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															SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 10–1211

															_________________

															PANAGIS VARTELAS, PETITIONER v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[March 28, 2012]

															Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court.

															Panagis Vartelas, a native of Greece, became a
lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989. He pleaded
guilty to a felony (conspiring to make a counterfeit security) in
1994, and served a prison sentence of four months for that offense.
Vartelas traveled to Greece in 2003 to visit his parents. On his
return to the United States a week later, he was treated as an
inadmissible alien and placed in removal proceedings. Under the law
governing at the time of Vartelas’ plea, an alien in his situation
could travel abroad for brief periods without jeopardizing his
resident alien status. See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13) (1988
ed.), as construed in Rosenberg v. Fleuti , 374 U.S.
449 (1963).

															In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
110Stat. 3009–546. That Act effectively precluded foreign travel by
lawful permanent residents who had a conviction like Vartelas’.
Under IIRIRA, such aliens, on return from a sojourn abroad, however
brief, may be permanently removed from the United States. See 8
U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v); §1182(a)(2).

															This case presents a question of retroactivity
not addressed by Congress: As to a lawful permanent resident
convicted of a crime before the effective date of IIRIRA, which
regime governs, the one in force at the time of the conviction, or
IIRIRA? If the former, Vartelas’ brief trip abroad would not
disturb his lawful permanent resident status. If the latter, he may
be denied reentry. We conclude that the relevant provision of
IIRIRA, §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), attached a new disability (denial of
reentry) in respect to past events (Vartelas’ pre-IIRIRA offense,
plea, and conviction). Guided by the deeply rooted presumption
against retroactive legislation, we hold that §1101(a)(13)(C)(v)
does not apply to Vartelas’ conviction. The impact of Vartelas’
brief travel abroad on his per- manent resident status is therefore
determined not by IIRIRA, but by the legal regime in force at the
time of his conviction.

															I

															A

															Before IIRIRA’s passage, United States
immigration law established “two types of proceedings in which
aliens can be denied the hospitality of the United States:
deportation hearings and exclusion hearings.” Landon v. Plasencia , 459 U.S.
21 , 25 (1982). Exclusion hearings were held for certain aliens
seeking entry to the United States, and deportation hearings were
held for certain aliens who had already entered this country. See ibid .

															Under this regime, “entry” into the United
States was defined as “any coming of an alien into the United
States, from a foreign port or place.” 8 U. S. C.
§1101(a)(13) (1988 ed.). The statute, however, provided an
exception for lawful permanent residents; aliens lawfully residing
here were not regarded as making an “entry” if their “departure to
a foreign port or place . . . was not intended or
reasonably to be expected by [them] or [their] presence in a
foreign port or place . . . was not voluntary.” Ibid. Interpreting this cryptic provision, we held in Fleuti , 374 U. S., at 461–462, that Congress did not
intend to exclude aliens long resident in the United States upon
their return from “innocent, casual, and brief excursion[s]
. . . outside this country’s borders.” Instead, the Court
determined, Congress meant to rank a once-permanent resident as a
new entrant only when the foreign excursion “meaningfully
interrupt[ed] . . . the alien’s [U. S.] residence.” Id., at 462. Absent such “disrupti[on]” of the alien’s
residency, the alien would not be “subject . . . to the
consequences of an ‘entry’ into the country on his return.” Ibid. [ 1 ]

															In IIRIRA, Congress abolished the distinction
between exclusion and deportation procedures and created a uniform
proceeding known as “removal.” See 8 U. S. C. §§1229,
1229a; Judulang v. Holder , 565 U. S. ___, ___
(2011) (slip op., at 1–2). Congress made “admission” the key word,
and defined admission to mean “the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspec- tion and authorization by an
immigration officer.” §1101(a)(13)(A). This alteration, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined, superseded Fleuti .
See In re Collado-Munoz , 21 I. & N. Dec. 1061,
1065–1066 (1998) (en banc).[ 2 ]
Thus, lawful permanent residents returning post-IIRIRA, like
Vartelas, may be required to “ ‘see[k] an admission’ into the
United States, without regard to whether the alien’s departure from
the United States might previously have been ranked as ‘brief,
casual, and innocent’ under the Fleuti doctrine.” Id. , at
1066.

															An alien seeking “admission” to the United
States is subject to various requirements, see, e.g. ,
§1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed “inadmissible” on
any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration stat- utes,
see §1182. Under IIRIRA, lawful permanent residents are regarded as
seeking admission into the United States if they fall into any of
six enumerated categories. §1101(a)(13)(C). Relevant here, the
fifth of these categories covers aliens who “ha[ve] committed an
offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title.”
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Offenses in this category include “a crime
involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense)
or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime.”
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i).

															In sum, before IIRIRA, lawful permanent
residents who had committed a crime of moral turpitude could, under
the Fleuti doctrine, return from brief trips abroad with-
out applying for admission to the United States. Under IIRIRA, such
residents are subject to admission procedures, and, potentially, to
removal from the United States on grounds of
inadmissibility.[ 3 ]

															B

															Panagis Vartelas, born and raised in Greece,
has resided in the United States for over 30 years. Originally
admitted on a student visa issued in 1979, Vartelas became a lawful
permanent resident in 1989. He currently lives in the New York area
and works as a sales manager for a roofing company.

															In 1992, Vartelas opened an auto body shop in
Queens, New York. One of his business partners used the shop’s
photocopier to make counterfeit travelers’ checks. Vartelas helped
his partner perforate the sheets into individual checks, but
Vartelas did not sell the checks or receive any money from the
venture. In 1994, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to make or
possess counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §371.
He was sentenced to four months’ incarceration, followed by two
years’ supervised release.

															Vartelas regularly traveled to Greece to visit
his aging parents in the years after his 1994 conviction; even
after the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, his return to the United
States from these visits remained uneventful. In January 2003,
however, when Vartelas returned from a week-long trip to Greece, an
immigration officer classified him as an alien seeking “admission.”
The officer based this classi- fication on Vartelas’ 1994
conviction. See United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith , 289 U.S.
422 , 423 (1933) (counterfeiting ranks as a crime of moral
turpitude).

															At Vartelas’ removal proceedings, his initial
attorney conceded removability, and requested discretionary relief
from removal under the former §212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA). See 8 U. S. C. §1182(c) (1994 ed.)
(repealed 1996). This attorney twice failed to appear for hearings
and once failed to submit a requested brief. Vartelas engaged a new
attorney, who continued to concede removability and to request
discretionary relief. The Immigration Judge denied the request for
relief, and ordered Vartelas removed to Greece. The BIA affirmed
the Immigration Judge’s decision.

															In July 2008, Vartelas filed with the BIA a
timely motion to reopen the removal proceedings, alleging that his
previous attorneys were ineffective for, among other lapses,
conceding his removability. He sought to withdraw the concession of
removability on the ground that IIRIRA’s new “admission” provision,
codified at §1101(a)(13), did not reach back to deprive him of
lawful resident status based on his pre-IIRIRA conviction. The BIA
denied the motion, declaring that Vartelas had not been prejudiced
by his lawyers’ performance, for no legal authority prevented the
application of IIRIRA to Vartelas’ pre-IIRIRA conduct.

															The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, agreeing that Vartelas had
failed to show he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly
ineffective performance. Rejecting Vartelas’ argument that IIRIRA
operated prospectively and therefore did not govern his case, the
Second Circuit reasoned that he had not relied on the prior legal
regime at the time he committed the disqualifying crime. See 620
F.3d 108, 118–120 (2010).

															In so ruling, the Second Circuit created a split
with two other Circuits. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held
that the new §1101(a)(13) may not be applied to lawful permanent
residents who committed crimes listed in §1182 (among them, crimes
of moral turpitude) prior to IIRIRA’s enactment. See Olatunji v. Ashcroft , 387 F.3d 383 (CA4 2004); Camins v. Gonzales , 500
F.3d 872 (CA9 2007). We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. ___ (2011),
to resolve the conflict among the Circuits.

															II

															As earlier explained, see supra , at
2–4, pre-IIRIRA, a resident alien who once committed a crime of
moral turpitude could travel abroad for short durations without
jeopardizing his status as a lawful permanent resident. Under
IIRIRA, on return from foreign travel, such an alien is treated as
a new arrival to our shores, and may be removed from the United
States. Vartelas does not question Congress’ authority to restrict
reentry in this manner. Nor does he contend that Congress could not
do so retroactively. Instead, he invokes the principle against
retro- active legislation, under which courts read laws as
prospective in application unless Congress has unambiguously
instructed retroactivity. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Products , 511 U.S.
244 , 263 (1994).

															The presumption against retroactive legislation,
the Court recalled in Landgraf , “embodies a legal doctrine
centuries older than our Republic.” Id ., at 265. Several
provisions of the Constitution, the Court noted, embrace the
doctrine, among them, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id ., at 266. Numerous decisions of this Court repeat the
classic formulation Justice Story penned for determining when
retrospective application of a law would collide with the doctrine.
It would do so, Story stated, when such application would “tak[e]
away or impai[r] vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creat[e] a new obligation, impos[e] a new duty, or attac[h] a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already
past.” Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler ,
22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814). See, e.g ., INS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S.
289 , 321 (2001) (invoking Story’s formulation); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer , 520 U.S.
939 , 947 (1997); Landgraf , 511 U. S., at
283.[ 4 ]

															Vartelas urges that applying IIRIRA to him,
rather than the law that existed at the time of his conviction,
would attach a “new disability,” effectively a ban on travel
outside the United States, “in respect to [events] . . .
already past,” i.e ., his offense, guilty plea, conviction,
and punishment, all occurring prior to the passage of IIRIRA. In
evaluating Vartelas’ argument, we note first a matter not disputed
by the Government: Congress did not expressly prescribe the
temporal reach of the IIRIRA provision in question, 8
U. S. C. §1101(a)(13). See Landgraf , 511
U. S., at 280 (Court asks first “whether Congress has
expressly prescribed [new §1101(a)(13)’s] proper reach”); Brief for
Respondent 11 (Court’s holding in INS v. St. Cyr , 533
U. S., at 317–320, “compels the conclusion that Congress has
not ‘expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach’ ”
(quoting Landgraf , 511 U. S., at 280)).[ 5 ] Several other provisions of IIRIRA, in
contrast to §1101(a)(13), expressly direct retroactive application, e.g ., 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43) (IIRIRA’s amendment
of the “aggravated felony” definition applies expressly to
“conviction[s] . . . entered before, on, or after” the
statute’s enactment date (internal quotation marks omitted)). See St. Cyr , 533 U. S., at 319–320, and n. 43 (setting out
further examples). Accordingly, we proceed to the dispositive
question whether, as Vartelas maintains, application of IIRIRA’s
travel restraint to him “would have retroactive effect” Congress
did not authorize. See Landgraf , 511 U. S., at 280.

															Vartelas presents a firm case for application of
the antiretroactivity principle. Neither his sentence, nor the
immigration law in effect when he was convicted and sentenced,
blocked him from occasional visits to his parents in Greece.
Current §1101(a)(13)(C)(v), if applied to him, would thus attach “a
new disability” to conduct over and done well before the
provision’s enactment.

															Beyond genuine doubt, we note, the restraint
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) places on lawful permanent residents like
Vartelas ranks as a “new disability.” Once able to journey abroad
to fulfill religious obligations, attend funerals and weddings of
family members, tend to vital financial interests, or respond to
family emergencies, permanent residents situated as Vartelas is now
face potential banishment. We have several times recognized the
severity of that sanction. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op.,
at 8–9, 16).

															It is no answer to say, as the Government
suggests, that Vartelas could have avoided any adverse consequences
if he simply stayed at home in the United States, his residence for
24 years prior to his 2003 visit to his parents in Greece. See
Brief in Opposition 13 (Vartelas “could have avoided the
application of the statute . . . [by] refrain[ing] from
departing from the United States (or from returning to the United
States).”); post , at 3. Loss of the ability to travel abroad
is itself a harsh penalty,[ 6 ]
made all the more devastating if it means enduring separation from
close family members living abroad. See Brief for Asian American
Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 16–23 (describing
illustrative cases). We have rejected arguments for retroactivity
in similar cases, and in cases in which the loss at stake was less
momentous.

															In Chew Heong v. United States , 112 U.S.
536 (1884), a pathmarking decision, the Court confronted the
“Chinese Restriction Act,” which barred Chinese laborers from
reentering the United States without a certificate issued on their
departure. The Court held the reentry bar inapplicable to aliens
who had left the country prior to the Act’s passage and tried to
return afterward without a certificate. The Act’s text, the Court
observed, was not “so clear and positive as to leave no room to
doubt [retroactive application] was the intention of the
legislature.” Id ., at 559.

															In Landgraf , the question was whether an
amendment to Title VII’s ban on employment discrimination
authorizing compensatory and punitive damages applied to
pre-enactment conduct. The Court held it did not. No doubt the
complaint against the employer charged discrimination that violated
the Act at the time it occurred. But compensatory and punitive
damages were not then available remedies. The later provision for
such damages, the Court determined, operated prospectively only,
and did not apply to employers whose discriminatory conduct oc-
curred prior to the amendment. See 511 U. S., at 280–286. And
in Hughes Aircraft , the Court held that a provision removing
an affirmative defense to qui tam suits did not apply to
pre-enactment fraud. As in Landgraf , the provision attached
“a new disability” to past wrongful conduct and therefore could not
apply retrospectively unless Congress clearly manifested such an
intention. Hughes Aircraft , 520 U. S., at 946–950.

															Most recently, in St. Cyr , the Court took
up the case of an alien who had entered a plea to a deportable
offense. At the time of the plea, the alien was eligible for
discretionary relief from deportation. IIRIRA, enacted after entry
of the plea, removed that eligibility. The Court held that the
IIRIRA provision in point could not be applied to the alien, for it
attached a “new disability” to the guilty plea and Congress had not
instructed such a result. 533 U. S., at 321–323.

															III

															The Government, echoed in part by the dissent,
argues that no retroactive effect is involved in this case, for the
Legislature has not attached any disability to past conduct.
Rather, it has made the relevant event the alien’s post-IIRIRA act
of returning to the United States. See Brief for Respondent 19–20; post , at 3. We find this argument disingenuous. Vartelas’
return to the United States occasioned his treatment as a new
entrant, but the reason for the “new disability” imposed on him was
not his lawful foreign travel. It was, indeed, his conviction,
pre-IIRIRA, of an offense qualifying as one of moral turpitude.
That past misconduct, in other words, not present travel, is the
wrongful activity Congress targeted in §1101(a)(13)(C)(v).

															The Government observes that lower courts have
up- held Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
prosecutions that encompassed pre-enactment conduct. See Brief for
Respondent 18 (citing United States v. Brown , 555
F.2d 407, 416–417 (CA5 1977), and United States v. Campanale , 518 F.2d 352, 364–365 (CA9 1975) (per
curiam) ). But those prosecutions depended on criminal activity, i.e. , an act of racketeering occuring after the
provision’s effective date. Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), in contrast,
does not require any showing of criminal conduct postdating
IIRIRA’s enactment. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales , 548 U.S.
30 (2006), featured by the Government and the dissent, Brief
for Respondent 17, 36–37; post , at 3, is similarly
inapposite. That case involved 8 U. S. C. §1231(a)(5), an
IIRIRA addition, which provides that an alien who reenters the
United States after having been removed can be removed again under
the same removal order. We held that the provision could be applied
to an alien who reentered illegally before IIRIRA’s enactment.
Explaining the Court’s decision, we said: “[T]he conduct of
remaining in the country . . . is the predicate action;
the statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing
violation . . . . It is therefore the alien’s
choice to continue his illegal presence . . . after the effective date of the new la[w] that subjects him
to the new . . . legal regime, not a past act that he is
helpless to undo.” 548 U. S., at 44 (emphasis added).
Vartelas, we have several times stressed, engaged in no criminal
activity after IIRIRA’s passage. He simply took a brief trip to
Greece, anticipating a return without incident as in past visits to
his parents. No “indefinitely continuing” crime occurred; instead,
Vartelas was apprehended because of a pre-IIRIRA crime he was
“helpless to undo.” Ibid .

															The Government further refers to lower court
decisions in cases involving 18 U. S. C. §922(g), which
prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Brief for
Respondent 18–19 (citing United States v. Pfeifer , 371 F.3d 430 , 436 (CA8 2004), and United States v. Hemmings , 258 F.3d 587 , 594 (CA7 2001)). “[L]ongstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons,” District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S.
570 , 626 (2008), however, target a present danger, i.e .,
the danger posed by felons who bear arms. See, e.g ., Pfeifer , 371 F. 3d, at 436 (hazardous conduct that
statute targets “occurred after enactment of the statute”); Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, §1201, 82Stat. 236
(noting hazards involved when felons possess firearms).[ 7 ]

															Nor do recidivism sentencing enhancements
support the Government’s position. Enhanced punishment imposed for
the later offense “ ‘is not to be viewed as . . .
[an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’ but instead, as a
‘stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be
an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.’ ” Witte v. United States , 515 U.S.
389 , 400 (1995) (quoting Gryger v. Burke , 334 U.S.
728 , 732 (1948)). In Vartelas’ case, however, there is no
“aggravated . . . repetitive” offense. There is, in
contrast, no post-IIRIRA criminal offense at all. Vartelas’ travel
abroad and return are “innocent” acts, see Fleuti , 374
U. S., at 462, burdened only because of his pre-IIRIRA
offense.

															In sum, Vartelas’ brief trip abroad post-IIRIRA
involved no criminal infraction. IIRIRA disabled him from leaving
the United States and returning as a lawful permanent resident.
That new disability rested not on any continuing criminal activity,
but on a single crime committed years before IIRIRA’s enactment.
The antiretroactivity principle instructs against application of
the new proscription to render Vartelas a first-time arrival at the
country’s gateway.

															IV

															The Second Circuit homed in on the words
“committed an offense” in §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) in determining that
the change IIRIRA wrought had no retroactive effect. 620
F. 3d, at 119–121. It matters not that Vartelas may have
relied on the prospect of continuing visits to Greece in deciding
to plead guilty, the court reasoned. “[I]t would border on the
absurd,” the court observed, “to suggest that Vartelas committed
his counterfeiting crime in reliance on the immigration laws.” Id ., at 120. This reasoning is doubly flawed.

															As the Government acknowledges, “th[is] Court
has not required a party challenging the application of a statute
to show [he relied on prior law] in structuring his conduct.” Brief
for Respondent 25–26. In Landgraf , for example, the issue
was the retroactivity of compensatory and punitive damages as
remedies for employment discrimination. “[C]oncerns of
. . . upsetting expectations are attenuated in the case
of intentional employment discrimination,” the Court noted, for
such discrimination “has been unlawful for more than a generation.”
511 U. S., at 282, n. 35. But “[e]ven when the conduct in
question is morally reprehensible or illegal,” the Court added, “a
degree of unfairness is inherent whenever the law imposes
additional burdens based on conduct that occurred in the past.” Id. , at 283, n. 35. And in Hughes Aircraft , the Court
found that Congress’ 1986 removal of a defense to a qui tam action did not apply to pre-1986 conduct in light of the
presumption against retroactivity. 520 U. S., at
941–942.[ 8 ] As in Landgraf , the relevant conduct (submitting a false claim)
had been unlawful for decades. See 520 U. S., at 947.

															The operative presumption, after all, is that
Congress intends its laws to govern prospectively only. See supra , at 7. “It is a strange ‘presumption,’ ” the
Third Circuit commented, “that arises only on . . . a
showing [of] actual reliance.” Ponnapula v. Ashcroft , 373 F.3d 480 , 491 (2004). The essential inquiry, as stated in Landgraf , 511 U. S., at 269–270, is “whether the new
provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.” That is just what occurred here.

															In any event, Vartelas likely relied on
then-existing immigration law. While the presumption against
retroactive application of statutes does not require a showing of
detrimental reliance, see Olatunji , 387 F. 3d, at
389–395, reasonable reliance has been noted among the “familiar
considerations” animating the presumption, see Landgraf , 511
U. S., at 270 (presumption reflects “familiar consid- erations
of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations”).
Although not a necessary predicate for in- voking the
antiretroactivity principle, the likelihood of reliance on prior
law strengthens the case for reading a newly enacted law
prospectively. See Olatunji , 387 F. 3d, at 393
(discussing St. Cyr ). St. Cyr is illustrative. That case
involved a lawful permanent resident who pleaded guilty to a
criminal charge that made him deportable. Under the immigration law
in effect when he was convicted, he would have been eligible to
apply for a waiver of deportation. But his removal proceeding was
commenced after Congress, in IIRIRA, withdrew that dispensation.
Disallowance of discretionary waivers, the Court recognized,
“attache[d] a new disability, in respect to transactions or
considerations already past.” 533 U. S., at 321 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Aliens like St. Cyr, the Court observed,
“almost certainly relied upon th[e] likelihood [of receiving
discretionary relief] in deciding [to plead guilty, thereby]
forgo[ing] their right to a trial.” Id ., at 325.[ 9 ] Hence, applying the IIRIRA
withdrawal to St. Cyr would have an “obvious and severe retroactive
effect.” Ibid . Because Congress made no such intention
plain, ibid. , n. 55, we held that the prior law, permitting
relief from deportation, governed St. Cyr’s case.

															As to retroactivity, one might think Vartelas’
case even easier than St. Cyr’s. St. Cyr could seek the Attorney
General’s discretionary dispensation. Vartelas, under Fleuti , was free, without seeking an official’s permission,
to make trips of short duration to see and assist his parents in
Greece.[ 10 ] The Second
Circuit thought otherwise, compounding its initial misperception
(treating reliance as essential to application of the
antiretroactivity principle). The deportation provision involved in St. Cyr , 8 U. S. C. §1229b(a)(3), referred to the
alien’s “convict[ion]” of a crime, while the statutory words sub
judice in Vartelas’ case were “committed an offense.”
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v); see supra , at 12–13.[ 11 ] The practical difference, so far as
retroactivity is concerned, escapes from our grasp. Ordinarily, to
determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that an
alien has committed a qualifying crime, the immigration officer at
the border would check the alien’s records for a conviction. He
would not call into session a piepowder court[ 12 ] to entertain a plea or conduct a trial.

															Satisfied that Vartelas’ case is at least as
clear as St. Cyr’s for declining to apply a new law retroactively,
we hold that Fleuti continues to govern Vartelas’ short-term
travel.

															*  *  *

															For the reasons stated, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

															It is so ordered. Notes 1 The dissent appears
driven, in no small measure, by its dim view of the Court’s opinion
in Fleuti . See post , at 6 (“same instinct” operative
in Fleuti and this case). 2 The BIA determined that
the Fleuti doctrine no longer held sway because it was
rooted in the “no longer existent definition of ‘entry’ in [the
INA].” 21 I. & N. Dec., at 1065. The Board also noted
that “Congress . . . amended the law to expressly
preserve some, but not all, of the Fleuti doctrine” when it
provided that a lawful permanent resident absent from the United
States for less than 180 days would not be regarded as seeking an
admission except in certain enumerated circumstances, among them,
prior commission of a crime of moral turpitude. See ibid. (citing 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(ii)). Vartelas does
not challenge the ruling in Collado-Munoz . We therefore
assume, but do not decide, that IIRIRA’s amendments to
§1101(a)(13)(A) abrogated Fleuti . 3 Although IIRIRA created a
uniform removal procedure for both excludable and deportable
aliens, the list of criminal offenses that subject aliens to
exclusion remains separate from the list of offenses that render an
alien deportable. These lists are “sometimes overlapping and
sometimes divergent.” Judulang v. Holder , 565
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 2). Pertinent here,
although a single crime involving moral turpitude may render an
alien inadmissible, it would not render her deportable. See 8
U. S. C. §1182(a)(2) (listing excludable crimes);
§1227(a)(2) (listing deportable crimes). 4 The dissent asserts that
Justice Story’s opinion “bear[s] no relation to the presumption
against retroactivity.” Post , at 6. That is a bold statement
in view of this Court’s many references to Justice Story’s
formulation in cases involving the presumption that statutes
operate only prospectively in the absence of a clear congressional
statement to the contrary. 5 In St. Cyr , 533
U. S., at 317–320, we rejected the Government’s contention
that Congress directed retroactive application of IIRIRA in its
entirety. 6 See Kent v. Dulles , 357 U.S.
116 , 126 (1958) (“Freedom of movement across frontiers
. . . may be as close to the heart of the individual as
the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.”); Aptheker v. Secretary of State , 378 U.S.
500 , 519–520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (right to travel,
“at home and abroad, is important for . . . business[,]
. . . cul-tural, political, and social activities—for all
the commingling which gre-garious man enjoys”). 7 The dissent, see post , at 6, notes two statutes of the same genre: laws
prohibiting persons convicted of a sex crime against a victim under
16 years of age from working in jobs involving frequent contact
with minors, and laws prohibiting a person “who has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a
mental insti-tution” from possessing guns, 18 U. S. C.
§922(g)(4). The dissent is correct that these statutes do not
operate retroactively. Rather, they address dangers that arise
postenactment: sex offenders with a history of child molestation
working in close proximity to children, and men-tally unstable
persons purchasing guns. The act of flying to Greece, in contrast,
does not render a lawful permanent resident like Vartelas
hazardous. Nor is it plausible that Congress’ solution to the
problem of dangerous lawful permanent residents would be to pass a
law that would deter such persons from ever leaving the United
States. As for student loans, it is unlikely that the provision
noted by the dissent, 20 U. S. C. §1091(r), would raise
retroactivity questions in the first place. The statute has a
prospective thrust. It concerns “[s]uspension of eligibility” when
a student receiving a college loan commits a drug crime. The
suspension runs “from the date of th[e] conviction” for specified
periods, e.g. , two years for a second offense of possession.
Moreover, eligibility may be restored before the period of
ineligibility ends if the student establishes, under prescribed
criteria, his rehabilitation. 8 The deleted defense
permitted qui tam defendants to escape liability if the
information on which a private plaintiff (relator) relied was
already in the Government’s possession. Detrimental reliance was
hardly apparent, for the Government, both before and after the
statu-tory change, could bring suit with that information, and “the
monetary liability faced by [a False Claims Act] defendant is the
same whether the action is brought by the Government or by a qui
tam relator.” 520 U. S., at 948. 9 “There can be little
doubt,” the Court noted in St. Cyr , “that, asa general
matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea
agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of
their convictions.” 533 U. S., at 322. Indeed, “[p]reserving
[their] right to remain in the United States may be more important
to [them] than any potential jail sentence.” Ibid . (internal
quotation marks omitted). See Padilla v. Kentucky ,
559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 9–11) (holding that
counsel has a duty under the Sixth Amendment to inform a noncitizen
defendant that his plea would make him eligible for
deportation). 10 Armed
with knowledge that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad,
aliens like Vartelas might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a
nonexcludable offense—in Vartelas’ case, e.g ., possession of
counterfeit securities—or exercise a right to trial. 11 After
the words “committed an offense,” §1101(a)(13)(C)(v)’s next words
are “identified in section 1182(a)(2).” That section refers to “any
alien convicted of , or who admits having committed,” inter alia , “a crime involving moral turpitude.”
§1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis added). The entire
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) phrase “committed an offense identified in
section 1182(a)(2),” on straightforward reading, appears to advert
to a lawful permanent resident who has been convicted of an offense
under §1182(a)(2) (or admits to one). 12 Piepowder (“dusty feet”) courts were
temporary mercantile courts held at trade fairs in Medieval Europe;
local merchants and guild members would assemble to hear commercial
disputes. These courts provided fast and informal resolution of
trade conflicts, settling cases “while the merchants’ feet were
still dusty.” Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties
in Partnership, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 215, 235, and n. 99 (2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting H. Berman, Law and
Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 347
(1983)). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

															_________________

															No. 10–1211

															_________________

															PANAGIS VARTELAS, PETITIONER v. ERIC H.
HOLDER, Jr., ATTORNEY GENERAL

															on writ of certiorari to the united states
court of appeals for the second circuit

															[March 28, 2012]

															Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas and
Justice Alito join, dissenting.

															As part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress required
that lawful permanent residents who have committed certain crimes
seek formal “admission” when they return to the United States from
abroad. 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v). This case presents
a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Does that
statute apply to lawful permanent residents who, like Vartelas,
committed one of the specified offenses before 1996, but traveled
abroad after 1996? Under the proper approach to determining a
statute’s temporal application, the answer is yes.

															I

															The text of §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not
contain a clear statement answering the question presented here. So
the Court is correct that this case is governed by our longstanding
interpretive principle that, in the absence of a contrary
indication, a statute will not be construed to have retroactive
application. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film
Products , 511 U.S.
244 , 280 (1994). The operative provision of this text—the
provision that specifies the act that it prohibits or
prescribes—says that lawful permanent residents convicted of
offenses similar to Vartelas’s must seek formal “admission” before
they return to the United States from abroad. Since Vartelas
returned to the United States after the statute’s effective date,
the application of that text to his reentry does not give the
statute a retroactive effect.

															In determining whether a statute applies
retroactively, we should concern ourselves with the statute’s
actual operation on regulated parties, not with retroactivity as an
abstract concept or as a substitute for fairness concerns. It is
impossible to decide whether a statute’s application is
retrospective or prospective without first identifying a reference
point—a moment in time to which the statute’s effective date is
either subsequent or antecedent. (Otherwise, the obvious
question—retroactive in reference to what?—remains unanswered.) In
my view, the identity of that reference point turns on the activity
a statute is intended to regulate. For any given regulated party,
the reference point (or “retroactivity event”) is the moment at
which the party does what the statute forbids or fails to do what
it requires. See Martin v. Hadix , 527 U.S.
343 , 362–363 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment); Landgraf , supra, at 291
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgments). With an identified reference
point, the retroactivity analysis is simple. If a person has
engaged in the primary regulated activity before the
statute’s effective date, then the statute’s application would be retroactive. But if a person engages in the primary
regulated activity after the statute’s effective date, then
the statute’s application is prospective only. In the latter case,
the interpretive presumption against retroactivity does not bar the
statute’s application.

															Under that commonsense approach, this is a
relatively easy case. Although the class of aliens affected
by §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) is defined with respect to past crimes, the regulated activity is reentry into the United States. By its
terms, the statute is all about controlling admission at the
border. It specifies six criteria to identify lawful permanent
residents who are subject to formal “admission” procedures, most of
which relate to the circumstances of departure, the trip itself, or
reentry. The titles of the statutory sections containing
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) confirm its focus on admission, rather than
crime: The provision is located within Title III of IIRIRA
(“Inspection, Apprehension, Detention, Adjudication, and Removal of
Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens”), under Subtitle A (“Revision
of Procedures for Removal of Aliens”), and §301 (“Treating Persons
Present in the United States Without Authorization as Not
Admitted”). 110Stat. 3009–575. And the specific subsection of
IIRIRA at issue (§301(a), entitled “ ‘Admission’ Defined”) is
an amendment to the definition of “entry” in the general
“Definitions” section of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
See ante, at 2–3. The original provision told border
officials how to regulate admission—not how to punish crime—and the
amendment does as well.

															Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) thus has no
retroactive effect on Vartelas because the reference point
here—Vartelas’s readmission to the United States after a trip
abroad—occurred years after the statute’s effective date. Although
Vartelas cannot change the fact of his prior conviction, he could
have avoided entirely the consequences of §1101(a)(13)(C)(v)
by simply remaining in the United States or, having left, remaining
in Greece. That §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) had no effect on Vartelas until
he performed a post-enactment activity is a clear indication that
the statute’s application is purely prospective. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales , 548 U.S.
30 , 45, n. 11, 46 (2006) (no retroactive effect where the
statute in question did “not operate on a completed preenactment
act” and instead turned on “a failure to take timely action that
would have avoided application of the new law altogether”).

															II

															The Court avoids this conclusion by insisting
that “[p]ast misconduct, . . . not present travel, is the
wrongful activity Congress targeted” in §1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Ante, at 11. That assertion does not, however, have any
basis in the statute’s text or structure, and the Court does not
pretend otherwise. Instead, the Court simply asserts that
Vartelas’s “lawful foreign travel” surely could not be the “reason
for the ‘new disability’ imposed on him.” Ibid. (emphasis
added). But the reason for a prohibition has nothing to do
with whether the prohibition is being applied to a past rather than
a future act. It may be relevant to other legal inquiries—for
example, to whether a legislative act violates one of the Ex
Post Facto Clauses in Article I, see, e.g., Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S.
84 , 92 (2003), or one of the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. , 348 U.S.
483 , 487 (1955), or the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment,
see, e.g., Kelo v. New London , 545 U.S.
469 , 477–483 (2005), or the Obligation of Contracts Clause in
Article I, see, e.g., United States Trust Co. of N. Y. v. New Jersey , 431 U.S.
1 , 29 (1977). But it has no direct bearing upon whether the
statute is retroactive.[ 1 ]*

															The Court’s failure to differentiate between the
statutory-interpretation question (whether giving certain effect to
a provision would make it retroactive and hence presumptively
unintended) and the validity question (whether giving certain
effect to a provision is unlawful) is on full display in its
attempts to distinguish §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) from similar statutes.
Take, for example, the Court’s discussion of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). That Act, which
targets “patterns of racketeering,” expressly defines those
“patterns” to include some pre-enactment conduct. See 18
U. S. C. §1961(5). Courts interpreting RICO therefore
need not consider the presumption against retroactivity; instead,
the cases cited by the majority consider whether RICO violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States v. Brown , 555 F.2d 407, 416–417 (CA5 1977); United
States v. Campanale , 518 F.2d 352, 364–365 (CA9 1975) (per curiam) . The Government recognized this
distinction and cited RICO to make a point about the Ex Post
Facto Clause rather than the presumption against retroactivity,
Brief for Respondent 17–18; the Court evidently does not.

															The Court’s confident assertion that Congress
surely would not have meant this statute to apply to Vartelas,
whose foreign travel and subsequent return to the United States
were innocent events, ante, at 11, 14, simply begs the
question presented in this case. Ignorance, of course, is no excuse (ignorantia legis neminem excusat); and his return was
entirely lawful only if the statute before us did not render it
unlawful. Since IIRIRA’s effective date in 1996, lawful permanent
residents who have committed crimes of moral turpitude are
forbidden to leave the United States and return without formally
seeking “admission.” See §1101(a)(13)(C)(v). As a result,
Vartelas’s numerous trips abroad and “uneventful” reentries into
the United States after the passage of IIRIRA, see ante, at
5, were lawful only if §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not apply to
him—which is, of course, precisely the matter in dispute here.

															The Court’s circular reasoning betrays its
underlying concern: Because the Court believes that reentry after a
brief trip abroad should be lawful, it will decline to apply
a statute that clearly provides otherwise for certain criminal
aliens. (The same instinct likely produced the Court’s questionable
statutory interpretation in Rosenberg v. Fleuti , 374 U.S.
449 (1963).) The Court’s test for retroactivity—asking whether
the statute creates a “new disability” in “respect to past
events”—invites this focus on fairness. Understandably so, since it
is derived from a Justice Story opinion interpreting a provision of
the New Hampshire Constitution that forbade retroactive
laws—a provision comparable to the Federal Constitution’s ex
post facto prohibition and bearing no relation to the
presumption against retroactivity. What is unfair or irrational
(and hence should be forbidden) has nothing to do with whether
applying a statute to a particular act is prospective (and thus
presumptively intended) or retroactive (and thus presumptively
unintended). On the latter question, the “new disability in respect
to past events” test provides no meaningful guidance.

															I can imagine countless laws that, like
§1101(a)(13) (C)(v), impose “new disabilities” related to “past
events” and yet do not operate retroactively. For example, a
statute making persons convicted of drug crimes ineligible for
student loans. See, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §1091(r)(1).
Or laws prohibiting those convicted of sex crimes from working in
certain jobs that involve repeated contact with minors. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §290.95(c) (West Supp. 2012). Or
laws prohibiting those previously committed for mental instability
from purchasing guns. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C.
§922(g)(4). The Court concedes that it would not consider the last
two laws inapplicable to pre-enactment convictions or commitments. Ante, at 12, n. 7. The Court does not deny that these
statutes impose a “new disability in respect to past events,” but
it distinguishes them based on the reason for their
enactment: These statutes “address dangers that arise
postenactment.” Ante, at 13, n. 7. So much for the
new-disability-in-respect-to-past-events test; it has now become a
new-disability-not-designed-to-guard-against-future-danger test.
But why is guarding against future danger the only reason
Congress may wish to regulate future action in light of past
events? It obviously is not. So the Court must invent yet another
doctrine to address my first example, the law making persons
convicted of drug crimes ineligible for student loans. According to
the Court, that statute differs from §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) because it
“has a prospective thrust.” Ante, at 13, n. 7. I cannot
imagine what that means, other than that the statute regulates
post-enactment con- duct. But, of course, so does
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Rather than reconciling any of these
distinctions with Justice Story’s formulation of retroactivity, the
Court leaves to lower courts the unenviable task of identifying
new-disabilities-not-designed-to-guard-against-future-danger-and-also-lacking-a-prospective-thrust.

															And anyway, is there any doubt that
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) is intended to guard against the “dangers that
arise postenactment” from having aliens in our midst who have shown
themselves to have proclivity for crime? Must that be rejected as
its purpose simply because Congress has not sought to achieve it by
all possible means—by ferreting out such dangerous aliens and going
through the expensive and lengthy process of deporting them? At
least some of the post-enactment danger can readily be eliminated
by forcing lawful permanent residents who have committed certain
crimes to undergo formal “admission” procedures at our borders.
Indeed, by limiting criminal aliens’ opportunities to travel and
then return to the United States, §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) may encourage
self-deportation. But all this is irrelevant. The positing of
legislative “purpose” is always a slippery enterprise compared to
the simple determination of whether a statute regulates a future
event—and it is that, rather than the Court’s pronouncement of some
forward-looking reason , which governs whether a statute has
retroactive effect.

															Finally, I cannot avoid observing that even if
the Court’s concern about the fairness or rationality of applying
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v) to Vartelas were relevant to the statutory
interpretation question, that concern is greatly exaggerated. In
disregard of a federal statute, convicted criminal Vartelas
repeatedly traveled to and from Greece without ever seeking formal
admission at this country’s borders. When he was finally unlucky
enough to be apprehended, and sought discretionary relief from
removal under former §212(c) of the INA, 8 U. S. C.
§1182(c) (1994 ed.), the Immigration Judge denying his application
found that Vartelas had made frequent trips to Greece and had
remained there for long periods of time, that he was “a serious tax
evader,” that he had offered testimony that was “close to
incredible,” and that he had not shown hardship to himself or his
estranged wife and children should he be removed. See 620 F.3d 108,
111 (CA2 2010); Brief for Respondent 5 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In decrying the “harsh penalty” imposed by this statute
on Vartelas, the Court ignores those inconvenient facts. Ante , at 9. But never mind. Under any sensible approach to
the presumption against retroactivity, these factual subtleties
should be irrelevant to the temporal application of
§1101(a)(13)(C)(v).

															*  *  *

															This case raises a plain-vanilla question of
statutory interpretation, not broader questions about frustrated
expectations or fairness. Our approach to answering that question
should be similarly straightforward: We should determine what
relevant activity the statute regulates (here, reentry); absent a
clear statement otherwise, only such relevant activity which occurs
after the statute’s effective date should be covered (here,
post-1996 reentries). If, as so construed, the statute is unfair or
irrational enough to violate the Constitution, that is another
matter entirely, and one not presented here. Our interpretive
presumption against retroactivity, however, is just that—a tool to
ascertain what the statute means, not a license to rewrite the
statute in a way the Court considers more desirable.

															I respectfully dissent. Notes 1 * I say no direct bearing because if the prospective application of a statute would
raise constitutional doubts because of its effect on pre-enactment
conduct, that would be a reason to presume a legislative
intent not to apply it unless the conduct in question is
post-enactment—that is, to consider it retroactive when the conduct
in question is pre-enactment. See Clark v. Martinez , 543 U.S.
371 , 380–381 (2005). That is not an issue here. If the statute
had expressly made the new “admission” rule applicable to those
aliens with prior convictions, its constitutionality would not be
in doubt.