U.S. Supreme Court Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963) Wong Sun v. United
States No. 36 Argued March 29 and April 2,
1962 Restored to calendar for reargument
June 4, 1962 Reargued October 8,
1962 Decided January 14,
1963 371
U.S. 471 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus In a trial in a Federal District Court without a jury,
petitioners were convicted of fraudulent and knowing transportation
and concealment of illegally imported heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §174. Although the Court of Appeals held that the arrests of
both petitioners without warrants were illegal, because not based
on "probable cause" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment nor
"reasonable grounds" within the meaning of the Narcotics Control
Act of 1956, it affirmed their convictions, notwithstanding the
admission in evidence over their timely objections of (1)
statements made orally by petitioner Toy in his bedroom at the time
of his arrest; (2) heroin surrendered to the agents by a third
party as a result of those statements; and (3) unsigned statements
made by each petitioner several days after his arrest, and after
being lawfully arraigned and released on his own recognizance. The
Court of Appeals held that these items were not the fruits of the
illegal arrests, and, therefore, were properly admitted in
evidence. Held: 1. On the record in this case, there was neither reasonable
grounds nor probable cause for Toy's arrest, since the information
upon which it was based was too vague and came from too untested a
source to accept it as probable cause for the issuance of an arrest
warrant; and this defect was not cured by the fact that Toy fled
when a supposed customer at his door early in the morning revealed
that he was a narcotics agent. Pp. 371 U. S.
479 -484.

															2. On the record in this case, the statements made by Toy in his
bedroom at the time of his unlawful arrest were the fruits of the
agents' unlawful action, and they should have been excluded from
evidence. Pp. 371 U. S.
484 -487.

															3. The narcotics taken from a third party as a result of
statements made by Toy at the time of his arrest were likewise
fruits of the unlawful arrest, and they should not have been
admitted as evidence against Toy. Pp. 371 U. S.
487 -488. Page 371 U. S. 472 4. After exclusion of the foregoing items of improperly admitted
evidence, the only proofs remaining to sustain Toy's conviction are
his and his codefendant's unsigned statements; any admissions of
guilt in Toy's statement require corroboration; no reference to Toy
in his codefendant's statement constitutes admissible evidence
corroborating any admission by Toy, and Toy's conviction must be
set aside for lack of competent evidence to support it. Pp. 371 U. S.
488 -491.

															5. In view of the fact that, after his unlawful arrest,
petitioner Wong Sun had been lawfully arraigned and released on his
own recognizance and had returned voluntarily several days later
when he made his unsigned statement, the connection between his
unlawful arrest and the making of that statement was so attenuated
that the unsigned statement was not the fruit of the unlawful
arrest and, therefore, it was properly admitted in evidence. P. 371 U. S.
491 .

															6. The seizure of the narcotics admitted in evidence invaded no
right of privacy of person or premises which would entitle Wong Sun
to object to its use at his trial. Pp. 371 U. S.
491 -492.

															7. Any references to Wong Sun in his codefendant's statement
were incompetent to corroborate Wong Sun's admissions, and Wong Sun
is entitled to a new trial, because it is not clear from the record
whether or not the trial court relied upon his codefendant's
statement as a source of corroboration of Wong Sun's confession.
Pp. 371 U. S.
492 -493.

															288 F.2d 366, reversed and cause remanded.

															MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The petitioners were tried without a jury in the District Court
for the Northern District of California under a two-count
indictment for violation of the Federal Narcotics Page 371 U. S. 473 Laws, 21 U.S.C. § 174. [ Footnote
1 ] They were acquitted under the first count which charged a
conspiracy, but convicted under the second count which charged the
substantive offense of fraudulent and knowing transportation and
concealment of illegally imported heroin. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, one judge dissenting, affirmed the convictions.
288 F.2d 366. We granted certiorari. 368 U.S. 817. We heard
argument in the 1961 Term and reargument this Term. 370 U.S.
908.

															About 2 a.m. on the morning of June 4, 1959, federal narcotics
agents in San Francisco, after having had one Hom Way under
surveillance for six weeks, arrested him and found heroin in his
possession. Hom Way, who had not before been an informant, stated
after his arrest that he had bought an ounce of heroin the night
before from one known to him only as "Blackie Toy," proprietor of a
laundry on Leavenworth Street.

															About 6 a.m. that morning six or seven federal agents went to a
laundry at 1733 Leavenworth Street. The sign Page 371 U. S. 474 above the door of this establishment said "Oye's Laundry." It
was operated by the petitioner James Wah Toy. There is, however,
nothing in the record which identifies James Wah Toy and "Blackie
Toy" as the same person. The other federal officers remained nearby
out of sight while Agent Alton Wong, who was of Chinese ancestry,
rang the bell. When petitioner Toy appeared and opened the door,
Agent Wong told him that he was calling for laundry and dry
cleaning. Toy replied that he didn't open until 8 o'clock, and told
the agent to come back at that time. Toy started to close the door.
Agent Wong thereupon took his badge from his pocket and said, "I am
a federal narcotics agent." Toy immediately "slammed the door and
started running" down the hallway through the laundry to his living
quarters at the back, where his wife and child were sleeping in a
bedroom. Agent Wong and the other federal officers broke open the
door and followed Toy down the hallway to the living quarters and
into the bedroom. Toy reached into a nightstand drawer. Agent Wong
thereupon drew his pistol, pulled Toy's hand out of the drawer,
placed him under arrest and handcuffed him. There was nothing in
the drawer, and a search of the premises uncovered no
narcotics.

															One of the agents said to Toy " . . . [Hom Way] says he got
narcotics from you." Toy responded, "No, I haven't been selling any
narcotics at all. However, I do know somebody who has." When asked
who that was, Toy said, "I only know him as Johnny. I don't know
his last name." However, Toy described a house on Eleventh Avenue
where he said Johnny lived; he also described a bedroom in the
house where he said "Johnny kept about a piece" [ Footnote 2 ] of heroin, and where he and
Johnny had smoked some of the drug the night before. The agents Page 371 U. S. 475 left immediately for Eleventh Avenue and located the house. They
entered and found one Johnny Yee in the bedroom. After a discussion
with the agents, Yee took from a bureau drawer several tubes
containing in all just less than one ounce of heroin, and
surrendered them. Within the hour, Yee and Toy were taken to the
Office of the Bureau of Narcotics. Yee there stated that the heroin
had been brought to him some four days earlier by petitioner Toy
and another Chinese known to him only as "Sea Dog."

															Toy was questioned as to the identity of "Sea Dog," and said
that "Sea Dog" was Wong Sun. Some agents, including Agent Alton
Wong, took Toy to Wong Sun's neighborhood, where Toy pointed out a
multi-family dwelling where he said Wong Sun lived. Agent Wong rang
a downstairs door bell and a buzzer sounded, opening the door. The
officer identified himself as a narcotics agent to a woman on the
landing and asked "for Mr. Wong." The woman was the wife of
petitioner Wong Sun. She said that Wong Sun was "in the back room
sleeping." Alton Wong and some six other officers climbed the
stairs and entered the apartment. One of the officers went into the
back room and brought petitioner Wong Sun from the bedroom in
handcuffs. A thorough search of the apartment followed, but no
narcotics were discovered.

															Petitioner Toy and Johnny Yee were arraigned before a United
States Commissioner on June 4 on a complaint charging a violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 174. Later that day, each was released on his own
recognizance. Petitioner Wong Sun was arraigned on a similar
complaint filed the next day, and was also released on his own
recognizance. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 371 U. S. 476 Within a few days, both petitioners and Yee were interrogated at
the office of the Narcotics Bureau by Agent William Wong, also of
Chinese ancestry. [ Footnote 4 ]
The agent advised each of the three of his right to withhold
information which might be used against him, and stated to each
that he was entitled to the advice of counsel, though it does not
appear that any attorney was present during the questioning of any
of the three. The officer also explained to each that no promises
or offers of immunity or leniency were being or could be made.

															The agent interrogated each of the three separately. After each
had been interrogated, the agent prepared a statement in English
from rough notes. The agent read petitioner Toy's statement to him
in English and interpreted certain portions of it for him in
Chinese. Toy also read the statement in English aloud to the agent,
said there were corrections to be made, and made the corrections in
his own hand. Toy would not sign the statement, however; in the
agent's words, "he wanted to know first if the other persons
involved in the case had signed theirs." Wong Sun had considerable
difficulty understanding the Page 371 U. S. 477 statement in English and the agent restated its substance in
Chinese. Wong Sun refused to sign the statement although he
admitted the accuracy of its contents. [ Footnote 5 ]

															Hom Way did not testify at petitioners' trial. The Government
offered Johnny Yee as its principal witness, but excused him after
he invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and flatly
repudiated the statement he had given to Agent William Wong. That
statement was not offered in evidence, nor was any testimony
elicited from him identifying either petitioner as the source of
the heroin in his possession, or otherwise tending to support the
charges against the petitioners.

															The statute expressly provides that proof of the accused's
possession of the drug will support a conviction under the statute
unless the accused satisfactorily explains the possession. The
Government's evidence tending to prove the petitioners' possession
(the petitioners offered no exculpatory testimony) consisted of
four items which the trial court admitted over timely objections
that they were inadmissible as "fruits" of unlawful arrests or of
attendant searches: (1) the statements made orally by petitioner
Toy in his bedroom at the time of his arrest; (2) the heroin
surrendered to the agents by Johnny Yee; (3) petitioner Toy's
pretrial unsigned statement; and (4) petitioner Wong Sun's similar
statement. The dispute below and here has centered around the
correctness of the rulings of the trial judge allowing these items
in evidence.

															The Court of Appeals held that the arrests of both petitioners
were illegal because not based on "probable cause" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment nor "reasonable grounds" within the
meaning of the Narcotic Page 371 U. S. 478 Control Act of 1956. [ Footnote
6 ] The court said as to Toy's arrest, "There is no showing in
this case that the agent knew Hom Way to be reliable," and,
furthermore, found "nothing in the circumstances occurring at Toy's
premises that would provide sufficient justification for his arrest
without a warrant." 288 F.2d at 369, 370. As to Wong Sun's arrest,
the court said "there is no showing that Johnnie Yee was a reliable
informer." The Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the four
items of proof were not the "fruits" of the illegal arrests, and
that they were therefore properly admitted in evidence.

															The Court of Appeals rejected two additional contentions of the
petitioners. The first was that there was insufficient evidence to
corroborate the petitioners' unsigned admissions of possession of
narcotics. The court held that the narcotics in evidence
surrendered by Johnny Yee, together with Toy's statements in his
bedroom at the time of arrest corroborated petitioners' admissions.
The second contention was that the confessions were Page 371 U. S. 479 inadmissible because they were not signed. The Court of Appeals
held on this point that the petitioners were not prejudiced, since
the agent might properly have testified to the substance of the
conversations which produced the statements.

															We believe that significant differences between the cases of the
two petitioners require separate discussion of each. We shall first
consider the case of petitioner Toy. I The Court of Appeals found there was neither reasonable grounds
nor probable cause for Toy's arrest. Giving due weight to that
finding, we think it is amply justified by the facts clearly shown
on this record. It is basic that an arrest with or without a
warrant must stand upon firmer ground than mere suspicion, see
Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 , 361 U. S. 101 ,
though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence which
would suffice to convict. The quantum of information which
constitutes probable cause -- evidence which would "warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief" that a felony has been
committed, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 162 -- must be measured by the facts of the particular case. The
history of the use, and not infrequent abuse, of the power to
arrest cautions that a relaxation of the fundamental requirements
of probable cause would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of
the officers' whim or caprice." [ Footnote 7 ] Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S.
176 .

															Whether or not the requirements of reliability and particularity
of the information on which an officer may act are more stringent
where an arrest warrant is absent, they surely cannot be less
stringent then where an arrest warrant is obtained. Otherwise, a
principal incentive now Page 371 U. S. 480 existing for the procurement of arrest warrants would be
destroyed. [ Footnote 8 ] The
threshold question in this case, therefore, is whether the officers
could, on the information which impelled them to act, have procured
a warrant for the arrest of Toy. We think that no warrant would
have issued on evidence then available.

															The narcotics agents had no basis in experience for confidence
in the reliability of Hom Way's information; he had never before
given information. And yet they acted upon his imprecise suggestion
that a person described only as "Blackie Toy," the proprietor of a
laundry somewhere on Leavenworth Street, had sold one ounce of
heroin. We have held that identification of the suspect by a
reliable informant may constitute probable cause for arrest where
the information given is sufficiently accurate to lead the officers
directly to the suspect. Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 .
That rule does not, however, fit this case. For aught that the
record discloses, Hom Way's accusation merely invited the officers
to roam the length of Leavenworth Street (some 30 blocks) in search
of one "Blackie Toy's" laundry -- and whether by chance or
other Page 371 U. S. 481 means (the record does not say) they came upon petitioner Toy's
laundry, which bore not his name over the door, but the unrevealing
label "Oye's." Not the slightest intimation appears on the record,
or was made on oral argument, to suggest that the agents had
information giving them reason to equate "Blackie" Toy and James
Wah Toy -- e.g., that they had the criminal record of a
Toy, or that they had consulted some other kind of official record
or list, or had some information of some kind which had narrowed
the scope of their search to this particular Toy.

															It is conceded that the officers made no attempt to obtain a
warrant for Toy's arrest. The simple fact is that, on the sparse
information at the officers' command, no arrest warrant could have
issued consistently with Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480 , 357 U. S. 486 .
[ Footnote 9 ] The arrest warrant
procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment
of a judicial officer will be interposed Page 371 U. S. 482 between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and
credibility of the information which the complaining officer
adduces as probable cause. Cf. Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 , 362 U. S. 270 .
To hold that an officer may act in his own, unchecked discretion
upon information too vague and from too untested a source to permit
a judicial officer to accept it as probable cause for an arrest
warrant would subvert this fundamental policy.

															The Government contends, however, that any defects in the
information which somehow took the officers to petitioner Toy's
laundry were remedied by events which occurred after they arrived.
Specifically, it is urged that Toy's flight down the hall when the
supposed customer at the door revealed that he was a narcotics
agent adequately corroborates the suspicion generated by Hom Way's
accusation. Our holding in Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301 , is
relevant here, and exposes the fallacy of this contention. We noted
in that case that the lawfulness of an officer's entry to arrest
without a warrant "must be tested by criteria identical with those
embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which deals with entry to execute a
search warrant." 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 306 .
That statute requires that an officer must state his authority and
his purpose at the threshold, and be refused admittance, before he
may break open the door. We held that when an officer
insufficiently or unclearly identifies his office or his mission,
the occupant's flight from the door must be regarded as ambiguous
conduct. We expressly reserved the question "whether the
unqualified requirements of the rule admit of an exception
justifying noncompliance in exigent circumstances." 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 309 .
In the instant case, Toy's flight from the door afforded no surer
an inference of guilty knowledge than did the suspect's conduct in
the Miller case. Agent Wong did eventually disclose that he was a
narcotics officer. However, he affirmatively misrepresented his
mission at the Page 371 U. S. 483 outset, by stating that he had come for laundry and dry
cleaning. And before Toy filed, the officer never adequately
dispelled the misimpression engendered by his own ruse. Cf.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 ; Gatewood v. United States, 209 F.2d 789.

															Moreover, he made no effort at that time, nor indeed at any time
thereafter, to ascertain whether the man at the door was the
"Blackie Toy" named by Hom Way. Therefore, this is not the case we
hypothesized in Miller where, "without an express
announcement of purpose, the facts known to officers would justify
them in being virtually certain" that the person at the door knows
their purpose. 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 310 . Toy's refusal to admit the officers and
his flight down the hallway thus signified a guilty knowledge no
more clearly than it did a natural desire to repel an apparently
unauthorized intrusion. [ Footnote 10 ] Here, as in Miller, Page 371 U. S. 484 the Government claims no extraordinary circumstances -- such as
the imminent destruction of vital evidence, or the need to rescue a
victim in peril -- see 357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 309 -- which excused the officer's failure truthfully to state his
mission before he broke in.

															A contrary holding here would mean that a vague suspicion could
be transformed into probable cause for arrest by reason of
ambiguous conduct which the arresting officers themselves have
provoked. Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98 . That result would have the same essential vice as a
proposition we have consistently rejected -- that a search unlawful
at its inception may be validated by what it turns up. Byars v.
United States, 273 U. S. 28 ; United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S. 581 , 332 U. S. 595 .
Thus, we conclude that the Court of Appeals' finding that the
officers' uninvited entry into Toy's living quarters was unlawful,
and that the bedroom arrest which followed was likewise unlawful,
was fully justified on the evidence. It remains to be seen what
consequences flow from this conclusion. II It is conceded that Toy's declarations in his bedroom are to be
excluded if they are held to be "fruits" of the agents' unlawful
action.

															In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional
guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 ,
this Court held nearly half a century ago that evidence seized
during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the
victim of the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.
S. 383 . The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to
the indirect as the direct products of such invasions. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States , 251 Page 371 U. S. 485 U.S. 385. MR. JUSTICE Holmes, speaking for the Court in that
case, in holding that the Government might not make use of
information obtained during an unlawful search to subpoena from the
victims the very documents illegally viewed, expressed succinctly
the policy of the broad exclusionary rule:

															"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of
evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired
shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used
at all. Of course, this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from
an independent source, they may be proved like any others, but the
knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it
in the way proposed."

															251 U.S. at 251 U. S.
392 .

															The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial
physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct
result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 505 , that the Fourth Amendment may protect against
the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more
traditional seizure of "papers and effects." Similarly, testimony
as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion has been
excluded in order to enforce the basic constitutional policies. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598. Thus, verbal
evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an
unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the present case is
no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more common
tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. [ Footnote 11 ] See Page 371 U. S. 486 Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690. Nor do
the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical
distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either in terms
of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, Rea v. United
States, 350 U. S. 214 , or
of closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence
unconstitutionally obtained, Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 , the
danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal
evidence would seem too great to warrant introducing such a
distinction.

															The Government argues that Toy's statements to the officers in
his bedroom, although closely consequent upon the invasion which we
hold unlawful, were nevertheless admissible because they resulted
from "an intervening independent act of a free will." This
contention, however, takes insufficient account of the
circumstances. Six or seven officers had broken the door and
followed on Toy's heels into the bedroom where his wife and child
were sleeping. He had been almost immediately handcuffed and
arrested. Under such circumstances, it is unreasonable to infer
that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge
the primary taint of the unlawful invasion. [ Footnote 12 ] Page 371 U. S. 487 The Government also contends that Toy's declarations should be
admissible because they were ostensibly exculpatory, rather than
incriminating. There are two answers to this argument. First, the
statements soon turned out to be incriminating, for they led
directly to the evidence which implicated Toy. Second, when
circumstances are shown such as those which induced these
declarations, it is immaterial whether the declarations be termed
"exculpatory." [ Footnote 13 ]
Thus, we find no substantial reason to omit Toy's declarations from
the protection of the exclusionary rule. III We now consider whether the exclusion of Toy's declarations
requires also the exclusion of the narcotics taken from Yee, to
which those declarations led the police. The prosecutor candidly
told the trial court that "we wouldn't have found those drugs
except that Mr. Toy helped us to." Hence, this is not the case
envisioned by this Court where the exclusionary rule has no
application because the Government learned of the evidence "from an
independent source," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U. S. 385 , 251 U. S. 392 ;
nor is this a case in which the connection between the lawless
conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence
has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone
v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 , 308 U. S. 341 .
We need not hold that all evidence Page 371 U. S. 488 is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not
have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police.
Rather, the more apt question in such a case is

															"whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."

															Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959). We think it clear that
the narcotics were "come at by the exploitation of that
illegality," and hence that they may not be used against Toy. IV It remains only to consider Toy's unsigned statement. We need
not decide whether, in light of the fact that Toy was free on his
own recognizance when he made the statement, that statement was a
fruit of the illegal arrest. Cf. United States v. Bayer, 331 U. S. 532 .
Since we have concluded that his declarations in the bedroom and
the narcotics surrendered by Yee should not have been admitted in
evidence against him, the only proofs remaining to sustain his
conviction are his and Wong Sun's unsigned statements. Without
scrutinizing the contents of Toy's ambiguous recitals, we conclude
that no reference to Toy in Wong Sun's statement constitutes
admissible evidence corroborating any admission by Toy. We arrive
at this conclusion upon two clear lines of decisions which converge
to require it. One line of our decisions establishes that criminal
confessions and admissions of guilt require extrinsic
corroboration; the other line of precedents holds that an
out-of-court declaration made after arrest may not be used at trial
against one of the declarant's partners in crime.

															It is a settled principle of the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts that a conviction must rest upon
firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission or Page 371 U. S. 489 confession of the accused. [ Footnote 14 ] We observed in Smith v. United
States, 348 U. S. 147 , 348 U. S. 153 ,
that the requirement of corroboration is rooted in

															"a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in
the realization that sound law enforcement requires police
investigations which extend beyond the words of the accused."

															In Opper v. United States, 348 U. S.
84 , 348 U. S. 89 -90,
we elaborated the reasons for the requirement:

															"In our country, the doubt persists that the zeal of the
agencies of prosecution to protect the peace, the self-interest of
the accomplice, the maliciousness of an enemy or the aberration or
weakness of the accused under the strain of suspicion may tinge or
warp the facts of the confession. Admissions, retold at a trial,
are much like hearsay, that is, statements not made at the pending
trial. They had neither the compulsion of the oath nor the test of
cross-examination."

															It is true that, in Smith v. United States, supra, we
held that although "corroboration is necessary for all elements of
the offense established by admissions alone," extrinsic proof was
sufficient which "merely fortifies the truth of the confession,
without independently establishing the crime charged. . . ." 348
U.S. at 348 U. S. 156 .
[ Footnote 15 ] Page 371 U. S. 490 However, Wong Sun's unsigned confession does not furnish
competent corroborative evidence. The second governing principle,
likewise well settled in our decisions, is that an out-of-court
declaration made after arrest may not be used at trial against one
of the declarant's partners in crime. While such a statement is

															"admissible against the others where it is in furtherance of the
criminal undertaking . . . all such responsibility is at an end
when the conspiracy ends." Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.
S. 211 , 329 U. S. 217 .
We have consistently refused to broaden that very narrow exception
to the traditional hearsay rule which admits statements of a
codefendant made in furtherance of a conspiracy or joint
undertaking. [ Footnote 16 ] See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.
S. 440 , 336 U. S.
443 -445. And where post-conspiracy declarations have
been admitted, we have carefully ascertained that limiting
instructions kept the jury from considering the contents with
respect to the guilt of anyone but the declarant. Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U. S. 604 , 344 U. S.
618 -619; Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 , 352 U. S.
236 -237. We have never ruled squarely on the question
presented here, whether a codefendant's statement might serve to
corroborate even where it will not suffice to convict. [ Footnote 17 ] We see Page 371 U. S. 491 no warrant for a different result so long as the rule which
regulates the use of out-of-court statements is one of
admissibility, rather than simply of weight, of the evidence. The
import of our previous holdings is that a co-conspirator's hearsay
statements may be admitted against the accused for no purpose
whatever, unless made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Thus, as to Toy, the only possible source of corroboration is
removed and his conviction must be set aside for lack of competent
evidence to support it. V We turn now to the case of the other petitioner, Wong Sun. We
have no occasion to disagree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals that his arrest, also, was without probable cause or
reasonable grounds. At all events, no evidentiary consequences turn
upon that question. For Wong Sun's unsigned confession was not the
fruit of that arrest, and was therefore properly admitted at trial.
On the evidence that Wong Sun had been released on his own
recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned
voluntarily several days later to make the statement, we hold that
the connection between the arrest and the statement had "become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United
States, 308 U. S. 338 , 308 U. S. 341 .
The fact that the statement was unsigned, whatever bearing this may
have upon its weight and credibility, does not render it
inadmissible; Wong Sun understood and adopted its substance, though
he could not comprehend the English words. The petitioner has never
suggested any impropriety in the interrogation itself which would
require the exclusion of this statement.

															We must then consider the admissibility of the narcotics
surrendered by Yee. Our holding, supra, that this Page 371 U. S. 492 ounce of heroin was inadmissible against Toy does not compel a
like result with respect to Wong Sun. The exclusion of the
narcotics as to Toy was required solely by their tainted
relationship to information unlawfully obtained from Toy, and not
by any official impropriety connected with their surrender by Yee.
The seizure of this heroin invaded no right of privacy of person or
premises which would entitle Wong Sun to object to its use at his
trial. Cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.
S. 114 . [ Footnote
18 ]

															However, for the reasons that Wong Sun's statement was
incompetent to corroborate Toy's admissions contained in Toy's own
statement, any references to Wong Sun in Toy's statement were
incompetent to corroborate Wong Sun's admissions. Thus, the only
competent source of corroboration for Wong Sun's statement was the
heroin itself. We cannot be certain, however, on this state of the
record, that the trial judge may not also have considered the
contents of Toy's statement as a source of corroboration.
Petitioners raised as one ground of objection to the introduction
of the statements the claim that each statement,

															"even if it were a purported admission or confession or
declaration against interest of a defendant . . . would not be
binding upon the other defendant."

															The trial judge, in allowing the statements in, apparently
overruled all of petitioners' objections, including this one. Thus,
we presume that he considered all portions of both statements as
hearing upon the guilt of both petitioners.

															We intimate no view one way or the other as to whether the trial
judge might have found in the narcotics alone sufficient evidence
to corroborate Wong Sun's admissions Page 371 U. S. 493 that he delivered heroin to Yee and smoked heroin at Yee's house
around the date in question. But because he might, as the
factfinder, have found insufficient corroboration from the
narcotics alone, we cannot be sure that the scales were not tipped
in favor of conviction by reliance upon the inadmissible Toy
statement. This is particularly important because of the nature of
the offense involved here.

															Surely, under the narcotics statute, the discovery of heroin
raises a presumption that someone -- generally the possessor --
violated the law. As to him, once possession alone is proved, the
other elements of the offense -- transportation and concealment
with knowledge of the illegal importation of the drug -- need not
be separately demonstrated, much less corroborated. 21 U.S.C. §
174. Thus, particular care ought to be taken in this area, when the
crucial element of the accused's possession is proved solely by his
own admissions, that the requisite corroboration be found among the
evidence which is properly before the trier of facts. We therefore
hold that petitioner Wong Sun is also entitled to a new trial.

															The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. (For concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, see
post, p. 371 U. S.
497 .)

															(For dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE CLARK, see post, p. 371 U. S.
498 .)

															| 371
U.S. 471 app| APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. Statement of JAMES WAH TOY taken on June 5, 1959, concerning his knowledge of WONG SUN's narcotic
trafficking I have known WONG SUN for about 3 months. I know him as SEA DOG,
which is what everyone calls him. Page 371 U. S. 494 I first met him in Marysville, California, during a Chinese
holiday. I drove him back to San Francisco on that occasion.
Sometimes he asks me to drive him home and to different places in
San Francisco.

															Sometime during April or May of this year, he asked me to drive
him out to JOHNNY YEE's house, at 11th and Balboa Streets. He asked
me to call JOHNNY and tell him we were coming. When we got there,
we went into the house and WONG SUN took a paper package out of his
pocket and put it on the table. Then both WONG SUN and JOHNNY YEE
opened the package. I don't know how much heroin was in it, but I
know it was more than 10 spoons. I asked them if I could have some
for myself and they said yes. I took a little bit and went across
the room and smoked it in a cigarette.

															WONG SUN and JOHNNY YEE talked for about 10 or 15 minutes, but
they were talking in low tones so that I could not hear what they
were saying. I didn't see any money change hands, because I wasn't
paying too much attention. WONG SUN and I then left the house and
drove. I drove WONG SUN to his home and he gave me $15.00. He said
the money was for driving him out there.

															I have driven WONG SUN out to JOHNNY YEE's house about 5 times
altogether. Each time, WONG SUN gave me $10 or $15 for doing it,
and also Johnny gave me a little heroin -- enough to put in 3 or 4
cigarettes. The last time I drove WONG SUN out to YEE's house was
last Tuesday, May 26, 1959. On Wednesday night, June 3, 1959, at
about 10:00 p.m., I called JOHNNY YEE and told him that "I'm coming
out pretty soon -- I don't have anything." He said okay, so I drove
out there. When I got there, I went in the house and Johnny gave me
a paper of heroin. The bindle had about enough for 5 or 6
cigarettes. I didn't give him any money, and he didn't ask for any.
He gives it to me just out of friendship. He has given me heroin
like this quite a few times. I don't remember how many times. I
have known HOM WEI Page 371 U. S. 495 about 2 or 3 years, but I have never dealt in narcotics with
him. I have known ED FONG about 1 year, and I have never dealt in
narcotics with him, either. I have heard people that I know in the
Hop Sing Tong Club talk about HOM WEI dealing in narcotics, but
nothing about ED FONG. I do not know JOHN MOW LIM or BILL FONG. The
only connection I have now is JOHNNY YEE.

															I have carefully read the foregoing statement, which was made of
my own free will, without promise of reward or immunity and not
under duress. I have been given ample opportunity to make
corrections have initialed or signed each page as evidence thereof,
and hereby state that this statement is true to the best of my
knowledge and belief.

															______________________

															JAMES WAH TOY * * * * JAMES WAH TOY did not wish to sign this statement at this time.
He stated he may change his mind at a later date. However, I read
this statement to him and in addition he read it also and stated
that the contents thereof were true to the best of his knowledge.
Corrections made were by JAMES WAH TOY without his initials.

															/s/ WILLIAM WONG

															William Wong, Narcotic Agent STATEMENT OF WONG SUN I met JAMES TOY approximately the middle of March, this year, at
Marysville, California, during a Chinese celebration. We returned
to San Francisco together and we discussed the possible sale of
heroin. I told JAMES that I could get a piece of heroin for $450
from a person known as BILL.

															Shortly after returning to San Francisco, JAMES told me he
wanted me to get a piece. I asked him who it was Page 371 U. S. 496 for and he told me it was for JOHNNY. He gave me $450 and I
obtained a piece of heroin from BILL. I did this on approximately 8
occasions; however, at least one of these times the heroin was not
for JOHNNY -- for another friend of JAMES TOY. JOHNNY would pay
JAMES $600 for each piece.

															On several occasions after I had obtained the piece for JAMES, I
would drive with him to JOHNNY's house, 606 11th Avenue, and we
would go upstairs to the bedroom. There, all three of us would
smoke some of the heroin and JAMES would give the piece to JOHNNY.
I also went with JAMES on approximately 3 other occasions when he
did not take any heroin, and then we smoked at JOHNNY's, and we
would also get some for our own use.

															About 4 days before I was arrested (arrested on June 4, 1959)
JAMES called me at home about 7 o'clock in the evening and told me
to come by. I went to the laundry and JAMES told me to get a piece.
I called BILL and arranged to meet him. JAMES gave me $450 which I
gave to BILL when I met him. BILL called me about one hour later at
the laundry and I met him. He gave me one piece, which I gave to
JAMES, and JAMES immediately thereafter called JOHNNY. We drove to
606-11th Ave. at approximately midnight, and JAMES gave the piece
to JOHNNY. It was contained in a rubber contraceptive in a small
brown paper bag.

															Again on June 3rd, the night before I was arrested, I met JAMES
at the laundry, prior to 11 o'clock in the evening, and JAMES
telephoned JOHNNY at EV-6-9336. Then we went out to JOHNNY's and
smoked heroin and also had one paper for our own use later. We were
there approximately 1/2 hour and then left.

															The laundry mentioned is OYE's LAUNDRY, 1733 Leavenworth Street,
which is run by JAMES TOY. I do not know JOHNNY's last name, and
know him only Page 371 U. S. 497 through JAMES TOY. As well as the few times at JOHNNY's home, I
have seen JOHNNY on a number of occasions at the laundry.

															I have carefully read the foregoing statement, consisting of 2
pages which was made of my own free will, without promise of reward
or immunity and not under duress. I have been given ample
opportunity to make corrections, have initialed or signed each page
as evidence thereof and hereby state that this statement is true to
the best of my knowledge and belief.

															______________________

															WONG SUN * * * * WONG SUN, being unable to read English, did not sign this
statement. However, I read this statement to him and he stated that
the contents thereof were true to the best of his knowledge.

															/s/ WILLIAM WONG

															William Wong, Narcotic Agent

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															21 U.S.C. § 174:

															"Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any
narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its
control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals,
buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation,
concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug after being imported
or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or brought
into the United States contrary to law, or conspires to commit any
of such acts in violation of the laws of the United States, shall
be imprisoned not less than five or more than twenty years and, in
addition, may be fined not more than $20,000. For a second or
subsequent offense (as determined under section 7237(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned
not less than ten or more than forty years and, in addition, may be
fined not more than $20,000."

															"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant
is shown to have or to have had possession of the narcotic drug,
such possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize
conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the
satisfaction of the jury."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															A "piece" is approximately one ounce.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The Record of the arraignment proceedings recites that arrest
warrants were issued, on the arraignment dates, for the arrest of
both petitioners and Yee. It was conceded in the trial court,
however, that no arrest warrants were outstanding at the time of
the actual arrests on June 4.

															The Record also states that bond was initially fixed for each of
the petitioners and for Yee in the amount of $5,000, on the
recommendation of the United States Attorney. Later on the
respective arraignment days, again on motion of the United States
Attorney, it was ordered that each of the three be released on his
own recognizance.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Because neither statement was ever signed, the blanks in which
the dates were to have been inserted were never filled in. The
heading of Toy's statement suggests that it was made on June 5,
although Agent William Wong at the trial suggested he had only
talked informally with Toy on that date, the formal statement not
being made until June 9. The agent also testified that Wong Sun's
statement was made June 9, although a rubber stamp date beneath the
agent's own signature at the foot of the statement reads, "June 15,
1959."

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The full texts of both statements are set forth in an 371
U.S. 471 app|>Appendix to this opinion.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															26 U.S.C. § 7607:

															"The Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant to the
Commissioner, and agents, of the Bureau of Narcotics of the
Department of the Treasury, and officers of the customs (as defined
in section 401(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended; 19 U.S.C.,
sec. 1401(1)), may --"

															"(1) carry firearms, execute and serve search warrants and
arrest warrants, and serve subpoenas and summonses issued under the
authority of the United States, and"

															"(2) make arrests without warrant for violations of any law of
the United States relating to narcotic drugs (as defined in section
4731) or marihuana (as defined in section 4761) where the violation
is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest or
where such person has reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed or is committing such violation."

															The terms "probable cause" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment
and "reasonable grounds" as used in the statute, mean substantially
the same. Draper v. United States, 358 U.
S. 307 , 358 U. S. 310 ,
n. 3; United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519, 526.

															[ Footnote 7 ] See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.
S. 480 , 357 U. S.
485 -487; Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 16 -17. See generally Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22
Mich.L.Rev. 541, 673, 695-701 (1924).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Our discussion implies no view whether a search warrant should
be obtained where a search is conducted incident to a valid arrest, cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S.
56 , for nothing in this case turns on the presence or
absence of a search warrant. Since the officers had obtained an
arrest warrant in Rabinowitz, the question before us here
was not there presented. As to the question before us, see
Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556, 559-560:

															"But, if officers can arrest without a warrant and never be
required to disclose the facts upon which they based their belief
of probable cause -- if, in other words, they have an untouchable
power to arrest without a warrant, -- why would they ever bother to
get a warrant? And the same obvious conclusion follows if the
courts, when an arrest is attacked as illegal, will assume, without
facts, that an arrest without a warrant was for probable cause. To
strike down all factual requirements in respect to probable cause
for arrests without a warrant, while maintaining them for the
issuance of a warrant, would be to blast one of the support columns
of justice by law."

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															We noted in Giordenello that Rules 3 and 4 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an arrest warrant
shall issue only upon a sworn complaint setting forth "the
essential facts constituting the offense charged," and showing
"that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it. . . ." The
Fourth Amendment, from which the requirements of the Rules derive,
provides that

															". . . no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing . . . the persons or things to be seized."

															(Emphasis added.) The requirement applies both to arrest and
search warrants. A description of a suspect merely as "Blackie
Toy," operator of a laundry somewhere on Leavenworth Street, hardly
is information "particularly describing . . . the person . . . to
be seized." Such information is no better than the wholesale or
"dragnet" search warrant, which we have condemned. See, e.g.,
Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 , 275 U. S. 196 ; see generally Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land
in the Criminal Law, 49 Calif.L.Rev. 474, 480-482 (1961).

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Although the question presented here is only whether the
petitioner's flight justified an inference of guilt sufficient to
generate probable cause for his arrest, and not whether his flight
would serve to corroborate proof of his guilt at trial, the two
questions are inescapably related. Thus, it is relevant to the
present case that we have consistently doubted the probative value
in criminal trials of evidence that the accused fled the scene of
an actual or supposed crime. In Alberty v. United States, 162 U. S. 499 , 162 U. S. 511 ,
this Court said:

															". . . it is not universally true that a man who is conscious
that he has done a wrong, 'will pursue a certain course not in
harmony with the conduct of a man who is conscious of having done
an act which is innocent, right, and proper,' since it is a matter
of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes
fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as
the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as
witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that
'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as
hold as a lion.'" See also Hickory v. United States, 160 U.
S. 408 ; Allen v. United States, 164 U.
S. 492 ; Starr v. United States, 164 U.
S. 627 ; and for the views of two Courts of Appeals see Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228, 233 (C.A.5th
Cir.) ("One motive is about as likely as another. Appellant may be
guilty, but his conviction cannot rest upon mere conjecture and
suspicion"); cf. Cooper v. United States, 218 F.2d 39, 41
("After all, innocent people caught in a web of circumstances
frequently become terror-stricken"). But cf. United States v.
Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (C.A.2d Cir.).

															[ Footnote 11 ] See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and
Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected
Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. of Ill.Law Forum 78, 84-96. But compare Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959) 187-190.

															[ Footnote 12 ] See Lord Devlin's comment:

															"It is probable that, even today, when there is much less
ignorance about these matters than formerly, there is still a
general belief that you must answer all questions put to you by a
policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for you if you do
not."

															Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (1958) 32. Even in
the absence of such oppressive circumstances, and where an
exclusionary rule rests principally on nonconstitutional grounds,
we have sometimes refused to differentiate between voluntary and
involuntary declarations. See Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47
Geo.L.J. 1, 26-27 (1958). For illustrative situations where a
voluntary act of the accused has been held insufficient to cure the
otherwise unlawful acquisition of evidence, see Bynum v. United
States, 262 F.2d 465 (holding inadmissible fingerprints made
by defendant after unlawful arrest); United States v.
Watson, 189 F.
Supp. 776 (excluding narcotics voluntarily surrendered by
accused in the course of an unauthorized search). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals from which the instant case comes has recognized
in an analogous context, that "all declarations and statements
under the compulsion of the things so seized, are affected by the
vice of primary illegality. . . ." Takahashi v. United
States, 143 F.2d 118, 122.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															Moreover, we held in Opper v. United States, 348 U. S. 84 , 348 U. S. 92 ,
that even where exculpatory statements are voluntary and thus
clearly admissible, they require at least the degree of
corroboration required of incriminating statements.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															For the history and development of the corroboration
requirement, see 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), §§ 2070-2071;
Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's
Confession, 103 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 638-649 (1955). For the present
scope and application of the rule, see 2 Underhill, Criminal
Evidence (5th ed. 1956), §§ 402-403. For a comprehensive collection
of cases, see Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															Where the crime involves physical damage to person or property,
the prosecution must generally show that the injury for which the
accused confesses responsibility did in fact occur, and that some
person was criminally culpable. A notable example is the principle
that an admission of homicide must be corroborated by tangible
evidence of the death of the supposed victim. See 7
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), § 2072, n. 5. There need in such a
case be no link, outside the confession, between the injury and the
accused who admits having inflicted it. But where the crime
involves no tangible corpus delicti, we have said that
"the corroborative evidence must implicate the accused in order to
show that a crime has been committed." 348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 154 .
Finally, we have said that one uncorroborated admission by the
accused does not, standing alone, corroborate an unverified
confession. United States v. Calderon, 348 U.
S. 160 , 348 U. S.
165 .

															[ Footnote 16 ] See Developments in the Law -- Criminal Conspiracy, 72
Harv.L.Rev. 922, 989-990 (1959).

															[ Footnote 17 ] Cf. Williams, The Proof of Guilt (1958), 135:

															"Even where . . . the evidence of an accomplice becomes
admissible against his fellows, it remains suspect evidence,
because of the tainted source from which it comes. The accomplice
may no longer have anything to fear or hope from the way in which
he gives his evidence; yet he may mistakenly entertain such a fear
or hope, or he may wish by his evidence against others to gratify
some spite against them."

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															This case is not like Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ,
where the person challenging the seizure of evidence was lawfully
on the premises at the time of the search. Nor is it like Chapman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 610 , where we held that a landlord could not lawfully
consent to a search of his tenant's premises. See
generally Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized
Evidence, 47 N.W.U.L.Rev. 471 (1952).

															MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.

															While I join the Court's opinion, I do so because nothing the
Court holds is inconsistent with my belief that there having been
time to get a warrant, probable cause alone could not have
justified the arrest of petitioner Toy without a warrant.

															I adhere to the views I expressed in Jones v. United
States, 362 U. S. 257 , 362 U. S. 273 .
What I said in the Jones case had been earlier stated by Mr.
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Johnson v. United
States, 333 U. S. 10 (another narcotics case):

															"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection Page 371 U. S. 498 consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a
magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant
will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's
homes secure only in the discretion of police officers."

															Pp. 333 U. S. 13 -14. And see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.
S. 610 , 365 U. S.
615 -616.

															The Court finds it unnecessary to reach that constitutional
question. I mention it only to reiterate that the Johnson case represents the law, and is in no way eroded by what we fail to
decide today.

															MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE
STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.

															The Court has made a Chinese puzzle out of this simple case
involving four participants: Hom Way, Blackie Toy, Johnny Yee and
"Sea Dog" Sun. In setting aside the convictions of Toy and Sun it
has dashed to pieces the heretofore recognized standards of
probable cause necessary to secure an arrest warrant or to make an
arrest without one. Instead of dealing with probable cause as
involving "probabilities," "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act," Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U. S. 160 , 338 U. S. 175 (1949), the Court sets up rigid, mechanical standards, applying the
20-20 vision of hindsight in an area where the ambiguity and
immediacy inherent in unexpected arrest are present. While probable
cause must be based on more than mere suspicion, Henry v.
United States, 361 U. S. 98 , 361 U. S. 104 (1959), it does Page 371 U. S. 499 not require proof sufficient to establish guilt. Draper v.
United States, 358 U. S. 307 , 358 U. S. 312 (1959). The sole requirement heretofore has been that the knowledge
in the hands of the officers at the time of arrest must support a
"man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the subject had
committed narcotic offenses. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 , 267 U. S. 162 (1925). That decision is faced initially not in the courtroom, but
at the scene of arrest, where the totality of the circumstances
facing the officer is weighed against his split-second decision to
make the arrest. This is an everyday occurrence facing law
enforcement officers, and the unrealistic, enlarged standards
announced here place an unnecessarily heavy hand upon them. I
therefore dissent. I The first character in this affair is Hom Way, who was arrested
in possession of narcotics and told the officers early that morning
that he had purchased an ounce of heroin on the previous night from
Blackie Toy, who operated a laundry on Leavenworth Street.
Narcotics agents, armed with this information from a person they
had known for six weeks and who was under arrest for possession of
narcotics, immediately sought out Blackie Toy, the second
character. The laundry was located without difficulty (as far as
the record shows) from the information furnished by Hom Way. The
Court gratuitously reads into the record its supposition that Hom
Way "merely invited the officers to roam the length of Leavenworth
Street (some 30 blocks) in search of one Blackie Toy's'
laundry. . . ." On the contrary, the identification of "Blackie"
and the directions to his laundry were sufficiently accurate for
the officers -- two of whom were of Chinese ancestry -- to find
Blackie at his laundry within an hour. I cannot say in the face of
this record that this was a "roaming" performance Page 371 U. S.
500 up and down Leavenworth Street. To me it was efficient
police work by officers familiar with San Francisco and the habits
and practices of its Chinese-American inhabitants. Indeed, the
information was much more explicit than that approved by this Court
in Draper v. United States, supra. There are other indicia of reliability, however. Here the
informer, believed by the officers to be reliable, * was under arrest
when he implicated himself in the purchase of an ounce of heroin
the previous night. Since he was in possession of narcotics and his
information related to a narcotics sale in which he was the buyer,
the officers had good reason to rely on Hom Way's knowledge. See Rodgers v. United States, 267 F.2d 79 (C.A.9th Cir.,
1959), and Thomas v. United States, 281 F.2d 132 (C.A.8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 904 (1960). As to his
credibility, he was confronted with prosecution for possession of
narcotics and well knew that any discrepancies in his story might
go hard with him. Furthermore, the statement was a declaration
against interest which stripped Hom Way of any explanation for his
possession of narcotics and made certain the presumption of 21
U.S.C. § 174, 21 U.S.C.A. § 174. I do not see what stronger and
more reliable information one could have to establish probable
cause for the arrest without warrant of Blackie Toy.

															But even assuming there was no probable cause at this point, the
Government produced additional evidence to support the lawfulness
of Backie's arrest. In broad daylight, about 6:30 on the same
morning that Hom Way was arrested, one of the officers of Chinese
ancestry, Agent Alton Wong, knocked on Blackie Toy's laundry door.
When Wong told him that he wanted laundry, Blackie Page 371 U. S. 501 opened the door and advised him to return at 8 a.m. Wong
testified that he then "pulled out [his] badge" and announced that
he was a narcotics agent. Blackie slammed the door in Wong's face
and ran down the hall of the laundry. Wong broke through the door
after him -- calling again that he was "a narcotics Treasury
agent." Only when Blackie reached the family bedroom was Wong able
to arrest him, as he reached into a nightstand drawer, apparently
looking for narcotics. Agent Wong immediately confronted him with
Hom Way's accusation that Blackie Toy had sold him narcotics.
Blackie denied selling narcotics, but he did not deny knowing Hom
Way, and later admitted knowing him. There is no basis in Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301 (1958), for the Court's conclusion that Blackie's flight "signified
. . . a natural desire (by Toy) to repel an apparently unauthorized
intrusion. . . ." As I see it, this is incredible in the light of
the record. Nor is there any support in the record that "before Toy
fled, the officer never adequately dispelled the misimpression
engendered by his own ruse." On the contrary, the officer's showing
of his badge and announcement that he was a narcotics agent
immediately put Blackie in flight behind the slamming door. To
conclude otherwise takes all prizes as a nonsequitur. As he
pursued, Wong continued to identify himself as a narcotics agent. I
ask, how could he more clearly announce himself and his
purpose?

															This Court has often held unexplained flight -- as here -- from
an officer to be strong evidence of guilt. E.g., Husty v.
United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931); Brinegar v. United States, supra, at p. 338 U. S. 166 ,
n. 7; see Henry v. United States, supra, where the Court
was careful to distinguish its facts from those of "fleeing men or
men acting furtively." 361 U.S. at 361 U. S. 103 .
Moreover, as the Government has always emphasized, this is
particularly true in narcotics cases where delay may have serious
consequences, i.e., the hiding Page 371 U. S. 502 or destruction of the drugs. This Court noted without
disapproval in Miller v. United States, supra, the state
decisions holding that

															"justification for noncompliance [with the rule] exists in
exigent circumstances, as, for example, when the officers may in
good faith believe . . . that the person to be arrested is fleeing
or attempting to destroy evidence. People v.
Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d
301 , 294 P.2d 6."

															357 U.S. at 357 U. S. 309 .
And the Court continued,

															"It may be that, without an express announcement of purpose, the
facts known to officers would justify them in being virtually
certain that the petitioner already knows their purpose so that an
announcement would be a useless gesture. Cf. People v.
Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755 , 290 P.2d 855; Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22
Mich.L.Rev. 541, 798, 802 (1924)." Id. at 357 U. S.
310 .

															The Court places entire reliance on the decision in Miller. I
submit that it is inapposite. That case involved interpretation of
the law of the District of Columbia. Id. at 357 U. S. 306 .
The arrest was at night, and the door was broken in just as the
defendant began to close it. Thus there was no flight, but only
what the officers believed to be an attempt to bar their entrance.
The only identification given by the officers occurred before the
defendant opened the door, when, "in a low voice" through the
closed door, they answered the defendant's query as to who was
there by saying, "Police." Id. at 357 U. S. 303 .
The facts in Miller differ significantly from this case both in the
clarity of identification by the officers and in the character and
extent of the defendant's conduct. For that reason, the conclusions
that Blackie's flight is evidence to support probable cause and
that the officers gave sufficient notice to permit lawful entry are
supported, rather than weakened, by the Court's decision in Miller. The information from Hom Way and Blackie Toy's unexplained
flight cannot be viewed "in two separate, logic-tight compartments.
. . . [T]ogether, they composed Page 371 U. S. 503 a picture meaningful to a trained, experienced observer." Christensen v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 36, 259
F.2d 192, 193 (1958). I submit that the officers, as reasonable
men, properly concluded that the petitioner was the "Blackie Toy"
who Hom Way informed them had committed a felony and that his
immediate arrest -- as he ran through his hall -- was lawful and
was imperative in order to prevent his escape. In view of this,
there is no "poisonous tree" whose fruits we must evaluate, and
Blackie's declaration at the time of the arrest and the narcotics
found in Yee's possession are admissible in evidence. The trial
court found that evidence sufficiently corroborative of Toy's
confession, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. For the same reasons
discussed infra as to Wong Sun, I see no occasion to
overturn these consistent findings of two courts. II As to "Sea Dog," Wong Sun, there is no disagreement that his
confession and the narcotics found in Yee's possession were
admissible in evidence against him. The question remains as to
whether there was sufficient independent evidence to corroborate
the confession. Such evidence "does not have to prove the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance. . . ." Smith v. United States, 348 U. S. 147 , 348 U. S. 156 (1954). The requirement is satisfied "if the corroboration merely
fortifies the truth of the confession, without independently
establishing the crime charged. . . ." Ibid; see also Opper v.
United States, 348 U. S. 84 (1954). Wong Sun's confession stated in part that, about four days
before his arrest, he and Toy delivered an ounce of heroin to Yee,
and that, on the night before his arrest -- the night of June 3,
1959 -- he and Toy smoked some heroin at Yee's house. On June 4,
1959, the officers found at Yee's residence quantities of heroin
totaling "just less than one ounce." In light Page 371 U. S. 504 of this evidence, I am unable to say that the trial court and
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Wong Sun's confession
was sufficiently corroborated.

															The Court does not reach a contrary conclusion as to
corroboration, but it grants Wong Sun a new trial on the ground
that the trial court "may" also "have considered the contents of
Toy's statement as a source of corroboration" of it. This point was
not raised as a question here, nor was it discussed in the briefs.
Despite this, the Court goes to some lengths to develop a chain of
inferences in finding prejudicial error. This might be plausible
where the case was tried to a jury, as were all the cases cited by
the Court. Indeed, I find no case where such presumption of error
was applied, as here, to a trial before a judge. The Court admits
that the heroin found in Johnny Yee's possession might itself be
sufficient corroboration, but it reverses on the excuse that the
judge "may" have considered Toy's confession as well. I see no
reason for this assumption where a federal judge is the trier of
the fact, and I would therefore affirm the judgment as to both
petitioners.

															* One of the officers testified at the trial that he had known
Hom Way for six weeks. In response to the question whether Hom Way
was a reliable informer, the officer replied, "I believe so, yes,
sir."