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2. Seat materials—the criteria for automobile materials are different from those for materials suitable for use in aircraft. Material coverings certified for aircraft use provide additional safety and are intended to reduce unnecessary exposure to fire. In this accident, 

the possibility exists that the seat covering on the automotive seat exacerbated the fire. 

3. Potential for electrical malfunctions, especially overheating—why use a 5-amp and then a 7-amp circuit breaker when a 30-amp circuit breaker was used in the original automotive installation? 

Did the pilot in command (PIC) take unnecessary risk? Assuming he or she had no knowledge of the differences between the replacement seat and a normal aircraft seat, he should have questioned the installation of a non-aircraft part. And, examine the PIC’s query to the controller during the flight. He indicated he was not sure if his aircraft were on fire or if something on the ground were on fire. Did he incorrectly assess the information he had been given? Did he assume his aircraft was not on fire? Given the seat’s installation, its propensity to overheat, and the indication of a fire, what should the pilot have done? 

In Figure 6-6,  the risk matrix relates directly to both the builder of the aircraft and the PIC. 

• Builder—the likelihood of an adverse event is minimized when aviation standards are adopted in both the selection of material and components, and their installation. The more closely the standards are followed, the less likely the occurrence of an adverse event. In this case, the likelihood of an adverse event is maximized not only because of the seat installation, but that it represents a potential problem across the construction of the entire aircraft. 

• PIC—if he were familiar with the seat installation, the problems it created, and its prior problem of overheating, he failed to assess the likelihood that the source of the smell was a fire in the aircraft and not a fire on the ground. No information is available on how long the occupants of the aircraft smelled the smoke, but there were only four minutes between the radio call requesting information about ground fires and the impact with the building. This left the pilot 

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