NOTICE: This opinion is subject to
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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 11–796

															_________________

															VERNON HUGH BOWMAN, PETITIONER v. MONSANTO COMPANY et al.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the federal circuit

															[May 13, 2013]

															Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the
authorized sale of a patented article gives the purchaser, or any
subsequent owner, a right to use or resell that article. Such a
sale, however, does not allow the purchaser to make new copies of
the patented invention. The question in this case is whether a
farmer who buys patented seeds may reproduce them through planting
and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission. We hold that
he may not.

															I

															Respondent Monsanto invented a genetic
modification that enables soybean plants to survive exposure to
glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides (including
Monsanto’s own Roundup). Monsanto markets soybean seed containing
this altered genetic material as Roundup Ready seed. Farmers
planting that seed can use a glyphosate-based herbicide to kill
weeds without damaging their crops. Two patents issued to Monsanto
cover various aspects of its Roundup Ready technology, including a
seed in-corporating the genetic alteration. See Supp. App. SA1–21
(U. S. Patent Nos. 5,352,605 and RE39,247E); see also 657 F.3d
1341, 1343–1344 (CA Fed. 2011).

															Monsanto sells, and allows other companies to
sell, Roundup Ready soybean seeds to growers who assent to a
special licensing agreement. See App. 27a. That agreement permits a
grower to plant the purchased seeds in one (and only one) season.
He can then consume the resulting crop or sell it as a commodity,
usually to a grain elevator or agricultural processor. See 657
F. 3d, at 1344–1345. But under the agreement, the farmer may
not save any of the harvested soybeans for replanting, nor may he
supply them to anyone else for that purpose. These restrictions
reflect the ease of producing new generations of Roundup Ready
seed. Because glyphosate resistance comes from the seed’s genetic
material, that trait is passed on from the planted seed to the
harvested soybeans: Indeed, a single Roundup Ready seed can grow a
plant containing dozens of genetically identical beans, each of
which, if replanted, can grow another such plant—and so on and so
on. See App. 100a. The agreement’s terms prevent the farmer from
co-opting that process to produce his own Roundup Ready seeds,
forcing him instead to buy from Monsanto each season.

															Petitioner Vernon Bowman is a farmer in Indiana
who, it is fair to say, appreciates Roundup Ready soybean seed. He
purchased Roundup Ready each year, from a company affiliated with
Monsanto, for his first crop of the season. In accord with the
agreement just described, he used all of that seed for planting,
and sold his entire crop to a grain elevator (which typically would
resell it to an agricultural processor for human or animal
consumption).

															Bowman, however, devised a less orthodox
approach for his second crop of each season. Because he thought
such late-season planting “risky,” he did not want to pay the
premium price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed. Id. , at 78a; see Brief for Petitioner 6. He therefore went
to a grain elevator; purchased “commodity soybeans” intended for
human or animal consumption; and planted them in his
fields.[ 1 ] Those soybeans came
from prior harvests of other local farmers. And because most of
those farmers also used Roundup Ready seed, Bowman could anticipate
that many of the purchased soybeans would contain Monsanto’s
patented technology. When he applied a glyphosate-based herbicide
to his fields, he confirmed that this was so; a significant
proportion of the new plants survived the treatment, and produced
in their turn a new crop of soybeans with the Roundup Ready trait.
Bowman saved seed from that crop to use in his late-season planting
the next year—and then the next, and the next, until he had
harvested eight crops in that way. Each year, that is, he planted
saved seed from the year before (sometimes adding more soybeans
bought from the grain elevator), sprayed his fields with glyphosate
to kill weeds (and any non-resistant plants), and produced a new
crop of glyphosate-resistant— i.e., Roundup
Ready—soybeans.

															After discovering this practice, Monsanto sued
Bowman for infringing its patents on Roundup Ready seed. Bowman
raised patent exhaustion as a defense, arguing that Monsanto could
not control his use of the soybeans because they were the subject
of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to the grain
elevator). The District Court rejected that argument, and awarded
damages to Monsanto of $84,456. The Federal Circuit affirmed. It
reasoned that patent exhaustion did not protect Bowman because he
had “created a newly infringing article.” 657 F. 3d, at 1348.
The “right to use” a patented article following an authorized sale,
the court explained, “does not include the right to construct an
essentially new article on the template of the original, for the
right to make the article remains with the patentee.” Ibid. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
Bowman could not “ ‘replicate’ Monsanto’s patented technology
by planting it in the ground to create newly infringing genetic
material, seeds, and plants.” Ibid. We granted certiorari to consider the important
question of patent law raised in this case, 568 U. S. ___
(2012), and now affirm.

															II

															The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a
patentee’s right to control what others can do with an article
embodying or containing an invention.[ 2 ] Under the doctrine, “the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.” Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. , 553 U.S.
617 , 625 (2008). And by “exhaust[ing] the [patentee’s]
monopoly” in that item, the sale confers on the purchaser, or any
subsequent owner, “the right to use [or] sell” the thing as he sees
fit. United States v. Univis Lens Co. , 316 U.S.
241 , 249–250 (1942). We have explained the basis for the
doctrine as follows: “[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled
with respect to any particular article when the patentee has
received his reward . . . by the sale of the article”; once that
“purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for
restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.” Id., at 251.

															Consistent with that rationale, the doctrine
restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the “particular article”
sold, ibid. ; it leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to
prevent a buyer from making new copies of the patented item. “[T]he
purchaser of the [patented] machine . . . does not acquire any
right to construct another machine either for his own use or to be
vended to another.” Mitchell v. Hawley , 16 Wall. 544,
548 (1873); see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther , 377 U.S.
422 , 424 (1964) (holding that a purchaser’s “reconstruction” of
a patented machine “would impinge on the patentee’s right ‘to
exclude others from making’ . . . the article” (quoting 35
U. S. C. §154 (1964 ed.))). Rather, “a second creation”
of the patented item “call[s] the monopoly, conferred by the patent
grant, into play for a second time.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. , 365
U.S. 336 , 346 (1961). That is because the patent holder has
“received his reward” only for the actual article sold, and not for
subsequent recreations of it. Univis , 316 U. S., at
251. If the purchaser of that article could make and sell endless
copies, the patent would effectively protect the invention for just
a single sale. Bowman himself disputes none of this analysis as a
general matter: He forthrightly acknowledges the “well settled”
principle “that the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the
right to ‘make’ a new product.” Brief for Petitioner 37 (citing Aro , 365 U. S., at 346).

															Unfortunately for Bowman, that principle decides
this case against him. Under the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman
could resell the patented soybeans he purchased from the grain
elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself or feed them to
his animals. Monsanto, although the patent holder, would have no
business interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready beans. But the
exhaustion doctrine does not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s permission
(either express or implied). And that is precisely what Bowman did.
He took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his fields
at the time he thought best; applied glyphosate to kill weeds (as
well as any soy plants lacking the Roundup Ready trait); and
finally harvested more (many more) beans than he started with. That
is how “to ‘make’ a new product,” to use Bowman’s words, when the
original product is a seed. Brief for Petitioner 37; see Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 1363 (1961) (“make” means “cause
to exist, occur, or appear,” or more specifically, “plant and raise
(a crop)”). Because Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented
invention, the exhaustion doctrine does not protect him.[ 3 ]

															Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent
would provide scant benefit. After inventing the Roundup Ready
trait, Monsanto would, to be sure, “receiv[e] [its] reward” for the
first seeds it sells. Univis , 316 U. S., at 251. But in
short order, other seed companies could reproduce the product and
market it to growers, thus depriving Mon-santo of its monopoly. And
farmers themselves need only buy the seed once, whether from
Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The grower
could multiply his initial purchase, and then multiply that new
creation, ad infinitum —each time profiting from the patented
seed without compensating its inventor. Bowman’s late-season
plantings offer a prime illustration. After buying beans for a
single harvest, Bowman saved enough seed each year to reduce or
eliminate the need for additional purchases. Monsanto still held
its patent, but received no gain from Bowman’s annual production
and sale of Roundup Ready soybeans. The exhaustion doctrine is
limited to the “particular item” sold to avoid just such a mismatch
between invention and reward.

															Our holding today also follows from J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. , 534 U.S.
124 (2001). We considered there whether an inventor could get a
patent on a seed or plant, or only a certificate issued under the
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U. S. C. §2321 et seq. We decided a patent was available, rejecting
the claim that the PVPA implicitly repealed the Patent Act’s
coverage of seeds and plants. On our view, the two statutes
established different, but not conflicting schemes: The
requirements for getting a patent “are more stringent than those
for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the pro-tections afforded” by
a patent are correspondingly greater. J. E. M. ,
534 U. S., at 142. Most notable here, we explained that only a
patent holder (not a certificate holder) could prohibit “[a] farmer
who legally purchases and plants” a protected seed from saving
harvested seed “for replanting.” Id. , at 140; see id. , at 143 (noting that the Patent Act, unlike the PVPA,
contains “no exemptio[n]” for “saving seed”). That statement is
inconsistent with applying exhaustion to protect conduct like
Bowman’s. If a sale cut off the right to control a patented seed’s
progeny, then (contrary to J. E. M. ) the patentee
could not prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed.
Indeed, the patentee could not stop the buyer from selling such seed, which even a PVP certificate owner (who, recall, is
supposed to have fewer rights) can usually accomplish. See 7
U. S. C. §§2541, 2543. Those limitations would turn
upside-down the statutory scheme J. E. M. described.

															Bowman principally argues that exhaustion should
apply here because seeds are meant to be planted. The exhaustion
doctrine, he reminds us, typically prevents a patentee from
controlling the use of a patented product following an authorized
sale. And in planting Roundup Ready seeds, Bowman continues, he is
merely using them in the normal way farmers do. Bowman thus
concludes that allowing Monsanto to interfere with that use would
“creat[e] an impermissible exception to the exhaustion doctrine”
for patented seeds and other “self-replicating technologies.” Brief
for Petitioner 16.

															But it is really Bowman who is asking for an
unprecedented exception—to what he concedes is the “well settled”
rule that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend to the right to
‘make’ a new product.” See supra, at 5. Reproducing a
patented article no doubt “uses” it after a fashion. But as already
explained, we have always drawn the boundaries of the exhaustion
doctrine to exclude that activity, so that the patentee retains an
undiminished right to prohibit others from making the thing his
patent protects. See, e.g., Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons , 106 U.S.
89 , 93–94 (1882) (holding that a purchaser could not “use” the
buckle from a patented cotton-bale tie to “make” a new tie). That
is because, once again, if simple copying were a protected use, a
patent would plummet in value after the first sale of the first
item containing the invention. The undiluted patent monopoly, it
might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as the Patent Act
promises), but for only one transaction. And that would result in
less incentive for innovation than Congress wanted. Hence our
repeated insistence that exhaustion applies only to the particular
item sold, and not to reproductions.

															Nor do we think that rule will prevent farmers
from making appropriate use of the Roundup Ready seed they buy.
Bowman himself stands in a peculiarly poor position to assert such
a claim. As noted earlier, the commodity soybeans he purchased were
intended not for planting, but for consumption. See supra, at 2–3. Indeed, Bowman conceded in deposition testimony that he
knew of no other farmer who employed beans bought from a grain
elevator to grow a new crop. See App. 84a. So a non-replicating use
of the commodity beans at issue here was not just available, but
standard fare. And in the more ordinary case, when a farmer
purchases Roundup Ready seed qua seed—that is, seed intended
to grow a crop—he will be able to plant it. Monsanto, to be sure,
conditions the farmer’s ability to reproduce Roundup Ready; but it
does not—could not realistically—preclude all planting. No sane
farmer, after all, would buy the product without some ability to
grow soybeans from it. And so Monsanto, predictably enough, sells
Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to make a
crop. See supra, at 2, 6, n. 3. Applying our usual rule in
this context therefore will allow farmers to benefit from Roundup
Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation.

															Still, Bowman has another seeds-are-special
argument: that soybeans naturally “self-replicate or ‘sprout’
unless stored in a controlled manner,” and thus “it was the planted
soybean, not Bowman” himself, that made replicas of Monsanto’s
patented invention. Brief for Petitioner 42; see Tr. of Oral Arg.
14 (“[F]armers, when they plant seeds, they don’t exercise any
control . . . over their crop” or “over the creative process”). But
we think that blame-the-bean defense tough to credit. Bowman was
not a passive observer of his soybeans’ multiplication; or put
another way, the seeds he purchased (miraculous though they might
be in other respects) did not spontaneously create eight successive
soybean crops. As we have explained, supra at 2–3, Bowman
devised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from Roundup
Ready seeds without paying the usual premium. He purchased beans
from a grain elevator anticipating that many would be Roundup
Ready; applied a glyphosate-based herbicide in a way that culled
any plants without the patented trait; and saved beans from the
rest for the next season. He then planted those Roundup Ready beans
at a chosen time; tended and treated them, including by exploiting
their patented glyphosate-resistance; and harvested many more
seeds, which he either marketed or saved to begin the next cycle.
In all this, the bean surely figured. But it was Bowman, and not
the bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth
generation) of Monsanto’s patented invention.

															Our holding today is limited—addressing the
situa- tion before us, rather than every one involving a
self-replicating product. We recognize that such inventions are
becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another
case, the article’s self-replication might occur outside the
purchaser’s control. Or it might be a necessary but incidental step
in using the item for another purpose. Cf. 17 U. S. C.
§117(a)(1) (“[I]t is not [a copyright] infringement for the owner
of a copy of a computer program to make . . . another copy or
adaptation of that computer program provide[d] that such a new copy
or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of
the computer program”). We need not address here whether or how the
doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances. In
the case at hand, Bowman planted Monsanto’s patented soybeans
solely to make and market replicas of them, thus depriving the
company of the reward patent law provides for the sale of each
article. Patent exhaustion provides no haven for that conduct. We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Grain elevators, as
indicated above, purchase grain from farmers and sell it for
consumption; under federal and state law, they generally cannot
package or market their grain for use as agricultural seed. See 7
U. S. C. §1571; Ind. Code §15–15–1–32 (2012). But because
soybeans are themselves seeds, nothing (except, as we shall see,
the law) prevented Bowman from planting, rather than consuming, the
product he bought from the grain elevator. 2 The Patent Act grants a
patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention.” 35 U. S. C.
§154(a)(1); see §271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the
patent”). 3 This conclusion applies
however Bowman acquired Roundup Ready seed: The doctrine of patent
exhaustion no more protected Bowman’s reproduction of the seed he
purchased for his first crop (from a Monsanto-affiliated seed
company) than the beans he bought for his second(from a grain
elevator). The difference between the two purchases was that the
first—but not the second—came with a license from Monsanto to plant
the seed and then harvest and market one crop of beans. We do not
here confront a case in which Monsanto (or an affiliated seed
company) sold Roundup Ready to a farmer without an express license
agreement. For reasons we explain below, we think that case
unlikely to arise. See infra, at 9. And in the event it did,
the farmer might reasonably claim that the sale came with an
implied license to plant and harvest one soybean crop.


Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.

OPINION OF THE COURT GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. V. SEB S.&NBSP;A. 563 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 10-6 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., et al.,
PETITIONERS v. SEB S. A.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit

															[May 31, 2011]

															   Justice Alito delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   We consider whether a party who
“actively induces in-fringement of a patent” under 35 U. S. C.
§271(b) must know that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement.

															I

															   This case concerns a patent for
an innovative deep fryer designed by respondent SEB S. A., a
French maker of home appliances. In the late 1980’s, SEB invented a
“cool-touch” deep fryer, that is, a deep fryer for home use with
external surfaces that remain cool during the frying process. The
cool-touch deep fryer consisted of a metal frying pot surrounded by
a plastic outer housing. Attached to the housing was a ring that
suspended the metal pot and insulated the housing from heat by
separating it from the pot, creating air space between the two
components. SEB obtained a U. S. patent for its design in 1991, and
sometime later, SEB started manufacturing the cool-touch fryer and
selling it in this country under its well-known “T-Fal” brand.
Superior to other products in the American market at the time,
SEB’s fryer was a commercial success.

															   In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc.,
a U. S. competitor of SEB, asked petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises,
Ltd., to supply it with deep fryers meeting certain specifications.
Pentalpha is a Hong Kong maker of home appliances and a wholly
owned subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc.[ Footnote 1 ]

															   In order to develop a deep fryer for Sunbeam,
Pentalpha purchased an SEB fryer in Hong Kong and copied all but
its cosmetic features. Because the SEB fryer bought in Hong Kong
was made for sale in a foreign market, it bore no U. S. patent
markings. After copying SEB’s design, Pentalpha retained an
attorney to conduct a right-to-use study, but Pentalpha refrained
from telling the attorney that its design was copied directly from
SEB’s.

															   The attorney failed to locate SEB’s patent,
and in August 1997 he issued an opinion letter stating that
Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents that he
had found. That same month, Pentalpha started selling its deep
fryers to Sunbeam, which resold them in the United States under its
trademarks. By obtaining its product from a manufacturer with lower
production costs, Sunbeam was able to undercut SEB in the U. S.
market.

															   After SEB’s customers started defecting to
Sunbeam, SEB sued Sunbeam in March 1998, alleging that Sunbeam’s
sales infringed SEB’s patent. Sunbeam notified Pentalpha of the
lawsuit the following month. Undeterred, Pentalpha went on to sell
deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co., both
of which resold them in the United States under their respective
trademarks.

															   SEB settled the lawsuit with Sunbeam, and then
sued Pentalpha, asserting two theories of recovery: First, SEB
claimed that Pentalpha had directly infringed SEB’s patent in
violation of 35 U. S. C. §271(a), by selling or offering to
sell its deep fryers; and second, SEB claimed that Pentalpha had
contravened §271(b) by actively inducing Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and
Montgomery Ward to sell or to offer to sell Pentalpha’s deep fryers
in violation of SEB’s patent rights.

															   Following a 5-day trial, the jury found for
SEB on both theories and also found that Pentalpha’s infringement
had been willful. Pentalpha filed post-trial motions seeking a new
trial or judgment as a matter of law on several grounds. As
relevant here, Pentalpha argued that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding of induced infringement
under §271(b) because Pentalpha did not actually know of SEB’s
patent until it received the notice of the Sunbeam lawsuit in April
1998.

															   The District Court rejected Pentalpha’s
argument, as did the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which affirmed the judgment, SEB S. A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F. 3d 1360 (2010).
Summarizing a recent en banc decision, the Federal Circuit stated
that induced infringement under §271(b) requires a “plaintiff [to]
show that the alleged infringer knew or should have known that his
actions would induce actual infringements” and that this showing
includes proof that the alleged infringer knew of the patent. Id. , at 1376. Although the record contained no direct
evidence that Pentalpha knew of SEB’s patent before April 1998, the
court found adequate evidence to support a finding that “Pentalpha
deliberately disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective
patent.” Id. , at 1377. Such disregard, the court said, “is
not different from actual knowledge, but is a form of actual
knowledge.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 562 U. S. ___
(2010).

															II

															   Pentalpha argues that active
inducement liability under §271(b) requires more than deliberate
indifference to a known risk that the induced acts may violate an
existing patent. Instead, Pentalpha maintains, actual knowledge of
the patent is needed.

															A

															   In assessing Pentalpha’s
argument, we begin with the text of §271(b)—which is short, simple,
and, with respect to the question presented in this case,
inconclusive. Section 271(b) states: “Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”

															   Although the text of §271(b)
makes no mention of intent, we infer that at least some intent is
required. The term “induce” means “[t]o lead on; to influence; to
prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.” Webster’s New
International Dictionary 1269 (2d ed. 1945). The addition of the
adverb “actively” suggests that the inducement must involve the
taking of affirmative steps to bring about the desired result, see id. , at 27.

															   When a person actively induces another to take
some action, the inducer obviously knows the action that he or she
wishes to bring about. If a used car salesman induces a customer to
buy a car, the salesman knows that the desired result is the
purchase of the car. But what if it is said that the salesman
induced the customer to buy a damaged car? Does this mean
merely that the salesman induced the customer to purchase a car
that happened to be damaged, a fact of which the salesman may have
been unaware? Or does this mean that the salesman knew that the car
was damaged? The statement that the salesman induced the customer
to buy a damaged car is ambiguous.

															   So is §271(b). In referring to a party that
“induces infringement,” this provision may require merely that the
inducer lead another to engage in conduct that happens to amount to
infringement, i.e. , the making, using, offering to sell,
selling, or importing of a patented invention. See
§271(a).[ Footnote 2 ] On the
other hand, the reference to a party that “induces infringement”
may also be read to mean that the inducer must persuade another to
engage in conduct that the inducer knows is infringement. Both
readings are possible.

															B

															   Finding no definitive answer in
the statutory text, we turn to the case law that predates the
enactment of §271 as part the Patent Act of 1952. As we recognized
in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co. , 377 U. S. 476 (1964) (Aro
II) , “[t]he section was designed to ‘codify in statutory form
principles of contributory infringement’ which had been ‘part of
our law for about 80 years.’ ” Id ., at 485–486,
n. 6 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 9
(1952)).

															   Unfortunately, the relevant
pre-1952 cases are less clear than one might hope with respect to
the question presented here. Before 1952, both the conduct now
covered by §271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now
addressed by §271(c) (sale of a component of a patented invention)
were viewed as falling within the overarching concept of
“contributory infringement.” Cases in the latter
category— i.e. , cases in which a party sold an item that
was not itself covered by the claims of a patent but that enabled
another party to make or use a patented machine, process, or
combination—were more common.

															   The pre-1952 case law provides conflicting
signals regarding the intent needed in such cases. In an oft-cited
decision, then-Judge Taft suggested that it was sufficient if the
seller of the component part intended that the part be used in an
invention that happened to infringe a patent. He wrote that it was
“well settled that where one makes and sells one element of a
combination covered by a patent with the intention and for the
purpose of bringing about its use in such a combination he is
guilty of contributory infringement.” Thomson-Houston Elec.
Co. v. Ohio Brass Co. , 80 F. 712, 721 (CA6
1897).[ Footnote 3 ]

															   On the other hand, this Court, in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. , 224 U. S. 1 (1912), overruled on other
grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co. , 243 U. S. 502 (1917), stated that “if the defendants [who were accused of
contributory infringement] knew of the patent and that
[the direct infringer] had unlawfully made the patented article …
with the intent and purpose that [the direct infringer] should use
the infringing article … they would assist in her infringing use.”
224 U. S., at 33 (emphasis added and deleted).[ Footnote 4 ] Our decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. , 545 U. S. 913 (2005), which looked to the law of contributory patent infringement
for guidance in determining the standard to be applied in a case
claiming contributory copyright infringement, contains dicta that
may be read as interpreting the pre-1952 cases this way. In Grokster , we said that “[t]he inducement rule … premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.” Id ., at 937.

															   While both the language of §271(b) and the
pre-1952 case law that this provision was meant to codify are
susceptible to conflicting interpretations, our decision in Aro
II resolves the question in this case. In Aro II , a
majority held that a violator of §271(c) must know “that the
combination for which his component was especially designed was
both patented and infringing,” 377 U. S., at 488, and as we explain
below, that conclusion compels this same knowledge for liability
under §271(b).

															C

															   As noted above, induced
infringement was not considered a separate theory of indirect
liability in the pre-1952 case law. Rather, it was treated as
evidence of “contributory infringement,” that is, the aiding and
abetting of direct infringement by another party. See Lemley,
In-ducing Patent Infringement, 39 U. C. D. L. Rev.
225, 227 (2005). When Congress enacted §271, it separated what had
previously been regarded as contributory infringement into two
categories, one covered by §271(b) and the other covered by
§271(c). Aro II concerned
§271(c), which states in relevant part:

															   “Whoever offers to sell or sells
… a component of a patented [invention] … , constituting a
material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.” (Emphasis added.)

															This language contains exactly the same ambiguity
as §271(b). The phrase “knowing [a component] to be especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement” may be read to
mean that a violator must know that the component is “especially
adapted for use” in a product that happens to infringe a patent. Or
the phrase may be read to require, in addition, knowledge of the
patent’s existence.

															   This question closely divided the Aro
II Court. In a badly fractured decision, a majority concluded
that knowledge of the patent was needed. 377 U. S., at 488, and n.
8; id ., at 514 (White, J., concurring); id ., at
524–527 (Black, J., dissenting).[ Footnote 5 ] Justice Black’s opinion, which explained the
basis for the majority’s view, concluded that the language of
§271(c) supported this interpretation. See id ., at 525.
His opinion also relied on an amendment to this language that was
adopted when the bill was in committee. Id. , at
525–527.

															   Four Justices disagreed with this
interpretation and would have held that a violator of §271(c) need
know only that the component is specially adapted for use in a
product that happens to infringe a patent. See id. , at
488–490, n. 8. These Justices thought that this reading was
supported by the language of §271(c) and the pre-1952 case law, and
they disagreed with the inference drawn by the majority from the
amendment of §271(c)’s language. Ibid .

															   While there is much to be said in favor of
both views expressed in Aro II, the “holding in Aro
II has become a fixture in the law of contributory
infringement under [section] 271(c),” 5 R. Moy, Walker on Patents
§15:20, p. 15–131 (4th ed. 2009)—so much so that SEB has not
asked us to overrule it, see Brief for Respondent 19, n. 3.
Nor has Congress seen fit to alter §271(c)’s intent requirement in
the nearly half a century since Aro II was decided. In
light of the “ ‘special force’ ” of the doctrine of stare decisis with regard to questions of statutory
interpretation, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States , 552 U. S.
130 , 139 (2008), we proceed on the premise that §271(c)
requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is
infringed.

															   Based on this premise, it follows that the
same knowledge is needed for induced infringement under §271(b). As
noted, the two provisions have a common origin in the pre-1952
understanding of contributory infringement, and the language of the
two provisions creates the same difficult interpretive choice. It
would thus be strange to hold that knowledge of the relevant patent
is needed under §271(c) but not under §271(b).

															   Accordingly, we now hold that induced
infringement under §271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement.

															III

															   Returning to Pentalpha’s
principal challenge, we agree that deliberate indifference to a
known risk that a patent exists is not the appropriate standard
under §271(b). We nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals because the evidence in this case was plainly sufficient to
support a finding of Pentalpha’s knowledge under the doctrine of
willful blindness.

															A

															   The doctrine of willful blindness
is well established in criminal law. Many criminal statutes require
proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts
applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants
cannot escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding
themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly
suggested by the circumstances. The traditional rationale for this
doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as
culpable as those who have actual knowledge. Edwards, The Criminal
Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294, 302 (1954) (hereinafter
Edwards) (observing on the basis of English authorities that “up to
the present day, no real doubt has been cast on the proposition
that [willful blindness] is as culpable as actual knowledge”). It
is also said that persons who know enough to blind themselves to
direct proof of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of
those facts. See United States v. Jewell , 532
F. 2d 697, 700 (CA9 1976) (en banc).

															   This Court’s opinion more than a
century ago in Spurr v. United States , 174 U. S. 728 (1899),[ Footnote 6 ] while not using the term
“willful blindness,” endorsed a similar concept. The case involved
a criminal statute that prohibited a bank officer from “willfully”
certifying a check drawn against insufficient funds. We said that a
willful violation would occur “if the [bank] officer purposely
keeps himself in ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the
bank.” Id. , at 735. Following our decision in Spurr , several federal prosecutions in the first half of
the 20th century invoked the doctrine of willful
blindness.[ Footnote 7 ] Later, a
1962 proposed draft of the Model Penal Code, which has since become
official, attempted to incorporate the doctrine by defining
“knowledge of the existence of a particular fact” to include a
situation in which “a person is aware of a high probability of [the
fact’s] existence, unless he actually believes that it does not
exist.” ALI, Model Penal Code §2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft
1962). Our Court has used the Code’s definition as a guide in
analyzing whether certain statutory presumptions of knowledge
comported with due process. See Turner v. United
States , 396 U. S. 398 ,
416–417 (1970); Leary v. United States , 395 U. S. 6 , 46–47, and n. 93
(1969). And every Court of Appeals—with the possible exception of
the District of Columbia Circuit, see n. 9, infra —has
fully embraced willful blindness, applying the doctrine to a wide
range of criminal statutes.

															   Given the long history of willful blindness
and its wide acceptance in the Federal Judiciary, we can see no
reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits for
induced patent infringement under 35 U. S. C.
§271(b).[ Footnote 8 ]

															   Pentalpha urges us not to take this step,
arguing that §271(b) demands more than willful blindness with
respect to the induced acts that constitute infringement.
See Reply Brief for Petitioners 13–14. This question, however, is
not at issue here. There is no need to invoke the doctrine of
willful blindness to establish that Pentalpha knew that the
retailers who purchased its fryer were selling that product in the
American market; Pentalpha was indisputably aware that its
customers were selling its product in this country.

															   Pentalpha further contends that this Court in Grokster did not accept the Solicitor General’s suggestion
that Grokster and StreamCast could be held liable for inducing the
infringement of copyrights under a theory of willful blindness.
Reply Brief for Petitioners 14 (citing Brief for United States,
O. T. 2004, No. 04–480, pp. 29–30). But the Court had no
need to consider the doctrine of willful blindness in that case
because the Court found ample evidence that Grokster and StreamCast
were fully aware—in the ordinary sense of the term—that their
file-sharing software was routinely used in carrying out the acts
that constituted infringement (the unauthorized sharing of
copyrighted works) and that these acts violated the rights of
copyright holders. See 545 U. S., at 922–927, 937–940.

															B

															   While the Courts of Appeals
articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different
ways, all appear to agree on two basic requirements: (1) the
defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take
deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.[ Footnote 9 ] We think these requirements give
willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses
recklessness and negligence. Under this formulation, a willfully
blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid
confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be
said to have actually known the critical facts. See G. Williams,
Criminal Law §57, p. 159 (2d ed. 1961) (“A court can properly
find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the
defendant actually knew”). By contrast, a reckless defendant is one
who merely knows of a substantial and unjustified risk of such
wrongdoing, see ALI, Model Penal Code §2.02(2)(c) (1985), and a
negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar risk
but, in fact, did not, see §2.02(2)(d).

															   The test applied by the Federal
Circuit in this case departs from the proper willful blindness
standard in two important respects. First, it permits a finding of
knowledge when there is merely a “known risk” that the induced acts
are infringing. Second, in demanding only “deliberate indifference”
to that risk, the Federal Circuit’s test does not require active
efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing about the infringing nature
of the activities.

															   In spite of these flaws, we believe that the
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict for
SEB is sufficient under the correct standard. The jury could have
easily found that before April 1998 Pentalpha willfully blinded
itself to the infringing nature of the sales it encouraged Sunbeam
to make.[ Footnote 10 ]

															   SEB’s cool-touch fryer was an innovation in
the U. S. market when Pentalpha copied it. App. to Brief for
Respondent 49. As one would expect with any superior product, sales
of SEB’s fryer had been growing for some time. Ibid. Pentalpha knew all of this, for its CEO and president, John Sham,
testified that, in developing a product for Sunbeam, Pentalpha
performed “market research” and “gather[ed] information as much as
possible.” App. 23a. Pentalpha’s belief that SEB’s fryer embodied
advanced technology that would be valuable in the U. S. market is
evidenced by its decision to copy all but the cosmetic features of
SEB’s fryer.

															   Also revealing is Pentalpha’s decision to copy
an overseas model of SEB’s fryer. Pentalpha knew that the product
it was designing was for the U. S. market, and Sham—himself a named
inventor on numerous U. S. patents, see id. , at
78a–86a—was well aware that products made for overseas markets
usually do not bear U. S. patent markings, App. in No. 2009–1099
etc. (CA Fed.), pp. A–1904 to A–1906. Even more telling is Sham’s
decision not to inform the attorney from whom Pentalpha sought a
right-to-use opinion that the product to be evaluated was simply a
knockoff of SEB’s deep fryer. On the facts of this case, we cannot
fathom what motive Sham could have had for withholding this
information other than to manufacture a claim of plausible
deniability in the event that his company was later accused of
patent infringement. Nor does Sham’s testimony on this subject
provide any reason to doubt that inference. Asked whether the
attorney would have fared better had he known of SEB’s design, Sham
was nonresponsive. All he could say was that a patent search is not
an “easy job” and that is why he hired attorneys to perform them.
App. 112a.

															   Taken together, this evidence was more than
sufficient for a jury to find that Pentalpha subjectively believed
there was a high probability that SEB’s fryer was patented, that
Pentalpha took deliberate steps to avoid knowing that fact, and
that it therefore willfully blinded itself to the infringing nature
of Sunbeam’s sales.

															*  *  *

															   The judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is

															Affirmed. Footnote 1 We refer to both petitioners as
“Pentalpha.” Footnote 2 Direct infringement has long been understood
to require no more than the unauthorized use of a patented
invention. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. , 377 U. S. 476 , 484 (1964); 3 A.
Deller, Walker on Patents §453, p. 1684 (1937) (hereinafter
Deller). Thus, a direct infringer’s knowledge or intent is
irrelevant. Footnote 3 For an article that is particularly clear on
this point, see H. Howson, Paper before American Association of
Inventors and Manufacturers, Washington, D. C., Contributory
Infringement of Patents 9 (Jan. 1895) (reading late 19th-century
case law to require only that a party “intentionally contribut[e]
to the act , which the Court holds to be an infringement”
(emphasis in original)). Other authorities from this era likewise
suggest that it was sufficient if the seller intended a component
part to be used in a manner that happened to infringe a patent.
See, e.g. , Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany
Perforated Wrapping Paper Co. , 152 U. S. 425 , 433 (1894) (“There are
doubtless many cases to the effect that the manufacture and sale of
a single element of a combination, with intent that it shall be
united to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is
an infringement”); Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett , 297 F. 733, 739–740 (CA2 1924) (“[B]efore one may
be held for contributory infringement, it must be shown that he had
knowingly done some act without which the infringement would not
have occurred”); New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney , 224 F. 452, 459 (CA8 1915) (“Contributory
infringement is the intentional aiding of one person by another in
the unlawful making, or selling, or using of a third person’s
patented invention”); 3 Deller §507, at 1764–1765 (“[W]here a
person furnishes one part of a patented combination, intending that
it shall be assembled with the other parts thereof, and that the
complete combination shall be used or sold; that person is liable
to an action, as infringer of the patent on the complete
combination”); 3 W. Robinson, Patents §924, p. 101 (1890) (“To
make or sell a single element with the intent that it shall be
united to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is
infringement”). Footnote 4 The earlier case of Cortelyou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co. , 207 U. S. 196 (1907), contains
language that may be read as adopting a similar position. In that
case, the Neostyle Company had a patent for a “stencil duplicating
machine” called the “rotary Neostyle,” and it licensed the use of
its machine pursuant to a license requiring the licensee to use
only Neostyle’s ink. Id. , at 198. Another company, Charles
Eneu Johnson & Co., sold its ink to a Neostyle licensee, and
Neostyle sued the Johnson company, claiming that it was “inducing a
breach of the license contracts” and was thus indirectly infringing
Neostyle’s patent rights. Id. , at 199. The Court held that
the defendant did not have “sufficient evidence of notice” to
support liability. The Court wrote:

															“True, the defendant filled a few orders for ink to be used on a
rotary Neostyle, but it does not appear that it ever solicited an
order for ink to be so used, that it was ever notified by the
plaintiffs of the rights which they claimed, or that anything
which it did was considered by them an infringement upon those
rights.” Id. , at 200 (emphasis added).

															   The italicized language above may suggest that
it was necessary to show that the defendants had notice of
Neostyle’s patent rights. See also Tubular Rivet & Stud
Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (CC Mass. 1898) (“a
necessary condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge of
the complainant’s patent”). Footnote 5 Although Justice Black disagreed with the
judgment and was thus in dissent, he was in the majority with
respect to the interpretation of §271(c), and his opinion sets out
the reasoning of the majority on this point. Three other Justices
joined his opinion, and a fourth, Justice White, endorsed his
reasoning with respect to the interpretation of §271(c). See 377 U.
S., at 514 (White, J., concurring). Footnote 6 The doctrine emerged in English law almost
four decades earlier and became firmly established by the end of
the 19th century. Edwards 298–301. In American law, one of the
earliest references to the doctrine appears in an 1882 jury charge
in a federal prosecution. In the charge, the trial judge rejected
the “great misapprehension” that a person may “close his eyes, when
he pleases, upon all sources of information, and then excuse his
ignorance by saying that he does not see anything.” See United
States v. Houghton , 14 F. 544, 547 (DC NJ). Footnote 7 United States v. Yasser ,
114 F. 2d 558, 560 (CA3 1940) (interpreting the crime of
knowingly and fraudulently concealing property belonging to the
estate of a bankrupt debtor to include someone who “closed his eyes
to facts which made the existence of” the receiver or trustee
“obvious”); Rachmil v. United States , 43
F. 2d 878, 881 (CA9 1930) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Erie R. Co. , 222 F. 444,
448–451 (DC NJ 1915) (approving a “willful ignorance” jury
instruction to a charge that a rail carrier knowingly granted a
concession to a shipper); Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States , 13 Ariz. 388, 400, 114 P. 955, 959 (1911)
(interpreting the crime of knowingly encouraging the importation of
contract laborers to include those who “willfully and intentionally
ignored facts and circumstances known to them, which would have led
to [actual] knowledge”). Footnote 8 Unlike the dissent, we do not think that
utilitarian concerns demand a stricter standard for knowledge under
§271(b), see post , at 3 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The
dissent does not explain—nor can we see—why promoting “ ‘the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ ” ibid. ,
requires protecting parties who actively encourage others to
violate patent rights and who take deliberate steps to remain
ignorant of those rights despite a high probability that the rights
exist and are being infringed, see infra , at 13–14. Footnote 9 United States v. Pérez-Meléndez , 599 F. 3d 31, 41 (CA1 2010); United States v. Svoboda , 347 F. 3d 471,
477–478 (CA2 2003); United States v. Stadtmauer ,
620 F. 3d 238, 257 (CA3 2010); United States v. Schnabel ¸ 939 F. 2d 197, 203 (CA4 1991) (“The willful
blindness instruction allows the jury to impute the element of
knowledge to the defendant if the evidence indicates that he
purposely closed his eyes to avoid knowing what was taking place
around him”); United States v. Freeman , 434
F. 3d 369, 378 (CA5 2005); United States v. Holloway , 731 F. 2d 378, 380–381 (CA6 1984) (per
curiam) (upholding jury instruction on knowledge when “it
prevent[ed] a criminal defendant from escaping conviction merely by
deliberately closing his eyes to the obvious risk that he is
engaging in unlawful conduct”); United States v. Draves , 103 F. 3d 1328, 1333 (CA7 1997) (“knowledge
may in some circumstances be inferred from strong suspicion of
wrongdoing coupled with active indifference to the truth”); United States v. Florez , 368 F. 3d 1042,
1044 (CA8 2004) (“Ignorance is deliberate if the defendant was
presented with facts that put her on notice that criminal activity
was particularly likely and yet she intentionally failed to
investigate those facts”); United States v. Heredia , 483 F. 3d 913, 917, 920 (CA9 2007) (en
banc); United States v. Glick , 710 F. 2d
639, 643 (CA10 1983); United States v. Perez-Tosta , 36 F. 3d 1552, 1564 (CA11 1994). But see United States v. Alston-Graves , 435 F. 3d
331, 339–341 (CADC 2006). Footnote 10 The District Court did not instruct the jury
according to the standard we set out today, see App. to Brief for
Respondent 26–27, and Pentalpha asks us to remand the case so it
can move for a new trial. We reject that request. Pentalpha did not
challenge the jury instructions in the Court of Appeals, see Brief
for Appellants in No. 2009–1099 etc. (CA Fed.), pp. 21–22, and
that court did not pass upon the issue. Finding no “exceptional”
circumstances in this case, we follow our usual course and refuse
to consider the issue. See Youakim v. Miller , 425 U. S. 231 , 234 (1976) (per curiam) . KENNEDY, J., DISSENTING GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC. V. SEB S.&NBSP;A. 563 U. S. ____ (2011) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 10-6 GLOBAL-TECH APPLIANCES, INC., et al.,
PETITIONERS v. SEB S. A.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit

															[May 31, 2011]

															   Justice Kennedy, dissenting.

															   The Court is correct, in my view,
to conclude that 35 U. S. C. §271(b) must be read in tandem
with §271(c), and therefore that to induce infringement a defendant
must know “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Ante , at 10.

															   Yet the Court does more. Having interpreted
the statute to require a showing of knowledge, the Court holds that
willful blindness will suffice. This is a mistaken step. Willful
blindness is not knowledge; and judges should not broaden a
legislative proscription by analogy. See United States v. Jewell , 532 F. 2d 697, 706 (CA9 1976) (en banc)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“When a statute specifically requires
knowledge as an element of a crime, however, the substitution of
some other state of mind cannot be justified even if the court
deems that both are equally blameworthy”) In my respectful
submission, the Court is incorrect in the definition it now adopts;
but even on its own terms the Court should remand to the Court of
Appeals to consider in the first instance whether there is
sufficient evidence of knowledge to support the jury’s finding of
inducement.

															   The Court invokes willful blindness to bring
those who lack knowledge within §271(b)’s prohibition. Husak &
Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and the “Equal Culpability”
Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of
Legality, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 29, 35; see also L. Alexander
& K. Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law
34–35 (2009) (cautioning against the temptation to “distort” cases
of willful blindness “into cases of knowledge”); G. Williams,
Criminal Law: The General Part §57, p. 157 (2d ed. 1961). The
Court’s definition of willful blindness reveals this basic purpose.
One can believe that there is a “high probability” that acts might
infringe a patent but nonetheless conclude they do not infringe. Ante , at 14; see also ibid. (describing a
willfully blind defendant as one “who can almost be said to have
actually known the critical facts”). The alleged inducer who
believes a device is noninfringing cannot be said to know
otherwise.

															   The Court justifies its substitution of
willful blindness for the statutory knowledge requirement in two
ways, neither of which is convincing.

															   First, the Court appeals to moral theory by
citing the “traditional rationale” that willfully blind defendants
“are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.” Ante , at 10. But the moral question is a difficult one. Is
it true that the lawyer who knowingly suborns perjury is no more
culpable than the lawyer who avoids learning that his client, a
criminal defendant, lies when he testifies that he was not the
shooter? See Hellman, Willfully Blind for Good Reason, 3 Crim. L.
& Philosophy 301, 305–308 (2009); Luban, Contrived Ignorance,
87 Geo. L. J. 957 (1999). The answer is not obvious. Perhaps
the culpability of willful blindness depends on a person’s reasons
for remaining blind. E.g. , ibid. Or perhaps only
the person’s justification for his conduct is relevant. E.g. , Alexander & Ferzan, supra , at 23–68.
This is a question of morality and of policy best left to the
political branches. Even if one were to accept the substitution of
equally blameworthy mental states in criminal cases in light of the
retributive purposes of the criminal law, those purposes have no
force in the domain of patent law that controls in this case. The
Constitution confirms that the purpose of the patent law is a
utilitarian one, to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,” Art. I, §8, cl. 8.

															   Second, the Court appeals to precedent, noting
that a “similar concept” to willful blindness appears in this
Court’s cases as early as 1899. Ante , at 11. But this
Court has never before held that willful blindness can substitute
for a statutory requirement of knowledge. Spurr v. United States , 174 U. S.
728 , 735 (1899), explained that “evil design may be presumed if
the [bank] officer purposefully keeps himself in ignorance of
whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or is grossly
indifferent to his duty in respect to the ascertainment of that
fact.” The question in Spurr was whether the defendant’s
admitted violation was willful, and with this sentence the Court
simply explained that wrongful intent may be inferred from the
circumstances. It did not suggest that blindness can substitute for
knowledge. Neither did Turner v. United States , 396 U. S. 398 (1970), or Leary v. United States , 395 U. S. 6 (1969). As the Court here
explains, both cases held only that certain statutory presumptions
of knowledge were consistent with due process. Ante , at
12. And although most Courts of Appeals have embraced willful
blindness, counting courts in a circuit split is not this Court’s
usual method for deciding important questions of law.

															   The Court appears to endorse the willful
blindness doctrine here for all federal criminal cases involving
knowledge. It does so in a civil case where it has received no
briefing or argument from the criminal defense bar, which might
have provided important counsel on this difficult issue.

															   There is no need to invoke willful blindness
for the first time in this case. Facts that support willful
blindness are often probative of actual knowledge. Circumstantial
facts like these tend to be the only available evidence in any
event, for the jury lacks direct access to the defendant’s mind.
The jury must often infer knowledge from conduct, and attempts to
eliminate evidence of knowledge may justify such inference, as
where an accused inducer avoids further confirming what he already
believes with good reason to be true. The majority’s decision to
expand the statute’s scope appears to depend on the unstated
premise that knowledge requires certainty, but the law often
permits probabilistic judgments to count as knowledge. Cf. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop , 111 U. S. 612 , 620 (1884)
(Harlan, J.) (“[B]eing founded on actual observation, and being
consistent with common experience and the ordinary manifestations
of the condition of the mind, it is knowledge, so far as the human
intellect can acquire knowledge, upon such subjects”).

															   The instant dispute provides a case in point.
Pentalpha copied an innovative fryer. The model it copied bore no
U. S. patent markings, but that could not have been a surprise, for
Pentalpha knew that a fryer purchased in Hong Kong was unlikely to
bear such markings. And Pentalpha failed to tell the lawyer who ran
a patent search that it copied the SEB fryer. These facts may
suggest knowledge that Pentalpha’s fryers were infringing, and
perhaps a jury could so find.

															   But examining the sufficiency of the evidence
presented in the 5-day trial requires careful review of an
extensive record. The trial transcript alone spans over 1,000
pages. If willful blindness is as close to knowledge and as far
from the “knew or should have known” jury instruction provided in
this case as the Court suggests, then reviewing the record becomes
all the more difficult. I would leave that task to the Court of
Appeals in the first instance on remand.

															   For these reasons, and with respect, I
dissent.


Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.

OPINION OF THE COURT QUANTA COMPUTER, INC. V. LG ELECTRONICS, INC. 553 U. S. ____ (2008) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES NO. 06-937 QUANTA COMPUTER, INC., et al., PETITIONERS v. LG ELECTRONICS, INC.

															on writ of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the federal circuit

															[June 9, 2008]

															   Justice Thomas delivered the
opinion of the Court.

															   For over 150 years this Court has
applied the doctrine of patent exhaustion to limit the patent
rights that survive the initial authorized sale of a patented item.
In this case, we decide whether patent exhaustion applies to the
sale of components of a patented system that must be combined with
additional components in order to practice the patented methods.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the doctrine
does not apply to method patents at all and, in the alternative,
that it does not apply here because the sales were not authorized
by the license agreement. We disagree on both scores. Because the
exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents, and because the
license authorizes the sale of components that substantially embody
the patents in suit, the sale exhausted the patents.

															I

															   Respondent LG Electronics, Inc.
(LGE), purchased a portfolio of computer technology patents in
1999, including the three patents at issue here: U. S. Patent Nos.
4,939,641 (’641); 5,379,379 (’379); and 5,077,733 (’733)
(collectively LGE Patents). The main functions of a computer system
are carried out on a microprocessor, or central processing unit,
which interprets program instructions, processes data, and controls
other devices in the system. A set of wires, or bus, connects the
microprocessor to a chipset, which transfers data between the
microprocessor and other devices, including the keyboard, mouse,
monitor, hard drive, memory, and disk drives.

															   The data processed by the
computer are stored principally in random access memory, also
called main memory. Webster’s New World Dictionary of Computer
Terms 334, 451 (8th ed. 2000). Frequently accessed data are
generally stored in cache memory, which permits faster access than
main memory and is often located on the microprocessor itself. Id. , at 84. When copies of data are stored in both the
cache and main memory, problems may arise when one copy is changed
but the other still contains the original “stale” version of the
data. J. Handy, Cache Memory Book 124 (2d ed. 1993). The ’641
patent addresses this problem. It discloses a system for ensuring
that the most current data are retrieved from main memory by
monitoring data requests and updating main memory from the cache
when stale data are requested. LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc. , 453 F. 3d 1364, 1377 (CA
Fed. 2006).

															   The ’379 patent relates to the coordination of
requests to read from, and write to, main memory. Id., at
1378. Processing these requests in chronological order can slow
down a system because read requests are faster to execute than
write requests. Processing all read requests first ensures speedy
access, but may result in the retrieval of outdated data if a read
request for a certain piece of data is processed before an
outstanding write request for the same data. The ’379 patent
discloses an efficient method of organizing read and write requests
while maintaining accuracy by allowing the computer to execute only
read requests until it needs data for which there is an outstanding
write request. LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek
Computer , Inc. , No. C 01–02187 CW et al., Order
Construing Disputed Terms and Phrases, p. 42 (ND Cal., Aug. 20,
2002). Upon receiving such a read request, the computer executes
pending write requests first and only then returns to the read
requests so that the most up-to-date data are retrieved. Ibid. The ’733 patent addresses the problem of
managing the data traffic on a bus connecting two computer
components, so that no one device monopolizes the bus. It allows
multiple devices to share the bus, giving heavy users greater
access. This patent describes methods that establish a rotating
priority system under which each device alternately has priority
access to the bus for a preset number of cycles and heavier users
can maintain priority for more cycles without “hogging” the device
indefinitely. Id., at 37–38.

															   LGE licensed a patent portfolio, including the
LGE Patents, to Intel Corporation (Intel). The cross-licensing
agreement (License Agreement) permits Intel to manufacture and sell
microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE Patents (the Intel
Products). The License Agreement authorizes Intel to “ ‘make,
use, sell (directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import or
otherwise dispose of’ ” its own products practicing the LGE
Patents. Brief for Petitioners 8 (quoting App. 154).[ Footnote 1 ] Notwithstanding this broad
language, the License Agreement contains some limitations. Relevant
here, it stipulates that no license

															“ ‘is granted by either party hereto … to any
third party for the combination by a third party of Licensed
Products of either party with items, components, or the like
acquired … from sources other than a party hereto, or for the use,
import, offer for sale or sale of such combination.’ ” Brief
for Petitioners 8 (quoting App. 164).

															The License Agreement purports not to alter the
usual rules of patent exhaustion, however, providing that,
“ ‘[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
this Agreement, the parties agree that nothing herein shall in any
way limit or alter the effect of patent exhaustion that would
otherwise apply when a party hereto sells any of its Licensed
Products.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 8 (quoting App. 164).

															   In a separate agreement (Master Agreement),
Intel agreed to give written notice to its own customers informing
them that, while it had obtained a broad license “ ‘ensur[ing]
that any Intel product that you purchase is licensed by LGE and
thus does not infringe any patent held by LGE,’ ” the license
“ ‘does not extend, expressly or by implication, to any
product that you make by combining an Intel product with any
non-Intel product.’ ” Brief for Respondent 9 (emphasis
deleted) (quoting App. 198). The Master Agreement also provides
that “ ‘a breach of this Agreement shall have no effect on and
shall not be grounds for termination of the Patent License.’ ”
Brief for Petitioners 9 (quoting App. 176).

															   Petitioners, including Quanta Computer
(collectively Quanta), are a group of computer manufacturers.
Quanta purchased microprocessors and chipsets from Intel and
received the notice required by the Master Agreement. Nonetheless,
Quanta manufactured computers using Intel parts in combination with
non-Intel memory and buses in ways that practice the LGE Patents.
Quanta does not modify the Intel components and follows Intel’s
specifications to incorporate the parts into its own systems.

															   LGE filed a complaint against Quanta,
asserting that the combination of the Intel Products with non-Intel
memory and buses infringed the LGE Patents. The District Court
granted summary judgment to Quanta, holding that, for purposes of
the patent exhaustion doctrine, the license LGE granted to Intel
resulted in forfeiture of any potential infringement actions
against legitimate purchasers of the Intel Products. LG
Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc. , 65 USPQ
2d 1589, 1593, 1600 (ND Cal. 2002). The court found that, although
the Intel Products do not fully practice any of the patents at
issue, they have no reasonable noninfringing use and therefore
their authorized sale exhausted patent rights in the completed
computers under United States v. Univis Lens Co. , 316 U. S. 241 (1942). Asustek, supra, at 1598–1600. In a subsequent
order limiting its summary judgment ruling, the court held that
patent exhaustion applies only to apparatus or
composition-of-matter claims that describe a physical object, and
does not apply to process, or method, claims that describe
operations to make or use a product. LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc. , 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918
(ND Cal. 2003). Because each of the LGE Patents includes method
claims, exhaustion did not apply.

															   The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed that the doctrine
of patent exhaustion does not apply to method claims. In the
alternative, it concluded that exhaustion did not apply because LGE
did not license Intel to sell the Intel Products to Quanta for use
in combination with non-Intel products. 453 F. 3d, at
1370.

															   We granted certiorari, 551 U. S. ___
(2007).

															II

															   The longstanding doctrine of
patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item. This Court
first applied the doctrine in 19th-century cases addressing patent
extensions on the Woodworth planing machine. Purchasers of licenses
to sell and use the machine for the duration of the original patent
term sought to continue using the licenses through the extended
term. The Court held that the extension of the patent term did not
affect the rights already secured by purchasers who bought the item
for use “in the ordinary pursuits of life.” Bloomer v. McQuewan , 14 How. 539, 549 (1853); see also ibid. (“[W]hen the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no
longer within the limits of the monopoly”); Bloomer v. Millinger , 1 Wall. 340, 351 (1864) . In Adams v. Burke , 17 Wall. 453 (1873), the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a patent holder’s suit alleging that a
licensee had violated postsale restrictions on where patented
coffin-lids could be used. “[W]here a person ha[s] purchased a
patented machine of the patentee or his assignee,” the Court held,
“this purchase carrie[s] with it the right to the use of that
machine so long as it [is] capable of use.” Id. , at
455.

															   Although the Court permitted
postsale restrictions on the use of a patented article in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co. , 224 U. S. 1 (1912),[ Footnote 2 ] that
decision was short lived. In 1913, the Court refused to apply A. B. Dick to uphold price-fixing provisions in a
patent license. See Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell , 229 U. S. 1 , 14–17
(1913). Shortly thereafter, in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. , 243 U. S. 502 , 518
(1917), the Court explicitly overruled A. B. Dick . In
that case, a patent holder attempted to limit purchasers’ use of
its film projectors to show only film made under a patent held by
the same company. The Court noted the “increasing frequency” with
which patent holders were using A. B. Dick -style
licenses to limit the use of their products and thereby using the
patents to secure market control of related, unpatented items. 243
U. S., at 509, 516–517. Observing that “the primary purpose of our
patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners
of patents but is ‘to promote the progress of science and useful
arts,’ ” id. , at 511 (quoting U. S. Const., Art. I,
§8, cl. 8), the Court held that “the scope of the grant which may
be made to an inventor in a patent, pursuant to the [patent]
statute, must be limited to the invention described in the claims
of his patent.” 243 U. S., at 511. Accordingly, it reiterated the
rule that “the right to vend is exhausted by a single,
unconditional sale, the article sold being thereby carried outside
the monopoly of the patent law and rendered free of every
restriction which the vendor may attempt to put upon it.” Id. , at 516.

															   This Court most recently discussed patent
exhaustion in Univis , 316 U. S. 241 , on which the District
Court relied. Univis Lens Company, the holder of patents on
eyeglass lenses, licensed a purchaser to manufacture lens
blanks[ Footnote 3 ] by fusing
together different lens segments to create bi- and tri-focal lenses
and to sell them to other Univis licensees at agreed-upon rates.
Wholesalers were licensed to grind the blanks into the patented
finished lenses, which they would then sell to Univis-licensed
prescription retailers for resale at a fixed rate. Finishing
retailers, after grinding the blanks into patented lenses, would
sell the finished lenses to consumers at the same fixed rate. The
United States sued Univis under the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
§§1, 3, 15, alleging unlawful restraints on trade. Univis asserted
its patent monopoly rights as a defense to the antitrust suit. The
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Univis’ patent
monopoly survived the sale of the lens blanks by the licensed
manufacturer and therefore shielded Univis’ pricing scheme from the
Sherman Act.

															   The Court assumed that the Univis patents
containing claims for finished lenses were practiced in part by the
wholesalers and finishing retailers who ground the blanks into
lenses, and held that the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the
patents on the finished lenses. Univis, 316 U. S., at
248–249. The Court explained that the lens blanks “embodi[ed]
essential features of the patented device and [were] without
utility until … ground and polished as the finished lens of the
patent.” Id., at 249. The Court noted that:

															“where one has sold an uncompleted article which,
because it embodies essential features of his patented invention,
is within the protection of his patent, and has destined the
article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the
patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be
embodied in that particular article.” Id., at 250–251.

															In sum, the Court concluded that the traditional
bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an item applies
when the item sufficiently embodies the patent—even if it does not
completely practice the patent—such that its only and intended use
is to be finished under the terms of the patent.

															   With this history of the patent exhaustion
doctrine in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

															III

															A

															   LGE argues that the exhaustion
doctrine is inapplicable here because it does not apply to method
claims, which are contained in each of the LGE Patents. LGE reasons
that, because method patents are linked not to a tangible article
but to a process, they can never be exhausted through a sale.
Rather, practicing the patent—which occurs upon each use of an
article embodying a method patent—is permissible only to the extent
rights are transferred in an assignment contract. Quanta, in turn,
argues that there is no reason to preclude exhaustion of method
claims, and points out that both this Court and the Federal Circuit
have applied exhaustion to method claims. It argues that any other
rule would allow patent holders to avoid exhaustion entirely by
inserting method claims in their patent specifications.

															   Quanta has the better of this
argument. Nothing in this Court’s approach to patent exhaustion
supports LGE’s argument that method patents cannot be exhausted. It
is true that a patented method may not be sold in the same way as
an article or device, but methods nonetheless may be “embodied” in
a product, the sale of which exhausts patent rights. Our precedents
do not differentiate transactions involving embodiments of patented
methods or processes from those involving patented apparatuses or
materials. To the contrary, this Court has repeatedly held that
method patents were exhausted by the sale of an item that embodied
the method. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United
States , 309 U.
S. 436 , 446, 457 (1940), for example, the Court held that the
sale of a motor fuel produced under one patent also exhausted the
patent for a method of using the fuel in combustion
motors.[ Footnote 4 ] Similarly,
as previously described, Univis held that the sale of
optical lens blanks that partially practiced a patent exhausted the
method patents that were not completely practiced until the blanks
were ground into lenses. 316 U. S., at 248–251.

															   These cases rest on solid footing. Eliminating
exhaustion for method patents would seriously undermine the
exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid patent exhaustion
could simply draft their patent claims to describe a method rather
than an apparatus.[ Footnote 5 ]
Apparatus and method claims “may approach each other so nearly that
it will be difficult to distinguish the process from the function
of the apparatus.” United States ex rel. Steinmetz v. Allen , 192
U. S. 543 , 559 (1904). By characterizing their claims as method
instead of apparatus claims, or including a method claim for the
machine’s patented method of performing its task, a patent drafter
could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.

															   This case illustrates the danger of allowing
such an end-run around exhaustion. On LGE’s theory, although Intel
is authorized to sell a completed computer system that practices
the LGE Patents, any downstream purchasers of the system could
nonetheless be liable for patent infringement. Such a result would
violate the longstanding principle that, when a patented item is
“once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on [its] use to be implied for the benefit of the patentee.” Adams , 17 Wall., at 457. We therefore reject LGE’s
argument that method claims, as a category, are never
exhaustible.

															B

															   We next consider the extent to
which a product must embody a patent in order to trigger
exhaustion. Quanta argues that, although sales of an incomplete
article do not necessarily exhaust the patent in that article, the
sale of the microprocessors and chipsets exhausted LGE’s patents in
the same way the sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents in Univis . Just as the lens blanks in Univis did not fully practice the patents at issue
because they had not been ground into finished lenses, Quanta
observes, the Intel Products cannot practice the LGE Patents—or
indeed, function at all—until they are combined with memory and
buses in a computer system. If, as in Univis , patent
rights are exhausted by the sale of the incomplete item, then LGE
has no postsale right to require that the patents be practiced
using only Intel parts. Quanta also argues that exhaustion doctrine
will be a dead letter unless it is triggered by the sale of
components that essentially, even if not completely, embody an
invention. Otherwise, patent holders could authorize the sale of
computers that are complete with the exception of one minor
step—say, inserting the microprocessor into a socket—and extend
their rights through each downstream purchaser all the way to the
end user.

															   LGE, for its part, argues that Univis is inapplicable here for three reasons. First, it
maintains that Univis should be limited to products that
contain all the physical aspects needed to practice the patent. On
that theory, the Intel Products cannot embody the patents because
additional physical components are required before the patents can
be practiced. Second, LGE asserts that in Univis there was
no “patentable distinction” between the lens blanks and the
patented finished lenses since they were both subject to the same
patent. Brief for Respondent 14 (citing Univis , supra , at 248–252). In contrast, it describes the Intel
Products as “independent and distinct products” from the systems
using the LGE Patents and subject to “independent patents.” Brief
for Respondent 13. Finally, LGE argues that Univis does
not apply because the Intel Products are analogous to individual
elements of a combination patent, and allowing sale of those
components to exhaust the patent would impermissibly “ascrib[e] to
one element of the patented combination the status of the patented
invention in itself.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. , 365 U. S. 336 , 344–345
(1961).

															   We agree with Quanta that Univis governs this case. As the Court there explained, exhaustion was
triggered by the sale of the lens blanks because their only
reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent and because
they “embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.”
316 U. S., at 249–251. Each of those attributes is shared by the
microprocessors and chipsets Intel sold to Quanta under the License
Agreement.

															   First, Univis held that “the
authorized sale of an article which is capable of use only in
practicing the patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly
with respect to the article sold.” Id ., at 249. The lens
blanks in Univis met this standard because they were
“without utility until [they were] ground and polished as the
finished lens of the patent.” Ibid . Accordingly, “the only
object of the sale [was] to enable the [finishing retailer] to
grind and polish it for use as a lens by the prospective wearer.” Ibid . Here, LGE has suggested no reasonable use for the
Intel Products other than incorporating them into computer systems
that practice the LGE Patents.[ Footnote 6 ] Nor can we can discern one: A microprocessor
or chipset cannot function until it is connected to buses and
memory. And here, as in Univis , the only apparent object
of Intel’s sales to Quanta was to permit Quanta to incorporate the
Intel Products into computers that would practice the patents.

															   Second, the lens blanks in Univis “embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.” Id ., at 250–251. The essential, or inventive, feature of
the Univis lens patents was the fusing together of different lens
segments to create bi- and tri-focal lenses. The finishing process
performed by the finishing and prescription retailers after the
fusing was not unique. As the United States explained:

															“The finishing licensees finish Univis lens blanks
in precisely the same manner as they finish all other bifocal lens
blanks. Indeed, appellees have never contended that their licensing
system is supported by patents covering methods or processes
relating to the finishing of lens blanks. Consequently, it appears
that appellees perform all of the operations which contribute any
claimed element of novelty to Univis lenses.” Brief for United
States in United States v. Univis Lens Co. , O. T.
1941, No. 855 et al., p. 10 (footnote and citations
omitted).

															While the Court assumed that the finishing process
was covered by the patents, Univis, supra , at 248–249, and
the District Court found that it was necessary to make a working
lens, United States v. Univis Lens Co., 41
F. Supp. 258, 262–263 (SDNY 1941), the grinding process was
not central to the patents. That standard process was not included
in detail in any of the patents and was not referred to at all in
two of the patents. Those that did mention the finishing process
treated it as incidental to the invention, noting, for example,
that “[t]he blank is then ground in the usual manner,” U. S. Patent
No. 1,876,497, p. 2, or simply that the blank is “then ground and
polished,” U. S. Patent No. 1,632,208, p. 1, Tr. of Record in United States v. Univis Lens Co ., O. T. 1941, No.
855 et al., pp. 516, 498.

															   Like the Univis lens blanks, the Intel
Products constitute a material part of the patented invention and
all but completely practice the patent. Here, as in Univis , the incomplete article substantially embodies the
patent because the only step necessary to practice the patent is
the application of common processes or the addition of standard
parts. Everything inventive about each patent is embodied in the
Intel Products. They control access to main and cache memory,
practicing the ’641 and ’379 patents by checking cache memory
against main memory and comparing read and write requests. They
also control priority of bus access by various other computer
components under the ’733 patent. Naturally, the Intel Products
cannot carry out these functions unless they are attached to memory
and buses, but those additions are standard components in the
system, providing the material that enables the microprocessors and
chipsets to function. The Intel Products were specifically designed
to function only when memory or buses are attached; Quanta was not
required to make any creative or inventive decision when it added
those parts. Indeed, Quanta had no alternative but to follow
Intel’s specifications in incorporating the Intel Products into its
computers because it did not know their internal structure, which
Intel guards as a trade secret. Brief for Petitioners 3. Intel all
but practiced the patent itself by designing its products to
practice the patents, lacking only the addition of standard
parts.

															   We are unpersuaded by LGE’s attempts to
distinguish Univis . First, there is no reason to
distinguish the two cases on the ground that the articles in Univis
required the removal of material to practice the patent
while the Intel Products require the addition of
components to practice the patent. LGE characterizes the lens
blanks and lenses as sharing a “basic nature” by virtue of their
physical similarity, while the Intel Products embody only some of
the “patentably distinct elements and steps” involved in the LGE
Patents. Brief for Respondent 26–27. But we think that the nature
of the final step, rather than whether it consists of adding or
deleting material, is the relevant characteristic. In each case,
the final step to practice the patent is common and noninventive:
grinding a lens to the customer’s prescription, or connecting a
microprocessor or chipset to buses or memory. The Intel Products
embody the essential features of the LGE Patents because they carry
out all the inventive processes when combined, according to their
design, with standard components.

															   With regard to LGE’s argument that exhaustion
does not apply across patents, we agree on the general principle:
The sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by virtue of
practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device practices
patent A while substantially embodying patent B, its
relationship to patent A does not prevent exhaustion of patent B.
For example, if the Univis lens blanks had been composed of
shatter-resistant glass under patent A, the blanks would
nonetheless have substantially embodied, and therefore exhausted,
patent B for the finished lenses. This case is no different. While
each Intel microprocessor and chipset practices thousands of
individual patents, including some LGE patents not at issue in this
case, the exhaustion analysis is not altered by the fact that more
than one patent is practiced by the same product. The relevant
consideration is whether the Intel Products that partially practice
a patent—by, for example, embodying its essential features—exhaust that patent.

															   Finally, LGE’s reliance on Aro is
misplaced because that case dealt only with the question whether
replacement of one part of a patented combination infringes the
patent. First, the replacement question is not at issue here.
Second, and more importantly, Aro is not squarely
applicable to the exhaustion of patents like the LGE Patents that
do not disclose a new combination of existing parts. Aro described combination patents as “cover[ing] only the totality of
the elements in the claim [so] that no element, separately viewed,
is within the grant.” 365 U. S., at 344; see also Mercoid Corp . v. Mid - Continent Investment Co ., 320 U. S. 661 , 667–668
(1944) (noting that, in a combination patent, “the combination is
the invention and it is distinct from any” of its elements). Aro ’s warning that no element can be viewed as central to
or equivalent to the invention is specific to the context in which
the combination itself is the only inventive aspect of the patent.
In this case, the inventive part of the patent is not the fact that
memory and buses are combined with a microprocessor or chipset;
rather, it is included in the design of the Intel Products
themselves and the way these products access the memory or bus.

															C

															   Having concluded that the Intel
Products embodied the patents, we next consider whether their sale
to Quanta exhausted LGE’s patent rights. Exhaustion is triggered
only by a sale authorized by the patent holder. Univis ,
316 U. S., at 249.

															   LGE argues that there was no
authorized sale here because the License Agreement does not permit
Intel to sell its products for use in combination with non-Intel
products to practice the LGE Patents. It cites General Talking
Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co. , 304 U. S. 175 (1938),
and General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec.
Co. , 305 U. S.
124 (1938), in which the manufacturer sold patented amplifiers
for commercial use, thereby breaching a license that limited the
buyer to selling the amplifiers for private and home use. The Court
held that exhaustion did not apply because the manufacturer had no
authority to sell the amplifiers for commercial use, and the
manufacturer “could not convey to petitioner what both knew it was
not authorized to sell.” General Talking Pictures, supra , at 181. LGE argues that the same principle applies
here: Intel could not convey to Quanta what both knew it was not
authorized to sell, i.e. , the right to practice the
patents with non-Intel parts.

															   LGE overlooks important aspects of the
structure of the Intel-LGE transaction. Nothing in the License
Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and
chipsets to purchasers who intend to combine them with non-Intel
parts. It broadly permits Intel to “ ‘make, use, [or]
sell’ ” products free of LGE’s patent claims. Brief for
Petitioners 8 (quoting App. 154). To be sure, LGE did require Intel
to give notice to its customers, including Quanta, that LGE had not
licensed those customers to practice its patents. But neither party
contends that Intel breached the agreement in that respect. Brief
for Petitioners 9; Brief for Respondent 9. In any event, the
provision requiring notice to Quanta appeared only in the Master
Agreement, and LGE does not suggest that a breach of that agreement
would constitute a breach of the License Agreement. Hence, Intel’s
authority to sell its products embodying the LGE Patents was not
conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by LGE’s
directions in that notice.

															   LGE points out that the License Agreement
specifically disclaimed any license to third parties to practice
the patents by combining licensed products with other components.
Brief for Petitioners 8. But the question whether third parties
received implied licenses is irrelevant because Quanta asserts its
right to practice the patents based not on implied license but on
exhaustion. And exhaustion turns only on Intel’s own license to
sell products practicing the LGE Patents.

															   Alternatively, LGE invokes the principle that
patent exhaustion does not apply to postsale restrictions on
“making” an article. Brief for Respondent 43. But this is simply a
rephrasing of its argument that combining the Intel Products with
other components adds more than standard finishing to complete a
patented article. As explained above, making a product that
substantially embodies a patent is, for exhaustion purposes, no
different from making the patented article itself. In other words,
no further “making” results from the addition of standard
parts—here, the buses and memory—to a product that already
substantially embodies the patent.

															   The License Agreement authorized Intel to sell
products that practiced the LGE Patents. No conditions limited
Intel’s authority to sell products substantially embodying the
patents. Because Intel was authorized to sell its products to
Quanta, the doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents LGE from further
asserting its patent rights with respect to the patents
substantially embodied by those products.[ Footnote 7 ]

															IV

															   The authorized sale of an article
that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s
rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to
control postsale use of the article. Here, LGE licensed Intel to
practice any of its patents and to sell products practicing those
patents. Intel’s microprocessors and chipsets substantially
embodied the LGE Patents because they had no reasonable
noninfringing use and included all the inventive aspects of the
patented methods. Nothing in the License Agreement limited Intel’s
ability to sell its products practicing the LGE Patents. Intel’s
authorized sale to Quanta thus took its products outside the scope
of the patent monopoly, and as a result, LGE can no longer assert
its patent rights against Quanta. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed.

															It is so ordered. Footnote 1 App. 145–198 is sealed; where material
contained therein also appears in the parties’ unsealed briefs,
citations are to the latter. Footnote 2 The A. B. Dick Company sold mimeograph
machines with an attached license stipulating that the machine
could be used only with ink, paper, and other supplies made by the
A. B. Dick Company. The Court rejected the notion that a
patent holder “can only keep the article within the control of the
patent by retaining the title,” A. B. Dick , 224 U.
S., at 18, and held that “any … reasonable stipulation, not
inherently violative of some substantive law” was “valid and
enforceable,” id. , at 31. The only requirement, the Court
held, was that “the purchaser must have notice that he buys with
only a qualified right of use,” so that a sale made without
conditions resulted in “an unconditional title to the machine, with
no limitations upon the use.” Id. , at 26. Footnote 3 Lens blanks are “rough opaque pieces of glass
of suitable size, design and composition for use, when ground and
polished, as multifocal lenses in eyeglasses.” Univis , 316
U. S., at 244. Footnote 4 The patentee held patents for (1) a fluid
additive increasing gasoline efficiency, (2) motor fuel produced by
mixing gasoline with the patented fluid, and (3) a method of using
fuel containing the patented fluid in combustion motors. Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. , 309 U. S., at 446. The patentee sold only the
fluid, but attempted to control sales of the treated fuel. Id. , at 459. The Court held that the sale of the fluid to
refiners relinquished the patentee’s exclusive rights to sell the
treated fuel. Id. , at 457. Footnote 5 One commentator recommends this strategy as a
way to draft patent claims that “will survive numerous transactions
regarding the patented good, allowing the force of the patent to
intrude deeply into the stream of commerce.” Thomas, Of Text,
Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent
Rules, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 219, 252 (1998);
see also id., at 225–226 (advocating the conversion of
apparatus claims into method claims and noting that “[e]ven the
most novice claims drafter would encounter scant difficulty in
converting a patent claim from artifact to technique and back
again”). Footnote 6 LGE suggests that the Intel Products would
not infringe its patents if they were sold overseas, used as
replacement parts, or engineered so that use with non-Intel
Products would disable their patented features. Brief for
Respondent 21–22, n. 10. But Univis teaches that the
question is whether the product is “capable of use only in practicing the patent,” not whether those uses are
infringing. 316 U. S., at 249 (emphasis added). Whether outside the
country or functioning as replacement parts, the Intel Products
would still be practicing the patent, even if not
infringing it. And since the features partially practicing the
patent are what must have an alternative use, suggesting that they
be disabled is no solution. The disabled features would have no
real use. Footnote 7 We note that the authorized nature of the
sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE’s other contract
rights. LGE’s complaint does not include a breach-of-contract
claim, and we express no opinion on whether contract damages might
be available even though exhaustion operates to eliminate patent
damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co. , 157 U. S. 659 ,
666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect himself and his
assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is
not a question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It
is, however, obvious that such a question would arise as a question
of contract, and not as one under the inherent meaning and effect
of the patent laws”).