congress imposed.

															B

															Dodd-Frank’s purpose and design corroborate
our comprehension of §78u–6(h)’s reporting requirement. The “core
objective” of Dodd-Frank’s robust whistleblower program, as Somers
acknowledges, Tr. of Oral Arg. 45, is “to motivate people who know
of securities law violations to tell the SEC ,” S. Rep.
No. 111–176, at 38 (emphasis added). By enlisting whistleblowers to
“assist the Government [in] identify[ing] and prosecut[ing] persons
who have violated securities laws,” Congress undertook to improve
SEC enforcement and facilitate the Commission’s “recover[y] [of]
money for victims of financial fraud.” Id., at 110. To that
end, §78u–6 provides substantial monetary rewards to whistleblowers
who furnish actionable information to the SEC. See §78u–6(b).

															Financial inducements alone, Congress
recognized, may be insufficient to encourage certain employees,
fearful of employer retaliation, to come forward with evidence of
wrongdoing. Congress therefore complemented the Dodd-Frank monetary
incentives for SEC reporting by heightening protection against
retaliation. While Sarbanes-Oxley contains an
administrative-exhaustion requirement, a 180-day administrative
complaint-filing deadline, and a remedial scheme limited to actual
damages, Dodd-Frank provides for immediate access to federal court,
a generous statute of limitations (at least six years), and the
opportunity to recover double backpay. See supra, at 5–6.
Dodd-Frank’s award program and anti-retaliation provision thus work
synchronously to motivate individuals with knowledge of illegal
activity to “tell the SEC.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38.

															When enacting Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower
regime, in comparison, Congress had a more far-reaching objective:
It sought to disturb the “corporate code of silence” that
“discourage[d] employees from reporting fraudulent behavior not
only to the proper authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, but
even internally.” Lawson , 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,
at 4) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the
Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision covers employees who
report fraud not only to the SEC, but also to any other federal
agency, Congress, or an internal supervisor. See 18
U. S. C. §1514A(a)(1).

															C

															In sum, Dodd-Frank’s text and purpose leave no
doubt that the term “whistleblower” in §78u–6(h) carries the
meaning set forth in the section’s definitional provision. The
disposition of this case is therefore evident: Somers did not
provide information “to the Commission” before his termination,
§78u–6(a)(6), so he did not qualify as a “whistleblower” at the
time of the alleged retaliation. He is therefore ineligible to seek
relief under §78u–6(h).

															III

															Somers and the Solicitor General tender a
different view of Dodd-Frank’s compass. The whistleblower
definition, as they see it, applies only to the statute’s award
program, not to its anti-retaliation provision, and thus not, as
the definition plainly states, throughout “this section,”
§78u–6(a). See Brief for Respondent 30; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10–11. For purposes of the anti-retaliation
provision alone, they urge us to construe the term “whistleblower”
in its “ordinary sense,” i.e., without any SEC-reporting
requirement. Brief for Respondent 18.

															Doing so, Somers and the Solicitor General
contend, would align with our precedent, specifically Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co. , 336 U. S. 198 (1949)
, and Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA , 573
U. S. ___ (2014). In those decisions, we declined to apply a
statutory definition that ostensibly governed where doing so would
have been “incompatible with . . . Congress’ regulatory
scheme,” id ., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (internal quotation
marks omitted), or would have “destroy[ed] one of the [statute’s]
major purposes,” Suwannee Fruit , 336 U. S., at
201 . This case is of a piece, Somers and the
Solicitor General maintain. Applying the statutory definition here,
they variously charge, would “create obvious incongruities,” Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 19 (internal quotation
marks omitted), “produce anomalous results,” id., at 22,
“vitiate much of the [statute’s] protection,” id., at 20
(internal quotation marks omitted), and, as the Court of Appeals
put it, narrow clause (iii) of §78u–6(h)(1)(A) “to the point of
absurdity,” Brief for Respondent 35 (quoting 850 F. 3d, at
1049). We next address these concerns and explain why they do not
lead us to depart from the statutory text.

															A

															It would gut “much of the protection afforded
by” the third clause of §78u–6(h)(1)(a), Somers and the Solicitor
General urge most strenuously, to apply the whistleblower
definition to the anti-retaliation provision. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 20 (internal quotation marks
omitted); Brief for Respondent 28–29. As earlier noted, see supra, at 4–5, clause (iii) prohibits retaliation against a
“whistleblower” for “making disclosures” to various persons and
entities, including but not limited to the SEC, to the
extent those disclosures are “required or protected under” various
laws other than Dodd-Frank. §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(iii). Applying the
statutory definition of whistleblower, however, would limit clause
(iii)’s protection to “only those individuals who report to the
Commission.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 22.

															The plain-text reading of the statute
undoubtedly shields fewer individuals from retaliation than the
alternative proffered by Somers and the Solicitor General. But we
do not agree that this consequence “vitiate[s]” clause (iii)’s
protection, id ., at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted),
or ranks as “absur[d],” Brief for Respondent 35 (internal quotation
marks omitted).[ 6 ] In fact, our
reading leaves the third clause with “substantial meaning.” Brief
for Petitioner 32.

															With the statutory definition incorporated,
clause (iii) protects a whistleblower who reports misconduct both to the SEC and to another entity, but suffers
retaliation because of the latter, non-SEC, disclosure. That would
be so, for example, where the retaliating employer is un- aware
that the employee has alerted the SEC. In such a case, without
clause (iii), retaliation for internal reporting would not be
reached by Dodd-Frank, for clause (i) applies only where the
employer retaliates against the employee “because of” the SEC
reporting. §78u–6(h)(1)(A). More- over, even where the employer
knows of the SEC reporting, the third clause may operate to dispel
a proof problem: The employee can recover under the statute without
having to demonstrate whether the retaliation was motivated by the
internal report (thus yielding protection under clause (iii)) or by
the SEC disclosure (thus gaining protection under clause (i)).

															While the Solicitor General asserts that
limiting the protections of clause (iii) to dual reporters would
“shrink to insignificance the [clause’s] ban on retaliation,” Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation
marks omitted), he offers scant evidence to support that assertion.
Tugging in the opposite direction, he reports that approximately 80
percent of the whistleblowers who received awards in 2016 “reported
internally before reporting to the Commission.” Id., at 23.
And Digital Realty cites real-world examples of dual reporters
seeking Dodd-Frank or Sarbanes-Oxley recovery for alleged
retaliation. See Brief for Petitioner 33, and n. 4 (collecting
cases). Overlooked by Somers and the Solicitor General, in
dual-reporting cases, retaliation not prompted by SEC disclosures
(and thus unaddressed by clause (i)) is likely commonplace: The SEC
is required to protect the identity of whistleblowers, see
§78u–6(h)(2)(A), so employers will often be unaware that an
employee has reported to the Commission. In any event, even if the
number of individuals qualifying for protection under clause (iii)
is relatively limited, “[i]t is our function to give the statute
the effect its language suggests, however modest that may be.” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. , 561
U. S. 247, 270 (2010) .

															B

															Somers and the Solicitor General express
concern that our reading would jettison protection for auditors,
attorneys, and other employees subject to internal-reporting
requirements. See Brief for Respondent 35; Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 21. Sarbanes-Oxley, for example, requires
auditors and attorneys to report certain information within the
company before making disclosures externally. See 15
U. S. C. §§78j–1(b), 7245; 17 CFR §205.3. If the
whistleblower definition applies, Somers and the Solicitor General
fear, these professionals will be “le[ft] . . .
vulnerable to discharge or other retaliatory action for complying
with” their internal-reporting obligations. Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															Our reading shields employees in these
circumstances, however, as soon as they also provide relevant
information to the Commission . True, such employees will remain
ineligible for Dodd-Frank’s protection until they tell the SEC, but
this result is consistent with Congress’ aim to encourage SEC
disclosures. See S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38; supra, at
3–4, 11. Somers worries that lawyers and auditors will face
retaliation quickly, before they have a chance to report to the
SEC. Brief for Respondent 35–36. But he offers nothing to show that
Congress had this concern in mind when it enacted §78u–6(h).
Indeed, Congress may well have considered adequate the safeguards
already afforded by Sarbanes-Oxley, protections specifi- cally
designed to shield lawyers, accountants, and similar professionals.
See Lawson , 571 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17).

															C

															Applying the whistleblower definition as
written, Somers and the Solicitor General further protest, will
create “an incredibly unusual statutory scheme”: “[I]dentical
misconduct”— i.e., retaliating against an employee for
internal reporting—will “go punished or not based on the
happenstance of a separate report” to the SEC, of which the
wrongdoer may “not even be aware.” Brief for Respondent 37–38. See
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24. The
upshot, the Solicitor General warns, “would [be] substantially
diminish[ed] Dodd-Fran[k] deterrent effect.” Ibid. Overlooked in this protest is Dodd-Frank’s core
objective: to prompt reporting to the SEC. Supra, at 3–4,
11. In view of that precise aim, it is understandable that the
statute’s retaliation protections, like its financial rewards,
would be reserved for employees who have done what Dodd-Frank seeks
to achieve, i.e., they have placed information about
unlawful activity before the Commission to aid its enforcement
efforts.

															D

															Pointing to another purported anomaly
attending the reading we adopt today, the Solicitor General
observes that neither the whistleblower definition nor §78u–6(h)
contains any requirement of a “temporal or topical connection
between the violation reported to the Commission and the internal
disclosure for which the employee suffers retaliation.” Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 25. It is therefore possible,
the Solicitor General posits, that “an employee who was fired for
reporting accounting fraud to his supervisor in 2017 would have a
cause of action under [§78u–6(h)] if he had reported an
insider-trading violation by his previous employer to the
Commission in 2012.” Ibid. For its part, Digital Realty
agrees that this scenario could arise, but does not see it as a
cause for concern: “Congress,” it states, “could reasonably have
made the policy judgment that individuals who report securities-law
violations to the SEC should receive broad protection over time
against retaliation for a variety of disclosures.” Reply Brief
11.

															We need not dwell on the situation hypothesized
by the Solicitor General, for it veers far from the case before us.
We note, however, that the interpretation offered by Somers and the
Solicitor General— i.e., ignoring the statutory definition
when construing the anti-retaliation provision—raises an even
thornier question about the law’s scope. Their view, which would
not require an employee to provide information relating to a
securities-law violation to the SEC, could afford Dodd-Frank
protection to an employee who reports information bearing no
relationship whatever to the securities laws. That prospect could
be imagined based on the broad array of federal statutes and
regulations cross-referenced by clause (iii) of the
anti-retaliation provision. E.g., 18 U. S. C.
§1513(e) (criminalizing retaliation for “providing to a law
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the
commission . . . of any Federal offense ” (emphasis
added)); see supra, at 5, and n. 2. For example, an employee
fired for reporting a coworker’s drug dealing to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation might be protected. Brief for Petitioner 38. It
would make scant sense, however, to rank an FBI drug-trafficking
informant a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank, a law concerned only
with encouraging the reporting of “ securities law
violations.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 38 (emphasis added).

															E

															Finally, the interpretation we adopt, the
Solicitor General adds, would undermine not just clause (iii) of
§78u–6(h)(1)(A), but clause (ii) as well. Clause (ii) prohibits
retaliation against a whistleblower for “initiating, testifying in,
or assisting in any investigation or . . . action of the
Commission based upon” information conveyed to the SEC by a
whistleblower in accordance with the statute. §78u–6(h)(1)(A)(ii).
If the whistleblower definition is applied to §78u–6(h), the
Solicitor General states, “an employer could fire an employee for
giving . . . testimony [to the SEC] if the employee had
not previously reported to the Commission online or through the
specified written form”— i.e., the methods currently
prescribed by Rule 21F–9 for a whistleblower to provide information
to the Commission. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20–21 (citing 17 CFR §240.21F–9(a)(1)–(2)).

															But the statute expressly delegates authority to
the SEC to establish the “manner” in which information may be
provided to the Commission by a whistleblower. See §78u–6(a)(6).
Nothing in today’s opinion prevents the agency from enumerating
additional means of SEC reporting—including through testimony
protected by clause (ii).

															IV

															For the foregoing reasons, we find the
statute’s definition of “whistleblower” clear and conclusive.
Because “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue,” Chevron , 467 U. S., at 842, we do not accord
deference to the contrary view advanced by the SEC in Rule 21F–2.
See 17 CFR §240.21F–2(b)(1); supra, at 6–7. The statute’s
unambiguous whistleblower definition, in short, precludes the
Commission from more expansively interpreting that term. See Burgess , 553 U. S., at 130.

															*  *  *

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Sarbanes-Oxley also
prohibits retaliation against an “employee” who “file[s],
. . . testif[ies], participate[s] in, or otherwise
assist[s] in a proceeding filed or about to be filed
. . . relating to an alleged violation of” the same
provisions of federal law addressed in 18 U. S. C.
§1514A(a)(1). See §1514A(a)(2). 2 Section 1513(e) provides:
“Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful
employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law
enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the
commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both.” 3 Section 78u–6(h)(1)(A)
reads in full: 4 Unlike Dodd-Frank,
Sarbanes-Oxley explicitly entitles a prevailing employee to “all
relief necessary to make the employee whole,” including
“compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination.” 18 U. S. C. §1514A(c)(1),
(2)(C). 5 In 2015, the SEC issued
an interpretive rule reiterating that anti-retaliation protection
is not contingent on a whistleblower’s provision of information to
the Commission. See 80 Fed. Reg. 47829 (2015). 6 The Solicitor General,
unlike Somers, acknowledges that it would not be absurd to apply
the “whistleblower” definition to the anti-retaliation provision.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1276

															_________________

															DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC., PETITIONER v. PAUL SOMERS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[February 21, 2018]

															Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Breyer
joins, concurring.

															I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write
separately only to note my disagreement with the suggestion in my
colleague’s concurrence that a Senate Report is not an appropriate
source for this Court to consider when interpreting a statute.

															Legislative history is of course not the law,
but that does not mean it cannot aid us in our understanding of a
law. Just as courts are capable of assessing the reliability and
utility of evidence generally, they are capable of assessing the
reliability and utility of legislative-history materials.

															Committee reports, like the Senate Report the
Court discusses here, see ante, at 3–4, 11–12, 16–18, are a
particularly reliable source to which we can look to ensure our
fidelity to Congress’ intended meaning. See Garcia v. United States , 469 U. S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying
legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the
authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies in
the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t] the
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen
involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation’ ”
(quoting Zuber v. Allen , 396 U. S. 168, 186
(1969) )). Bills presented to Congress for consideration are
generally accompanied by a committee report. Such reports are
typically circulated at least two days before a bill is to be
considered on the floor and provide Members of Congress and their
staffs with information about “a bill’s context, purposes, policy
implications, and details,” along with information on its
supporters and opponents. R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 20, and n.
62 (2014) (citing A. LaRue, Senate Manual Containing the Standing
Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting the Business of the
United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 107–1, p. 17 (2001)). These
materials “have long been important means of informing the whole
chamber about proposed legislation,” Katzmann, Judging
Statutes , at 19, a point Members themselves have emphasized
over the years.[ 1 ]* It is thus
no surprise that legislative staffers view committee and conference
reports as the most reliable type of legislative history. See Gluck
& Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the
Canons: Part I, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 977 (2013).

															Legislative history can be particularly helpful
when a statute is ambiguous or deals with especially complex
matters. But even when, as here, a statute’s meaning can clearly be
discerned from its text, consulting reliable legislative history
can still be useful, as it enables us to corroborate and fortify
our understanding of the text. See, e.g., Tapia v. United
States , 564 U. S. 319 –332 (2011); Carr v. United States , 560 U. S. 438 –458 (2010). Moreover,
confirming our construction of a statute by considering reliable
legislative history shows respect for and promotes comity with a
coequal branch of Government. See Katzmann , Judging
Statutes, at 35–36.

															For these reasons, I do not think it wise for
judges to close their eyes to reliable legislative history—and the
realities of how Members of Congress create and enact laws—when it
is available. Notes 1 * See, e.g., Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, To Be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 65–66 (1986)
(Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (“[A]s one who has served in Congress
for 12 years, legislative history is very important to those of us
here who want further detailed expression of that legislative
intent”); Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 181, 184 (1986) (“The committee report is the bone
structure of the legislation. It is the road map that explains why
things are in and things are out of the statute”); Brudney,
Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response? 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 28
(1994) (compiling the views of former Members on “the central
importance of committee reports to their own understanding of
statutory text”). In fact, some Members “are more likely to vote
. . . based on a reading of the legislative history than
on a reading of the statute itself.” Gluck & Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation From the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 Stan.
L. Rev. 901, 968 (2013). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 16–1276

															_________________

															DIGITAL REALTY TRUST, INC., PETITIONER v. PAUL SOMERS

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the ninth circuit

															[February 21, 2018]

															Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito and
Justice Gorsuch join, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.

															I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent it
relies on the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124Stat. 1376. The question
in this case is whether the term “whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank’s
antiretaliation provision, 15 U. S. C. §78u–6(h)(1),
includes a person who does not report information to the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The answer is in the definitions section
of the statute, which states that the term “whistleblower” means a
person who provides “information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). As the Court
observes, this statutory definition “resolves the question before
us.” Ante , at 9. The Court goes on, however, to discuss the
supposed “purpose” of the statute, which it primarily derives from
a single Senate Report. See ante , at 3–4, 11–12, 16–18. Even
assuming a majority of Congress read the Senate Report, agreed with
it, and voted for Dodd-Frank with the same intent, “we are a
government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress
enacted rather than by what it intended.”[ 1 ] Lawson v. FMR LLC , 571 U. S. 429
, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (slip op., at 1). And “it would be a strange canon of
statutory construction that would require Congress to state in
committee reports . . . that which is obvious on the face
of a statute.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 446
U. S. 578, 592 (1980) . For these reasons, I am unable to join
the portions of the Court’s opinion that venture beyond the
statutory text. Notes 1 For what it is worth, I
seriously doubt that a committee report is a “particularly reliable
source” for discerning “Congress’ intended meaning.” Ante ,
at 1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The following exchange on the
Senate floor is telling: “Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the
Senator tell me whether or not he wrote the committee report? “Mr.
DOLE. Did I write the committee report? “Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. “Mr.
DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the com-mittee
report. “Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report?
“Mr. DOLE. I have to check. “Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know
of any Senator who wrote the committee report? “Mr. DOLE. I might
be able to identify one, but I would have to search. I was here all
during the time it was written, I might say, and worked carefully
with the staff as they worked. . . . “Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr.
President, has the Senator from Kansas, the chairman of the Finance
Committee, read the committee report in its entirety? “Mr. DOLE. I
am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it.
“Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, did members of the Finance Committee
vote on the committee report? “Mr. DOLE. No. “Mr.
ARMSTRONG. . . . The report itself is not considered
by the Committee on Finance. It was not subject to amendment by the
Committee on Finance. It is not subject to amendment now by the
Senate. . . . If there were matter within this report
which was disagreed to by the Senator from Colorado or even by a
majority of all Senators, there would be no way for us to change
the report. I could not offer an amendment tonight to amend the
committee report. . . . [ L]et me just make the
point that this is not the law, it was not voted on, it is not
subject to amendment, and we should discipline ourselves to the
task of expressing congressional intent in the statute.” Hirschey v. FERC , 777 F. 2d 1, 7–8, n. 1
(CADC 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 128 Cong. Rec.
16918–16919 (1982)). See also Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency
Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 Vand.
L. Rev. En Banc 315, 317–318 (2017) (describing his experience
as a Senate staffer who drafted legislative history “like being a
teenager at home while your parents are away for the weekend: there
was no supervision. I was able to write more or less what I
pleased. . . . [ M ]ost members of
Congress . . . have no idea at all about what is in the
legislative history for a particular bill”).