U.S. Supreme Court Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919) Debs v. United States No. 714 Argued January 27, 28,
1919 Decided March 10,
1919 249
U.S. 211 ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO Syllabus The delivery of a speech in such word and such circumstances
that the probable effect will be to prevent recruiting, and with
that intent, is punishable under the Espionage Act of June 15,
1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, as amended by the Act of May 16,
1918, c. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553. P. 249 U. S.
212 .

															Such a speech is not protected because of the fact that the
purpose to oppose the war and obstruct recruiting, and the
expressions used in that regard, were but incidental parts of a
general propaganda of socialism and expressions of a general and
conscientious belief. P. 249 U. S.
215 .

															In a prosecution for obstructing and attempting to obstruct
recruiting, by a speech in which defendant expressed sympathy with
others, imprisoned for similar offenses, the ground for whose
convictions he purported to understand, held that the
records in the other cases were admissible as tending to explain
the subject and true import of defendant's remarks and his intent. Id. In such prosecution, held that a document -- a
so-called "Anti-War Proclamation and Program" -- expressing and
advocating opposition to the war was admissible against the
defendant as evidence of his intent in connection with other
evidence that, an hour before his speech, he expressed his approval
of such platform. Id. Semble that persons designated by the Draft Act of May
18, 1917, registered and enrolled under it and thus subject to be
called into active service, are part of the military forces of the
United States within the meaning of § 3 of the Espionage Act. P. 249 U. S.
216 . Affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Page 249 U. S. 212 MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This is an indictment under the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917,
c. 30, Tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219, as amended by the Act of May 16,
1918, c. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553. It has been cut down to two counts,
originally the third and fourth. The former of these alleges that,
on or about June 16, 1918, at Canton, Ohio, the defendant caused
and incited and attempted to cause and incite insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny and refusal of duty in the military and naval
forces of the United States and with intent so to do delivered, to
an assembly of people, a public speech, set forth. The fourth count
alleges that he obstructed and attempted to obstruct the recruiting
and enlistment service of the United States and to that end and
with that intent delivered the same speech, again set forth. There
was a demurrer to the indictment on the ground that the statute is
unconstitutional as interfering with free speech, contrary to the
First Amendment, and to the several counts as insufficiently
stating the supposed offence. This was overruled, subject to
exception. There were other exceptions to the admission of evidence
with which we shall deal. The defendant was found guilty and was
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on each of the two counts, the
punishment to run concurrently on both.

															The main theme of the speech was Socialism, its growth, and a
prophecy of its ultimate success. With that we have nothing to do,
but if a part or the manifest intent of the Page 249 U. S. 213 more general utterances was to encourage those present to
obstruct the recruiting service, and if, in passages, such
encouragement was directly given, the immunity of the general theme
may not be enough to protect the speech. The speaker began by
saying that he had just returned from a visit to the workhouse in
the neighborhood where three of their most loyal comrades were
paying the penalty for their devotion to the working class -- these
being Wagenknecht, Baker, and Ruthenberg, who had been convicted of
aiding and abetting another in failing to register for the draft. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.
S. 480 . He said that he had to be prudent, and might not
be able to say all that he thought, thus intimating to his hearers
that they might infer that he meant more, but he did say that those
persons were paying the penalty for standing erect and for seeking
to pave the way to better conditions for all mankind. Later he
added further eulogies, and said that he was proud of them. He then
expressed opposition to Prussian militarism in a way that naturally
might have been thought to be intended to include the mode of
proceeding in the United States.

															After considerable discourse that it is unnecessary to follow,
he took up the case of Kate Richards O'Hare, convicted of
obstructing the enlistment service, praised her for her loyalty to
Socialism and otherwise, and said that she was convicted on false
testimony, under a ruling that would seem incredible to him if he
had not had some experience with a federal court. We mention this
passage simply for its connection with evidence put in at the
trial. The defendant spoke of other cases, and then, after dealing
with Russia, said that the master class has always declared the war
and the subject class has always fought the battles -- that the
subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose, including
their lives; that the working class, who furnish the corpses, have
never yet had a voice in declaring war and never yet had a voice in
declaring Page 249 U. S. 214 peace. "You have your lives to lose; you certainly ought to have
the right to declare war if you consider a war necessary." The
defendant next mentioned Rose Pastor Stokes, convicted of
attempting to cause insubordination and refusal of duty in the
military forces of the United States and obstructing the recruiting
service. He said that she went out to render her service to the
cause in this day of crises, and they sent her to the penitentiary
for ten years; that she had said no more than the speaker had said
that afternoon; that, if she was guilty, so was he, and that he
would not be cowardly enough to plead his innocence, but that her
message that opened the eyes of the people must be suppressed, and
so after a mock trial before a packed jury and a corporation tool
on the bench, she was sent to the penitentiary for ten years.

															There followed personal experiences and illustrations of the
growth of socialism, a glorification of minorities, and a prophecy
of the success of the international socialist crusade, with the
interjection that "you need to know that you are fit for something
better than slavery and cannon fodder." The rest of the discourse
had only the indirect. though not necessarily ineffective. bearing
on the offences alleged that is to be found in the usual contrasts
between capitalists and laboring men, sneers at the advice to
cultivate war gardens, attribution to plutocrats of the high price
of coal, &c., with the implication running through it all that
the working men are not concerned in the war, and a final
exhortation, "Don't worry about the charge of treason to your
masters; but be concerned about the treason that involves
yourselves." The defendant addressed the jury himself, and while
contending that his speech did not warrant the charges said, "I
have been accused of obstructing the war. I admit it. Gentlemen, I
abhor war. I would oppose the war if I stood alone." The statement
was not necessary to warrant the jury in finding that one purpose
of the speech, whether incidental Page 249 U. S. 215 or not does not matter, was to oppose not only war in general,
but this war, and that the opposition was so expressed that its
natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting. If
that was intended and if, in all the circumstances, that would be
its probable effect, it would not be protected by reason of its
being part of a general program and expressions of a general and
conscientious belief.

															The chief defenses upon which the defendant seemed willing to
rely were the denial that we have dealt with and that based upon
the First Amendment to the Constitution, disposed of in Schenck
v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 . His
counsel questioned the sufficiency of the indictment. It is
sufficient in form. Frohwerk v. United States, ante, 249 U. S. 204 . The
most important question that remains is raised by the admission in
evidence of the record of the conviction of Ruthenberg,
Wagenknecht, and Baker, Rose Pastor Stokes, and Kate Richards
O'Hare. The defendant purported to understand the grounds on which
these persons were imprisoned, and it was proper to show what those
grounds were in order to show what he was talking about, to explain
the true import of his expression of sympathy, and to throw light
on the intent of the address so far as the present matter is
concerned.

															There was introduced also an "Anti-War Proclamation and Program"
adopted at St. Louis in April, 1917, coupled with testimony that,
about an hour before his speech, the defendant had stated that he
approved of that platform in spirit and in substance. The defendant
referred to it in his address to the jury, seemingly with
satisfaction and willingness that it should be considered in
evidence. But his counsel objected, and has argued against its
admissibility at some length. This document contained the usual
suggestion that capitalism was the cause of the war and that our
entrance into it "was instigated by the predatory capitalists in
the United States." It alleged that the war Page 249 U. S. 216 of the United States against Germany could not "be justified
even on the plea that it is a war in defense of American rights or
American honor.'" It said: "We brand the declaration of war by our governments as a crime
against the people of the United States and against the nations of
the world. In all modern history there has been no war more
unjustifiable than the war in which we are about to engage."

															Its first recommendation was, "continuous, active, and public
opposition to the war, through demonstrations, mass petitions, and
all other means within our power." Evidence that the defendant
accepted this view and this declaration of his duties at the time
that he made his speech is evidence that, if in that speech he used
words tending to obstruct the recruiting service, he meant that
they should have that effect. The principle is too well established
and too manifestly good sense to need citation of the books. We
should add that the jury were most carefully instructed that they
could not find the defendant guilty for advocacy of any of his
opinions unless the words used had as their natural tendency and
reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting service,
&c., and unless the defendant had the specific intent to do so
in his mind.

															Without going into further particulars, we are of opinion that
the verdict on the fourth count, for obstructing and attempting to
obstruct the recruiting service of the United States, must be
sustained. Therefore it is less important to consider whether that
upon the third count for causing and attempting to cause
insubordination, &c., in the military and naval forces is
equally impregnable. The jury were instructed that, for the
purposes of the statute, the persons designated by the Act of May
18, 1917, c. 15, 40 Stat. 76, registered and enrolled under it, and
thus subject to be called into the active service, were a part of
the military forces of the United States. The government presents a
strong argument from the history of the statutes that the
instruction Page 249 U. S. 217 was correct and in accordance with established legislative
usage. We see no sufficient reason for differing from the
conclusion, but think it unnecessary to discuss the question in
detail. Judgment affirmed.