terrain. Contributing factors were the pilot’s inadequate preflight planning, self-induced pressure to conduct the flight, and poor judgment. 

Unfortunately for this pilot, he fell into a high-risk category. According to the NTSB, pilots on flights of more than 300 nautical miles (NM) are 4.7 times more likely to be involved in an accident than pilots on flights of 50 NM or less. Another statistic also put him in to the potential accident category: his lack of an instrument rating. Studies have found that VFR pilots are trained to avoid bad weather and when they find themselves in poor weather conditions, they do not have the experience to navigate their way through it. 

## Continuing VFR into IMC 

Continuing VFR into IMC often leads to spatial disorientation or collision with ground/obstacles. It is even more dangerous when the pilot is not instrument rated or current. The FAA and NTSB have studied the problem extensively with the goal of reducing this type of accident. Weather-related accidents, particularly those associated with VFR flight into IMC, continue to be a threat to GA safety because 80 percent of the VFR-IMC accidents resulted in a fatality. 

One question frequently asked is whether or not pilots associated with VFR flight into IMC even knew they were about to encounter hazardous weather. It is difficult to know from accident records exactly what weather information the pilot obtained before and during flight, but the pilot in the following accident departed in marginal visual meteorological conditions (VMC). 

In 2007, a Beech 836 TC Bonanza was destroyed when it impacted terrain. The private, non-instrument-rated pilot departed in VMC on a personal flight and requested VFR flight following to his destination. When he neared his destination, he contacted approach control and reported that his altitude was 2,500 feet above mean sea level (MSL). Approach control informed the pilot that there were moderate to heavy rain showers over the destination airport. The pilot reported that he was experiencing “poor visibility” and was considering turning 180° to “go back.” Approach control informed the pilot that IMC prevailed north of his position with moderate to heavy rain showers. Their exchange follows: 

At 1413:45, approach control asked the pilot if he was going to reverse course. The pilot replied, “Ah, affirmative, yeah we’re gonna make, we’re gonna actually head, ah, due north.” 

Approach control instructed the pilot to proceed to the northeast and maintain VFR. 

At 1414:53, approach control asked the pilot what was his current destination. The pilot responded, “We’re deviating. I think we’re going to go back over near Eau Claire, but, ah, we’re going to see what the weather is like. We’re, we’re kinda in the soup at this point so I’m trying to get back, ah, to the east.” 

At 1415:10, approach control informed the pilot that there was “some level one rain or some light rain showers” that were about seven miles ahead of his present position. 

At 1415:30, the pilot asked approach control, “What is the ah, ah, Lakeville weather? I was showing seven thousand and overcast on the system here. Is that still holding?” 

Approach control responded, “No, around [the] Minneapolis area we’re overcast at twenty three hundred and twenty one hundred in the vicinity of all the other airports around here.” 

At 1415:49, the pilot stated, “I’m going to head due south at this time, down to, ah, about two thousand and make it into Lakeville.” 

Approach control responded, “...you can proceed south bound.” 

At 1416:02, the pilot responded, “...thanks (unintelligible).” 

The radar data indicated that the airplane’s altitude was about 2,600 feet MSL. 

There were no further radio transmissions. After the last radio transmission, three radar returns indicated the airplane descended from 2,500 feet to 2,300 feet MSL before it was lost from radar contact. 

A witness reported he heard an airplane and then saw the airplane descending through a cloud layer that was about 400–500 feet above the ground. The airplane was in about a 50° nose-down attitude with its engine producing “cruise power.” He reported the airplane was flying at a high rate of speed for about four seconds until he heard the airplane impact the terrain. The observed weather in the area of the accident was reported as marginal VMC and IMC. 

The NTSB determined the probable cause(s) of this accident to be the pilot’s continued flight into IMC, which resulted in spatial disorientation and loss of control. 

Research can offer no single explanation to account for this type of accident. Is it the end result of poor situational 

