This federal class action lawsuit sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for over 60 immigrant women who were detained in ICE custody at the Irwin County Detention Center in Ocilla, Georgia. The plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to medical abuse while in ICE custody including nonconsensual hysterectomies, overly aggressive gynecological care, and medically unnecessary procedures. In addition to the medical abuse itself, the plaintiffs sought relief against federal officials and the local employees of the ICE jail who, the plaintiffs claimed, engaged in a widespread conspiracy to silence the detainees from sharing their abuse with the public and retaliated against women who spoke out about the conditions at the detention center. Procedural Background:  This federal class action lawsuit commenced on November 9, 2020, with a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order filed by Yanira Oldaker in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (in Valdosta). At the time of the initial filing, Yanira Oldaker was a detainee of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC also referred to below as “the ICE jail”) in Ocilla, Georgia. The November 9 motion named ICE, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) as defendants. On November 16 and 17, 2020, two other women detained at ICDC filed separate habeas petitions in the same district court. (Trial dockets 7:20-cv-00231 and 7:20-cv-00237). On November 18, 2020, District Judge W. Louis Sands ordered the two new habeas petitions to be consolidated into the Oldaker case which had been referred to Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles. A fourth ICDC detainee joined the consolidated action on November 23, 2020, also seeking a writ of habeas corpus. On November 25, 2020, the district court granted a consent motion to revise a scheduling order agreed to by the four plaintiffs and the defendants who now included ICE, DHS, DOJ, and ICDC. In the revised scheduling order, the government agreed to not deport any of the four plaintiffs or any other ICDC detainees who wished to file similar habeas petitions or motions for temporary restraining orders at least until a hearing on the motions for temporary restraining orders was held. The plaintiffs agreed to file a consolidated habeas petition and consolidated motion for temporary restraining order for all individuals at ICDC with substantially similar factual allegations as themselves by December 21, 2020. The Amended Habeas Petition/Class Action Complaint, and the Amended Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order: The plaintiffs met the deadline they agreed to and submitted an amended habeas petition together with a class action complaint (the complaint) and an updated emergency motion for a temporary restraining order on December 21, 2020. Represented by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Morningside Heights Legal Services, Project South, a small Atlanta based law firm, and law school clinics from Boston University, Harvard, Texas A&M, and the University of Georgia as counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. In the complaint, the plaintiffs described themselves as current or former ICDC detainees who were each subjected to “non-consensual, medically unindicated, and/or invasive gynecological procedures” by the physician assigned to the ICE jail. The complaint set out three main categories of plaintiffs: 1) a group of nine women who were detained at ICDC at the time the complaint was filed, 2) four women previously detained at ICDC who had been either deported from the U.S. or released from the ICE jail at the time the complaint was filed, 3) a putative class of at least 60 women who were subjected to similar medical abuse at ICDC as the named plaintiffs. The list of defendants was extensive and includes federal agencies, federal officials, employees at ICDC, the corporate defendant LaSalle Southeast, LLC which owned and operated ICDC at the time of the complaint, and the Hospital Authority of Irwin County which employed the defendant physician Mahendra Amin. The complaint included 21 claims for relief. The first was a habeas claim for the release of the nine detained plaintiffs from unlawful detention under 28 U.S.C. §§2241, 2243 and the common law to remedy the “egregious and systematic retaliatory behavior” of the defendants. In claims two through four, the plaintiffs sought a remedy for violations of their First Amendment Rights. The second claim alleged retaliatory conduct by federal respondents against ICDC detainees in violation of the First Amendment rights of speech and petition. The plaintiffs claimed that their testimony to federal investigators and communications to the press regarding medical abuse was met by adverse actions by federal respondents including deportations and attempted deportations of individual plaintiffs and putative class members, use of force, solitary confinement, and denial of privileges at the ICDC. The plaintiffs claimed that their exercise of free speech was “chilled” and that they suffered physical and/or psychological harm. The second claim sought damages against federal respondents pursuant to Bivens, declaratory relief finding their actions in violation of the First Amendment, and injunctive relief prohibiting further retaliation by federal officials against the exercise by plaintiffs of First Amendment protected conduct. The third claim is similar to the second but described the retaliation committed by ICDC, LaSalle, and their employees/officials including the defendant physician and is based on the incorporation of the First Amendment in the Fourteenth Amendment as a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The retaliatory conduct committed by these non-federal actors included the placement of plaintiffs in solitary confinement, cell restriction, physical assault, assault of handcuffed detainees, threats of deprivation of property and commissary to hunger strikers, denial of access to the law library, monitoring of phone calls, destruction of outgoing correspondence, and the making of false claims to congressional investigators. Plaintiffs sought the same injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials as they did against the federal respondents and ask for both compensatory and punitive damages. As an alternative to the third claim, claim four restates the allegations of retaliation committed by the non-federal respondents but argued that if claim three failed, the court should find that the ICDC and LaSalle employees/officials were acting under color of federal authority and can be sued for damages pursuant to Bivens. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh claims of the complaint, the plaintiffs sought relief for violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. The fifth claim sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against federal officials with the damages claim based on Bivens. The plaintiffs alleged that the federal officials who facilitated their confinement at ICDC were either motivated by evil intent or callously/recklessly indifferent to the medical abuse they endured in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of reasonable safety and freedom from punitive confinement for people in civil immigration detention. The sixth claim sought the same type of relief as the fifth but is against the ICDC respondents and was based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process and 42 U.S.C §1983. Like the fourth claim’s alternative theory for damages under Bivens, the seventh claim similarly argued that if the court finds that the ICDC respondents were operating solely under color of federal law, they should still be liable for damages for violating the plaintiffs’ rights to substantive due process. The eighth claim sought declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants in their official capacities for violating Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act with regards to the detained plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that the detained plaintiffs (all of whom have underlying medical conditions which qualify as disabilities under the Rehab Act) were excluded and/or denied benefits of the “services, programs, and activities” within ICDC. The plaintiffs argued that the only “reasonable accommodation” that would have mitigated their disabilities would have been released from detention and that because they were still detained at ICDC at the time the complaint was filed, their ongoing detention violated the Rehab Act. The ninth claim was against the federal defendants for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the deportation of two of the detainees who provided information about medical abuse to a  whistleblower ICDC employee was a violation of ICE’s own policy (ICE Policy Number 10076.1) to not remove individuals from the U.S. “in the midst of a legitimate effort to protect their civil rights or civil liberties.” This disregard of its own policy by ICE amounted to a violation of the APA’s guarantee of judicial review for persons who suffer a legal wrong because of an agency action and also violated regulations promulgated under the INA which prohibit the deportation of individuals needed in the US for any investigation “being, or soon to be, conducted by any official executive, legislative, or judicial agency…”. 8 C.F.R. §215.3(h). The tenth claim was also based in APA violations by federal officials. Plaintiffs alleged that federal defendants failed to follow the Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) requirements with regards to the medical care at ICDC amounting to an unlawful agency action under the APA. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the violations alleged in their ninth and tenth claims. In the eleventh claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §1985 by 1) conspiring to deter detainees from attending/testifying in a pending federal court proceeding and 2) conspiring to retaliate against witnesses/participants in federal court proceedings. The plaintiffs supported these conspiracy claims with extensive allegations including examples of expedited deportations, forced transfers of detainees out of the main ICDC facility during a September 2020 visit by a Congressional delegation, and phone call monitoring all of which commenced after ICDC received notice in mid-September 2020 that federal agencies were investigating it for medical abuse. The plaintiffs sought damages, injunctive, and declaratory relief to remedy these claims. In the twelfth claim, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against federal defendants for violating the Fifth Amendment prohibition on deportation of essential witnesses in civil proceedings. The thirteenth claim requested a grant of bail to the plaintiffs who were petitioning for habeas. The fourteenth claim is for breach of contract. Here, the plaintiffs argued that both the federal and ICDC defendants breached the terms of the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) established for the administration of the ICE jail by failing to abide by the terms of the PBNDS, not providing appropriate medical care, providing medical treatment without informed consent, and by not providing language accessibility during medical care to detainees who did not speak English. The plaintiffs claimed that they were the intended third-party beneficiaries of the IGA and that they were owed damages to remedy the breach as well as injunctive relief to enforce the contract. Counts fifteen through twenty were tort claims, listed as follows; 15) negligent hiring or retention against ICDC, LaSalle, and Irwin County Hospital; 16) gross negligence against ICDC and its officials; 17) medical battery against the defendant physician and Irwin County Hospital; 18) medical malpractice against the defendant physician and Irwin County Hospital; 19) intentional infliction of emotional distress against ICDC and its officials; 20) negligent infliction of emotional distress against ICDC and its officials. The twenty-first claim was for attorneys’ fees and costs. It was brought under Georgia law against all ICDC defendants who committed intentional torts. In addition to the complaint, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and petition for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The temporary restraining order sought by the plaintiffs would have enjoined retaliation against them by federal and ICDC officials including use of force, solitary confinement, denial of privileges, and deportation. If granted by the court, the habeas writs sought in the emergency motion would have ordered the defendants to make the plaintiffs available for any hearings deemed necessary by the court. In the emergency motion, the plaintiffs also asked for the release from ICDC of all detained plaintiffs and members of the putative class as an alternative to not granting the temporary restraining order and habeas petition. Proceedings and Factual Changes Since the December 2020 Filings: No district court rulings had been made on the merits of any of the plaintiffs’ claims as of June 8, 2021. Only the corporate defendant, LaSalle, has filed an answer to the complaint (submitted April 15, 2021). On June 8, the government submitted a notice of new facts in opposition to the December 21, 2020, emergency motion for temporary restraining order. Though this document is not available for purchase on PACER, it likely has to do with DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas’  announcement  of the end of ICE’s contract with ICDC on May 20, 2021. Interestingly, according to a June 3, 2021, report by  the Intercept,  at least 34 ICE detainees were transferred to ICDC the week after DHS claimed to have terminated the contract. As for the status of the plaintiffs in this case, the National Immigration Project of the NLG  reported  that all of the women who claimed medical abuse by the defendant physician had been released from ICDC as early as January 22, 2021. This claim is further corroborated by a  press release  from Detention Watch Network that announced that no women were being detained at ICDC as of April 29, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, women who were detainees at Irwin County Detention Center (an ICE Jail in Ocilla County, Georgia) filed a class action complaint, habeas petition, and emergency motion for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (in Valdosta). The plaintiffs alleged that they were medically abused while in ICE custody and that federal and jail officials retaliated against them when they attempted to inform the public about the conditions of their confinement. The plaintiffs claim that these actions violated the First, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and other federal and state laws. ICE moved all women detainees out of ICDC by late April 2021 and the Department of Homeland Security announced the end of its contract with the detention center in May 2021. The case is ongoing.


On December 18, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a Muslim crew person, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against McDonald's Corporation. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and prejudgment interest, claiming that the defendant discriminated against one if its employees based on his religion, Islam, when it refused to accommodate the employee's religious belief to wear a beard at work, resulting in the employee's constructive discharge. The employee began working as a crew person for the defendant in around 2001 and was promoted to Crew Trainer in 2003. In July and August 2005, the employee informed the defendant of his religious belief of wearing a beard at work. The defendant allegedly did not allow him to wear a beard and so the employee was constructively discharged. On December 19, 2013, the EEOC filed an amended complaint. Also, on the same day, the District Court (Judge Anthony W. Ishii) issued a consent decree for two years. Among other things, the defendant agreed to pay the employee $50,000, which was characterized as non-wage compensation for emotional distress. The decree was entered in December 2013 and scheduled to last until December 2015. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: On December 18, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of a Muslim crew person, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against McDonald's Corporation. The EEOC alleged that the defendant discriminated against one if its employees based on his religion, Islam, when it refused to accommodate the employee's religious belief to wear a beard at work, resulting in the employee's constructive discharge. On December 19, 2013, the District Court issued a consent decree for two years where, among other things, the defendant agreed to pay the employee $50,000.


The Plaintiff in this case has been paralyzed from the chest down ever since an accident in 2007. She has limited mobility and manual dexterity, and thus requires some assistance in caring for herself carrying out daily activities. After her accident, she placed herself on the waitlist for Florida Medicaid's Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord (TBI/SC) Waiver Program. In early 2010, Plaintiff's husband and primary caregiver left her home following a divorce. She then contacted the state in the hope of receiving Waiver services but was told she would need to spend 60 days in an institution to then be eligible for community-based services to meet her needs. She then filed this lawsuit on May 13, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida challenging this condition for receipt of services as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She filed a concurrent complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the state to immediately provide services that will allow her to remain in the community. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest supporting the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. At a June 15, 2010 hearing, the Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that the Plaintiff had been hospitalized due to an unrelated issue, but that she would not be able to return home without the services that the TBI/SC waiver provides. After additional briefing, the District Court (Judge Marcia Morales Howard) granted the motion for preliminary injunction and ordered that the Plaintiff begin to receive services on June 23, 2010 so that she could be discharged from the hospital. The court issued its full analysis in granting the preliminary injunction on July 9, 2010. In March 2011, the court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the Plaintiff had stated a claim under the ADA. At this time, the Plaintiff had been enrolled in the waiver program for several months. Thus, the parties stipulated to settle the claims with no further obligations for the Defendants. After some dispute over attorney's fees, the parties agreed to dismiss the matter on April 19, 2011.

Summary: In 2010, Michele Haddad challenged the State of Florida's refusal to provide her with necessary home-based services pursuant to a Medicaid waiver program and its apparent condition that she reside in an institution for a limited period of time before receiving such services. The plaintiff prevailed on a motion for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2010, and the state began to provide Waiver services to her soon after. After the court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss in March 2011, the parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice. Plaintiff was receiving services at that time.


On December 23, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner in the Cook County jail, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff later amended the complaint twice, adding two plaintiffs and to seeking class-action certification. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued both the Sheriff of Cook County in his official capacity and Cook County itself for damages under Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the Cook County Jail's policy of forced tapering of inmates participating in opioid antagonist therapy caused them great physical pain and thereby deprived them of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought class-action certification and compensatory damages for their pain and suffering. The case was assigned to Judge Edmond E. Chang. The named plaintiffs all entered the Cook County Jail between late 2013 to early 2014. During that time, the plaintiffs informed intake personnel of their enrollment in opioid antagonist therapy. Each experienced extremely painful withdrawal symptoms after administration of their prescribed medical treatment was delayed. One entered the jail on January 20, 2014, and did not receive treatment until January 26, 2014. The second entered the jail on December 23, 2013, and did not receive treatment until December 25, 2013. The third entered the jail on September 12, 2013, and did not receive treatment until September 20, 2013. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims, but Judge Chang denied the motion on June 27, 2016. Judge Chang noted that the plaintiffs may face difficulty in proving their claim, but declined to evaluate the facts at that stage of the litigation. On November 29, 2020, the court granted class certification for the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied class certification for the plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims. 2020 WL 7027556. The court held that the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims raised “questions that are necessarily common to all class members,” such as Cook County Jail officials’ state of mind when developing the tapering policy, whereas the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims required individualized determinations. The court divided the class it into two classes: “Pre-trial Detainees” consisted of all pre-trial detainees who entered the Cook County Jail between December 23, 2013 and October 7, 2019 and who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they entered. ; “Post-sentence Prisoners” consisted of all post-sentencing prisoners who were lawfully taking an opioid antagonist when they entered the Cook County Jail between the same time period. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Three prisoners sued the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County on behalf of themselves and all prisoners who were forced to taper from opioid antagonist therapy while in custody. On November 29, 2020, the court granted class certification for the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims and denied class certification for the plaintiffs’ Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims, finding that common questions predominate over the former but not the latter. This case is ongoing.


On February 8, 1971, inmates at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1994, against the Penitentiary, the Mississippi Penitentiary Board and the Governor in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Greenville Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU National Prison Project and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that conditions and practices in the maintenance, operation and administration of the Parchman facility violated their First, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that black inmates were segregated and discriminated against on the basis of their race. On August 23, 1971, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division was allowed to intervene. In its complaint, the government alleged that the defendants maintained a system of prison facilities segregated by race, and additionally failed to provide inmates with adequate housing, medical care, and protection from other inmates, that conditions of the sewage disposal and water systems created an immediate health hazard, and that prison officials permitted the custodial staff, including inadequately trained armed trustees, to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon inmates. After a full evidentiary hearing on May 15, 1972, on September 13, 1972, the District Court (Judge William Colbert Keady) issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972). The court found the defendants practiced racial discrimination, provided inadequate physical facilities, medical facilities and protection of inmates, inadequate training to trustees, excessive disciplinary rules, punishment without adequate procedure, and unconstitutional censure of mail. The court found conditions violative of inmates' First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and issued an injunctive order providing immediate, intermediate and long-range relief. The defendants appealed the Court's award of attorneys' fees as well as the Court's ruling on the merits of the case. On December 5, 1973, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Elbert Tuttle) affirmed the District Court's order. Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973). On September 9, 1974, the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' petition for a rehearing. Gates v. Collier, 500 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1974). On September 20, 1974, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Tuttle) affirmed the District Court's ruling on the merits. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The Court held that jurisdiction was proper and that conditions that deprived inmates of basic hygiene and adequate medical treatment, including solitary confinement, as well as failure to protect inmates from violence by other inmates and mail censorship, were unconstitutional. The plaintiffs moved for further relief, alleging the defendants failed to comply with the Court's order and, on January 31, 1975, the District Court (Judge Keady) granted in part and denied in part injunctive relief. Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975). The Court denied some relief, holding that opening and inspecting, but not reading, inmates' mail was constitutional and that racial discrimination at the penitentiary had been mostly eliminated, but granted some relief, holding that the state's continuing failure to provide for inmates' physical health and well-being, and for adequate facilities, contravened the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed. On January 8, 1976, the Fifth Circuit held that the District Court's refusal to modify the previous injunctive order with respect to racial discrimination and training and its modification of the order with respect to mail regulations was not an abuse of discretion. Gates v. Collier, 525 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1976). On November 19, 1976, the District Court (Judge Keady) issued a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of various provisions of the Mississippi Corrections Act. Gates v. Collier, 423 F. Supp 732 (N.D. Miss. 1976). The Court further requested the convening of a three-judge court to consider a more permanent injunction concerning inmate housing units that were unfit for human habitation and constitutionally condemned, as well as a ceiling on inmate population of the remaining housing units to avoid unconstitutionally intolerable overcrowding of inmates. The defendants appealed. On March 18, 1977, the Fifth Circuit (per curiam) affirmed and remanded the case to the District Court to continue the implementation of conversion to a constitutionally permissible penal system. Gates v. Collier, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977). After the defendants moved for adoption of revised disciplinary rules, on June 30, 1978, the District Court (Judge Keady) held that revising the disciplinary rules was permissible so long as they did not infringe on the inmates' constitutional rights, and entered a modified version of the defendants' proposed revisions. Gates v. Collier, 454 F. Supp 579 (N.D. Miss. 1978). Of note, the Court held that allowing a classification officer to also serve as a disciplinary hearing officer violated the inmates' due process rights. The plaintiffs appealed. On November 8, 1979, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Joseph Woodrow Hatchett) affirmed the District Court's adoption of the revised rules. Gates v. Collier, 606 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1979). On January 6, 1983, the District Court (Judge Keady) awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees for class representation. Subsequent litigation by HIV+ inmates was consolidated into this case. In that litigation, male HIV+ prisoners housed at Unit 28 of the maximum-security state prison at Parchman, Mississippi, and female HIV+ prisoners housed at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility in Rankin County, filed a lawsuit on May 29, 1990, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Mississippi Department of Corrections in the US District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, Greenville Division. The plaintiffs in that case, represented by the ACLU National Prison Project, alleged that all HIV+ prisoners, regardless of their offense or other classification factors, were housed at the same facility by gender, not allowed to participate in vocational and educational programs, and that living conditions and medical care were inadequate in these HIV+ segregated units. That case was consolidated with this one for having some similar questions of law. For more information on that case, see <ahref="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=798"> Moore v. Fordice, PC-MS-0002, on the Clearinghouse. According to the 5th Circuit in a different case, Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, in 1998, the District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi finally dismissed the action from its inactive docket as to state-owned, state-operated, and private-company-contracted facilities (not county facilities). The court also stated that it would continue to forward prisoner petitions relating to defendants' facilities to plaintiffs' class counsel. However, litigation continued regarding compliance with court orders and issues in consolidated cases. Over the next few years, inmates were moved around to various jails and units while repairs to the Mississippi State Penitentiary were being made. The Court denied many inmates that were moved to become class members, but granted plaintiffs several post-judgment attorney fees awards over the next years. The Moore class (of HIV+ inmates) moved to intervene in this case to challenge adequacy of class representation, but the Court denied the class's motion. The class moved the court for a preliminary injunction to provide HIV+ prisoners with adequate medical care. On July 19, 1999, the court granted this motion, requiring defendants to provide HIV+ prisoners with constitutionally adequate medical care and testing, and requiring progress reports on the implementation of the changes (the order and opinion are not available on PACER). After alleging noncompliance with prior orders, the plaintiffs moved to supersede previous orders to allow greater inmate access to courts. The court denied this motion, but no available documents provide the court's reasoning. The ACLU National Prison Project moved to substitute as class counsel for this litigation, though the court ordered that they could not contact inmates until it ruled on their motion. On February 2, 2000, the Court denied the ACLU National Prison Project's motion to represent the interest of HIV+ inmates at Parchman and denied plaintiff's motion to sanction the ACLU. Later, class members appealed the order prohibiting contact by the ACLU National Prison Project; during appeal, the ACLU was allowed to contact inmates only to prosecute its appeal. On February 19, 2000, the Court granted appellants' motion to stay the enforcement of the "no contact" order pending appeal. On April 30, 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated in part and reversed in part the February 2, 2000, decision. However, the details of the decision are not available. In May of 2000, and for many years following, a number of jails were approved to house additional state inmates. In June of 2000, the Court granted in part a motion for writ of execution to collect contempt fines against the defendants. In the same month, the Court also granted a motion that required inmates to stay in one of the approved jails for at least 30 days to be counted in the jail's population. In September of 2000, the Court ordered the state to pay $1.8 million into the Court's account, and the Court would return $100,000 for each month that the state complied with prior orders. From October of 2000 to February of 2000, the state complied with Court orders and the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for contempt and for an order enforcing the Court's mandate, and granted defendants' motion for the return of $500,000 of the $1.8 million for compliance ($100,000 for each month). On March 30, 2001, the Court ordered the return of the remaining $1.3 million to the state, but retained the interest from the amount with the intention to use it for the plaintiffs' benefit. This case was consolidated with a few other cases with similar issues whose dockets are not available, and on July 18, 2001, with the Givhan v. Puckett (PC-MS-0004), a case involving a class of Muslim inmates who sought religious freedom in prisons. Over the next few months, many filings were made in the consolidated cases, though the documents and details are not available. On November 22, 2002, and on May 15, 2003, the court granted plaintiff's motions for modification of prior jail orders, but the details of the modification are not available. The following year, the court also ordered defendants to provide the appropriate amount of space for inmates as required by previous orders. On May 21, 2003, the court ordered the defendants to remedy Eighth Amendment violations and report progress by July 7, 2003 (part of a consolidated case). Over the next year, the defendants submitted status reports to the court, and the court required the defendants not to discriminate against HIV+ inmates when deciding community work center placement; the Court also required the defendants to report inmate capacity to the Court following a June 4, 2004 status conference. On November 12, 2004, the Court denied a number of motions by class members, warning them that any further filings that are deemed frivolous by the court will count as strikes for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On March 31, 2005, the court dismissed the consolidated Moore case (4:90-cv-125), finding that both the PLRA and the compliance with previous orders had provided sufficient relief for the class. Inmates who were HIV+ had been integrated into the general prison population except for housing, and discrimination with respect to services and privileges had been addressed by the defendants. On March 6, 2006, the Court issued an order to update the April 1997 order to require facilities to more promptly respond to notices of noncompliance from the Court. Under the order, noncompliance after two notices automatically disapproved a jail for incarceration until they were reapproved for compliance. Over the next couple of years, the jails were monitored for compliance and disapproved when not in compliance. The jail order was modified again on September 26 and November 5 of 2007, the first modification required jails to obtain periodic approval from plaintiffs' counsel, and the second required jails to provide evidence of compliance whenever plaintiffs' counsel gave notice of noncompliance. On September 9, 2008, the order was modified to require defendants to pay a flat fee in advance of jail inspections to prevent manipulation by either side. On March 10, 2011, the Court dismissed the consolidated Stevenson and Givhan cases and the portions of this case related to the state-owned and contractor facilities. The order held that county defendants would be dismissed when the state removed all state prisoners from county jails, or on July 1, 2015, whichever came first. The case was then assigned to Magistrate Judge David A. Sanders for post-judgment proceedings. On May 29, 2012, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal without prejudice. Since then, the court has granted roughly 300 orders approving jails or prisons for housing state inmates. The most recent order granting approval occurred in 2017. On February 25, 2018, a petitioner motioned to reinstate the class action, but it was denied on February 28, 2018. The petitioner appealed this decision and which was then denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals on September 20, 2018. There has been no further action on the docket.

Summary: On February 8, 1971, inmates at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman, Mississippi filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1994, against the state of Mississippi. Plaintiffs alleged that conditions of confinement were unconstitutional and that black inmates faced discrimination, violating First, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs were granted preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as well as attorney fees. Lengthy and complex litigation regarding different classes of inmates and enforcement of Court orders has been consolidated into this case. On May 29, 2012, parties submitted a joint motion for dismissal and the case has since been closed, however, from 2012-2017 the court has been granting approval to various prisons and jails involved in the case the ability to house state inmates.


The New Orleans (along with the Houston) office of the EEOC brought this ADA suit against Ampace Freightlines, Inc. d/b/a Merchants Dutch Express, in May 1999, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that the defendant discharged the charging party because he was regarded as having a disability. More specifically, the defendant allegedly discharged the defendant from his job as a truck driver because he had "lazy eye." The parties settled and the court entered judgment dismissing the matter in June 2000. No information from the settlement was made available.

Summary: EEOC brought ADA suit against Ampace Freightlines in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The parties settled and judgment was dismissed in June 2000. No information from the settlement was made available.


On May 8, 2018, Speech First, a nationwide membership organization of students, alumni, and others concerned with preserving the protections of the First Amendment, filed this lawsuit, on behalf of members attending the University of Michigan, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff sued the University of Michigan under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and 1988. Represented by private counsel, Speech First sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees, claiming violations of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged that the University of Michigan’s policies and enforcement of those policies chilled the speech and expression of student claimants. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that University’s policies on “harassment” and “bullying” were unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the policies provided no notice to students on what would constitute “harassment” or “bullying,” and enforcement of the policies were implemented arbitrarily. 2018 WL 2123702. This case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth Stafford. On May 11, 2018, Speech First moved for preliminary injunctions against the defendant. The plaintiff sought to prohibit the defendant from: “(1) taking any actions to investigate, threaten, or punish students for violations of the prohibitions on “harassment,” “bullying,” and “bias-related misconduct” set forth in the University’s Statement of Student Rights and Responsibilities; and (2) using the Bias Response Team to investigate, threaten, or punish students (including informal punishments such as restorative justice or individual education) for bias incidents. On June 11, 2018, the United States filed a statement of interest in support of the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. In response, the defendant moved for a stay on its obligation to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. The defendant argued that the University’s answer should be stayed until the court made a decision on the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction. Although the court noted that the defendant’s request served the interest of efficiency, it did not stay the defendant's answer. Instead, on June 19, 2018, the court extended the deadline until twenty-one (21) days from the date the court ruled on the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. The court held a hearing on Speech First's motion for preliminary injunction on July 31, 2018. On August 6, the court denied the plaintiff's motion, holding that the Bias Response Team did not pose a concrete threat to the plaintiffs; that Speech First's constitutional challenge to the University's definitions of "bullying" and "harassment" had become moot after the University changed the definitions; and that there was no threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. The district determined that Speech First was not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims because it lacked standing to assert that claim. The plaintiff appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on August 13, 2018. The Appeals Court found that Speech First had associational standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the students of the University. The Appeals Court also found that the claims were not moot, as the University’s voluntary cessation would not preclude them from reverting back to the prior definitions of "bullying" and "harassment." The Court vacated and remanded the District’s Court decision, determining that the District Court was in a better position to assess the facts. 939 F.3d 756 (6th Cir. 2019). The parties agreed to settle the dispute, and each bore their own costs. The University agreed not to reinstate the Bias Response team or the prior definitions of bullying and harassment and to maintain the published definitions on the website as they were at the time of settlement. On October 28, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. Judge Linda Parker order the dismissal with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: In May 2018, Speech First filed this lawsuit on behalf of members attending the University of Michigan. The plaintiff sued the University of Michigan under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and 1988, alleging that the University of Michigan’s policies and enforcement of those policies violated the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. After the plaintiff’s initial motion for injunctive relief was denied by the District Court, the plaintiff appealed to the 6th Circuit Court. The Circuit Court vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the proceedings, but the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claim soon after. The case is now closed


On August 22, 2007, individuals with disabilities filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Social Security Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Nursing Care Reform Act, against various Illinois state officials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that they were institutionalized in a nursing facility even though they were capable of living in a more community-integrated setting with appropriate services. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants conditioned receipt of long-term care on remaining in an institutionalized setting, even though it would be less expensive for Plaintiffs to receive appropriate care in the community. The Court (Judge Joan H. Lefkow) certified a class as: "all Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities in Cook County, Illinois, who are being, or may in the future be, unnecessarily confined to nursing facilities and who, with appropriate supports and services, may be able to live in a community setting." 71 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1089. At a status hearing on January 7, 2011, the parties advised Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez that they could conclude settlement discussions without further assistance from the court. On Aug. 29, 2011, the parties jointly moved for the court to approve the consent decree they had agreed upon. The court held a fairness hearing on Dec. 20, 2011, and ultimately accepted the decree. The consent decree established benchmarks for moving specific numbers of class members out of nursing facilities and into community-based settings. Over the course of the first two-and-a-half years, the decree compelled the state to move 1,100 class members into the community. It also required the state to provide up to $10 million in housing assistance to support the first group of transitioned adults. The decree also compelled the state to develop services needed to adequately support class members who choose to live in the community. It established a monitor to ensure compliance with the decree, and granted $1.2 million in attorneys' fees. The court approved an updated plan following the parties' cross-motion to enter into a cost-neutral plan and supplement and amend the December 2011 consent decree on November 16, 2016. The plan included the transition of class members into community-based settings, and continued evaluations and service plans for the class members. The court retained jurisdiction to oversee the full implementation of the plan. The court approved an updated plan on April 5, 2018. Monitoring by the court appointed monitor (Gail P. Hutchings) is ongoing as of May 20, 2020.

Summary: This case was brought by individuals with disabilities against various Illinois state officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that they were inappropriately institutionalized when they could have received care and services in an integrated community setting. In August 2011, the parties entered a consent decree that compelled the state to transition members of the class from nursing facilities to community-based settings over the course of a number of years. The transition plan was updated in April 2018, and monitoring is ongoing as of November 2018.


On October 6, 2009, two individuals who had their DNA collected pursuant to a California statute filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs challenged a provision of California law which mandates the DNA collection of any individual arrested for or charged with a felony. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and claimed that the practice violates substantive and procedural Due Process, as well as the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the practice infringes on rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because it mandates the DNA collection of all persons arrested for a felony--without requiring a warrant or that the individual actually be charged with or convicted of a felony. In 2004, California passed Proposition 69, which expanded the scope of the state's mandatory DNA collection laws, Cal. Penal Code. §§ 295 et seq. Prior to the enactment of Proposition 69, California law provided that only persons convicted of certain felonies were subject to the mandatory DNA testing program. Under the revised statute, which took effect on January 1, 2009, any individual arrested for a felony must provide their DNA for analysis and storage in a national database accessible by federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Proposition 69 also eliminated language in the statute which provided for the automatic expungement of a person's DNA samples and database entries if that individual's conviction was reversed. On December 1, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two more plaintiffs, bringing the total plaintiffs to four. None of the plaintiffs were convicted of charges related to the arrests which led to the collection of their DNA; three never had charges filed, and one had his case dismissed. On December 23, 2009, the District Court (Judge Charles R. Breyer) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). The court found that although the plaintiffs had established that arrestees have greater privacy interests than convicted felons, they had failed to show that this interest outweighs the government's compelling interest in using arrestees' DNA to solve past crimes. The court reasoned that as a result, the plaintiffs had failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of equities tipped in their favor. On January 29, 2010--shortly after denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction--the District Court granted the motion for class certification. Minute Entry Granting Mot. for Class Certification. In doing so, the court adopted plaintiffs' proposed class description. This class description is "all persons who have been, are, or will be, compelled to submit to the search and seizure of their body tissue and DNA pursuant to California Penal Code § 296(a)(2)(C) solely because they have been arrested for, or charged with, a felony offense." Proposed Order Granting Mot. for Class Certification. The plaintiffs appealed the District Court's denial of the preliminary injunction, but on February 23, 2012, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr. writing for the majority) affirmed the District Court's denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012). The majority applied a "totality of the circumstances" test, balancing arrestees' privacy interests against the government's need for their DNA samples. The court concluded that "the Government's compelling interests far outweigh arrestees' privacy concerns," and affirmed on that basis. Id. Judge William A. Fletcher filed a dissenting opinion, in which he analogized the collection of arrestees' DNA to taking their fingerprints. Judge Fletcher argued that because in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion an arrestee's fingerprints may only be taken for identification purposes--and not solely for an investigative purpose--the same logic applied to the collection of an arrestee's DNA. Id. at 1066. Judge Fletcher felt that this made Proposition 69 unconstitutional, rendering the majority's "totality of the circumstances" test irrelevant. Id. at 1080. However, he also noted that if he were to apply that test, he would find the "strength of plaintiffs' privacy interests much stronger." Id. After the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the District Court's decision, the plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit to rehear the appeal en banc. On July 25, 2012, the Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc. Haskell v. Harris, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). After oral argument on the rehearing, the Ninth Circuit issued an order stating that it would not rule on the appeal until the U.S. Supreme Court decided a related issue in Maryland v. King. In that case, Maryland's DNA collection laws were being challenged. In June 2013, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, held that Maryland's DNA collection laws were constitutional. The Ninth Circuit subsequently ordered both sides to submit supplemental briefs and scheduled additional oral argument for December 2013. Haskell v. Harris, 727 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2013). On March 20, 2014, the en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. In a per curiam opinion, the appeals court held that after Maryland v. King, California's DNA collection scheme was constitutional. Further, the appeals court declined the plaintiffs' request to enter a preliminary injunction applicable to only a smaller class consisting of individuals arrested for certain felonies not covered by King. Haskell v. Harris, 745 F.3d 1269 (9th Cir. 2014). On July 18, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to create subclasses. Proposed subclass A would include all persons arrested on suspicion of a felony but never charged with a crime. Proposed subclass B would include only persons arrested for non-serious, non-violent felonies who were not actually charged. On that same date, the state filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that because California's DNA collection law was materially indistinguishable from the Maryland law upheld in King, neither the plaintiffs nor any possible class fell outside the wide parameters of King and the case was therefore over. On December 3, 2014, however, the district court stayed the case pending final resolution of a similar challenge to California's DNA Act in state court. In April 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the state's DNA Act under both federal and California law as to the felony arrestee in that case. People v. Buza, 4 Cal. 5th 658 (2018). On June 22, 2018, Judge Breyer granted the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the state. Haskell v. Brown, 317 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court rejected the plaintiffs' proposed "rule" that would allow law enforcement to seize samples from all felony arrestees, but that would prevent law enforcement from analyzing those samples until a prosecutor has filed charges. Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments distinguishing King. First, the court explained that the plaintiffs understated the state's interests in taking, analyzing, and retaining DNA from people who are not charged with any offense or are discharged for lack of probable cause. Specifically, the court held that the state has a significant interest in the identification of arrestees, in accurately assessing the danger an arrestee poses to the public, and in exoneration. Second, the court noted that the individual interest was no different than that in King. Thus, in weighing the state's significant interest against the individual's modest interest, the court deemed the searches reasonable. Finally, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish King based on three differences between the California and Maryland laws: (1) arrestee DNA samples are analyzed before arraignment in California; (2) more crimes qualify for mandatory DNA analysis in California; (3) records and samples are not automatically expunged in California. The court held that none of these three differences were constitutionally significant. The case is now closed.

Summary: Four individuals who had their DNA collected upon arrest pursuant to a California statute filed a class action against the Attorney General of California and the California Department of Justice, alleging that a provision of the state's mandatory DNA collection law is unconstitutional. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. Following the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Maryland v. King</i>, the en banc court affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. On June 22, 2018, the District Court granted the state's motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment for the state. The case is now closed.


On January 7, 1999 several individuals eligible to participate in Medicaid because of disabilities and an advocacy organization for disabled individuals filed suit against New Mexico, the New Mexico Department of Health, and the New Mexico Department of Human Services in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They alleged that the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Medicaid Act, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically they claimed that the defendants provided community-based treatment to individuals with disabilities authorized as waiver services in a way that prevented disabled individuals from receiving these services in a reasonably prompt manner. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 24, 2000 the district court (Judge Martha Alicia Vazquez) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed the ruling denying their sovereign immunity claims but on August 16, 2001 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Tacha, Pulitz, and Lucero) affirmed the district court. On November 5, 2002 the district court granted the defendants summary judgment as to claims by plaintiffs who had since received the desired services or were deceased but denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim of the advocacy organization for lack of standing. Discovery proceeded until the district court (Judge Vazquez) granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on two counts and the defendants summary judgment on one count on August 5, 2003. On February 4, 2004 the district court (Judge Vazquez) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to evaluate applicants for waiver services within 90 days and then provide them with such services when appropriate within 90 days. The district court (Judge Vazquez) denied the plaintiffs motion to find the defendants in contempt on September 7, 2005 and found the defendants to be in compliance with the judgment on October 21, 2005.

Summary: On January 7, 1999 several disabled individuals eligible to participate in Medicaid and an advocacy organization for disabled individuals filed suit against New Mexico and two state agencies in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They alleged that the defendants had failed to provide community-based services to disabled individuals in a reasonably prompt manner. On April 24, 2000 the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and on August 16, 2001 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. The district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on two counts and the defendants summary judgment on one count on August 5, 2003 and on February 4, 2004 entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to provide the services in a timely manner. On October 21, 2005 the district court found the defendants to be in compliance with the judgment.


Turkmen v. Ashcroft, also known as Ziglar v. Abbasi, is one of two related actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York by plaintiffs who were investigated and detained for suspected terrorist ties in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It was filed on April 17, 2002 as a class-action lawsuit, but the class was never certified. The case was assigned to Judge John Gleeson. (The related case, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft (later Ashcroft v. Iqbal), was also assigned to Judge Gleeson, and was settled following the Supreme Court's ruling in that case, 556 U.S. 662.) This case was reassigned to Judge Dora Irizarry on March 9, 2016, when Judge Gleeson resigned from the bench to return to private practice. The plaintiffs in this case were men of Middle Eastern and South Asian descent who were arrested by the FBI and the INS in immigration raids following the September 11 attacks. They were held for months in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn as the FBI investigated potential links to terrorism, but they were never charged with a crime. Some of the plaintiffs alleged that they were kept in solitary confinement, barred from communication with attorneys, family, and friends, subjected to physical and verbal abuse, and obstructed in their efforts to practice their religion. They sued the U.S. Attorney General, the FBI Director, the INS Commissioner, and employees of the Metropolitan Detention Center, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, international human rights law, the Civil Rights Act, and the Alien Tort Statute, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Factually, the plaintiffs alleged that notices to appear in court were delayed in reaching them, that they were subject to a blanket no-bond policy, and that they were arbitrarily classified as "of high interest." They claimed that they were subjected to strip searches, sleep deprivation, effective denial of exercise, denial of hygiene items and adequate food, inadequate medical attention, deliberate interference with religious rights, communications blackouts, interference with access to counsel, and denial of consular rights. The plaintiffs further alleged that they were subjected to these harsh conditions because of their religion or ethnicity, and that their continued detention under these conditions stemmed from a discriminatory policy created by high-level officials in the Bush Administration. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint in light of reports published by the Office of the Inspector General in April and December 2003. The amended complaints added new allegations, claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, one additional plaintiff, and 28 Metropolitan Detention Center employees as defendants. Four plaintiffs who had been deported were paroled into the U.S. for deposition. This was the first time that non-citizens barred from re-entering the U.S. were allowed to enter for the purpose of pursuing a civil case. While in the country they were under the strict custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. In 2007, the Department of Justice indicted eleven current and former Metropolitan Detention Center employees, including three Turkmen defendants. Ten of the eleven were convicted of physical attacks against detainees at the Center; those convictions did not involve attacks against the plaintiffs in this case. Following the 2009 Supreme Court ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, six of the plaintiffs settled their claims for $1.26 million. The remaining plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on September 13, 2010, adding six new plaintiffs and attempting to meet the pleading standard set in Iqbal, so as to maintain claims against Ashcroft and other high-ranking officials. On January 15, 2013, the district court dismissed all claims against the Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the INS Commissioner (the "DOJ defendants"), and also dismissed two of the claims against the Metropolitan Detention Center employees (the "MDC defendants"). Those two claims, based on alleged communications blackouts and interference with counsel, were dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs collectively and the MDC defendants individually appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit. The appeals were consolidated as Case No. 13-1662; the consolidated appeal was heard on May 1, 2014. More than a year later, on June 17, 2015, the appeals court reinstated the plaintiffs' claims under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. §1985, against the DOJ defendants and the MDC defendants. The court upheld the dismissal, however, of the plaintiffs' claims under the Free Exercise Clause. In reinstating the claims against the Attorney General and the FBI Director for their post-September 11 policy decisions, the court was extending the application of Bivens into "a context not previously recognized by the Supreme Court or Second Circuit precedent." 789 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2015). It was also an innovation for the court to hold that officials were not protected by qualified immunity for punitive and discriminatory confinement and unreasonable strip searches that they imposed on detainees after learning that those detainees were being held with no individualized suspicion of terrorist connections. The defendants' petition for rehearing en banc was denied; they subsequently sought a 90-day stay of the mandate while the Solicitor General determined whether to appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeals court granted the stay, and the Supreme Court ultimately heard the appeal and issued a decision on June 19, 2017. Titling the case Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit should not have extended Bivens liability to the DOJ defendants, emphasizing that "Congress, not the courts, should decide whether a damages action should be allowed." 137 S.Ct. 1843. It held that the plaintiffs' abuse allegations against the MDC defendants did state a plausible claim for relief under the Fifth Amendment, and remanded to the Second Circuit to determine whether a Bivens damages remedy would be appropriate. Finally, the Court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. §1985 conspiracy claims, ruling that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court for additional proceedings. On February 27, 2018, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the DOJ defendants and referred the remainder of their claims to a magistrate judge. In light of the Supreme Court's ruling, the remaining (MDC) defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. On August 13, 2018, the magistrate judge issued a report, recommending that the plaintiffs' claims against the MDC defendants be dismissed. The magistrate judge concluded that Congress was in "the best position to weight the costs and benefits of allowing a [Bivens] cause of action to proceed" in the context of prisoner abuse claims such as those brought in this case. The plaintiffs have since filed objections to the report. As of July 2, 2020, the report and the plaintiffs' objections to it are pending before the district court.

Summary: Turkmen v. Ashcroft is one of two related actions, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, by plaintiffs who were investigated and detained for suspected terrorist ties in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The U.S. Attorney General, the FBI Director, and the INS Commissioner were named as defendants, but after a Supreme Court ruling in 2017, they were dismissed as defendants. The plaintiffs' remaining claims, against staff of the Metropolitan Detention Center in New York City, are before the district court on remand. A magistrate judge has recommended that the claims be dismissed.


Between November 18, 2005 and November 16, 2006, current and former African-American financial advisor employees and trainees filed a lawsuit against their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both monetary damages and injunctive relief, alleging the defendant engaged in race discrimination in terms of hiring, retention, promotion, pay, resource allocation and more. The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on July 19, 2006. On November 8, 2008 the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On August 9, 2010, the District Court (Judge Robert W. Gettleman) issued an amended order denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on the ground that commonality was not satisfied because the putative class members were supervised by hundreds of different people and had a wide variety of salary levels and positions. 2010 WL 3087483. On February 14, 2011, Judge Gettleman denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration for class certification and their request to narrow the class definition. Judge Gettleman held that the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was not sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification and that their class as proposed failed to satisfy either category of class certification because the individual questions of law and claims to relief predominated over those of the class. 2011 WL 658155. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. (Judges Richard Posner, Diane Wood, and David Hamilton), which denied the request based on an untimely appeal. The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for class certification in July 2011, shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Judge Gettlman denied their motion on September 19, 2011, once again on commonality grounds. 2011 WL 4471028. The employees filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. On February 24, 2012, the Seventh Circuit (Judges Posner, Wood, and Hamilton) reversed the District Court decision. The Circuit Court held that the issue of whether Merrill Lynch's policies had a disparate impact on African-American employees was appropriate for class-wide treatment because each of the plaintiffs' claims had the common question of whether Merrill Lynch "violated the antidiscrimination statutes." 672 F.3d 482. Merrill Lynch's motion for rehearing en banc was denied by the Seventh Circuit on March 27, 2012. Its subsequent appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied on October 1, 2012. On July 13, 2012, the District Court issued certification of the disparate impact class, according to the Seventh Circuit's order. On December 6, 2013, the District Court (Judge Gettleman) approved a settlement agreement on all claims proposed by the parties. Pursuant to the agreement, Merrill Lynch would allocate $160 million in a settlement fund, $25 million of which would be designated for extraordinary claims. The District Court also approved service awards of $250,000 for each Class Representative and $75,000 for each member of the Steering Committee. In regards to attorney's fees, the District Court approved the plaintiff's requested attorney's fees of 21.25% (20% of the first 100 million of the settlement fund and 15% of the remainder). The programmatic relief granted by the settlement consisted of several changes to company policies, including changes to the distribution of accounts, as well as the establishment of coaching for African American financial advisors and a diversity fund to assist African Americans in funding business development events. This portion of the settlement lasted for 3 years. On December 16, 2014, a named plaintiff filed a motion to appeal the District Court's final approval of the class action settlement, but the Seventh Circuit (Diane P. Wood, Richard D. Cudahy, and Diane S. Sykes) denied the appeal based on an untimely request. The settlement how now run its course and there has been no further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: After African-American financial advisor employees and trainees of Merrill Lynch & Co, Inc. obtained class certification from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, they settled their claims of race discrimination with their employer for $160 million. The District Court granted approval of their agreement on December 6, 2013. The programmatic relief portion of the settlement ended after three years. This case is now closed.


On July 19, 2011, the state of Texas filed suit against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The state asked for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the Department of Justice inappropriately declared Texas's new districting plan to be retrogressive (that is, discriminatory, because it diluted minority voting power). Arguments focused primarily on the demographics of the state of Texas and its new districting map. On November 8, 2011, the District Court (Judge Thomas Griffith) denied Texas's motion for summary judgment, holding that Texas improperly relied solely on demographic data in formulating its plans and that there were genuine issues of material fact. 831 F. Supp. 2d 244. On August 28, 2012, the District Court held that Texas had not met its burden of showing that the new U.S. Congressional and State House plans were not retrogressive or its burden of proving that its U.S. Congressional and State Senate plans were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, and therefore denied declaratory judgment. 887 F. Supp. 2d 133. Texas sought review in the Supreme Court, and the case was held while the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act was under review in Shelby County v. Holder. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court held in the Shelby County case that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional in part, striking down Section 4 of the Act, the "coverage" provision, which controlled which jurisdictions were obligated to seek DOJ preclearance of voting-related changes. 570 U.S. 529. The next day, the Court vacated the opinion in this case and remanded the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia. 570 U.S. 928. On July 3, 2013, Texas moved to dismiss as moot all claims brought in its original complaint. It advanced two arguments in support of dismissal. First, on June 23, 2013, while Texas's appeal was pending and before the Supreme Court had announced its decision in Shelby County, the Texas legislature adopted a new set of redistricting plans that replaced those challenged in this case. Second, Shelby County (which held the VRA's coverage formula unconstitutional) had removed Texas from the preclearance regime of Section 5. Texas argued that these two factors had mooted it claims. On December 3, 2013, a three-judge panel for the District Court for the District of Columbia (Judge Thomas B. Griffith writing for the Court) agreed that the controversy had been mooted, and dismissed all claims. Mem. & Order, Dec. 3, 2013. On December 17, 2013, several parties (individual voters, elected state representatives, and civil rights advocacy groups) who had intervened as defendants earlier in the litigation moved for attorney fees and costs totaling $1,096,770.01. The intervenors argued that they were prevailing parties and thus entitled to fees and costs under the VRA-specifically, under § 1973l(e) of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e), and subsection (b) of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. These sections allow courts to, at their discretion, award the prevailing party reasonable fees and costs if the underlying action was to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On June 18, 2014, the District Court (Judge Rosemary M. Collyer) granted the intervenors' motion for attorney fees and costs in full. Texas v. United States, Civil Action No. 11-1303 (RMC), 2014 WL 2758597, at *11 (D.D.C. June 18, 2014). Describing the issue as a "case study in how not to respond to a motion for attorney fees and costs," id. at *1, Judge Rosemary chastised Texas for failing to respond (other than by means of a three-page "Advisory" filing) to the intervenors' motion. Finding that Texas's "Advisory" filing presented no substantive legal opposition, the Court thus granted the motion. On July 16, 2014, Texas appealed the order granting attorney fees to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The June 18 order was stayed pending this appeal. On August 18, 2015, the Judge Patricia A. Millett of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion affirming the District Court’s fee award. Judge Millett found that Texas failed to follow the District Court’s rules for responding to motions for attorneys’ fees and did not challenge the District Court’s use of its rules on appeal. Judge Millett proceeded to identify numerous flaws in Texas’ argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County made the intervenors ineligible for attorneys’ fees. Concluding that “Texas gets no second bite at the apple now” after its procedural missteps, Judge Millett affirmed the District Court’s fee award. 798 F.3d 1108. After the Court of Appeals issued its opinion, the intervenors moved for additional attorneys’ fees to cover the costs of appeal, and Texas failed to secure Supreme Court review. 136 S. Ct. 981. On March 17, 2016, the Court of Appeals remanded the intervenor’s motion for additional attorneys’ fees, now augmented by the costs of opposing Supreme Court review, to the District Court for fact-finding. After almost a year of litigation over the additional attorneys’ fees, Judge Collyer issued an order and opinion granting the intervenors most of their requested fees on March 30, 2017. Judge Collyer noted that prevailing parties challenging voting plans or procedures are entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The parties disputed whether undetermined fees should be calculated using the intervenors’ attorneys’ rates from private practice or the more conservative Laffey Matrix, a “commonly used” tool in the D.C. Circuit. Judge Collyer selected a generous form of the Laffey Matrix as most appropriate given the skill of the intervenors’ attorneys and the complexity of the litigation but reduced one fee award by 7.6 hours for work on a motion that was never filed. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 19, 2011, the state of Texas filed suit against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The state asked for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the Department of Justice inappropriately declared Texas's new districting plan to be retrogressive. On August 28, 2012, the District Court held that Texas had not met its burden of showing that the new U.S. Congressional and state House plans were not retrogressive or its burden of proving that its U.S. Congressional and state Senate plans were not enacted with a discriminatory purpose, and therefore denied declaratory judgment. However, following the Court's opinion in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded the case to the District Court. The District Court dismissed the case as moot and the case is now closed.


On Jan. 25, 2018, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG) and a law professor brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as well as the U.S. Department of State (DOS). The plaintiffs sought to shed light on the government's decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals, including its justification and legality. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and assigned to Judge Ronnie Abrams on Jan. 29, 2018. NIPNLG is a nonprofit organization that provides legal assistance to immigrants and advocacy on behalf of noncitizens. The other plaintiff is a professor at the New York University School of Law, where she works on human rights issues and in particular Haiti and Haitian immigrants in the United States. The plaintiffs sought records related to the government's determination to terminate TPS for Haitian nationals. The plaintiffs argued that "[t]imely disclosure of these records is critically important because of the looming termination of legal immigration status for tens of thousands of Haitian nationals living in the United States." The complaint explained that TPS status protected foreign nationals from deportation and allowed them to access work authorization. To get TPS, the individual's country of origin must be designated as warranting TPS and the individual must apply and be approved for the status. The plaintiffs argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) required a factual inquiry to terminate TPS for a particular country after the designation had been granted; it could not be terminated without reason. According to the complaint, DHS most recently designated Haiti for TPS in 2015 and then extended the designation by six months in May 2017 in light of extensive hurricane damage. DHS terminated TPS for Haiti on Nov. 20, 2017—according to the plaintiffs, without justification—leaving 58,000 Haitian nationals in the U.S. at the risk of deportation and loss of work authorization. On Feb. 15, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, noting that DOS had issued a travel warning for Haiti. The plaintiffs also added as a defendant U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which they alleged had not substantively responded to a Nov. 2017 FOIA request. On March 16, 2018, the defendants wrote to the Court arguing that the plaintiffs did not qualify for expedited processing and that plaintiffs' proposed production schedule was not practicable. The defendants requested additional time to process. On Mar. 23, 2018, the plaintiffs opposed this request. By April 4, 2018 the parties had agreed on a proposed briefing schedule, which Judge Abrams approved, specifying that each agency was required to produce 1500 pages monthly of the requested documents. The defendants moved for summary judgment on April 27, 2018, and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgement on May 18, 2018. While the court considered the motions, similar cases involving the termination of Haiti's TPS were litigated, most notably Ramos v. Nielsen, et al., 3:18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal.) and Saget v. Trump, et al., 1:18-cv-01599 (E.D.N.Y.). The documents submitted for discovery in these cases were re-released to the plaintiffs in this case. These releases occurred on March 27, 2019 and April 10, 2019. Following the release of this additional information, and due to parallel injunctive litigation, the plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss their case on April 23, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: On Jan. 25, 2018, the NIPNLG and a professor sued DHS under FOIA, seeking materials on the government's Nov. 2017 decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitian nationals. Due to parallel injunctive litigation and receiving the desired documents the plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss on April 23, 2019.


Plaintiff, the editor of a local newspaper, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts against the Newark Police Department on January 23, 2008 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and N.J.S.A. 10:6-1. Plaintiff, represented by attorneys from Seton Hall University School of Law and the ACLU of New Jersey, sought damages, alleging that police officers violated his First Amendment right to receive and record information for later dissemination, Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures, corresponding provisions in the New Jersey State Constitution, and the New Jersey Reporter Shield Law. Specifically, plaintiff's allegations revolved around an August 4, 2007 incident in which Newark Police Department officers confiscated a photographer's camera and detained plaintiff under threat of arrest until he agreed to turn over all copies of photographs related to a murder in a rash of violence in the city described as an embarrassment to local law enforcement. On December 23, 2009, plaintiff petitioned for judgment after agreeing with the Newark Police Department to settle the case in the amount of $55,000. On the same day, plaintiff also filed a Request to File an Application for Attorneys' Fees. In entering judgment on February 22, 2010, the District Court (Judge Faith S. Hochberg) granted the judgment in the amount of $55,000 and denied plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees on the grounds that the settlement agreement included all attorneys' fees. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on March 9, 2010. On July 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals (Judge Thomas M. Hardiman) reversed the District Court and held that, since the offer of settlement did not explicitly reference the inclusion of fees, attorneys' fees were not included in the settlement. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On October 13, 2011, the parties settled the remaining attorneys' fees claim. On October 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge Faith S. Hochberg) ordered the case closed. Plaintiff entered a notice that the judgment of $55,000, and additional attorneys' fees, had been paid in full on October 23, 2012.

Summary: Plaintiff, the editor of a local newspaper, filed a lawsuit against the Newark Police Department alleging that his First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated when defendant seized a camera and detained him until he agreed to turn over or destroy all copies of photographs depicting a potentially embarrassing crime. Plaintiff ultimately agreed to settle the case for $55,000. There was a dispute as to whether the settlement agreement included attorneys' fees. The District Court, in entering judgment in the amount of $55,000, held that it did not. Plaintiff appealed that decision. The Appeals Court sided with plaintiff, remanding the case to the District Court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees. The parties ultimately settled on the issue of attorneys' fees and as of October 23, 2012, defendant had paid in full the judgment, including attorneys fees.


On January 30, 2017, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) of the United States, represented by private counsel, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was held for questioning at Atlanta International Airport as he was trying to return to his home to Atlanta, solely due to the Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017 suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The complaint further alleged that the defendants, in denying an LPR re-entry after a brief visit abroad, violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint was filed as a petition for mandamus (directing inspection of returning LPRs under the INA rather than under the Executive Order) and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff was an Iraqi refugee who has worked for CNN since 2004 and currently is an International Desk Producer. He was based at CNN's Atlanta bureau and travels to the Middle East regularly for his reporting work. On January 29, 2017, after returning to the US from a trip to Iraq, he was detained and questioned at Atlanta International Airport, before being released. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that he was therefore uncertain whether he may leave and re-enter the United States in the future, and that this is a substantial problem, because he travels often for his work. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy Batten. On February 1, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to expedite proceedings, arguing that the issues raised in the complaint are of immediate importance and could evade review if not expedited. On February 2, the court ordered the defendants to respond by February 8 to the plaintiff's emergency motion. On February 7, the government filed a motion to dismiss and on February 8 they filed a response in opposition to the plaintiff's emergency motion. On February 9, the plaintiffs filed an answer to the government's response, and on February 10 Judge Batten denied the motion to expedite proceedings. On February 17, the plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the response timeline to the government's motion to dismiss. On February 21, Judge Batten granted plaintiffs' motion for an extension through February 28. On Feb. 27, the plaintiffs filed a response to the government's motion to dismiss the complaint as moot. The plaintiffs argued that executive documents issued to clarify the EO do not change the clear text of the EO, which is still binding and still purports to exclude all "immigrants" - including LPRs like the named plaintiff - despite the government's clarifying documents indicating otherwise. The plaintiffs further argued that, as the EO remains in effect and the defendants have therefore not yet established full voluntary cessation of their conduct, the EO falls under a mootness exception for conduct "capable of repetition yet evading review." Prompted by adverse developments in the Ninth Circuit in Washington v. Trump, another litigation challenging the Executive Order, on Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On Mar. 9, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the reply and pretrial discovery timeline. The court granted this motion on Mar. 13. The parties now have until Mar. 23 to file a discovery plan and for the defendants to respond on their Feb. 7 motion to dismiss the complaint as moot. On Mar. 21, the parties filed a joint motion to extend the reply timeline. On Mar. 22, the court granted the motion, giving plaintiff through Mar. 23 to file an amended complaint and giving the government 30 days from the plaintiff's filing date to respond. The court additionally allowed the government to withdraw its Feb. 7 motion to dismiss the complaint. On Mar. 23, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging Section 1(g) (which applied greater scrutiny to Iraqi nationals during the visa issuance/U.S. admissions process) and Section 4 (which provides that applications for visa/admissions/any immigration benefit by Iraqi nationals should be "subjected to thorough review") of the second EO. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that no section of the EO removes Iraqi LPR's from the "additional scrutiny" and "thorough review" requirements, in violation of the INA, APA, and Fifth Amendment due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a writ of mandamus instructing DHS to instruct its employees inspecting aliens at U.S. points of entry to exclude returning Iraqi resident immigrants from the new screening terms under the EO. On Apr. 24, the government filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The parties filed a joint preliminary report and discovery plan on July 7. Later in July, the parties noted their disagreement over the discovery deadlines, and discovery was stayed pending the district court's ruling on the Apr. 24 motion to dismiss. On Aug. 11, Judge Batten granted the defendants' Apr. 24 motion to dismiss the amended complaint, finding that Tawfeeq lacked standing to challenge sections 2 (which does not apply to Iraqi nationals such as Tawfeeq), 1(g) (which the plaintiffs acknowledge would only apply to Tawfeeq if erroneously implemented, and the court will not presume that the law would be erroneously implemented), and 4 (which the court determined was too speculative to grant standing). Finally, the court determined that the revocation of the January EO rendered moot Tawfeeq's claims challenging its application to lawful permanent residents. This case is now closed.

Summary: An Iraqi refugee and LPR was held and questioned at Atlanta International Airport on January 29, 2017, following the Executive Order of January 27, 2017, suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq and other countries. The plaintiff is a CNN journalist who travels frequently between his home in Atlanta and the Middle East. He feared he would be unable to re-enter the United States if he leaves, due to his difficulties returning from Iraq on January 29. On January 30, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. On February 1, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to expedite proceedings. Prompted by adverse developments in the Ninth Circuit in Washington v. Trump, another litigation challenging the Executive Order, on Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging the new order, and the defendants moved to dismiss. On August 11, 2017, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and entered judgment for the defendants. This case is now closed.


On June 29, 2017, the James Madison Project, Noah Shachtman, and Betsy Woodruff sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The James Madison Project (JMP) is an organization established in 1998 "to promote government accountability and the reduction of secrecy, as well as [to educate] the public on issues relating to intelligence and national security." Noah Schactman is the current Editor-in-Chief (previously the Executive Editor) of The Daily Beast, and Betsy Woodruff was a politics reporter for the publication at the time. Private counsel represented plaintiffs, who filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sought disclosure of agency records by DHS and its subordinate entities: the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Specifically, plaintiffs sought the disclosure of records clarifying the extent to which U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs) were coerced into surrendering their residency statuses, once DHS began implementing President Trump's Jan. 27 Executive Order 13769 but before DHS stopped enforcing it on Feb. 4. According to plaintiffs, lawyers for some travelers affected by the EO claimed their clients were, during this implementation period, pressured to sign I-407 forms surrendering their LPR status. The complaint alleged that on Mar. 3, 2017, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies seeking copies of records memorializing: 1. Instructions or guidelines – including verbal instructions memorialized in writing – provided to CBP officials with respect to agency practice for presenting I-407 forms to individuals impacted by the EO; 2. Communications between CBP officials – including verbal communications memorialized in writing – mentioning I-407 forms between Jan. 27 and Feb. 5; 3. Any documentation tabulating or calculating the number of individuals who signed I-407 forms between Jan. 27 and Feb. 5; 4. Copies of the actual I-407 forms signed between Jan. 27 and Feb. 5. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies, and that the plaintiffs had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. The plaintiffs sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. (Plaintiff James Madison Project also has two similar FOIA cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, summarized in this Clearinghouse: one by the Daily Beast against the Department of Justice (NS-DC-0106) and one by Politico against DHS (NS-DC-0107). On June 29, the case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. On Sept. 7, the parties reported that USCIS and CBP were searching for records responsive to plaintiff's request and needed another month to prepare a list. On Oct. 10, the parties reported the following: TSA had located no responsive documents; USCIS had located no responsive records for some requests and had withheld responsive records for other requests due to privacy; and CBP had located a few responsive records. Judge Boasberg then ordered defendant (USCIS and CBP) to provide its first production of non-exempt portions of responsive records by Nov. 6 and its second production by Dec. 7. On Nov. 6, the parties reported that defendants were following the schedule ordered by Judge Boasberg. The following status report, of Jan. 5, 2018, noted that USCIS and CBP had both produced more responsive non-exempt records and informed plaintiff that the search was completed. The parties agreed to meet to confer on next steps. The Feb. 1 status report stated that the parties needed more time to discuss search declarations, before deciding whether to brief motions. A status report filed on Apr. 13 informed the Court that plaintiffs accepted TSA's productions and the sufficiency of USCIS's and CBP's searches, but would challenge denials and redactions of some of USCIS's and CBP's productions. Status reports filed October through December indicated the production was ongoing. Though the documents released by the government are not available online, this news article references some of their contents. On June 15, 2018, the defendants submitted a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the I-407 forms in question were exempt and properly withheld. The plaintiffs responded to the motion on July 16, claiming that the categorical refusal to produce the I-407 forms was improper and that their redactions were unjustified. After a conference call on October 3, the defendant submitted a status report on October 5, with the defendant’s agreement to respond to the plaintiff’s FOIA requests and a proposed schedule. The court, as agreed in the report, ordered the defendant to provide rolling productions every 60 days of the I-407 forms and a joint status report every 45 days. Production followed the next few months. On December 26, 2018, the defendant moved for a stay of production schedule due to lapse of appropriations, which resulted in a temporary prohibition of DOJ’s work. Two days later, the court granted the motion. According to the February 1, 2019 status report, the funding was restored and the defendants had completed their required production on December 18, 2018. The parties then continued to provide status reports regarding attorney fees. On April 19, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, and the court ordered dismissal the same day. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 29, 2017, the James Madison Project and journalists at the Daily Beast sued DHS under FOIA, seeking disclosure of records clarifying the extent to which LPRs were coerced into surrendering their residency statuses, once DHS began implementing President Trump's Jan. 27 EO but before DHS stopped enforcing it on Feb. 4. The defendants completed the FOIA productions and the case is now dismissed.