U.S. Supreme Court Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981) Steagald v. United
States No. 79-6777 Argued January 14,
1981 Decided April 21,
1981 451
U.S. 204 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus Pursuant to an arrest warrant for one Lyons, Drug Enforcement
Administration agents entered petitioner's home to search for Lyons
without first obtaining a search warrant. In the course of
searching the home, the agents found cocaine and other
incriminating evidence, but did not find Lyons. Petitioner was then
arrested and indicted on federal drug charges. His pretrial motion
to suppress all evidence uncovered during the search of his home on
the ground that it was illegally obtained because the agents had
failed to obtain a search warrant was denied by the District Court,
and petitioner was convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The Government is precluded from contending in this Court
that petitioner lacked an expectation of privacy in his searched
home sufficient to prevail on his Fourth Amendment claim where this
argument was never raised in the courts below, but, rather, the
Government had made contrary assertions in those courts, and
acquiesced in their contrary findings. Pp. 451 U. S.
208 -211.

															2. The search in question violated the Fourth Amendment where it
took place in the absence of consent or exigent circumstances. Pp. 451 U. S.
211 -222.

															(a) Absent exigent circumstances or consent, a home may not be
searched without a warrant. Two distinct interests were implicated
by the search in this case -- Lyons' interest in being free from an
unreasonable seizure and petitioner's interest in being free from
an unreasonable search of his home. Because the arrest warrant for
Lyons addressed only the former interest, the search of
petitioner's home was no more reasonable from petitioner's
perspective than it would have been if conducted in the absence of
any warrant. The search therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 451 U. S.
211 -216.

															(b) Common law, contrary to the Government's assertion, does not
furnish precedent for upholding the search in question, but rather
sheds little light on the narrow issue presented of whether an
arrest warrant, as opposed to a search warrant, is adequate to
protect the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the
warrant when their home is searched without their consent and in
the absence of exigent Page 451 U. S. 205 circumstances. Moreover, the history of the Fourth Amendment
strongly suggests that its Framers would not have sanctioned the
search in question. Pp. 451 U. S.
217 -220.

															(e) A search warrant requirement, under the circumstances of
this case, will not significantly impede effective law enforcement
efforts. An arrest warrant alone suffices to enter a suspect's own
residence, and, if probable cause exists, no warrant is required to
apprehend a suspected felon in a public place. Moreover, the
exigent circumstances doctrine significantly limits the situations
in which a search warrant is needed. And in those situations in
which a search warrant is necessary, the inconvenience incurred by
the police is generally insignificant. In any event, whatever
practical problems there are in requiring a search warrant in cases
such as this, they cannot outweigh the constitutional interest at
stake in protecting the right of presumptively innocent people to
be secure in their homes from unjustified forcible intrusions by
the government. Pp. 451 U. S.
220 -222.

															606 F.2d 540 and 615 F.2d 642, reversed and remanded.

															MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
BURGER, C.J., concurred in the judgment. REHNQUIST, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which WHITE, J., joined, post, p. 451 U. S.
223 .

															JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

															The issue in this case is whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a
law enforcement officer may legally search for the subject of an
arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining
a search warrant. Concluding that a search warrant must be obtained
absent exigent circumstances Page 451 U. S. 206 or consent, we reverse the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirming petitioner's
conviction. I In early January, 1978, an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) was contacted in Detroit, Mich., by a
confidential informant who suggested that he might be able to
locate Ricky Lyons, a federal fugitive wanted on drug charges. On
January 14, 1978, the informant called the agent again and gave him
a telephone number in the Atlanta, Ga., area where, according to
the informant, Ricky Lyons could be reached during the next 24
hours. On January 16, 1978, the agent called fellow DEA Agent Kelly
Goodowens in Atlanta and relayed the information he had obtained
from the informant. Goodowens contacted Southern Bell Telephone
Co., and secured the address corresponding to the telephone number
obtained by the informant. Goodowens also discovered that Lyons was
the subject of a 6-month-old arrest warrant.

															Two days later, Goodowens and 11 other officers drove to the
address supplied by the telephone company to search for Lyons. The
officers observed two men standing outside the house to be
searched. These men were Hoyt Gaultney and petitioner Gary
Steagald. The officers approached with guns drawn, frisked both
men, and, after demanding identification, determined that neither
man was Lyons. Several agents proceeded to the house. Gaultney's
wife answered the door, and informed the agents that she was alone
in the house. She was told to place her hands against the wall and
was guarded in that position while one agent searched the house.
Ricky Lyons was not found, but, during the search of the house, the
agent observed what he believed to be cocaine. Upon being informed
of this discovery, Agent Goodowens sent an officer to obtain a
search warrant, and in the meantime conducted a second search of
the house, which uncovered Page 451 U. S. 207 additional. incriminating evidence. During a third search
conducted pursuant to a search warrant, the agents uncovered 43
pounds of cocaine. Petitioner was arrested and indicted on federal
drug charges.

															Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress all evidence
uncovered during the various searches on the ground that it was
illegally obtained because the agents had failed to secure a search
warrant before entering the house. Agent Goodowens testified at the
suppression hearing that there had been no "physical hinderance"
preventing him from obtaining a search warrant, and that he did not
do so because he believed that the arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons
was sufficient to justify the entry and search. The District Court
agreed with this view, and denied the suppression motion.
Petitioner was convicted, and renewed his challenge to the search
in his appeal. A divided Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Court's denial of petitioner's suppression
motion. United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (1979).
[ Footnote 1 ] Because the issue
presented by this case is an important one [ Footnote 2 ] that has divided the Circuits, [ Footnote 3 ] we granted certiorari. 449
U.S. 819. Page 451 U. S. 208 II The Government initially seeks to avert our consideration of the
Fifth Circuit's decision by suggesting that petitioner may,
regardless of the merits of hat decision, lack an expectation of
privacy in the house sufficient to prevail on his Fourth Amendment
claim. This argument was never raised by the Government in the
courts below. Moreover, in its brief in opposition to certiorari,
the Government represented Page 451 U. S. 209 to this Court.that the house in question was "petitioner's
residence," and was "occupied by petitioner, Gaultney, and
Gaultney's wife." Brief in Opposition 1, 3. However, the Government
now contends that the record does not clearly show that petitioner
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house, and hence
urges us to remand the case to the District Court for reexamination
of this factual question.

															We decline to follow the suggested disposition. Aside from
arguing that a search warrant was not constitutionally required,
the Government was initially entitled to defend against
petitioner's charge of an unlawful search by asserting that
petitioner lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
searched home, or that he consented to the search, or that exigent
circumstances justified the entry. The Government, however, may
lose its right to raise factual issues of this sort before this
Court when it has made contrary assertions in the courts below,
when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by those courts, or
when it has failed to raise such questions in a timely fashion
during the litigation.

															We conclude that this is such a case. The Magistrate's report on
petitioner's suppression motion, which was adopted by the District
Court, characterized the issue as whether an arrest warrant was
sufficient to justify the search of "the home of a third person"
for the subject of the warrant. App. 12. The Government never
sought to correct this characterization on appeal, and instead
acquiesced in the District Court's view of petitioner's Fourth
Amendment claim. Moreover, during both the trial and the appeal in
this case, the Government argued successfully that petitioner's
connection with the searched home was sufficient to establish his
constructive possession of the cocaine found in a suitcase in the
closet of the house. [ Footnote
4 ] Moreover, the Court of Appeals concluded, as Page 451 U. S. 210 had the Magistrate and the District Court, that petitioner's
Fourth Amendment claim involved the type of warrant necessary to
search "premises belonging to a third party." 606 F.2d at 544.
Again, the Government declined to disturb this characterization.
When petitioner sought review in this Court, the Government could
have filed a cross-petition for certiorari suggesting, as it does
now, that the case be remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings. Instead, the Government argued that further review was
unnecessary. Finally, the Government, in its opposition to
certiorari, expressly represented that the searched home was
petitioner's residence.

															Thus, during the course of these proceedings, the Government has
directly sought to connect petitioner with the house, has
acquiesced in statements by the courts below characterizing the
search as one of petitioner's residence, and has made similar
concessions of its own. Now, two years after petitioner's trial,
the Government seeks to return the case to the District Court for a
reexamination of this factual issue. [ Footnote 5 ] Page 451 U. S. 211 The tactical advantages to the Government of this disposition
are obvious, for if the Government prevailed on this claim upon a
remand, it would be relieved of the task of defending the judgment
of the Court of Appeals before this Court. We conclude, however,
that the Government, through its assertions, concessions, and
acquiescence, has lost its right to challenge petitioner's
assertion that he possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the searched home. We therefore turn to the merits of petitioner's
claim. III The question before us is a narrow one. [ Footnote 6 ] The search at issue here took place in the
absence of consent or exigent circumstances. Except in such special
situations, we have consistently held that the entry into a home to
conduct a search or make an arrest is unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment unless done pursuant to a warrant. See Payton v.
New Page 451 U. S. 212 York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S.
10 , 333 U. S. 13 -15
(1948). Thus, as we recently observed:

															"[I]n terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to
seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at
the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant." Payton v. New York, supra, at 445 U. S. 590 . See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.
S. 443 , 403 U. S. 474 475, 403 U. S.
477 -478 (1971); Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493 , 357 U. S.
497 -498 (1958); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 , 269 U. S. 32 -33
(1925). Here, of course, the agents had a warrant -- one
authorizing the arrest of Ricky Lyons. However, the Fourth
Amendment claim here is not being raised by Ricky Lyons. Instead
the challenge to the search is asserted by a person, not named in
the warrant, who was convicted on the basis of evidence uncovered
during a search of his residence for Ricky Lyons. Thus, the narrow
issue before us is whether an arrest warrant -- as opposed to a
search warrant -- is adequate to protect the Fourth Amendment
interests of persons not named in the warrant when their homes are
searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent
circumstances.

															The purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral judicial officer
to assess whether the police have probable cause to make an arrest
or conduct a search. As we have often explained, the placement of
this checkpoint between the Government and the citizen implicitly
acknowledges that an "officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States,
supra, at 333 U. S. 14 ,
may lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of
the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the
individual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the
privacy of his home. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 403 U. S.
449 -451; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 , 335 U. S.
455 -456 (1948). However, while an arrest warrant and a
search warrant both serve to subject the probable cause
determination Page 451 U. S. 213 of the police to judicial review, the interests protected by the
two warrants differ. An arrest warrant is issued by a magistrate
upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe that the
subject of the warrant has committed an offense, and thus the
warrant primarily serves to protect an individual from an
unreasonable seizure. A search warrant, in contrast, is issued upon
a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object
of a search is located in a particular place, and therefore
safeguards an individual's interest in the privacy of his home and
possessions against the unjustified intrusion of the police.

															Thus, whether the arrest warrant issued in this case adequately
safeguarded the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment depends
upon what the warrant authorized the agents to do. To be sure, the
warrant embodied a judicial finding that there was probable cause
to believe that Ricky Lyons had committed a felony, and the warrant
therefore authorized the officers to seize Lyons. However, the
agents sought to do more than use the warrant to arrest Lyons in
public place or in his home; instead, they relied on the warrant as
legal authority to enter the home of a third person based on their
belief that Ricky Lyons might be a guest there. Regardless of how
reasonable this belief might have been, it was never subjected to
the detached scrutiny of a judicial officer. Thus, while the
warrant in this case may have protected Lyons from an unreasonable
seizure, it did absolutely nothing to protect petitioner's privacy
interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of
his home. Instead, petitioner's only protection from an illegal
entry and search was the agent's personal determination of probable
cause. In the absence of exigent circumstances, we have
consistently held that such judicially untested determinations are
not reliable enough to justify an entry into a person's home to
arrest him without a warrant, or a search of a home for objects in
the absence of a search warrant. Page 451 U. S. 214 Payton v. New York, supra; Johnson v. United States,
supra. We see no reason to depart from this settled course
when the search of a home is for a person, rather than an object.
[ Footnote 7 ] Page 451 U. S. 215 A contrary conclusion -- that the police, acting alone and in
the absence of exigent circumstances, may decide when there is
sufficient justification for searching the home of a third party
for the subject of an arrest warrant -- would create a significant
potential for abuse. Armed solely with an arrest warrant for a
single person, the police could search all the homes of that
individual's friends and acquaintances. See, e.g., Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (CA4 1966) (enjoining police practice
under which 300 homes were searched pursuant to arrest warrants for
two fugitives). Moreover, an arrest warrant may serve as the
pretext for entering a home in which the police have a suspicion,
but not probable cause to believe, that illegal activity is taking
place. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.
S. 752 , 395 U. S. 767 (1969). The Government recognizes the potential for such abuses,
[ Footnote 8 ] but contends that
existing remedies -- such as motions to suppress illegally procured
evidence and damages actions for Fourth Amendment violations --
provide adequate means of redress. We do not agree. As we observed
on a previous occasion, "[t]he [Fourth] Amendment is designed to
prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action." Chimel
v. California, supra, at 395 U. S. 766 ,
n. 12. Indeed, if suppression motions and damages actions were
sufficient to implement the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, there would be no need for the
constitutional requirement that, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, a warrant Page 451 U. S. 216 must be obtained for a home arrest or a search of a home for
objects. We have instead concluded that, in such cases, the
participation of a detached magistrate in the probable cause
determination is an essential element of a reasonable search or
seizure, and we believe that the same conclusion should apply here.
[ Footnote 9 ]

															In sum, two distinct interests were implicated by the search at
issue here -- Ricky Lyons' interest in being free from an
unreasonable seizure and petitioner's interest in being free from
an unreasonable search of his home. Because the arrest warrant for
Lyons addressed only the former interest, the search of
petitioner's home was no more reasonable from petitioner's
perspective than it would have been if conducted in the absence of
any warrant. Since warrantless searches of a home are impermissible
absent consent or exigent circumstances, we conclude that the
instant search violated the Fourth Amendment. IV The Government concedes that this view is "apparently logical,"
that it furthers the general policies underlying the Fourth
Amendment, and that it

															"has the virtue of producing symmetry between the law of entry
to conduct a search for things to be seized and the law of entry to
conduct a search for persons to be seized."

															Brief for United States 36. Yet we are informed that this
conclusion is "not without its flaws," in that it is contrary to
common law precedent and creates some practical problems of law
enforcement. We treat these contentions in turn. Page 451 U. S. 217 A The common law may, within limits, [ Footnote 10 ] be instructive in determining what sorts
of searches the Framers of the Fourth Amendment regarded as
reasonable. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 591 .
The Government contends that, at common law, an officer could
forcibly enter the home of a third party to execute an arrest
warrant. To be sure, several commentators do suggest that a
constable could "break open doors" to effect such an arrest. See 1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law *57 (Chitty); M. Foster,
Crown Law 320 (1762) (Foster); 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown
116-117 (1st Am. ed. 1847) (Hale). But see 4 E. Coke,
Institutes *177. As support for this proposition, these
commentators all rely on a single decision, Semayne's
Case, 5 Co.Rep. 91a, 92b-93 A. 77 Eng.Rep. 194, 198 (K.B.
103). [ Footnote 11 ] See 1 Chitty *57; Page 451 U. S. 218 Foster 320; 2 Hale 116. Although that case involved only the
authority of a sheriff to effect civil service on a person within
his own home, the court noted in dictum that a person could not
"escape the ordinary process of law" by seeking refuge in the home
of a third party. 5 Co.Rep. at 93a, 77 Eng.Rep. at 198. However,
the language of the decision, while not free from ambiguity,
suggests that forcible entry into a third party's house was
permissible only when the person to be arrested was pursued to the
house. The decision refers to a person who "flies" to another's
home, ibid., and the annotation notes that,

															"in order to justify the breaking of the outer door, after
denial on request to take a person . . . in the house of a
stranger, it must be understood . . . that the person upon a
pursuit taketh refuge in the house of another." Id. at 93a, n. (1), 77 Eng.Rep. at 198, n. (1)
(emphasis in original). The common law commentators appear to have
adopted this limitation. See 1 Chitty *57 (sheriff may
enter third parties' home "if the offender fly to it for refuge");
Foster 320 ("For if a Stranger whose ordinary Residence is
elsewhere, upon a Pursuit taketh Refuge in the House of another,
this is not his Castle, He cannot claim the Benefit of Sanctuary in
it"); 2 Hale 116, n. 20 (forcible entry permissible "only upon
strong necessity"). We have long recognized that such "hot pursuit"
cases fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.
S. 294 (1967), and therefore are distinguishable from
the routine search situation presented here.

															More important, the general question addressed by the common law
commentators was very different from the issue presented by this
case. The authorities on which the Government relies were concerned
with whether the subject of the arrest warrant could claim
sanctuary from arrest by hiding Page 451 U. S. 219 in the home of a third party. See 1 Chitty *57; Foster
320; 2 Hale 116-117. Thus, in Semayne's Case, it was
observed:

															"[T]he house of anyone is not a castle or privilege but for
himself, and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to
his house, or the goods of any other which are brought and conveyed
into his house to prevent a lawful execution and to escape the
ordinary process of law, for the privilege of his house extends
only to him and his family, and to his own proper goods."

															5 Co.Rep. at 93a, 77 Eng.Rep. at 128. The common law thus
recognized, as have our recent decisions, that rights such as those
conferred by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature, and
cannot bestow vicarious protection on those who do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place to be searched. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U. S.
83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
S. 128 (1978). The issue here, however, is not whether
the subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a
search warrant when he is apprehended in another person's home, but
rather whether the residents of that home can complain of the
search. Because the authorities relied on by the Government focus
on the former question without addressing the latter, we find their
usefulness limited. Indeed, if anything, the little guidance that
can be gleaned from common law authorities undercuts the
Government's position. The language of Semayne's Case quoted above, for example, suggests that, although the subject of
an arrest warrant could not find sanctuary in the home of the third
party, the home remained a "castle or privilege" for its residents.
Similarly, several commentators suggested that a search warrant,
rather than an arrest warrant, was necessary to fully insulate a
constable from an action for trespass brought by a party whose home
was searched. See, e.g., 1 Chitty *57; 2 Hale 116-117,
151. Page 451 U. S. 220 While the common law thus sheds relatively little light on the
narrow question before us, the history of the Fourth Amendment
strongly suggests that its Framers would not have sanctioned the
instant search. The Fourth Amendment was intended partly to protect
against the abuses of the general warrants that had occurred in
England, and of the writs of assistance used in the Colonies. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S.
608 -609 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616 , 116 U. S.
624 -629 (1886); N. Lasson, The History and Development
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 13-78
(1937). The general warrant specified only an offense -- typically
seditious libel -- and left to the discretion of the executing
officials the decision as to which persons should be arrested and
which places should be searched. Similarly, the writs of assistance
used in the Colonies noted only the object of the search -- any
uncustomed goods -- and thus left customs officials completely free
to search any place where they believed such goods might be. The
central objectionable feature of both warrants was that they
provided no judicial check on the determination of the executing
officials that the evidence available justified an intrusion into
any particular home. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.
S. 476 , 379 U. S.
481 -485 (1965). An arrest warrant, to the extent that it
is invoked as authority to enter the homes of third parties,
suffers from the same infirmity. [ Footnote 12 ] Like a writ of assistance, it specifies only
the object of a search -- in this case, Ricky Lyons -- and leaves
to the unfettered discretion of the police the decision as to which
particular homes should be searched. We do not believe that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have condoned such a
result B The Government also suggests that practical problems might arise
if law enforcement officers are required to obtain Page 451 U. S. 221 a search warrant before entering the home of a third party to
make an arrest. [ Footnote
13 ] The basis of this concern is that persons, as opposed to
objects, are inherently mobile, and thus officers seeking to effect
an arrest may be forced to return to the magistrate several times
as the subject of the arrest warrant moves from place to place. We
are convinced, however, that a search warrant requirement will not
significantly impede effective law enforcement efforts.

															First, the situations in which a search warrant will be
necessary are few. As noted in Payton v. New York, supra, at 445 U. S.
602 -603, an arrest warrant alone will suffice to enter a
suspect's own residence to effect his arrest. Furthermore, if
probable cause exists, no warrant is required to apprehend a
suspected felon in a public place. United States v.
Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). Thus, the subject of an arrest warrant can be readily
seized before entering or after leaving the home of a third party.
[ Footnote 14 ] Finally, the
exigent circumstances doctrine significantly limits the situations
in which a search warrant would be needed. For example, a
warrantless entry of a home would be justified if the police were
in "hot pursuit" of a fugitive. See United States v.
Santana, 427 U. S. 38 , 427 U. S. 42 -43
(1976); Warden v.
Hayden , 387 U. S. 294 Page 451 U. S. 222 (1967). Thus, to the extent that searches for persons pose
special problems, we believe that the exigent circumstances
doctrine is adequate to accommodate legitimate law enforcement
needs.

															Moreover, in those situations in which a search warrant is
necessary, the inconvenience incurred by the police is simply not
that significant. First, if the police know of the location of the
felon when they obtain an arrest warrant, the additional burden of
obtaining a search warrant at the same time is miniscule. The
inconvenience of obtaining such a warrant does not increase
significantly when an outstanding arrest warrant already exists. In
this case, for example, Agent Goodowens knew the address of the
house to be searched two days in advance, and planned the raid from
the federal courthouse in Atlanta where, we are informed, three
full-time magistrates were on duty. In routine search cases such as
this, the short time required to obtain a search warrant from a
magistrate will seldom hinder efforts to apprehend a felon.
Finally, if a magistrate is not nearby, a telephonic search warrant
can usually be obtained. See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 41(c)(1),
(2).

															Whatever practical problems remain, however, cannot outweigh the
constitutional interests at stake. Any warrant requirement impedes
to some extent the vigor with which the Government can seek to
enforce its laws, yet the Fourth Amendment recognizes that this
restraint is necessary in some cases to protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures. We conclude that this is such a
case. The additional burden imposed on the police by a warrant
requirement is minimal. In contrast, the right protected -- that of
presumptively innocent people to be secure in their homes from
unjustified, forcible intrusions by the Government -- is weighty.
Thus, in order to render the instant search reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, a search warrant was required. Page 451 U. S. 223 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. So ordered. THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs in the judgment.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The court relied on a previous decision in the Circuit that held
that,

															"when an officer holds a valid arrest warrant and reasonably
believes that its subject is within premises belonging to a third
party, he need not obtain a search warrant to enter for the purpose
of arresting the subject." United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). Circuit Judge Kravitch
dissented on the ground that the information known to the agents
was insufficient to establish a reasonable belief that Lyons could
be found in the house to be searched. 606 F.2d at 548. On the
petition for rehearing, Judge Kravitch, again in dissent, contended
that the majority's decision announced a "rule of questionable
validity and wisdom," and represented a "disturbing erosion of the
Fourth Amendment rights of third parties." United States v.
Gaultney, 615 F.2d 642, 644 (1980).

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Last Term, we noted that this question remained unresolved. See Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 , 445 U. S. 583 (1980).

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															Three Circuits have held that, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, a search warrant is required before law officers may
enter the home of a third party to execute an arrest warrant. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914,
928 (CA3 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1158-1159 (CA4 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-503; United States v
Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1347-1350 (CA9 1978). Two Circuits
have joined the Court of Appeals in this case in adopting the
contrary view that a search warrant is not required in such
situations if the police have an arrest warrant and reason to
believe that the person to be arrested is within the home to be
searched. See United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259,
262-263 (CA6 1967); United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610,
612-614 (CA10), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977). The
Second Circuit has suggested in dictum that it subscribes to this
latter view, see United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978,
983 (1980), while the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has recently indicated that it would require a search
warrant in such cases. See United States v. Ford, 180
U.S.App.D.C. 1, 14, n. 45, 553 F.2d 146, 159, n. 45 (1977). Two
other Courts of Appeals have left the issue open. See United
States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44, n. 7 (CA1 1980); Rice v.
Wolff, 513 F.2d.1280, 1291-1292, and n. 7 (CA8 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976). The Seventh Circuit has not considered the question.

															While the courts are in conflict, most modern commentators agree
that a search warrant is necessary to fully protect the privacy
interests of third parties when their home is searched for the
subject of an arrest warrant. See 2 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 374, 384-385 (1978);
Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person to Be Seized, 35
Ohio St.L.J. 56, 67-71 (1974); Groot, Arrests in Private Dwellings,
67 Va.L.Rev. 275 (1981); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment
Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 Stan.L.Rev. 995, 997-999 (1971);
Comment, Arresting a Suspect in a Third Party's Home: What is
Reasonable?, 72 J.Crim.L. & C. 293 (1981). But see Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: The Seizure of A
Suspect in the Home of a Third Party, 54 Conn.Bar J. 299
(1980).

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The Court of Appeals, in accepting this contention, cited the
Government's own evidence that several checks and papers bearing
petitioner's name were found in the house, and that

															"Steagald, when taken into custody, was wearing only slacks and
a long-sleeve shirt, clothing inconsistent with the coldness of the
January afternoon, and that, once taken inside the . . . house,
told a DEA agent that he was cold and requested that she get a
sweater or coat for him from the kitchen area."

															606 F.2d at 546-547.

															[ Footnote 5 ]

															The Government asserts that it was unable to raise this issue in
the courts below because both courts had acted before this Court
decided United States v. Salvucci, 448 U. S.
83 (1980). We do not find this justification to be
compelling. Under the "automatic standing" rule of Jones v.
United States, 362 U. S. 257 (1960), any person charged with a possessory offense could
challenge the search in which the incriminating evidence was
obtained. Salvucci overruled Jones, and instead
limited such Fourth Amendment claims to those persons who had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or object of the
search. Although Salvucci thus altered Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to some extent, the rationale of that decision was,
in large part, simply an extension of this Court's earlier
reasoning in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
S. 128 (1978). The Rakas decision held that an
illegal search violated the Fourth Amendment rights only of those
persons who had a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place." Id. at 439 U. S. 143 .
While that decision did not directly address the "automatic
standing" rule of Jones v. United States, it was clearly
an ill omen for the continued vitality of that decision. Since Rakas was decided well before this case was briefed and
argued in the Court of Appeals, the Government could easily have
raised before that court the question of whether petitioner's
Fourth Amendment rights were even implicated by the search at issue
here. Indeed, the Government in Salvucci clearly
recognized the significance of Rakas, for in that case,
despite the contrary authority of Jones v. United States, it argued from the outset that the defendant lacked a sufficient
expectation of privacy to challenge the legality of the search
under the Fourth Amendment. We are given no explanation why the
Government failed to regard Rakas as of equal significance
to this case. In any event, Salvucci was decided before
certiorari was sought in this case, but, rather than oppose
certiorari on the ground that petitioner lacked a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the searched home, the Government made
explicit concessions to the contrary.

															[ Footnote 6 ]

															Initially, we assume, without deciding, that the information
relayed to Agent Goodowens concerning the whereabouts of Ricky
Lyons would have been sufficient to establish probable cause to
believe that Lyons was at the house searched by the agents.

															[ Footnote 7 ]

															Indeed, the plain wording of the Fourth Amendment admits of no
exemption from the warrant requirement when the search of a home is
for a person, rather than for a thing. As previously noted, absent
exigent circumstances or consent, an entry into a private dwelling
to conduct a search or effect an arrest is unreasonable without a
warrant. The second clause of the Fourth Amendment, which governs
the issuance of such warrants, provides that

															"no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

															This language plainly suggests that the same sort of judicial
determination must be made when the search of a person's home is
for another person as is necessary when the search is for an
object. Specifically, absent exigent circumstances, the magistrate,
rather than the police officer, must make the decision that
probable cause exists to believe that the person or object to be
seized is within a particular place.

															In Payton, of course, we recognized that an arrest
warrant alone was sufficient to authorize the entry into a person's
home to effect his arrest. We reasoned:

															"If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in
a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is
justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open
his doors to the officers of the law. Thus, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly
carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which
the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is
within."

															445 U.S. at 445 U. S.
602 -603. Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police
to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes
a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is
necessary to arrest him in his home. This analysis, however, is
plainly inapplicable when the police seek to use an arrest warrant
as legal authority to enter the home of a third party to conduct a
search. Such a warrant embodies no judicial determination
whatsoever regarding the person whose home is to be searched.
Because it does not authorize the police to deprive the third
person of his liberty, it cannot embody any derivative authority to
deprive this person of his interest in the privacy of his home.
Such a deprivation must, instead, be based on an independent
showing that a legitimate object of a search is located in the
third party's home. We have consistently held, however, that such a
determination is the province of the magistrate, and not that of
the police officer.

															[ Footnote 8 ]

															The Government concedes that

															"an arrest warrant may be thought to have some of the
undesirable attributes of a general warrant if it authorizes entry
into third party premises."

															Brief for United States 42. Similarly, the Government agrees
that

															"the potential for abuse is much less if the implicit entry
authorization of an arrest warrant is confined to the suspect's own
residence, and is not held to make the police free to search for
the suspect in anyone else's house without obtaining a
particularized judicial determination that the suspect is
present." Ibid. [ Footnote 9 ]

															Moreover, the remedies suggested by the Government are not
without their pitfalls and limitations. For example, absent a
search warrant requirement, a person seeking to recover civil
damages for the unjustified search of his home may possibly be
thwarted if a good faith defense to such unlawful conduct is
recognized. See, e.g., Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d at
1161.

															[ Footnote 10 ]

															The significance accorded to such authority, however, must be
kept in perspective, for our decisions in this area have not
"simply frozen into constitutional law those enforcement practices
that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's passage." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 591 ,
n. 33. The common law rules governing searches and arrests evolved
in a society far simpler than ours is today. Crime has changed, as
have the means of law enforcement, and it would therefore be naive
to assume that those actions a constable could take in an English
or American village three centuries ago should necessarily govern
what we, as a society, now regard as proper. Cf. Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347 , 389 U. S.
352 -353 (1967). Instead, the Amendment's prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" must be interpreted
"in light of contemporary norms and conditions." Payton v. New
York, supra, at 445 U. S. 591 ,
n. 33.

															[ Footnote 11 ]

															The three other decisions cited by the Government do not address
the issue raised here. Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246,
248, 128 Eng.Rep. 1029, 1029-1030 (C.P. 1815), dealt with the
authority of a constable to enter the home of a third person to
make an arrest when the "outer door" was open. Under the common
law, "a privilege attaches to the outer door of a dwelling, because
. . . it is the owner's castle." Hutchison v. Birch, 4
Taunt. 619, 625, 128 Eng.Rep. 473, 476 (C.P. 1812). Thus, an open
outer door was apparently regarded as the equivalent of a consent
of the occupant for the constable to enter the home and conduct a
search. The other two decisions cited by the Government, Sheers
v. Brooks, 2 Bl.H. 120, 122, 126 Eng.Rep. 463, 464 (C.P.
1792), and Kelsy v. Wright, 1 Root 83 (Conn.1783), dealt
only with the authority of the constable to enter the home of the
person to be arrested.

															[ Footnote 12 ]

															The Government recognizes this problem. See n 8, supra. [ Footnote 13 ]

															A number of Circuits already require a search warrant for
entries of this sort, see n 3, supra, and there is no indication in the
record that law enforcement efforts in these jurisdictions have
suffered as a result. Thus, we are inclined to view the
Government's argument on this point with considerable skepticism. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 445 U. S.
602 .

															Moreover, we are informed by the Government that

															"it is the present policy of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, whose agents conducted the search in the present
case, to secure a search warrant prior to making an arrest entry
into third party premises, in the absence of exigent circumstances
or consent."

															Brief in Opposition 9, n. 7.

															[ Footnote 14 ]

															Indeed, the "inherent mobility" of persons noted by the
Government suggests that, in most situations, the police may avoid
altogether the need to obtain a search warrant simply by waiting
for a suspect to leave the third person's home before attempting to
arrest that suspect.

															JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE WHITE joins, dissenting

															The Court's opinion reversing petitioner's conviction proceeds
in a pristinely simple manner: Steagald had a Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in the dwelling entered by the police, and even
though the police entered the premises for the sole purpose of
executing a valid arrest warrant for Lyons, a fugitive from
justice, whom they had probable cause to believe was within, the
arrest warrant was not sufficient, absent exigent circumstances, to
justify invading Steagald's privacy interest in the dwelling.
Petitioner Steagald's privacy interest is different from Lyons'
interest in being free from an unreasonable seizure, according to
the Court, and the arrest warrant only validated the invasion of
the latter. In the words of the Court:

															"[T]he search of petitioner's home was no more reasonable from
petitioner's perspective than it would have been if conducted in
the absence of any warrant. Since warrantless searches of a home
are impermissible absent consent or exigent circumstances, we
conclude that the instant search violated the Fourth
Amendment." Ante at 451 U. S.
216 .

															This "reasoning" not only assumes the answer to the question
presented -- whether the search of petitioner's dwelling could be
undertaken without a search warrant -- but also conveniently
ignores the critical fact in this case, the existence of an arrest
warrant for a fugitive believed on the basis of probable cause to
be in the dwelling. The Court assumes Page 451 U. S. 224 that, because the arrest warrant did not specifically address
petitioner's privacy interest it is of no further relevance to the
case. Incidental infringements of distinct Fourth Amendment
interests may, however, be reasonable when they occur in the course
of executing a valid warrant addressed to other interests. In Dalia v. United States, 441 U. S. 238 (1979), the Court rejected the argument that a separate search
warrant was required before police could enter a business office to
install an eavesdropping device when a warrant authorizing the
eavesdropping itself had already been obtained. As the Court put
it:

															"This view of the Warrant Clause parses too finely the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Often, in executing a
warrant, the police may find it necessary to interfere with privacy
rights not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the
warrant. " Id. at 441 U. S. 257 (emphasis supplied). In Payton v. New York, 445 U.
S. 573 (1980), the Court rejected the suggestion that a
separate search warrant was required before police could execute an
arrest warrant by entering the home of the subject of the warrant.
Although the subject of the warrant had a Fourth Amendment interest
in the privacy of his dwelling quite distinct from the interest in
being free from unreasonable seizures addressed by the arrest
warrant, the Court concluded that it was "constitutionally
reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the
law." Id. at 445 U. S.
602 -603.

															This case, therefore, cannot be resolved by the simple
Aristotelian syllogism which the Court employs. Concluding, as it
does, that the arrest warrant did not address the privacy interest
affected by the search by no means ends the matter; it simply
presents the issue for decision. Resolution of that issue depends
upon a balancing of the "need to search against the invasion which
the search entails." Camara v. Municipal Court of San
Francisco, 387 U. S. 523 , 387 U. S. 537 (1967). Here, as in all Fourth Amendment cases, "reasonableness is
still the ultimate standard." Id. at 387 U. S. 539 . See Wyman v. James, 400 U. S. 309 , 400 U. S. 318 (1971); Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. , Page 451 U. S. 225 436 U. S. 307 , 436 U. S.
315 -316 (1978). In determining the reasonableness of
dispensing with the requirement of a separate search warrant in
this case, I believe that the existence of a valid arrest warrant
is highly relevant.

															The government's interests in the warrantless entry of a
third-party dwelling to execute an arrest warrant are compelling.
The basic problem confronting police in such situations is the
inherent mobility of the fugitive. By definition, the police have
probable cause to believe that the fugitive is in a dwelling which
is not his home. He may stay there for a week, a day, or 10
minutes. Fugitives from justice tend to be mobile, and police
officers will generally have no way of knowing whether the subject
of an arrest warrant will be at the dwelling when they return from
seeking a search warrant. See United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (CA6 1967); State v. Jordan, 288 Ore.
391, 400-401, 605 P.2d
646 , 651 (1980) (en banc). Imposition of a search warrant
requirement in such circumstances will frustrate the compelling
interests of the government, and indeed the public, in the
apprehension of those subject to outstanding arrest warrants.

															The Court's responses to these very real concerns are singularly
unpersuasive. It first downplays them by stating that "the
situations in which a search warrant will be necessary are few," ante at 451 U. S. 221 ,
because no search warrant is necessary to arrest a suspect at his
home and, if the suspect is at another's home, the police need only
wait until he leaves, since no search warrant is needed to arrest
him in a public place. Ibid. These beguilingly simple
answers to a serious law enforcement problem simply will not wash.
Criminals who know or suspect they are subject to arrest warrants
would not be likely to return to their homes, and while

															"[t]he police could reduce the likelihood of escape by staking
out all possible exits . . . the costs of such a stakeout seem
excessive in an era of rising crime and scarce police resources.
" Page 451 U. S. 226 Payton v. New York, supra, at 445 U. S. 619 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The Court's ivory tower misconception of
the realities of the apprehension of fugitives from justice reaches
its apogee when it states:

															"In routine search cases such as this, the short time required
to obtain a search warrant from a magistrate will seldom hinder
efforts to apprehend a felon." Ante at 451 U. S. 222 .
The cases we are considering are not "routine search cases." They
are cases of attempted arrest, pursuant to a warrant, when the
object of the arrest may flee at any time -- including the "short
time" during which the police are endeavoring to obtain a search
warrant.

															At the same time, the interference with the Fourth Amendment
privacy interests of those whose homes are entered to apprehend the
felon is not nearly as significant as suggested by the Court. The
arrest warrant serves some of the functions a separate search
warrant would. It assures the occupants that the police officer is
present on official business. The arrest warrant also limits the
scope of the search, specifying what the police may search for -- i.e., the subject of the arrest warrant. No general search
is permitted, but only a search of those areas in which the object
of the search might hide. See Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d
333, 343 (CA3 1974); State v. Jordan, supra, at 400-401,
605 P.2d at 651; United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406
421, nn. 1. 2 (CA5 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100 and
430 U.S. 983 (1977). Indeed, there may be no intrusion on the
occupant's privacy at all, since, if present, the suspect will have
the opportunity to voluntarily surrender at the door. Even if the
suspect does not surrender, but secretes himself within the house,
the occupant can limit the search by pointing him out to the
police. It is important to remember that the contraband discovered
during the entry and search for Lyons was in plain view, and was
discovered during a "sweep search" for Lyons, not a probing of
drawers or cabinets for contraband. United States v.
Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 544 (1979). Page 451 U. S. 227 Because the burden on law enforcement officers to obtain a
separate search warrant before entering the dwelling of a third
party to execute a concededly valid arrest warrant is great, and
carries with it a high possibility that the fugitive named in the
arrest warrant will escape apprehension, I would conclude that the
application of the traditional "reasonableness" standard of the
Fourth Amendment does not require a separate search warrant in a
case such as this.

															This conclusion is supported by the common law as it existed at
the time of the framing of the Fourth Amendment, which incorporated
the standard of "reasonableness." As the Court noted last Term in Payton: "An examination of the common law understanding of an officer's
authority to arrest sheds light on the obviously relevant, if not
entirely dispositive, consideration of what the Framers of the
Amendment might have thought to be reasonable."

															445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 591 ; see also id. at 445 U. S. 604 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The duty of the populace to aid in the
apprehension of felons was well established at common law, see
Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552 , 445 U. S. 557 (1980), and, in light of the overriding interest in apprehension,
the common law permitted officers to enter the dwelling of third
parties when executing an arrest warrant. Chitty wrote that

															"[t]he house of a third person, if the offender fly to it for
refuge, is not privileged, but may be broken open after the usual
demand; for it may even be so upon civil process."

															1 J. Chitty, Criminal Law *57 (hereafter Chitty). Gabbett
agreed:

															"Neither is the house of a third person, if the offender fly to
it for refuge, privileged, but it may be broken open, after the
usual demand; for it may be even so upon civil process."

															2 J. Gabbett, Criminal Law 142 (1843) (hereafter Gabbett). Hale
noted that an officer could forcibly enter the house of the subject
of an arrest warrant, "[a]nd so much more may he break open the
house of another person to take him, for so the sheriff may do upon
a civil process." 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 117 Page 451 U. S. 228 (1736) (hereafter Hale). See also M. Foster, Crown Law
320 (1762). [ Footnote 2/1 ] A
17-century work on constables noted:

															"[I]t is the chief part of their office to represse fellony, and
albeit it be a man's house he doth dwell in, which they doe suspect
the fellon to be in, yet they may enter in there to search; and if
the owner of the house, upon request, will not open his dores, it
seems the officer may break open the dores upon him to come in to
search."

															W. Sheppard, The Offices of Constables, ch. 8, § 2, no. 4 (c.
1650) (quoted in T. Taylor, Two Studies in Constitutional
Interpretation 28-29 (1969)).

															The leading authority, Semayne's Case, 5 Co.Rep. 91a,
93a, 77 Eng.Rep. 194, 198 (K.B. 1603), recognized that

															"[t]he house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for
himself, and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to
his house . . . to prevent a lawful execution, and to escape the
ordinary process of law . . . and therefore in such cases after
denial on request made, the sheriff may break the house."

															In Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 223, 230, 127
Eng.Rep. 123, 126-127 (C.P. 1802), Judge Heath ruled that, before
breaking doors, officers must announce their authority, because a
contrary rule

															"must equally hold good in cases of process upon escape, where
the party has taken refuge in the house of a stranger. Shall it be
said that, in such case, the officer may break open the outer door
of a stranger's house without declaring the authority under which
he acts . . . ?"

															Thus, no distinction was recognized between authority to enter
the suspect's home and that of a stranger. See also Page 451 U. S. 229 Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass.190, 196-197 (1876); cf. State v. Brown, 5 Del. 505 (1854). [ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court argues that the common law authorities are not
relevant because they do not consider the rights of third parties
whose dwellings were entered, but only the rights of the arrestee. Ante at 451 U. S.
218 -219. This is not so. The authorities typically
concern the right of the third party to resist the officer's
attempted entry or the offense committed by the officer against the
third party in entering. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reynolds,
supra; 1 Chitty *57-*58; 2 Hale 117; 1 Russell 519-521.

															The basic error in the Court's treatment of the common law is
its reliance on the adage that "a man's home is his castle." Though
there is undoubtedly early case support for this in the common law,
it cannot be accepted as an uncritical statement of black letter
law which answers all questions in this area. William Pitt, when he
was Prime Minister of England, used it with telling effect in a
speech on the floor of the House of Commons; but parliamentary
speaking ability and analytical legal ability ought not to be
equated with one Page 451 U. S. 230 another. It is clear that the privilege of the home did not
extend when the King was a party, i.e., when a warrant in
a criminal case had been issued. See 1 Russell 520; 2
Gabbett 141; Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East 1, 79, 104
Eng.Rep. 501, 531 (K.B. 1811); Commonwealth v. Reynolds,
supra, at 196. That a man's home may be his castle in civil
cases, but not in criminal cases, was recognized as far back as the
Year Books. See Y.B. 13 Ewd. IV, f. 9a (quoted in Burdett, supra, at 79, 104 Eng.Rep. at 531). The
suggestion in the Court's opinion, ante at 451 U. S. 219 ,
that

															"[t]he language of Semayne's Case . . . suggests that,
although the subject of an arrest warrant could not find sanctuary
in the home of the third party, the home remained a 'castle or
privilege' for its residents"

															is thus completely unfounded in the present context.

															An officer could break into one's own home to execute an arrest
warrant for the owner, and "so much more may he break open the
house of another person to take him," 2 Hale 117. Entry into the
house of a third party to effect arrest was considered to follow a fortiori from the accepted entry into the home of the
subject of the arrest warrant himself. This was because those in
the home of a third party had no protection against civil process,
let alone criminal process. See 1 Chitty *57; 2 Gabbett
142; 2 Hale 117. See generally Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant, 22 Mich.L.Rev. 798, 800-801 (1924). At common law, the
Sovereign's key -- criminal process -- unlocked all doors, whether
to apprehend the owner or someone else.

															While I cannot subscribe to the Court's decision today, I will
not falsely cry "wolf" in this dissent. The decision rests on a
very special set of facts, and, with a change in one or more of
them, it is clear that no separate search warrant would be required
even under the reasoning of the Court.

															On the one side, Payton makes clear that an arrest
warrant is all that is needed to enter the suspect's "home" to
effect the arrest. 445 U.S. at 445 U. S.
602 -603. If a suspect has been living in a particular
dwelling for any significant period, say Page 451 U. S. 231 a few days, it can certainly be considered his "home" for Fourth
Amendment purposes, even if the premises are owned by a third party
and others are living there, and even if the suspect concurrently
maintains a residence elsewhere as well. In such a case, the police
could enter the premises with only an arrest warrant. On the other
side, the more fleeting a suspect's connection with the premises,
such as when he is a mere visitor, the more likely that exigent
circumstances will exist justifying immediate police action without
departing to obtain a search warrant. The practical damage done to
effective law enforcement by today's decision, without any basis in
the Constitution, may well be minimal if courts carefully consider
the various congeries of facts in the actual case before them.

															The genuinely unfortunate aspect of today's ruling is not that
fewer fugitives will be brought to book, or fewer criminals
apprehended, though both of these consequences will undoubtedly
occur; the greater misfortune is the increased uncertainty imposed
on police officers in the field, committing magistrates, and trial
judges, who must confront variations and permutations of this
factual situation on a day-to-day basis. They will, in their
various capacities, have to weigh the time during which a suspect
for whom there is an outstanding arrest warrant has been in the
building, whether the dwelling is the suspect's home, how long he
has lived there, whether he is likely to leave immediately, and a
number of related and equally imponderable questions. Certainty and
repose, as Justice Holmes said, may not be the destiny of man, but
one might have hoped for a higher degree of certainty in this one
narrow but important area of the law than is offered by today's
decision.

															[ Footnote 2/1 ]

															The Court cites Coke as a contrary authority, ante at 451 U. S. 217 ,
but Coke's disagreement with the rule that the constable could
"break open doors" extended only to requiring that the suspect
sought first be indicted. He wrote that,

															"if the party suspected be indicted, then the sheriff, by force
of the kings writ, may demand the party indicted to be delivered;
and that not done, he may break open the house, &c. and
apprehend the felon. . . ."

															4 E. Coke, Institutes *177. Lyons had been indicted, United
States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 543 (1979).

															[ Footnote 2/2 ]

															The Court strives to minimize the significance of the common law
rule by suggesting that it only applied in cases of "hot pursuit," ante at 451 U. S. 218 .
Even if the authorities did impose some "pursuit" requirement, and
by no means all did, see, e.g., 2 Hale 117; 1 W. Russell,
Crimes and Misdemeanors 521 (2d ed. 1826) (hereafter Russell), the
"pursuit" referred to was apparently "the old Common Law mode of
pursuing," by the "hue and cry." 1 Chitty *26; 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 293 (J. Wendell ed. 1847); 2 Hale 98. See
Semayne's Case, 5 Co.Rep. 91a, 91b-93a, 77 Eng.Rep. 194, 196
(K.B. 1603) ("J. beats R. so as he is in danger of death, J. flies,
and thereupon hue and cry is made, J. retreats into the house of T.
they who pursue him, if the house be kept and defended with force
(which proves that first request ought to be made) may lawfully
break the house of T. for it is at the K.'s suit"). The "hue and
cry," however, was not the same as "hot pursuit" by officers of the
law, and the situations in which it might be invoked -- for
example, simply to apprehend a person suspected of a felony --
would not be considered exigent circumstances. See 1
Chitty *27-*29.


U.S. Supreme Court United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411 (1981) United States v.
Cortez No. 79-404 Argued December 1,
1980 Decided January 21,
1981 449
U.S. 411 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT Syllabus Based on their discovery of sets of distinctive human footprints
in the desert, Border Patrol officers deduced that on a number of
occasions groups of from 8 to 20 persons had been guided by a
person, whom they designated "Chevron," from Mexico across an area
of desert in Arizona, known to be heavily trafficked by aliens
illegally entering the country. These groups of aliens proceeded to
an isolated point on a road to be picked up by a vehicle; the
officers deduced the vehicle probably approached from the east and
returned to the east after the pickup. They also surmised, based on
the times when the distinctive tracks were discovered, that
"Chevron" generally traveled on clear nights during or near
weekends, and arrived at the pickup point between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.
On the basis of this information, the officers stationed themselves
at a point east of the probable pickup point on a night when they
believed there was a strong possibility that "Chevron" would be
smuggling aliens. The officers observed a pickup truck with a
camper shell suitable for carrying sizable groups pass them heading
west, and then observed the same vehicle return within the
estimated time for making a round trip to the pickup point. The
officers stopped the vehicle, which was being driven by respondent
Cortez and in which respondent Hernandez-Loera, who was wearing
shoes with soles matching the distinctive "chevron" shoeprint, was
a passenger. Cortez voluntarily opened the door of the camper, and
the officers then discovered illegal aliens. Prior to trial on
charges of transporting illegal aliens, respondents sought to
suppress the evidence of the presence of the aliens discovered as a
result of the stopping of their vehicle, contending that the
officers did not have adequate cause to make the investigative
stop. The District Court denied the motion, and respondents were
convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officers
lacked a sufficient basis to justify stopping the vehicle, and thus
respondents' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Held: The objective facts and circumstantial evidence
justified the investigative stop of respondents' vehicle. Pp. 449 U. S.
417 -422.

															(a) In determining what cause is sufficient to authorize police
to stop a person, the totality of the circumstances -- the whole
picture -- must be taken into account. Based upon that whole
picture, the detaining Page 449 U. S. 412 officers must have a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. The
process of assessing all of the circumstances does not deal with
hard certainties, but with probabilities, and the evidence
collected must be weighed as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement. Also, the process must raise suspicion
that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in
wrongdoing. Pp. 449 U. S.
417 -418.

															(b) This case implicates all of these principles -- especially
the imperative of recognizing that, when used by trained law
enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the
untrained, allow for permissible deductions from such facts to
afford a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular person and
action on that suspicion. Pp. 449 U. S.
418 -421.

															(c) The intrusion upon privacy associated with this stop was
limited, and "reasonably related in scope to the justification for
[its] initiation." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.
1 , 392 U. S. 29 .
Based upon the whole picture, the officers, as experienced Border
Patrol agents, could reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle
they stopped was engaged in criminal activity. Pp. 449 U. S.
421 -422.

															595 F.2d 505, reversed.

															BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ.,
joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 449 U. S. 422 .
MARSHALL, J., concurred in the judgment.

															CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

															We granted certiorari, 447 U.S. 904, to consider whether
objective facts and circumstantial evidence suggesting that a
particular vehicle is involved in criminal activity may provide Page 449 U. S. 413 a sufficient basis to justify an investigative stop of that
vehicle. I Late in 1976, Border Patrol officers patrolling a sparsely
populated section of southern central Arizona found human
footprints in the desert. In time, other sets of similar footprints
were discovered in the same area. From these sets of footprints, it
was deduced that, on a number of occasions, groups of from 8 to 20
persons had walked north from the Mexican border, across 30 miles
of desert and mountains, over a fairly well-defined path, to an
isolated point on Highway 86, an east-west road running roughly
parallel to the Mexican border.

															Officers observed that one recurring shoeprint bore a
distinctive and repetitive V-shaped or chevron design. Because the
officers knew from recorded experience that the area through which
the groups passed was heavily trafficked by aliens illegally
entering the country from Mexico, they surmised that a person, to
whom they gave the case-name "Chevron," was guiding aliens
illegally into the United States over the path marked by the tracks
to a point where they could be picked up by a vehicle.

															The tracks led into or over obstacles that would have been
avoided in daylight. From this, the officers deduced that "Chevron"
probably led his groups across the border and to the pickup point
at night. Moreover, based upon the times when they had discovered
the distinctive sets of tracks, they concluded that "Chevron"
generally traveled during or near weekends, and on nights when the
weather was clear.

															Their tracking disclosed that, when "Chevron's" groups came
within 50 to 75 yards of Highway 86, they turned right and walked
eastward, parallel to the road. Then, approximately at highway
milepost 122, the tracks would turn north and disappear at the
road. From this pattern, the officers concluded that the aliens
very likely were picked up by a vehicle Page 449 U. S. 414 -- probably one approaching from the east, for, after a long
overland march, the group was most likely to walk parallel to the
highway toward the approaching vehicle. The officers also concluded
that, after the pickup, the vehicle probably returned to the east,
because it was unlikely that the group would be walking away from
its ultimate destination.

															On the Sunday night of January 30-31, 1977, Officers Gray and
Evans, two Border Patrolmen who had been pursuing the investigation
of "Chevron," were on duty in the Casa Grande area. The latest set
of observed "Chevron" tracks had been made on Saturday night,
January 15-16. January 30-31 was the first clear night after three
days of rain. For these reasons, Gray and Evans decided there was a
strong possibility that "Chevron" would lead aliens from the border
to the highway that night.

															The officers assumed that, if "Chevron" did conduct a group that
night, he would not leave Mexico until after dark, that is, about 6
p.m. They knew from their experience that groups of this sort,
traveling on foot, cover about two and a half to three miles an
hour. Thus, the 30-mile journey would take from 8 to 12 hours. From
this, the officers calculated that "Chevron" and his group would
arrive at Highway 86 somewhere between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. on January
31.

															About 1 a.m., Gray and Evans parked their patrol car on an
elevated location about 100 feet off Highway 86 at milepost 149, a
point some 27 miles east of milepost 122. From their vantage point,
the officers could observe the Altar Valley, an adjoining territory
they had been assigned to watch that night, and they also could see
vehicles passing on Highway 86. They estimated that it would take
approximately one hour and a half for a vehicle to make a round
trip from their vantage point to milepost 122. Working on the
hypothesis that the pickup vehicle approached milepost 122 from the
east and thereafter returned to its starting point, they focused
upon vehicles that passed them from the east, Page 449 U. S. 415 and, after about one hour and a half, passed them returning to
the east.

															Because "Chevron" appeared to lead groups of between 8 and 20
aliens at a time, the officers deduced that the pickup vehicle
would be one that was capable of carrying that large a group
without arousing suspicion. For this reason, and because they knew
that certain types of vehicles were commonly used for smuggling
sizable groups of aliens, they decided to limit their attention to
vans, pickup trucks, other small trucks, campers, motor homes, and
similar vehicles.

															Traffic on Highway 86 at milepost 149 was normal on the night of
the officers' surveillance. In the 5-hour period between 1 a.m. and
6 a.m., 15 to 20 vehicles passed the officers heading west, toward
milepost 122. Only two of them -- both pickup trucks with camper
shells -- were of the kind that the officers had concluded
"Chevron" would likely use if he was to carry aliens that night.
One, a distinctively colored pickup truck with a camper shell,
passed for the first time at 4:30 a.m. Officer Gray was able to see
and record only a partial license number, "GN 88__." [ Footnote 1 ] At 6:12 a.m., almost exactly the
estimated one hour and a half later, a vehicle looking like this
same pickup passed them again, this time heading east.

															The officers followed the pickup and were satisfied from its
license plate, "GN 8804," that it was the same vehicle that had
passed at 4:30 a.m. At that point, they flashed their police lights
and intercepted the vehicle. Respondent Jesus Cortez was the driver
and owner of the pickup; respondent Pedro Hernandez-Loera was
sitting in the passenger's seat. Hernandez-Loera was wearing shoes
with soles matching the distinctive "chevron" shoeprint.

															The officers identified themselves and told Cortez they were
conducting an immigration check. They asked if he was Page 449 U. S. 416 carrying any passengers in the camper. Cortez told them he had
picked up some hitchhikers, and he proceeded to open the back of
the camper. In the camper, there were six illegal aliens. The
officers then arrested the respondents.

															Cortez and Hernandez-Loera were charged with six counts of
transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). By
pretrial motion, they sought to suppress the evidence obtained by
Officers Gray and Evans as a result of stopping their vehicle. They
argued that the officers did not have adequate cause to make the
investigative stop. The District Court denied the motion. A jury
found the respondents guilty as charged. They were sentenced to
concurrent prison terms of five years on each of six counts. In
addition, Hernandez-Loera was fined $12,000.

															A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the officers lacked a sufficient basis to
justify the stop of the pickup. 595 F.2d 505 (1979). That court
recognized that United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975), provides a standard governing investigative stops of the
kind involved in this case, stating:

															"The quantum of cause necessary in . . . cases [like this one]
was established . . . in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. . . ."

															"[O]fficers on roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are
aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that
the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the
country."

															595 F.2d at 507 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
supra, at 422 U. S. 884 )
(citations omitted). The court also recognized that "the ultimate
question on appeal is whether the trial judge's finding that
founded suspicion was present here was clearly erroneous." 595 F.2d
at 507. Here, because, in the view of the facts of the two judges
constituting the majority, "[t]he officers did not have a valid
basis for singling out the Cortez vehicle," id. at 508,
and because Page 449 U. S. 417 the circumstances admitted "far too many innocent inferences to
make the officers' suspicions reasonably warranted," ibid., the panel concluded that the stop of Cortez'
vehicle was a violation of the respondents' rights under the Fourth
Amendment. In dissent, Judge Chambers was persuaded that Brignoni-Ponce recognized the validity of permitting an
officer to assess the facts in light of his past experience. II A The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of the person,
including brief investigatory stops such as the stop of the vehicle
here. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 , 448 U. S. 440 (1980); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S. 878 ; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 , 392 U. S. 16 -19
(1968). An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective
manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be,
engaged in criminal activity. [ Footnote 2 ] Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S.
47 , 443 U. S. 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.
S. 648 , 440 U. S. 661 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S. 884 ; Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 , 407 U. S.
146 -149 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra at 392 U. S.
16 -19.

															Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a
person. Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion"
are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance
dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the
essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the
circumstances -- the whole picture -- must be taken into account.
Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal Page 449 U. S. 418 activity. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, supra at 443 U. S. 51 ; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S.
884 .

															The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a
particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must
be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must
be based upon all of the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with
various objective observations, information from police reports, if
such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of
operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a
trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions -- inferences
and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.

															The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated
as such, practical people formulated certain common sense
conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are
permitted to do the same -- and so are law enforcement officers.
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not
in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by
those versed in the field of law enforcement.

															The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of
the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the
concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that
the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio,
supra, said that

															"[t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which
police action is predicated is the central teaching of this
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. " Id. at 392 U. S. 21 , n.
18 (emphasis added). See also Brown v. Texas, supra at 443 U. S. 51 ; Delaware v. Prouse, supra at 440 U. S.
661 -663; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 422 U. S.
884 . B This case portrays at once both the enormous difficulties of
patrolling a 2,000-mile open border and the patient skills Page 449 U. S. 419 needed by those charged with halting illegal entry into this
country. It implicates all of the principles just discussed --
especially the imperative of recognizing that, when used by trained
law enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the
untrained, can be combined with permissible deductions from such
facts to form a legitimate basis for suspicion of a particular
person and for action on that suspicion. We see here the kind of
police work often suggested by judges and scholars as examples of
appropriate and reasonable means of law enforcement. Here, fact on
fact and clue on clue afforded a basis for the deductions and
inferences that brought the officers to focus on "Chevron."

															Of critical importance, the officers knew that the area was a
crossing point for illegal aliens. They knew that it was common
practice for persons to lead aliens through the desert from the
border to Highway 86, where they could -- by prearrangement -- be
picked up by a vehicle. Moreover, based upon clues they had
discovered in the 2-month period prior to the events at issue here,
they believed that one such guide, whom they designated "Chevron,"
had a particular pattern of operations.

															By piecing together the information at their disposal, the
officers tentatively concluded that there was a reasonable
likelihood that "Chevron" would attempt to lead a group of aliens
on the night of Sunday, January 30-31. Someone with chevron-soled
shoes had led several groups of aliens in the previous two months,
yet it had been two weeks since the latest crossing. "Chevron,"
they deduced, was therefore due reasonably soon. "Chevron" tended
to travel on clear weekend nights. Because it had rained on the
Friday and Saturday nights of the weekend involved here, Sunday was
the only clear night of that weekend; the officers surmised it was
therefore a likely night for a trip.

															Once they had focused on that night, the officers drew upon
other objective facts known to them to deduce a timeframe Page 449 U. S. 420 within which "Chevron" and the aliens were likely to arrive.
From what they knew of the practice of those who smuggle aliens,
including what they knew of "Chevron's" previous activities, they
deduced that the border crossing and journey through the desert
would probably be at night. They knew the time when sunset would
occur at the point of the border crossing; they knew about how long
the trip would take. They were thus able to deduce that "Chevron"
would likely arrive at the pickup point on Highway 86 in the
timeframe between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.

															From objective facts, the officers also deduced the probable
point on the highway -- milepost 122 -- at which "Chevron" would
likely rendezvous with a pickup vehicle. They deduced from the
direction taken by the sets of "Chevron" footprints they had
earlier discovered that the pickup vehicle would approach the
aliens from, and return with them to, a point east of milepost 122.
They therefore staked out a position east of milepost 122 (at
milepost 149) and watched for vehicles that passed them going west
and then, approximately one and a half hours later, passed them
again, this time going east.

															From what they had observed about the previous groups guided by
the person with "chevron" shoes, they deduced that "Chevron" would
lead a group of 8 to 20 aliens. They therefore focused their
attention on enclosed vehicles of that passenger capacity.

															The analysis produced by Officers Gray and Evans can be
summarized as follows: if, on the night upon which they believed
"Chevron" was likely to travel, sometime between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.,
a large enclosed vehicle was seen to make an east-west-east round
trip to and from a deserted point (milepost 122) on a deserted road
(Highway 86), the officers would stop the vehicle on the return
trip. In a 4-hour period, the officers observed only one vehicle
meeting that description. And it is not surprising that, when they
stopped the Page 449 U. S. 421 vehicle on its return trip, it contained "Chevron" and several
illegal aliens. [ Footnote
3 ] C The limited purpose of the stop in this case was to question the
occupants of the vehicle about their citizenship and immigration
status and the reasons for the round trip in a short timespan in a
virtually deserted area. No search of the camper or any of its
occupants occurred until after respondent Cortez voluntarily opened
the back door of the camper; thus, only the stop, not the search,
is at issue here. The intrusion upon privacy associated with this
stop was limited, and was "reasonably related in scope to the
justification for [its] initiation," Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. at 392 U. S. 29 .

															We have recently held that stops by the Border Patrol may he
justified under circumstances less than those constituting probable
cause for arrest or search. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 422 U. S. 880 .
[ Footnote 4 ] Thus, the test is
not whether Officers Gray and Evans had probable cause to conclude
that the vehicle they stopped would contain "Chevron" and a group
of illegal aliens. Rather, the question is whether, based upon the
whole picture, they, as experienced Border Patrol officers, could
reasonably surmise that the particular vehicle Page 449 U. S. 422 they stopped was engaged in criminal activity. On this record,
they could so conclude. Reversed. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment.

															[ Footnote 1 ]

															The second camper passed them 15 or 20 minutes later. As far as
the record shows, it did not return.

															[ Footnote 2 ]

															Of course, an officer may stop and question a person if there
are reasonable grounds to believe that person is wanted for past
criminal conduct.

															[ Footnote 3 ]

															In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.
S. 873 , 422 U. S.
884 -885 (1975), the Court listed several factors to be
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in
determining the existence vel non of a particularized
suspicion in cases treating official attempts to stem the influx of
illegal aliens into our country. Though the list did not purport to
be exhaustive, it is noteworthy that several of the factors present
here were recognized by Brignoni-Ponce as significant in
this context; for example, information about recent border
crossings and the type of vehicle involved.

															[ Footnote 4 ]

															The wide public interest in effective measures to prevent the
entry of illegal aliens at the Mexican border has been cataloged by
this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891 , 422 U. S.
899 -914 (1975) (BURGER, C.J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 422 U. S.
878 -879.

															JUSTICE STEWART, concurring in the result.

															The Border Patrol officers in this case knew, or had rationally
deduced, that "Chevron" had repeatedly shepherded illegal aliens up
from the border; that his treks had commonly ended early in the
morning around milepost 122 on Highway 86; that he usually worked
on weekends; that he probably had made no trips for two weeks; and
that trips were most likely when the weather was good. Knowing of
this pattern, the officers could reasonably anticipate, even if
they could not guarantee, the arrival of another group of aliens,
led by Chevron, at milepost 122 on the first clear weekend night in
late January, 1977. Route 86 leads through almost uninhabited
country, so little traveled in the hours of darkness that only 15
to 20 westbound vehicles passed the police during the five hours
they watched that Sunday night. Only two vehicles capacious enough
to carry a sizable group of illegal aliens went by. One of those
two vehicles not only drove past them, but returned in the opposite
direction after just enough time had elapsed for a journey to
milepost 122 and back. This nocturnal round trip into "desolate
desert terrain" would in any event have been puzzling. Coming when
and as it did, surely the most likely explanation for it was that
Chevron was again shepherding aliens.

															In sum, the Border Patrol officers had discovered an abundance
of "specific articulable facts" which, "together with rational
inferences from [them]," entirely warranted a "suspicion that the
vehicl[e] contain[ed] aliens who [might] be illegally in the
country." United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce , Page 449 U. S. 423 422 U. S. 873 , 422 U. S. 884 .
Because the information possessed by the officers thus met the
requirements established by the Brignoni-Ponce case for
the kind of stop made here, I concur in the reversal of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.