U.S. Supreme Court Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, 259
U.S. 200 (1922) Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs No. 204 Argued April 19, 1922 Decided May 29, 1922 259
U.S. 200 ERROR TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA Syllabus 1. The business of providing public baseball games for profit
between clubs of professional baseball players in a league and
between clubs of rival leagues, although necessarily involving the
constantly repeated traveling of the players from one state to
another, provided for, controlled, and disciplined by the
organizations employing them, is not interstate commerce. P. 259 U. S.
208 .

															2. Held that an action for triple damages under the
Anti-Trust Acts could not be maintained by a baseball club against
baseball leagues and their constituent clubs, joined with
individuals, for an alleged conspiracy to monopolize the baseball
business resulting injuriously to the plaintiff. P. 259 U. S. 209 .

															269 F. 681, 50 App.D.C. 165, affirmed.

															Error to a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia reversing a judgment for triple damages under the
Anti-Trust Acts recovered by the Page 259 U. S. 201 plaintiff in error in the Supreme Court of the District and
directing that judgment be entered for the defendants. Page 259 U. S. 207 MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This is a suit for threefold damages brought by the plaintiff in
error under the Anti-Trust Acts of July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 7, 26
Stat. 209, 210, and of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730,
731. The defendants are the National League of Professional Base
Ball Clubs and the American League of Professional Base Ball Clubs,
unincorporated associations, composed respectively of groups of
eight incorporated baseball clubs, joined as defendants; the
presidents of the two Leagues and a third person, constituting what
is known as the National Commission, having considerable powers in
carrying out an agreement between the two Leagues, and three other
persons having powers in the Federal League of Professional Base
Ball Clubs, the relation of which to this case will be explained.
It is alleged that these defendants conspired to monopolize the
baseball business, the means adopted being set forth with a detail
which, in the view that we take, it is unnecessary to repeat.

															The plaintiff is a baseball club incorporated in Maryland, and,
with seven other corporations, was a member of the Federal League
of Professional Base Ball Players, a corporation under the laws of
Indiana, that attempted to compete with the combined defendants. It
alleges that the defendants destroyed the Federal League by buying
up some of the constituent clubs and in one way or another inducing
all those clubs except the plaintiff to leave their League, and
that the three persons connected with the Federal League and named
as defendants, one of them being the President of the League, took
part in the conspiracy. Great damage to the plaintiff is alleged.
The Page 259 U. S. 208 plaintiff obtained a verdict for $80,000 in the Supreme Court,
and a judgment for treble the amount was entered, but the Court of
Appeals, after an elaborate discussion, held that the defendants
were not within the Sherman Act. The appellee, the plaintiff,
elected to stand on the record in order to bring the case to this
Court at once, and thereupon judgment was ordered for the
defendants. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v.
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 50 App.D.C. 165, 269 F.
681, 68. It is not argued that the plaintiff waived any rights by
its course. Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S.
66 .

															The decision of the Court of Appeals went to the root of the
case, and, if correct, makes it unnecessary to consider other
serious difficulties in the way of the plaintiff's recovery. A
summary statement of the nature of the business involved will be
enough to present the point. The clubs composing the Leagues are in
different cities and for the most part in different states. The end
of the elaborate organizations and sub-organizations that are
described in the pleadings and evidence is that these clubs shall
play against one another in public exhibitions for money, one or
the other club crossing a state line in order to make the meeting
possible. When, as the result of these contests, one club has won
the pennant of its league and another club has won the pennant of
the other league, there is a final competition for the world's
championship between these two. Of course, the scheme requires
constantly repeated traveling on the part of the clubs, which is
provided for, controlled, and disciplined by the organizations, and
this, it is said, means commerce among the states. But we are of
opinion that the Court of Appeals was right.

															The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely
state affairs. It is true that, in order to attain for these
exhibitions the great popularity that they have achieved,
competitions must be arranged between clubs from different cities
and states. But the fact that, in order Page 259 U. S. 209 to give the exhibitions, the Leagues must induce free persons to
cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is
not enough to change the character of the business. According to
the distinction insisted upon in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 , 155 U. S. 655 ,
the transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That to
which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money,
would not be called trade of commerce in the commonly accepted use
of those words. As it is put by defendant, personal effort not
related to production is not a subject of commerce. That which in
its consummation is not commerce does not become commerce among the
states because the transportation that we have mentioned takes
place. To repeat the illustrations given by the court below, a firm
of lawyers sending out a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqua
lecture bureau sending out lecturers, does not engage in such
commerce because the lawyer or lecturer goes to another state.

															If we are right, the plaintiff's business is to be described in
the same way, and the restrictions by contract that prevented the
plaintiff from getting players to break their bargains and the
other conduct charged against the defendants were not an
interference with commerce among the states. Judgment affirmed.


U.S. Supreme Court Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918) Chicago Board of Trade v. United
States No. 98 Argued December 18, 19,
1917 Decided March 4, 1918 246
U.S. 231 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
ILLINOIS Syllabus The "Call" rule of the Board of Trade of Chicago, prohibiting
members of the Board from purchasing or offering to purchase,
during the period between the session of the Board termed the
"Call" and the opening of the regular session of the next business
day, grain "to arrive," at a price other than the closing bid at
the "Call," does not violate the Anti-Trust Law.

															A rule or agreement by which men occupying strong positions in a
branch of trade fix prices at which they will buy or sell during an
important part of the business day is not necessarily an illegal
restraint of trade under the Anti-Trust Law.

															Every agreement concerning or regulating trade restrains, and
the true test of legality is whether the restraint is such as
merely regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes, competition, or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.

															To determine this question, the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business, its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint, and its
effect, actual or probable.

															The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts, not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse, but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and predict consequences.

															It was therefore error for the District Court to strike from the
answer in this case allegations concerning the history and purpose
of the "Call" rule and to exclude evidence on that subject.

															The rule of the Board of Trade here involved, by nature, is a
restriction merely upon the period of price-making; in scope, it
applies during a small part only of the business day, to a small
part only of the grain shipped from day to day to Chicago, to an
even smaller part of the day's sales, and not at all to grain
shipped to any of numerous other Page 246 U. S. 232 available markets; it has had no appreciable effect upon general
market prices, nor has it materially affected the total volume of
grain coming to Chicago, but, within the narrow limits of its
operation, it has helped to improve market conditions in a number
of ways.

															Reversed.

															The case is stated in the opinion. Page 246 U. S. 235 MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

															Chicago is the leading grain market in the world. Its Board of
Trade is the commercial center through which most of the trading in
grain is done. The character of the organization is described in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 . Its
1600 members include brokers, commission merchants, dealers,
millers, Page 246 U. S. 236 maltsters, manufacturers of corn products and proprietors of
elevators. Grains there dealt in are graded according to kind and
quality, and are sold usually "Chicago weight, inspection and
delivery." The standard forms of trading are: (a) spot sales; that
is, sales of grain already in Chicago in railroad cars or elevators
for immediate delivery by order on carrier or transfer of warehouse
receipt. (b) future sales; that is, agreements for delivery later
in the current or in some future month. (c) sales "to arrive" --
that is, agreements to deliver on arrival grain which is already in
transit to Chicago or is to be shipped there within a time
specified. On every business day, sessions of the Board are held at
which all bids and sales are publicly made. Spot sales and future
sales are made at the regular sessions of the Board from 9:30 A.M.
to 1:15 P.M., except on Saturdays, when the session closes at 12 M.
Special sessions, termed the "call," are held immediately after the
close of the regular session, at which sales "to arrive" are made.
These sessions are not limited as to duration, but last usually
about half an hour. At all these sessions, transactions are between
members only, but they may trade either for themselves or on behalf
of others. Members may also trade privately with one another at any
place, either during the sessions or after, and they may trade with
nonmembers at any time except on the premises occupied by the
Board. * Purchases of grain "to arrive" are made largely from country
dealers and farmers throughout the whole territory tributary to
Chicago, which includes, besides Illinois and Iowa, Indiana, Ohio,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, and even South
and North Dakota. The purchases are sometimes the result of bids to
individual country dealers made by telegraph or telephone either
during the sessions or after, but most purchases Page 246 U. S. 237 are made by the sending out from Chicago by the afternoon mails
to hundreds of country dealers, offers to buy at the prices named,
any number of carloads, subject to acceptance before 9:30 A.M. on
the next business day.

															In 1906, the Board adopted what is known as the "call" rule. By
it, members were prohibited from purchasing or offering to
purchase, during the period between the close of the call and the
opening of the session on the next business day, any wheat, corn,
oats or rye "to arrive" at a price other than the closing bid at
the call. The call was over, with rare exceptions, by 2 o'clock.
The change effected was this: before the adoption of the rule,
members fixed their bids throughout the day at such prices as they
respectively saw fit; after the adoption of the rule, the bids had
to be fixed at the day's closing bid on the call until the opening
of the next session.

															In 1913, the United States filed in the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, this suit against the Board and its
executive officers and directors, to enjoin the enforcement of the
call rule, alleging it to be in violation of the Anti-Trust Law of
July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209. The defendants admitted the
adoption and enforcement of the call rule, and averred that its
purpose was not to prevent competition or to control prices, but to
promote the convenience of members by restricting their hours of
business and to break up a monopoly in that branch of the grain
trade acquired by four or five warehousemen in Chicago. On motion
of the government, the allegations concerning the purpose of
establishing the regulation were stricken from the record. The case
was then heard upon evidence; and a decree was entered which
declared that defendants became parties to a combination or
conspiracy to restrain interstate and foreign trade and commerce
"by adopting, acting upon and enforcing" the "call" rule; and
enjoined them from acting Page 246 U. S. 238 upon the same or from adopting or acting upon any similar
rule.

															No opinion was delivered by the District Judge. The government
proved the existence of the rule and described its application and
the change in business practice involved. It made no attempt to
show that the rule was designed to or that it had the effect of
limiting the amount of grain shipped to Chicago, or of retarding or
accelerating shipment, or if raising or depressing prices, or of
discriminating against any part of the public, or that it resulted
in hardship to anyone. The case was rested upon the bald
proposition that a rule or agreement by which men occupying
positions of strength in any branch of trade fixed prices at which
they would buy or sell during an important part of the business day
is an illegal restraint of trade under the Anti-Trust Law. But the
legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates, and
perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question,
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied, its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed, the nature of the restraint,
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation, or the reverse, but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences. The District Court erred, therefore, in striking from
the answer Page 246 U. S. 239 allegations concerning the history and purpose of the call rule
and in later excluding evidence on that subject. But the evidence
admitted makes it clear that the rule was a reasonable regulation
of business consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Trust
Law. First. The nature of the rule: the restriction was upon
the period of price-making. It required members to desist from
further price-making after the close of the call until 9:30 A.M.
the next business day; but there was no restriction upon the
sending out of bids after close of the call. Thus, it required
members who desired to buy grain "to arrive" to make up their minds
before the close of the call how much they were willing to pay
during the interval before the next session of the Board. The rule
made it to their interest to attend the call, and if they did not
fill their wants by purchases there, to make the final bid high
enough to enable them to purchase from country dealers. Second. The scope of the rule: it is restricted in
operation to grain "to arrive." It applies only to a small part of
the grain shipped from day to day to Chicago, and to an even
smaller part of the day's sales; members were left free to purchase
grain already in Chicago from anyone at any price throughout the
day. It applies only during a small part of the business day;
members were left free to purchase during the sessions of the Board
grain "to arrive," at any price, from members anywhere and from
nonmembers anywhere except on the premises of the Board. It applied
only to grain shipped to Chicago; members were left free to
purchase at any price throughout the day from either members or
non-members, grain "to arrive" at any other market. Country dealers
and farmers had available in practically every part of the
territory called tributary to Chicago some other market for grain
"to arrive." Thus, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Page 246 U. S. 240 and parts of Illinois are also tributary to St. Louis; Nebraska
and Iowa, to Omaha; Minnesota, Iowa, South and North Dakota, to
Minneapolis or Duluth; Wisconsin and parts of Iowa and of Illinois,
to Milwaukee; Ohio, Indiana and parts of Illinois, to Cincinnati;
Indiana and parts of Illinois, to Louisville. Third. The effects of the rule: as it applies to only a
small part of the grain shipped to Chicago, and to that only during
a part of the business day, and does not apply at all to grain
shipped to other markets, the rule had no appreciable effect on
general market prices; nor did it materially affect the total
volume of grain coming to Chicago. But, within the narrow limits of
its operation, the rule helped to improve market conditions
thus:

															(a) It created a public market for grain "to arrive." Before its
adoption, bids were made privately. Men had to buy and sell without
adequate knowledge of actual market conditions. This was
disadvantageous to all concerned, but particularly so to country
dealers and farmers.

															(b) It brought into the regular market hours of the Board
sessions, more of the trading in grain "to arrive."

															(c) It brought buyers and sellers into more direct relations
because, on the call, they gathered together for a free and open
interchange of bids and offers.

															(d) It distributed the business in grain "to arrive" among a far
larger number of Chicago receivers and commission merchants than
had been the case there before.

															(e) It increased the number of country dealers engaging in this
branch of the business, supplied them more regularly with bids from
Chicago, and also increased the number of bids received by them
from competing markets.

															(f) It eliminated risks necessarily incident to a private
market, and thus enabled country dealers to do business on a
smaller margin. In that way, the rule made it possible for them to
pay more to farmers without raising the price to consumers. Page 246 U. S. 241 (g) It enabled country dealers to sell some grain to arrive
which they would otherwise have been obliged either to ship to
Chicago commission merchants or to sell for "future delivery."

															(h) It enabled those grain merchants of Chicago who sell to
millers and exporters to trade on a smaller margin and, by paying
more for grain or selling it for less, to make the Chicago market
more attractive for both shippers and buyers of grain.

															(i) Incidentally, it facilitated trading "to arrive" by enabling
those engaged in these transactions to fulfill their contracts by
tendering grain arriving at Chicago on any railroad, whereas
formerly shipments had to be made over the particular railroad
designated by the buyer.

															The restraint imposed by the rule is less severe than that
sustained in Anderson v. United States, 171 U.
S. 604 . Every Board of Trade and nearly every trade
organization imposes some restraint upon the conduct of business by
its members. Those relating to the hours in which business may be
done are common; and they make a special appeal where, as here,
they tend to shorten the working day or, at least, limit the period
of most exacting activity. The decree of the District Court is
reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.

															* There is an exception as to future sales not here
material.


Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. U.S.

U.S. Supreme Court Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United
States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914) Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Association v. United
States Nos. 511, 550 Argued October 24, 27,
1913 Decided June 22, 1914 234
U.S. 600 APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK Syllabus Conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct testimony,
and a conspiracy to accomplish that which is their natural
consequence may be inferred from the things actually done.

															The Sherman Law, as construed by this Court in the Standard
Oil case, while not reaching normal and usual contracts
incident to lawful purposes and in furtherance of legitimate trade,
does broadly condemn all combinations and conspiracies which
restrain the free and natural flow of trade in the channels of
interstate commerce. Held in this case that the circulation of a so-called
official report among members of an association of retail dealers
calling attention to actions Page 234 U. S. 601 of listed wholesale dealer in selling direct to consumers tended
to prevent member of the association from dealing with the listed
dealers referred to in the report, and to directly and unreasonably
restrain trade by preventing it with such listed dealer, and was
within the prohibitions of the Sherman Law.

															While a retail dealer may unquestionably stop dealing with a
wholesaler for any reason sufficient to himself, he and other
dealer may not combine and agree that none of them will deal with
such wholesaler without, in case interstate commerce is involved,
violating the Sherman Law.

															An act, harmless when done by one person, may become a public
wrong when done by many acting in concert in pursuance of a
conspiracy. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433 .

															201 F. 581 affirmed.

															The facts, which involve the determination of whether an
arrangement between certain retail lumbermen's associations in
regard to their relations with wholesale dealers amounted to a
combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act, are stated in the opinion. Page 234 U. S. 604 MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

															These are appeals from a decree of the District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York Page 234 U. S. 605 in an action brought by the United States under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act (July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, c. 647), having for its
object an injunction against certain alleged combinations of retail
lumber dealers which, it was averred, had entered into a conspiracy
to prevent wholesale dealers from selling directly to consumers of
lumber. The defendants are various lumber associations composed
largely of retail lumber dealers in New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland,
and the District of Columbia, and the officers and directors of the
associations. The record is very voluminous, but the facts
essential to a consideration of the decree of the district court
are in comparatively narrow compass. While the record also concerns
practices which are said to have been abandoned, the decree
entered, declaring the defendants named to be in a combination or
conspiracy to restrict and restrain competition, depends solely
upon the method adopted and being used by the defendants in the
distribution of the information contained in a certain document
known as the "Official Report," the form of which, set forth in the
decree, is as follows:

															" OFFICIAL REPORT" " (Name of the Particular Association Circulating
it.)" " STATEMENT TO MEMBERS (WITH THE DATE)" "You are reminded that it is because you are members of our
Association and have an interest in common with your fellow members
in the information contained in this statement that they
communicate it to you, and that they communicate to you in
strictest confidence, and with the understanding that you are to
receive it and treat it in the same way."

															"The following are reported as having solicited, quoted, or as
having sold direct to the consumers:"

															"[Here follows a list of the names and addresses of various
wholesale dealers.] " Page 234 U. S. 606 "Members, upon learning of any instance of persons soliciting,
quoting, or selling direct to consumers, should at once report
same, and in so doing should, if possible, supply the following
information:"

															"The number and initials of car."

															"The name of consumer to whom the car is consigned."

															"The initials or name of shipper."

															"The date of arrival of car."

															"The place of delivery."

															"The point of origin;"

															and the defendants were enjoined from combining, conspiring, or
agreeing together to distribute, and from distributing, to members
of the associations named or any other person or persons, any
information showing soliciting, quotations, or sales and shipments
of lumber and lumber products from manufacturers and wholesalers to
consumers of or dealers in lumber, and from the preparation and
distribution of the lists above described as the "Official Report,"
or the use of a similar device.

															The record discloses that the defendant associations are
constituted largely of retail lumber dealers, each of whom has the
natural desire to control his local trade, which the retailers
contend have been unduly interfered with by the wholesalers in
selling to consumers within the local territory in such wise as to
conflict with what they regard as a strictly local trade, and it
appears that the defendant associations have for their object,
among other things, the adoption of ways and means to protect such
trade and to prevent the wholesale dealers from intruding therein.
The particular thing which this case concerns in the retailers'
efforts to promote the end in view is the attempt in the manner
shown, by the circulation of the reports in question, to keep the
wholesalers from selling directly to the local trade. The trade of
the wholesalers involved covers a number of states, and there is no
question but that the supplying of lumber to the large numbers Page 234 U. S. 607 of retailers in these associations in different states is
interstate trade, and that, if the practices are illegal within the
Sherman Act, they may be reached by this proceeding. Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 ; Loewe v.Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 , 208 U. S.
300 .

															The record discloses a systematic circulation among the members
of the defendant associations of the official report above quoted.
The method of operation as stated by the learned counsel for the
appellants is thus summarized in his brief:

															"The names on this list are obtained and placed thereon as the
result of complaints made by individual retailers. When an
individual member of a retail association learns of a sale by a
wholesaler to one of the customers of the retailer he may complain
in writing to the secretary of his association, whose duty it is
thereupon to ascertain the facts by correspondence with the
wholesaler in question and such other means as may seem proper.
Should the report or complaint be without proper foundation, or
should the secretary become satisfied that the matter is a trifling
one, or the result of inadvertence, the incident usually terminates
at this point; but should the complaint appear to be serious and
well founded, the case is submitted to the board of directors of
the retail association at its next meeting, and, should the board
be satisfied that the wholesaler is generally making a practice of
selling to consumers or customers of the retail trade, the
secretary is directed to report the name of such wholesaler for the
official list. Thereupon the secretary sends the name to Mr. Crary
of New York, who adds it upon the next report to the names of those
already thereupon. Each report contains the names of all
wholesalers who have been reported from the very beginning as
selling to consumers, and whose names have not been removed for
cause. The reports or lists, after being printed in New York, are
distributed amongst the secretaries of the defendant
associations, Page 234 U. S. 608 those for each association being marked with its name, and in
that way only being distinguished from those sent to the other
associations. The secretary of each association then distributes
the lists to his members. Should any wholesaler desire to have his
name removed from the list, he can have it done upon satisfactory
assurance to the local secretary that he is no longer selling in
competition with the retailers. In practice, the greatest care is
taken to make the list accurate, and, as a matter of fact, it only
contains the names of such wholesalers as are absolutely committed
to the practice of competing with retailers for the custom of
builders and contractors."

															The reading of the official report shows that it is intended to
give confidential information to the members of the associations of
the names of wholesalers reported as soliciting or selling directly
to consumers, members upon learning of any such instances being
called upon to promptly report the same, supplying detailed
information as to the particulars of the transaction. When viewed
in the light of the history of these associations and the conflict
in which they were engaged to keep the retail trade to themselves
and to prevent wholesalers from interfering with what they regarded
as their rights in such trade, there can be but one purpose in
giving the information in this form to the members of the retail
associations of the names of all wholesalers who, by their attempt
to invade the exclusive territory of the retailers, as they regard
it, have been guilty of unfair competitive trade. These lists were
quite commonly spoken of as blacklists, and when the attention of a
retailer was brought to the name of a wholesaler who had acted in
this wise, it was with the evident purpose that he should know of
such conduct, and act accordingly. True it is that there is no
agreement among the retailers to refrain from dealing with listed
wholesalers, nor is there any penalty annexed for the failure so to
do; but he is blind indeed who does not see the Page 234 U. S. 609 purpose in the predetermined and periodical circulation of this
report to put the ban upon wholesale dealers whose names appear in
the list of unfair dealers trying by methods obnoxious to the
retail dealers to supply the trade which they regard as their own.
Indeed, this purpose is practically conceded in the brief of the
learned counsel for the appellants:

															"It was and is conceded by defendants, and the court below
found, that the circulation of this information would have a
natural tendency to cause retailers receiving these reports to
withhold patronage from listed concerns. That was, of course, the
very object of the defendants in circulating them."

															In other words, the circulation of such information among the
hundreds of retailers as to the alleged delinquency of a wholesaler
with one of their number had, and was intended to have, the natural
effect of causing such retailers to withhold their patronage from
the concern listed.

															The Sherman Act has been so frequently and recently before this
Court as to require no extended discussion now. Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S.
1 06; United States v. St. Louis Terminal, 224 U. S. 383 ; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S.
20 ; United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 226 U. S. 61 ; United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.
S. 324 ; United States v. Patten, 226 U.
S. 525 ; Nash v. United States, 229 U.
S. 373 ; Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 231 U. S. 222 . It
broadly condemns all combinations and conspiracies which restrain
the free and natural flow of trade in the channels of interstate
commerce. It is true that this Court held in the Standard
Oil and Tobacco cases, supra, and in the
subsequent cases following them, that, in its proper construction,
the act was not intended to reach normal and usual contracts
incident to lawful purposes and intended to Page 234 U. S. 610 further legitimate trade, and summarizing the meaning of the act
in the Tobacco case, this Court said (221 U.S. 221 U. S.
179 ):

															"Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute,
it was held in the Standard Oil case that as the words
'restraint of trade' at common law and in the law of this country
at the time of the adoption of the antitrust act only embraced acts
or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the
prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting
competition, or unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or
which, either because of their inherent nature or effect, or
because of the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously
restrained trade, that the words as used in the statute were
designed to have and did have but a like significance."

															The same principle was affirmed in Nash v. United States,
supra. The Court in the Standard Oil case construed the act as
intended to reach only combinations unduly restrictive of the flow
of commerce, or unduly restrictive of competition, and,
illustrating what were such undue or unreasonable combinations, it
classed as illegal (p. 221 U. S. 58 )

															"all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the
contract or act, or where the surrounding circumstances were such
as to justify the conclusion that they had not been entered into or
performed with the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding
personal interest and developing trade but, on the contrary, were
of such a character as to give rise to the inference or presumption
that they had been entered into or done with the intent to do wrong
to the general public and to limit the right of individuals, thus
restraining the free flow of commerce and tending to bring about
the evils, such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to
be against public policy."

															And in Loewe v.Lawlor, supra, this Court held that a
combination to boycott Page 234 U. S. 611 the hats of a manufacturer and deter dealers from buying them in
order to coerce the manufacturer to a particular course of action
with reference to labor organizations, the effect of the
combination being to compel third parties and strangers not to
engage in a course of trade except upon conditions which the
combination imposed, was within the Sherman Act. In Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.
S. 418 , after citing Loewe v.Lawlor, supra, this Court said (p. 221 U. S.
438 ):

															"But the principle announced by the Court was general. It [the
Sherman Act] covered any illegal means by which interstate commerce
is restrained, whether by unlawful combinations of capital, or
unlawful combinations of labor, and we think also whether the
restraint be occasioned by unlawful contracts, trusts, pooling
arrangements, blacklists, boycotts, coercion, threats,
intimidation, and whether these be made effective, in whole or in
part, by acts, words, or printed matter." And see Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S.
38 .

															These principles are applicable to this situation. Here are
wholesale dealers in large number engaged in interstate trade upon
whom it is proposed to impose as a condition of carrying on that
trade that they shall not sell in such manner that a local retail
dealer may regard such sale as an infringement of his exclusive
right to trade, upon pain of being reported as an unfair dealer to
a large number of other retail dealers associated with the offended
dealer, the purpose being to keep the wholesaler from dealing not
only with the particular dealer who reports him, but with all
others of the class who may be informed of his delinquency.

															"Section 1 of the act . . . is not confined to voluntary
restraints, as where persons engaged in interstate trade or
commerce agree to suppress competition among themselves, but
includes as well involuntary restraints, as where persons not so
engaged conspire to compel action by others, or to create
artificial Page 234 U. S. 612 conditions, which necessarily impede or burden the due course of
such trade or commerce, or restrict the common liberty to engage
therein." United States v. Patten, 226
U. S. 541 . This record abounds in instances where the
offending dealer was thus reported, the hoped-for effect, unless he
discontinued the offending practice, realized, and his trade
directly and appreciably impaired.

															But it is said that, in order to show a combination or
conspiracy within the Sherman Act, some agreement must be shown
under which the concerted action is taken. It is elementary,
however, that conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct
testimony, and may be inferred from the things actually done, and
when, in this case, by concerted action, the names of wholesalers
who were reported as having made sales to consumers were
periodically reported to the other members of the associations, the
conspiracy to accomplish that which was the natural consequence of
such action may be readily inferred.

															The circulation of these reports not only tends to directly
restrain the freedom of commerce by preventing the listed dealers
from entering into competition with retailers, as was held by the
district court, but it directly tends to prevent other retailers
who have no personal grievance against him, and with whom he might
trade, from so doing, they being deterred solely because of the
influence of the report circulated among the members of the
associations. In other words, the trade of the wholesaler with
strangers was directly affected not because of any supposed wrong
which he had done to them, but because of the grievance of a member
of one of the associations, who had reported a wrong to himself,
which grievance, when brought to the attention of others, it was
hoped would deter them from dealing with the offending party. This
practice takes the case out of those normal and usual agreements in
aid of trade and commerce which may be found not to be within the
act, and puts it within the prohibited Page 234 U. S. 613 class of undue and unreasonable restraints such as was the
particular subject of condemnation in Loewe v. Lawlor,
supra. The argument that the course pursued is necessary to the
protection of the retail trade and promotive of the public welfare
in providing retail facilities is answered by the fact that
Congress, with the right to control the field of interstate
commerce, has so legislated as to prevent resort to practices which
unduly restrain competition or unduly obstruct the free flow of
such commerce, and private choice of means must yield to the
national authority thus exerted. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 , 175 U. S.
241 -242. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.
S. 604 , is cited and relied upon by the appellants. In
that case, this Court sustained, as against an attack under the
Sherman law, the legality of an association called the Traders'
Live Stock Exchange in Kansas City. An agreement among purchasers
of cattle for the purpose of regulating and controlling the local
business among themselves had been entered into, and one of the
rules provided that the members of the exchange should not deal
with any other yard trader unless he was a member of such exchange.
It was said (p. 171 U. S.
613 ):

															"There is no evidence that these defendants have in any manner
other than by the rules above mentioned hindered or impeded others
in shipping, trading, or selling their stock, or that they have in
any way interfered with the freedom of access to the stock yards of
any and all other traders and purchasers, or hindered their
obtaining the same facilities which were therein afforded by the
stock yards company to the defendants as members of the exchange,
and we think the evidence does not tend to show that the above
results have flowed from the adoption and enforcement of the rules
and regulations referred to. " Page 234 U. S. 614 As distinguished from this situation, the present case shows
that the trade of the listed wholesalers is hindered or impeded;
that competition is suppressed and the natural flow of commerce
interfered with as the direct result of the circulation of the
official reports in the manner stated. The case is quite different
from the Anderson case. And see Montague & Co. v.
Lowry, supra. A retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop dealing with
a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, and may do so
because he thinks such dealer is acting unfairly in trying to
undermine his trade. "But," as was said by Mr. Justice Lurton,
speaking for the Court in Grenada Lumber Co. v.
Mississippi, 217 U. S. 433 ,

															"when the plaintiffs in error combine and agree that no one of
them will trade with any producer or wholesaler who shall sell to a
consumer within the trade range of any of them, quite another case
is presented. An act harmless when done by one may become a public
wrong when done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the
form of a conspiracy, and may be prohibited or punished if the
result be hurtful to the public or to the individual against whom
the concerted action is directed."

															When the retailer goes beyond his personal right, and,
conspiring and combining with others of like purpose, seeks to
obstruct the free course of interstate trade and commerce and to
unduly suppress competition by placing obnoxious wholesale dealers
under the coercive influence of a condemnatory report circulated
among others, actual or possible customers of the offenders, he
exceeds his lawful rights, and such action brings him and those
acting with him within the condemnation of the act of Congress and
the district court was right in so holding. It follows that its
decree must be Affirmed.


NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the preliminary print of the United States
Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.

															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–9972

															_________________

															DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

															[April 21, 2015] Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court. In Illinois v. Caballes ,543 U. S. 405 (2005), this
Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop
does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of
unreasonable seizures. This case presents the question whether the
Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion
of a traffic stop. We hold that a police stop exceeding the time
needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates
the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure
justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore,
“become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a ticket for the
violation. Id ., at 407. The Court so recognized in Caballes , and we adhere to the line drawn in that
decision.

															I

															Just after midnight on March 27, 2012, police officer Morgan
Struble observed a Mercury Mountaineer veer slowly onto the
shoulder of Nebraska State Highway 275 for one or two seconds and
then jerk back onto the road. Nebraska law prohibits driving on
highway shoulders, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §60–6,142 (2010), and on
that basis, Struble pulled the Mountaineer over at 12:06 a.m.
Struble is a K–9 officer with the Valley Police Department in
Ne-braska, and his dog Floyd was in his patrol car that night. Two
men were in the Mountaineer: the driver, Dennys Rodriguez, and a
front-seat passenger, Scott Pollman.

															Struble approached the Mountaineer on the passenger’s side.
After Rodriguez identified himself, Struble asked him why he had
driven onto the shoulder. Rodriguez replied that he had swerved to
avoid a pothole. Struble then gathered Rodriguez’s license,
registration, and proof of insurance, and asked Rodriguez to
accompany him to the patrol car. Rodriguez asked if he was required
to do so, and Struble answered that he was not. Rodriguez decided
to wait in his own vehicle.

															After running a records check on Rodriguez, Struble returned to
the Mountaineer. Struble asked passenger Pollman for his driver’s
license and began to question him about where the two men were
coming from and where they were going. Pollman replied that they
had traveled to Omaha, Nebraska, to look at a Ford Mustang that was
for sale and that they were returning to Norfolk, Ne-braska.
Struble returned again to his patrol car, where he completed a
records check on Pollman, and called for a second officer. Struble
then began writing a warning ticket for Rodriguez for driving on
the shoulder of the road.

															Struble returned to Rodriguez’s vehicle a third time to issue
the written warning. By 12:27 or 12:28 a.m., Struble had finished
explaining the warning to Rodriguez, and had given back to
Rodriguez and Pollman the documents obtained from them. As Struble
later testified, at that point, Rodriguez and Pollman “had all
their documents back and a copy of the written warning. I got all
the reason[s] for the stop out of the way[,] . . . took
care of all the business.” App. 70.

															Nevertheless, Struble did not consider Rodriguez “free to
leave.” Id., at 69–70. Although justification for the
traffic stop was “out of the way,” id., at 70, Struble asked
for permission to walk his dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle.
Rodriguez said no. Struble then instructed Rodriguez to turn off
the ignition, exit the vehicle, and stand in front of the patrol
car to wait for the second officer. Rodriguez complied. At 12:33
a.m., a deputy sheriff arrived. Struble retrieved his dog and led
him twice around the Mountaineer. The dog alerted to the presence
of drugs halfway through Struble’s second pass. All told, seven or
eight minutes had elapsed from the time Struble issued the written
warning until the dog indicated the presence of drugs. A search of
the vehicle revealed a large bag of methamphetamine.

															Rodriguez was indicted in the United States District Court for
the District of Nebraska on one count of possession with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1). He moved to suppress the
evidence seized from his car on the ground, among others, that
Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion
in order to conduct the dog sniff.

															After receiving evidence, a Magistrate Judge recommended that
the motion be denied. The Magistrate Judge found no probable cause
to search the vehicle independent of the dog alert. App. 100 (apart
from “information given by the dog,” “Officer Struble had [no]thing
other than a rather large hunch”). He further found that no
reasonable suspicion supported the detention once Struble issued
the written warning. He concluded, however, that under Eighth
Circuit precedent, extension of the stop by “seven to eight
minutes” for the dog sniff was only a de minimis intrusion
on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights and was therefore
permissible.

															The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s factual
findings and legal conclusions and denied Rodriguez’s motion to
suppress. The court noted that, in the Eighth Circuit, “dog sniffs
that occur within a short time following the completion of a
traffic stop are not constitutionally prohibited if they constitute
only de minimis intrusions.” App. 114 (quoting United States v. Alexander , 448 F. 3d 1014, 1016 (CA8 2006)). The
court thus agreed with the Magistrate Judge that the “7 to 10
minutes” added to the stop by the dog sniff “was not of
constitu-tional significance.” App. 114. Impelled by that decision,
Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to
five years in prison.

															The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The “seven- or eight-minute delay”
in this case, the opinion noted, resembled delays that the court
had previously ranked as permissible. 741 F. 3d 905, 907
(2014). The Court of Appeals thus ruled that the delay here
constituted an acceptable “ de minimis intrusion on
Rodriguez’s personal liberty.” Id., at 908. Given that
ruling, the court declined to reach the question whether Struble
had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez’s detention after
issuing the written warning.

															We granted certiorari to resolve a division among lower courts
on the question whether police routinely may extend an
otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reason-able suspicion, in
order to conduct a dog sniff. 573 U. S. ___ (2014). Compare, e.g., United States v. Morgan , 270 F. 3d 625,
632 (CA8 2001) (postcompletion delay of “well under ten minutes”
permissible), with, e.g., State v. Baker , 2010 UT 18,
¶13, 229 P. 3d 650, 658 (2010) (“[W]ithout additional
reasonable suspicion, the officer must allow the seized person to
depart once the purpose of the stop has concluded.”).

															II

															A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police
investigation of that violation. “[A] relatively brief encounter,”
a routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called
‘ Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Knowles v. Iowa ,525 U. S. 113,117 (1998)
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty ,468 U. S. 420,439
(1984), in turn citing Terry v. Ohio ,392 U. S. 1
(1968)). See also Arizona v. Johnson ,555 U. S.
323,330 (2009). Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of
police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the
seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted
the stop, Caballes , 543 U. S., at 407, and attend to
related safety concerns, infra , at 6–7. See also United
States v. Sharpe ,470 U. S. 675,685 (1985); Florida v. Royer ,460 U. S. 491,500 (1983)
(plurality opinion) (“The scope of the detention must be carefully
tailored to its underlying justification.”). Because addressing the
infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than
is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Ibid. See also Caballes , 543 U. S., at 407. Authority for the seizure
thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
reasonably should have been—completed. See Sharpe , 470
U. S., at 686 (in determining the reasonable duration of a
stop, “it [is] appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
pursued [the] investigation”).

															Our decisions in Caballes and Johnson heed these
constraints. In both cases, we concluded that the Fourth Amendment
tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen
the roadside detention. Johnson , 555 U. S., at 327–328
(questioning); Caballes , 543 U. S., at 406, 408 (dog
sniff). In Caballes , however, we cautioned that a traffic
stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a warning
ticket. 543 U. S., at 407. And we repeated that admonition in Johnson : The seizure remains lawful only “so long as
[unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop.” 555 U. S., at 333. See also Muehler v. Mena ,544 U. S. 93,101 (2005) (because unrelated
inquiries did not “exten[d] the time [petitioner] was detained[,]
. . . no additional Fourth Amendment justification
. . . was required”). An officer, in other words, may
conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic
stop. But contrary to Justice Alito’s suggestion, post, at
4, n. 2, he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop,
absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individ-ual. But see post , at 1–2 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (premising opinion on the dissent’s own finding of
“reasonable suspicion,” although the District Court reached the
opposite conclusion, and the Court of Appeals declined to consider
the issue).

															Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an
officer’s mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the
traffic] stop.” Caballes , 543 U. S., at 408. Typically
such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.
See Delaware v. Prouse ,440 U. S. 648–660 (1979).
See also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.3(c), pp. 507–517 (5th
ed. 2012). These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of
the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated
safely and responsibly. See Prouse, 440 U. S., at
658–659; LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.3(c), at 516 (A “warrant
check makes it possible to determine whether the apparent traffic
violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic
offenses.”).

															A dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at “detect[ing]
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Indianapolis v. Edmond ,531 U. S. 32–41 (2000). See also Florida v. Jardines ,569 U. S. 1, ___–___ (2013) (slip op., at
7–8). Candidly, the Government acknowledged at oral argument that a
dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an
ordinary incident of a traffic stop. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.
Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary
inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the
officer’s traffic mission.

															In advancing its de minimis rule, the Eighth Circuit
relied heavily on our decision in Pennsylvania v. Mimms ,434 U. S. 106 (1977) ( per curiam ). See United States v. $404,905.00 in U. S. Currency ,
182 F. 3d 643, 649 (CA8 1999). In Mimms , we reasoned
that the government’s “legitimate and weighty” interest in officer
safety outweighs the “ de minimis ” additional intrusion of
requiring a driver, already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle.
434 U. S., at 110–111. See also Maryland v. Wilson ,519 U. S. 408–415 (1997) (passengers may be
required to exit vehicle stopped for traffic violation). The Eighth
Circuit, echoed in Justice Thomas’s dissent, believed that the
imposition here similarly could be offset by the Government’s
“strong interest in interdicting the flow of illegal drugs along
the nation’s highways.” $404,905.00 in U. S. Currency ,
182 F. 3d, at 649; see post, at 9.

															Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the
government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the
stop itself. Traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to
police officers,” Johnson , 555 U. S., at 330 (internal
quotation marks omitted), so an officer may need to take certain
negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission
safely. Cf. United States v. Holt , 264 F. 3d
1215, 1221–1222 (CA10 2001) (en banc) (recognizing officer safety
justification for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks),
abrogated on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Stewart , 473 F. 3d 1265, 1269 (CA10 2007). On-scene
investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that
mission. See supra, at 6–7. So too do safety precautions
taken in order to facilitate such detours. But cf. post, at
2–3 (Alito, J., dissenting). Thus, even assuming that the
imposition here was no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms , the dog sniff could not be justified on the same
basis. Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind
from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general or drug
trafficking in particular.

															The Government argues that an officer may “incremental[ly]”
prolong a stop to conduct a dog sniff so long as the officer is
reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the
stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in
relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar
circumstances. Brief for United States 36–39. The Government’s
argument, in effect, is that by completing all traffic-related
tasks expeditiously, an officer can earn bonus time to pursue an
unrelated criminal investigation. See also post, at 2–5
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (embracing the Government’s argument). The
reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in
fact do. See Knowles , 525 U. S., at 115–117. In this
regard, the Government acknowledges that “an officer always has to
be reasonably diligent.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. How could diligence
be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and
how he did it? If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries
expeditiously, then that is the amount of “time reasonably required
to complete [the stop’s] mission.” Caballes , 543 U. S., at
407. As we said in Caballes and reiterate today, a traffic
stop “prolonged beyond” that point is “unlawful.” Ibid. The
critical question, then, is not whether the dog sniff occurs before
or after the officer issues a ticket, as Justice Alito supposes, post, at 2–4, but whether conducting the sniff
“prolongs”— i.e., adds time to—“the stop,” supra, at
6.

															III

															The Magistrate Judge found that detention for the dog sniff in
this case was not independently supported by individualized
suspicion, see App. 100, and the District Court adopted the
Magistrate Judge’s findings, see id ., at 112–113. The Court
of Appeals, however, did not review that determination. But see post, at 1, 10–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (resolving the
issue, nevermind that the Court of Appeals left it unaddressed); post, at 1–2 (Alito, J., dissenting) (upbraiding the Court
for addressing the sole issue decided by the Court of Appeals and
characterizing the Court’s answer as “unnecessary” because the
Court, instead, should have decided an issue the Court of Appeals
did not decide). The question whether reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion
of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open
for Eighth Circuit consideration on remand.

															*  *  *

															For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–9972

															_________________

															DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

															[April 21, 2015]

															Justice Kennedy, dissenting.

															My join in Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinion does not extend to
Part III. Although the issue discussed in that Part was argued
here, the Court of Appeals has not addressed that aspect of the
case in any detail. In my view the better course would be to allow
that court to do so in the first instance. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–9972

															_________________

															DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

															[April 21, 2015]

															Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito joins, and with whom
Justice Kennedy joins as to all but Part III, dissenting.

															Ten years ago, we explained that “conducting a dog sniff [does]
not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its
inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.” Illinois v. Caballes ,543 U. S. 405,408 (2005).
The only question here is whether an officer executed a stop in a
reasonable manner when he waited to conduct a dog sniff until after
he had given the driver a written warning and a backup unit had
arrived, bringing the overall duration of the stop to 29 minutes.
Because the stop was reasonably executed, no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred. The Court’s holding to the contrary cannot be
reconciled with our decision in Caballes or a number of
common police practices. It was also unnecessary, as the officer
possessed reasonable suspicion to continue to hold the driver to
conduct the dog sniff. I respectfully dissent.

															I

															The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 4. As
the text indicates, and as we have repeatedly confirmed, “the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness.’ ” Brigham City v. Stuart ,547
U. S. 398,403 (2006). We have defined reasonableness “in
objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances,” Ohio v. Robinette ,519 U. S. 33,39 (1996), and by
considering “the traditional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the
framing,” Atwater v. Lago Vista ,532 U. S.
318,326 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). When traditional
protections have not provided a definitive answer, our precedents
have “analyzed a search or seizure in light of traditional
standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.” Virginia v. Moore ,553 U. S. 164,171 (2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

															Although a traffic stop “constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’
within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment],” such a seizure is
constitutionally “reasonable where the police have probable cause
to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States ,517 U. S. 806–810 (1996). But “a seizure
that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if
its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected
by the Constitution.” Caballes , supra, at 407.

															Because Rodriguez does not dispute that Officer Struble had
probable cause to stop him, the only question is whether the stop
was otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. See Brief for
Appellant in No. 13–1176 (CA8), p. 4, n. 2. I easily
conclude that it was. Approximately 29 minutes passed from the time
Officer Struble stopped Rodriguez until his narcotics-detection dog
alerted to the presence of drugs. That amount of time is hardly out
of the ordinary for a traffic stop by a single officer of a vehicle
containing multiple occupants even when no dog sniff is involved.
See, e.g., United States v. Ellis , 497 F. 3d 606
(CA6 2007) (22 minutes); United States v. Barragan ,
379 F. 3d 524 (CA8 2004) (approximately 30 minutes). During
that time, Officer Struble conducted the ordinary activities of a
traffic stop—he approached the vehicle, questioned Rodriguez about
the observed violation, asked Pollman about their travel plans, ran
serial warrant checks on Rodriguez and Pollman, and issued a
written warning to Rodriguez. And when he decided to conduct a dog
sniff, he took the precaution of calling for backup out of concern
for his safety. See 741 F. 3d 905, 907 (CA8 2014); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms ,434 U. S. 106,110 (1977)
( per curiam ) (officer safety is a “legitimate and weighty”
concern relevant to reasonableness).

															As Caballes makes clear, the fact that Officer Struble
waited until after he gave Rodriguez the warning to conduct the dog
sniff does not alter this analysis. Because “the use of a
well-trained narcotics-detection dog . . . generally does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests,” 543 U. S., at 409,
“conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic
stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a
reasonable manner,” id., at 408. The stop here was “lawful
at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner.” Ibid . As in Caballes , “conducting a dog sniff [did]
not change the character of [the] traffic stop,” ibid. , and
thus no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

															II

															Rather than adhere to the reasonableness requirement that we
have repeatedly characterized as the “touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment,” Brigham City , supra , at 403, the majority
constructed a test of its own that is inconsistent with our
precedents.

															A

															The majority’s rule requires a traffic stop to “en[d] when tasks
tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have
been—completed.” Ante , at 5. “If an officer can complete
traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of
time reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission” and he may
hold the individual no longer. Ante , at 8 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). The majority’s rule thus
imposes a one-way ratchet for constitutional protection linked to
the characteristics of the individual officer conducting the stop:
If a driver is stopped by a particularly efficient officer, then he
will be entitled to be released from the traffic stop after a
shorter period of time than a driver stopped by a less efficient
officer. Similarly, if a driver is stopped by an officer with
access to technology that can shorten a records check, then he will
be entitled to be released from the stop after a shorter period of
time than an individual stopped by an officer without access to
such technology.

															I “cannot accept that the search and seizure protections of the
Fourth Amendment are so variable and can be made to turn upon such
trivialities.” Whren , 517 U. S. , at 815
(citations omitted). We have repeatedly explained that the
reasonableness inquiry must not hinge on the characteristics of the
individual officer conducting the seizure. We have held, for
example, that an officer’s state of mind “does not invalidate [an]
action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify that action.” Id. , at 813 (internal quotation marks
omitted). We have spurned theories that would make the Fourth
Amendment “change with local law enforcement practices.” Moore , supra , at 172. And we have rejected a rule
that would require the offense establishing probable cause to be
“closely related to” the offense identified by the arresting
officer, as such a rule would make “the constitutionality of an
arrest . . . vary from place to place and from time to
time, depending on whether the arresting officer states the reason
for the detention and, if so, whether he correctly identifies a
general class of offense for which probable cause exists.” Devenpeck v. Alford ,543 U. S. 146,154 (2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Devenpeck , a unanimous Court explained: “An arrest made by a
knowledgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest
made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances would
not. We see no reason to ascribe to the Fourth Amendment such
arbitrarily variable protection.” Ibid. The majority’s logic would produce similarly arbitrary results.
Under its reasoning, a traffic stop made by a rookie could be
executed in a reasonable manner, whereas the same traffic stop made
by a knowledgeable, veteran officer in precisely the same
circumstances might not, if in fact his knowledge and
experience made him capable of completing the stop faster. We have
long rejected interpretations of the Fourth Amendment that would
produce such haphazard results, and I see no reason to depart from
our consistent practice today.

															B

															As if that were not enough, the majority also limits the
duration of the stop to the time it takes the officer to complete a
narrow category of “traffic-based inquiries.” Ante, at 8.
According to the majority, these inquiries include those that
“serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:
ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and
responsibly.” Ante, at 6. Inquiries directed to “detecting
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” are not traffic-related
inquiries and thus cannot count toward the overall duration of the
stop. Ibid . (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted).

															The combination of that definition of traffic-related inquiries
with the majority’s officer-specific durational limit produces a
result demonstrably at odds with our decision in Caballes . Caballes expressly anticipated that a traffic stop could be reasonably prolonged for officers to engage in a dog sniff.
We explained that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred in Caballes , where the “duration of the stop . . .
was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary
inquiries incident to such a stop,” but suggested a different
result might attend a case “involving a dog sniff that occurred
during an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop.” 543
U. S. , at 407–408 (emphasis added). The dividing line
was whether the overall duration of the stop exceeded “the time
reasonably required to complete th[e] mission,” id., at 407,
not, as the majority suggests, whether the duration of the stop “in
fact” exceeded the time necessary to complete the traffic-related
inquiries, ante, at 8.

															The majority’s approach draws an artificial line between dog
sniffs and other common police practices. The lower courts have
routinely confirmed that warrant checks are a constitutionally
permissible part of a traffic stop, see, e.g., United States v. Simmons , 172 F. 3d 775, 778 (CA11 1999); United
States v. Mendez , 118 F. 3d 1426, 1429 (CA10 1997); United States v. Shabazz , 993 F. 2d 431, 437
(CA5 1993), and the majority confirms that it finds no fault in
these measures, ante, at 6. Yet its reasoning suggests the
opposite. Such warrant checks look more like they are directed to
“detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” than to
“ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and
responsibly.” Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Perhaps one could argue that the existence of
an outstanding warrant might make a driver less likely to operate
his vehicle safely and responsibly on the road, but the same could
be said about a driver in possession of contraband. A driver
confronted by the police in either case might try to flee or become
violent toward the officer. But under the majority’s analysis, a
dog sniff, which is directed at uncovering that problem, is not
treated as a traffic-based inquiry. Warrant checks, arguably,
should fare no better. The majority suggests that a warrant check
is an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop because it can be
used “ ‘to determine whether the apparent traffic violator is
wanted for one or more previous traffic offenses.’ ” Ante, at 6 (quoting 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §9.3(c),
p. 516 (5th ed. 2012)). But as the very treatise on which the
majority relies notes, such checks are a “manifest[ation of ]
the ‘war on drugs’ motivation so often underlying [routine traffic]
stops,” and thus are very much like the dog sniff in this case. Id. , §9.3(c), at 507–508.

															Investigative questioning rests on the same basis as the dog
sniff. “Asking questions is an essential part of police
investigations.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nev., Humboldt Cty. ,542 U. S. 177,185 (2004). And the
lower courts have routinely upheld such questioning during routine
traffic stops. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera , 570 F. 3d 1009, 1013 (CA8 2009); United
States v. Childs , 277 F. 3d 947, 953–954 (CA7
2002). The majority’s reasoning appears to allow officers to engage
in some questioning aimed at detecting evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing. Ante, at 5. But it is hard to see how
such inquiries fall within the “seizure’s ‘mission’ [of ]
address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the stop,” or
“attend[ing] to related safety concerns.” Ibid. Its
reasoning appears to come down to the principle that dogs are
different.

															C

															On a more fundamental level, the majority’s inquiry elides the
distinction between traffic stops based on probable cause and those
based on reasonable suspicion. Probable cause is the “traditional justification” for the seizure of a person. Whren , 517 U. S. , at 817 (emphasis deleted); see
also Dunaway v. New York ,442 U. S. 200, 207–208
(1979). This Court created an exception to that rule in Terry v. Ohio ,392 U. S. 1 (1968), permitting
“police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited
intrusions on an individual’s personal security based on less than
probable cause,” Michigan v. Summers ,452 U. S.
692,698 (1981). Reasonable suspicion is the justification for such
seizures. Prado Navarette v. California , 572
U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 3).

															Traffic stops can be initiated based on probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Although the Court has commented that a
routine traffic stop is “more analogous to a so-called
‘ Terry stop’ than to a formal arrest,” it has rejected the
notion “that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not
exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop.” Berkemer v. McCarty ,468
U. S. 420, and n. 29 (1984) (citation omitted).

															Although all traffic stops must be executed reasonably, our
precedents make clear that traffic stops justified by reasonable
suspicion are subject to additional limitations that those
justified by probable cause are not. A traffic stop based on
reasonable suspicion, like all Terry stops, must be
“justified at its inception” and “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place.” Hiibel, 542 U. S. , at 185 (internal
quotation marks omitted). It also “cannot continue for an excessive
period of time or resemble a traditional arrest.” Id., at
185–186 (citation omitted). By contrast, a stop based on probable
cause affords an officer considerably more leeway. In such
seizures, an officer may engage in a warrantless arrest of the
driver, Atwater , 532 U. S. , at 354, a
warrantless search incident to arrest of the driver, Riley v. California , 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at
5), and a warrantless search incident to arrest of the vehicle if
it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found there, Arizona v. Gant ,556
U. S. 332,335 (2009).

															The majority casually tosses this distinction aside. It asserts
that the traffic stop in this case, which was undisputedly
initiated on the basis of probable cause, can last no longer than
is in fact necessary to effectuate the mission of the stop. Ante, at 8. And, it assumes that the mission of the stop was
merely to write a traffic ticket, rather than to consider making a
custodial arrest. Ante, at 5. In support of that durational
requirement, it relies primarily on cases involving Terry stops. See ante, at 5–7 (citing Arizona v. Johnson ,555 U. S. 323 (2009) (analyzing “stop and
frisk” of passenger in a vehicle temporarily seized for a
traffic violation); United States v. Sharpe ,470
U. S. 675 (1985) (analyzing seizure of individuals based on
suspicion of marijuana trafficking); Florida v. Royer ,460 U. S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(analyzing seizure of man walking through airport on suspicion of
narcotics activity)).

															The only case involving a traffic stop based on probable
cause that the majority cites for its rule is Caballes . But,
that decision provides no support for today’s restructuring of our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Caballes , the Court made
clear that, in the context of a traffic stop supported by probable
cause, “a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic
stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a
reasonable manner.” 543 U. S., at 408. To be sure, the
dissent in Caballes would have “appl[ied] Terry ’s
reasonable-relation test . . . to determine whether the
canine sniff impermissibly expanded the scope of the initially
valid seizure of Caballes.” Id., at 420 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). But even it conceded that the Caballes majority
had “implicitly [rejected] the application of Terry to a
traffic stop converted, by calling in a dog, to a drug search.” Id., at 421.

															By strictly limiting the tasks that define the durational scope
of the traffic stop, the majority accomplishes today what the Caballes dissent could not: strictly limiting the scope of
an officer’s activities during a traffic stop justified by probable
cause. In doing so, it renders the difference between probable
cause and reasonable suspicion virtually meaningless in this
context. That shift is supported neither by the Fourth Amendment
nor by our precedents interpreting it. And, it results in a
constitutional framework that lacks predictability. Had Officer
Struble ar-rested, handcuffed, and taken Rodriguez to the police
station for his traffic violation, he would have complied with the
Fourth Amendment. See Atwater, supra, at 354–355. But
because he made Rodriguez wait for seven or eight extra minutes
until a dog arrived, he evidently committed a constitutional
violation. Such a view of the Fourth Amendment makes little
sense.

															III

															Today’s revision of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was also
entirely unnecessary. Rodriguez suffered no Fourth Amendment
violation here for an entirely independent reason: Officer Struble
had reasonable suspicion to continue to hold him for investigative
purposes. Our precedents make clear that the Fourth Amendment
permits an officer to conduct an investigative traffic stop when
that officer has “a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Prado Navarette, 572 U. S. , at ___ (slip op., at
3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonable suspicion is
determined by looking at “the whole picture,” ibid. , taking
into account “the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act,” Ornelas v. United States ,517 U. S. 690,695
(1996) (internal quotation marksomitted).

															Officer Struble testified that he first became suspicious that
Rodriguez was engaged in criminal activity for a number of reasons.
When he approached the vehicle, he smelled an “overwhelming odor of
air freshener coming from the vehicle,” which is, in his
experience, “a common attempt to conceal an odor that [people]
don’t want . . . to be smelled by the police.” App.
20–21. He also observed, upon approaching the front window on the
passenger side of the vehicle, that Rodriguez’s passenger, Scott
Pollman, appeared nervous. Pollman pulled his hat down low, puffed
nervously on a cigarette, and refused to make eye contact with him.
The officer thought he was “more nervous than your typical
passenger” who “do[esn’t] have anything to worry about because
[t]hey didn’t commit a [traffic] violation.” Id. , at 34.

															Officer Struble’s interactions with the vehicle’s occupants only
increased his suspicions. When he asked Rod-riguez why he had
driven onto the shoulder, Rodriguez claimed that he swerved to
avoid a pothole. But that story could not be squared with Officer
Struble’s observation of the vehicle slowly driving off the road
before being jerked back onto it. And when Officer Struble asked
Pollman where they were coming from and where they were going,
Pollman told him they were traveling from Omaha, Nebraska, back to
Norfolk, Nebraska, after looking at a vehicle they were considering
purchasing. Pollman told the officer that he had neither seen
pictures of the vehicle nor confirmed title before the trip. As
Officer Struble explained, it “seemed suspicious” to him “to drive
. . . approximately two hours . . . late at
night to see a vehicle sight unseen to possibly buy it,” id., at 26, and to go from Norfolk to Omaha to look at it
because “[u]sually people leave Omaha to go get vehicles, not the
other way around” due to higher Omaha taxes, id., at 65.

															These facts, taken together, easily meet our standard for
reasonable suspicion. “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent
factor in determining reasonable suspicion,” Illinois v. Wardlow ,528 U. S. 119,124 (2000), and both vehicle
occupants were engaged in such conduct. The officer also recognized
heavy use of air freshener, which, in his experience, indicated the
presence of contraband in the vehicle. “[C]ommonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior” further support the officer’s
conclusion that Pollman’s story about their trip was likely a cover
story for illegal activity. Id., at 125. Taking into account
all the relevant facts, Officer Struble possessed reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to conduct the dog sniff.

															Rodriguez contends that reasonable suspicion cannot exist
because each of the actions giving rise to the officer’s suspicions
could be entirely innocent, but our cases easily dispose of that
argument. Acts that, by themselves, might be innocent can, when
taken together, give rise to reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Arvizu ,534 U. S. 266–275 (2002). Terry is a classic example, as it involved two individuals
repeatedly walking back and forth, looking into a store window, and
conferring with one another as well as with a third man. 392
U. S., at 6. The Court reasoned that this “series of acts,
each of them perhaps innocent in itself, . . . together warranted
further investigation,” id., at 22, and it has reiterated
that analysis in a number of cases, see, e.g., Arvizu , supra, at 277; United States v. Sokolow ,490
U. S. 1–10 (1989). This one is no different.

															*  *  *

															I would conclude that the police did not violate the Fourth
Amendment here. Officer Struble possessed probable cause to stop
Rodriguez for driving on the shoulder, and he executed the
subsequent stop in a reasonable manner. Our decision in Caballes requires no more. The majority’s holding to the
contrary is irreconcilable with Caballes and a number of
other routine police practices, distorts the distinction between
traffic stops justified by probable cause and those justified by
reasonable suspicion, and abandons reasonableness as the touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment. I respectfully dissent. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 13–9972

															_________________

															DENNYS RODRIGUEZ, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eighth circuit

															[April 21, 2015]

															Justice Alito, dissenting.

															This is an unnecessary,[ 1 ] impractical, and
arbitrary decision. It addresses a purely hypothetical question:
whether the traffic stop in this case would be unreason-able
if the police officer, prior to leading a drug-sniffing dog around
the exterior of petitioner’s car, did not already have reasonable
suspicion that the car contained drugs. In fact, however, the
police officer did have reasonable suspicion, and, as a
result, the officer was justified in detaining the occupants for
the short period of time (seven or eight minutes) that is at
issue.

															The relevant facts are not in dispute. Officer Struble, who made
the stop, was the only witness at the suppression hearing, and his
testimony about what happened was not challenged. Defense counsel
argued that the facts recounted by Officer Struble were
insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, but defense counsel
did not dispute those facts or attack the officer’s credibility.
Similarly, the Magistrate Judge who conducted the hearing did not
question the officer’s credibility. And as Justice Thomas’s opinion
shows, the facts recounted by Officer Struble “easily meet our
standard for reasonable suspicion.” Ante , at 11 (dissenting
opinion); see also, e.g. , United States v. Carpenter , 462 F. 3d 981, 986–987 (CA8 2006) (finding
reasonable suspicion for a dog sniff based on implausible travel
plans and nervous conduct); United States v. Ludwig ,
641 F. 3d 1243, 1248–1250 (CA10 2011) (finding reasonable suspicion
for a dog sniff where, among other things, the officer smelled
“strong masking odors,” the defendant’s “account of his travel was
suspect,” and the defendant “was exceptionally nervous throughout
his encounter”).

															Not only does the Court reach out to decide a question not
really presented by the facts in this case, but the Court’s answer
to that question is arbitrary. The Court refuses to address the
real Fourth Amendment question: whether the stop was unreasonably
prolonged. Instead, the Court latches onto the fact that Officer
Struble delivered the warning prior to the dog sniff and proclaims
that the authority to detain based on a traffic stop ends when a
citation or warning is handed over to the driver. The Court thus
holds that the Fourth Amendment was vio-lated, not because of the
length of the stop, but simply be-cause of the sequence in which
Officer Struble chose to perform his tasks.

															This holding is not only arbitrary; it is perverse since Officer
Struble chose that sequence for the purpose of protecting his own
safety and possibly the safety of others. See App. 71–72. Without
prolonging the stop, Officer Struble could have conducted the dog
sniff while one of the tasks that the Court regards as properly
part of the traffic stop was still in progress, but that sequence
would have entailed unnecessary risk. At approximately 12:19 a.m.,
after collecting Pollman’s driver’s license, Officer Struble did
two things. He called in the information needed to do a records
check on Pollman (a step that the Court recognizes was properly
part of the traffic stop), and he requested that another officer
report to the scene. Officer Struble had decided to perform a dog
sniff but did not want to do that without another officer present.
When occupants of a vehicle who know that their vehicle contains a
large amount of illegal drugs see that a drug-sniffing dog has
alerted for the presence of drugs, they will almost certainly
realize that the police will then proceed to search the vehicle,
discover the drugs, and make arrests. Thus, it is reasonable for an
officer to believe that an alert will increase the risk that the
occupants of the vehicle will attempt to flee or perhaps even
attack the officer. See, e.g., United States v. Dawdy , 46 F. 3d 1427, 1429 (CA8 1995) (recounting
scuffle between officer and defendant after drugs were
discovered).

															In this case, Officer Struble was concerned that he was
outnumbered at the scene, and he therefore called for backup and
waited for the arrival of another officer before conducting the
sniff. As a result, the sniff was not completed until seven or
eight minutes after he delivered the warning. But Officer Struble
could have proceeded with the dog sniff while he was waiting for
the results of the records check on Pollman and before the arrival
of the second officer. The drug-sniffing dog was present in Officer
Struble’s car. If he had chosen that riskier sequence of events,
the dog sniff would have been completed before the point in time
when, according to the Court’s analysis, the authority to detain
for the traffic stop ended. Thus, an action that would have been
lawful had the officer made the unreasonable decision to
risk his life became un-lawful when the officer made the reasonable decision to wait a few minutes for backup.
Officer Struble’s error—apparently—was following prudent procedures
motivated by legitimate safety concerns. The Court’s holding
therefore makes no practical sense. And nothing in the Fourth
Amendment, which speaks of reasonableness , compels this
arbitrary line.

															The rule that the Court adopts will do little good going
forward.[ 2 ] It is unlikely to have any
appreciable effect on the length of future traffic stops. Most
officers will learn the prescribed sequence of events even if they
cannot fathom the reason for that requirement. (I would love to be
the proverbial fly on the wall when police instructors teach this
rule to officers who make traffic stops.)

															For these reasons and those set out in Justice Thomas’s opinion,
I respectfully dissent. Notes 1 See Brief in Opposition
11–14. 2 It is important to note that the
Court’s decision does not affect procedures routinely carried out
during traffic stops, including “checking the driver’s license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the
driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance.” Ante, at 6. And the Court reaffirms that police
“may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful
traffic stop.” Ibid. Thus, it remains true that police may
ask questions aimed at uncovering other criminal conduct and may
order occupants out of their car during a valid stop. See Arizona v. Johnson ,555 U. S. 323,333 (2009); Maryland v. Wilson ,519 U. S. 408–415 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms ,434 U. S. 106,111 (1977)
( per curiam ).