attributable to the future sale of our LNG inventory and to price risk attributable to future purchases of natural gas to be utilized as fuel to operate our LNG terminals and to secure natural gas feedstock for our liquefaction facilities. 

The CFTC has re-proposed position limits rules that would modify and expand the applicability of position limits on the amounts of certain speculative futures contracts, as well as economically equivalent options, futures and swaps for or linked to certain physical commodities, including Henry Hub natural gas, that market participants may hold, subject to limited exemptions for certain bona fide hedging positions and other types of transactions. To the extent the revised CFTC position limits proposal becomes final, our ability to execute our hedging strategies described above could be limited. It is uncertain at this time whether, when and in what form the CFTC’s proposed new position limits rules may become final and effective. 

Under the Dodd-Frank Act and the rules adopted thereunder, we may be required to clear through a derivatives clearing organization any swaps into which we enter that fall within a class of swaps designated by the CFTC for mandatory clearing and we could have to execute trades in such swaps on certain trading platforms or exchanges. The CFTC has designated certain interest rate swaps and index credit default swaps for mandatory clearing, but has not yet finalized rules designating any physical commodity swaps, for mandatory clearing or mandatory exchange trading. Although we expect to qualify for the end-user exception from the mandatory clearing and trade execution requirements for our swaps entered into to hedge our commercial risks, if we fail to qualify for that exception as to any swap we enter into and have to clear that swap through a derivatives clearing organization, we could be required to post margin with respect to such swap, our cost of entering into and maintaining such swap could increase and we would not enjoy the same flexibility with the cleared swaps that we enjoy with the uncleared OTC swaps we enter into. Moreover, the application of the mandatory clearing and trade execution requirements to other market participants, such as swap dealers, may change the market cost and general availability in the market of swaps of the type we enter into to hedge our commercial risks and, thus, the cost and availability of the swaps that we use for hedging. 

As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC and federal banking regulators have adopted rules to require certain market participants to collect and post initial and/or variation margin with respect to uncleared swaps from their counterparties that are financial end users and certain registered swap dealers and major swap participants. Although we believe we will not be required to post margin with respect to any uncleared swaps we enter into in the future, were we required to post margin as to our uncleared swaps in the future, our cost of entering into and maintaining swaps would be increased. Our counterparties that are subject to the regulations imposing the Basel III capital requirements on them may increase the cost to us of entering into swaps with them or, although not required to collect margin from us under the margin rules, contractually require us to post collateral with them in connection with such swaps in order to offset their increased capital costs or to reduce their capital costs to maintain those swaps on their balance sheets. 

The Dodd-Frank Act also imposes other regulatory requirements on swaps market participants, including end users of swaps, such as regulations relating to swap documentation, reporting and recordkeeping, and certain business conduct rules applicable to swap dealers and major swap participants. Together with the Basel III capital requirements on certain swaps market participants, the regulatory requirements of the Dodd- Frank Act and the rules thereunder relating to swaps and derivatives market participants could significantly increase the cost of derivative contracts (including through requirements to post margin or collateral), materially alter the terms of derivative contracts, reduce the availability of derivatives to protect against certain risks that we encounter and reduce our ability to monetize or restructure our existing derivative contracts and to execute our hedging strategies. If, as a result of the swaps regulatory regime discussed above, we were to reduce our use of swaps to hedge our risks, such as commodity price risks that we encounter in our operations, our operating results and cash flows may become more volatile and could be otherwise adversely affected. 

The Federal Reserve Board also has proposed rules that would limit certain physical commodity activities of financial holding companies. Such rules, if adopted, may adversely affect our ability to execute our strategies by restricting our available counterparties for certain types of transactions, limiting our ability to obtain certain services, and reducing liquidity in physical and financial markets. It is uncertain at this time whether, when and in what form the Federal Reserve’s proposed rules regarding financial holding companies may become final and effective. 

European and UK-specific regulations, including but not limited to EMIR, MiFID II, REMIT, MAR, FSMA and RAO, govern our trading activities and our compliance with such laws may result in increased costs and risks to the business similar to the impacts stated above with respect to Dodd-Frank. The increased costs may also have an adverse impact on our business, contracts, financial condition, operating results, cash flow, liquidity and prospects. Further, any violation of the foregoing laws and regulations could result in investigations, and possible fines and penalties, and in some scenarios, criminal offenses. 

