On January 25, 2018, SurvJustice, Equal Rights Advocates, and Victim Rights Law Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. These three nonprofit organizations sued the U.S. Department of Education under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by Democracy Forward, the National Center for Youth Law, and the National Women’s Law Center, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Department of Education’s decision to rescind sexual violence guidance documents issued in 2011 and 2014 created educational access disparities on the basis of sex and hampered the plaintiffs' ability to do their jobs. The complaint argued that the new policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It further argued that the decision had been made without the proper procedures, in violation of the APA. On February 21, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, including several new factual allegations regarding accusations of sexual assault against top government officials and adverse changes to universities’ policies as a result of the Title IX guidance. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that the plaintiffs failed to plead that the Department of Justice had a discriminatory purpose on May 2, 2018. On August 31, 2018, non-profit organizations Women’s and Children’s Advocacy Project, Equal Means Equal, National Coalition Against Violent Athletes, Allies Reaching for Equality, Women Matter, and We are Women filed a motion for leave to intervene as plaintiffs. These organizations argued that the parties and court did not address the issues raised in the organizations’ amicus curiae briefs as the plaintiffs did not amend the complaint to argue in favor of the right to equal treatment. Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley granted the May 2, 2018 motion to dismiss on October 1, 2018 because the allegations were insufficient to show standing to bring an equal protection claim; the 2017 Guidance was not a final agency action for purposes of an APA claim; and the allegations did not plausibly suggest that the defendants acted outside their authority for the ultra vires claim. 2018 WL 4770741. The first and third claims were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend, while the APA claim was dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 31, 2018 and the organizations refiled a motion for leave to intervene as plaintiffs on November 20, 2018. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on December 14, 2018. On February 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the APA claim. On March 29, 2019, Judge Corley denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of Article III standing but granted their motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' equal protection and ultra vires claims. 2019 WL 143141. On that same day, Judge Scott granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, finding that a recent Ninth Circuit decision warranted reconsidering the plaintiffs' APA claim. 2019 WL 1434144. Finally, Judge Corley denied the motion to intervene, finding that the motion was untimely, that the intervenors failed to establish Article III standing, and that the intervenors' interests were adequately represented by the existing plaintiffs. 2019 WL 1427447. On April 18, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a Third Amended Complaint, removing the ultra vires and equal protection claims and reinserting the APA claim. The plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 1, 2019, Judge Corley denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion. 2019 WL 5684522. She agreed with the defendants' argument that the challenged agency action was not "final" for purposes of judicial review under the APA. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal is pending.

Summary: In January 2018, SurvJustice, Equal Rights Advocates, and Victim Rights Law Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Education, alleging that the 2017 Title IX guidance created educational access disparities on the basis of sex and hampered the plaintiffs’ ability to do their jobs. The court ultimately granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the appeal is pending.


During 2003, a law professor residing in Illinois developed a mental illness. Due to this illness, a state court appointed the Office of State Guardian as guardian of his person and, in 2004, of his estate. He moved to Missouri, where a petition was soon filed to appoint a guardian for him. The guardianship in Illinois did not affect his eligibility to vote while residing there, but the guardianship adjudication had a different, prohibitive impact on his voting rights in Missouri. Thus, in October 2004, the former professor, as plaintiff and by the Office of State Guardian, filed a civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, naming as defendants Missouri's governor, attorney general, and several city election officials. The plaintiff alleged that, previously, he had been adjudged mentally incapacitated and appointed a guardian and, presently, would like to register to vote for, and to vote in, upcoming elections. Missouri, however, had a constitutional provision and a statute that barred incapacitated persons and those under guardianship from registering to vote and from voting. Alleging that these state laws denied him his fundamental right to vote and violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses, as well as statutory (and related regulatory) rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C § 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys fees and costs. Numerous attorneys represented the plaintiff, including those from Illinois' Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, the ACLU National Voting Rights Project, and the ACLU of Eastern Missouri. The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied in an unpublished opinion by District Judge Ortrie Smith on October 26, 2004. The judge ruled that it would be inappropriate to issue injunctive relief when the plaintiff had other means of protecting his voting rights, such as seeking in state court proceedings that any guardianship order applicable to him be limited in a way that allowed for him to vote. In December 2004, an amended complaint was filed. It made essentially the same attacks upon the state's limitations on voting eligibility, but added two additional individual plaintiffs under guardianship orders and one associational plaintiff, the Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc. ("MOPAS"). It also added another federal constitutional claim, alleging that the full faith and credit clause was violated by Missouri's law, since deprivation of voting rights occurred in Missouri based upon an Illinois adjudication that did not expressly deprive one of voting rights. Also in December 2004, the Missouri probate court acted upon the petition for appointment of a guardian for the original plaintiff. In an unpublished ruling, Circuit Judge Joan Moriarty found that the Illinois guardianship order had no extraterritorial effect and that the Illinois guardian had exceeded its authority in moving the plaintiff to a Missouri psychiatric facility. The judge directed that the Illinois guardian move the plaintiff to an Illinois facility. The probate court's ruling, however, was reversed on appeal eight months later. Appellate Judge Gary M. Gaertner, Sr., writing for a panel of the Missouri Court of Appeals, found that the Illinois guardianship order was entitled to recognition and enforcement under the federal constitution's full faith and credit clause, particularly given Missouri statutes that reflected a willingness to recognize guardianship judgments without regard to the location of the guardian or the ward. Thus, the Illinois guardian had acted appropriately in moving the plaintiff to Missouri. That the ward had been moved back to Illinois did not fully moot the case, according to the appellate panel, due to the significance of the lower court's erroneous ruling. In re Prye, 168 S.W.3d 116 (Mo. App. 2005). The federal case proceeded, in the meantime, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. These were ruled upon by Judge Smith on July 7, 2006, in an unpublished order. By this time, two of the individual plaintiffs had been dismissed from the case at their request (including the original plaintiff), leaving MOPAS and a plaintiff under a Missouri guardianship order as the challengers to the Missouri laws. Judge Smith first decided that the election board's recent issuance of a voter registration card to the individual plaintiff did not moot the case, because the defendants had not met their burden of showing the permanence of their voluntary cessation of the alleged wrongful conduct. Next, he ruled that the state's use of a guardianship scheme that required individualized determination of a person's abilities and limitations sufficiently allowed for differentiating those who are qualified to vote from those who are not and, so, did not violate the federal constitution or statutes. Additionally, the opportunity for review and modification of state guardianship orders gave wards recourse to protect their interests in voting. Accordingly, Judge Smith granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On August 23, 2007, that court affirmed the district court, although on somewhat different grounds. In an opinion by Circuit Judge James B. Loken, the court rejected the state's assertion of the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to suit against the state officials, since the named state defendants had "some connection" to enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional law. The state's arguments fared better, however, on the merits. Judge Loken noted that the state guardianship scheme did not categorically disenfranchise persons under full guardianship, since the state's courts retained authority to preserve a ward's right to vote in accordance with the state's statutory mandate to minimize deprivation of a ward's liberty. Thus, the state law did not deny equal protection or federal statutory rights, given the law's lack of a categorical bar to voting. Further, the court ruled that the advocacy group plaintiff (MOPAS) lacked standing to bring suit on behalf of mere constituents, who lacked the active relationship to the organization that exists when membership exists. Without participation by a ward who had been denied the right to vote because a guardian was appointed for reasons other than mental incapacity, MOPAS' assertion of the rights of such a hypothetical plaintiff was "too abstract," according to Judge Loken, who saw MOPAS as asking for an impermissible advisory opinion. Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc., v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007). Likewise, the remaining individual plaintiff could not prevail, since his local election board had denied him the right to vote in error, not noting that his guardianship order expressly allowed him to retain that right. The board, noting the error after he had been added to the case as a plaintiff, issued him a voter registration card. This made his pending claim for injunctive relief moot, as there was no reasonable expectation that the earlier error would be repeated. Further, he had no standing to assert the rights of others and had not been injured by the alleged flaws in the Missouri voting laws, since his voting rights had been preserved in the guardianship order. Id. Efforts to seek rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied on October 18, 2007. After the appellate ruling in favor of the defendants became final, no further material activity occurred in this case. The case is now closed.

Summary: Several Missouri residents with adjudged mental incapacities and appointed guardianship were barred from registering to vote and voting in elections in the state of Missouri. The individuals filed a civil suit in the Western District of Missouri against Missouri's governor, attorney general, and several election officials for violating their fundamental right to vote. The Federal District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary on the grounds that, because the state's guardianship scheme required individualized determination of a person's abilities and qualifications to vote, it did not violate the federal constitution or statutes. On plaintiff's appeal, the decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit for several reasons, including a similar reason to the District Court that the state guardianship scheme did not categorically disenfranchise all persons under full guardianship, and for the remaining plaintiffs' lack of standing.


On January 13, 2006, Illinois parolees who were re-arrested for alleged parole violations filed this class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) arguing that they had been unconstitutionally denied a timely parole revocation hearing. For violations of their constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiffs asked the Court for preliminary and permanent injunctions. On May 8, 2006, the court (Judge Robert W. Gettleman) certified a class consisting of individuals held for more than 10 business days without a preliminary parole revocation hearing. The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the parolees had a constitutional right to a prompt, preliminary parole revocation hearing and a limited constitutional right to confront and cross examine persons who had provided testimony or evidence which could be used to revoke parole. On November 2, 2006, the parties reached a settlement and submitted the proposed agreement to the court, which approved the consent decree on January 26, 2007. The consent decree set specific timelines, notice provisions, and guidelines for inspections for revocation hearings. It prohibited the assignment of any DOC employee or agent from serving as Hearing Officers. The Court also appointed a monitor to assess progress for one year after entry of the consent decree, to be paid for his services by the defendant. On January 23, 2008, the monitor reported that the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the consent decree. The Court approved the final report and discharged the monitor. In 2012, new lawyers appeared for the plaintiff class, from the Roderick Macarthur Justice Center, at Northwestern University law school, and the Uptown People's Law Center. On November 30, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for a rule to show cause alleging that the defendants were no longer complying with the consent decree. On October 30 and 31, 2013, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the allegations. After the hearing, the parties stated they wanted to resolve the matter via settlement, so the court reserved ruling on the motion to show cause. The parties did reach a second settlement agreement, and on April 24, 2014, the court approved an amended consent decree. For one year and 90 days following the entry of the amended consent decree, the plaintiffs' counsel had the opportunity to observe 15 parole hearings. The parties reserved the determination of attorneys' fees and costs for the Court. After proceedings regarding attorneys' fees and costs, the court awarded the plaintiffs $140,000 for attorneys' fees and costs on October 31, 2014. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, Illinois parolees who were re-arrested for alleged parole violations filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) arguing that they had been unconstitutionally denied a timely parole revocation hearing. The parties settled in 2006 and entered a consent decree, which the court terminated in 2008 because the defendants had reached compliance. However, the case was reopened in 2013 when the plaintiffs reported the defendants noncompliance, and the parties entered an amended consent decree in 2014.


On March 14, 2013, the United States Department of Justice filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The United States sued a Marion County-owned skilled nursing facility, the operation of which was largely funded through Medicaid, under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), alleging that the Defendant had a practice of violating the constitutional and statutory rights of residents at the nursing home. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant deliberately disregarded known harm or serious risks of harm to residents, and that its actions and failures to act caused harm to residents, including unnecessary segregation, and physical, mental and psychological harm. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant was violating the ADA by failing to serve individuals in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, by not taking sufficient steps to assess, identify, and prepare individuals for discharge from the facility to programs in the community. The Plaintiff also alleged the Defendant failed to adequately screen individuals who are required by federal law to be screened before admission, resulting in individuals being served in a more restrictive setting than appropriate to their needs. The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendant’s healthcare services “substantially depart from professional standards,” and thus failed to provide adequate healthcare, a constitutionally protected right. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant failed to monitor, evaluate, update, or review individual’s care plans, despite new diagnoses or changes in conditions. For example, the Plaintiff alleged that on multiple occasions, residents showing symptoms of a stroke or began to foam at the mouth sometimes waited hours before nursing staff noticed or notified a physician. These failures allegedly resulted in unnecessary harm, including hospitalization, preventable falls, and a decline in functional abilities. Concurrently with the Complaint, the United States filed a settlement agreement, which it had already negotiated with the Defendant. The settlement involved a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment, and mandated improvements in three areas: (1) placement in the most integrated settings, (2) conditions of care and treatment, and (3) protection from harm. On March 22, 2013, Judge Charles A. Shaw for the United States District for the Eastern District of Missouri issued an order entering the settlement agreement as an order of the court. The Agreement provided for a third party to serve as the Monitor of compliance with the Agreement. The Agreement provided that it should terminate when the Defendant achieved substantial compliance with each provision of the Agreement and has maintained substantial compliance with the Agreement for a period of two years. First, to ensure placement in the most integrated settings, the Agreement required the Defendant to conduct adequate pre-admission evaluations to ensure that individuals were not inappropriately admitted to the facility. The Defendant was also required to implement a discharge and transition process to ensure that individuals who could be served in more integrated settings were identified and that such individuals would be part of a robust and individualized discharge planning process and implementation. The Agreement also provided for “in-reach” by community service providers to residents to actively support them in moving to more integrated settings. The Agreement established specific requirements for the “care plan,” or formal written individualized plan of treatment, required for each individual living at the nursing home and those at risk of being institutionalized there. The Defendant was required to implement a quality assurance process to oversee the discharge and transition process. It was required to review this information on a quarterly basis, and on an annual basis, create a report summarizing its quality assurance activities, findings, and recommendations, and evaluate whether it had been effective in addressing the barriers preventing individuals from receiving services in the most integrated, appropriate settings. Second, to improve the Defendant's conditions of care and treatment, the Agreement required the Defendant to provide individuals at Maple Lawn with adequate and appropriate protections, treatment, supports, and services to meet the individualized needs of the individuals and that are consistent with generally accepted professional standards. This involved the following: improving health care assessments and care plans, establishing an effective infection control program to minimize the spread of infections or communicable diseases, ensuring that nutrition and hydration services as well as aspiration prevention care were sufficient, improving its psychiatric and psychosocial services, specifically its policies about psychotropic medication, improving pressure sore prevention and treatment policies, providing adequate pain management services, mortality reviews for individuals who die at the Defendant’s facility or at an acute-care facility after being transferred from the Defendant’s facility, and annual quality assurance reporting. Third, the Defendant was required to provide individuals with a safe and secure environment and ensure protection from harm. The Agreement mandated improvements in the Defendant's fall prevention and reporting policies, adequate reporting and investigation of all incidents where individuals sustain injuries, and annual quality assurance reporting. The Agreement provided for a third party to serve as the Monitor of compliance with the Agreement. The Agreement provided that it should terminate when the Defendant achieved substantial compliance with each provision of the Agreement and has maintained substantial compliance with the Agreement for a period of two years. The Monitor’s first Semi-Annual Compliance Report was adopted by the Defendant and filed with the court on September 19, 2013. On January 30, 2014, the Plaintiff and Defendant filed a joint statement regarding Defendant’s compliance with the settlement agreement, informing the court that they both agreed with the Monitor’s finding that as of January 15, 2014, the Defendant had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the Agreement. For the next two years, the Monitor and Defendant filed semi-annual reports on compliance with the settlement agreement. On April 15, 2016, the Plaintiff and Defendant filed a joint stipulation and motion for dismissal, in which they agreed and stipulated that the Defendant achieved substantial compliance on January 15, 2014 and remained in substantial compliance at all times through January 15, 2016. The parties jointly stipulated to the dismissal of the action, and each paid its own costs. District Judge Rodney W. Sippel dismissed the case, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The United States sued a Marion County-owned skilled nursing facility under the ADA and CRIPA for alleged violations of the residents' constitutional and statutory rights. Concurrently with the complaint, the parties submitted a settlement agreement, requiring the Defendant to meet certain requirements related to terms of placement in the most integrated settings, conditions of care and treatment, and protection from harm. The District Judge issued an order entering the settlement agreement as an order of the court. After the parties agreed that the Defendant had met the Agreement's requirement of two years of substantial compliance, the parties filed a joint stipulation and motion for dismissal, and the case was dismissed.


On 06/28/1993, inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility filed a Section 1983 class action suit, pro se, in the Southern District of Ohio against officials in Youngstown, Ohio of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Plaintiffs' claims were related to the treatment of prisoners during the prison riot that occurred in April 1993. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants locked as many as ten inmates in a cell, failed to protect them from violence, did not provide them with water or working toilets, used excessive force, destroyed personal property, and denied medical care. In December 1993, Magistrate Judge Robert A. Steinberg appointed several private lawyers and certified the class. By the summer of 1994, counsel, along with their expert Steven Martin, negotiated an end to the post-riot lockdown of general population inmates. By February 1995, counsel negotiated with Defendants for a special Rules Infraction Board to handle the cases of inmates against whom administrative charges for riot-related, violent misconduct were filed. Following extensive discovery, the parties reached an agreement and signed the Class Action Memorandum of Understanding in January 1997. The settlement included two major parts. First, the settlement established terms to improve the ""quality of life"" including: single-celling maximum security inmates; modifying the inmate classification system; improving racial and cultural relations; securing at least forty hours of out-of-cell time per week; and instituting new state-wide directives on religious practices. Second, the settlement established a $4.1 million fund, from which inmate damage claims, attorneys' fees and expenses would be paid. The case was dismissed conditional on completion of the reforms specified in the settlement agreement. Following a fairness hearing, the District Court (Judge S. Arthur Spiegel) approved the settlement in April 1997. Michael R. Barrett was named Special Master and has filed several status reports regarding the distribution of the fund. However, extensive litigation continued regarding the distribution of the fund and attorneys' fees. On December 12, 1999, the District Court (Judge Spiegel) approved a recommendation by the claims administrator that the two class representatives be paid $7,500 apiece. The stated basis for these awards was that "the class representatives performed important work on behalf of the other members of class and class counsel," serving as a "crucial link for class members and counsel throughout the proceedings" and keeping the "class members generally informed in the progress of the case and relay[ing] information back to class counsel." In a subsequent order, the district court stayed its grant of incentive awards pending appeal. In 2001, the Sixth Circuit (Judge David A. Nelson) reversed the district court's decision to grant incentive awards to the two named plaintiffs and place all inmates' claim determinations under protective order. In re Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 2001 WL 1667267 (6th Cir. 2001). On November 4, 2002, Judge Spiegel entered an order granting class counsel's request for an order increasing the awards to class members pro rata and ordering the settlement master/trustee to distribute $500,000 to be awarded on a pro rata basis on each claimant's previous award totals. In 2004, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's disbursement of unassigned funds to certain prisoner-class members. The court held that the settlement agreement did not authorize the district court to make a pro rata distribution of the remaining settlement funds. Morris v. Voinovich, 2004 WL 1745781 (6th Cir. 2004). On January 20, 2005, Judge Spiegel approved the joint motion of the parties to distribute the remainder of the settlement fund. The remaining funds are to be used to support two re-entry caseworkers who will work with the class members to help them succeed on release. The court also acknowledged that sufficient effort had been made to attempt to track down all members of the class, and that the funds allocated to the former inmates who could not be traced were returned to the general pool. A second order on the same day awarded attorney’s fees to counsel representing the class. Funds were distributed between 2005 and 2007. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 1993 inmates at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility filed a civil rights class action for injunctive relief and damages for deprivations of rights based on the events and conditions of confinement after the April 1993 prison riot at the same facility. The court certified the class and the parties entered into a memorandum of understanding to settle the case. The memorandum of understanding outlined the steps Defendant would take to improve conditions of confinement and to address the deprivations of rights that occurred after the 1993 prison riot. The first component of the settlement agreement provides for an agreement on 11 issues aimed to improve the quality of inmate life. Among there are initiatives to review the housing and transfer policies and to improve racial, cultural, and religious relations. The second component of the settlement agreement established a $4.1 million fund, from which claims and attorneys fees would be paid. Claims were to be paid at the recommendation of the claims administrator, with any residual amounts to be used for inmate programming. There was further litigation concerning the right of two named plaintiffs to receive incentive awards. The district court granted incentive awards, but the decision was ultimately overturned by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.


On August 29, 2014 Ada County and the Ada County Coroner filed a complaint in the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho. They sued Disability Rights Idaho (“DRI”) under Idaho Code § 10-1201 et seq., (Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57. At the request of the defendant, Disability Rights Idaho, Inc. (DRI), the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho on September 8, 2014. On September 18, 2014 DRI filed a counterclaim under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI), 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. DRI sought injunctive and declaratory relief to challenge the refusal of the Coroner to provide timely access to the records sought. Ada County filed a motion to remand the case, but the motion was denied by Judge Edward J. Lodge on April 29, 2015. 2015 WL 1944003. Disability Rights Idaho (DRI) is a non-profit corporation that has been designated by Idaho to protect and advocate on behalf of people with mental illness, as defined in the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et. seq. (“PAIMI”). (PAIMI is a federal mandate that gives authority to investigate complaints of abuse, neglect, due process and rights violations in public and private facilities that provide overnight mental health treatment.) The dispute arose when the Ada County Coroner refused to provide its investigatory records relating to a suicide death of an individual, who had been residing in an inpatient behavioral health unit of an Ada County hospital. The Coroner denied DRI’s request for non-public records and initiated this declaratory judgment action in State court in response to DRI’s letter that stated they would initiate a federal lawsuit if necessary. DRI submitted an answer to the Coroner’s complaint and a counterclaim. On June 15, 2015 both parties submitted Motions for Summary Judgment. In addition, DRI submitted a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Ada County Coroner argued that regardless of PAIMI, DRI did not have the right to access the Coroner’s records of its death investigation, because the Coroner was not an “agency” as defined by PAIMI. The Coroner had also cited federal and state privacy concerns and questioned DRI’s probable cause to investigate the death. On July 20, 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a statement of interest stating that federal law was clear that P&A’s had broad access to investigatory records relating to mental health treatment facilities. The DOJ also stated that the Coroner’s office was an “agency charged with investigating,” as stated in PAIMI, because it was a division of the Ada County government that was responsible for investigating deaths. On March 7, 2016, Judge Edward J. Lodge entered a judgment in favor of DRI. The court held that the Coroner was an “agency charged with investigating” reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury under PAIMI and that the Coroner needed to release the records to DRI. 168 F.Supp.3d 1282. The case is now closed.

Summary: Disability Rights Idaho (DRI) sought records pertaining to the death of an individual, who had been residing in an inpatient behavioral health unit of an Ada County hospital. The Ada County Coroner refused to provide the documents and DRI counterclaimed that the Coroner was obligated to provide the documents due to the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (PAIMI). Judge Edward J. Lodge entered a judgment in favor of DRI instructing the Coroner to release the records.


In September 2006, the EEOC brought this suit against AutoZone, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under title VII of 42 U.S.C § 2000e. In this case, it is alleged that Autozone discharged an employee who worked in a store because he opposed discriminatory conduct of his supervisor (store manager) on the basis of race and sex. The EEOC asked for (a) a permanent injunction enjoining AutoZone from engaging in retaliating or any other employment discrimination practice on the basis of race, sex or retaliation; (b) an order for AutoZone to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs which provide equal employment opportunities; (c) an order for AutoZone to provide backpay and compensate to a discharged employee; and (d) punitive damages. In 2003, the employee recognized that his supervisor's conduct and statements towards employees and customers were racially and sexually derogatory and harassing in nature. The employee suggested his supervisor refrain from such behavior, wrote a letter to AutoZone's district manager about the supervisor's behavior, and visited AutoZone's regional human resources manager to report harassment by the supervisor. Autozone did not take any action about the reported behavior. The employee was then discharged by AutoZone in 2004. On October 30, 2007, the District Court (Judge Kristi DuBose) granted AutoZone's motion for summary judgment stating that (1) AutoZone's discharge of him did not constitute retaliation against him after the involvement of EEOC; and (2) the supervisor's actions did not rise to the standard of racial harassment and sexual harassment, which are requirement of protection under title VII. The District Court entered judgment for AutoZone and dismissed the EEOC's claim with prejudice .

Summary: In September 2006, the EEOC brought this suit against Autozone for discharging its employee who opposed discriminatory conduct of his supervisor on the basis of race and sex. The court dismissed the claim on 10/30/2007.


On April 13, 2010, a group of children in foster care in Clark County (Las Vegas), Nevada filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiffs sued the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, the Nevada Division of Child and Family Services, Clark County, and lark County Department of Family Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. (Previously, NCYL had filed a similar suit on behalf of another group of children, Clark K. v. Willden, in August 2006, but voluntarily dismissed it after the judge decided against certification of the class and all the plaintiffs had either aged out of the system or been adopted. That case can be found at CW-NV-0002 in this Clearinghouse.) Back in this case, the plaintiffs alleged that County and State officials failed to protect the health and safety of children in foster care. According to the complaint, foster children in the county were denied stability, health care, and, in many cases, even the most minimal level of safety. Many children were taken from their homes only to be subjected to physical, sexual, or psychological abuse while in the county's custody. For example, child welfare officials placed an infant and her older brother in a foster home where the baby was locked in a closet, and her brother was beaten when he tried to help her. Another plaintiff was shuttled through 40 placements in the 15 years she was in foster care. Another child was hospitalized twice in the ICU for near organ failure after being given an overdose of psychotropic drugs. The plaintiffs sought money damages for thirteen children named in the lawsuit, and systematic improvements for several classes of children that represent more than half of the 3,600 children in foster care in the county. The suit also sought improvements for children who had not had guardians ad litem appointed to represent them in court, children who had not been provided early intervention services, and children who were sent to foster parents without case plans that contain the information needed to properly care for them. In May 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim. After extensive hearings and related motions, on Oct. 26, 2010, U.S. District Judge Robert C. Jones dismissed the action, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs failed to assert a clearly established constitutional right. 2010 WL 4362809 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2010). The plaintiffs, however, then appealed. On May 4, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that foster children have a clearly established constitutional right to safety and adequate medical care. 678 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J.). On remand, the district court ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and the defendants to respond. On July 20, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and in August 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss. Because of the delay that caused by the appeal, however, the plaintiffs had aged out of foster care, moved home with their families, or had been adopted. As a result of the plaintiffs exiting foster care, the district court on remand ruled on February 27, 2013 that only relief in the form of money damages would be available to them, except for the two plaintiffs that remained in the foster care system. 2013 WL 759479 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2013). Later, on January 10, 2014, the court further ruled that the two remaining plaintiffs also lacked standing to seek injunctive relief unless the plaintiffs filed a more definite statement supporting their claims as to the nature of the children's case plan deficiencies under 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(g). 2014 WL 117562 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2014). In the spring of 2014, in the midst of trial preparation and shortly after the plaintiffs served their expert witness reports, the parties entered into settlement talks. The talks resulted in a settlement agreement of $2.075 million dollars in damages, approved on November 18, 2014 and entered on January 9, 2015. About $1.6 million directly benefited the seven former foster children, while $500,000 covered attorney fees and costs for the plaintiffs’ attorneys. On November 12, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to close the case, and the district court granted the stipulation on November 16, 2015, closing the case.

Summary: On April 13, 2010, a group of foster children, foster parents, relatives, and advocates set out to reform the child welfare system in Clark County, Nevada. Two lawsuits later, the District Court approved a settlement agreement on January 9, 2015 for the amount of $2.075 Million. Each of the seven remaining plaintiffs received damages awards ranging from $100,000 to $350,000 for the many harms they experienced while in the Clark County foster care system. The money was placed either in trust or in annuities that will pay out over time.


On September 30, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Wichita U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas against O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., (doing business as O'Reilly Auto Parts) on behalf of a female employee. According to the EEOC, O'Reilly Automotive violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, by forcing the pregnant employee, an assistant manager whose doctor had imposed a 30-pound lifting restriction, to take unpaid leave and subsequently firing her. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, backpay, reinstatement, medical expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Wesley E. Brown) entered as a consent decree on June 17, 2004. The 2-year decree provided $50,000 in monetary relief ($15,000 in lost wages and $35,000 in compensatory damages), subject to execution of a release of claims. The decree also provided for up to $200 for the employee to consult an attorney before signing the release. Under the injunctive provisions of the decree, O'Reilly Automotive was required to provide a positive reference, to adopt and distribute anti-pregnancy-discrimination policies to managers and supervisors, to provide equal employment training to all managers and supervisors, to post a pregnancy discrimination notice, and to report to the EEOC every 6 months about employees who took pregnancy-related leave, including whether the leave was voluntary, whether the employee was terminated, and why. The parties bore their own costs. No further court activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 30, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Wichita U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas against O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., (doing business as O'Reilly Auto Parts) on behalf of a female employee. According to the EEOC, O'Reilly Automotive violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, by forcing the pregnant employee, an assistant manager whose doctor had imposed a 30-pound lifting restriction, to take unpaid leave and subsequently firing her. The parties entered into a 2-year consent decree, which provided the employee with $50,000 ($15,000 in lost wages and $35,000 in compensatory damages) and subjected O'Reilly Automotive to an array of injunctive provisions. The case is now closed.


On July 16, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, against the owners, operators and managers of a 268-unit apartment complex located in Renton Washington. The U.S. claimed that Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, people from India, and families with children by instructing staff not to show newly renovated apartments to them, steering them to less desirable buildings, demanding proof of citizenship, asking them not to speak to one another in their first language, requiring stricter application requirements, and refusing services. These behaviors were confirmed by testing conducted by the Fair Housing Council of Washington. The case proceeded towards trial, but then settled on March 7, 2011, when the Court (Judge James Robart) approved a jointly submitted Consent Decree. Besides general non-discrimination provisions, the Decree prohibited the defendant owner from employing its manager in any position in connection with housing rentals. It also required adoption, implementation, and notification to tenants of a Uniform Nondiscriminatory Procedure, and employee training on Fair Housing Act requirements. In included provisions on recordkeeping, monitoring, and reporting, to facilitate compliance. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $85,000 for the establishment of a settlement fund for victims of the Defendants' discrimination and a $25,000 civil penalty to be paid to the United States. The consent decree terminated in 2014, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This fair housing litigation was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, by the U.S., which accused the owners, operators, and managers of a 268-unit apartment complex in Renton Washington of a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, people from India, and families with children. The Complaint accused the defendants of instructing staff not to show newly renovated apartments to minority and family tenants, steering them to less desirable buildings, demanding proof of citizenship, asking them not to speak to one another in their first language, requiring stricter application requirements, and refusing services. These behaviors were confirmed by testing conducted by the Fair Housing Council of Washington. The case settled in March 2011, with a detailed consent decree setting out requirements for uniform and nondiscriminatory procedures, as well as other policy, training, and compliance mechanisms. The defendants also agreed to pay $85,000 for the establishment of a settlement fund for victims of the Defendants' discrimination and a $25,000 civil penalty to be paid to the United States.


This is a constitutional challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, as it applies to the immigration rights of lesbian and gay bi-national couples. It was filed on April 2, 2012, by five such couples, each lawfully married in South Africa, Vermont, New York, or Connecticut, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Represented by Immigration Equality and private pro bono counsel, plaintiffs sued the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS -- a component agency of DHS), seeking to compel recognition of their same-sex marriages and non-discriminatory adjudication of marriage-based immigrant benefits. Under DOMA, marriage "means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7. In each of the plaintiff couples, one spouse is American and the other foreign; if the marriage were not same-sex, the American spouse could petition for an immigrant visa for the foreign spouse and place the foreign spouse on the path to lawful permanent residence and citizenship. However, following DOMA's direction, USCIS has denied plaintiffs those immigration benefits. Plaintiffs argue that this denial is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, constituting discrimination on account of both sexual orientation and sex. The Obama administration has announced that in its view, DOMA is unconstitutional and has therefore declined to defend it in court (although the federal government continues to enforce the statute). Accordingly, a "Bipartizan Legal Advisory Group" (BLAG) has been appointed by the (Republican) House of Representatives to appear in cases like this one and defend the constitutionality of DOMA. BLAG filed papers in this case on May 31, 2012. On July 25, 2012, the district court (Judge Amon) stayed proceedings in the case--including immigration enforcement against any of the plaintiffs--pending the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Windsor v. United States, No. 12 CV 2335 (2d Cir), a case already pending on appeal similarly challenging the constitutionality of DOMA. (PB-NY-0017 in the Clearinghouse.) Since the government had declined to stay immigration enforcement, this was reported as a small victory by the plaintiffs. On July 8, 2013, following the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor, BLAG withdrew as intevenor-defendant. On August 26, 2013, after the Plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice.

Summary: This is a constitutional challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, as it applies to the immigration rights of lesbian and gay bi-national couples. It was filed on April 2, 2012, by five such couples, each lawfully married in South Africa, Vermont, New York, or Connecticut, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. On July 25, the district court (Judge Amon) stayed proceedings in the case--including immigration enforcement against any of the plaintiffs--pending the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Windsor v. United States, No. 12 CV 2335 (2d Cir), a case already pending on appeal similarly challenging the constitutionality of DOMA. Since the government had declined to stay immigration enforcement, this was reported as a small victory by the plaintiffs. The case was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in August 2013.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a hybrid putative class action and habeas action filed by a group of medically vulnerable individuals being held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison and Pike County Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs seek safety remedies and release from detention in light of COVID-19. The court granted the plaintiffs’ temporary restraining order on April 7, 2020. Defendants appealed. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the decision for a temporary restraining order on August 25, 2020. The case is ongoing.
 A group of 22 medically vulnerable plaintiffs in civil detention facing potential deportation filed a hybrid putative class action and habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania asking for release in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 3, 2020, represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania and the law firm Dechert LLP, the plaintiffs asked for a temporary restraining order against the detention centers and their wardens, including Mr. Clair Doll in his official capacity as the warden of the York County Prison, Craig A. Lowe as Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility, Simona Flores-Lund as Field Office Director, Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Matthew Albence as Acting Director of ICE, and Chad Wolf as Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs based their request to the court on the defendants’ alleged failures to adequately protect high-risk detainees from contracting COVID-19. Since March 31, 2020, the conditions at the facilities had deteriorated, with cramped, overcrowded facilities hindering social distancing, increased numbers of positive COVID-19 test results, and the rising necessity of quarantining. They based their claim for relief on the similarities between this case and Thakker v. Doll (found here in the Clearinghouse), where the court found that the ICE detention centers could not provide adequately safe conditions for the detainees and thereby ordered their release. On April 7, 2020, Judge John E. Jones III of the federal district court issued a temporary restraining order and granted the immediate release of the 22 plaintiffs. On April 10, the defendants’ Application to Stay all Proceedings Pending Appeal was denied. The case was appealed to the the Third Circuit, which vacated and remanded the the decision for a temporary restraining order on August 25, 2020. See Hope v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 26968. The case is ongoing.

Summary: COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative habeas action filed by a group of medically vulnerable individuals being held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison and Pike County Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs seek safety remedies and release from detention in light of COVID-19. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the decision for a temporary restraining order on August, 25, 2020. The case is ongoing. <hr>


This lawsuit, brought in the the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, was filed on June 3, 2020. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Southern California. This lawsuit followed nation-wide protests that occurred in response to the killing of George Floyd by a police officer in Minneapolis. While most protests were peaceful, some ended in violence, property destruction, rioting, and looting. Many cities, including Los Angeles and San Bernardino, issued curfews in an attempt to quell these riots. This action challenged these curfews as violations of free speech and assembly, free movement, due process, and challenged the San Bernardino curfew as a violation of the establishment clause (the San Bernardino curfew included a provision that exempted attendants of religious meetings from the curfew.) The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief that would void the curfew and prohibit the cities from enforcing them. The following day, June 4th, 2020, the case was assigned to District Judge Philip S. Gutierre and to Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo. Judge Gutierrez informed the parties that he was part of a mandatory alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program and asked the parties to try to form an agreement before going to trial. On July 7, 2020, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint, citing that fact that the city had rescinded the curfews already and not attempted to reinstate them. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case challenged curfews in Los Angeles and San Bernardino, California. The curfews were issued in response to the nationwide protests following the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The complaint argued that these curfews were violations of the free speech and free assembly, free movement, and Due Process. It also argued that the San Bernardino curfew violated the Establishment Clause. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on July 7, 2020, because the city had rescinded the curfews and not attempted to reinstate them.


By filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas on February 6, 2008, which they amended on April 7, 2008, and again on September 16, 2008, nine named plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit naming, as defendants, the U.S. State Department and the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that each had been born in the U.S. years earlier, with the births occurring not in a medical facility but typically attended by a midwife who, for some, registered the birth as occurring in the U.S. Recently, each plaintiff had applied for a U.S. passport. Rather than adjudicate their applications by granting or denying each a passport, the State Department requested additional proof of U.S. citizenship from each. After supplying additional proof, the plaintiffs alleged that, usually, the agency did not acknowledge its receipt and, instead, advised the plaintiffs that their applications would be filed "without further action." To the plaintiffs, this kind of stalling non-decision was how the agency avoided legal formalities and approvals required to actually deny a passport application and constituted, effectively, denial. The plaintiffs' U.S. citizenship assertions were often complicated by their having also been registered in Mexico as having been born there. Bogus Mexican birth registrations, filed by their parents, typically made the plaintiffs eligible for health benefits or school in that country when, at times, the parents resided there. Represented by the ACLU and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought to represent a national class consisting of "all persons who have filed or will in the future file applications for United States passports, in whose cases, on or after April 8, 2003, the defendants did, or will in the future, 'file' or 'close' their applications without formally adjudicating them." The plaintiffs alleged that their inability to travel freely, resulting from the effective denial of their passport applications, significantly and unlawfully restricted their liberty. They sought a declaratory judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 that the named plaintiffs were, in fact, U.S. citizens; a class-wide declaratory judgment that defendants had violated due process by failing to adjudicate and otherwise obstructing the class's applications, and corresponding injunctive relief; a class-wide declaratory judgment that defendants had violated equal protection by treating the class differently from similarly situated U.S. citizens of different race, ethnicity or ancestry, and corresponding injunctive relief; a class-wide declaration that defendants had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703, by acting arbitrarily and capriciously, and corresponding injunctive relief; a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants to actually adjudicate the applications and issue the passports; and attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs also initially sought habeas relief, but dropped this cause of action in their second amended complaint. On October 15, 2008, the defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Over the course of the following six months, several individual plaintiffs obtained their passports and voluntarily dismissed their claims. On June 26, 2009, the parties informed the District Court that they had come to a agreement. Under the terms of their proposed settlement, the defendants agreed to re-adjudicate the applications of the class without denying them solely because an applicant had been birthed by a midwife on defendants' list of suspected or known birth certificate forgers, and to waive fees if the class member made a request by June 1, 2010. Defendants also agreed to train their employees on re-adjudication under the terms of the settlement, to give notice to the class, and to pay attorneys' fees of $150,000. The Court was to retain only contingent jurisdiction to mediate disputes over the settlement should the other dispute resolution mechanisms listed be exhausted, and the settlement was to last for two years and eleven months. The parties moved for preliminary approval and class certification for settlement purposes, and the Court (Judge Randy Crane) granted their motion on July 7, 2009. After hearing objections from individuals who wanted to be covered by the settlement but who had been denied passports and were thus not part of the class, and responses from the parties, who pointed out that the objectors were not bound by the settlement and could thus still bring their own claims, the Court (Judge Crane) gave its final approval to the settlement on August 14, 2009. (Note that on July 2, 2009, the Court approved the motion of three plaintiffs to sever their individual claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 for declarations that they were U.S. citizens, and created the separate case of Castelano v. Rice, No. 7:09-cv-00177, to address these claims. By October 25, 2010, all three plaintiffs had received their passports and dismissed their claims, reserving the right to file future 8 U.S.C. § 1503 claims should the need arise.)

Summary: This is a class action suit for declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief brought by nine individuals against the U.S. State Department. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had illegally put their applications for passports on hold, effectively denying them, because their registration of birth in the United States had been filed by a midwife who appeared on list of known or suspected birth certificate forgers. A class settlement was reached in 2009 that allowed plaintiffs and other similarly situated individuals to have their applications for passports re-adjudicated without paying an additional fee and required defendants not to deny or shelve applications solely because an applicant was birthed by a midwife on the list.


On May 28, 2002, Disability Advocates, Inc., along with other public interest groups, filed a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of state prisoners with mental illness. The complaint alleged that the New York State Office of Mental Health [OMH] and the New York State Department of Correctional Services [DOCS] were deliberately indifferent to the serious mental health needs of state prisoners with mental illness, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that a cycle of torment existed within the New York state prison system: a lack of adequate mental health care resulted in the placement of prisoners with mental illness in isolated confinement, which in turn caused greater psychiatric harm to those prisoners. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion to transfer the case which was denied by the District Court (Judge Gerard E. Lynch) on October 31, 2002. Thereafter, the parties conducted discovery through 2006. In April 2007, the parties reached a settlement, which Judge Lynch approved on April 27, 2007. The settlement requires that prisoners with serious mental illness confined in Special Housing Units ("SHU") will now receive a minimum of 2 hours per day of out of cell treatment and that prisoners in the RMHU receive as many as 4 hours, in addition to an hour of recreation. The settlement also provides:

Multiple reviews of disciplinary sentences for prisoners with mental illness for the purpose of removing prisoners with serious mental illness from isolated confinement.
Residential programs for 405 prisoners with serious mental illness.
215 Transitional Intermediate Care Program beds for prisoners with mental illness in general population.
90 additional Intermediate Care Program beds for prisoners with mental illness who cannot tolerate the prison general population.
A 100 bed Residential Mental Health Unit ("RMHU") which will provide 4 hours per day of out-of-cell programming for prisoners with serious mental illness who would otherwise be in SHU.
The above are in addition to 310 residential mental health programs beds which the state instituted after the litigation commenced.
An additional 20 psychiatric hospital beds for prisoners in need of acute care.
Universal and improved mental health screening of all prisoners at admission to prison.
Improved suicide prevention assessments, now required upon admission to SHU.
Improved treatment and conditions for prisoners in psychiatric crisis in observation cells.
Limits on the use of observation cells, where prisoners in psychiatric crisis are deprived of most possessions and clothing.
Limits on punishment of prisoners with mental illness who hurt themselves because of their illness.
Limits on the use of the punitive 'restricted diet' (a loaf made from bread and cabbage) as a punishment for misconduct by prisoners with serious mental illness.
Elimination of isolated confinement of prisoners with serious mental illness in cells that have solid steel doors that severely isolate and restrict communication.
The new state budget provides monies to carry out the State's commitments in the settlement agreement. These funds approximate over $50 million in capital construction costs; $2 million for additional OMH staffing for the 2007-2008 year to grow to $9 million when construction is complete; and nearly $2 million for additional DOCS staffing for the 2007-2008 fiscal year.

Summary: On May 28, 2002, various public interest groups filed this § 1983 action in the Southern District of New York against the state's Mental Health office and Department of Correctional Services on behalf of state prisoners with mental illness. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's prisons' lack of adequate mental health care increased psychiatric harm in those prisoners. The parties settled in April 2007. The settlement required better mental health treatment and more recreational time for the prisoners.


On July 12, 2012, three African-American former store-management employees of Wet Seal who had been terminated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs were represented the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and private counsel, and alleged that Wet Seal, Inc., and related corporations, which sell women's clothing in Wet Seal and Arden B. retail stores., had engaged in racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs filed the retaliation claims on their own behalf and the discrimination claims as a class action on behalf of black current or former store-management employees. The complaint sought injunctive relief, including reinstatement and monetary relief in the form of back pay, front pay, attorneys' fees, punitive damages, and compensation for emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against black employees in hiring, pay, promotion, and discipline, in comparison to similarly situated white employees. Plaintiffs further argued that senior level company management discriminated against black employees by firing them on account of their race and without cause. Senior-level management had pursued a racially discriminatory brand image of white women, preferably with blond hair and blue eyes, especially in markets with a greater percentage of white clientele, by instructing various levels of management to "diversify" stores with largely black employees by hiring more white employees and firing black employees. The plaintiffs claimed that their difficulty in obtaining subsequent employment was due to retaliation for resisting the defendant's discriminatory policies, alleging that the defendant had failed to provide fair references, and in one case, even failed to verify employment. On Jan. 9, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, that among other amendments, added another named plaintiff and new claims: a claim for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) and claims for retaliation and hostile work environment under Title VII on behalf of individual plaintiffs. On May 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, preliminary approval of settlement class, appointment of plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel, approval of notice plan and distribution of notice, and setting schedule for final approval. The settlement addressed both the class action and individual claims. The terms of the proposed settlement provided for a payment of $7.5 million, which included up to $1.8 million for attorney's fees and costs and $120,000 for administration of claims. The proposed settlement included injunctive relief, including diversity, nondiscrimination, and investigation training; development of fair job-related evaluation criteria; and a dedicated phone line for verifying employment. On June 10, 2013, a motion hearing was held before District Judge Andrew J. Guilford. The court granted class certification, appointed the plaintiffs' counsel as class counsel, and preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement, and stayed all further litigation not related to the settlement approval process. Regarding the notice plan and distribution of notice, the court suggested several changes at the hearing that the parties adopted. On June 12, 2013, Judge Guilford signed the order, which included the following deadlines: class counsel was to file a motion for final approval of the settlement and Settlement Agreement by Oct. 18, 2013, and class counsel was to file a reply to any objection from class members no later than Nov. 11, 2013. On Nov. 18, 2013, a final approval hearing was held. On Dec. 9, 2013, the court issued an order granting final approval of the settlement. The court awarded a total of $1,729,037.80 to class counsel, which included attorneys' fees and reasonable costs for work performed to date as well as future monitoring and enforcement through the three-year term of the settlement. The court also granted in part the fee application by the plaintiffs' original attorney - who had been terminated from the plaintiffs' litigation team on July 3, 2012, and had disputed the terms of the settlement agreement - and found that she was entitled to a total fee award of $70,962.20. Over the 36 months of monitoring required by the settlement, the defendant filed periodic Monitor's Certificates of Compliance, in which the Monitor, the defendant's Vice President and Corporate Controller, certified to the court the status of the defendant's implementation of its programmatic initiatives with the Settlement Agreement. In the Dec. 11, 2014, Certificate of Compliance, the Monitor stated that it was satisfied that the defendant was complying with the Settlement Agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiffs, African-Americans who had been terminated as store-management-level employees of Wet Seal, brought suit individually and as a class action for discriminatory practices regarding the pay, promotion, discipline, and firing of black store-management-level employees under 42 U.S.C . § 1981. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant retaliated against them by hindering their search for subsequent employment with unfair references or refusal to verify employment. Similar claims were later added under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e). The parties reached a class settlement to handle the class and individual claims of the case. The settlement provided for up to a total of $7.5 million in payments, including attorneys' fees, and a wide range of injunctive relief. The class settlement has not yet been approved by the court, so the case is ongoing.


On July 25, 2007, the parents of a young woman arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the County and City of Denver against the City and County of Denver, Colorado, Denver Department of Health and Hospitals. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel asked the court for declaratory relief, economic losses. compensatory and consequential damages, and punitive damages claiming under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants failed to provide medical care and treatments as well as failure to properly train and supervise. On the morning of February 18, 2006, Emily Rice was involved in a non-fatal car collision in which her car was destroyed and she suffered life-threatening injuries. After being transported by paramedics to the local hospital Denver Health, operated by the Defendant, she complained of shoulder and abdomen pain. She was booked at the Denver Health as a detainee. The only test performed on Rice was a breathalyzer to determine her blood alcohol which was determined to be .12. Rice was given ibuprofen and then released to the Denver Sheriffs for detention at the Denver County Jail. She was placed in an isolation cell for several hours. Rice continued to complain and was briefly seen by a nurse who told Rice to sleep the pain off. Rice fainted during the intake process. She was not treated by the jail nurse. The Denver Jail staff pulled Rice to her feet and continued the intake process. Rice began to complain of numbness in her feet which had turned cold and grey. The jail doctor was informed of Rice's condition and diagnosed her with drunkenness for which she needed to get sleep. Throughout the night Rice and other inmates yelled for help for which there was no reply from the guards. Eventually Rice complained of numbness is her legs and that was unable to move them. The on-staff nurse was informed of Rice's condition; she never visited to Rice to treat her. Approximately 24-hours after Rice's car collision, she died in her jail cell. The official medical report stated that the cause of death was a ruptured spleen. On December 2, 2008, settlement was reached for a non-disclosed amount. Media reports stated the amount was approximately $4 million. On December 17, 2008, Judge Marcia Krieger dismissed the case in light of the settlement.

Summary: On July 25, 2007, the parents of a young woman arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the County and City of Denver against the City and County of Denver, Colorado, Denver Department of Health and Hospitals, claiming under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants failed to provide medical care and treatments as well as failure to properly train and supervise. On December 2, 2008, settlement was reached for a non-disclosed amount. Media reports stated the amount was approximately $4 million.


On January 8, 2016, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover property seized by the NYPD after an arrest. The case was assigned to Judge Denise L. Cote. The individual plaintiff was arrested in November 2014, and his iPhone and $1,399 in wages were seized by police. In his criminal case, which was dismissed in May 2015, he was represented by the Bronx Defenders, who are the second plaintiff to this lawsuit. The Bronx Defenders, a non-profit organization that provides criminal defense and civil legal services to law-income people in the Bronx, also assists hundreds of clients every year who are attempting to retrieve property seized pursuant to an arrest. Together they brought this lawsuit against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the city violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages for the individual plaintiff for the monies seized from him at his arrest, the replacement costs for his iPhone, and all applicable interest. According to the complaint, after a person is arrested, the NYPD routinely seized his or her personal property and recorded it in a computerized invoice system that tracked and categorized it. Once the criminal case against that individual was terminated, and the time to appeal had lapsed, the U.S. Constitution mandated that the government demonstrate a new legal basis to retain the property. But in practice, the NYPD often retained property and refused to release it until claimants obtained a "DA Release," even where all charges had been dismissed and sealed. In the Bronx, the District Attorney's Office frequently failed to respond to requests for DA Releases, and the City did not provide an alternate recourse or assistance. The plaintiffs here alleged in the complaint that they tried numerous times - via voicemails, letters, and in-person requests - to obtain the property seized by the NYPD with no success. They subsequently filed this complaint against the city. The proposed class would consist of "all individuals who have been or will be unable to secure the release from the NYPD Property Clerk of Personal Property seized in connection with an arrest where (i) the individual named on the voucher for the property can no longer be tried on any charge that was the original basis for the arrest, and (ii) the City has made no showing of any continued basis to retain the property." On May 17, 2016, Judge Cote signed an order referring this case to a magistrate judge for settlement, and the settlement discussions were to take place in June. However, on June 3, 2016, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, which added two additional individual plaintiffs who experienced similar property loss by the NYPD and provided more facts as to the NYPD's process of returning property seized after an arrest. Five days later, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On July 25, 2016, the parties agreed to stay all proceedings through February 28, 2017 to work toward a possible settlement. Accordingly, on the same day, Judge Cote ordered that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification be denied without prejudice to renewal upon the expiration of the six-month stay. On March 1, 2017, the parties agreed to extend the stay, and at the parties’ consent, Judge Cote referred the case to Magistrate Judge James Francis for further settlement discussions. On June 22, 2017, after nearly a year of unsuccessful settlement negotiations, the court lifted the stay, and litigation continued. Despite this, the parties did eventually reach a settlement agreement on February 9, 2018. The court ordered the settlement agreement into effect three days later. This settlement agreement required the city to pay the plaintiffs a total of $10,000 in damages and create a committee to assess its compliance over the two years that the agreement would be in effect. The Bronx DA was also required to reform its policies to make it easier for arrestees to recover their seized property in a timely fashion. The parties agreed to resolve their dispute over attorneys’ fees at a later date. On August 15, 2018, the parties agreed that defendants would pay $675,000 to cover all costs and attorneys’ fees. In an order issued on February 19, 2020, the obligations of the settlement were extended for the City of New York until June 30, 2020. The Bronx DA was released from its settlement obligations on February 12, 2020. As of May 27, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket, and the case is ongoing for enforcement.

Summary: In January 2016, an individual and the Bronx Defenders, which had represented the individual during his criminal case, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover property seized by the NYPD after his arrest. The case settled in February 2018. The settlement required the city to pay $10,000 in damages and reform its arrest policies.


On November 3, 2016, a female prisoner in the custody of the Denver Women’s Correctional Facility filed this pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued the State of Colorado, the Colorado Department of Corrections, and the Warden of the Denver Women’s Correctional Facility under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages. She claimed that defendants violated the ADA as well as her constitutional rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged she was denied a Sorenson Video Phone (SVP) after she placed multiple requests with the Department of Corrections to provide one so that she could communicate with her parents, who were deaf. The SVP offers a service for the deaf community paid for by the government for those who qualify under the ADA. Although the plaintiff originally struggled to meet the court’s pleading standards, once she obtained counsel from the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center on March 31, 2017, she filed a third amended complaint on June 15, 2017, adding three new plaintiffs. The new complaint also added claims under the Rehabilitation Act and replaced allegations of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations with claims of First Amendment violations. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher and then later reassigned to Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak. On June 30, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court disagreed with the defendants’ arguments and on September 29, 2017, denied the motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiff had standing to assert her ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, that the plaintiff pleaded sufficiently plausible claims for relief. On January 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint, adding two plaintiffs and removing the Fourteenth Amendment claim. The defendants filed an answer to this complaint on February 5, 2018. The plaintiffs dismissed an additional defendant on October 25, 2018 without explanation. Four days later, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Colorado Department of Corrections could not prove that the TTY phones it had were as effective as videophones and that CDOC provided no affirmative defenses under the Effective Communication Claim. In response, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2018, arguing in part that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies through the prison grievance system. The plaintiffs joined their case with <i>Rabinkov v. Colorado Department of Corrections</i>, another federal case against the CDOC regarding the provision (or lack thereof) of videophones to deaf prisoners or relatives of deaf individuals on November 20, 2018. On December 27, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class of similarly-situated deaf prisoners; however, the motion was withdrawn less than a month later. On January 14, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and on January 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On January 25, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim for failure to state a claim; this was dismissed by Judge Varholak on April 9, 2019. Defendants then moved for summary judgment and for dismissal on mootness grounds on May 6, and June 21, respectively. On September 18, 2019, Judge Varholak ruled on several outstanding motions: the defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed on June 21, 2019, one plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, filed on January 17, 2019, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed on May 6, 2019. Judge Varholak denied the June 21 motion (finding that the defendants had not met the burden to show that the plaintiffs’ claims were moot), granted the January 17 motion (one plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims), and granted in part and denied in part the May 6 motion (finding that two out of three plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies but denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss regarding the remaining plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, First Amendment claims, and claims for compensatory damages). Finally, Judge Varholak ordered the Colorado Department of Corrections to make videophones available and to adopt effective and comprehensive policies relating to videophones. 2019 WL 4464036. On October 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for referral to a settlement conference, and Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter was assigned to conduct a settlement conference. The parties gave no reason for the sudden change in tactic. Currently, the conference is scheduled for October 28, 2019. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This 2016 lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado by a female prisoner of the Denver Women’s Correctional Facility who had been denied the use of a Sorenson Video Phone to communicate with her parents, who were deaf. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and her First Amendment rights. Currently, the case is scheduled for a settlement conference in October 2019.