U.S. Supreme Court Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228
U.S. 585 (1913) Bugajewitz v. Adams No. 239 Submitted April 21,
1913 Decided May 12, 1913 228
U.S. 585 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLORADO Syllabus Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful, and this applies to
prostitutes regardless of the time they have been here.

															The determination of whether an alien falls within the class
that Congress had declared to be undesirable, by facts which might
constitute a crime under local law, is not a conviction of crime,
nor is deportation a punishment. Page 228 U. S. 586 The prohibition of ex post facto laws in Art. I, § 9 of
the federal Constitution has no application to the deportation of
aliens.

															There is a distinction between the words "as provided" and "in
the manner provided;" the former may be controlled by an express
limitation in the statute, while the latter must not be so
controlled, and so held that the limitation in § 3 of the
Act of February 20, 1907, was stricken out by the Act of February
26, 1910, notwithstanding a reference in the latter act to a
section in the former act in which the limitation was referred
to.

															The facts, which involve the power of Congress to deport aliens
and the construction of the Acts of Congress relating to
deportation of alien prostitutes, are stated in the opinion. Page 228 U. S. 590 MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

															This is an appeal from an order discharging a writ of habeas
corpus and remanding the petitioner to custody. The ground of the
appeal is that the Act of March 26, 1910, c. 128, § 2, 36 Stat.
263, 265, relied on as authority for the arrest, impairs the
petitioner's constitutional rights. It appears from the petition
and the return to the writ that the petitioner is an alien; that
she entered the United States not later than January 4, 1905, and
that she was arrested on August 3, 1910, on an order of the Acting
Secretary of Commerce and Labor, directing the Immigrant Inspector
to take her into custody, and to grant her a hearing to show cause
why she should not be deported. The order recited that she was then
a prostitute and inmate of a house of prostitution, and that she
was a prostitute at the time of entry, and entered the United
States for the purpose of prostitution or for an immoral purpose.
The answer to the return demurs to its sufficiency, and denies that
she was a prostitute at the time of entry, or that she entered the
United States for any of the purposes alleged; but we must take it
at least that she is a prostitute now.

															By the Act of February 20, 1907, c. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898,
899, any alien woman found practicing prostitution within three
years after she should have entered the United States was to be
deported "as provided by sections twenty and twenty-one of this
act." This section was amended by the Act of March 26, 1910, c.
128, § 2, 36 Stat. 265, Page 228 U. S. 591 and the limitation of three years was stricken out, but the
amendment still refers to §§ 20, 21, and orders deportation "in the
manner provided by" §§ 20, 21. The beginning of these two sections
provides for the taking into custody of aliens subject to removal,
within three years from entry, and so it has been argued in other
cases that the three-year limitation still holds good. The
construction of the amendment was not relied on here, but, before
we can deal with the constitutional question, it becomes necessary
to dispose of that point. We are of opinion that the effect of
striking out the three-year clause from § 3 is not changed by the
reference to §§ 20 and 21. The change in the phraseology of the
reference indicates to narrowed purpose. The prostitute is to be
deported, not "as provided," but "in the manner provided," in §§
20, 21. Those sections provide the means for securing deportation,
and it still was proper to point to them for that. United
States v. Weis, 181 F. 860; Chomel v. United States, 192 F. 117

															The attempt to reopen the constitutional question must fail. It
is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems
hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a crime
under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the
deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government
to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of the
local penal law with the policy of Congress is an accident. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 , 149 U. S. 707 , 149 U. S.
728 -730; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 , 163 U. S. 231 ; Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 , 226 U. S. 275 ; Tiaco v. Forbes, ante, p. 229 U. S. 549 .
The prohibition of ex post facto laws in Article 1, § 9,
has no application, Johnannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 , 225 U. S. 242 ,
and, with regard to the petitioner, it is not necessary to construe
the statute as having any retrospective effect. Judgment affirmed.


U.S. Supreme Court Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S.
86 (1903) Japanese Immigrant
Case No. 171 Argued February 24,
1903 Decided April 6, 1903 189 U.S.
86 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON Syllabus 1. As the existing treaty with Japan expressly excepts from its
operation any regulation relating to police and public security,
and as the various acts of Congress forbidding aliens of whatever
country to enter the United States who are paupers or persons
likely to become a public charge are regulations for police and
public security, aliens from Japan of the prohibited class have no
right to enter or reside in the United States. Quaere whether, even in the absence of such a provision
in the treaty, the "full liberty to enter, reside," etc., clause
refers to that class in either country who from habits or
conditions are the object of police regulations designed to protect
the general public against contact with dangerous or improper
persons.

															2. It has been firmly established by numerous decisions of this
Court that it is within the constitutional power of Congress to
exclude aliens of a particular race from the United States,
prescribe the terms and conditions upon which certain classes may
come to this country, establish regulations for sending out of the
country such aliens as come here in violation of law, and commit
the enforcement of such provisions, conditions and regulations to
executive officers, without judicial intervention.

															3. An administrative officer, when executing the provisions of a
statute involving the liberty of persons, may not disregard the
fundamental principles of due process of law as understood at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution. Nor is it competent for
any executive officer at any time within the year limited by the
statute, to arbitrarily cause an alien who has entered the country,
and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a
part of its population, although illegally here, to be arrested and
deported without giving such alien an opportunity, appropriate to
the case, to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be
and remain in the United States.

															Where, however, the alien had notice, although not a formal one,
the courts cannot interfere with the executive officers conducting
it. The objections of the alien to the form of the investigation
could have been presented to the officer having primary control of
the case, or by an appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
action of the executive officers is not subject to judicial
review. Page 189 U. S. 87 This case presents some questions arising under the act of
Congress relating to the exclusion of certain classes of alien
immigrants.

															On the 11th day of July, 1901, appellant, a subject of Japan,
landed at the port of Seattle, Washington, and on or about July 15,
1901, the appellee, an immigrant inspector of the United States,
having instituted an investigation into the circumstances of her
entering the United States, decided that she came here in violation
of law, in that she was a pauper and a person likely to become a
public charge, aliens of that class being excluded altogether from
this country by the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1085, c.
551.

															The evidence obtained by the inspector was transmitted to the
Secretary of the Treasury, who, under date of July 23, 1901, issued
a warrant addressed to the immigrant inspector at Seattle, reciting
that the appellant had come into the United States contrary to the
provisions of the above act of 1891, and ordering that she be taken
into custody and returned to Japan at the expense of the vessel
importing her.

															The inspector being about to execute this warrant, an
application was presented in behalf of the appellant to the
District Court of the United States for the District of Washington,
Northern Division, for a writ of habeas corpus. The application
alleged that the imprisonment of the petitioner was unlawful, and
that she did not come here in violation of the act of 1891 or of
any other law of the United States relating to the exclusion of
aliens.

															The writ having been issued, a return was made by the inspector
stating that he had found upon due investigation and the admissions
of the appellant that she was a pauper and a person likely to
become a public charge, and had "surreptitiously, clandestinely,
unlawfully, and without any authority come into the United States;"
that, "in pursuance of said testimony, admissions of the
petitioner, Kaoru Yamataya, evidence, facts, and circumstances," he
had decided that she had no right to be within the Territory of the
United States, and was a proper person for deportation, all which
he reported to the proper officers of the government, who confirmed
his decision, Page 189 U. S. 88 and thereupon the Secretary of the Treasury issued his warrant
requiring the deportation of the appellant. That warrant was
produced and made part of the return.

															The return of the inspector was traversed, the traverse
admitting that the inspector had investigated the case of the
petitioner, and had made a finding that she had illegally come into
this country, but alleging that the investigation was a "pretended"
and an inadequate one; that she did not understand the English
language, and did not know at the time that such investigation was
with a view to her deportation from the country, and that the
investigation was carried on without her having the assistance of
counsel or friends, or an opportunity to show that she was not a
pauper or likely to become a public charge. The traverse alleged
that the petitioner was not in the United States in violation of
law.

															A demurrer to the traverse was sustained, the writ of habeas
corpus was dismissed, and the appellant was remanded to the custody
of the inspector. From that order, the present appeal was
prosecuted. Page 189 U. S. 94 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															It will conduce to a clear understanding of the questions to be
determined if we recall certain legislation of Congress relating to
the exclusion of aliens from the United States, and to the Treaty
of 1894 between Japan and the United States.

															By the deficiency appropriation Act of October 19, 1888, c.
1210, it was provided that the Act of February 23, 1887, c. 220,
amendatory of the act prohibiting the importation and immigration
of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform
labor in the United States, its territories, and the District of
Columbia, 24 Stat. 414, be so amended

															"as to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury, in case he shall
be satisfied that an immigrant has been allowed to land contrary to
the prohibition of that law, to cause such immigrant, within the
period of one year after landing or entry, to be taken into custody
and returned to the country from whence he came at the expense of
the owner of the importing vessel, or, if he entered from an
adjoining country at the expense of the person previously
contracting for the services."

															25 Stat. 566.

															By the first section of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1891, c.
551, amendatory of the various acts relating to immigration and
importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor,
it was provided:

															"That the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from
admission into the United States, in accordance with the existing
acts regulating immigration, other than those concerning Chinese
laborers: all idiots, insane persons, paupers, or persons likely to
become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a
dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a
felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or passage
is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others
to come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown,
on Page 189 U. S. 95 special inquiry, that such person does not belong to one of the
foregoing excluded classes, or to the class of contract laborers
excluded by the Act of February twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and
eighty-five (23 Stat. 332). . . ."

															26 Stat. 1084.

															By the eighth section of that act, it was provided:

															"That upon the arrival by water at any place within the United
States of any alien immigrants, it shall be the duty of the
commanding officer and the agents of the steam or sailing vessel by
which they came to report the name, nationality, last residence,
and destination of every such alien, before any of them are landed,
to the proper inspection officers, who shall thereupon go or send
competent assistants on board such vessel and there inspect all
such aliens, or the inspection officers may order a temporary
removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time and
place, and then and there detain them until a thorough inspection
is made. . . . The inspection officers and their assistants shall
have power to administer oaths, and to take and consider testimony
touching the right of any such aliens to enter the United States,
all of which shall be entered of record. During such inspection,
after temporary removal, the superintendent shall cause such aliens
to be properly housed, fed, and cared for, and also, in his
discretion, such as are delayed in proceeding to their destination
after inspection. All decisions made by the inspection officers or
their assistants touching the right of any alien to land, when
adverse to such right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the
superintendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject to
review by the Secretary of the Treasury. It shall be the duty of
the aforesaid officers and agents of such vessel to adopt due
precautions to prevent the landing of any alien immigrant at any
place or time other than that designated by the inspection
officers, and any such officer or agent or person in charge of such
vessel who shall, either knowingly or negligently, land or permit
to land any alien immigrant at any place or time other than that
designated by the inspection officers, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or
by both such fine and imprisonment."

															26 Stat. 1085. Page 189 U. S. 96 By the tenth section, it is provided that "all aliens who may
unlawfully come to the United States shall, if practicable, be
immediately sent back on the vessel by which they were brought
in."

															The eleventh section of the same act provided:

															"That any alien who shall come into the United States in
violation of law may be returned as by law provided at any time
within one year thereafter at the expense of the person or persons,
vessel, transportation company, or corporation bringing such alien
into the United States, and, if that cannot be done, then at the
expense of the United States, and any alien who becomes a public
charge within one year after his arrival in the United States, from
as causes existing prior to his landing therein, shall be deemed to
have come in violation of law, and shall be returned as
aforesaid."

															26 Stat. 1084.

															In the Sundry Civil Appropriation Act of August 18, 1894, c.
301, was the following provision:

															"In every case where an alien is excluded from admission into
the United States under any law or treaty now existing or hereafter
made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs
officers, if adverse to the admission of such alien, shall be
final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the
Treasury."

															28 Stat. 372, 390.

															Then came the treaty between the United States and the Empire of
Japan, concluded November 23, 1894, and proclaimed March 21, 1895,
and which, by its terms, was to go into operation July 17, 1899. By
the first article of that treaty it was provided:

															"The citizens or subjects of each of the two high contracting
parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any
part of the territories of the other contracting party, and shall
enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and
property."

															29 Stat. 848. But, by the second article, it was declared.

															"It is, however, understood that the stipulations contained in
this and the preceding article do not in any way affect the laws,
ordinances, and regulations with regard to trade, the immigration
of laborers, police and public security, which are in force or
which may hereafter be enacted in either of the two countries."

															29 Stat. 849.

															1. From the above acts of Congress, it appears that, among Page 189 U. S. 97 the aliens forbidden to enter the United States are those, of
whatever country, who are "paupers or persons likely to become a
public charge." We are of opinion that aliens of that class have
not been given by the treaty with Japan full liberty to enter or
reside in the United States; for that instrument expressly excepts
from its operation any ordinance or regulation relating to "police
and public security." A statute excluding paupers or persons likely
to become a public charge is manifestly one of police and public
security. Aside from that specific exception, we should not be
inclined to hold that the provision in the treaty with Japan, that
the citizens or subjects of each of the two counties should have
"full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the
territories of the other contracting party," has any reference to
that class, in either country, who, from their habits or condition,
are ordinarily or properly the object of police regulations
designed to protect the general public against contact with
dangerous or improper persons.

															2. The constitutionality of the legislation in question, in its
general aspects, is no longer open to discussion in this Court.
That Congress may exclude aliens of a particular race from the
United States, prescribe the terms and conditions upon which
certain classes of aliens may come to this country, establish
regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as come here
in violation of law, and commit the enforcement of such provisions,
conditions, and regulations exclusively to executive officers,
without judicial intervention -- are principles firmly established
by the decisions of this Court. Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651 ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 ; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 ; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.
S. 228 ; Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296 , 185 U. S.
305 .

															In Nishimura's case, the Court said:

															"The supervision of the admission of aliens into the United
States may be entrusted by Congress either to the Department of
State, having the general management of foreign relations, or to
the Department of the Treasury, charged with the enforcement of the
laws regulating foreign commerce, and Congress has often passed Page 189 U. S. 98 acts forbidding the immigration of particular classes of
foreigners, and has committed the execution of these acts to the
Secretary of the Treasury, to collectors of customs, and to
inspectors acting under their authority."

															After observing that Congress, if it saw fit, could authorize
the courts to investigate and ascertain the facts on which depended
the right of the alien to land, this Court proceeded:

															"But, on the other hand, the final determination of those facts
may be entrusted by Congress to executive officers, and in such a
case, as in all others in which a statute gives a discretionary
power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of
certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly
authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to reexamine or
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. Martin v.
Mott , 12 Wheat. 19, 25 U. S.
31 ; Philadelphia & Trenton Railroad v.
Stimpson , 14 Pet. 448, 39 U. S.
458 ; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S.
457 ; In re Oteiza, 136 U. S.
330 . It is not within the province of the judiciary to
order that foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired
any domicil or residence within the United States, nor even been
admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to
enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of
the legislative and executive branches of the national government.
As to such persons, the decisions of executive or administrative
officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are
due process of law. Murray v. Hoboken Co. , 18
How. 272; Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U. S.
97 ."

															In Lem Moon Sing's case, it was said:

															"The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the
United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which
they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in
that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers,
without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous
adjudications."

															And in Fok Yung Yo's case, the latest one in this
Court, it was said:

															"Congressional action has placed the final determination of the
right of admission in executive officers, without judicial Page 189 U. S. 99 intervention, and this has been for many years the recognized
and declared policy of the country."

															What was the extent of the authority of the executive officers
of the government over the petitioner after she landed? As has been
seen, the Secretary of the Treasury, under the above Act of October
19, 1888, c. 1210, was authorized, within one year after an alien
of the excluded class entered the country, to cause him to be taken
into custody and returned to the country whence he came.
Substantially the same power was conferred by the Act of March 3,
1891, c. 551, by the eleventh section of which it is provided that
the alien immigrant may be sent out of the country, "as provided by
law," at any time within the year after his illegally coming into
the United States. Taking all its enactments together, it is clear
that Congress did not intend that the mere admission of an alien,
or his mere entering the country, should place him at all times
thereafter entirely beyond the control or authority of the
executive officers of the government. On the contrary, if the
Secretary of the Treasury became satisfied that the immigrant had
been allowed to land contrary to the prohibition of that law, then
he could at any time within a year after the landing cause the
immigrant to be taken into custody and deported. The immigrant must
be taken to have entered subject to the condition that he might be
sent out of the country by order of the proper executive officer
if, within a year, he was found to have been wrongfully admitted
into, or had illegally entered, the United States. These were
substantially the views expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Yamasaka, 100 F.
404.

															It is contended, however, that in respect of an alien who has
already landed, it is consistent with the acts of Congress that he
may be deported without previous notice of any purpose to deport
him, and without any opportunity on his part to show by competent
evidence before the executive officers charged with the execution
of the acts of Congress, that he is not here in violation of law;
that the deportation of an alien without provision for such a
notice and for an opportunity to be heard Page 189 U. S. 100 was inconsistent with the due process of law required by the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

															Leaving on one side the question whether an alien can rightfully
invoke the due process clause of the Constitution who has entered
the country clandestinely, and who has been here for too brief a
period to have become, in any real sense, a part of our population,
before his right to remain is disputed, we have to say that the
rigid construction of the acts of Congress suggested by the
appellant are not justified. Those acts do not necessarily exclude
opportunity to the immigrant to be heard, when such opportunity is
of right. It was held in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co. , 18 How. 272, 59 U. S.
280 -281, 59 U. S. 283 ,
that,

															"though 'due process of law' generally implies and includes actor, reus, judgex, regular allegations, opportunity to
answer and a trial according to some settled course of judicial
proceedings, . . . yet this is not universally true,"

															and

															"that though generally, through judicial action, there are more
summary through judicial action, there are more summary
extrajudicial remedies for both."

															Hence, it was decided in that case to be consistent with due
process of law for Congress to provide summary means to compel
revenue officers -- and, in case of default, their sureties -- to
pay such balances of the public money as might be in their hands.
Now, it has been settled that the power to exclude or expel aliens
belonged to the political department of the government, and that
the order of an executive officer invested with the power to
determine finally the facts upon which an alien's right to enter
this country, or remain in it, depended, was

															"due process of law, and no other tribunal, unless expressly
authorized to do so, was at liberty to reexamine the evidence on
which he acted, or to controvert its sufficiency." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 , 149 U. S. 713 ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.
S. 651 , 142 U. S. 659 ; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.
S. 538 , 158 U. S. 547 .
But this Court has never held, nor must we now be understood as
holding, that administrative officers, when executing the
provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may
disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in "due process of
law" as understood at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. Page 189 U. S. 101 One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of
his liberty without opportunity at some time to be heard before
such officers in respect of the matters upon which that liberty
depends -- not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set
occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one
that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by
Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the
case upon which such officers are required to act. Therefore it is
not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive
officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute,
arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has
become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of
its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken
into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be
heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in
the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the
principles involved in due process of law are recognized.

															This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congress here
in question, and they need not be otherwise interpreted. In the
case of all acts of Congress, such interpretation ought to be
adopted as, without doing violence to the import of the words used,
will bring them into harmony with the Constitution. An act of
Congress must be taken to be constitutional unless the contrary
plainly and palpably appears. The words here used do not require an
interpretation that would invest executive or administrative
officers with the absolute, arbitrary power implied in the
contention of the appellant. Besides, the record now before us
shows that the appellant had notice, although not a formal one, of
the investigation instituted for the purpose of ascertaining
whether she was illegally in this country. The traverse to the
return made by the immigration inspector shows upon its face that
she was before that officer pending the investigation of her right
to be in the United States, and made answers to questions
propounded to her. It is true that she pleads a want of knowledge
of our language, that she did not understand the nature and import
of the questions propounded to her, that the investigation made was
a Page 189 U. S. 102 "pretended" one, and that she did not, at the time, know that
the investigation had reference to her being deported from the
country. These considerations cannot justify the intervention of
the courts. They could have been presented to the officer having
primary control of such a case, as well as upon an appeal to the
Secretary of the Treasury, who had power to order another
investigation if that course was demanded by law or by the ends of
justice. It is not to be assumed that either would have refused a
second or fuller investigation if a proper application and showing
for one had been made by or for the appellant. Whether further
investigation should have been ordered was for the officers charged
with the execution of the statutes to determine. Their action in
that regard is not subject to judicial review. Suffice it to say it
does not appear that appellant was denied an opportunity to be
heard. And as no appeal was taken to the Secretary from the
decision of the immigration inspector, that decision was final and
conclusive. If the appellant's want of knowledge of the English
language put her at some disadvantage in the investigation
conducted by that officer, that was her misfortune, and constitutes
no reason, under the acts of Congress or under any rule of law, for
the intervention of the court by habeas corpus. We perceive no
ground for such intervention -- none for the contention that due
process of law was denied to appellant.

															The judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.


U.S. Supreme Court Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537 (1950) United States ex Rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy No. 54 Argued December 5-6,
1949 Decided January
16,1950 338
U.S. 537 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND
CIRCUIT Syllabus The alien wife of a citizen who had served honorably in the
armed forces of the United States during World War II sought
admission to the United States. On the basis of confidential
information, the disclosure of which, in his judgment, would
endanger the public security, the Attorney General denied a
hearing, found that her admission would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States, and ordered her excluded. Held: this action was authorized by the Act of June 21,
1941, 22 U.S.C. § 223, and the proclamations and regulations issued
thereunder, notwithstanding the War Brides Act of December 28,
1945, 8 U.S.C. § 252 et seq. Pp. 539-547.

															(a) The admission of aliens to this country is not a right, but
a privilege, which is granted only upon such terms as the United
States prescribes. P. 338 U. S.
542 .

															(b) The Act of June 21, 1941, did not unconstitutionally
delegate legislative power to prescribe the conditions under which
aliens should be excluded. Pp. 338 U. S.
542 -543.

															(c) It is not within the province of any court, unless expressly
authorized by law, to review the determination of the political
branch of Government to exclude a given alien. Page 338 U. S. 538 (d) Any procedure authorized by Congress for the exclusion of
aliens is due process, so far as an alien denied entry is
concerned. P. 338 U. S.
544 .

															(e) The regulations governing the entry of aliens into the
United States during the national emergency proclaimed May 27,
1941, which were prescribed by the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 2523, were
"reasonable" within the meaning of the Act of June 21, 1941. P. 338 U. S.
544 .

															(f) Presidential Proclamation 2523 authorized the Attorney
General, as well as the Secretary of State, to order the exclusion
of aliens. P. 338 U. S.
544 .

															(g) Petitioner, an alien, had no vested right of entry which
could be the subject of a prohibition against retroactive
operations of regulations affecting her status. P. 338 U. S.
544 .

															(h) The national emergency proclaimed May 27, 1941, has not been
terminated; a state of war still exists; and the Act of June 21,
1941, and the proclamations and regulations thereunder, are still
in force. Pp. 338 U. S.
545 -546.

															(i) A different result is not required by the War Brides Act,
which waives some of the usual requirements for the admission of
certain alien spouses only if they are "otherwise admissible under
the immigration laws." Pp. 338 U. S. 546 -547.

															173 F.2d 599 affirmed.

															The District Court dismissed a writ of habeas corpus obtained to
test the right of the Attorney General to exclude from the United
States, without a hearing, the alien wife of a citizen who had
served honorably in the armed forces during World War II. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. 173 F.2d 599. This Court granted certiorari.
336 U.S. 966. Affirmed, p. 338 U. S.
547 . Page 338 U. S. 539 MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.

															May the United States exclude without hearing, solely upon a
finding by the Attorney General that her admission would be
prejudicial to the interests of the United States, the alien wife
of a citizen who had served honorably in the armed forces of the
United States during World War II? The District Court, for the
Southern District of New York held that it could, and the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 173 F.2d 599. We granted
certiorari to examine the question especially in the light of the
War Brides Act of December 28, 1945, 336 U.S. 966.

															Petitioner was born in Germany in 1915. She left Germany and
went to Czechoslovakia during the Hitler regime. There, she was
married and divorced. She went to England in 1939 as a refugee.
Thereafter, she served with the Royal Air Force efficiently and
honorably from January 1, 1943, until May 30, 1946. She then
secured civilian employment with the War Department of the United
States in Germany. Her work was rated "very good" and "excellent."
On February 28, 1948, with the permission of the Commanding General
at Frankfurt, Germany, she married Kurt W. Knauff, a naturalized
citizen of the United States. He is an honorably discharged United
States Army veteran of World War II. He is, as he was at the time
of his marriage, a civilian employee of the United States Army at
Frankfurt, Germany.

															On August 14, 1948, petitioner sought to enter the United States
to be naturalized. On that day, she was temporarily excluded from
the United States and detained at Ellis Island. On October 6, 1948,
the Assistant Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
recommended that she be permanently excluded without a hearing on
the ground that her admission would be Page 338 U. S. 540 prejudicial to the interests of the United States. On the same
day, the Attorney General adopted this recommendation and entered a
final order of exclusion. To test the right of the Attorney General
to exclude her without a hearing for security reasons, habeas
corpus proceedings were instituted in the Southern District of New
York, based primarily on provisions of the War Brides Act. The
District Court dismissed the writ, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.

															The authority of the Attorney General to order the exclusion of
aliens without a hearing flows from the Act of June 21, 1941,
amending § 1 of the Act of May 22, 1918, 55 Stat. 252, 22 U.S.C. §
223. [ Footnote 1 ] By the 1941
amendment, it was provided that the President might, upon finding
that the interests of the United States required it, impose
additional restrictions and prohibitions on the entry into and
departure of persons from the United States during the national
emergency proclaimed May 27, 1941. Pursuant to this Act of
Congress, the President, on November 14, 1941, issued Proclamation
2523, 55 Stat. 1696, 3 CFR, 1943 Cum.Supp., 270-272. This
proclamation recited that the interests of the United States
required the imposition of additional restrictions upon the entry
into and Page 338 U. S. 541 departure of persons from the country, and authorized the
promulgation of regulations jointly by the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General. It was also provided that no alien should be
permitted to enter the United States if it were found that such
entry would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States.
[ Footnote 2 ]

															Pursuant to the authority of this proclamation, the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General issued regulations governing the
entry into and departure of persons from the United States during
the national emergency. Subparagraphs (a) to (k) of § 175.53 of
these regulations specified the classes of aliens whose entry into
the United States was deemed prejudicial to the public interest.
Subparagraph (b) of § 175.57 provided that the Attorney General
might deny an alien a hearing before a board of inquiry in special
cases where he determined that the alien was excludable under the
regulations on the basis of information of a confidential nature,
the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public
interest. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 338 U. S. 542 It was under this regulation § 175.57(b) that petitioner was
excluded by the Attorney General and denied a hearing. We are asked
to pass upon the validity of this action.

															At the outset, we wish to point out that an alien who seeks
admission to this country may not do so under any claim of right.
Admission of aliens to the United States is a privilege granted by
the sovereign United States Government. Such privilege is granted
to an alien only upon such terms as the United States shall
prescribe. It must be exercised in accordance with the procedure
which the United States provides. Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States, 142 U. S. 651 , 142 U. S. 659 ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 , 149 U. S.
711 .

															Petitioner contends that the 1941 Act and the regulations
thereunder are void to the extent that they contain
unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. But there is no
question of inappropriate delegation of legislative power involved
here. The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty.
The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power, but is
inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of
the nation. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.
S. 698 , 149 U. S. 713 .
When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility
of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is
implementing an inherent executive power. Page 338 U. S. 543 Thus, the decision to admit or to exclude an alien may be
lawfully placed with the President, who may, in turn, delegate the
carrying out of this function to a responsible executive officer of
the sovereign, such as the Attorney General. The action of the
executive officer under such authority is final and conclusive.
Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have
gained entry into the United States, it is not within the province
of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the
determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude
a given alien. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651 , 142 U. S.
659 -660; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 , 149 U. S.
713 -714; Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.
S. 160 . Cf. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S.
86 , 189 U. S. 101 .
Normally, Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of
entry into the United States. But, because the power of exclusion
of aliens is also inherent in the executive department of the
sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to
exercise the power, e.g., as was done here, for the best
interests of the country during a time of national emergency.
Executive officers may be entrusted with the duty of specifying the
procedures for carrying out the congressional intent. What was said
in Lichter v. United States, 334 U.
S. 742 , 334 U. S. 785 ,
is equally appropriate here:

															"It is not necessary that Congress supply administrative
officials with a specific formula for their guidance in a field
where flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to
infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the
program. . . . Standards prescribed by Congress are to be read in
the light of the conditions to which they are to be applied. 'They
derive much meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its
factual background and the statutory context in which they appear.'
" Page 338 U. S. 544 Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned. Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, supra; Ludecke v. Watkins, supra. In the particular circumstances of the instant case, the
Attorney General, exercising the discretion entrusted to him by
Congress and the President, concluded upon the basis of
confidential information that the public interest required that
petitioner be denied the privilege of entry into the United States.
He denied her a hearing on the matter because, is his judgment, the
disclosure of the information on which he based that opinion would
itself endanger the public security.

															We find no substantial merit to petitioner's contention that the
regulations were not "reasonable," as they were required to be by
the 1941 Act. We think them reasonable in the circumstances of the
period for which they were authorized, namely, the national
emergency of World War II. Nor can we agree with petitioner's
assertion that Proclamation 2523, see note 2 supra, authorized only the
Secretary of State, and not the Attorney General, to order the
exclusion of aliens. See Presidential Proclamation 2850 of
August 17, 1949, 14 Fed.Reg. 5173, amending and clarifying
Proclamation 2523. We reiterate that we are dealing here with a
matter of privilege. Petitioner had no vested right of entry which
could be the subject of a prohibition against retroactive operation
of regulations affecting her status.

															It is not disputed that the Attorney General's action was
pursuant to the 8 CFR regulations heretofore discussed. [ Footnote 4 ] However, 22 U.S.C. §§ 223
[ Footnote 5 ] authorizes these
special restrictions on the entry of aliens only when the United
States is at war or during the existence of the Page 338 U. S. 545 national emergency proclaimed May 27, 1941, No. 2487. [ Footnote 6 ] For ordinary times,
Congress has provided aliens with a hearing. 8 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153.
And the contention of petitioner is that she is entitled to the
statutory hearing because, for purposes of the War Brides Act,
within which she comes, the war terminated when the President
proclaimed the cessation of hostilities. [ Footnote 7 ] She contends that the War Brides Act,
applicable portions of which are set out in the margin, [ Footnote 8 ] discloses a congressional
intent that special restrictions on the entry of aliens should
cease to apply to war brides upon the cessation of hostilities.

															The War Brides Act provides that World War II is the period from
December 7, 1941, until the proclaimed termination of hostilities.
This has nothing to do with the period for which the regulations
here acted under were Page 338 U. S. 546 authorized. The beginning and end of the war are defined by the
War Brides Act, we assume, for the purpose of ascertaining the
period within which citizens must have served in the armed forces
in order for their spouses and children to be entitled to the
benefits of the Act. The special procedure followed in this case
was authorized not only during the period of actual hostilities,
but during the entire war and the national emergency proclaimed May
27, 1941. The national emergency has never been terminated. Indeed,
a state of war still exists. See Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U. S. 138 , n.
3. Thus, the authority upon which the Attorney General acted
remains in force. The Act of June 21, 1941, and the President's
proclamations and the regulations thereunder, are still a part of
the immigration laws.

															The War Brides Act does not relieve petitioner of her alien
status. Indeed, she sought admission in order to be naturalized,
and thus to overcome her alien status. The Act relieved her of
certain physical, mental, and documentary requirements, and of the
quota provisions of the immigration laws. But she must, as the Act
requires, still be "otherwise admissible under the immigration
laws." In other words, aside from the enumerated relaxations of the
immigration laws she must be treated as any other alien seeking
admission. Under the immigration laws and regulations applicable to
all aliens seeking entry into the United States during the national
emergency, she was excluded by the Attorney General without a
hearing. In such a case, we have no authority to retry the
determination of the Attorney General. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 , 335 U. S.
171 -172.

															There is nothing in the War Brides Act or its legislative
history [ Footnote 9 ] to
indicate that it was the purpose of Congress, Page 338 U. S. 547 by partially suspending compliance with certain requirements and
the quota provisions of the immigration laws, to relax the security
provisions of the immigration laws. There is no indication that
Congress intended to permit members or former members of the armed
forces to marry and bring into the United States aliens who the
President, acting through the Attorney General in the performance
of his sworn duty, found should be denied entry for security
reasons. As all other aliens, petitioner had to stand the test of
security. This she failed to meet. We find no legal defect in the
manner of petitioner's exclusion, and the judgment is Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															"When the United States is at war or during the existence of the
national emergency proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941, or
as to aliens whenever there exists a state of war between, or
among, two or more states, and the President shall find that the
interests of the United States require that restrictions and
prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this
Act be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry
into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof,
it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or Congress, be
unlawful --"

															"(a) For any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart
from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules,
regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and
exceptions as the President shall prescribe. . . ."

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															"(3) After the effective date of the rules and regulations
hereinafter authorized, no alien shall enter or attempt to enter
the United States unless he is in possession of a valid unexpired
permit to enter issued by the Secretary of State, or by an
appropriate officer designated by the Secretary of State, or is
exempted from obtaining a permit to enter in accordance with the
rules and regulations which the Secretary of State, with the
concurrence of the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to
prescribe in execution of these rules, regulations, and
orders."

															"No alien shall be permitted to enter the United States if it
appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such
entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States as
provided in the rules and regulations hereinbefore authorized to be
prescribed by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the
Attorney General."

															3 CFR, 1943 Cum.Supp., 271.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															"In the case of an alien temporarily excluded by an official of
the Department of Justice on the ground that he is, or may be
excludable under one or more of the categories set forth in §
175.53, no hearing by a board of special inquiry shall be held
until after the case is reported to the Attorney General and such a
hearing is directed by the Attorney General or his representative.
In any special case, the alien may be denied a hearing before a
board of special inquiry and an appeal from the decision of that
board if the Attorney General determines that he is excludable
under one of the categories set forth in § 175.53 on the basis of
information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would
be prejudicial to the public interest."

															8 CFR, 1945 Supp., § 175.57(b).

															[ Footnote 4 ] See note 3 supra. [ Footnote 5 ] See note 1 supra. [ Footnote 6 ]

															And at certain other times not material here.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Proclamation 2714 of December 31, 1946, 1946 Supp., 77.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															"That, notwithstanding any of the several clauses of section 3
of the Act of February 5, 1917, excluding physically and mentally
defective aliens, and notwithstanding the documentary requirements
of any of the immigration laws or regulations, Executive orders, or
Presidential proclamations issued thereunder, alien spouses or
alien children of United States citizens serving in, or having an
honorable discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United
States during the Second World War shall, if otherwise admissible
under the immigration laws and if application for admission is made
within three years of the effective date of this Act, be admitted
to the United States. . . ."

															"SEC. 2. Regardless of section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1924,
any alien admitted under section 1 of this Act shall be deemed to
be a nonquota immigrant as defined in section 4(a) of the
Immigration Act of 1924."

															" * * * *" "SEC. 5. For the purpose of this Act, the Second World War shall
be deemed to have commenced on December 7, 1941, and to have ceased
upon the termination of hostilities as declared by the President or
by a joint resolution of Congress."

															59 Stat. 659, 8 U.S.C. §§ 232-236.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															See H.R.Rep. No. 1320, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S.Rep. No.
860, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); 91 Cong.Rec. 11738, 12342
(1945).

															MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, dissenting.

															If the essence of statutory construction is to find the thought
beneath the words, the views expressed by MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, in
which I fully concur, enforce the purpose of Congress. The contrary
conclusion substantially frustrates it.

															Seventy years ago began the policy of excluding mentally
defective aliens from admission into the United States. Thirty
years ago, it became our settled policy to admit even the most
desirable aliens only in accordance with the quota system. By the
so-called War Brides Act, Congress made inroads upon both these
deeply rooted policies. Act of December 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 659, 8
U.S.C. § 232 et seq. It lifted the bar against the
exclusion even of "physically and mentally defective aliens." It
did this in favor of

															"alien spouses and alien minor children of citizen members who
are serving or have served honorably in the armed forces of the
United States during World War II."

															H.R.Rep. No.1320 and S.Rep. No.860, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1945). Page 338 U. S. 548 This was a bounty afforded by Congress not to the alien who had
become the wife of an American, but to the citizen who had
honorably served his country. Congress gave this bounty even though
a physically or mentally defective person might thereby be added to
the population of the United States. Yet it is suggested that the
deepest tie that an American soldier could form may be secretly
severed on the mere say-so of an official, however well
intentioned. Although five minutes of cross-examination could
enable the soldier-husband to dissipate seemingly convincing
information affecting the security danger of his wife, that
opportunity need not be accorded. And all this because of the
literal reading of the provision of the War Brides Act that the
alien spouse, though physically and mentally defective, is to be
allowed to join her citizen husband "if otherwise admissible under
the immigration laws." Upon that phrase is rested the whole
structure of Executive regulation based on § 1 of the Act of May
22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1941, 55
Stat. 252, 22 U.S.C. § 223, regarding the summary exclusion,
without opportunity for a hearing, of an alien whose entry the
Attorney General finds inimical to the public interest. * This is not the way to read such legislation. It is true also of
Acts of Congress that "The letter Killeth." Legislation should not
be read in such a decimating spirit unless the letter of Congress
is inexorable. We are reminded from time to time that, in enacting
legislation, Congress is not engaged in a scientific process which
takes account of every contingency. Its laws are not to be read as
though every "i" has to be dotted and every "t" Page 338 U. S. 549 crossed. The War Brides Act is legislation derived from the
dominant regard which American society places upon the family. It
is not to be assumed that Congress gave with a bountiful hand, but
allowed its bounty arbitrarily to be taken away. In framing and
passing the War Brides Act, Congress was preoccupied with opening
the door to wives acquired by American husbands during service in
foreign lands. It opened the door on essentials -- wives of
American soldiers and perchance mothers of their children were not
to run the gauntlet of administrative discretion in determining
their physical and mental condition, and were to be deemed nonquota
immigrants. Congress ought not to be made to appear to require that
they incur the greater hazards of an informer's tale without any
opportunity for its refutation, especially since considerations of
national security, insofar as they are pertinent, can be amply
protected by a hearing in camera. Compare Rule 46
of the Rules of Practice for Admiralty Courts during World War II,
316 U.S. 717, and see Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems
Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 468,
482-83 (1948). An alien's opportunity of entry into the United
States is, of course, a privilege which Congress may grant or
withhold. But the crux of the problem before us is whether
Congress, having extended the privilege for the benefit not of the
alien, but of her American husband, left wide open the opportunity
ruthlessly to take away what it gave.

															A regulation permitting such exclusion by the Attorney General's
fiat -- in the nature of things, that high functionary must largely
act on dossiers prepared by others -- in the case of an alien
claiming entry on his own account is one thing. To construe such
regulation to be authorized and to apply in the case of the wife of
an honorably Page 338 U. S. 550 discharged American soldier is quite another thing. Had Congress
spoken explicitly, we would have to bow to it. Such a substantial
contradiction of the congressional beneficence which is at the
heart of the War Brides Act ought not to be attributed to Congress
by a process of elaborate implication. Especially is this to be
avoided when to do so charges Congress with an obviously harsh
purpose. Due regard for the whole body of immigration laws and
policies makes it singularly appropriate in construing the War
Brides Act to be heedful of the admonition that "The letter
killeth."

															* The Attorney General is to act on information that satisfies
him, but not only is there no opportunity for a hearing, but the
Attorney General can lock in his own bosom the evidence that does
satisfy him. 8 C.F.R. §§ 175.53, 175.57 (1949).

															MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER join, dissenting.

															I do not question the constitutional power of Congress to
authorize immigration authorities to turn back from our gates any
alien or class of aliens. But I do not find that Congress has
authorized an abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife of an
American citizen without a hearing.

															Congress held out a promise of liberalized admission to alien
brides, taken unto themselves by men serving in or honorably
discharged from our armed services abroad, as the Act, set forth in
the Court's opinion, indicates. The petitioning husband is
honorably discharged, and remained in Germany as a civilian
employee. Our military authorities abroad required their permission
before marriage. The Army in Germany is not without a vigilant and
security-conscious intelligence service. This woman was employed by
our European Command, and her record is not only without blemish,
but is highly praised by her superiors. The marriage of this alien
woman to this veteran was approved by the Commanding General at
Frankfurt-on-Main.

															Now this American citizen is told he cannot bring his wife to
the United States, but he will not be told why. Page 338 U. S. 551 He must abandon his bride to live in his own country or forsake
his country to live with his bride.

															So he went to court and sought a writ of habeas corpus, which we
never tire of citing to Europe as the unanswerable evidence that
our free country permits no arbitrary official detention. And the
Government tells the Court that not even a court can find out why
the girl is excluded. But it says we must find that Congress
authorized this treatment of war brides, and, even if we cannot get
any reasons for it, we must say it is legal; security requires
it.

															Security is like liberty, in that many are the crimes committed
in its name. The menace to the security of this country, be it
great as it may, from this girl's admission is as nothing compared
to the menace to free institutions inherent in procedures of this
pattern. In the name of security, the police state justifies its
arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is secret, because security
might be prejudiced if it were brought to light in hearings. The
plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free
men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the
misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of
informer undetected and uncorrected. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 , 333 U. S.
268 .

															I am sure the officials here have acted from a sense of duty,
with full belief in their lawful power, and no doubt upon
information which, if it stood the test of trial, would justify the
order of exclusion. But not even they know whether it would stand
this test. And anyway, as I have said before, personal confidence
in the officials involved does not excuse a judge for sanctioning a
procedure that is dangerously wrong in principle. Dissent in Bowles v. United States, 319 U. S. 33 , 319 U. S.
37 .

															Congress will have to use more explicit language than any yet
cited before I will agree that it has authorized an administrative
officer to break up the family of an Page 338 U. S. 552 American citizen or force him to keep his wife by becoming an
exile. Likewise, it will have to be much more explicit before I can
agree that it authorized a finding of serious misconduct against
the wife of an American citizen without notice of charges, evidence
of guilt and a chance to meet it.

															I should direct the Attorney General either to produce his
evidence justifying exclusion or to admit Mrs. Knauff to the
country.