U.S. Supreme Court South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966) South Carolina v.
Katzenbach No. 22, Orig. Argued January 17-18,
1966 Decided March 7, 1966 383
U.S. 301 ON BILL OF
COMPLAINT Syllabus Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2,
of the Constitution, South Carolina filed a bill of complaint
seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality as to certain
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and an injunction
against their enforcement by defendant, the Attorney General. The
Act's key features, aimed at areas where voting discrimination has
been most flagrant, are: (1) A coverage formula or "triggering
mechanism" in § 4(b) determining applicability of its substantive
provisions; (2) provision in § 4(a) for temporary suspension of a
State's voting tests or devices; (3) procedure in § 5 for review of
new voting rules, and (4) a program in §§ 6(b), 7, 9, and 13(a) for
using federal examiners to qualify applicants for registration who
are thereafter entitled to vote in all elections. These remedial
sections automatically apply to any State or its subdivision which
the Attorney General has determined maintained on November 1, 1964,
a registration or voting "test or device" (a literacy, educational,
character, or voucher requirement as defined in § 4(c)) and in
which, according to the Census Director's determination, less than
half the voting-age residents were registered or voted in the 1964
presidential election. Statutory coverage may be terminated by a
declaratory judgment of a three-judge District of Columbia District
Court that, for the preceding five years, racially discriminatory
voting tests or devices have not been used

															No person in a covered area may be denied voting rights because
of failure to comply with a test or device. § 4(a). Following
administrative determinations, enforcement was temporarily
suspended of South Carolina's literacy test, as well as of tests
and devices in certain other areas. The Act further provides in § 5
that, during the suspension period, a State or subdivision may not
apply new voting rules unless the Attorney General has interposed
no objection within 60 days of their submission to him, or a
three-judge District of Columbia District Court has issued a
declaratory judgment that such rules are not racially
discriminatory. South Carolina wishes to apply a recent amendment
to its voting laws without following these procedures. In Page 383 U. S. 302 any political subdivision where tests or devices have been
suspended, the Civil Service Commission shall appoint voting
examiners whenever the Attorney General has, after considering
specified factors, duly certified receiving complaints of official
racial voting discrimination from at least 20 residents or that the
examiners' appointment is otherwise necessary under the Fifteenth
Amendment. § 6(b). Examiners are to transmit to the appropriate
officials the names of applicants they find qualified, and such
persons may vote in any election after 45 days following
transmission of their names. § 7(b). Removal by the examiners of
names from voting lists is provided on loss of eligibility or on
successful challenge under prescribed procedures. § 7(d). The use
of examiners is terminated if requested by the Attorney General or
the political subdivision has obtained a declaratory judgment as
specified in § 13(a). Following certification by the Attorney
General, federal examiners were appointed in two South Carolina
counties, as well as elsewhere in other States. Subsidiary cures
for persistent voting discrimination and other special provisions
are also contained in the Act. In addition to a general assault on
the Act as unconstitutionally encroaching on States' rights,
specific constitutional challenges by plaintiff and certain amici curiae are: the coverage formula violates the
principle of equality between the States, denies due process
through an invalid presumption, bars judicial review of
administrative findings, is a bill of attainder, and legislatively
adjudicates guilt; the review of new voting rules infringes Art.
III by directing the District Court to issue advisory opinions; the
assignment of federal examiners violates due process by foreclosing
judicial review of administrative findings and impairs the
separation of powers by giving the Attorney General judicial
functions; the challenge procedure denies due process on account of
its speed, and provisions for adjudication in the District of
Columbia abridge due process by limiting litigation to a distant
forum. Held: 1. This Court's judicial review does not cover portions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 not challenged by plaintiff; nor does it
extend to the Act's criminal provisions, as to which South
Carolina's challenge is premature. Pp. 383 U. S.
316 -317.

															2. The sections of the Act properly before this Court are a
valid effectuation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 383 U. S.
308 -337.

															(a) The Act's voluminous legislative history discloses
unremitting and ingenious defiance in certain parts of the country
of Page 383 U. S. 303 the Fifteenth Amendment ( see paragraphs (b)-(d), infra ) which Congress concluded called for sterner and
more elaborate measures than those previously used. P. 383 U. S.
309 .

															(b) Beginning in 1890, a few years before repeal of most of the
legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia
enacted tests, still in use, specifically designed to prevent
Negroes from voting while permitting white persons to vote. Pp. 383 U. S.
310 -311.

															(c) A variety of methods was used thereafter to keep Negroes
from voting, one of the principal means being through racially
discriminatory application of voting tests. Pp. 383 U. S.
311 -313.

															(d) Case-by-case litigation against voting discrimination under
the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964, has not appreciably
increased Negro registration. Voting suits have been onerous to
prepare, protracted, and, where successful, have often been
followed by a shift in discriminatory devices, defiance or evasion
of court orders. Pp. 383 U. S.
313 -315.

															(e) A State is not a "person" within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; nor does it have standing to
invoke the Bill of Attainder Clause of Art. I or the principle of
separation of powers, which exist only to protect private
individuals or groups. Pp. 383 U. S. 323 -324.

															(f) Congress, as against the reserved powers of the States, may
use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
of racial voting discrimination. P. 383 U. S.
324 .

															(g) The Fifteenth Amendment, which is self-executing, supersedes
contrary exertions of state power, and its enforcement is not
confined to judicial invalidation of racially discriminatory state
statutes and procedures or to general legislative prohibitions
against violations of the Amendment. Pp. 383 U. S. 325 , 383 U. S.
327 .

															(h) Congress, whose power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment has
repeatedly been upheld in the past, is free to use whatever means
are appropriate to carry out the objects of the Constitution. McCulloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , 100 U. S.
345 -346. Pp. 383 U. S.
326 -37.

															(i) Having determined case-by-case litigation inadequate to deal
with racial voting discrimination, Congress has ample authority to
prescribe remedies not requiring prior adjudication. P. 383 U. S.
328 . Page 383 U. S. 304 (j) Congress is well within its powers in focusing upon the
geographic areas where substantial racial voting discrimination had
occurred. Pp. 383 U. S.
328 -329.

															(k) Congress had reliable evidence of voting discrimination in a
great majority of the areas covered by § 4(b) of the Act, and is
warranted in inferring a significant danger of racial voting
discrimination in the few other areas to which the formula in §
4(b) applies. Pp. 383 U. S.
329 -330.

															(l) The coverage formula is rational in theory, since tests or
devices have so long been used for disenfranchisement, and a lower
voting rate obviously results from such disenfranchisement. P. 383 U. S.
330 .

															(m) The coverage formula is rational as being aimed at areas
where widespread discrimination has existed through misuse of tests
or devices even though it excludes certain areas where there is
voting discrimination through other means. The Act, moreover,
strengthens existing remedies for such discrimination in those
other areas. Pp. 383 U. S.
330 -331.

															(n) The provision for termination at the benefit of the States
of § 4(b) coverage adequately deals with possible overbreadth; nor
is the burden of proof imposed on the States unreasonable. Pp. 383 U. S.
331 -332.

															(o) Limiting litigation to a single court in the District of
Columbia is a permissible exercise of power under Art. III, § 1, of
the Constitution, previously exercised by Congress on other
occasions. Pp. 383 U. S.
331 -332.

															(p) The Act's bar of judicial review of findings of the Attorney
General and Census Director as to objective data is not
unreasonable. This Court has sanctioned withdrawal of judicial
review of administrative determinations in numerous other
situations. Pp. 383 U. S.
332 -333.

															(q) Congress has power to suspend literacy tests, it having
found that such tests were used for discriminatory purposes in most
of the States covered; their continuance, even if fairly
administered, would freeze the effect of past discrimination, and
re-registration of all voters would be too harsh an alternative.
Such States cannot sincerely complain of electoral dilution by
Negro illiterates when they long permitted white illiterates to
vote. P. 383 U. S.
334 .

															(r) Congress is warranted in suspending, pending federal
scrutiny, new voting regulations in view of the way in which some
States have previously employed new rules to circumvent adverse
federal court decrees. P. 383 U. S.
335 . Page 383 U. S. 305 (s) The provision whereby a State whose voting laws have been
suspended under § 4(a) must obtain judicial review of an Amendment
to such laws by the District Court for the District of Columbia
presents a "controversy" under Art. III of the Constitution, and
therefore does not involve an advisory opinion contravening that
provision. P. 383 U. S.
335 .

															(t) The procedure for appointing federal examiners is an
appropriate congressional response to the local tactics used to
defy or evade federal court decrees. The challenge procedures
contain precautionary features against error or fraud, and are
amply warranted in view of Congress' knowledge of harassing
challenging tactics against registered Negroes. P. 383 U. S.
336 .

															(u) Section 6(b) has adequate standards to guide determination
by the Attorney General in his selection of areas where federal
examiners are to be appointed, and the termination procedures in §
13(b) provide for indirect judicial review. Pp. 383 U. S.
336 -337.

															Bill of complaint dismissed. Page 383 U. S. 307 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

															By leave of the Court, 382 U.S. 898, South Carolina has filed a
bill of complaint, seeking a declaration that selected provisions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 [ Footnote 1 ] violate the Federal Constitution, and asking
for an injunction against enforcement of these provisions by the
Attorney General. Original jurisdiction is founded on the presence
of a controversy between a State and a citizen of another State
under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution. See Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439 .
Because no issues of fact were raised in the complaint, and because
of South Carolina's desire to obtain a ruling prior to its primary
elections in June, 1966, we dispensed with appointment of a special
master and expedited our hearing of the case.

															Recognizing that the questions presented were of urgent concern
to the entire country, we invited all of the States to participate
in this proceeding as friends of the Court. A majority responded by
submitting or joining in briefs on the merits, some supporting
South Carolina and others the Attorney General. [ Footnote 2 ] Seven of these States Page 383 U. S. 308 also requested and received permission to argue the case orally
at our hearing. Without exception, despite the emotional overtones
of the proceeding, the briefs and oral arguments were temperate,
lawyerlike and constructive. All viewpoints on the issues have been
fully developed, and this additional assistance has been most
helpful to the Court.

															The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the
blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the
electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century. The
Act creates stringent new remedies for voting discrimination where
it persists on a pervasive scale, and, in addition, the statute
strengthens existing remedies for pockets of voting discrimination
elsewhere in the country. Congress assumed the power to prescribe
these remedies from § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which
authorizes the National Legislature to effectuate by "appropriate"
measures the constitutional prohibition against racial
discrimination in voting. We hold that the sections of the Act
which are properly before us, are an appropriate means for carrying
out Congress' constitutional responsibilities, and are consonant
with all other provisions of the Constitution. We therefore deny
South Carolina's request that enforcement of these sections of the
Act be enjoined. I The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
must be judged with reference to the historical experience which it
reflects. Before enacting the measure, Congress explored with great
care the problem of racial discrimination in voting. The House and
Senate Committees on the Judiciary each held hearings for nine days
and received testimony from a total of 67 witnesses. [ Footnote 3 ] Page 383 U. S. 309 More than three full days were consumed discussing the bill on
the floor of the House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26
days in all. [ Footnote 4 ] At
the close of these deliberations, the verdict of both chambers was
overwhelming. The House approved the bill by a vote of 328-74, and
the measure passed the Senate by a margin of 79-18.

															Two points emerge vividly from the voluminous legislative
history of the Act contained in the committee hearings and floor
debates. First: Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and
pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our
country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the
Constitution. Second: Congress concluded that the unsuccessful
remedies which it had prescribed in the past would have to be
replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy
the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. We pause here to
summarize the majority reports of the House and Senate Committees,
which document in considerable detail the factual basis for these
reactions by Congress. [ Footnote
5 ] See H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-16
(hereinafter cited as House Report); S.Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3-16 (hereinafter cited as Senate Report). Page 383 U. S. 310 The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified in
1870. Promptly thereafter, Congress passed the Enforcement Act of
1870, [ Footnote 6 ] which made
it a crime for public officers and private persons to obstruct
exercise of the right to vote. The statute was amended in the
following year [ Footnote 7 ] to
provide for detailed federal supervision of the electoral process,
from registration to the certification of returns. As the years
passed and fervor for racial equality waned, enforcement of the
laws became spotty and ineffective, and most of their provisions
were repealed in 1894. [ Footnote
8 ] The remnants have had little significance in the recently
renewed battle against voting discrimination.

															Meanwhile, beginning in 1890, the States of Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia enacted tests still in use which were specifically
designed to prevent Negroes from voting. [ Footnote 9 ] Typically, they made the ability to read
and write Page 383 U. S. 311 a registration qualification and also required completion of a
registration form. These laws were based on the fact that, as of
1890, in each of the named States, more than two-thirds of the
adult Negroes were illiterate, while less than one-quarter of the
adult whites were unable to read or write. [ Footnote 10 ] At the same time, alternate tests
were prescribed in all of the named States to assure that white
illiterates would not be deprived of the franchise. These included
grandfather clauses, property qualifications, "good character"
tests, and the requirement that registrants "understand" or
"interpret" certain matter.

															The course of subsequent Fifteenth Amendment litigation in this
Court demonstrates the variety and persistence of these and similar
institutions designed to deprive Negroes of the right to vote.
Grandfather clauses were invalidated in Guinn v. United
States, 238 U. S. 347 , and Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 .
Procedural hurdles were struck down in Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 . The
white primary was outlawed in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 , and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 .
Improper challenges were nullified in United States v.
Thomas, 362 U. S. 58 .
Racial gerrymandering was forbidden by Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 .
Finally, discriminatory application of voting tests was condemned
in Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933; Alabama Page 383 U. S. 312 v. United States, 371 U. S. 37 , and Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.
S. 145 .

															According to the evidence in recent Justice Department voting
suits, the latter stratagem is now the principal method used to bar
Negroes from the polls. Discriminatory administration of voting
qualifications has been found in all eight Alabama cases, in all
nine Louisiana cases, and in all nine Mississippi cases which have
gone to final judgment. [ Footnote 11 ] Moreover, in almost all of these cases, the
courts have held that the discrimination was pursuant to a
widespread "pattern or practice." White applicants for registration
have often been excused altogether from the literacy and
understanding tests, or have been given easy versions, have
received extensive help from voting officials, and have been
registered despite serious errors in their answers. [ Footnote 12 ] Negroes, on the other hand,
have typically been required to pass difficult versions of all the
tests, without any outside assistance and without the slightest
error. [ Footnote 13 ] The
good-morals requirement Page 383 U. S. 313 is so vague and subjective that it has constituted an open
invitation to abuse at the hands of voting officials. [ Footnote 14 ] Negroes obliged to
obtain vouchers from registered voters have found it virtually
impossible to comply in areas where almost no Negroes are on the
rolls. [ Footnote 15 ]

															In recent years, Congress has repeatedly tried to cope with the
problem by facilitating case-by-case litigation against voting
discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 [ Footnote 16 ] authorized the Attorney General to
seek injunctions against public and private interference with the
right to vote on racial grounds. Perfecting amendments in the Civil
Rights Act of 1960 [ Footnote
17 ] permitted the joinder of States as parties defendant, gave
the Attorney General access to local voting records, and authorized
courts to register voters in areas of systematic discrimination.
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ Footnote 18 ] expedited the hearing of voting cases
before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics used to
disqualify Negroes from voting in federal elections.

															Despite the earnest efforts of the Justice Department and of
many federal judges, these new laws have done little to cure the
problem of voting discrimination. According to estimates by the
Attorney General during hearings on the Act, registration of
voting-age Negroes in Alabama rose only from 14.2% to 19.4% between
1958 and 1964; in Louisiana, it barely inched ahead from 31.7% to
31.8% between 1956 and 1965, and in Mississippi it increased only
from 4.4% to 6.4% between 1954 and 1964. In each instance,
registration of voting-age whites ran roughly 50 percentage points
or more ahead of Negro registration. Page 383 U. S. 314 The previous legislation has proved ineffective for a number of
reasons. Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes
requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing through
registration records in preparation for trial. Litigation has been
exceedingly slow, in part because of the ample opportunities for
delay afforded voting officials and others involved in the
proceedings. Even when favorable decisions have finally been
obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to
discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees, or have
enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing
disparity between white and Negro registration. [ Footnote 19 ] Alternatively, certain local
officials have defied and evaded court orders or have simply closed
their registration offices to freeze the voting rolls. [ Footnote 20 ] The provision of the
1960 law authorizing registration by federal officers has had
little impact on local maladministration, because of its procedural
complexities. During the hearings and debates on the Act, Selma,
Alabama, was repeatedly referred to as the preeminent example of
the ineffectiveness of existing legislation. In Dallas County, of
which Selma is the seat, there were four years of litigation by the
Justice Department and two findings by the federal courts of
widespread voting discrimination. Yet, in those four years, Negro
registration Page 383 U. S. 315 rose only from 156 to 383, although there are approximately
15,000 Negroes of voting age in the county. Any possibility that
these figures were attributable to political apathy was dispelled
by the protest demonstrations in Selma in the early months of 1965.
The House Committee on the Judiciary summed up the reaction of
Congress to these developments in the following words:

															"The litigation in Dallas County took more than 4 years to open
the door to the exercise of constitutional rights conferred almost
a century ago. The problem on a national scale is that the
difficulties experienced in suits in Dallas County have been
encountered over and over again under existing voting laws. Four
years is too long. The burden is too heavy -- the wrong to our
citizens is too serious -- the damage to our national conscience is
too great not to adopt more effective measures than exist
today."

															"Such is the essential justification for the pending bill."

															House Report 11. II The Voting Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention
to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting. [ Footnote 21 ] The heart of the Act is
a complex scheme of stringent remedies aimed at areas where voting
discrimination has been most flagrant. Section 4(a)-(d) lays down a
formula defining the States and political subdivisions to which
these new remedies apply. The first of the remedies, contained in §
4(a), is the suspension of literacy tests and similar voting
qualifications for a period of five years from the last occurrence
of substantial voting discrimination. Section 5 prescribes a
second Page 383 U. S. 316 remedy, the suspension of all new voting regulations pending
review by federal authorities to determine whether their use would
perpetuate voting discrimination. The third remedy, covered in §§
6(b), 7, 9, and 13(a), is the assignment of federal examiners on
certification by the Attorney General to list qualified applicants
who are thereafter entitled to vote in all elections.

															Other provisions of the Act prescribe subsidiary cures for
persistent voting discrimination. Section 8 authorizes the
appointment of federal poll-watchers in places to which federal
examiners have already been assigned. Section 10(d) excuses those
made eligible to vote in sections of the country covered by § 4(b)
of the Act from paying accumulated past poll taxes for state and
local elections. Section 12(e) provides for balloting by persons
denied access to the polls in areas where federal examiners have
been appointed.

															The remaining remedial portions of the Act are aimed at voting
discrimination in any area of the country where it may occur.
Section 2 broadly prohibits the use of voting rules to abridge
exercise of the franchise on racial grounds. Sections 3, 6(a), and
13(b) strengthen existing procedures for attacking voting
discrimination by means of litigation. Section 4(e) excuses
citizens educated in American schools conducted in a foreign
language from passing English language literacy tests. Section
10(a)-(c) facilitates constitutional litigation challenging the
imposition of all poll taxes for state and local elections.
Sections 11 and 12(a)-(d) authorize civil and criminal sanctions
against interference with the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act.

															At the outset, we emphasize that only some of the many portions
of the Act are properly before us. South Carolina has not
challenged §§ 2, 3, 4(e), 6(a), 8, 10, 12(d) and (e), 13(b), and
other miscellaneous provisions having nothing to do with this
lawsuit. Judicial review of these sections must await subsequent
litigation. [ Footnote
22 ] Page 383 U. S. 317 In addition, we find that South Carolina's attack on §§ 11 and
12(a)-(c) is premature. No person has yet been subjected to, or
even threatened with, the criminal sanctions which these sections
of the Act authorize. See United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 , 362 U. S. 224 .
Consequently, the only sections of the Act to be reviewed at this
time are §§ 4(a)-(d), 5, 6(b), 7, 9, 13(a), and certain procedural
portions of § 14, all of which are presently in actual operation in
South Carolina. We turn now to a detailed description of these
provisions and their present status. Coverage formula. The remedial sections of the Act assailed by South Carolina
automatically apply to any State, or to any separate political
subdivision such as a county or parish, for which two findings have
been made: (1) the Attorney General has determined that, on
November 1, 1964, it maintained a "test or device," and (2) the
Director of the Census has determined that less than 50% of its
voting-age residents were registered on November 1, 1964, or voted
in the presidential election of November 1964. These findings are
not reviewable in any court, and are final upon publication in the
Federal Register. § 4(b). As used throughout the Act, the phrase
"test or device" means any requirement that a registrant or voter
must

															"(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or
interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement
or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral
character, or (4) prove his qualifications Page 383 U. S. 318 by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other
class."

															§ 4(c).

															Statutory coverage of a State or political subdivision under
4(b) is terminated if the area obtains a declaratory judgment from
the District Court for the District of Columbia determining that
tests and devices have not been used during the preceding five
years to abridge the franchise on racial grounds. The Attorney
General shall consent to entry of the judgment if he has no reason
to believe that the facts are otherwise. § 4(a). For the purposes
of this section, tests and devices are not deemed to have been used
in a forbidden manner if the incidents of discrimination are few in
number and have been promptly corrected, if their continuing
effects have been abated, and if they are unlikely to recur in the
future. § 4(d). On the other hand, no area may obtain a declaratory
judgment for five years after the final decision of a federal court
(other than the denial of a judgment under this section of the
Act), determining that discrimination through the use of tests or
devices has occurred anywhere in the State or political
subdivision. These declaratory judgment actions are to be heard by
a three-judge panel, with direct appeal to this Court. § 4(a).

															South Carolina was brought within the coverage formula of the
Act on August 7, 1965, pursuant to appropriate administrative
determinations which have not been challenged in this proceeding.
[ Footnote 23 ] On the same
day, coverage was also extended to Alabama, Alaska, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, 26 counties in North Carolina,
and one county in Arizona. [ Footnote 24 ] Two more counties in Arizona, one county in
Hawaii, and one county in Idaho were added to the list on November
19, 1965. [ Footnote 25 ] Page 383 U. S. 319 Thus far, Alaska, the three Arizona counties, and the single
county in Idaho have asked the District Court for the District of
Columbia to grant a declaratory judgment terminating statutory
coverage. [ Footnote 26 ] Suspension of tests In a State or political subdivision covered by § 4(b) of the
Act, no person may be denied the right to vote in any election
because of his failure to comply with a "test or device." §
4(a).

															On account of this provision, South Carolina is temporarily
barred from enforcing the portion of its voting laws which requires
every applicant for registration to show that he:

															"Can both read and write any section of [the State] Constitution
submitted to [him] by the registration officer or can show that he
owns, and has paid all taxes collectible during the previous year
on, property in this State assessed at three hundred dollars or
more."

															S.C.Code Ann. § 262(4) (1965 Supp.). The Attorney General has
determined that the property qualification is inseparable from the
literacy test, [ Footnote 27 ]
and South Carolina makes no objection to this finding. Similar
tests and devices have been temporarily suspended in the other
sections of the country listed above. [ Footnote 28 ] Review of new rules In a State or political subdivision covered by § 4(b) of the
Act, no person may be denied the right to vote in any election
because of his failure to comply with a voting qualification or
procedure different from those in force on Page 383 U. S. 320 November 1, 1964. This suspension of new rules is terminated,
however, under either of the following circumstances: (1) if the
area has submitted the rules to the Attorney General and he has not
interposed an objection within 60 days, or (2) if the area has
obtained a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the
District of Columbia determining that the rules will not abridge
the franchise on racial grounds. These declaratory judgment actions
are to be heard by a three-judge panel, with direct appeal to this
Court. § 5.

															South Carolina altered its voting laws in 1965 to extend the
closing hour at polling places from 6 p.m. to 7 p.m. [ Footnote 29 ] The State has not
sought judicial review of this change in the District Court for the
District of Columbia, nor has it submitted the new rule to the
Attorney General for his scrutiny, although, at our hearing, the
Attorney General announced that he does not challenge the
amendment. There are indications in the record that other sections
of the country listed above have also altered their voting laws
since November 1, 1964. [ Footnote 30 ] Federal examiners. In any political subdivision covered by § 4(b) of the Act, the
Civil Service Commission shall appoint voting examiners whenever
the Attorney General certifies either of the following facts: (1)
that he has received meritorious written complaints from at least
20 residents alleging that they have been disenfranchised under
color of law because of their race, or (2) that the appointment of
examiners is otherwise necessary to effectuate the guarantees of
the Fifteenth Amendment. In making the latter determination, the
Attorney General must consider, among other factors, whether the
registration ratio of non-whites to whites seems reasonably
attributable to Page 383 U. S. 321 racial discrimination, or whether there is substantial evidence
of good faith efforts to comply with the Fifteenth Amendment. §
6(b). These certifications are not reviewable in any court, and are
effective upon publication in the Federal Register. § 4(b).

															The examiners who have been appointed are to test the voting
qualifications of applicants according to regulations of the Civil
Service Commission prescribing times, places, procedures, and
forms. §§ 7(a) and 9(b). Any person who meets the voting
requirements of state law, insofar as these have not been suspended
by the Act, must promptly be placed on a list of eligible voters.
Examiners are to transmit their lists at least once a month to the
appropriate state or local officials, who in turn are required to
place the listed names on the official voting rolls. Any person
listed by an examiner is entitled to vote in all elections held
more than 45 days after his name has been transmitted. § 7(b).

															A person shall be removed from the voting list by an examiner if
he has lost his eligibility under valid state law, or if he has
been successfully challenged through the procedure prescribed in §
9(a) of the Act. § 7(d). The challenge must be filed at the office
within the State designated by the Civil Service Commission; must
be submitted within 10 days after the listing is made available for
public inspection; must be supported by the affidavits of at least
two people having personal knowledge of the relevant facts, and
must be served on the person challenged by mail or at his
residence. A hearing officer appointed by the Civil Service
Commission shall hear the challenge and render a decision within 15
days after the challenge is filed. A petition for review of the
hearing officer's decision must be submitted within an additional
15 days after service of the decision on the person seeking review.
The court of appeals for the circuit in which the person challenged
resides is to Page 383 U. S. 322 hear the petition and affirm the hearing officer's decision
unless it is clearly erroneous. Any person listed by an examiner is
entitled to vote pending a final decision o the hearing officer or
the court. § 9(a).

															The listing procedures in a political subdivision are terminated
under either of the following circumstances: (1) if the Attorney
General informs the Civil Service Commission that all persons
listed by examiners have been placed on the official voting rolls,
and that there is no longer reasonable cause to fear abridgment of
the franchise on racial grounds, or (2) if the political
subdivision has obtained a declaratory judgment from the District
Court for the District of Columbia, ascertaining the same facts
which govern termination by the Attorney General, and the Director
of the Census has determined that more than 50% of the non-white
residents of voting age are registered to vote. A political
subdivision may petition the Attorney General to terminate listing
procedures or to authorize the necessary census, and the District
Court itself shall request the census if the Attorney General's
refusal to do so is arbitrary or unreasonable. § 13(a). The
determinations by the Director of the Census are not reviewable in
any court, and are final upon publication in the Federal Register.
§ 4(b).

															On October 30, 1965, the Attorney General certified the need for
federal examiners in two South Carolina counties, [ Footnote 31 ] and examiners appointed by the
Civil Service Commission have been serving there since November 8,
1965. Examiners have also been assigned to 11 counties in Alabama,
five parishes in Louisiana, and 19 counties in Mississippi.
[ Footnote 32 ] The examiners
are listing people found eligible to vote, and the challenge
procedure has been Page 383 U. S. 323 employed extensively. [ Footnote 33 ] No political subdivision has yet sought to
have federal examiners withdrawn through the Attorney General or
the District Court for the District of Columbia. III These provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are challenged
on the fundamental ground that they exceed the powers of Congress
and encroach on an area reserved to the States by the Constitution.
South Carolina and certain of the amici curiae also attack
specific sections of the Act for more particular reasons. They
argue that the coverage formula prescribed in § 4(a)-(d) violates
the principle of the equality of States, denies due process by
employing an invalid presumption and by barring judicial review of
administrative findings, constitutes a forbidden bill of attainder,
and impairs the separation of powers by adjudicating guilt through
legislation. They claim that the review of new voting rules
required in § 5 infringes Article III by directing the District
Court to issue advisory opinions. They contend that the assignment
of federal examiners authorized in § 6(b) abridges due process by
precluding judicial review of administrative findings, and impairs
the separation of powers by giving the Attorney General judicial
functions; also that the challenge procedure prescribed in § 9
denies due process on account of its speed. Finally, South Carolina
and certain of the amici curiae maintain that §§ 4(a) and
5, buttressed by § 14(b) of the Act, abridge due process by
limiting litigation to a distant forum.

															Some of these contentions may be dismissed at the outset. The
word "person" in the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be
expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and, to our
knowledge, Page 383 U. S. 324 this has never been done by any court. See International
Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 266, 164 So. 2d
314 , 322, n. 5; cf. United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 8 (C.A. 5th Cir.). Likewise, courts have consistently
regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause of Article I and the
principle of the separation of powers only as protections for
individual persons and private groups, those who are peculiarly
vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt. See United
States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 ; Ex parte
Garland , 4 Wall. 333. Nor does a State have
standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these
constitutional provisions against the Federal Government, the
ultimate parens patriae of every American citizen. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 , 262 U. S.
485 -486; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S.
12 , 273 U. S. 18 . The
objections to the Act which are raised under these provisions may
therefore be considered only as additional aspects of the basic
question presented by the case: has Congress exercised its powers
under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner with
relation to the States?

															The ground rules for resolving this question are clear. The
language and purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment, the prior
decisions construing its several provisions, and the general
doctrines of constitutional interpretation all point to one
fundamental principle. As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. Cf. our rulings last Term, sustaining Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U. S. 241 , 379 U. S.
258 -259, 379 U. S.
261 -262, and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 , 379 U. S.
303 -304. We turn now to a more detailed description of
the standards which govern our review of the Act Page 383 U. S. 325 Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment declares that

															"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

															This declaration has always been treated as self-executing, and
has repeatedly been construed, without further legislative
specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or
procedures which are discriminatory on their face or in practice. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 ; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368 ; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 ; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 ; Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933; Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 ; United States v. Thomas, 362 U. S. 58 ; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 ; Alabama v. United States, 371 U. S.
37 ; Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.
S. 145 . These decisions have been rendered with full
respect for the general rule, reiterated last Term in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89 , 380 U. S. 91 ,
that States "have broad powers to determine the conditions under
which the right of suffrage may be exercised." The gist of the
matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary
exertions of state power.

															"When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of state
interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But such
insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. at 364 U. S.
347 .

															South Carolina contends that the cases cited above are
precedents only for the authority of the judiciary to strike down
state statutes and procedures -- that to allow an exercise of this
authority by Congress would be to rob the courts of their rightful
constitutional role. On the contrary, § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment expressly declares that "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." By adding
this Page 383 U. S. 326 authorization, the Framers indicated that Congress was to be
chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in § 1.

															"It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. Congress
is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate
legislation. Some legislation is contemplated to make the [Civil
War] amendments fully effective." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 , 100 U. S. 345 .
Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial
powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial
discrimination in voting.

															Congress has repeatedly exercised these powers in the past, and
its enactments have repeatedly been upheld. For recent examples, see the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which was sustained in United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17 ; United States v. Thomas, supra, and Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U. S. 420 , and
the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which was upheld in Alabama v.
United States, supra; Louisiana v. United States, supra, and United
States v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128 . On
the rare occasions when the Court has found an unconstitutional
exercise of these powers, in its opinion Congress had attacked
evils not comprehended by the Fifteenth Amendment. See United
States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 ; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127 .

															The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the
express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of
the States. Chief Justice Marshall laid down the classic
formulation, 50 years before the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified:

															"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S.
421 . Page 383 U. S. 327 The Court has subsequently echoed his language in describing
each of the Civil War Amendments:

															"Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to
enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure
to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or
invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 100 U. S.
345 -346. This language was again employed, nearly 50
years later, with reference to Congress' related authority under §
2 of the Eighteenth Amendment. James Everard's Breweries v.
Day, 265 U. S. 545 , 265 U. S.
558 -559.

															We therefore reject South Carolina's argument that Congress may
appropriately do no more than to forbid violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment in general terms -- that the task of fashioning specific
remedies or of applying them to particular localities must
necessarily be left entirely to the courts. Congress is not
circumscribed by any such artificial rules under § 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment. In the oft-repeated words of Chief Justice
Marshall, referring to another specific legislative authorization
in the Constitution,

															"This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v.
Ogden , 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 196 . IV Congress exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment
in an inventive manner when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of
1965. First: the measure prescribes remedies for voting
discrimination which go into Page 383 U. S. 328 effect without any need for prior adjudication. This was clearly
a legitimate response to the problem, for which there is ample
precedent under other constitutional provisions. See Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294 , 379 U. S.
302 -304; United States v. Darby, 312 U.
S. 100 , 312 U. S.
120 -121. Congress had found that case-by-case litigation
was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination
in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy
required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably
encountered in these lawsuits. [ Footnote 34 ] After enduring nearly a century of
systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might
well decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the
perpetrators of the evil to its victims. The question remains, of
course, whether the specific remedies prescribed in the Act were an
appropriate means of combating the evil, and to this question we
shall presently address ourselves.

															Second: the Act intentionally confines these remedies to a small
number of States and political subdivisions which, in most
instances, were familiar to Congress by name. [ Footnote 35 ] This, too, was a permissible method
of dealing with the problem. Congress had learned that substantial
voting discrimination presently occurs in certain sections of the
country, and it knew no way of accurately forecasting whether the
evil might spread elsewhere in the future. [ Footnote 36 ] In acceptable legislative fashion,
Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where
immediate action seemed necessary. See McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 , 366 U. S. 427 ; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 , 346 U. S.
550 -554. The doctrine of the equality of States, invoked
by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, for that doctrine
applies only to the terms Page 383 U. S. 329 upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not to the
remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared. See
Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559 , and
cases cited therein. Coverage formula We now consider the related question of whether the specific
States and political subdivisions within § 4(b) of the Act were an
appropriate target for the new remedies. South Carolina contends
that the coverage formula is awkwardly designed in a number of
respects, and that it disregards various local conditions which
have nothing to do with racial discrimination. These arguments,
however, are largely beside the point. [ Footnote 37 ] Congress began work with reliable
evidence of actual voting discrimination in a great majority of the
States and political subdivisions affected by the new remedies of
the Act. The formula eventually evolved to describe these areas was
relevant to the problem of voting discrimination, and Congress was
therefore entitled to infer a significant danger of the evil in the
few remaining States and political subdivisions covered by § 4(b)
of the Act. No more was required to justify the application to
these areas of Congress' express powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment. Cf. North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.
S. 686 , 327 U. S.
710 -711; Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.
S. 564 , 274 U. S.
582 -583.

															To be specific, the new remedies of the Act are imposed on three
States -- Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi -- in which federal
courts have repeatedly found substantial voting discrimination.
[ Footnote 38 ] Section 4(b)
of the Act also embraces two other States -- Georgia and South
Carolina -- plus large portions of a third State North Carolina --
for which there was more fragmentary evidence of Page 383 U. S. 330 recent voting discrimination mainly adduced by the Justice
Department and the Civil Rights Commission. [ Footnote 39 ] All of these areas were
appropriately subjected to the new remedies. In identifying past
evils, Congress obviously may avail itself of information from any
probative source. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U. S. 241 , 379 U. S.
252 -253; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. at 379 U. S.
299 -301.

															The areas listed above, for which there was evidence of actual
voting discrimination, share two characteristics incorporated by
Congress into the coverage formula: the use of tests and devices
for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential
election at least 12 points below the national average. Tests and
devices are relevant to voting discrimination because of their long
history as a tool for perpetrating the evil; a low voting rate is
pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread disenfranchisement
must inevitably affect the number of actual voters. Accordingly,
the coverage formula is rational in both practice and theory. It
was therefore permissible to impose the new remedies on the few
remaining States and political subdivisions covered by the formula,
at least in the absence of proof that they have been free of
substantial voting discrimination in recent years. Congress is
clearly not bound by the rules relating to statutory presumptions
in criminal cases when it prescribes civil remedies against other
organs of government under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Compare United States v. Romano, 382 U.
S. 136 ; Tot v. United States, 319 U.
S. 463 .

															It is irrelevant that the coverage formula excludes certain
localities which do not employ voting tests and Page 383 U. S. 331 devices but for which there is evidence of voting discrimination
by other means. Congress had learned that widespread and persistent
discrimination in voting during recent years has typically entailed
the misuse of tests and devices, and this was the evil for which
the new remedies were specifically designed. [ Footnote 40 ] At the same time, through §§ 3,
6(a), and 13(b) of the Act, Congress strengthened existing remedies
for voting discrimination in other areas of the country.
Legislation need not deal with all phases of a problem in the same
way, so long as the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical
experience. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 , 348 U. S.
488 -489; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 .
There are no States or political subdivisions exempted from
coverage under § 4(b) in which the record reveals recent racial
discrimination involving tests and devices. This fact confirms the
rationality of the formula.

															Acknowledging the possibility of overbreadth, the Act provides
for termination of special statutory coverage at the behest of
States and political subdivisions in which the danger of
substantial voting discrimination has not materialized during the
preceding five years. Despite South Carolina's argument to the
contrary, Congress might appropriately limit litigation under this
provision to a single court in the District of Columbia, pursuant
to its constitutional power under Art. III, § 1, to "ordain and
establish" inferior federal tribunals. See Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503 , 321 U. S.
510 -512; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.
S. 414 , 321 U. S.
427 -431; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.
S. 182 . At the present time, contractual claims against
the United States for more than $10,000 must be brought in the
Court of Claims, and, until 1662, the District of Columbia was the
sole venue of suits against Page 383 U. S. 332 federal officers officially residing in the Nation's Capital.
[ Footnote 41 ] We have
discovered no suggestion that Congress exceeded constitutional
bounds in imposing these limitations on litigation against the
Federal Government, and the Act is no less reasonable in this
respect.

															South Carolina contends that these termination procedures are a
nullity because they impose an impossible burden of proof upon
States and political subdivisions entitled to relief. As the
Attorney General pointed out during hearings on the Act, however,
an area need do no more than submit affidavits from voting
officials, asserting that they have not been guilty of racial
discrimination through the use of tests and devices during the past
five years, and then refute whatever evidence to the contrary may
be adduced by the Federal Government. [ Footnote 42 ] Section 4(d) further assures that an area
need not disprove each isolated instance of voting discrimination
in order to obtain relief in the termination proceedings. The
burden of proof is therefore quite bearable, particularly since the
relevant facts relating to the conduct of voting officials are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the States and political
subdivisions themselves. See United States v. New York, N.H.
& H. R. Co., 355 U. S. 253 , 355 U. S. 256 ,
n. 5; cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.
S. 119 , 346 U. S.
126 .

															The Act bars direct judicial review of the findings by the
Attorney General and the Director of the Census which trigger
application of the coverage formula. We reject the claim by Alabama
as amicus curiae that this provision is invalid because it
allows the new remedies of Page 383 U. S. 333 the Act to be imposed in an arbitrary way. The Court has already
permitted Congress to withdraw judicial review of administrative
determinations in numerous cases involving the statutory rights of
private parties. For example, see United States v. California
Eastern Line, 348 U. S. 351 ; Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.
S. 297 . In this instance, the findings not subject to
review consist of objective statistical determinations by the
Census Bureau and a routine analysis of state statutes by the
Justice Department. These functions are unlikely to arouse any
plausible dispute, as South Carolina apparently concedes. In the
event that the formula is improperly applied, the area affected can
always go into court and obtain termination of coverage under §
4(b), provided, of course, that it has not been guilty of voting
discrimination in recent years. This procedure serves as a partial
substitute for direct judicial review. Suspension of tests We now arrive at consideration of the specific remedies
prescribed by the Act for areas included within the coverage
formula. South Carolina assails the temporary suspension of
existing voting qualifications, reciting the rule laid down by Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U. S. 45 , that
literacy tests and related devices are not in themselves contrary
to the Fifteenth Amendment. In that very case, however, the Court
went on to say,

															"Of course, a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed
to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was
designed to uproot." Id. at 360 U. S. 53 .
The record shows that, in most of the States covered by the Act,
including South Carolina, various tests and devices have been
instituted with the purpose of disenfranchising Negroes, have been
framed in such a way as to facilitate this aim, and have been
administered Page 383 U. S. 334 in a discriminatory fashion for many years. [ Footnote 43 ] Under these circumstances, the
Fifteenth Amendment has clearly been violated. See Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U. S. 145 ; Alabama v. United States, 371 U. S.
37 ; Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933.

															The Act suspends literacy tests and similar devices for a period
of five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting
discrimination. This was a legitimate response to the problem, for
which there is ample precedent in Fifteenth Amendment cases. Ibid. Underlying the response was the feeling that States
and political subdivisions which had been allowing white
illiterates to vote for years could not sincerely complain about
"dilution" of their electorates through the registration of Negro
illiterates. [ Footnote 44 ]
Congress knew that continuance of the tests and devices in use at
the present time, no matter how fairly administered in the future,
would freeze the effect of past discrimination in favor of
unqualified white registrants. [ Footnote 45 ] Congress permissibly rejected the
alternative of requiring a complete re-registration of all voters,
believing that this would be too harsh on many whites who had
enjoyed the franchise for their entire adult lives. [ Footnote 46 ] Review of new rules The Act suspends new voting regulations pending scrutiny by
federal authorities to determine whether their use would violate
the Fifteenth Amendment. This may have been an uncommon exercise of
congressional power, as South Carolina contends, but the Court has
recognized that exceptional conditions can justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate. See Home Page 383 U. S. 335 Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.
S. 398 ; Wilson v. New, 243 U.
S. 332 . Congress knew that some of the States covered by
§ 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of
contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal
court decrees. [ Footnote 47 ]
Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar
maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting
discrimination contained in the Act itself. Under the compulsion of
these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly
decisive manner.

															For reasons already stated, there was nothing inappropriate
about limiting litigation under this provision to the District
Court for the District of Columbia, and in putting the burden of
proof on the areas seeking relief. Nor has Congress authorized the
District Court to issue advisory opinions, in violation of the
principles of Article III invoked by Georgia as amicus
curiae. The Act automatically suspends the operation of voting
regulations enacted after November 1, 1964, and furnishes
mechanisms for enforcing the suspension. A State or political
subdivision wishing to make use of a recent amendment to its voting
laws therefore has a concrete and immediate "controversy" with the
Federal Government. Cf. Public Utilities Comm'n v. United
States, 355 U. S. 534 , 355 U. S.
536 -539; United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 , 332 U. S. 24 -25.
An appropriate remedy is a judicial determination that continued
suspension of the new rule is unnecessary to vindicate rights
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. Federal examiners The Act authorizes the appointment of federal examiners to list
qualified applicants who are thereafter Page 383 U. S. 336 entitled to vote, subject to an expeditious challenge procedure.
This was clearly an appropriate response to the problem, closely
related to remedies authorized in prior cases. See Alabama v.
United States, supra; United States v. Thomas, 362 U. S.
58 . In many of the political subdivisions covered by §
4(b) of the Act, voting officials have persistently employed a
variety of procedural tactics to deny Negroes the franchise, often
in direct defiance or evasion of federal court decrees. [ Footnote 48 ] Congress realized that
merely to suspend voting rules which have been misused or are
subject to misuse might leave this localized evil undisturbed. As
for the briskness of the challenge procedure, Congress knew that,
in some of the areas affected, challenges had been persistently
employed to harass registered Negroes. It chose to forestall this
abuse, at the same time providing alternative ways for removing
persons listed through error or fraud. [ Footnote 49 ] In addition to the judicial challenge
procedure, § 7(d) allows for the removal of names by the examiner
himself, and 11(c) makes it a crime to obtain a listing through
fraud.

															In recognition of the fact that there were political
subdivisions covered by § 4(b) of the Act in which the appointment
of federal examiners might be unnecessary, Congress assigned the
Attorney General the task of determining the localities to which
examiners should be sent. [ Footnote 50 ] There is no warrant for the claim, asserted
by Georgia as amicus curiae, that the Attorney General is
free to use this power in an arbitrary fashion, without regard to
the purposes of the Act. Section 6(b) sets adequate standards to
guide the exercise of his discretion, by directing him to calculate
the registration ratio of nonwhites to whites, and to weigh
evidence of good faith Page 383 U. S. 337 efforts to avoid possible voting discrimination. At the same
time, the special termination procedures of § 13(a) provide
indirect judicial review for the political subdivisions affected,
assuring the withdrawal of federal examiners from areas where they
are clearly not needed. Cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 , 342 U. S.
542 -544; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S.
38 , 307 U. S.
48 -49.

															After enduring nearly a century of widespread resistance to the
Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent
weapons against the evil, with authority in the Attorney General to
employ them effectively. Many of the areas directly affected by
this development have indicated their willingness to abide by any
restraints legitimately imposed upon them. [ Footnote 51 ] We here hold that the portions of
the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a valid means for
carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully,
millions of non-white Americans will now be able to participate for
the first time on an equal basis in the government under which they
live. We may finally look forward to the day when truly

															"[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

															The bill of complaint is Dismissed. | 383
U.S. 301 app| APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT V OTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 AN ACT To enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress Page 383 U. S. 338 assembled, That this Act shall be known as the "Voting
Rights Act of 1965."

															SEC. 2. No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color.

															SEC. 3.(a) Whenever the Attorney General institutes a proceeding
under any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth
amendment in any State or political subdivision the court shall
authorize the appointment of Federal examiners by the United States
Civil Service Commission in accordance with section 6 to serve for
such period of time and for such political subdivisions as the
court shall determine is appropriate to enforce the guarantees of
the fifteenth amendment (1) as part of any interlocutory order if
the court determines that the appointment of such examiners is
necessary to enforce such guarantees or (2) as part of any final
judgment if the court finds that violations of the fifteenth
amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred in such State
or subdivision: Provided, That the court need not
authorize the appointment of examiners if any incidents of denial
or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color (1)
have been few in number and have been promptly and effectively
corrected by State or local action, (2) the continuing effect of
such incidents has been eliminated, and (3) there is no reasonable
probability of their recurrence in the future.

															(b) If in a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General under
any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment in
any State or political subdivision the court finds that a test or
device has been used for the purpose or with the effect of denying
or abridging the right of any citizen of the United States to vote
on account of race or color, it shall suspend the use of Page 383 U. S. 339 tests and devices in such State or political subdivisions as the
court shall determine is appropriate and for such period as it
deems necessary.

															(c) If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General
under any statute to enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth
amendment in any State or political subdivision the court finds
that violations of the fifteenth amendment justifying equitable
relief have occurred within the territory of such State or
political subdivision, the court, in addition to such relief as it
may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it may deem
appropriate and during such period no voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the
time the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and
until the court finds that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color: Provided, That such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may
be enforced if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other
appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection
within sixty days after such submission, except that neither the
court's finding nor the Attorney General's failure to object shall
bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.

															SEC. 4.(a) To assure that the right of citizens of the United
States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or
color, no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal,
State, or local election because of his failure to comply with any
test or device in any State with respect to which the
determinations have been Page 383 U. S. 340 made under subsection (b) or in any political subdivision with
respect to which such determinations have been made as a separate
unit, unless the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in an action for a declaratory judgment brought by such
State or subdivision against the United States has determined that
no such test or device has been used during the five years
preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color: Provided, That no such declaratory judgment
shall issue with respect to any plaintiff for a period of five
years after the entry of a final judgment of any court of the
United States, other than the denial of a declaratory judgment
under this section, whether entered prior to or after the enactment
of this Act, determining that denials or abridgments of the right
to vote on account of race or color through the use of such tests
or devices have occurred anywhere in the territory of such
plaintiff.

															An action pursuant to this subsection shall be heard and
determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the
provisions of section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code
and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. The court shall
retain jurisdiction of any action pursuant to this subsection for
five years after judgment and shall reopen the action upon motion
of the Attorney General alleging that a test or device has been
used for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color.

															If the Attorney General determines that he has no reason to
believe that any such test or device has been used during the five
years preceding the filing of the action for the purpose or with
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color, he shall consent to the entry of such judgment Page 383 U. S. 340 (b) The provisions of subsection (a) shall apply in any State or
in any political subdivision of a state which (1) the Attorney
General determines maintained on November 1, 1964, any test or
device, and with respect to which (2) the Director of the Census
determines that less than 50 percentum of the persons of voting age
residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or that less
than 50 percentum of such persons voted in the presidential
election of November 1964.

															A determination or certification of the Attorney General or of
the Director of the Census under this section or under section 6 or
section 13 shall not be reviewable in any court and shall be
effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

															(c) The phrase "test or device" shall mean any requirement that
a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting
(1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or
interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement
or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral
character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of
registered voters or members of any other class.

															(d) For purposes of this section no State or political
subdivision shall be determined to have engaged in the use of tests
or devices for the purpose or with the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color if (1)
incidents of such use have been few in number and have been
promptly and effectively corrected by State or local action, (2)
the continuing effect of such incidents has been eliminated, and
(3) there is no reasonable probability of their recurrence in the
future.

															(e)(1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under
the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag
schools in which the predominant Page 383 U. S. 342 classroom language was other than English, it is necessary to
prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of such
persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any
matter in the English language.

															(2) No person who demonstrates that he has successfully
completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a
private school accredited by, any State or territory, the District
of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the
predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election
because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret
any matter in the English language, except that, in States in which
State law provides that a different level of education is
presumptive of literacy, he shall demonstrate that he has
successfully completed an equivalent level of education in a public
school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or
territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico in which the predominant classroom language was other than
English.

															SEC. 5. Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect
to which the prohibitions set forth in section 4(a) are in effect
shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with
respect to voting different from that in force or effect on
November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute an action
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color, and unless and until the court enters
such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, Page 383 U. S. 343 or procedure: Provided, That such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced
without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has
not interposed an objection within sixty days after such
submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure to
object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall
bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any
action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284
of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to
the Supreme Court.

															SEC. 6. Whenever (a) a court has authorized the appointment of
examiners pursuant to the provisions of section 3(a), or (b) unless
a declaratory judgment has been rendered under section 4(a), the
Attorney General certifies with respect to any political
subdivision named in, or included within the scope of,
determinations made under section 4(b) that (1) he has received
complaints in writing from twenty or more residents of such
political subdivision alleging that they have been denied the right
to vote under color of law on account of race or color, and that he
believes such complaints to be meritorious, or (2) that, in his
judgment (considering, among other factors, whether the ratio of
nonwhite persons to white persons registered to vote within such
subdivision appears to him to be reasonably attributable to
violations of the fifteenth amendment or whether substantial
evidence exists that bona fide efforts are being made within such
subdivision to comply with the fifteenth amendment), the
appointment of examiners is otherwise necessary to Page 383 U. S. 344 enforce the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment, the Civil
Service Commission shall appoint as many examiners for such
subdivision as it may deem appropriate to prepare and maintain
lists of persons eligible to vote in Federal, State, and local
elections. Such examiners, hearing officers provided for in section
9(a), and other persons deemed necessary by the Commission to carry
out the provisions and purposes of this Act shall be appointed,
compensated, and separated without regard to the provisions of any
statute administered by the Civil Service Commission, and service
under this Act shall not be considered employment for the purposes
of any statute administered by the Civil Service Commission, except
the provisions of section 9 of the Act of August 2, 1939, as
amended (5 U.S.C. 118i), prohibiting partisan political activity: Provided, That the Commission is authorized, after
consulting the head of the appropriate department or agency, to
designate suitable persons in the official service of the United
States, with their consent, to serve in these positions. Examiners
and hearing officers shall have the power to administer oaths.

															SEC. 7.(a) The examiners for each political subdivision shall,
at such places as the Civil Service Commission shall by regulation
designate, examine applicants concerning their qualifications for
voting. An application to an examiner shall be in such form as the
Commission may require and shall contain allegations that the
applicant is not otherwise registered to vote.

															(b) Any person whom the examiner finds, in accordance with
instructions received under section 9(b), to have the
qualifications prescribed by State law not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States shall promptly be placed
on a list of eligible voters. A challenge to such listing may be
made in accordance with section 9(a) and shall not be the basis for
a prosecution under section 12 of this Act. The examiner Page 383 U. S. 345 shall certify and transmit such list, and any supplements as
appropriate, at least once a month, to the offices of the
appropriate election officials, with copies to the Attorney General
and the attorney general of the State, and any such lists and
supplements thereto transmitted during the month shall be available
for public inspection on the last business day of the month and, in
any event, not later than the forty-fifth day prior to any
election. The appropriate State or local election official shall
place such names on the official voting list. Any person whose name
appears on the examiner's list shall be entitled and allowed to
vote in the election district of his residence unless and until the
appropriate election officials shall have been notified that such
person has been removed from such list in accordance with
subsection (d): Provided, That no person shall be entitled
to vote in any election by virtue of this Act unless his name shall
have been certified and transmitted on such a list to the offices
of the appropriate election officials at least forty-five days
prior to such election.

															(c) The examiner shall issue to each person whose name appears
on such a list a certificate evidencing his eligibility to
vote.

															(d) A person whose name appears on such a list shall be removed
therefrom by an examiner if (1) such person has been successfully
challenged in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section
9, or (2) he has been determined by an examiner to have lost his
eligibility to vote under State law not inconsistent with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.

															Sec. 8. Whenever an examiner is serving under this Act in any
political subdivision, the Civil Service Commission may assign, at
the request of the Attorney General, one or more persons, who may
be officers of the United States, (1) to enter and attend at any
place for holding an election in such subdivision for the
purpose Page 383 U. S. 346 of observing whether persons who are entitled to vote are being
permitted to vote, and (2) to enter and attend at any place for
tabulating the votes cast at any election held in such subdivision
for the purpose of observing whether votes cast by persons entitled
to vote are being properly tabulated. Such persons so assigned
shall report to an examiner appointed for such political
subdivision, to the Attorney General, and if the appointment of
examiners has been authorized pursuant to section 3(a), to the
court.

															SEC. 9.(a) Any challenge to a listing on an eligibility list
prepared by an examiner shall be heard and determined by a hearing
officer appointed by and responsible to the Civil Service
Commission and under such rules as the Commission shall by
regulation prescribe. Such challenge shall be entertained only if
filed at such office within the State as the Civil Service
Commission shall by regulation designate, and within ten days after
the listing of the challenged person is made available for public
inspection, and if supported by (1) the affidavits of at least two
persons having personal knowledge of the facts constituting grounds
for the challenge, and (2) a certification that a copy of the
challenge and affidavits have been served by mail or in person upon
the person challenged at his place of residence set out in the
application. Such challenge shall be determined within fifteen days
after it has been filed. A petition for review of the decision of
the hearing officer may be filed in the United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the person challenged resides
within fifteen days after service of such decision by mail on the
person petitioning for review but no decision of a hearing officer
shall be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Any person listed shall
be entitled and allowed to vote pending final determination by the
hearing officer and by the court Page 383 U. S. 347 (b) The times, places, procedures, and form for application and
listing pursuant to this Act and removals from the eligibility
lists shall be prescribed by regulations promulgated by the Civil
Service Commission and the Commission shall, after consultation
with the Attorney General, instruct examiners concerning applicable
State law not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States with respect to (1) the qualifications required for
listing, and (2) loss of eligibility to vote.

															(c) Upon the request of the applicant or the challenger or on
its own motion the Civil Service Commission shall have the power to
require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of documentary evidence relating to any matter
pending before it under the authority of this section. In case of
contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena, any district court of the
United States or the United States court of any territory or
possession, or the District Court of the United States for the
District of Columbia, within the jurisdiction of which said person
guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or is
domiciled or transacts business, or has appointed an agent for
receipt of service of process, upon application by the Attorney
General of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue to
such person an order requiring such person to appear before the
Commission or a hearing officer, there to produce pertinent,
relevant, and nonprivileged documentary evidence if so ordered, or
there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation,
and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by
said court as a contempt thereof.

															SEC. 10.(a) The Congress finds that the requirement of the
payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting (i) precludes
persons of limited means from voting or imposes unreasonable
financial hardship upon such persons Page 383 U. S. 348 as a precondition to their exercise of the franchise, (ii) does
not bear a reasonable relationship to any legitimate State interest
in the conduct of elections, and (iii) in some areas has the
purpose or effect of denying persons the right to vote because of
race or color. Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares
that the constitutional right of citizens to vote is denied or
abridged in some areas by the requirement of the payment of a poll
tax as a precondition to voting.

															(b) In the exercise of the powers of Congress under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment and section 2 of the fifteenth amendment,
the Attorney General is authorized and directed to institute
forthwith in the name of the United States such actions, including
actions against States or political subdivisions, for declaratory
judgment or injunctive relief against the enforcement of any
requirement of the payment of a poll tax as a precondition to
voting, or substitute therefor enacted after November 1, 1964, as
will be necessary to implement the declaration of subsection (a)
and the purposes of this section.

															(c) The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of such actions which shall be heard and determined by
a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of
section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal
shall lie to the Supreme Court. It shall be the duty of the judges
designated to hear the case to assign the case for hearing at the
earliest practicable date, to participate in the hearing and
determination thereof, and to cause the case to be in every way
expedited.

															(d) During the pendency of such actions, and thereafter if the
courts, notwithstanding this action by the Congress, should declare
the requirement of the payment of a poll tax to be constitutional,
no citizen of the United States who is a resident of a State or
political Page 383 U. S. 349 subdivision with respect to which determinations have been made
under subsection 4(b) and a declaratory judgment has not been
entered under subsection 4(a), during the first year he becomes
otherwise entitled to vote by reason of registration by State or
local officials or listing by an examiner, shall be denied the
right to vote for failure to pay a poll tax if he tenders payment
of such tax for the current year to an examiner or to the
appropriate State or local official at least forty-five days prior
to election, whether or not such tender would be timely or adequate
under State law. An examiner shall have authority to accept such
payment from any person authorized by this Act to make an
application for listing, and shall issue a receipt for such
payment. The examiner shall transmit promptly any such poll tax
payment to the office of the State or local official authorized to
receive such payment under State law, together with the name and
address of the applicant.

															SEC. 11.(a) No person acting under color of law shall fail or
refuse to permit any person to vote who is entitled to vote under
any provision of this Act or is otherwise qualified to vote, or
willfully fail or refuse to tabulate, count, and report such
person's vote.

															(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise,
shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or
intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any person for urging or aiding any person to
vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
person for exercising any powers or duties under section 3(a), 6,
8, 9, 10, or 12(e).

															(c) Whoever knowingly or willfully gives false information as to
his name, address, or period of residence in the voting district
for the purpose of establishing his eligibility to register or
vote, or conspires with another Page 383 U. S. 350 individual for the purpose of encouraging his false registration
to vote or illegal voting, or pays or offers to pay or accepts
payment either for registration to vote or for voting shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both: Provided, however, That this provision shall be
applicable only to general, special, or primary elections held
solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or electing any
candidate for the office of President, Vice President, presidential
elector, Member of the United States Senate, Member of the United
States House of Representatives, or Delegates or Commissioners from
the territories or possessions, or Resident Commissioner of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

															(d) Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of an
examiner or hearing officer knowingly and willfully falsifies or
conceals a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.

															SEC. 12.(a) Whoever shall deprive or attempt to deprive any
person of any right secured by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, or 10 or
shall violate section 11(a) or (b), shall be fined not more than
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

															(b) Whoever, within a year following an election in a political
subdivision in which an examiner has been appointed (1) destroys,
defaces, mutilates, or otherwise alters the marking of a paper
ballot which has been cast in such election, or (2) alters any
official record of voting in such election tabulated from a voting
machine or otherwise, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both Page 383 U. S. 351 (c) Whoever conspires to violate the provisions of subsection
(a) or (b) of this section, or interferes with any right secured by
section 2, 3 4, 5, 7, 10, or 11(a) or (b) shall be fined not more
than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

															(d) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act or
practice prohibited by section 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, or subsection
(b) of this section, the Attorney General may institute for the
United States, or in the name of the United States, an action for
preventive relief, including an application for a temporary or
permanent injunction, restraining order, or other order, and
including an order directed to the State and State or local
election officials to require them (1) to permit persons listed
under this Act to vote and (2) to count such votes.

															(e) Whenever in any political subdivision in which there are
examiners appointed pursuant to this Act any persons allege to such
an examiner within forty-eight hours after the closing of the polls
that notwithstanding (1) their listing under this Act or
registration by an appropriate election official and (2) their
eligibility to vote, they have not been permitted to vote in such
election, the examiner shall forthwith notify the Attorney General
if such allegations in his opinion appear to be well founded. Upon
receipt of such notification, the Attorney General may forthwith
file with the district court an application for an order providing
for the marking, casting, and counting of the ballots of such
persons and requiring the inclusion of their votes in the total
vote before the results of such election shall be deemed final and
any force or effect given thereto. The district court shall hear
and determine such matters immediately after the filing of such
application. The remedy provided Page 383 U. S. 352 in this subsection shall not preclude any remedy available under
State or Federal law.

															(f) The district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and
shall exercise the same without regard to whether a person
asserting rights under the provisions of this Act shall have
exhausted any administrative or other remedies that may be provided
by law

															SEC. 13. Listing procedures shall be terminated in any political
subdivision of any State (a) with respect to examiners appointed
pursuant to clause (b) of section 6 whenever the Attorney General
notifies the Civil Service Commission, or whenever the District
Court for the District of Columbia determines in an action for
declaratory judgment brought by any political subdivision with
respect to which the Director of the Census has determined that
more than 50 percentum of the nonwhite persons of voting age
residing therein are registered to vote, (1) that all persons
listed by an examiner for such subdivision have been placed on the
appropriate voting registration roll, and (2) that there is no
longer reasonable cause to believe that persons will be deprived of
or denied the right to vote on account of race or color in such
subdivision, and (b), with respect to examiners appointed pursuant
to section 3(a), upon order of the authorizing court. A political
subdivision may petition the Attorney General for the termination
of listing procedures under clause (a) of this section, and may
petition the Attorney General to request the Director of the Census
to take such survey or census as may be appropriate for the making
of the determination provided for in this section. The District
Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction to
require such survey or census to be made by the Director of the
Census and it shall require him to do so if it deems the
Attorney Page 383 U. S. 353 General's refusal to request such survey or census to be
arbitrary or unreasonable.

															SEC. 14.(a) All cases of criminal contempt arising under the
provisions of this Act shall be governed by section 151 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C.1995).

															(b) No court other than the District Court for the District of
Columbia or a court of appeals in any proceeding under section 9
shall have jurisdiction to issue any declaratory judgment pursuant
to section 4 or section 5 or any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction against the execution or enforcement of any
provision of this Act or any action of any Federal officer or
employee pursuant hereto.

															(c)(1) The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action
necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or
general election, including, but not limited to, registration,
listing pursuant to this Act, or other action required by law
prerequisite to voting, casting a ballot, and having such ballot
counted properly and included in the appropriate totals of votes
cast with respect to candidates for public or party office and
propositions for which votes are received in an election.

															(2) The term "political subdivision" shall mean any county or
parish, except that, where registration for voting is not conducted
under the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include
any other subdivision of a State which conducts registration for
voting.

															(d) In any action for a declaratory judgment brought pursuant to
section 4 or section 5 of this Act, subpoenas for witnesses who are
required to attend the District Court for the District of Columbia
may be served in any judicial district of the United States: Provided, That no writ of subpoena shall issue for
witnesses without the District of Columbia at a greater distance
than one hundred Page 383 U. S. 354 miles from the place of holding court without the permission of
the District Court for the District of Columbia being first had
upon proper application and cause shown.

															SEC. 15. Section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.1971),
as amended by section 131 of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71 Stat.
637), and amended by section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1960
(74 Stat. 90), and as further amended by section 101 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (78 Stat. 241), is further amended as
follows:

															(a) Delete the word "Federal" wherever it appears in subsections
(a) and (c);

															(b) Repeal subsection (f) and designate the present subsections
(g) and (h) as (f) and (g), respectively.

															SEC. 16. The Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense,
jointly, shall make a full and complete study to determine whether,
under the laws or practices of any State or States, there are
preconditions to voting, which might tend to result in
discrimination against citizens serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States seeking to vote. Such officials shall, jointly, make
a report to the Congress not later than June 30, 1966, containing
the results of such study, together with a list of any States in
which such preconditions exist, and shall include in such report
such recommendations for legislation as they deem advisable to
prevent discrimination in voting against citizens serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States.

															SEC. 17. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to deny, impair,
or otherwise adversely affect the right to vote of any person
registered to vote under the law of any State or political
subdivision.

															SEC. 18. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such
sums as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act Page 383 U. S. 355 SEC 19. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of
the Act and the application of the provision to other persons not
similarly situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.

															Approved August 6, 1965.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															19 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1964 ed., Supp. I).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															States supporting South Carolina: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Virginia. States supporting the Attorney General:
California, Illinois, and Massachusetts, joined by Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

															[ Footnote 3 ] See Hearings on H.R. 6400 before Subcommittee No. 5 of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(hereinafter cited as House Hearings); Hearings on S. 1564 before
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings).

															[ Footnote 4 ] See the Congressional Record for April 22, 23, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30; May 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 24, 25, 26; July 6, 7, 8, 9; August 3 and 4, 1965.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The facts contained in these reports are confirmed, among other
sources, by United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 , 363-385 (Wisdom, J.), aff'd, 380 U.
S. 145 ; United States v.
Mississippi, 229 F.
Supp. 925 , 983-997 (dissenting opinion of Brown, J.), rev'd
and rem'd, 380 U. S. 128 ; United States v. Alabama, 192 F.
Supp. 677 (Johnson, J.), aff'd, 304 F.2d 583, aff'd, 371 U. S. 37 ;
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Voting in Mississippi; 1963 Comm'n on Civil
Rights Rep. Voting; 1961 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep. Voting, pt. 2;
1959; Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep. pt. 2. See generally Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 18 Stan.L.Rev. 1; Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting
Rights, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1051.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															16 Stat. 140.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															16 Stat. 433.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															28 Stat. 36.

															[ Footnote 9 ]

															The South Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1895 was a
leader in the widespread movement to disenfranchise Negroes. Key,
Southern Politics, 537-539. Senator Ben Tillman frankly explained
to the state delegates the aim of the new literacy test:

															"[T]he only thing we can do as patriots and as statesmen is to
take from [the 'ignorant blacks'] every ballot that we can under
the laws of our national government."

															He was equally candid about the exemption from the literacy test
for persons who could "understand" and "explain" a section of the
state constitution: "There is no particle of fraud or illegality in
it. It is just simply showing partiality, perhaps, [laughter,] or
discriminating." He described the alternative exemption for persons
paying state property taxes in the same vein: "By means of the $300
clause, you simply reach out and take in some more white men and a
few more colored men." Journal of the Constitutional Convention of
the State of South Carolina 464, 469, 471 (1895). Senator Tillman
was the dominant political figure in the state convention, and his
entire address merits examination.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															Prior to the Civil War, most of the slave States made it a crime
to teach Negroes how to read or write. Following the war, these
States rapidly instituted racial segregation in their public
schools. Throughout the period, free public education in the South
had barely begun to develop. See Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U. S. 483 , 347 U. S.
489 -490, n. 4; 1959 Comm'n on Civil Rights Rep.
147-151.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															For example, see three voting suits brought against the States
themselves: United States v. Alabama, 192 F.
Supp. 677 , aff'd, 304 F.2d 583, aff'd, 371 U. S. 37 ; United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 , aff'd, 380 U. S. 145 ; United States v. Mississippi, 339 F.2d 679.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															A white applicant in Louisiana satisfied the registrar of his
ability to interpret the state constitution by writing, "FRDUM FOOF
SPETGH." United States v. Louisiana, 225 F.
Supp. 353 , 384. A white applicant in Alabama who had never
completed the first grade of school was enrolled after the
registrar filled out the entire form for him. United States v.
Penton, 212 F.
Supp. 193 , 210-211.

															[ Footnote 13 ]

															In Panola County, Mississippi, the registrar required Negroes to
interpret the provision of the state constitution concerning "the
rate of interest on the fund known as the Chickasaw School
Fund.'" United States v. Due, 332 F.2d 759, 764. In
Forrest County, Mississippi, the registrar rejected six Negroes
with baccalaureate degrees, three of whom were also Masters of
Arts. United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818, 821. [ Footnote 14 ]

															For example, see United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733,
743.

															[ Footnote 15 ]

															For example, see United States v. Logue, 344 F.2d 290,
292.

															[ Footnote 16 ]

															71 Stat. 634.

															[ Footnote 17 ]

															74 Stat. 86.

															[ Footnote 18 ]

															78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964 ed.).

															[ Footnote 19 ]

															The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered the
registrars of Forrest County, Mississippi, to give future Negro
applicants the same assistance which white applicants had enjoyed
in the past, and to register future Negro applicants despite errors
which were not serious enough to disqualify white applicants in the
past. The Mississippi Legislature promptly responded by requiring
applicants to complete their registration forms without assistance
or error, and by adding a good morals and public challenge
provision to the registration laws. United States v.
Mississippi, 229 F.
Supp. 925 , 996997 (dissenting opinion).

															[ Footnote 20 ]

															For example, see United States v.
Parker, 236 F.
Supp. 511 ; United States v. Palmer, 230 F.
Supp. 716 .

															[ Footnote 21 ]

															For convenient reference, the entire Act is reprinted in an 383
U.S. 301 app|>Appendix to this opinion.

															[ Footnote 22 ]

															Section 4(e) has been challenged in Morgan v.
Katzenbach, 247 F. Supp 196, prob. juris. noted, 382
U.S. 1007, and in United States v. County Bd. of
Elections, 248 F.
Supp. 316 . Section 10(a)(c) is involved in United States v.
Texas, 252 F.
Supp. 234 , and in United States v.
Alabama, 252 F. Supp.
95 ; see also Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, No. 48, 1965 Term, and Butts v. Harrison, No. 655, 1965 Term, which were argued together before this Court on
January 25 and 26, 1966.

															[ Footnote 23 ]

															30 Fed.Reg. 9897

															[ Footnote 24 ] Ibid. [ Footnote 25 ]

															30 Fed.Reg. 1505.

															[ Footnote 26 ] Alaska v. United States, Civ.Act. 101-66; Apache
County v. United States, Civ.Act. 292-66; Elmore County v.
United States, Civ.Act. 320-66.

															[ Footnote 27 ]

															30 Fed.Reg. 14045-14046.

															[ Footnote 28 ]

															For a chart of the tests and devices in effect at the time the
Act was under consideration, see House Hearings 30-32;
Senate Report 42-43.

															[ Footnote 29 ]

															S.C.Code Ann. § 23-342 (195 Supp.).

															[ Footnote 30 ]

															Brief for Mississippi as amicus curiae, App.

															[ Footnote 31 ]

															30 Fed.Reg. 13850.

															[ Footnote 32 ]

															30 Fed.Reg. 9970-9971, 10863, 12363, 12654, 13849-13850, 15837;
31 Fed.Reg. 914.

															[ Footnote 33 ] See Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act
(1965).

															[ Footnote 34 ]

															House Report 9-11; Senate Report 9.

															[ Footnote 35 ]

															House Report 13; senate Report 52, 55.

															[ Footnote 36 ]

															House Hearings 27; Senate Hearings 201.

															[ Footnote 37 ]

															For Congress' defense of the formula, see House Report
13-14; Senate Report 13-14.

															[ Footnote 38 ]

															House Report 12; Senate Report 10.

															[ Footnote 39 ]

															Georgia: House Hearings 160-176; Senate Hearings 1182-1184 1237,
1253, 1300-1301, 1336-1345. North Carolina: Senate Hearings 27-28,
39, 246-248. South Carolina: House Hearings 114-116 196-201; Senate
Hearings 1353-1354.

															[ Footnote 40 ]

															House Hearing.s 75-77; Senate Hearings 241-243.

															[ Footnote 41 ]

															Regarding claims against the United States, see 28
U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1346(a) (1964 ed.). Concerning suits against
federal officers, see Stroud v. Benson, 254 F.2d 448;
H.R.Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.; S.Rep. No.1992, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess.; 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1964 ed.); 2 Moore, Federal
Practice � 4.29 (1964 ed.).

															[ Footnote 42 ]

															House Hearings 92-93; Senate Hearings 22-27.

															[ Footnote 43 ]

															House Report 11-13; Senate Report 4-5, 9-12.

															[ Footnote 44 ]

															House Report 15; Senate Report 15-16.

															[ Footnote 45 ]

															House Report 15; Senate Report 16.

															[ Footnote 46 ]

															House Hearings 17; Senate Hearings 22-23.

															[ Footnote 47 ]

															House Report 111; Senate Report 8, 12.

															[ Footnote 48 ]

															House Report 16; Senate Report 15.

															[ Footnote 49 ]

															Senate Hearings 200.

															[ Footnote 50 ]

															House Report 16

															[ Footnote 51 ] See Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act
(1965).

															MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring and dissenting.

															I agree with substantially all of the Court's opinion sustaining
the power of Congress under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to
suspend state literacy tests and similar voting qualifications and
to authorize the Attorney General to secure the appointment of
federal examiners to register qualified voters in various sections
of the country. Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides
that

															"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

															In addition to this unequivocal command to the States and the
Federal Government that no citizen shall have his right to vote
denied or abridged because of race or color, § 2 of the Amendment
unmistakably gives Congress specific power to go further and pass
appropriate legislation to protect this right to vote against any
method of abridgment no matter how subtle. Compare my
dissenting opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.
S. 226 , 378 U. S. 318 .
I have no doubt whatever as to the power of Congress under § 2 to
enact the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 dealing with
the suspension of state voting tests that have been used as
notorious means to deny and abridge voting rights on racial
grounds. This same congressional power necessarily exists to
authorize appointment of federal examiners. I also agree with the
judgment of the Court upholding § 4(b) of Page 383 U. S. 356 the Act which sets out a formula for determining when and where
the major remedial sections of the Act take effect. I reach this
conclusion, however, for a somewhat different reason than that
stated by the Court, which is that "the coverage formula is
rational in both practice and theory." I do not base my conclusion
on the fact that the formula is rational, for it is enough for me
that Congress, by creating this formula, has merely exercised its
hitherto unquestioned and undisputed power to decide when, where,
and upon what conditions its laws shall go into effect. By stating
in specific detail that the major remedial sections of the Act are
to be applied in areas where certain conditions exist, and by
granting the Attorney General and the Director of the Census
unreviewable power to make the mechanical determination of which
areas come within the formula of § 4(b), I believe that Congress
has acted within its established power to set out preconditions
upon which the Act is to go into effect. See, e.g., 25 U. S. Mott, 12 Wheat.19; United States v. Bush Co., 310 U.
S. 371 ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 .

															Though, as I have said, I agree with most of the Court's
conclusions, I dissent from its holding that every part of § 5 of
the Act is constitutional. Section 4(a), to which § 5 is linked,
suspends for five years all literacy tests and similar devices in
those States coming within the formula of § 4(b). Section 5 goes on
to provide that a State covered by § 4(b) can in no way amend its
constitution or laws relating to voting without first trying to
persuade the Attorney General of the United States or the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia that the new proposed
laws do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying the right to vote to citizens on account of their race or
color. I think this section is unconstitutional on at least two
grounds Page 383 U. S. 357 (a) The Constitution gives federal courts jurisdiction over
cases and controversies only. If it can be said that any case or
controversy arises under this section which gives the District
Court for the District of Columbia jurisdiction to approve or
reject state laws or constitutional amendments, then the case or
controversy must be between a State and the United States
Government. But it is hard for me to believe that a justiciable
controversy can arise in the constitutional sense from a desire by
the United States Government or some of its officials to determine
in advance what legislative provisions a State may enact or what
constitutional amendments it may adopt. If this dispute between the
Federal Government and the States amounts to a case or controversy,
it is a far cry from the traditional constitutional notion of a
case or controversy as a dispute over the meaning of enforceable
laws or the manner in which they are applied. And if, by this
section, Congress has created a case or controversy, and I do not
believe it has, then it seems to me that the most appropriate
judicial forum for settling these important questions is this Court
acting under its original Art. III, 2, jurisdiction to try cases in
which a State is a party. [ Footnote
2/1 ] At least a trial in this Court would treat the States with
the dignity to which they should be entitled as constituent members
of our Federal Union.

															The form of words and the manipulation of presumptions used in §
5 to create the illusion of a case or controversy should not be
allowed to cloud the effect of that section. By requiring a State
to ask a federal court to approve the validity of a proposed law
which has in no way become operative, Congress has asked the State
to Page 383 U. S. 358 secure precisely the type of advisory opinion our Constitution
forbids. As I have pointed out elsewhere, see my
dissenting opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 , 381 U. S. 507 ,
n. 6, pp. 318 U. S.
513 -515, some of those drafting our Constitution wanted
to give the federal courts the power to issue advisory opinions and
propose new laws to the legislative body. These suggestions were
rejected. We should likewise reject any attempt by Congress to
flout constitutional limitations by authorizing federal courts to
render advisory opinions when there is no case or controversy
before them. Congress has ample power to protect the rights of
citizens to vote without resorting to the unnecessarily circuitous,
indirect and unconstitutional route it has adopted in this
section.

															(b) My second and more basic objection to § 5 is that Congress
has here exercised its power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
through the adoption of means that conflict with the most basic
principles of the Constitution. As the Court says the limitations
of the power granted under § 2 are the same as the limitations
imposed on the exercise of any of the powers expressly granted
Congress by the Constitution. The classic formulation of these
constitutional limitations was stated by Chief Justice Marshall
when he said in McCulloch v.
Maryland , 4 Wheat. 316, 17 U. S.
421 ,

															"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional."

															(Emphasis added.) Section 5, by providing that some of the
States cannot pass state laws or adopt state constitutional
amendments without first being compelled to beg federal authorities
to approve their policies, so distorts our constitutional structure
of government as to render any distinction drawn in the
Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless.
One Page 383 U. S. 359 of the most basic premises upon which our structure of
government was founded was that the Federal Government was to have
certain specific and limited powers and no others, and all other
power was to be reserved either "to the States respectively, or to
the people." Certainly if all the provisions of our Constitution
which limit the power of the Federal Government and reserve other
power to the States are to mean anything, they mean at least that
the States have power to pass laws and amend their constitutions
without first sending their officials hundreds of miles away to beg
federal authorities to approve them. [ Footnote 2/2 ] Moreover, it seems to me that § 5, which
gives federal officials power to veto state laws they do not like,
is in direct conflict with the clear command of our Constitution
that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government." I cannot help but believe
that the inevitable effect of any such law which forces any one of
the States to entreat federal authorities in far-away places for
approval of local laws before they can become effective is to Page 383 U. S. 360 create the impression that the State or States treated in this
way are little more than conquered provinces. And if one law
concerning voting can make the States plead for this approval by a
distant federal court or the United States Attorney General, other
laws on different subjects can force the States to seek the advance
approval not only of the Attorney General, but of the President
himself, or any other chosen members of his staff. It is
inconceivable to me that such a radical degradation of state power
was intended in any of the provisions of our Constitution or its
Amendments. Of course, I do not mean to cast any doubt whatever
upon the indisputable power of the Federal Government to invalidate
a state law once enacted and operative on the ground that it
intrudes into the area of supreme federal power. But the Federal
Government has heretofore always been content to exercise this
power to protect federal supremacy by authorizing its agents to
bring lawsuits against state officials once an operative state law
has created an actual case and controversy. A federal law which
assumes the power to compel the States to submit in advance any
proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents
approaches dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and
effective units in the government of our country. I cannot agree to
any constitutional interpretation that leads inevitably to such a
result.

															I see no reason to read into the Constitution meanings it did
not have when it was adopted and which have not been put into it
since. The proceedings of the original Constitutional Convention
show beyond all doubt that the power to veto or negative state laws
was denied Congress. On several occasions, proposals were submitted
to the convention to grant this power to Congress. These proposals
were debated extensively, and on every occasion when submitted for
vote, they were overwhelmingly rejected. [ Footnote 2/3 ] Page 383 U. S. 361 The refusal to give Congress this extraordinary power to veto
state laws was based on the belief that, if such power resided in
Congress, the States would be helpless to function as effective
governments. [ Footnote 2/4 ] Since
that time neither the Fifteenth Amendment nor any other Amendment
to the Constitution has given the slightest indication of a purpose
to grant Congress the power to veto state laws, either by itself or
its agents. Nor does any provision in the Constitution endow the
federal courts with power to participate with state legislative
bodies in determining what state policies shall be enacted into
law. The judicial power to invalidate a law in a case or
controversy after the law has become effective is a long way from
the power to prevent a State from passing a law. I cannot agree
with the Court that Congress -- denied a power, in itself, to veto
a state law -- can delegate this same power to the Attorney General
or the District Court for the District of Columbia. For the effect
on the States is the same in both cases -- they cannot pass their
laws without sending their agents to the City of Washington to
plead to federal officials for their advance approval.

															In this and other prior Acts Congress has quite properly vested
the Attorney General with extremely broad power to protect voting
rights of citizens against discrimination on account of race or
color. Section 5, viewed in this context, is of very minor
importance and, in my judgment, is likely to serve more as an
irritant to Page 383 U. S. 362 the States than as an aid to the enforcement of the Act. I would
hold § 5 invalid for the reasons stated above, with full confidence
that the Attorney General has ample power to give vigorous,
expeditious and effective protection to the voting rights of all
citizens. [ Footnote 2/5 ]

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															If § 14(b) of the Act by stating that no court other than the
District Court for the District of Columbia shall issue a judgment
under § 5 is an attempt to limit the constitutionally created
original jurisdiction of this Court, then I think that section is
also unconstitutional.

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The requirement that States come to Washington to have their
laws judged is reminiscent of the deeply resented practices used by
the English crown in dealing with the American colonies. One of the
abuses complained of most bitterly was the King's practice of
holding legislative and judicial proceedings in inconvenient and
distant places. The signers of the Declaration of Independence
protested that the King

															"has called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public
Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance
with his measures,"

															and they objected to the King's "transporting us beyond Seas to
be tried for pretended offences." These abuses were fresh in the
minds of the Framers of our Constitution, and in part caused them
to include in Art. 3, § 2, the provision that criminal trials
"shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed." Also included in the Sixth Amendment was the
requirement that a defendant in a criminal prosecution be tried by
a "jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law."

															[ Footnote 2/3 ] See Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 as
reported by James Madison in Documents Illustrative of the
Formation of the Union of the American States (1927), pp. 605, 789,
856.

															[ Footnote 2/4 ]

															One speaker expressing what seemed to be the prevailing opinion
of the delegates said of the proposal, "Will any State ever agree
to be bound hand & foot in this manner. It is worse than making
mere corporations of them. . . ." Id. at 604.

															[ Footnote 2/5 ]

															Section 19 of the Act provides as follows:

															"If an provision of this Act or the application thereof to an
person or circumstances is held invalid, the remainder of the Act
and the application of the provision to other persons not similarly
situated or to other circumstances shall not be affected
thereby."