This lawsuit was filed on August 31, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs included Detroit Will Breathe (DWB) and fourteen individuals. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild, sued the city of Detroit, Mayor Michael Duggan, Police Chief James Craig, and over one hundred Detroit Police Department (DPD) officers. Between May 29, 2020 and August 22, 2020, the plaintiffs participated in protests across Detroit calling for the end of police brutality and racial injustice. The plaintiffs stated that the DPD used excessive force on multiple occasions during the approximately 90 protests that the plaintiffs engaged in during this time period. These instances of excessive force included police driving cars into protest leaders on June 28; using dangerous chokeholds and teargas on peaceful protesters on July 10; and using additional pepper spray, teargas, and chokeholds on protestors on August 22. The plaintiffs also alleged alleged that a curfew imposed by the defendants was only enforced against protesters. The plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly, and also violated their Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force, arrest without probable cause, and false imprisonment. They also alleged that defendants' actions represented retaliation forbidden under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and contended that the city of Detroit was liable under the <i>Monell</i> theory of liability. The plaintiffs requested injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, including punitive damages, and asked for attorneys' fees and costs. The same day that they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which would prohibit the DPD from using weapons against peaceful protesters or arresting protesters without probable cause. The plaintiffs also sought basic amenities, such as access to water and the provision of necessary medical attention, be for any protesters that were arrested. The case was originally assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland and Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti, but was then reassigned to District Judge Laurie J. Michelson and Magistrate Judge David R. Grand on September 1, 2020. On September 4, 2020, the court partially granted the request for a temporary restraining order (TRO). 2020 WL 5269789. Judge Michelson enjoined the defendants from using weapons against peaceful protesters, from placing individuals in choke-holds or hitting them with vehicles, from using zip ties or handcuffs in a way that causes injury, and arresting demonstrators without probable cause. The order was to last 14 days. However, the defendants thought that the order was one-sided. They submitted a motion to modify the TRO on the grounds that it would allow protesters to break the law without repercussions. Judge Michelson disagreed. On September 16, Judge Michelson issued an order denying the defendants' request to modify the TRO, holding that the TRO in no way allowed plaintiffs or other protesters to break the law without legal consequences -- DPD was still allowed to arrest those that sought to break the law. 2020 WL 8575150. The parties jointly agreed that police officers would refrain from using weapons (batons, shield, etc.), chemical agents, or chokeholds against protestors, and also agreed not to arrest demonstrators en masse without probable cause. The defendants answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim on September 25, alleging that the plaintiffs engaged in a civil conspiracy. The defendants sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The defendants also sought declaratory judgment stating that the plaintiffs defamed Mayor Michael Duggan and multiple police officers. After the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim, the counterclaim was dismissed on March 10, 2021. Judge Michelson found that the city did not allege that the plaintiffs committed an underlying tort to support the conspiracy allegation, nor did the city allege sufficient factual allegations to sustain a conspiracy charge even if it could proceed without an underlying tort. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiffs, an activist organization and several individuals, brought this suit against Detroit and members of the DPD, arguing that they used excessive force and abridged their freedom of speech and freedom of assembly on various occasions throughout the summer of 2020. The plaintiffs engaged in numerous protests after the police killing of George Floyd. They sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On September 4, 2020, the court granted their request for a temporary restraining order. The case is ongoing as of September 12, 2020.


On May 15, 2015, the mother of a deceased prison inmate filed this lawsuit against the San Juan County Detention Center, the San Juan County Regional Medical Center, and San Juan County in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought damages and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging wrongful death and violations of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ actions and policies constituted severe and deliberate indifference to the medical needs of her son, who suffered injuries and death as a result of receiving insufficient medical care while incarcerated. The plaintiff’s claims were consolidated with those of three other plaintiffs suing the San Juan County Detention Center, for the pretrial and discovery purposes, although the parties agreed that each case was to be tried separately. Two other individual plaintiffs had filed complaints alleging Eighth Amendment violations, ADA violations, negligence, and wrongful death in June 2015. On July 28, 2015, twenty-seven plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint in the District of New Mexico in Burkee v. San Juan. The Burkee plaintiffs asserted causes of action for Eighth Amendment violations, negligence, ADA violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). On August 24, 2015, the consolidated case was assigned to Judge James O. Browning. On September 28, the plaintiffs moved for injunctive relief, requesting either that the court order the defendants to provide emergency medical care to the plaintiffs, or appoint an independent medical overseer for the facility. On November 17, the court dismissed all federal claims against the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not meet the requisite pleading standards. On January 15, 2016, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The plaintiffs each filed an amended complaint on February 29, 2016, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state tort claims. The lead plaintiff in this case entered into a settlement agreement with the defendants, which was approved by the District Court on September 19, 2016. The details of the settlement were not made publicly available. On September 20, 2016, the court dismissed all claims under the A.D.A. and state law. On September 30, 2016, the court entered its final judgment, dismissing the lead plaintiff’s claims against the defendants with prejudice. Salazar v. San Juan Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. CIV 15-0417 JB/LF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141408, at *41 (D.N.M. Sep. 30, 2016). The case of one of the other individual wrongful death plaintiffs was also dismissed on September 30, 2016. Following settlement and dismissal of the lead plaintiff's case, proceedings in two of the other consolidated cases continued. In the other individual wrongful death plaintiff's case, claims against the San Juan County Detention Center were dismissed on December 12, 2016. The claims against San Juan Regional Medical Center and its employees and agents on July 31, 2017. In the Burkee case, the San Juan County Detention Center, its administrator, and San Juan County moved to dismiss the A.D.A. and state law claims, and Judge Browning granted the motion on September 20, 2016. On March 31, 2017, Judge Browning denied the San Juan Regional Medical Center's motion to dismiss the nine remaining plaintiffs' IIED claims and motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' state law claims. Judge Browning also granted the plaintiffs' August 15, 2016 motion to remand to state court. The court found that the remaining plaintiffs' federal claims had already been dismissed, and it declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, remanding the case to the Eleventh Judicial District Court, San Juan County, New Mexico. The court explained its rationale in an October 13, 2017 memorandum opinion. 301 F.Supp.3d 992 (D.N.M. 2017). Judge Browning issued a final judgment in the case on October 27, 2017. After discovery in the district court, the case was dismissed in the state court on June 12, 2018.

Summary: On May 15, 2015, the mother of a deceased prison inmate sued the San Juan County Detention Center in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, alleging that the decedent's death was caused by the defendant's severe and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The plaintiffs filed for injunctive relief against the defendants, which the District Court denied on January 15, 2016. On September 19, 2016, the court approved a settlement agreement between the parties.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID 19 Summary: The League of Women Voters of Virginia and three individual voters filed a suit against the Virginia State Board of Elections to remove Virginia’s witness requirement. The parties reached a partial agreement, which the court approved in a consent decree, to remove the requirement for the June 23, 2020 elections. On August 5, the parties came to an agreement to stop enforcement of the witness requirement for the November 3 General Election and collectively sought approval of a partial consent judgment, which the court approved on August 21. The case is ongoing.
 On April 17, 2020, the League of Women Voters of Virginia and three individual voters filed a complaint against the Virginia State Board of Elections to remove Virginia’s witness requirement in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and ACLU of Virginia, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, 52 U.S.C. § 10302 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Specifically, they alleged that requiring absentee ballots to be marked in the presence of a witness was contrary to social distancing guidelines and that forcing voters to comply amid the COVID-19 pandemic unduly burdened the fundamental right to vote by forcing voters to choose between their safety and right to vote. Additionally, they alleged that the requirement disproportionately discriminated against elderly voters, African American voters, and voters with disabilities who face a heightened risk of illness from COVID-19. The case was assigned to Judge Norman K. Moon. On April 21, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction that would: (1) prohibit the defendants from enforcing the witness requirement for the June 23 primary and all subsequent elections; (2) order the defendants to issue guidance instructing city and county election officials to count otherwise validly cast absentee ballots that are missing a witness signature for the June 23 primary election; (3) order the defendants to conduct a public campaign informing Virginia voters about the elimination of the requirement. On April 23, a group of three individuals filed a motion to intervene as defendants. The next day, the Republican Party of Virginia (RPV) and another group of three voters also filed a motion to intervene. The following day, all of the individuals' requests to intervene were denied because they would unnecessarily expand the scope of the litigation and detract from timely resolution. 2020 WL 2090679. However, the RPV’s motion to intervene was granted. 2020 WL 2090678. On April 27, the parties filed a joint motion for a partial consent decree, agreeing to withdraw the preliminary injunction motion in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to forego enforcement of the witness requirement for the June Primary. On May 5, Judge Moon approved the partial consent decree. 2020 WL 2158249. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou for all nondispositive pretrial motions and issues. On June 19, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with one of the named plaintiffs removed. On July 17, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with three additional plaintiffs who were at higher risk from COVID-19 due to underlying medical conditions. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction for the upcoming November 3 election and other subsequent elections affected by COVID-19 on July 23. On August 5, the parties came to an agreement to stop enforcement of the witness requirement for the November 3 General Election and collectively sought approval of a partial consent judgment. The district court approved the second consent judgment and decree on August 21, finding that the same reasons for the previous consent decree carried even more force, as the pandemic has resurged. 2020 WL 4927524. A bench trial is scheduled for May 19-21, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 17, 2020, the League of Women Voters of Virginia and three individual voters filed a complaint against the Virginia State Board of Elections to remove Virginia’s witness requirement at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that the enforcement of the witness requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as requiring the absentee ballot to be marked in the presence of a witness, was contrary to social distancing guidelines by risking voter health if forced to comply amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs further alleged that the requirement unduly burdened their fundamental right to vote by forcing voters to choose between their safety and right to vote. Additionally, they alleged that the requirement disproportionately discriminated against elderly voters, African American voters, and voters with disabilities who face a heightened risk of illness from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin Virginia’s witness requirement for the upcoming June and subsequent elections, to count otherwise valid ballots missing witness signatures for the June elections, and to conduct a public information campaign informing voters on the elimination of the witness requirement. Ahead of the June 23 election, both parties filed a joint motion for a partial consent decree agreeing to withdraw the preliminary injunction motion in exchange for the defendant’s agreement to forego enforcement of the witness requirement for the June Primary. On May 5, the joint motion for the consent judgment and decree was approved. On August 5, the parties came to an agreement to stop enforcement of the witness requirement for the November 3 General Election and collectively sought approval of a partial consent judgment, which was approved on August 21. The case is ongoing.


On January 31, 2017, two F1 student visa holders, represented by the NYU Law School Immigrant Rights Clinic, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, after being detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) upon their arrival at the Buffalo Port of Entry on the evening of January 31, 2017. Petitioners are Muslim Iranian F1 student visa holders who attend the New York University Tandon School of Engineering. The complaint alleged that CBP detained the plaintiffs solely pursuant to an executive order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017 suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The complaint further alleged that this executive order was being enforced against them contrary to nationwide federal court stays, including the ones issued in Darweesh v. Trump and portions of Louhghalem/Tootkaboni v. Trump. Petitioners claimed that their continued detention and bar to entry based solely on the executive order violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, violated Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and was ultra vires under the immigration statutes. The complaint was filed as a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention), and as a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 1, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. It seems likely the plaintiffs were released from detention. On February 2, 2017, the case was terminated. No judge was assigned. This case is closed.

Summary: Two Iranian F1 student visa holders filed a writ of habeas corpus and civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief after being detained pursuant to President Donald Trump's January 31, 2017 executive order (and contrary to nationwide federal court stays of that order). Petitioners voluntarily dismissed this case the day after filing.


On November 17, 2011, several couples who reside in Alabama filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendants' policies discriminated against non-U.S. citizens trying to obtain a marriage license in Alabama. In Alabama, no person may marry without a marriage license. One of a probate judge's ministerial jobs is to issue marriage licenses to those couples that meet the requirements. Alabama law states that the parties issuing the marriage license must obtain the Social Security Number of the individuals getting married and have it appear in the marriage license and certificate. In 2008, the Alabama Attorney General, issued a statement saying that a Social Security Number or other proofs of citizenship were not required to obtain a marriage license. The Attorney General ordered the probate offices to instead allow people trying to get married the opportunity to submit an affidavit saying they do not have a Social Security Number. On September 13, 2012, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) denied Defendant Probate Judge McKinney, Jr.'s (Probate Judge Reed's predecessor) motion to dismiss. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing since they did not apply for a marriage license and thus did not suffer any type of injury. However, the District Court (Judge Watkins) did not buy this argument since Judge McKinney, Jr. had a clear policy of requiring non-citizens who wanted to get a marriage license to provide proof of legal status. The District Court (Judge Watkins) thus found that the plaintiffs were effectively barred from applying for a marriage license and that applying for it would have been futile. On September 25, 2012, the District Court (Judge Watkins) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification so on December 7, 2012, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On June 3, 2013, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) entered a protective order assuring the confidentiality of certain information disclosed by both parties. On June 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Watkins) granted Defendant Probate Judge Reed's motion to dismiss any claims against him. Judge Reed argued that his probate office did not require proof of citizenship prior to issuing marriage licenses, and that he was actually willing to give the plaintiffs their marriage licenses if they had applied for it. Judge McKinney, Jr.'s prior policy was repealed and so the District Court (Judge Watkins) found that the plaintiffs no longer had standing. On August 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) approved the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. As part of the agreement, the official Probate County's marriage policy was amended and published so that it was clear that there were no citizenship requirements, including a Social Security Number, to obtaining a marriage license.

Summary: On November 17, 2011, several couples who reside in Alabama filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendants' policies discriminated against non-U.S. citizens trying to obtain a marriage license in Alabama. On August 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) approved the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. As part of the agreement, the official Probate County's marriage policy was amended and published so that it was clear that there were no citizenship requirements, including a Social Security Number, to obtaining a marriage license.


On March 15, 2011, a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers brought suit against the United States and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were potential claimants in the proposed settlement agreement in Garcia v. Vilsack, an earlier case in which a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers filed suit against the USDA, claiming that the USDA had systematically denied Hispanics farmers and ranchers loans and loan servicing in the 1990s. In this case, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights by offering a settlement agreement unequal to the settlement agreement offered to African American, Native American, and women farmers and ranchers who had previously sued the USDA over similar discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the proposed settlement agreement was unequal in comparison to the other discrimination settlements because it did not provide judicial supervision (leading to deficient notice and defective claims processes); did not provide assistance of class counsel; provided disproportionate monetary relief (only $1.33 billion, compared to the $2.23 billion in the African American discrimination case, despite Hispanic farmers outnumbering African American farmers 12 to 1); required additional proof elements in the claims process; and did not propose compensation for non-credit farm benefits. The plaintiff filed under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. They sought a declaration that this settlement proposal violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from engaging in racially discriminatory treatment of Hispanic farmers by treating them differently in comparison to African American, Native American, and women farmers with similar complaints. On March 25, 2011, the plaintiffs filed papers for a putative class of plaintiffs in the Garcia case, who allegedly "were subjected to, and continue to be subject to, USDA discrimination in its farm benefit programs" and who "are potential claimants" under the defendants' administrative claim process for Hispanic farmers. On May 11, 2011, the US moved to dismiss the case, denying any unlawful conduct and stating that the plaintiffs lacked standing, were attempting improper claim splitting, and were time barred. The plaintiffs moved to certify the class on June 11, 2011, and the defendant moved on June 14 to stay the certification motion pending adjudication of the motion to dismiss. On November 11, 2011, Judge Reggie B. Walton entered an order asking parties to clarify whether the plaintiffs' claims were ripe, given that the settlement agreement in Garcia had not been formally proposed. On December 21, 2011, Judge Walton entered an order denying all extant motions without prejudice, and holding the case in abeyance pending an announcement of the final version of Defendants' ADR program, because this suit would be unripe until the settlement agreement was formally proposed. On January 20, 2012, the defendants in the Garcia case submitted the proposed framework for the settlement agreement. Based on the proposal, the plaintiffs in this case submitted a first amended complaint on April 13, 2012, and Judge Walton lifted the stay on the case on August 24, 2012. The defendant then moved to dismiss the amended complaint on September 24, 2012. On December 11, 2012, Judge Walton granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that there was no injury because participation in the administrative claims process was optional, and that the suit lacked redressability because the court had no way of compelling the government to propose a specific settlement agreement. 908 F. Supp. 2d 146. On February 15, 2013, the plaintiffs entered a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (docket no. 13-05044). The Circuit court heard oral arguments from the parties more than a year later on May 7, 2014. In its opinion, the appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs' prayer for relief overreached because the court could not coerce a party, especially an Executive Branch agency, to settle in a case. Therefore, the district court correctly held that it lacked authority to enjoin the government to offer class settlement such as in previous cases. However, the appeals court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case on May 27, 2014 because the district court could have granted relief in the form of an injunction ordering the government not to act on unlawful racial grounds toward Hispanic and female farmers. While the parties litigated the case in district court on remand, the defendant filed a new motion on November 25, 2014 to dismiss on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a valid claim. In response to the defendant's motion, the district court officially reopened the case on May 14, 2015. On October 26, 2015, the defendant filed a status report regarding the voluntary alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program established for farmers alleging discrimination against Hispanic and female individuals in making or servicing farm loans. The Claims Adjudicator approved a total of 3,210 claims in the ADR program. On October 23, 2015, USDA reported as a total of 2,847 of the approved claims had been paid by the Judgment Fund, and another 126 claims were in process. Months later, Judge Walton granted the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss the case. When the defendant moved to dismiss in November 2014, Judge Walton found that in light of the appeals court's agreement that a court cannot order a party to settle, only the plaintiffs' equal protection claim remained. Judge Walton reasoned that the plaintiffs' other claims related to specific terms of the ADR and therefore the court did not have the authority to adjudicate those issues. In relation to plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim because the complaint did not allege facts showing that the defendant had a discriminatory purpose in settling claims brought by hispanic or female farmers. Judge Walton agreed with the defendant and dismissed the case in March 2016, closing the case.

Summary: On March 15, 2011, a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers brought suit against the United States and the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that they were being treated unequally compared to other minority and women farmers who have settled with the USDA regarding discriminatory lending practices. In December 2012, the District Court dismissed the case for lack of ripeness and redressability. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment on February 15, 2013 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the grounds that while the court could not compel settlement, the district court could have issued an injunction ordering the defendant to not act on unlawful racial grounds. On remand, the defendant filed a status report in October 2015 regarding the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program established for the parties to work out settlement terms. While the ADR resulted in a vast majority of claims being paid, around 130 were processing. In addition, the defendant filed a renewed motion to dismiss the case in November 2015. Judge Walton granted the motion on March 1, 2016. The case is now closed.


This lawsuit, filed on July 21, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, was brought by the Western State Center (a public benefit corporation), the First Unitarian Church of Portland, a private individual, and two Oregon State Representatives. Represented by private attorneys, they sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Federal Protective Service, and the U.S. Marshal Service over the defendants' presence and role in quelling protests that ensued after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleged violation of the First and Tenth Amendments. The First Amendment claim was brought by First Unitarian Church and argued that the defendants' arrests of protesters were in violation of the First Amendment right to protest, but also in violation of the Free Exercise clause, as protest was an integral part of the church's philosophy. The Tenth Amendment claim, brought by all plaintiffs, claimed that the federal agencies' enforcement of law on Portland property (and not just federal property) amounted to an unconstitutional violation of the principles of federalism. Plaintiffs requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Michael W. Mosman and Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo. However, on July 27, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint. The amended complaint retained the arguments about free speech, free exercise, and principles of federalism, but added other claims regarding the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the federal agents were arresting Portland residents without probable cause, adding that some of these arrests were caught on video. Protesters were taken off the street by non-uniformed federal officers and hauled into unmarked vans. Two days later the plaintiffs submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order with an expedited hearing and a motion for a preliminary injunction. However, on August 4 the court granted an email request to withdraw the motion for a temporary restraining order as moot. This is probably because the court had already granted a TRO against against federal agents in Portland in Index Newspapers earlier in the week. The plaintiffs continued to seek a preliminary injunction. On October 22 and 30, the court held oral argument on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Mosman granted the preliminary injunction with respect to the First Amendment claims, but denied the preliminary injunction with respect to the Tenth Amendment claim. 2020 WL 6555054. While Judge Mosman found no showing that the federal agents acted with retaliatory motive, he found that the President and Acting Secretary Chad Wolf expressed such a motivation and the plaintiffs were entitled to some form of injunctive relief. Under the preliminary injunction, Judge Mosman limited the defendants from engaging in crowd control beyond an extended city block around the U.S. Courthouse. The defendants promptly appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 20-35959) and requested a stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' emergency motion for a stay pending appeal without prejudice to renewal after the district court ruled on the motion to stay pending appeal. Then on November 9, 2020, the court held a status conference and vacated the order for the preliminary injunction as no longer necessary. The defendants subsequently dismissed the appeal. On December 4, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing because the plaintiffs did not attend the protest and the feared injuries were not injuries in fact or traceable to federal agents' conduct. In addition, they argued that the First Amendment allegations were actually weaker than what was considered in the preliminary injunction motion. The defendants also requested a stay of discovery. The parties then consented to proceed before Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo. Magistrate Judge Russo extended the discovery deadline to November 30, 2021. As of December 30, 2020, the motions to dismiss and stay discovery remained pending. This case is ongoing.

Summary: This case was filed on July 21, 2020. Plaintiffs included Western States Center (a public benefit corporation), the First Unitarian Church of Portland, and three individuals (including two state representatives). They sued the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Protective Service, and the U.S. Marshals for their presence and role in quelling protests that ensued after the police killing of George Floyd. The complaint alleged violations of the First and Tenth Amendment, and plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The court granted the preliminary injunction with respect to the First Amendment claims, but denied the preliminary injunction with respect to the Tenth Amendment claim on October 30, 2020. A week later though, the court vacated the preliminary injunction as no longer necessary. On December 4, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. They also requested a stay of discovery. As of December 30, 2020, the motions to dismiss and stay discovery remained pending. This case is ongoing.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. In the fall of 2019, district court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule. But after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The District Court in this case issued a judgment vacating the public charge rule. The Seventh Circuit stayed the order pending appeal and petition for certiorari. In addition, on February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. Cook County Sues Over the Public Charge Rule On September 23, 2019, Cook County, Illinois, and the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc., represented by private counsel, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule ("the Rule") unlawful and invalid due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional due to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced in the state of Illinois. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. The plaintiffs asserted that the effect of this Rule would be to force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain permanent resident status. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants violated the APA in exceeding their statutory authority by redefining the term "public charge" and contravened existing law by considering public benefits that have been explicitly and repeatedly excluded from public charge determinations. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that that Rule was arbitrary and capricious because defendants failed to justify their departure from settled practice, failed to adequately consider the Rule's varied and extensive harms, and because the Rule's complex rules will lead to arbitrary enforcement. The plaintiffs also argued that the Rule violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by discriminating against people with disabilities and that the Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that the Rule would have a chilling effect on immigrant communities, "causing individuals to forgo critical public benefits—an impact that will cause devastating, irreparable harm to children, families, and public health in Cook County and throughout Illinois." The plaintiffs argued that immigrant families will disenroll in federal health and assistance programs, leading to adverse health, economic, and productivity results, and placing a heavy burden and strain on County agencies and programs. The Plaintiffs Seek a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction On September 25, 2019, after originally being assigned to Judge John Robert Blakey, the case was reassigned to Judge Gary Feinerman. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction (PI) or stay. With the Rule set to go in effect on October 15, 2019, the plaintiffs sought immediate injunctive relief or a stay enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. The plaintiffs claimed that they were likely to succeed on their claim under the APA, that they would suffer irreparable harm absent immediate injunctive relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest weighed strongly in favor of an immediate injunction or stay to maintain the status quo. On October 8, 2019, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' emergency motion. The defendants argued that the court should deny the motion because the plaintiffs were a governmental entity and a group of organizations serving immigrants, rather than persons actually affected by the rule, and thus cannot meet jurisdictional requirements. The defendants also asserted that the plaintiffs' claims were meritless, that "the Rule accords with the longstanding meaning of 'public charge' and complies with the APA" and that plaintiffs' "disagreements are ultimately with the wisdom of the policy, a judgment allocated to the political branches." A few days later the defendants filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs' emergency motion. On October 11, orders by the United States District Courts for the Southern District of New York and Eastern District of Washington preliminarily enjoined the defendants from implementing the Rule nationwide, including Illinois. The defendants asserted that the plaintiffs could no longer claim that they will suffer irreparable harm absent a PI and thus a PI at this time is inappropriate. District Court Grants a Preliminary Injunction Notwithstanding these nationwide PIs, on October 14, 2019, Judge Feinerman granted the plaintiffs' motion and enjoined the defendants from implementing the Rule in the State of Illinois. Judge Feinerman concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the Rule conflicts with the Supreme Court’s formulation of public charge, in violation of the APA. Judge Feinerman further concluded that the plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable harm in the absence of a PI and that the balance of harms favors the plaintiffs. 417 F.Supp.3d 1008. Soon after, on October 25, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the PI pending appeal. The defendants argued that they were likely to succeed on appeal and that they would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay from being compelled to grant lawful permanent residence to persons who would likely become a public charge under the Rule. The defendants appealed the PI to the Seventh Circuit on October 30, 2019. Judge Feinerman denied the defendants' motion on November 14, 2019. On December 23, 2019, a Seventh Circuit panel denied the defendants' motion to stay the PI pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit's decision was in contrast to a Ninth Circuit order staying a nationwide PI, which also enjoined the implementation of the Rule, pending appeal. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Back in the district court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 16, 2020. The defendants argued that in light of a Ninth Circuit opinion concluding that the Rule falls within the defendants' discretion to interpret and implement the meaning of public charge and that the Supreme Court has not set a fixed definition of public charge, the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed. Plaintiffs, in opposition to the motion, maintained that the Rule "is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text, and DHS does not, and cannot, offer justification for this transformation of well-settled law" and will impose significant costs on the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule, but Not Illinois' Injunction The Supreme Court weighed in to provide clarity to the several, overlapping PIs enjoining the implementation of the Rule that had been issued across the country. On January 27, 2020, ruling in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Justice Gorsuch stayed the Southern District of New York's nationwide PI regarding the Rule, concluding that the "routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions." However, the Supreme Court declined to stay the Northern District of Illinois' PI because it applied only to the state of Illinois. 140 S. Ct. 599. Defendants Renew Efforts to Seek a Stay of the Injunction Following the Supreme Court's order to stay the nationwide PI, on January 28, 2020, the defendants filed a renewed motion to the Seventh Circuit to stay the district court's PI. The defendants argued that "in light of the Supreme Court's decision holding that a stay pending appeal of injunctions against enforcement of this Rule is appropriate," the Seventh Circuit should issue a stay pending appeal to allow the Rule to go into effect in Illinois. A Seventh Circuit panel denied the renewed motion for stay on February 10, 2020, without issuing an opinion or explanation for its conclusion. Instead, the Seventh Circuit issued an expedited briefing schedule to ensure prompt consideration of the PI. On February 13, 2020, the defendants filed an application to the Supreme Court for a stay pending appeal. The defendants contended that the Seventh Circuit "stands alone in finding a stay unwarranted;" the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, along with the Supreme Court in an appeal pending in the Second Circuit, stayed "materially identical" PIs. The defendants further asserted that, even though the PI here was distinguishable because it was not nationwide, the Supreme Court indicated in its January 27 order that "challenges to the Rule will be unsuccessful and that even a more limited injunction would impose irreparable harm on the government." The Supreme Court Stays Illinois' Injunction Pending the Seventh Circuit Ruling and a Writ of Certiorari On February 21, 2020, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, granted the defendants' application for stay and issued an order staying the district court's PI pending disposition of the appeal in the Seventh Circuit and disposition on defendants' timely petition for a writ of certiorari. The majority did not file an opinion in support of its decision. Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, concluded that "the Government’s only claimed hardship is that it must enforce an existing interpretation of an immigration rule in one State—just as it has done for the past 20 years—while an updated version of the rule takes effect in the remaining 49," which was not enough to satisfy its "especially heavy burden." 140 S. Ct. 681. The District Court Denies Defendants' Motion to Dismiss On May 19, Judge Feinerman issued a memorandum opinion and order denying defendants' motion to dismiss and concluding that plaintiffs are entitled to discovery on its equal protection claim. First, Judge Feinerman denied defendants' claims that plaintiffs "lack standing or fall outside the pertinent zone of interests, that this suit is not ripe, or that the APA claims fail as a matter of law," as the court already addressed those issues in its preliminary injunction opinion. Moreover, Judge Feinerman found that plaintiffs' equal protection claim survived dismissal, as the allegation "that the Final Rule’s disproportionate impact on nonwhite immigrants motivated its promulgation is eminently plausible." Judge Feinerman further concluded that extra-record discovery on plaintiffs' equal protection claim was justified because plaintiffs' made a "strong showing that the Rule was developed and promulgated 'at least in part because of' a substantial and impermissible reason not reflected in the administrative record—the Rule’s disproportionate 'adverse effects upon' nonwhite immigrants." The Seventh Circuit Affirms the Preliminary Injunction On June 10, a Seventh Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Diane Wood, Ilana Rovner, and Amy Coney Barrett) issued a ruling affirming the preliminary injunction. 962 F.3d 208. Writing for a 2-1 majority, Judge Wood held that (1) the county had standing to sue; (2) DHS's interpretation of the rule fell outside the boundaries set by the statute; and (3) the public charge rule was likely to be arbitrary and capricious. Judge Barrett dissented, writing that DHS's interpretation of the public charge rule did not fall outside the boundaries set by the statute. She did not comment on the rule being likely to fail the arbitrary and capricious standard, however, because the district court didn't address it and plaintiffs barely briefed it. The stay remained, however, as defendants still had the chance to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Defendants' Appeal is Denied, as is their Petition to Rehear In response to the ruling on the motion to dismiss, defendants asked the district court to certify for interlocutory appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss on June 10. Defendants argued that dismissal of plaintiffs' equal protection claim would avoid difficult issues of executive privilege arising from plaintiff's extra-record discovery. On July 14, Judge Feinerman declined to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. He found that, even if plaintiffs' equal protection claim were dismissed, plaintiffs would still be entitled to the same discovery from their APA claims. On July 27, defendants filed a petition for the Seventh Circuit to rehear their appeal of the preliminary injunction en banc. The Seventh Circuit denied their petition on August 12. On October 7, 2020, defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Public Charge Rule is Vacated Following Plaintiffs' Successful Motion for Summary Judgment on APA Claim On August 31, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the APA claim. Relying on the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of the preliminary injunction, they argued that they should win on the APA claim while the equal protection claim proceeds in court. They further argued that the public charge rule should be vacated as a result. Defendants conceded that plaintiffs were likely to win on the APA claim, but argued that the injunction should only be lifted for the State of Illinois. On November 2, Judge Feinerman issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion and vacating the public charge rule nationwide. He agreed that the Seventh Circuit had effectively argued the merits of the APA claim, and held vacatur to be an appropriate remedy for a rule that violated the APA. Order Vacating the Rule is Stayed Pending Appeal and Petition for Certiorari Immediately after the ruling, defendants moved to stay the district court's vacatur of the public charge rule pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit granted defendants' motion on November 3. On November 19, the Seventh Circuit further ordered that the appeal of the order would be suspended pending the Supreme Court's resolution of defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari on the preliminary injunction. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On January 22, 2021, two days after President Biden's inauguration, Judge Feinerman requested a status report from the new defendants addressing whether they plan to pursue their Seventh Circuit appeal or petition for certiorari. The status hearing was originally set for February 8, but was moved to February 26. On February 2, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide. That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition from this case, as well as a similar petition for the Second Circuit (New York v. DHS) and the Ninth Circuit (San Francisco v. USCIS). On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Seventh Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. Despite the motion to intervene in the Seventh Circuit, on March 12, Judge Feinerman approved a stipulation by both parties to voluntarily dismiss the lawsuit, closing the civil case. The Seventh Circuit then went on to deny the states' motion to intervene 3 days later, on March 15. As of April 15, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The case has been closed in the district court. However, the application by the states to intervene in the Supreme Court remains open.

Summary: On September 23, 2019, Cook County, Illinois and the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Inc. filed this suit the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its statutory authority and claimed that the Rule was "arbitrary and capricious." In October 2019 the district court ordered a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule in Illinois. The defendants appealed this order to the Seventh Circuit, where a panel declined to issue a stay of the district court's preliminary injunction. In February 2020 the Supreme Court granted the defendants' stay of the preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction in June, 2020. The rule was subsequently vacated altogether by the district court in November, 2020, but the order was immediately stayed by the Seventh Circuit. However, the Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021 and the Seventh Circuit subsequently lifted its stay, vacating the Rule nationwide. The case was closed in the District Court on March 12, 2021.


On September 25, 2019, the State of New York and the Kings County District Attorney filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs challenged the federal government’s new directive authorizing civil immigration arrests in and around New York State courthouses (“the Directive”). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the Directive violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Tenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Jed S. Rakoff. In their complaint, the plaintiffs stated that prior to a January 2018 ICE directive addressing “Civil Immigration Enforcement Actions Inside Courthouses,” there was a longstanding practice of avoiding civil immigration arrests in and around state courthouses. And, because New York recognizes a common-law privilege against civil arrests in, or while traveling to or from, courthouses, the plaintiffs argued that the Directive, which generally authorizes such arrests, violates the APA by exceeding ICE’s statutory authority. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Directive is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA because it was issued absent adequate justification or explanation. Next, the plaintiffs alleged that implementation of the Directive disrupts the effective functioning of the State’s court system, deters victims and witnesses from assisting law enforcement and vindicating their rights, hinders criminal prosecution, and undermines public safety. The plaintiffs also noted that ICE enforcement actions at New York State courthouses had “skyrocketed” since the Directive was issued, and that such enforcement had significantly chilled participation in the courts. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the Directive violates the Tenth Amendment by impermissibly interfering with New York’s right to form its own government by disrupting state court operations and impeding criminal prosecutions. On October 23, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants claimed that the Directive is unreviewable under the APA, there is no federal common-law immunity from immigration enforcement for those who are subject to ICE arrest, and that the Directive does not implicate the Tenth Amendment because it does not command or compel state actors to take any action. On December 19, 2019, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to all of the plaintiffs’ claims for relief. First, Judge Rakoff found that the Directive was final agency action subject to judicial review. Next, he held that the common-law privilege against civil courthouse arrests applies to immigration arrests, and has not been displaced by federal immigration law. Finally, he found that the facts presented demonstrate that ICE has commandeered state and local judges and court officials not to take action in response to ICE courthouse arrests, even when such arrests cause great disruption and state agents would therefore normally intervene. 431 F.Supp.3d 377. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on March 13, 2020. The motion was accompanied by three amicus briefs: one from former nominee to be U.S. Attorney General for Civil Rights and Commissioner of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Debo Adegbile, another from Harvard Law Professor Nikolas Bowie, and a third from the New York Bar Association. Judge Rakoff granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on June 10, 2020. He held that the Immigration and Nationality Act incorporated the English common law rule preventing service and arrest on people in or traveling to a courthouse. He also ruled that the policy change violated the APA's arbitrary and capricious review standard. He was not persuaded by the defendants' arguments that executive orders and policy directives from DHS effectively mandated that arrests must be carried out in courthouses because the orders mandated no such thing. In granting the summary judgment motion, Judge Rakoff also granted the motion for declaratory and injunctive relief and enjoined ICE from carrying out any civil arrests in New York courthouses. 2020 WL 3067715. On August 7, 2020, the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. As of December 23, 2020, the appeal is pending.

Summary: The State of New York and the Kings County District Attorney filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on September 25, 2019, challenging a new directive issued by ICE generally authorizing civil immigration arrests in and around New York State courthouses. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the directive violates the APA and the Tenth Amendment. On March 10, 2020, Judge Jed Rakoff granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, enjoining ICE from conducting civil arrests on the grounds of New York courthouses. On August 7, 2020, the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. As of December 23, 2020, the appeal is pending.


On January 13, 2012, the Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Columbia County. The plaintiff, represented by Human Rights Defense Center and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' "postcard only" and "no magazine" policies for inmate mail violated the plaintiff's First Amendment rights, as well as the First Amendment rights of inmates at the Jail and their correspondents. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the policy resulted in the unlawful censorship of PLN's books and magazines, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Columbia County Jail. The plaintiff claimed that these mailings were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff also alleged the defendants' "notice and appeal" policy for rejected inmate mail violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights and the procedural due process rights of inmates and their correspondents. On May 29, 2012, Judge Michael H. Simon granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction in part, holding that the jail's policy likely violated the First Amendment. Judge Simon ordered the defendants to stop restricting all incoming and outgoing inmate personal mail to postcards only and to stop refusing to deliver or process inmate mail solely on the grounds that it is not on a postcard. Prison Legal News v. Columbia Cnty., 2012 WL 1936108 (D. Or. May 29, 2012). Judge Simon rejected the jail's arguments that the policy was rationally related to both safety and the efficient use of the jail's limited resources. On September 13, 2012, PLN moved for partial summary judgment on the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and on the defendants' affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages. These issues went to two separate trials in 2013: a bench trial and a jury trial. From February 5 to February 8 the parties argued before Judge Simon in the bench trial. The defendants argued that the rationale behind the policy was preventing the introduction of contraband and saving time during mail inspection. Following the trial, Judge Simon found that this rationale was not supported by the evidence. This was the first time a postcard-only policy went to trial, so it is the first available legal precedent that can be used in future litigation against postcard-only policies. On February 8, after the bench trial, Judge Simon asked the parties to submit post-trial briefing on several issues relating to the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, including: the legal criteria for a permanent injunction; the application of the trial evidence to the legal standard; whether the Sheriff's credibility and limited political term impact the Court's analysis; and whether the injunction should be permanent or a limited term. On April 24, 2013, Judge Simon held that the jail's policy was unconstitutional. Judge Simon issued a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered the Final Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against all defendants on May 28, 2013. Judge Simon permanently enjoined the defendants from restricting incoming and outgoing inmate personal mail to postcards only. Judge Simon also declared that inmates have a First Amendment right to receive magazines, and publishers have a First Amendment right to send magazines to inmates and have their magazines delivered. As such, the defendants' policy and custom of prohibiting magazines violated the First Amendment. Judge Simon also declared that that inmates and their unincarcerated correspondents have a Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process when the defendants reject their mail and that the defendants must notify an inmate and the unincarcerated correspondent when the defendants reject correspondence written by or addressed to the inmate, including a description of the rejected mail and the basis for the rejection. Prison Legal News v. Columbia Cnty., 942 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (D. Or. 2013). Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to recover attorney fees and costs. On June 25, 2013, the defendants moved for the court to amend its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as for relief from the judgment. They claimed that the plaintiffs lacked standing for the claims, that the claims were moot based off of corrective actions taken, and that the postcard policy is not a violation of the First Amendment. They sought to have the declaratory judgment removed and claimed that the preliminary injunction should be found an unnecessary remedy by the court. On July 31, 2013, the court denied the motions and the findings and conclusions were left in place. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit in August 2013. While the appeal was pending, the court sent the parties to mediation. On March 24, 2014, Judge Simon in the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees in part, awarding the plaintiff a total of $802,176.46 in attorney fees and expenses. 2014 WL 1225100 (D. Or. 2014). The appellate court then stayed its proceedings in order to give the defendants time to appeal the attorney fees decision. The defendants filed the second appeal in April 2014 and in June 2014, the appeals were consolidated. However, the defendants subsequently moved, unopposed, to dismiss the appeal. The parties may have engaged in settlement talks, but it is unclear why the defendants sought voluntary dismissal. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal with prejudice on July 1, 2014 and the case is now closed. Each party paid its own costs for the appeal.

Summary: On January 13, 2012, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Columbia County. After a bench trial, the Court ordered the defendants to stop restricting all mail that was not on a postcard and to implement a notification process when mail is denied, and awarded the plaintiffs $802,176.46 in attorney fees and expenses.


On Jan. 20, 2017, an individual who participated in a protest in Washington D.C., on President Trump's Inauguration Day, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued John Doe D.C. Metropolitan Police Officers, John Doe U.S. Park Police Officers, and the Interim Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department, all in their individual capacities. Represented by private counsel, plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens for alleged violations of Fourth Amendment protections from false arrest and excessive force. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants used a "kettle" tactic to confine him and other demonstrators to a small area, and then deployed chemical irritants and flash-bang grenades against the members of the putative plaintiff class, as well as striking them with batons. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants then made numerous arrests without probable cause. The plaintiff sued on his own behalf and on behalf of a putative class, estimated to encompass at least thirty people, described as individuals who were subjected to the same police action as the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiff asked the court to declare defendants' conduct unlawful, order the expungement of class-members' arrest records, and for compensatory and punitive damages. On April 18, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay the case during the resolution of his criminal felony charges related to the incident in the District of Columbia Superior Court. On April 24, 2017, Senior Judge Richard J. Leon granted the plaintiff's motion. On June 12, 2017, the plaintiff provided notice of voluntary dismissal of the case without prejudice. As of Mar. 20, 2018, the case appears to be closed.

Summary: On Jan. 20, 2017, an individual who participated in protests in Washington D.C. during Donald Trump's inauguration sued police on behalf of a putative class of demonstrators, who allegedly were confined to a small area and unnecessarily subdued by chemical irritants, flash-bang grenades, and batons in violation of their protections against false arrest and excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The case was stayed while criminal charges against the plaintiff related to the same events were resolved, and then the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case.


On March 14, 2017, a female prisoner who was forced to receive prenatal care, give birth, and undergo post-partum treatment while shackled, filed a putative class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiff sued the County of Milwaukee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff alleged that in being shackled in accordance with the Milwaukee County Jail’s (MCJ) policy, her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process had been violated. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge David E. Jones. Due to non-consent to jurisdiction on the part of the plaintiff, however, the case was reassigned to Judge Lynn Adelman. On April 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that contained minor rewordings of the factual allegations without significantly altering the claims for relief. On October 17, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to certify class. The proposed class definition included “All persons who, while incarcerated by Milwaukee County Jail, were hospitalized for labor, delivery, or to receive post-partum treatment at any time from February 1, 2010-present.” This definition differed from the one originally proposed in the complaint in that it did not include “prenatal” care. Judge Adelman denied this motion on May 23, 2018. Litigation continued after the order denying class certification until April 8, 2019, when the parties informed the court that they had reached a private settlement agreement. The contents of this agreement was not made public. The plaintiff stipulated to dismissal on June 18, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by a female inmate in the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Wisconsin who was forced to undergo prenatal care, labor, and give birth while shackled. The parties reached a private settlement agreement on April 8, 2019 and the case was dismissed shortly after. This case is now closed.


On January 15, 2015, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC), along with two individuals requiring wheelchairs for mobility, brought this class action against Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc., in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. Ashford operated 15 hotels in California and others throughout the United States. In October 2014, the two plaintiffs had separately asked if the Courtyard Oakland Airport hotel and the Embassy Suites Walnut Creek hotel provided wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. Both locations informed the plaintiffs that they did not. The plaintiffs alleged that Ashford violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act by failing to provide wheelchair accessible vehicles at its hotels. The plaintiffs requested declaratory relief and a permanent injunction requiring Ashford to comply with state statutes and the ADA. The plaintiffs filed for class certification of individuals who rely on wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and have been or would be denied full and equal enjoyment of Ashford's services because of the lack of accessible transportation services at Ashford's hotels. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. On March 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed to consolidate and/or relate this case to two other cases for pre-trial purposes, because the defendants were publicly traded real estate investment trusts that own and operate hotels in the U.S. and the plaintiff was similarly-situated and seeking class certification. The judge rejected the argument that these similarities warranted case consolidation, and denied this motion on May 6, 2015. On August 27, CREEC filed a stipulated dismissal of all claims, with prejudice, of one of the plaintiffs. In an amended complaint filed on August 31, that plaintiff was removed and a new one was added. Meanwhile the court had granted the defendant's request for private alternative dispute resolution and the parties began settlement discussions before Magistrate Judge James Larson. These proceedings concluded with a settlement agreement reached on October 2, 2015. On November 5, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to certify the class and for preliminary approval of the settlement. The judge granted both motions on December 18, 2015. The Settlement Agreement required all Ashford-owned and operated hotels to come into compliance with ADA regulations by providing hotels that offer transportation services with equivalent transportation services for people who used wheelchairs or scooters. The Agreement explicitly required that Ashford provide accurate information to potential hotel guests so that no guests would be erroneously deterred. Ashford agreed to pay fees and costs of monitoring and the agreement authorized class counsel to seek an award of attorney's fees. The proposed Settlement Agreement was sent to hundreds of disability organizations as well as individuals who had communicated with CREEC about problems with Ashford's transportation. The plaintiffs sent class notice by email to 655 organizations and 43 individuals on December 21, 2015, and received no objections to the proposed settlement. On March 22, 2016, the court approved the final certification of the settlement class. In a final judgment on March 29, 2016, the Court approved the Settlement and announced that it would retain continuing jurisdiction over the parties, the lawsuit, and the settlement for purposes of enforcing the settlement and resolving disputes under the Settlement Agreement. The case was closed.

Summary: Two individual plaintiffs, both of whom required wheelchairs for mobility, as well as the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against Ashford Hospitality Trust, Inc., an operator of hotels. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the ADA and the case settled with a requirement that the defendant hotels provide wheelchair-accessible shuttle services.


This is a case about the unfair business practices of Global Tel*Link, a private company with a state granted monopoly on telephone services in New Jersey's prison systems. On August 20, 2013 the plaintiffs, people incarcerated in New Jersey prisons and people who created accounts with Global Tel*Link to receive calls from New Jersey prisoners, filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, where it was assigned to United States District Judge William J. Martini. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link and several associated companies, alleging violations of New Jersey's Consumer Fraud and Public Utilities statutes, the Federal Communications Act (42 U.S.C. § 201), the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). They plaintiffs also brought a common law unjust enrichment claim. In their § 1983 count, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, acting on behalf of the State of New Jersey, imposed unconscionable fees and rates on plaintiffs, which amounted to a violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on the taking of property without just compensation. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, disgorgment, restitution, and prejudgment interest, as well as injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. Specifically, they claimed that the defendant's billing policies were "abusive, discriminatory, and unreasonable." In 2006, Global Tel*Link, an Alabama company that provides telecommunications services and surveillance technology to correctional institutions, bought the contractual right to be the sole provider of telecommunications for prisons and many county jails in New Jersey. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that Global Tel*Link abused its monopoly power by charging plaintiffs exorbitant rates, forcing friends and family of incarcerated people to create prepaid accounts with minimum payments of $25 to receive calls from their loved ones, forfeiting money from prepaid accounts when they went unused for 90 days, and failing to disclose rates, fees, and billing practices. The defendants paid commissions, sometimes exceeding 50% of their revenue, to the correctional agency they contracted with. To turn a profit the defendants charged exceedingly high rates for calls and imposed numerous fees, such a 19% fee on deposits to the prepaid accounts. On November 22, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it should have been brought as a complaint to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) instead. At that time, the FCC had been in the process of determining whether the defendants' business practices were violations of the Federal Communications Act, as alleged in this lawsuit. On September 8, 2014, the court issued an opinion denying the motion to dismiss, but staying the case until the conclusion of the FCC's proceedings. The plaintiffs responded on September 19, 2014 by withdrawing their Federal Communications Act claim, as well as their claim under New Jersey Public Utilities Statutes. After close to a year of discovery disputes, on August 7, 2015, the defendants moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration clauses in their products' terms of use. On February 11, 2016, Judge Martini denied the motion with respect to all but one of the plaintiffs. He found that the recorded message notifying Global Tel*Link users of its terms of use, including the arbitration provision, did not inform most of the plaintiffs that they would have to abide by Global Tel*link's terms of use to use its services. Consequently, the court held the plaintiffs did not enter into a legally enforceable contract with the defendants. One of the named plaintiffs who created their account through the defendants' website, which used a different system, was forced to arbitrate their claim. On June 15, 2016, the defendants filed a motion with the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate this case with several others on which prisoners and their families were suing Global Tel*Link. The Panel denied that request in an October 13, 2015 order, docketed as JPML No. 2651, Entry 23. The defendants appealed Judge Martini's arbitration decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on March 9, 2016. On March 29, 2017, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Martini's ruling in an opinion by Judge Thomas M. Hardiman. James v. Global Tel*Link Corp. 852 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2017). The Circuit agreed with Judge Martini that because the plaintiffs did not receive the defendants' terms of use or were informed that use of the defendants' services constituted assent to the terms, the plaintiffs were not bound by them or the arbitration clause they contained. While the appeal was pending, the case lay mostly dormant in the district court. The litigation continued to move slowly until the plaintiffs moved for class certification on their New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and § 1983 Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claims on February 27, 2018. On August 6, 2018, Judge Martini granted that motion and certified a class consisting of all people incarcerated in New Jersey prisons or correctional institutions who used a phone system provided by the defendants and people who received calls from a person incarcerated in New Jersey or established an advance pay account to receive calls from such a person from 2006 to June 2011 (with the exception of people calling from or to Essex County). On March 27, 2018 the defendants moved for summary judgment and on May 4, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion on their § 1983 Takings claim. Judge Martini denied both motions on August 6 in a separate opinion from the one addressing the class certification question.The court rejected several of the defendants' legal claims, including the assertion that they were not state actors amenable to suit under § 1983 and finding issues of material fact for others. On April 2, 2018, Judge Martini referred the case to mediation and took the step of scheduling a settlement conference on December 10, 2019. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement and the case was scheduled for trial in March of 2020. On January 24, 2020, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and to decertify the plaintiffs' class. Judge Martini granted the defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiffs' Fifth Amendments Takings claims on March 2, 2020. He found that denying the plaintiffs reasonably priced calling options did not amount to a taking as it lacked legal compulsion. The court did not resolve the decertification motion. This case was scheduled to go to trial on March 16, 2020. However, in a March 3 settlement conference the parties reached an agreement on the broad terms of a settlement and the trial was canceled. After more negotiation, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement on May 28, 2020, which Judge Martini granted on July 15, 2020. The settlement provided that the defendants would pay $25 million to a settlement fund. That money would be distributed to members of the plaintiffs' class based on the amount each member spent on the defendants' services, with a maximum recovery of $5,000 per account. While the class certified by the court included people who used the defendants' services in New Jersey after 2006, the settlement only allowed for payment to class members who used the defendants' services from 2006 to 2016. The settlement also allowed the plaintiffs to apply for a maximum of $8,332,500 in attorneys' fees. It also provided that class members who were still incarcerated in New Jersey would receive their payments in the form of credits on the phone accounts without filing a proof of claim. However, the settlement did not enjoin the defendants from continuing to engage in unfair business practices, as the plaintiffs had requested in their complaint. After the proposed settlement was filed, on September 21, 2020, several plaintiffs from a separate class action against the defendants in the Northern District of Georgia moved to intervene in this case. The plaintiffs in the Georgia case also challenged some of the defendants' business practices, but on behalf of a putative class of individuals across the country who used the defendants' services. On October 22, 2020, Judge Martini denied this motion, finding that the Georgia plaintiffs did not have a sufficient direct interest in this case to intervene, but allowing them to appear as amicus curiae at the fairness hearing. That hearing happened on October 15, 2020 and a week on October 22, 2020 later Judge Martini issued an opinion approving the settlement. He found that the settlement met all the relevant tests for approval and that he could not address the Georgia plaintiffs' concerns about the settlement, as their class had not yet been certified. The case was closed the day of the order approving the settlement, though the settlement provides that the court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement and its enforcement. The is case ongoing as of November 2020 for settlement enforcement purposes.

Summary: In 2013 New Jersey prisoners and their loved ones filed this class action complaint against Global Tel*Link, a major prison telecommunications provider, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants high billing rates and unjust billing practices violated New Jersey law, the Federal Communications act, and the Fifth Amendment's Takings clause through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In October of 2020, the parties reached a settlement in which the defendants agreed to pay $25 million to the plaintiffs and other class members. This case remains open for settlement enforcement purposes.


On October 28, 2008, an African-American man filed this class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Oakland, California Police Department and one of its officers. The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, requested injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleging that the City unlawfully targeted citizens on the basis of race, violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officers of the police department had issued warrants based on intentionally false or misleading information, subjecting him to unreasonable search and seizure, arresting him without probable cause, and maliciously prosecuting him. On October 6, 2008, the charges against the plaintiff were dismissed when the Alameda County District Attorney's Office discovered that the warrant had been illegally obtained. Although the charges were dismissed, the plaintiff alleged that as a result of the unreasonable search and seizure, he was unable to work causing a loss of income and suffered damages for pain and emotional distress. On February 9, 2009, a second amended complaint was filed. This complaint added plaintiffs, including African American and Hispanic men and women, who were allegedly subjected to unreasonable search and seizure stemming from illegally obtained warrants and many of whom had been subsequently arrested. On August 5, 2010, the plaintiffs submitted a stipulated motion for approval of settlement. The United States District Court Northern District of California (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted the motion where the City offered to settle the monetary relief claims of the 104 individual plaintiffs and putative class members for total gross settlement sum of $6,500.00 inclusive of all attorney fees and costs. After reaching this agreement, the parties continued with settlement discussions on non-monetary relief claims. Their discussions focused on specific reforms intended to remedy the kind of police misconduct that occurred in this case that would be of substantial benefit to the putative class. On February 14, 2011, the parties reached a non-monetary settlement agreement. The settlement set out specific procedures for the Oakland Police Department to obtain affidavits and warrants. The parties also agreed to set of protocols for drug evidence testing. The Court retained jurisdiction for two years from the settlement date so that the parties could petition for redress pertaining to compliance with their agreement. There is nothing substantive in the docket sheet following settlement. Presumably the matter is closed.

Summary: In late 2008, an African-American man filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Oakland Police Department and one individual officer, alleging the officers issued warrants based on intentionally false or misleading information, subjecting him to unreasonable search and seizure, arresting him without probable cause, and maliciously prosecuting him. The complaint was later amended to include named plaintiffs, all black or Hispanic. The parties settled the case by agreeing to monetary-relief on August 5, 2010, and non-monetary relief on February 14, 2011.


COVID-19 Summary: Over a dozen non-citizens detained in immigration detention facilities, who had underlying medical conditions rendering them particularly susceptible to COVID-19 complications, filed this suit on April 3, 2020 against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Atlanta, GA, seeking immediate release. The court granted a motion to dismiss and terminated the case on April 7, 2020.
 On April 3, 2020, the Southern Poverty Law Center, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, and private counsel filed suit on behalf of thirteen individuals detained in three U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention or processing centers in Georgia. The plaintiffs named as defendants ICE, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and various officers of those departments. The plaintiffs asked the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or in the alternative, issue injunctive relief ordering the immediate release of the plaintiffs. In addition, the plaintiffs sought a declaration stating that the continued detention of individuals at increased risk for severe illness including COVID-19, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Further, the plaintiffs asked for an award of attorneys' fees. The complaint alleged that the medical conditions or underlying diseases of these detained individuals, like diabetes and hypertension, made them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. The facilities where ICE has detained the plaintiffs lacked access to critical care necessary for treating serious cases of COVID-19. According to the complaint, imprisoned populations, including those in ICE detention facilities, pose a higher risk for the spread of infectious disease. The plaintiffs stated that in March 2020, over 3,000 medical professionals across the United States urged ICE to release individuals and families to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among detainees as well as facility staff. The complaint also explained that social distancing measures and large-scale quarantines as recommended by the Center for Disease Control are "nearly impossible" in immigration detention due to overcrowding, poor availability of hygiene products, and lack of access to adequate medical services. In addition to the complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order as well as an emergency writ of habeas corpus and requested an immediate hearing given the time-sensitive nature of the case. The plaintiffs alleged that because the government knew or should have known of the substantial risk to the plaintiffs, the continued detention of these individuals demonstrated deliberate indifference, thereby violating the plaintiffs' right to Due Process under the Fifth Amendment. On April 6, 2020 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or in the alternative, a transfer of venue. Additionally, the defendants asked the court to sever the plaintiffs' claims by facility. The plaintiffs, in response, filed a motion for voluntary dismissal on April 6, 2020. The motion, without conceding that this court lacked jurisdiction, gave notice of the dismissal in the interest of expediting emergency relief. The motion stated that the plaintiffs would seek relief in other federal district courts.  Martinez v. Donahue was filed on April 7 in the Middle District of Georgia, and  Benavides v. Donahue was filed on April 8 in the Southern District of Georgia. The court granted the motion to dismiss and terminated the case on April 7, 2020.

Summary: Individuals with underlying conditions detained in immigration detention facilities filed this suit on April 3, 2020 against the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Atlanta, GA. The plaintiffs asked the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus or issue an injunction requiring the immediate release of the plaintiffs during the COVID-19 pandemic in addition to declaratory judgment and attorneys' fees. After the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in the interest of expediting emergency relief and stated their intention to refile in the district courts for the Middle District and Southern District of Georgia.


On May 12, 2005, male arrestees at the Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the warden of Central Booking, the Baltimore Police Department, the City of Baltimore, and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief, compensatory and consequential damages, and attorneys fees and costs. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they engaged in unconstitutional strip searches of the plaintiffs and detained the plaintiffs for unreasonable lengths of time. This case was one of three cases alleging mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to Central Booking for booking and processing. The other cases were JC-MD-0008: Maryland NAACP v. Baltimore City Police Department, 1:06-cv-01863-CCB (D. Md. 2006) and JC-MD-0011: Rodney v. Murphy, 24-C-05004405, filed in Maryland state court. Plaintiffs sought certification for five classes. First, the suspicionless strip search class which consisted of those who had been or would be arrested for crimes not involving weapons, drugs, or felony violence, who were strip searched by Central Booking employees without any individualized finding that they were harboring weapons, drugs, or other contraband. Second, the non-private strip search class was composed of those who had been or would be subjected to strip searches at Central Booking with other arrestees present. Third, the equal protection strip search class consisted of male arrestees strip searched at Central Booking while similarly-situated female arrestees were not. Fourth, the underwear strip search class was made up of male arrestees subjected to an underwear strip search while similarly-situated female arrestees were not. Fifth, the over-detention class consisted of those arrested without warrants who had been or would be detained for an unreasonable length of time (more than 48 hours) before presentment to a judicial officer for a determination of probable cause. The defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The District Court (District Judge Catherine C. Blake) granted the motion in part and dismissed all claims against the City and the Police Department, rejecting the theory of "entrustment liability." Claims against the state defendants survived, with the exception of individual claims against the current warden. 470 F.Supp.2d 537 (D. Md. Jan 04, 2007). On July 11, 2008, the district court (Judge Blake) issued a memorandum on the issue of whether the gender-differentiated search policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue and denied the defendants' motion. On March 19, 2009, the district court partially granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify a class. Specifically, the court certified the following subclasses: 1) those people detained for more than 48 hours without having been brought before a commissioner, and 2) those people arrested for minor, nondrug, nonviolent offenses and strip-searched before they were brought before a commissioner. The court declined to certify the following subclasses: 1) those people who weren't strip-searched privately, and 2) male arrestees who were searched to their underwear when female detainees were not. For the next two years, discovery motions were exchanged, until the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on January 14, 2011. On March 5th, 2013 Judge Blake issued a memorandum and an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment. The court granted the motion under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The plaintiffs filed an appeal on August of 2013. A panel of three judges rendered a decision on November 11, 2014. 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). The Circuit Court (Circuit Judge James Harvie Wilkinson III) affirmed the district court's decision to grant partial summary judgment for the defendants. The court noted that several police officers and guards testified that they found illegal contraband from these searches. And the searchers were being conducted in a private room. On the issue of qualified immunity, the court noted that the right to not be subjected to a strip search was not clearly established at the time of the searches. A Supreme Court decision was filed in 2012, settling aspects of the issue after the fact, but before this, officers who were conducting searches, could not reasonably tell if the searches were violating a constitutional right. The court found the defense of qualified immunity acceptable here, and determined that the motion for partial summary judgment was properly granted. Circuit Judge James Andrew Wynn Jr. filed a concurring opinion in which he pointed out that the Supreme Court intimated in the <i>Florence</i> decision that there may be exceptions to the rule. That detainees not being admitted into the general population should not have to be stripped searched. The complexities of the exceptions had not been explored by the courts, and Judge Wynn noted that there needed to be more elaboration on this topic, so public officials would know how to act accordingly. However, the merits of the case were not be reached because of the granting of summary judgment. On February 24, 2015 Judge Blake filed a memo regarding the January 31, 2011 motion for partial summary judgment. 2015 WL 790334. The motion was made by the warden-defendant, over the class of Plaintiffs claiming that Central Booking practiced "over-detention." The court held that the plaintiffs' theory of supervisor liability was defective because there was no evidence that the warden-defendant was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional injury of the Plaintiffs. The warden-defendant did not deny that there were detainees held longer than 48 hours, which was past what was constitutionally acceptable, but she argued that it was caused by factors outside of her control. The court agreed that the delays in presenting detainees before a court commissioner was the fault of the Baltimore police, the state's attorneys office, and court officials. Furthermore, the court argued that the warden had made several efforts to remedy the problem, and that the plaintiffs' complaint that it was not fast enough or proactive enough did not prove deliberate indifference. Finally, the court also granted the summary judgment motion on the theory of qualified immunity, so the defendant had no fair warning that her conduct was unconstitutional. A few months later on June 15, 2015 the Court entered final judgment and closed the case.

Summary: This class action lawsuit was filed on May 12, 2005 by two male arrestees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that they and all male arrestees taken to Central Booking were subjected to unconstitutional strip searches and many were subjected to "over detentions" in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.