U.S. Supreme Court California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386 (1985) California v. Carney No. 83-859 Argued October 30,
1984 Decided May 13, 1985 471
U.S. 386 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA Syllabus A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent, who had
information that respondent's mobile motor home was being used to
exchange marihuana for sex, watched respondent approach a youth who
accompanied respondent to the motor home, which was parked in a lot
in downtown San Diego. The agent and other agents then kept the
vehicle under surveillance, and stopped the youth after he left the
vehicle. He told them that he had received marihuana in return for
allowing respondent sexual contacts. At the agents' request, the
youth returned to the motor home and knocked on the door;
respondent stepped out. Without a warrant or consent, one agent
then entered the motor home and observed marihuana. A subsequent
search of the motor home at the police station revealed additional
marihuana, and respondent was charged with possession of marihuana
for sale. After his motion to suppress the evidence discovered in
the motor home was denied, respondent was convicted in California
Superior Court on a plea of nolo contendere. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the search of the motor home was
unreasonable and that the motor vehicle exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment did not apply, because
expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those in a
dwelling than in an automobile. Held: The warrantless search of respondent's motor home
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 471 U. S.
390 -395.

															(a) When a vehicle is being used on the highways or is capable
of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used
for residential purposes, the two justifications for the vehicle
exception come into play. First, the vehicle is readily mobile,
and, second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on
highways. Here, while respondent's vehicle possessed some
attributes of a home, it clearly falls within the vehicle
exception. To distinguish between respondent's motor home and an
ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require
that the exception be applied depending on the size of the vehicle
and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to apply the
exception to vehicles such as a motor home would ignore the fact
that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument of
illicit drug traffic or other illegal activity. Pp. 471 U. S.
390 -394. Page 471 U. S. 387 (b) The search in question was not unreasonable. It was one that
a magistrate could have authorized if presented with the facts. The
DEA agents, based on uncontradicted evidence that respondent was
distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle, had abundant
probable cause to enter and search the vehicle. Pp. 471 U. S.
394 -395. 34 Cal. 3d
597 , 668 P.2d 807 ,
reversed and remanded.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 471 U. S.
395 .

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari to decide whether law enforcement agents
violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless
search, based on probable cause, of a fully mobile "motor home"
located in a public place. I On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency Agent Robert Williams
watched respondent, Charles Carney, approach Page 471 U. S. 388 a youth in downtown San Diego. The youth accompanied Carney to a
Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a nearby lot. Carney and the youth
closed the window shades in the motor home, including one across
the front window. Agent Williams had previously received
uncorroborated information that the same motor home was used by
another person who was exchanging marihuana for sex. Williams, with
assistance from other agents, kept the motor home under
surveillance for the entire one and one-quarter hours that Carney
and the youth remained inside. When the youth left the motor home,
the agents followed and stopped him. The youth told the agents that
he had received marihuana in return for allowing Carney sexual
contacts.

															At the agents' request, the youth returned to the motor home and
knocked on its door; Carney stepped out. The agents identified
themselves as law enforcement officers. Without a warrant or
consent, one agent entered the motor home and observed marihuana,
plastic bags, and a scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a
table. Agent Williams took Carney into custody and took possession
of the motor home. A subsequent search of the motor home at the
police station revealed additional marihuana in the cupboards and
refrigerator.

															Respondent was charged with possession of marihuana for sale. At
a preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered
in the motor home. The Magistrate denied the motion, upholding the
initial search as a justifiable search for other persons, and the
subsequent search as a routine inventory search.

															Respondent renewed his suppression motion in the Superior Court.
The Superior Court also rejected the claim, holding that there was
probable cause to arrest respondent, that the search of the motor
home was authorized under the automobile exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, and that the motor home itself
could be seized without a warrant as an instrumentality of the
crime. Respondent Page 471 U. S. 389 then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges against
him, and was placed on probation for three years.

															Respondent appealed from the order placing him on probation. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning that the vehicle
exception applied to respondent's motor home. 117 Cal. App. 3d
36 , 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).

															The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 34 Cal. 3d
597 , 668 P.2d 807 (1983). The Supreme Court did not disagree with the conclusion of
the trial court that the agents had probable cause to arrest
respondent and to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a
crime; however, the court held that the search was unreasonable
because no warrant was obtained, rejecting the State's argument
that the vehicle exception to the warrant requirement should apply.
[ Footnote 1 ] That court reached
its decision by concluding that the mobility of a vehicle "is no
longer the prime justification for the automobile exception;
rather, the answer lies in the diminished expectation of
privacy which surrounds the automobile.'" Id. at 605, 668
P.2d at 811. The California Supreme Court held that the
expectations of privacy in a motor home are more like those in a
dwelling than in an automobile because the primary function of
motor homes is not to provide transportation but to "provide the
occupant with living quarters." Id. at 606, 668 P.2d at
812. We granted certiorari, 465 U.S. 1098 (1984). We reverse. Page 471 U. S. 390 II The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." This fundamental right is
preserved by a requirement that searches be conducted pursuant to a
warrant issued by an independent judicial officer. There are, of
course, exceptions to the general rule that a warrant must be
secured before a search is undertaken; one is the so-called
"automobile exception" at issue in this case. This exception to the
warrant requirement was first set forth by the Court 60 years ago
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 (1925). There, the Court recognized that the
privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected;
however, it held that the ready mobility of the automobile
justifies a lesser degree of protection of those interests. The
Court rested this exception on a long-recognized distinction
between stationary structures and vehicles:

															"[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically
since the beginning of Government, as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may
be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought." Id. at 267 U. S. 153 (emphasis added).

															The capacity to be "quickly moved" was clearly the basis of the
holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently
recognized ready mobility as one of the principal bases of the
automobile exception. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 , 386 U. S. 59 (1967); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S.
42 , 399 U. S. 52 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.
S. 433 , 413 U. S. 442 (1973); Page 471 U. S. 391 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 , 417 U. S. 588 (1974); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.
S. 364 , 428 U. S. 367 (1976). In Chambers, for example, commenting on the
rationale for the vehicle exception, we noted that "the opportunity
to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable." 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 51 .
More recently, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 , 456 U. S. 806 (1982), we once again emphasized that "an immediate intrusion is
necessary" because of "the nature of an automobile in transit. . .
." The mobility of automobiles, we have observed, "creates
circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity,
rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible." South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, at 429 U. S.
367 .

															However, although ready mobility alone was perhaps the original
justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made
clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception.
The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said, are twofold.
428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
367 .

															"Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant
requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect
to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to
one's home or office." Ibid. Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile,
the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a
readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular
exception. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. In some
cases, the configuration of the vehicle contributed to the lower
expectations of privacy; for example, we held in Cardwell v.
Lewis, supra, at 9417 U.S. 590590, that, because the passenger
compartment of a standard automobile is relatively open to plain
view, there are lesser expectations of privacy. But even when
enclosed "repository" areas have been involved, we have concluded
that the lesser expectations of privacy warrant application of the
exception. We have applied the exception in the context of a locked
car trunk, Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, a sealed package in
a car trunk, Ross, supra, a closed compartment under the
dashboard, Chambers Page 471 U. S.
392 v. Maroney, supra, the interior of a vehicle's
upholstery, Carroll, supra, or sealed packages inside a
covered pickup truck, United States v. Johns, 469 U.
S. 478 (1985).

															These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact
that the area to be searched is in plain view, but from the
pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways. Cady v. Dombrowsk, supra, at 413 U. S.
440 -441. As we explained in South Dakota v.
Opperman, an inventory search case:

															"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and
continuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic
inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence,
police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection
stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust
fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other
safety equipment are not in proper working order."

															428 U.S. at 428 U. S.
368 .

															The public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in
its automobiles because of this compelling governmental need for
regulation. Historically,

															"individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels
may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause
that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection
afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts." Ross, supra, at 456 U. S. 806 ,
n. 8. In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which
necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the
exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without
prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the
overriding standard of probable cause is met.

															When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is
readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not
regularly used for residential purposes -- temporary or otherwise
-- the two justifications for the vehicle exception Page 471 U. S. 393 come into play. [ Footnote 2 ]
First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an
ignition key, if not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced
expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor
vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a
fixed dwelling. At least in these circumstances, the overriding
societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an
immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become
unavailable.

															While it is true that respondent's vehicle possessed some, if
not many of the attributes of a home, it is equally clear that the
vehicle falls clearly within the scope of the exception laid down
in Carroll and applied in succeeding cases. Like the
automobile in Carroll, respondent's motor home was readily
mobile. Absent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily have
been moved beyond the reach of the police. Furthermore, the vehicle
was licensed to "operate on public streets; [was] serviced in
public places; . . . and [was] subject to extensive regulation and
inspection." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
S. 128 , 439 U. S. 154 ,
n. 2 (1978) (POWELL, J., concurring). And the vehicle was so
situated that an objective observer would conclude that it was
being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle.

															Respondent urges us to distinguish his vehicle from other
vehicles within the exception because it was capable of
functioning as a home. In our increasingly mobile society,
many vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not
only for transportation but for shelter, i.e., as a "home"
or "residence." To distinguish between respondent's motor home and
an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would
require that we apply the exception depending upon the size of the
vehicle and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to
apply the exception to vehicles Page 471 U. S. 394 such as a motor home ignores the fact that a motor home lends
itself easily to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and
other illegal activity. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
at 456 U. S. 822 ,
we declined to distinguish between "worthy" and "unworthy"
containers, noting that "the central purpose of the Fourth
Amendment forecloses such a distinction." We decline today to
distinguish between "worthy" and "unworthy" vehicles which are
either on the public roads and highways, or situated such that it
is reasonable to conclude that the vehicle is not being used as a
residence.

															Our application of the vehicle exception has never turned on the
other uses to which a vehicle might be put. The exception has
historically turned on the ready mobility of the vehicle, and on
the presence of the vehicle in a setting that objectively indicates
that the vehicle is being used for transportation. [ Footnote 3 ] These two requirements for
application of the exception ensure that law enforcement officials
are not unnecessarily hamstrung in their efforts to detect and
prosecute criminal activity, and that the legitimate privacy
interests of the public are protected. Applying the vehicle
exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes
served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the
exception will acknowledge legitimate privacy interests. III The question remains whether, apart from the lack of a warrant,
this search was unreasonable. Under the vehicle exception to the
warrant requirement, "[o]nly the prior approval of the magistrate
is waived; the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate
could authorize." Ross, supra, at 456 U. S.
823 . Page 471 U. S. 395 This search was not unreasonable; it was plainly one that the
magistrate could authorize if presented with these facts. The DEA
agents had fresh, direct, uncontradicted evidence that the
respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the
vehicle, apart from evidence of other possible offenses. The agents
thus had abundant probable cause to enter and search the vehicle
for evidence of a crime notwithstanding its possible use as a
dwelling place.

															The judgment of the California Supreme Court is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion. It is so ordered. [ Footnote 1 ]

															Respondent contends that the state court decision rests on an
adequate and independent state ground, because the opinion refers
to the State as well as the Federal Constitution. Respondent's
argument is clearly foreclosed by our opinion in Michigan v.
Long, 463 U. S. 1032 , 463 U. S.
1040 -1041 (1983), in which we held,

															"when . . . a state court decision fairly appears to rest
primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law,
and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law
ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the
case the way it did because it believed that federal law required
it to do so."

															We read the opinion as resting on federal law.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															With few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the
vehicle exception to vehicles other than automobiles. See,
e.g., United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530 (CA11)
(airplane), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															We need not pass on the application of the vehicle exception to
a motor home that is situated in a way or place that objectively
indicates that it is being used as a residence. Among the factors
that might be relevant in determining whether a warrant would be
required in such a circumstance is its location, whether the
vehicle is readily mobile or instead, for instance, elevated on
blocks, whether the vehicle is licensed, whether it is connected to
utilities, and whether it has convenient access to a public
road.

															JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL
join, dissenting.

															The character of "the place to be searched" [ Footnote 2/1 ] plays an important role in Fourth
Amendment analysis. In this case, police officers searched a
Dodge/Midas Mini Motor Home. The California Supreme Court correctly
characterized this vehicle as a "hybrid" which combines "the
mobility attribute of an automobile . . . with most of the privacy
characteristics of a house." [ Footnote
2/2 ]

															The hybrid character of the motor home places it at the
crossroads between the privacy interests that generally forbid
warrantless invasions of the home, Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S.
585 -590 (1980), and the law enforcement interests that
support the exception for warrantless searches of automobiles based
on probable cause, United States v. Ross, 456 U.
S. 798 , 456 U. S. 806 , 456 U. S. 820 (1982). By choosing to follow the latter route, the Court errs in
three respects: it has entered new Page 471 U. S. 396 territory prematurely, it has accorded priority to an exception,
rather than to the general rule, and it has abandoned the limits on
the exception imposed by prior cases. I In recent Terms, the Court has displayed little confidence in
state and lower federal court decisions that purport to enforce the
Fourth Amendment. Unless an order suppressing evidence is clearly
correct, a petition for certiorari is likely to garner the four
votes required for a grant of plenary review -- as the one in this
case did. Much of the Court's "burdensome" workload is a product of
its own aggressiveness in this area. By promoting the Supreme Court
of the United States as the High Magistrate for every warrantless
search and seizure, this practice has burdened the argument docket
with cases presenting fact-bound errors of minimal significance.
[ Footnote 2/3 ] It has also
encouraged state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari in
even the most frivolous search and seizure cases. [ Footnote 2/4 ]

															The Court's lack of trust in lower judicial authority has
resulted in another improvident exercise of discretionary Page 471 U. S. 397 jurisdiction. [ Footnote 2/5 ] In
what is at most only a modest extension of our Fourth Amendment
precedents, the California Supreme Court held that police officers
may not conduct a nonexigent search of a motor home without a
warrant supported by probable cause. The State of California filed
a petition for certiorari contending that the decision below
conflicted with the authority of other jurisdictions. [ Footnote 2/6 ] Even a cursory examination of
the cases alleged to be in conflict revealed that they did not
consider the question presented here. [ Footnote 2/7 ] Page 471 U. S. 398 This is not a case "in which an American citizen has been
deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a
federal statute. Rather, . . . a state court has upheld a citizen's
assertion of a right, finding the citizen to be protected under
both federal and state law." Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 , 463 U. S.
1067 -1068 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). As an
unusually perceptive study of this Court's docket stated with
reference to California v. Ramos, 463 U.
S. 992 (1983), "this . . . situation . . . rarely
presents a compelling reason for Court review in the absence of a
fully percolated conflict." [ Footnote
2/8 ] The Court's decision to forge ahead Page 471 U. S. 399 has established a rule for searching motor homes that is to be
followed by the entire Nation. If the Court had merely allowed the
decision below to stand, it would have only governed searches of
those vehicles in a single State. The breadth of this Court's
mandate counsels greater patience before we offer our binding
judgment on the meaning of the Constitution.

															Premature resolution of the novel question presented has stunted
the natural growth and refinement of alternative principles.
Despite the age of the automobile exception and the countless cases
in which it has been applied, we have no prior cases defining the
contours of a reasonable search in the context of hybrids such as
motor homes, house trailers, houseboats, or yachts. In this case,
the Court can barely glimpse the diverse lifestyles associated with
recreational vehicles and mobile living quarters. [ Footnote 2/9 ] The line or lines separating mobile
homes from permanent structures might have been drawn in various
ways, with consideration given to whether the home is moving or at
rest, whether it rests on land or water, the form of the vehicle's
attachment to its location, its potential speed of departure, its
size and capacity to serve as a domicile, and its method of
locomotion. Rational decisionmaking strongly counsels against
divining the uses and abuses of these vehicles in the vacuum of the
first case raising the question before us.

															Of course, we may not abdicate our responsibility to clarify the
law in this field. Some caution, however, is justified when every
decision requires us to resolve a vexing "conflict . . . between
the individual's constitutionally protected interest in privacy and
the public interest in effective law enforcement." United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 804 .
"The certainty that is supposed to come from speedy resolution Page 471 U. S. 400 may prove illusory if a premature decision raises more questions
than it answers." [ Footnote 2/10 ]
The only true rules governing search and seizure have been
formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case
adjudication. Consideration of this matter by the lower courts in a
series of litigated cases would surely have facilitated a reasoned
accommodation of the conflicting interests. To identify rules that
will endure, we must rely on the state and lower federal courts to
debate and evaluate the different approaches to difficult and
unresolved questions of constitutional law. [ Footnote 2/11 ] Deliberation on the question over time
winnows out the unnecessary Page 471 U. S. 401 and discordant elements of doctrine and preserves "whatever is
pure and sound and fine." [ Footnote
2/12 ] II The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures." We have interpreted this
language to provide law enforcement officers with a bright-line
standard:

															"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically
established and well delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.
S. 347 , 389 U. S. 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 , 442 U. S. 758 (1979).

															In United States v. Ross, the Court reaffirmed the
primary importance of the general rule condemning warrantless
searches, and emphasized that the exception permitting the search
of automobiles without a warrant is a narrow one. 456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
824 -825. We expressly endorsed "the general rule,"
stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.
S. 132 , 267 U. S. 156 (1925), that, " [i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonably practicable, it must be used.'" 456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 807 .
Given this warning and the presumption of regularity that attaches
to a warrant, [ Footnote 2/13 ] it
is hardly unrealistic to expect experienced law enforcement
officers to obtain a search warrant when one can easily be
secured. The ascendancy of the warrant requirement in our system of
justice must not be bullied aside by extravagant claims of
necessity:

															""The warrant requirement . . . is not an inconvenience to be
somehow weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It
is, or should be, an important working part Page 471 U. S.
402 of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of
course to check the `well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous
executive officers' who are a part of any system of law
enforcement." [ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 , 403 U. S. 481 (1971).]" ". . . By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause
and the scope of a search"

															"be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime"

															" Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 14 (1948), we
minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive
authority." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 442 U. S.
758 -759. If the motor home were parked in the exact
middle of the intersection between the general rule and the
exception for automobiles, priority should be given to the rule,
rather than the exception. III The motor home, however, was not parked in the middle of that
intersection. Our prior cases teach us that inherent mobility is
not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an exception
to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened
expectations of privacy in the location searched. Motor homes, by
their common use and construction, afford their owners a
substantial and legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell
within. When a motor home is parked in a location that is removed
from the public highway, I believe that society is prepared to
recognize that the expectations of privacy within it are not unlike
the expectations one has in a fixed dwelling. As a general rule,
such places may only be searched with a warrant based upon probable
cause. Warrantless searches of motor homes are only reasonable when
the motor home is traveling on the public streets or highways, or
when exigent circumstances otherwise require an immediate search
without the expenditure of time necessary to obtain a warrant. Page 471 U. S. 403 As we explained in Ross, the automobile exception is
the product of a long history:

															"[S]ince its earliest days, Congress had recognized the
impracticability of securing a warrant in cases involving the
transportation of contraband goods. It is this impracticability,
viewed in historical perspective, that provided the basis for the Carroll decision. Given the nature of an automobile in
transit, the Court recognized that an immediate intrusion is
necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.
In this class of cases, the Court held that a warrantless search of
an automobile is not unreasonable."

															456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
806 -807 (footnotes omitted). [ Footnote 2/14 ] The automobile exception has been
developed to ameliorate the practical problems associated with the
search of vehicles that have been stopped on the streets or public
highways because there was probable cause to believe they were
transporting contraband. Until today, however, the Court has never
decided whether the practical justifications that apply to a
vehicle that is stopped in transit on a public way apply with the
same force to a vehicle parked in a lot near a courthouse where it
could easily be detained while a warrant is issued. [ Footnote 2/15 ] Page 471 U. S. 404 In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot
only a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where
dozens of magistrates were available to entertain a warrant
application. [ Footnote 2/16 ] The
officers clearly had the element of surprise with them, and with
curtains covering the windshield, the motor home offered no
indication of any imminent departure. The officers plainly had
probable cause to arrest the respondent and search the motor home,
and, on this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe
harbor of a warrant. [ Footnote
2/17 ]

															In the absence of any evidence of exigency in the circumstances
of this case, the Court relies on the inherent mobility of the
motor home to create a conclusive presumption of exigency. This
Court, however, has squarely held that mobility of the place to be
searched is not a sufficient justification for abandoning the
warrant requirement. In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977),
the Court held that a warrantless search of a footlocker violated
the Fourth Amendment even Page 471 U. S. 405 though there was ample probable cause to believe it contained
contraband. The Government had argued that the rationale of the
automobile exception applied to movable containers in general, and
that the warrant requirement should be limited to searches of homes
and other "core" areas of privacy. See id. at 433 U. S. 7 . We
categorically rejected the Government's argument, observing that
there are greater privacy interests associated with containers than
with automobiles, [ Footnote 2/18 ]
and that there are less practical problems associated with the
temporary detention of a container than with the detention of an
automobile. See id. at 433 U. S. 13 , and
n. 7.

															We again endorsed that analysis in Ross: "The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the
argument that the warrantless search was 'reasonable' because a
footlocker has some of the mobile characteristics that support
warrantless searches of automobiles. The Court recognized that 'a
person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are
substantially greater than in an automobile,' [433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 13 ], and noted that
the practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a
piece of luggage during the period of time necessary to obtain a
warrant are significantly less than those associated with the
detention of an automobile. Id. at 433 U. S.
13 , n.7."

															456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 811 .
It is perfectly obvious that the citizen has a much greater
expectation of privacy concerning the interior of a mobile home
than of a piece of luggage such as a footlocker. If "inherent
mobility" does not justify warrantless searches Page 471 U. S. 406 of containers, it cannot rationally provide a sufficient
justification for the search of a person's dwelling place.

															Unlike a brick bungalow or a frame Victorian, a motor home
seldom serves as a permanent lifetime abode. The motor home in this
case, however, was designed to accommodate a breadth of ordinary
everyday living. Photographs in the record indicate that its
height, length, and beam provided substantial living space inside:
stuffed chairs surround a table; cupboards provide room for storage
of personal effects; bunk beds provide sleeping space; and a
refrigerator provides ample space for food and beverages. [ Footnote 2/19 ] Moreover, curtains and
large opaque walls inhibit viewing the activities inside from the
exterior of the vehicle. The interior configuration of the motor
home establishes that the vehicle's size, shape, and mode of
construction should have indicated to the officers that it was a
vehicle containing mobile living quarters.

															The State contends that officers in the field will have an
impossible task determining whether or not other vehicles contain
mobile living quarters. It is not necessary for the Court to
resolve every unanswered question in this area in a single case,
but common English usage suggests that we already distinguish
between a "motor home" which is "equipped as a self-contained
traveling home," a "camper" which is only equipped for "casual
travel and camping," and an automobile which is "designed for
passenger transportation." [ Footnote
2/20 ] Surely the exteriors of these vehicles contain clues
about their different functions which could alert officers in the
field to the necessity of a warrant. [ Footnote 2/21 ] Page 471 U. S. 407 The California Vehicle Code also refutes the State's argument
that the exclusion of "motor homes" from the automobile exception
would be impossible to apply in practice. In its definitional
section, the Code distinguishes campers and house cars from station
wagons, and suggests that they are special categories of the more
general terms -- motor vehicles and passenger vehicles. [ Footnote 2/22 ] A "house car" is

															"a motor vehicle originally designed, or permanently altered,
and equipped for human habitation, or to which a camper has been
permanently attached. [ Footnote
2/23 ]"

															Alcoholic beverages may not be opened or consumed in motor
vehicles traveling on the highways, except in the "living quarters
of a housecar or camper." [ Footnote
2/24 ]

															The same definitions might not necessarily apply in the context
of the Fourth Amendment, but they do indicate that descriptive
distinctions are humanly possible. They also reflect the California
Legislature's judgment that "house cars" entertain different kinds
of activities than the ordinary passenger vehicle.

															In my opinion, searches of places that regularly accommodate a
wide range of private human activity are fundamentally different
from searches of automobiles which primarily serve a public
transportation function. [ Footnote
2/25 ] Although it may not be a castle, a motor home is usually
the functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and
retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin. These places may
be as spartan Page 471 U. S. 408 as a humble cottage when compared to the most majestic mansion,
456 U.S. at 456 U. S. 822 ; ante at 471 U. S. 393 ,
but the highest and most legitimate expectations of privacy
associated with these temporary abodes should command the respect
of this Court. Stoner v. California, 376 U.
S. 483 , 376 U. S. 490 (1964); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 585 ; United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 , 468 U. S.
714 -715 (1984). [ Footnote
2/26 ] In my opinion, a warrantless search of living quarters in
a motor home is "presumptively unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances." Ibid. I respectfully dissent.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Fourth Amendment provides:

															"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."

															[ Footnote 2/2 ] 34 Cal. 3d
597 , 606, 668 P.2d 807 ,
812 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] E.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.
S. 478 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 (1985); Oklahoma v. Castleberry, ante p. 146. Cf.
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U. S. 1 , 469 U. S. 12 -13
(1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN, J.).

															[ Footnote 2/4 ] See, e.g., State v. Caponi, 12 Ohio St.3d 302, 466
N.E.2d 551 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985). The
Court's inventiveness in the search and seizure area has also
emboldened state legal officers to file petitions for certiorari
from state court suppression orders that are explicitly based on
independent state grounds. See, e.g., Jamison v. State, 455 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.App.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.
S. 1127 (1985); Ex parte
Gannaway, 448 So. 2d
413 (Ala.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985); State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St.3d 205, 466 N.E.2d 176, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1062 (1984); People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20 (Colo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855 (1984); State v.
Von Bulow, 475 A.2d
995 (R.I.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875 (1984).

															[ Footnote 2/5 ] Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 , 463 U. S.
1065 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); California v.
Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 , 463 U. S.
1029 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U. S. 36 , 462 U. S. 72 -73
(1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259 , 451 U. S. 273 (1981) (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also Stevens, Some
Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66 Judicature 177, 182 (1982).

															[ Footnote 2/6 ]

															Pet. for Cert. 15-17, 21, 24-25. The petition acknowledged that
the decision below was consistent with dictum in two recent Ninth
Circuit decisions. See United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d
1325, 1329 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982); United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1980).

															[ Footnote 2/7 ]

															Only one case contained any reference to heightened expectations
of privacy in mobile living quarters. United States v.
Cadena, 588 F.2d 100, 101-102 (CA5 1979) (per curiam).
Analogizing to automobile cases, the court upheld the warrantless
search of an oceangoing ship while in transit. The court observed
that the mobility "exception" required probable cause and exigency,
and that

															"the increased measure of privacy that may be expected by those
aboard a vessel mandates careful scrutiny both of probable cause
for the search and the exigency of the circumstances excusing the
failure to secure a warrant." Id. at 102.

															In all of the other cases, defendants challenged warrantless
searches for vehicles claiming either no probable cause or the
absence of exigency under Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 760
(CA10) ("camper"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 882 (1980); United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 423-425 (CA5)
("camper pick-up truck"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977); United States v. Lovenguth, 514 F.2d 96, 97 (CA9
1975) ("pick up with . . . camper top"); United States v.
Cusanelli, 472 F.2d 1204, 1206 (CA6) (per curiam) (two camper
trucks), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973); United
States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582, 585-586 (CA10 1972) ("motor
home"); United States v. Rodgers, 442 F.2d 902, 904 (CA5
1971) ("camper truck"); State v. Million, 120 Ariz. 10,
15-16, 583 P.2d 897 ,
902-903 (1978) ("motor home"); State v. Sardo, 112 Ariz.
509, 513-514, 543 P.2d 1138 ,
1142 (1975) ("motor home"). Only Sardo involved a vehicle
that was not in transit, but the motor home in that case was about
to depart the premises.

															Two State Supreme Courts have upheld the warrantless search of
mobile homes in transit, notwithstanding a claim of heightened
privacy interests. See State v. Mower, 407 A.2d
729 , 732 (Me.1979); State v. Lepley, 343 N.W.2d
41 , 42-43 (Minn.1984). Those cases -- which were not cited in
the petition for certiorari -- are factually distinguishable from
the search of the parked motor home here. In any case, some
conflict among state courts on novel questions of the kind involved
here is desirable as a means of exploring and refining alternative
approaches to the problem.

															[ Footnote 2/8 ]

															Estreicher & Sexton, New York University Supreme Court
Project, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities (1984) (to be published in 59 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 677,
761 (1984)). The study elaborated:

															"[T]he Court should not hear cases in which a state court has
invalidated state action on a federal ground in the absence of a
conflict or a decision to treat the case as a vehicle for a major
pronouncement of federal law. Without further percolation, there is
ordinarily little reason to believe that the issue is one of
recurring national significance. In general, correction of error,
even regarding a matter of constitutional law, is not a sufficient
basis for Supreme Court intervention. This last category differs
from a federal court's invalidation of state action in that a
structural justification for intervention is generally missing,
given the absence of vertical federalism difficulties and the
built-in assurance that state courts functioning under significant
political constraints are not likely to invalidate state action
lightly, even on federal grounds. . . . [The Court] should not
grant . . . merely to correct perceived error." Id. at 738-739 (footnote omitted). Chief Justice Samuel
Roberts, Retired, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, has expressed
similar concerns. Roberts, The Adequate and Independent State
Ground: Some Practical Considerations, 17 IJA Rep. No. 2, pp. 1-2
(1985).

															[ Footnote 2/9 ] See generally 45 Trailer Life, No. 1 (1985); id. No. 2; 22 Motor Home, No. 1 (1985); id. No.
2; 1 RV Lifestyle Magazine, No. 3 (1985).

															[ Footnote 2/10 ]

															Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will
It Work?, 11 Hastings Const.L.Q. 375, 405 (1984).

															[ Footnote 2/11 ]

															"Although one of the Court's roles is to ensure the uniformity
of federal law, we do not think that the Court must act to
eradicate disuniformity as soon as it appears. . . . Disagreement
in the lower courts facilitates percolation -- the independent
evaluation of a legal issue by different courts. The process of
percolation allows a period of exploratory consideration and
experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court ends the
process with a nationally binding rule. The Supreme Court, when it
decides a fully percolated issue, has the benefit of the experience
of those lower courts. Irrespective of docket capacity, the Court
should not be compelled to intervene to eradicate disuniformity
when further percolation or experimentation is desirable."

															" * * * *" "Our system is already committed in substantial measure to the
principle of percolation. This is one justification for the absence
of intercircuit stare decisis. Similarly, state and
federal courts daily engage in a process of 'dialectical
federalism' wherein state courts are not bound by the holdings of
lower federal courts in the same geographical area. But more than
past practice and the structure of the judicial system supports a
policy of awaiting percolation before Supreme Court intervention. A
managerial conception of the Court's role embraces lower court
percolation as an affirmative value. The views of the lower courts
on a particular legal issue provide the Supreme Court with a means
of identifying significant rulings as well as an experimental base
and a set of doctrinal materials with which to fashion sound
binding law. The occurrence of a conflict acts as a signaling
device to help the Court identify important issues. Moreover, the
principle of percolation encourages the lower courts to act as
responsible agents in the process of development of national
law."

															Estreicher & Sexton, supra, n. 8, at 716, 719
(footnotes omitted).

															[ Footnote 2/12 ]

															B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 179 (1921).

															[ Footnote 2/13 ] United States v. Leon, 468 U.
S. 897 , 468 U. S.
913 -914 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.
S. 213 , 462 U. S.
236 -237 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/14 ]

															"As we have stated, the decision in Carroll was based
on the Court's appraisal of practical considerations viewed in the
perspective of history."

															456 U.S. at 456 U. S.
820 .

															[ Footnote 2/15 ]

															In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 (1971), a plurality refused to apply the
automobile exception to an automobile that was seized while parked
in the driveway of the suspect's house, towed to a secure police
compound, and later searched:

															"The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. And surely there is
nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule
of Carroll v. United State -- no alerted criminal bent on
flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a
hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no
confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the
inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized
automobile. In short, by no possible stretch of the legal
imagination can this be made into a case where 'it is not
practicable to secure a warrant.' [267 U.S. at 267 U. S.
153 ,] and the 'automobile exception,' despite its label,
is simply irrelevant." Id. at 403 U. S.
461 -462 (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Douglas,
BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ.). In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U. S. 583 (1974), a different plurality approved the seizure of an automobile
from a public parking lot, and a later examination of its exterior. Id. at 417 U. S.
592 -594 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). Here, of course, we
are concerned with the reasonableness of the search, not the
seizure. Even if the diminished expectations of privacy associated
with an automobile justify the warrantless search of a parked
automobile notwithstanding the diminished exigency, the heightened
expectations of privacy in the interior of a motor home require a
different result.

															[ Footnote 2/16 ] See Suppression Hearing Tr. 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. In
addition, a telephonic warrant was only 20 cents and the nearest
phone booth away. See Cal.Penal Code Ann. §§ 1526(b),
1528(b) (West 1982); People v. Morroniello, 145 Cal. App. 3d
1 , 9, 193 Cal. Rptr.
105 , 109 (1983).

															[ Footnote 2/17 ]

															This willingness to search first and later seek justification
has properly been characterized as "a decision roughly comparable
in prudence to determining whether an electrical wire is charged by
grasping it." United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230,
1233 (CA5 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945
(1977).

															[ Footnote 2/18 ]

															"The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile
do not apply to respondent's footlocker. Luggage contents are not
open to public view, except as a condition to a border entry or
common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject to regular
inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an
automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is
intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's
expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially
greater than in an automobile."

															433 U.S. at 433 U. S. 13 .

															[ Footnote 2/19 ]

															Record, Ex. Nos. 102, 103.

															[ Footnote 2/20 ]

															Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 118, 199, 775
(1983).

															[ Footnote 2/21 ]

															In refusing to extend the California Supreme Court's decision in Carney beyond its context, the California Courts of Appeal
have had no difficulty in distinguishing the motor home involved
there from a Ford van, People v. Chestnut, 151 Cal. App.
3d 721 , 726-727, 198 Cal. Rptr.
8 , 11 (1983), and a cab-high camper shell on the back of a
pickup truck, People v. Gordon, 156 Cal. App. 3d
74 , 82 , 202 Cal. Rptr.
566 , 570 (1984). There is no reason to believe that trained
officers could not make similar distinctions between different
vehicles, especially when state vehicle laws already require them
to do so.

															[ Footnote 2/22 ]

															Cal.Veh.Code Ann. §§ 243, 362, 415, 465, 585 (West 1971 and
Supp.1985).

															[ Footnote 2/23 ]

															§ 362 (West 1971).

															[ Footnote 2/24 ]

															§§ 23221, 23223, 23225, 23226, 23229 (West Supp.1985).

															[ Footnote 2/25 ] Cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. at 417 U. S. 590 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.):

															"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation, and it seldom serves as
one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has
little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view."

															[ Footnote 2/26 ]

															"At the risk of belaboring the obvious, private residences are
places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that
expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable. Our cases have not deviated from this basic Fourth
Amendment principle. Searches and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances." United State v. Karo, 468 U.S. at 468 U. S.
714 -715.