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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 19–199

															_________________

															MANFREDO M. SALINAS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit

															[February 3, 2021]

															Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA),
50Stat. 307, as restated and amended, 45 U. S. C. §231 et seq. , establishes a system of disability,
retirement, and survivor benefits for railroad employees. That
system is administered by the U. S. Railroad Retirement Board
(Board). The Board denied benefits to petitioner Manfredo M.
Salinas, a former railroad employee, when he applied in 2006, but
it later granted him benefits when he reapplied in 2013. Salinas
then requested that the Board reopen its decision to deny his 2006
application, but the Board declined. This case asks whether the
Board’s refusal to reopen the prior denial of benefits is subject
to judicial review. The Court holds that it is.

															I

															A

															The RRA provides long-term benefits to
railroad employees who have accrued enough years of service and who
have either reached a certain age or become disabled. See 45
U. S. C. §§231a(a)(1), (b). It also provides benefits for
eligible employees’ spouses and survivors under certain conditions.
§§231a(c)–(d). These benefits complement those provided by another
statute, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA), 52Stat.
1094, 45 U. S. C. §351 et seq ., which covers
short-term periods of unemployment and sickness. See §352. This
case concerns benefits under the RRA only. Both statutes, however,
are relevant, as discussed below.

															To administer benefits under the RRA, the Board
has implemented a multistep system of administrative review. First,
an individual applies for benefits and receives an initial decision
from the appropriate division of the Board, such as the Disability
Benefits Division. 20 CFR §260.1(a) (2020). If the individual is
dissatisfied, she may seek reconsideration from the Board’s
Reconsideration Section. §260.3(a). If denied again, she may appeal
to the Board’s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals (Bureau). §260.5(a).
Lastly, the applicant may take a final appeal to the Board itself.
§260.9(a).

															This four-step sequence is the primary form of
administrative review for benefits determinations. Applicants have
a right to seek each of the above levels of review within 60 days.
See, e.g., 45 U. S. C. §231f(b)(3); 20 CFR
§260.9(b). Once an applicant completes the review process, or the
deadline for seeking further review passes, the benefits
determination becomes “final” under the Board’s regulations. See 20
CFR §261.1(b).

															After a determination becomes final, an
applicant can request that the Board reopen it. See §261.1(a).
“Reopening . . . means a conscious determination on the
part of the agency to reconsider an otherwise final decision for
purposes of revising that decision.” §261.1(c) (emphasis deleted).
Whether to grant reopening is ultimately discretionary. See
§261.11. The Board, however, has established substantive criteria
to guide its discretion. For example, as relevant here, a decision
may be reopened “[w]ithin four years of the date of the notice of
such decision, if there is new and material evidence.”
§261.2(b).

															B

															Salinas is a former carpenter and assistant
foreman for the Union Pacific Railroad. During his 15-year railroad
career, he suffered two serious injuries on the job. In 1989, a
co-worker dropped a sledge hammer from an overhead bridge, hitting
Salinas on the top of his hardhat. Then, in 1993, a wooden railroad
tie fell from a truck and struck Salinas in the head. As a result,
Salinas underwent two spinal fusion surgeries. After receiving
treatment, Salinas continued to experience pain, anxiety, and
depression. He began seeking RRA disability benefits in 1992. His
first two applications were denied, and he did not seek
reconsideration of either.

															On February 28, 2006, Salinas filed his third
application for RRA benefits. The Board denied Salinas’ application
on August 28, 2006, concluding that his impairments were not severe
enough to qualify for relief. After missing the deadline for
seeking reconsideration, Salinas sent a letter to the Board
requesting that it reconsider its decision “even though the 60 days
had passed.” Record 207. Salinas noted, among other things, that he
had “more medical records to provide.” Ibid. The
Reconsideration Section denied Salinas’ request, finding that he
had failed to demonstrate good cause for his late filing. See 20
CFR §260.3(c). Salinas did not appeal.

															Seven years later, on December 26, 2013, Salinas
filed his fourth application for RRA benefits. This time, his
application was granted. Although Salinas was deemed disabled as of
October 9, 2010, his benefits began on December 1, 2012, 12 months
prior to the date on which he filed his successful application.
Under the RRA, disability benefits begin on the latest of several
alternative start dates, and Salinas’ application-based start date
was later than his disability onset date. See Record 8; 45
U. S. C. §231d(a)(ii); 20 CFR §218.9(c).

															Salinas timely sought reconsideration of the
amount and start date of his benefits. The Reconsideration Section
denied relief, and Salinas appealed to the Bureau. On appeal,
Salinas argued that his 2006 application should be reopened because
the Board had not considered certain medical records in existence
at the time when it denied him benefits. Salinas submitted the
records as part of his appeal.

															On August 26, 2016, the Bureau denied Salinas’
request to reopen the 2006 decision. The Bureau concluded that
Salinas had failed to seek reopening based on “new and material
evidence” within four years of the decision at issue, as required
by regulation. 20 CFR §261.2(b). Salinas appealed to the Board,
which affirmed the Bureau’s decision on the ground that Salinas had
not met the criteria for reopening under §261.2. The Board notified
Salinas that he could seek judicial review of the Board’s decision
within one year.

															Salinas filed a timely pro se petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. 765 Fed. Appx. 79, 80–81 (2019)
( per curiam ). In a previous decision, the Fifth Circuit
had joined the majority of Circuits in holding that federal courts
cannot review the Board’s refusal to reopen a prior benefits
determination. See Roberts v. Railroad Retirement
Bd. , 346 F.3d 139 , 141 (2003). The Fifth Circuit noted a
longstanding split among the Circuits on this issue. 765 Fed.
Appx., at 80–81 (citing cases).

															We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the Courts of Appeals. 589 U. S. ___ (2020).

															II

															Section 231g of the RRA provides that, except
for the deadline for seeking review, “[d]ecisions of the Board
determining the rights or liabilities of any person” under the RRA
“shall be subject to judicial review in the same manner, subject to
the same limitations, and all provisions of law shall apply in the
same manner as though the decision were a determination of
corresponding rights or liabilities under the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act.” 45 U. S. C. §231g. In other words, §231g
makes judicial review available under the RRA to the same extent
that review is available under the RUIA.[ 1 ] This case, therefore, turns on the RUIA’s judicial
review provision, 45 U. S. C. §355(f ).

															Section 355(f ) provides: “Any claimant, or
any railway labor organization organized in accordance with the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act . . . , of which claimant is a
member, or any base-year employer of the claimant, or any other
party aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this
section, may . . . obtain a review of any final decision
of the Board.”[ 2 ] To qualify
for judicial review under this provision, the Board’s refusal to
reopen its denial of Salinas’ 2006 application must constitute “any
final decision of the Board.” It does.

															A

															The text of §355(f ) starts our analysis.
The phrase “any final decision” is broad, and it reflects Congress’
intent to define the scope of review “expansively.” Smith v. Berryhill , 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 6)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The phrase
“denotes some kind of terminal event,” such as the “final stage of
review.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7). Similar
language in the Administrative Procedure Act has been interpreted
to refer to an agency action that “both (1) mark[s] the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process and (2) is one
by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which
legal consequences will flow.” Id ., at ___ (slip op., at 9)
(quoting Bennett v. Spear , 520
U.S. 154 , 177–178 (1997); internal quotation marks
omitted).

															The Board’s refusal to reopen the prior denial
of benefits satisfies these criteria. First, the decision was the
“terminal event” in the Board’s administrative review process. Smith , 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). After first
requesting reopening before the Bureau, Salinas exhausted further
agency review by appealing to the Board itself. Salinas’ only
recourse thereafter was to seek judicial review.

															Second, the Board’s decision was one “ ‘by
which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which
legal consequences will flow.’ ” Army Corps of
Engineers v. Hawkes Co. , 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016). The
Board has defined reopening as “a conscious determination
. . . to reconsider an otherwise final decision for
purposes of revising that decision.” 20 CFR §261.1(c). Reopening
therefore entails substantive changes that affect benefits and
obligations under the RRA. Consistent with its substantive nature,
the decision to grant or deny reopening is guided by objective
criteria, including whether “there is new and material evidence or
there was adjudicative error not consistent with the evidence of
record at the time of adjudication.” §261.2(b). If reopening is
granted, any revision the Board makes may be reviewed in the same
manner as a primary determination of benefits; otherwise, the
revision is “binding.” §§261.7, 261.8. In light of these features,
a decision about reopening fits within the meaning of “any final
decision” as that phrase is used in §355(f ).

															The Board disagrees because it interprets the
phrase “any final decision” to mean “any final decision under
§355(c).” The Board’s argument goes like this: Section 355(f )
authorizes four parties to seek judicial review: (1) a claimant for
benefits, (2) a claimant’s railway labor organization, (3) a
claimant’s base-year employer, and (4) “any other party aggrieved
by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section.” 45
U. S. C. §355(f ). The phrase “any other” means
that, in order to obtain judicial review, each of the enumerated
parties must be “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection
(c).” This implies, in turn, that each party may seek judicial
review of only the decision “under subsection (c)” by which it was
aggrieved. A denial of reopening is not a decision “under
subsection (c)” because it is not a determination granting or
denying benefits. See §§355(c)(1)–(4). Thus, the Board argues,
reopening decisions are not subject to judicial review.

															The Board’s interpretation is inconsistent with
the text of §355(f ). Congress conspicuously chose the broad
language “any final decision,” without tying that phrase to the
earlier reference to “a final decision under subsection (c).” This
omission is especially notable because Congress used such limiting
references elsewhere in §355. Under §355(c)(5), Congress
established rules for “[f]inal decision[s] of the Board in the
cases provided for in the preceding three paragraphs” (in other
words, under §§355(c)(2)–(4)). 45 U. S. C. §355(c)(5). In
the same paragraph, Congress authorized any properly interested and
notified party to obtain judicial review of “any such decision by
which he claims to be aggrieved.” 45 U. S. C. §355(c)(5).
By using the language “such” and “by which he claims to be
aggrieved,” Congress clearly referred to the particular type of
decision described earlier in §355(c)(5), thus limiting judicial
review to final decisions “provided for” in §§355(c)(2)–(4).

															This type of limiting language is absent from
§355(f ). “Where Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States , 464 U.S.
16 , 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Section 355(f ) authorizes judicial review of “any” final
decision, not “such” final decision “under subsection (c).” The
Board’s denial of reopening qualifies for review under the language
Congress chose.[ 3 ]

															B

															To the extent there is ambiguity in the
meaning of “any final decision,” it must be resolved in Salinas’
favor under the “strong presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action.” Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC , 575
U.S. 480, 486 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
default rule is “ ‘well-settled,’ ” and Congress is
presumed to legislate with it in mind. Kucana v. Holder , 558 U.S.
233 , 252 (2010). To rebut the presumption, the Board bears a
“heavy burden” of showing that the statute’s “language or
structure” forecloses judicial review. Mach Mining , 575
U. S., at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).

															The Board has not met its burden. The Board
argues that various cross-references within §355 indicate that
§355(f ) covers only decisions made under §355(c). For
instance, §355(c)(7) provides for review solely “pursuant to this
subsection and subsection (f ).” 45 U. S. C.
§355(c)(7); see also §355(c)(5). Meanwhile, §355(f ) requires
that “all administrative remedies within the Board,” including
review under §355(c), must be exhausted before a party can seek
judicial review. Finally, §355(g) provides that “[f]indings of fact
and conclusions of law of the Board in the determination of any
claim for benefits or refund” and “the determination of any other
matter pursuant to subsection (c)” shall be reviewed exclusively
under §355(f ). In the Board’s view, these cross-references
prove that §§355(f ) and 355(c) are coextensive.

															The structure of §355 shows that §355(c) feeds
exclusively into §355(f ), but nothing in the statute suggests
that the exclusivity runs the other way. To the contrary, several
clues indicate that §355(f ) encompasses decisions beyond
those described in §355(c). For example, §355(g) lists three types
of decisions that are subject to review exclusively under
§355(f ): determinations of claims for benefits or refunds,
determinations of other matters under §355(c), and determinations
that unexpended funds in the railroad unemployment insurance
account may be used to pay benefits or refunds. See 45
U. S. C. §§355(g), 351(p), 360(a). The Board concedes
that the third type of decision falls outside §355(c). See Brief
for Respondent 22, n. 4.[ 4 ] In addition, the Board’s own regulations appear to
presume that judicial review is available for decisions not covered
by §355(c), such as the Board’s determinations of employers’
contribution rates. See 20 CFR §345.307(c). Given these indications
that §355(f ) is broader than §355(c), the Board’s structural
argument does not overcome the plain meaning of “any final
decision” and the presumption in favor of judicial review.

															C

															The Board’s remaining arguments also fall
short. First, the Board argues that this Court’s precedent holds
that reopening decisions are not subject to judicial review. In Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S.
99 (1977), this Court concluded that §405(g) of the Social
Security Act, which authorizes judicial review of “ ‘any final
decision of the Secretary made after a hearing,’ ” does not
apply to refusals to reopen a prior benefits determination. Id., at 102 (quoting 42 U. S. C. §405(g)). As it is
under the RRA, the opportunity to seek reopening in Califano was “a second look that the agency had made available to claimants
as a matter of grace” after the deadline for appealing an initial
benefits determination had passed. Smith , 587 U. S., at
___ (slip op., at 12). Given this similarity, many courts have
applied Califano to the type of decision at issue here. See, e.g., Roberts , 346 F. 3d, at 141; Harris v. Railroad Retirement Bd. , 198 F.3d 139 , 142 (CA4 1999); Abbruzzese v. Railroad
Retirement Bd. , 63 F.3d 972 , 974 (CA10 1995).

															A key textual difference in the respective
judicial review provisions, however, distinguishes Califano from this case. Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act provides
that reviewable decisions must be “made after a hearing,” whereas
§355(f ) of the RRA contains no such limitation. Compare 42
U. S. C. §405(g) with 45 U. S. C.
§355(f ). Section 405(g)’s hearing requirement was a
significant basis for Califano ’s conclusion that judicial
review was unavailable, as “a petition to reopen a prior final
decision may be denied without a hearing.” 430 U. S., at 108;
see also ibid. (explaining that §405(g) “clearly limits
judicial review to a particular type of agency action”). The other
considerations identified in Califano , including the fact
that reopening was made available only by regulation, corroborated
the Court’s interpretation of this important textual limit. Ibid. ; see also Smith , 587 U. S., at ___ (slip
op., at 8). Section 355(f ), by contrast, contains no such
express limitation, and the Board’s decision fits within the
provision’s plain language.

															Second, the Board argues that §355(f )
should be interpreted in light of §231g’s reference to decisions
“determining the rights or liabilities of any person.” See 45
U. S. C. §231g. The denial of reopening does not qualify
for judicial review, the Board claims, because it is simply a
“refusal to make a new determination” of rights or liabilities,
like the decision this Court addressed in Your Home Visiting
Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala , 525
U.S. 449 (1999). Id., at 453 (emphasis deleted). In Your Home , this Court concluded that an agency
intermediary’s refusal to reopen a prior Medicare reimbursement
determination was not subject to further administrative review
because it was not a “ ‘final determination . . . as
to the amount of total program reimbursement due.’ ” Ibid . (quoting 42 U. S. C.
§1395 oo (a)(1)(A)(i)). The agency argued that the denial of
reopening was not itself a determination “as to the amount,” but
rather a refusal to make such a determination. Ibid. This
Court concluded that the agency’s interpretation was reasonable,
and thus entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Your Home , 525 U. S., at 453. The Court
noted that the agency’s interpretation was also “the more natural”
reading of the statute and was “further confirmed” by two
considerations from Califano : The right to seek reopening
existed only by regulation, and permitting review would undermine
the ordinary deadlines for appealing the intermediary’s
reimbursement decisions. 525 U. S., at 453–454. The Board
argues that its decision here should be viewed in the same way.

															The Board’s argument is unpersuasive for several
reasons. First, the statute in Your Home defined the scope
of internal agency review and thus did not implicate the
presumption in favor of judicial review. To the contrary, the Court
ultimately deferred to the agency’s interpretation precluding
review under Chevron . See 525 U. S., at 453. No such
deference is due here because the scope of judicial review is
“hardly the kind of question that the Court presumes that Congress
implicitly delegated to an agency.” Smith , 587 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 14).

															Second, the statute at issue in Your Home was narrower than §231g because it focused on a particular type of
determination: one “as to the amount of total program reimbursement
due the provider.” See 42 U. S. C.
§1395 oo (a)(1)(A)(i). Section 231g, in contrast, broadly
authorizes judicial review of “[d]ecisions . . .
determining the rights or liabilities of any person under [the
RRA].” This broader language, as well as §231g’s express direction
that “all provisions of law shall apply in the same manner as
though the decision were a determination of corresponding rights or
liabilities under the [RUIA],” indicates that §231g simply
incorporates §355(f ) into the RRA. As the Board stated during
oral argument, §231g “effectively piggybacks” on §355(f ). Tr.
of Oral Arg. 46. Every Court of Appeals to interpret these statutes
has reached the same conclusion. See supra, at 5, n. 1.
Thus, the key language governing judicial review under both
statutes is the phrase “any final decision.”

															Finally, the Board argues that the opportunity
to seek reopening is a matter of administrative grace, and such
solicitous discretion should not be discouraged by allowing
judicial review. But the fact that the Board could decline to offer
reopening does not mean that, having chosen to provide it, the
Board may avoid the plain text of §355(f ). See Hawkes
Co. , 578 U. S., at 602 (“[S]uch a ‘count your blessings’
argument is not an adequate rejoinder to the assertion of a right
to judicial review”). Whether the availability of judicial review
will affect how the Board exercises its discretion is a question
properly reserved for Congress.

															It is also worth noting that judicial review of
reopening decisions will be limited. The Board’s decision to grant
or deny reopening, while guided by substantive criteria, is
ultimately discretionary and therefore subject to reversal only for
abuse of discretion. See 20 CFR §261.11; Stovic , 826
F. 3d, at 506; Szostak v. Railroad Retirement
Bd. , 370 F.2d 253, 254 (CA2 1966) (Friendly, J., for the
court). Most decisions will be upheld under this deferential
standard. See ICC v. Locomotive Engineers , 482 U.S.
270 , 288 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring). Judicial review
plays a modest, but important, role in guarding against decisions
that are arbitrary, inconsistent with the standards set by the
Board’s own regulations, or otherwise contrary to law.

															*  *  *

															We hold that the Board’s refusal to reopen a
prior benefits determination is a “final decision” within the
meaning of §355(f ), and therefore subject to judicial review.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 Every Court of Appeals to
interpret these statutes has reached the same conclusion. See Stovic v. Railroad Retirement Bd ., 826 F.3d 500, 502
(CADC 2016) (Kavanaugh, J., for the court); Cunningham v. Railroad Retirement Bd ., 392 F.3d 567 , 571 (CA3 2004); Roberts v. Railroad
Retirement Bd ., 346 F.3d 139 , 140 (CA5 2003); Rivera v. Railroad
Retirement Bd ., 262 F.3d 1005 , 1008 (CA9 2001); Harris v. Railroad
Retirement Bd ., 198 F.3d 139 , 141 (CA4 1999); Abbruzzese v. Railroad
Retirement Bd ., 63 F.3d 972 , 974 , n. 4 (CA10 1995); Clifford v. Railroad
Retirement Bd ., 3 F.3d 536 , 538, n. 4 (CA1 1993); Linquist v. Bowen , 813 F.2d 884, 888 (CA8 1987); Steebe v. Railroad Retirement Bd ., 708 F.2d 250, 252 (CA7 1983); Railroad Concrete Crosstie Corp. v. Railroad Retirement
Bd ., 709 F.2d 1404, 1406, n. 2 (CA11 1983); Szostak v. Railroad Retirement Bd ., 370 F.2d 253, 254 (CA2 1966)
(interpreting §231g’s predecessor provision); accord, Brief for
Petitioner 15; Brief for Respondent 12. 2 “[S]ubsection (c),” i.e., 45 U. S. C. §355(c), governs administrative
review of benefits determinations under the RUIA. It addresses
decisions awarding or denying benefits, including “initial
determination[s],” as well as decisions about the recovery of
improperly awarded benefits. 45 U. S. C.
§§355(c)(1)–(4). 3 The Court need not
resolve the parties’ dispute about whether each type of party
listed in §355(f ) must be “aggrieved by a final decision
under subsection (c),” or whether that phrase modifies only the
closest antecedent. Either way, Salinas is a proper party because
he qualifies as both a “claimant” and a “claimant . . .
aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c).” Salinas has
filed four separate applications for benefits under the RRA, and he
claims to have been aggrieved by the Board’s decision on each,
including the Board’s allegedly incorrect assessment of the
benefits he is owed based on his 2013 application. 4 The Board argues that
§355(g) merely precludes review of the Board’s fund decisions by
the Comptroller General, who ordinarily makes determinations
related to the charging and settling of government accounts. See
Brief for Respondent 22, n. 4. That purpose, however, could
have been accomplished without also indicating that review is
available “as provided in subsection (f ).” 45
U. S. C. §355(g). Indeed, the RUIA does exactly this with
respect to determinations about the use of funds from an
administrative expense account. See §361(c) (providing simply that
the Board’s determinations “shall not be subject to review in any
manner”). Ultimately, we need not resolve whether the Board’s fund
decisions are subject to judicial review. The point is that the
Board’s structural interpretation is subject to doubt, and
therefore does not overcome the presumption in favor of judicial
review. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 19–199

															_________________

															MANFREDO M. SALINAS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the fifth circuit

															[February 3, 2021]

															Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito,
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Barrett join, dissenting.

															The Court may well correctly interpret the
judicial review provision located in the Railroad Unemployment
Insurance Act (RUIA). See 45 U. S. C. §355(f). But this
case concerns the judicial review provision located in the Railroad
Retirement Act (RRA). See 45 U. S. C. §231g. And though
the RRA references the RUIA to explain how to obtain
judicial review, it defines separately what may be
reviewed—the key issue here.

															The RRA provides that “[d]ecisions of the Board
determining the rights or liabilities of any person under this
subchapter shall be subject to judicial review in the same manner,
subject to the same limitations, and all provisions of law shall
apply in the same manner as though the decision were a
determination of corresponding rights or liabilities under the
[RUIA].” Ibid. This language directs courts to assess
questions about reviewability in three steps. First, resolve
whether the Board’s decision determined rights or liabilities.
Second, locate the rights or liabilities under the RUIA, if any,
that correspond to the ones determined by the Board. And third,
decide whether and how a determination of those parallel rights or
liabilities would be reviewed under the RUIA.

															The majority bypasses this structure entirely by
overlooking the question whether the Board’s decision here
determined any right or liability at all. It did not. A “right” is
“[a] power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
statutes or decisional laws, or claimed as a result of long usage.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1189 (5th ed. 1979). Similarly, a
“liability” is “an obligation one is bound in law or justice to
perform.” Id., at 823. The Board here did not assess a legal
obligation or claim. As the majority points out, the Board decided
only the “ultimately discretionary” matter of whether to reopen the
2006 decision. Ante, at 13. Neither the RRA nor the RUIA
provides any statutory right to reopen a proceeding. And the
regulations that create reopening procedures make clear that no one
has a right to that proceeding; the Board has plenary authority to
“direct that any decision, which is otherwise subject to reopening
under this part, shall not be reopened.” 20 CFR §261.11 (2020).

															Nor did the Board’s decision determine any
underlying statutory entitlement to benefits, as petitioner
contends. The most recent reopening decision did not address the
merits of the 2006 decision. On the contrary, it briefly explained
that petitioner failed to meet any of the threshold regulatory
requirements to obtain a reopening in the first place. As we
unanimously said in a similar context, the “more natural”
understanding of a reopening denial like this one is that it was
simply “the refusal to make a new determination.” Your
Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala , 525 U.S.
449 , 453 (1999).

															The majority skirts this analysis by noting that
the statute at issue in Your Home was narrower than the RRA.
In Your Home , the statute involved determinations of
“program reimbursement” amounts, 42 U. S. C. §1395 oo (a)(1)
(A)(i), whereas the statute here provides review for determinations
of “rights or liabilities,” 45 U. S. C. §231g. But that distinction
is irrelevant. The reasoning in Your Home was simply that
the refusal to reopen a determination “is not a final determination
. . . but rather the refusal to make a new
determination.” 525 U. S., at 453 (internal quotation marks
omitted). So too here.[ 1 ]

															The majority also tries to sidestep text and
precedent by invoking the presumption in favor of judicial review
of administrative action that this Court sometimes applies. But we
have explained that this presumption is nothing more than a default
rule that gives way to “a statute’s language or structure.” Mach
Mining, LLC v. EEOC , 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015); see also Block v. Community Nutrition Institute , 467 U.S.
340 , 351 (1984) (explaining that the presumption is
“overcome. . . whenever the congressional intent to
preclude judicial review is fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, §231g limits
judicial review to Board decisions determining rights or
liabilities. The statutory language alone controls the outcome.

															Any presumption is further undercut because
petitioner had full opportunity to seek judicial review of the 2006
decision that did determine his rights. Congress gave petitioner 90
days to file a petition for review in a court of appeals. §355(f).
Petitioner simply did not take advantage of it. To require a court
to review a reopening denial now—15 years after the statutory time
for review expired—transforms a default presumption into a tool to
“frustrate the statutory purpose of imposing a [time] limit on
judicial review.” Your Home , 525 U. S., at 454. The
presumption of judicial review is not a presumption of infinite
judicial review. See Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S.
99 , 108 (1977) (rejecting “an interpretation that would allow a
claimant judicial review simply by filing—and being denied—a
petition to reopen his claim”). We should not so readily allow a
court-created presumption to overcome statutory time limits.

															The majority opinion is doubly incorrect because
it creates a new form of judicial review in a context where it is
not clear how it can be exercised. What standards a court could use
to review Board decisions denying reopening remain elusive. There
are no statutory cues to guide review—indeed, it is not altogether
clear that the Board has authority to reopen its final decisions.
See 45 U. S. C. §355(g). And the regulations that provide
review give the Board discretion to deny reopening whenever it
“deem[s] proper,” even if a case “is otherwise subject to
reopening. 20 CFR §261.11. The “impossibility of devising an
adequate standard of review” for these sorts of decisions is yet
another reason to conclude that no review is warranted. ICC v. Locomotive Engineers , 482 U.S.
270 , 282 (1987); cf. 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2) (extending
judicial review, “except to the extent that . . . agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law”).[ 2 ] Were courts to try to impose standards
governing when the Board can deny reopening, the unintended effect
may be to discourage the Board from offering reopenings in the
first place. I would not distort the RRA’s judicial review
provision to force courts to review a decision where no standards
of review are evident.

															Instead of reckoning with these serious
questions, the majority interprets §231g to say nothing more than
that the RUIA’s judicial review provision applies. Ante , at
5. But that interpretive gloss ignores the words Congress chose.
Only Board decisions “determining the rights or liabilities of any
person” under the RRA are subject to judicial review. 45
U. S. C. §231g. Because the Board’s decision below did
not determine any right or liability, the RRA does not provide for
judicial review. I respectfully dissent. Notes 1 That the Court noted the
best reading of the statute also happened to be a reasonable one
under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S.
837 (1984), does not undermine its logic. 2 Our precedent suggests
that even if judicial review is generally precluded, it may still
remain available for “the adjudication of colorable constitutional
claims.” Califano v. Sanders , 430 U.S.
99 , 109 (1977). But we need not decide whether this exception
applies because neither side contends that the Board decided such
an issue below.