On March 25, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of African-American applicants to entry-level firefighter positions. The plaintiff alleged that, from 2004-2008, the City of Portsmouth fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for an entry-level firefighter positions had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices, and damages for those who have been impacted by them. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, since 2004, the city has administered a standardized test that applicants must pass with a minimum score of 70%, in order to be considered for hire into entry-level firefighter positions. The results of the test are then combined with scores from a personal interview to rank candidates for selection. The test passage rate of white test-takers was twice that of African Americans. The test is not essential to the job of firefighting and it prematurely eliminated 86 African Americans from the application process. On July 23, 2009, following a hearing on the matter, the District Court (Judge Mark S. Davis) ruled that a joint settlement agreement was fair and that the court would enforce it. The agreement held that the city could not use any selection method for entry-level firefighting positions that had a disparate impact on African Americans or was not job related (preferably both). It could, however, use the 2008 test to fill essential vacancies as long as they did not do so in a way that maintained the discriminatory impact. After these essential hires the city must use a new selection method. Both of these conditions were subject to either US or court approval. According to the settlement agreement, the city must also pay out a total of $145,000 to African-American applicants who failed the test between 2004 and 2008, but who did well on the reading comprehension part of the test. The city had to notify these former applicants and they, in turn, had to make a claim for an award out of the $145,000. Following a second fairness hearing, on April 29, 2010, the District Court (Judge Davis) set the final list of people eligible for this relief. The city also had to make ten priority hires of African Americans who were discriminatorily eliminated from the application process, based on the list of people eligible for monetary relief. These applicants must finish all of the nondiscriminatory parts of the application to be hired, but once hired they would receive retroactive seniority regarding pay and benefits. On January 29, 2013, the District Court (Judge Davis) terminated the consent decree because the city had implemented a nondiscriminatory hiring practice with US approval, and they had met all of their obligations to individuals by either paying them their damage award or hiring them with the full benefits of retroactive seniority.

Summary: On March 25, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint alleging that from 2004-2008, the City of Portsmouth, VA fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for an entry-level firefighter positions had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The parties entered a joint settlement requiring the city to implement nondiscriminatory hiring practice with US approval, and they had to pay damages to or hire these former applicants. On January 29, 2013, the court terminated the consent decree because the parties fulfilled their obligations.


On January 24, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of female social workers, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Indiana, under the Equal Pay Act as incorporated into the Fair Labor Standards Act, against School City of Hammond. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant paid its female social workers at a rate less than that paid to similarly situated males. On October 26, 2005, the District Court (Judge Philip P. Simon) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the two female complainants a total of $27,000.

Summary: On January 24, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of female social workers, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Indiana, under the Equal Pay Act against School City of Hammond. The EEOC claimed that the defendant paid its female social workers at a rate less than that paid to similarly situated males. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the two female complainants a total of $27,000.


On April 13, 2010, rejected U.S. Census Bureau job applicants filed an employment discrimination class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by a coalition of public interest attorney organizations and private counsel, alleged that Census hiring procedures, which pre-screened all applicants with arrest records, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Census screened out applicants whose names turn up in an FBI database, indicating an arrest record regardless of whether the arrest led to a criminal conviction or to any action at all. Applicants were required to provide the Census with official documents from any criminal case that shows up on their record within 30 days of their application. The plaintiffs claimed the 30-day letter requirement was unduly burdensome - if not impossible - to comply with since the documentation requested may have been sealed, expunged, lost, or destroyed due to age. Because African Americans and Latinos were more likely to have arrest records than whites, the plaintiffs claimed the hiring policies discriminated against people of color in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This was supported by a letter the EEOC sent the Census in 2009 criticizing the policy, warning that it may be in violation of Title VII. The plaintiffs also claimed that the compliance procedures did not distinguish among applicants with recent, serious convictions and those with records of long-ago, minor - often non-criminal - conduct, and that the requirement therefore had no job-related relevance. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief to alter the Census hiring practices, eliminating the 30-day letter requirement and other modifications to comply with the Uniform Guidelines for Employee Selection Procedures and related EEOC Guidance. They also requested that the defendant eradicate the effects of past and present unlawful employment practices by providing back pay and equal employment opportunities for all Class members. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on June 28, 2013. On December 16, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On July 1, 2014, the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Magistrate Judge Frank Maas) issued an order with respect to both motions. Judge Maas granted the defendant's motion in part and denied in part. Three named plaintiffs were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Maas granted in part and denied in part motion for class certification. He certified the class, consisting only of African-Americans, who sought temporary employment during the 2010 census and alleged harm suffered from the 30-day letter. However, since two of the three plaintiffs Judge Maas dismissed were the only Latino applicants, he did not include Latinos in the class certification originally. The class was certified for the purposes of determining liability and affording injunctive relief, but not for resolving damages. On October 2, 2014, Judge Maas re-instated one of the Latino plaintiffs, and certified the class as representing all African American and Latino candidates who applied for temporary employment to the 2010 Decennial Census and claim they were harmed by the 30-day requirement, adjudication criteria, or both. Subsequent to the Court's order, the parties entered into negotiations in the hopes of reaching a settlement. On February 8, 2016, the parties filed a joint letter with the Court stating they had concluded negotiations and reached an agreement that was subject to the Department of Justice's approval. In April 2016 the parties submitted the settlement agreement to the Court and Judge Maas issued a preliminary approval on April 19, 2016. Judge Maas ordered a final approval of the settlement on September 20, 2016. In the settlement, the Defendant agreed to pay 15 million dollars in damages and attorneys fees. In addition, the parties jointly selected independent organizations to work together as independent consultants to Census relative to the selection and hiring of temporary employees for the 2020 decennial census.

Summary: On April 13, 2010, rejected U.S. Census Bureau (Census) job applicants filed an employment discrimination class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of African American and Latino applicants to the Census. The plaintiffs alleged that the Census unlawfully screens out applicants who have arrest records, regardless of whether the arrest led to a criminal conviction or to any action at all. On September 20, 2016, the Court certified the parties' Settlement Agreement in which the Defendant agreed to pay 15 million dollars in damages and alter their hiring procedures.


On June 20, 2005, the San Francisco District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this action in the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Amelco Electric S.F., Inc. and Amelco Corporation. The EEOC, who brought suit on behalf of a male electrician and other similarly situated employees who worked for Amelco, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that Amelco had subjected its employees to disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, and termination because of their sex, race, national origin, and religion. The EEOC further alleged that Amelco retaliated against an employee and fired him for his complaints of discrimination. The EEOC filed a similar action on behalf of different Amelco employees on May 4, 2006 (see EEOC v. Amelco Electric Company, Inc, EE-CA-0013 on this site). Though the cases were not consolidated, the parties agreed to settle both matters simultaneously. The Settlement Agreement, which took effect on August 28, 2006, bound Amelco to not retaliate against the individuals who complained of discrimination the EEOC, and awarded the plaintiffs $125,000.

Summary: In June 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this suit in the Northern District of California under Title VII against Amelco Electric S.F., Inc. and Amelco Corporation, claiming Amelco had discriminated against its employees because of the sex, race, national origin, and religion. The parties settled on August 28, 2006, and plaintiffs were awarded $125,000.


On February 10, 2011, the United States Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section) released a letter of findings detailing the results of its investigation into the institutionalization of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in Virginia. The investigation focused specifically on the Central Virginia Training Center (CVTC), an intermediate care facility for persons with developmental disabilities (ICF/DD), but also considered the statewide institutionalization of this population (DOJ's involvement began as an investigation of CVTC pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act but later expanded to include the statewide system's compliance with the ADA). The DOJ concluded that Virginia was systematically violating the Americans with Disabilities Act under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. LC, in forcing the unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities. The DOJ found a lack of sufficient community-based services available to this population, an unreasonably long waiting list for Medicaid waiver services, inadequate discharge planning at CVTC, and other deficiencies. According to the DOJ, these policies lead to a situation in which individuals with developmental disabilities were housed unnecessarily in institutions and were unable to either remain in the community or transition from an institution to a community placement. Nearly one year later, the DOJ and Virginia entered into a settlement agreement to remedy the deficiencies outlined in the findings letter. The DOJ filed a complaint and settlement agreement in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on January 26, 2012. The court (Judge John A. Gibney, Jr.) gave preliminary approval to the agreement and allowed interested parties to submit letters and amici curiae briefs to the court in advance of the final approval of the settlement. On March 2, 2012, several individuals then living in institutions filed a motion to intervene in the litigation, claiming that they wished to remain in institutions and that the proposed settlement would force the closing of their institutions. The court found that they had adequately demonstrated that they stood to be affected by the outcome of the litigation and granted their intervention in the case on May 9, 2012. 282 F.R.D. 403. The intervenors then filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the United States' authority to bring the claim to enforce the ADA. On June 5, 2012, the court denied the intervenors' motion to dismiss, finding that DOJ's ADA enforcement authority included the ability to investigate and file suit in federal court as had occurred here, and that the government had followed all necessary procedures. On August 23, 2012, the court finalized its approval of the settlement between the United States and Virginia. Under the settlement, Virginia agreed to increase its community-based services for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. The goal of the agreement was to prevent individuals living in their communities from being forced into institutions, and to allow those living in institutions to transition to their communities. Virginia agreed to create additional slots on its Home and Community Based Services Medicaid waiver programs and to allow those on the waitlist to begin receiving services. The state also agreed to provide crisis services and employment training. Reports from the independent reviewer over the next three years noted significant progress in certain areas, including the discharge of adults from institutions and development of adult crisis services. However, in other areas, progress lagged. On September 23, 2015, the DOJ submitted a motion for a court-ordered schedule of implementation. Shortly afterward, the Intervenors filed a statement of interest asking that the court suspend the closure of remaining institutions until the State could show that adequate financial and community support structures were in place. Before the court made a determination on the DOJ's schedule motion, the parties negotiated and agreed on specific implementation schedules. The DOJ subsequently withdrew its motion in January 2016. On August 4, 2017, the Intervenors filed a motion for injunctive relief. The Intervenors alleged that several former residents who had never voluntarily consented to a move from the State Training Centers were coerced by the State into transitioning into the community. They asked that the court permanently enjoin the State from forcibly removing residents from Training Centers and that it issue a declaratory judgment stating that the State had acted in violation of state laws. A hearing on the motion took place on November 6, 2017. On February 2, 2018, the court (Judge Gibney) denied the Intervenors' motion. The court found that though the Intervenors had standing to pursue their motion for injunctive relief, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the motion because the Intervenors' claims did not form part of the same case or controversy as the DOJ's ADA claims and, further, because Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prevents federal courts from enjoining states based on state law claims. Even if it had jurisdiction, the court found that the Intervenors did not meet the standard for an award of injunctive relief. The court began the process of terminating the case in 2019. After a hearing on April 23, 2019, however, Judge Gibney found that the defendants had not complied with the terms of the consent decree, and that monitoring should continue. As of April 14, 2020, this case is ongoing and the independent reviewer continues to submit reports on compliance with the settlement agreement.

Summary: The United States Department of Justice conducted an investigation pursuant to CRIPA and the ADA into the institutionalization of individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in Virginia. After finding systemic ADA violations, DOJ and Virginia entered into a settlement agreement to increase community-based services and ultimately prevent unnecessary institutionalization. Monitoring of the settlement continues.


This civil rights class action challenges the burden of proof and other procedural issues within immigration court bond hearings. In 2019, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested the named plaintiffs in this case and initiated deportation proceedings. ICE placed each one in immigration detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), so they were eligible for release on bond. (Under a different statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), applicable based on criminal history or national security grounds, some noncitizens facing deportation are categorically ineligible for bond.) The government’s bond hearings under § 1226(a) placed the burden of proof regarding flight risks or dangers to the community on the detained person, not the government. Some of the named plaintiffs had not been afforded a bond hearing yet; others had been denied bond. This case was filed on June 13, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts as a habeas corpus petition and putative class action complaint against the Department of Justice, which is responsible for operating the immigration courts. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of detainees detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), “either within Massachusetts or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Boston Immigration Court.” The case was assigned to Chief Judge Patti Saris. Plaintiffs’ lawyers included a private firm, the ACLU National Prison Project, and two state ACLU affiliates (New Hampshire and Massachusetts). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that the burden of proof in immigration bond properly lays not on the detainee but on the government. Second, they sought implementation of a “clear and convincing evidence” standard; that is, they argued that bond should be granted unless there was clear and convincing evidence of a safety or flight risk need for ongoing detention. Third, they claimed that alternative conditions of release must be considered by immigration courts. Finally, they claimed that immigration courts must consider detainees’ ability to pay when they set bond. On August 6, 2019, the court certified two classes, each for detainees held under §1226(a)--one for those who had not yet received a bond hearing and the other for those who had received a hearing but had been denied bond. 395 F.Supp.3d 135. On November 27, 2019, Judge Saris ruled on the request for an injunction, granting it in part and denying it in part. First, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that the burden of proof should be placed on the government to prove that the detainee was dangerous or a flight risk. Second, it held that immigration courts must evaluate detainees' ability to pay. Third, immigration courts must consider alternative conditions of release including GPS monitoring. However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ "clear and convincing evidence" proposal, instead of holding that the “preponderance of evidence” standard would apply. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ request for re-dos on all the bond hearings members of the post-hearing class that had lost but ordered the government to report various facts to class counsel including whether a new bond hearing was held under the injunction’s rules. 415 F.Supp.3d 258. Both sides appealed. Plaintiffs sought review of the District Court’s “preponderance of evidence” ruling. The government challenged the rest of the decision. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In this class action covering the Boston Immigration Court (which covers immigration detainees in Massachusetts and other parts of New England), the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered numerous procedural changes to immigration court bond hearings. First, the Court put the burden on the government, not the detainee, to prove a flight risk or danger to the public. Second, immigration courts must consider the detainee's ability to pay. Finally, immigration courts must consider alternative conditions of release. Appeal is pending.


On December 4, 2014, eight female inmates of Muskegon County Jail (MCJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Muskegon County, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Michigan and private counsel, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the conditions of confinement at the MCJ were inhumane and unconstitutional. The plaintiffs brought the case as a class action; it was assigned to Judge Janet T. Neff. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, in addition to being exposed to unsafe physical conditions, male guards at the prison are permitted to watch female inmates while they change clothes, shower, and use the bathroom. The plaintiff also alleged they were referred to by slurs and often denied clean underwear and basic sanitary items such as toilet paper and feminine hygiene products. These conditions, the plaintiffs contended, violated the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and the prohibition against punishment of pretrial detainees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and to certify the class. The plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendants to take immediate measures to repair broken and backed-up plumbing and other failures of basic infrastructure, treat and exterminate infestations of mold and vermin, and implement a regular system of inspection, maintenance and repair to prevent these and related conditions. The plaintiffs also sought for the defendants to provide female prisoners with privacy from being routinely viewed by male prison staff, to provide women with reasonable access to toilet paper, feminine hygiene products, clean undergarments, etc., and to provide these prisoners with out-of-cell exercise opportunities for at least one hour per day. The motion for class certification consisted of four classes: (1) all current and future inmates at the Muskegon County Jail (“MCJ”), represented by plaintiff Stashia Collins, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement that affect all inmates (Overcrowding Injunctive Class); (2) all current and future female inmates at MCJ, represented by Ms. Collins, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from unconstitutional conditions of confinement specific to female inmates (Female Injunctive Class); (3) all inmates incarcerated at MCJ within three years prior to the filing of the complaint in this case, represented by the plaintiffs, seeking damages for harm suffered as a result of unconstitutional conditions of confinement that affect all inmates (Overcrowding Damages Class); and (4) all female inmates incarcerated at MCJ within three years prior to the filing of the complaint in this case, represented by the plaintiffs, seeking damages for harm suffered as a result of unconstitutional conditions of confinement specific to female inmates (Female Damages Class). On February 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding three additional named plaintiffs. On July 1, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint, arguing that it failed to state any plausible Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claims. On September 11, 2015, Judge Neff granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion. 2015 WL 9906265. The court dismissed Count III (Denial of Access to Feminine Hygiene Products, Toilet Paper and Adequate Underwear and Other Clothing) and Count IV (Severe Overcrowding and Other Abysmal Conditions) but retained Count I (Violation of Privacy and Bodily Integrity) and Count II (Denial of Exercise). In the same order, Judge Neff denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ pending motions for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and expert testimony in support of a preliminary injunction but left the plaintiffs opportunity to re-file to conform to the court’s standards. The plaintiffs appealed this order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit insofar as the district court’s order denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Count III, and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. On May 12, 2016, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as it pertained to the motion for summary judgment and the motion for class certification but the appeal was allowed to proceed as it related to the denial of preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision but the motion was denied on December 12, 2016. On March 31, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for joinder of four new plaintiffs and partial renewal of class certification. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested certification of a class of all current and future female inmates at the Muskegon County Jail (MCJ) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 7, 2017, the court entered an order holding these motions in abeyance. On October 19, 2016, the parties agreed to dismiss Count V of the complaint and filed an order of dismissal. The court granted this motion that same day. The following year, the parties were able to come to a settlement agreement. On May 31, 2017, the parties had a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmody, where the parties reviewed their settlement. The agreement, consisted of monetary and injunctive relief. Each plaintiff was to be paid damages in the amount of $20,000 and the defendants were required to change policies regarding dispersal of medication, hygiene products, exercise, and cross-gender viewing. The agreement dictated that, pending final approval by the court, this case would be dismissed with prejudice and the appeal and the motion for class certification would be withdrawn. Having settled, the parties filed a proposed stipulation and order of dismissal with prejudice which the court granted on July 24, 2017. The district court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement due to it being a private settlement agreement. That same day, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal. There has been no other activity on the docket as of June 27, 2018.

Summary: In December 2014, eight female inmates of Muskegon County Jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Muskegon County, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Michigan and private counsel, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the conditions of confinement at the jail are inhumane and unconstitutional. In June 2017, the parties settled and voluntarily dismissed the case with prejudice.


The Department of Justice filed suit on May 7, 1996, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a mortgage company subsidiary of Fleet Mortgage Financial Group alleging that the company engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The Department of Justice specifically argued that the defendant charged African American and Hispanic borrowers higher prices for home mortgage loans than comparatively qualified white borrowers by requiring African American and Hispanic borrowers to pay higher interest rates or upfront fees. These allegations surfaced after the Federal Reserve completed a routine compliance check with two of Fleet Mortgage Financial Group's branches in Westbury, New York and Woodbridge, New Jersey. The parties settled the case on June 24, 1996, which was approved by the court. Under the settlement agreement, the defendant was required to establish a four million dollar settlement fund to compensate minority borrowers who the parties agreed had paid higher prices for loans between August 1993 and June 1994. The fund was also to contribute to a fair lending outreach campaign. In addition, the defendant was permanently enjoined from continuing such discriminatory practices. The case is now closed.

Summary: The Department of Justice filed suit on May 7, 1996, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a mortgage company subsidiary of Fleet Mortgage Financial Group alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The case settled.


On August 22, 2012, two individuals incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., against the State of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Uptown People's Law Center, alleged that prison employees confiscated several items of personal property from their cells. They asked the Court for a judgment declaring that the confiscation constituted a taking without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and directing the defendant to either return or provide just compensation for the confiscated property. The plaintiffs, incarcerated at the Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville") purchased several items from the prison commissary, including a typewriter and multiple fans, that had been approved for prisoner use. In July 2012, the Warden of Stateville reversed course and mandated the confiscation of all typewriters and any fan in excess of one per inmate. On October 3, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thomas Durkin) granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed all counts with prejudice. 2013 WL 5497244. The Court found that the removal of the items from plaintiffs' cells did not constitute a taking. It determined there was no deprivation of property since incarceration entails limitations upon certain rights, including the right to possess property. The Court also found that the plaintiffs did not enter into a contract with the state when they purchased their items from the prison commissary. On October 29, 2013, plaintiffs appealed their case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Oral arguments were heard on September 10, 2014 before Judges Easterbrook, Tinder, and Wood. On February 17, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the District Court was correct in dismissing the action, but the dismissal should have been without prejudice.

Summary: In August 2012, prisoners at the Stateville Correctional Center filed a lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Corrections, alleging that prison officials had confiscated their property in violation of the Takings Clause and Contract Clause of the Constitution. In October 2013, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss all counts. Plaintiffs' appealed and to Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed the District Court's decision.


On February 7, 2013, four immigrants born in Mexico with prior arrests for alleged violations of an Alabama state law prohibiting fishing without a license filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of Homeland Security ("ADHS") and Alabama's Administrative Office of the Court ("AOC") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, SPLC, NILC, and private counsel, challenged enforcement of HB 658 § 5, which required the AOC to compile the names and identifying information of undocumented immigrants who had been detained for any violation of state law and ADHS to post that information for the public on its website. They sought a declaratory judgment that the enforcement of HB 658 § 5 violated the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S. Constitution and the Due Process Clause of Amendment XIV of the U.S. Constitution and to enjoin the defendants from enforcing HB 658 § 5. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Section 5 of H.B. 658 Act No. 2012-491, which is codified as Ala. Code § 31-13-32, was preempted by federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, and also violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 of HB 658 required the AOC to compile, and the ADHS post on its public website, the names and other identifying information of "unlawfully present alien[s]" who were detained for any violation of state law and who then appeared in a state court. The four plaintiffs feared that their prior arrests and scheduled appearance in court for fishing without a license would enable the defendants to publicize their names on this list that would result in various consequences such as the denial of bail, denial of employment opportunities, and a significant loss of privacy. The proposed class certification was: "All persons who are or will be subject to Section 5 of HB 658, Ala. Code § 31-13-32". On February 8, 2013, the case was reassigned from District Court Judge W. Harold Albritton, III to U.S. District Judge William Keith Watkins. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles S. Coody. On July 31, 2013, the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted by Judge Watkins. The court identified the following impediments to the plaintiffs’ standing: (1) the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were "unlawfully present aliens" subject to the consequences prescribed by Ala. Code § 31-13-32, the state law which they challenged as unconstitutional; and (2) the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were "unlawfully present aliens" at the crucial times identified by the law – i.e., when they were detained by law enforcement and when they appeared in court for a violation of state law. Without asserting they were unlawfully present aliens, the plaintiffs could not show that they faced the threat of imminent injury. The court afforded the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to cure these impediments to standing. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint, but filed a motion requesting that the court reconsider and vacate its July 31, 2013 opinion and order. On January 6, 2014, the motion for reconsideration was granted and the order of July 31, 2013 was vacated as the plaintiffs should not have been required to plead that they were in fact "unlawfully present aliens." On May 4, 2014, Judge Watkins granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were unlawfully present aliens. The plaintiffs requested reconsideration of that ruling. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, reinstated the previously pending motions, and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing. On May 20, 2014, Judge Watkins granted the plaintiffs' request to withhold their identities from the public but not from the defendants. On July 3, 2014, Judge Watkins denied the class certification without prejudice with leave to refile on or before September 5, 2014. The parties began mediation proceedings on September 11, 2014, and they eventually reached a private settlement agreement. Under the settlement, the AOC agreed not to forward information it collected under § 31-13-32 to other government agencies except the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency; in turn, the Agency promised not to publish the § 31-13-32 information it received from the AOC. On October 10, 2014, the judge dismissed the case but retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement's terms. The agreement was to be in effect for 5 years (from October 2014 until October 2019), and there has been no further activity on the docket since October 2014. Because the agreement expired in 2019, the case is presumably now closed.

Summary: Four immigrants born in Mexico with prior arrests for alleged violation of an Alabama state law filed a class action lawsuit alleging that that their prior arrests and scheduled appearances in court would enable defendants to publicize the plaintiffs' names on the online list pursuant to Alabama's legislation of HB 658 §5 of "unlawfully present aliens". The parties entered a settlement agreement set to end in 2019.


On November 23, 2015, five Texas Planned Parenthoods (provider plaintiffs) and ten Medicaid patients of Planned Parenthood (patient plaintiffs) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Commissioner and the Inspector General of the Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, asked the court for class action certification; declaratory judgments; temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions; and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs claimed that HHSC had violated the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by barring the provider plaintiffs from the Medicaid program. Specifically, the plaintiffs explained that on October 21, 2015, the HHSC notified the provider plaintiffs that HHSC would soon terminate the Provider Plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreement. The HHSC justified the termination using false allegations, which were primarily based on misleading videos leaked by anti-choice activists. The HHSC claimed that the case was premature because they had not yet terminated the provider plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreement. On January 27, 2016, U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks stayed the case pending a final termination letter. For nearly a year, the case lay relatively dormant. In this time, Texas and the U.S. Congress conducted separate investigations into the allegations against Planned Parenthood raised by the misleading videos. Planned Parenthood was repeatedly found free of wrongdoing. Nonetheless, on December 20, 2016, HHSC sent a final Notice of Termination to each provider plaintiff. On January 17, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint outlining the events since the order to stay the case. That day the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent termination. On January 19, 2017, Judge Sparks entered an order temporarily enjoining the defendants from terminating the provider plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreements until February 21, 2017. On February 21, 2017, Judge Sparks granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from terminating the Provider Plaintiffs' Medicaid Provider Agreements. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then moved to withdraw their motion for class certification, which the court granted without prejudice on March 24, 2017. On March 30, 2017, the defendants submitted an appeal regarding the order granting the plaintiff’s preliminary motion to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court on January 17, 2019. 913 F.3d 551. The panel determined that while the individual plaintiffs had a private right of action, the district court erred by failing to defer to agency's findings, by accepting evidence beyond agency record and by conducting de novo review. Judge Jones wrote a concurrence urging a rehearing en banc to reconsider whether the individual plaintiffs did have a private right of action on behalf of Medicaid patients to challenge the termination of their providers’ contracts. The defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc on January 31, 2019. The next day, the defendants filed a petition to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction pending the rehearing, which was granted on February 4, 2019. 914 F.3d 994. On February 4, 2019, the en banc court granted rehearing on the court’s own motion, therefore appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc filed on January 31, 2019, was denied as moot. 914 F.3d 994. The same day, the plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the defendants' stay application. In the alternative, the plaintiffs requested to defer the effective date in order to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. On Feb 15, 2019, the appellant’s motion to stay the district court’s injunction pending the en banc consideration was ordered to be carried by the Fifth Circuit on behalf of the en banc court. The en banc oral argument was held on May 14, 2019. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 23, 2015, five Texas Planned Parenthoods and ten Medicaid patients of Planned Parenthood filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Commissioner and the Inspector General of the Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC), claiming violations of the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by barring Planned Parenthood from the Medicaid program. On February 21, 2017, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, but the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court on January 17, 2019. The defendants petitioned for rehearing and to stay the preliminary injunction pending the rehearing. On February 4, 2019, the en banc court granted rehearing on the court’s own motion and granted the stay. The en banc oral argument was held on May 14, 2019. The case is ongoing.


On Feb. 22, 2018, eight Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador and Haiti, as well as the Massachusetts immigrants' rights organization Centro Presente, filed this lawsuit. Represented by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s recent revocation of TPS for Salvadorians and Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking mandamus (for DHS to carry out the INA's procedures for reviewing TPS), injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of Homeland Security may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for six to eighteen months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Salvadorians and for Haitians following devastating earthquakes in those countries in 2001 and 2010 respectively. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that the nationals could not yet return safely to their countries (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent natural disasters), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS's announcement that it would soon terminate TPS for Haitians (effective July 2019) and for Salvadorians (effective Sept. 2019). The plaintiffs argued that DHS's decision to end the program was based not on a change in conditions in El Salvador or Haiti, but rather on invidious discrimination toward black and Latino immigrants on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin. This racial animus allegedly appeared in President Trump's public remarks disparaging Haitians and Latin American immigrants. This case was assigned to Judge Denise J. Casper. On May 9, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding additional claims that the government violated the APA. The government moved to dismissed the complaint, the court (Judge Casper) granted it in part and denied in part on July 23, 2018. 332 F.Supp.3d 393. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' mandamus claim because they had not yet exhausted all other avenues of relief. Otherwise, the court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that President Trump did not have to be dismissed as a defendant at this stage. The court also held that the government had not proven elements to show its changed policy will survive review under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, including displaying awareness of its changed position, demonstrating good reasons for the new policy, and displaying awareness of the reliance upon the longstanding prior policy. The court also held that the plaintiffs' constitutional claims should not be dismissed, finding "that the combination of a disparate impact on particular racial groups, statements of animus by people plausibly alleged to be involved in the decision-making process, and an allegedly unreasoned shift in policy" were sufficient to suggest the policy shift was motivated by discriminatory purposes. With the government shutdown, the defendants filed a motion to stay all proceedings. The plaintiffs took no position on the request for a limited stay, noting that the Ramos v. Nielsen preliminary injunction offered some protection with a Ninth Circuit appeal pending. The court granted the limited stay on January, 17, 2019 and a joint motion to extend discovery. Since then, the parties have vigorously pursued discovery; this case is ongoing.

Summary: On Feb. 22, 2018, eight Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador and Haiti, as well as the Massachusetts immigrants' rights organization Centro Presente, filed this lawsuit. Represented by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s recent revocation of TPS for Salvadorians and Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking mandamus (for DHS to carry out the INA's procedures for reviewing TPS), injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment. The government moved to dismissed the complaint, the court (Judge Casper) granted it in part and denied in part on July 23, 2018. 332 F.Supp.3d 393. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' mandamus claim because they had not yet exhausted all other avenues of relief. Otherwise, the court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction and that President Trump did not have to be dismissed as a defendant at this stage.


On December 21, 2016, after a two-year investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division released its findings that Louisiana unnecessarily relied on nursing facilities to service people with mental disabilities in violation of the community integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well as the Supreme Court ruling in Olmstead v. L.C. The investigation focused on Louisiana residents with serious mental disabilities who received care and services in nursing facilities. The DOJ found that individuals who needed to obtain health services from the state for serious mental disabilities were forced to live in nursing facilities to receive proper care. This system isolated these individuals from their communities when they could live in an integrated setting if given access to adequate evidence-based community services. The DOJ found that around 4,000 residents with serious mental disabilities were housed in nursing facilities in Louisiana each year. These residents were generally younger, had less nursing needs and lived in the facilities longer than a typical nursing home resident. Further, the report alleged that Louisiana could likely serve these individuals more effectively and for less money in their communities. The findings letter emphasized four key conclusions:
That individuals with serious mental disabilities are confined to nursing home care in Louisiana because the state does not adequately arrange community-based services or properly identify those who would benefit from such services.

That individuals who would benefit from community-based services don’t know these services are available because the state has not told them.

That many of the individuals receiving service in nursing facilities can successfully live in the community rather than institutions.

And that other states successfully provide these services without unnecessarily relying on nursing facilities and the Louisiana already provides many of the necessary services and could serve more people by expanding pre-existing programs.
 The DOJ and Louisiana reached a settlement to address the findings in the DOJ's report Louisiana agreed to review and augment its current policies for the seriously mentally ill. The DOJ then filed this lawsuit alleging that Louisiana failed to serve people with serious mental illnesses in the most integrated situation appropriate to their needs in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana on June 6, 2018, and immediately moved to dismiss due to the settlement. Specifically, the settlement agreement focused on diversion and screening for the target population of Medicaid-eligible individuals over the age of 18 with serious mental disabilities who either reside in nursing facilities or who have been referred for review for placement in nursing facilities. The state agreed to design and implement a system designed to quickly identify individuals under review for nursing home care who would benefit from community-based services and divert them away from institutionalization. The state also agreed to screen all individuals in the target population currently in nursing home care to determine whether they should be allowed to return to the community. The screening process starts with the assumption that all individuals with serious mental disabilities in nursing homes would benefit more from community-based services. The agreement also called for specific elements of the plan such as outreach to affected individuals, transition support committees, post-discharge case management and tracking. It also required the expansion of community-based service programs. These included mandatory crisis support services including a 24/7 emergency hotline, intensive community support services such as psychiatric treatment and housing and tenancy support. In addition, the agreement stipulated that the state had to implement a quality assurance program to make sure individuals in the target population received proper care. The state also agreed to retain a subject matter expert, John O’Brien, who will provide technical expertise to help the state fully comply with the agreement and produce a report every six months on the quality and progress of the plan. The agreement called for an initial plan to be submitted by the Louisiana Department of Health immediately that laid out the goals and details of the first 18 months. After 18 months, the LDH must produce a yearly report detailing goals for the coming year. The agreement was set to expire in five years provided the parties agree that the state has established compliance with the agreement and maintained compliance for one year. Under the settlement, the court retained jurisdiction and DOJ could reinstate the suit at any time to remedy a breach of the settlement as long as it first followed the dispute resolution laid out in the agreement. The case is ongoing for compliance with the settlement agreement.

Summary: The Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Louisiana alleging that their policies of institutionalizing individuals with serious mental illnesses was operated in a manner that too often resulted in unnecessary admission to nursing facilties when community-based services would be more appropriate. The US alleged that this violated Title II of the American's with Disabilities Act which requires that states serve individuals with disabilities in the least segregated manner appropriate to their needs. Louisiana reached a settlement agreement with the US the same day the lawsuit was filed. The state agreed to review its nursing facilities and new referrals for admission to determine whether seriously mentally ill residents would be better served in their communities. They also agreed to expand community-based services for the mentally ill.


On August 14, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on behalf of Jewish prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 against the Florida Department of Corrections. The DOJ asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendant violated religious freedoms granted by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the Florida Department of Corrections violated RLIUPA and substantially burdened the prisoners' religious exercise by not offering kosher meals to inmates. On May 15, 2013, Muslim prisoners filed a motion to intervene, seeking halal, or in the alternative, kosher meals for Muslim prisoners who observed halal dietary laws. Judge Patricia A. Seitz denied the motion on September 6, 2013. 2013 WL 4786829. The court issued a preliminary injunction on December 6, 2013. It required the defendants to provide a kosher diet program to all prisoners with a sincere religious belief by July 2014. It also enjoined three of the state’s methods for issuing a religious diet program: 1) the Orthodox sincerity test, 2) the “ten-percent rule,” which removed a prisoner from the Religious Diet Program for missing ten percent of meals within a month, and 3) a zero tolerance rule that suspended the kosher diet for prisoners who were caught eating non-kosher once, without opportunity to contest suspension. The defendants filed motions for a stay of the preliminary injunction both to the Eleventh Circuit and the district court. The motions contested the enjoining of the three “tests” for granting a kosher diet as well as the July 2014 deadline for compliance. The Eleventh Circuit denied the motion for a stay in May 2014. The district then denied the motion for stay in June 2014. On June 27, 2014, the Circuit remanded to the district court to alter the July deadline. On February 27, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the defendant's remaining appeals of the preliminary injunction because of mootness. It ruled that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which governs all RLUIPA challenges, a preliminary injunction would expire automatically after 90 days unless the court “makes the findings required under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief. . .” and “makes the order final before the expiration of the 90-day period.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The district court made neither finding, so the preliminary injunction expired in March 2014. Judge Seitz ruled on the summary judgment motions for declaratory relief and permanent injunctions on April 30, 2015. 2015 WL 1977795. Declaratory relief was granted to the plaintiffs for three claims. The court held that the defendant violated RLUIPA through 1) denial of a kosher diet to sincere prisoners, 2) its “ten-percent rule”, and 3) its zero tolerance rule. Summary judgment was also granted to the defendants on two claims, declaring that 1) the doctrinal sincerity test for a special diet did not violate RLUIPA as long as it was not unduly weighted in determining sincerity, and 2) an anti-bartering policy did not violate RLUIPA. The court then issued its final ruling on a permanent injunction on August 12, 2015. 2015 WL 4768247. The injunction ordered the defendants to 1) offer a kosher diet to all prisoners with a sincere religious basis for keeping kosher, 2) end the ten percent rule, and 3) stop enforcement of the zero tolerance rule without an opportunity for prisoners to contest their removal or suspension. The court then furthered ordered that the defendants create auditing and training procedures, produce both monthly and quarterly reports, and open access of their facilities to the Federal Dept. of Corrections. It provided a thirty day period to cure the failures in the kosher diet program. On September 11, 2015, the defendants appealed the order. On July 14, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit (Judges William Pryor, Jill Pryor, Richard Story) denied the appeal, holding that the defendants had not proved a compelling governmental interest for not providing kosher meals to the inmates. Moreover, the court stated that even if the defendants had a compelling governmental interest, there was no proof that denying kosher meals was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Over the following months, the court continued to receive reports on compliance with the order and also fielded grievances from prisoners denied entry into the kosher diet program (though none received an additional hearing). A hearing was held on October 23, 2018, when the parties discussed the quarterly and monthly reports, the auditing process and filing a joint motion to terminate the injunction. The the joint motion to terminate the injunction and declaratory judgement was filed on December 5, 2018. On January 9, 2019, the court ordered the motion to terminate the injunction to be granted following two years without evidence of violation. However, the court denied the motion to terminate the declaratory judgement to ensure the Department of Corrections continues to have a legal responsibility to meet religious dietary preferences. During April and May, prisoners mailed motions requesting enforced relief and inquiring into updates in the proceedings. On May 22, 2019, the court denied the motion to enforce relief from the previously entered permanent injunction. However, the permanent injunction was dissolved on January 9, 2019, and there was no injunction to enforce. As of October 31, 2019, the declaratory judgement remains in effect ensuring the Department of Corrections to meet the religious dietary preferences of prisoners.

Summary: The U.S Department of Justice, on behalf of Jewish prisoners in Southern Florida's Correctional Facilities, filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections for failing to offer kosher meal options. The court issued a permanent injunction ordering the defendants to offer a kosher died to all prisoners with a sincere religious basis on August 12, 2015. On January 9, 2019, the court ordered the motion to terminate the injunction to be granted following two years without evidence of violation. However, the court denied the motion to terminate the declaratory judgement to ensure the Department of Corrections continues to have a legal responsibility to meet religious dietary preferences.


On February 3, 2015, an advocacy organization for women in military service, Service Women’s Action Network, filed this lawsuit under Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) against the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The Act requires government organizations to conduct a reasonable search or to provide the records when requested by the public. The plaintiffs argued that DOD, however, did not comply to the plaintiffs’ request to gather information from the US Military Academies about the policies and practices that lead to women’s under-representation in the Academies in violation of FOIA. Represented by ACLU and ACLU of Connecticut, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory relief, and for the court to compel a reasonable search for records and timely production of records on the discrimination faced by women who aspire to be military officers due to the defendants' admissions policies. On June 23 and July 23, 2015, the defendant filed two status reports to report on the actions taken by the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Naval Academy in response to the plaintiffs’ FOIA requests. These Academies has completed reasonable searches designed to find all information in its possession responsive to the plaintiffs’ request, with some exceptions. On June 17, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal informing the court that this case had been settled between the parties and agreed to a stipulated dismissal with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, an advocacy organization for women in military service filed this lawsuit against the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued under Freedom of Information Act alleging that the defendant refused to provide requested documents. On June 17, 2016, the parties settled and agreed to have this case dismissed with prejudice.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit about election procedures in light of the coronavirus pandemic. The district court ordered the extension of the deadline to return absentee ballots, but ultimately, the evening before the election, the Supreme Court stayed the order, which required all absentee ballots to be returned the next day. The Wisconsin Elections Committee moved to dismiss the case based on mootness since the Spring Election had passed, but the court denied the motion on June 9. On September 21, the court granted a preliminary injunction, extending the ballot deadline. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
 In the midst of the COVID-19 crisis, states all around the country attempted to conduct presidential primary elections. Simultaneously, Americans were practicing “social distancing,” sheltering in place, and avoiding going out in public and interacting with others as much as possible. Individuals, especially those over the age of sixty and those with preexisting conditions like asthma and autoimmune disorders, were encouraged to stay home as much as possible. Schools and daycares closed across the country, “non-essential” businesses were shuttered, and Americans went into lockdown to try to slow the spread of the disease. As of March 18, 2020, Wisconsin had reported 72 cases of the novel coronavirus, although a substantially larger number has likely already contracted it. The state had also received an unprecedented number of absentee ballots for its April 7, 2020 election, but with electronic and by-mail registration ending on March 18, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and the Democratic National Convention filed this lawsuit in U.S. federal court for the Western District of Wisconsin that day. They sought an extension of that deadline and suspension of other normal voting requirements, such as the requirement to provide proof of residence. “Absent intervention by the Court,” the complaint alleged, “the electronic and by-mail registration deadline of today will pass, and the safety risks of COVID-19 will prevent countless eligible Wisconsinites from registering and voting altogether.” The plaintiffs brought this suit against the Wisconsin Elections Commissioners under § 1983, alleging that Wisconsin voting laws would prevent many Wisconsites from voting in the election, or would require them to vote in person at great risk to themselves and others. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged laws that established the electronic and by-mail registration deadline, that required proof of residence and scans or copies of photo ID to accompany remote registration, and the deadline of 8:00 pm on April 7 for absentee ballots to be received by polling places. The complaint alleged undue burdens on the constitutional right to vote, invoking the First and Fourteenth Amendment, and denial of procedural due process. The plaintiffs sought an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction extending the March 18 deadline to April 3 and suspending the proof-of-residence and photo ID requirements. Represented by private counsel, they also sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. The case was assigned to Judge William M. Conley. On March 19, the court received notice of the Wisconsin State Legislature’s intent to intervene, and the court conducted a telephone conference with the parties to discuss the proposed intervenor. On March 20, the Wisconsin State Legislature moved to intervene as a defendant, and submitted a proposed motion to dismiss. The legislature expressed doubt that the Wisconsin Attorney General would adequately defend the constitutionality of the state’s laws, and asked leave to intervene solely for the purpose of filing an appeal from any court order blocking its laws. The legislature argued that it had a strong interest in ensuring that the election was conducted in an orderly fashion and that this proposed injunction would disrupt that process. The same day, Judge Conley issued an order granting in part and denying in part the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Noting the “near certainty” of increased barriers to in-person voting on April 7, Judge Conley ordered the extension of the deadline for electronic voter registration to March 30. He denied the remainder of the plaintiffs’ requests. 2020 WL 1320819. The court left open the question of whether the deadline for absentee ballots to be received could be extended, and invited the plaintiffs to present sufficient evidence to support that motion. On March 22, the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wisconsin filed a motion to intervene as defendants, arguing that the plaintiffs’ request would “confuse voters and undermine confidence in the election process.” A response to this motion is due by March 30, 2020. On March 26, in light of Governor Evers' "Stay-at-Home" order, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, declaring that Wisconsites, now mandated to stay at home, would rely on absentee ballots more than ever. The next day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and reconsideration of the court's ruling on the aspects of the prayer for relief that had been denied in the court's March 20 order. The plaintiffs again requested that the court extend the March 18 deadline for by-mail registration and asked the court to suspend the witness requirement of the absentee ballot procedure, since many voters would be unable to obtain a witness while sheltering in place. Multiple parties requested to intervene, and on March 28, Judge Conley granted the motion of the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wisconsin to intervene, but denied the Wisconsin Legislature's motion to intervene. 2020 WL 1505640. Not to be dissuaded, the legislature immediately filed a motion for leave to file an amicus brief. Judge Conley, the same day, consolidated this case with two other cases, Gear v. Bostelmann (3:20-cv-00278) and Lewis v. Bostelmann (3:20-cv-00284), since all three cases concerned elections issues in light of the COVID-19 crisis. On March 30, 2020, the defendants filed declarations and a brief in reply to the plaintiffs' motions. By March 30, 2020, the following parties had requested to intervene or to submit amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs: City of Milwaukee, Honest Elections Project, City of Green Bay, Disability Rights Wisconsin, ACLU of Wisconsin, Wisconsin Conservation Voices, and the City of Racine. On April 1, Judge Conley denied the Wisconsin Legislature's renewed motion to intervene as a defendant, but granted it leave to file an amicus brief. Judge Conley scheduled a videoconference on March 31, 2020, and held an evidentiary hearing on April 1, 2020. On April 2, 2020, Judge Conley ordered that the deadline for receipt of absentee ballots be extended from 8:00 PM on election day to April 13, 2020 at 4:00 PM. He also ordered that the defendants be prevented from enforcing Wis. Stat. § 6.87(2) as to absentee voters who have provided a written affirmation or other statement that they were unable to safely obtain a witness certification despite reasonable efforts to do so, provided that the ballots are otherwise valid. The court subsequently made two minor amendments to the order. The Wisconsin State Legislature filed an emergency notice of appeal to the Seventh Circuit of the order denying intervention, docketed as 20-1539, and the preliminary injunction, docketed as 20-1545. The Republican National Committee also appealed the preliminary injunction order and the amended order, docketed as 20-1538 and 20-1546. The next day, on April 3, the Seventh Circuit declined to stay the extension of the deadline for returning absentee ballots but stayed the portion of the order enjoining the defendants from enforcing Wis. Stat. § 6.87(2). 2020 WL 1638374. In addition, they held that the district court erred in refusing to let the Wisconsin State Legislature intervene. After the appeal, the Wisconsin State Legislature filed a renewed motion to intervene and the district court granted the motion. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States seeking a stay of the modified absentee-ballot deadline. For a short time on April 6, it appeared the that Supreme Court involvement was unnecessary as Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers issued an executive order suspending the in-person voting scheduled for April 7 until June 9. However, the state's legislature asked the Wisconsin Supreme Court to overturn the order, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court blocked the Governor's order. Later that day, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the defendant's request in a 5-4 decision. The Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction "to the extent it requires the State to count absentee ballots postmarked after April 7, 2020." 140 S.Ct. 1205. The majority stressed that the “question before the Court is a narrow, technical question about the absentee ballot process” and that "lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that the stay would "result in massive disenfranchisement." On April 16, the Wisconsin State Legislature filed a motion to dismiss based on mootness, since the April 7 Spring Election has passed. In response, the plaintiffs argued that their original and amended complaints clearly asked for injunctive relief both with respect to the April 7 election and for “any election that occurs while this crisis continues.” They proposed an amended complaint clarifying this matter on April 30. On May 18, the defendants filed a reply brief, claiming that any relief for the August and November elections should be dismissed as unripe. On May 21, the plaintiffs from the consolidated case, Lewis v. Bostelmann (3:20-cv-00284), moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims, which had been rendered moot as they only sought injunctive relief regarding the April 7 election. The defendants then argued that the Lewis plaintiffs should not be awarded costs or attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit ordered the appeals be dismissed as moot on June 5. 2020 WL 3077047. Back in the district court, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied on June 9. 2020 WL 3077047. On June 25, the WEC defendants submitted a status report detailing their COVID-19 related measures for the August and November Elections, including absentee ballot preparations, sanitation measures, increased funding for increased election costs due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a new Clerk Advisory Committee dedicated to Vote by Mail, testing, staff training, as well as voter and public health outreach. The same day, the WEC defendants and the Gear plaintiffs met and conferred. On June 26, they jointly stipulated to a proposed amended complaint in which the plaintiffs sought additional relief that would permit certain voters to electronically access and download a mail-in absentee ballot, reducing the administrative burden on municipal clerks’ offices. They further agreed to abandon their respective positions with respect to the pending motion to dismiss the Gear Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. On July 2, the Lewis plaintiffs sought to recover attorneys' fees and costs. On July 8, the plaintiffs moved for a renewed preliminary injunction for the November General and Presidential Election. They noted that nearly 62 percent of Wisconsin’s electorate chose to vote by mail in the April 7 election and that the pandemic continues to worsen. The Wisconsin Legislature opposed and sought to dismiss the complaints by the Gear and Swenson plaintiffs, arguing that unlike the April Election, Wisconsin voters have months to register to vote and to request an absentee ballot in advance of the November Election. On July 20, the Republican National Committee and the Republican Party of Wisconsin also joined in opposition of the preliminary injunction. On September 21, the court granted preliminary injunction and extended the mail-in ballot deadline, finding that: "(1) an unprecedented number of absentee ballots, which turned the predominance of in-person voting on its head in April, will again overwhelm the WEC and local officials despite their best efforts to prepare; (2) but for an extension of the deadlines for registering to vote electronically and for receipt of absentee ballots, tens of thousands of Wisconsin voters would have been disenfranchised in April; and (3) absent similar relief, will be again in November." 2020 WL 5627186. However, the court stayed the order for seven days to provide defendants the opportunity to seek an emergency appeal. Two days later, the defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 2020 WL 5652436. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 18, 2020, the Democratic Party of Wisconsin and Democratic National Committee filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin against the state Elections Commission calling for changes to Wisconsin election laws amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including extensions to online voter registration and mail-in ballot return deadlines. On March 20, Judge Conley issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The order was appealed, and the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction. The Wisconsin State moved to dismiss the case based on mootness since the Spring Election had passed, and the plaintiffs from the consolidated Lewis case voluntarily dismissed their claims. On September 21, the court granted a preliminary injunction, extending the ballot deadline. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The case is ongoing.


On April 30, 2019, an anonymous plaintiff filed a civil suit against Fairfax Behavior Health (“Fairfax”) under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and state statutes. Seven additional anonymous plaintiffs joined this suit via amended complaints, all represented by Disability Rights Washington, a public interest organization, and private counsel. They filed suit in the Western District of Washington seeking damages for pain and suffering, compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs were individuals with unspecified mental illnesses admitted to Fairfax for treatment. They alleged that Fairfax has an indiscriminate policy of requiring all adult and teen patients to submit to random strip and cavity searches, a policy not shared by any other psychiatric hospital in Washington State. This process was also video recorded by Fairfax in violation of patients’ privacy. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that this practice is substantially motivated by discriminatory animus towards people with serious mental health conditions requiring inpatient treatment, inhibiting those patients’ ability to receive the treatment they need. The plaintiffs sought to bring a class action on behalf of all persons who were admitted to Fairfax between April 30, 2016 and the date of class certification. The court denied class certification in an order from Judge Thomas S. Zilly dated August 10, 2020. 2020 WL 4584228. Certification was denied because the court found that the allegedly common questions among the class were unrelated to the ADA and state law claims and because the class was defined too broadly. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In April 2019, former mental health patients at Fairfax Behavioral Medicine in Washington State sued Fairfax under Title III of the Americans with Disability Act and state statues. The plaintiffs alleged that Fairfax has an indiscriminate policy of requiring all adult and teen patients to submit to random, video-recorded strip and cavity searches. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all persons admitted to Fairfax between April 30, 2016 and the date of class certification, but certification was denied in August 2020. The case is ongoing.


On April 17, 2018, three current or former detained immigrants filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc., a private prison corporation that owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1594, and 1595. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, alleged that the defendant operated a deprivation scheme intended to force detained immigrants to work nearly for free for the detention facility, resulting in a forced labor scheme and an economic windfall for the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant deprived detainees of basic necessities so that they were forced to work to purchase those items and threatened those who refused to work with serious harm, such as deprivation of privacy, criminal prosecution, or solitary confinement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. They claimed violations of the TVPA and unjust enrichment under state common law. The plaintiffs sought certification of the following two classes: (1) all civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the “Volunteer Work Program” within the past ten years, up to the date the class is certified (“Forced Labor Class”); and (2) all civil immigration detainees who performed work for CoreCivic at Stewart in the “Volunteer Work Program” within the past four years, up to the date the class is certified (“Unjust Enrichment Class”). The case was assigned to Judge Clay D. Land. On June 21, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ entire complaint for failure to state a claim under the TVPA, arguing that Congress did not intend the TVPA to apply to alien detainees in the lawful custody of the U.S. Government or to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities. On August 17, 2018, Judge Land denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support both their TVPA claim and their unjust enrichment claim. Most significantly, the court found that the TVPA does apply to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors. However, Judge Land certified the issue for immediate interlocutory appeal given the substantial ground for difference of opinion on this issue. 332 F.Supp.3d 1305. The defendant appealed the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss to the Eleventh Circuit on December 12, 2018. After holding oral argument in January 2020, an Eleventh Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Frank Hull and Stanley Marcus and District Court Judge Barbara Rothstein) issued an opinion on February 28, 2020, concluding that "the TVPA covers the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities." 2020 WL 964358. The Eleventh Circuit further concluded that the TVPA does not bar private contractors from operating voluntary work programs for persons held in immigration detention facilities but that private contractors who operate such programs "may be liable if they knowingly obtain or procure the labor or services of a program participant through the illegal coercive means explicitly listed in the TVPA." The Eleventh Circuit's review was limited only to the legal question of whether the TVPA applies to private contractors operating immigration detention facilities, so it did not address whether the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently stated a claim under the TVPA. As of March 3, 2020, this case is ongoing in the district court.

Summary: On April 17, 2018, three current or former detained immigrants filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc., a private prison corporation that owns and operates the Stewart Detention Center (“Stewart”), under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant operated a deprivation scheme intended to force detained immigrants to work nearly for free for the detention facility, resulting in a forced labor scheme and an economic windfall for the defendant. Judge Clay D. Land denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and found that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to support both their TVPA claim and their unjust enrichment claim. The district court certified the issue of whether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors for interlocutory appeal. An Eleventh Circuit panel concluded in February 2020 that the TVPA applies to the conduct of private contractors operating federal immigration detention facilities. The case is ongoing in the district court.


Thousands of United States Sailors and Marines are deployed to combat zones across the globe, and return home suffering from the invisible wounds of war, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or traumatic brain injury (TBI). Sometimes these mental health issues indirectly lead to less-than-Honorable discharges, resulting in permanent stigma and preventing veterans from accessing essential benefits like the GI bill and much-needed mental health care. The Naval Discharge Review Board adjudicates discharge upgrade applications from veterans seeking an appeal of their less-than-Honorable discharge. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed these boards to consider PTSD and related conditions as “potential mitigating factors in the misconduct that caused the under-other-than-honorable-conditions characterization of service.” This Hagel Memo was codified by Congress in 2016, statutorily requiring Discharge Review Boards to grant “liberal consideration” to the discharge upgrade applications of veterans with symptoms related to PTSD or TBI. 10 U.S.C. §1553(d)(3)(A)(ii). On March 2, 2018, Tyson Manker and the National Veterans Council for Legal Redress (NVCLR), represented by the Veterans Legal Services Clinic at Yale Law School and private counsel, filed a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf of a class of Navy and Marine Corps veterans. The complaint was filed against the Secretary of the Navy. According to the plaintiffs, the Naval Discharge Review Board rejected almost 90% of discharge upgrade applications based on credible claims of service-connected PTSD, without clearly explaining what a veteran must show to prevail, and without applying the proper legal standards. The plaintiffs alleged that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing arbitrary and capricious decisions that were inconsistent with relevant statutory law, and deprived applicants of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process of law. They argued that the Board’s actions, in violation of binding Department of Defense guidance, evidenced an unconstitutional secret policy against granting discharge upgrades: the Board had set an unachievable and sometimes unknown evidentiary burden for applicants alleging PTSD as a basis for a discharge upgrade. The plaintiffs requested that the Court set aside and hold unlawful the Board’s improper denials of veterans’ discharge upgrade applications, order the applications' approval, and issue injunctive relief to ensure that all Navy and Marine Corps veterans had their discharge upgrade applications considered according to the Constitution and as intended by Congress. The case was assigned to Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. On November 15 2018, the court granted a motion to certify a class of veterans who served during the Iraq and Afghanistan Era (between October 7, 2001, and the present) and who:

were discharged from the Navy, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps, or Marine Corps Reserve with less-than-Honorable statuses, including General and Other-than-Honorable discharges but excluding Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges;
have not received upgrades of their discharge statuses to Honorable from the NDRB; and
have diagnoses of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health conditions, or records documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health conditions at the time of discharge, attributable to their military service under the Hagel Memo standards of liberal or special consideration.

 On December 27, 2018, the Court ordered a scheduling conference to resolve the issue of whether the federal and local rules of civil procedure exempt this case from the usual discovery procedures, the scope of discovery, and discovery deadlines. On July 26, 2019, the Navy sought to dismiss the case, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The court denied the motion on November 7, 2019, holding that in order for the motion to dismiss to prevail, the defendant “must demonstrate that as a matter of law this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over each and every claim plausibly pleaded in the Complaint on behalf of Manker, Doe, or any member of the certified Plaintiff class." The court found that the Navy failed to so demonstrate, also stating that whether “the [Board] regarded itself as required to act in accordance with the Hagel Memo’s guidance is at the very least a factual issue that can be explored in discovery.” 2019 WL 5846828. Following this order, the parties held telephonic settlement conferences on April 14, 2020 and May 7, 2020; this case is ongoing.

Summary: Former US Navy and Marine veterans claim that the Naval Discharge Review Board failed to consider the effect of PTSD when reviewing their less-than-Honorable discharge upgrade applications. Upon returning to civilian life, veterans struggled to address PTSD and other mental health issues, which in some cases had lead to their less-than-Honorable discharge. This caused permanent stigma and prevented veterans from accessing essential benefits like the GI bill and much-needed mental health care. The Board was directed by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to consider PTSD and related conditions as “potential mitigating factors" in veterans' discharges. The plaintiffs claimed that the Board had rejected most such applications in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. As of June 2020, the case is in discovery.


On March 28, 2002, the plaintiffs, the American Friends Service Committee, along with the ACLU and other activist organizations, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and under federal regulations in the United States Court for the District of Colorado, Denver Division against the City and County of Denver. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated, as well as violations of federal regulations and the state constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the maintenance of "Spy Files" on leftist groups in Colorado for lawful, peaceful, non-criminal activities and falsely labeling the groups "criminal extremist" was a violation of the constitutional rights of its members to petition the government for redress of grievances, the freedom of association, and a misappropriation of federal funds in electronically storing this information. On March 11, 2002, the ACLU published the partial contents of leaked "Spy Files" that the Denver police had been maintaining on several organizations and individuals. The ACLU petitioned the Mayor of Denver to investigate take four specific actions to stem the dissemination and expunge the Spy Files. The Mayor held a news conference in which he claimed that the Spy Files resulted from an overly broad interpretation of the City's policy on the maintenance of criminal intelligence. The city's policy mirrored a federal regulation (28 C.F.R § 23.20) that prohibited the police from maintaining criminal intelligence electronic records that would violate citizens' constitutional rights, absent (1) a direct relationship to criminal conduct, and (2) a reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity. The disclosed records detailed the protest activities of individuals not only in Colorado, but lists of protest and political beliefs of persons from outside the state. The Spy Files also labeled several organizations as criminal extremists (notably including the American Friends Service Committee, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1947). The plaintiffs alleged that this information was false, that the organizations were not criminally extremist, and that there were statements of the political beliefs of the members that the City had misconstrued were defamatory. Most importantly, the plaintiffs claimed that criminal intelligence files were being maintained on them for lawful activity that was not connected to criminal conduct. Defendantes moved and were permitted to remove the case to the United State District Court for the District of Coloradoon April 16, 2002. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the Court (Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer) on October 17, 2002. On April 17, 2003, the case was settled without class certification being determined. In the settlement agreement, the City of Denver agreed to adopt a more specific and detailed policy (included in the Clearinghouse collection as Appendix to Settlement Agreement), and to review and purge all criminal intelligence files in violation of the new policy. The city also agreed to furnish copies to all individuals and organizations on which the city maintained criminal intelligence files. Lastly, the city agreed to contact entities to which it had distributed copies of the criminal intelligence files and notify them of the purge. Compliance of the agreement was subject to an audit for a two-year period. On August 05, 2004, the Court (Judge Edward Nottingham) ordered that the City pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of $469,018.63. The case was dismissed with prejudice thereafter.

Summary: In 2002, the American Friends Service Committee and other leftist political organizations filed suit, represented by the ACLU, against the City and County of Denver in federal court. The Denver police had maintained criminal intelligence records on the plaintiffs for constitutionally-protected, lawful activity. The case settled, and the City of Denver agreed to purge the files, notify organizations to which it had distributed the files, and adopt a new policy that clarified the acceptable uses in the police training program and manual.


On May 24, 1998, a group of individuals confined to Florida's four Developmental State Institutions for Persons with Developmental Disabilities ("DSIs") filed suit against the state of Florida and relevant state officials alleging that defendants failed to take appropriate measures to habilitate the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs suffered grave harm as a result. They asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA") and its regulations; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 29 U .S.C. § 794; the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq . and its regulations; and 42 U .S.C. § 1983, alleging Due Process and Equal Protection violations. Represented by Florida's Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, the plaintiffs asked the U.S District Court for the Southern District of Florida for declaratory and injunctive relief. In May 1998, defendants filed a motion to dismiss based, among other things, on lack of standing and failure to state a claim under the ADA. Defendants also argued that plaintiffs were barred from bringing suit against the State because the State was immune from suit by private citizens under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In July 1998, the United States Department of Justice filed a motion to intervene in the case and included a memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. The DOJ also filed for leave to address as amicus curiae the proper construction of the ADA as it related to this case. In its memo on the motion to dismiss, the DOJ argued that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were valid examples of Congress's power to abrogate, or abolish, the states' immunity from suit by private citizens. It also argued that both the ADA and the integration mandate established by the Supreme Court in L.C. v. Olmstead in 1998 provided a cause of action under which plaintiffs could challenge unnecessary institutionalization of mentally ill persons. On October 15, 1998, Judge Ferguson granted the DOJ's motion to intervene in the motion to dismiss and denied its motion to participate as amicus curiae. On March 31, 1999, Judge Ferguson denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. On March 10, 1999, the Court (Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson) entered an order certifying a class. Defendants appealed the order to the Eleventh Circuit and on February 3, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion reversing and vacating the class certification order and remanding the matter back to the Court for further action with instructions to certify the class as instructed. On February 11, 2000, the Court (Judge Ferguson) issued a Revised Order certifying a class. After lengthy mediation and negotiations, the parties reached a Settlement Agreement on May 11, 2004, which was filed with the Court on May 21, 2004. On June 16, 2004, the parties submitted an amended Agreement, according to which defendants agreed to utilize both the Supported Living Home and Community-Based Services Waiver and the Developmental Disabilities Home and Community-Based Services Waiver to serve clients residing in the DSIs. Defendants also agreed to close one DSI no later than June 30, 2005 and another no later than July 1, 2010. On August 11, 2005, the Court (Judge Jose E. Martinez) approved the Amended Settlement Agreement. On July 2, 2007, Judge Martinez granted the parties' Joint Motion to Dismiss Case After Substantial Compliance with Amended Settlement Agreement and closed the case.

Summary: This case was brought in 1998 by the class of individuals confined to Florida's four state institutions for people with developmental disabilities, alleging failure to habilitate. The parties reached an agreement involving provision of community based services and closure of at least two residential facilities in 2003. On July 2, 2007, the case was dismissed on joing motion in which the parties agreed that the state had substantially complied with the Settlement Agreement.