This action, filed by the City of Los Angeles, California on Sept. 29, 2017, challenged the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)'s imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. The plaintiff, represented by its legal department and the law firm Covington & Burling, filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Los Angeles receives federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program, both administered by the DOJ and its component agencies Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The latest DOJ requirements for FY2017 program funding imposed new conditions on recipient cities, including Los Angeles. One condition was compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The other two conditions required recipients to allow the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to access any correctional or detention facility and question suspected undocumented immigrants about their right to be in the U.S., and to provide DHS at least 48 hours advance notice of any noncitizen's scheduled release from custody. After several lawsuits challenged these conditions, the federal government was preliminarily enjoined from imposing them on Byrne JAG funding in City of Chicago v. Sessions. The DOJ continued to revise these conditions, but Los Angeles believed the revised requirements were ambiguous. Los Angeles alleged that accepting these conditions would force it to abandon its longstanding law enforcement policies, intended to improve cooperation between immigrant residents and municipal police. These policies restrict the city from seeking and disclosing information about residents' immigration status, as well as from honoring Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer requests without an independent warrant or judicial determination of probable cause. Los Angeles explained its view that its policies in fact complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, but that the notice and access conditions were so ambiguous that the DOJ could continue to wrongly deny Los Angeles the funding. Additionally, the city believed that Congress did not intend these immigration-related conditions in either the Byrne JAG statute or the COPS statute. Los Angeles argued that the access and notification requirements would compel it to choose between either submitting to an unconstitutional federal enforcement agenda, or losing critical funds. The city contended that this violated the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers, the Spending Clause (by usurping Congress' ability to set conditions for funding), the Tenth Amendment (by usurping Los Angeles's power over its own municipal policy), and the Administrative Procedure Act (as arbitrary and capricious agency action). On the same day that it filed its complaint, Los Angeles also moved for a preliminary injunction, pointing to what it described as the irreparable injury from the loss of critical public-safety funds. The case was assigned to Judge Manuel L. Real on Oct. 2, 2017. On Oct. 4, 2017 the parties moved for an expedited briefing schedule, because the DOJ expected to make FY2017 COPS funding decisions on or around Oct. 30. Judge Real granted the motion and planned for a hearing to be held on Oct. 23. The DOJ, in its response to the city's complaint, argued against the preliminary injunction, asserting that the city lacked standing (as it would not have been a successful COPS applicant anyway in FY2017, regardless of the immigration-related factors); that COPS' immigration-related factors were consistent with the program's purposes under the APA; and that the DOJ had broad discretion to make the grants. Los Angeles withdrew its motion for preliminary injunction on Oct. 16, 2017 because the DOJ had disclosed that Los Angeles' award application for this cycle would have been unsuccessful even without the immigration-related considerations. However, Los Angeles maintained its claims and request for permanent relief, because the DOJ continued to attach the immigration-related conditions to the COPS program. On Nov. 21, 2017 Los Angeles then moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the DOJ's use of COPS funding conditions violated the separation of powers, the Spending Clause, and the APA as arbitrary and capricious. On Feb. 1, five counties, seven cities, and the District of Columbia filed amici briefs supporting Los Angeles. The DOJ also moved for partial summary judgment on Jan. 12, 2018 arguing that Los Angeles' claims were non-justiciable or, in the alternative, that the funding conditions were consistent with the governing statutes, the Spending Clause, and the APA. Judge Real held a motion hearing on Feb. 28, 2018, and on Apr. 11, 2018 issued an order granting Los Angeles' partial summary judgment motion and denying the DOJ's. First, Judge Real held that the case was not moot because Los Angeles' harm was capable of repetition if the City applied for a FY2018 grant. As to the substantive claims, Judge Real held that the challenged conditions exceeded DOJ's legal authority (as federal power infringing on the state police power), in violation of the Spending Clause (because Congress did not unambiguously condition grant receipt on local compliance with federal authorities for a matter not reasonably related to COPS's goal), and in violation of the APA (as arbitrary and capricious without a reasonable basis). Judge Real then permanently enjoined the DOJ from imposing the challenged conditions nationwide. In doing so, Judge Real held that Los Angeles would suffer irreparable harm in future grant cycles against its competitors, making a nationwide injunction necessary. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On July 12, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Los Angeles. 929 F.3d 1163. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claims that the DOJ's use of certain factors in scoring applicants for COPS grants violated the Spending Clause or the Tenth Amendment. The Court also held that the DOJ did not exceed its statutory authority or act arbitrarily and capriciously. The plaintiffs requested rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied to rehear the appeal. On December 23, 2019, the district court dissolved and vacated the April 11 injunction in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's ruling. Meanwhile, back in the district court, Judge Real had stayed Los Angeles' Byrne JAG claims pending one of the following events: (a) the nationwide injunction issued in City of Chicago v. Sessions is dissolved, in which case proceedings on these claims would resume; or (b) the case results in a nationwide permanent injunction of the challenged Byrne JAG conditions, after all opportunities for appeal were exhausted. On July 18, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction of the Byrne JAG funding conditions. On Sept. 13, 2018, Judge Real granted Los Angeles' application for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the notice and access conditions imposed upon the Byrne JAG grant. The court held that the statutes did not grant the Attorney General authority to impose such conditions. The court also held that Los Angeles faced irreparable harm because it was forced to make "an impossible choice: either it must certify compliance with unconstitutional and unlawful directives that impinge on the City's sovereignty, damage community trust, and harm public safety, or it will lose congressionally authorized Byrne JAG funding." The government appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, which then docketed the appeal as No. 18-56292. Four days later, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss. On October 31, 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against the DOJ's use of the notice and access conditions on recipients of Byrne JAG grants. 941 F.3d 931. The Court found that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the conditions. On December 31, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Josephine L. Staton. In light of the Ninth Circuit finding that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to impose the notice and access conditions on the Byrne JAG grants, Judge Staton entered final judgment for Los Angeles regarding the notice and access claim on March 20, 2020. Judge Staton converted the September 2018 preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the notice and access conditions. In addition, the Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the COPS claims and dismissed these claims with prejudice. The defendants appealed the final judgment in favor of Los Angeles on the notice and access claims in May 2020, docket 20-55545. The parties then began mediation, and the Ninth Circuit stayed the appeal pending mediation. This case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit, filed by the City of Los Angeles on Sept. 29, 2017 challenged the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)'s imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. Plaintiff filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Los Angeles receives federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program, both administered by DOJ and its component agencies Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The latest DOJ requirements for FY2017 program funding imposed new conditions on recipient cities, including Los Angeles. One condition was compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The other two conditions required recipients to allow the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to access any correctional or detention facility and question suspected undocumented immigrants about their right to be in the U.S., and to provide DHS at least 48 hours advance notice of any noncitizen's scheduled release from custody. After several lawsuits challenged these conditions, the federal government was preliminarily enjoined from imposing them on Byrne JAG funding in City of Chicago v. Session. DOJ continued to revise these conditions, but Los Angeles believed the revised requirements were ambiguous. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment, and the court granted Los Angeles' motion. On April 11, 2018, Judge Real held that the challenged conditions exceeded DOJ's legal authority (as federal power infringing on the state police power), in violation of the Spending Clause (because Congress did not unambiguously condition grant receipt on local compliance with federal authorities for a matter not reasonably related to COPS's goal), and in violation of the APA (as arbitrary and capricious without a reasonable basis). Judge Real then permanently enjoined DOJ from imposing the challenged conditions nationwide. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On Sept. 13, 2018, Judge Real granted Los Angeles' application for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the statutes in question gave "no indication that DOJ is authorized to add civil immigration conditions" and that Congress did not grant the attorney general authority to impose such conditions. The court also held that Los Angeles faced irreparable harm because it was forced to make "an impossible choice: either it must certify compliance with unconstitutional and unlawful directives that impinge on the City's sovereignty, damage community trust, and harm public safety, or it will lose congressionally authorized Byrne JAG funding." The government appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, which then docketed the appeal as No. 18-56292. Four days later, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss. The court held that the City had plausibly stated claims that the new funding conditions were ultra vires, and also violated the separation of powers, the spending clause, and the APA. This case is ongoing.


On September 4, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act. and the First Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the Thomas More Society, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the deeply held, Catholic religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On September 25, 2013, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. The court initially ordered a stay until the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services . The district court kept the stay in place until after the Supreme Court's ruling in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius  on June 30, 2014. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court held that the version of the contraceptive services mandate in place at that time was a violation of the plaintiff's rights under the RFRA. Based on that ruling and the parties' joint status report, on October 27, 2014 the district court entered a permanent injunction and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining defendants from enforcing the version of the contraception mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby against the plaintiffs in this case. The parties were instructed to meet and confer on attorneys' fees and costs. The most recent status report in following that order was entered on December 17, 2014.

Summary: A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the District Court for the District of Columbia granted an injunction for the plaintiffs against the version of the contraceptive services mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby.


On June 27, 2018, a refugee from Guatemala filed this lawsuit on behalf of herself and her daughter in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Attorney General of the United States and officers and executives of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.) and the Declaratory Judgment Act (22 U.S.C. § 2201). Represented by the ACLU of Massachusetts and private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief, along with attorney’s fees. The plaintiff alleged that she and her daughter had been separated upon their entry to the United States in violation of their Fifth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights and their equal protection rights. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s family reunification requirements violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the Department of Health and Human Services had violated the Flores Settlement’s requirements regarding immigrant detention.  See  Flores v. Reno. Finally, the plaintiff filed petitions for mandamus and habeas relief for the defendants to release her daughter. The plaintiff brought the case in Massachusetts, where she was domiciled as she awaited her asylum hearing, while her daughter was kept in a shelter in Texas. The case was assigned to Judge George A. O’Toole. The following day, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order for immediate injunctive relief, asking the court to order the release of the daughter. A copy of the motion was promptly sent to the defendants, who were ordered to respond by July 2, 2018. The defendants requested, and were granted, an extension until July 6. Rather than take advantage of the extension, the defendants decided to release her daughter. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case on July 5, 2018 after she and her daughter were reunited. The case is now closed.

Summary: A refugee and her daughter were separated when they entered Arizona, and the mother sued in federal court in Massachusetts for injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was resolved eight days later, when the mother and daughter were reunited.


On May 17, 2007, Medicaid-eligible individuals with acquired brain injuries qualifying for long-term care services in nursing or rehabilitation facilities and the Brain Injury Association of Massachusetts filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The plaintiffs sued Massachusetts under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794(a)), and the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10)(A)). Represented by the Center for Public Representation and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin Massachusetts to comply with the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Social Security Act by offering services and programs for individuals with acquired brain injuries in integrated community settings. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Massachusetts had illegally discriminated against them on the basis of disability. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), which held that the ADA forbids the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities, and mandates that their rehabilitative and medical needs be provided in a manner that enables individuals with disabilities to be independent and integrated members of the community. The plaintiffs alleged that at least a quarter of the more than 8,000 individuals with traumatic brain injuries living in nursing homes or rehabilitation facilities in Massachusetts would be able to and would prefer to reside in an integrated community setting, provided they received appropriate aids and support. The plaintiffs alleged that in the absence of these services, they were unlawfully denied their personal liberty, freedom of association, and meaningful access to community life. On September 26, 2007, the court certified the class. On May 30, 2008, the parties entered a court-approved settlement agreement. Under the settlement, Massachusetts agreed that within six months of the effective date of the settlement it would issue a proposal to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to establish a Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) (§1915(c) of the Social Security Act) waiver program that would enable individuals with traumatic brain injuries the option of a community-placed living situation. Initially this program would offer 300 such waivers. Individuals receiving the waivers would participate in developing their own Individualized Service Plan with an interdisciplinary team and would receive services appropriate to their level of need. Waiver recipients would have the option of living with family, where applicable, or of living in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, e.g., their own apartment or home, or in a group home. Massachusetts reserved the right to deny waivers to any person whose annual costs of care to Medicaid from residential habilitation and other waiver services, plus Title XIX state plan services, would exceed $164,131, and also to deny waivers to any person whose annual Medicaid waiver costs, exclusive of Title XIX and residential costs, would likely exceed $87,919. The settlement limited the total cost of the waiver program, inclusive of all Medicaid and state-funded expenditures for the participants, to $15,000,000. In order to stay within this cap, the state reserved the right to take corrective actions, such as reducing the number of waivers available. Massachusetts also agreed to implement an education and outreach program in order to educate individuals with acquired traumatic brain injuries about the program. On June 2, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the fee shifting provisions of the ADA, which allow a "prevailing party" plaintiff to recover expenses from a defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Massachusetts objected, arguing that the court-approved class action settlement, which expressly was not a court-ordered consent decree, was insufficient to establish the plaintiffs as the prevailing party. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion, ordering the State to pay $750,000 in attorneys' fees. 683 F. Supp. 2d 121. Massachusetts appealed. On February 17, 2011, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (Selya, J.) affirmed the lower court’s decision. 636 F.3d 1. On June 19, 2013, the parties agreed to a new settlement agreement that would replace the original agreement, which the state was unable to fully implement because it could not secure federal grant funding for community-based services, leaving thousands of individuals with brain injuries languishing in facilities across the state. Under the Amended Agreement, the state would use another federal grant project, the Money Follows the Person (MFP) Demonstration, as well as other waiver programs, to provide residential and non-residential supports for up to 1,174 Medicaid-eligible people with brain injuries who were in long-term rehabilitation facilities and nursing homes. On July 11, 2013, the district court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) issued final approval of the amended settlement agreement. The court retained jurisdiction over the case. The agreement was to last for six years. On June 27, 2014, Judge Ponsor revised a Protective Order originally granted on August 27, 2007, adjusting and broadening the scope of protected health information (PHI) for class members and their guardians. No substantive docket entries were made during the remainder of the six-year term, which ended on July 1, 2019, so the case is presumably now closed.

Summary: In 2007, several Medicaid recipients with acquired traumatic brain injuries filed a class action suit in federal court against Massachusetts, alleging it was unlawfully failing to provide care to people with brain injuries in a community setting as required by the ADA, instead illegally segregating them in nursing facilities. The parties entered a court-approved settlement, with Massachusetts agreeing to provide a limited number of waivers allowing individuals with brain injuries the option of a community-placed living situation, provided their individual annual cost of care was below a certain cap. The court awarded the plaintiffs $750,000 in attorneys' fees under the fee shifting provisions of the ADA, finding them to be the "prevailing party" despite the fact that the parties had settled. In 2013, the parties amended the settlement agreement, which was set to expire in 2019. Little additional litigation occurred during the term of the settlement agreement.


On November 24, 1999, Plaintiffs first filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs, Native American farmers who alleged they were victims of discriminatory lending practices by the USDA, brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15, U.S.C. §1691. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the USDA's Farm Service Agency ("FSA") had failed to respond to investigation reports submitted by the Civil Rights Action Team and the Office of the Inspector General, which found widespread discriminatory lending practices against Native American farmers. According to the reports, the FSA utilized subjective interpretations of loan approval guidelines improperly to the detriment of Native American farmers, failed to advise Native Americans of the availability of USDA loan and loan servicing opportunities, and systematically erected barriers that prevented Native Americans from receiving loans or loan servicing. Plaintiffs claimed that the USDA failed to supervise in response to these reports, and failed to investigate the civil rights complaints that its office received in response to those discriminatory practices. The "Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999," 7 U.S.C. §2279, waived the statute of limitations for these civil rights claims, normally barred after two years. Plaintiff sought (1) declaratory judgment that the USDA had violated their rights to equal credit, participation in loan programs, and full and timely enforcement of discrimination complaints, and (2) monetary compensation and injunctive relief from the discriminatory practices outlined above. On July 22, 2000, the U.S. moved for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved on October 11, 2000 for a preliminary injunction. However, District Court Judge Emmitt G. Sullivan denied both motions on June 18, 2001. On November 28, 2001, Judge Sullivan granted certification of the class. 2001 WL 34676944. This class was described as "[a]ll Native American farmers and ranchers who (1) framed or ranched between January 1, 1981, and November 24, 1999, (2) applied to the USDA for participation in a farm program during that time period, and (3) filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA individually or through a representative during the time period." The U.S. filed an interlocutory appeal of the class certification with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and asked the District Court to stay the case pending the appeal on December 18, 2002. Judge Sullivan denied the motion to stay on December 28, 2001. The interlocutory appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals on October 29, 2002 (Judge David S. Tatel). 309 F.3d 789. On December 5, 2003, Judge Sullivan granted a motion by class-member Phil Givens to opt out of the class. In response, the Plaintiff class sought reversal by the Court of Appeals, petitioning the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus on February 9, 2004, but the petition was denied in a per curiam opinion on March 3, 2004. On March 23, 2006, Judge Sullivan entered an order granting the motions by multiple involuntary members to opt out of the class and pursue individual relief. 236 F.R.D. 1. Plaintiffs submitted their eighth amended (and final) complaint on February 11, 2008. On December 19, 2010, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement, and on December 22, Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of the settlement and settlement agreement class certification. Judge Sullivan granted the preliminary approval on November 1, 2010, and granted final approval of the settlement agreement on April 28, 2011. On April 29, 2011, Judge Sullivan entered an order of final judgment, dismissing this action with prejudice. This began the 180-day period of the settlement agreement claims process, ending on October 26, 2011. The settlement agreement created a total compensation fund of $680,000,000. In exchange for Plaintiffs' agreement to dismiss the suit, Defendants agreed to suspend all collection efforts that were currently in the Service Center Information Management System or on individuals who file claims pursuant to the agreement. In addition, all members of the class would be able to make a claim to an appointed "claim administrator," who would make its best effort to make a determination on the claim within 10 days. These claims would be in one of two tracks: "Track A" required "substantial evidence" of discrimination, and awarded a liquidated damage amount of $50,000. "Track B" claims required more--a preponderance of the evidence of discrimination--and could pay an award up to $250,000. If any claimant was also making a claim in response to the Pigford v. Glickman or Garcia v. Vilsack settlements, that individual was not eligible for a claim award in this settlement. The deadline for claims under the settlement agreement was set at 180 days after final approval of settlement agreement. Pursuant to a cy pres provision, any leftover or unclaimed funds were to be distributed to non-profit organizations serving Native American farmers and ranchers. Additional provisions of the settlement included: the USDA agreed to create a Council for Native American Farming and Ranching (responsible for transmitting recommendations concerning changes to FSA regulations or internal guidance that would eliminate barriers to program participation by Native Americans), create an ombudsperson for Native Americans and other socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, and commence a review of their policies and training materials, promising to make all necessary revisions to prevent further discriminatory behavior. On August 30, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a status report notifying the court that the claims process had concluded, but that approximately $380,000,000 remained available for cy pres distribution. On September 24, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the settlement’s cy pres provision: while the cy pres funds would still go to non-profit organizations serving Native American farmers and ranchers, the plaintiffs proposed changes in the mechanism for distributing funds. However, on May 19, 2015, Marilyn and George Keepseagle (“the Keepseagles”), lead named plaintiffs and class representatives, opposed class counsel’s proposed modification, retained their own counsel, and filed their own motion to modify the settlement agreement, proposing that the court order a pro rata distribution of the remaining settlement funds to successful claimants. On July 24, 2015, Judge Sullivan denied both motions to modify the settlement agreement, concluding that there was no basis to approve the modifications under the law governing the disposition of unclaimed settlements nor under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). 2015 WL 4510837. On December 14, 2015, all the plaintiffs, including the Keepseagles, filed an unopposed motion to modify the settlement agreement’s cy pres provision. The proposed modification was a compromise between class counsel’s and the Keepseagles’ prior proposals and provided for (1) a supplemental award of $18,500 to each claimant who prevailed in the original claims process, and (2) an amended process through which $38,000,000 of cy pres funds were to be distributed. On April 20, 2016, Judge Sullivan approved the modification. 2016 WL 9455764. In June 2016, two class members appealed Judge Sullivan’s approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, contending that all of the remaining funds should have been distributed pro rata to the successful claimants and that the cy pres provision was unconstitutional. On May 16, 2017, the Court of Appeals (Judges Brown, Wilkins, and Edwards) affirmed the district court in finding that the modification was “fair, reasonable, and adequate”; the Court declined to reach the merits of the appellants’ legal challenges to the cy pres provision, finding that they had explicitly waived those claims before the district court and forfeited them because they had never raised any legal challenges to the cy pres provision previously despite multiple clear opportunities to do so. 2017 WL 2111020. The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case on March 26, 2018, finally permitting the modification to the agreement to be implemented.

Summary: On November 24, 1999, a group of Native Americans farmers and ranchers who claimed that they had been victims of discriminatory lending practices between 1981 and 1999 brought suit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On April 29, 2011, Judge Emmitt G. Sullivan of the District Court granted a final approval of the settlement agreement, in which the USDA agreed to revise policies to prevent further discrimination and create a compensatory fund of $680,000,000, from which claimants could bring evidence of discrimination in order to receive a monetary reward up to $250,000. On August 30, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a status report notifying the court that the claims process had concluded, but that approximately $380,000,000 remained available for cy pres distribution. On December 14, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to modify the settlement agreement’s cy pres provision. The proposed modification provided for (1) a supplemental award of $18,500 to each claimant who prevailed in the original claims process, and (2) an amended process through which $38,000,000 of cy pres funds were to be distributed. On April 20, 2016, Judge Sullivan approved the modification. However, in June 2016, two class members appealed Judge Sullivan’s approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On May 16, 2017, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in finding that the modification was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” The Supreme Court then declined to hear the case on March 26, 2018, finally permitting the modification to the agreement to be implemented.


On November 4, 1998 plaintiffs, a group of eight black employees and one Asian employee of a Sears store in Little Rock, Arkansas, filed suit against Sears, Roebuck and Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), and state law. The complaint stemmed from an allegation of unequal pay but included other related allegations. Specifically the employees alleged disparate treatment and disparate impact in terms of pay, training, placement, transfer, and promotion. They sought a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, damages, and costs and fees. On July 3, 2000 the district court (Judge Susan Webber Wright) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the individual claims of each plaintiff and granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as modified by the court. The class was comprised of current and former non-white hourly employees of the Sears store in question from November 4, 1995 for the disparate treatment claims and from November 4, 1997 for the disparate impact claims. The parties thereafter pursued settlement negotiations and on May 17, 2001 the court (Judge Wright) granted preliminary approval to their agreement. The settlement provided for injunctive relief and damages. The defendant agreed to hold a job fair for all class members, modify its hiring and promotion procedures, modify its evaluation and employee recordkeeping protocols, and monitor its compliance with the settlement and report to the court and class counsel. Class members were awarded a total of $1,142,000.00 and defendant agreed to pay attorney's fees of costs of $417,717.00. The case terminated on August 17, 2001 when the court (Judge Wright) granted final approval to the settlement agreement.

Summary: On November 4, 1998 plaintiffs, a group of eight black employees and one Asian employee of a Sears store in Little Rock, AR, filed suit against Sears, Roebuck and Co. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas alleging that the defendant had unlawfully discriminated against them on the basis of race. Specifically they alleged disparate treatment and disparate impact in terms of pay, training, placement, transfer, and promotion. On July 3, 2000 the district court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The case terminated on August 17, 2001 when the court approved a settlement agreement. The settlement required the defendant to implement various protocols to prevent discrimination and awarded the class $1,142,000.00 plus $417,717.00 for attorney's fees.


This case involves a dispute about visa processing. Following a March 20, 2020 decision by the State Department to cease most visa services, President Trump issued Presidential Proclamation 10014 on April 20, suspending the entry of all immigrants into the U.S. for two months, unless they qualified for an exception. Two months later, the entry suspension was extended to December 31, 2020 and expanded to include temporary nonimmigrant visas in Proclamation 10052. As a result, the State Department suspended review and adjudication of visas for non-excepted applicants (the No-Visa Policy). Many groups were affected, including diversity lottery (DV-2020) winners who had not yet been issued a visa and who would not have their eligibility carry over into the next year, and minors who would age out of the preferential treatment for which they were eligible. On May 28, 2020, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who had sponsored noncitizen minor children or other relatives for immigrant visas filed this class action lawsuit against President Trump, the State Department, and the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with Judge Amit P. Mehta presiding. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the government from acting to “deny or refuse consideration” of their visa petitions, a declaration that the Proclamations were unlawful, and attorney’s fees. They sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. § 706) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1185) and alleged that the defendants’ conduct exceeded their authority and violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of visa sponsors whose beneficiaries or derivative beneficiaries were subject to the Proclamations and at risk of aging out on June 2. On June 23, Judge Mehta denied the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification because they failed to show that a justiciable case or controversy existed. Specifically, Judge Mehta found that the plaintiffs had not shown that they faced imminent injury because some of the plaintiffs’ minor beneficiaries had successfully applied for visas under the “national interest exception” (a separate administrative procedure), and others had been unable to apply for visas for reasons unrelated to the Proclamations. 2020 WL 3429786. The plaintiffs then amended their complaint on July 17, 2020, adding as plaintiffs corporations that were unable to hire necessary workers because workers’ visas had not been issued along with diversity visa selectees whose visas had to issue by September 30 to remain eligible for entry. They also proposed the following four subclasses: 1. Those who will be unable to receive their diversity visas before Sept. 30 deadline, and will thus be unable to immigrate. 2. Citizens who have sponsored an immediate relative who now cannot immigrate. 3. Lawful permanent residents who have an “approved immigrant visa petition for a preference relative” who, because of the Proclamations, will be unable to immigrate. 4. U.S. employers whose employees or potential employees cannot now immigrate. Several states and the District of Columbia also filed an amicus brief arguing that immigrants were good for their economies and that the presidential action would hurt their recovery. Three other suits filed between July 10, 2020 and August 5, 2020 were fully consolidated with this case on August 13: Aker v. Trump, No. 20-cv-1926; Mohammed v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-1856; and Fonjong v. Trump, No. 20-cv-2128. In all of these cases, the plaintiffs were diversity visa selectees and derivative beneficiaries challenging Presidential Proclamations 10014 and 10052 under the APA; two (Mohammed and Fonjong) were filed by the same law firm. Judge Mehta also partially consolidated Panda v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-1907, with this case to the extent that Panda raised similar issues. Panda involved an APA challenge to Proclamation 10052 but also included an equal protection argument that the government's conduct disparately impacted Indian nationals. On September 16, Judge Mehta denied the Panda plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction in the part of that case continuing separately. 2020 WL 5545554. The Panda plaintiffs appealed, and on September 29, Panda was stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. Following the consolidation, many influential companies filed an amicus brief as well, arguing that they would suffer serious economic harm from the proclamations. The companies included Adobe, Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft, Paypal, Reddit, Twitter, Uber Technologies, and Zillow. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 23, 2020, adding a claim under the Mandamus Act (28 U.S.C. § 1361) and requesting that the court issue an order of mandamus requiring defendants to adjudicate visa petitions. On September 4, 2020, Judge Mehta granted the DV-2020 plaintiffs a preliminary injunction. The defendants were ordered to “undertake good-faith efforts . . . to expeditiously process and adjudicate DV-2020 diversity visas.” Defendants were preliminarily enjoined “from interpreting and applying the COVID Guidance to DV-2020 selectees” in such a way as not to process their visas because they were not “mission critical.” The remaining motions and requests were not granted. The court also delayed certifying a class, and the non DV-2020 plaintiffs did not obtain injunctive relief because vacatur of the policy would not eliminate their family separation problem. 2020 WL 5367010. On September 14, 2020, the court amended the preliminary injunction to prevent the State Department from waiting 14 days to issue visas to DV-2020 applicants who were inside certain COVID-affected regions because the delay served no rational purpose. 2020 WL 5886855. On September 24, 2020, non DV-2020 plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit over the ruling against their motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 30, 2020, the court certified a class in Gomez consisting of all “Individuals who have been selected to receive an immigrant visa through the U.S. Department of State’s FY2020 Diversity Visa Lottery and who had not received their immigrant visa on or before April 23, 2020, when the Presidential Proclamation 10014, later extended by Presidential Proclamation 10052, took effect.” But the court declined to certify a class in Aker because it was unclear how many applicants who were issued visas before the Proclamation had not been able to have them renewed, and because there was no legal impediment to renewing a visa. It also ordered the State Department to reserve 9,095 visas (calculated based on the expected reduction due to COVID-19) to correct for the loss of visas due to the illegal processing delays. 2020 WL 5861101. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the State Department ceased processing most visas on March 20, 2020. Over the next few months, President Trump issued two Proclamations which effectively suspended the entry of all immigrants to the US for two months, unless they qualified for an exception. The State Department also suspended review and adjudication of visas. Relatives of minors who would age out of preferential treatment filed suit, seeking injunctive relief. On July 17, plaintiffs amended their complaint and expanded the putative class to include companies that were unable to bring in necessary workers and Diversity Visa Selectees who must have visas issued before Sept. 30 to be eligible for entry. On September 4, Judge Mehta granted preliminary injunctive relief to the DV-2020 plaintiffs, but not the others. This was followed by further orders for the State Department to process the visas and to hold a number of DV-2020 visas for the plaintiffs past the September 30 deadline. The case in ongoing.


On September 2, 2010, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), Civil Rights Division, filed this lawsuit under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the United States Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The DOJ sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Maricopa County had violated the Civil Rights Act by failing to comply with a DOJ investigation. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that Maricopa County had refused to comply after a year of being minimally cooperative and obstructing the DOJ investigation into the police practices in Maricopa County. Maricopa County receives federal funds for its Sheriff's Office. Under an implementing regulation, offices that receive financial assistance agree to give the DOJ access to their records and they make contractual agreements to that effect. The DOJ was investigating a violation of the Omnibus Crime Control Act and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, and had requested documents from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO). The DOJ made 51 specific requests. After over a year had passed, the MCSO had only partially complied with 3 of these 51 requests. The DOJ found them to be in violation of Title VI and initiated this lawsuit. On June 2, 2011, after the parties had both filed motions for summary judgment, a settlement agreement was reached. The agreement granted the DOJ access to the MCSO facilities. Additionally, the MCSO agreed to produce the documents that the DOJ had requested, as well as a blanket agreement to comply with Title VI. On August 1, 2011, the Court (Judge Murray G. Snow) dismissed the case 60 days after a Joint Motion to Remove Case to the Inactive Docket was made. There is no further activity and this case appears to be closed. On May 10, 2012, presumably as a result of the continued investigation, the United States filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County in a related case, United States v. Maricopa County, et. Al, docket #2:12-cv-00981-LOA, (Clearinghouse Code: PN-AZ-0001).

Summary: The United States filed this 2010 lawsuit against the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) for failure to completely respond to document and other requests related to an ongoing investigation of MCSO for violations of federal law related to unconstitutional profiling and treatment of Latinos. The case was settled on June 2, 2011 with MCSO agreeing to provide access to the facilities and production of the requested documents. The United States filed a related lawsuit (PN-AZ-0001) on May 10, 2012.


On April 7, 2015, Human Rights Watch (HRW), a non-partisan, non-profit human rights organization, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued under the Administrative Procedures Act against the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The plaintiff, represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that a mass surveillance program conducted by the DEA violated the HRW and its staff's First Amendment free speech and free association rights as well as their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, HRW alleged that the DEA had been engaged in a secret mass surveillance program as early as the 1990s. HRW noted that the DEA acknowledged the existence of this program in a declaration filed in January 2015 for a separate case (included as an exhibit in HRW's complaint). According to HRW, the surveillance program indiscriminately swept in call records for calls between the United States and "Designated Countries" that are "determined to have a 'demonstrated nexus to international drug trafficking and related criminal activities.' " HRW alleged that these call records were recorded in databases, which were then made accessible to the officers and employees of the DEA, DHS, and FBI. HRW claimed that during the course of its work, it communicated with individuals in Designated Countries, and that the surveillance program put HRW's contacts at risk and burdened HRW's human rights advocacy efforts. HRW alleged that the defendants violated its First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights, and requested declaratory and injunctive relief and reasonable attorneys' fees. On June 15, 2015, the defendants, represented by an attorney from the Department of Justice, moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that HRW failed to establish that it has standing to pursue its claims. On August 14, 2015, Judge Philip S. Gutierrez issued an order holding in abeyance ruling on the defendants' motion. Judge Gutierrez determined that HRW should be allowed an opportunity to conduct discovery to respond to the defendants' attack on standing, and authorized HRW to serve a limited number of interrogatories on the defendants. On December 14, 2015, HRW filed for voluntary dismissal without prejudice, as the defendants had provided additional information through discovery concerning the destruction of call records collected in bulk. Two days later, Judge Gutierrez submitted an order dismissing the case without prejudice.

Summary: In 2015, Human Rights Watch, a non-partisan, non-profit human rights organization, filed a lawsuit against the DEA and FBI, alleging that a mass surveillance program conducted by the DEA violated HRW's First and Fourth Amendment rights. HRW has requested declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was voluntarily dismissed by HRW without prejudice after the defendants demonstrated the destruction of call records. The case is closed.


Plaintiffs, ACLU national and the ACLU of Wisconsin, along with Covington & Burling attorneys, filed this class action alleging that the Milwaukee Police Department's (MPD) stop-and-frisk policies were unconstitutional. The case was filed in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on February 22, 2017. The complaint alleged under Section 1983 that Milwaukee's stop-and-frisk policies violated the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure protections as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. It also alleged under Section 2000d that Milwaukee was in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees and costs. This case was brought as a class action on behalf of all persons who had been or would have been stopped by MPD officers after January 7th, 2008. More broadly, the complaint alleged that in 2008, when Milwaukee adopted a "broken windows" policy regarding crime prevention, MPD began engaging in high-volume, suspicion-less stops as well as stops illegally motivated by race and ethnicity. The complaint alleges a formal and informal quota system of stops that led to a threefold increase in stops from 2007 to 2015. Plaintiffs also defined a subclass of black and Latino individuals. All of the named plaintiffs in the class were black or Latino, and the complaint detailed specific allegations of suspicion-less stops for each of them as well as data indicating the impact that Milwaukee's stop-and-frisk policy had specifically on black and Latino communities. The parties were engaged in negotiations almost from the beginning - a Joint Interim Settlement Report was filed in September 2017, and minute orders show that the parties were engaged in mediation and later settlement negotiations throughout the fall of 2017 and into the spring and summer of 2018. A settlement was approved on July 23, 2018. The settlement covers a range of issues: changes to officer training; revisions to MPD policies and guidelines regarding reasonable suspicion and probable cause; body camera usage; data collection, coding, and publication; timely filing of reports after stops; supervision from within MPD for officers conducting stops; procedures for both external and internal complaints regarding stop-and-frisk; data auditing by MPD; hiring, counseling, retraining, and discipline; and community engagement. The District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement under Judge J. P. Stadtmueller. To achieve compliance with the agreement, MPD must incorporate all substantive parts of the agreement into policy, hire and train needed personnel, appropriate sufficient funds, and show sustained and continuing improvement on constitutional policing based on a variety of data-based factors. The settlement terminates after five years. The ACLU and an outside consultant (CJI) will act as monitors. The settlement indicates $1,900,000 in attorney's fees and costs, and Milwaukee is also responsible for paying for CJI's fees. <b>Current status</b> MPD is required to provide data on variety of police and civilian interactions quarterly, and to make training and policy materials available for review. CJI is to file a report each year regarding MPD's compliance and their review of relevant data. If MPD is non-compliant, CJI can submit six-month updates on those issues, indicating whether they have been fixed. The case is ongoing: CJI filed an initial report in September of 2019, a six-month report indicating items on which MPD is non-compliant in April of 2020, and a second semi-annual report on Jun 5, 2020.

Summary: The ACLU and ACLU of Wisconsin brought a class action on February 22, 2017 in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the City of Milwaukee, alleging that their stop-and-frisk program violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The case settled on July 23, 2018, requiring MPD to undertake reforms around training, data collection and dissemination, hiring, and more. The goal is to make sustained and continuing improvement on constitutional policing. The ACLU and an outside consultant will act as monitors for the five-year duration of the settlement.


In the fall of 2018, Florida voters amended the Florida Constitution, restoring voting rights to most people convicted of felonies “upon completion of all terms of sentence, including parole or probation.” (This excluded people convicted of murder or sexual offenses.) On June 28, 2019, Governor Ron DeSantis signed Senate Bill 7066 into law, defining “all terms of sentence” to include payment of all conviction-related restitution, fines, fees, and costs (“legal financial obligations”). People who could not determine the amount of their obligations, or who could not afford to pay them, were effectively disenfranchised. In June and July 2019, five lawsuits were filed challenging SB7066:

June 15, Mendez v. DeSantis

June 28, Jones v. DeSantis

June 28, Raysor v. Lee

June 28, Gruver v. Barton

July 1,  McCoy v. DeSantis

 All five suits, filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, were assigned to Chief Judge Mark Walker. Consolidated on June 30, 2019 for purposes of case management, they were ultimately tried together as a single consolidated case. Chief Judge Walker recused himself on July 17, 2019, because his wife’s law firm had been retained to represent one of the defendants. The consolidated case was reassigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. The plaintiffs were 19 individuals, the League of Women Voters of Florida, the NAACP Florida State Conference, and the Orange County Branch of the NAACP. Each group of plaintiffs advanced different legal theories and named different defendants. Combined, the consolidated suit named as defendants Governor DeSantis, his Secretary of State, and the Supervisor of Elections for each county where an individual plaintiff resided. The consolidated suit alleged that SB7066 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution; the First, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments; the National Voter Registration Act; and the Florida Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by the Brennan Center for Justice, the Campaign Legal Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU, the ACLU of Florida, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief restoring their voting rights. In their amended complaint of July 16, 2019, the Raysor plaintiffs sought class certification (which was eventually granted on April 7, 2020). The proposed class included “all persons who would be eligible to vote in Florida but for unpaid financial obligations.” Class members asserting that they were “genuinely unable to pay” would form a subclass. The Governor petitioned the Florida Supreme Court on August 9, 2019 for an advisory opinion on the validity of SB7066. The court’s advisory opinion of January 16, 2020 announced that the constitutional amendment’s language “all terms of sentence” would have been understood by Florida voters to include “all legal financial obligations imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt.” While awaiting this advisory opinion, the Governor unsuccessfully sought a stay of proceedings in the district court. On August 15, 2019, the court denied the Supervisors of Elections’ motion to dismiss the case or to stay discovery. The Gruver plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction the same day. The injunction was granted on October 18, 2019, effective against all defendants except the Governor and the Supervisor of Elections for Orange County. The injunction prohibited officials from taking any action to prevent the named plaintiffs from registering to vote (if they asserted inability to pay) or from voting (if they demonstrated their inability to pay). Simultaneously, the court denied the Governor and the Secretary of State their motion to dismiss or abstain. 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284. The Eleventh Circuit upheld on February 19, 2020. 950 F.3d 795. The Gruver plaintiffs sought in late October to expand the preliminary injunction to cover four additional named plaintiffs who were seeking to vote in November municipal elections. This motion was denied the first week of January 2020. In the meantime, the district court partially stayed the injunction on December 19, 2019. While still protecting the plaintiffs’ ability to register, the modified injunction did not guarantee their ability to vote. This partial stay expired on February 11, 2020. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction on February 19, ruling that, among other things, the state’s pay-to-vote requirement should be analyzed under a standard of heightened scrutiny rather than rational basis review. 950 F.3d 795. On March 30, 2020, the court denied the state defendants’ motion for summary judgment, but dismissed the plaintiffs’ abandoned Ex Post Facto and Florida Constitution claims. The plaintiffs’ class certification motion was granted the following week, on April 7 (not in time for class members to vote in the March 2020 presidential primaries). The trial was held from April 27–May 6 by videoconference (due to the COVID-19 pandemic). The court issued its opinion on the merits on May 24, 2020. Ruling that the state was in violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments and the National Voter Registration Act, the court declared Florida’s requirements unconstitutional as applied to: those who could not vote because they could not afford to pay; those who could not vote because the amount to pay was unknown and “cannot be determined with diligence”; and those who could not vote because they owed the state “fees” or “costs.” However, a requirement to pay “fines and restitution…is not unconstitutional as applied to those who are able to pay.” The court named each plaintiff and specifically declared his or her eligibility to vote. It ruled that the plaintiffs in McCoy, Raysor, and Gruver could collect attorneys’ fees and costs (the plaintiffs in Jones and Mendez had not actively participated in the majority of the litigation). As to the class and the subclass, the court issued an injunction requiring the state to create and advertise a form for obtaining an individual advisory opinion on voting eligibility. The injunction specified that if the state failed to respond to an individual submission within 21 days, the person would be automatically eligible to vote. It further directed the state to publish requirements for voting eligibility following a felony conviction. The court explicitly retained jurisdiction to enforce the declaration and injunction. The state defendants appealed the ruling on June 1, 2020. On June 14, the district court denied their motion to stay the ruling pending appeal. On July 1, the Eleventh Circuit granted the state’s motion for initial hearing en banc (that is, before the entire court, rather than a panel of three judges). Without explanation, it also granted a stay of the district court’s injunction, pending appeal. The Supreme Court, also without explanation and over a dissent by Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan, denied a request to lift the stay. On July 15, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the Eleventh Circuit seeking to disqualify 3 of the court’s 12 judges from hearing the appeal. Judges Lagoa and Luck had been justices of the Florida Supreme Court when it issued its advisory opinion in this case in August 2019; both had committed to the United States Senate that they would recuse themselves from cases in which they had previously played a role. Judge Brasher, as the Solicitor General of Alabama, had vigorously defended Alabama against a similar lawsuit shortly before his appointment to the federal judiciary. Judge Brasher disqualified himself on July 21, 2020, but denied the plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify as moot: he emphasized that he was recusing because of his chambers policy, not as a result of the plaintiffs’ motion. Judges Lagoa and Luck denied the motion to disqualify on July 27, 2020. The Eleventh Circuit heard oral arguments on August 18, 2020. On September 11, 2020, the court issued an opinion that reversed the judgment of the district court on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to prove Constitutional violation. The court held that: (1) the amendment and the statute did not violate Equal Protection Clause; (2) the amendment and the statute did not violate Twenty-Fourth Amendment; (3) felon re-enfranchisement laws were not void for vagueness; and (4) the amendment and the statute did not deny the plaintiffs' rights to procedural due process. Because section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows for felon disenfranchisment, the Supreme Court had held in Richardson v. Ramirez that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid it. Applying that precedent, the court held that Florida's Amendment 4 and Senate Bill 7066 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause under rational basis review. Additionally, the court held that because court costs and fees are legitimate parts of a criminal sentence, there was no basis to regard them as a tax. As such, the laws did not disenfranchise the individuals for failure to pay a tax, but rather because they had not "satisfied the demands of justice" as mandated by state statute. The state's justification for these voting requirements qualified as a constitutionally legitimate interest. Therefore the statutes satisfied the requirements of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. Lastly, the criminal processes necessary for a conviction were sufficient to justify denying individuals the right to vote. The deprivation was a consequence of a felony conviction in Florida, so the court upheld Florida's conditional restoration of the right to vote. The appeals court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the challenged portions of its injunction. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit severed and lifted the stay of the cross-appeal (Case No. 20-12304). This cross-appeal had been filed on June 19, 2020 by the plaintiffs in the McCoy case, which has been consolidated earlier in the litigation. On October 21, 2020, the plaintiffs in the McCoy case filed an opening brief for the cross appeal on the questions of (1) whether a Nineteenth Amendment claim requires proof of discriminatory intent and (2) the appropriateness of the test applied by the lower court to the equal protection claims, given that the plaintiffs in McCoy are women. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Florida voters in 2018 passed Amendment 4, amending the Florida Constitution to restore voting rights to people with felony convictions “upon completion of all terms of sentence, including parole or probation.” In response to this amendment, the state legislature passed Senate Bill 7066, which redefined “all terms of sentence” to include the payment of restitution, fines, and fees, also known as “legal financial obligations (LFO)”. The Campaign Legal Center filed a class action federal lawsuit on behalf of formerly incarcerated Florida citizens challenging Senate Bill 7066 under the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional and statutory provisions. After a bench trial, the district court issued an injunction barring the state from preventing people from voting solely because of unpaid obligations that they were unable to pay. On September 11, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion that reversed the judgment of the district court on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to prove Constitutional violation. The stay on the cross-appeal was lifted and the <i>McCoy</i> plaintiffs filed a brief in the Eleventh Circuit on October 21, 2020.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by four immigrants held at the Montgomery Processing Center, seeking release in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their medical conditions. In April, the court issued a temporary restraining order that provided for the release of one of the individual plaintiffs. In September, the court entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for individualized bail hearings. Three detainees were released in October. The defendants appealed in November. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 8, 2020, a group of four immigrants in detention filed this lawsuit against U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), ICE officials, and the warden of the Montgomery Processing Center ("MPC"). Represented by the ACLU and private counsel, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Alternatively, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the petitioners argued that by detaining them, the defendants were subjecting them to an unreasonable risk of contracting COVID-19 in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Keith P. Ellison. On April 10, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order. On April 17, Judge Ellison entered an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. 455 F.Supp.3d 330. The government was required to release one plaintiff from detention because the plaintiff did not have a history of violence, so the danger to the plaintiff in detention outweighed the public interest in safety; the court issued this order as a preliminary injunction rather than a temporary restraining order. The court declined to order the release of another plaintiff due to his history of violence and violation of previous court protective orders. Ten days later that plaintiff was transferred to a different detention facility. (The two other individual plaintiffs had already been released.) On April 29, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint with four additionally plaintiffs with medical conditions that put them at higher risk of serious illness or death if they contracted COVID-19. Two of those plaintiffs were later released on May 1. The plaintiffs also filed a motion to certify the class. The proposed class consisted of "all individuals detained at MPC who have been diagnosed with or are receiving treatment for an enumerated list of medical conditions... and/or who are over the age of 50." The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on May 1 on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were mooted after each was either transferred or released. On May 1 and 4, the plaintiffs moved to expedite discovery and to expedite relief. In the meantime, at least six detainees and five MPC staff members had tested positive for COVID-19. On May 25, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiff that secured release through the April 17 preliminary injunction still had standing to amend the complaint since her claims had not been finally adjudicated. The court also ordered that plaintiffs submit supplemental information on the proposed class certification before the court rule on the other outstanding motions. 2020 WL 2617939. Defendants filed another motion to dismiss the amended complaint on June 5. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on June 7 which was denied as moot on June 23. Several detainees filed an emergency motion to intervene on July 30 which was granted on August 31. The court found that the intervenors met the requirements for permissive intervention, but not intervention as of right. The intervenors filed a complaint, adopting the prior allegations and making additional allegations, and a motion for a temporary restraining order on September 4. On September 10, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss and on September 21, the court declined to grant provisional class certification, but granted in part plaintiffs' motion for expedited relief and outlined a process for the parties to proceed with individualized bail hearings for plaintiffs with high risk medical conditions that did not have violent and felonious criminal histories. 2020 WL 5646138. The court noted that by July 29, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among detainees at MPC was reported to be 206. By August 11, defendants reported zero active cases and deaths, but the court noted that it "lack[ed] confidence in these numbers." The court also noted that "the timeline of events at MPC demonstrates that, despite the measures [d]efendants allegedly implemented, the detention facility nonetheless experienced a significant outbreak of COVID-19 while those measures were already in place." In October, the court granted bail for three detainees and denied bail for one detainee. 2020 WL 6130717. On November 20, the defendants appealed the bail determinations and the court's September 21 order granting the plaintiffs' motion for individualized bail hearings. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a habeas action filed by four immigrants held at the Montgomery Processing Center, seeking release in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their medical conditions. The court issued a temporary restraining order that provided for the release of one of the individual plaintiffs. In September, the court entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for individualized bail hearings and three detainees were ordered to be released in October. The defendants appealed in November. The case is ongoing.


On September 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff, an author of a Pulitzer-prize winning book about the Attica Prison uprising, wished for her book to be made available to prisoners who are under the authority of the Illinois Department of Correction (IDOC). Her complaint alleged that the defendants, employees of IDOC, improperly censored her book by preventing it from being distributed in some of the prisons in the state. The complaint further alleged a violation of the plaintiff's free speech and due process rights, because there was no process available to challenge the censorship. The case was assigned to Judge Sue E. Myerscough. The Uptown People's Law Center represent the plaintiff. The most recent amended complaint was filed by the plaintiff on April 30, 2019. The defendants filed their answer on June 4, 2019. The parties continued discovery through the spring and summer of 2020; they also considered mediation. Subsequently, on September 29, 2020, the plaintiff filed for partial summary judgment and the defendants filed a separate motion for summary judgment one day later. In late October, the parties filed their respective response motions. The court granted a joint motion to continue the trial date pending the cross-motions for summary judgment, which had originally been scheduled for February 16, 2021. As of March 30, 2021, the case is ongoing and the dates have not yet been rescheduled.

Summary: On September 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the 1st and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff, an author of a Pulitzer-prize winning book about the Attica Prison uprising, wished for her book to be made available to prisoners who are under the authority of the Illinois Department of Correction [IDOC]. Her complaint alleged that the defendants, employees of IDOC, improperly censored her book by preventing it from being distributed in some of the prisons in the state. The complaint further alleged a violation of the plaintiff's free speech and due process rights, because there was no process available to challenge the censorship. The case is currently ongoing.


In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature passed three statutes modifying the State's Medicaid plan, reducing payments made to health providers. Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (The Medicaid Act), such modifications must be approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being put in place. In September and December 2008, California submitted amendment proposals to CMS that incorporated most of the rate reductions the Legislature had already included in the three statutes. This suit, and several others seeking injunctions to prevent the rate reductions, was filed before CMS had completed its review of the amendments. The Independent Living Center of Southern California (a disability advocacy group), two branches of the Gray Panthers (a healthcare and anti-ageism advocacy organization), individual Medicaid benefit recipients, and several pharmacies and pharmacists (collectively, "the petitioners") filed this suit as a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the State of California not to implement the reductions to its Medicaid program ("Medi-Cal"). The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid. The case was originally filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on April 22, 2008, but was removed to federal U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on May 19, 2008. The defendants had requested the removal to federal court; the removal was granted because the case involved questions of federal law. According to the plaintiffs' Petition for Mandamus, prior to the rate reduction, California Medicaid rates for physicians were 61% or less of what Medicare paid for the same services. The plaintiffs claimed that "as a result of the low Medi-Cal rates, only 55% of primary care physicians and less than 50% of specialists [were] willing to participate in the Medi-Cal program." They argued that a ten percent reduction in the fee-for-service rate would reduce physician participation to even lower levels. The plaintiffs alleged that the rate reductions violated the Medicaid Act, because they had not been approved by CMS and because the State had failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the quality of and level of access to care available to Medi-Cal recipients. Plaintiffs argued that California had not shown that, were the rate reductions to go into effect, the State would be able to enlist enough providers as to make Medi-Cal services sufficiently available to benefit recipients, as required by 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(30)(A). The plaintiffs alleged that because these rate reductions violated the Medicaid Act, they were therefore preempted by federal law due to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to find that the rate reduction was a violation of federal law and to prevent its enforcement. They also maintained that the rate reduction was prohibited by the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). On May 30, 2008, the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction that would prevent the rate reductions from coming into effect until further review by the District Court. On June 25th, the Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) denied this motion, finding that the petitioners’ case had no likelihood of succeeding because the Medicaid Act did not expressly create an individual right that could be the basis of a cause of action and therefore the petitioners probably did not have standing to bring their suit. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 2008 WL 4298223 (C.D. Cal. 2008). The petitioners appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which vacated the lower court's decision on July 11, 2008, finding that the Supremacy Clause could serve as the basis for their action. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). In light of the Ninth Circuit's order, on August 18, 2008, District Judge Snyder granted in part and denied in part the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that their Supremacy Clause case was likely to succeed on its merits. The Court therefore issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation of the Medi-Cal fee-for-service rate reductions for physicians, dentists, pharmacies, adult day health care centers, clinics, and health systems for services provided on or after July 1, 2008. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 2008 WL 3891211 (C.D. Cal. 2008). On August 27, 2008, the Court issued an order modifying this injunction, so that it did not retroactively apply to the period between July 1 and August 18, 2008. On November 17, 2008, Judge Snyder granted the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction against the rate reductions for non-emergency medical transportation services and for in-home health services. On July 9, 2009, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Milan D. Smith Jr.) affirmed the ruling establishing the injunction, and reversed the modification. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Maxwell-Jolly, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009). Back in the district court, on March 26, 2010, Judge Snyder granted a motion to allow several outside groups to join the case as intervenor plaintiffs, who raised issues similar to those of the original petitioners. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry, 2010 WL 1235762 (C.D. Cal. 2010). On February 10, 2010, the defendants sought review in the United States Supreme Court of the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution could serve as a basis for a cause of action in this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review on January 18, 2011, consolidating this case with four others that raised the same issue, 131 S.Ct. 992 (2011). These four cases were California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly (Clearinghouse case code PB-CA-0020), Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly (PB-CA-0019), Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger (DR-CA-0031), and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Shewry (Docket #: 3:08-cv-05173-SC). On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the list of active District Court cases pending the decision of the Supreme Court. Oral argument before the Supreme Court took place on October 3, 2011. After oral argument, while the cases were pending in the Supreme Court, CMS approved California's amendments to its Medicaid plan. In light of this, on February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce Title XIX against a state. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, with instructions to take into account CMS's approval of the amendments. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012). On April 12, 2012, the petitioners moved to have the stay lifted in the District Court. The Court denied this motion because issues that would be determinative of the outcome of the case were still awaiting adjudication at the Ninth Circuit Court. Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Douglas, 2012 WL 1622346 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, the parties entered into mediation efforts. On May 22, 2012, the parties' unanimous joint motion to enter mediation, and to stay the supplemental briefing schedule during the pendancy of mediation was granted by the Ninth Circuit. The District Court directed the parties to submit a joint status report, which was filed on July 23, 2013. On November 5, 2013, the District Court reviewed the parties' positions from the joint status report, as well as issues presented in a certiorari petition pending in the United States Supreme Court in a totally different case (brought by other parties against the same defendant, involving some but not all the same issues)(Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, S.Ct. Docket 13-253). In this and another 19 similar cases, the District Court stayed or continued an existing stay of the proceedings. The parties then settled, and filed a joint request for dismissal of several appeals in the Ninth Circuit; this was granted on May 28, 2014. Back in the district court, on August 14, 2014 the parties filed a Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement; Judge Snyder granted the motion on September 22, 2014. In the settlement, all parties agreed to dismiss any remaining pending appeals pursuant to the original preliminary injunction. The petitioners also agreed to dismiss the entire case with prejudice. The District Court retained jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs’ motions for attorneys' fees, and also to determine any of the plaintiffs’ motions to enforce the Agreement up to January 1, 2016. Each side would bear its own costs, outside of any plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees that the District Court decided to award. Since fee-for-service delivery systems are where health care providers are paid for each service, the preliminary injunction against rate reductions for Medi-Cal cost the defendants money. Due to this, the defendants had filed claims against Medi-Cal providers in order to recoup these funds. In the Settlement Agreement, the defendants agreed to forego these claims outside of a few specified exceptions. The plaintiffs also agreed to release state and federal entities from liability for claims concerning payment reductions, unless the claims related to the accuracy of reimbursement. In return, the defendants agreed to release the plaintiff from liability for claims of “excess payment”, including payments made while the preliminary injunction was in effect, but where the rate reductions ultimately received federal approval. After the Settlement Agreement was approved, pursuant to its terms, on April 22, 2015, the petitioners and intervenors filed to dismiss the case and made a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party. They also brought three other motions for attorneys’ fees and costs the next day. On April 23, 2015, Judge Snyder, considering application, ordered that this case be dismissed with prejudice, and that each party bear its own costs in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. Judge Snyder declined to grant any attorneys' fees. On July 24 and 28, 2015, the plaintiff and intervenors appealed to the Ninth Circuit this order denying fees. On November 21, 2018, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded this case to the district court to determine whether the appellants (plaintiff and intervenors) should recover attorneys’ fees, and, if so, the amount of the award. The court also remanded for a determination of whether appellants can recover any fees from the relief obtained in 2010. Judge Milan Smith Jr., writing for the majority, found that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to set aside funds for attorneys’ fees following the decision permitting retroactive monetary relief from the Medi-Cal reimbursement reduction. On January 14, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court also denied the plaintiff and intervenors' petition for rehearing en banc. The case is still ongoing in the district court to determine the payment of attorney's fees. On April 10, 2019 the plaintiffs and the intervenors filed motions for attorney's fees. The defendants opposed these motions. A hearing on the motion for attorney's fees was held on June 24, 2019. On August 6, 2019, the court denied the motion. The court ordered additional briefing on the issue, which was submitted by both parties in August and September 2019. Oral argument was held on January 13, 2020. On January 24, 2020, Judge Snyder granted the motion for attorney's fees. The court awarded the intervenor's counsel $4,254,713.88, and awarded the plaintiff's counsel $2,731,800. 2020 WL 418947. The plaintiff's appealed the decision on attorney's fees to the Ninth Circuit (Appeal Docket No. 20-55193 ) on February 21, 2020. The plaintiff-appellants filed their opening briefs on June 30, 2020. The defendant-appelles have not yet filed a brief in opposition. As of July 2020, the Ninth Circuit appeal remains ongoing.

Summary: A disability advocacy group, an anti-ageism advocacy organization, several individual Medicaid benefit recipients, and several pharmacies and pharmacists ("the Petitioners") filed this suit as a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the State of California not to implement the Medicaid reductions. The case was originally filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on April 22, 2008, but was removed to federal U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on May 19, 2008. The plaintiffs alleged that the rate reductions violated the Medicaid Act, because they had not been approved by CMS and because the State had failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the quality of and level of access to care available to Medi-Cal recipients. After California's amended its amendment proposals were approved by the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the two parties reached a settlement agreement. The district court awarded attorneys fees, and the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal is ongoing.


On July 27, 2010, four students with disabilities and the Hawaii Disability Rights Center filed this class action against the Hawaii Department of Education seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by Hawaii Disability Rights Center, contended that the Department was failing to comply with its obligations to provide a Free Accessible Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and their right to a discrimination-free education under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The case was assigned to District Judge Susan Oki Mollway. At the time the complaint was filed, the disabled individuals who brought the suit were over twenty but under twenty-two years old and had previously received a FAPE under the IDEA. However, following the establishment of a new Hawaii Law, Act 163, these individuals were denied a FAPE because they were over twenty years of age. The plaintiffs moved for class certification and a preliminary injunction. District Judge David Alan Ezra signed an order granting in part and denying in part the motion for class certification on March 15, 2011. 272 F.R.D. 541. The judge also issued an order denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2011 WL 2746800. Defendants then moved for a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction and moved for summary judgment. Judge Ezra then issued an order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, and denying plaintiff's renewed motion for preliminary relief. 817 F.Supp.2d 1182. In 2012, the case went to a bench trial. Judge Alan Ezra held that the plaintiffs failed to prove the Hawaii Department of Education violated the IDEA, ACA, and Rehabilitation Act and entered judgment for the defendants. 2012 WL 1082250. The case was then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On August 28, 2013, the Ninth Circuit announced its conclusion, affirming in part and reversing in part. 728 F.3d 982. The court found that the State of Hawaii offered public education to nondisabled students between the ages of 20 and 22 through its Community Schools for Adults. The court held that so long as the State continued to provide such an education to nondisabled students under 22, it was required under IDEA to provide a FAPE to disabled students in the same age bracket. The court reversed and remanded the case on the IDEA count. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the Department was required to make such changes as a "reasonable accommodation." Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's judgement in favor of the Department on the ACA and Rehabilitation Act claims. The court also awarded costs on appeal to the Plaintiffs. After being remanded to district court, and after the case was reassigned to Judge Susan Oki Mollway, the class was recertified. Subsequently, the parties began settlement conferences. On December 8, 2017, Judge Oki Mollway issued an order approving settlement for class members. As part of the settlement, the Department of Education agreed to fund the requisite services and pay $8.2 million dollars to class members, $1.5 million for attorneys' fees, and up to $250,000 to class counsel for future services rendered in relation to the administration of the settlement. The administration of the settlement continues. The case remains open.

Summary: In this class action suit, four students with disabilities and the Hawaii Disability Rights Center sued the Hawaii Department of Education for allegedly violating the IDEA, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. After seven years of litigation, Judge Oki Mollway approved the settlement for class members. Under the settlement agreement, the Department of Education agreed to pay $8.2 million dollars to class members, $1.5 million for attorneys' fees, and up to $250,000 for class counsel for future services. The administration of the settlement continues.


On December 31, 1996 a law student who used a wheelchair for mobility sued the University of Denver in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Chief Judge Richard P. Matsch. The Plaintiff claimed that numerous architectural and other barriers to accessibility prevented him from full participation as a student in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that he encountered automatic doors which did not open, elevators that did not work, transportation available to students but without disabled access, and classroom configurations that segregated him in the back of the room. He sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On July 21, 1998, the court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice, with each party bearing its own costs and attorneys' fees. There is no settlement agreement or other similar document available in this case.

Summary: A disabled law student sued his school for numerous architectural and other barriers to accessibility that prevented him from full participation as a student. It appears the parties settled, although no settlement documents are publicly available.


On November 15, 2007, an individual who was strip searched after being charged with a petty crime filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project and private counsel, the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging as unconstitutional Bexar County Detention Center's policy or custom of strip searching misdemeanant arrestees even where they were not suspected of concealing weapons or contraband. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she was arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant and taken to the Bexar County Detention Center, where she was subjected to a strip search upon admission. The plaintiff further alleged that, after being held for two days, she and 25 other pretrial detainees were ordered to change into jail-issued uniforms, at which time she was again strip searched. The plaintiffs allege that detainees were told to manipulate genitalia and sometimes "squat and cough" regardless of whether there was reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. The plaintiff claimed that the strip searches violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that they were conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband. To remedy the alleged constitutional violation, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On April 2, 2009, both parties agreed to a consent decree that would provide permanent injunctive relief without further litigation. The decree dictated that the County Detention Center would no longer, absent reasonable suspicion that someone is concealing contraband, engage in the practice of strip searching or visual cavity searching those in their custody who are charged with misdemeanors. The County Detention Center also had to provide the court with an annual report regarding the implementation of the consent decree. Nothing in the consent decree addressed the plaintiff's request for compensatory and punitive damages. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree. The decree was signed by Judge Fred Biery of the Western District of Texas. On November 16, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The parties continued to engage in discovery and settlement talks to resolve the damages claims. On August 26, 2010, the plaintiffs' submitted a motion of preliminary approval of the class-action settlement. The court preliminarily approved the settlement on October 13, 2010. After a fairness hearing, a final order of approval was granted on January 12, 2011. The settlement agreement certified a class of plaintiffs composed of all detainees of Bexar County Detention Center between November 2005 and April 2009 who were subjected to strip searches and booked on misdemeanor or other minor charges. Those with felonies were not included. The class also had two subclasses. Subclass I was composed of all detainees not in subclass II, and subclass II included detainees booked on narcotics, shoplifting, and weapons-violation misdemeanors. All members of the class were to receive a pro rata share of the settlement after administrative expenses, attorneys' fees, and other expenses are counted for. Attorneys' fees were $900,000 for this case. The court found this reasonable considering the amount of time put in and the complexity of the case. The settlement included $395,000 for the claim administrator, and $15,000 was given to the three class representatives for their work in the lawsuit. The fund was then be used to pay class members. Class members in subclass I could receive up to $1,000, and members of subclass II can receive up to $100. Class members could pay off court fines and fees in Bexar County with their settlement funds, but this was capped at $500 and $50 for the subclasses respectively. On January 28, 2013, however, the district court dismissed this case, thus vacating and revoking the settlement agreement. In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, holding that jail administrators may require all arrestees committed to the general population of the jail to undergo a no-touch visual strip search, even if the detainees is booked for a minor offense or reasonable suspicion is absent. The plaintiffs, their attorneys, and class members were not required to pay back any fees or funds they were awarded, but the County no longer needed to abide by the consent decree from April 9, 2009, that details how their strip search policy is to be conducted. They were now guided by the decision in Florence.

Summary: In 2007, an individual who was strip searched after being charged with a petty crime, represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project and private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, challenging as unconstitutional Bexar County Detention Center's policy or custom of strip searching misdemeanant arrestees even where they were not suspected of concealing weapons or contraband. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that she was arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant and taken to the Bexar County Detention Center, where she was subjected to a strip search upon admission.Plaintiff claimed that the strip searches violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that they were conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that she was hiding weapons or contraband. To remedy the alleged constitutional violation, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On April 2nd, 2009 both parties agreed to a consent decree that dictated that the Bexar County Detention Center would no longer, absent reasonably suspicion, engaged in strip searching of those in custody who are charged with misdemeanors. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint later that year, and the two parties engaged in settlement discussions. A settlement was preliminarily approved on October 13th, and officially approved on January 12th, 2011. The Agreement certified the class of petitioners, and required the County to create a $3.5 million fund. The fund paid for $900,00 in attorneys' fees, $395,000 for administrative costs, and $15,000 fees to each of the three class representatives. It also paid for damages to be paid to class members. ON January 28th, 2013 the consent decree and the settlement agreement were vacated because of a Supreme Court decisions from 2012 holding that jail administrators could conduct no-touch visual strip searches of detainees, without reasonable suspicion that they detainee has contraband. The case is now closed.