On August 14, 2018, two children with mental health disabilities in the District of Columbia and University Legal Services, Inc. filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a class of children with mental health disabilities, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia under:

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.;

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794;

The Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights program, 29 U.S.C. § 794;

Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396; and

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Youth Law, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, in-house counsel, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief together with costs and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the District of Columbia failed to comply with mandates of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act. Specifically, they claimed that the District of Columbia failed to provide medically necessary intensive community-based services (ICBS) to children with mental health disabilities. Intensive community-based services consist of three components:

Intensive care coordination (ICC): designing and supervising a plan to provide and coordinate services to children that includes the child, the child’s family, and service providers;

Intensive behavior support services: individual therapy provided to the child where they live; and

Mobile crisis services: crisis response services that can provide care in a child’s home, school, or community.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs acknowledged that the District of Columbia provides some components of ICBS. For example, the District offers the “high fidelity wraparound” ICC program, “community-based intervention” services, and the Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) intensive support program. But the plaintiffs alleged that the District’s existing services “fail[] to provide medically necessary ICBS” for many children who need them. The complaint did not name the putative class representatives. Instead, the plaintiffs moved that the minor plaintiffs be allowed to proceed anonymously. Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell granted this motion on August 14, 2018. Judge Howell determined that the plaintiffs have a “strong interest” in protecting “highly sensitive details” about their mental health that would be revealed in the litigation that outweighs the government defendants’ “minimal” interest in disclosure. The District moved to dismiss the case on October 3. First, it argued that the two individual plaintiffs lack standing. The District claimed that the first individual plaintiff refused to use the District’s existing wraparound services, that the second would not be eligible for ICBS because she is in the custody of the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services, and that the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim by University Legal Services alone. Second, it argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because the plaintiffs’ allegations involve the adequacy of care rather than where the District provides services. Finally, the District argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations that it violated Medicaid requirements were “threadbare . . . conclusory statements” that could not support a claim under the pleading standard set in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. On July 25, 2019, the court (now Judge Emmet G. Sullivan) denied the motion to dismiss holding that the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit, had sufficiently stated a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and had sufficiently alleged a § 1983 claim. 401 F.Supp.3d 1. As of July 2020, discovery is ongoing.

Summary: On August 14, 2018, two children with mental health disabilities and University Legal Services, Inc. filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a class of children with mental health disabilities in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Youth Law, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, in-house counsel, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief together with costs and attorney’s fees. They claimed that the District of Columbia failed to comply with mandates of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act by failing to provide medically necessary intensive community-based services (ICBS) to children with mental health disabilities. The parties are currently engaged in discovery.


On October 18, 2006, several then and former employees of the defendant's Albertville, Alabama facility filed a lawsuit against the defendant under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought this class action seeking damages and injunctive relief for violations of the FLSA. Specifically, plaintiffs claim the company failed to account for all compensable time of its employees, including time spent clearing security and time walking to and from security to donning and doffing areas. On June 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge R. David Proctor) ordered the case stayed because the court had received Defendant's Notice of Motion to Transfer and Consolidate for Pretrial Proceedings to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that the case be transferred to the Southern District of Mississippi. The following development is included in our database at EE-MS-0060.

Summary: This case was brought by several then and former employees of the defendant againt the defendant Wayne Farms LLC., seeking damages. The case was transferred to the Southern District of Mississippi. (See EE-MS-0060).


On February 28, 2014, a same-sex couple married outside of the state of Florida filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the state of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, declaratory judgment, and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the state ban against same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment (right to associate), and violated the Supremacy Clause and the Establishment Clause. This case was captioned as Brenner v. Scott. On March 12, 2014, several same-sex couples married outside of the state of Florida, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, filed essentially an identical lawsuit, also in the Northern District of Florida. This case was captioned as Grimsley v. Scott. On April 21, 2014, the Court (Judge Robert L. Hinkle), upon a joint motion, consolidated the two cases for case management purposes. Both cases are addressed in this summary and Clearinghouse case record. On April 24, 2014, Judge Hinkle denied permission to Florida Family Action, a "cultural action organization" that opposes same-sex marriage, to intervene as a party. FFA was permitted, however, to file amicus briefs. 298 F.R.D. 689 (N.D. Fla. 2014). On August 21, 2014, Judge Hinkle issued a preliminary injunction, finding Florida's ban on same-sex marriage a violation of plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (using strict scrutiny in the analysis). The court stayed the preliminary injunction in these cases until ninety-one days after similar stays were denied or lifted in three cases pending in the Fourth and Tenth Circuit Courts—Bostic v. Schaefer, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014); Bishop v. Smith, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); and Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014). Brenner v. Scott, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2014 WL 4113100 (N.D. Fla. 2014). On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States held, in Obergefell v. Hodges, that the right to marry was fundamental. In the opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The Fourteenth Amendment thus did not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters—Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—wrote a dissent. On August 4, 2015, the Grimsley plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed, arguing that the court should not grant summary judgment but rather dismiss the case as moot. Meanwhile, the defendants moved for voluntarily dismissal of the appeal at the Eleventh Circuit. On October 19, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit granted the voluntary dismissal transferred consideration of attorney's fees to the district court. On January 12, 2016, the issue of appellate's attorney's fees was also transferred to the district court for consideration. On March 2, 2016, the Brenner plaintiffs filed a separate motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs asked that the court not dismiss this case as moot because the same-sex marriage ban was not repealed and Florida's Surgeon General persisted in refusing to issue birth certificates to the children of same-sex couples. On March 30, 2016, Judge Hinkle granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and declared the Florida Constitution, Article I, § 27 as well as Florida Statutes § 741.212 and §741.04(1) as unconstitutional. Judge Hinkle also issued an injunction to prohibit the defendants from enforcing or applying the Florida provisions that were declared unconstitutional. The court granted and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss as moot; it dismissed the claims against the Clerk of Court as moot but not the claims against the Surgeon General and Secretary. Subsequently, the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs against the Secretary of the Department of Management Services and the Surgeon General, but the court dismissed without prejudice the claims against all other defendants. On April 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs, which the court granted and determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to a fee award. The parties, however, then filed a joint notice of settlement on attorney’s fees and costs. (The amount that the parties settled on is not publicly available.) On June 16, 2016, the plaintiffs officially withdrew their fee petition and notified the court that they received their settlement funds. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, several same-sex couples who were married outside the state of Florida but who wanted their marriages recognized in the state of Florida sued in the Northern District of Florida to have the state's ban on same-sex marriage declared unconstitutional. In August of 2014, Judge Robert Hinkle entered a preliminary injunction in the plaintiffs' favor, but immediately stayed it, pending resolution of similar cases in the 4th and 10th Circuits. After the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, which legalized same-sex marriage across the United States, the defendant's appeal was dismissed. In March 2016, the plaintiffs filed a separate motion for summary judgment which the court granted and declared Florida's Constitution and Statutes that banned same-sex marriage as unconstitutional. It also entered judgment for the plaintiffs against the Secretary and Surgeon General and dismissed without prejudice the claims against all other defendants. The parties settled the attorney's fees and costs in June 2016 and the case closed.


On April 14, 2019, several pre-trial detainees in Wayne County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the 36th District Court in Detroit, the Wayne County Sheriff's Office (WCSO), the Chief Judge, and five Magistrates of the 26th District Court in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Laurie J. Michelson. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants unconstitutionally detained them in Wayne County Jail because they were unable to pay for their release and that the defendants' current arraignment policies created a wealth-based detention system that kept the plaintiffs in jail for their inability to afford bail. All of the plaintiffs included in the complaints were arrested and had their arraignment hearings held in the 36th District Court in Detroit. The plaintiffs were not provided attorneys during their arraignments and in each instance, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay cash bail amounts beyond their financial abilities. The arraignment policies provided two different condition forms: (1) 10% bail condition, which required the plaintiff to pay 10% or the real estate equivalent of their bail amount in order to be released; or (2) full cash bail condition, which required the plaintiff to pay the full amount. The magistrate judges that set the plaintiffs' bail amounts did not inquire whether the plaintiffs could afford their set bail amounts. When plaintiffs notified the court that they were unable to pay bail, they were sent to Wayne County Jail. The plaintiffs also sought class certification of all pre-trial detainees that had their bail set during arraignment hearings held in the 36th District Court and as a result of the court's bail policies were detained because they could not afford their imposed cash bail conditions. On June 10, 2019, WCSO moved to dismiss the complaint. They alleged that the plaintiffs could not seek injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because: they were an entity entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where declaratory relief was available; under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for municipal liability because obeying court orders is not considered a policy of the municipality; and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that clearly established law would have put WCSO on notice that obeying a court order for pretrial incarceration would expose it to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 19, 2019, the Chief Judge moved to dismiss plaintiffs' class action complaint. A stipulated stay order was entered on August 23, 2019 to allow time for discussions between the parties as to resolution of the matter. Meanwhile, the Detroit News reported that a former Detroit magistrate judge filed a federal whistleblower lawsuit alleging that she had been fired after raising concerns about violations of defendants' rights in the 36th District Court. As of April 12, 2021, the case remains stayed. However, the court has held telephone status conferences, and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, pre-trial detainees of Wayne County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy and practice of detaining individuals in jail following their arraignment hearing because they were unable to afford imposed cash bail conditions violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case was stayed in August 2019 and remains stayed as of April 2021.


This is a class action filed in the Western District of Missouri, in which the plaintiffs are seeking to prevent the state from disenrolling recipients in Missouri's State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) who fail to meet their premium requirements without first notifying them of their right to appeal and to continue to receive program benefits pending the outcome of the appeal. The defendants are the Missouri Department of Social Services, and the interim directors of the state Family Support Division and the state Division of Medical Services. According to the named plaintiff, Julia M., Missouri terminated the benefits of her minor child, when, after a series of bank errors, the monthly premium was not deducted from Julia M.'s account in a timely fashion. Julie M. received the notice after the benefits already had been terminated. While the notice indicated a right to appeal, it did not indicate a right to continue benefits pending the outcome of the appeal or that the state had conducted any evaluation to determine eligibility for other benefits. On June 25, 2007, the District Court (Judge Nanette K. Laughrey) certified the class, defining it as "[a]ll children residing in Missouri and who are receiving or who will receive [Missouri SCHIP] health coverage and are required to pay a premium under [state law]." Judge Laughrey, however, did not immediately rule on the request of the representative plaintiff, identified as Julia M., to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the Missouri Department of Social Services to provide recipients with sufficient notice of disenrollment and continued benefits pending any appeal. On February 2, 2008, the parties signed a Consent Decree in which the Defendants agreed to notify participants in SCHIP who have fallen behind in their payments. The notification must tell the participant that he/she has a right to appeal, and that during the appeals process he/she is entitled to continued benefits until the matter is resolved. Defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs over $165,000 in attorneys fees and expenses. The Court was to retain jurisdiction until October 15, 2008 in order to monitor the execution of the Consent Decree.

Summary: This class action lawsuit was filed on February 15, 2007 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services. The Plaintiff class alleged that they were wrongly disenrolled from the Missouri State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) because they were not properly notified of deficiencies in their payments. On February 2, 2008 the parties signed a Consent Decree which required the Defendants to notify SCHIP participants of deficiencies in their payments, and also provided for court monitoring of the notification process. The Court was to retain jurisdiction until October 15, 2008 in order to monitor the execution of the Consent Decree.


On September 5, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Mount Carmel, LLC. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the plaintiff-intervenor in retaliation for her opposition to sexual harassment and her participation in an investigation of sexual harassment claims. On February 12, 2004, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint against the defendant. On October 7, 2004, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $257,500 for past and future lost payroll income, other forms of alleged damages, including emotional distress and reputation damages, and attorneys' fees.

Summary: On September 5, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Mount Carmel, LLC. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the plaintiff-intervenor in retaliation for her opposition to sexual harassment and her participation in an investigation of sexual harassment claims. On October 7, 2004, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Aaron E. Goodstein) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $257,500.


This is one of several federal lawsuits addressing North Carolina Session Law 2016-3, House Bill 2 (HB2), which was passed on March 23, 2016. For the others, see the case collection. On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed Ordinance 7056, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, passenger vehicle for hire, and city contractors. The city ordinance was set to take effect on April 1, 2016. In response, on March 23, 2016, the North Carolina legislature held a special session and passed House Bill 2; it was signed that same day by North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory. HB2 prohibited municipalities in North Carolina from enacting anti-discrimination policies and removed the statutory and common-law private right of action to enforce state anti-discrimination statutes in state courts. It also required that individuals only be permitted to use bathrooms and changing facilities that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates while in government buildings. For many transgender people, this prevented them from using the restroom consistent with their gender identity (in North Carolina, only people who undergo sex reassignment surgery can change the sex on their birth certificates; some other jurisdictions have even more restrictive rules). In addition, the legislation changed the definition of sex in the state's anti-discrimination law to "the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate,” which prevented discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. On May 4, in a letter to Governor Pat McCrory, the Justice Department informed him that the U.S. had concluded that HB2 violated federal law. The DOJ asked the Governor to respond by close of business on May 9, and that he remedy the violations, "including by confirming that the State will not comply with or implement H.B. 2." Instead of providing the demanded assurances, the Governor sued the United States on the morning of May 9, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking a declaratory judgment that HB2 did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), or the Violence Against Woman Act (42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13)). That case is in the Clearinghouse as PA-NC-0003, and is described there. A few hours later, the U.S. filed this lawsuit, seeking to enjoin operation of HB2, in the U.S District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The DOJ sued the State of North Carolina under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.), under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.), and under the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act (42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13)). The DOJ sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the U.S. asked the Court to find that HB 2’s Part I—the part that instructs public agencies to deny transgender individuals access to multiple-occupancy bathrooms and changing facilities consistent with their gender identity--violated federal law, and to issue an injunction ordering the state to stop violating the federal laws in question. North Carolina’s former Attorney General, Roy Cooper, had said that he agreed that HB2 is illegal, and declined to defend it against this and the other lawsuits challenging it. On June 10, 2016 the United States and the Defendants issued a joint motion to enjoin automatic suspension of funds received under the Violence Against Women Act that prohibits recipients of federal funds administered by the Department of Justice’s Office on Violence Against Women (“OVW”) from engaging in discrimination based on sex and gender identity. The United States and the Defendants agreed that the suspension of funds would on balance harm the public interest. On June 23, 2016, Judge Thomas D. Schroeder granted the parties' joint motion to enjoin the United States from automatically withholding funds. 192 F.Supp.3d 620. On June 29, 2016, Judge Thomas D. Schroeder granted Phil Berger, President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate, and Tim Moore, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, the right to permissively intervene as defendants in the case. Several other private individuals requested to intervene on either side of the case and their motions were denied. On July 14, 2016, Judge Thomas D. Schroeder ordered that parties in the four related cases of HB2 file a short joint notice identifying any agreements reached and explaining their respective positions. On July 25, 2016, the Court consolidated this case with Carcaño v. McCrory(1:16CV236), Berger v. United States (1:16CV844), and North Carolinians for Privacy v. United States (1:16CV845) for discovery purposes only. After this consolidation, the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Berger v. United States on July 28, 2016, and North Carolinians for Privacy v. United States on August 31, 2016. On August 12, 2016, the Defendants submitted motions to stay the proceedings in light of the Supreme Court hearing the G.G. case regarding similar issues. Ten days later, the United States submitted a response in opposition to the Defendants' request to stay the proceedings. The United States stated that the Defendants were violating federal laws and that the proceedings should not be delayed in anticipation of a change in the law. On December 16, 2016, upon the joint motion of the parties and in the interest of judicial economy, the court stayed the proceedings in the case and in the related case of Carcano v. McCrory (1:16CV236) pending disposition in the Supreme Court of Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., No. 16- 273 (S. Ct.). At the United States’ request, the court did not include the United States’ pending motion for preliminary injunction in the stay. On January 1, 2017, Roy Cooper, who opposed HB2 as NC Attorney General, took office as Governor of North Carolina, changing the Governor’s position. On February 22, 2017, the Department of Justice and the Department of Education, under President Trump, withdrew and rescinded their earlier guidance documents, changing the federal government’s position. On March 2, 2017, the Plaintiff submitted a request to expand the stay (granted on December 16, 2016) to include the preliminary injunction request, on the grounds that the United States had withdrawn two guidance documents upon which the motion was based. On March 28, 2017, the Plaintiff submitted a joint status report with the Carcaño Plaintiffs, UNC Defendants, Legislative Defendants, and the State Defendants. The United States aligned itself with the UNC and Legislative Defendants requesting that the court leave the stay entered on December 16, 2016, until resolution of the pending appeals in G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board (4th Cir. No. 15-2056) and Carcaño v. Cooper (4th Cir. No. 16-1989). The Carcaño Plaintiffs and the State Defendants requested that the stay be lifted so that parties could confer about a new discovery plan. On March 30, 2017, the North Carolina Legislature, and the newly appointed Governor enacted House Bill 142 which, among other things, repealed HB2. The repeal included a compromise that left many on both sides unhappy. The compromise prevented municipalities from passing anti-discrimination laws until December 2020, and the legislature still had the ability to regulate bathrooms. On April 14, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal stating that in light of the passage of House Bill 142, the claims and causes of actions against the Defendants would be dismissed with prejudice, which closed the case.

Summary: On May 5, 2016, the U.S Department of Justice sued the State of North Carolina based on a law denying transgender people access to multiple-access bathrooms that match their gender identities. On March 2, 2017, the United States reversed its earlier position regarding two guidance documents and later dismissed the case in light of the passage of House Bill 142, which repealed HB2. The repeal included a compromise that left many on both sides unhappy. The compromise prevented municipalities from passing anti-discrimination laws until December 2020, and the legislature still had the ability to regulate bathrooms.


On February 21, 2007, employees of S.C.C.P Painting Contractors Inc. filed this class action lawsuit against it under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219), the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, the D.C. Minimum Wage Law, the D.C. payment and Collection of Wages Law, and the Maryland and District of Columbia Common Law in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Plaintiffs alleged that S.C.C.P. (1) failed to pay wages for work performed, (2) failed to pay for work that employers were required to perform "off the clock", (3) failed to pay employees overtime compensation, (4) and unlawfully deducted amounts from their employee's paychecks. Plaintiffs were represented by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and sought injunctive and monetary relief in the form of reimbursement for all withheld and unpaid wages. The Court (Judge Catherine C. Blake) conditionally certified a class of "all individuals who are or have been employed by Defendants as non-exempt, hourly-paid employees for the three years immediately prior to the date of conditional certification" on February 26, 2008. 2008 WL 554114. On December 16, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, holding that Plaintiffs were covered FLSA employees when they worked for Defendant, and that as a result Defendant would be liable to Plaintiffs for underpayment of overtime wages. 589 F. Supp. 2d 569. On March 19, 2009, the Court entered a consent decree awarding Plaintiffs a total of $200,000. This case is closed.

Summary: Employees of S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors Inc. filed a class action lawsuit against their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, the D.C. Minimum Wage Law, the D.C. Payment and Collection of Wages Law, and the Maryland and District of Columbia Common Law. After Plaintiffs were granted Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of Defendant's liability for unpaid wages, a Consent Decree was entered awarding Plaintiffs a total of $200,000.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: On May 11, 2020, the Texas State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Texas Alliance for Retired Americans, and six individuals filed this lawsuit against the Texas Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of the laws restricting vote by mail. No outcome yet.
 On May 11, 2020, the Texas State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Texas Alliance for Retired Americans, and six individuals filed this lawsuit against the Texas Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of the laws restricting vote by mail. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the current vote by mail system was in violation of the plaintiffs' First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the requirement that voters pay for the postage to return their early voting ballots by mail, the postmark requirements for the ballots, the requirement that voters must submit two handwriting samples that “match” in order to have their early voting ballots counted, and the criminalization of a person assisting a voter in returning a marked mail ballot denied the plaintiffs equal protection and procedural due process, and violated the prohibition on poll tax. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the defendants to provide prepaid postage on the ballot carrier envelopes used to return the marked mail-in ballots to the counties and enjoining them from rejecting vote-by-mail ballots if those ballots were postmarked by 7:00 p.m. on election day and received by the county election administrator before it canvased the election and from implementing, enforcing, or giving any effect to the Voter Assistance Ban. They further sought to enjoin the defendants from rejecting mail-in ballots on signature verification grounds, and sought an injunction requiring the defendants to provide voters the opportunity to cure any issues with signature verification before their ballots are rejected. This lawsuit was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, and assigned to Judge Orlando L. Garcia. The plaintiffs were represented by private attorneys. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 3, arguing that the sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs’ claims, that the plaintiffs lack standing and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The case is ongoing.


Two minors and their mother and their mother sued the Colorado Department of Motor Vehicles. Colorado law required that a teenager log a certain amount of hours driving under the supervision of a licensed parent or guardian. Because the mother is blind, she was unable to supervise her daughters' driving. The girls' father did not have custody and lived out of state, leaving no qualified adult to supervise them in completeing the requirements for a driver's license. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to make a reasonable modification of Colorado law, which violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the defendants had violated the federal statutes, an injunction against the defendants' further discrimination, monetary compensation, attorney's fees and costs, and other equitable relief. Under Colorado law, individuals who are 16 can apply for a minor's driver's license provided they have logged 50 hours of driving experience with their learner's permit, under the supervision of a qualified adult. C.R.S. §§ 42-2-104(1)(c) & 106(1)(a). Another statute, C.R.S. § 42-2-106(b) (2004), restricts minors with learners' permits to driving under the supervision of "a parent, stepparent, or guardian with a valid driver's license." On May 27, 2005, the legislature amended § 42-2-106(b) (2004) to include grandparents with powers of attorney as acceptable supervisory drivers, but the mother stated she would not relinquish her parental rights to her daughters' grandfather. Thus again, under the amended statute there was no eligible driver for supervision. On August 10, 2005 the DMV allowed the mother to sign a "designation" giving the grandfather permission to supervise but indicating that she was "in no way relinquishing any parental rights." On October 17, 2005, in an unpublished order, the District Court dismissed the individual claims of the minor named plaintiffs because they were not themselves disabled. Although they had an association with their mother, who is disabled, there was no employment relationship with the defendant, which is required for "associational disability" claims. The court permitted the organizational plaintiffs and the mother to continue the lawsuit. On January 04, 2006, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider its previous opinion and reinstated the minors as named plaintiffs. The court held that a party, although not herself disabled, may assert claims under Title II of the ADA and under the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination against a disabled person that directly injures that party. The older daughter obtained her driver's license on November 14, 2005, two months after she turned 16. She claimed compensatory damages because of the two-month delay and because she had not been able to experience driving under different road conditions over the previous year, having compressed her entire learning experience into two months. On July 1, 2006, the legislature further amended the statute to allow the appointment of an alternate permit supervisor who holds a valid Colorado driver's license and is twenty-one years or older, without any relinquishing of parental rights or power of attorney over the child. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs continued the lawsuit. On May 14, 2007, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in an unpublished opinion, 2007 WL 1430103. The court found that after the amended statute mooted the claims for equitable relief, the only remaining claim was for compensatory damages under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. However, because the plaintiffs could not prove that the defendants acted intentionally -- i.e. with "deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally protected rights," they could not sustain a claim for damages. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider in an unpublished opinion on June 21, 2007. <b>Appeal</b> In a published opinion on April 15, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order granting summary judgment to the defendants. Barber v. Colorado, Dept. of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs failed to prove intent as the Rehabilitation Act required. Especially relevant were the facts that the DMV offered reasonable accommodation by allowing the mother to designate the grandfather as a supervisor and that the DMV was aware the state legislature was progressing towards amendment. The Court of Appeals' mandate on is the final entry on the district court docket, on May 7, 2009.

Summary:
Colorado law required minors to log 50 hours driving under the supervision of a licensed "adult, stepparent, or guardian" before they could obtain a driver's license. Plaintiffs were blind mother and her sighted daughters. The father lived out of state. The daughters could not log hours because their mother was not eligible for a driver's license.

The state amended the statute during the litigation, allowing the mother to appoint children's grandfather as supervisor for logging hours. This rendered equitable claims moot. The district court ruled that no claim for compensatory damages could stand for the delay in obtaining license because defendants did not act intentionally. The Court of Appeals affirmed.


On August 10, 1998, two named plaintiffs, both of whom had paraplegia and used wheelchairs, filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, against the State of Tennessee and 25 Tennessee counties. The plaintiffs alleged past and ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12131-12165. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been denied access to the Tennessee state court system because of their disabilities. One plaintiff alleged that when he was ordered to appear at a county courthouse whose courtroom was on the second floor without elevator access, he had to crawl up two flights of stairs to reach the courtroom. When he next returned to the courthouse he refused to pull himself up the stairs again and for safety reasons declined being carried up by security personnel. As a result he was arrested and jailed for failure to appear. The other plaintiff was a certified court reporter who alleged that because she was not able to access many Tennessee county courthouses she lost work opportunities and was denied the opportunity to participate in the judicial process. The plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive relief to modify the inaccessible courthouses. On October 5, 1998, Tennessee moved to have the case dismissed on Eleventh Amendment Grounds, arguing that Title II of the ADA was invalid to the extent that it authorized private parties to file federal lawsuits for money damages against states. On November 10, 1998, the District Court denied this motion. Tennessee appealed to the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and proceedings in the district court were stayed while this appeal was pending. On July 16, 2002, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss (Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr writing for a three-judge panel). Lane v. Tennessee, 40 Fed.Appx. 911 (2012). The Court of Appeals granted a rehearing on the issue before the same three-judge panel, and on January 10, 2003 it issued an Amended Judgment, wherein the Court (Judge Martin) again affirmed the lower court's decision and explained that, because the Plaintiffs were "seeking to vindicate" their due process "right of access to the courts," the action was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680 (2003). Tennessee petitioned for certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. At this point the United States of America, represented by attorneys from Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, joined the Plaintiffs as respondents. On May 17, 2004, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, upheld the constitutionality of the ADA's application against states. The Court found that Congress had abundant evidence that the states frequently denied people with disabilities fundamental rights protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to access courts. Further, the remedy Congress enacted was congruent and proportional, because the "reasonable accommodations" mandated by the ADA were not unduly burdensome and disproportionate to the harm. Garrett, the Court said, covered only Equal Protection claims, not Due Process claims. Therefore the law was constitutional. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). On August 17, 2004, the District Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, finding that the question of whether each particular member of the proposed class was discriminated against because of their disability would need to be determined on an individual basis, considering the conditions of the particular courthouses, and that therefore class action was inappropriate. Shortly thereafter the parties began negotiating settlements. In February and March of 2005, the Plaintiffs entered separate settlements with the State of Tennessee and with each of the defendant counties. Tennessee agreed to pay the Plaintiffs $905,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. Tennessee also agreed to recommend to the Tennessee Supreme Court that it implement a comprehensive policy ensuring ADA compliance at state and county courthouses. Each of the counties agreed to make modifications to their courthouses to make them accessible to wheelchair users and other people with mobility impairments. The Defendants agreed to cooperate in the appointment of ninety-five Local Judicial Program ADA Coordinators. Each county agreed to pay $2,680, totaling $67,000, in attorneys' fees and costs. The Plaintiffs did not receive money damages.

Summary: On August 10, 1998, two paraplegic wheelchair users filed a class action suit in federal court against the State of Tennessee and several of its counties. The Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had unlawfully discriminated against them by failing to make county courthouses physically accessible to individuals with mobility impairments, in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Tennessee motioned to have the case dismissed, arguing the Title II of the ADA violated the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. The court denied this motion, and Tennessee appealed. The appeal eventually reached the Supreme Court, which on May 17, 2004, upheld the lower court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss. Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the District Court denied the plaintiffs motion to certify the class. The case proceeded with the named plaintiffs only. In February and March of 2005, the Plaintiffs entered separate settlements with Tennessee and each of the defendant counties, wherein the defendants agreed to physically modify the courthouses and to appoint a total of 95 Judicial Program ADA Coordinators to ensure ADA compliance. The defendants also agreed to pay the Plaintiffs a total of $972,000 in legal fees.


On January 22, 2013, private individual filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a). The plaintiff sued the US and Frontier Airlines. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and any other relief the Court may deem appropriate. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated her right to be free of discrimination as a passenger, as well as her right to equal protection and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On September 11, 2011, the plaintiff was on a flight from Denver to Detroit. She was seated next to two men described as being of South Asian descent. The plaintiff did not know the men or communicate with them in any way throughout the flight. During the flight, the men began to exhibit suspicious behavior and Frontier Airlines was accordingly notified of a potential threat. In reporting this threat, the plaintiff was identified as part of the threat under the suspicion that she may have been traveling with the two men. When the plane landed, armed guards forcefully arrested the plaintiff and moved her to a detention facility in Wayne County, where she was held and searched for approximately four hours. The plaintiff alleged that since the police and TSA officers had no facts connecting her to criminal activity, they must have acted on the perceived ethnicity, national origin, or race of the plaintiff's name. The plaintiff was released without any charges. On May 20, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the equal protection claims against the named federal individuals. The Court (Judge Terrence Berg) held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied the motion to dismiss. On March 21, 2014, a motion to dismiss Count IV was brought by Defendants Robert Ball, John Brand, Paul Brumley, Nathaniel Devins, and David Lakatos, all of whom are federal law enforcement officials or agents ("Federal Agent Defendants"), and a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings to dismiss Count IV brought by Defendants Jeremy Bohn, Corporal Bradley, Lieutenant M. Wasiukanis, Captain Patrick Driscoll, Mark DeBeau, Officer Grant,Toya Parker, Detective Carmona, and Officer Johnson, who are law enforcement officers of the Wayne County Airport Authority ("WCAA Defendants"). The motions are brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), respectively, and both assert that the individual law enforcement defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claims that her arrest and detention on September 11, 2011, was in violation of her rights to Equal Protection. The court denied the motion. (Hebshi v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (E.D. Mich. 2014)) On July 18, 2014, the court denied a motion submitted by the individual plaintiffs for partial summary judgment as to Counts V and VI. The motion is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), asserting that the WCAA Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claim that her arrest, detention, and search were in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court dismissed the motion. (Hebshi v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 834 (E.D. Mich. 2014), appeal dismissed (Feb. 6, 2015)) Throughout the November and December 2014, several settlement conferences were held between the remaining defendants and the plaintiff--wherein a settlement was reached between the parties. Under the settlement terms that have been disclosed, the plaintiff will receive $40,000 from the federal government to compensate her for the severe humiliation she suffered. Additionally, under the settlement, Frontier has agreed to amend its employee handbook to more clearly state its zero-tolerance policy on discrimination and to provide all new employees with training on that revision. Frontier also will amend its customer complaint policy to ensure allegations of discrimination are given the appropriate attention. Source: https://www.aclu.org/news/mom-arrested-and-strip-searched-after-911-flight-settles-lawsuit The federal government provided sworn statements promising that this incident did not land Hebshi on any federal terrorism watch lists. The airport police have similarly provided assurances that no record of the arrest remains. During the course of litigation, the Wayne County Airport Authority independently implemented changes to its police policies and training that address many of Hebshi's concerns. (https://www.aclu.org/cases/hebshi-v-united-states?redirect=racial-justice/hebshi-v-united-states)

Summary: On September 11, 2011, the plaintiff, Hebshi, was detained without cause on a flight landing at Detroit, MI--she was held in prison for several hours after the arrest and strip searched. The plaintiff claims that she was illegally detained and searched because of her Saudi Arabian last name and heritage. The plaintiff filed suit against several government agencies and individuals, and private organizations and individuals, claiming that they had violated her right to equal protection and due process under the Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 49 U.S.C. § 40127(a). The defendant and the plaintiff settled for $40,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.


This case, filed in federal court in 2011 and settled in 2012, addressed the Adams County Sheriff’s Department and its communication with deaf inmates of its jail. The case’s complaint described an incident in May 2010 in which law enforcement was called on two individuals engaged in an argument. Neither of the two--who became the case’s individual plaintiffs--could speak, write, or read effectively in English. As a result, when Sheriff’s deputies arrived, the plaintiffs were not able to communicate or explain what had happened. Nonetheless, the complaint alleged that the deputies failed to provide a sign language interpreter or any other effective auxiliary aid. Instead, one of the individuals was arrested for allegedly hitting the second individual, despite the attempts by both to explain that no violence had occurred. While in custody, the arrestee was required to sign several forms that he did not understand, including a Miranda form acknowledging that he knew his rights. Throughout his 25-day detention at the Adams County Detention Facility, staff failed to provide him with appropriate auxiliary aids or services. He was unable to call anyone, to communicate during his medical intake, or understand why he was being detained. This lawsuit followed. It was filed November 23, 2011 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. by the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition the two deaf individuals just described. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Adams County in his official capacity under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition Legal Program, they sought declaratory and monetary relief, and an injunction requiring the defendant to provide qualified sign language interpreters or other appropriate auxiliary aids or services to ensure effective communication with deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. On January 26, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two additional individual plaintiffs. One was another deaf individual who communicated only through American Sign Language. He was detained at the Adams County Detention Facility for six days and unable to communicate during his detention. The other plaintiff was his aunt. The amended complaint also added the Colorado Association of the Deaf as a plaintiff. On March 13, 2012, District Judge John L. Kane referred the case to Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland. The parties then spent the next several months engaging in settlement conversations. On September 25, they moved to dismiss the case because they had reached a settlement agreement. The agreement required the defendant to change jail policies to ensure that detained individuals who required sign language interpretation knew how to request it. The settlement also required the defendants to provide training for staff, verify and monitor compliance with the agreement, and pay $100,000 to the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition Legal Program. On September 27, 2012, Judge Kane granted the parties’ motion to dismiss the case and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement for two years. There are no further docket entries. The enforcement period was scheduled to end in 2014, so the case is now closed.

Summary: Four individuals and two disability rights groups sued the Sheriff of Adams County for its alleged failure to provide interpreters or other auxiliary aids to deaf individuals in its jail. The lawsuit ended in a two year settlement. The case is now closed.


This lawsuit was filed in the Central District of California on July 18, 2002, by the class of children and young adults who (a) are in the custody of Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services; (b) have a behavioral, emotional, or psychiatric impairment; and (c) need individualized mental health services. The suit is against County and State agencies for neglecting their responsibilities to provide mental health care services to foster children in California. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the State and Los Angeles County under provisions of the Medicaid Act, Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment (EPSDT), 42 U.S.C. § 1396; the Substantive Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Article I, section 7(a) of the California Constitution; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701; and California Government Code § 11135. Plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU of Southern California, Center for Public Interest, Western Center for Law and Poverty, Protection & Advocacy, Inc., Youth Law Center, and Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law. In March 2003, Plaintiffs and L.A. County began settlement negotiations. On June 19, 2003, United States District Judge A. Howard Matz certified class status, and on July 16, 2003, the Court approved a jointly submitted settlement agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The settlement agreement has four objectives: (1) to facilitate a provision of services delivered in a coordinated, comprehensive, community-based fashion; (2) to support the development and delivery of a service structure and fiscal system that supports core practices and services model; (3) to support an effective and sustainable solution that will involve standards and methods to achieve quality-based oversight; and (4) to address the need for certain class members with more intensive needs to receive medically necessary mental health services in their own home, a family settings, or the most homelike setting appropriate to their needs, in order to facilitate reunification, and to meet their needs for safety, permanence, and well-being. Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties to the settlement appointed a six-member expert advisory panel to determine whether the County met the objectives set forth and implemented the plans. The Panel was required to make regular written reports to the parties and Court of its findings and recommendations. In August 2005, the Panel issued a two-year report finding that the County had not complied with the terms of the Agreement. Because the state agencies did not participate in the settlement, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against them on September 15, 2005. Judge Matz granted the motion on March 14, 2006, ordering the State to provide "wraparound services" and "therapeutic foster care," to thousands of Medi-Cal eligible children who are in foster care or at risk of foster care placement. There are approximately 85,000 children in foster care in California and an even greater number of children served by the child welfare system in their own homes. The court's order extends to both groups of children. (In the meantime, on February 16, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Compliance with the Settlement Agreement against LA County. In November 2006, Judge Matz ordered the County to address deficiencies in its implementation plan.) The State of California appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On March 23, 2007, the Ninth Circuit vacated the March 14th, 2006, preliminary injunction, holding that Judge Matz had erroneously interpreted the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) provisions of the Medicaid Act by not "explor[ing] the possibility that the State might only have an obligation to fund the component services of wraparound and TFC, rather than to offer the coordinated complex of services in a single package." Katie A. v. Bonta, 481 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007). After further discovery, Plaintiffs filed another Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the state defendants on January 11, 2008. In response, the Court ruled that wraparound services are Medi-Cal eligible and ordered the parties to address how to provide and bill for those services. A Special Master was appointed in March 2009 to facilitate a settlement between the parties. The parties reached a settlement agreement in December 2011, which included the development of an Implementation Plan to be evaluated by the Special Master. The agreement included a payment of $3.75 million in attorneys' fees, including costs and expenses, to plaintiffs' counsel. The parties developed a two-phase Implementation Plan. On August 28, 2012, the Special Master informed the District Court that he found the Implementation Plan reasonably and sufficiently calculated to meet the objectives of the agreement, and the Court accepted his recommendations on September 13, 2012. The Special Master and Advisory Panel continued to monitor and report on the completion of the Implementation Plan. In light of the fact that the District Court's jurisdiction was scheduled to end in December 2014, the Special Master put forth a set of recommendations in his report on September 26, 2014 to sustain the growth in the development and delivery of the intensive services agreed to by the parties. The Special Master submitted a final report to the Court on November 20, 2014. The report identified areas of progress and growth, but also found that there remained significant unfinished deliverables from the settlement agreement and identified the key activities the State should begin or continue implementing. A status conference was held on November 24, 2014. Judge John A. Kronstadt determined that there was no need for the court to extend its jurisdiction at that time. Subsequently, in August of 2015, Judge Kronstadt issued a minute order stating that while the parties should continue to file reports consistent with the implementation of the settlement, the matter was considered closed. As of October 19, 2017, the parties had stipulated, with approval from the court, that the Panel monitoring L.A. County's progress toward implementation of the settlement agreement should continue to operate through December 31, 2018. On December 21, 2018, the Panel issued its report for 2017. The plaintiff then filed this report with the court on January 23, 2019. The 2017 report identified major continuing concerns regarding the County's slow progress in implementing the settlement and uncertainty that County strategies would succeed in implementing the Shared Core Practice Model, which the report identified as a key strategy for compliance. The Panel noted its hope that the County's work would have developed data indicators that reflected progress towards full implementation, but because the County has concluded its data systems will not support those tasks, other strategies would be needed to improve performance. Among other things, the report was particularly troubled by the County's decision to change from using an Immersion Process, in which the Shared Core Practice Model would be fully implanted in only a few offices every eighteen months, to instead deciding to use a countywide approach in an attempt to reform all 19 offices and 3 specialized units simultaneously. The Panel report expressed doubt that this approach would bring the County any closer to full implementation of the Shared Core Practice Model, and disapproved of the County's decision to make this change without first notifying the parties or Panel, both of which had treated the immersion approach as a part of the strategic plan. According to Bloomberg, the case is now closed.

Summary: Children in foster care and at risk of foster care in California brought suit in 2002 against the State and Los Angeles County to reform provision of mental health services to foster care children. The parties reached a settlement agreement in December 2011 that implements community-based mental health services and makes wraparound and therapeutic foster care available. A Special Master and Advisory Committee monitored the progress of the parties' implementation of the settlement agreement from 2012 to 2014. The Special Master submitted a final report to the Court on November 20, 2014. The report identified areas of progress and growth, but also found that there remained significant unfinished deliverables from the settlement agreement and identified key activities the State should begin or continue implementing. A final status conference was held on November 24, 2014. However, the Panel monitoring L.A. County's progress toward implementation will continue to operate through December 31, 2018.


On June 9, 2014, a complaint was filed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) against the National Security Agency (NSA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for failing to fulfill two Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the conduct of the EPA. The case was filed after the NSA issued a Glomar response, in which it declined to provide the requested information, and instead refused to confirm or deny that it possessed the request records. According to the complaint, this lawsuit stems from repeated incidents of the EPA circumventing federal recordkeeping laws by using personal devices, including email accounts and text messages, to conduct work-related correspondence and otherwise federal business. As revealed by its Inspect General, NSA is known to have a program to collect metadata from telephone, text message and email records from certain telephony carriers including Verizon. CEI requested the copies of all text message data, and particularly all metadata of text messaging activity using Verizon voice and/or data accounts in NSA’s possession. On September 5, 2014, defendant filed for summary judgment. In response, the plaintiffs argued that NSA has waived its right to issue such a response by its previous official acknowledgment that it has the records they seek. The judge found that despite their FOIA requests for email and text records, the plaintiffs failed to identify any evidence showing that the NSA actually collects this information on a widespread basis. On January 13, 2015, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The court stated that plaintiffs failed to point to concrete evidence showing that the NSA has actually admitted this fact. The court entered a judgment for the defendant on the same day. The case is closed.

Summary: A complaint was filed by the Competitive Enterprise Institute against the National Security Agency in the federal court for the District of Columbia for failing to fulfill two Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the conduct of the EPA. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.


On March 3, 2003, Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania (DIA) brought this action against the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) alleging that SEPTA violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (RA) after it completed two construction projects on its public transit facilities in Philadelphia and did not make the facilities sufficiently accessible to people with disabilities. DIA, represented by attorneys from the Disability Law Project and a private disability rights firm, asked the court for injunctive relief requiring SEPTA to make the stations accessible to persons who use wheelchairs by constructing elevators at the City Hall Station and the 15th Street Courtyard, which provides access to the 15th Street Station. Specifically, DIA alleged that SEPTA replaced an existing stairway at the 15th Street Courtyard without making the entrance accessible to persons in wheelchairs, and that SEPTA replaced an existing escalator at the City Hall Station Broad Street entrance but did not make the entrance accessible to persons using wheelchairs. DIA's fourth amended complaint alleged that SEPTA violated the ADA and RA by making "alterations" to the 15th Street Courtyard and the City Hall Station without also making the affected portions of the facilities accessible to individuals with disabilities. Additionally, DIA alleged that the 15th Street Station and City Hall Station were "key stations" under the ADA and RA. Therefore, SEPTA was required to make those stations handicapped accessible. On May 15, 2003, the United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Judge Clifford Scott Green) granted SEPTA's motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure R. 19(b) for DIA's failure to join the City of Philadelphia as a defendant. SEPTA argued that joinder of the City of Philadelphia was required, because the property at issue was owned by the City. On June 4, 2003 the District Court (Judge Green) granted DIA's motion vacating the May 15, 2003 order granting dismissal. On June 12, 2003, DIA filed an amended complaint, which included the City of Philadelphia as a defendant. DIA reached a settlement agreement with the City of Philadelphia on August 16, 2004. The terms of the agreement provided that the City encouraged and would permit SEPTA to construct ADA-compliant elevators at the City Hall Station and the 15th Street Courtyard. On August 19, 2004, the case was reassigned and on November 30, 2004, the Court (Judge Gene E.K. Pratter) granted DIA's motion to dismiss the City of Philadelphia pursuant to the settlement agreement. On January 7, 2004, DIA filed its third amended complaint, adding the "key station" claim. On December 23, 2004, the District Court (Judge Pratter) granted in part and denied in part SEPTA's motion to dismiss and motion to strike portions of DIA's third amended complaint. Specifically, the District Court (Judge Pratter) denied SEPTA's motion to strike DIA's allegations that SEPTA violated the "key station" provisions of Title II of the ADA, but DIA was ordered to strike allegations relating to an alleged agreement SEPTA made to construct elevators at City Hall in lieu of construction of an elevator at the 15th Street Station. On February 15, 2005, DIA filed a fourth amended complaint, and alleged that SEPTA's renovations to both the 15th Street Courtyard and City Hall Station constituted "alterations" that triggered ADA and RA accessibility obligations. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on April 5, 2006. On November 17, 2006, the Court (Judge Pratter) granted SEPTA's motion for summary judgment regarding all of DIA's claims. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 03-CV-1577, 2006 WL 3392733 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006). The Court (Judge Pratter) held that DIA's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, because the claims accrued when DIA knew, or had reason to know, that SEPTA's renovations would not include elevators. DIA filed its claims more than two years after those dates. DIA subsequently appealed. On March 27, 2007, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of DIA urging a reversal of the Court's summary judgment in favor of SEPTA. On August 19, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judge Michael D. Fisher; Judge Thomas M. Hardiman, Judge Walter King Stapleton) reversed the District Court and remanded the case. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199 (3rd Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit (Judges Fisher, Hardiman, Stapleton) held that the accrual date of a discrimination claim depends on when the discrimination occurred and that discrimination did not occur until the construction was completed. Therefore, DIA's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. On November 04, 2008, DIA filed its motion for summary judgment. On January 16, 2009, SEPTA filed its motion for summary judgment. On September 11, 2009, the United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Judge Pratter) granted DIA's motion for summary judgment. Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 655 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D.Pa. 2009). The Court (Judge Pratter) held that SEPTA's construction work at both the 15th Street Courtyard and City Hall Station were "alterations" under the ADA and RA. Therefore, the ADA and RA required SEPTA to make both locations readily accessible to individuals with disabilities. SEPTA appealed the District Court decision. On February 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judge Julio M. Fuentes, Judge Kent A. Jordan, Judge Anthony Joseph Scirica) affirmed the District Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of DIA Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 09-3964, 2011 WL 522947 (3rd Cir. Feb. 16, 2011). The Third Circuit held that the ADA must be interpreted liberally to provide equal access for disabled persons to public facilities. The court concluded that the City Hall Station and 15th Street Courtyard construction projects were "alterations" under the ADA, even though they were not "major structural alterations." Additionally, the court held that the ADA required SEPTA to make the alterations "to the maximum extent feasible" regardless of their cost, because "feasible" referred to technical matters and not economic costs. Furthermore, the court held that the 15th Street and the City Hall stations were not already "readily accessible" merely because there were disabled accessible elevators at other portions of the underground concourse connecting the 15th Street, City Hall, and Suburban Station. On remand, the case finally settled; a consent decree was entered September 16, 2011, approved by Judge Pratter. The decree provided that SEPTA would install several elevators at the relevant stations, make fare lines accessible, and pay attorneys fees of about $500,000. It also required SEPTA to provide status reports to plaintiffs counsel, quarterly. The agreement lasted until 2013. The case is now closed.

Summary: After years of litigation, the Third Circuit found in 2011 that SEPTA (Southeastern Pennsylvania Tranportation Authority) had violated the ADA by failing to make several subway stations accessible for people with disabilities, including those who use wheelchairs. The parties settled a few months later for a consent decree that provided that SEPTA would install several elevators at the relevant stations, make fare lines accessible, and pay attorneys fees of about $500,000. It also required SEPTA to provide status reports to plaintiffs counsel, quarterly.


The plaintiff was a naturalized U.S. Citizen denied boarding to a flight from Kuwait to the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List. On January 18, 2011, he filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the Transportation and Security Administration ("TSA"), and the Terrorist Screening Center ("TSC"), which created and maintained the No Fly List. The plaintiff, represented by the Council on American Islamic Relations, alleged that his placement on the No Fly List constituted: (1) a violation of his right as a United States citizen to reside in the United States and re-enter it from abroad; (2) unlawful agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) a denial of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief requiring defendants to remove him from the No-Fly List; inform him of the grounds for his inclusion on the No-Fly List; and provide him with an opportunity to rebut his inclusion. The plaintiff also sought monetary damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and a declaration that the defendants violated his rights. The case was assigned to Judge Anthony J. Trenga. Contemporaneously with the complaint, the plaintiff also filed an emergency motion with respect to his alleged inability to return to the U.S. from Kuwait. The relief requested in the motion became moot, however, when the plaintiff was permitted to return to the U.S. on January 21, 2011. On June 3, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claims lies exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, which gave the U.S. Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to certain orders of the TSA. Judge Trenga agreed and held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's challenge to past or future restrictions on his ability to travel because such claims are "inescapably intertwined" with the review of TSA orders. 2011 WL 3820711. Instead of dismissing the plaintiff's claims, however, the court transferred the plaintiff's claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff contended that the district court did have jurisdiction, and thus, requested that his claims be remanded. On May 28, 2013, the Fourth Circuit agreed. In an order signed by the Court's clerk, the Fourth Circuit explained that 49 U.S.C. § 46110 did not evidence Congress' intent to exclude the plaintiff's challenge to past and future restricts on his ability to travel from consideration in the district court. On remand, the defendants again filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that he lacked standing, that his claims were not ripe for adjudication, and that he failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted. On January 22, 2014, Judge Trenga granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion. 2014 WL 243115. The Court held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, had standing, and that his claims were ripe. The Court then dismissed a portion of the plaintiff's first claim for relief, concluding that four to five day delay that the the plaintiff experienced in his ability to reenter the U.S. did not unduly burden his rights such that it constituted a constitutional deprivation. The court, however, found that the plaintiff's broader allegations in his first claim for relief of present and future harms from his inability to fly were sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. The court also held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss as the plaintiff did not receive any notice of his inclusion or reasons for his inclusion. The parties then engaged in discovery for the next year. On December 9, 2014, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as to his procedural due process claim. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to challenge his inclusion on the No Fly List, either before or after his inclusion, depriving him of various liberty interests. The defendants contended that the redress process established through the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program ("TRIP") was constitutionally sufficient. On July 16, 2015, the court issued an order partially granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court concluded that the plaintiff was denied his Fifth Amendment right to an adequate opportunity to challenge his inclusion on the No Fly List. On April 13, 2015, the defendants filed a notice stating the government's new redress procedures for claims submitted through DHS regarding denial of boarding on a covered aircraft, and that these new procedures would be available to the plaintiff should he wish to use them. The plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint on December 28, 2015. On March 3, 2016, using arguments that are unavailable on the docket, the defendants moved for summary judgment of the plaintiff’s substantive due process and non-delegation claims of the fifth amended complaint. That same day, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment of those same claims, arguing that the No Fly List interfered with his fundamental right of movement and was not narrowly tailored and that the No Fly List was operating in the absence, and in some ways against, the wishes of Congress. On July 20, 2017, Judge Trenga granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s. The court concluded that the No Fly List was not unconstitutional on substantive due process grounds because it was not unlawful under the non-delegation doctrine nor did it exceed agency authority. As such, the court entered judgment in favor of the United States and against the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Not long after, however, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this appeal and the Fourth Circuit obliged on December 21, 2017. There are no pending motions or appeals so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: The plaintiff, a citizen and resident of the U.S. who was denied boarding a flight from Kuwait to the U.S., filed a lawsuit against the federal government, alleging that his inclusion on the No Fly List constitutes various constitutional violations and unlawful agency action. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia initially concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the federal government moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on various grounds, which the District Court largely rejected. On June 20, 2017, the court entered judgment in favor of the United States and against the plaintiff. The case is closed.


On Oct. 7, 2004, the St. Louis District office of the EEOC brought this suit against Allstate Insurance Company, a major insurance provider, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The complaint alleged that Allstate's rehire policy disproportionately and adversely impacted workers over the age of 40, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC also brought a disparate treatment claim, alleging that Allstate refused to rehire certain former employees because of their age. The EEOC sought to permanently enjoin Allstate from discriminating on the basis age against individuals 40 years of age and older. The EEOC also wanted the court to order that Allstate implement policies, practices, and programs providing equal employment opportunities for individuals 40 years of age and older. Finally, the EEOC sought back wages and liquidated damages for adversely affected employees. In 1999, Allstate implemented a Reorganization Plan, which eliminated all employee-agent positions and terminated the employment contracts of its employee-agents. In connection with the Reorganization Plan, Allstate implemented a rehire moratorium policy in 2000. Under the policy, former employee-agents who were subject to the Reorganization Plan were ineligible for rehire in non-agent positions for a period of one year after their termination, or after all severance benefits had been received. The EEOC alleged that the rehire moratorium policy had disparate impact on former employee-agents who were members of the protected age group and that Allstate engaged in disparate treatment of such members of the protected age group. Both sides filed motions for partial summary judgment in June 2006, and in October 2006 District Judge E. Richard Webber denied Allstate's motion but granted in part the EEOC's motion. The court held that although no material issue of fact existed as to the EEOC's prima face case of disparate impact, Allstate had provided sufficient evidence that the challenged employment policy was adopted based on reasonable factors other than age. Since the EEOC had the ultimate burden of showing that Allstate's reasons for the policy were unreasonable, and had provided sufficient evidence of unreasonableness, the court held that question was not appropriate for summary judgment. 458 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mo. 2006). In Jan. 2007, Allstate was given leave in the district court to file an interlocutory appeal, at which point the case was stayed pending the result of that appeal. No. 4:04CV01359 ERW, 2007 WL 38675 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 2007). Allstate appealed on two questions of law: (1) whether Allstate’s rehire policy is an “employment policy” which can be challenged under a disparate impact theory of discrimination; and (2) whether the statistics proffered by the EEOC and adopted by the district court establish disparate impact as a matter of law. On June 10, 2008, Eighth Circuit Judge Myron H. Bright answered both questions in the affirmative, holding that Allstate's rehire policy could be challenged under ADEA and that the EEOC's statistical evidence established a prima facie case that the rehire policy had a disparate impact. 528 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2008). However, on September 8, 2008, the Eighth Circuit granted Allstate's Petition for Rehearing En Banc and vacated the June 10, 2008 judgment. That same day, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and the case went back to district court. After proceedings resumed in the district court, there was additional discovery. On Sept. 11, 2009, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the parties' proposed Stipulated Order resolving all claims in this action. On Sept. 14, 2009, District Judge Webber issued a Stipulated Order containing the terms of the parties' settlement agreement. With respect to injunctive relief, Allstate agreed that before adopting any new policy limiting the re-employment of former employees whose employment was terminated involuntarily as part of a reorganization or reduction-in-force, it will determine whether such a policy disproportionately affects individuals who are age 40 and above. If the policy does disproportionately impact those 40 or older, Allstate agreed to refrain from implementing the policy until it gives the EEOC 14 days written notice of its implementation, provides a list of reasons for the policy, and gives reasonable opportunity to meet and discuss with the EEOC. Additionally, Allstate agreed that any new policy would comply with the requirements of the ADEA. However, there was no admission of liability by Allstate. With respect to monetary damages, Allstate agreed to pay a total of $4.5 million to individuals affected by the rehire policy. The settlement agreement required that the EEOC provide notice to all eligible claimants, giving them a chance to comment on or object to the methodology for allocating the $4.5 million settlement fund. The agreement specified that the court would retain jurisdiction over the case for three years. Following the notice and comment period, Judge Webber issued a Settlement Allocation Order on Dec. 15, 2009. The Settlement Allocation Order approved of the proposed Distribution Plan, stating that it was a fair and reasonable allocation of the monetary relief provided under the Stipulated Order, and rejected all of the claimants' objections. On Jan. 14, 2010, Judge Webber finalized the settlement. The three year period of the court's jurisdiction passed without further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2004, the EEOC filed a complaint against Allstate Insurance Company in the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiffs allege that Allstate's rehire policy disproportionately and adversely impacted workers over the age of 40, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In 2009, the parties reached a settlement that required Allstate to conduct a disparate impact analysis on its rehire policies and in the event that there is a disparate impact on those 40 or older, required Allstate to coordinate with the EEOC before implementing the policy. The settlement also awarded monetary damages to adversely impacted claimants. The case is now closed.


On July 12, 1999, several medical, dental, and child advocacy organizations, along with several individuals, filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the directors of the Michigan Department of Health, the Medical Services Administration, the Michigan Medical Services Administration, and the Michigan Department of Community Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by The Public Interest Law Center, in collaboration with Dechert LLP, Michigan Legal Services, the National Health Law Project, and the Michigan Association for Children with Emotional Disorders, sought injunctive relief to prevent state officials from violating the Medicaid law, claiming violations of federal Medicaid laws. The plaintiffs alleged that the state of Michigan failed to provide essential dental and medical services, known as Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Services (“EPSDT services”) required by the Medicaid program to eligible minors. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan’s Medicaid system paid doctors and dentists too little to ensure that they would be willing to treat patients on Medicaid, such that low-income families faced a dangerous shortage of essential care for their children. The case was assigned to Judge Robert H. Cleland. On October 14, 1999, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking class certification of children eligible for EPSDT services. On November 9, 1999, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Clearinghouse does not have access to this document so it is unclear by what reasoning the defendants sought judgment. On December 28, 1999, Judge Robert H. Cleland granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Clearinghouse does not have access to this document so it is unclear which parts were granted or denied. On March 26, 2001, Judge Cleland entered an order denying the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class and granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Judge Cleland held that the substantive defendant, in this case, was the state of Michigan and that Ex parte Young was inapplicable, meaning state sovereign immunity doctrine barred this type suit against the state. While the Constitution says that federal statutes are the “supreme law of the land,” Judge Cleland ruled that because the Medicaid program was enacted under Congress’ spending power and is a consensual, contractual agreement between the states and Congress, it is not encompassed by the supremacy clause. Thus, Congress cannot compel states to participate in the program and individual state actors, indistinguishable from the state, retain “constitutional sovereignty from the suit.” 133 F.Supp.2d 549. Judge Cleland also held that even if there were no immunity from these suits, Section 1983 did not authorize suits against states or state officials for failure to carry out the terms of a federal grant program like Medicaid. The Supreme Court has required a historical statutory construction when construing Section 1983 and Judge Cleland found “no such clear, unambiguous intent to subject States to private suit.” 133 F.Supp.2d 549. On April 4, 2001, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit (Circuit Judges Merritt, Boggs, and Moore) delivered its opinion on May 15, 2002, in which it reversed the district court’s decision on all issues presented. The court held that conditions imposed by the federal government upon states participating in Medicaid do not arise out of a contractual agreement; they are federal laws. The court also ruled, in line with “well-established precedent,” that laws passed by Congress under its spending powers are supreme law of the land. Furthermore, while the district court ruled that Ex parte Young was unavailable to the plaintiffs, the Sixth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs sought relief from state officials for those officials’ alleged violations of federal law, this case was squarely within Ex parte Young and thus allowed to proceed. Lastly, the court held that the plaintiffs did have a cause of action under Section 1983. The case was remanded back to the district court. 289 F.3d 852. With the case back in the district court, the plaintiffs moved for class certification on October 14, 2015, and filed an amended complaint on October 18, 2015. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents so it is unclear what was different in the amended complaint. Accordingly, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on November 29, 2004. On April 22, 2005, Judge Cleland granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ 2004 motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Judge Cleland addressed the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants failed to provide EPSDT services to all eligible children by holding that plaintiffs stated a cause of action to the extent that they alleged that the state of Michigan has a policy or practice of not providing the EPSDT services to eligible children who have requested them. Addressing the plaintiffs’ second claim, Judge Cleland held that the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action because the Medicaid statute did not “unambiguously confer rights enforceable under Section 1983.” Finally, Judge Cleland denied the plaintiffs’ final claim that the defendants failed to adequately inform eligible individuals of programs and services available through Medicare, holding that it was not their duty to inform all potentially eligible children of EPSDT services. 368 F.Supp.2d 740. On May 17, 2005, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed this judgment the next day. On July 7, 2006, the Sixth Circuit (again before Judges Merritt, Moore, and now Chief Judge Boggs) affirmed in part the district court’s dismissal of the claims under the Medicaid statutory provisions but reversed the holding that there was no cause of action for failing to inform all potentially eligible children of EPSDT services. The appeals court also modified the district court’s order to reflect a dismissal without prejudice, which allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to allege that Michigan's inadequate payment system effectively denied many eligible children the right to medical assistance. The case was remanded back to the district court. 454 F.3d 532. On October 11, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in the district court. The complaint alleged that the reimbursement rates provided by the defendants were so low that an insufficient number of providers were willing to care for children who were enrolled in Medicaid. The plaintiffs further claimed that these inadequate payments effectively denied the plaintiffs and the class of minors eligible for Medicaid represented in the suit the right to medical assistance. On August 7, 2007, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement that resulted in the case being dismissed without prejudice. The settlement preserved significant expansions of the state’s program and major increases in rates paid to doctors and dentists for treating Medicaid patients. The settlement also required the state to monitor children’s access to care, which it had never done before the settlement. Finally, the settlement provided for ongoing oversight of the state’s program by representatives of the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.

Summary: This class-action suit was filed in 1999 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, representing a class of one million low-income children, alleged that the state of Michigan's Medicaid system reimbursed doctors and dentists too little to ensure that they would be willing to treat patients on Medicaid. After two amended complaints and two appeals to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the parties agreed to a settlement in 2007. The agreement preserved significant expansions of the state’s program and major increases in rates paid to doctors and dentists for treating Medicaid patients, required the state to monitor children’s access to care, and provided for ongoing oversight of the state’s program by representatives of the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.