On January 13, 2011, New York wheelchair users and several disability rights organizations filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Represented by Disabilities Right Advocates, the plaintiffs claimed the TLC failed to give meaningful access to persons with disabilities when issuing its regulations for the design of the next generation of NYC taxicabs. According to the complaint, only 1.8% of taxis were accessible to persons with mobility disabilities, which deprived them of meaningful access to New York City without using more expensive alternatives. In addition, the Taxi & Limousine Commission had recently approved of specific Nissan models of SUVs and hybrid automobiles for the next generation of NYC taxicabs. The complaint alleged that the SUVs were too high for wheelchair access and that the hybrids' trunk space could not accommodate a wheelchair, including the folding model. The TLC responded in early March by filing a motion to dismiss. Judge George B. Daniels held an oral argument over the motion and denied the TLC's motion, as well as their motion for interlocutory appeal. The case proceeded with discovery and, on August 10, 2011, Judge Daniels granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment, and several interested parties filed Amicus Curiae briefs in response to the motion. On December 23, 2011, Judge Daniels entered partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding the defendants liable under Title II of the ADA, and granted plaintiffs a temporary restraining order. The order required all new taxi medallions and livery services to be limited to accessible vehicles until TLC came up with a plan for meaningful access to persons who use wheelchairs. 837 F.Supp.2d 268. The defendants filed another interlocutory appeal, which was granted. The injunction was stayed pending the appeal. On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated both the temporary restraining order and the partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that although the TLC exercised "pervasive control" over the taxi industry in New York City, it was not mandated by Title II to provide meaningful access to taxis. 687 F.3d 63. The case was remanded to determine the plaintiffs' claims under Title II(B) (which governs public transportation), the Rehab Act, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and another motion for partial summary judgment. The district court heard oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment on October 11, 2013. The parties entered settlement discussions shortly thereafter, and as a result the court did not make a formal ruling on the matter. Instead, on February 18, 2014, the court terminated the summary judgment motion as moot due to settlement, which was approved by Judge Daniels on June 10, 2014. In the settlement, TLC agreed that at least 50% of the new taxicab vehicles put into circulation from the time of the settlement until the year 2020 would be wheelchair accessible, with the goal of having 50% of the fleet accessible by 2020. The defendants also agreed to regularly report their progress to the plaintiffs. The parties did not agree on attorneys fees in the settlement, and the matter was subsequently referred to the court-annexed mediation program by Judge Daniels. Before the completion of the mediation, however, the parties reached a private agreement on fees, and the case was closed.

Summary: After the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission to make all new taxis wheelchair accessible, the TLC appealed to the Court of Appeals. On June 28, 2012, it reversed. It concluded that although the TLC exercises "pervasive control" over the taxi industry in New York City, it is not required by the ADA's Title II(A) to use its regulatory apparatus to ensure that private taxi companies provide meaningful access to taxis. The case was remanded to the district court, where the parties entered in a court-approved settlement agreement. In it, the Taxi & Limousine Commission agreed to that 50% of new vehicles added to the streets of NYC would be wheelchair accessible, with the goal of reaching 50% total accessibility by 2020.


On October 11, 2005, students from various district of California public schools filed this class action suit, in conjunction with the American Diabetes Association, in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California. The suit was filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act against the California Department of Education and various school districts throughout California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel as well as the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, asked the court for class action certification and an injunction compelling districts to provide all children with diabetes care to enable them to access education. The plaintiffs claimed that the school districts, often not having a full-time nurse on duty, were not providing appropriate care and management of diabetes for students with the disease. The students, who often cannot administer or monitor their own glucose levels, were either made to change their physician-mandated medical plans due to the schools' lack of resources, miss large amounts of class time while waiting in the office for a family member to come to school to administer an insulin shot, or to miss school due to lack of resources for monitoring blood sugar and administering insulin shots, among other consequences. The plaintiffs claim that this denies them a free and appropriate education in the least restrictive environment possible due to a physical disability, violating the above statutes. By August 2007, the plaintiffs had reached settlement agreements with various parties and had dismissed the complaints against the defendants. A 2007 Legal Advisory of the California Department of Education states that the settlement agreement, among other things, requires California public schools to provide management of diabetes and administer insulin in accordance with the child's physician's management plan. The 2007 Legal Advisory also notes that school placement cannot be based on the unwillingness of a school to provide for a child with diabetes and that plans must be individualized. In an offshoot of this litigation, American Nurses Assn. v. Torlakson (ED-CA-0009), a group of nurses challenged the 2007 Legal Advisory as in violation of state law. A trial and appellate court agreed, but the California Supreme Court reversed, explaining that "California law does permit trained, unlicensed school personnel to administer prescription medications, including insulin, in accordance with written statements of individual students' treating physicians, with parental consent (Ed. Code §§ 49423, 49423.6; tit. 5 §§ 600-611.)..." American Nurses Association v. Tom Torlakson, 57 Cal.4th 570 (2013), 591. The settlement therefore survived that state court challenge. On April 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Maxime M. Chesney) denied a motion by the plaintiff for attorney's fees and expenses for ongoing monitoring of defendants' compliance on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. 2012 WL 1380243. That decision was overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in an opinion by Judge Nguyen on August 11, 2014, which affirmed the District Court's jurisdiction over the matter and remanded to the District Court to decide whether or not to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. 762 F.3d 963. On remand, on March 20, 2015, Judge Chesney held that attorneys fees were appropriate; the parties then settled the fee issues and the case was dismissed on July 1, 2015.

Summary: In 2005 students in California public schools requested an injunction requiring schools to monitor blood sugar levels and administer insulin shots to diabetic students. The students and schools reached a settlement agreement in 2007, but the settlement agreement is now complicated by an ongoing case that found it permissible for trained unlicensed personnel to administer insulin shots.


On August 4, 2014, advocates for A.B. and other legally incompetent criminal defendants in county jails in Washington State filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued the Washington Department of Social and Health Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 12111 et seq.; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. They sought both injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the rights of A.B. and similarly situated persons were violated by the delay between being deemed legally incompetent and being transferred to a mental health facility. In response to a prior order for immediate transfer of A.B. to a mental health facility, the State explained that the state-run facility that they ordinarily utilized for legally incompetent defendants such as A.B. did not have enough physical bed space to promptly treat every patient. The State argued it was under no deadline to transport legally incompetent defendants for treatment. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued that the State's failure to adhere to a seven-day deadline imposed by Washington law, RCWA 10.77.220, constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. On September 12, 2014, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, added three additional named plaintiffs, and sought class certification. The court granted the class certification. On November 6, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and a declaration that the defendants' conduct had violated the due process rights of the named plaintiffs and class members. On December 22, 2014, the court declared: <blockquote> The Due Process Clause protects the liberty interests of individuals to be free from incarceration absent a criminal conviction, and to receive restorative treatment when they are being incarcerated due to mental incompetence. Defendants' failure to provide timely services to these detainees has caused them to be incarcerated, sometimes for months, in conditions that erode their mental health, causing harm and making it even less likely that they will eventually be able to stand trial. Because this failure violates the due process rights of criminal defendants who are mentally ill or suspected to be mentally ill, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion and declares that Defendants have violated their constitutional rights.</blockquote> 2014 WL 7338747 at *1. There was a seven-day bench trial in March 2015. The court heard facts to determine what amount of time legally incompetent detainees could be made to wait for transfer to a mental health facility without experiencing a violation of their due process rights. On April 2, 2015, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered the defendants to stop violating the class members' constitutional rights by providing timely competency evaluation and restoration services. The court also entered a permanent injunction requiring the provision of competency services within seven days. The court appointed a monitor to ensure that progress toward the timely provision of services was being made. 101 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Subsequently, the defendants asked the court to modify the permanent injunction in four ways. On May 6, 2015, the court modified the permanent injunction to allow for a good cause exception to the seven-day timeframe for class members ordered to receive competency services at state hospitals where a class member’s health prevented them from being medically cleared to be transported, despite the defendants’ good faith efforts. The court denied the defendants’ other requests for modification. On June 22, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The court awarded $1,303,169 in fees and costs. The defendants also appealed this decision. The defendants appealed the December 2014 grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the court's judgment, the permanent injunction, and the denial of the defendants' motion to modify the injunction. While the appeal was pending, the defendants again asked the district court to modify the permanent injunction. On February 8, 2016, the district court modified the permanent injunction and extended the defendants’ compliance deadline to May 27, 2016, along with other minor changes. At two different points, the plaintiffs moved for temporary restraining orders due to safety issues at two different facilities: Yakima Competency Restoration Center and Maple Lane Competency Restoration Program. First, on March 17, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for an order temporarily restraining the defendant from assigning class members to receive restoration treatment at the Yakima Competency Restoration Center. They claimed that the partially renovated jail was unsafe and violated the court’s orders, as the class members are to be provided services in a state psychiatric hospital or a facility that is therapeutically comparable to the hospital. After considering the motion, defendants’ response, the plaintiffs’ subsequent reply, oral arguments, and findings from a court visit to the facility, on April 12, 2016, the court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion. The court found that there were unacceptable risks of irreparable harm to class members and staff posed by the facility’s staircase and its seclusion and restraint room. The court explained that these spaces presented an opportunity for suicide, especially given that the facility did not have a clear policy on the use of seclusion and restraint. However, the court agreed with the defendants that immediately closing the Yakima program would not be in the best interest of the class members or the public. Thus, the court issued a modified temporary restraining order prohibiting use of the facility’s second floor and seclusion and restraint room unless and until the risks presented are remediated. Per the plaintiffs’ subsequent motions, the court extended the temporary restraining order twice (April 24 and May 10, 2016), leaving it in effect until May 20, 2016. On May 20, 2016, the court lifted the portion of the order restricting use of the seclusion and restraint room. On June 29, 2016, the parties entered a stipulated agreement regarding use of the facility, specifying that the facility had been modified consistently with the court order. On June 30, 2016, the court issued an order stating that the court agrees that there is no further restriction on the use of the stairwell, and that the stairwell and second floor of the facility may be used freely. Second, on May 19, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining DSHA and its Maple Lane contractors from exposing plaintiffs to an unsafe stairwell at the Maple Lane facility. On June 6, 2016, the court granted the motion with some modification. The court ordered that no members may access the second floor until the staircase risks have been remediated, except for in one wing of the facility in which remediation efforts were completed. On June 7, 2016, the defendants submitted proof of compliance at the facility; they explained that remediation efforts for the rest of the staircases had been completed. On June 10, 2016, the court lifted the temporary restraining order. Meanwhile, the issue of timeframe for conducting evaluations was being considered on appeal. On May 6, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion regarding the timeframe for conducting competency evaluations. 822 F.3d 1037. The court agreed with the district court that DSHS must conduct the evaluations “within a reasonable time following a court’s order,” but found that the seven-day mandate “imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the Constitution requires.” The court therefore vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day requirement and remanded to the district court to amend the injunction. The plaintiffs moved the court several times to find the defendants in civil contempt of its prior court orders. On May 10, 2016, the plaintiffs withdrew a previous civil contempt motion (dated May 5) and made a new motion. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to meet important compliance deadlines and were not on track to meet the court’s amended compliance deadline of May 27, 2016. Despite court orders, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide timely competency services. On May 26, 2016, the plaintiffs moved the court to find the defendants in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s order to admit class members to state hospitals for competency evaluations within seven days of a court order. On June 2 the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the scope of the injunction regarding in-jail evaluations. The plaintiffs claimed that a 10-day requirement for completing jail-based competency requirements serves all legitimate state interests regarding timely completion. On June 30, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to reconsider the scope of the injunction regarding timing of services and inpatient evaluations. On July 7, 2016, the court issued an order of civil contempt. The court imposed monetary sanctions on the defendants, to be continued until the defendants complied by providing timely services. The court issued many money judgments regarding the civil contempt payments throughout the litigation. On December 20, 2016, the court granted the parties’ joint motion to amend the monetary fines imposed as contempt sanctions, ordering a single judgment for $7,486,500 in sanctions to date. After this date, the court made more money judgments. On August 15, 2016, the court issued an order modifying the permanent injunction as to in-jail competency evaluations. The court considered this matter on remand from the Ninth Circuit. The court modified the injunction to require in-jail competency evaluations to be completed within fourteen days of the signing of a court order. On August 17, 2016, the court issued an order denying defendants’ motion to reconsider the order of civil contempt in all respects except with regard to a transcription error. On August 19, 2016, the court issued an order denying the defendants’ motion to reconsider the injunction regarding timing of services and inpatient evaluations. On September 14, 2016, the defendants appealed the judgment and order modifying the permanent injunction as to in jail competency evaluations, and the order denying their motion to reconsider the injunction regarding timing of services and inpatient evaluations. On October 13, 2016, the court granted plaintiffs’ second motion for attorney’s fees and costs, awarding plaintiffs $1,267,769.10 in attorneys fees, and $35,400.38 in litigation costs (subject to reductions previously detailed in the original order on attorneys’ fees). On November 14, 2016, the defendants appealed this order. On February 1, 2017, at the direction of the court, the defendants submitted a proposed compliance plan. The plan details how DSHS would admit class members to receive competency evaluations, treatment services, and in-custody evaluation services. The plan includes proposals to increase competency evaluation capacity, expand bed capacity for inpatient competency services, and diversion and triage, and it also addresses various recommendations that had been made by the plaintiffs. On February 21, 2017, the court issued an order expanding the court monitor’s authority and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the parties had been engaging in mediation regarding the issues on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On February 15, 2017, the parties informed the Ninth Circuit that they resolved the matter contingent on district court approval of their settlement. On February 23, 2017, the appeal was remanded to the district court for consideration of the settlement. On March 17, 2017, the parties made a joint motion to adopt the mediated settlement agreement. The parties’ agreement includes the following principles: the parties will jointly generate outreach documents to inform courts of their obligations regarding timing of services; DSHS shall complete in-jail competency evaluations within either 14 days from receipt of order (or 21 days from signature or order); DSHS shall admit class members for inpatient competency evaluation or restoration within 7 days from receipt of order (or 14 days from signature of order); orders will be deemed received as of the time they are electronically transmitted; the defendants will continue to track the data. On April 26, 2017, the court partially adopted the parties' mediated settlement agreement. Specifically, the court adopted the provisions of the proposed settlement agreement concerning outreach, the deadline for in-jail competency evaluations, the deadline for in-patient evaluation and restoration services, receipt of order, the trigger point for notice to plaintiffs' counsel, and the defendants' data collection. Additionally, the court modified the prior orders of the court in order to conform with this new agreement. On August 30, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' third motion for attorney’s fees and costs, awarding plaintiffs $1,108,351.50 in attorneys fees, and $8,270.45 in litigation costs. The defendants appealed this order on September 27, 2017. On October 19, 2017, the court issued an order on the plaintiffs' second motion for civil contempt. The court found that the defendants were in contempt of court, as they had failed to: comply with the court’s orders requiring the timely completion of in-jail competency evaluations, take all reasonable steps to reduce wait times for in-jail competency evaluations, hire sufficient staff to timely respond to the demand for in-jail competency services, diversify the types of medical professionals serving class members, and secure sufficient temporary contracted staff to respond to unanticipated increases in evaluation orders. The court noted that it would continue to impose monetary sanctions, as well as a reporting requirement in order to facilitate payment of the contempt fines. In December 2017, the defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeals of the court's attorney’s fees and costs awards. On January 12, 2018, the parties submitted an agreement resolving the pending motions and setting up a settlement negotiation process. Throughout 2017 and 2018, the court continued to issue many money judgments regarding the civil contempt payments. On March 28, 2018, the court granted the parties' stipulated motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding the plaintiffs $444,473.46 in total. The court awarded an additional $263,006.60 in attorneys' fees and $3,571.80 in costs on October 4, 2018, as well as an additional $290,181.00 in attorneys' fees and $763.21 in costs on January 3, 2019. After filing a motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement on August 16, 2018, the parties filed an amended settlement agreement on October 25, 2018. The agreement covered the substantive areas of competency evaluation; competency restoration; crisis triage and diversion supports; education and training; and workforce development. The agreement required the State to support and work to achieve legislative changes to reduce the number of people ordered into competency evaluation and restoration, and to use community-based restoration services. The agreement contained three implementation phases, focusing on various regions. Additionally, the defendants agreed to use a sustainable oversight structure to inform and provide supervision for high-level policymaking, planning, and decision-making on targeted issues. The parties also asked the court to suspend the entry of judgments for continuing contempt fines beginning December 1, 2018 (except those fines accumulated under the court's order regarding jail-based evaluations). Finally, the agreement's terms would remain in effect until the defendants achieve substantial compliance with its various requirements. On November 1, the court issued its order for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Following a fairness hearing on December 11, the court issued its final approval of the settlement agreement. The court directed the parties to submit quarterly reports on the implementation beginning in April 2019. On March 11, 2019, the parties filed with the court a preliminary implementation plan for the settlement agreement. This preliminary plan will be subject to refinement and will eventually result in a final implementation plan. The April 2019 implementation report noted the passage of several legislative enactments that would create greater diversion opportunities for class members and reduce the number of individuals ordered into competency evaluation and restoration services. The report also noted that the State had created several work groups and committees to implement the agreement. There were no overdue or incomplete action steps within the preliminary implementation plan. Finally, the report noted that implementation efforts will expand substantially during the second half of 2019. As of August 13, 2020, the court is holding periodic status conferences, the State is continuing to report compliance data, monitoring is ongoing, and the court continues to issue monthly monetary contempt judgments against the defendants.

Summary: In 2014, advocates for a class of legally incompetent criminal defendants in Washington filed suit against the Washington Department of Social and Health Services seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief for the cruel and unusual punishment, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and violation of due process rights that stem from prolonged in-jail detention prior to transfer to a mental health facility. After a bench trial, the court issued a permanent injunction requiring the provision of competency services within seven days. The defendants appealed the injunction. During the litigation, the court considered restraining orders due to safety issues at two facilities - the safety issues were later resolved. On July 7, 2016, the court issued an order of civil contempt. The court imposed monetary sanctions on the defendants, to be continued until the defendants complied by providing timely services. As for the issue on appeal, the parties reached a settlement, which was partially adopted by the court on April 26, 2017. In October 2018, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement, which sought to bring the defendants' into substantial compliance with the court's orders. The parties must submit quarterly reports on the agreement's implementation and the first report was submitted in April 2019. As of May 27, 2019, the court is holding periodic status conferences, the State is continuing to report compliance data, monitoring is ongoing, and the court continues to issue monthly monetary contempt judgments against the defendants.


On December 19, 2005 the Department of Justice (DOJ), Civil Rights Division, initiated an investigation into the conditions and practices at the Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH), the largest of five state-run psychiatric hospitals in the State of Connecticut, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (CRIPA). A report of findings was submitted to the governor of Connecticut on August 6, 2007. The DOJ’s investigation found that CVH regularly failed to: (1) adequately protect patients from harm and undue restraints; (2) provide adequate psychiatric and psychological services; and (3) ensure adequate discharge planning and placement in the most integrated setting appropriate to each patient’s individualized needs. The report formally put CVH on notice that failure to improve conditions would result in a lawsuit. On January 20, 2009, the Department of Justice filed suit against the state of Connecticut and its Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services in U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut for the aforementioned pattern of practices at CVH, that violated the constitutional and federal statutory rights of patients under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (CRIPA). The lawsuit was filed along with a settlement agreement and joint motion to dismiss. Judge Alvin W. Thompson approved the settlement on July 8, 2009 and conditionally dismissed the suit. In the settlement, Connecticut agreed to a wide variety of practice changes and a period of supervised operation. The state agreed to provide care and treatment “based on professional standards of practice that shall seek to: A. ameliorate symptoms such that a less restrictive locus of treatment may safely be employed; B. strengthen and support individuals’ rehabilitation and recovery; and C. enable individuals and grow and develop in ways benefiting their health and well-being.” The settlement called for an environment that maximizes safety and is predicated on respect between the staff and those whom they serve. In addition, it mandated implementation of integrated treatment plans and interdisciplinary staff teams to increase the efficacy of treatment provided. Furthermore, the settlement outlined extensive changes in the psychiatric and psychological care provided in order to increase the safety and wellbeing of patients while also reducing the risk of harm and suicide that was extensive at CVH. Across the board, the settlement emphasized that care provided be consistent with generally accepted professional standards of care and that the environment at CVH be sufficiently humane to reduce the risk of harm. The settlement outlined a 48-month period of supervised implementation after which the agreement would terminate provided that CVH had demonstrated substantial compliance with the terms. On September 25, 2013, the Court approved a notice of substantial compliance with certain terms of the settlement agreement and extension of termination that was filed by the State. On May 22, 2015, the Court approved the State’s notice of substantial compliance and motion to terminate the settlement agreement, effectively terminating the Court’s ability to enforce the agreement. Although the notice of substantial compliance and motion to terminate was accepted and granted, news suggests that as late as mid-2017, patients at the Connecticut Valley Hospital continued to suffer from widespread abuse. On September 6, 2017, the Connecticut State Police announced the arrests of nine CVH employees on charges on cruelty to persons and disorderly conduct. Reports from the Associated Press and Channel 3 Eyewitness News (the New Haven area CBS news affiliate) detail violence, humiliation, and sexual harassment suffered by inmates at the hands of CVH employees.

Summary: On January 20, 2009, the Department of Justice filed and settled a lawsuit with the State of Connecticut for practices at the Connecticut Valley Hospital, a state-run psychiatric facility, that violated the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (CRIPA). In the settlement, Connecticut agreed to a wide variety of practice changes and a period of supervised operation. On May 22, 2015, the Court approved the State’s notice of substantial compliance and motion to terminate the settlement agreement, however, news suggests that as late as mid-2017, patients at the Connecticut Valley Hospital continued to suffer from widespread abuse.


On December 12, 2007, a group of plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO), as well as Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of Latino persons who have been or will be stopped, detained, interrogated, or searched by the Sheriff or his agents in moving or parked vehicles in Maricopa County. They alleged claims under the Fourth Amendment (search and seizure) and Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection) to the U.S. Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and the Arizona state constitution. The plaintiffs were represented by private pro bono attorneys, the American Civil Liberties Union (both local and national), and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. The United States Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division and local U.S. Attorneys) appeared in the case as amicus, explaining that they had a sharp interest in the matter because of its separate civil rights lawsuit against the County, United States v. Maricopa County, PN-AZ-0001 in this Clearinghouse. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, claiming that defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of racial profiling and racially or ethnically discriminatory treatment in "enforcing" federal immigration laws against Latino persons without regard for actual citizenship or immigration status. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants have launched a series of "crime suppression sweeps" to target Latino persons for investigation of immigration status, using pretextual and unfounded stops, racially motivated questioning, searches, and/or baseless arrests. These sweeps include a volunteer "posse" that help to carry out defendants' policies and practices. Defendants had claimed authority under a limited agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). However, plaintiffs allege that the ICE agreement prohibits these practices, because the agreement only allows for questioning of immigration status once someone is suspected of violating a state or federal law more severe than a traffic offense. The plaintiffs further allege that defendants' pattern and practice of racial profiling goes beyond these "sweeps" to include widespread, everyday targeting and mistreatment of drivers and passengers in Maricopa County who appear to be Latino. The plaintiffs allege that Latino drivers and passengers are stopped at higher rates, treated more intrusively, and detained longer than similarly situated Caucasian drivers and passengers (even within the same vehicle). The plaintiffs also allege that defendants have set up a "hotline" for "tips" on illegal immigrants, which they allege invites individuals to equate race with immigration status. Finally, the plaintiffs allege a failure to train personnel and volunteers adequately and to promulgate appropriate policies to prevent infringement of plaintiffs' rights. Allegedly, the Sheriff made many public statements about his intent to "go after illegals" and said publicly that physical appearance was basis to question someone about their immigration status. On July 15, 2009, the court (Judge Mary H. Murgia) granted the defendants' motion for recusal. The defendants claimed that only the day after Judge Murgia ruled against them did they become aware that Judge Murgia's (identical twin) sister was the President and CEO of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR); they argued that accordingly, Judge Murgia must recuse herself. On the one hand, the court found that the motion was untimely, that the defendants had not shown any evidence of the court's bias, and that her sister's position was not enough to compel recusal. On the other, however, the court found that NCLR's "Stop the Hate" online campaign, which contains articles that are highly disparaging of these defendants and which takes a strong stand on disputed legal and factual matters in this case (and which contain pictures of the judge's identical twin sister) might lead the public to question Judge Murgia's impartiality, and that she should recuse herself in this close call. Melendres v. Arpaio, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65069, 2009 WL 2132693 (D. Ariz. July 15, 2009). The case was reassigned to Judge G. Murray Snow. On August 13, 2009, Judge Snow denied the County's motion to stay proceedings pending DOJ investigations. Melendres v. Maricopa County, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75364, 2009 WL 2515618 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2009). On October 13, 2009, the court approved a joint motion and stipulation of plaintiffs and defendant Maricopa County to dismiss Maricopa County without prejudice. On December 23, 2011, the court issued an order denying summary judgment and sending the case to trial in large part. Based on the few statistical sheets that were available, the court held that the finder of fact may draw the following inferences from the statistic sheets that MCSO shredded: that they would have suggested officers involved in special operations did not follow a "zero tolerance" policy requiring them to stop all traffic offenders; that they would have included a significantly higher number of arrests in the categories "Illegal Alien turned over to ICE/LEAR" and/or "Suspected Illegal Alien arrested on state charges" than records documenting ordinary patrol activity. Based on the recovered emails, the court found that the finder of fact could draw the following inferences from emails that MCSO irretrievably purged: that MCSO maintained a file of citizen complaints making requests for special operations; that MCSO conducted operations in areas named in the complaints; and that at least some of the citizen communications complained about "Mexicans," "day laborers," or "illegal immigrants" but did not provide a description of any criminal activity. Melendres v. Arpaio, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148187 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2011). On the same day, the court certified the class of "all Latino persons who, since January 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona." The court also enjoined MCSO and its officers from detaining any person only because they believe or know that the person is unlawfully present in the United States. Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959 (D. Ariz. 2011). The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office filed an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit. Later, on September 25, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District court's order. De Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2012). In the meantime, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, held in July and August 2012. On May 24, 2013, Judge Snow issued a 142-page decision finding for the plaintiffs. The court found the plaintiffs entitled to injunctive relief to remedy the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations caused by the Sheriff's Office past and continuing operations, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding the MCSO from:
detaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of vehicles in Maricopa County based on a reasonable belief, without more, that such persons are in the country without authorization;
following or enforcing its LEAR policy against any Latino occupant of a vehicle in Maricopa County;
using race or Latino ancestry as a factor in determining to stop any vehicle in Maricopa County with a Latino occupant;
using race or Latino ancestry as a factor in making law enforcement decisions with respect to whether any Latino occupant of a vehicle in Maricopa County may be in the country without authorization;
detaining Latino occupants of vehicles stopped for traffic violations for a period longer than reasonably necessary to resolve the traffic violation in the absence of reasonable suspicion that any of them have committed or are committing a violation of federal or state criminal law;
detaining, holding or arresting Latino occupants of a vehicle in Maricopa County for violations of the Arizona Human Smuggling Act without a reasonable basis for believing that, under all the circumstances, the necessary elements of the crime are present; and
detaining, arresting or holding persons based on a reasonable suspicion that they are conspiring with their employer to violate the Arizona Employer Sanctions Act.
The defendant appealed this decision, along with the denial of their initial motion to dismiss (Docket No. 13-16285). The parties negotiated a consent decree to ensure the Maricopa Sheriff's Office complied with the court's findings of facts for the plaintiffs. On October 2, 2013, after hearing the terms on which the parties could and could not agree, the court (Judge Snow) issued an order making the previous injunctions permanent and establishing the methods for compliance. The order required the Sheriff's Office to create a unit to aid in compliance and a system for identifying problematic behavior and provided for an independent monitor to ensure compliance. It further demanded that all of the Sheriff's policies and procedures conform to the US and AZ constitutions and laws, that the monitor review any of the Sheriff's immigration-related policies and practices, that all officers receive training on nondiscriminatory policing, that the Sheriffs create an accountable system for documenting traffic stops including dash-cam recording, that all complaints are brought forward and addressed, and that the Sheriffs get involved in the community to rebuild public trust. The Sheriffs appealed this order as well (Docket No. 13-17238), and it was consolidated with their previous appeal. On April 4, and October 10, 2014, the court issued orders amending the permanent injunction, giving the Monitor, rather than the Sheriff's Office, the community outreach responsibility to serve as a liaison between the public and the Sheriff's Office. The second of the orders amended the injunction to allow for body-mounted cameras as opposed to dash mounted cameras, for the purpose of recording traffic stops. On September 11, 2014, the court (Judge Snow) awarded attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs, as the prevailing party in a civil rights case, totaling $4,439,241.66. The court retained jurisdiction of this action for all purposes until such time as the defendants have achieved full and effective Compliance and maintained such compliance for no less than three years. On February 12, 2015, Judge Snow entered an order for an evidentiary hearing to address whether MCSO committed contempt of the court. This order was in response to a 2013 video released of Sheriff Arpaio telling his officers to disregard the court's order requiring them to track the race and ethnicity of the individuals they stopped. Further videos were retrieved showing officers had detained people against the court's earlier orders and that these officers had been unlawfully taking detainees possessions. On April 15, 2015, Justice John Wallace for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded Judge Snow's May 24, 2013 permanent injunction. He held that the the named plaintiffs were adequate class representatives and the district court had not abused its discretion. He found the requirement within the permanent injunction that monitors consider "disciplinary outcomes for any violation of department policy" and assess whether deputies should be subject to "civil suits or criminal charges for off-duty conduct" was overbroad. 784 F.3d 1254 The United States moved to intervene based on the "general public importance" of the matter. Judge Snow granted the motion on August 13, 2015. The United States's intervenor complaint cited violations of 42 USC § 14141(b) and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It sought equitable and injunctive relief. On August 26, 2015, Judge Snow issued an order amending the supplemental permanent injunction. In response to the defendants' appeal of the initial supplemental permanent injunction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all provisions except for those allowing the Monitor to consider MCSO's discipline for "any violations of department policy" and whether any deputies were repeatedly party to any "complaints, civil suits, or criminal charges, including for off-duty conduct." After the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Judge Snow narrowed the Monitor's considerations to only include violations pursuant to this particular case and injunction. Meanwhile, in a related case filed by the Department of Justice in 2012, Judge Silver for the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, settled certain issues but required the DOJ to pursue further relief within this case. (PN-AZ-0001 in this Clearinghouse). The parties then litigated evidentiary issues for several months. On May 13, 2016, Judge Snow issued a Finding of Fact holding defendants in civil contempt of the court and setting a hearing date for May 31, 2016. 2016 WL 2783715. Based on the Finding of Fact, the court found that the defendants' had failed to implement the court's preliminary injunction, failed to disclose thousands of relevant discovery items, and deliberately violated court orders. These actions harmed the plaintiff class, impeded litigation, and led to a trial that did not adequately address plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Judge Snow therefore issued an amended supplemental permanent injunction on July 22, 2016. The Injunction required MCSO to investigate all allegations of employee misconduct related to the issues in this case; implement misconduct related training, develop a civilian complaint intake, implement transparency measures, and ensure document preservation and production. It further demanded that all policies, procedures, protocols, training materials, and other relevant materials remain subject to review and comment by the compliance Monitor implemented in the first supplemental permanent injunction. 2016 WL 3965949. In November 2016, Paul Penzone defeated Joe Arpaio in the Arizona election for Sheriff. On January 13, 2017, the court replaced Penzone as the named defendant for the case. Prior to the change in defendant, Judge Snow issued an order on August 19, 2016 referring Sheriff Arpaio to a randomly selected judge for criminal proceedings to determine whether he should be held in criminal contempt for:
Violation of the court's December 23, 2011, preliminary injunction;
failure to disclose all relevant materials for the investigation; and
his intentional failure to preserve and produce required records as directed in the court's April 23, 2015, order.
The criminal proceedings continued separately to this case. On July 31, 2017, District Judge Susan R. Bolton issued an order finding Sheriff Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt. 2017 WL 3268180. The court found that Judge Snow’s preliminary injunction was clear and spelled out that detaining persons past the time sufficient to conduct a criminal investigation was a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights and that Sheriff Arpaio had to cease the practice immediately. Further, the court found that Sheriff Arpaio had the requisite knowledge of the order and that, based on public statements demonstrating flagrant disregard for the order, he had willfully violated the preliminary injunction order. On August 14, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio filed a motion for a new trial, and/or that the verdict be vacated, arguing that he was wrongfully denied a trial by jury. On that same date, he also filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal. After President Trump issued an Executive grant of clemency to Joe Arpaio on August 28, 2017, he filed an additional motion to vacate the verdict. Subsequently, the court dismissed the first two motions with prejudice, reserving only the motion to vacate the verdict. On October 19, 2017, Judge Bolton denied Sheriff Arpaio's motion to vacate the verdict, insofar as it sought relief beyond dismissal with prejudice. 2017 WL 4839072. The court held that although the presidential pardon spared Sheriff Arpaio from any punishment that otherwise might have been imposed, it did not "revise the historical facts" of the case. Thus, the judgment of conviction was maintained. Sheriff Arpaio appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. On April 17, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued an order appointing a special prosecutor to defend the district court’s decision. United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2018). The role of the “special prosecutor” under the order was limited to providing briefing and argument to the merits panel. A judge of the appeals court sua sponte called for a vote on whether to rehear en banc the order appointing a special prosecutor. Rehearing en banc was denied. On October 25, 2018, the Court stayed briefing in this case to allow the Solicitor General to consider whether to file certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. On January 1, 2019, the Solicitor General determined that the government would not seek certiorari in the Supreme Court and the appeals court reinstated a briefing schedule. Thus, the appeal in the contempt proceedings is still pending. Meanwhile, in the district court, the parties continued litigating over legal fees. Although they went to mediation, this was unsuccessful. On March 3, 2017, the Ninth Circuit ordered Maricopa County to pay $400,395.55 to the plaintiffs to cover legal fees. On March 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit ordered that an employee of Maricopa County pay the plaintiffs $52,877.42 in additional attorneys' fees for work performed on a motion to dismiss the employee's appeal of the district court's order finding that he had committed civil contempt for violating the injunction. In 2017, the Monitor noted that MCSO had completed the delivery of misconduct investigations training. As of November 2018, the Monitor noted steady improvement in the quality of internal investigations, particularly since completion of the training. On May 24, 2018, MCSO published its Third Traffic Stop Annual Report. The Monitor noted issues with the underlying data due to a lack of quality control procedures with MCSO’s contracted vendor responsible for the various analyses. MCSO has since contracted with a new vendor. Despite the Monitor's concerns with the data, the Report found that the issue of racial differences in post-stop outcomes is systemic and cannot be attributed only to a small number of deputies. The Report did, however, identify several deputies which were outliers when compared to their geographic peers and MCSO is working to address those outliers. The Monitor continues to oversee the MCSO's compliance with the multiple supplemental injunctive relief orders entered. The plaintiffs have filed a supplemental motion for attorneys' fees incurred from June 1, 2016, through August 31, 2017, in the total amount of $1,237,192.10. On April 12th, 2019 the court granted plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $747,836.24. In mid-June of 2019, the Independent Investigator, assigned in the Second Amended Second Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order, announced that he had completed his duties and that he was no longer needed to investigate MCSO affairs. In January of 2020 he submitted a letter to the judge charting the work he did and notifying him that he would be available to the court if he was required to testify. The Maricopa County Sheriff continues to submit reports to the court and the case is ongoing as of June 8th, 2020.

Summary: On December 12, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. They claimed that defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of racial profiling and racially or ethnically discriminatory treatment against Latino persons in an attempt to find people who are in the United States illegally. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' pattern and practice of racial profiling goes beyond unlawful "sweeps" to include widespread, everyday targeting and mistreatment of drivers and passengers in Maricopa County who appear to be Latino. The Court certified the class as "all Latino persons who, since January, 2007, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned or searched by MCSO agents while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in Maricopa County, Arizona." In May 2013, the Court found the MCSO in violation of the Constitution, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding racial profiling. The Court made the previous injunctions permanent and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The Court retains jurisdiction until the Sheriff has fully complied with the Court's order, pending the result of the Sheriff's appeal. In July 2016 the Court found that the defendants' had failed to comply with many components of the injunction. Judge Snow therefore issued an Amended Second Supplemental Permanent Injunction that required MCSO to investigate all allegations of employee misconduct related to the issues in this case; implement misconduct related training, develop a civilian complaint intake, implement transparency measures, and ensure document preservation and production. On August 19, 2016 the Court ordered Sheriff Arpaio to a randomly-selected judge for criminal proceedings to determine whether he should be held in criminal contempt for failure to comply with court orders. On July 31, 2017, the Court found Sheriff Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt. Sheriff Arpaio's appeal of the District Court's denial of his motion to vacate the verdict was denied by the 9th Circuit in February of 2020. In November 2016, Sheriff Arpaio was replaced by Sheriff Penzone. In 2019, the Independent Investigator that was assigned in the Second Amended Second Permanent Injunction/Judgment Order resigned, saying that he was no longer needed to investigate MSCO affairs. The case continues as the Court Monitor continues to oversee the MCSO's compliance with the multiple supplemental injunctive relief orders entered.


On June 29, 2007, the EEOC filed this race discrimination case against Family Dollar Stores of Arkansas. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, on behalf of a former employee who claimed she was denied promotion opportunities and constructively discharged because of her race (black.) There was no discovery and the case was settled when a three-year Consent Decree was entered on June 30, 2008 by U.S. District Court Judge J. Leon Holmes. The Decree prevents the employer from denying promotions to black employees based on their race and prohibits retaliation against any employee or applicant. The Decree also requires non-discrimination awareness training for mangers and supervisors, EEO policy posting and $25,000.00 in damages to the claimant. The decree stayed in effect for three years from its entry on June 30, 2008. As of 2019, there have been no further entries on the docket, and the case decree presumably expired on June 30, 2011.

Summary: This race discrimination case was brought by the EEOC against Family Dollar Stores of Arkansas on behalf of a black former employee who claimed she was denied promotion and constructively discharged from her job based on her race. With almost no litigation, the case was settled with a three-year Consent Decree which requires the employer to stop denying promotions on the basis of race, to conduct non-discrimination training, post policies and not to retaliate against any employee or applicant. The employer agreed to pay $25,000.00 in damages to the claimant. This Decree is in effect until June 30, 2011; three years from its entry.


On February 12, 2015, the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), on behalf of its members (including three named in the complaint) and a proposed class, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the plaintiffs sued Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the Disability Law Center, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, the National Association of the Deaf Law and Advocacy Center, and private counsel. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction that would require MIT to provide accurate captioning on its online content. The plaintiffs claimed that MIT willfully violated the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act by not providing captioned video and audio content on its platforms and therefore excluded deaf and hard of hearing individuals from benefiting from said content. The plaintiffs alleged that based on information and belief, MIT did not have administrative procedures or policies in place to ensure that its online content had accurate captioning, whether or not that content had been created or produced by MIT itself. This issue extended back to 2010, when the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Education issued a joint letter to university colleges and presidents to make clear that the requirements of § 504 and ADA include technological devices when used by places of public accommodation. The following year, the Department of Education released an FAQ explaining that letter, indicating that its contents were predicated on legal precedents and that the letter would apply to all forms of emerging technology, including online content. Additionally, MIT has stated on its website how important captioning is to deaf and hard of hearing individuals. Despite all this and repeated requests from the NAD, MIT has yet to accurately caption much of its online content. After the initial filing of the complaint on February 12, 2015, MIT filed a motion to dismiss on May 11, 2015, citing issues of jurisdiction and a failure to state a cause of action. There were a number of responses on MIT's motion, including the filing of an Amicus Brief by a representative from the U.S. Department of Justice. While not directly involved in the case, the DOJ was an interested party and appeared to agree with the plaintiffs on this issue. On September 10, 2015, there was a hearing on the motion to dismiss held before the Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson. On February 9, 2016, Judge Robertson issued a report and recommended that the motion be denied in its entirety, for reasons identical to those in the related case the NAD filed at the same time against Harvard University. National Association of the Deaf v. Harvard University. Judge Mark Mastroianni adopted Judge Robertson’s reasoning and denied the motion to dismiss on November 4, 2016. On May 10, 2017, the parties agreed to try to settle the dispute using a private mediator. The parties met with a mediator over the course of several months but were ultimately unable to reach an agreement, and initial pretrial deadlines were set on July 23, 2018. On August 24, 2018, MIT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings to all claims. On March 28, 2019, Judge Katherine A. Robertson denied the motion in part, but granted it in part, for the same reasons under which a similar motion was granted in part in the lawsuit involving Harvard; MIT was entitled to immunity under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (477 U.S.C. §230) when publishing third-party's content, but not content created in whole or in part by MIT or by someone associated with it. Judge Robertson referred the case to mediation on August 23, 2019. After several rounds of mediation, the parties reached a consent decree, and Judge Robertson granted preliminary approval of the decree on March 27, 2020 (2020 WL 1495903, D. Mass.). The plaintiffs only sought injunctive relief to make MIT's online content in line with national standards for disability accessibility. The parties are notifying members of the class. Final approval of the settlement agreement is pending.

Summary: In February 2015, the National Association of the Deaf filed a proposed class action complaint against Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the complaint claimed that MIT harmed the plaintiffs and other deaf and hard of hearing individuals by not providing accurate captioning on much of its online audio and video content. The parties reached an initial settlement on March 27, 2020. Notification of class members is ongoing.


On May 7, 2014, a same-sex couple, who were legally married in California, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the state of Alabama. One plaintiff had given birth to a child, whom the other plaintiff wanted to adopt. Under Alabama law, non-biological parents may adopt their "spouse's child." The plaintiffs were not considered spouses, however, because the state did not recognize same-sex marriages. As a result, their adoption petition was denied and the couple filed suit. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare Alabama's same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. They also asked for an injunction, ordering the defendants to recognize same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions and to grant the plaintiffs' adoption petition. On June 12, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The next day, the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (Judge Callie V. S. Granade) found the motion to be premature. On August 20, 2014, Judge Granade adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted several parties' motions to dismiss: the Alabama Attorney General was now the only defendant. On January 23, 2015, Judge Granade granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding that Alabama's same-sex marriage ban violated the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses and enjoining the state attorney general from enforcing that ban. The freedom to marry was a fundamental right, the court held, protected by the Constitution. In order for Alabama to restrict that right, its same-sex marriage ban had to be narrowly tailored and it had to serve a compelling state interest. The court rejected the state's purported interests as either not compelling or overly broad. Thus, the ban was unconstitutional. Two days later, the district court stayed its injunction until February 9, giving the defendant time to seek a further stay pending appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On January 28, at plaintiffs' request, Judge Granade clarified her order. The Alabama Probate Judges Association had stated to the press that, despite the ruling, they were bound by Alabama law and could not issue same-sex marriage licenses. The Court stated that because the judgment was stayed, the Alabama probate courts were not required to follow the judgment. However, if the stay were lifted, the U.S. Constitution would require the probate judges to issue same-sex marriage licenses, because the court's order had found that Alabama's marriage laws were unconstitutional. On February 3, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte consolidated the appeals in this case and in Strawser v. Strange (PB-AL-0010 in this Clearinghouse), and denied the Alabama Attorney General's motions for a stay pending appeal. In response, the Attorney General filed an application for a stay with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit. That same day, the District Court denied plaintiffs' request to lift the stay. Late on February 8, 2015, with the district court's stay set to expire, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy Moore, sent an order to probate judges and state employees, threatening them with legal action by the governor if they issued or recognized same-sex marriage licenses. The chief justice claimed that the district court orders bound only the Alabama Attorney General and his employees and not Alabama's probate judges. On February 9, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the application for stay, with Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting from the denial. Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015). As a result, Judge Granade's orders took effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, at least according to the federal courts. Alabama's probate judges faced competing orders: the district court's would allow same-sex marriage, but Chief Justice Moore's would not. The result was legal chaos. Some probate judges followed the federal court order and issued same-sex marriage licenses but most probate judges refused and many ceased issuing marriage licenses entirely. In the plaintiffs' county, Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis refused to issue any licenses that day. Plaintiffs responded by filing a motion to hold him in contempt, which Judge Granade rejected because the probate judge was not a party to the case. That same day the plaintiffs re-filed their adoption petition. Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis issued an initial adoption decree but he added language saying "that this Decree is qualified in nature, and the Court will not issue a final adoption order until a final ruling is issued in the United States Supreme Court on the Marriage Act cases before it." The non-biological parent brought a new lawsuit against the probate judge for including this language. Searcy v. Davis (PB-AL-0011 in this Clearinghouse) Probate Judge Davis eventually removed the qualified wording from the adoption petition and the court dismissed that suit. In this case, Searcy v. Bentley, the only remaining issue involves attorneys' fees. On February 12, 2015, Judge Granade granted the plaintiffs' motion extending the time to file a petition for attorneys' fees until 30 days after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). Plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees on August 31, 2015. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part on May 27, 2016, awarding attorneys' fees of $126,206.66 and allowing plaintiffs to file further documentation in support of the remainder of their costs. The court additionally granted plaintiffs $500.98 in costs on June 28, 2016. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 7, 2014, a same-sex couple from Alabama, who were married in California, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Alabama U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Alabama. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, recognize same-sex marriages entered into outside of Alabama, enjoin Alabama from enforcing the marriage ban, and grant the plaintiffs' adoption petition. They alleged that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Full Faith and Credit Clause. Summary judgment was granted on behalf of the plaintiffs but the district court stayed the order's execution until February 9, 2015. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendant's requests to extend the stay. And so, the order went into effect. A probate judge issued the plaintiffs an adoption decree. The court granted plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.


On July 21, 2005, fifteen named indigent plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed this suit in in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of Gulfport, Mississippi. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, asked the court for class certification and injunctive relief, claiming that various city policies and practices related to the processing, fining, and jailing of indigent accused and convicted misdemeanor offenders violated the First, Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Mississippi state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the following policies and practices were illegal: incarcerating indigent debtors for failure to pay court-imposed fines and fees; denying accused misdemeanants the right to counsel at hearings where the accused faced incarceration; and effectively denying indigent persons access to public court records by levying unreasonably high record retrieval fees. On August 9, 2005, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding three more named plaintiffs to the suit. Seven months later, the defendants filed a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs' service of the complaint was improper and insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The District Court (Judge Louis Guirola) denied the motion on August 23, 2006. On September 27, 2006, the District Court stayed the case for 120 days pending settlement discussions. Following these discussions, the parties jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal on January 31, 2007, and the court closed the case. According to a February 1, 2007 article in Mississippi's Sun Herald newspaper, the plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal after the city: created a program allowing indigent debtors to perform community service in lieu of paying fines; granted temporary amnesty to debtors with overdue fines; implemented a new court document filing and retrieval system; and doubled its budget for public defenders.

Summary: In July 2005, indigent plaintiffs filed this class-action suit against the City of Gulfport, MS in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging that various city policies and practices concerning the processing, fining, and jailing of indigent accused and convicted offenders violated both the U.S. Constitution and state law. In January 2007, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the suit after the defendants amended their policies and practices to cure the alleged violations.


On September 29, 2006, the Detroit field office of the EEOC brought this suit against Rocket Enterprise, Inc. in the Eastern District of Michigan. The EEOC alleged that the defendant violated Title VII by allowing a co-worker of the complainant to sexually harass her and that the defendant retaliated against the complainant by terminating her after she complained about the harassment. EEOC sought permanent injunctive relief, monetary relief, and punitive damages. The case was assigned to Sean F. Cox. On July 18, 2007, the court referred the parties to mediation, which was unsuccessful. On August 13, 2007, the defendant moved for summary judgement, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the plaintiff's claims. The defendant's motion was denied on November 19, 2007 because there was no genuine issue of material fact (Judge Sean F. Cox.). On January 18, 2008, the parties agreed to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment and hostile work environment, leaving the retaliation claim alone. It is unclear from the docket why the parties came to this agreement. The case moved to a trial on the retaliation claim, which led to a jury verdict for the defendant on February 7, 2008. The EEOC moved for a new trial in February of 2008, alleging an erroneous verdict. EEOC's motion was denied on March 18, 2008. The EEOC then appealed in May 2008. It later voluntarily dismissed the appeal on February 3, 2009. The case is closed.

Summary: The EEOC brought this suit in September of 2006, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation for complaining about the sexual harassment. The suit went to trial, where a jury found for the defendant in February of 2008. The EEOC voluntarily dismissed the suit on appeal and the case is now closed.


On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against GNLV, Corp., d/b/a Golden Nugget Hotel and Casino along with several individual employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, modification of defendants’ policies, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was originally assigned to Judge Brian Sandoval and referred to Magistrate Judge Peggy A. Leen. After Judge Sandoval resigned, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Jones on September 16, 2009. The EEOC claimed that because of the defendants’ actions, claimants were exposed to a hostile work environment based on being black, female, or both. Specifically, the claimants alleged that the defendants subjected them to intimidation, threats of physical force, and racial slurs by co-workers, supervisors, and third parties. When the claimants attempted to report such offenses, the defendants allegedly retaliated by issuing verbal or written warnings or suspending the women from work. On February 15, 2007, the parties began settlement negotiations and were referred to Magistrate Judge George Foley for early neutral evaluation. However, no settlement was reached and parties began the process of litigation in March 2007. On October 28, 2008, the defendant’s motion to preclude the EEOC from adding additional class members was granted. On December 12, 2008, the defendants filed for summary judgement on the EEOC’s claim that they had employed discriminatory procedures, on their request for punitive damages, and on the merits of the individual class members’ claims. On June 2, 2009, the court granted summary judgement regarding the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim. 2009 WL 10679135. Based on this ruling, the six individual employees’ claims became moot. On June 12, 2009, the court issued a judgment in favor of the defendants. The court ordered the EEOC to pay $14,681.25. The EEOC objected to these costs. On August 3, 2009, the EEOC appealed to the Ninth Circuit from the final judgement entered in favor of the defendants. Specifically, they appealed the district court’s dismissal of the six individual employees’ employment discrimination claims and the district court’s order precluding additional class members from being added to the suit. Oral arguments were heard on February 14, 2011. On April 19, 2011 the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the six individual employees’ claims. The Circuit Court stated that judgment in favor of the defendant on the classwide discrimination claim did not prevent the individual employees from bringing forward their claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court barring additional class members from joining the suit. 2011 WL 1461444. On December 18, 2014, on remand, the district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment for three of the individual employees’ claims and granted and denied in part for the remaining claims. For the three claimants whose claims survived summary judgment in part, two had summary judgement granted on their claims for hostile work environment, one had summary judgement granted on her disparate treatment claim, and one had summary judgment granted towards her retaliation claim. The court denied summary judgment on two of the claims of retaliation and one claim of hostile work environment. 2014 WL 7365871. On June 1, 2015, the court granted and denied in part the EEOC’s motion for summary judgment on the defendant’s affirmative defenses initially filed on December 15, 2008. Of the defendant’s 21 affirmative defenses, the court granted summary judgement for failure to state a claim and punitive damages to the extent that those were defenses going to the sufficiency of the pleading; failure to exhaust administrative remedies to the extent they alleged administrative deficiencies to two of the individual employees’ claims; statute of limitations to the extent the defendant claimed the EEOC’s Title VII action was barred by the statute of limitations; lack of jurisdiction towards two of the individual employees’ claims; and unnamed defenses. The court denied summary judgement to the affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim and punitive damages to the extent those defenses raised substantive issues; failure to exhaust administrative remedies to the extent they related to one of the individual employee’s retaliation claim; statute of limitations to the extent the defense applied to any state tort claim being raised by the EEOC; lack of jurisdiction towards one of the individual employee’s claims; non-discriminatory reasons; privilege of an employer; failure to mitigate; laches; and the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act. 2015 WL 3467092. On June 11, 2015, the EEOC filed a motion to amend the court’s June 1, 2015 opinion. The EEOC argued that the court should have granted summary judgment in its favor on more of the defendant’s affirmative defenses. On July 6, 2015, the court denied this motion towards the defendant’s affirmative defenses of privilege of employer, mitigation of damages, and proximate cause. The court granted summary judgement on the defendant’s affirmative defense of state law. 2015 WL 13505878. On August 7, 2015, the parties proposed a pretrial order and scheduled a jury trial for April 4, 2016. But on February 17, 2016, the parties reached a settlement that was formally approved on March 1, 2016. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to comply with the Civil Rights Act, to post a notice on the employee bulletin board regarding employment discrimination until February 2018, and to hold trainings in 2016 and 2017 for all employees concerning the discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII. The defendants also agreed to pay the three remaining claimants a total of $30,000. Each party agreed to pay its own attorney fees and costs. The defendants denied all wrongdoing in agreeing to this settlement. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, employees of GNLV, Corp. filed this lawsuit through the EEOC, which alleged that the defendants discriminated and retaliated against their employees based on being black and/or female. In 2009, the court granted summary judgement to the defendant. The EEOC appealed and in 2011 the Ninth circuit reversed the motion for summary judgment. On remand in 2014, summary judgment was granted on three of the employees’ claims and granted and denied in part for the remaining three. Summary judgement was then granted and denied in part on the defendant’s affirmative defenses. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement as to the remaining claims, which required the defendants to pay monetary damages, comply with the Civil Rights Act, post a notice regarding employment discrimination, and hold employee training regarding discrimination and retaliation. The case is now closed.


On February 22, 2018, four Vietnamese refugees filed this habeas petition and class action lawsuit challenging U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for allegedly arbitrarily and unlawfully detaining them. In January 2008, the United States and Vietnam entered an agreement governing the repatriation of Vietnamese nationals facing final orders of removal to Vietnam. One limit made part of the agreement was Vietnam's decision not to agree to repatriation of any national who had arrived in the United States before July 12, 1995. As a result, from 2008-2016, ICE maintained a policy of releasing Vietnamese nationals facing final orders of removal from ICE custody, given the impracticability of their deportation. However, in 2016, ICE reversed its policy, detaining Vietnamese nationals with final orders of removal indefinitely. In the original complaint, the petitioners argued that this change in policy violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which prescribes a 90-day "removal period" in which to remove the detainee. Petitioners relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's 2001 opinion in Zadvydas v. Davis (533 U.S. 678), which held that Due Process precludes the United States from indefinitely detaining immigrants for whom it is not "reasonably foreseeable" that deportation can occur. In addition, petitioners argued that failing to provide an individualized assessment as to whether or not detention is even necessary, due to danger or flight risk, also violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and Due Process. Petitioners sought habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Represented by Asian Americans Advancing Justice and the private law firms Reed Smith and Davis Adams, the habeas petition was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (in Santa Ana). The petition proposed three classes of Vietnamese refugees held after receiving final orders of removal: those detained for more than 90 days (90-day class), those detained for more than 180 days (180-day class), and those detained for longer than 180 days without an individualized hearing to assess whether detention is necessary based on danger or flight risk (prolonged detention class). All class members arrived in the U.S. before 1995 and had lived in the United States as legal permanent residents (LPR) ever since. Class members faced removal proceedings after becoming involved with the criminal justice system and losing their LPR status. The case was initially assigned to Judge John A. Kronstadt. However, the plaintiffs in Chhoeun v. Marin, a case challenging ICE's detention of Cambodian refugees stripped of their legal permanent resident status due to criminal convictions, moved to relate this case to that one. On March 14, 2018, the motion was granted, and both cases were assigned to Judge Cormac J. Carney. On April 25, 2018, the petitioners moved for a preliminary injunction to secure the release of the named defendants. However, soon thereafter, ICE released them from detention, mooting the motion. At this point, the government moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that its claims were now moot. Petitioners responded by filing an amended complaint, acknowledging that the original named petitioners had been released from ICE custody and adding new named petitioners who were in ICE detention at the time of filing. In light of the amended complaint, Judge Cormac J. Carney dismissed the motion for a preliminary injunction on May 23, 2018, simply noting that the injunction was superseded by the new complaint and that the need for release no longer applied to the named petitioners in the original complaint. 2018 WL 3357577. Judge Carney denied the government’s motion to dismiss on September 6, 2018. 333 F. Supp. 3d 984. The court held that the petitioners' claims were not moot because, although the named petitioners were released from detention, they could still be re-detained at any time and therefore still had a live habeas relief interest. The court also held that the petitioners had successfully pleaded claims upon which relief could be granted as to their assertions that their post-removal order detention was unlawful when removal was not likely in the foreseeable future and that detentions over six months without individualized bond hearings are unlawful. On October 18, 2018, Judge Carney granted in part and denied in part class certification, granting certification to the 90-day and 180-day classes only as to the declaratory "issues of whether the Class has overcome the six month presumption of reasonableness and met its burden under Zadvydas [v. Davis (533 U.S. 678)]," declining to certify on the injunctive issue that would have limited the government's authority to detain immigrants past 180 days. The court furthermore certified the prolonged detention class, seeking injunctive relief to compel bond hearings for the detainees. 2018 WL 11184556. After a year and a half of discovery, the petitioners moved for summary judgment on March 6, 2020, and the government cross-filed a month later on April 10. On June 11, 2020, the government's motion was granted in substantial part, settling all of the declaratory issues in favor of the government. Judge Carney's opinion repeatedly noted the validity of the petitioners' arguments, writing that "many class members may be able to show that there is 'good reason to believe' their removal is unlikely" but concluded that sweeping declarations as such would be inappropriate where individualized, fact-intensive review is the norm, noting that Zadvydas claims are usually made in individual habeas hearings. Following this ruling, the petitioners moved to reconsider but then withdrew their motion. From there, the case went silent until May 5, 2021 when Judge Carney ordered the parties to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed and closed. The petitioners have since responded to that order; however the contents of their response have been sealed for reasons unknown. It is unclear how the change from the Trump presidential administration to the Biden administration has affected this case. Under the Biden administration, on March 15, 2021, 33 Vietnamese nationals, including at least one who arrived in the United States before 1995, were deported to Vietnam. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Four refugees filed this class action suit in the U.S. Central District of California on behalf of Vietnamese immigrants facing orders of removal and indefinite detention by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), despite the fact that Vietnam has stated that it will not repatriate nationals who arrived in the U.S. before 1995. Judge Cormac J. Carney certified three classes of Vietnamese immigrants held in ICE detention in 2018 but subsequently dismissed their claims for declaratory relief in 2020 on the basis that it was inappropriate to grant sweeping declarations where individual review is required. The case is ongoing.


On November 10, 2011, nine African-American voters in Maryland filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Maryland, under Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked for both declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that Maryland intentionally violated minority rights after the 2010 Census by only creating two minority-majority districts (out of eight total) despite 40% of the population being a minority. The plaintiffs argued that Maryland's approach to census data that required prisoners to be considered at their last known address, rather than at their correctional facility (and eliminating any prisoners whose last known address was outside the state from consideration) violated the Voting Rights Act, as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Over 70% of those not considered were black. The District Court (Judge Roger Titus) granted a motion allowing for a three-judge panel to hear the case (2011 WL 5854636) and later denied a motion to intervene by six additional Maryland residents (2011 WL 6097770). On December 23, 2011, the three-judge panel (opinion written by Judge Paul Niemeyer) granted Maryland's motion for summary judgment because states are allowed to tinker with census data as long as their method was not haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural (831 F.Supp.2d 887). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed (without opinion) on June 25, 2012, 133 S.Ct. 29.

Summary: The plaintiffs, nine African-American voters in Maryland, claimed that Maryland's redistricting intentionally violated minority rights because there are only two minority-majority districts (out of eight total,) despite 40% of population being minority. Maryland law took an approach to census data that required prisoners to be considered at their last known address, rather than at their correctional facility (and eliminating any prisoners whose last known address was outside the state from consideration.) Over 70% of those removed consideration were black. The three-judge panel ruled against plaintiffs because states are allowed to tinker with census data as long as it was not haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.


On September 21, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Bass Pro Outdoor World in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff brought the lawsuit for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that since November of 2005 Bass Pro engaged in a nationwide pattern or practice of denying employment to qualified Black and Hispanic applicants for hourly and salaried positions and that it retaliated against employees who opposed actions they perceived as unlawful or who otherwise complained or reported such incidents (including but not limited to sexual harassment and gender discrimination). The EEOC also alleged that Bass Pro destroyed or failed to preserve relevant records in violation of Section 709(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c), such as employment applications, personnel files, tests, lists of job candidates, and efforts to contact the corporate complaint center. The EEOC sought back pay, economic compensation, compensation for emotional suffering, punitive damages, and reinstatement of behalf of those affected. It also sought injunctions to end the allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory practices and to create and preserve records in compliance with the Civil Rights Act. Unusually, for the EEOC, the lawsuit was based on a "Commissioner's Charge" rather than a complaint by an employee. The case was assigned to Judge Keith Ellison. Bass Pro responded to the EEOC's 9-page complaint on January 5, 2012 with a motion to dismiss complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On January 26, 2012, the EEOC filed a 12-page amended complaint giving more factual detail for its allegations, such as statistics on the number of Black and Hispanic managers and another instance of retaliation. In this complaint the EEOC also added Bass Pro, Inc. (BPI), and Tracker Marine, LLC (Tracker), as defendants. Because the EEOC had filed a new complaint, Judge Ellison denied Bass Pro's motion to dismiss the original complaint as moot. On March 5, 2012, Bass Pro filed a new motion to dismiss seeking, among other things, not only dismissal of all claims based on a failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, but also to have the claims against Tracker and Bass Pro, Inc. dismissed on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. On May 31, 2012, the court granted Bass Pro's motion in part, giving the EEOC leave to amend the complaint. 884 F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D. Tex. 2012). The court found that the EEOC had made sufficient allegations to state the recordkeeping claim. Because the EEOC had not identified even one particular individual for its retaliation claim, that claim was dismissed with leave to amend. The court ruled that the 300-day limitation (barring suits for conduct that occurred more than 300 days before a charge is filed with the EEOC) applied to both claims under § 706 and claims under § 707 (pattern or practice). The court also ruled that the EEOC could not proceed on a hybrid § 706 and § 707 claim--pattern or practice claims could not be brought under § 706, and the EEOC had to provide sufficient allegations for each type of claim. For those reasons the court restricted the EEOC's claims to those that fell within February 2007 and April 2010 and dismissed the EEOC's discriminatory hiring claims because the statistics on managers did not plausibly suggest a pattern or practice of hiring discrimination for the wider category of salaried and hourly positions, as opposed to just manager positions. The EEOC filed a 247-page second amended complaint on July 20, 2012. The complaint greatly elaborated the factual details of the claims. The most notable additions were as follows: connecting the behavior of store lower-level management to a profile allegedly established by the owner of the companies at a meeting of Store General Managers, listing a total of 201 individuals (184 Black and 18 Hispanic) covering a range of states who were denied employment with details of their application efforts, identifying 5 targets of retaliation and narrating their attempts to complain about or correct unlawful activity, and providing statistic data from 24 stores across the country on the number of total Black and Hispanic employees as well as store-specific comparisons of percentages of Black and Hispanic Bass Pro employees to the percentage of Black and Hispanic employees in the county respectively (the comparisons involved manager and non-manager positions). The complaint did not explicitly differentiate §706 claims from §707 claims. The complaint also addressed jurisdictional issues. Bass Pro filed another motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on August 24, 2012. On October 25, 2012, the court dismissed the claims against BPI for lack of jurisdiction but deferred deciding jurisdiction over Tracker because Bass Pro had misidentified Tracker Marine Retail, LLC, as Tracker Marine and the EEOC hadn't had a full opportunity for discovery to establish jurisdiction. 2012 WL 13040407. On March 18, 2013, the court granted Bass Pro's motion to dismiss in part, with leave to amend. Noting that the allegations did not constitute a prima facie case of discriminatory hiring under § 706, the court found them sufficient to state the claim. The court held the combination of statistics and anecdotes to be sufficient to state a §707 pattern or practice claim. The court dismissed retaliation claims for 2 of the 5 individuals. The record-keeping claim was still valid. 2013 WL 1124063. The EEOC filed a third amended complaint on April 15, 2013 adding details for the retaliation claims that had been dismissed. On May 15, 2013, Bass Pro filed its response and a motion for summary judgment. The EEOC subsequently filed a motion for partial summary in its own favor, arguing that it had satisfied its duty to engage in conciliation before bringing a suit and that the court should not rule on that issue. On October 2, 2013, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the issue was reviewable. 2013 WL 5515345. On June 13, 2014, the EEOC filed its fourth amended complaint, correcting the name of one of the defendants. Because this was the only change, the parties agreed that the fourth amended complaint did not render Bass Pro’s motion for summary judgment moot. On July 30, 2014, the court denied this motion, reconsidering its denial of the EEOC’s motion for summary judgment and finding that the EEOC did meet the statutory requirements of conciliation. 35 F.Supp.3d 836. On November 17, 2014, the court allowed Bass Pro to file an interlocutory appeal. 2014 WL 6453606. Bass Pro appealed the July 30 order to the U.S. Appellate Court for the Fifth Circuit on February 10, 2015. The district court chose not to stay discovery pending the appeal. On May 8, 2017, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny Bass Pro’s motion for summary judgment. 826 F.3d 791. The panel was made up of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Judge Stephen Higginson, and Judge Leslie Southwick. On July 24, 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and the court entered a consent decree the next day. The consent decree required Bass Pro to reform its recruitment and hiring practices, provide anti-discrimination training, create an Office of Diversity and Inclusion, and pay a total of $10,500,000.00 to be distributed among the qualified Black and Hispanic applicants who had been denied employment at any of its stores nationwide. Pro Bass also had to report back to the EEOC. The consent decree was to be in effect for forty-two months (or three and a half years) after its date of entry, during which the court would retain jurisdiction. In September 2017, the court granted a motion to extend the deadlines for Bass Pro having to complete certain tasks. As of April 20, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket since then, which suggests that the parties have been compliant with the consent decree so far. The court will presumably continue to retain jurisdiction until January 2021, when the consent decree expires.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that since November of 2005 Bass Pro engaged in a nationwide pattern or practice of denying employment to qualified black and Hispanic applicants and that it retaliated against employees who opposed actions they perceived as unlawful. The case settled in July 2017. Bass Pro paid a total of $10.5 million in damages to be distributed among qualified Black and Hispanic applicants who were denied employment between February 2007 and April 2010. Bass Pro was also required to reform many of its hiring and conduct policies. The retains jurisdiction over this case until January 2021.