On July 18, 2007, attorneys for the ACLU of Kentucky Foundation, Inc. and private counsel filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of a lawful permanent resident living in Kentucky, challenging a Kentucky statute, §1 KRS 237.110, which barred resident aliens from obtaining licenses to carry a concealed deadly weapon. Plaintiff alleged that the U.S. citizenship requirement of the concealed carry law violated equal protection. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, which the court granted on March 13, 2008. The following month, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the action was moot because the law had been amended to remove the citizenship requirement. On June 16, 2008, the court entered an order converting the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. The parties then disagreed about the awarding of attorney fees and costs. In March 2009, the court granted attorneys fees and costs to the plaintiffs, but did reduce the amount requested. This case was closed in May 2009.

Summary: This 2007 case was a challenge to Kentucky's concealed deadly weapon's statute which barred non-U.S. citizens from obtaining licenses to carry. The court granted a permanent injunction against that requirement, although in the meantime, Kentucky amended the law to remove the citizenship requirement. This case was closed in 2009.


On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court upheld the 9th Circuit's decision in this case that the Trump Administration acted unlawfully when it rescinded DACA, because its reasons for rescission were insufficient.
 The Regents of the University of California (UC) and Janet Napolitano, in her official capacity as President of the University of California, filed this lawsuit challenging the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). The complaint was filed on September 8, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. According to the complaint, DACA has benefited approximately 800,000 individuals brought to the U.S. as children “through no choice of their own.” Under DACA, applicants who met certain criteria were eligible for deferred immigration action for two-year periods, pending approval of their applications. As the complaint stated, “DACA allowed these individuals to live, study, and work in the United States without fear that they could be arrested and deported at any time,” and so they “were able to pursue opportunities in higher education, to more readily obtain driver’s licenses and access lines of credit, to obtain jobs and access to certain Social Security and Medicare benefits, and to contribute to their communities and American society.” The plaintiffs stated that these individuals - known as Dreamers - have enabled the nation and UC to greatly benefit from their presence as students and employees at the university. The plaintiffs stated the Dreamers contribute significantly to UC life, “expanding the intellectual vitality of the school, filling crucial roles as medical residents, research assistants, and student government leaders, and increasing the diversity of the community.” Plaintiff Janet Napolitano was the Secretary of Homeland Security who designed and implemented DACA in 2012. But the revocation of DACA, the plaintiffs argued, threatened the Dreamers with “expulsion from the only country that they call home.” Moreover, the plaintiffs argued, DHS did not offer any “reasoned basis” for revoking DACA and did so in violation of legally required procedures. The plaintiffs argued that DHS’s justification for revocation is that a related but ultimately separate program - Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) - is illegal. The plaintiffs asserted that this justification is based on “an incorrect legal premise” as the two programs “were governed by different sets of rules, applied to different individuals, and conferred different benefits” and that “no court has held that DACA is unlawful.” Further, the plaintiffs argued that in not accounting for the Dreamers' strong reliance on DACA, DHS violated Supreme Court precedent requiring agencies to provide “more substantial justification” for policy changes when there is significant reliance on the preexisting policy. The plaintiffs argued that DHS’s revocation of DACA violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley on Sept. 8, but then reassigned to Judge Hon. William Alsup on Sept. 12. On Sept. 18, the court related this case to State of California v. Department of Homeland Security, Case No. 17-cv-05235. Two days later, the court related two more cases to this one: Garcia v. United States of America, No. 17-cv-05380, and City of San Jose v. Trump, No. 17-cv-05329. On Oct. 16, County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-05813, was added as a related case. All are summarized in this Clearinghouse. On Oct. 6, the defendants filed the administrative record, available here, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception to the decision to rescind it. On Oct. 17, after the plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so. The court found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission, specifically related documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court on Oct. 18 in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit. The court denied staying proceedings on Oct. 19, and the defendants appealed the next day by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the district court and emergency motion for stay. On Oct. 23, the district court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until DACA would end on March 5, 2018. On Nov. 1, in the district court, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from rescinding DACA, arguing that the rescission "violate[d] the fundamental prohibition on arbitrary agency action imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act" by not providing a reasoned basis for it. That same day, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the rescission is an enforcement action "presumed immune from judicial review" and that the government provided ample explanation for the rescission based on DAPA's enjoinment. On Nov. 16, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus and vacated the stay of discovery and record expansion that had been entered. The District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by Nov 22. 875 F.3d 1200. On Nov. 17, the federal government filed an emergency motion noting that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the Supreme Court no later than Nov. 20, and requesting that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the forthcoming petition. On Nov. 21, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, noting that jurisdiction currently lies with the district court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. 875 F.3d 1177. Meanwhile, in the District Court, Judge Alsup on Nov. 20 agreed to stay all discovery until Dec. 22, at which point the augmented administrative record was due. On Dec. 1, 2017, the government filed notice that they appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On Dec. 21 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case, arguing that the district court should have stayed implementation of the Oct. 17 order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have "first resolved the Government’s threshold arguments (that the Acting Secretary’s determination to rescind DACA is unreviewable because it is “committed to agency discretion,” 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the District Court of jurisdiction). Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record." 138 S.Ct. 443. The same day, the district court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. On Jan. 9, 2018, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction from Nov. 1, 2017 and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. 877 F.3d 1080. The order indicated the court would separately dismiss the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the recession. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who never before received deferred action. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on Jan. 12, dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims as well the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. 298 F.Supp.3d 1304. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 16, 2018. The government also sought certiorari from the Supreme Court on Jan. 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied cert without prejudice on Feb. 26, 2018, indicating the justices assume "that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case." 138 S.Ct. 1182. The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. From February through April 2018, the parties filed their briefs. Meanwhile, the following entities filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs: historians, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Service Employees International Union, American Federation of Teachers, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Communications Workers of America, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, International Union of Painters and Allied Traders, United Farm Workers of America, United We Dream, public education groups, current and former prosecutors and law enforcement leaders, over 100 religious organizations, higher education institutions, over 100 companies and associations, the Bar Association of San Francisco, former federal immigration and homeland security officials, law professors and scholars, the Institute for Policy Integrity at NYU School of Law, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Anti-Defamation League, social justice organizations, legal services organizations, American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, California Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, Partnership for Educational Justice, DelawareCAN, HawaiiKidsCAN, NewMexicoKidsCAN, Virginia Excels, various cities and counties, the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, various ACLU branches. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5, 2018. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on Nov. 8, 2018. 908 F.3d 476. The panel held that the government's decision to rescind DACA was reviewable because it was based on a belief that law foreclosed any alternative because the agency lacked authority rather than on exercise of discretion. The panel further concluded the decision was reviewable because the government based rescission only on the belief that DACA went beyond DHS' authority and so the APA's bar did not apply, and the decision did not fall within the three discrete occasions when the INA bars judicial review of DHS decisions. As to the merits of the preliminary injunction, the panel held that "DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion" and the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. Thus, the panel concluded the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it "promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress." Id. In November 2018, while the appeal was pending, the Government simultaneously filed three petitions for certiorari before judgment, in this case, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Trump, and Vidal v. Nielsen, also challenging the DACA rescission. In both this case and Vidal v. Nielsen, the district courts had granted a nationwide injunction to maintain the DACA program. In NAACP v. Trump, the district court also found that the vacatur of rescission was proper, but later granted a limited stay for certain DACA applications pending appeal. All three cases were appealed to the Circuit courts as well. On June 28, 2019, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the nationwide injunction (on Nov. 8 the previous year), but before rulings from the other two Circuits, the Supreme Court granted the petitions and consolidated the cases for argument. 908 F.3d 476; 139 S.Ct. 2779. The case was argued at the U.S. Supreme Court on November 12, 2019. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants did not follow proper APA procedures. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation of the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020 ("Wolf Memorandum"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that the Acting Secretary Wolf actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. The parties agreed to a briefing schedule on forthcoming motions for summary judgment. Though the parties in this case have yet to file motions for summary judgment and the court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs' amended complaint, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: The Regents of the University of California filed this lawsuit challenging DHS's revocation of DACA on September 8, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs stated that DACA recipients have enabled the nation and the university to greatly benefit from their presence as students and employees at the university. The plaintiffs argued that DHS’ revocation of DACA violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. On Jan. 9, 2018, the court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the recession. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on Nov. 8, 2018. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5 which was granted on July 3, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Though the parties in this case have yet to file motions for summary judgment and the court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs' amended complaint, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On August 11, 1980, several inmates filed pro se complaints in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tennessee Attorney General. The cases were consolidated despite abstention issues and in light of the 6th Circuit's decision Hanna v. Toner. Attorneys were appointed to represent plaintiffs, including Legal Services of Middle Tennessee, Legal Services of South Central Tennessee, National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, Rural Legal Services of Tennessee, and Legal Aid in Nashville. The plaintiff prisoners alleged that the conditions of confinement and practices in Tennessee's adult penal institutions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the state's constitution. The amended complaint also resulted in certification of the plaintiffs as a class of all present and future adult male inmates committed to the Tennessee Department of Correction. The complaint challenged living conditions in Tennessee's prisons, ranging from overcrowding and sanitation to medical care and violence. Such "wanton infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering," the plaintiffs alleged, amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. In August of 1982, the district court (Judge Leland Clure Morton) found that the conditions within Tennessee's adult penal institutions were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and ordered the defendants to establish remedies and submit them to the court. Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp. 1052 (M.D.Tenn. 1982). The court found specific facilities--but not all in the system--were inadequate to accommodate a growing prison population, and mandated that the prisons cease double celling in those units. While the court noted significant concern with prison conditions, including serious fire hazards and sanitation issues, it found them constitutionally adequate. Other sanitation issues, such as drinking water sanitation and absence of bedding cleaning procedure, were not found to rise to the level of unconstitutionality. However, the court did find that the constitution did require a level of hygiene in food preparation and kitchen sanitation that the prisons did not meet. The defendants would be required to implement a procedure to ensure basic sanitation practices. Issues of violence were found "endemic" to the system and warranting attention, but also "inevitable" and not unconstitutional. Similarly, it found the healthcare provided to inmates to be constitutionally adequate. The court mandated that the defendants design a plan to address the constitutionally inadequate conditions and appoint a special master to evaluate the defendants' plan. Other remedial orders were issued by the court in this case, such as enjoining defendants from keeping prisoners in confinement without physical exercise for longer than one week. The defendants appointed Patrick D. McManus. In 1987, the court ordered the plans to be completed by 1992. In a separate litigation concerning inmate populations at Tennessee penal institutions governed by the Grubbs population orders, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Merritt, Nelson, and Lievely), remanded the case to the judge presiding over the Grubbs decree to oversee proceedings in that case consistent with the Grubbs order. Roberts v. Tennessee Department of Correction, 887 F.2d 1281. The Sixth Circuit noted that the Grubbs court should have jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to population limits and other matters of the Grubbs decree, and transferred the case to that judge. On May 14, 1993, the matter came before the court regarding terminating the class action. The court (Judge Thomas A. Higgins) determined that conditions within Tennessee prisons had improved sufficiently to warrant the almost complete termination of court supervision, vacating and dissolving the injunction. Grubbs v. Bradley, 821 F.Supp. 496 (M.D.Tenn. 1993). The court retained jurisdiction in one area to ensure the defendants created a health care quality-assurance program. The court also awarded the plaintiffs' side attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiffs had moved to hold the defendants in contempt for violation of the injunction and the court denied without prejudice in 1999. The PACER docket indicates that defendants complied with this order and the docket ends on October 13, 2000 after several years of compliance review.

Summary: Tennessee inmates filed <i>pro se<i> to challenge the constitutionality of the conditions within the state's adult penal institutions. They were appointed counsel and granted class status. The court found the conditions appalling; however, not all rose to the level of unconstitutionality sufficient to find a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Those that did were mandated to be addressed in a statewide plan to address those conditions, including overcrowding and food sanitation. Over a decade later, the state was found in compliance and the injunction was dissolved.


On April 27, 2006, the United States government filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against First National Bank of Pontotoc (the "Bank") and its former Vice-President, under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The U.S. sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants engaged in a practice or pattern of gender discrimination against female borrowers, female applicants for credit, and female account holders. Specifically, the U.S. alleged that the Vice-President sexually harassed the aforementioned women, and the Bank was liable for his actions. According to the DOJ press release, the Vice-President's actions included offensive comments, unwanted sexual touching, and demanding sexual favors from female customers over a period of years until his employment ended in May of 2004. On July 6, 2006, the Vice-President filed a motion to dismiss. On November 3, 2006, the Court (Judge Glen H. Davidson) dismissed the motion. On July 11, 2007, the U.S. filed an amended complaint, adding allegations of gender discrimination under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. In other respects, the complaint reiterated the original allegations. On July 25, 2007, the Bank filed a cross-claim against its former Vice-President, denying liability for the latter's actions and seeking compensation from him to the Bank for any liability imposed on the Bank. The parties entered into settlement negotiations and reached an agreement. On November 7, 2007, the Court entered the parties' consent decree. The decree contained general injunctions on gender discrimination in: 1) application for credit: 2) residential real-estate related transaction; 3) terms or conditions of residential real-estate transactions. If the Vice-President resumed engagement in residential real-estate transaction, he had to provide notice to the plaintiff and go through a fair lending laws training, with focus on sex discrimination and harassment. The Bank agreed to institute anti-discrimination policies, including posting notices in media, and a complaints procedure for sexual harassment. The Bank also agreed to provide fair lending training to its present and future employees, focused on sexual harassment. The Bank agreed to pay $130,000.00 in damages to victims of sexual harassment and the Vice-President agreed to pay $120,000.00, with up to $50,000.00 for additional victims. The Bank had to pay $5,000.00 and the Vice-President $45,000.00 in civil penalty to the United States. The Bank also agreed to provide reports to the plaintiff pertaining to the consent decree. The decree remained in effect for five years and the Court retained jurisdiction over the decree for its duration. On September 24, 2008, the Court (Judge Michael P. Mills) approved the joint stipulation of parties on disbursement of funds, and ordered payment of $50,000.00 by the Bank to 29 women with varying amounts.

Summary: On April 27, 2006, the United States government filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against First National Bank of Pontotoc (the "Bank") and its former Vice-President, under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The plaintiff sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the former Vice-President sexually harassed female customers, and the Bank was liable for his actions. The parties settled and the Court entered the consent decree on November 7, 2007. The defendants had to pay $250,000.00 to victims and $50,000.00 in civil penalty to the United States. The bank also agreed to institute anti-discrimination policies, a complaint procedure for sexual harassment, and provide fair lending training.


This is a case about the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) failing to provide accommodations for nursing employees. On November 26, 2019, a female PPD employee filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the City of Philadelphia under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. She sought a proposed class of all female police officers who had worked for the Philadelphia Police Department during the preceding three years. The plaintiff claimed that the PPD had failed to provide nursing female police officers with appropriate accommodations and had engaged in sex and pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, she alleged that the PPD had failed to comply with the Break Time for Nursing Mothers provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not providing break times or a private location for expressing breast milk (collecting and storing breast milk for use later). The plaintiff also alleged that the PPD had violated the Equal Protection Clause in creating a hostile work environment where the plaintiff class suffered from disparate treatment as a result of their sex and pregnancy status, and the PPD had violated the plaintiff class's First Amendment right to petition by retaliating against them when they tried to assert their rights. The case was assigned to Judge Michael M. Baylson. On February 3, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 17, 2020. The changes included explaining more specifically why declaratory and injunctive relief would be appropriate through adding new sections and more citations to case law. The amended complaint also highlighted more explicitly that the plaintiff had to pump at irregular times and in unsanitary bathrooms, or sometimes not at all, as a result of the defendant's actions. More details about the defendant's retaliatory actions were added, including dates that the plaintiff had been forced to work from home without pay. Information about the benefits of breastfeeding infants and statistics regarding breastfeeding mothers in the U.S. was also added to the factual background. On March 2, 2020, the court denied the initial motion to dismiss as moot, and the defendant filed a new motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On March 16, the plaintiff moved to file a supplemental complaint, and the court granted this motion on March 25. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the court also granted additional briefing time. On August 21, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for the supplemental complaint. On November 12, 2020, the court denied the motion to dismiss for two counts: the violations of FLSA protection and Title VII disparate treatment claims. For the other six counts, the court granted the motion to dismiss. In its opinion, the court explained that the plaintiff did not establish enough of a causal connection between the plaintiff's conduct and the defendant's adverse action for FLSA and Title VII retaliation claims. For the Title VII and § 1983 hostile work environment claims, the plaintiff did not establish "severe or pervasive conduct" or "intentional discrimination." For the § 1983 disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege any policy or custom that caused the disparate treatment. Lastly, for the First Amendment claim regarding the right to petition, the court held that the plaintiff was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, so the First Amendment did not apply. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on December 12, 2020. The amended complaint added Pennsylvania state law to the causes of action. It added four new counts under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance; it also removed four of the six counts that the court had dismissed: Title VII hostile work environment, § 1983 hostile work environment, § 1983 disparate treatment, and First Amendment right to petition. For the other two dismissed counts, FLSA and Title VII retaliation, specific acts from the defendant were added to the claims to establish more of a causal connection. On December 24, 2020, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. As of March 13, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a case about the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) failing to provide accommodations for nursing employees. On November 26, 2019, a female PPD employee filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the City of Philadelphia under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the PPD had failed to provide nursing female police officers with appropriate accommodations, engaged in sex and pregnancy discrimination, and violated the First Amendment right to petition. On November 12, 2020, court granted a motion to dismiss for six of the eight counts, holding that the plaintiff did not have enough of a factual basis to allege claims of retaliation, a hostile work environment, or § 1983 disparate treatment. In addition, the First Amendment protection did not apply. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 12, 2020, which the defendant has moved to dismiss. This case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the state of Washington regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On October 6, the court granted the parties stipulated request for a dismissal.
 Background Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially "student visas") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an "operational change plan" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. The Lawsuit This lawsuit was filed on July 10, 2020, four days after the directive was issued. The State of Washington was the plaintiff. Defendants were the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Washington claimed that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act in six ways: 1) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it set up implausible deadlines for institutions to decide whether to be fully online or not; 2) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it reversed a prior policy without detailing any change in facts; 3) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that the defendants entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; 4) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that defendants did not offer any cogent explanation for the change in policy; and 5) defendants did not engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when issuing the new policy. Finally, Washington also argued that the directive violated the APA because it was issued in excess of ICE's statutory authority and encroached on the state's ability to exercise police powers regarding public health. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the agencies from enforcing the new directive. Plaintiffs also requested that the court vacate and set aside the new directive, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Ricardo S. Martinez. On July 13, the plaintiff requested an emergency temporary restraining order, asking that the court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the directives for at least two weeks. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, President and Fellows of Harvard College, the parties conferred and the defendants agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. On July 16, the parties filed a joint stipulation stating that the defendants' rescission of the directive mooted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and that the parties agreed to withdraw the motion without prejudice. On October 6, 2020, the court granted the parties' stipulated request for a dismissal.

Summary: The state of Washington sued the Department of Homeland Security and ICE following the July 6, 2020 directive that would effectively require international students to take in-person classes or be subject to deportation. Washington argued that this violated several provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and sought injunctive relief and a court order vacating the directive. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. Washington voluntarily dismissed its claims on October 6, 2020.


On March 8th, 2016, two Genesee County Jail detainees filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other detainees in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Genesee County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Clinic of Michigan State University, sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring the Genesee County Jail to provide safe and clean water to all detainees, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the Genesee County Jail provided detainees with toxic water for consumption, bathing, and food preparation in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant did not provide safe and clean water to detainees, impacting their health. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff had overwhelming evidence that the water was unsafe to drink and caused lead poisoning after Genesee County officials declared a public health emergency on October, 1, 2015. The health concerns relating to the toxic water of Flint included hypertension, autoimmune disorders, neurological disorders, and psychological disorders. After providing only a nine day supply of bottled water to detainees, the Jail required that detainees return to drinking, bathing, and cooking with the toxic tap water. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff made the decision to return to using toxic tap water for fiscal reasons. The plaintiffs estimated that 500 individuals were detained at any one time in Jail, and thus subjected to toxic water. This is one of many cases that arose from the Flint Water Crisis. Many cases relating to this crisis were condensed into one class action lawsuit, Waid v. Snyder. This case proceeded independently. For another suit involving the Genesee County Jail but seeking damages, please see Hatcher v. Genesee County. On April 6, 2016, the complaint was amended to include an additional plaintiff (another detainee) and an additional defendant (the Captain in charge of the internal workings of the Jail). On June 23, 2016, the lawsuit was resolved via a consent decree approved by District Judge Avern Cohn. In the decree, the defendants maintained that detainees had not consumed toxic water. The decree required defendants to provide detainees with water that is not contaminated by lead for drinking and cooking, meaning the water contains less than fifteen parts per billion of lead contaminants. Additionally, the decree required defendants to test the water in five locations within the Jail every fourteen days for an eight week period, sending copies to the plaintiffs’ counsel. If the tests showed that the lead levels were safe, the defendants were allowed to supply water from the Flint water system to detainees for all uses. The consent decree was set to last for one year and enforceable by the court. (The decree would also terminate if Michigan or the Genesee County Health Department declared Flint’s water safe). There was no additional docket activity during the term of the consent decree, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On March 8th, 2016, two Genesee County Jail detainees, on behalf of themselves and other detainees, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Genesee County Jail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring the Genesee County Jail to provide safe and clean water to all detainees, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the Genesee County Jail provided detainees with toxic water for consumption, bathing, and food preparation in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. On June 23, 2016, the lawsuit was resolved via a consent decree. The decree required defendants to test the water in five locations within the Jail every fourteen days for an eight week period, sending copies to the plaintiffs’ counsel. If the tests showed that the lead levels were safe, the defendants were allowed to supply water from the Flint water system to detainees for all uses. The consent decree lasted for one year.


On January 16, 2009, a group of California pharmacies participating in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, against the California Department of Health Care Services. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for preliminary injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and costs claiming that Assembly Bill 1183 ("AB 1183") was preempted by § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act (hereinafter referred to as "§ 30(A)"). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the 5% reduction in Medi-Cal fee-for-service payments to pharmacies would cause the denial of services to Medi-Cal patients, or result in a reduction in services to Medi-Cal patients, or the closure of pharmacies serving Medi-Cal patients in violation of the quality and equal access clauses of § 30(A). The complaint explained that on September 15, 2008, the California Legislature amended AB 1883, originally a hazardous material bill, to include measures designed to reduce government expenditures in line with the provisions of the earlier 2008-2009 Budget Bill. There were no committee hearings on the amended portions of the bill and the Legislature passed the bill within twenty-four hours, even though, according to the plaintiffs, it contained changes to hundreds of health-care related subjects. The plaintiffs therefore alleged that the California Legislature did not have time to consider whether a 5% rate reduction was consistent with providing quality services and maintaining equal access to services as required under § 30(A), or time to evaluate the costs to providers of performing services and procedures as also required under § 30(A). The 5% rate reduction was therefore preempted by § 30(A), they argued. On February 27, 2009, the District Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the State to refrain from implementing the 5% payment reduction to pharmacies for prescription drugs provided under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program. Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Shortly after, on March 13, 2009, the State filed a motion to alter or amend and clarify the preliminary injunctive ruling that the District Court denied on April 3, 2009. Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. CV 09-382 CAS (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2009). The State appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on March 25, 2010, the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court. Independent Living Center v. Maxwell-Jolly, 374 Fed. Appx. 690 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 2010). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that the California Legislature was required to study the impact of the five percent rate reduction on the statutory factors of efficiency, economy, quality, and access to care, prior to enacting AB 1183, and that the legislature had not adequately done so. It also upheld the lower court's finding of irreparable harm, noting that many brand name and generic drugs would be reimbursed at a level below costs, thereby limiting access to Medi-Cal patients. The State appealed the Ninth Circuit ruling to the Supreme Court, and on January 18, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case and two related cases. Maxwell-Jolly v. Cal. Pharmacists Assoc., 131 S.Ct. 992 (2011). Oral argument took place on October 3, 2011. While the cases were pending in the Supreme Court, the HHS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) determined that the rate reductions complied with the Medicaid statute and approved a limited retroactive implementation of the rate reductions. Consequently, the Supreme Court (Justice Stephen Breyer) found that the posture of the case had changed from the Supremacy Clause to the Administrative Procedure Act, introducing a new issue not briefed to the Court or in earlier proceedings, and therefore it vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for reconsideration. 132 S.Ct. 1204 (2012). On remand, the parties agreed to enter settlement mediation overseen by the Ninth Circuit. A settlement agreement was executed in April 2014 and submitted to the district court for approval on August 19, 2014. In the agreement the parties dismissed their appeals from the preliminary injunctions issued in the cases, and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the pending actions with prejudice, subject to the Court retaining continuing jurisdiction to determine (1) motions for attorneys’ fees by counsel for Plaintiffs, and (2) motions or proceedings by Plaintiffs to enforce the Agreement through January 1, 2016. In return, under the settlement, the defendant agreed – either by release or by agreement – to forgo recoupment of any amounts paid out by the Department to Medi-Cal providers, pursuant to the preliminary injunctions previously issued by the Court, except with respect to “opt-out providers.” In other words, when the settlement became effective, Plaintiffs gave up their right to seek any further relief, and the defendant gave up its right to seek recoupment of funds that have already been paid pursuant to the preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs reserved the right to submit a claim for attorney’s fees. In order to acquire attorneys’ fees from the defendants, on July 24 and 28th, 2015 the plaintiffs and intervenors filed additional appeals in the Ninth Circuit to Judge Snyder's order denying fees. However, during a settlement conference on November 16, 2015, the motion for attorneys’ fees was settled, though the terms are not available.

Summary: On January 16, 2009, a group of California pharmacies participating in the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program filed suit against the California Department of Health Care Services in federal court. Plaintiffs claimed that the rate reductions included in Assembly Bill ("AB") 1183 were preempted by the federal Medicaid law. The district court granted the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed this ruling. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, the HHS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved the rate reductions included in AB 1183. Consequently, the Supreme Court (Justice Stephen Breyer) concluded that the case presented issues not briefed in earlier proceedings and vacated the Ninth Circuit decision. On September 22, 2014, the district court approved the settlement agreement that required the plaintiffs to give up their right to seek further relief and the defendant agreed to give up its right to seek recoupment of funds paid in pursuance of the preliminary injunctions


On July 18, 2018, the City of New York filed a complaint against the Attorney General of the U.S. and the Department of the Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The City alleged that the defendants imposed new immigration-related conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and separation of powers. The City, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin defendants from imposing new conditions on congressionally approved federal funding for the JAG program because these conditions are arbitrary and capricious. The City further sought a declaration that Section 1373 of Title 8 of the United States Code ("Section 1373") is unconstitutional, or, to the extent that Section 1373 lawfully applies to the JAG program, a declaration that the City's laws and policies comply with Section 1373. A couple of days later, on July 20, 2018, DOJ released the FY 2018 JAG award solicitation and sought to impose new immigration-related conditions on grantees in addition to those imposed on FY 2017 grantees. Any recipient that accepts the FY 2018 award would also need to certify that it would not violate 8 U.S.C. § 1644, a federal statute prohibiting restrictions on sharing information about an individual’s immigration status with federal authorities. In light of this, the City filed an amended complaint on August 6 to seek additional relief. On August 17, the City filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On September 14, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively, motion for partial summary judgment. On November 30, Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment. The court held that the conditions were not in accordance with the APA, violated the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment, and violated the constitutional separation of powers. However, the motion for summary judgment with respect to the Spending Clause was denied as moot. The defendants were enjoined from imposing or enforcing the conditions. On January 28, 2019, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Back in district court, the City again filed a motion for partial summary judgment. These competing motions remained in limbo for nearly a year until, in February 2020, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's initial finding and directed it to enter partial summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Attorney General and the Department of Justice. However, before the case was concluded, the Biden administration took over and reversed course. The case was stayed on March 19, 2021, and in the following month, on April 30, 2021, the case was voluntarily dismissed by both parties. This case is now closed.

Summary: On July 18, 2018, the City of New York filed a complaint against the Attorney General of the U.S. and the Department of the Justice in the Southern District of New York. The City alleged that the defendants imposed new immigration-related conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and separation of powers. The City sought to enjoin defendants from imposing new conditions on congressionally approved federal funding for the JAG program because these conditions are arbitrary and capricious. On November 30, Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, but on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the District Court's finding. When the new Biden administration took over in the following year, however, the case was voluntarily dismissed by both parties.


On May 3, 2017, Jewish prisoners at the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Idaho Department of Corrections and several agents of the IDOC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and state law, namely, the Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Candy W. Dale. The plaintiffs alleged that, in refusing to offer Kosher meals to prisoners, the defendants had imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ religious practice. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants had violated RLUIPA, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment and the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. On May 4, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to require the defendants to provide a kosher diet option without charge for prisoners at all Idaho Department of Correction facilities. On July 11, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, alternatively, for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and that their state law claims for monetary relief were barred for the failure to file a notice of tort claim. After reaching a partial settlement, the parties jointly filed a motion for entry of an order dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ class action claims. The parties also posed a joint stipulation of their settlement agreement to create a new kosher diet system. Entitled the Common Fare No Touch menu, this diet system consisted of a majority of meals that were pre-packaged or double-sealed frozen meals that were kosher certified. The parties also agreed that the plaintiffs’ counsel would monitor compliance for at least six months. On August 17, 2017, Judge Dale entered an order adopting the stipulation, dismissing the claims and deeming as moot the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. The court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. In October 2017, the plaintiffs agreed to allow judgment to be taken against them in exchange for the sum of $93,000, including all accrued costs and attorney’s fees. The court entered such judgment. On December 26, 2017, the defendants agreed that the monitoring period of the new diet system would end on June 1, 2018. As of October 23, 2018, there are no new entries on the docket that would suggest noncompliance. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was filed by Jewish prisoners in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiffs alleged that, in refusing to offer Kosher meals to prisoners, the defendants had imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ religious practice. In October 2017, the parties reached a settlement where the defendant would provide kosher meals to Jewish prisoners and award $93,000 in damages and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The case is presumably closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by several Michigan businesses against the State of Michigan's executive orders requiring non-critical businesses to stop operating during the outbreak of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan's orders arbitrarily discriminated against their businesses, in violation of several constitutional clauses and state law. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss after Governor Whitmer lifted the restrictions on businesses. <hr> The executive orders issued by Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 prohibited activities and business "not necessary to sustain or protect life." Seven Michigan businesses that were required to stop operating alleged that the executive orders violated their constitutional rights and state law. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs brought this Section 1983 suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan against Governor Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services on April 28, 2020. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders were arbitrary and discriminated against their businesses by treating them differently than other similarly situated businesses. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Maloney. Plaintiffs asserted that the executive orders forced them to "close or significantly restrict their businesses, depriving them of their liberty and property interests without due process," while allowing other businesses deemed 'critical' to stay open, even though: 'critical' businesses must adhere to guidance from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on 'social distancing'; and Plaintiffs are fully capable of adhering to those same guide-lines if allowed to reopen." Moreover, plaintiffs argued that the measures taken by defendants to "flatten the curve" and stop the spread of COVID-19 in Michigan were unnecessary and excessive. Plaintiffs claimed that the executive orders requiring them to close their businesses violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, their Procedural and Substantive Due Process rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and that the orders were unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs also contended that executive orders violated the state's separation of powers clause and the Emergency Powers Act. 2020 WL 2079549. On May 11, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and removed their claims that the executive orders violated state law. On May 29, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest explaining that the alleged facts suggest that the executive orders violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce Clause. The DOJ stated that "Plaintiffs have made an initial showing that the Orders arbitrarily and oppressively limit their business operations by prohibiting and restricting Plaintiffs’ business operations while permitting similarly situated businesses to continue to operate, or to operate with lesser restrictions, and permitting social gatherings of as many as ten people." The DOJ also concluded that plaintiffs were likely to establish that the executive orders unduly burdened interstate commerce, in violation of the Commerce Clause. On June 8, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were moot, that plaintiffs lacked standing, and that plaintiffs failed to adequately state a claim concerning their federal constitutional challenges. Defendants asserted that the restrictions challenged by plaintiffs had been lifted as the "curve of the virus's spread . . . flatten[ed]," rendering the plaintiffs' claims moot. Furthermore, defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims lacked merit because the executive orders were "a proper exercise of the authority given to the States to combat a public health crisis" and "necessary to meet the demands of these extraordinary times." On June 12, the Michigan Epidemiologists sought to file an amicus brief in support of the defendants' motion to dismiss. The case appears ongoing, but with minimal docket entries.

Summary: On April 28, 2020, several Michigan businesses that were required to close during the outbreak of COVID-19 filed this suit against Governor Whitmer in the U.S. District Court for the District of Western Michigan. Plaintiffs challenged Michigan's executive orders, which required businesses deemed non-critical to close, alleging that the orders arbitrarily discriminated against their businesses. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest suggesting that the executive orders likely violated the Equal Protection and the Commerce Clauses. After the Governor lifted the restrictions on plaintiffs, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing.


In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against the County of Maui Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.). The EEOC alleged that the County of Maui Police Department did not hire a candidate because of his age (45). The EEOC asked for (a) a permanent injunction enjoining the police from engaging in any employment practices which resulted in discrimination on the basis of age; (b) an order that the police institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities for persons forty (40) years of age and older; (c) an order that the police provide wages and benefits to the candidate; and (d) an order that the police provide rightful-place reinstatement with seniority restored or front pay. In 2009, the candidate applied to the County of Maui Police Department. He met all minimum qualifications for training and experience, and he passed the initial written civil service exam with a high score above 90 points. Then he was scheduled for an oral interview. During the interview, the panel made age-based remarks including "I doubt someone your age could handle the stress of training" in addition to whether he could perform the physical holds required due to his age, and whether someone his age could take directives from a younger person. They decided not to hire the candidate. During the hiring period of January through October 2009, at least 28 applicants were hired who were younger than the candidate and were less qualified for the position than the candidate on the basis of their education, experience and civil service written exam scores. On May 6, 2016, the parties entered into a three-year consent decree that required the defendant to pay the charging party $24,000 in unclassified damages and required the defendant to modify its anti-discrimination policy, establish record-keeping procedures, improve its compliance efforts, provide anti-discrimination training to employees to prevent future discrimination including providing training to employees, and report to an independent monitor. There has been no activity on the docket since May 2016, and the case is thus presumed to be closed.

Summary: In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against the County of Maui Police Department for engaging in age discrimination in its hiring practices. In May 2016, the parties entered into a 3-year consent decree which required the defendant to pay damages to the charging party, revise its anti-discrimination policy, provide employee training, and comply with other reporting and monitoring requirements. There has been no activity on the docket since May 2016, and the case is thus presumed to be closed.


On December 20, 2011, Charlie Savage, Scott Shane, and the New York Times (NYT) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). There had been controversy and questions surrounding the legality of targeted killings since October 2001, when the Bush Administration had first contemplated whether covert lethal force could be used against people deemed to be al-Qaeda operatives. The debate rekindled when an Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was killed in Yemen on September 29, 2011. On September 30, 2011, the Washington Post had reported that the government had produced a “secret memorandum authorizing the legal targeting” of al-Awlaki. Both before and after the death of al-Awlaki, the NYT had filed FOIA requests seeking records regarding the government’s use of targeted lethal force. On June 11, 2010, Mr. Shane had submitted a FOIA request to DOJ seeking a copy of “all Office of Legal Counsel opinions or memoranda since 2001 that addresses the legal status of targeted killings, assassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.” However, the DOJ had denied the FOIA request, maintaining that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions. On October 7, 2011, Mr. Savage submitted a similar FOIA request and were denied for similar reasons. In their complaint, the plaintiffs requested that the records requested by the NYT be declared public, or that the court conduct an in camera review to determine whether any parts of the memoranda are properly public under FOIA; that the DOJ provide the records; and that the court award the NYT attorneys’ fees and costs. On June 20, 2012, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment, and on July 18, 2012, the NYT filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 2, 2013, District Judge Colleen McMahon granted the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment and denied the NYT’s cross-motion (the court filed a corrected opinion on January 22, 2013 that corrected several grammatical and typographical errors; however, the corrected opinion was substantively identical to the original opinion). Judge McMahon stated that she found herself in a “a veritable Catch-22” and that she could not find any way “around the ticket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.” However, under the law, Judge McMahon found that the DOJ had not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the FOIA requests and that their motion for summary judgment had to be granted. Nearly all of the documents located in response to the plaintiffs’ FOIA requests were classified, and the appropriate authorities from each of the responding agencies had filed affidavits; Judge McMahon found that there was no evidence suggesting that the proper procedures were not followed when these documents were classified. She noted that the DOJ had submitted additional material to the court for ex parte and for in camera review in support of its position; however, due to their classified nature, she filed a separate, classified appendix to her opinion, which was filed under seal and was not made available to the plaintiffs. 915 F.Supp.2d 508. On January 31, 2013, the plaintiffs appealed Judge McMahon’s grant of summary judgment to the DOJ to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On April 21, 2014, the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In particular, it found that the DOJ had improperly submitted a “no number, no list” response, which acknowledges the existence of documents responsive to a FOIA request but does not identify nor number them, to the NYT’s first FOIA request instead of submitting the usual “Vaughn index,” which numbers and identifies by title and description documents that are being withheld and specifies the FOIA exemptions asserted. Additionally, the appeals court found that the DOJ had insufficiently justified submitted a “Glomar response,” which neither confirms nor denies the existence of documents responsive to a FOIA request, in response to NYT’s second FOIA request. Therefore, the appeals court ordered that the DOJ submit a redacted version of a classified Vaughn index. 752 F.3d 123. On June 23, 2014, the appeals court ordered that the DOJ disclose a 2010 document known as the “OLC-DOD Memorandum,” which was a legal opinion prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ advising as to the legality of targeted drone attacks. The appeals court had found that prior disclosures by senior officials of the government had resulted in waiver of all applicable exemptions for protection of the OLC-DOD memorandum. 756 F.3d 100. On October 22, 2015, the appeals court ruled that the DOJ did not have to disclose other documents. 806 F.3d 682. On February 29, 2016, the parties stipulated that the DOJ would pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in attorneys’ fees and litigation costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 20, 2011, Charlie Savage, Scott Shane, and the New York Times (NYT) filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The plaintiffs had previously submitted multiple FOIA requests to the DOJ seeking a copy of “all Office of Legal Counsel opinions or memoranda since 2001 that addresses the legal status of targeted killings, assassination, or killing of people suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.” However, the DOJ had denied the FOIA requests, maintaining that all responsive records were being withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions. On June 23, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered that the DOJ disclose a 2010 document known as the “OLC-DOD Memorandum,” which was a legal opinion prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ advising as to the legality of targeted drone attacks. The appeals court had found that prior disclosures by senior officials of the government had resulted in waiver of all applicable exemptions for protection of the OLC-DOD memorandum. On October 22, 2015, the appeals court ruled that the DOJ did not have to disclose other documents. On February 29, 2016, the parties stipulated that the DOJ would pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in attorneys’ fees and litigation costs. The case is now closed.


On November 22, 2013, a man that had been in custody for twenty-five years for a crime committed when he was sixteen filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The plaintiff sued the Iowa Board of Parole and the Iowa Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the University of Iowa Law School Clinic, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the parole board’s actions and policies violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was being denied the opportunity for meaningful release while he was being detained under a mandatory adult life sentence for the crime he committed when he was sixteen. The plaintiff was not attempting to invalidate his life sentence, rather he was requesting a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on his youth at the time the crime was committed combined with his demonstrated rehabilitation and maturity during the time he had already spent in prison. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court stated that “Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide” and to sentence otherwise was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). Under Graham, the State is required to give juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. The plaintiff had previously filed a motion to correct his illegal sentence on October 15, 2010 in a separate lawsuit, filed in Iowa State Court. The motion was granted by Judge Carroll, who resentenced the plaintiff to life with eligibility for parole. The amended sentence established that the plaintiff was then eligible for parole as he had served past the statutory minimum of twenty-five years. The plaintiff applied for parole several times and was summarily denied based on the grounds of the seriousness of the offense he committed. No other grounds, such as the fact that he was an exemplary inmate for nearly thirty years and had only one minor infraction during that time, were considered during the parole review. In addition to the policies that failed to take into account the plaintiff’s youth at the time and demonstrated maturity over the course of imprisonment, the parole board also required that the plaintiff take sex offender courses due to the nature of his crime. The plaintiff attempted to enroll in these courses, but was denied because of the Department of Corrections’ enrollment policy. Under IDOC policy, an inmate was only eligible to take the course if there were within two years of their date of discharge. Since inmates serving a life sentence lack a date of discharge, they are permanently unable to enroll in the classes required by the parole board. As a result, the plaintiff claimed that the IDOC had failed to implement any policies that would give the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on rehabilitation and demonstrated maturity. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 7, 2014. On January 15, 2015, the court (Judge Robert Pratt) denied the defendant’s motion. The court found that the plaintiff did, in fact, state a plausible claim that the defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, denying the motion in its entirety. 79 F.Supp.3d 933. The parties then engaged in discovery for more than two years. According to a status report filed on June 15, 2017, the plaintiff was granted work release status. On October 3, 2017, the parties filed stipulation of dismissal of all claims without prejudice, which the court granted the next day. No reasons were provided. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was filed on November 23, 2013 and alleges that the Iowa Department of Corrections violated an inmate’s right to due process and protection from cruel and unusual punishment by denying him a meaningful opportunity for parole. The inmate was a juvenile offender, but was sentenced to a mandatory adult life sentence without parole. The Supreme Court eventually deemed it unconstitutional to give juveniles life sentences without parole, so the plaintiff was resentenced to life with parole and was applying to be released based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The case is still ongoing.


On April 15, 1992, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and ten parents of homeless, school-age children filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C., seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty and private counsel, sued the District of Columbia and D.C. Public Schools under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the McKinney Act and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The case was assigned to Judge Royce Lamberth. The McKinney Act was passed in 1987 to assure that homeless children had equal access to free education and to improve the educational experience of homeless children. The Act required state plans that required the state educational agency to make determinations about which school each homeless child should attend based on their best interest, and to provide the child with services comparable to the services offered to other students - including transportation services, programs for vocational education, and school meal programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia violated the Act because it had:<blockquote> (1) Failed to implement a best interest standard in placing homeless children in schools; (2) failed to ensure transportation to and from the school that [was] in the best interest of homeless children to attend; (3) failed to coordinate social services and public education for homeless children, and to ensure access to comparable educational services and school meal programs; and (4) failed to provide access to free, appropriate public education for homeless children.</blockquote> The plaintiffs also alleged that the District of Columbia had violated their Equal Protection rights by providing transportation assistance to handicapped children but not providing transportation to homeless children, despite the two groups of children being similarly situated. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction concurrently with the complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there was no private right of action under the McKinney Act and that the plaintiffs had not stated a valid Equal Protection claim. On June 9, 1992, Judge Lamberth granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction as moot. 1992 WL 151813. He held that the McKinney Act did not have a private right of action and that Equal Protection claims failed because the defendants had a rational basis for treating homeless children and handicapped children differently with respect to transportation assistance. After plaintiffs appealled, on August 22, 1994, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court held that the McKinney Act did confer enforceable rights on its beneficiaries, so the plaintiffs could bring a § 1983 claim. 27 F.3d 605. The defendants sought review by the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on November 28, 1994. 115 S. Ct. 578. On remand, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for preliminary injunction on September 12, 1994, and filed an amended complaint on September 21. On November 18, 1994, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on November 21, 1994. On March 7, 1995, Judge Lamberth granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the defendants had violated the McKinney Act by failing to address the educational needs of homeless children and by failing to provide adequate transportation. 879 F. Supp. 116. The court entered an injunction, requiring defendants to identify homeless children the first time they reported to the intake center and arrange for appropriate educational services at that time. The court also required the defendants to either offer bus tokens to homeless children who traveled over 1.5 miles to attend school or implement a bus service dedicated to transporting homeless children to and from school. Following this judgment, the District of Columbia passed emergency legislation and withdrew from the McKinney Act programs. On March 21, 1995, the defendants separate motions to stay or vacate the March 7 order. The motion to stay was denied on March 25, and the defendants took steps to comply with the injunction while awaiting a decision on their motion to vacate. On May 4, 1995, Judge Lamberth denied the motion to vacate, but dissolved the injunction because D.C. no longer was a part of the grant program under the McKinney Act. 886 F. Supp. 56. The plaintiffs petitioned for attorneys fees on May 31, 1995; the parties settled this issue in October 1995. The case is closed.

Summary: Parents of homeless children sued D.C. to provide transportation and better identification of the needs of homeless children attending public schools in compliance with the McKinney Act. The court initially dismissed the case, but the decision was remanded by the D.C. Court of Appeals. On remand, the court entered an injunction, requiring better identification and transportation. However, D.C. withdrew from the McKinney Act and the injunction was dissolved.


On February 27, 2013, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for failure to release information in response to EPIC's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIA request was filed on July 10, 2012 regarding the disclosure of a communication shutdown procedure approved by DHS. EPIC claimed that DHS's failure to respond to an administrative appeal violated the statutory deadline imposed by FOIA. Additionally, EPIC claims that DHS failed to make a reasonable effort to search for the documents requested and that DHS was unlawfully withholding said documents. The EPIC requested injunctive relief from the court to compel immediate disclosure of the relevant records. The FOIA request was for disclosure of records related to a communication shutdown procedure called Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 303 described in the <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2006-2007%20NSTAC%20Issue%20Review_0.pdf">2006-07 DHS Issue Review </a> as codifying a "shutdown and restoration process for use by commercial and private wireless networks during national crises" to prevent the remote detonation of bombs. On July 11, 2011 a Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) officer in San Francisco shot and killed a homeless man. He later alleged that the homeless man had a knife and that the officer had shot him in self defense. This resulted in a major protest against BART. The second protest on August 12, 2011 was cut short when BART supposedly used the SOP 303 communication shutdown procedure to shut off all cellular service in several of its transit stations for three hours. DHS responded to EPIC's FOIA request on August 21, 2012 notifying EPIC that DHS was unable to locate or identify the records requested. EPIC administratively appealed this response on September 13, 2012. DHS, which was statutorily required by FOIA to respond to an administrative appeal within 20 days, did not submit a timely response. On May 20, 2013, Judge James E. Boasberg ordered the disclosure of any segregable portions of SOP 303. On June 28, 2013, DHS disclosed the document, but withheld portions under FOIA exemptions 6 and 7(C), 7(E), and 7(D) on the grounds that they included personal information of DHS officials, techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or endangered the life of any individual. At the same time, DHS moved for summary judgment and EPIC made a cross-motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2013 Judge James E. Boasberg granted EPIC's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that DHS's invocation of exemptions 7(E) and 7(D) were improper, and stayed the order pending the defendant's appeal to the DC Circuit Court. On June 1, 2015, The DC Circuit Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether any segregable portions of SOP 303 could be disclosed. On July 10, 2015, DHS submitted a redacted version of SOP 303 to Judge Boasberg, who decided consistent with the court of appeals' decision that DHS did not need to disclose any further information and entered judgment in favor DHS. Afterwards, the parties litigated regarding DHS's payment of EPIC's attorney's fees. On July 18, 2016, the judge granted in part the motion for attorney's fees totaling $20,145.04. The case is now closed.

Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adopted a communication shutdown procedure (SOP 303) intended to prevent the remote detonation of bombs without publicly disclosing the content of the procedure. The Electronic Privacy and Information Center (EPIC) filed a FOIA request in July 2012 for SOP 303, and the DHS was reluctant to disclose it. It responded to EPIC's FOIA request by saying the document could not be located, and did not respond timely to EPIC's administrative appeal of that response. EPIC filed this law suit on February 27, 2013 for injunctive relief to compel DHS to disclose the entirety of SOP 303. On May 20, 2013, the judge ordered the disclosure of any segregable portions of SOP 303. On June 28, 2013, DHS disclosed portions of the document and withheld other based on FOIA exemptions DHS believed applied to the procedure. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Judge Boasberg granted the EPIC's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that DHS did not properly apply the exemptions. The DC Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case to determine whether there were segregable portions of SOP 303 that could be disclosed. DHS then submitted a redacted version of SOP 303 to Judge Boasberg, who decided that the document was disclosed liberally enough and granted judgment in favor of DHS.


On May 27, 2003, the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh offices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under Title VII against PJAX, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC alleged that the defendants, an interstate trucking and freight firm, had violated Title VII by subjecting their female employees to sexual harassment in the workplace. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants created a hostile work environment and failed to promote qualified females. On October 6, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court never ruled on that motion because on November 24, 2003, the parties filed a consent decree, which the court approved two days later. This consent decree has an effective period of two years and required the defendant to pay $300,000.00 in compensatory damages to the complainant and $200,000.00 in compensatory damages to four other complainants, to be distributed pro-rata. It also states that the defendants were enjoined from discriminating or retaliating against any of their employees on the basis of sex. They agreed to revise their anti-discrimination policy, and to provide their employees with equal employment opportunity training. Additionally, the defendants were required to distribute their revised policies and to post notice of EEO rights.

Summary: This case was brought in 2003 by the EEOC against PJAX, a trucking firm, for sexual harassment and sex discrimination. The case settled for $500,000 and injunctive relief. See EE-MD-0093 for a related case settled simultaneously.


On July 11, 2006, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, other civil rights organizations, and state legislators filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Montana, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions banning all executions in the state. The complaint alleged that the state did not provide standards for the use of lethal injections in executions to ensure constitutional protections. The Supreme Court of Montana dismissed or denied all claims. The court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction because the only prisoner scheduled to be executed, David Dawson, did not wish to appeal his death sentence and there were no other emergency circumstances warranting injunctive relief. On August 4, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of Montana seeking to litigate the issue of whether the procedure for administering lethal injections in Montana was constitutional. On August 7, 2006, the court (Judge Donald W. Molley) dismissed the case for lack of standing. The plaintiffs appealed the same day. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and dismissed the appeal on Aug. 10. Court documents explaining the court's reasoning are not publicly available. The case is closed.

Summary: On July 11, 2006, the Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, other civil rights organizations, and state legislators filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court of Montana, seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions banning all executions in the state. The complaint alleged that the state did not provide standards for the use of lethal injections in executions to ensure constitutional protections. The court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction because the only prisoner scheduled to be executed did not wish to appeal his death sentence and there were no other emergency circumstances warranting injunctive relief. On August 4, 2006, the plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana seeking to litigate the issue of whether the procedure for administering lethal injections in Montana was constitutional. On August 7, 2006, the court dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The case is closed.


On August 8, 2013, detainees of the Costa County Juvenile Hall filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Contra Costa County, California. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Disability Rights Advocates, alleged that defendants discriminated against disabled youth in the Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that because Contra Costa County denied the plaintiffs special education and related services, the plaintiffs misbehaved and were punished; during punishment, the plaintiffs were placed in solitary confinement for at least 22 hours per day, which made their disabilities worse and made the plaintiffs more likely to misbehave again. The plaintiffs alleged that the solitary confinement, denial of rehabilitative services while in solitary confinement, and denial of special education and other services even while out of solitary confinement violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), the American Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and three state anti-discrimination laws. Plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief with monitoring by a special master, and attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Saundra B. Armstrong. Over the next year, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to drop all defendants except Contra Costa County and Contra Costa County Office of Education. As a result, Judge Armstrong denied as moot the motions for dismissal and class certification, and both parties refiled their motions to include the updated parties and proceedings. On January 16, 2014, the County filed three separate suits in this same Court, one against each plaintiff, arguing that the underlying Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for California improperly found that the County's Probation Department could be sued under the IDEA. The County requested attorney fees for the appeal and that the Court set aside the OAH findings. The plaintiffs moved to consolidate their action with the County's three suits, but the Court deferred litigation on the County's claims until a decision was made on its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. On February 13, 2014, the United States filed a Statement of Interest concerning protection of detained youth, especially when solitary confinement was involved. The U.S. explained that it had an interest in the case because of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, which allows the U.S. to investigate juvenile detention facilities for unlawful detention practices. The U.S. argued that the County had a duty to provide services, activities and programs to qualified youth, and that the law does not allow discrimination based on disabilities. For that reason, the U.S. requested that the Court consider the Statement of Interest and deny defendants' motion to dismiss. Following extensive negotiations, the plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with both Contra Costa County and the Contra Costa County Office of Education. On November 25, 2015, the court (Judge Maria-Elena James) approved the settlement agreements. 2015 WL 7571789. Under the settlement agreement with Contra Costa County, the County would no longer use solitary confinement for discipline, punishment, administrative convenience, retaliation, staffing shortages, or reasons other than a temporary response to behavior that threatens immediate harm to the youth or others. In line with national standards, the County could segregate a youth in his or her room for no more than four hours but only if the youth’s behavior risked immediate harm to themselves or others. After four hours, the Probation Department had to remove the youth from confinement, develop specialized individualized programming for the youth, or assess whether the youth should be transported to a mental health facility. Under the settlement agreement with the Contra Costa County Office of Education, the County Office of Education would retain an outside expert to evaluate its compliance with federal and state special education laws and to ensure that the students with disabilities in Juvenile Hall would receive the special education that they need. The expert would make recommended revisions to policies, procedures and practices as they relate to Child Find, development and implementation of individualized education plans, and discipline, which the County’s Board of Education will adopt. The defendants also agreed to pay $1,340,000 in attorneys' fees. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreements, which were scheduled to last for four years. On December 18, 2015, the court approved the parties' motion to modify the settlement agreements' procedures for choosing experts to monitor implementation. On July 13, 2016, the court approved the parties' second request for modification of the settlement agreement, which increased the time period during which the parties could raise challenges to the export report required by the settlement agreement. On September 28, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for administrative relief, seeking referral to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero for a status conference to discuss disputes between the parties regarding implementation of the settlement agreement. The motion for administrative relief was granted the next day, and the parties held status conferences before Magistrate Judge Spero on October 17 and November 10, 2016. As of April 18, 2020, the court retains jurisdiction over the settlement agreements.

Summary: In 2013, Disability Rights Advocates in partnership with Public Counsel filed this lawsuit because Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall had a policy and practice of locking young people with disabilities in solitary confinement for up to 23 hours a day and depriving them of education. They filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Contra Costa County, California. The parties settled in 2015.