On January 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 2000e(k), against AT&T Corporation in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, was a former AT&T employee and asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, alleging that AT&T's health insurance policy discriminated against women. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendant's health insurance plan, which did not provide prescription contraceptives (birth control) before 2002 and only through the mail after 2002, violated female employees' civil rights. The action originally started in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, but was transferred to Missouri on May 12, 2003. This is the date on which the docket begins. Originally, there were two plaintiffs on the case, but one dropped out of the litigation. Thus, a single plaintiff carried forth the case. On September 3, 2004, the Court (Judge Sachs) denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. In the opinion, the Court barely discussed the requirements for a class-action lawsuit, except to point out typicality. The plaintiff, since the suit began, had stopped taking birth control and was seeking to get pregnant. Therefore, the Court declared that a class could not be certified without a class representative who would have an ongoing interest in the prayed-for relief. The plaintiff wanted to recover her past expenditures on the prescribed contraceptives. The Women's Law project came onto the case as an amicus. After a lengthy discovery period, the Court made another ruling. On June 7, 2006, the Court (Judge Sachs) granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification as to the damages in the complaint. The class was comprised of female employees of AT&T, who paid for their own prescription contraception from the dates of October 31, 2001 to July 2, 2002. The Court did not certify the claims for injunctive or declaratory relief because as of 2002, the health insurance provider covered birth control through mail order. While the cost of the plaintiff's potential recovery was relatively small, $68.07, the class action potential in the litigation, given AT&T's size made both parties fight vigorously. According to the docket, neither side was content with this decision. The plaintiff wanted the period of time for damages claims to be extended, and the defendant did not approve of the decision at all. Ultimately, the plaintiffs filed an appeal. On June 1, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued a preliminary judgment to the District Court (Judge Sachs). The Circuit Court advised the District Court to review the findings of another recent case, In Re Union Pacific Railroad Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007). This case featured a ruling that was fundamentally at odds with the decision of the District Court on June 7, 2006. On October 22, 2007, the District Court (Judge Sachs) vacated its previous decision, and ordered a decision in favor of the defendant. The case was closed the next day on October 23, 2007.

Summary: This case was brought in 2004 by a female former AT&T employee against AT&T Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff alleged that AT&T, specifically the company's health insurance policy, discriminated against women, and she sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The Court originally denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification, but later reversed its denial and granted summary judgment to plaintiff, certifying a class to determine compensation. However, the Court of Appeals referred the District Court Judge to a relevant case which rejected a challenge to a similar program, thereby forcing the Court to vacate its prior ruling and issue judgment in favor of defendants on October 22, 2007.


On April 25, 2016, three individuals that were blind and enrolled in the Barbri bar exam preparation course filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs brought this suit against BarBri Inc., aka Barbri Bar Review, a company that sells and provides products for bar exam preparation. The plaintiffs alleged that Barbri violated the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) and the Texas Human Resource Code §§ 121.002-.003. The plaintiffs, represented by Texas Civil Rights Project and Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights/Urban Affairs, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver. The three plaintiffs were all enrolled in the Barbri bar preparation course and relied on Barbri to prepare for the bar examination. The Barbri bar preparation course provided online bar review resources including online live chat to match Barbri students with tutors, an online planner, study outlines, online lecture notes, and online lecture videos. The website, however, was not compatible with the software that the plaintiffs relied on to access the internet, like Job Access With Speech (“JAWS”) screen readers. The plaintiffs requested reasonable accommodation, but BarBri did not provide them. On July 1, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The plaintiff amended their complaint on July 19, 2016. This new complaint added more factual allegations and slightly modified the definition of the sought class. The amended class definition was as follows: “All legally blind individuals nationwide who, on or after April 25, 2014, took, plan to take or attempted to take a Barbri bar review course at a time when Barbri’s website, mobile application, or other course materials was or is not fully accessible to legally blind students, or who have been discouraged from taking the Barbri bar review course due to such inaccessibility.” The defendant again moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on October 3, 2016. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class on February 10, 2017. The court never ruled on this motion. In October 2017, the parties underwent settlement discussions. Eventually the parties reached a confidential Settlement Agreement. Then on January 19, 2018, the parties jointly moved for a stipulation of dismissal and sought approval of a consent decree. Three days later, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. The parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance with this decree. The consent decree prohibited the defendant from engaging in disability discrimination, required the defendant to comply with the ADA, and required the defendant to undergo an accessibility audit to ensure that all accessibility barriers for screen readers were removed. The defendant also agreed to provide accessibility training to all development team employees and to reform its procedures for implementing reasonable accommodations when students request accommodations. The consent decree remains in force as of May 2020.

Summary: In 2016, three individuals who were blind law school graduates enrolled in the BarBri bar preparation course filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that Barbri’s website, which offers bar preparation resources, was not accessible to blind students who relied on screen readers to access the internet. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that Barbri failed to provide reasonable accommodations. In late 2017, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, and then in early 2018, the court approved the parties consent decree. This decree granted the court jurisdiction over the matter for three years. In this consent decree, the defendant agreed to make their website accessible to students who relied on screen readers and other similar technology to access the internet. Moreover, the defendant was required to provide anti-discrimination training to its employees, audit its website to ensure accessibility, and refrain from discriminatory conduct. This case is ongoing. The court still retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the consent decree.


On November 23, 2014, two African-American teenage males filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Hamilton County Juvenile Detention Center and Hamilton County, Ohio. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. They requested that the Court enjoin the Juvenile Court from arresting and detaining youth without conducting a probable cause hearing. The plaintiffs claimed that the detention of youth after 48 hours without providing a probable cause hearing violates their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first plaintiff was arrested at school on September 12, 2014, on a charge of aggravated robbery. Based on the victim's description, a warrant was issued, and the plaintiff was taken into custody at the Hamilton County Detention Center. He was in isolation for two days. The Juvenile Court did not make a probable cause determination prior to issuing a warrant for the first plaintiff, nor within 48 hours of detention. The case was continued on October 6, 2014, for a probable cause hearing, which never happened. S.W. had a trial on October 10, 2014, where the case was dismissed on the merits. Although S.W. was released, he never received a probable cause hearing at arrest or during his detention. The second plaintiff was arrested outside his home on July 8, 2014, by Cincinnati police officers, who did not present an arrest warrant. He was taken to the local police station, interrogated for alleged involvement in a robbery, and taken to the Hamilton County Detention Center on July 9, 2014. He remained incarcerated at the Detention Center from July 8 to July 23, during which time no probable cause determinations in his case occurred. On December 10, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Although a preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled for March 24, 2015, the parties began settlement negotiations in February 2015 and the hearing was changed to a status conference on settlement progress. On September 29, 2015, the parties reached an agreement and Judge Susan Dlott approved and adopted an agreed order of dismissal without prejudice. The Hamilton County Juvenile Court agreed to plan, design, and implement a best practice model for processing complaints, issuing arrest warrants, making probable cause determinations, and conducting detention hearings. This included revisions to Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice for Hamilton County Juvenile Court. Additionally, the juvenile court agreed create a new training curriculum to assist clerks in making probable cause determinations. The Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney also agreed to assign an assistant prosecuting attorney to attend detention hearings at the Youth Center. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: Two African-American teenagers, on behalf of a class of youth detained at the Hamilton County Juvenile Detention Center, Hamilton County, Ohio, are filing suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for due process violations involving incarceration without probable cause determinations and hearings after 48 hours of arrest and throughout their detention. In September 2015, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby the Hamilton County Juvenile Court agreed to improve procedures for processing complaints, issuing arrest warrants, making probable cause determinations, and conducting detention hearings. The case is now closed.


On April 13, 2018, the Arab American Institute (“AAI”) sued the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AAI alleged that OMB violated FOIA by failing to disclose requested records pertaining to OMB’s decision not to include a combined race and ethnicity question or a Middle Eastern or North African (MENA) category on the 2020 Census. AAI asked the court to declare that OMB violated FOIA and to issue an injunction ordering the agency to release the requested records. This case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman Jackson. One month later, on May 18, 2018, the court ordered OMB to file a dispositive motion or a status report setting a schedule for OMB’s production of documents to AAI. OMB chose the latter, filing its first status report on June 15, 2018. Over the next two years, the parties filed several joint status reports detailing which documents OMB had disclosed to AAI and which documents were still outstanding or disputed. By May 13, 2020, OMB had reviewed approximately 2,000 potentially responsive documents, producing “a number” of them to AAI and withholding 161 of them, claiming they were FOIA exempt. AAI objected to the withholding of five of the allegedly exempt documents. OMB filed a motion for summary judgment on February 10, 2020, arguing that the five disputed documents were exempt under FOIA Exemption 5, which allows agencies to withhold “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” including “predecisional and deliberative” documents that reflect internal Executive Branch deliberations. AAI filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on March 12, 2020, arguing that OMB had not provided a sufficient basis for exempting the documents and that the exemption didn’t apply because the documents were not “predecisional.” On August 13, 2020, after conducting in camera review, the court granted OMB’s motion for summary judgment and denied AAI’s cross-motion, finding that the disputed documents were predecisional and exempt from FOIA. 2020 WL 4698098. As of December 25, 2020, AAI has not appealed the court’s decision.

Summary: On April 13, 2018, the Arab American Institute sued the Office of Management and Budget under the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AAI alleged that OMB violated FOIA by failing to disclose requested records pertaining to OMB’s decision not to include a combined race and ethnicity question or a Middle Eastern or North African (MENA) category on the 2020 Census. In May, the court ordered OMB to file a dispositive motion or a status report setting a schedule for OMB’s production of documents to AAI. Over the next two years, the parties filed several joint status reports detailing which documents OMB had disclosed to AAI and which documents were still outstanding or disputed. OMB produced a number of documents to AAI but withheld some, claiming they were FOIA exempt. AAI objected to five claimed exemptions. The parties both filed motions for summary judgment. After conducting in camera review, on August 13, 2020, the court granted OMB’s motion for summary judgment and denied AAI’s cross-motion, finding that the disputed documents were predecisional and exempt from FOIA. As of December 25, 2020, AAI has not appealed the court’s decision.


On March 7, 1980, inmates of the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls, South Dakota filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the South Dakota Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and by East River Legal Services, asked the court for class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by the conditions of their confinement. Specifically, they complained of fire hazards, unsanitary food, work safety hazards, poor ventilation, inadequate plumbing, inadequate medical care, inadequate dental care, inadequate psychological care, overcrowding, lack of hot water, lack of heat in winter, inadequate law library, lack of recreation and exercise, and inadequate grievance procedures. On May 31, 1984, the district court (Judge Donald J. Porter) granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants stop double-celling inmates and to file a plan to fix the other problems within 120 days. Cody v. Hilliard, 599 F.Supp. 1025 (D.S.D. 1984). The defendants appealed. On October 28, 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Judge Gerald W. Heaney) affirmed the district court's decision. Cody v. Hilliard, 799 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1986). The defendants asked the Eighth Circuit for a rehearing en banc, and on October 28, 1986, the Eighth Circuit agreed to rehear the case. Cody v. Hilliard, 804 F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1986). On October 6, 1987, the en banc Eighth Circuit (Judge Pasco Middleton Bowman II) reversed the district court's order forbidding double-celling, declaring that the practice was not unconstitutional, but affirmed all other orders of the district court. Cody v. Hilliard, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs appealed. On February 29, 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal. Cody v. Hilliard, 485 U.S. 906 (1988). On July 8, 1985, the district court (Judge Porter) issued a consent decree in the case, addressing issues such as prison environmental concerns, fire safety, medical care, psychological care, prisoners' access to courts, and food preparation and sanitation. In the years that followed, the defendants paid attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs on multiple occasions, never disputing the plaintiffs' entitlement to fees. On April 16, 1996, the defendants asked the district court to terminate the consent decree, arguing that they were in substantial compliance. On March 13, 1997, the district court (Judge Richard H. Battey) dissolved the consent decree and vacated all supplemental orders. The plaintiffs appealed. On March 27, 1998, the Eighth Circuit (Judge John R. Gibson) reversed the decision to dissolve the decree and remanded the case back to the district court, holding that the dissolution of the decree was not supported by sufficient findings or an articulation of basis for the decision. Cody v. Hilliard, 139 F.3d 1197 (8th Cir. 1998). On February 17, 2000, the district court (Judge Lawrence L. Piersol) approved a private settlement agreement between the parties and dismissed the case without prejudice. Cody v. Hilliard, 88 F.Supp.2d 1049 (D.S.D. 2000). According to Jude Piersol’s opinion, the settlement agreement contained more specific language and guidelines than the 1985 consent decree and established procedures for continued monitoring of prison conditions. The defendants agreed to monthly self-inspections for fire safety and yearly OSHA-type inspections of all shop areas. The settlement agreement provided more relief with regards to the tuberculosis isolation provision, quality control provision, and specific shop provisions. The plaintiffs asked the district court to award them attorneys' fees. On November 15, 2000, the district court (Judge Piersol) awarded $106,877.74 in attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. On September 11, 2002, the Eighth Circuit (Judge Gibson) affirmed the fee award. Cody v. Hilliard, 304 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2002). The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 7, 1980, inmates of the South Dakota State Penitentiary in Sioux Falls, South Dakota filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the South Dakota Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and by East River Legal Services, alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by the conditions of their confinement. The District Court (Judge Porter) granted preliminary relief, and on July 8, 1985, permanent injunctive relief. The defendants paid attorney fees, and they complied with the consent decree until February 17, 2000, when the Court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case.


On April 14, 2004, individuals and an advocacy organization filed this First Amendment case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New Orleans against Jefferson Parish claiming the Parish had unfairly applied parish ordinances (including one known as "the circus ordinance") to squelch pro-life speech. the plaintiffs were represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, "an alliance of more than 700 attorneys defending religious liberty through strategy, training, funding, and litigation." (ADF Press Release) The plaintiffs claimed they were unlawfully prohibited from using voice amplification equipment, a stage, and from playing religious songs in their 2004 protest against the Roe v. Wade decision. Before a hearing could be held on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the parish council used an emergency procedure to approve changes to the ordinances and the case was dismissed.

Summary: On April 14, 2004, individuals and an advocacy organization filed this First Amendment case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New Orleans against Jefferson Parish claiming the Parish had unfairly applied parish ordinances (including one known as "the circus ordinance") to squelch pro-life speech. the plaintiffs were represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, "an alliance of more than 700 attorneys defending religious liberty through strategy, training, funding, and litigation." (ADF Press Release) Before a hearing could be held on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the parish council used an emergency procedure to approve changes to the ordinances and the case was dismissed.


On November 5, 2015, the plaintiffs, nine pretrial detainees, filed this class action in the United States District Court of New Jersey. The plaintiffs sued Middlesex County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of rights secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, asked the court to declare that the conditions in solitary confinement were unconstitutional, to enjoin Middlesex County to take all of its inmates out of solitary confinement, and to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the conditions in C-Pod, the solitary confinement unit in Middlesex County Jail, were unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were locked in a small cell alone almost continuously; could not interact with other inmates; could not be visited by family; could not participate in religious, educational or rehabilitative programs; and were never allowed outdoors. The plaintiffs sought class action status. However, on January 4, 2016, Judge Peter G. Sheridan granted the plaintiffs' request to withdraw their pending motion for class certification without prejudice so that the ACLU attorneys could get acclimated to the case before proceeding with a dispositive motion. The parties then began settlement conversations. On May 24, 2017, the Court stayed discovery in order to further facilitate the parties’ settlement discussions. The parties reached a settlement with eight of the nine plaintiffs signing the agreement by June 19, 2018. The ninth plaintiff indicated he was not unhappy with the agreement, but did not want to sign. After failing to show and respond to requests to explaining absence from a scheduled conference, Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni recommended this plaintiff’s claims be dismissed with prejudice. 2018 WL 4006809. Judge Peter G. Sheridan adopted the recommendation and dismissed this plaintiff’s claims with prejudice on August 22, 2018. 2018 WL 4005749. The eight remaining plaintiffs entered a private settlement agreement with the defendants on September 25, 2018. Under the settlement agreement, the county would continue to operate a precautionary supervision unit, but also provide 28 hours per week out of cells, access to recreation time, in-unit programming, and law library services. Protections used would involve less restrictive security measures. Disciplinary detention could no longer exceed 15 days for a single disciplinary charge and 30 days for multiple disciplinary charges. The county also implemented a mental health screening policy that allowed the director of mental health to stop inappropriate placements in solitary confinement. The settlement agreement permitted the plaintiffs’ counsel access to people detained in the jail, jail records, and the facility itself to ensure full compliance with the settlement. The defendants agreed to pay $11,123 in attorneys’ fees and cost. Under the agreement, any alleged non-compliance would first be brought to the defendant’s counsel, with the opportunity for mediation. The settlement agreement was enforceable for two years. If the mediation failed to resolve the issue, plaintiffs were permitted to move the Court for reinstatement or ask for a one-time one-year extension of the agreement. The two-year enforcement period began on the date the parties executed the agreement. Judge Peter G. Sheridan entered a stipulated of dismissal on October 25, 2018. As of March 21, 2019, the settlement is still in force.

Summary: Pretrial detainees file lawsuit against Middlesex County in November 2015 to ameliorate the unconstitutional conditions of solitary confinement in the Middlesex County Jail. In September 2018, the parties reached a settlement agreement that restricted the maximum amount of time allowed in isolation and provides those in isolation with opportunities to interact with others.


On October 20, 2006, state prisoners at New Jersey's Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center ("ADTC") filed this §1983 suit against officials associated with ADTC in the District Court for New Jersey, alleging violations of their 8th and 14th amendment rights. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that officials associated with the facility violated their constitutional rights by failing to contain and treat a serious and contagious skin condition. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and injunctive relief, and moved to certify a class of all similarly situated persons. On January 25, 2007, the Court (Judge Stanley R. Chesler) dismissed thirteen of the prisoners sua sponte, with leave to file amended individual complaints, after concluding he was not authorized to join their matters together. The Court also denied class certification. On June 19, 2009, the 3rd Circuit reversed the categorical denial of joinder, vacated the denial of class certification for failure to adequately justify the denial, and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. As of February 14, 2016, the docket listed no further proceedings.

Summary: On October 20, 2006, state inmates at New Jersey's Adult Diagnostic & Treatment Center ("ADTC") filed this §1983 suit against officials associated with ADTC in the District Court for New Jersey, alleging violations of their 8th and 14th amendment rights. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that officials associated with the facility violated their constitutional rights by failing to contain and treat a serious and contagious skin condition. The district court denied class certification, and dismissed 13 of the prisoners sua sponte, with leave to file amended individual complaints, after concluding that prisoners were barred from permissive joinder. The 3rd Circuit reversed the categorical denial of joinder, vacated the denial of class certification, and remanded. As of April 30, 2013, the docket listed no further proceedings.


On October 25, 2010, an inmate at the LA County Men's Central Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued Los Angeles County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by private counsel, he sought damages for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as California state law. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that sheriff deputies used excessive force when the deputies beat him while he was handcuffed. The unprovoked attack caused severe injuries. On May 23, 2011, Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams issued an order compelling the disclosure of some discovery material requested by the plaintiff but also denying portions of the request. On October 12, 2011, Magistrate Abrams granted the defendants' motion for a protective to stop the deposition of one party witness and one nonparty witness, but did denied the defendants' motion for two other nonparty witnesses. 2011 WL 7128640 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011). On December 15, 2011, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on twelve separate grounds, including that all of the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. On February 23, 2012, Judge George H. Wu circulated a tentative ruling denying in part and granting in part the motion for summary judgement. Judge Wu allowed the parties to file three-page briefs regarding the points raised in the tentative ruling. In particular, Judge Wu denied the defendants qualified immunity. On April 12, 2012, Judge Wu issued a final ruling granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment, including denying qualified immunity. On May 9, 2012, defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity in the tentative rulings filed in February and March, 2012. On June 29, 2012, the parties agreed to a stipulated stay pending the appeal, and on July 6, 2012, Judge Wu granted the stay. While the appeal was pending, the parties settled the case and agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice on April 1, 2013. The LA County Sheriff's Department agreed to pay $475,000. The settlement has not been made public. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case because the settlement mooted the appeal. On April 3, 2013, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. In December 2013, one of the deputies (Deputy Fernando Luviano) who beat the plaintiff was included in a group of 18 L.A. County Sheriff's Department employees federally indicted in criminal cases alleging various types of misconduct, including abusing inmates and visitors and trying to intimidate a federal agent. (He was not indicted for this incident but for other later incidents of abuse.) The L.A. Times reports that he was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison.

Summary: An inmate at the LA County Men's Central Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Los Angeles County. The plaintiff claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that sheriff deputies used excessive force when the deputies beat him while he was handcuffed. In 2010, In 2013, the parties settled the case, and the LA County Sheriff's Department agreed to pay $475,000.


On April 14, 1999, a consent decree was approved in Pigford v. Glickman (FH-DC-0006 in this Clearinghouse; see "related cases", below), involving a class of thousands of African American farmers who had sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture over racially discriminatory farm loan denials. 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999). In the settlement, two "claim tracks" were created: Track A, which had a lower standard of proof of discrimination (paying up to $50,000 for credit claims and $3,000 for non-credit claims), and Track B, which required a preponderance of the evidence (paying up to $250,000). The deadline for claims under this settlement was October 12, 1999. The Consent Decree allowed claimants who could show "extraordinary circumstances" for missing the October 12 deadline to file at a later date, until the final deadline of September 15, 2000. In total 61,000 claims were brought late, but fewer than 3,000 were adjudicated based on the merits. On May 22, 2008, the Food, Conservation and Energy Act (a/k/a "2008 Farm Bill") was enacted, providing claimants a right to pursue discrimination claims if they had petitioned to participate but did not get their petitions considered on the merits because they were filed late. Pub. L. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923. Section 14012 of the bill created a completely new cause of action for these "late-filers," which could be brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Subsequently, a large number of suits were filed under this new cause of action. On August 8, 2008, Judge Paul L. Friedman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated 17 cases resulting from Section 14012 that were currently pending in the district court: Agee v. Schafer (C.A.. No. 08-0882); Kimbrough v. Schafer (08-0901); Adams v. Schafer (08-0919); National Black Farmers Association v. Schafer (08-0940); Bennet v. Schafer (08-0962); McKinney v. Schafer (08-1062); Bolton v. Schafer (08-1070); Copland v. Vilsack (08-1188); Hampton v. Schafer (08-1381); Robinson v. Schafer (08-1513); James v. Schafer (08-2220); Beckley v. Vilsack (09-1019); Sanders v. Vilsack (09-1318); Russell v. Vilsack (09-1323); Bridgeforth v. Vilsack (09-1401); Allen v. Vilsack (09-1422); and Anderson v. Vilsack (09-1507). All together, these matters were captioned In re Black Farmers' Litigation, and given the docket number 08-mc-0511. On November 14, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, including a request to certify a putative class of "All individuals: (1) who submitted late-filing requests under section 5(g) of the Pigford v. Glickman Consent Decree on or after October 13, 1999, and on or before June 18, 2008; but (2) who have not obtained a determination on the merits of their discrimination complaints, as defined by Section 1(h) of the Consent Decree." On February 18, 2010, the parties came to a settlement agreement, which was submitted to the court. The settlement agreement created a class with the description language from the amended complaint (see above). This settlement maintained the two tracks of claims, established "neutrals" who were assigned to adjudicate the settlement claims, and created an ombudsman position, which was to act as the liaison between the claimants and the court. In return for the re-evaluation of late-filing claims, the plaintiffs agreed to move for dismissal of all pending consolidated cases with prejudice, to be effective upon the court's final approval. After the execution of the initial form of the settlement agreement, six additional complaints were filed and consolidated with this case: Edwards v. Vilsack (10-0456); Latham v. Vilsack (10-0737); Andrews v. Vilsack (10-0801); Sanders v. Vilsack (10-1053); Johnson v. Vilsack (10-0839); and Abney v. Vilsack (10-1026). On December 8, 2010, Congress passed the "Claims Resolution Act," which appropriated $1.15 billion to fund this settlement agreement. Pub. L. No. 111-291, §201, 124 Stat. 3064, 3070 (2010). On February 11, 2011, Judge Friedman approved this settlement agreement. The order fixed the claim period between November 14, 2011, and May 11, 2012. On March 30, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for certification of the settlement class, described above. Judge Friedman approved certified the settlement class on May 13, 2011. On October 27, 2011, Judge Friedman approved the final proposed class settlement. 820 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2011). On November 15, 2011, one of the plaintiffs in the consolidated case, the Black Farmers and Agriculturalist Association (BFAA), moved for reconsideration of the settlement approval. The BFAA argued that the settlement should not have been approved because it unfairly prevented plaintiffs from pursuing substantive relief under the Section 741 of the 1999 Farm Bill. This motion was denied on January 13, 2012, by Judge Friedman. 2012 WL 8007271 (D.D.C. 2012). The BFAA and another class member, Charlie Latham, appealed this denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On July 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, denied the reconsideration appeal for the BFAA because the BFAA is not an "individual" under the class settlement, thereby not a part of the settlement. In the same order, the Court of Appeals also denied Latham's appeal because he had already received a determination on his Pigford claim. On February 26, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States denied BFAA and Latham's petition for a writ of certiorari. On February 6, 2012, Stephen Carpenter was appointed the independent ombudsman per the settlement agreement. 842 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2012). On May 11, 2012, the claim process ended. The parties in this case moved on August 17, 2012 to alter the settlement to provide relief for claimants who missed the deadline for certain circumstances. On September 14, 2012, Judge Friedman approved this alteration of the settlement, which allowed claimants who made a claim before the May 11 deadline and made a prima facie showing of class membership but was not sent a claim form before May 1, 2012 to have their claim considered "timely" if resubmitted within 30 days of the approved alteration. On May 24, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion to further modify the settlement agreement to allow certain claims previously denied as “incomplete” to be considered for adjudication on the merits. There are potentially 384 claims under the subject of this motion. On June 21, 2013, Judge Friedman denied this motion. Judge Friedman granted many more motions to amend the settlement agreement on the following dates: August 27, 2013, April 7, 2014, September 17, 2014, August 31, 2016, March 28, 2017. As of August 2020, the court is still reviewing invoices submitted by the Ombudsman’s office; the case is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiffs in this case are claimants under the <i>Pigford v. Glickman</i> settlement who were considered "late-filers," but never received a determination of their claim on the merits, who receieved a new cause of action in the 2008 Farm Bill. This matter was a consolidation of 26 cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in front of Judge Paul L. Friedman. The final settlement agreement allowed the plaintiffs to file a new claim between November 14, 2011 and May 11, 2012 to be evaluated. The court is still reviewing invoices submitted by the Ombudsman’s office.


On September 9, 2014, the National Federation of the Blind (NFB), along with several of its members who had been discriminated against by Uber drivers because of their service animals, filed this lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the Northern District of California. They sued Uber under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12811 et seq.), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code §§ 51 & 52), and the California Disabled Persons Act (California Civil Code §§ 54-54.3). Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as damages for the named plaintiffs. The plaintiffs accused Uber drivers of, among other things, refusing to provide service to people with service dogs, mistreating the dogs and their owners, unfairly giving them negative feedback scores, and charging inappropriate cancellation fees. They alleged that Uber’s response to complaints about driver behavior was opaque and insufficient: Uber generally failed to notify service dog owners of whether the company had investigated complaints, and denied responsibility for drivers’ behavior. On October 22, 2014, Uber filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the NFB and the named plaintiffs all lacked standing to sue under both state and federal law. Uber also argued that even if the plaintiffs had standing, Uber wasn’t a public accommodation and thus wasn’t covered by Title III of the ADA. The United States Department of Justice issued a statement of interest on December 23, 2014. It asked the court to consider the Department of Transportation’s Title III regulations, which are granted considerable weight since the DOT is responsible for implementing the ADA. DOT regulations state that Title III applies to any “demand-responsive” service that doesn’t operate on a fixed route, and that private entities cannot “contract away” any responsibilities under the ADA. 49 C.F.R. § 37.3; 49 C.F.R. pt. 37, app. D § 37.23. The DOT regulations further require entities covered by Title III to permit service animals to accompany their owners into vehicles, and requires entities to apply eligibility criteria that don’t screen disabled people out, unless doing so would make it impossible to provide the service. 49 C.F.R. § 37.167(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12184(b)(1); 49 C.F.R. § 37.5(f). The regulations also require positive action on the part of private entities to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid discrimination (except when those modifications would fundamentally alter the service), and to ensure that their personnel are trained to properly assist disabled individuals in a respectful and courteous way, with appropriate attention to the difference among individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12184(b)(2)(A); 49 C.F.R. § 37.173. On April 17, 2015, the court denied Uber’s motion to dismiss. It found that even if not all Uber drivers discriminated against blind people with service animals, discrimination by some drivers was sufficient injury for the plaintiffs to bring suit. The court also found that the NFB could sue even if some of its members had signed binding arbitration agreements with Uber, because many of its members had not. The court didn’t directly respond to the DOJ’s statement of interest, finding instead that since there was a possibility that Uber was covered by the ADA and the California statutes, the parties should have the opportunity to litigate the question. 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073. On December 6, 2016, the court approved a settlement agreement. Uber agreed to:

Require its drivers to provide service to blind people with service animals
Modify its cleaning fee policy for messes caused by service animals
Make it easier for service animal owners to file complaints
Implement enhanced procedures for investigating complaints
Dismiss drivers receiving multiple plausible complaints
Submit to third-party monitoring
Pay the NFB $75,000 per year for three years
Pay a lump sum of $45,000 for distribution among the named plaintiffs
Pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs
Uber also agreed to a class certification for purposes of the settlement, extending to all blind people with service animals who had used, attempted to use, or been deterred from attempting to use transportation through the Uber app. The settlement was to last for a default period of 3½ years. Retired Judge Margaret A. Nagle was appointed as a neutral monitor to oversee compliance. The monitor had authority to extend the agreement by 1½ years if Uber failed to substantially comply with the terms of the agreement in the second or third year. Any disputes related to the monitor would first be referred to an arbitrator, and if that failed, the court would exercise jurisdiction. Two weeks following the approval of the settlement agreement, on December 15, 2016, the court awarded the plaintiffs $2,485,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Uber appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which dismissed the appeal with prejudice on March 7, 2017. On November 8, 2019, the court ordered Uber to pay the plaintiffs a total of $313,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in monitoring and enforcing the agreement. On July 15, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to modify the settlement. As of July 20, 2020, the court’s jurisdiction over the settlement agreement is ongoing.

Summary: The national Federation for the Blind and blind individuals discriminated against by Uber drivers brought action against Uber Technologies, Inc. for violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Disabled Persons Act. The court approved a settlement agreement, under which Uber would pay damages to the plaintiffs, pay for the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, improves its complaint process for complaints by service animal owners, submit to third party monitoring, and dismiss drivers receiving multiple plausible complaints.


In August 2005, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against H and M International Transportation, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that the defendant discriminated against the two charging parties and a group of similarly situated female employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by subjecting them to sexual harassment. In October 2005, one of the charging parties intervened in the suit. A few weeks later in early November, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The second charging party intervened in the suit in mid November. The defendant's motion to dismiss was denied in January 2006. After some discovery disputes, one of the charging parties was voluntarily dismissed from the case in late June 2006. Thereafter, the parties participated in a settlement conference in October 2006, resulting in a tentative settlement. The parties entered into a final agreement in November 2006 through a consent decree. The two-year decree, containing non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses, required the defendant to: revise and distribute its sexual harassment policy, post a notice of employee rights, provide Title VII training for all its employees, retain relevant records, report to the EEOC at specified intervals, and pay $150,000. The only additional activity that shows up in the docket is the notice to employees that the defendants were required to post as part of the consent decree. Since there appears to be no additional enforcement activity, it is presumed the case closed in November 2008.

Summary: In August 2005, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against H and M International Transportation, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging Title VII violations. The parties entered into a final agreement in November 2006 through a consent decree, set to last two years. Since there appears to be no additional enforcement activity, it is presumed the case closed in November 2008.


On March 30, 2006, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff sued the automobile repairer AutoZone, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing a female employee of AutoZone Inc., asked the court for monetary relief for the complainant and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from future discrimination on the basis of sex. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that her manager at AutoZone Inc. had sexually harassed her, and that her employer had retaliated against her when she complained of the sexual harassment. On June 5, 2008 Judge Stephen M McNamee granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment with regard to the defendant's affirmative defense. AutoZone Inc. had argued as an affirmative defense that the complainant's previous conviction of disorderly conduct would have constituted termination regardless of her sexual harassment complaints. The Court found this defense lacked sufficient evidence and was merely speculation. AutoZone Inc. further argued an affirmative defense that punitive damages in this case were a violation of the state and federal constitution. Judge McNamee found this affirmative defense erroneous. On September 11, 2008 Judge Stephen M McNamee denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Judge McNamee ruled that material questions remained with regard to the sexual harassment, the plaintiff's actions following the sexual harassment, and whether the complainant was retaliated against after she filed complaints of sexual harassment. Given these remaining questions, summary judgement was inappropriate. The parties then disputed jury instruction. On December 11, 2008, the EEOC provided proposed jury instructions. The defendant claimed that the instructions were incorrect because the plaintiff had not pled that tangible employment action occurred in retaliation to her complaint. On June 1, 2009, Judge McNamee found the instructions proper. The model instructions direct the jury to find whether or not the complainant proved she had suffered a tangible employment action. If found, the defendant was vicariously liable for the manager's conduct, and the defendant's affirmative defense would not be considered. On June 10, 2009, a jury found for the plaintiff. The jury found that the plaintiff did experience a hostile work environment, but also found that AutoZone Inc. did not retaliate against the complainant. The jury found AutoZone Inc. liable to the complainant for $15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. On June 22, 2009 the defendant moved for a judgment as a matter of law, or alliteratively, a new trial. On July 24, 2009 Judge McNamee found that there was legally sufficient evidence for the jury finding, and there was not mistake in the case. He denied both motions. On June 25, 2009, the EEOC moved to amend the judgment to include equitable relief. On November 9, 2009, Judge McNamee partially granted the EEOC's motion. He granted requests to require training programs, and he granted the request to require updated posters with specific information about Title VII and a complaint process. He denied the motion for a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from discriminating against employees based on sex because the complainant in this case was the only to come forward with a complaint, and because AutoZone had sufficiently shown that sexual harassment was unlikely to reoccur. He also denied relief requiring the defendant to investigate all employee complaints of sexual harassment from the last three years, relief requiring the defendant to change its complaint process, and relief requiring monitoring and reporting. The Defendant then moved for partial reconsideration with regard to new postings on Title VII. One January 6, 2010, Judge McNamee ordered that the original posters may be used as a foundation, but he found three problems that must be corrected. The posters must be updated, they must include EEOC contact information for the Phoenix Field Office, and they must be moved further from the manager's offices. On July 23, 2012, Judge McNamee found that the defendant had paid the ordered monetary damages, so he ordered that the bond securing judgment could be released.

Summary: On March 30, 2016, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff sued the automobile repairer AutoZone, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing a female employee of AutoZone Inc., asked the court for monetary relief for the complainant and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from future discrimination on the basis of sex. The plaintiff claimed that she had faced discrimination on the basis of her sex. The fury found AutoZone Inc. liable to the complainant for $15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. On June 25, 2009, Judge McNamee partially granted the EEOC's motion to amend the judgment to include equitable relief.


On March 26, 1993, the United States Justice Department filed this lawsuit under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (the Public Accommodations Act), in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against TW Services and its subsidiary, Denny's, Inc., which operates Denny's Restaurants, alleging discriminatory treatment of African Americans by Denny's restaurants in California. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Denny's implemented terms and conditions for service of black customers, such as the requirement of prepayment and cover charges, that were not required of white patrons, that African Americans received poorer service, and that they were discouraged from patronizing the restaurant. The complaint was filed contemporaneously with a consent decree, which was approved by the Court on April 1, 1993. On July 2, 1993, the Court, on its own motion, consolidated the case with Ridgeway v. Denny's Corporation, a class action filed on March 24, 1993, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Both actions alleged violations of the Public Accommodations Act in relation to Denny's treatment of African American customers. The class action also alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq., California Civil Code §§ 51 et seq. and California Civil Code §§ 1750 et seq. Following execution of the original decree, numerous complaints of racial discrimination were submitted to the Plaintiff Class and the United States. The United States investigated the complaints and, on May 24, 1994, submitted an amended consent decree to expand the protections to customers and prevent future discrimination. The amended consent decree prohibited Denny's from engaging in discriminatory treatment of African Americans and established procedures for compliance, including a comprehensive non-discrimination training program, as well as provisions for notice, advertising, testing, monitoring and record keeping. It also required the defendants to establish a $28 million settlement fund for the plaintiff class, and appointment of a Special Master. The Amended Consent Decree was given final approval by the Court (Judge James Ware) on July 29, 1994. After preliminary approval of the Amended Consent Decree, the parties received reports that a number of individuals and organizations in California were charging fees for services related to the preparation and/or filing of claims in the case. The court (Judge Ware) issued several cease and desist orders to counsel concerning processing of potential claimants. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 525553 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 22, 1994.), Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 564571 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 3, 1994)). The court (Judge Ware) also issued orders vacating depositions scheduled by class counsel. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 665250 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 3, 1994), Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 665243 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 8, 1994), and denying requests of non-party lawyers to amend the judgment and get for fees defending motions to compel. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 665414 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 8, 1994). The court (Judge Ware) further denied a second motion from the lawyers, vacated a scheduled hearing, and ordered the lawyers to prepare a list of any Denny's claimants who had signed contingency fees with them. Ridgeway v. Flagstar Corporation, Nos. C 93-20202, C 93-20208, 1994 WL 669935 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 18, 1994). In July and August of 1996 the court issued orders clarifying the confidentiality provisions of the decree and modifying dates for distribution of residual funds. After several years of status reports, the United States submitted a final report on January 16, 2001, recommending early dismissal of the consent decree. On April 4, 2001, the Court (Judge Ware) terminated the consent decree's provisions effective November 11, 2000, and dismissed the case.

Summary: On March 26, 1993, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against Denny's for alleged discriminatory treatment of African American customers by Denny's restaurants. The complaint was filed contemporaneously with a consent decree. Litigation over enforcement of the decree continued for several years until the case was dismissed on April 4, 2001.


On May 4, 1990, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division announced, in a letter to the Governor of Virginia, its intent to launch an investigation, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., into conditions at the Northern Virginia Training Center (NVTC), an institution for individuals with developmental disabilities in Fairfax, Virginia. Five experts from the Department of Justice toured the facility, reviewed policies and procedures, interviewed NVTC staff, and audited reporting and investigation practices. On April 9, 1991, the Department of Justice announced its findings. The Department of Justice reported that the health and safety of people living at NVTC was at risk for a number of reasons. NVTC employed too few people and inadequately trained those it did employ, which placed residents in danger of unnecessary chemical and physical restraint. Often mechanical restraints were accompanied by seclusion, which was a fire hazard. Individualized programming for residents was inadequate and recordkeeping deficiencies made it impossible to monitor an individual's progress. In addition, NVTC's medical care, physical therapy, occupational therapy, and medication and side effect monitoring we all inadequate. In addition, NVTC provided insufficient medical care, including medication monitoring and occupational therapy. Recordkeeping made it difficult to track the efficacy of individualized programming and medical care. In closing, the Department of Justice expressed the desire to negotiate a resolution. Negotiations did not make enough progress and, on May 31, 1994, the Department of Justice threatened to file a CRIPA lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of conditions at NVTC. In addition to its earlier concerns, the Department of Justice chronicled systematic abuse and neglect at NVTC. For instance, individualized training programs were so inadequate that individuals became seriously sick or died as the result of aggressive, pica, and other self-injurious behaviors. One resident asphyxiated on a rubber glove, while another ate a reported seven cigarettes and one feminine hygiene pad in the span of two days. Similarly, inappropriate feeding techniques and poor nutrition endangered residents' health. Virginia may have made an effort engage in productive negotiations, but the Department of Justice was not satisfied. On February 8, 1995, the Department of Justice notified the Governor of Virginia that, in addition to being unconstitutional, the conditions at NVTC violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, the Social Security Act ("Medicaid"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq., and Virginia law. On March 4, 1996, the Department of Justice filed a CRIPA lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, challenging conditions at NVTC. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to address (1) individualized programming, (2) undue physical restraint and isolation, (3) facility safety, (4) medical care, (5) physical and occupational therapy, (6) medication monitoring, especially for tardive dyskenesia, and (7) staff numbers and training. On May 21, 1996, the court (Judge Leonie M. Brinkema) refused to consolidate this lawsuit with United States v. Virginia, No. 96-284, MH-VA-0002, an action challenging the constitutionality of conditions at a Virginia psychiatric hospital. On May 21, 1996, the court also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, but stayed its ruling to allow for settlement. On July 18, 1996, the court approved a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement itself was mostly concerned with procedural elements, such as development of a plan for improvement, compliance deadlines, evaluation, and dismissal. The NVTC plan describes the required compliance. The plan emphasizes the importance of trained staff in the provision of developmental disability services. The plan stated detailed training requirements for direct care staff and incorporated training into almost every solution. For instance, the plan mandated the dismissal of employees who neglected or abused residents. Similarly, the plan sought to reduce the need for restraints by both improving staff development and requiring the interdisciplinary treatment teams' advance approval for the type of restraints to be used for each individual. Thus, both chemical restraints and draconian physical restraint techniques, such as papoose boards, were eliminated. Similar clauses addressed medical care, medication administration and tracking, physical and occupational therapy, abuse and injury reporting and investigations, recordkeeping, functional planning, community placement, and quality assurance. The parties modified the settlement on May 30, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the Department of Justice inspected NVTC and found it was in compliance with the plan. On June 3, 1998, the court dismissed the lawsuit.

Summary: On May 4, 1990, the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §1997 et seq., into conditions at the Northern Virginia Training Center (NVTC). On April 9, 1991, the DOJ released their findings; people at NCTC were at risk because of inadequate training of staff and inappropriate chemical and physical restraints. Negotiations were initiated, but broke down. On March 4, 1996 the DOJ filed a CIRPA lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. On July 18, 1996, the parties entered a court approved settlement agreement in which NVTC agreed to better train their staff and reduce their need for restraints. The court dismissed the lawsuit on June 3, 1998.


On September 22, 2016, this complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on behalf of 104 unnamed sexual offenders, identified as John or Jane Does, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Idaho against the Idaho Attorney General, the Idaho Department of Corrections, and the Idaho State Police Force. The plaintiffs alleged that Idaho’s Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process and the Ex Post Facto clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes further violated the Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Double Jeopardy, Contracts, and Takings clauses of the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The plaintiffs were from across the country. Most were convicted of sexual offenses in 1980s and 1990s. One of their major complaints was that subsequent amendments to Idaho’s sex-offender registry laws amounted to unconstitutional retroactive punishment. For example, John Doe 100, of Bannock County, was convicted of a misdemeanor sexual offense in Montana in 1996. His offense did not require registration in Montana. He moved to Idaho in 2005 and was not required to register until 2007, 11 years after his conviction, when Idaho authorities reclassified his offense as a felony rather than the original misdemeanor. The plaintiffs sought a permanent order to stop the state and its counties from enforcing specific provisions of the Sex Offender Registry and accompanying statutes and laws. An amended complaint was filed on Apr. 26, 2017, which argued that the defendants further violated the plaintiffs' rights to: acquire, possess and protect property; seek and obtain safety and happiness; travel, life and liberty; and freedom of association and religion protected by the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. The complaint argued that the Registry and accompanying laws were unconstitutional both facially and as-applied. The case was assigned to Judge David C. Nye on Aug. 2, 2017. On Nov. 17, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. A hearing was held on March 6, 2018 before Judge Nye. On May 17, 2018, Judge Nye granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified. Specifically, the plaintiffs must identify actual harms suffered by one or more “Does” and present sufficient facts upon which the court can make a reasoned decision. 2018 WL 2275220. On August 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint against the defendants. The defendants filed another motion to dismiss on October 18, 2018. A hearing was held on March 12, 2019. On April 5, 2019, Judge Nye granted the motion to dismiss again and dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs added facts with respect to twelve defendants in the second amended complaint but failed to tie such facts to specific constitutional violations and allege essential details that would allow the court to evaluate whether any of the allegations are plausible. The plaintiffs also ignored most of the arguments raised in the defendants’ motion to dismiss and failed to cite any binding authority to support their arguments. Accordingly, Judge Nye dismissed this case. 2019 WL 1508037. On May 5, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As of January 20, 2020, this case is pending in the Court of Appeals.

Summary: More than 100 sex offenders are challenging Idaho’s laws that require registration and community notification of sex offenders, saying the laws violate an array of constitutional rights, from the prohibition on double jeopardy to freedom of religion. The lawsuit seeks a permanent order to stop the state and its counties from enforcing some portions of the law. On April 5, 2019, Judge Nye dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice because the plaintiffs failed to tie facts to specific constitutional violations. On May 5, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. As of January 20, 2020, this case is pending in the Court of Appeals.


On January 12, 2005, a group of pre-arraignment detainees filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for New Mexico, challenging the strip search policy in effect at the Santa Fe County Detention Facility. The policy at issue required that all persons to be housed in the Detention Center be strip searched for weapons and contraband, regardless of the offense charged and whether or not there was individualized reasonable suspicion that the search would lead to the discovery of contraband or weapons. Plaintiffs maintained that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. They sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. Management & Training Corporation (the company that was contracted to operated the Detention Center), the Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners and Santa Fe County Sheriffs were named as defendants. From January 2005 through November 2005, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, including document production, numerous depositions, inspection of the Detention Center and analysis of over 31,000 individual booking records. Settlement talks began in 2005 and included a six day mediation session before retired District Court Judge Raul A. Ramirez of California. Negotiations continued until a deal was reached in June 2006. On July 24, 2006, the District Court (District Judge Bruce D. Black) preliminarily approved the Stipulation of Settlement and certified the case as a class action. Following a fairness hearing, the District Court entered its final order approving the settlement and closing the case on December 8, 2006. Under the terms of the settlement, defendants agreed to pay $8.5 million into a settlement fund. Up to $5,529,750.00, plus interest earned on the settlement fund, would be allocated to pay verified claims. If the total amount of verified claims exceeded that amount, the amount payable to each member for each claim would be proportionately reduced. If the total amount of verified claims was less than that amount, the balance would be refunded to the defendants. $2 million was allocated for attorneys' fees and costs, and $470,250.00 was allocated equally among the class representatives. Up to $500,000 was to be paid for claims administration costs, with restrictions to come into play if administration expenses incurred were more or less than that amount. The case is now closed.

Summary: In January 2005, a group of pre-arraignment detainees filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for New Mexico, challenging the over-broad strip search policy in effect at the Santa Fe County Detention Facility. Plaintiffs maintained that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, and sought monetary damages and injunctive relief from the contractors operating the Detention Center, the Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners and Santa Fe County Sheriffs. Under the terms of a 2006 settlement, defendants agreed to pay $8.5 million into a settlement fund, with $5,529,750.00, allocated to pay verified claims.


The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On January 29, 2018, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) voted to disclose a memorandum (the Nunes Memo) revealing existence of a FISA warrant for the electronic surveillance of Carter Page, who served as a onetime foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign until September 2016. The Nunes Memo was declassified by President Donald Trump on February 2, 2018. The Nunes Memo revealed that on October 21, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) sought and received a probable cause order from the FISC authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page. The Nunes Memo further disclosed that in addition to the initial warrant application, the government had received three renewal orders from the FISC. On February 6, 2018, reporters Adam Goldman and Charlie Savage, along with the New York Times, filed a motion in the FISC for release of all court records, including opinions and application materials, in reference to the surveillance of Carter Page. See Misc. 18-01, NS-DC-0126 in this Clearinghouse. On March 7, 2018, reporter Charlie Savage and the New York Times Company also filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the same documents they requested in their FISC motion: the release of all documents regarding the surveillance of Carter Page. On July 21, 2018, the DOJ produced redacted documents it considered responsive to the FOIA request. See In re Carter W. Page, NS-DC-0127 in this Clearinghouse. On August 9, 2018, the parties stipulated to settle their claims. In exchange for The Times's agreement to dismiss this action, the DOJ agreed to provide to the Times any additional documents responsive to The Times's FOIA Request that are released in any related actions. On August 9, 2018, United States District Judge Analisa Torres approved the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 7, 2018, reporter Charlie Savage and the New York Times Company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the release of all documents regarding the surveillance of Carter Page. On July 21, 2018, the DOJ produced redacted documents it considered responsive to the FOIA request, and on August 9, 2018, the Court approved a stipulation agreement between the parties to settle this case. The case closed in August 2018.


On October 16, 2014, three individuals with significant physical disabilities requiring substantial medical care filed this lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the state had violated Section II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which require public entities to provide services to persons with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and to prevent unnecessary institutionalization. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing DHCS from reducing at-home medical care and support for the plaintiffs, and a permanent injunction preventing unnecessary institutionalization in the future. They also sought attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs were represented by Disability Rights California. At the time, the plaintiffs, who were once institutionalized because of their disabilities, were living in their own homes where they received Medicaid-funded nursing and attendant care through the California Medi-Cal Home and Community Based Nursing Facility/Acute Hospital Waiver Program (“Waiver Program”). They alleged that they were at risk of institutionalization because DHCS maintained unnecessarily low cost limits for these services. On January 29, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. The amended complaint added an organizational plaintiff, In Spirit, a non-profit organization that provided financial assistance to persons with disabilities to receive medical care in their home. On July 7, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. This complaint added a new named plaintiff, dismissed one of the existing named plaintiffs, elaborated on the factual allegations, and added a third claim for violations of California state law. On September 23, 2015, In Spirit was voluntarily dismissed as a party in the lawsuit. On January 26, 2016, the parties held a mediation session but were unable to reach an agreement. Throughout the mediation, the parties continued to engage in discovery. On March 8, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On March 10, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgement. District Judge Fernando Olguin denied both motions on April 27, 2016. He further set out deadlines for continued discovery. On March 29, 2016, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") filed a statement of interest to clarify the defendant’s obligations under the ADA. The DOJ explained that the ADA prohibits unjustified institutionalization and requires individuals with disabilities receive support and services in the most integrated setting as mandated in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The DOJ also clarified that the defendants could not administer the Medicaid waiver without accounting for individual needs and that the integration mandate protects individuals at serious risk of institutionalization. The DOJ filed subsequent statements of interest on August 4, 2016 and September 16, 2016, which further clarified the states’ ADA obligations in light of DHCS’s arguments against the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement. On July 18, 2016, the plaintiffs again moved for summary judgement, which Judge Olguin denied on August 4, 2016 due to continued factual disputes. Judge Olguin also noted being “deeply troubled” by the defendants’ repeated failure to comply in good faith with discovery requests and threatened to impose sanctions. On September 7, 2016, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for summary judgement. On June 5, 2017, the Court denied that motion, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether or not the California waiver program’s cost limits created a serious risk of institutionalization and whether California had an existing deinstitutionalization scheme in place that was effective. 385 F. Supp. 3d 1048. The parties continued with discovery, and it appears they continued engaging in settlement talks as well. On March 14, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss their case without prejudice, and on March 19, 2018, the court granted this motion for voluntary dismissal of most of the case. There was some continued litigation over whether the plaintiffs were entitled to costs and attorneys’ fees. The dismissal seems to come from the fact that DHCS eventually changed the waiver application process so that decisions would be based on medical necessity without any mention of cost limits. In their motion opposing attorneys’ fees, the defendants asserted that this made the plaintiffs' claims moot, and that there was no basis for awarding attorneys’ fees or costs. The plaintiffs argued that the overall course of events demonstrated that this litigation was a significant factor prompting defendants to eliminate waiver cost limits, which created a presumption that plaintiffs were a catalyst and, because defendants could not rebut that presumption, plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys fees’ and costs under a state statute. On May 30, 2019, Judge Olguin granted the plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys fees. The court found that the litigation led to the elimination of DHCS’s cost limits, conferring a significant benefit for potentially thousands of people. The elimination of cost limits would ensure that participants would not have to resort to litigation to secure needed services and that they would be able to remain in their homes and avoid segregation and isolation. The court ordered the plaintiffs to file their motion for attorneys’ fees and costs no later than July 31, 2019. 2019 WL 2590170. After a brief delay, the parties agreed on how much the defendants should pay in attorneys’ fees. They notified the court that they had resolved all outstanding issues in this case on November 22, 2019. The notification did not state the size of the award, so the Clearinghouse is unaware of the amount. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, individuals with disabilities receiving Medicaid-funded care at their homes filed this lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California alleging that they were at risk for institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disability Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. After over 2 years of discovery and multiple Statements of Interests filed by the United States, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims in March of 2018, after the defendants adopted a new waiver process that did not contain any cost limits.


On September 13, 2012, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against Bank of America, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Specifically, the federal government alleged that Bank of America discriminated against disabled mortgage applicants by requiring all disabled applicants to submit a letter from their doctors indicating the amount of the disability income they received. In some cases, the U.S. claimed that Bank of America required disabled loan applicants to provide information about the nature and severity of their disability as a condition of receiving a mortgage. The federal government further alleged that Bank of America discriminated against applicants receiving public assistance in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunities Act. The federal government asked the court for an injunction as well as monetary damages. A consent order was submitted on October 10, 2012 and later amended on December 6. The Court (Chief Judge Robert J. Conrad, Jr.) approved the order, which prohibited Bank of America from requiring applicants to submit a letter from a doctor and required Bank of America to institute a monitoring program, train staff on the new policies, maintain a complaint resolution program, and to compensate affected applicants. According to the press release from the Department of Justice, Bank of America paid a minimum of $370 million in the settlement to about 200,000 borrowers. The order was to remain in effect for 42 months following the approval date. On June 5, 2013, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge David S. Cayer. The consent order terminated without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 13, 2012, the United States (on behalf of disabled individuals applying for home mortgage loans while receiving Social Security Disability Insurance) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Western District of North Carolina against Bank of America. The federal government claimed that Bank of America has violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunities Act. The case resulted in a Consent Order which required Bank of America to change its policies and pay a minimum of $370 million to approximately 200,000 borrowers.


On November 21, 2019, three refugee resettlement agencies filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging the Trump Administration's recent Executive Order, "Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement." The agencies (HIAS, Inc., Church World Service, Inc., and Lutheran Immigration & Refugee Service, Inc.), represented by the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), sued President Trump, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs alleged that the President’s September 26, 2019, Executive Order violated the Refugee Act of 1980, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.), and principles of federalism. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, as well as a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Order. The case was assigned to Judge Peter J. Messitte. The plaintiffs alleged that Executive Order 13888 made an unprecedented change to the refugee resettlement process by mandating that refugees not be resettled in the United States unless the state and locality where they are to be resettled take the affirmative step of providing written consent. As national refugee resettlement agencies, the plaintiffs were then charged by the federal government with the responsibility of soliciting and obtaining written consent from all states and localities where refugees they assist could be resettled. The plaintiffs claimed that such a change would provide individual states and local governments with effective veto power over refugee resettlement. The plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction on November 22, 2019. Judge Messitte granted the plaintiffs’ motion on January 15. 2020 WL 218646. Judge Messitte concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, that they faced irreparable harm, and that the Executive Order was not in the public interest. Consequently, he issued a nationwide injunction enjoining the Executive Order. The government appealed the injunction to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on February 12, 2020 (Do. 20-1160), and Judge Messitte stayed the proceedings in the district court pending resolution of that appeal on February 14, 2020. On January 8, 2021, Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan upheld the preliminary injunction. 985 F.3d 309. The court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated that they were likely to succeed on their claim that the order and notice violated the Refugee Act. The court also determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction because the refugee resettlement programs were, by their nature. located throughout the country. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 21, 2019, three refugee resettlement agencies filed this lawsuit against the Trump Administration in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that Executive Order 13888 violated the Refugee Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and principles of federalism. The plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Order was granted on January 15, 2020.


On October 5, 2012, the Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, the Catholic Diocese of Savannah, and affiliated Catholic organizations filed this U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments, and as a violation of the Constitution's Separation of Powers provisions. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs amended their complaint a first time on December 31, 2012, and a second time on August 19, 2013 to challenge the ACA as amended by the 2013 Final Rules. They argued that while the Diocese itself likely fell within the "religious employer" exception, the affiliated Catholic entities did not and, instead, were considered "eligible organizations" qualifying for an accommodation. The accommodation would require plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections to the ACA, in turn trigging an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs find objectionable. According to the plaintiffs, this series of events makes them the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage in violation of their sincerely held beliefs. Plaintiffs continued to ask the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On March 26, 2014, the District Court (Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.) permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against plaintiffs. 2014 WL 1256373. The court noted that the contraception mandate, including the self-certification form, placed a substantial burden on plaintiffs by compelling them to affirmatively modify their behavior and violate their religious beliefs. The court also held that the general applicability of the law was not a compelling state interest nor was the conception mandate the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. On May 23, 2014, the government appealed this case to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 30, 2014, Judge Duffey issued an opinion and order in response to the government's motion for Reconsideration on the Dioceses' RFRA and free exercise claims. 2014 WL 2441742. The government had also asked the court to reconsider whether or not the affiliated entities maintained a "church plan" under ERISA. If they did, they would be exempt from the self-certification requirement, and not have standing to challenge the mandate. Judge Duffey held that the Dioceses' RFRA and free exercise claims should be dismissed, and clarified that the affiliated organizations did not need to establish that they were church plans, because the self-certification requirement was a substantial burden on their religious exercise. This case was consolidated on appeal with Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius. On February 18, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Jill Pryor) held that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA because it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest, but enjoined enforcement of the mandate against the plaintiffs because the issue of whether the accommodation violates the RFRA was currently before the Supreme Court. 818 F.3d 1122. On May 31, 2016, following the Supreme Court's decision in Zubik v. Sebelius [II] that religious nonprofits and the government should return the related cases to the courts of appeals and attempt to negotiate a solution, the Eleventh Circuit vacated their February 19, 2016 order in this case, and directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing. On July 29, 2016 the parties jointly moved for a stay in the proceedings that was granted on August 10, 2016. The parties were ordered to file status reports sixty days after the given order. Also on August 10, 2016, the defendants moved for an order materially identical to the remand orders the Supreme Court issued in  Zubik . The defendants moved for this motion because they wanted to modify the existing injunction against them and have the ability to tell insurance issuers and third party administrators of their requirement to make separate payments for contraceptives given the plaintiffs met the requirements under the accommodation. This would ensure the affected women that would be under the plaintiffs insurance receive coverage while the litigation continued. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. On October 3, 2016, the court granted the defendant's motion for materially identical orders. The new injunction stated: “As such, we modify the injunction entered on May 31, 2016 to add that: Nothing in this opinion, [in this Court's prior opinion or orders], or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, is to affect the ability of the Government to ensure that women covered by the [plaintiffs'] health plans "obtain, without cost, the full range of FDA approved contraceptives." Through this litigation, [plaintiffs] have made the Government aware of their view that they meet "the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds. Nothing in this opinion, [in this Court's prior opinions or orders], or in the opinions or orders of the courts below, "precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of frill contraceptive coverage" going forward. Because the Government may rely on this notice, the Government may not impose taxes or penalties on [plaintiffs] for failure to provide the relevant notice.” Both parties filed status reports on October 11, 2016, stating the defendants were sorting through the 52,000 comments received during the governments’ Request for Information (RFI) and required additional time to determine if modifications were necessary to accommodate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim still pending. The parties then continued to file monthly status reports with no changes to the case until October 16, 2017. However, during this time President Trump issued an executive order in May of 2017, called the "Executive Order Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty". As a result, on October 6, 2017, the US Department of Health and Human Services released a statement explaining the changes in policy related to President Trump's executive order requiring HHS to consider amending the accommodation requirements under the ACA for the contraception mandate. The new policy would expand the exception to fit entities that had sincerely held religious beliefs opposed to providing contraception.  Here is an article from HHS describing the change. On October 16, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case, with each party bearing its own costs. On November 7, 2017, the court dismissed the appeal. This case is now presumed closed.

Summary: On October 5, 2012, the Catholic Archdiocese of Atlanta, the Catholic Diocese of Savannah, and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On March, 26, 2014, the Court permanently enjoined the Federal Government from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against plaintiffs. This case was consolidated on appeal with Eternal Word Television Network v. Sebelius. After the Supreme Court decision, the Eleventh Circuit directed the parties to negotiate a solution. The parties eventually moved to dismiss the case on October 16, 2017.