On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Michigan filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of more than a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders (EO) banning admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Detroit Field Office. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders through the Detroit Field Office" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." The complaint stated that "Michigan residents were among those most severely impacted by the Executive Orders...Of the major metropolitan areas in the United States, Detroit has the highest number of residents per capita from the seven countries barred under Executive Order No. 1." On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that "[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice." On August 3, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's transfer motion. In its order, the Panel found that, although the thirteen FOIA cases shared "a limited number of factual issues," these issues "appear[ed] relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings." On Oct. 26, 2017, the court ordered the government to review the first 820 pages of records it had identified as potentially responsive to the FOIA request, and produce responsive records from that batch, by Nov. 27. The court also ordered the government to repeat this process monthly. A joint status report filed on April 27, 2018 indicated that the production was complete and the ACLU was in the process of reviewing the government's production. The report indicated further litigation may be possible in light of disagreement over search terms between the parties. A subsequent August status report indicated the parties were attempting to negotiate a resolution and avoid further litigation. On August 20, 2019, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement. On September 16, 2019, the parties stipulated dismissal of claims against the defendants, with prejudice, and the court dismissed the case.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Michigan filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the case was dismissed on September 16, 2019.


On April 23, 2014, hunger-strike protesters at a family detention center filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Homeland Security and the GEO Group, Inc, a subcontractor of the Karnes County Residential Center in Karnes City, Texas. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, claim that the defendants violated their First Amendment Right to freedom of expression by discriminating against them. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they suffered and continue to suffer injury, including chilling effects, as a result of the defendants' interrogation and isolation the plaintiffs because of their participation in various hunger strikes protesting their detention. In March 2014, eighty mothers awaiting asylum proceedings with their children protested the inadequate and intolerable living conditions of the detention center by participating in a hunger strike. The mothers continued feeding their children. Many of the participants, along with their children, were subsequently isolated and interrogated by ICE officials and GEO agents. Many were fired from their jobs in the detention center which had previously allowed them to pay for food from the commissary to continue feeding their children. ICE officials did not respond to the signed petition and many of the participants discontinued their protest as a result of these actions described. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on April 29, 2015, but the court denied their motion on May 8, 2015. On June 1, 2015 the District Court (Judge Xavier Rodriguez) scheduled a bench trial for June 6, 2016. Subsequently, the defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. However, on September 9, 2015, the plaintiffs informed the court that they were voluntarily dismissing the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). This case is now closed.

Summary: Immigrant mothers signed a petition and organized a hunger strike protesting the conditions of a private prison while awaiting asylum proceedings. The participants were interrogated, isolated, and threatened with deportation in retaliation. They were fired from their jobs in the detention center which had previously given them access to food from the commissary to continue feeding their children. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief but voluntarily dismissed their claim on September 9, 2015.


On November 7, 2005, Freedom from Religious Foundation, Inc., along with several individual members of the organization who were New Mexico taxpayers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against the New Mexico Corrections Department and Correction Corporation of America, a private contractor paid to run the New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility (NMWCF) in Grants County. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the CCA's use of Christian faith-based programming in NMWCF constituted an endorsement of religion and violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. On January 31, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi) denied a variety of motions for summary judgement regarding whether Plaintiffs had stated a valid claim, whether Plaintiffs' taxpayer status gave them standing to sue, and whether the Christian program at NMWCF violated the Establishment Clause. On June 26, 2007, the Court notified the parties of its intention to withdraw its decisions on the summary judgement motions and to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims with prejudice or grant summary judgement for Defendants on the issue of taxpayer standing. The Court asked the parties to submit arguments about the proposed action. Instead, on July 6, 2007, the parties moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice, which the Court did the same day. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 7, 2005, Freedom from Religious Foundation, Inc., along with several individual members of the organization who were New Mexico taxpayers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against the New Mexico Corrections Department and Correction Corporation of America, a private contractor paid to run the New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility (NMWCF) in Grants County.The plaintiffs alleged that the CCA's use of Christian faith-based programming in NMWCF constituted an endorsement of religion and violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Despite initially ruling in response to summary judgement motions that Plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to sue, the Court notified that parties that it had reversed course and intended to rule in favor of Defendants on the issue of standing. The parties subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed on April 23, 2020 by an Illinois State Representative, an Illinois Circuit Court judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Governor of Illinois from enforcing the state's stay at home order against the plaintiff. Later, the judge declared that both the Governor's extension of the stay at home order and the order itself exceeded his authority. The Illinois Supreme Court transferred this case to consolidate it with other COVID-19-related litigation, and the Governor is seeking to vacate the original judge's declaratory judgment.
 On April 23, 2020, an Illinois State Representative filed this lawsuit suit in the Clay County Circuit Court. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the Governor of Illinois under state law, asserting that the governor lacked authority under the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act (the Act) to extend the state's stay at home order through the end of April. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the extended stay at home order was "in excess of the authority granted . . . under the act." The plaintiff also sought to enjoin the Governor from enforcing the extended stay at home order against the plaintiff. This case arose from Illinois' response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 9, 2020, the Governor issued a proclamation under the Act declaring that the COVID-19 pandemic was a public health emergency rising to the level of a disaster. The Act conferred on the Governor emergency powers for 30 days following the declaration. Under his emergency powers, the Governor issued an executive order on March 20 requiring that Illinois residents only leave their home for essential activities or business. This executive order was effective until April 8. On April 1, the Governor declared that the COVID-19 pandemic was a "continuing public health emergency" and issued an executive order extending the stay at home requirement until April 30. The plaintiff asserted that under the Act, the Governor lacked the authority to extend the March 20 executive order beyond April 8, which was 30 days after the initial disaster declaration. The plaintiff further alleged that the executive order "limit[ed] [the plaintiff's] constitutionally protected freedoms in that it ordered him to stay at home, or at his place of residence, as well as limited his ability to travel within the state." The plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), asserting that the executive order was causing irreparable harm by ordering him to stay at home and avoid travel. The same day, Judge Michael McHaney granted the the plaintiff's motion for a TRO and enjoined the Governor from enforcing the stay at home order against the plaintiff. Judge McHaney found that the plaintiff "has a clearly ascertainable right in need of immediate protection, namely his liberty interest to be free from [defendant's] executive order of quarantine in his own home." Judge McHaney also concluded that the plaintiff had a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm if a TRO were not issued, and had no adequate remedy at law. The Governor immediately appealed to the Fifth District Appellate Court and filed an emergency motion for direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Before the appellate court could rule, the plaintiff consented to the vacating of the TRO, and the matter was remanded to the circuit court on May 1. On May 13, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The plaintiff maintained his argument that the Governor exceeded his authority in extending the stay at home order. In addition, the plaintiff asserted that the April 30 disaster proclamation was void because the continuing public health emergency failed to meet the statutory definition of a disaster. The plaintiff further argued that the governor "had no Illinois constitutional authority to restrict citizen's movement or activities and/or forcibly close the business premises" and that this authority was delegated to the Department of Health. On May 18, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 21, the Governor removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. He asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the "action seeks redress for alleged deprivations of [plaintiff's] federal constitutional rights caused by actions taken under color of state law." He asserted that the action sought to redress the "alleged deprivation of [plaintiff's] . . . First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, his right to interstate travel, and the right to a Republican Form of Government conferred by Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution." The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison. Later that day, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to remand the case. The plaintiff argued that the matter raised "nothing but questions concerning Defendant's authority under certain Illinois statutes" and asserted that the defendant was "intent on forum shopping and want[ed] nothing more than to derail state court proceedings." Plaintiff further contended that "Whether or not Defendant’s actions infringe on rights existing under the United States Constitution is irrelevant to and mentioned nowhere in Plaintiff’s complaint or first amended complaint" and that "the core of Plaintiff’s causes of action, is not 'capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance.'” Plaintiff additionally sought expedited relief and attorneys' fees. A day later, on May 22, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a statement of interest supporting the plaintiff's motion "because the plaintiff makes no federal claim." First, the DOJ asserted that the defendant misread the amended complaint and that "plaintiff has elected to proceed on only state law claims, and removal is thus improper." Moreover, the DOJ contended that the Governor exceeded his authority when issuing the executive orders. Lastly, the DOJ argued that while the case had federal implications, these implications were not sufficient to support removal. On June 29, 2020, Judge Sison remanded the case. While calling the decision "a close call," Judge Sison reasoned that the "most straightforward reading" of the amended complaint was that the plaintiff sued under the Illinois declaratory judgment statute seeking resolution of state-law questions about the extent of the Governor's power; any implicit federal constitutional issues were "not central" to the case. Judge Sison also rejected the Governor's argument that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (a largely defunct statute that allows civil rights plaintiffs to sue in federal court regardless of the amount in controversy, useful decades ago when 28 U.S.C. § 1331 had an amount in controversy requirement) conferred broader jurisdiction than § 1331. However, Judge Sison rejected the plaintiff's motion for fees, finding that removal was non-frivolous since the complaint referred to constitutional rights. 2020 WL 3498428. Three days later, Judge McHaney granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff. Judge McHaney declared that the Governor's second and third disaster proclamations were void because they arose from the same "occurrence or threat" that gave rise to the first proclamation yet extended beyond the Act's 30-day limit. Judge McHaney also declared that the proclamations' substantive provisions were invalid because the Act did not give the Governor "any authority to restrict a citizen's movement or activities." In addition, Judge McHaney held that the decision applied to all citizens of Illinois. But he declined to issue an injunction and denied summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims that COVID-19 did not meet the Act's definition of a disaster. On July 7, the Governor moved to dismiss the plaintiff's remaining claim that COVID-19 was not a disaster under the Act. Meanwhile, the plaintiff felt that the Governor had not complied with the circuit court's summary judgment ruling. So, he filed a motion to hold the Governor in civil contempt on August 5, 2020. In response, the circuit court on August 7 issued the Governor a show cause order. The Governor sought a supervisory order from the Illinois Supreme Court, which stayed the contempt hearing on August 11 but refused to issue a supervisory order. Instead, the Court ordered this case consolidated with Craig v. Pritzker, No. 20 MR 589, in the Sangamon County Circuit Court before Judge Raylene D. Grischow. After consolidation, the Governor promptly filed a motion to vacate the Clay County Circuit Court's July 2 summary judgement decision for lack of jurisdiction. That motion is pending as of October 12, 2020; the case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 23, 2020, an Illinois State Representative filed this suit against the Governor of Illinois in Illinois circuit court, asserting that the governor exceeded his authority under state law by extending a stay at home order for more than 30 days in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The circuit court granted a temporary restraining order for plaintiff, but during an appeal, the plaintiff agreed to have it vacated. On May 21, defendant removed the matter to the U.S. District Court for the District of Southern Illinois, and the federal court remanded the case on June 29. The Illinois circuit court declared the extension of the stay at home order invalid on July 2 but denied injunctive relief. After the plaintiff tried to have the Governor held in contempt, the Illinois Supreme Court transferred and consolidated the case with other ongoing COVID-19 litigation.


This suit challenged Texas's "Sanctuary City" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which required local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punished them if they did not. Unlike the other suits in this special collection, this suit did not challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order. At the time of this writing, there were three other cases addressing SB4 (in addition to this one). This case was before Judge Orlando L. Garcia, as was El Paso County v. Texas, No. 17-cv-00459 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0046, and City of San Antonio, Texas v. State of Texas, No. 17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0047. The final case, Texas v. Travis County, No. 17-cv-00425 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0044, was before Judge Sparks. The three cases pending before Judge Garcia were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking an injunction barring implementation of SB4. The other case was brought by Texas, which sought a declaratory judgment to uphold SB4 against pro-immigration cities and counties. On June 6, Judge Garcia ordered a consolidation of this case with the San Antonio and El Paso cases, with this case becoming the lead case in the consolidation. The Travis County case, however, remained separate. On this case: On May 8, 2017, the City of El Cenizo filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 2017 WL 1950681 (W.D.Tex.). The suit alleged that SB4 violated the 10th Amendment by commandeering local government and that it was preempted under federal immigration law. The City also complained that SB4's “endorse” prohibition violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, that its ICE-detainer mandate violated the Fourth Amendment, and that its “materially limits” phrase was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Numerous procedural developments took place over the summer as the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction. The defendants sought to dismiss the cases and numerous entities sought to intervene. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on May 18. 2017 WL 10900157. And they filed a second amended complaint on June 8 once the claims were consolidated. 2017 WL 9362206. The plaintiffs moved again for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 2017. The defendants moved to dismiss the consolidated case. The court allowed the City of Austin to intervene on June 12, 2017 and Austin filed an intervenor complaint that day. The plaintiffs filed another amended complaint on June 19, 2017. The same day, the plaintiffs and intervenors issued four separate motions for preliminary injunction. On June 21, 2017, Texas moved to dismiss the City of Austin’s complaint in intervention and El Paso County’s first amended complaint. Later that week, Judge Garcia granted two motions to intervene: to Travis County and the City of Dallas. On June 28 and 29, 2017, the state of Texas filed a series of motions to dismiss. The court allowed the City of Houston and the Texas Association of Hispanic County Judges and County Commissioners to intervene on June 30, 2017. On July 14, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss two complaints on intervention (the City of Houston and the Texas Association of Hispanic County Judges & County Commissioners). The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 20, 2017, to which the defendants responded with a motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Texas' motion to dismiss El Paso County's complaint on August 15, 2017. SB4 was set to go into effect on September 1, 2017, however on August 30 Judge Garcia granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Texas from enforcing certain provisions of the law that were preempted by federal law. 264 F. Supp. 3d 744 (W.D. Tex. 2017). In particular, Judge Garcia blocked the portion of SB4 that stated that local government officials may not "adopt, enforce, or endorse a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws." The following day, the defendants appealed that injunction and filed a motion to stay pending the appeal. The motion to stay was denied. Meanwhile, the following entities submitted briefs in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction: El Paso County, Travis County, the City of Austin, the City of San Antonio, the City of Dallas, the City of Houston, the City of San Marcos, the El Cenzino plaintiffs, the Anti-Defamation League, the Harris County attorney at the time, Major Cities Chiefs Association, Police Executive Research Forum, the United States Conference of Mayors, the National Human Rights Commission of Mexico, and a Houston-based law firm specializing in immigration law. At the appeals court, on September 25, 2017, the Fifth Circuit denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction while appeal was pending. 2017 WL 4250186. The court granted stay for the injunction on the enforcement of an SB4 provision that local entities could not "prohibit" immigration law enforcement by inhibiting cooperation with federal immigration officers. The court also stayed the injunction on the provision requiring enforcement agencies to comply with detainer requests issued by ICE. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Fifth Circuit on September 29 from the denial of their relief in the preliminary injunction order. Oral argument was held on November 7, 2017. The Fifth Circuit reversed the injunction on March 13, 2018, holding that SB4 did not violate the constitution with the exception of the prohibition on "endors[ing] a policy under which the entity or department prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of immigration laws." 885 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2018). The court struck down that part of the statute, finding that it violated the First Amendment and lacked a limiting principle. As to upholding the remainder of the statute, the court did not find that SB4 conflicted with federal law so as to warrant preemption, nor did it find that the remainder of the statute violated the constitution. The court found that the law's mandate that local law enforcement was to comply with ICE detainer requests did not facially violate the Fourth Amendment, though it left the door open for an as-applied challenge should violations occur or ICE policy change. The court found that the provision forbidding policies or practices that "materially limit[]" the enforcement of immigration laws was not facially vague. The court also remanded the case. The plaintiffs petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en banc, which was granted. Many amici were represented at this stage, including the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, and many others in support of Texas. Amici in support of the plaintiffs included the Major Cities Chiefs Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, Texas Senate Hispanic Caucus, Mexican American Legislative Caucus, Interfaith Coalition of Clergy and Religious Organizations, and many others. On May 8, 2018, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc upheld SB4 in its entirety, with the exception of the application of the "endorsement" prohibition of Tex. Gov't Code § 752.053(a)(1) to Texas officials, in an opinion which withdrew and superseded its March opinion. 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018). The case was ordered remanded to the district court to vacate the remaining injunction provisions that had halted full implementation of SB4. The court held that Texas law was not preempted by federal law in this case, because while federal law regulates how local entities may cooperate in immigration enforcement, SB4 specifies whether they cooperate. It confirmed that the endorsement prohibition could not pass muster under the First Amendment. Most critically, the court found that the immigration detainer provision was not facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, and that the Constitution does not require probable cause of criminality to detain in the immigration context. The phrase “materially limits” in the provision forbidding any policy or pattern or practice that prohibits or materially limits the enforcement of the immigration laws, was not unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Texas constitution did not prevent Texas from preempting cities' home-rule authority in passing SB4. According to the ACLU, this meant that local officials were free to speak out against laws like SB4 that would require cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. For example, sheriffs and police chiefs can continue to speak publicly about why asking about immigration status is a poor police practice that harms public safety. However, because of the Fifth Circuit's May 2018 decision, local Texas officials were obligated under SB4 to assist in federal immigration enforcement, and could face penalties for declining requests to assist with federal immigration agents. However, the preliminary injunction had not covered the statute in its entirety. On April 22, 2019, the court stated as much in an order requesting an update from the parties as to the status of the litigation. The court reiterated that after the appeal, neither of the parties had continued to litigate though live claims still remained. On September 12, 2019, the El Cenizo and Travis County plaintiffs and the cities of Houston and Dallas filed to voluntarily dismiss their remaining claims with prejudice. In light of the failure of the facial challenge to SB4 and the Fifth Circuit's opinion, these plaintiffs no longer wanted to pursue the remaining as-applied claims. But on December 13, 2019, the City of Austin filed an amended complaint. It sought a declaratory judgment that SB4 violated the First Amendment because it penalized city officials for protected speech that "endorsed" policies contradicting SB4. It also sought an injunction against its enforcement. The city of El Paso and its official in their official capacity, along with Project Education Fund and MOVE Texas, also filed an amended complaint on December 13. They alleged that SB4 imposed unconstitutional mandates on local governments, facilitated discriminatory policing, chilled protected speech, and was pretext for discriminatory intent. They claimed that the ordinance violated Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and the First Amendment. They sought declaratory relief and an injunction against SB4's enforcement, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This suit challenges Texas's "Sanctuary City" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the other suits in this special collection, this suit does not challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order. In this consolidated action, the district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting SB4 from going into effect on its projected start date. The Fifth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction and affirmed in a rehearing en banc, stating that the ordinance was facially constitutional. Some of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on remand. Others filed amended complaints in December 2019 and the case is alive again.


On January 25, 2012, this class action was brought by individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) and the United Cerebral Palsy Association of Oregon and Southwest Washington, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs claimed that the State of Oregon and its Offices of Developmental Disability Services and Vocational Rehabilitation Services, along with other state agencies, violated the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act by operating an employment services program that unnecessarily separated disabled participants from nondisabled participants. The plaintiffs claimed these segregated settings deprived members of the plaintiff class (more than 2,300 people in the state) of supported employment services, the opportunity to work alongside nondisabled persons, and the ability to compete for higher-paying jobs. They claimed the state's policy discriminated against them based on disability. The plaintiffs sought certification of their proposed class, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction to limit unnecessary segregation in the defendants' employment services program and to provide an adequate array of integrated employment and supported employment services. On April 3, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs were attempting to create "a new cause of action" by extending the ADA's integration mandate beyond the requirement to provide community and home-based services (which were designed to prevent unnecessary institutionalization) to also include employment services. The defendants argued that (1) employment claims were not covered by Title II of the ADA; (2) the integration mandate did not apply because a denial of employment services did not place any plaintiff at risk of institutionalization; (3) the plaintiffs' claims sought to require the defendants to provide a service that the state did not and could not provide; and (4) the plaintiffs' claims improperly imposed a certain standard of care on the state's provision of employment services. At the core of the defendants' argument was the notion that the integration mandate of the ADA applied only to a person's place of residency and not place of employment. On April 20, 2012, the United States submitted a statement of interest regarding the motion to dismiss. It cited that contrary to defendant’s motion to dismiss, Title II of the ADA forms a clear and comprehensive mandate to end the segregation of persons with disabilities in virtually all aspects of American life. On May 17, 2012, Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart held that the integration mandate applies equally to employment-related services and to services allowing persons to live outside institutions. 841 F.Supp.2d 1199. The court did, however, find that the plaintiffs sought "the forbidden remedy" of requiring defendants to provide an adequate level of employment services to enable plaintiffs to obtain a competitive job in their initial complaint. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. On May 29, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with changes made to correct errors identified by the court. The court then addressed the question of class certification. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of "all individuals in Oregon with intellectual or developmental disabilities who are in, or who have been referred to, sheltered workshops" and "who are qualified for supported employment services." The plaintiffs argued that the evidence needed to resolve the common questions of law and fact was the same for all class members. On August 6, 2012, the court granted class certification. 283 F.R.D. 587. On May 24, 2014, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed an intervenor complaint on behalf of the United States, which included evidence of a nine-month investigation into Oregon’s failure to comply with the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Some individual members of the class viewed sheltered work as equally valuable as integrated work and moved to intervene on the concern that their ability to choose sheltered work would be curtailed. But on June 20, 2014, Magistrate Judge Stewart denied the motion. 2014 WL 2807701. On September 8, 2015, the parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement and on January 17, 2016, the court approved it. 166 F.Supp.3d 1180. In the settlement, the defendant committed to assisting 1,115 working-age individuals who receive or have received sheltered workshop services to obtain integrated employment in competitive-wage jobs and to reducing the number of adults with I/DD in sheltered workshops from 1,926 to no more than 1,530. The state also committed to end funding for sheltered workshop placements for youth newly eligible for state-funded employment, to provide at least 4,900 youth with employment services to help them access integrated employment, and to work with the state Department of Human Services in seeking financial incentives for providers to hire individuals with I/DD and in obtaining integrated employment. The parties agreed the settlement would terminate no later than July 1, 2022. On February 11, 2016, the court granted an award of $5,250,000.00 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. 2016 WL 589684. As part of the settlement, the state's efforts are being monitored by an independent reviewer who will issue annual reports until the settlement's termination date. Since the case settled, two annual reports have been filed, one on March 2, 2017 and one on March 23, 2018. Because the settlement continues to be monitored and the plaintiffs may reopen litigation if defendants fail to comply, this case is ongoing as of May 22, 2020.

Summary: This is a case filed in 2012 by persons with disabilities who qualify for the state of Oregon's supported employment services, and were not given meaningful opportunity to work in community settings, violating the ADA. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon held that the plaintiffs' claims were cognizable under the ADA, and that they could be brought as a class action, distinguishing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. A class action settlement was approved on February 11, 2016. As part of the settlement, Oregon agreed to a sustained commitment to improve employment offerings for about 7,000 people between 2015-2022. Their progress is being monitored by an independent review and will be reported on annually until the settlement agreement ends on July 1, 2022.


This group of 1,704 plaintiffs, led by a Flint homeowner, sued the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Federal Tort Claims Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in connection with the Flint water crisis on April 18, 2017. This lawsuit is distinct from the Flint water cases in front of Judge Judith Levy, which were filed against various state actors. The plaintiffs were represented by a variety of Michigan-based small private law firms. They sought $722.4 million dollars in personal and property damages. An FTCA complaint must allege the ways in which employees of the federal government are liable to plaintiffs under state tort law. Here, the plaintiffs alleged that the EPA was liable for negligence in two instances related to statutory duties: first, because it failed to bring a Section 1431 Emergency Action under the Safe Drinking Water Act until 2016, despite being on notice as early as October 2014 that there was a potential problem of toxic water in Flint; second, because the EPA failed to provide advice and technical assistance to states and local providers which are not in compliance with the requirements of the Safe Water Drinking Act. They also alleged that the EPA was negligent in not warning the public of potential risks to public health due to the contamination of Flint's water, and that they were negligent in undertaking a timely investigation of the situation in Flint. Procedural background The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 2, 2018. In response to the complaint, the government filed a motion to dismiss on March 2, 2018. Mediation proceedings were ongoing for about a year, and the plaintffs filed a second amended complaint on February 8, 2019. On April 18, 2019, Judge Linda V. Walker issued an order and opinion denying the government's motion to dismiss. She also held that the discretionary function exception to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply in this case, and that plaintiffs' suit could move forward. 375 F.Supp.3d 796. On June 7, 2019, the government filed a motion to certify interlocutory appeal, seeking to immediately bring the case in front of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. This motion was denied by Judge Walker on September 27, 2019. 2019 WL 4734686. Current status The government filed an answer to the second amended complaint on December 6, 2019. The case was consolidated with several others in an order entered on March 3, 2020. The consolidated cases represent 7,535 plaintiffs in total. Judge Walker appointed Deborah Greenspan, a partner in Blank Rome's Washington, DC office, as a special master for the now-consolidated action In re FTCA Flint Water Cases on March 25, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: A group of over 1700 plaintiffs led by a Flint homeowner filed a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the EPA in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on April 18, 2017. Judge Linda V. Walker found that the EPA's actions and lack of actions taken during the Flint Water Crisis did not fall under the discretionary function exception to liability of the FTCA, and issued an opinion on April 18, 2019 ordering that the case move forward. After consolidating this case with several others in March 2020, Judge Walker appointed Deborah Greenspan as a special master for the consolidated cases. The plaintiffs seek $722.4 million dollars in personal and property damages. The case is ongoing.


In May of 2002, the EEOC's Chicago District Office filed suit in U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, against Custom Companies Inc., a trucking company, and related corporate entities. The suit alleged sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The charging parties intervened as plaintiffs. In July of 2003, the case was consolidated with a separate action brought by the EEOC against Custom Companies (1:03-cv-02293). The defendants made multiple motions for summary judgment; one was granted in part, the others were denied. After a prologued series of discovery disputes, the case went to trial in November of 2006. On November 17, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding over $2 million in punitive damages and over $300,000 in compensatory damages. In March of 2007, the award was halved pursuant to statutory caps, and the court entered the judgment against the defendants. Both parties moved to amend the judgment. In June of 2007, the defendants appealed the judgment. In December of 2007, the parties came to terms, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the district court could amend the judgment to reflect the settlement. After some disputes regarding withholding, a final order was entered in March of 2008 granting $452,800 in compensatory and punitive damages and $900,000 in attorney fees. Custom Companies was also ordered to conduct annual anti-discrimination training for its employees, and to report any future complaints of sexual harassment to the EEOC. On June 19, 2008, Judge Harry Leinenweber signed an order indicating that the plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors, and counsel had all been paid in full, and the matter appears to have been resolved.

Summary: In May of 2002, the EEOC's Chicago District Office filed this Title VII sexual-harassment and retaliation suit against Custom Companies Inc., a trucking company, and related corporate entities. The charging parties intervened as plaintiffs, and the case was consolidated with a separate action brought by the EEOC against Custom Companies (1:03-cv-02293). At trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding over $2 million in punitive damages and over $300,000 in compensatory damages. The award was halved pursuant to statutory caps, and the court entered the judgment against the defendants. Both parties moved to amend the judgment. The defendants appealed the judgment. The parties eventually settled, and the Court of Appeals remanded the case so that the district court could amend the judgment to reflect the settlement. The matter appears to be closed.


This case was filed on July 21, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The lawsuit was brought by a single private individual against President Donald Trump, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, and John Does 1-100, all of whom were unnamed federal agents. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel and attorneys from People's Law Project. The complaint alleged that the unnamed federal agents, at the direction of defendant Wolf, beat the plaintiff while they were peacefully protesting to carry out defendant Trump's political agenda. The lawsuit argued that the defendants were in violation of the U.S. Constitution and federal civil rights law. The complaint first alleged violations, both actual and threatened, of the plaintiff's First Amendment to free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition the government. The complaint also alleged violations, actual and threatened, of the Fourth Amendment, specifically through the use of excessive force. The complaint alleged that defendants employed chemical agents, batons, and shields to remove protesters. Finally, the complaint alleged that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 for conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights. The plaintiff requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages, in addition to attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman. For the next few months, there was no activity in the case until the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on October 21, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to why the plaintiff dismissed the claim. This case is closed

Summary: This case deals with President Trump's deployment of federal law enforcement officers to Portland, Oregon in response to the protests that took place there after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint was filed on July 21, 2020, and alleged that the federal officers used excessive force against protesters and violated the protesters First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government. It also alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. Sections 1985 and 1986. The plaintiff, a private individual, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. For the next few months, there was no activity in the case until the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on October 21, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to why the plaintiff dismissed the claim. This case is closed The case is ongoing as of August 6, 2020.


This lawsuit was filed on October 6, 2017 over Section 2 of President Trump’s Sep. 24, 2017 Proclamation ("Executive Order #3" or "EO-3") barring travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. The plaintiffs were U.S. citizens or permanent residents who would not be able to reunite with their family members or who otherwise claimed injury as a direct result of EO-3. Specifically, the plaintiffs were a Syrian national and U.S. lawful permanent resident ("LPR"), a U.S. citizen of Syrian descent with a Syrian national sister currently outside of the U.S., an American citizen of Yemeni descent with a Yemeni national wife currently outside of the U.S., a U.S. citizen with a Syrian national wife currently outside of the U.S., an American citizen of Syrian descent with a Syrian national father currently outside of the U.S., and an American citizen with a Somali national fiancé currently outside of the U.S.. The plaintiffs, represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Brennan Center, and private counsel, filed a concurrent complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The complaint alleged that EO-3 violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants nationwide from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 across the nation. On October 12, the government responded to the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs replied on October 14. The case was assigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang, who was also presiding over IRAP v. Trump. He held a hearing on the Preliminary Injunction motion on October 16. The following day, Judge Chuang granted the motion in part, enjoining all defendants, with the exception of the President of the United States, from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 nationwide. On October 20, the defendants appealed Judge Chuang's decision to the Fourth Circuit (docket no. 17-2233) and requested that the Fourth Circuit stay the injunction pending resolution of the appeal. The defendants also requested accelerated processing of the appellate case, which the plaintiffs opposed the following day. Also on October 20, the Fourth Circuit consolidated this case with IRAP v. Trump and Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump. From October 20 through October 25, the parties continued to file responses regarding the motion to accelerate processing of the case. On October 24, the States of Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and West Virginia filed an amicus brief in support of the government's motion to stay the district court's injunction. On October 27, the Iranian Alliances Across Borders and IRAP plaintiffs responded to the government's motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. Also on October 27, the government requested that the Court schedule oral argument for December 8, immediately after the current Ninth Circuit oral argument in Hawaii v. Trump. On October 31, the Court granted this request. On October 30, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") responded to the plaintiffs' motion to stay. On November 1, the DOJ submitted its opening brief, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were not justiciable and that EO-3 fell well within the President's constitutional and statutory authority. Also on November 1, amici began filing briefs with the Court. On November 15, the plaintiffs filed their opening/response brief. The DOJ responded on November 22. On November 22, the court submitted a letter requesting that the DOJ supplement the record with two reports referenced in both the DOJ's opening brief and EO-3: a report submitted to the President on July 9, 2017, identifying "16 countries as having 'inadequate' information sharing practices and risk factors, and another 31 countries as 'at risk' of becoming inadequate," and a report submitted to the President on September 15, 2017, recommending that the President impose entry restrictions on certain nationals from seven of the countries determined to have inadequate information sharing practices and risk factors. On November 24, the DOJ responded, noting that the requested reports contain classified information and requesting that any reviewing of the reports take place in camera and ex parte. This case is ongoing. Oral argument on the government's motion to stay the district court's injunction pending appeal is scheduled for December 8, and will be held en banc. Because this case was consolidated with Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump into IRAP v. Trump on October 20, 2017, further updates on activity within this case can be found at IRAP v. Trump.

Summary: This is a lawsuit filed against Section 2 of President Trump’s Sep. 24, 2017 Proclamation ("Executive Order #3" or "EO-3") barring travel to the United States from six Muslim-majority countries. The plaintiffs are US citizens or permanent residents who will not be able to reunite with their family members or who otherwise claim injury as a direct result of EO-3. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief: they asked the court to enjoin defendants nationwide from enforcing Section 2 of EO-3 across the nation.


The plaintiffs in this case are three individuals with dual diagnoses of mental illness and intellectual disability. They receive services and support in order to remain in the community through Pennsylvania Medicaid's Consolidated Waiver program. After each plaintiff experienced a change in his/her condition (i.e. a specific episode caused by mental illness that necessitated increased care), the plaintiffs were briefly institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals. The disruption in services created a range problems when the plaintiffs sought to resume waiver services. The level of care offered under the waiver was allegedly insufficient, which put the plaintiffs at risk of future institutionalization. In addition, the plaintiffs faced numerous administrative challenges in securing services. One of the plaintiffs could not be discharged from an institutionalization without a promise of more extensive services than could be put in place under the waiver. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on May 20, 2011. The complaint alleged that the state placed the plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C. The complaint also alleged violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and that the insufficient waiver services amount to violations of the Medicaid Act. Although the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the case was resolved before any decision was necessary. Two of the three plaintiffs were moved to community placements with sufficient support services, while the state had taken some steps to ensure that the third plaintiff would be moved in a timely fashion. Judge Joel H. Slomsky approved the parties' stipulation of dismissal and settlement on October 18, 2011.

Summary: This was a challenge to the insufficiency of Pennsylvania Medicaid's Consolidated Waiver program for individuals with both mental illness and intellectual disabilities. The case was dismissed after each of the three plaintiffs began to receive adequate services in the community.


On July 8, 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, against the federal government. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging an overreaching of federal authority into an exclusive sphere of the states. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment, exceeds Congress's Article I powers, and runs afoul of the Constitution's principles of federalism by creating an extensive federal regulatory scheme that interferes with and undermines the Commonwealth's sovereign authority to define marriage and to regulate the marital status of its citizens. On July 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Joseph L. Tauro), substantially agreeing with the Commonwealth's characterization of DOMA, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and enjoined the federal government from enforcing DOMA against Massachusetts or its agencies. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 698 F.Supp.2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). (The decision was issued the same day as Judge Tauro's decision striking down DOMA on equal protection grounds, in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), PB-MA-0006, and the two cases were consolidated on appeal.) The defendants appealed and moved for a stay of the injunction pending their appeal, and the Court (Judge Tauro) granted their motion. On February 24, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated to the Court of Appeals that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and would cease defending it. (It would later file a brief in support of the plaintiffs' case on September 22.) In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives intervened to defend the act. On August 23, 2011, the plaintiff moved for an initial en banc hearing to expedite the case, but despite a supporting brief from the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals (Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch) denied the motion. After hearing arguments on April 4, 2012, on May 31 a three-judge panel of the First Circuit (Chief Judge Lynch, Judge Michael Boudin, and Judge Juan R. Torruella) unanimously affirmed the District Court's judgment in an opinion by Judge Boudin. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, No. 10-2204, 2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012). While the Court of Appeals refrained from applying heightened scrutiny, it also declined to employ hyper-deferential rational basis review; instead, the Court held that Supreme Court precedent in cases implicating the interests of historically disadvantaged minority groups (e.g. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)) and cases considering federal action in areas of traditional state concern (e.g. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) suggested a more searching form of rational basis inquiry (so-called 'rational basis with bite'), and that the rationales given for DOMA did not hold up under this closer scrutiny. Injunctive relief was stayed pending the possibility of review by the Supreme Court; the Department of Justice sought review on July 3, 2012. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 27, 2013.

Summary: On July 8, 2009, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, against the federal government , claiming that the federal Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, violates the Tenth Amendment, exceeds Congress's Article I powers, and runs afoul of the Constitution's principles of federalism by creating an extensive federal regulatory scheme that interferes with and undermines the Commonwealth's sovereign authority to define marriage and to regulate the marital status of its citizens. On July 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Joseph L. Tauro), substantially agreeing with the Commonwealth's characterization of DOMA, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and enjoined the federal government from enforcing DOMA against Massachusetts or its agencies. (The decision was issued the same day as Judge Tauro's decision striking down DOMA on equal protection grounds, in Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010), PB-MA-0006.) The defendants appealed and moved for a stay of the injunction pending their appeal, and the Court (Judge Tauro) granted their motion. On February 24, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated to the court that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and would cease defending it. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives intervened to defend the act. The case was argued before a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on April 4, 2012, and on May 31, 2012, the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment. Injunctive relief has been stayed pending the possibility of review by the Supreme Court; the Department of Justice sought review on July 3, 2012. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 27, 2013.


On July 10, 2017, five residents of Florida, the ACLU of Florida, and the Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia G. Cooke and Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. The plaintiffs sued the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (Commission), the Executive Office of the President of the United States, the Executive Office of the Vice President of the United States, and several agents of the executive branch, all under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). The plaintiffs also sued the Florida Secretary of State under state law, namely Florida Statute § 97.0585: Information Regarding Voters and Voter Registration Confidentiality. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and other public interest counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. This complaint, brought on behalf of Florida voters, challenged the legality of the actions of the Commission and the legality of its directive requesting voter registration information of state-registered voters in Florida and throughout the United States. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the unauthorized collection of state voter information data and to prohibit the Florida Secretary of State and other similarly situated officials of other states from providing state voter data to the Commission. The plaintiffs claimed that the actions of the Commission and other defendants constituted an unjustified invasion of privacy in violation of the constitutional separation of powers, Article II, and voters’ First Amendment rights. On July 13, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, asking the court to prohibit the defendants from collecting every American voter’s personal data to create a national, centralized database, to prohibit the defendants from running all business until fully complying with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, and to restrain the Florida Secretary of State from submitting to the Commission any voter data in violation of Fla. Stat. § 97.0585 and Florida’s Right to Privacy. The court held a hearing on July 18, 2017, regarding this motion. Unfortunately, the details of this hearing are not available on the docket. On July 20, 2017, deferring to the conclusions made during the hearing, Judge Marcia Cooke denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. 2017 WL 3113486. On August 14, 2017, the defendant Florida Secretary moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, because the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. The following month, the Secretary filed a motion to stay the filing of the joint scheduling report until the court resolved this motion to dismiss. The court denied this motion to stay, finding that if there were a stay and the court ultimately denied the motion, this case would have been significantly behind schedule. On October 20, 2017, the federal defendants moved to dismiss this action, arguing that the case lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to establish standing. In December 2017, the federal defendants moved for a protective order staying discovery until the court ruled on the federal defendants’ pending motion to dismiss. On December 29, 2017, however, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, removing a claim that the federal defendants had exceeded the authority of Executive Order 13799. As such, the court denied as moot both the motions to dismiss as they were regarding the initial complaint. On January 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed this motion because on January 3, 2018, President Trump issued an Executive Order terminating the Commission after the defendants and other had successfully worked together to transfer private, protected voter data to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs claimed that, in using Commission data, the Federal Defendants sought to “Stop Aliens From Voting,” without complying with FACA and argued that injunctive relief was appropriate to compel government compliance with FACA. The court referred this motion to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. 2018 WL 333821. On February 6, 2018, Judge Goodman issued a report and recommendation regarding the plaintiffs’ emergency motion. Judge Goodman recommended that the plaintiffs’ motion be denied because Plaintiffs had not established a substantial threat of irreparable injury. 2018 WL 1863751. Agreeing with the report, Judge Cooke denied the motion on March 19, 2018. In light of the dissolution of the Commission, the defendant Secretary and the federal defendants filed new motions to dismiss, arguing that without the Commission, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On May 30, 2018, Judge Cooke entered an order granting both motions to dismiss and dismissed the case. The court granted the defendant Secretary’s motion because Florida had already provided the Commission with the publicly available information, and the Commission had been disbanded. As such, there was no continuing case or controversy with respect to the Secretary. The court granted the federal defendants’ motion for similar reasons. The Commission ceased to exist and, while Judge Cooke agreed with the plaintiffs that simply because a commission ceased to exist does not necessarily render a case moot, the court found that the instant case had indeed become moot as to the remaining federal defendants. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by five residents of Florida, the ACLU of Florida, and the Florida Immigrant Coalition, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity engaged in an unauthorized collection of state voter information data that violated the APA, FACA, the PRA, and the First Amendment rights of voters. After the dissolution of the Commission in January 2018, the court dismissed the case as moot.


On February 18, 2016, a group of Flint, Michigan residents filed this class action lawsuit in the Michigan Circuit Court for the County of Genesee. The plaintiffs sued Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C. and a related corporate entity under state law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Lockwood, a company that helped Flint switch its water source from Lake Huron to the Flint River, negligently caused Flint residents to be supplied with water contaminated by lead and other biological and chemical agents and failed to warn residents about the health risks. The plaintiffs claimed that they sustained serious bodily injury, property damage, depreciation of property value, and emotional harm and resulting stress-related physical symptoms as a result. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. The defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on February 23, 2016, which the plaintiffs opposed. On May 11, 2016, the district court (Judge John Corbett O’Meara) remanded the case to state court. In Judge O’Meara’s view, the dispute was “a truly local controversy” ill-suited to a federal forum. Judge O’Meara noted that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims did not involve a substantial federal question and that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) could not support federal jurisdiction because CAFA’s local controversy exception applied: there was a significant local defendant, more than two-thirds of the proposed class were Michiganders, the injuries happened in Michigan, and there was no similar class action against any of the defendants. The defendants appealed. On November 16, 2016, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision. Judge Richard A. Griffin (joined by Judge Bernice B. Donald) wrote that the case “exemplifies the quintessential local controversy” and found that CAFA’s local controversy exception applied. Judge Raymond M. Kethledge dissented, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to adduce sufficient proof that at least two-thirds of the members of the putative class were Michiganders or that the conduct of a Michigan defendant formed a significant basis for the claim. The case is now ongoing in Michigan state court. As of November 19, 2019, the parties are engaged in discovery.

Summary: A group of Flint, Michigan residents sued companies involved in switching Flint's water supply to the Flint river, thereby causing the Flint water crisis, for negligence in state court. The defendants attempted to remove the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), but both the district court and Sixth Circuit found that CAFA's local controversy exception applied. The case is now proceeding in state court.


On June 8, 2011, several veterans, on behalf of all homeless veterans suffering from disabilities caused by their military service, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the Department of Veterans' Affairs alleging violations of state law and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, asked the court for an injunction requiring the defendants to provide the plaintiff class with permanent supportive housing that accommodates their disabilities so that they can access the VHA benefits for which they are eligible. They also requested that the court enjoin defendants from using the West Los Angeles Medical Center & Community Living Center campus (WLA Campus) for any purpose that is not directly related to housing veterans with disabilities and to require an accounting of profits of all money received for land use agreements for the WLA campus. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the design and implementation of the VHA benefits program was discriminatory and that plaintiffs were being denied meaningful access to benefits by defendants because of their disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the WLA campus was intended, under the grant that established it, to provide housing and services for veterans with disabilities. By entering into land use agreements with commercial and non-DVA entities, defendants violated the grant, which plaintiffs argued was a charitable trust. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that there was never a public accounting of the transactions. Plaintiffs claimed that this lack of housing prevented the plaintiffs from meaningfully accessing the veterans' benefits to which they were entitled. An amended complaint filed Aug. 12, 2011 added claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). On Mar. 16, 2012, the court (Judge S. James Otero) dismissed in part the plaintiff's claims. 860 F. Supp. 2d 1079. After the Ninth Circuit vacated Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, on which the court had relied, it reconsidered the Mar. 16 ruling. Eventually, the en banc Ninth Circuit issued Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013. Based on that decision, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' Rehabilitation Act claims because resolving the claims would require the court to second-guess the government's determination about what benefits specific veterans were entitled to. But the court let the plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act claims proceed because they did not turn on questions about specific veterans' benefits. 2012 WL 12882704. Mediation was attempted during the course of proceedings, but it proved unsuccessful. Following the mediation, both parties moved for summary judgment. On Aug. 29, 2013, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the land use agreements that defendant had with non-healthcare organizations were unauthorized by law and therefore void. 2013 WL 12121981. The defendants moved to vacate the judgment, which was denied on Oct. 21, 2013, and then appealed to the Ninth Circuit on Oct. 24. Meanwhile, the parties continued to attempt to find resolution outside of the courtroom, and filed notice of their decision to end litigation on Jan. 28, 2015. The parties stated that they would work together to create a strategy and action plan for veteran homelessness in Greater LA. The final plan was to address chronic homelessness through evidence-based methods and with input from all stakeholders. The VA would address various issues related to creating a plan for the WLA Campus, including bridge housing, permanent supportive housing, and land use agreements. On Feb. 17, 2015, pursuant to a joint motion to vacate, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment. The parties filed joint stipulation to dismiss the case on Mar. 26, 2015. The Clearinghouse does not know whether the parties agreed to a final plan after the case was dismissed or what changes, if any, occurred at the WLA Campus because of this suit.

Summary: On June 8, 2011, several veterans, on behalf of all homeless veterans suffering from disabilities caused by their military service, filed a lawsuit against the Department of Veterans' Affairs for misuse of the WLA campus which prevented them from meaningfully accessing the veterans' benefits to which they are entitled.On August 29, 2013, the District Court (Judge S. James Otero) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the land use agreements that defendant had with non-healthcare organizations were unauthorized by law and therefore void. On August 29, 2013, the District Court (Judge Otero) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the land use agreements that defendant had with non-healthcare organizations were unauthorized by law and therefore void. The case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.


On February 8, 2017, three organizations—Public Citizen, Inc., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and Communications Workers of America—filed this lawsuit against the United States of America, President Donald Trump, and 14 federal agencies, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. One week prior, on January 30, President Trump had signed Executive Order 13771.The order instructed federal agencies to rescind at least two existing regulations for every new regulation issued, and to ensure that the costs of new regulations were offset by the rescinded regulations. All regulations promulgated during fiscal year 2017 were required to have net costs of $0, regardless of benefits. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Executive Order 13771 violated the Take Care Clause, exceeded Article II presidential power, and infringed on legislative authority, and was therefore invalid. They sought a declaration that the agencies could not lawfully implement or comply with the order, and sought an injunction preventing them from complying with the order. They argued that the order’s requirements would harm the people of the United States, and that the decision-making process required by this order was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. On April 21, 2017 the plaintiffs amended their complaint. The government filed a motion to dismiss on May 12, and on May 15 the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On February 26, 2018 the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, denying the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 297 F. Supp. 3d 6. It found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of establishing standing to sue: they had failed to allege that the order would “substantially increase the risk” of harm to any of their members. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint two months later on April 20, 2018. On June 4, California and Oregon intervened as plaintiffs, arguing that they had “unique interests in the health and well-being of their citizens, natural resources, infrastructure, institutions, and economies” which could not be adequately represented by the non-governmental plaintiffs in the case. The following year, on February 8, 2019, the court denied the government’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint: the plaintiffs had demonstrated standing to sue, sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 361 F. Supp. 3d 60. However, the court simultaneously denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment: they had “done enough to stay afloat but not enough to move forward.” Because there was still doubt as to standing, and therefore as to the court’s jurisdiction, the court denied the states’ motion to intervene as premature, indicating that they could renew their motion if the court ultimately found it had jurisdiction. But on December 20, 2019 the court granted the government’s summary judgment motion, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately establish standing. It found that although the court had previously “provided Plaintiffs with three opportunities to meet this burden and, most recently, allowed Plaintiffs to take focused discovery in aid of establishing jurisdiction,” the plaintiffs had still “failed to carry their burden.” 435 F. Supp. 3d 144. The plaintiffs did not appeal the court’s decision; the case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiffs in this case sought declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to President Trump’s Executive Order 13771 (on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs). This case was filed on February 8, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On December 20, 2019, the court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately establish standing. The plaintiffs did not appeal; the case is now closed.


This case arose from the Flint water crisis, a public health emergency in which the city of Flint, Michigan supplied water that contained elevated levels of lead to the public. On April 6, 2016, fifteen residents of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan, his chief of staff, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several other government agencies, the City of Flint, and three corporations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C § 1964), and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that defendants’ involvement in the supply of lead-contaminated drinking water violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights, RICO, and state law. Flint had purchased water from the high quality Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) for roughly half a century before the crisis. But in 2014, led by an Emergency Manager, Flint switched its water source to the Flint River as a way to address the city’s financial problems. The plaintiffs alleged that, because the Flint River was only a temporary solution until the City could be connected to the Karegnondi Water Authority, the state knew that the Flint River was low quality even before connecting the City to the source. The plaintiffs claimed that by continuing to charge the residents of Flint the same amount for water despite the significantly lower quality, the defendants were fraudulently engaged in a RICO scheme by selling unsafe water. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that this deprived them of both contractually guaranteed property and bodily integrity rights protected under a substantive due process framework. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that their Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection was violated because the switch from the DWSD to the Flint River was motivated by racism. The plaintiffs’ evidence of racial discrimination was the fact that, of the six municipalities that bought water from DWSD through which the Flint River flowed, only the predominantly Black City of Flint was switched to the Flint River source. Because this case appeared to be a companion case to Mays v. Snyder (Case No. 15-14002), on April 20, 2016, this case was reassigned to District Judge John Corbertt O’Meara and Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub in Ann Arbor. On June 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding a jury demand and several additional defendants in their official capacities at all times relevant to the complaint, some of which included the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), the former treasurer of the State of Michigan, all four emergency managers assigned to the city of Flint, the elected mayor of the City of Flint, and the directors and managers of several city and state health programs and water treatment plants. Another amended complaint was filed by the plaintiffs on August 12, 2016. On October 6, 2016, the State of Michigan, the Governor, MDEQ, MDHHS, and several individual government employees being sued in their official capacity filed a motion to dismiss. Another group of defendants—the Emergency Managers and City Officials of the City of Flint named in their official capacity as defendants in the suit—also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint for similar reasoning as the other defendants. Additional motions to dismiss were filed on October 21st, 28th, and 31st. Although filed separately, all of the motions argued primarily the same reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs’ suit: the state defendants were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Court had already declared that the only federal remedy available for the plaintiffs’ grievances is the Safe Drinking Water Act. Meanwhile, two cases with similar claims had recently been decided and were consolidated on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: Mays v. Snyder (Case No. 15-14002) and Boler v. Earley (Case No. 16-10323). On April 18, 2017, the parties in this case stipulated, and Judge John Corbett O’Meara granted, a stay on all aspects of this case, pending the consolidated appeals of these two cases. On July 27, 2017, this case, along with seven other cases litigating the Flint Water Crisis, were consolidated with Waid v. Snyder, PB-MI-0014 in this Clearinghouse. All motions pending in this case were denied without prejudice. See the Clearinghouse record for Waid for all subsequent litigation.

Summary: On April 6, 2016, fifteen residents of Flint, Michigan filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan, his chief of staff, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several other government agencies, the City of Flint, and three corporations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, RICO, and state law. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that their Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection and Due Process were violated when the State of Michigan and the City of Flint switched the City's water source from Detroit to the Flint River. Because several cases with similar claims were filed throughout the state, this case was ultimately consolidated with <i>Waid v. Snyder</i> on July 27, 2017.


COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed against the state of Michigan by 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan and an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state to enjoin executive orders that caused their facilities to remain closed. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 19. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction on June 24. <hr> On May 22, 2020, owners and operators of Michigan’s indoor fitness facilities filed a suit against the Governor of the State of Michigan and the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services to enjoin orders that required the plaintiffs to keep their facilities closed. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory and injunctive action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Lockdown Orders violated the Constitution, an order enjoining the state from enforcing the lockdown orders, and a prohibition form issuing further orders that would require the plaintiffs to keep their businesses closed. The case filed in the U.S District Court for the Western District of Michigan and assigned to District Judge Paul L Maloney. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were comprised of 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan, as well as the League of Independent Fitness Facilities and Trainers (LIFFT), an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state. On March 16, Governor Whitmer issued temporary restrictions on the uses of public facilities, which included gymnasiums, fitness centers, recreation centers, and indoor sports facilities. Throughout June, the defendant incrementally re-opened sectors of the economy with Michigan Executive order 2020-110 and 2020-115. The orders lifted certain restrictions on facilities such as restaurants, bowling, and climbing facilities subject to capacity restrictions, but left indoor fitness facilities remained completely closed. The plaintiffs alleged that the differential treatment of indoor fitness facilities violated substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Emergency Management Act. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the order was void for vagueness as the defendant did not identify the criteria for which businesses were allowed to operate during the pandemic. They also alleged that the defendant exceeded the Governor’s authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine in the Michigan constitution. The complaint was amended on June 1 to add 15 additional plaintiffs. On June 8, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the orders. On June 12, the defendants filed a response to the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants contended that the plaintiff LIFFT lacked organizational standing as it failed to establish injury-in-fact for the pre-enforcement claim, and therefore, should be dismissed. Oral argument was held on June 17. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On June 19, the preliminary injunction was granted. 2020 WL 3421229. The court found that while the state was empowered to address emergencies like pandemics largely without interference from the courts, it was subject to constitutional limitations. Because the court found that the defendant was unable to state a rational basis to support the continued closure of indoor gyms, it did not survive deferential review. On the same day, the defendant filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and also an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal filed at the district court. On June 22, the plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to the stay pending appeal. The same day, the district court denied the defendants’ emergency motion to stay. 2020 WL 3422586. On June 24, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendant’s motion for an emergency stay, contending that the public interest of combatting COVID-19 outweighed the plaintiffs’ in favor of the stay. 2020 WL 3468281. The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court on whether the State demonstrated a rational basis to justify the plaintiffs’ continued closure, therefore surviving deferential review. The plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the order, but the Sixth Circuit denied the motion on July 7. Back in the district court, the plaintiffs responded to the defendants motion to dismiss on July 16, 2020. As of October 17, the case is still ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed against the state of Michigan by 22 individual companies operating fitness businesses in Michigan and an organization representing over 150 fitness facilities in the state. The suit was filed to enjoin orders that required the plaintiffs to keep their facilities closed. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction which was granted on June 19. The defendants filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit, with a motion for a stay pending appeal. The district court denied the stay on June 22 but the Sixth CIrcuit granted the stay pending appeal on June 24. The case is ongoing.


This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds, argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. On October 22, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented in part by the public interest firm American Center for Law and Justice, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the deeply held religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On November 27, 2013, United States District Court (Judge Reggie B. Walton) granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. The Court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiff until 30 days after the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services , which involved similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. On November 1, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi that the ACA's contraception insurance mandate likely violated the free exercise clause of the Constitution. It therefore reversed the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction against the defendant in that case. On November 6, 2013, a petition for certiorari was filed in the Gilardi case. The Supreme Court docketed the case on January 30, 2014. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court released its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct.2751 (2014) (FA-OK-0001 in this Clearinghouse), a case with substantially similar facts. There, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) permits for-profit corporations that are closely held (e.g., owned by a family or family trust) to refuse, on religious grounds, to pay for legally mandated coverage of certain contraceptive drugs and devices in their employees’ health insurance plans. In light of the Hobby Lobby decision, on October 24, 2014, the parties submitted a joint motion to the District Court. They agreed that judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiff on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, that a permanent injunction should be entered, and that all other claims against the defendant should be dismissed. They also agreed that the issue of plaintiff's attorneys’ fees and costs would be resolved after the judgement was entered. The court adopted the parties' proposed permanent injunction on November 3, 2014. The defendant was enjoined from enforcing the “Contraceptive Coverage Requirement,” that required the plaintiff to provide its employees with health coverage for contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and related patient education and counseling to which the plaintiff objected on religious grounds. It also barred defendant from taking any actions against plaintiff for noncompliance with the "Contraception Coverage Requirement." The only issue left open was attorneys' fees. The parties reached an undisclosed agreement regarding attorneys' fees on March 17, 2015, and asked the court to close the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 22, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. On November 27, 2013, the Court granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. During the stay, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby was decided. In light of the Hobby Lobby decision, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction barring defendant from enforcing the "Contraceptive Coverage Requirement" against plaintiff, and taking any adverse action against plaintiff for noncompliance with that requirement. The case is now closed.


On October 15, 2008, inmates of the Becker County Jail, represented by private counsel, filed this civil rights class action against Becker County, Minnesota and several law enforcement officials in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota for interfering with their communications with their attorneys. Plaintiffs claim that Becker County failed to train its jail perosnel, and did not inform the inmates that phone calls between inmates and their attorneys were supposed to be private. County employees monitored and recorded privileged telephone calls between detainees/inmates of the jail and their attorneys. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On December 12, 2008, the Court (Judge Ann D. Montgomery) denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs were unable to make a showing that the recording of their phone calls was so severe a constitutional violation to warrant a TRO. On September 28, 2009, in cross-motions for Summary Judgment, the Court (Judge Montgomery) granted in part, the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed, along with state law and federal common law claims. The plaintiffs claims of violations federal wiretapping statutes survived. On January 11, 2010, the parties received a settlement. Defendants agreed to pay $104,000 in damages. The case was closed thereafter.

Summary: Inmate plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with defendant County Jail for the recording of private conversations between the inmates and their attorneys after all constitutional claims had been dismissed, and only violation of federal wiretapping laws remained. Plaintiffs received $104,000 divided among them.


On November 9, 2010, several citizens of Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire who were or had been married to partners of the same sex under the law of their states filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Office of Personnel Management, the Social Security Administration, the U.S. Postal Service, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Labor, the Department of Justice, and the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) and by private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, alleging a violation of equal protection. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that operation of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, to deny them a variety of state and federal benefits that would be available to similarly situated individuals with spouses of the opposite sex violated the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On February 25, 2011, the Department of Justice, representing the defendants, notified the court that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and that it would thus cease defending it. In response, on April 26 the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) moved to intervene in defense of the act, and the Court (Judge Vanessa L. Bryant) granted its motion on May 27. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155323 (D. Conn. 2011). On July 15, 2011, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and on August 15, BLAG moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Briefing on both motions continued over the course of the following year. On June 20, 2012, BLAG moved to stay the proceedings pending the decision of the Second Circuit in Windsor v. United States, No. 10-cv-08435 (S.D.N.Y.) [PB-NY-0017]. The District Court (Judge Bryant) denied BLAG's motion on July 4, finding BLAG's assertion that the Second Circuit's decision would be dispositive in the case to be speculative. On July 31, 2012, the Court (Judge Bryant) issued an order denying BLAG's motion to dismiss and granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 2012 WL 3113883, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106713 (D. Conn. 2012). The Court found that "homosexuals display all the traditional indicia of suspectness and therefore statutory classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled to a heightened form of judicial scrutiny," but also found that application of heightened scrutiny was unnecessary to resolve the case, as Section 3 of DOMA failed to pass muster even under rational basis review. BLAG filed notice of appeal with the Second Circuit on September 26, 2012. On August 17, 2012, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before judgment under the Supreme Court Rule that permits deviation from normal appellate practice "upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to...require immediate determination in [the Supreme] Court." Sup. Ct. R. 11. On June 26, 2013 the Supreme Court held Section 3 of DOMA to be unconstitutional in Windsor v. United States and denied certiorari in this case the next day, June 27, 2013. On July 23, 2013, parties agreed to withdraw appeals before the Second Circuit in this case.

Summary: On November 9, 2010, several citizens of Connecticut, Vermont and New Hampshire (who were or had been married to same-sex partners under the law of their states) filed suit against the federal government, claiming that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denied same-sex spouses a variety of state and federal benefits in violation of equal protection. On July 31, 2012, Judge Bryant of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Following a similar holding by the United States Supreme Court (striking down Section 3 of DOMA in Windsor v. United States), parties in this case withdrew appeals on July 7, 2013.