On Apr. 6, 2016, two noncitizens—a Mexican citizen and an asylum-seeking Honduran national, both detained pending immigration removal hearings—brought this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU, the plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were kept in detention pending removal proceedings, despite having been granted release on bond after having been found not to pose any significant flight risk or danger to the community, because they could not afford to pay the cash bond. The plaintiffs’ class-action complaint challenged the federal practice of detaining noncitizens for failure to post cash bond without considering the noncitizen’s financial resources, or the availability of alternative forms of bond or other conditions of supervision which would enable the detainee’s release. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on Apr. 22, 2016. The proposed class was specified as all individuals detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), on a bond set by an ICE officer or an Immigration Judge in the Central District of California. The case was assigned to Judge Jesus G. Bernal. On June 10, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss this case. On Nov. 20, 2016, Judge Bernal denied the defendants’ motion and granted the plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and class-wide preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim. The preliminary injunction order required that the defendants develop and apply guidelines requiring officers to Immigration Judges to take into account a noncitizen detainee’s financial ability to pay a bond, to refrain from setting cash bonds at amounts greater than what was required to ensure appearance, and to consider alternative forms of supervision when determining conditions of release. 2016 WL 7116611 (C.D. Cal. 2016). On Dec. 12, 2016, the defendants appealed the District Court’s preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On the same day, the defendants moved ex parte to stay proceedings related to the preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeal. On Dec. 28, 2016, Judge Bernal denied the motion to stay. On Jan. 4, 2017, however, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants’ motion to stay the District Court’s order pending appeal. The defendants then filed their opening brief in the Ninth Circuit on Feb. 1, 2017. They argued that the District Court had erred in issuing the preliminary injunction because federal courts lacked jurisdiction (under federal statutes and because the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies); because the plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional claims were unlikely to succeed (because ability to pay is not a primary factor in determining bond); and because current bond determination proceedings did not violate noncitizens' constitutional rights (because they received full and fair hearings, and because the primary purpose of bond was to ensure that the noncitizen had an incentive to appear at future removal proceedings rather than abscond). The plaintiffs answered in the Ninth Circuit on Mar. 1, 2017. They argued that federal courts had jurisdiction; that the preliminary injunction applied only to individuals already found eligible for release, whose bond was to be determined, and that the INA should be construed to prevent the defendants' bond-setting policies from violating the Constitution; and that the plaintiffs continued to suffer irreparable harm from their detention. Also in Mar. 2017 in the Ninth Circuit, several amici briefs were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, including by retired Board of Immigration Appeals members and Immigration Judges, and by the American Bar Association. On June 30, 2017, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, and consolidated this case with another, <i>Marvin Rodriguez Aroche v. Jason Park</i>, No. 8:17-cv-00367 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2017). The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on July 11, 2017 and issued a decision on Oct. 2, 2017, affirming the District Court's class-wide preliminary injunction. 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017). In the opinion, the Court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by requiring immigration officials making bond decisions to consider, inter alia, detainees' financial ability to obtain bond and alternative conditions of release. The plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Fifth Amendment Due Process claim, because "[s]etting a bond amount without considering financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release undermines the connection between the bond and the legitimate purpose of ensuring the non-citizen’s presence at future hearings." The plaintiffs had established a likelihood of irreparable harm because "they are likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time." Finally, the balance of equities and the public interest favored the plaintiffs because "any additional administrative costs to the government are far outweighed by the considerable harm to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in the absence of the injunction" and because "[t]he public interest benefits from an injunction that ensures that individuals are not deprived of their liberty and held in immigration detention because of bonds established by a likely unconstitutional process." The Ninth Circuit also lifted the stay of the District Court's preliminary injunction pending appeal. The defendants were given until Jan. 2, 2018 to petition the Ninth Circuit for a panel or en banc rehearing, but they filed no petition. In the District Court on Nov. 21, 2017, Judge Bernal approved the parties' joint stipulation for an extension of time to implement the part of his Nov. 10, 2016 order granting a class-wide preliminary injunction. The defendants were required to update the plaintiffs by Feb. 16, 2018 about their progress in meeting the injunction requirements. On Dec. 1, 2017, Magistrate Judge Kenly Kato granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel production of documents and to obtain fees. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198255 (C.D. Cal. 2017). On Jan. 3, 2018, Magistrate Judge Kato granted $22,820 in fees regarding this motion. As discovery got underway, Magistrate Judge Kato decided that a Special Master should be appointed to consider the parties' discovery disputes and facilitate the timely production of documents. Rosalyn Chapman was appointed Special Master on May 23, 2018. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery over the next year. On May 16, 2019, the parties made a joint request to the District Court, asking for this case to be referred for a settlement conference. Judge Bernal granted the request on May 21 and referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, noncitizens detained pending immigration removal proceedings brought this class action, alleging a federal practice of detaining noncitizens solely on the basis of indigence, by failing to take into account their ability to pay bond or to consider alternative means of supervision to ensure appearance. The District Court granted plaintiffs' request for a PI, and the 9th Circuit affirmed. The parties have since engaged in extensive discovery, but jointly requested to be referred for a settlement conference in May 2019. The case is ongoing.


A trans woman housed in a mens' prison in Texas filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on June 8, 2015 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff represented herself in the trial court, and she was represented on appeal by Stephen Braga, a law professor at the University of Virginia. The case was assigned to Judge Robert Pitman. The plaintiff alleged that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's blanket ban on gender affirmation surgery violated the Eighth Amendment because it amounted to deliberate indifference to her medical needs. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that, while incarcerated, her primary care physician was not adequately trained on transgender care and failed to provide her with treatment consistent with the WPATH standards of care. He refused to provide her with an individualized assessment or treatment plan, which denied her access to various forms of treatment that may have been medically necessary. The plaintiff had on several occasions used the prison's formal grievance system to protest this lack of care as well as the blanket policy to no avail. The defendants named in this case were the TDCJ Director, the primary care physician who refused to provide the plaintiff with treatment for her gender dysphoria, and and unknown University of Texas Medical Branch official. The Director moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim. On June 8, 2015, the district court granted this motion, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. The plaintiff filed an appeal in the Fifth Circuit pro se on September 16, 2016. On October 10, 2017, Professor Stephen Bega began representing her. Judges Smith, Ho and Barksdale heard the case and released an opinion on March 29, 2019 (920 F.3d 212). The majority opinion, written by Judge Ho, held that there had been no Eighth Amendment violation, characterizing the WPATH standards as simply one side of a contested debate rather than the widely accepted standard in the medical field. Judge Ho held that because the doctor and prison administration had merely chosen a side, they were not demonstrating the malicious intent necessary to make out a claim of deliberate indifference. Judge Barksdale's dissent, on the other hand, took issue with both the summary judgment procedure used by the lower court and the majority's assessment of the merits. Specifically, he disagreed with the majority's characterization of WPATH, noting that it had become a widely accepted norm that had been acknowledged as such in both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. Judge Barksdale also questioned whether authorities cited by the majority supported its use of he/him/his pronouns to refer to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari (an appeal) in the Supreme Court of the United States on July 1, 2019. The Supreme Court announced on December 9, 2019 that they had declined to hear the case (140 S. Ct. 653). The case is now closed. While this case was still ongoing, the plaintiff filed another lawsuit alleging retaliation in response to pursuing these claims. For more information, see <i>Gibson v. Jean-Baptiste</i>, No. 6:17-cv-00042 (W.D. Tex.)

Summary: A trans woman incarcerated in a men's prison in Texas filed a pro se suit against the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and her primary care physician in the prison. She filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas on June 8, 2015. She alleged that TDCJ blanket policy refusing to provide gender affirming surgery and the doctor's refusal to give her an individualized assessment regarding her gender identity disorder violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and a law professor from the University of Virginia began representing her. The Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the defendants on the merits, with a dissenting opinion from Judge Barksdale. The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought Supreme Court review, and the case is now closed.


On November 18, 2002, HIV positive inmates at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama to challenge their treatment and conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private civil rights attorneys, alleged that they were denied adequate medical treatment and were subjected to deplorable living conditions. Defendants included officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections [DOC] and NaphCare, Inc., a private health care company that contracted with the DOC to provide healthcare services at Limestone. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Following plaintiffs' lawsuit, an audit report addressing the medical treatment provided to HIV positive inmates confined at Limestone was prepared by Moore and Associates, an independent entity that was hired to assess the performance of NaphCare under its contract with the DOC. The audit report noted many deficiencies in the care provided and found that the number of AIDS related deaths at Limestone (reportedly 36 deaths from 1992 to 2002) was remarkably high compared to averages reported by other correctional institutions. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on April 2, 2003, which cited various findings and the conclusion reported by Moore and Associates in its audit report. NaphCare moved to dismiss. The District Court Judge Karon O. Bowdre certified the case as a class action on January 27, 2004. NaphCare was dismissed from the case without prejudice, with the dismissal contingent on NaphCare complying with all standing discovery orders. The case was then referred to mediation. The parties eventually arrived at a settlement. On May 6, 2004, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the Settlement Agreement. A fairness hearing was held on May 26, 2004 before Magistrate Judge John E. Ott. Judge Ott issued a report and recommendation that the Court adopt the Settlement Agreement. The District Court issued a memorandum opinion and order approving the Settlement Agreement on June 24, 2004. The Settlement Agreement specified numerous changes to be made by the DOC relative to the delivery of health care at Limestone, including the hiring of an HIV Specialist to provide treatment to HIV infected prisoners and a full time registered nurse to serve as the "HIV Coordinator" in charge of infection control. An additional medical doctor was to be hired to treat non-HIV positive inmates. The Agreement was set to terminate two years after its final approval. The District Court retained jurisdiction over the case to enforce the agreement and appointed Magistrate Judge Ott as Special Master to oversee the remedial phase. Dr. Joseph Bick was appointed as the independent medical consultant. By separate agreement of the parties, attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $410,000.00 were awarded to class counsel. During the remediation phase, plaintiffs moved for an order of contempt for the DOC's alleged non-compliance with the Settlement Agreement. In January 2006, The District Court (Judge Bowdre) denied the motion as moot and ordered Dr. Bick to conduct an audit at Limestone in November 2006 and to issue a written report on his findings. The parties were advised to file any motions to terminate or extend the Settlement Agreement within 30 days of its June 26, 2006 termination date. On April 5, 2006 Judge Ott issued an order preserving the confidentiality of all medical records incorporated in "mortality reviews"provided to Dr. Bick and extended the confidentiality requirements in perpetuity. On April 26, 2007 the State of Alabama was ordered to pay Dr. Bick $4,000 for his last quarterly evaluation. There have been no updates as of October 7, 2018, and the case is now closed. Additional case information can be accessed at the website of the Southern Center for Human Rights (http://www.schr.org/).

Summary: On November 18, 2002, HIV positive inmates at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama to challenge their treatment and conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private civil rights attorneys, alleged that they were denied adequate medical treatment and were subjected to deplorable living conditions. Defendants included officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections [DOC] and NaphCare, Inc., a private health care company that contracted with the DOC to provide healthcare services at Limestone. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On May 6, 2004, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement specified numerous changes to be made by the DOC relative to the delivery of health care at Limestone, including the hiring of an HIV Specialist to provide treatment to HIV infected prisoners and a full time registered nurse to serve as the "HIV Coordinator" in charge of infection control. An additional medical doctor was to be hired to treat non-HIV positive inmates. The Agreement was set to terminate two years after its final approval.


On June 5, 2017, a male Louisiana detainee filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. He had been arrested and detained after being charged with felony theft and was unable to post the $375 bond to a for-profit bonding agent to clear his $3000 bail. The plaintiff sued the Sheriff, County Commissioner, and Chief Judge for the 15th Judicial District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Represented by Civil Rights Corps, MacArthur Justice Center, and Loyola University School of Law, the plaintiff sought to represent a class of all arrestees who were or would be detained in that state district--which covered Acadia, Lafayette, and Vermillon Parishes--for any amount of time after an arrest because they were unable to pay money bail. He claimed that the district scheme of setting bail amounts without further inquiry into a person's ability to pay violated his Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought an injunction, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Patrick Hanna and Judge Robert G. James. Judge James recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Elizabeth E. Foote. The defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They also argued that the claim was moot because the plaintiff was no longer in jail. On July 20, the case was stayed as the parties engaged in settlement talks under Judge Hanna's orders. After several months of unsuccessful settlement talks, the stay was lifted even though settlement discussions continued. The defendants claimed there was nothing to settle and the plaintiff claimed irreparable harm was ongoing. On December 6, 2017, Judge Hanna filed a Report and Recommendation in response to the Commissioner's motion to dismiss. The report recommended that the motion should be granted with respect to plaintiff's equal protection claims and due process claims against the County Judge. The Judge also recommended that the motion be denied to the extent that it requested dismissal of due process claims against the Commissioner. On December 11, 2017, Judge Hanna filed a second Report and Recommendation in response to the Sheriff's motion to dismiss. The report recommended the motion be denied with respect to subject matter jurisdiction claims because the claim was not moot and Younger abstention did not apply. However, the plaintiff had requested relief that could not be granted, and so Judge Hanna recommended dismissal. The plaintiff objected to both of these reports and sought oral argument before Judge Foote. On January 12, 2018, Judge Foote granted a hearing. On February 14, 2018, the plaintiff and an intervenor filed a motion to intervene or to consolidate the case with the intervenor's individual case, 6:18-cv-00159, with this case. On February 26, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint with opposition, which was granted later by Judge Foote. Judge Foote adopted partially the second Report and Recommendations and denied the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on March 6, 2018. 2018 WL 1188077. On March 8, Judge Hanna denied the plaintiff’s motion to certify class without prejudice. 2018 WL 1221119. On March 9, the plaintiff filed the first supplemental class-action complaint to allege material facts that have arisen since the original complaint on June 5, 2017. Specifically, the Sheriff revised his policies and procedures governing the Sheriff’s Tracking Offender Program (S.T.O.P), which determines a detainee’s eligibility for these programs. On March 27, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint and original complaint for failure to state a claim. Discovery then followed. On April 12, Judge Foote granted the plaintiff’s motion to intervene and denied the motion to consolidate cases. On June 28, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for sanction regarding the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint. On August 28, 2018, Judge Hanna filed a Report and Recommendations. She recommended that the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss filed on March 27 should be granted in part and denied in part, and that the re-urged first motion to dismiss the original complaint should be granted. 2018 WL 6036911. The next day, Judge Hanna filed an additional Report and Recommendations, recommending that the motion for sanctions be denied. 2018 WL 6028683. On October 26, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the Sheriff but later withdrew this motion. On the same day, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment again on October 30. On November 9, this case was reassigned to Judge Terry A. Doughty. On November 14, Judge Doughty adopted the Report and Recommendation of Judge Hanna, granting the motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint and original complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6). The plaintiffs’ claims against the Sheriff were dismissed without prejudice. 2018 WL 5993879. Furthermore, Judge Doughty adopted the second Report and Recommendation and denied the motion for sanctions. 2018 WL 5987022. On December 3, 2018, Judge Doughty denied both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ motions for summary judgment and the parties were required to file pre-trial memoranda. 2018 WL 6314730. Bench trial was held on August 6, 2019 and the parties were asked to file post-trial briefs. The plaintiffs filed their brief on September 20 and the defendants filed their brief on December 3. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The plaintiff filed a class action on behalf of all arrestees who are or will be detained for any amount of time after an arrest because they are unable to pay money bail. Under a § 1983 action, he claimed that a wealth-based post-arrest detention policy violates equal protection and due process under the 14th amendment by jailing the poor for no reason other than their poverty.


On June 27, 2017, pre-trial detainees at the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s office filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the magistrate judge of the Criminal District Court alleging unlawful bail setting practices. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by keeping them in jail post-arrest when they could not afford the bail set by defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s practice of regularly setting a $2,500 minimum financial condition, without considering arrestees' inability to pay or other non-financial alternatives, violated plaintiffs’ fundamental rights. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by holding a dual role of determining pre-trial release conditions and managing the court's finances, thereby creating an institutional conflict of interest and depriving plaintiffs of a neutral tribunal. By requiring detainees pay their bail amounts as a commercial surety instead of in cash, plaintiffs allege that defendant enforced a mechanism whereby bail payments generated revenue for the court and directly benefited defendant’s office. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgement. The next day, plaintiffs moved to certify their class for all similarly situated detainees who were unable to pay the financial condition imposed by defendant as a requirement for their immediate release. In July 2017, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for two reasons. First, the defendant claimed that that putative class members whose criminal proceedings had ended no longer had standing and were therefore unlikely to be injured. Secondly, the defendant claimed that because there were ongoing state court criminal proceedings against named plaintiffs and other class members, a federal proceeding would interfere with the state court’s ability to handle these proceedings. On August 25, 2017, Judge Eldon E. Fallon denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that there were still named and proposed class members with ongoing criminal cases who had ongoing and actual injuries. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not have an adequate opportunity to raise issues of bond policies in the relevant state courts, and so the issue of federal proceedings interfering with state court did not apply. On November 7, 2017, the defendant again moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the defendant magistrate judge was not the proper defendant on plaintiffs’ claim of unconstitutionality. Over the next several months, the parties engaged in settlement talks but did not reach an agreement. The court denied the defendant's second motion to dismiss in December, 2017. On March 16, 2018, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class was certified as: "all presumptively innocent arrestees who are now before or will come before Defendant Magistrate Judge of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court for proceedings concerning pretrial release or detention and who are unable to pay the financial condition that Defendant imposes as a requirement for their immediate release." 2018 WL 1365809. On August 06, 2018, Judge Eldon E. Fallon granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and provided the declaratory relief requested. The Court stated that the defendant's bail procedures had not provided notice of the importance of the issue of the criminal defendant’s ability to pay, and consideration of alternative conditions of release, or application of a legal standard in the determination of the necessity of pretrial detention. Hence, these procedures violated plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. On August 14, 2018, Judge Fallon issued an order granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and providing declaratory relief as follows: (i) in the context of hearings to determine pretrial detention Due Process requires: (a) an inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay, including notice of the importance of this issue and the ability to be heard on this issue; (b) consideration of alternative conditions of release, including findings on the record applying the clear and convincing standard and explaining why an arrestee does not qualify for alternative conditions of release; and (c) representative counsel; (ii) defendant's institutional incentives created a substantial and unconstitutional conflict of interest when he determined their ability to pay bail and set the amount of that bail. The defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 2018, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (Docket No. 18-30954). The defendant appealed only the determination that his setting of bonds that help fund his court violated due process. On June 13, 2019, Judge Fallon entered an Order governing the protocol that the defendant will use in determining the conditions of pre-trial release for arrestees. The order directed the defendant to consider the need for pre-trial release or detention based on the flight risk and/or danger posed by the arrestee. The defendant must also consider whether there are any nonfinancial conditions of release that would satisfy concerns of public safety and/or future appearances at court. The order also instructed that if a financial condition for release is set and the arrestee cannot meet it, the court must provide clear and convincing evidence that the financial condition is necessary to guard against risks of flight and danger to public safety. On August 29, 2019, the appeals court affirmed the decision of the district court (Circuit Judges Patrick Higginbotham, Edith Jones, and Gregg Costa). See 937 F.3d 525 (2019). The appeals court concluded that the defendant had a direct and personal interest in maintaining the fiscal health of his court through the generation of bonds fees. The defendant also held a dual role because he generated and appropriated funds for the court through his bail procedures. The appeals court found that the combination of the dual role and personal interest in benefitting from bond fees “may make the magistrate ‘partisan to maintain the high level of contribution’,” thus violating due process. On September 12, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for rehearing en banc in the appeals court. This motion was denied by the appeals court on October 1, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: On June 27, 2017, pre-trial detainees at the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s office filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the magistrate judge of the Criminal District Court alleging unlawful bail setting practices. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by keeping them in jail post-arrest when they cannot afford the bail set by defendant. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause by holding a dual role of determining pre-trial release conditions and managing the courts finances, thereby creating an institutional conflict of interest and depriving plaintiffs of a neutral tribunal. The Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and provided the requested declaratory relief, stating that, in the context of hearings to determine pretrial detention, Due Process requires (a) an inquiry into the arrestee’s ability to pay, including notice of the importance of this issue and the ability to be heard on this issue; (b) consideration of alternative conditions of release, including findings on the record applying the clear and convincing standard and explaining why an arrestee does not qualify for alternative conditions of release; and (c) representative counsel. The Court also declared that defendant's institutional incentives created a substantial and unconstitutional conflict of interest when he determined plaintiffs' ability to pay bail and set the amount of that bail. On August 29, 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appeals court held that the defendants' dual role in generating and appropriating court funds through bond fees, along with benefitting personally from these fees, violated due process.


On June 26, 2020, three individuals filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The suit arose out of the protests that swept the nation following the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The suit alleged that Fort Wayne Police Officers used chemical weapons, flash bang grenades, and rubber bullets on individuals peacefully protesting. They brought suit against the City of Fort Wayne and the Allen County Sheriff, arguing that these actions constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that these actions were violations of the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, free assembly, and free petition. They also argued that the defendants used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and money damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel from the ACLU of Indiana. The case was assigned to Judge Holly A. Brady and Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins on June 29. However, that same day Judge Brady recused herself and the case was reassigned to Judge Damon R. Leichty. On July 2, 2020, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief which added several individuals as plaintiffs along with two organizations: Black and Brown Liberation and the ACLU of Indiana. The legal claims and sought-after relief remained the same. That same day, plaintiffs submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties began to engage in preliminary discovery related to the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court set a hearing for October 15-16. The plaintiffs amended the complaint again on August 28, 2020. They voluntarily dismissed one of the individual plaintiffs and also dismissed the Allen Country Sheriff as a defendant. The defendants agreed to the dismissal, and the parties stipulated that the City of Fort Wayne did not need to file an additional answer to the amended complaint. As the hearing on the preliminary injunction neared, the plaintiffs then filed a motion to withdraw the motion for a preliminary injunction and to vacate the hearing on October 1, 2020. The court granted the motion the next day. As of December 30, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: This case arose out of the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The plaintiffs in this case allege that police used illegal tactics in order to quell the protests, thereby violating their constitutional rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs were several individuals and, later, two organizations. Defendants were the City of Fort Wayne and the Allen County Sheriff. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020.


In September 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Trimbco, doing business as Sharp Precision Manufacturing, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging discrimination on the basis of gender (female) and national origin (Hispanic) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant subjected the complaining party, and similarly situated employees, to a hostile work environment based upon gender and national origin. An unknown portion of the allegations were settled through mediation. On June 24, 2008, the defendant's counsel withdrew, and the defendants did not notify the court of its new counsel. The EEOC moved for a default judgment, which was granted and entered on March 17, 2009. The judgment required the defendant to pay $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to six claimants. Additionally, the judgment enjoined the defendants from further engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex or national origin, required the defendants to institute policies and programs to ensure equal opportunities for employees. The case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Trimbco, Inc., doing business as Sharp Precision Manufacturing, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging discrimination on the basis of gender, female, and national origin, Hispanic. The case ended with a default judgment against defendants entered on March 17, 2009. The judgment required Defendant to pay $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to each of the six complainants. Additionally, the judgment enjoined defendants from further engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex or national origin, required defendants to institute policies and programs to ensure equal opportunities for employees.


On April 29, 2019, the Middlesex County District Attorney, Suffolk County District Attorney, Committee for Public Counsel Services (“CPCS”), and the Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and several officials under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), 1357(a). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of common-law privilege against civil arrests in courthouses and the Tenth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that in 2017, ICE authorized a nationwide campaign to target state courthouses as sites for civil-immigration enforcement. The plaintiffs further alleged that this policy undermined the administration of justice in Massachusetts, as many permanent residents refused to appear in court out of fear of ICE interference. On April 29, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction that sought to enjoin ICE from authorizing and conducting civil arrests on parties, witnesses, and others attending Massachusetts courthouses on official business. The plaintiffs alleged that by authorizing civil arrests in courthouses, ICE ignored the well-settled common-law privilege against such civil arrests and exceeded its statutory jurisdiction under the Immigrant and Nationality Act. Thus, the practice is unlawful and should be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act. While the motion included other claims, the plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief only on this claim. On May 15, 2019, the defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In the Opposition, the defendants disputed the existence of a common-law privilege against civil arrest in courthouses. Furthermore, the defendants argued that even if the common-law privilege existed, Congress erased the privilege when it passed the INA. On June 20, 2019, Judge Indira Talwani granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and issued a memorandum. See 382 F. Supp. 3d 142 (2019). Judge Talwani found that plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit, were likely to succeed on the merits of their Administrative Procedure Act claim, and the injunction was of public interest. Thus, the defendants were enjoined from implementing the Courthouse Civil Arrest Directive and from civilly arresting parties, witnesses, and others attending Massachusetts courthouses on official business while they are going to, attending, or leaving the courthouse. Defendants appealed; the appeal is pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

Summary: In April 2019, two District Attorneys in Massachusetts and two public interest organizations filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE's practice of conducting civil arrests inside state courthouses violated their common-law privilege against such arrests and Tenth Amendment Rights. In June 2019, Judge Indira Talwani granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction and enjoined ICE from continuing with this practice. The order for Preliminary Injunction is currently pending appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.


On June 12, 1968 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. et seq. (Title VII). The DOJ asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against applicants for employment on the basis of race by bypassing higher ranked African-American applicants in favor of lower ranked white applicants. The complaint alleged that the Alabama Personnel Department discriminated on the basis of race by hiring lower ranked white applicants over higher ranked African-American applicants. A no-bypass rule was instituted by the Alabama Personnel Department. On July 28, 1970, United States brought this action to enforce the federal requirement that state personnel engaged in administration of federally financed grant-in-aid programs be recruited, hired and promoted or demoted on merit basis, without discrimination on the grounds of race or color (317 F.Supp 1079, D.C.Ala. 1970). The District Court (Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.) ordered: that the affected African-American applicants be offered the first available position with the rate of pay he would have and seniority rights; that African-American applicants be appointed to positions other than custodial, domestic, laborer or laboratory aide, unless another position is filled; that the defendants not appoint or offer a position to a lower-ranking white applicant over a higher-ranking available African-American applicant. In May of 2002, in order to determine whether the no-bypass rule was still necessary, the state defendants hired statistical experts to examine the racial composition of the Alabama workforce as well as the racial patterns of recent selections in the workforce. On February 11, 2003, a white employee of the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADC) who had claimed that he had been denied a promotion because of the no-bypass rule, moved to intervene. He alleged, among other things, that the no-bypass rule was unconstitutional and must be modified or ended. On February 11, 2003, the United States and the state defendants began discussions on the results of the statistical analysis and proposed to terminate the no-bypass rule, as the problems, aimed at by the no-bypass rule, were remedied. On March 20, 2003, the United States and the state defendants entered a joint motion to terminate the no-bypass rule. On May 22, 2003, representatives of African-American employees of the State of Alabama moved to intervene to oppose termination or modification of the no-bypass rule and to otherwise enforce it. On January 20, 2004, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) granted both the white employee of ADC and the African-American employees the right to intervene under the permissive intervention rule. On February 28, 2004, the ADC employee filed a motion to terminate the no-bypass rule. On April 21, 2004, the white employee of the ADC filed a motion to certify class. On the same day, non-black employees filed a motion to intervene. On March 28, 2005, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) denied both motions conditionally until after the court determined the scope of discovery and the scope of its inquiry into the joint motion to terminate the no-bypass rule. On May 9, 2005, the white employee moved for preliminary injunction. On May 20, 2005, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) issued an order, treating the joint motion to terminate the no-bypass rule as a motion for preliminary injunction, and granted both the motion as well as ADC employee's preliminary injunction motion. The court suspended the no-bypass rule effective no later than June 20, 2005, pending final resolution of the challenges to the rule. The court reasoned that the special change in circumstances warranted the suspension of the rule. On June 1, 2005 the ADC employee filed a motion for interim award of attorneys' fees. On September 09, 2005 the white employee filed a motion for summary judgment. On the same day, the state defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the joint motion to terminate no-bypass rule. On June 30, 2006, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) issued a judgment, permanently terminating the no-bypass rule. The court reasoned that the no-bypass rule was no longer an appropriate tool, and that there was no longer a fit between the practices and the rule. United States v. Director Alabama Personnel Department, 444 F.Supp.2d 1192 (M.D. Ala. 2006). On September 17, 2007, the Court granted the plaintiff-intervenor's motion for attorney's fees to the extent that plaintiff-intervenor recovered $61,499.70 for fees and expenses. The state defendants filed an appeal against the order granting attorney's fees to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On July 1, 2008, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a motion for attorney's fees on appeal, which was denied without prejudice on the same day. On August 19, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit issued a judgment per curiam, affirming the District Court's grant of attorney's fees to the plaintiff-intervenor. United States v. Director Alabama Personnel Department, 281 Fed.Appx. 960 (11th Cir. 2008). On November 30, 2012, the Court (Judge Myron Thompson) issued an order terminating and dissolving all outstanding injunctions and orders issued in this case, with the last of them terminating on December 31, 2014.

Summary: On June 12, 1968 the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. et seq. (Title VII) in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by bypassing higher ranked African-American applicants in favor of lower ranked white applicants. The Alabama Personnel Department instituted a no-bypass rule and the District Court ordered injunctive relief. In May of 2002, the state defendants hired statistical experts to determine whether the no-bypass rule was still necessary. On March 20, 2003 the United States and the state defendants moved to terminate the no-bypass rule. A white employee and several black employees moved to intervene. On May 20, 2005, the court suspended the no-bypass rule pending final resolution of the challenges to the rule. On June 30, 2006, the court permanently terminated the no-bypass rule. On September 17, 2007, the court granted the white employee attorney's fees of $61,499.70, which were affirmed on the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The case has effectively ended, with the last order of the court terminating on December 31, 2014.


On August 8, 2015, same-sex couples seeking to adopt in Mississippi and civil rights organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued, at various times, the Mississippi Department of Human Services, the Governor of Mississippi, the Mississippi DOJ, and the Mississippi judiciary under 42 U.S § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that enforcement of the Mississippi statuary ban on same-sex adoptions violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due process clauses in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The case was assigned to Judge Daniel P. Jordan. In his words, the state presented a tepid defense of the ban's constitutionality, focusing on procedural rather than substantive questions. Judge Jordan ultimately dismissed the lawsuits against all defendants but the Mississippi Department of Human Services on procedural grounds, but granted full preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiffs against the Mississippi Department of Human Services on May 13, 2016, 2016 WL 1306202, and converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction two months later. (The state apparently agreed to the permanent injunction--submitting it for the court's approval. We don't know whether that was because the state had conceded, or whether it was facilitating entry of a final order to allow immediate appeal.)

Summary: Same-sex couples and advocate organizations brought lawsuit against the Mississippi Department of Human Services, the Governor of Mississippi, the Mississippi DOJ, and the Mississippi judiciary under 42 U.S § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Mississippi ban on same-sex adoptions in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell. The district judge issued preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the Mississippi Department of Human services and affirmed plaintiff's contention that the ban was unconstitutional.


On February 16, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against City of Hayti Heights, Missouri. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against a "patrolman" on the basis of sex. The complaint alleges that the defendant discriminated on the basis of sex by: (1) terminating the plaintiff's employment with the City on the basis of her sex and (2) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the effects of the discriminatory treatment of the plaintiff. Afterwards, the parties went into alternative dispute resolution processes. They reached a settlement, and filed a joint motion to approve consent judgment on October 25, 2007. The Court (Judge Rodney W. Sippel) issued a consent judgment on October 30, 2007. Under the consent decree, the parties were not making any admissions. The decree included following general injunctions: 1) prohibition against gender discrimination; 2) prohibition against retaliation or any acts adversely affecting the conditions of employment. Subject to the approval of the United States, the City agreed to modify its policies and procedures prohibiting gender discrimination in the following ways: 1) prohibition of discrimination in any conditions of employment, including hiring and termination; 2) implementing procedures for complaints and redress; 3) notice of new policies through posting in public places, including Internet; 4) providing antidiscrimination training; 5) designating a special person to monitor compliance with the decree; 6) retaining records pertinent to new policies. The individual and the City agreed to her reinstatement with the seniority date of July 9, 2004 and requirement of at least a 32 hours work week. The individual also receive $1,000.00 in backpay. The Court retained jurisdiction over the implementation of the decree. The decree was to dissolve within two years of its entry. On December 27, 2007, the Court granted the defendant's motion to withdraw.

Summary: On February 16, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against City of Hayti Heights, Missouri. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, alleging gender discrimination in termination and subsequent lack of remedy involving a female "patrolman". The parties settled and the consent judgment was entered by the Court on October 30, 2007. The consent decree included several general injunctions against gender discrimination with new policies to be implemented to battle such discrimination. The individual received reinstatement and monetary relief.


This case was severed from West v. City of Hitchcock, 3:16-cv-00309 (S.D. Tex.). The case originally pursued claims against the Cities of Hitchcock and Santa Fe at the same time, but the court severed the two on September 19, 2018. The original complaint, filed on November 3, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, involved three individuals under threat of being jailed for failure to pay fines to the City of Santa Fe. The plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Fe, the Municipal Judge, and the Chief of Police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants run a modern-day debtors' prison to raise revenue for the City. They claimed that city officials have colluded on an unconstitutional two-tiered system of justice by which the City and Municipal Judge agreed to raise the costs of the traffic and other misdemeanor fines to boost revenue and the City extracts payments from local residents. Police officers regularly jail people who fail to pay their fines without giving them access to a lawyer or the chance to mount a legal defense, nor are they given the opportunity to see a judge for the constitutionally mandated hearing on their ability to pay. Moreover, the police chief makes jail intolerable, giving detainees too little food to eat and depriving them of medical care. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys fees. They also sought class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that the revenue-generating scheme begins with Municipal Court proceedings, which its jurisdiction is limited to tickets for class C misdemeanors. These offenses are defined by Texas law as "nonjailable," "fine only" offenses, punishable by a fine up to $500. For an individual unable to make timely payments in full, the Municipal Court issues a "capias pro fine" warrant for failure to pay a fine. Individuals who have a capias pro fine have two options: pay in full or turn themselves in to the police. Police also search for people subject to capias pro fine warrants, sometimes arresting people at their homes in front of family, friends, and neighbors. Though police have the option of taking such individuals before a court, they do not. Instead, they transfer them to the police chief and book them into jail where they will be held until they pay their debt in full or satisfy the fines with "jail credit." Once in jail, the allegations continued, individuals are subjected to unsafe conditions without proper food. The complaint terms this the "Hungry Man policy," and alleges that jailed individuals are fed one Pop Tart for breakfast, one Pop Tart for lunch, and a frozen meal, such as a Hungry Man meal, for dinner. This amounts to only about 750 calories a day, which is less than half of the calories the average sedentary adult requires, and less than a third of the calories sedentary young men require. Judge George C Hanks, Jr. denied class certification without prejudice on September 18, 2017, without providing a detailed reason in the order. On October 11, 2017, one of the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his claims. The other two plaintiffs continued with the same case at this point in time. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 23, 2017, adding a magistrate judge, in his individual capacity, and the Chief of Police, in his official capacity, as defendants. The case was temporarily assigned to Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison on June 1, 2018. The Magistrate Judge provided a recommendation against granting the defendant's various motions to dismiss, saying that all plaintiffs in the case had standing and that the injuries alleged in the case amounted to civil rights violations. Though he did not explicitly recommend severing the claims against Hitchcock and Santa Fe at this point, the Magistrate Judge discussed each plaintiff's claims against their respective cities separately. This likely influenced Judge Hanks's decision to sever the two cases when he adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on September 19. Discovery continued on the case in 2018 and 2019. In May and June of 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed a motion opposing it. Judge Hanks scheduled a jury trial for August 26, 2019, and the parties submitted witness and exhibit lists in anticipation of the hearing. However, on August 2, the plaintiff moved for court-ordered mediation, which the Judge granted on August 5. Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison oversaw the mediation, which occurred on August 13, 2019. The following day, the parties entered into a settlement agreement; the terms of the agreement were not publicly disclosed. The order dismissing the case from August 14 noted that if either party filed a motion before September 13, 2019 saying that the agreement could not be implemented, the case would close. No motions were filed, and the case closed on that date.

Summary: This case, severed from West v. City of Hitchcock, involved individuals jailed for an inability to pay fines suing two cities in south Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They described the situation as a "modern day debtor's prison" and added allegations that they were being underfed in the jail once they entered. Despite almost going to trial, the parties settled the dispute in mediation. The case is closed.


On January 28, 2019, several arrestees from St. Louis filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. None of the four named plaintiffs could afford to pay their monetary release conditions, which ranged from $10,000 to $30,000, and were thus incarcerated at one of the City’s two detention centers without access to showers or medical care and forced to endure allegedly unconscionable conditions, including extreme heat and cold, rat and cockroach infestations, mold, and abuse by guards. The Plaintiffs sued the City of St. Louis, its officers, and judges responsible for setting release conditions in the 22nd Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Plaintiffs alleged violations of their Equal Protection and Due Process rights through the Defendants’ policy of setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that exceeded an individual’s ability to pay and by detaining the Plaintiffs solely on their inability to pay. They claimed that holding the Plaintiffs in pretrial detention violated their Substantive Due Process rights by failing to consider each detainee’s particular likelihood to appear and their threats of danger to the community. Finally, they claimed that the Defendants violated the Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Process rights by detaining them for weeks before giving them a hearing or opportunity to challenge or modify their release conditions. Represented by a collection of public interest organizations including ArchCity Defenders, the Advancement Project, Civil Rights Corps, and the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, the Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the Defendants from implementing a wealth-based pretrial detention system. They sought class certification as “all arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution (referred to as ‘the Workhouse’) or the City Justice Center (‘CJC’), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition.” In addition, the Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order requiring the Sheriff and Commissioner of Corrections to release the Plaintiffs unless they were provided a hearing. The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. On January 30, 2019, the parties reached a Stipulation Agreement (which obviated the Plaintiffs’ need for a hearing on the request for a temporary restraining order). The Agreement provided that a Judge of the 22nd Judicial Circuit would hold a hearing for each Named Plaintiff regarding his conditions of release before the end of the day on January 31, 2019. The Agreement also provided that the Defendant Judges would comply with the Missouri Supreme Court Rules regarding the conditions of release, as well as a number of procedural requirements, including (1) allowing Plaintiffs to present evidence and contest evidence, (2) having the hearings on the record in open court, and (3) maintaining and making the records available for review. The next day, the Defendant Judges held bond hearings for the named Plaintiffs. Two were released without bond, with other conditions. Two did not receive a reduction in bond. Plaintiff’s counsel posted bail for the two detained Plaintiffs, and on February 5, 2019, they were also released. On February 21, 2019, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the Defendant Jail Commissioner from enforcing any bail order that operated as a de facto detention order due to an arrestee’s inability to pay (unless accompanied by a determination that there are no less restrictive alternatives to ensure the arrestee’s future court appearance and public safety). Specifically, the Plaintiffs sought the following procedural protections:
1. notice of the nature and significance of the financial information required, 2. a prompt hearing, on the record, regarding the person’s inability to pay, 3. legal counsel at such hearings, 4. findings on the record as to whether the person has the ability to pay, and 5. clear and convincing evidence supporting the necessity of detention.
Shortly after, the City Defendants and the Defendant Judges separately filed motions to dismiss the case on March 1, 2019. The City Defendants asserted that they had no authority to establish bail conditions and no policy or custom of silencing arrestees in initial appearances. The Defendant Judges asserted theories of immunity and abstention. On June 11, 2019, the Court issued an opinion granting class certification, denying the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 2437026. With regard to class certification, the Court decided that the class met all the requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; furthermore, the Court held that although the named Plaintiffs had received bond hearings and were no longer detained, this did not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class. The class was certified as “all arrestees who are or will be detained in the Medium Security Institution (the Workhouse) or the City Justice Center (CJC), operated by the City of St. Louis, post-arrest because they are unable to afford to pay a monetary release condition,” and the Plaintiffs’ counsel was appointed counsel for the class. With regard to the Defendant Judges’ motion to dismiss, the Court found that the Plaintiffs could seek a declaratory judgment against a judge in his or her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the Plaintiffs could seek injunctive relief because they did not necessarily have an adequate remedy at law. With regard to the City’s motion to dismiss, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had successfully stated a claim for municipal liability under Monell by alleging facts to draw an inference that the constitutional violation occurred as a result of the City’s alleged policy or custom to inform detained individuals that they are not allowed to speak during their initial appearances. Finally, with regard to the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court concluded that the motion was meritorious, finding that the Plaintiffs had a high probability of success on their claim and the prolonged incarceration would result in irreparable harm to the Plaintiff class. Both the City Defendants and the Defendant Judges separately appealed the preliminary injunction order to the Eighth Circuit on June 13, 2019, and the docket numbers 19-2251 and 19-2254 were assigned. The Defendants also moved to stay the preliminary injunction pending the appeal. On June 17, 2019, the District Court denied the motion to stay the preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 2509792. However, the District Court granted a limited extension of time to conduct hearings for the approximately 700 arrestees already in detention. The parties were to confer and submit a joint plan for hearings for the backlog detainees. In the meantime, Judge Fleissig ordered the Defendant Judges to conduct 30 hearings a day, Monday through Wednesday. Two days later, both the City Defendants and the Defendant Judges filed motions in the Eighth Circuit to stay the injunction pending the appeal. On July 3, 2019, the Eighth Circuit granted the Defendants' motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the outcome of the appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting preliminary injunction on February 28, 2020. The court (Judges Ralph R. Erickson, Michael J. Melloy, and Jonathan A. Kobes) found, among other things, that in granting preliminary injunction, "district court resorted to the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction without giving adequate consideration to the new rules and their implementation." In so doing, "it interjected the power of the federal government into the Missouri Supreme Court’s attempt to police its own lower courts, without contemplating what this would mean for federal-state relations." 950 F.3d 1052. In light of the opinion, the plaintiffs filed a motion for renewed preliminary injunction on April 13, 2020. On May 22, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to decertify the class. The motions are pending as of August 18, 2020; the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, several arrestees in St. Louis who were incarcerated because they could not afford to pay their monetary release conditions filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged that the City's policy of detaining arrestees for weeks before they were given a hearing or opportunity to contest the monetary release condition violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, while the Defendants moved to dismiss the case. In June 2019, the Court granted class certification and issued a preliminary injunction requiring a prompt hearing for each plaintiff, ensuring procedural safeguards, and preventing the City from enforcing any bail order that operated as a de facto detention order due to an arrestee’s inability to pay. The case is ongoing.


This is a federal criminal case where the government attempted to introduce evidence obtained through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). On August 14, 2018, two operators of a Detroit gas station were indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for the crime of defrauding the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The defendants allegedly bought SNAP funds from recipients with cash at a discounted price, then fraudulently billed the government for the total value. They were charged with 14 counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343). The case was assigned to United States District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. On September 12, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice notified the criminal defendants in this case that some of the evidence the government intended to use against them was obtained from a FISA warrant obtained under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812. Both men were released on bail after their arraignment on August 16, 2018. One defendant, represented by a federal public defender, pleaded guilty to a single count of wire fraud on December 6, 2018, prior to filing any pretrial motions. He was sentenced to a year and a day in federal prison on April 18, 2019. The other defendant, represented by private counsel, filed several pretrial motions relating to the FISA evidence. On February 8, 2019, he moved for discovery of the evidence obtained under FISA, as well as the application and order that allowed the government to collect it. The government opposed this motion. On June 6, 2019, it filed a declaration from Attorney General William P. Barr claiming that an adversarial hearing would endanger national security and asking the court to conduct an ex parte and in camera review of the relevant documents. This process is set out in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(f) and 1825(g). Later on September 19, 2019, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment against him, claiming that the use of FISA material in this prosecution was improper because he was charged with a domestic criminal offense with no relationship to the normal subjects of FISA: foreign powers or their agents. Judge Edmunds denied both of the defendants' motions in a December 24, 2020 order. After reviewing the FISA warrant and application materials ex parte and in camera she found that they complied with the relevant statutory standards. In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, she also found that FISA materials could be used in cases without a national security connection when the original surveillance was designed to obtain foreign intelligence information. 2020 WL 7664789. As of March 3, 2021, the remaining defendant's case is set for trial on April 13, 2021.

Summary: This is a federal criminal case about SNAP fraud where the U.S. government moved to introduce evidence obtained using a FISA warrant. In 2018, the two defendants in this case were charged with multiple counts of wire fraud in connection with a scheme to defraud the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. One defendant pleaded guilty before filing any pretrial motions, but the other litigated the use of FISA evidence in a domestic criminal case. The court refused to dismiss the case due to the introduction of FISA evidence. The case is ongoing.


On September 29, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Hensley Enterprises, Inc. and Mid-Atlantic Lubes, LLC. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, reinstatement of the plaintiff-intervenor, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendants subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a racially hostile work environment and, in retaliation for plaintiff-intervenor's complaints of racial discrimination, reduced his hours, denied him training, and discharged him. On February 25, 2005, the complainant filed a motion to intervene and a complaint as plaintiff-intervenor; however, the court ruled it as moot due to the consent decree. On April 7, 2005, the District Court (Judge William M. Nickerson) entered a consent decree where the defendants, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $30,000.

Summary: On September 29, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Hensley Enterprises, Inc. and Mid-Atlantic Lubes, LLC. The EEOC alleged that the defendants subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a racially hostile work environment and, in retaliation for plaintiff-intervenor's complaints of racial discrimination, reduced his hours, denied him training, and discharged him. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendants, among other things, agreed to pay $30,000.


On January 22, 2018, a mother and her minor son filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of State (DOS) for not granting U.S. citizenship to the child plaintiff because he was born outside of the U.S. to a same-sex dual-nationality couple. Represented by the nonprofit organization Immigration Equality and the private law firm Sullivan & Cromwell (who also represented plaintiffs in a similar lawsuit filed the same day), the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief granting birthright U.S. citizenship to the child. The adult plaintiff, a natural-born U.S. citizen, entered into a civil partnership with her Italian partner in England in 2009. (The partnership was later converted into a marriage after the legalization of same-sex marriage in England in 2015.) While living in England, both women each gave birth to one son, with sperm from a donor. Both the children's birth certificates listed only the names of the two mothers as parents. However, when the mothers applied for U.S. citizenship for the two sons, DOS only recognized the citizenship of the son born to the U.S. citizen, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 301(g) (8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)) (governing derivation of U.S. citizenship for a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen). DOS did not recognize U.S. citizenship of the child plaintiff born to the Italian woman because he lacked a biological or adoptive relationship to the U.S. citizen adult plaintiff. According to the plaintiffs, DOS erroneously considered this child born "out of wedlock" and not entitled to U.S. citizenship at birth under INA § 309 (8 U.S.C. § 1409). The plaintiffs asserted that DOS had a policy of discrimination against the children of same-sex couples. Any child born to a U.S. citizen woman married to a man was born "in wedlock." But a child of a U.S. citizen who was not the biological or adoptive parent, but instead whose spouse conceived through reproductive technology, could be considered born "out of wedlock." The plaintiffs argued that this policy, which largely burdened same-sex couples, was unsupported by the INA's text and intent to keep families together, as well as case law supporting the rights of same-sex married couples. The plaintiffs alleged that DOS's policy and its application to plaintiffs violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the INA. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell, and then reassigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. Status reports filed in May, July, and August 2018 indicated that the parties were continuing to try to resolve the matter without resorting to litigation. On September 3, 2018, the DOS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. With respect to the constitutional claims, the DOS argued that the plaintiffs failed to state an Equal Protection claim because a legal and biological relationship was required for a child to acquire citizenship from a parent, regardless of sex or sexual orientation of the parent. The DOS argued that the substantive due process right must also fail because the plaintiffs failed to state a fundamental right upon which the government has infringed. The DOS further argued that the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a cause of action, and that the plaintiffs APA claim must fail because there is an adequate remedy at law and the Department’s interpretation of “parent” as requiring both a legal and biological relationship was reasonable. On February 25, 2019, the Court ordered both parties to submit supplemental briefs concerning the DOS’s motion to dismiss, in light of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California’s recent ruling in Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo, 2019 BL 63916 (C.D. Cal.), a summary of which can be found here. On March 19, 2019, the parties filed their supplemental memorandum. While the DOS found aspects of that ruling to be flawed, it encouraged the court in the present case to strongly consider the court’s ruling insofar as it dismissed those plaintiffs’ APA and Declaratory Judgment Act claims. The plaintiffs, for their part, distinguished the dismissal of the APA claim in Dvash-Banks from the present case, and argued that the central holding from the Dvash-Banks court supports their argument that the child plaintiff acquired citizenship at birth. In late 2019, the plaintiffs relocated from London to New Jersey. The parties subsequently filed a joint motion to transfer the case from the District Court of D.C. to the District Court of New Jersey. The motion was granted, and the case was transferred on February 14, 2020. The case was assigned to Judge Kevin McNulty and Magistrate Judge James B. Clark. On July 14, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which added as a cause of action 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), a provision of the INA that authorizes courts to make de novo determinations and judgments of citizenship. Accordingly, the plaintiffs eliminated their APA claim and instead claimed that the Court can and should use its independent authority under the INA to declare the child plaintiff a U.S. citizen. A pretrial conference was held on September 14, 2020. Three days later, the Court ordered the parties to serve amended disclosures by September 28, 2020; to file a stipulation of agreed facts by September 28, 2020; to file motions for summary judgment by November 18, 2020; to file oppositions to such motions by January 4, 2021; and to file replies by February 4, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Jan. 22, 2018, a mother and her minor son sued DOS for not granting U.S. citizenship to the child plaintiff, because he was born outside of the U.S. to a same-sex dual-nationality couple via reproductive technology. Plaintiffs asserted that DOS had an unconstitutional policy of discrimination against the children of same-sex couples. This case is ongoing.


On July 1, 2013, a lawful permanent resident held in immigration detention in Massachusetts for eight months filed a federal habeas petition under 18 U.S.C. § 2241, and a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, contending that the prolonged detention of himself and others similarly situated without an individualized bond hearing violated the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause. The plaintiff was represented by Yale's Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, the ACLU, and private attorneys. The defendants included several Massachusetts sheriffs, the Franklin County Jail, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). District Court Judge Michael A. Ponsor was assigned to the case. While living in the U.S., the plaintiff had been convicted of a number of crimes, including selling an illegal drug, third degree burglary, and failure to appear. As a result of those convictions, he was sentenced in Connecticut state court to twelve years in prison, to be suspended after five. After serving two years, he was paroled on November 13, 2012. On that same day, ICE took the plaintiff into custody and immediately took action to deport him to Jamaica. In removal proceedings, the plaintiff sought relief against deportation under the Convention Against Torture, and on the ground that his removal would be disproportionate to any underlying misconduct. The Immigration Judge denied relief, and after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded, the Immigration Judge denied relief a second time. On December 29, 2014, the BIA found error and remanded the case once more. On January 9, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiff's habeas petition and ordered ICE to provide the plaintiff with a bond hearing. The Court determined that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), the statute governing the detention of noncitizens who have committed certain crimes and are in removal proceedings, imposed a "reasonableness limit on the length of time an individual can be detained in immigration custody without an individual bond hearing." 991 F.Supp.2d 275. The Court held that detention beyond six months, absent an individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness, was presumptively unreasonable. In the alternative, the Court found that the individualized circumstances of the plaintiff's case rendered his continued detention unreasonable. The plaintiff also argued in District Court that he had been needlessly shackled in Hartford Immigration Court. On March 6, 2014, the District Court held that ICE's nationwide policy of shackling detainees without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. However, the Judge found that the claim of Mr. Reid himself was moot because he had been released on bond as a result of his successful habeas petition. Finally, because ICE had repeatedly and unlawfully held detainees like the plaintiff for months or years without a bond hearing, the plaintiff had moved to represent a class of similarly situated detainees in Massachusetts (where ICE confines most Connecticut residents). The District Court granted the motion for class certification, defining the class as: all individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond hearing. On May 27, 2014, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class and ordered class-wide relief. The Court held that the defendants must: (1) cease and desist subjecting all current and future class members to mandatory detention; (2) immediately determine the custody of every current class member under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and timely provide a bond hearing to every class member that seeks a redetermination of his or her custody by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19; (3) determine the custody of every future class member under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and provide a bond hearing to every class member that seeks a redetermination of his or her custody by an Immigration Judge pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19 & 1236.1(d); (4) provide class counsel with a list of identified class members, including their names and alien numbers, and the facility in which they are detained; and (5) submit to the Court a report detailing custody determinations, bond hearing information, etc. The defendants appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 13, 2016, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment with respect to the plaintiff, but vacated the judgment as to the class members, and remanded the class action for reconsideration of the class certification. The Court disagreed with the District Court's adoption of the six-month bright line rule regarding detention under § 1226(c), preferring instead an individualized approach. And while it agreed that in the plaintiff's particular case his prolonged detention had become unreasonable, it determined that the adoption of the six-month rule was "an essential predicate to class certification" in the case, and by removing that predicate the class's legitimacy was called into question. 819 F.3d 486. On February 10, 2017, the defendants moved to decertify the class. The District Court denied the request on March 23. On January 2, 2018, the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but on April 16, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. On May 11, 2018, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez (summarized here), where the Court reversed the six-month detention rule that had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit withdrew its 2016 opinion and vacated the judgment. The District Court’s judgment as to the plaintiff was again affirmed but vacated as to the class members. The class action was remanded for reconsideration of the certification order. On May 30, 2018, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Patti B. Saris. On June 26, 2018, the defendants again moved to decertify the class. On October 23, 2018, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class, and certified the following class: All individuals who are or will be detained within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or the State of New Hampshire pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) for over six months and have not been afforded an individualized bond or reasonableness hearing. On October 24, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, including new class representatives and expanding the class to include detainees at an additional county jail in New Hampshire. On January 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the individual habeas claims of the newly added named plaintiffs. However, this motion was denied as moot in February as those plaintiffs were no longer in detention. On April 15, 2019, the plaintiffs filed another motion for summary judgment, this time renewing their constitutional claims, which the District Court had not reached in its prior decision. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same day. On July 9, 2019, Judge Saris granted in part and denied in part the parties' motions. 390 F.Supp.3d 201. First, the court agreed that mandatory detention without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates due process when circumstances render the detention unreasonably prolonged in relation to its purpose (ensuring removal of criminal noncitizens). Second, it held that the determination of whether mandatory detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonably prolonged is a fact-specific analysis, rejecting the plaintiffs' request for a bright-line six-month rule. Third, it found that when such detention lasts for more than one year (excluding any delay attributable to the noncitizen), the delay is likely to be unreasonable. Fourth, it held that noncitizens subject to such detention without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) must bring a habeas petition in federal court to challenge the detention as unreasonably prolonged (if the court agrees, they are entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge where the government carries the burden of proving dangerousness or risk of flight). And fifth, it declared that in making release determinations, immigration courts may not impose excessive bail, must evaluate the individual's ability to pay bond, and must consider alternative conditions of release (e.g., GPS monitoring). The court issued a permanent injunction to enforce its holdings related to the burden at bond hearings and bail setting by immigration courts. On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the First Circuit. The defendants filed a cross-appeal on September 6. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In ruling on the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by a lawful permanent resident and veteran held in immigration detention in Massachusetts, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that prolonged detention without an individualized bond hearing violates immigration statutes and the Constitution and that ICE's nationwide policy of shackling detainees without an individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, and ordered relief for all ICE detainees in Massachusetts. On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment with respect to the plaintiff, but vacated the judgment as to the class members. After the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, the First Circuit withdrew its opinion and vacated the judgment (still affirming the judgment as to the original plaintiff), remanding for reconsideration of the class certification. The class was upheld and the District Court ruled on the plaintiffs' constitutional claims in July 2019, granting a permanent injunction and declaratory relief, but rejecting the request for a bright-line six-month rule for when prolonged detention becomes unconstitutional. Both parties appealed to the First Circuit. The case is ongoing.


On November 7, 2017, the League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona (LULAC-Arizona) and the Arizona Students’ Association (ASA) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State of Arizona (the Secretary) and the Maricopa County Recorder (the County Recorder) under the National Voter Registration Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Campaign Legal Center and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, sought a declaration that the policies of the Secretary violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted the Secretary to (1) register voters to vote in federal elections regardless of whether they provide documentary proof of citizenship (DPOC); (2) match voters’ data with driving records to verify citizenship before rejecting voters for state and local elections; (3) refrain from requiring voters to re-submit DPOC when they moved counties, and subsequently to re-register; and (4) notify potential voters that they can register to vote in federal elections without DPOC. The plaintiffs claimed that there was undue burden on their right to vote and equal protection. Specifically, LULAC-Arizona and ASA alleged that Arizona treated voter registration applicants differently depending on whether they used Arizona’s state registration form (the “State Form”) or the national registration form (the “Federal Form”), and that Arizona’s arbitrary dual voter registration policies irrationally disenfranchised thousands of eligible Arizona voters and furthered no legitimate state interests. On December 29, 2017, the Secretary responded to the plaintiffs’ claims and denied that Arizona’s voter registration policies violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments or were otherwise illegal under state or federal law. The Secretary asserted that Federal and State Form applicants were not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. The Secretary asserted that Arizona was constitutionally permitted to require those applying to register to vote using the State Form to personally provide DPOC at the time that they submitted their State Form. The Secretary further asserted that there was no constitutional or statutory requirement that Arizona election officials register applicants for federal elections when they had chosen to use the State Form to register to vote rather than the Federal Form. On January 29, 2018, the Court ordered a settlement conference to take place before Judge Eileen S. Willett. According to the later filed Consent Decree, after reviewing the applicable law, the Secretary and County Recorder concluded that current technology can treat State Form applications the same as Federal Form applications, which would make it easier for Arizona’s citizens to register to vote while also providing important safeguards to prevent unlawful voter registration. On 8 February 2018, the Secretary and County Recorder notified LULAC-Arizona and ASA that they wanted to get to an agreement that would resolve the underlying litigation and also benefit Arizona’s citizens. On June 4, 2018, the parties jointly filed a Consent Decree. They agreed that within thirty days after the entry of the Consent Decree, the Secretary was to revise the Procedures Manual to incorporate the terms of the Consent Decree, to provide guidance to the County Recorders to accept State Form applications submitted without DPOC, to enter all such applications in the Database, to immediately register the applicants for federal elections, and to check all State Form applications submitted without DPOC against the driving database. The Secretary was also to make reasonable efforts to better educate the citizens of Arizona concerning their opportunities to register to vote, and to update their website to explain that: (1) the State Form requires valid DPOC for state elections only; (2) submission of a sufficiently complete State Form with valid DPOC will make the applicant a Full Ballot Voter; (3) submission of a sufficiently complete State Form without DPOC will make the applicant a Federal Only Voter; (4) the Federal Form does not require DPOC; (5) submission of the Federal Form without valid DPOC will make the applicant a Federal Only Voter; and (6) submission of the Federal Form with valid DPOC will make the applicant a Full Ballot Voter. On June 18 2018, Judge David G. Campbell approved the consent decree and retained jurisdiction over the case until December 31, 2020 to ensure the decree’s terms were followed. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance with consent decree on November 9, 2018 and a second motion to compel compliance on November 12, 2018. Both motions requested expedited rulings. Two days later, on November 14, the court denied the motions. As of April 21, 2020, there has been no substantial action in the docket since then. This case remains open for enforcement purposes until the consent decree expires.

Summary: In November 2017, the League of United Latin American Citizens of Arizona (LULAC-Arizona) and the Arizona Students’ Association (ASA) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs claimed that there was undue burden on the right to vote and a violation of Equal Protection. In June 2018, the parties reached an agreement that made it less difficult for voters to register. The count continues to monitor implementation of the consent decree.


On July 13, 2017, elderly and dependent residents with physical or cognitive impairments who lived in assisted living facilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and state law against the corporation that owned the facilities. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's California facilities and services failed to meet accessibility and usability requirements of persons with disabilities. The plaintiffs also asserted that the California facilities are understaffed, which resulted in insufficient care and services. On August 25, 2017, the complaint was amended to include additional plaintiffs. On September 28, 2017, the defendant filed motions to dismiss, strike, and compel arbitration. Among other things, the motions requested that the Court (Judge James Donato) dismiss any claims against communities operated by the defendant in which the plaintiffs had never lived. The defendant also claimed that their residential communities were not covered under Title III of ADA, and thus the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. If not dismissed, the defendant requested language regarding the understaffing allegations be stricken as the understaffing did not suggest discrimination under ADA. The defendant sought that class allegations be stricken due to a lack of factual allegations, and alternatively sought limitations to the class definition. Additionally, the defendant sought compelled arbitration of various plaintiffs based on arbitration agreements signed by the plaintiffs or their legal representatives. On March 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The amended complaint limited the scope of the injunctions sought to residents with mobility or visual disabilities class, and to residents with disabilities class. On April 16, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge Haywood Gilliam. On April 19, 2018, the defendants’ renewed their motion to compel arbitration and motioned to dismiss/strike portions of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. On January 25, 2019, the court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, but partially granted their motion to dismiss, which compelled the plaintiffs to submit a third amended complaint on February 15, 2019 (ECF #90). The defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal concerning the decision to deny arbitration to the 9th Circuit. On March 7, 2019, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Beeler for discovery purposes. On May 2, 2019, the defendants moved for a protective order, which was granted. The court denied the defendants’ motion for an interlocutory appeal on June 5, 2019. Since July 25, 2019 discovery has been ongoing and the case has continued.

Summary: On July 13, 2017, plaintiffs, elderly or dependent residents with physical or cognitive impairments who lived in the defendant's assisted living facilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and state law against the corporation that owned the facilities. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's California facilities and services fail to meet accessibility and usability requirements of persons with disabilities. The plaintiffs also asserted that the California facilities are understaffed, which resulted in insufficient care and services. Currently, the case has been in discovery since July 25, 2019 ad the case has continued.