Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.

U.S. Supreme Court Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Ins., 463 U.S.
29 (1983) Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. No. 82-354 Argued April 26, 1983 Decided June 24, 1983 463 U.S.
29 ast|>* 463 U.S.
29 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT Syllabus The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act)
directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue motor vehicle
safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the need
for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms."
In issuing these standards, the Secretary is directed to consider
"relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the
proposed standard is "reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for
the particular type of motor vehicle for which it is prescribed,
and "the extent to which such standards will contribute to carrying
out the purposes" of the Act. The Act authorizes judicial review,
under the Administrative Procedure Act, of "all orders
establishing, amending, or revoking" a motor vehicle safety
standard. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), to which the Secretary has delegated his authority to
promulgate safety standards, rescinded the requirement of Modified
Standard 208 that new motor vehicles produced after September 1982
be equipped with passive restraints (automatic seatbelts or
airbags) to protect the safety of the occupants of the vehicle in
the event of a collision. In explaining the rescission, NHTSA
maintained that it was no longer able to find, as it had in 1977
when Modified Standard 208 was issued, that the automatic restraint
requirement would produce significant safety benefits. In 1987,
NHTSA had assumed that airbags would be installed in 60% of all new
cars and automatic seatbelts in 40%. But by 1981 it became apparent
that automobile manufacturers planned to install automatic
seatbelts in approximately 99% of the new cars, and that the
overwhelming majority of such seatbelts could be easily detached
and left that way permanently, thus precluding the realization of
the lifesaving potential of airbags and requiring the same type of
affirmative action that was the stumbling block Page 463 U. S. 30 to achieving high usage of manual belts. For this reason, NHTSA
concluded that there was no longer a basis for reliably predicting
that Modified Standard 208 would lead to any significant increased
usage of restraints. Hence, in NHTSA's view, the automatic
restraint requirement was no longer reasonable or practicable.
Moreover, given the high expense of implementing such a requirement
and the limited benefits arising therefrom, NHTSA feared that many
consumers would regard Modified Standard 208 as an instance of
ineffective regulation. On petitions for review of NHTSA's
rescission of the passive restraint requirement, the Court of
Appeals held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious on
the grounds that NHTSA's conclusion that it could not reliably
predict an increase in belt usage under the Standard was an
insufficient basis for the rescission, that NHTSA inadequately
considered the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install
nondetachable, rather than detachable, passive belts, and that the
agency failed to give any consideration to requiring compliance
with the Standard by the installation of airbags. The court found
that congressional reaction to various versions of the Standard
"raised doubts" that NHTSA's rescission "necessarily demonstrates
an effort to fulfill its statutory mandate," and that therefore the
agency was obligated to provide "increasingly clear and convincing
reasons" for its action. Held: NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint
requirement in Modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious;
the agency failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for
rescinding the requirement, and must either consider the matter
further or adhere to or amend the Standard along lines which its
analysis supports. Pp. 463 U. S.
40 -57.

															(a) The rescission of an occupant crash protection standard is
subject to the same standard of judicial review -- the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard -- as is the promulgation of such a
standard, and should not be judged by, as petitioner Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association contends, the standard used to judge an
agency's refusal to promulgate a rule in the first place. The Act
expressly equates orders "revoking" and "establishing" safety
standards. The Association's view would render meaningless
Congress' authorization for judicial review of orders revoking
safety standards. An agency changing its course by rescinding a
rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change
beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in
the first instance. While the scope of review under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard is narrow, and a court is not to
substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency
nevertheless must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action. In reviewing that
explanation, a court must consider whether the decision was based
on a Page 463 U. S. 31 consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a
clear error of judgment. Pp. 463 U. S.
40 -44.

															(b) The Court of Appeals correctly found that the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of judicial review applied to rescission of
agency regulations, but erred in intensifying the scope of its
review based upon its reading of legislative events. While an
agency's interpretation of a statute may be confirmed or ratified
by subsequent congressional failure to change that interpretation,
here, even an unequivocal ratification of the passive restraint
requirement would not connote approval or disapproval of NHTSA's
later decision to rescind the requirement. That decision remains
subject to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Pp. 463 U. S.
44 -46.

															(c) The first reason for finding NHTSA's rescission of Modified
Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious is that it apparently
gave no consideration to modifying the Standard to require that
airbag technology be utilized. Even if NHTSA's conclusion that
detachable automatic seatbelts will not attain anticipated safety
benefits because so many individuals will detach the mechanism were
acceptable in its entirety, standing alone, it would not justify
any more than an amendment of the Standard to disallow compliance
by means of one technology which will not provide effective
passenger protection. It does not cast doubt on the need for a
passive restraint requirement or upon the efficacy of airbag
technology. The airbag is more than a policy alternative to the
passive restraint requirement; it is a technology alternative
within the ambit of the existing standard. Pp. 463 U. S.
46 -51.

															(d) NHTSA was too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of
automatic seatbelts. Its explanation for rescission of the passive
restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable this Court to
conclude that the rescission was the product of reasoned
decisionmaking. The agency took no account of the critical
difference between detachable automatic seatbelts and current
manual seatbelts, failed to articulate a basis for not requiring
nondetachable belts, and thus failed to offer the rational
connection between facts and judgment required to pass muster under
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Pp. 463 U. S.
51 -57.

															220 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 680 F.2d 206, vacated and remanded.

															WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in all but Parts
V-B and VI of which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL, REHNQUIST and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL
and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 463 U. S.
57 . Page 463 U. S. 32 JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The development of the automobile gave Americans unprecedented
freedom to travel, but exacted a high price for Page 463 U. S. 33 enhanced mobility. Since 1929, motor vehicles have been the
leading cause of accidental deaths and injuries in the United
States . In 1982, 46,300 Americans died in motor vehicle accidents,
and hundreds of thousands more were maimed and injured. [ Footnote 1 ] While a consensus exists
that the current loss of life on our highways is unacceptably high,
improving safety does not admit to easy solution. In 1966, Congress
decided that at least part of the answer lies in improving the
design and safety features of the vehicle itself. [ Footnote 2 ] But much of the technology for
building safer cars was undeveloped or untested. Before changes in
automobile design could be mandated, the effectiveness of these
changes had to be studied, their costs examined, and public
acceptance considered. This task called for considerable expertise,
and Congress responded by enacting the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Act), 80 Stat. 718, as amended, 15 U.
S. C. §1381 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The Act,
created for the purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents," 15 U. S.
C. §1381, directs the Secretary of Transportation or his delegate
to issue motor vehicle safety standards that "shall be practicable,
shall meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated
in objective terms." 15 U.S.C. §1392(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V). In
issuing these standards, the Secretary is directed to consider
"relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the
proposed standard "is reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for
the particular type of motor vehicle, and the "extent to which Page 463 U. S. 34 such standards will contribute to carrying out the purposes" of
the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(f)(1), (3), (4). [ Footnote 3 ]

															The Act also authorizes judicial review under the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, of all
"orders establishing, amending, or revoking a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard," 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b). Under this authority, we
review today whether NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
revoking the requirement in Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 that
new motor vehicles produced after September, 1982, be equipped with
passive restraints to protect the safety of the occupants of the
vehicle in the event of a collision. Briefly summarized, we hold
that the agency failed to present an adequate basis and explanation
for rescinding the passive restraint requirement, and that the
agency must either consider the matter further or adhere to or
amend Standard 208 along lines which its analysis supports. I The regulation whose rescission is at issue bears a complex and
convoluted history. Over the course of approximately 60 rulemaking
notices, the requirement has been imposed, amended, rescinded,
reimposed, and now rescinded again.

															As originally issued by the Department of Transportation in
1967, Standard 208 simply required the installation of seatbelts in
all automobiles. 32 Fed.Reg. 2415. It soon became apparent that the
level of seatbelt use was too low to reduce traffic injuries to an
acceptable level. The Department therefore began consideration of
"passive occupant restraint systems" -- devices that do not depend
for their effectiveness Page 463 U. S. 35 upon any action taken by the occupant except that necessary to
operate the vehicle. Two types of automatic crash protection
emerged: automatic seatbelts and airbags. The automatic seatbelt is
a traditional safety belt, which, when fastened to the interior of
the door, remains attached without impeding entry or exit from the
vehicle and deploys automatically without any action on the part of
the passenger. The airbag is an inflatable device concealed in the
dashboard and steering column. It automatically inflates when a
sensor indicates that deceleration forces from an accident have
exceeded a preset minimum, then rapidly deflates to dissipate those
forces. The lifesaving potential of these devices was immediately
recognized, and in 1977, after substantial on-the-road experience
with both devices, it was estimated by NHTSA that passive
restraints could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over
100,000 serious injuries annually. 42 Fed.Reg. 34298.

															In 1969, the Department formally proposed a standard requiring
the installation of passive restraints, 34 Fed.Reg. 11148, thereby
commencing a lengthy series of proceedings. In 1970, the agency
revised Standard 208 to include passive protection requirements, 35
Fed.Reg. 16927, and in 1972, the agency amended the Standard to
require full passive protection for all front seat occupants of
vehicles manufactured after August 15, 1975. 37 Fed.Reg. 3911. In
the interim, vehicles built between August, 1973, and August, 1975,
were to carry either passive restraints or lap and shoulder belts
coupled with an "ignition interlock" that would prevent starting
the vehicle if the belts were not connected. [ Footnote 4 ] On review, the Page 463 U. S. 36 agency's decision to require passive restraints was found to be
supported by "substantial evidence," and upheld. Chrysler Corp.
v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (CA6 1972).
[ Footnote 5 ]

															In preparing for the upcoming model year, most car makers chose
the "ignition interlock" option, a decision which was highly
unpopular and led Congress to amend the Act to prohibit a motor
vehicle safety standard from requiring or permitting compliance by
means of an ignition interlock or a continuous buzzer designed to
indicate that safety belts were not in use. Motor Vehicle and
Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat.
1482, 15 U.S.C. § 1410b(b). The 1974 Amendments also provided that
any safety standard that could be satisfied by a system other than
seatbelts would have to be submitted to Congress, where it could be
vetoed by concurrent resolution of both Houses. 15 U.S.C. §
1410b(b)(2). [ Footnote 6 ]

															The effective date for mandatory passive restraint systems was
extended for a year until August 31, 1976. 40 Fed.Reg. 16217
(1975); id. at 33977. But in June, 1976, Secretary of
Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr., initiated a new rulemaking
on the issue, 41 Fed.Reg. 24070. After hearing testimony and
reviewing written comments, Coleman extended the optional
alternatives indefinitely and suspended the passive restraint
requirement. Although he found passive Page 463 U. S. 37 restraints technologically and economically feasible, the
Secretary based his decision on the expectation that there would be
widespread public resistance to the new systems. He instead
proposed a demonstration project involving up to 500,000 cars
installed with passive restraints, in order to smooth the way for
public acceptance of mandatory passive restraints at a later date.
Department of Transportation, The Secretary's Decision Concerning
Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection (Dec. 6, 1976), App.
2068.

															Coleman's successor as Secretary of Transportation disagreed.
Within months of assuming office, Secretary Brock Adams decided
that the demonstration project was unnecessary. He issued a new
mandatory passive restraint regulation, known as Modified Standard
208. 42 Fed.Reg. 34289 (1977); 49 CFR § 571.208 (1978). The
Modified Standard mandated the phasing in of passive restraints
beginning with large cars in model year 1982 and extending to all
cars by model year 1984. The two principal systems that would
satisfy the Standard were airbags and passive belts; the choice of
which system to install was left to the manufacturers. In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transportation, 193 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 593 F.2d 1338, cert. denied, 444
U.S. 830 (1979), the Court of Appeals upheld Modified Standard 208
as a rational, nonarbitrary regulation consistent with the agency's
mandate under the Act. The Standard also survived scrutiny by
Congress, which did not exercise its authority under the
legislative veto provision of the 1974 Amendments. [ Footnote 7 ]

															Over the next several years, the automobile industry geared up
to comply with Modified Standard 208. As late as July, 1980, NHTSA
reported: Page 463 U. S. 38 "On-the-road experience in thousands of vehicles equipped with
air bags and automatic safety belts has confirmed agency estimates
of the life-saving and injury-preventing benefits of such systems.
When all cars are equipped with automatic crash protection systems,
each year an estimated 9,000 more lives will be saved, and tens of
thousands of serious injuries will be prevented."

															NHTSA, Automobile Occupant Crash Protection, Progress Report No.
3, p. 4; App. in No. 81-2220 (CADC), p. 1627 (hereinafter App.). In
February, 1981, however, Secretary of Transportation Andrew Lewis
reopened the rulemaking due to changed economic circumstances and,
in particular, the difficulties of the automobile industry. 46
Fed.Reg. 12033. Two months later, the agency ordered a one-year
delay in the application of the Standard to large cars, extending
the deadline to September 1982, id. at 21172, and at the
same time, proposed the possible rescission of the entire Standard. Id. at 21205. After receiving written comments and holding
public hearings, NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice 25) that
rescinded the passive restraint requirement contained in Modified
Standard 208. II In a statement explaining the rescission, NHTSA maintained that
it was no longer able to find, as it had in 1977, that the
automatic restraint requirement would produce significant safety
benefits. Notice 25, id. at 53419. This judgment reflected
not a change of opinion on the effectiveness of the technology, but
a change in plans by the automobile industry. In 1977, the agency
had assumed that airbags would be installed in 60% of all new cars
and automatic seatbelts in 40%. By 1981, it became apparent that
automobile manufacturers planned to install the automatic seatbelts
in approximately 99% of the new cars. For this reason, the
lifesaving potential of airbags would not be realized. Moreover, it
now appeared that the overwhelming majority of passive belts Page 463 U. S. 39 planned to be installed by manufacturers could be detached
easily and left that way permanently. Passive belts, once detached,
then required "the same type of affirmative action that is the
stumbling block to obtaining high usage levels of manual belts." Id. at 53421. For this reason, the agency concluded that
there was no longer a basis for reliably predicting that the
Standard would lead to any significant increased usage of
restraints at all.

															In view of the possibly minimal safety benefits, the automatic
restraint requirement no longer was reasonable or practicable in
the agency's view. The requirement would require approximately $1
billion to implement, and the agency did not believe it would be
reasonable to impose such substantial costs on manufacturers and
consumers without more adequate assurance that sufficient safety
benefits would accrue. In addition, NHTSA concluded that automatic
restraints might have an adverse effect on the public's attitude
toward safety. Given the high expense and limited benefits of
detachable belts, NHTSA feared that many consumers would regard the
Standard as an instance of ineffective regulation, adversely
affecting the public's view of safety regulation and, in
particular, "poisoning . . . popular sentiment toward efforts to
improve occupant restraint systems in the future." Id. at
53424.

															State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. and the National
Association of Independent Insurers filed petitions for review of
NHTSA's rescission of the passive restraint Standard. The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the agency's rescission of the passive restraint requirement
was arbitrary and capricious. 220 U.S.App.D.C. 170, 680 F.2d 206
(1982). While observing that rescission is not unrelated to an
agency's refusal to take action in the first instance, the court
concluded that, in this case, NHTSA's discretion to rescind the
passive restraint requirement had been restricted by various forms
of congressional "reaction" to the passive restraint issue. It
then Page 463 U. S. 40 proceeded to find that the rescission of Standard 208 was
arbitrary and capricious for three reasons. First, the court found
insufficient as a basis for rescission NHTSA's conclusion that it
could not reliably predict an increase in belt usage under the
Standard. The court held that there was insufficient evidence in
the record to sustain NHTSA's position on this issue, and that,
"only a well justified refusal to seek more evidence could render
rescission non-arbitrary." Id. at 196, 680 F.2d at 232.
Second, a majority of the panel [ Footnote 8 ] concluded that NHTSA inadequately considered
the possibility of requiring manufacturers to install
nondetachable, rather than detachable, passive belts. Third, the
majority found that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by failing to give any consideration whatever to requiring
compliance with Modified Standard 208 by the installation of
airbags.

															The court allowed NHTSA 30 days in which to submit a schedule
for "resolving the questions raised in th[e] opinion." Id. at 206, 680 F.2d at 242. Subsequently, the agency filed a Notice of
Proposed Supplemental Rulemaking setting forth a schedule for
complying with the court's mandate. On August 4, 1982, the Court of
Appeals issued an order staying the compliance date for the passive
restraint requirement until September 1, 1983, and requested NHTSA
to inform the court whether that compliance date was achievable.
NHTSA informed the court on October 1, 1982, that, based on
representations by manufacturers, it did not appear that
practicable compliance could be achieved before September, 1985. On
November 8, 1982, we granted certiorari, 459 U.S. 987, and on
November 18, the Court of Appeals entered an order recalling its
mandate. III Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not find the appropriate
scope of judicial review to be the "most troublesome Page 463 U. S. 41 question" in these cases. Both the Act and the 1974 Amendments
concerning occupant crash protection standards indicate that motor
vehicle safety standards are to be promulgated under the informal
rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553. The agency's action in promulgating such standards therefore
may be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 , 401 U. S. 414 (1971); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281 (1974). We believe that the rescission or modification of an
occupant protection standard is subject to the same test. Section
103(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(b), states that the procedural
and judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
"shall apply to all orders establishing, amending, or revoking a
Federal motor vehicle safety standard," and suggests no difference
in the scope of judicial review depending upon the nature of the
agency's action.

															Petitioner Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (MVMA)
disagrees, contending that the rescission of an agency rule should
be judged by the same standard a court would use to judge an
agency's refusal to promulgate a rule in the first place -- a
standard petitioner believes considerably narrower than the
traditional arbitrary and capricious test. We reject this view. The
Act expressly equates orders "revoking" and "establishing" safety
standards; neither that Act nor the APA suggests that revocations
are to be treated as refusals to promulgate standards. Petitioner's
view would render meaningless Congress' authorization for judicial
review of orders revoking safety rules. Moreover, the revocation of
an extant regulation is substantially different than a failure to
act. Revocation constitutes a reversal of the agency's former views
as to the proper course. A

															"settled course of behavior embodies the agency's informed
judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry out the
policies Page 463 U. S. 42 committed to it by Congress. There is, then, at least a
presumption that those policies will be carried out best if the
settled rule is adhered to." Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of
Trade, 412 U. S. 800 , 412 U. S.
807 -808 (1973). Accordingly, an agency changing its
course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned
analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an
agency does not act in the first instance.

															In so holding, we fully recognize that "[r]egulatory agencies do
not establish rules of conduct to last forever," American
Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397 , 387 U. S. 416 (1967), and that an agency must be given ample latitude to "adapt
their rules and policies to the demands of changing circumstances." Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.
S. 747 , 390 U. S. 784 (1968). But the forces of change do not always or necessarily point
in the direction of deregulation. In the abstract, there is no more
reason to presume that changing circumstances require the
rescission of prior action, instead of a revision in or even the
extension of current regulation. If Congress established a
presumption from which judicial review should start, that
presumption -- contrary to petitioners' views -- is not against
safety regulation, but against changes in current policy
that are not justified by the rulemaking record. While the removal
of a regulation may not entail the monetary expenditures and other
costs of enacting a new standard, and, accordingly, it may be
easier for an agency to justify a deregulatory action, the
direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the
standard of judicial review established by law.

															The Department of Transportation accepts the applicability of
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. It argues that, under this
standard, a reviewing court may not set aside an agency rule that
is rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors, and
within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency by the
statute. We do not disagree with Page 463 U. S. 43 this formulation. [ Footnote
9 ] The scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action, including a "rational connection between the facts found
and the choice made." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 371 U. S. 156 , 371 U. S. 168 (1962). In reviewing that explanation, we must "consider whether
the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Bowman
Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
supra, at 419 U. S. 285 ; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, supra, at 401 U. S. 416 .
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise. The reviewing court should not attempt itself to
make up for such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis
for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194 , 332 U. S. 196 (1947). We will, however, "uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., supra, at 419 U. S. 286 . See also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138 , 411 U. S.
142 -143 (1973) (per curiam). For purposes of these
cases, it is also relevant that Congress required a record of the
rulemaking proceedings to be compiled Page 463 U. S. 44 and submitted to a reviewing court, 15 U.S.C. § 1394, and
intended that agency findings under the Act would be supported by
"substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." S.Rep.
No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966); H.R.Rep. No. 1776, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966). IV The Court of Appeals correctly found that the arbitrary and
capricious test applied to rescissions of prior agency regulations,
but then erred in intensifying the scope of its review based upon
its reading of legislative events. It held that congressional
reaction to various versions of Standard 208 "raise[d] doubts" that
NHTSA's rescission "necessarily demonstrates an effort to fulfill
its statutory mandate," and therefore the agency was obligated to
provide "increasingly clear and convincing reasons" for its action.
220 U.S.App.D.C. at 186, 193, 680 F.2d at 222, 229. Specifically,
the Court of Appeals found significance in three legislative
occurrences:

															"In 1974, Congress banned the ignition interlock, but did not
foreclose NHTSA's pursuit of a passive restraint standard. In 1977,
Congress allowed the standard to take effect when neither of the
concurrent resolutions needed for disapproval was passed. In 1980,
a majority of each house indicated support for the concept of
mandatory passive restraints, and a majority of each house
supported the unprecedented attempt to require some installation of
airbags." Id. at 192, 680 F.2d at 228. From these legislative
acts and nonacts, the Court of Appeals derived a "congressional
commitment to the concept of automatic crash protection devices for
vehicle occupants." Ibid. This path of analysis was misguided, and the inferences it
produced are questionable. It is noteworthy that, in this Court,
respondent State Farm expressly agrees that the postenactment
legislative history of the Act does not heighten the Page 463 U. S. 45 standard of review of NHTSA's actions. Brief for Respondent
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 13. State Farm's
concession is well taken, for this Court has never suggested that
the standard of review is enlarged or diminished by subsequent
congressional action. While an agency's interpretation of a statute
may be confirmed or ratified by subsequent congressional failure to
change that interpretation, Bob Jones University v. United
States, 461 U. S. 574 , 461 U. S.
599 -602 (1983); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.
S. 280 , 453 U. S.
291 -300 (1981), in the cases before us, even an
unequivocal ratification -- short of statutory incorporation -- of
the passive restraint standard would not connote approval or
disapproval of an agency's later decision to rescind the
regulation. That decision remains subject to the arbitrary and
capricious standard.

															That we should not be so quick to infer a congressional mandate
for passive restraints is confirmed by examining the postenactment
legislative events cited by the Court of Appeals. Even were we
inclined to rely on inchoate legislative action, the inferences to
be drawn fail to suggest that NHTSA acted improperly in rescinding
Standard 208. First, in 1974, a mandatory passive restraint
standard was technically not in effect, see n 6, supra; Congress had no reason
to foreclose that course. Moreover, one can hardly infer support
for a mandatory standard from Congress' decision to provide that
such a regulation would be subject to disapproval by resolutions of
disapproval in both Houses. Similarly, no mandate can be divined
from the tabling of resolutions of disapproval which were
introduced in 1977. The failure of Congress to exercise its veto
might reflect legislative deference to the agency's expertise, and
does not indicate that Congress would disapprove of the agency's
action in 1981. And even if Congress favored the Standard in 1977,
it -- like NHTSA -- may well reach a different judgment, given
changed circumstances four years later. Finally, the Court of
Appeals read too much into floor action on the 1980 authorization
bill, a bill which was not enacted into law. Other Page 463 U. S. 46 contemporaneous events could be read as showing equal
congressional hostility to passive restraints. [ Footnote 10 ] V The ultimate question before us is whether NHTSA's rescission of
the passive restraint requirement of Standard 208 was arbitrary and
capricious. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that it was.
We also conclude, but for somewhat different reasons, that further
consideration of the issue by the agency is therefore required. We
deal separately with the rescission as it applies to airbags and as
it applies to seatbelts. A The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission
arbitrary and capricious is that NHTSA apparently gave no
consideration whatever to modifying the Standard to require that
airbag technology be utilized. Standard 208 sought to achieve
automatic crash protection by requiring automobile manufacturers to
install either of two passive restraint devices: airbags or
automatic seatbelts. There was no suggestion in the long rulemaking
process that led to Standard 208 that, if only one of these options
were feasible, no passive restraint standard should be promulgated.
Indeed, the agency's original proposed Standard contemplated the
installation of inflatable restraints in all cars. [ Footnote 11 ] Automatic belts Page 463 U. S. 47 were added as a means of complying with the Standard because
they were believed to be as effective as airbags in achieving the
goal of occupant crash protection. 36 Fed.Reg. 12859 (1971). At
that time, the passive belt approved by the agency could not be
detached. [ Footnote 12 ] Only
later, at a manufacturer's behest, did the agency approve of the
detachability feature -- and only after assurances that the feature
would not compromise the safety benefits of the restraint.
[ Footnote 13 ] Although it
was then foreseen that 60% of the new cars would contain airbags
and 40% would have automatic seatbelts, the ratio between the two
was not significant as long as the passive belt would also assure
greater passenger safety.

															The agency has now determined that the detachable automatic
belts will not attain anticipated safety benefits, because so many
individuals will detach the mechanism. Even if this conclusion were
acceptable in its entirety, see infra, at 463 U. S. 51 -54,
standing alone, it would not justify any more than an amendment of
Standard 208 to disallow compliance by means of the one technology
which will not provide effective passenger protection. It does not
cast doubt on the need for a passive restraint standard or upon the
efficacy of airbag technology. In its most recent rulemaking, the
agency again acknowledged the lifesaving potential of the
airbag: Page 463 U. S. 48 "The agency has no basis at this time for changing its earlier
conclusions in 1976 and 1977 that basic air bag technology is sound
and has been sufficiently demonstrated to be effective in those
vehicles in current use. . . ."

															NHTSA Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) XI-4 (Oct.1981),
App. 264. Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by
the agency, the mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety would
suggest that the logical response to the faults of detachable
seatbelts would be to require the installation of airbags. At the
very least, this alternative way of achieving the objectives of the
Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons given for its
abandonment. But the agency not only did not require compliance
through airbags, it also did not even consider the possibility in
its 1981 rulemaking. Not one sentence of its rulemaking statement
discusses the airbags-only option. Because, as the Court of Appeals
stated, "NHTSA's . . . analysis of airbags was nonexistent," 220
U.S.App.D.C. at 200, 680 F.2d at 236, what we said in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 167 ,
is apropos here:

															"There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the
choice made, no indication of the basis on which the [agency]
exercised its expert discretion. We are not prepared to, and the
Administrative Procedure Act will not permit us to, accept such . .
. practice. . . . Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the
administrative process, but"

															"unless we make the requirements for administrative action
strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government,
can become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its
discretion."

															" New York v. United States, 342 U. S.
882 , 342 U. S. 884 (dissenting
opinion)."

															(Footnote omitted.) We have frequently reiterated that an agency
must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a
given manner, Page 463 U. S. 49 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of
Trade, 412 U.S. at 412 U. S. 806 ; FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.
S. 233 , 405 U. S. 249 (1972); NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.
S. 438 , 380 U. S. 443 (1965); and we reaffirm this principle again today.

															The automobile industry has opted for the passive belt over the
airbag, but surely it is not enough that the regulated industry has
eschewed a given safety device. For nearly a decade, the automobile
industry waged the regulatory equivalent of war against the airbag
[ Footnote 14 ] and lost --
the inflatable restraint was proved sufficiently effective. Now the
automobile industry has decided to employ a seatbelt system which
will not meet the safety objectives of Standard 208. This hardly
constitutes cause to revoke the Standard itself. Indeed, the Act
was necessary because the industry was not sufficiently responsive
to safety concerns. The Act intended that safety standards not
depend on current technology, and could be "technology-forcing" in
the sense of inducing the development of superior safety design. See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472
F.2d at 672-673. If, under the statute, the agency should not defer
to the industry's failure to develop safer cars, which it surely
should not do, a fortiori it may not revoke a safety
standard which can be satisfied by current technology simply
because the industry has opted for an ineffective seatbelt
design.

															Although the agency did not address the mandatory airbag option
and the Court of Appeals noted that "airbags seem to have none of
the problems that NHTSA identified in passive seatbelts," 220
U.S.App.D.C. at 201, 680 F.2d at 237, petitioners recite a number
of difficulties that they Page 463 U. S. 50 believe would be posed by a mandatory airbag standard. These
range from questions concerning the installation of airbags in
small cars to that of adverse public reaction. But these are not
the agency's reasons for rejecting a mandatory airbag standard. Not
having discussed the possibility, the agency submitted no reasons
at all. The short -- and sufficient -- answer to petitioners'
submission is that the courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. at 371 U. S. 168 .
It is well established that an agency's action must be upheld, if
at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself. Ibid.;
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. at 332 U. S. 196 ; American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490 , 452 U. S. 539 (1981). [ Footnote 15 ]

															Petitioners also invoke our decision in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978), as though it were a talisman under which any agency
decision is by definition unimpeachable. Specifically, it is
submitted that to require an agency to consider an airbags-only
alternative is, in essence, to dictate to the agency the procedures
it is to follow. Petitioners both misread Vermont Yankee and misconstrue the nature of the remand that is in order. In Vermont Yankee, we held that a court may not impose
additional procedural requirements upon an agency. We do not
require today any specific procedures Page 463 U. S. 51 which NHTSA must follow. Nor do we broadly require an agency to
consider all policy alternatives in reaching decision. It is true
that rulemaking

															"cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to
include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the
mind of man . . . regardless of how uncommon or unknown that
alternative may have been. . . ." Id. at 435 U. S. 551 .
But the airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive
restraint Standard; it is a technological alternative within the
ambit of the existing Standard. We hold only that, given the
judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an effective and
cost-beneficial lifesaving technology, the mandatory passive
restraint rule may not be abandoned without any consideration
whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement. B Although the issue is closer, we also find that the agency was
too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts.
NHTSA's critical finding was that, in light of the industry's plans
to install readily detachable passive belts, it could not reliably
predict "even a 5 percentage point increase as the minimum level of
expected usage increase." 46 Fed.Reg. 53423 (1981). The Court of
Appeals rejected this finding because there is "not one iota" of
evidence that Modified Standard 208 will fail to increase
nationwide seatbelt use by at least 13 percentage points, the level
of increased usage necessary for the Standard to justify its cost.
Given the lack of probative evidence, the court held that "only a
well justified refusal to seek more evidence could render
rescission nonarbitrary." 220 U.S.App.D.C. at 196, 680 F.2d at
232.

															Petitioners object to this conclusion. In their view,
"substantial uncertainty" that a regulation will accomplish its
intended purpose is sufficient reason, without more, to rescind a
regulation. We agree with petitioners that, just as an agency
reasonably may decline to issue a safety standard if it is
uncertain about its efficacy, an agency may also revoke a Page 463 U. S. 52 standard on the basis of serious uncertainties if supported by
the record and reasonably explained. Rescission of the passive
restraint requirement would not be arbitrary and capricious simply
because there was no evidence in direct support of the agency's
conclusion. It is not infrequent that the available data do not
settle a regulatory issue, and the agency must then exercise its
judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record
to a policy conclusion. Recognizing that policymaking in a complex
society must account for uncertainty, however, does not imply that
it is sufficient for an agency to merely recite the terms
"substantial uncertainty" as a justification for its actions. As
previously noted, the agency must explain the evidence which is
available, and must offer a "rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made." Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, supra, at 371 U. S. 168 .
Generally, one aspect of that explanation would be a justification
for rescinding the regulation before engaging in a search for
further evidence.

															In these cases, the agency's explanation for rescission of the
passive restraint requirement is not sufficient to enable us to
conclude that the rescission was the product of reasoned
decisionmaking. To reach this conclusion, we do not upset the
agency's view of the facts, but we do appreciate the limitations of
this record in supporting the agency's decision. We start with the
accepted ground that, if used, seatbelts unquestionably would save
many thousands of lives and would prevent tens of thousands of
crippling injuries. Unlike recent regulatory decisions we have
reviewed, Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum
Institute, 448 U. S. 607 (1980); American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490 (1981), the safety benefits of wearing seatbelts are not in doubt,
and it is not challenged that, were those benefits to accrue, the
monetary costs of implementing the Standard would be easily
justified. We move next to the fact that there is no direct
evidence in support of the agency's finding that detachable
automatic belts cannot be predicted Page 463 U. S. 53 to yield a substantial increase in usage. The empirical evidence
on the record, consisting of surveys of drivers of automobiles
equipped with passive belts, reveals more than a doubling of the
usage rate experienced with manual belts. [ Footnote 16 ] Much of the agency's rulemaking
statement -- and much of the controversy in these cases -- centers
on the conclusions that should be drawn from these studies. The
agency maintained that the doubling of seatbelt usage in these
studies could not be extrapolated to an across-the-board mandatory
standard because the passive seatbelts were guarded by ignition
interlocks and purchasers of the tested cars are somewhat atypical.
[ Footnote 17 ] Respondents
insist these studies demonstrate that Modified Standard 208 will
substantially increase seatbelt usage. We believe that it is within
the agency's discretion to pass upon the generalizability of these
field studies. This is precisely the type of issue which rests
within the expertise of NHTSA, and upon which a reviewing court
must be most hesitant to intrude.

															But accepting the agency's view of the field tests on passive
restraints indicates only that there is no reliable real-world
experience that usage rates will substantially increase. To be
sure, NHTSA opines that "it cannot reliably predict even a 5
percentage point increase as the minimum level of Page 463 U. S. 54 expected increased usage." Notice 25, 46 Fed.Reg. 53423 (1981).
But this and other statements that passive belts will not yield
substantial increases in seatbelt usage apparently take no account
of the critical difference between detachable automatic belts and
current manual belts. A detached passive belt does require an
affirmative act to reconnect it, but -- unlike a manual seatbelt --
the passive belt, once reattached, will continue to function
automatically unless again disconnected. Thus, inertia -- a factor
which the agency's own studies have found significant in explaining
the current low usage rates for seatbelts [ Footnote 18 ] -- works in favor of, not against, use of the protective device. Since 20% to 50% of
motorists currently wear seatbelts on some occasions, [ Footnote 19 ] there would seem to be
grounds to believe that seatbelt use by occasional users will be
substantially increased by the detachable passive belts. Whether
this is in fact the case is a matter for the agency to decide, but
it must bring its expertise to bear on the question.

															The agency is correct to look at the costs as well as the
benefits of Standard 208. The agency's conclusion that the
incremental costs of the requirements were no longer reasonable was
predicated on its prediction that the safety benefits of the
regulation might be minimal. Specifically, the Page 463 U. S. 55 agency's fears that the public may resent paying more for the
automatic belt systems is expressly dependent on the assumption
that detachable automatic belts will not produce more than
"negligible safety benefits." Id. at 53424. When the
agency reexamines its findings as to the likely increase in
seatbelt usage, it must also reconsider its judgment of the
reasonableness of the monetary and other costs associated with the
Standard. In reaching its judgment, NHTSA should bear in mind that
Congress intended safety to be the preeminent factor under the
Act:

															"The Committee intends that safety shall be the overriding
consideration in the issuance of standards under this bill. The
Committee recognizes . . . that the Secretary will necessarily
consider reasonableness of cost, feasibility and adequate
leadtime."

															S.Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1966).

															"In establishing standards, the Secretary must conform to the
requirement that the standard be practicable. This would require
consideration of all relevant factors, including technological
ability to achieve the goal of a particular standard as well as
consideration of economic factors."

															"Motor vehicle safety is the paramount purpose of this bill, and
each standard must be related thereto."

															H.R.Rep. No. 1776, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1966).

															The agency also failed to articulate a basis for not requiring
nondetachable belts under Standard 208. It is argued that the
concern of the agency with the easy detachability of the currently
favored design would be readily solved by a continuous passive
belt, which allows the occupant to "spool out" the belt and create
the necessary slack for easy extrication from the vehicle. The
agency did not separately consider the continuous belt option, but
treated it together with the ignition interlock device in a
category it titled "Option of Adopting Use-Compelling Features." 46
Fed.Reg. 53424 Page 463 U. S. 56 (1981). The agency was concerned that use-compelling devices
would "complicate the extrication of [an] occupant from his or her
car." Ibid. "[T]o require that passive belts contain
use-compelling features," the agency observed,

															"could be counterproductive[, given] . . . widespread, latent
and irrational fear in many members of the public that they could
be trapped by the seat belt after a crash." Ibid. In addition, based on the experience with the
ignition interlock, the agency feared that use-compelling features
might trigger adverse public reaction.

															By failing to analyze the continuous seatbelts option in its own
right, the agency has failed to offer the rational connection
between facts and judgment required to pass muster under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that NHTSA did not suggest that the emergency release
mechanisms used in nondetachable belts are any less effective for
emergency egress than the buckle release system used in detachable
belts. In 1978, when General Motors obtained the agency's approval
to install a continuous passive belt, it assured the agency that
nondetachable belts with spool releases were as safe as detachable
belts with buckle releases. 43 Fed.Reg. 21912, 21913-21914 (1978).
NHTSA was satisfied that this belt design assured easy
extricability: "[t]he agency does not believe that the use of
[such] release mechanisms will cause serious occupant egress
problems. . . ." Id. at 52493, 52494. While the agency is
entitled to change its view on the acceptability of continuous
passive belts, it is obligated to explain its reasons for doing
so.

															The agency also failed to offer any explanation why a continuous
passive belt would engender the same adverse public reaction as the
ignition interlock, and, as the Court of Appeals concluded, "every
indication in the record points the other way." 220 U.S.App.D.C. at
198, 80 F.2d at 234. [ Footnote
20 ] Page 463 U. S. 57 We see no basis for equating the two devices: the continuous
belt, unlike the ignition interlock, does not interfere with the
operation of the vehicle. More importantly, it is the agency's
responsibility, not this Court's, to explain its decision. VI "An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change,
either with or without a change in circumstances. But an agency
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis. . . ." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 143
U.S.App.D.C. 383, 394, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (1970) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). We do not accept all of
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, but we do conclude that the
agency has failed to supply the requisite "reasoned analysis" in
this case. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the cases to that court with directions to
remand the matter to the NHTSA for further consideration consistent
with this opinion. [ Footnote
21 ] So ordered. * Together with No. 82-365, Consumer Alert et al. v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al.; and No. 82-398, United States Department of Transportation et al. v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al., also on certiorari to
the same court.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															National Safety Council, 1982 Motor Vehicle Deaths By States
(May 16, 1983).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															The Senate Committee on Commerce reported:

															"The promotion of motor vehicle safety through voluntary
standards has largely failed. The unconditional imposition of
mandatory standards at the earliest practicable date is the only
course commensurate with the highway death and injury toll."

															S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1966).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															The Secretary's general authority to promulgate safety standards
under the Act has been delegated to the Administrator of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 49 CFR §
1.50(a) (1982). This opinion will use the terms NHTSA and agency
interchangeably when referring to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the
Secretary of Transportation.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															Early in the process, it was assumed that passive occupant
protection meant the installation of inflatable airbag restraint
systems. See 34 Fed.Reg. 11148 (1969). In 1971, however,
the agency observed that "[s]ome belt-based concepts have been
advanced that appear to be capable of meeting the complete passive
protection options," leading it to add a new section to the
proposed standard "[t]o deal expressly with passive belts." 36
Fed.Reg. 12859.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The court did hold that the testing procedures required of
passive belts did not satisfy the Act's requirement that standards
be "objective." 472 F.2d at 675.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Because such a passive restraint standard was not technically in
effect at this time due to the Sixth Circuit's invalidation of the
testing requirements, see n 5, supra, the issue was not submitted to
Congress until a passive restraint requirement was reimposed by
Secretary Adams in 1977. To comply with the Amendments, NHTSA
proposed new warning systems to replace the prohibited continuous
buzzers. 39 Fed.Reg. 42692 (1974). More significantly, NHTSA was
forced to rethink an earlier decision which contemplated use of the
interlocks in tandem with detachable belts. See n 13, infra. [ Footnote 7 ]

															No action was taken by the full House of Representatives. The
Senate Committee with jurisdiction over NHTSA alternatively
endorsed the Standard, S.Rep. No. 96-481 (1977), and a resolution
of disapproval was tabled by the Senate. 123 Cong.Rec. 33332
(1977).

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															Judge Edwards did not join the majority's reasoning on these
points.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The Department of Transportation suggests that the arbitrary and
capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a
statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due
Process Clause. We do not view as equivalent the presumption of
constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the
presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its
statutory mandate.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															For example, an overwhelming majority of the Members of the
House of Representatives voted in favor of a proposal to bar NHTSA
from spending funds to administer an occupant restraint standard
unless the standard permitted the purchaser of the vehicle to
select manual, rather than passive, restraints. 125 Cong.Rec. 36926
(1979).

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															While NHTSA's 1970 passive restraint requirement permitted
compliance by means other than the airbag, 35 Fed.Reg. 16927,
"[t]his rule was a de facto air bag mandate, since no
other technologies were available to comply with the standard."
Graham & Gorham, NHTSA and Passive Restraints: A Case of
Arbitrary and Capricious Deregulation, 35 Ad.L.Rev.193, 197 (1983). See n 4, supra. [ Footnote 12 ]

															Although the agency suggested that passive restraint systems
contain an emergency release mechanism to allow easy extrication of
passengers in the event of an accident, the agency cautioned
that,

															"[i]n the case of passive safety belts, it would be required
that the release not cause belt separation, and that the system be
self-restoring after operation of the release."

															36 Fed.Reg. 12866 (1971).

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															In April, 1974, NHTSA adopted the suggestion of an automobile
manufacturer that emergency release of passive belts be
accomplished by a conventional latch -- provided the restraint
system was guarded by an ignition interlock and warning buzzer to
encourage reattachment of the passive belt. 39 Fed.Reg. 14593. When
the 1974 Amendments prohibited these devices, the agency simply
eliminated the interlock and buzzer requirements, but continued to
allow compliance by a detachable passive belt.

															[ Footnote 14 ] See, e.g., Comments of Chrysler Corp., Docket No.
69-07, Notice 11 (Aug. 5, 1971) (App. 2491); Chrysler Corp.
Memorandum on Proposed Alternative Changes to FMVSS 208, Docket No.
44, Notice 76-8 (1976) (App. 2241); General Motor Corp. Response to
the Dept. of Transportation Proposal on Occupant Crash Protection,
Docket No. 74-14, Notice 08 (May 27, 1977) (App. 1745). See
also Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d
659 (CA6 1972).

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															The Department of Transportation expresses concern that adoption
of an airbags-only requirement would have required a new notice of
proposed rulemaking. Even if this were so, and we need not decide
the question, it would not constitute sufficient cause to rescind
the passive restraint requirement. The Department also asserts that
it was reasonable to withdraw the requirement as written to avoid
forcing manufacturers to spend resources to comply with an
ineffective safety initiative. We think that it would have been
permissible for the agency to temporarily suspend the passive
restraint requirement or to delay its implementation date while an
airbag mandate was studied. But, as we explain in text, that option
had to be considered before the passive restraint requirement could
be revoked.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															Between 1975 and 1980, Volkswagen sold approximately 350,000
Rabbits equipped with detachable passive seatbelts that were
guarded by an ignition interlock. General Motors sold 8,000 1978
and 1979 Chevettes with a similar system, but eliminated the
ignition interlock on the 13,000 Chevettes sold in 1980. NHTSA
found that belt usage in the Rabbits averaged 34% for manual belts
and 84% for passive belts. RIA at IV-52, App. 108. For the
1978-1979 Chevettes, NHTSA calculated 34% usage for manual belts
and 72% for passive belts. On 1980 Chevettes, the agency found
these figures to be 31% for manual belts and 70% for passive belts. Ibid. [ Footnote 17 ]

															"NHTSA believes that the usage of automatic belts in Rabbits and
Chevettes would have been substantially lower if the automatic
belts in those cars were not equipped with a use-inducing device
inhibiting detachment."

															Notice 25, 46 Fed.Reg. 53422 (1981).

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															NHTSA commissioned a number of surveys of public attitudes in an
effort to better understand why people were not using manual belts
and to determine how they would react to passive restraints. The
surveys reveal that, while 20% to 40% of the public is opposed to
wearing manual belts, the larger proportion of the population does
not wear belts because they forgot or found manual belts
inconvenient or bothersome. RIA at IV-25, App. 81. In another
survey, 38% of the surveyed group responded that they would welcome
automatic belts, and 25% would "tolerate" them. See RIA at
IV-37, App. 93. NHTSA did not comment upon these attitude surveys
in its explanation accompanying the rescission of the passive
restraint requirement.

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															Four surveys of manual belt usage were conducted for NHTSA
between 1978 and 1980, leading the agency to report that 40% to 50%
of the people use their belts at least some of the time. RIA at
IV-25, App. 81.

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															The Court of Appeals noted previous agency statements
distinguishing interlocks from passive restraints. 42 Fed.Reg.
34290 (1977); 36 Fed.Reg. 8296 (1971); RIA at II-4, App. 30.

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															Petitioners construe the Court of Appeals' order of August 4,
1982, as setting an implementation date for Standard 208, in
violation of Vermont Yankee's injunction against imposing
such time constraints. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.
S. 519 , 435 U. S.
544 -545 (1978). Respondents maintain that the Court of
Appeals simply stayed the effective date of Standard 208, which,
not having been validly rescinded, would have required mandatory
passive restraints for new cars after September 1, 1982. We need
not choose between these views, because the agency had sufficient
justification to suspend, although not to rescind, Standard 208,
pending the further consideration required by the Court of Appeals,
and now, by us.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE POWELL,
and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

															I join Parts I, II, III, IV, and V-A of the Court's opinion. In
particular, I agree that, since the airbag and continuous Page 463 U. S. 58 spool automatic seatbelt were explicitly approved in the
Standard the agency was rescinding, the agency should explain why
it declined to leave those requirements intact. In this case, the
agency gave no explanation at all. Of course, if the agency can
provide a rational explanation, it may adhere to its decision to
rescind the entire Standard.

															I do not believe, however, that NHTSA's view of detachable
automatic seatbelts was arbitrary and capricious. The agency
adequately explained its decision to rescind the Standard insofar
as it was satisfied by detachable belts.

															The statute that requires the Secretary of Transportation to
issue motor vehicle safety standards also requires that "[e]ach
such . . . standard shall be practicable [and] shall meet the need
for motor vehicle safety." 16 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V).
The Court rejects the agency's explanation for its conclusion that
there is substantial uncertainty whether requiring installation of
detachable automatic belts would substantially increase seatbelt
usage. The agency chose not to rely on a study showing a
substantial increase in seatbelt usage in cars equipped with
automatic seatbelts and an ignition interlock to prevent the car
from being operated when the belts were not in place and which were
voluntarily purchased with this equipment by consumers. See
ante at 463 U. S. 53 , n.
16. It is reasonable for the agency to decide that this study does
not support any conclusion concerning the effect of automatic
seatbelts that are installed in all cars, whether the consumer
wants them or not, and are not linked to an ignition interlock
system.

															The Court rejects this explanation because "there would seem to
be grounds to believe that seatbelt use by occasional users will be
substantially increased by the detachable passive belts," ante at 463 U. S. 54 ,
and the agency did not adequately explain its rejection of these
grounds. It seems to me that the agency's explanation, while by no
means a model, is adequate. The agency acknowledged that there
would probably be some increase in belt usage, but concluded that
the increase would be small, and not worth the cost of
mandatory Page 463 U. S. 59 detachable automatic belts. 46 Fed.Reg. 53421-53423 (1981). The
agency's obligation is to articulate a " rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.'" Ante at 463 U. S. 42 , 463 U. S. 52 ,
quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156 , 371 U. S. 168 (1962). I believe it has met this standard. The agency explicitly stated that it will increase its
educational efforts in an attempt to promote public understanding,
acceptance, and use of passenger restraint systems. 46 Fed.Reg.
53425 (1981). It also stated that it will

															"initiate efforts with automobile manufacturers to ensure that
the public will have [automatic crash protection] technology
available. If this does not succeed, the agency will consider
regulatory action to assure that the last decade's enormous
advances in crash protection technology will not be lost." Id. at 53426.

															The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to
the election of a new President of a different political party. It
is readily apparent that the responsible members of one
administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to
be more important than do their counterparts in a previous
administration. A change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its
programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the
bounds established by Congress,* it is entitled to assess
administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the
philosophy of the administration.

															* Of course, a new administration may not refuse to enforce laws
of which it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in
carrying out its regulatory functions. But in this case, as the
Court correctly concludes, ante at 463 U. S. 44 -46,
Congress has not required the agency to require passive
restraints.