content_image/302842.jpg content_image/302835.jpg content_image/302837.jpg content_image/302841.jpg content_image/302836.jpg
of generality, assume that r$_{2}$ = 1. 

The fitness of individuals is determined by the average payoff over a large number of interactions. Therefore, the fitness of C and D players are non-linear functions of x and y , given by 

The replicator equations can be reduced to 

where, 

The equilibrium points are either on the boundary or in the interior. The boundary points x = 0 is stable equilibrium while x = 1 is unstable equilibrium. If f C − f D = 0 and x + y = 1then we have two interior equilibrium are given by 

where, 

In case of non- uniform interaction rate ,the selection dynamics depend on the size of r$_{1}$r$_{3}$ relative to ρ $^{2}$.[1] where, 

<img src='content_image/302842.jpg'>

<img src='content_image/302835.jpg'>

<img src='content_image/302837.jpg'>

<img src='content_image/302841.jpg'>

<img src='content_image/302836.jpg'>

