On October 15, 2008, African-American employees at the freight transportation company Yellow Transportation, Inc. ("Yellow") filed a class action lawsuit against their employer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by an attorney from the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged that Yellow created a racially hostile work environment for African-American employees working at Yellow's facility in Chicago Ridge, IL, from October 15, 2004 to the present. They also claimed that Yellow subjected those employees to disparate treatment and retaliated against them when they complained about the discriminatory practice. The named plaintiffs also brought their individual claims against the employer. The parties started the discovery process with regard to the issue of class certification. During March and June 2009, Yellow served 19 subpoenas on the plaintiffs' former employers, requesting various information regarding their previous employment. Yellow claimed that some of the plaintiffs failed to disclose their claims against it in their filings of bankruptcy proceedings despite their knowledge of the claims, and that some failed to disclose criminal convictions on their job applications with Yellow. The plaintiffs moved to quash subpoenas and for protective order. The District Court (Magistrate Judge Nan R. Nolan) granted the plaintiffs' motion on October 9. 2009. 2009 WL 3270791 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2009). Yellow then moved for leave to amend its answer and add the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and after-acquired evidence. The Court (Judge Joan B. Gottschall) granted the motion on January 14, 2010. 2010 WL 152000 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2010). In the meantime, in or about March 2009, YRC, Inc. ("YRC"), Yellow's parent company, merged Yellow with another YRC company, Roadway Express, Inc. ("Roadway"). In December 2009, the plaintiffs and the proposed class who were still on the job were transferred to a former Roadway facility in Chicago Heights, IL. In the same month, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") started its own lawsuit against Yellow and YRC, EEOC v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. and YRC, Inc., linked below as a related case (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0330). It was filed in the same district court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the plaintiffs in this case later joined that one, too, as intervenor plaintiffs. Back in this case, on April 12, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding YRC as a co-defendant and an individual as a named plaintiff. They also redefined the hostile work environment class to include individuals working at both the Chicago Ridge and Chicago Heights facilities. This modification was in light of a then ongoing case filed by the EEOC originally against Roadway EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0189). The action was brought on behalf of African-American employees working at the Roadway facility in Chicago Heights for race discrimination. Yellow opposed to this last change, arguing that the class definition was too broad. The plaintiffs then moved to withdraw the amended complaint and to file a new one, with a hostile work environment class including only former Chicago Ridge employees. The Court (Magistrate Judge Nolan) granted the motion on July 26, 2010, reasoning that it was not clear yet to the Court that both Yellow and Roadway employees were complaining of the same events. Brown v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 08 C 5908, 2010 WL 2911786 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2010). The corrected amended complaint was filed the next day. Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to certify class and the defendants filed their opposition. On May 11, 2011, the Court (Judge Gottschall) granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. 2011 WL 1838741 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2011). The defendants filed a petition for permission to appeal to the appellate court, but it was denied on July 1, 2011. On June 27, 2012, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox, upon both parties' consent, for settlement proceedings. Negotiations were successful, and this Brown case and the EEOC case were consolidated for the purpose of a consent decree, which Magistrate Judge Cox signed on September 25, 2012. In the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $11,000,000 to the plaintiff class; the EEOC was placed in charge of allocating the award to eligible individuals. No injunction was issued, since the Chicago Ridge facility was closed and the Chicago Heights facility was already subject to a consent decree issued in EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc. After some court proceedings regarding award allocation, the case ended.

Summary: On October 15, 2008, African-American employees at the freight transportation company Yellow Transportation, Inc. ("Yellow") filed a class action lawsuit against their employer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of African-American employees working at Yellow's facility in Chicago Ridge, IL, from October 15, 2004 to the present. They alleged that Yellow created a racially hostile work environment, subjected them to disparate treatment and retaliated against them when they complained about the discriminatory practice. In the meantime, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") started its own lawsuit against Yellow and YRC, Yellow's parent company. After some disputes regarding the scope of the class, the District Court certified the class on May 11, 2011. This case and the EEOC case were eventually consolidated for the sake of a consent decree, filed by the Court on September 25, 2012. In the decree, the defendants shall pay $11,000,000 to the plaintiff class. This ended the case.


On July 10, 2014, five U.S. citizens who had their information entered into counterterrorism databases and were subjected to law enforcement scrutiny and interrogation, filed this lawsuit against the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment ("PM-ISE"). Plaintiffs challenged the legality of a domestic surveillance program, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), the ACLU of California, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Seeborg. Through the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiatives ("NSI"), the federal government encourages state and local law enforcement agencies and private actors to collect and report information that has a potential nexus to terrorism through Special Activity Reports. Plaintiffs were reported as having engaged in "suspicious activities" under DOJ and PM-ISE standards when engaged in actions such as taking pictures, buying computers, and standing in a train station. As a consequence of being reported through SARs, plaintiffs were subject to law enforcement scrutiny and interrogation. Plaintiffs claimed that the DOJ and PM-ISE Standards for SARs are invalid because they violate federal statutory requirements that agencies observe certain procedures and not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that defendants' standards conflict with a DOJ regulation (28 C.F.R. § 23) (hereinafter Part 23) that prohibits the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of criminal intelligence information unless there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and that defendants' standards were not promulgated in accordance with the notice and comment requirements of the APA. Plaintiffs claimed that the PM-ISE adopted a “Functional Standard” that utilises overly broad criteria to define the types of activities deemed as having a potential nexus to terrorism. The government moved to dismiss the case on October 16, 2014. First, defendants claimed that plaintiffs lacked standing because 1) they had not alleged a nexus between their injuries and the guidance provided by defendants, and 2) their allegations of future law enforcement scrutiny were too speculative to satisfy the requirement of imminent future harm to warrant prospective relief. Second, defendants claimed that plaintiffs failed to plead an action that could proceed under the APA because alternative remedies were available to plaintiffs and the guidance provided by defendants in connection with the NSI did not create binding legal obligations remediable under the APA. Finally, defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims were improperly joined and should be severed. Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on November 20, 2014. On February 20, 2015, Judge Richard Seeborg denied a motion to dismiss, holding that the defendants’ contentions as to causality and redressability both fail, as the plaintiffs are claiming injury from what happens after the encounters law enforcement or private security officers. Consequently, the plaintiffs are not challenging the conduct of law enforcement or private security officers during the alleged encounters, but rather, they are seeking to remedy harms that arise directly from the existence of the defendants’ Standards. The court also accepted that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case, and that the APA claims are not subject to dismissal on grounds that plaintiffs have adequate remedies elsewhere. On September 3, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, which claimed that the defendants violated the APA in two ways. First, plaintiffs argue the Functional Standard was adopted without complying with the APA’s requirement that the public be provided a notice and comment period prior to adoption of “legislative rules.” While defendants acknowledge no such notice and comment procedure was utilised, they argued that the Functional Standard is not a “legislative rule” subject to the requirement, or that even if it were, the violation was harmless because the Functional Standard was adopted through a collaborative process that included public input. Second, plaintiffs claimed that adoption of the Functional Standard was “arbitrary and capricious” because of the alleged conflict with Part 23. Defendants argued there is no conflict that renders adoption of the Functional Standard improper. On September 8, 2015, the case was referred to Magistrate Kandis A. Westmore for discovery. On December 18, 2015, the Magistrate held that defendants are to revisit their compilation of the administrative record to ensure that it includes all documents and materials considered by the agency in deciding (1) to adopt a standard that is broader than Part 23 and authorizes the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of information even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, in conflict with 28 CFR Part 23 and (2) to promulgate such a standard without public notice and comment. On March 27, 2017, Judge Richard Seeborg issued an Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. In this Order, the court noted that the crux of the dispute lay in the distinction between the “reasonably indicative” standard, and the “reasonable suspicion” standard. This distinction was raised when the Plaintiffs argued that the Functional Standard conflicted with a duly-promulgated DOJ regulation, Part 23, which they asserted was adopted to protect constitutional and privacy rights by prohibiting the collection of “criminal intelligence” unless supported by “reasonable suspicion.” The Functional Standard, in contrast, called for sharing of SARs whenever they reflect “observed behaviour” that was “reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning associated with terrorism or other criminal activity.” Both sides had agreed that “reasonably indicative” is a lesser standard which calls for dissemination of SARs even in the absence of “reasonable suspicion.” The question before the court was therefore whether defendants failed to comply with the APA in adopting the “reasonably indicative” standard. The court held that the defendants were able to show that the adoption of the Functional Standard did not violate the APA. First, the court held that the Functional Standard was fundamentally a policy guidance statement, and that it was not subject to a notice-and-comment requirement. Second, the court accepted the defendants’ argument that the Functional Standard was developed to address data collection and dissemination issues not already within the scope of Part 23, and while they could have adopted the same standard, the record revealed no “clear error of judgment” or “failure to consider an important aspect of the problem” or such a counter-factual or implausible explanation as to permit the court to substitute its judgment of what a better rule might be. In a footnote, the court observed that Plaintiffs offered policy arguments as to why, in their view, the “reasonably indicative” standard draws a poor balance between individual rights and public safety; however, in an action under the APA, something more must be shown. Judgment was entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs on March 29, 2017. On May 28, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed an appeal to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 3, 2017, the Appellants filed an Opening Brief. They argued that the (1) Functional Standard is a substantive rule that is subject to notice and comment as required by the APA, and that the Functional Standard created a binding norm and constituted final agency action. They also argued that (2) the Defendants’ rationales for adopting the ‘reasonably indicative’ standard were arbitrary and capricious if the agency failed to consider an important aspect of the problem or offered an implausible explanation, the defendants initially failed to address Part 23 at all, the rationale for rejecting Part 23 is contrary to the purpose of the Functional Standard, and the post hoc rationales are meritless. The Appellees responded on February 16, 2018. 2018 WL 948517. Appellants’ Reply Brief was submitted on March 30, 2018. 2018 WL 1583408. A Ninth Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Milan D. Smith Jr. and Andrew D. Hurwitz and Circuit Judge Richard K. Eaton agreed with the district court's decision in a January 29, 2019 opinion. It held that the Functional Standard was a final agency outcome that was still legislative in nature, since it influenced internal filing behavior while agency officials had to decide whether to pursue an SAR further. As for Arbitrary and Capricious review, the panel highlighted that while the line between criminal intelligence and SARs was murky, the fact that more investigation is needed for a criminal intelligence investigation than an SAR, which can be as simple as a notification for further review. They believed that this distinction was enough to demonstrate that the SAR process was intentionally crafted with enough consideration to withstand Arbitrary and Capricious review. 913 F.3d 1179. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision; the case is now closed.

Summary: On July 10, 2014, five U.S. citizens who had their information entered into counterterrorism databases and were subjected to law enforcement scrutiny and interrogation, filed suit against the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the U.S. Attorney General, and the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment ("PM-ISE"). Plaintiffs challenged the legality of a domestic surveillance program, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")(5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A), (D)) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), the ACLU of California, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus. Plaintiffs claim that certain DOJ standards encouraging state and local law enforcement and private actors to report activities potentially related to terrorism are invalid. Defendants moved to dismiss the case on October 16, 2014, and plaintiffs filed a response on November 20, 2014. A judgment was entered in favour of defendants and against plaintiffs on March 29, 2017. The Ninth Circuit supported the district court's decision on appeal. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision; the case is now closed.


On December 10, 2014, two student-athletes brought this discrimination action against Pepperdine University in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs alleged that the university administration, athletic department, and women’s basketball coach coordinated to discriminate against them because of their same-sex relationship, resulting in dismissal from the basketball team and loss of athletic scholarships, which forced them to leave school. The plaintiffs’ complaint asserted state claims for violation of rights under the California Constitution and California state law and federal claims for violation of Title IX. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary damages. On January 14, 2015, the defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs then amended the complaint on February 5, 2015. Two weeks later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On April 16, 2015, Federal District Judge Dean D. Pregerson issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court denied the motion to dismiss the invasion of privacy claim as to the plaintiffs' sexual orientation and the violations of California’s Educational Code or invasion of privacy via medical records. Further, since the plaintiffs did not contest Pepperdine’s assertion that Title IX does not cover sexual orientation discrimination, the court dismissed Title IX claims with leave to amend. 100 F. Supp. 3d 927. On June 9, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, claiming that Title IX covered gender stereotype discrimination. That same day, the defendants again filed a motion to dismiss the Title IX claim, claiming the statute's prohibition on the "basis of sex" did not cover sexual orientation. On December 15, 2015, Judge Pregerson denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding “the distinction is illusory and artificial, and that sexual orientation discrimination is not a category distinct from sex or gender discrimination”, and that “claims of sexual orientation discrimination are gender stereotype or sex discrimination claims.” 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151. The parties proceeded with discovery from March 2016 to August 2017. Trial was held from July 18, 2017 to August 11, 2017. On August 11, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on all claims. The court entered a judgement based on the verdict on September 11, 2017. The plaintiffs filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (No. 17-56548) on October 12, 2017. A mediation conference was scheduled for November 28, 2017 and on December 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal. There were no further developments in the District Court and the case is closed.

Summary: On December 10, 2014, two student-athletes brought a discrimination action against Pepperdine University alleging that the university discriminated against them because of their same-sex relationship. They were dismissed from the basketball team and lost their athletic scholarships, which forced them to leave school. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the university on August 11, 2017. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit but later dismissed their appeal and the case is now closed.


On September 13, 2017 ten U.S. citizens and a lawful permanent resident filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) under 28 U.S.C. §2201 for a declaration that the defendants had violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights and to enjoin defendants from searching or confiscating electronic devices without probable cause and expunge all collected information from plaintiffs' devices. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants seized and then searched their electronic devices, containing expressive content and associational content, at the United States border without a warrant demonstrating probable cause that these devices contained contraband or evidence of a violation of immigration or customs laws and without describing the information to be searched. On December 15, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On September 13, 2017, District Judge Denise J. Casper denied the motion to dismiss finding that plaintiffs had standing to sue and pled plausible Fourth and First Amendment claims. On April 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. On June 6, 2019, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2019, District Judge Denise J. Casper granted the plaintiffs' motion in part and denied the defendants' motion. On the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims, Judge Casper denied the plaintiff's argument that a warrant was required to search their devices at the border, but Judge Casper found that the defendants' advanced searches of the plaintiffs' devices violated the Fourth Amendment because the policy would have required a reasonable suspicion that the devices contained contraband. Judge Casper also granted summary judgment for certain plaintiffs who argued that the government required probable cause for searches of devices kept by the defendants after the plaintiffs left the border. Judge Casper denied both parties' motions for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's First Amendment claims. Both parties have appealed to the First Circuit in January 2020. The appeals were docketed as 20-01081 and 20-01077. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 13, 2017 ten U.S. citizens and a lawful permanent resident filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement under 28 U.S.C. §2201 for a declaration that defendants had violated their the First and Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants seized and searched their electronic devices at the United States border without probable cause that the devices contained contraband or evidence of a violation of immigration or customs laws and without describing the information to be searched. The case is ongoing.


On January 16, 2007, two recipients of federal benefits under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program and a non-profit advocacy organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was assigned to Judge George H. Wu. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed that the Authority had violated due process by altering housing benefits to voucher recipients without adequate notice. The plaintiff claimed that HACLA violated six due process and federal regulations by failing to provide proper notice of Section 8 rent increases, which would affect approximately 22,000 tenants receiving federal benefits. The Section 8 Housing Voucher Program was designed to aid low-income families in acquiring housing by subsidizing private landlords who rented to low-income tenants. In 2004, the defendant proposed cutting back on these federal subsidies in order to meet a federally-set budget. The changes were announced publicly, and would not take effect until April 2005. Individual tenants would not be subject to new regulations until their next annual evaluation, unless they moved before that time. In November 2007, the court granted in part and denied in part a motion to dismiss. 2007 WL 9658205. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint alleging violations of (1) due process of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) rights created by 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), (3) Cal. Gov. Code § 815.6, (4) due process of law under Art. 1, § 7 of the California Constitution, and (5) negligence. The court dismissed the second and fifth claims and later granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims. 2009 WL 10678033. Plaintiffs appealed and Judge Percy Anderson of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the fifth claim and the grant of summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth claims. 425 Fed.Appx. 539. On remand, the district court granted HACLA’s renewed motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit again reversed, holding that the flyer sent by HACLA did not provide sufficient notice of the voucher program change. Specifically, the court held that this “failure violated both the requirements of the Voucher Program and regulations and the requirements of procedural due process.” 806 F. 3d 1178. The matter was remanded but included instructions to the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the matters of federal and state law at issue on appeal. In November 2015, HACLA petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en banc which the court denied in January 2016. 806 F. 3d 1178. HACLA subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which was denied in October 2016. 137 S.Ct. 52. Following remand, the court certified two classes: (1) an injunctive relief class and (2) a damages class. The Injunctive Relief Class consisted of all Section 8 voucher recipients whose benefits were administered by HACLA and who in the past received, or in the future may receive, notice of decreased benefits. The Damages Class consisted of HACLA Section 8 tenants, between June 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006, whose rental contribution was greater than it would have been if not for HACLA’s 2004 decrease in benefits. The Damages Class consisted of 11,870 tenants. In February 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment as to remedies. Before the court ruled on these motions, the parties filed a stipulation for settlement. On February 15, 2018, the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement. 2018 WL 1659984. The settlement included attorneys’ fees and other fees (approximately $3.5 million total), a $6 million fund for the damages class, a three-year injunction that required HACLA to:

Notify all Section 8 tenants in plain language of a known, likely, or potential reduction in benefits

Notify Class Counsel of any reduction in benefits

Communicate with all Section 8 tenants in plain language regarding anything related to the Settlement Agreement

 In return for the injunction and monetary award, the plaintiffs agreed to release the defendant from all claims potentially arising out of the facts alleged in the complaint. The district court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement until 2021. As of May 26, 2020, there has been no further docket activity.

Summary: In 2007, two recipients of federal benefits under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program and a non-profit advocacy organization filed a class action lawsuit against the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), claiming that the Authority was cutting back federal housing subsidies without due notice. In 2015, following years of litigation, appeals, and remand, the district court granted class certification to plaintiffs. The parties finally reached a settlement agreement in 2017 which the district court approved. The settlement included a class award of approximately $9.5 million (including attorneys' fees) and a three-year injunction requiring HACLA to clearly communicate any future reduction of benefits in plain language to all voucher recipients and class counsel. The district court will retain jurisdiction over the case until February 2021.


This lawsuit, filed by the General Assembly of Tennessee "General Assembly," a state senator, and state representative on their own behalf and on additionally on the behalf of the state of Tennessee, challenged the U.S. Department of State's (DOS) ability to use state funds to resettle refugees within the United States through the Refugee Act ("the Act") and the Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR") within the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). On March 13, 2017, the General Assembly Tennessee filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that provisions of the Refugee Resettlement Act ("the Act") and Refugee Medical Assistance Program violated the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment through enacting and implementing certain statutes that require states to provide Medicaid coverage to eligible refugees. The General Assembly argued that the intent behind the Act was to avoid taxing states for what was ultimately a federal effort. Since the Act's passage in 1980, the General Assembly of Tennessee alleged that the burden on states to fund the program had increased. Moreover, the complaint argued, the state was further burdened by a requirement to cover medical costs for refugees until the state of Tennessee itself determines that a refugee is ineligible for the state Medicaid program. The state of Tennessee withdrew its participation from the refugee resettlement program in 2007. The complaint argued that the federal government nevertheless "coerced the state to continue funding" the program by threatening to withdraw federal Medicaid funding, which would amount to a 20% loss of its budget. The complaint further asserted that in establishing a private agency, Catholic Charities of Tennessee, to assume control and of the program in the state, "the federal government nullified the decision of the people of Tennessee to withdraw from an ostensibly voluntary federal program and thereby commandeered state funds to support a federal initiative." The case was reassigned to Judge S. Thomas Anderson on March 24, 2017. DOS moved to dismiss the case on June 1, 2017. DOS argued that "the refugee-coverage provision does not compel States to expend Medicaid funds for refugees; it conserves State funds by limiting to seven years the obligation the States would otherwise incur, under the Equal Protection Clause, to provide coverage to refugees on the same terms as they do U.S. citizens." Meanwhile, on June 2, 2017, the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition, Bridge Refugees Services, and the Nashville Intentional Center for Empowerment moved to intervene as defendants. Both the General Assembly and DOS filed responses in opposition to that motion to intervene. On March 19, 2018, Judge Anderson granted DOS's motion to dismiss for lack of standing on the alleged injury. 329 F.Supp.3d 597, 2018 WL 1386845. The General Assembly of Tennessee failed to establish that it has the authority on behalf of the state of Tennessee. The court also denied the intervenors' motions as moot. In his opinion, Judge Anderson held, first, that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. The General Assembly of Tennessee, specifically its legislators, legislature, and Attorney General, lacked standing. The claim was not ripe because the federal government had not yet denied Medicaid funds to Tennessee and no such enforcement was imminent. Further, the Medicaid Act, which required an administrative process followed by appellate court review, precluded the claim from review in a district court. Next, Judge Anderson held that the General Assembly of Tennessee had failed to state a claim for relief under the Spending Clause or Tenth Amendment. Congress had broad powers over immigration and naturalization, including refugees' eligibility for participation in federal benefits programs. Congress had, thus, acted within its authority to set funding conditions for the States in the relevant statutes. These conditions were neither coercive nor new. The federal government had not threatened to deny funding to Tennessee. The State had, for over four decades, accepted federal Medicaid funds on the condition that it had to cover lawfully-present noncitizens, so the requirement to provide state funding for refugees in exchange for federal Medicaid funds was not a new condition. Nor should the General Assembly of Tennessee be surprised by recent fluctuations in the number of admitted refugees -- a recurring situation that the Refugee Act of 1980 anticipates. On May 10, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, docket #18-5478, regarding the March 19, 2018 judgement dismissing the case and denying the motion to intervene as moot. On July 24th, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision stating that the General Assembly was without subject-matter jurisdiction, 931 F.3d 499, 2019 WL 3310332. The Sixth Circuit held that the General Assembly had not identified an injury that it suffered, such as disruption of the legislative process, a usurpation of its authority, or nullification of anything it has done. The lower court's decision that the General Assembly was without standing to bring a case was affirmed on the basis that an alleged injury was insufficient. Therefore, the individual legislators' standing was also denied. Finally, the General Assembly did not have the authority to bring a suit in the name of the state of Tennessee. The case was closed October 24, 2019.

Summary: This lawsuit, brought by the General Assembly of Tennessee in their own interests and on behalf of the state of Tennessee, challenged DOS's ability to use state funds to resettle refugees within the U.S. Tennessee maintained that provisions of the Refugee Resettlement Act and Refugee Medical Assistance Program violated the Spending Clause and 10th Amendment. In Mar. 2018, the court granted DOS' motion to dismiss and closed the case. On July 24th, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit filled their mandate to issue stating that the General Assembly was without subject-matter jurisdiction, affirming the lower court's decision.


On November 11, 2015, a Medicaid recipient with Hepatitis C filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The case was assigned to District Judge Sarah Evans Barker. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (“the agency”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana and the Health and Human Rights Clinic at Indiana University’s McKinney School of Law, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violation of federal Medicaid law. The plaintiff alleged that the Agency had a formal policy of denying Medicaid recipients with Hepatitis C “medically necessary” drugs. Specifically, they alleged that the agency denied Medicaid recipients with Hepatitis C direct-acting antiviral medications (specifically Harvoni) unless and until absolutely necessary. Despite these practices, medical professional agreed that early administration of the medication was “medically necessary” to prevent liver damage and other serious conditions. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 15, 2016. They alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for which relief could be granted. On April 12, 2016, Judge Barker denied defendants’ motion. She held that the plaintiff had sufficiently pled a claim, so she denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. The original plaintiff was provided with Harvoni by the agency, and consequently a new plaintiff intervened in the suit on January 3, 2017. Discovery and negotiations lasted through the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. On November 8, 2018, the parties settled the case. The settlement, contingent on the Court’s certification of the class, involved injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees for the plaintiff. As part of the settlement, the agency agreed to eliminate its policy of restricting Medicaid reimbursement for Harvoni to only those Medicaid recipients with advanced Hepatitis C or those who were co-infected with HIV or AIDS or were post-liver transplant. The defendants had to implement this policy by July 1, 2019. The defendants also agreed that they would pay the plaintiffs’ counsel $117,500 in attorneys’ fees. The agreement stated that the plaintiffs could enforce it through a breach of contract claim - meaning that the Court did not maintain jurisdiction to enforce it. Judge Barker approved class-certification on November 9, 2018. The Court defined the certified class as: Any and all adult Medicaid recipients in Indiana, current and future, with a diagnosis of chronic Hepatitis C, genotype 1, who have been prescribed one of the direct-acting antiviral medications enumerated in the 2016 Policy or 2018 Policy, by or in consultation with an Infectious Disease or GI specialist, but do not meet the medical requirements of such policy to receive Medicaid reimbursement for that prescribed medication. On November 26, 2018, Judge Barker approved the parties’ joint motion regarding the manner and form of notice to the class. A class-action fairness hearing was held on February 5, 2019. At this hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement and the attorney fee request. One week later, the court issued a written order confirming the oral order from the hearing where the court approved the settlement agreement, and found that it was a fair, reasonable, and adequate resolution of the cause. With the settlement agreement approved, on February 20, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. Six days later, the court dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 41(a) (1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, a Medicaid recipient with Hepatitis C filed this class action complaint alleging that his rights were violated when the state refused to reimburse him for antiviral medications until late stages in his disease. The parties reached a settlement agreement whereby the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration agreed to eliminate its policy of restricting Medicaid reimbursement for Harvoni to only those Medicaid recipients with advanced Hepatitis C or those who were co-infected with HIV or AIDS or were post-liver transplant. The case is now closed.


On September 28, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC sued Hannabery Electric, Inc., doing business as Hannabery HVAC, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC sought injunctive relief and back pay on behalf of Hannabery employees alleging that the defendant violated the ADEA by subjecting older workers to disparate terms and conditions of employment, including discharge, loss of raises, benefits and bonuses, negative performance evaluations, and excess scrutiny of their job performances. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas M. Golden. On March 15, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint. The complaint additionally sought nonpecuniary and punitive damages. On October 20, 2006, three Hannabery employees filed a motion to intervene. On April 9, 2007, District Judge Thomas M. Golden denied their motion. In response, on July 30, 2007, those three employees and one other brought their own suit before Judge Golden against their employer. The plaintiffs made the same allegations as the EEOC did in its complaint against Hannabery (Morrone v. Hall et al, EE-PA-0216). On November 15, 2007, Judge Golden consolidated the employees’ suit with the EEOC’s. On December 21, 2007, the parties submitted a consent decree. The defendant did not admit liability, but agreed to pay a total of $156,700 to the five complainants. The defendant was enjoined from engaging in discriminatory and retaliatory employment practices. The defendant agreed to post notice of its anti-discrimination policy, provide ADEA training to all supervisory and management employees, and report to the EEOC verifying that training was conducted, a list of training attendees, and the duration of training. The consent decree had an initial period of five years. On January 8, 2008, Judge Golden entered the agreement. On April 7, 2008, the EEOC filed a motion to enforce the consent decree and impose sanctions. The EEOC alleged that the defendant willingly failed to comply with the agreement to pay three of the complainants. However, on June 10, 2008, Judge Golden denied the motion as moot after the EEOC advised that the defendant was in compliance with the terms of the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC alleged that the defendant had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by subjecting older workers to disparate terms and conditions of employment, including discharge, loss of raises, benefits and bonuses, negative performance evaluations, and excess scrutiny of their job performances. In 2008, the defendant entered a five-year consent decree that enjoined the defendant from engaging in discriminatory and retaliatory employment practices; required the defendant to post notice of its anti-discrimination policy, provide ADEA training to all supervisory and management employees, and report to the EEOC verifying that training was conducted, a list of training attendees, and the duration of trainin; and awarded monetary demages to complainants. The case is now closed.


On March 9, 2016, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) and students within the University System of Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the members of the Board of Regents for the University System of Georgia for denying in-state tuition to undocumented students who had received deferred immigration action under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. They argued that the students were lawful residents of Georgia and that, as such, the state had created an unconstitutional two-tiered residency classification system. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the Supremacy Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on April 7, 2016. They argued that GLAHR lacked standing; the plaintiff’s official capacity claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and the defendants had qualified immunity. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint on April 21, 2016, adding both plaintiffs and defendants to the lawsuit and maintaining their original causes of action. They also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 3, 2016, seeking enjoinment of the University System’s classification system that had been classifying deferred action recipients as not lawfully present. The plaintiffs alleged that this system was irreparably harming the educational opportunities and career prospects of the deferred action students. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint two days later. Judge William C. O’Kelley heard oral arguments regarding the motion to dismiss on August 25, 2016. On February 10, 2017, defendants motioned to stay proceedings given a parallel proceeding in Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez. In that case, plaintiffs brought suit in state court against the University System of Georgia Board of Regents, arguing their denial of in-state tuition to DACA recipients violated the Board of Regents’ own policies and state statutory law concerning residency status. As that case had moved to the Georgia Supreme Court, defendants argued proceedings in this case should be stayed pending the outcome of that case. On February 16, 2017, Judge William C. O’Kelley granted defendant’s motion to stay proceedings and denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and the defendants’ motion to dismiss. He explained both the parallel litigation in Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez and President Trump’s stated opposition to the DACA program justified the stay. Following the stay, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on May 1, 2017. The plaintiffs filed another motion for a preliminary injunction on May 31, 2017. Defendants responded in opposition on June 13, 2017. Subsequent to Judge O’Kelley’s decision, the Trump Administration announced its decision to rescind the DACA program. On March 28, 2018, the District Court dismissed without prejudice the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court stayed the case pending a decision from the Eleventh Circuit in Estrada v. Becker. In Estrada, students qualified to attend Georgia’s selective schools challenged the Georgia Board of Regents’ policy requiring Georgia’s three most selective universities to verify the “lawful presence” of students admitted. Under the challenged policy, applicants with DACA could not attend schools that did not admit all academically qualified applicants for the two most recent years. The District Court in Estrada had dismissed plaintiffs’ challenges that the policy violated the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. On March 6, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in Estrada and affirmed the District Court. 917 F.3d 1298. It found the policy did not violate the Supremacy Clause because it was not an unconstitutional regulation of immigration and the policy was not preempted. Regarding the Equal Protection claim, it agreed with the District Court that the students were not similarly situated to other noncitizens permitted to attend because unlike the other noncitizens the DACA recipients did not have lawful status. Following the decision in Estrada, Judge Richard W. Story issued an order to show cause on March 12, 2019, asking the plaintiffs to demonstrate why GLAHR v. Alford should not be dismissed. In response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case was closed on March 28, 2019.

Summary: On March 9, 2016, the Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights (GLAHR) and students within the University System of Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. They alleged the students, who had been granted legal status under the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, were entitled to in-state tuition, and that the defendants had created an unconstitutional two-tiered system of residency in violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. The proceedings were largely stayed as parallel suits also involving challenges to the University System of Georgia's policies relating to DACA recipients progressed in the Georgia Supreme Court (Dean Alford v. Rigoberto Rivera Hernandez) and the Eleventh Circuit (Estrada v. Becker). After the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in Estrada affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims challenging the University System of Georgia's policies treating DACA recipients differently, the Court in GLAHR v. Alford issued an order to show cause for why this case should not be dismissed. In response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case was closed on March 28, 2019.


On July 14, 2015, a female Walmart employee filed this class action lawsuit against Wal-Mart in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Represented by the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, the plaintiff alleged that Wal-Mart had intentionally deprived her of employment-based spousal health insurance benefits because the plaintiff and her wife were the same sex. This, she alleged, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal Equal Pay Act, and the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Law. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as class certification. This case was assigned to District Judge William G. Young. Discovery and settlement negotiations proceeded, and were successful: in December 2016, the parties proposed a class-wide settlement. The class was specified as all current and former Walmart employees who were married to “legal same-sex spouse” between January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2013, would have been eligible to receive spousal health insurance benefits from Wal-Mart if they had been married to a person of the opposite sex, but did not receive those benefits. The remedy included a payment of $7.5 million—which covered reasonable attorneys fees to be determined by the Court (but not to exceed $1.875 million), a $25,000 “service payment” to the named plaintiff, all notice and administrative costs of the settlement (not to exceed $110,000), and damages paid to class members. Class members were able to submit proof of actual medical expenses, which received priority. Whatever money was left after those were paid was to be distributed pro rata to all the other class members, with a cap of $5,000 per year for each class member. The settlement agreement set up a claims process to manage the distribution of these funds. Class members had the ability to “opt out” of the settlement, in which case they would receive no money, but retain their right to sue separately. In addition, the settlement had a paragraph on “programmatic relief,” in which Wal-Mart “commit[ed] to treating same-sex and opposite-sex spouses or couples equally in the provision of health insurance benefits, so long as to do so is consistent with applicable law.” On December 16, 2016, Judge Young granted the parties’ motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. Wal-Mart was required to notify the members of the class and to give them the chance to object to the settlement if they chose to do so. The fairness hearing took place on May 15, 2017. Judge Young issued a final order approving the settlement the following day. He approved Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees, and awarded counsel $1.875 million in fees and $25,285.04 in litigation expenses. The court retained jurisdiction over the case either for a period of six months after the Settlement Effective Date, or for a period of one month after all Settlement Class Members received their final payments and any remaining funds had been distributed cypres--whichever was longer. As of March 2019, nearly two years after the settlement agreement was entered, there has been no further litigation. The case is presumed closed.

Summary: In 2015, a female Wal-Mart employee filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that Wal-Mart had intentionally deprived the plaintiff's wife of employment-based spousal health insurance benefits because the plaintiff and her wife were of the same sex and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. A settlement was reached and the Court issued a final order approving the settlement on May 16, 2017.


On January 23, 2019, six indigent prison inmates with mental illness whom the defendants held in secure prisons past their release dates filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of other prisoners in similar situations. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of New York, the New York State Office of Mental Health, Commissioner, Associate Commissioner, and the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), alleging that the defendants failed to make available community-based housing and supportive services that the plaintiffs require upon release. As a result, plaintiffs were allegedly held in state prison past their lawful release dates (in some cases over a year). The plaintiffs also alleged that during this prolonged time in prison, the defendants subjected them to solitary confinement and even revoked the approved release status of the inmates in response to the inmates' reporting of violations. The plaintiffs sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C § 794, and 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Represented by the Legal Aid Society and Disability Rights New York, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged unconstitutional and discriminatory practices to which the defendants subjected them. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked that the defendants make release possible by developing the community-based mental health housing programs that the defendants have imposed as a precondition for the plaintiff's discharge from prison, and by creating an effective plan for community integration. The case was assigned to Judge Cathy Seibel. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 3, 2019. After some discovery, defendant Cuomo filed a motion to dismiss the entire action against him on December 16, 2019. The motion alleged that all claims against him should be dismissed as moot because he had no direct involvement in securing housing or community-based services for the plaintiffs. The motion further alleges that all claims from five of the six plaintiffs should be dismissed as moot because they had since been released to community residences. Defendant Cuomo claimed sovereign immunity regarding the claims of the remaining one plaintiff not yet released. On August 10, 2020, before a ruling on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs requested leave to amend their complaint, which was granted by Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith on August 26. The second amended complaint was filed on August 27, 2020. Judge Seibel issued a bench ruling on the earlier motion to dismiss on September 25, 2020, granting the motion to dismiss as to the substantive due process claim, but otherwise denying the motion. Additionally, Judge Seibel found that the PLRA and its exhaustion requirements did not apply to the Residential Treatment Facility subclass, which includes those who were incarcerated past the maximum expiration dates of their court-imposed prison sentences. 2020 WL 5038525. The court also dismissed Governor Cuomo as a defendant. Judge Seibel ordered the defendants to submit their pre-motion letter or answer as to the second amended complaint by October 16, 2020. As of October 14, 2020, the defendants have yet to file an answer or motion in response to the second amended complaint and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, six indigent prison inmates with mental illness whom the defendants held in secure prisons past their release dates filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of other prisoners in similar situations. The plaintiffs alleged that the New York State and its Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) failed to make available community-based housing and supportive services that the plaintiffs require upon release, thereby holding the plaintiffs in state prison past their lawful release dates. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case is ongoing.


Plaintiffs, individuals who allege they were stopped and interrogated by U.S. Border Patrol agents in the Olympic Peninsula without reasonable suspicion, filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act against the Border Patrol on April 26, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Claiming that the patrol officers were stopping vehicles solely due to the race/ethnicity of the occupants, Plaintiffs asserted that their Fourth Amendment rights were being violated, and that the officers were acting in excess of their authority under 8 U.S.C. §1357 and 8 C.F.R. §287.8(b)(2) (generally requiring officers to have a reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is illegally present in the United States in order to stop the vehicle). The Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Washington and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NIRP), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs requested that patrol officers be trained on what "reasonable suspicion" entails, and that the patrol office keep complete and accurate records of officer training and testing, as well as every vehicle stop. Plaintiffs also requested a master to oversee the implementation of these policies. Class certification is still pending. In challenging the Border Patrol's interrogations of Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion, Plaintiffs cite Nicacio v. INS (IM-WA-0011), in which the court stated it was unlawful for INS to stop vehicles occupied by persons of "Hispanic appearance" without particularized reasonable suspicion based on specific articulable documented facts. 595 F. Supp. 19, 26 (E.D. Wash. 1984). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 12, 2012. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff did not have standing and that there was no private cause of action under 8 U.S.C. §1357. Judge Benjamin H. Settle of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied this motion on August 27, 2012, stating that Plaintiffs were likely to suffer substantial and immediate irreparable injury (further stops without reason), and that Plaintiffs properly made a claim under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 551, which provides a private cause of action. Sanchez v. U.S. Office of Border Patrol, No. 12-5378 BHS, 2012 WL 3715719 (W.D. Wash. 2012). The parties then began settlement negotiations, and reached a settlement in September 2013. The case was voluntarily dismissed. The settlement agreement provided: 1) Border Patrol issued a letter to the ACLU of Washington and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project acknowledging that reasonable suspicion is required for investigative stops, including near the border, and that Border Patrol is "committed to [comply] with applicable Department of Homeland Security guidance, including with respect to the use of race or ethnicity in law enforcement activities." (Oddly, the letter referenced 2004 guidance, rather than stricter 2013 guidance. 2) One refresher training session for Border Patrol personnel on the Fourth Amendment. 3) Every six months for eighteen months, CBP agreed to produce to plaintiffs' counsel Field Contact Data Sheets issued by agents at the Port Angeles, Washington Station, redacted to protect personal information.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individuals stopped by Border Patrol in the Olympic Peninsula in Washington without reasonable suspicion other than their Hispanic appearance, filed suit in 2012 against the U.S. Border Patrol, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiffs sought a requirement that Border Patrol document all stops, as well as training and testing of officers as to what "reasonable suspicion" entails. The litigation settled for modest training requirements in 2013.


On September 9, 2008, in response to charges filed by 18 women, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Sterling Jewelers, alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 based on discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that Sterling Jewelers intentionally discriminated against female sales employees by maintaining a system of excessively subjective promotion and compensation decisions and thereby permitting or encouraging managers to deny equal access to promotion and compensation to female employees. The EEOC claimed in the alternative that Sterling Jewelers maintained an excessively subjective system that had an illegal disparate impact on female retail sales employees. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief, including back pay, promotion, compensation for lost benefits and emotional suffering, and development of policies and programs to provide equal opportunities to women and eliminate the effects of past discrimination. The EEOC also sought to recoup the cost of its litigation. The litigation was brought on behalf of the 18 charging parties and all other similarly situated female employees. The progress of the case has been slow because of numerous disputes over procedure and discovery. On January 6, 2010, the Court (Judge Richard J. Arcara) denied Sterling's motion to dismiss all claims for conduct preceding the statute of limitations period for the first party to file charges with the EEOC, holding that the EEOC was not bound by the statute of limitations, which applied only to individuals. 2010 WL 86376 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) On July 15, 2010, the Court (Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy), among other things, allowed the charging parties to intervene in the proceedings to participate in argument over the scope of a protective order. 2010 WL 2803017 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). For contractual reasons the charging parties were pursuing their claims separately in a class-action arbitration and wanted to be able to receive discovery information from the EEOC, though they were prohibited from sharing information with the EEOC. See Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc.. The protective order was issued on July 23, 2011. On April 25, 2011, the Court (Judge Richard J. Arcara) bifurcated the trial and discovery into two phases, liability (Stage I) and damages (Stage II). Stage I generally covered the issue of whether there was a disparate impact on female retail employees at Sterling to establish a pattern or practice of discrimination, while Stage II would occur only if the EEOC prevailed at phase I and covered the individual aspects of each employee's case along with whether there was a legitimate business reason for the disparity. The EEOC sought to have the punitive damages determination included in phase I, but the Court rejected that approach. 788 F.Supp.2d 83 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). The bifurcation was followed by extensive discovery disputes from 2011 to 2012. On September 25, 2013, Sterling moved for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the EEOC failed to satisfy its obligation to conduct an adequate, nationwide investigation of Sterling's employment practices. To this, the EEOC stated that courts need not inquire into the sufficiency of the investigation itself. On March 10, 2014, the Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The court granted partial summary judgment on the claim that the EEOC failed to prove that it satisfied its statutory obligation to conduct a pre-suit investigation, and it denied Sterling’s motion to strike portions of the EEOC’s Statement of Facts for the reason that it contained “statement[s] that rely on an admissible evidence not in the record, as well as legal argument and generalized conclusory statements.” 3 F.Supp.3d 57 On May 15, 2014, the EEOC filed an appeal, arguing that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the magistrate judge improperly reviewed the sufficiency of the EEOC's investigation, rather than whether there was an investigation or not. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and decided on September 9, 2015, to vacate the district court's summary judgment order, thus remanding the case for further proceedings. 801 F.3d 96 On May 4, 2017, the EEOC and Sterling entered into a consent decree. The court maintained jurisdiction for a period of three years and three months. Provisions included enjoining Sterling's conduct, the appointment of an employment practice expert to oversee and recommend changes within Sterling, training, and further additional internal procedures for implementing equal employment practices. While there was no award of attorney's fees, Sterling agreed to bear all expenses that it would incur to implement the provisions of the consent decree. In 2018, a dispute arose between Sterling and the EEOC regarding Sterling's rejection of a merit pay program that the EEOC had proposed pursuant to the consent decree. The EEOC claimed that Sterling had not provided a legitimate business reason for rejecting the proposal. The parties submitted the issue to Fred Alvarez through their mutually agreed upon dispute resolution mechanism. Mr. Alvarez issued a decision on June 19, 2019, holding that Sterling had not demonstrated that its alternative merit pay program would be less adversely impactful to their female retail sales employees than the EEOC's proposal. After the EEOC sought relief from Sterling, the parties agreed to extend the term of the decree for 15 months until November of 2021 in order to verify Sterling's implementation of the new merit pay compensation program. On March 11, 2020, Judge Arcara granted the extension. The consent decree remains in force.

Summary: On September 9, 2008, in response to charges filed by 18 women, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Sterling Jewelers, Inc., alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through sex-discriminatory employment practices. The EEOC alleged that Sterling's system of promotion and compensation decisions was excessively subjective, which intentionally facilitated or encouraged discrimination and, in addition, that the decisions had a disparate impact on female sales employees. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and monetary relief for the class of female sales employees and to recover its costs. The progress of the case has been slow because of numerous disputes over procedure and discovery. On April 25, 2011, the Court (Richard J. Arcara) bifurcated trial and discovery into two phases, liability (Stage I) and damages (Stage II). The bifurcation was followed by extensive discovery disputes. The court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Sterling on the grounds that the EEOC failed to satisfy its obligation to conduct a nationwide investigation of Sterling's employment practices. The EEOC appealed, and the Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The EEOC and Sterling the entered into a consent decree. The court maintained jurisdiction, and provisions included changes in employment practices and the appointment of an employment practice expert. The consent decree remains in force


On September 25, 2013, Feltl and Company, Inc., a privately held, for-profit securities brokerage and investment banking company subject to the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota. The plaintiff sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaratory injunction that the contraceptive services mandate violated the above statutes. The plaintiffs also requested a declaratory judgment that the mandate is generally invalid, a permanent injunction against HHS, Treasury, and the IRS from enforcing the mandate against the Feltls and their company, and a declaratory judgment that group health plans excluding contraception do not violated the Affordable Care Act. The plaintiffs further requested reasonable attorneys fees and a jury trial. This lawsuit claims that the contraceptive services mandate was improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act, and that being required to provide a health plan to their employees that includes contraceptive services violates the Feltls' freedom of religion and First and Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that distinguishing between religious employers and private companies in exemptions for the contraceptive services mandate constitutes establishing religion, and that purchasing or providing coverage for contraception, sterilization, and abortifactant drugs through their employee group health plan violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's June 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., courts have granted similar closely-held, private, for profit companies injunctions protecting them from enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate. On November 5, 2013, Judge Donovan W. Frank ordered a preliminary injunction staying HHS's ability to enforce the mandate against Feltl and Company. On November 26, 2014, Judge Frank issued an order for injunction and judgment that enjoined HHS or other agencies from taking any action to enforce the contraceptive services mandate or attendant penalties against the plaintiffs. The court found that the contraceptive services mandate violated the plaintiff's rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and awarded attorneys fees. The injunction excluded future changes in statute or regulation. The plaintiff was given time to file for attorneys fees, but nothing shows that it did, so either it didn't claim them, or that part of the matter was settled out of court.

Summary: In 2013, Feltl and Company, Inc., a privately held, company subject to the employer mandate under the Affordable Care Act, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota against federal agencies involved in enforcing the ACA. The plaintiff alleged that the contraceptive services mandate violated its freedom of religion. The Court enjoined HHS and related agencies from enforcing the mandate or related penalties against the Feltls, and found that the mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in their case.


COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed on behalf on an unaccompanied minor subject to deportation, alleging that the Trump administrations' system of authorizing the summary removal of persons to prevent the introduction of COVID-19 bypassed procedural protections otherwise granted to minor children. On June 24, the court granted a TRO. On June 29, the defendants notified the court that they have exempted the plaintiff from processing under Title 42. On August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.
 On June 9, 2020, a 16-year-old migrant filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Office of Field Operations, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, against the Trump administration’s system which authorizes deportation from the United States even without any signs of COVID-19. The plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the order under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, the Public Health Services Act of 1944, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the new system for restricting immigration along the borders (collectively referred to as “Title 42 Process”) which authorizes the summary removal of unaccompanied children without any due process is an unlawful invocation of Title 42 of the U.S. Code. The plaintiff was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants Rights Project, ACLU District of Columbia, ACLU Texas, Oxfam America, and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies. The case was assigned to Judge Carl K. Nichols. On May 19, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued an order suspending “the introduction into the United States of persons from designated foreign countries or places” to prevent the introduction of COVID-19 under 42 U.S.C. § 265 (Title 42). The CDC interpreted the authority expansively to cover not only those entering the U.S but also those who have already crossed the border. The Title 42 Process was amended on May 20 to take effect indefinitely until the CDC determined it was no longer necessary. The plaintiff, an unaccompanied minor, fled persecution from Honduras and was apprehended by CBP upon entry. Under the Title 42 Process, he was subject to summary expulsion and was scheduled to be deported to Honduras on June 10. The plaintiff alleged that the Title 42 Process bypassed statutory and procedural protections otherwise granted to unaccompanied minor children. While the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) already authorized the rapid removal of noncitizens who entered the U.S. illegally, unaccompanied children were not subject to expedited removal unlike the May 19 order which did not exempt minors. Prior to implementation of the Title 42 Process, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a full hearing and appeals process to determine his right to remain in the U.S. The plaintiff also alleged that while the Title 42 Process authorized the defendant for testing and quarantine as a health directive, the expulsion of children seeking protection from persecution violated the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The plaintiff also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) staying his expulsion scheduled for June 10, pending the hearing on the authority of Title 42. The plaintiff also sought an order staying his expulsion under the protection of the INA and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. The same day the complaint was filed, the parties agreed that the government will not move the plaintiff until June 10. On June 10, a hearing was held regarding the TRO. On June 15, an amicus brief was submitted by the International Refugee Assistance Project in support of the plaintiff’s emergency TRO motion. On June 17, the defendants submitted an opposition to the TRO, contending that public health concerns justified the CDC order. The following day, the Scholars or Refugee and Immigration Law sought to submit an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff. On June 24, the TRO was granted pending the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 29, the defendants notified the court that they had transferred the custody of the plaintiff to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), Department of Health and Human Services, for immigration processing under Title 8 of the U.S. Code, which exempted the plaintiff from processing under Title 42. The defendants argued that since the plaintiff would no longer be subject to the challenged CDC Order, the case was moot. On July 2, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding another minor child as an additional plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 23, arguing lack of jurisdiction. They argued that the case is moot, since both plaintiffs are now excepted from the order, and therefore, there is no actual ongoing controversy. On August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.

Summary: This suit was filed on June 9 by an unaccompanied minor subject to deportation from the United States against various government entities. The plaintiff alleged that the Trump administration’s system which authorizes the summary removal of persons to prevent the introduction of COVID-19 bypassed statutory procedural protections otherwise granted to unaccompanied minor children. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the new system, and a temporary restraining order (TRO) staying his expulsion scheduled on June 10. On June 24, the TRO was granted pending the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 29, the defendants notified the court that they have exempted the plaintiff from processing under Title 42. On August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by Harvard and MIT regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. On July 14, the parties informed the court that the government agreed to rescind the July 6 directive, as well as the associated FAQ on the ICE website, and also agreed to rescind the implementation of the directive. Instead, the government said it would return to the March policy. As a result, the court mooted the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order motions and in October 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.
 Background Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially "student visas") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an "operational change plan" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. The Lawsuit This lawsuit was filed on July 8, 2020, two days after the directive was issued. Plaintiffs were the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and were represented by private counsel. Defendants were the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The universities claimed that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act in three ways: 1) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to address the reliance interests of both universities that had already engaged in extensive planning and international students expectations of their immigration status; 2) the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to offer a reasoned basis to justify the policy; and 3) defendants failed to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures in issuing this directive. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the agencies from enforcing the new directive. Plaintiffs also requested that the court vacate and set aside the directive in addition to declaratory relief and attorney's fees and costs. The case was originally assigned to Judge Douglas P. Woodlock but he immediately recused himself and it was reassigned to Judge Allison D. Borroughs. Fifteen parties filed amicus briefs in support of the universities motion, representing the interests of dozens of higher education institutions, education nonprofits, labor unions, and tech corporations. On July 14, the parties informed the court that the government agreed to rescind the July 6 directive, as well as the associated FAQ on the ICE website, and also agreed to rescind the implementation of the directive. Instead, the government said it would return to the March policy. As a result, the court mooted the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order motions. On October 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in response to a July 6, 2020 ICE directive that would effectively force out of the country many international students studying remotely during the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Harvard and MIT filed suit claiming that the directive was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting defendants from enforcing the directive, and an order vacating and setting aside the policy. They also sought declarative relief and attorney's fees. On July 14, the parties informed the court that the government agreed to rescind the July 6 directive, as well as the associated FAQ on the ICE website, and also agreed to rescind the implementation of the directive. Instead, the government said it would return to the March policy. As a result, the court mooted the preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order motions. On October 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.


On May 23, 2013, prisoners and recently released prisoners from Monterey County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Monterey and the California Forensic Medical Group (CFMG) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, the ACLU National Prison Project, the Monterey Public Defender, and private attorneys, asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the conditions in the Monterey County Jail (the "Jail") violated federal and state law due to failures to protect prisoners from violence, provide adequate medical and mental health care, and provide reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities. On April 25, 2015, the County and Sheriff's Office filed a motion to dismiss, and the CFMG filed a motion to dismiss on May 2, 2014. The District Court (Magistrate Judge Paul Singh Grewal) denied both motions on September 29, 2014. 2014 WL 4843945 (N.D. Cal. 2014). First, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing even if they were no longer incarcerated, due to the short average length of stay of prisoners in the putative class and the slow speed of legal action. Second, the Court addressed the issue of whether a private provider of jail medical facilities are "services" that can face scrutiny under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that CFMG was subject to Title III of the ADA because it operates a "professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment" within the jail. The Court further explained that, although the "place" of a jail fell under Title II of the ADA as a public entity, courts had consistently found that Title III applied to "places of public accommodation" within places that normally don't fit under Title III either because they are owned by or operated for other purposes by a public entity. On April 29, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking certification of a prisoner class consisting of all current and future prisoners in the jail, and a subclass of prisoners with disabilities, consisting of all current and future prisoners who have a qualifying disability. Then, on August 26, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court order defendants to fix six of the conditions at the Jail that placed the plaintiffs and class members at risk of serious injury and death. On January 29, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grewal certified the class. 2015 WL 399975 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Then on April 14, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grewal also granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 11, 2015, the parties settled the case. The jail agreed to set new standards for the medical and mental health care provided to inmates and to expand accessibility for prisoners with disabilities. The parties agreed to retain experts as neutral monitors for a limited term of oversight. The parties planned for the jail to come into compliance with the Settlement Agreement within five years, unless they moved for an extension. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the settlement for this five year period. On August 18, 2015, Magistrate Judge Grewal approved the settlement. Litigation continued over attorneys' fees as the settlement agreement only set upper limits for attorneys' fees of $4.8 million. On November 6, the parties stipulated to an agreement of how they would address the issue of interest on attorneys' fees. The parties then litigated the implementation plan. After briefing and hearings, the court approved an implementation plan on May 27, 2016. On June 6, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Beth Labson Freeman. In 2017 and 2018, there was some litigation over compliance issues. On March 19, 2018, the plaintiffs proposed an order regarding the use of telepsychiatry by the defendants, as per the settlement agreement. The court had instructed the parties that the defendants needed to have standards for when they could deviate from the typical in-person encounter and instead use “telemedicine or telepsychiatry.” After counsel met and decided on these issues, plaintiffs’ proposed order was signed and ordered by the judge on March 22, 2018. (ECF 632). Over the following months, parties handled various settlement agreement enforcement issues, such as attorneys fees and costs, the production of medical records, and neutral monitors. The docket remains active with these issues as of March 6, 2020.

Summary: In 2013, prisoners from the Monterey County Jail filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County and the California Forensic Medical Group. The plaintiffs claimed that the conditions in the Jail failed to protect prisoners from violence, provide adequate medical and mental health care, and provide reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities. In 2015, the parties settled the case, favoring the plaintiff. Litigation regarding attorneys' fees and settlement enforcement is ongoing.


On Aug. 11, 2014, four individuals filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, and the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Nov. 17, 2014. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Institute for Justice, alleged the defendants’ policies and practices with regard to civil forfeitures: (1) violated the plaintiffs’ rights to notice or a hearing prior to the seizure, (2) compelled the plaintiffs to give up constitutional and statutory rights, (3) prevented the plaintiffs from receiving a timely hearing, (4) required the plaintiffs to return to court multiple times by re-listing the property in question, (5) inserted an institutional and personal interest in forfeiture proceedings by allowing the defendants to retain the property’s proceeds, and (6) violated due process by allowing the defendants to run the forfeiture courtroom proceedings. The plaintiffs sought an injunction and declaratory judgment on these six claims. Under Pennsylvania law, law enforcement can confiscate real and personal property if it is associated with a crime, even if the owner of the property is not associated with the crime. Commonly, property was seized in connection with a controlled substance violation pursuant to the Controlled Substance Forfeiture Act. Once seized, the property owner must prove the innocence of the property to get it back. Otherwise, the District Attorney’s Office (DA) keeps the property or proceeds from its sale. The plaintiffs alleged that by using forms copied from civil forfeiture petitions and courtroom proceedings run by DA prosecutors, the DA generates a substantially high volume of cases that account for almost 20% of its general budget. Moreover, after the initial hearing, prosecutors sometimes decided to re-list the case multiple times before it concluded, compelling the plaintiffs to return to court each time if they wished to contest the forfeiture. After seizing the property, the defendants required the plaintiffs to agree to particular conditions before regaining their property, including waiving the right to an innocent-owner defense should the defendants seize the property in the future or waiving the defense that the forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense. The plaintiffs sought class certification, and the defendants sought to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Following Senior Judge Eduardo Robreno’s May 12, 2015, denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 103 F. Supp. 3d 694, the parties entered into settlement discussions. On Nov. 4, 2015, after a fairness hearing, the Judge Robreno ordered approval of a settlement and class certification only with regard to the first two claims. 2015 WL 12806512 (E.D. Penn. Nov. 4, 2015). Per the order, the class for the first claim of relief was “all persons holding legal title to or otherwise having a legal interest in real property against which an ex parte 'seize and seal' order is presently in effect, or will in the future be in effect.” The class for the second claim of relief was “all persons holding legal title to or otherwise having a legal interest in real or personal property against which a civil-forfeiture petition has been filed, or will in the future be filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County and who entered into an unsealing agreement or a settlement agreement.” Per the settlement agreement, the defendants were prohibited from seeking ex parte “seize and seal” orders under the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act unless the application was previously approved, there are facts to establish the existence of exigent circumstances connected to the property, and there are facts to establish that less restrictive measures would not be sufficient. Additionally, any existing ex parte “seize and seal” orders were to be removed. The settlement also provided that notice would be given to civil forfeiture respondents that entered into unsealing or settlement agreements that specific conditions of their agreements are now void. Litigation continued regarding the outstanding claims for relief. On Sept. 7, 2016, the court denied the defendants' joint motion for reconsideration. 2016 WL 7219641. On Aug. 1, 2016, the plaintiffs had filed a motion to join defendant state court administrators, file a second amended complaint, and sever plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief. In an order dated Sept. 14, 2016 and filed on Sept. 15, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion. 2016 WL 7203707. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint the same day, requesting relief on the remaining claims. For the next several months, procedural developments continued, including the defendants filing two motions to dismiss on Sept. 19, 2016, and again on Nov. 29, 2016. Then, on Feb. 23, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' request for class certification as to their fifth claim. 320 F.R.D. 12. The court granted certification "with respect to Plaintiffs’ requests for (1) a declaration that the City and D.A. Defendants’ policy and practice of retaining forfeited property and its proceeds is unconstitutional, and (2) an injunction enjoining that policy and practice." It denied certification with respect to "entry of judgment requiring the return of property." A month later, on March 30, 2017, in a written memorandum, the court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. 246 F.Supp.3d 1058. The defendants filed a motion for a permanent injunction on July 21, 2017. They argued that, despite offering the plaintiffs "a settlement agreement whereby the Philadelphia Police Department and District Attorney’s Office would no longer receive any forfeiture proceeds" two months prior, the plaintiffs had not accepted the offer. In an effort to end the litigation, the defendants asked the court to issue an injunction against themselves. On Aug. 4, 2017, the plaintiffs responded to the defendants' motion, alleging that the defendants were attempting to "moot" the plaintiffs' claims in order to avoid a ruling on the merits of the constitutionality of their policy of using forfeiture proceeds. The plaintiffs asked the court to defer ruling on the defendants' motion and hold it in abeyance until after the parties completed discovery and summary judgment briefing had been completed. On Aug. 18, 2017, the court ordered the parties to submit a list of proposed facilitators to mediate settlement of the courtroom claims by Sept. 7, 2017. On Nov. 27, 2017, the court ordered that the case be suspended pending the parties' settlement negotiations and the appointment of a mediator. On May 22, 2018, the court appointed Mark A. Aronchick as a facilitator to promote settlement of all matters. His appointment was extended until November 9, 2018. In September 2018, the parties reached an agreement and the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class certification and a consent decree on their fifth and sixth claims. The parties agreed to create a Restitutionary Class under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). The class consisted of "[a]ll persons who held or hold legal title to, or otherwise had or have a legal interest in property against which a Statutory or Common Law civil-forfeiture petition (i) was pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County as of August 11, 2012; or (ii) was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on or after August 11, 2012 until the date the Court grants preliminary approval." The defendants agreed to make a payment of $3,000,000 to the Restitutionary Fund in order to compensate people whose property was wrongly confiscated. Additionally, as part of the proposed consent decree, the defendants agreed to a set of reforms that have the goal of ending abusive civil-forfeiture practices in Philadelphia. The defendants were to be permanently enjoined from using forfeiture proceeds to fund the District Attorney’s Office, the Philadelphia Police Department, or any law enforcement purpose. On October 16, 2018, the court held a hearing on the motion for preliminary approval of class certification and the consent decree. The court requested that parties submit a revised version, which they did on March 26, 2019. On April 30, 2019, the court granted class certification and the consent decree, scheduling a final fairness hearing on November 1, 2019. The date of this hearing was later pushed back to August 3, 2020. Between the order approving the class certification and consent decree and the final fairness hearing, several class members filed objections, including one group that filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 27, 2021, the court simultaneously ruled on two separate consent decrees between the parties - one governing a settlement as to the third, fourth, and seventh claims for relief and one concerning the fifth and sixth. The court granted the first consent decree and class certification and granted in part the second while still granting class certification. Broadly, the court approved of safeguards that allow individuals to more easily contest and prevent property seizure and relisting while limiting forfeiture. The court further approved a permanent injunction against the defendants' financial interest in forfeiture proceedings. However, the court rejected the settlement fund distribution proposal, noting that too high a proportion, 27%, of the settlement fund was left for the residual, cy pres purpose of a charitable donation. The court thus instructed the parties to redetermine a reasonable settlement fund distribution plan that awarded a greater amount of the settlement's $3 million to the members of the plaintiff classes. On February 17, 2021, following an addendum by the parties that increased the amounts awarded to members of the classes, the court approved of the consent decree as to the fifth and sixth claims for relief and ordered the case closed.

Summary: On Aug. 11, 2014, four individuals sued the City of Philadelphia, the Mayor, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, the District Attorney, and the Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police Department, alleging that the defendants’ policies and practices with regard to civil forfeitures violated due process. Following settlement negotiations, the parties reached a set of consent decrees as to the claims for relief.