COVID-19 Summary: This case was initially filed in February 2020 to address the absence of bond hearings for ICE detainees in New York. Then on March 16, 2020, in light of the grave threat posed by congregate detention during the coronavirus pandemic, plaintiffs sought emergency relief: individualized determinations assessing whether detention is necessary in light of flight risk/public safety, and releases where it is not. On March 31, the Court issued an order granting this relief and enjoining the government's "No-Release Policy." On December 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary inunction and the case was referred to a Magistrate Judge for settlement proceedings.
 On February 28, 2020, a noncitizen placed in a federal immigration detention facility and denied bond or release while awaiting immigration hearings filed this class-action suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Foundation and the Bronx Defenders, the petitioner sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and individual agency officials; he filed a habeas petition to challenge that the absence of an adequate individual custody determination, which led to him being denied bond or release violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. He sought declaratory relief that the ICE's practices were unlawful and an injunction ordering the government to conduct adequate individualized custody determinations for members of the proposed classes. The policy challenged by the petitioner is referred to in the complaint as the "No-Release Policy." It is ICE's alleged policy of denying release and bond to all immigrant detainees arrested in the New York City area. The complaint asserted that the No-Release Policy violated federal law which requires that, within 48 hours of their arrest, many immigrant detainees get an individualized determination of whether they can be released while immigration proceedings go forward. According to data obtained by the petitioner's counsel under the Freedom of Information Act, "from 2013 to June 2017, approximately 47% of those deemed to be low risk by the government were granted release. From June 2017 to September 2019, that figure plummeted to 3%." Furthermore, the complaint alleged that in mid-2017, ICE had modified its risk-assessment tool's algorithm to prevent it from recommending that noncitizens be released--the tool was only able to recommend further detention. The petitioner claimed that the No-Release Policy resulted in thousands of detainees being denied individualized custody determinations and remaining in detention facilities "under harsh conditions of confinement akin to criminal incarceration." The petitioner asserted four causes of action; violations of "the Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Rehabilitation Act." The two classes proposed by the petitioner were: (1) The Petitioner Class: All individuals eligible to be considered for bond or release on recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2) by ICE’s New York Field Office who have been or will be detained without bond; and (2) the Rehabilitation Act Subclass: All individuals with a disability, as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations, who are eligible to be considered for bond or release on recognizance under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2) by ICE’s New York Field Office and who have been or will be detained without bond. The case was assigned to Judge Hellerstein. The petitioner's motion for class certification is pending before the district court and the government has yet to file a response to the complaint. On March 16, 2020, the petitioner filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which argued:
This illegal practice of mass detention causes enormous and unnecessary irreparable harm, separating people from their families, jobs, and communities and exposing them to serious health risks without any individualized determination of whether the ongoing denial of liberty is justified. Exacerbating these harms—and increasing the urgency of the petitioners’ request for relief—is the threat posed by COVID-19, the pandemic experts predict will spread to New York City area immigration detention centers in a matter of days, bringing with it the threat of infection, pneumonia, sepsis, or even death.
 The motion sought prompt provide individualized determinations for class members assessing "whether detention is necessary based on individualized assessments of the petitioners’ flight risk, danger to the community, and disability and issue class-wide preliminary declaratory relief ordering the same. Pursuant to its habeas jurisdiction, the Court should order release in the event of noncompliance with this procedural remedy." In opposition to the motion for PI, defendants offered "a single core argument upon which most of its other contentions rely: The No-Release Policy does not exist." Instead, defendants claim that they are exercising discretion in the making of each individual custody determination. As their secondary argument, defendants asserted that "review is unavailable under the APA because Plaintiffs have not exhausted administrative remedies and because Plaintiffs do not challenge 'final agency action.'" Following expedited briefing and a telephonic hearing, on March 31, Judge Hellerstein issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (PI). The order enjoined ICE's New York Field Office Director from following the No-Release Policy and to return to its pre-June 2017 practice of making individualized assessments about whether detention is justified by flight risk or danger. The defendants are required to file a report by April 17, 2020, identifying "all persons thus arrested by or under the authority of ICE's New York City Field Office and, of such persons, all such persons who have had their bond or recognizance application heard by an immigration judge." According to the NYCLU, "as a result of this ruling, many class members who are in ICE detention must be promptly evaluated for release. This expedited decision provides much-needed relief for people in detention who are exposed to the increasing threat of coronavirus spreading through crowded jails." In issuing the order, Judge Hellerstein did not provide a statement of its reasoning due to the expedited circumstances; however, "the Court, in due course, intends to deliver a more fulsome statement of its reasoning." On April 27, plaintiffs filed a letter addressed to Judge Hellerstein requesting information regarding defendants' compliance with the PI. The defendants responded to the plaintiffs' letter on May 1. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these filings, so the extent to which the defendants have complied with the PI is unclear. On May 4, Judge Hellerstein issued "a formal opinion explaining more fully the Court's reasoning for its oral ruling granting Plaintiffs' motion" for a PI. Judge Hellerstein concluded that "[p]laintiffs have established a clear and substantial likelihood of being able to demonstrate that the No-Release Policy exists . . . and that none of the procedural hurdles identified by Defendants preclude my awarding injunctive relief in Plaintiffs' favor." In concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to demonstrate that the No-Release Policy exists, Judge Hellerstein was persuaded by data provided by the plaintiff showing a "substantial increase in detention rates for final decisions in the New York Field Office beginning in 2017." Moreover, defendants acknowledged that a No-Release Policy "is inconsistent with the INA and regulations passed thereunder, at least without notice-and-comment rule making." Because "the Court ha[d] already found that Plaintiffs have shown they will suffer irreparable harm without relief and that the equities tilt in Plaintiffs' favor, injunctive relief is called for here." 2020 WL 2114984. (S.D.N.Y. May 04, 2020). Judge Hellerstein stated at the end of this opinion that the parties had disagreements regarding the implementation of the PI and that these disagreements "culminated in the government's filing of a motion to clarify and/or amend the injunction" on May 1. After expedited briefing and hearing, Judge Hellerstein issued an order on May 15 denying the defendants' motion to clarify/amend the PI. Judge Hellerstein stated that
Defendants were required to: 1. Apply the injunction to all persons who were detained as of April 10, 2020 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), except those persons already given an individualized custody determination by an immigration judge, and expeditiously determine, or redetermine, their custody status consistent with the injunction; and to 2. Report to the court on May 22, 2020, and weekly thereafter, as to the progress made, which shall be steady and expeditious. All custody determinations and redeterminations must be completed by June 5, 2020. If extensions are required, Defendants may make an application therefore, showing good cause.
 Judge Hellerstein followed up his May 15 order, giving further explanation of his decision to deny the motion to amend or modify. On July 1, the parties filed a stipulated protective order. On July 6, the defendants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal. The appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 20-2153. The appeal was withdrawn on October 13. 2020 WL 7973940. On September 21, the district court filed an order directing the parties how to proceed. The court granted the Plaintiffs' request to conduct a deposition pertaining to training received by ICE personnel with respect to the court's earlier injunction. On December 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction and the defendants filed their opposition on January 6, 2021, however, the Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Katherine H. Parker for settlement discussions, and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In February 2020, a person arrested by ICE and denied bond or release while his immigration proceedings continued filed this class-action against the Department of Homeland Security and several of its constituent agencies in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The petitioner filed a habeas petition, alleging that the New York City-area immigration officials' policy of denying release and bond to persons in immigration detention facilities violated his statutory, regulatory, and constitutional rights. As of March 31, 2020, the petitioner's motion for class certification is pending in the district court. On March 16, in response to the risk posed by the outbreak of COVID-19, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking relief in the form of individualized assessments about whether detention is justified by flight risk or danger. On March 31 the Court issued an order granting this relief. On December 18, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary inunction and oral arguments are scheduled for March 17, 2021. The case is ongoing.


On May 27, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Crane Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan and the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan (medium security prisons for women) pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. The state refused to allow the DOJ access to the prisons to conduct an investigation, and declined to negotiate with the DOJ or resolve the allegations. On March 27, 1995, the DOJ issued a findings letter regarding the results of the CRIPA investigation, which was conducted solely through prisoner interviews during visiting hours, as the DOJ had not been allowed access to the physical facilities. The letter detailed findings of sexual abuse of female inmates by guards (including rapes), lack of adequate medical care, lack of mental health services, grossly deficient sanitation, crowding, and other threats to the physical safety and well-being of inmates in violation of their constitutional rights. On March 10, 1997, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the state of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Flint office, alleging that the state had violated the rights of women prisoners at Scott and Crane to be free from sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy, and to receive appropriate medical and mental health care. The medical and mental health care claims were later withdrawn. The case had received the docket number 97-40053 in Flint, but it was quickly transferred to Detroit and given a new docket number (97-71514). It was consolidated for discovery purposes with another case brought by women prisoners, Nunn v. Mich. Dept. of Corrections, 2:96-cv-71416, (E.D. Mich) (PC-MI-0017). After considerable discovery, the state and the federal government (but not the private plaintiffs in Nunn) entered into a Settlement Agreement on May 25, 1999. The District Court (Judge John Corbett O'Meara) approved the settlement agreement as a court order on September 30, 1999. The agreement provided for considerable changes to Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) policies and procedures relating to sexual misconduct. Among other things, the agreement included: preemployment screenings, staff trainings, inmate education, facilitation of inmate and staff reporting of sexual misconduct allegations, investigation of sexual misconduct allegations, approach and response to misconduct, monitoring of inmate bathroom, dressing and shower areas, pat-down searches, and inmate screenings. It further set forth terms for quality assurance and for DOJ monitoring for compliance with the terms of the agreement. Following execution of this settlement agreement, the case was conditionally dismissed by Judge O'Meara on September 28, 1999, pending Michigan's compliance with the terms of the agreement. The case was placed on the court's inactive docket during this time, and the parties agreed upon an expert, Patrick McManus, to assess Michigan's compliance with the settlement agreement three and six months after its execution. The U.S. filed a memo in support of its stipulation to conditionally dismiss the case in March 2000 indicating that the expert had found Michigan to be in substantial compliance with the terms of the settlement. The court entered an order of conditional dismissal of the case on August 17, 2000. As part of its subsequent compliance efforts, the Michigan Department of Corrections established a policy barring men from serving as resident officers in housing units in women's prisons, and began the process of replacing those positions with female officers. After the directive to staff housing units with female officers, male corrections officers filed a separate lawsuit alleging gender discrimination. (Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004). In December 2002, the compliance expert filed a final report concluding that defendants were in substantial compliance with much of the agreement, but because of Michigan's ongoing efforts to staff housing units with female officers, that portion of the settlement would be subject to additional monitoring. Judge O'Meara granted the parties' stipulation for Partial Unconditional Dismissal of the case in February 2003, agreeing to up to one year of continued monitoring only on the issue of female housing guards, given a pending appeal in the Everson case (the district court in that case had found the Department of Corrections could not designate such positions as "female-only" - that issue was being contested on appeal). In October 2004, the defendants sought full unconditional dismissal of the case, given that the timeline for continued monitoring of the housing situation had expired (even though the Everson decision remained pending). The 6th Circuit finally issued its ruling in Everson in December 2004 (391 F.3d 737, 6th Cir. 2004), concluding that female gender was a bonafide occupational qualification for housing unit guards in women's prisons. Rehearing en banc in the Everson case was denied in March 2005. Subsequently, on September 29, 2005, the Defendants withdrew their Motion for full unconditional dismissal of this action. Thus, all that was left of the case was the issue of the staffing of housing units by women. That issue was finally dismissed on April 25, 2007, after the state apparently attested that only female officers were assigned to housing units in all facilities covered by the settlement agreement.

Summary: On May 27, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Crane Correctional Facility in Coldwater, Michigan and the Scott Correctional Facility in Plymouth, Michigan, both medium security prisons for women, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ issued a letter, detailing findings of sexual abuse of female inmates by guards, lack of adequate medical care, and grossly deficient sanitation, inter alia. In March 1997, DOJ filed a lawsuit against the state of Michigan for violating the rights of the women prisoners. In May 1999, the parties entered a settlement agreement meant to address these issues and in 1999 the court conditionally dismissed the case, pending Michigan's compliance. Monitoring continued in various forms until the cases was entirely dismissed in April 2007.


On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC claimed that the corporation had failed to reasonably accommodate a woman who was able to perform the essential functions of the position yet suffered from disabilities, including multiple sclerosis. The EEOC asked the court to permanently enjoin the corporation from engaging in unlawful employment practice as well as grant relief to those employees against whom the discrimination had occurred. Over the course of the next year, a number of settlement conferences were scheduled between the parties to take place before Magistrate Judge Ellen S. Carmod. And on October 26, 2005, Magistrate Judge Carmod granted plaintiffs' unopposed motion to consolidate the case with the ongoing litigation in EEOC. v Magna Donnelly Corporation, Inc., EE-MI-0047. Both cases had been brought under the ADA, and dealt with the same corporation's employment discrimination practices and policies. Settlement conferences continued between the parties, and a proposed consent decree was submitted to the court on November 28, 2006. On December 15, 2006, United States District Judge Richard A. Enslen approved the consent decree and dismissed the case with prejudice and without costs to either party. The decree included monetary compensation for back pay to the injured employees, totaling $100,000. The corporation also agreed to provide ADA training in the normal course to managers, supervisors, and human resources staff according to a training program developed by defense counsel that had been reviewed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The decree also included a retaliatory prohibition. The decree would remain in effect for one year and include reporting to the EEOC to ensure compliance.

Summary: On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on behalf of one or more workers, filed a lawsuit against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEC claimed that the corporation had failed to reasonably accommodate persons who were able to perform the essential functions of the position yet suffered from disabilities. On December 15, 2006 the District Court approved a consent decree that required the defendant to pay $100,000 in backpay to the complainants, post notice, provide ADA training, refrain from discrimination and retaliation, and send compliance reports to the EEOC.


On May 16, 2006 a juvenile detainee filed a class action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, challenging the strip search policy of the Dona Ana County Juvenile Detention Center. Plaintiff alleged that the County and officials in charge of Juvenile Detention Center had a blanket policy of strip searching all pre-arraignment detainees upon their arrival at the Juvenile Detention Center, regardless of the offense charged, or whether there was any suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons or contraband. The plaintiff, who was strip searched pursuant to this policy, alleged that that the policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. The County and Detention Center officials generally denied the allegations. Shortly after the suit was filed, the District Court (Judge Judith C. Herrera) stayed the proceedings at the request of the parties so that they could pursue settlement negotiations. Plaintiff's attorney had filed a similar class action on behalf of adult detainees that were strip searched at the Dona Ana County. See JC-NM-0004: Lira v. Dona Ana County. Negotiations were conducted on both the adult and juvenile cases. On November 21, 2007, Judge William Johnson consolidated both cases, designating Lira as the lead case. Shortly after the consolidation, the parties filed an Amended Stipulation of Settlement, under which the Defendants agreed to pay $5.3 million to resolve all class claims. The stipulated Adult Settlement Class included all detainees who were strip searched between March 7, 2003 and March 7, 2006 at the Dona Ana County Jail prior to arraignment. The stipulated Juvenile Settlement class included all detainees who were strip searched between May 16, 2003 and May 16, 2006 at the Dona Ana Juvenile Detention Center. It was estimated that there were approximately 11,000 class members. Individual claims were to be paid per an agreed upon distribution formula, with the range of expected pay-outs per individual claimant was estimated at $1,200 to $2,400. Representative plaintiffs would receive a total $200,000 or $25,000 per class representative. $1,666,667 of the settlement fund was allocated for attorneys' fees. Judge Johnson preliminarily approved the settlement on December 20, 2007. On May 20, 2008, the district court (Judge Johnson) issued a final approval of the settlement and a final judgment of dismissal in the case. In 2011, the parties filed a Joint Motion to allow disbursement of remaining funds to two non-profit entities. Although most of the funds had been successfully distributed, about $22,000 remained for claimants the administrator could not reach. The court granted the motion.

Summary: On May 16, 2006 a juvenile detainee filed a class action civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, challenging the strip search policy of the Dona Ana County Juvenile Detention Center. This case was consolidated with a similar class action on behalf of adult detainees at Dona Ana County, see JC-NM-0004: Lira v. Dona Ana County. Shortly after the consolidation, the parties filed an Amended Stipulation of Settlement, under which the Defendants agreed to pay $5.3 million to resolve all class claims. In 2008, the district court (Judge Johnson) issued a final approval of the settlement and a final judgment of dismissal in the case.


On May 21, 2011, plaintiffs, two men of color, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state law against the City of New York in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Foley Square. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for injunction and compensatory relief, claiming that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the New York City Police Department (NYPD) had violated their rights by unreasonably searching them during routine livery cab stops. On September 3, 2010, at 11:30 P.M., one plaintiff, a lawyer in the Bronx, was leaving work and chose to use a livery cab. The cab was enrolled in the Taxi/Livery Robbery Inspection Program (TRIP), which gave consent for the cab to be stopped and inspected by the NYPD. The cab displayed a decal that indicated enrollment in TRIP. The NYPD stopped the livery cab, and ordered the plaintiff out of the vehicle. The plaintiff protested the search without reasonable suspicion, but the police indicated that enrollment in the TRIP program gave them the right to search passengers in the livery cab. Nothing was found. On October 30, 2010, at 3:00 A.M., the second plaintiff, who was a manager at a popular radio station and a comedian, was returning to his home in Brooklyn in a livery cab. This cab was also enrolled in TRIP. The car was stopped and the plaintiff ordered to exit the vehicle, at which point the plaintiff's person and belongings were searched. Again, nothing was found. The plaintiffs' case was accepted by the NYCLU and the New York University School of Law Civil Rights Clinic, and a complaint was filed alleging that the search of passengers in livery cabs without reasonable suspicion was unconstitutional. On May 14, 2012, the Court (Judge Richard M. Berman) entered a stipulation and order of dismissal, because the case had settled. The Settlement contained $10,000 relief for each plaintiff ($20,000 total), $38,000 in attorney's fees, and injunctive-like provisions. The NYPD agreed to suspend its routine searching of passengers of vehicles that were pulled over as part of the TRIPS program. The NYPD further agreed that it would only search passengers when reasonable suspicion of a violent crime existed. Furthermore, the NYPD provided information that it was amending its training manual, informing officers at roll-call citywide (repeating it for 10 day periods, for three times over the next year), and issuing an operations order communicating the order to not search passengers absent reasonable suspicion of a violent crime during a TRIP stop. The case was dismissed with the approval of the settlement.

Summary: The plaintiffs, men of color who were stopped and searched while riding in livery cabs without any reasonable suspicion, sued the City of New York, alleging that searching of livery passengers during routine stops was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs settled with the City. The City agreed to suspend the practice of searching passengers of livery and taxi cabs absent reasonable suspicion of a violent crime.


On July 19, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act of 1988, §42 U.S.C. §§3601-3631 against the owner and manager of a four-unit apartment building in Monroe, New Hampshire. The plaintiff brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, on behalf of a mixed-national origin and race family, claiming the Defendant engaged in discriminatory housing practices. The complaint sets out allegations involving ethnic slurs and other bad treatment of the complainant family, including incidents that led to the arrest of the landlord and state court orders against him. The U.S. sought to enjoin further discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin and asked for compensatory and punitive damages to the complainants. The complainants intervened in the suit a few months later. On April 7, 2011, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire (Judge Landya McCafferty) approved a consent decree. The decree enjoined the defendant and its employees from making statements with respect to the rental of a dwelling that indicated a preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, or national origin; or coercing, threatening, intimidating, or interfering with any tenant's exercised or enjoyed rights. The defendant was required to get tenants' permission prior to entering units, except to make emergency repairs. In addition, the defendant agreed to undertake fair housing training of all employees, and a set of recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Finally, the defendant agreed to pay the complainants $15,000 in compensatory damages. The consent order was set to last two years, unless the defendant retained any direct or indirect ownership, management, or other financial interest in any residential rental property, in which case the consent order was to remain in effect for three years. The consent decree terminated without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This fair housing litigation was brought in July 2010 by the United States Department of Justice against the owner and manager of a four-unit apartment building in Monroe, New Hampshire. It came after a series of racial incidents involving a mixed race/ethnicity tenant family. A consent decree was entered by District Judge Landya McCafferty in April 2011. The decree enjoined discrimination, required fair housing training and recordkeeping, and was scheduled to remain in effect for two years (three years if the defendant retained any ownership, management, or other financial interest in any residential rental property).


On July 28, 2005 a death-sentenced inmate of the Potosi Correctional Center in Washington County, Missouri, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. He claimed that there was a 43% chance that the defendants' planned lethal injection procedure would torture him and cause him unnecessary pain. He argued that this violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He also argued that the infliction of the death penalty, and specifically the use of a form of execution more painful than necessary to bring about the death involved, violated the Thirteenth Amendment because it was a relict, vestige, and badge of slavery. Specifically, he was concerned that that the use of the femoral vein for the administration of the lethal injection would require a painful "cut-down" procedure, and that the anesthetic used (thiopental) would wear off too soon, allowing him to be conscious during the administration of potassium chloride, which causes a painful burning sensation throughout the body. In addition, the plaintiff argued that the Missouri physicians who were involved in administering the lethal injections were violating their ethical obligations. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the case, claiming that the plaintiff had to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing the case in District Court. On December 28, 2005, the District Court (Judge Scott O. Wright) denied their request, finding that the plaintiff did not have to exhaust his administrative remedies because if the defendants had wanted to change the method of execution due to the pain it inflicted, they would have already done so. On January 18, 2006, the plaintiff asked the District Court to order the defendants not to execute him until the court had held a hearing and decided how to resolve the issues in the case. The next day, the District Court (Judge Wright) granted his request and ordered the defendants not to execute the plaintiff until the court told them that they could do so. The defendants appealed. On January 29, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Judges William J. Riley, Clarence Arlen Beam, and David Rasmussen Hansen) vacated the stay and ordered the District Court to hold a hearing before noon on February 1, 2006. They also held that the execution should be stayed until midnight on February 3, 2006. According to the Eighth Circuit's order, the District Court held a hearing to decide the merits of the case on January 31, 2006. After the hearing, Court (Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.) found that neither the chemicals used by the State of Missouri for lethal injection nor the procedure employed to administer these injections constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court reasoned that while the plaintiff suggested a different approach to lethal injection, he did not prove that the current method used by Missouri violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court also said that it was not persuaded that the use of the femoral vein for the administration of the lethal injection violated applicable standards of the Eighth Amendment, and it did not believe that the Missouri physicians who were involved in administering the lethal injections were violating their ethical obligations. Finally, the Court said that the lethal injection procedure did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery. The plaintiff appealed. On April 27, 2006, the Eighth Circuit (Judges Riley, Beam, and Hansen) issued a per curiam opinion vacating the District Court's decision and remanding the case so that the lower court could hold a more thorough hearing and expand the record. The Eighth Circuit decided to do this because they felt that the time constraints that they had imposed on the lower court had been unreasonable, and they wished to allow the parties more time to present their cases. Taylor v. Crawford, 445 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2006). After holding a more extensive hearing, the District Court ruled on June 26, 2006, amended its earlier decision, ordering the defendants to prepare a written protocol for lethal injections that included the following changes: 1) a board certified anesthesiologist must be responsible for the mixing and administering of all drugs used during the lethal injection, 2) at least 5 grams of thiopental must be administered and the anesthesiologist must certify that the thiopental has rendered the plaintiff unconscious, 3) the state must purchase any equipment necessary to allow the anesthesiologist to monitor the depth of the anesthetic, in order to insure that the plaintiff will not feel any pain, 4) the state must have a contingency plan in place in case problems develop during the execution procedure, 5) an auditing process must be in place to ensure that all individuals involved in the lethal injection process are correctly following the protocol, and 6) after the Court approves the lethal injection protocol, it must not be changed without the prior approval of the Court. The District Court then sent this ruling up to the Eighth Circuit for their consideration and approval. Taylor v. Crawford, 2006 WL 1779035 (W.D.Mo. June 26, 2006). On July 24, 2006, the defendants filed a revised protocol for use in carrying out the inmate's death sentence in the District Court, and the Eighth Circuit remanded their jurisdiction back to the lower court so that the new protocol could be considered. On September 12, 2006, the District Court (Judge Gaitan) rejected the defendants' revised protocol, saying that even though it was an improvement, it was not enough to meet the standards of the Constitution because it lacked a provision for purchase of equipment that allows monitoring of anesthetic depth. The Court ordered the defendants to submit a revised protocol to the Court by October 27, 2006. The defendants asked the District Court to reconsider their rejection of the revised protocol, and on October 16, 2006, the District Court (Judge Gaitan) refused to reconsider the decision. The defendants appealed that refusal, and on June 4, 2007, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the defendants' proposed revisions of the protocol were sufficient to get rid of any Constitutional problems. They also vacated the District Court's injunction that had forbidden the defendants from executing the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the Eighth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on August 8, 2007, the Eighth Circuit declined to do so. The plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon denied the inmate's request for clemency and he was executed on February 25, 2014.

Summary: On July 28, 2005, Michael Anthony Taylor, a death-sentenced inmate of the Potosi Correctional Center in Washington County, Missouri, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. He claimed that there was a 43% chance that the defendants' planned lethal injection procedure would torture him and cause him unnecessary pain. He argued that this violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. On July 24, 2006, the Court ordered the defendants to submit a revised protocol to the Court. The defendants appealed, and on June 4, 2007, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the defendants' proposed revisions of the protocol were sufficient to get rid of any Constitutional problems. They also vacated the District Court's injunction that had forbidden the defendants from executing the plaintiff. The plaintiff asked the Eighth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on August 8, 2007, the Eighth Circuit declined to do so. The plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and unfortunately the inmate was executed on February 25, 2014.


Plaintiffs, minor students, filed this class action lawsuit on March 27, 2006, against Winner School District and three of its administrators in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. Plaintiffs, who were Native American, alleged that employees of the School District engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional racial discrimination with the purpose of pushing Native American students out of the school system. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the School District disciplinary practices targeted Native American students by disciplining them more often and more harshly than other students, referring them to law enforcement for minor infractions, and coercing criminal confessions out of them. They also alleged that teachers and administrators tolerated and fostered a racially hostile school environment by allowing racial name-calling and bullying to occur and treating Native American parents with disrespect. As a result, Native American students were less likely to complete high school and felt demoralized at school. Represented by the ACLU and the Rosebud Sioux Attorney General's Office, plaintiffs brought claims under the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs also asked the court to certify as a class all Native American students who were or would be enrolled in Winner School District's middle and high schools. On April 28, 2006, plaintiffs submitted a motion for class certification. The parties began the discovery process in June. On October 20, 2006, Judge Charles B. Kornmann issued an order granting class certification. After a series of mediation sessions, the parties settled and filed a proposed Settlement Agreement on May 30, 2007. A court-enforceable Consent Decree was entered by Judge Kornmann on December 10, 2007. The terms of the Consent Decree prohibited defendants from requiring any student to make a written statement ("affidavit") that could be used against him or her in legal proceedings. The Decree also required defendants to immediately notify parents after deciding to refer a student to law enforcement and to notify students of their legal right to remain silent in such a case; train School District employees on proper disciplinary procedures and the constitutional rights of students; obtain an independent expert to assist with the development of disciplinary matrices; keep accurate records of disciplinary incidents; conduct evaluations of students subjected to discipline three or more times over the course of a year; hire a Native American ombudsperson; train teachers on American Indian education and educational equity; increase its number of Native American employees; and take several other measures designed to eliminate racial discimination and create an inclusive environment for Native American students and families. Defendants were also ordered to find and appoint a Monitor to oversee and report on the implementation of the Consent Decree. The court maintained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. The Decree was to stay in effect until defendants had achieved and maintained compliance for four years. Finally, it awarded plaintiffs $100,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The first and second progress reports, filed in June and September 2008, indicated that defendants had made progress in all areas. Among other things, they had hired more Native American staff members, developed anti-bullying programming, and developed a disciplinary matrix. On January 8, 2014, the parties proposed an Amended Consent Decree. The court granted the Amended Decree on April 28, 2014. The new agreement was very similar to the original, but required that, if the School District reached all outcome measures within the following two years, it would be released from the Agreement. If some measures were not reached within that time, the District would be formally released from having to reach those outcomes but would be required to continue a good-faith effort to do so for the following two years. On May 31, 2017, the parties jointly filed a motion to terminate the Consent Decree after finding that defendants had met all of their obligations. Judge Kornmann formally terminated the Decree on June 6, 2017.

Summary: A group of Native American students filed this §1983 lawsuit on March 27, 2006, against Winner School District in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. The students alleged that the District engaged in intentional racial discrimination by disproportionately disciplining Native American middle and high school students and tolerating racial bullying in the schools. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The case settled, and the court entered a Consent Decree on December 10, 2007. The Consent Decree remained in force until June of 2017, when it was dismissed because the parties agreed that defendants had complied with all terms of the Decree.


On August 17, 2018, 29 parents who were forcibly separated from their children by the federal government filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court of District Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice for violating the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 701), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.), and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Plaintiffs, represented by Muslim Advocates as well as the Legal Aid Justice Center and the law firm of Eversheds & Sunderland, LLP, sought an order compelling the defendants to vacate the results of credible fear interviews, which had found them eligible for removal, as well as the resulting orders of removal. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and new credible fear interviews. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that under DOJ policy, parents were forced to undergo credible fear interviews while they were suffering from emotional and psychological trauma from being separated from their children. Credible fear interviews determine whether an asylum seeker faces a credible fear of persecution or torture when returned to their home country. Unable to articulate their experiences due to trauma, the plaintiffs received negative credible fear determinations and faced immediate deportation. This case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. On August 17, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to proceed under pseudonyms and a redacted complaint. The defendant filed a motion to extend time to file an answer on October 22, 2018. On December 31, 2018, the defendant again filed such a motion. Along with two related cases, MMM v. Sessions and Ms. L v. ICE, this case settled. On November 15, 2018, Judge Dana M. Sabraw (the judge assigned in Ms. L. v. ICE) issued a final approval of the settlement. According to this settlement, the government committed to conducting a good faith review of the plaintiff’s prior credible fear findings to determine if reconsideration would be appropriate. However, the government refused to return any parent who had already been deported. On February 5, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. This case is now closed, but the court in Ms. L v. ICE retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. For more information on that case, including disputes that have developed over the settlement's terms, see here.

Summary: On August 17, 2018, 29 parents, who underwent credible fear interviews while suffering from trauma due to recent family separation, sued the Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court of District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, among other laws. On November 15, 2018, a judge in a related case approved a settlement in which the government committed to conducting a good faith review of the plaintiffs' interviews. On February 5, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.


On February 13, 2012, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this §1983 class habeas action against the Connecticut Department of Corrections. The petition was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut and assigned to Judge Janet Bond Arteton. The plaintiffs were detainees in Connecticut Department of Corrections (CDOC) facilities who, after the expiration of the state-law basis of their detention, remained in state custody solely due to an administrative "immigration detainer" placed by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Represented by the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, the plaintiffs sought a writ of habeas corpus requiring the state to release them, an injunction against detaining future individuals based solely on an immigration detainer, and declaratory judgment invalidating such detention. Detainers issued by ICE request state and local law enforcement officials to hold individuals in custody, without any basis in state law, for up to 48 hours, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §287.7. The named plaintiff's state-based detention ended on February 10, 2012; he filed the petition on February 13, 2012 when his subsequent detention continued for more than 48 hours. On the same day, the plaintiff requested class certification of detainees similarly situated in CDOC facilities. Claiming they were detained without probable cause hearings,and that the detainer is an invalid commandeering of state officials, the plaintiff alleged violation of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights were violated because the state lacked a compelling interest to continue detention. On February 19, 2013, the parties entered a proposed settlement agreement based on the newly enacted state regulations. The settlement agreement states that if an ICE immigration detainer is placed on a detainee, he or she will be notified by the CDOC as soon as practicable. If the detainee's state-based detention has expired and the detainee does not have a prior order of removal or meet certain "dangerousness criteria" set forth in the statute, the detainee shall not be held. The statute allowed for only rare occasions where CDOC could use its discretion to continue detention. The court approved the settlement agreement on March 5, 2013. The settlement agreement was set to expire on February 2, 2017. On February 2, 2017, the parties jointly moved to extend the termination date of the settlement agreement from February 2, 2017 to February 2, 2018. The court ordered the modification of the settlement agreement to reflect the extension that day, and the settlement agreement remained otherwise unchanged. On January 19, 2018, the parties moved to extend the settlement agreement for another year, and on January 26, 2018, the court modified the agreement with a new termination date of February 2, 2019. As of April 14, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket and the settlement is presumed to have lapsed.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus and suit against the Connecticut Department of Corrections for their continued detention due solely to an "immigration detainer" placed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 2012. A settlement agreement laying out the criteria for release and/or continued detention was approved on March 5, 2013, and was set to expire on February 2, 2017. The settlement agreement has been subsequently extended and is now set to expire on February 2, 2019.


This class action brought by children placed in Connecticut's Department of Children and Youth Services (DCYS) was filed on December 19, 1989, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state to redress deficiencies in the child welfare system, claiming that the state violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to:

provide adequate protective services to abused, neglected, or at risk children;
provide adequate medical care, mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, sexual abuse treatment to children in DCYS care;
ensure that all children in DCYS care receive appropriate and least restrictive placements;
ensure that all reports regarding these children are investigated and responded to promptly by caseworkers;
provide sufficient and trained staff;
provide adequate records and information systems;
make reasonable efforts to keep families together by providing threatened families with reasonable and appropriate services to prevent placement into out-of-home care;
provide minimally adequate and appropriate care to all of the children, placed by DCYS, into foster homes or similar settings;
move children into adoptive or other permanent homes when reunification is impossible; and
develop and implement appropriate case plans that will assure permanent placements for all children in their custody.
 On January 7, 1991, the parties reached a settlement agreement mandating broad scale reform. The Court entered a consent decree reflecting their agreement and requiring the defendants to:

establish a training academy and statewide computerized data system;
appoint an advisory board;
design and implement a management structure that delineates reporting relationships;
establish a health management unit for children under the supervision, care or custody of the department;
increase staff by hiring qualified and experienced individuals;
establish comprehensive guidelines and regulations to facilitate the uniform intake and investigation of reports of suspected child abuse or neglect;
institute standards for treatment, case management, and family training,
implement objectives and goals for adoptions,
establish regional resource groups for consultations and evaluations;
develop procedures to complete Probate Court Ordered Studies within the timeframes specified by state law; and
establish a DCYS Monitoring Panel to determine, promulgate, or approve standards and procedures to fulfill the mandates of the Consent Decree, to implement reasonable timetables, and to establish mandatory funding amounts to ensure compliance.
 The Consent Decree could be modified, amended, or changed by the trial judge, but only upon the filing of an appropriate motion by a party or the DCYS Monitoring Panel. On December 19, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt. The defendants admitted to noncompliance and after extended negotiations the defendants agreed in October 2003 to: require the monitor to develop a definitive exit plan with specific outcomes; establish a Transition Task Force to assume all decisionmaking authority having substantial impact on the plaintiffs' safety and welfare; establish funds of $1 million for meeting emergency needs of class members; and to ensure that the governor would not replace the Commissioner during the term of this order without consulting the monitor first. Shortly thereafter, the monitor developed an exit plan detailing the necessary reforms and benchmarks that the defendants would have to meet. This plan was entered as a court order on December 23, 2003. It was modified three years later. Despite some improvements made by the defendants, the plaintiffs formally reported noncompliance again on May 5, 2008. Two months later, the plaintiffs withdrew their assertions of noncompliance pursuant to another stipulated agreement in which the defendant's agreed to comply with the foster-care recruitment and retention plans, administrative case reviews and treatment planning conferences plans, and health-care requirements. In December 2009, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from suspending new intakes to one of their programs, the Voluntary Services Program. The defendants responded by arguing that the children receiving treatment or assistance in that program were not members of the plaintiff class. A year later, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that children in the Voluntary Services Program were indeed members of the class. On August 17, 2010, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion for preliminary injunction and motion for permanent injunction. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on August 31, 2010, but the court denied the motion four months later. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135238; 2010 WL 5376224. In the meantime, while that motion for injunctive relief was pending, on April 13, 2010, the defendants sought to vacate the Consent Decree and Exit Plan, claiming that the objectives of the Consent Decree and Exit Plan had been achieved and that factual and legal changes would make continued enforcement unfair. The court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate on September 22, 2010. The court also directed the parties to meet immediately with the court monitor to discuss new methods of evaluating the state's performance. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99455; 2010 WL 5590094. For the next seven years, the monitor periodically provided the court with revised exit plan quarterly reports. The most recent exit plan was submitted by the court monitor's office on May 1, 2017. The parties were then given an opportunity to respond to the recommended exit plan, and when both did, the court scheduled settlement talks with Magistrate Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons for later that year. It's not clear if the parties agreed on a revised exit plan or if the court adopted one on its own, but on December 13, 2017, the Court entered a 2017 Revised Exit Plan and it appears that since then the case has continued by reference to compliance with that. That exit plan identified 14 relevant outcome measures. The plan also required the Court Monitor to conduct what it referred to as "Certification" reviews to ensure that defendants were in compliance with all of the outcome measures, and in sustained compliance with all of the outcome measures for at least two quarters prior to asserting compliance. The Court Monitor would then conduct a review of a statistically significant valid sample of cases to determined whether the defendants were in compliance. The parties and Court Monitor later created a "Pre-Certification" review process. This intended to obviate the need to implement the full certification review for certain outcome measures after sustained compliance had been achieved for all outcome measures. Under this process, if DCF achieved sustained compliance for at least two consecutive quarters, the Court Monitor could, in his discretion, conduct a pre-certification review. The purpose of this review was to identify and provide a prompt and timely opportunity to remedy any problem areas. In February of 2019, the Court Monitor released the Revised Exit Plan Status Report, covering the period from April 1, 2018, to September 30, 2018. It found that of the ten remaining outcome measures, there were five that had not been pre-certified. A year later, in February of 2020, the Court Monitor released another Exit Plan Status Report, covering the period from April 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019. The monitor found one more of the outstanding outcome measures, relating to the caseloads of DCF social workers, had been pre-certified, leaving four outcome measures awaiting pre-certification. As of October 7, 2020, the Court Monitor has continued to assess compliance under the 2017 Revised Exit Plan, and the litigation is ongoing, presumably until the outcome measures required by the exit plan are met.

Summary: The plaintiffs, children placed in the custody, care, or supervision of the defendant Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state failed to redress deficiencies in the child welfare system. The case was filed in 1989 and the parties agreed upon and filed a Consent Decree in 1991. In 2010, the state sought to vacate the Consent Decree but the motion was denied by the court. As of October 2020, the parties are continuing to work with the Court Monitor to assess compliance according to the terms of the 2017 Revised Exit Plan.


On March 11, 2004, the City of Detroit removed a state court lawsuit to the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Detroit and Wayne County, as well as the Detroit Psychiatric Institute. The plaintiff's estate, represented by the Innocence Project, asked the Court for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the defendants violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the The Rehabilitation Act and also claimed violations of the state constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff's estate claimed that the plaintiff's wrongful conviction was the product of malicious police tactics that coerced a false confession from a mentally ill and hospitalized man. In 1984, a 16-year-old girl named Michelle Jackson was found dead in a warehouse in Detroit. She had been sodomized and killed. Her death was part of a string of 47 rapes and disappearances between September 1983 and 1984. The plaintiff, a man declared legally mentally incompetent, had a habit of calling the police and offering to help them solve rapes and murders. When the police approached the plaintiff in 1984, officers convinced him that his confession would lure the real killer out into the open. The plaintiff confessed under this delusional belief, was convicted, sentenced to life in prison. He remained in prison for 17 years. The plaintiff's appellate attorney, Robert Slameka, refused to communicate with the plaintiff. When the plaintiff filed a grievance against Mr. Slameka, he responded that the plaintiff's "claim of my wrongdoing is frivolous, just as his existence. Both should be terminated." The plaintiff was exonerated by DNA evidence in 2002. The plaintiff filed this action alleging that the detectives concealed evidence in bad faith, that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective, and that the result was false imprisonment in violation of the Constitution. He also alleged that the Detroit Psychiatric Institute cooperated with the police in prolonging his hospitalization and coercing his confession. The plaintiff died while the lawsuit was pending, in 2005. The plaintiff's estate filed an Amended Complaint on May 10, 2005. On May 5, 2006, the parties settled the case. The Court (Judge Gerald Rosen) entered a Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment required the City of Detroit to pay the plaintiff's estate 3.25 million dollars. In addition, there was a side agreement, provided as an exhibit to the Consent Judgment, under which the City agreed to make a good-faith effort to implement video recording by January 1, 2007, and to to submit bi-monthly reports on its progress to the Plaintiff's estate. A Satisfaction of Judgment was entered on July 10, 2007, and the case was closed. We have no further information about the City's compliance with the Consent Judgment.

Summary: A man who was the victim of a coerced confession was convicted of murder in 1985, and was exonerated by the Innocence Project in 2002. He filed this action against the City of Detroit in 2004. The plaintiff died while the action was pending, but in 2006 his estate settled the case for 3.25 million dollars and an agreement to begin recording interrogations by the Detroit Police Department.


This case was filed by the Chicago office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in June 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC alleged that the defendant, a telemarketer of small business consulting packages based in Buffalo Grove, IL, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by carrying out a pattern or practice of discrimination by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment. EEOC also alleged the defendant made favorable employment actions contingent upon the performance of sexual favors. The case was before Judge Joan B. Gottschall. Two of the employees allegedly harassed filed related suits (see related cases EE−IL−0307 and EE-IL-0308), and two other employees intervened in the EEOC's suit. The discovery stage of this litigation was protracted, with several dozen discovery motions being filed over the course of a five-year period. On October 23, 2007, the court divided the case into two phases to be tried before one jury. 2007 WL 3120067. In phase I, the EEOC had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the sexual harassment that occurred at the defendant business during the relevant time period, taken as a whole, was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable woman would find the work environment to be hostile or abusive. EEOC also had to establish that the defendant knew, or should have known, that systematic sexual harassment was occurring in its offices but did not take adequate steps to address the problem. In Phase II, the EEOC had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that each individual claimant seeking monetary damages experienced sex-based harassment that an objectively reasonable woman would find severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment and demonstrate that each claimant subjectively perceived the harassment she experienced to be hostile or abusive. The defendant sought summary judgment on the individual claims in this case in a series of motions spanning from 2006 to 2009. For the purpose of resolving the summary judgment motions, the court assumed that the EEOC had prevailed in their required showings at Phase I. The court entered orders on July 14, 2008, July 7, 2009, and August 13, 2009. Within these orders, the court granted and denied in part the defendant's summary judgment, finding the harassment was not sufficiently severe for all claimants and dismissing those claimants. 2008 WL 4876860; 654 F. Supp. 2d 767; 647 F. Supp. 2d 951. In 2004, before the filing of the summary judgment motions as to individual claimants began, there were approximately 121 claimants. By 2010, IPA obtained rulings dismissing 40 of those claimants based on summary judgment and statutes of limitations. 81 triable complaints proceeded. On October 9, 2009, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the EEOC’s “pattern or practice” claim. The court considered only the defendant’s statistical arguments (the defendants claimed that the number of individual claimants was too statistically insignificant to present a triable claim for a “pattern or practice”), and did not consider the defendant's other arguments. The court found that the statistics alone did not entitle the defendant to judgment as a matter of law, and denied the motion on March 31, 2010. 2010 WL 1416153. On April 9, 2010, the defendant requested that the court certify its March 31, 2010 order for interlocutory appeal. The court declined to do so on April 16, 2010. On June 14, 2010, the court found, upon the consent of the defendant, that an unlawful pattern or practice of tolerating sexual harassment existed at the business from November 25, 1997 to February 14, 2005. With the order entered on Phase I, the case proceeded toward trial on Phase II. On June 16, 2010, the defendant moved to sever the individual claims for compensatory and punitive damages for the eighty-one remaining claimants, or, in the alternative, for separate trials. The court denied the motion on June 29, 2010. Trial began in the case on July 6, 2010. After the start of jury selection, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement, and the court stayed the trial. At that point, the parties began to work to finalize a consent decree. On February 9, 2011, the court entered an order granting the parties’ joint motion to enforce the settlement agreement reached in court on July 6, 2010. The court entered the consent decree on March 2, 2011. The consent decree included injunctive provisions enjoining the defendant and its employees from retaliation and from discrimination against women on the basis of sex by sexually harassing female employees, harassing female employees on account of their sex, and/or creating, facilitating, or permitting the existence of a hostile work environment. The consent decree also required the defendant to implement and maintain compliance with a “statement of intolerance of sexual harassment,” establish a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure, and provide training regarding sexual harassment. The defendant paid eight million dollars to a settlement fund to be distributed as compensatory damages to the eligible claimants, including the intervenors. The settlement fund also paid attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $431,667 to attorneys for the plaintiff-intervenors. The consent decree appointed Nancy B. Kreiter and George F. Galland as Decree Monitors to oversee IPA’s implementation of the decree’s terms. The court retained jurisdiction over the consent decree for three years. After the entry of the consent decree, the parties' outstanding motions were denied as moot on March 24, 2011. The Monitors’ reports of February 23, 2012 and March 4, 2013 both found the defendant in compliance with the consent decree and made certain recommendations, mostly concerning profanity, enforcement of the dress code, and restructuring of Human Resources. On May 14, 2013, the plaintiffs moved to amend the consent decree. The motion, to which the defendants agreed, proposed an amendment to the payment schedule in the consent decree. Under the consent decree, the defendants were responsible for annual payments to a settlement account, but had not made its annual payments on time, and claimed financial hardship, so the parties agreed to allow weekly payments to ensure that final payment was fully and timely made in March 2014. Judge Gotschall granted the motion on May 22, 2013. The defendants submitted their final payment into the settlement fund on March 3, 2014, and the Monitors submitted their final report on March 10, 2014, finding that the IPA complied fully with the decree. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was filed by the Chicago office of the EEOC in June 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC alleged that the defendant, International Profit Associates, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by carrying out a pattern or practice of discrimination by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment, and by making favorable employment actions contingent upon the performance of sexual favors. After extensive discovery and litigation of summary judgment motions as to each of the individual claimants in the case, the parties settled and a consent decree, providing for monetary and injunctive relief, was entered on March 2, 2011.


This lawsuit was filed on July 24, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The suit was brought by the Texas Civil Rights Project as next friend for one hundred unaccompanied migrant children who had been arrested by Customs and Border Protection. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union Immigration Rights Project, the ACLU Foundation of Texas, Oxfam America, the Center for Gender and Refugees Studies, and the ACLU of D.C.. They sued the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, Acting Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection Mark Morgan, Chief of U.S. Border Patrol Rodney Scott, Director of Immigration Customs and Enforcement Matthew Albence, Secretary of HHS Alex Azar, and CDC Director Robert Redfield. The complaint contended that the federal government had implemented a new process of removing immigrant children without providing for adequate protections, especially by holding those children away from their families or other sponsors and by not providing counsel. This process was instituted over a series of regulations, orders, and agency memos that the complaint calls the "Title 42 Process." The complaint argued that this Title 42 Process violated the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA), and that agencies exceed the power granted to them under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. They requested declaratory relief and injunctive relief that would prohibit the defendants from enforcing the Title 42 Process, stay their removal, grant them counsel, and grant the children TVPRA protections. The case was assigned to Judge Beryl A. Howell. A few weeks later, on August 6, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, even before defendants responded -- they did not give an explanation as to why they dismissed the case. In a minute order on August 10, Judge Howell dismissed the case without prejudice and closed the case.

Summary: This case was brought by Texas Civil Rights Project as next friend for one hundred unaccompanied migrant children against top executives of the Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the CDC, and the HHS. They argued that a group of regulations, orders, and memos made up a process called "Title 42 Process," which skirted statutory law requiring certain safeguards on the removal of unaccompanied immigrant minors. While the process was created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs argued that the process was an illegal expansion of executive authority. However, a few weeks later, before defendants responded, the plaintiffs withdrew the complaint without explaining why. The case is now closed.


Disabled prisoners incarcerated at the Denver County Jail sued the city and county, alleging it had discriminated against them by segregating them from the general population, denying access to activities and services, and failing to accommodate their basic needs. The plaintiffs filed their complaint on April 13, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs were inmates at the Denver County Jail. Both have spinal cord injuries and use wheelchairs. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were segregated in the medical ward, despite no medical necessity, denied recreational and other activities because of their disabilities, denied access to religious facilities, the library, education, counseling, and other services and activities, and that the jail lacked accessible showers and other basic necessities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On March 3, 2011, the parties reached a settlement, the terms of which are not available. On May 31, 2011, the case was dismissed with prejudice. This case is closed.

Summary: Disabled prisoners in the Denver County Jail sued the city and county, alleging it had discriminated against them by segregating them from the general population, denying access to activities and services, and failing to accommodate basic needs. The parties reached a settlement whose terms are not available.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action lawsuit was filed on June 16, 2020 by detainees in the Maricopa County Jail system in Arizona, who sought extra protections from COVID-19 and, in some cases, release. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on August 14, 2020.<hr>This is a lawsuit challenging the Maricopa County Sheriff's response to COVID-19 in its jails and requesting the release of detainees and prisoners. On June 16, 2020, nine named plaintiffs and the immigrants' rights non-profit Puente Human Rights Movement filed this class action law suit and habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Maricopa County and its Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12131), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794) and petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Represented by the national and Arizona ACLUs, as well as several law firms working pro bono, the plaintiffs sought to certify several classes of detainees and prisoners, the release of certain individuals at high risk of developing serious illness from COVID-19, and injunctions governing the Sheriff's response to COVID-19 in Maricopa County's jails, as well as attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, were violated by the Sheriff's response to COVID-19. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants placed them in danger of contracting COVID-19 by continuing to book new detainees in the jail without quarantining them from the existing population, as well as a host of other unsafe practices, including a lack of masks and cleaning supplies, little testing for individuals held in the jail or jail staff, and crowded conditions that prevented social distancing. According to the complaint, the pretrial detainees' Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the conditions of their confinement, which amounted to deliberate indifference and unconstitutional punishment prior to conviction. The convicted prisoners made a similar Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. Additionally, the subclasses of prisoners with disabilities claimed that their rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to equal access to jail programming were violated by the defendants' COVID-19 response. Finally, the plaintiffs requested that the court release medically vulnerable pretrial detainees. The case was assigned to United States District Judge Steven P. Logan. On June 29, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order against the defendants, ordering them to improve COVID-19 safety protocols and begin releasing medically vulnerable pretrial detainees. Judge Logan denied the plaintiffs' ex parte request, but set a briefing schedule to determine whether to grant a similar preliminary injunction on July 2, 2020. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case on July 20, 2020. Judge Logan resolved both of these motions in an August 14, 2020 opinion. He denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. He also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss some of the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims against the Sheriff, but not the County. Shortly after the filing of the lawsuit, back on June 29, 2020, the plaintiffs had moved for class certification. Judge Logan granted that motion in a November 13, 2020 opinion and certified two classes, one of detainees incarcerated pending trial and one of convicted prisoners, and four subclasses (two within each class) of medically vulnerable individuals and individuals with disabilities. After class certification was granted, the parties began the discovery process. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, individuals held in Maricopa County's jails filed this class action lawsuit and habeas petition to challenge the jails' response to COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights and statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act were violated by the defendants' lack of action to protect them from COVID-19. They requested the certification of several classes, which was granted, and a preliminary injunction, including the release of medically vulnerable individuals, which was not. The case is ongoing


This lawsuit was the result of an investigation launched by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2009 into the alleged targeting and unconstitutional treatment of Latinos by the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. (The DOJ's initial inquiry apparently started in 2008, but the formal investigation opened with notice to the Sheriff's Office in March 2009.) The Sheriff's Office declined to cooperate in the investigation, leading the DOJ to file a a related lawsuit in September 2010 against Maricopa County under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, seeking to compel the Sheriff's Office to provide the requested information. See PN-AZ-0002 in this Clearinghouse). Maricopa County settled that lawsuit in June 2011, and agreed to cooperate. (Also, prior to this case, in 2007, a group of plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit, Melendres v. Arpaio, against the County of Maricopa, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, and Sheriff Joe Arpaio. (PN-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse). In 2013, the Melendres Court found the MCSO in violation of the Constitution, and entered a permanent injunction forbidding racial profiling.) In this matter, DOJ released its findings letter reporting the results of the investigation on December 15, 2011. The letter reported that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) was engaged in an unconstitutional pattern of policing. The DOJ found that the MSCO profiled Latinos, and unlawfully stoped, detained, and arrested Latinos. The DOJ also found that services in the Maricopa County Jail for people of limited English proficiency were insufficient or nonexistent. The DOJ found that a lack of policy to ensure constitutional policing underscored these problems. On May 10, 2012, the DOJ filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Specifically, the DOJ's complaint alleged that:

(1) the MSCO's policies and practices discriminated against Latino persons;
(2) the MSCO targeted Latino workers while enforcing state identity theft laws, resulting in the seizure of Latinos at worksites without reasonable suspicion;
(3) the MSCO's discriminatory law enforcements practices violated Title VI;
(4) the County's jails discriminated against limited English proficiency Latino prisoners in violation of Title VI;
(5) the County and MSCO were violating their Title VI contractual assurances; and
(6) the County and MSCO retaliated against persons in Maricopa County on the basis of their protected speech.

 The DOJ requested injunctive and declaratory relief to stop Maricopa County's alleged practice of depriving Latino persons of their constitutional rights and to stop discrimination against Latinos in violation of Title VI. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Roslyn O. Silver. On December 12, 2012, she denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the case, but granted the motion to dismiss the MCSO from the case, ruling the MCSO was not an entity that could sue or be sued. On September 4, 2014, after lengthy discovery, proceedings were held before Judge Silver in which both parties informed the court that they would file dispositive motions. On October 27, the DOJ filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Defendants were precluded by collateral estoppel from re-litigating the issue of whether the MSCO's traffic stops constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The DOJ claimed that the issue had already been decided against the MSCO in Melendres v. Arpaio, where the MCSO was a defendant. 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013) (PN-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse). On the same day, the Defendants made a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that neither Title VI nor § 14141 authorized this suit against Maricopa County. On June 15, 2015, Judge Silver granted the DOJ's motion with respect to the traffic stops and denied the Defendants' motion. On July 15, 2015, Judge Silver ordered the parties to file a joint statement setting forth what issues remained for trial. In response, on July 17, the parties filed a joint motion to approve a settlement agreement regarding the second, fourth, and sixth claims for relief from the DOJ's complaint. The MSCO agreed to stop unconstitutionally enforcing state identity theft laws and to develop an anti-retaliation policy. On July 20, the DOJ moved to stay this action until the court in Melendres (PN-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse), in which the DOJ had recently intervened, found that the Defendants had maintained compliance with an injunction for three years. However, the Defendants argued this was inappropriate because when the DOJ moved to intervene in Melendres, it had represented that it would terminate the overlapping parts of this case if the intervention motion was granted. On September 2, 2015, Judge Silver granted the parties' joint motion to approve the settlement agreement with respect to the issues not covered by Melendres--worksite operations and retaliation--but otherwise dismissed the matter. On December 30, 2015, Maricopa County appealed this case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Over the next two years, little happened in the case as the parties awaited a decision from the appellate court. On May 7, 2018, the Court issued an opinion affirming the judgment. Judge Paul J. Watford held that sheriffs act as final policymakers for their respective counties on law-enforcement matters. Moreover, U.S.C. §12601 imposed liability on a governmental authority whose own official policy caused it to engage in “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers” that deprived persons of federally protected rights. Because sheriffs are final policymakers for their counties, the policies they adopt are, in fact, the counties' policies. For this reason, Maricopa County should be held liable for their sheriffs' acts. On June 21, 2018, Maricopa County filed a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, but the request was denied. On October 15, 2018, Maricopa County filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Certiorari was denied on March 25, 2019. 139 S.Ct. 1373. The parties jointly moved to terminate the settlement on May 9, 2019. The court ordered this termination on May 14, and the case has since been closed.

Summary: As a result of an investigation conducted by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in 2009, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against Maricopa County, Arizona for a pattern of unconstitutional action as well as discrimination against Latinos. The district court granted summary judgment with respect to some of the DOJ's claims in June 2015. In July 2015, the parties settled some of the remaining claims, and the court entered judgment in favor of the DOJ for the remaining claims, with the understanding that the DOJ would pursue further relief in <i>Melendres v. Arpaio</i>. Maricopa Couty appealed arguing it could not be held liable for its sheriffs' acts, but the Court affirmed the judgement on May 7, 2018. Maricopa Couty is now seeking for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.


On July 20, 2005, two death-sentenced inmates of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Anderson and Taylor complained to the Court that the lethal injection procedure used by the defendants during executions violated the Constitution by inflicting enormous amounts of pain on the executed prisoner. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants 1) violated medically approved procedures by failing to employ properly trained people to inject the anesthesia, 2) arbitrarily and unnecessarily used drugs and drug dosages that created significant risks that the condemned prisoner would suffer unnecessary pain, 3) used a sequence of drug administration that delays administration of the anesthetic until after the prisoner is dead, 4) delivered the drugs through alternating IV lines, impairing control over the timing and sequence of drug delivery and increasing the risk of drug administration failure. Due to these concerns, the plaintiffs asked the Court to stay their executions and to enjoin the defendants from using the lethal injection procedure that they normally used. On August 15, 2005, the case was referred to Magistrage Judge Bacharach. On September 6, 2005, the defendants asked the Court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, arguing that the Anderson and Taylor had failed to show any likelihood that their claim would succeed at trial. On December 20, 2005, Judge Bacharach filed a report stating that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that they had a viable claim and recommending that the District Court should overrule the defendants' motion to dismiss. On January 11, 2006, the District Court (Judge Stephen P. Friot) adopted the Magistrate's recommendation and overruled the motion to dismiss. Anderson v. Evans, 2006 WL 83093 (W.D.Okla. Jan. 11, 2006). On December 19, 2006, the parties initiated a settlement conference and sought asistance from the court. On February 22, 2007, the parties held their settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Doyle Argo. On March 6, 2007, the parties entered a joint motion asking the District Court to stay the case and place it in abeyance for a period of one year. We're not sure exactly why the defendants agreed to put off the case for a year, but their motion mentions "recent developments in Plaintiff Anderson's habeas case" and states that neither of the plaintiffs would "face execution during the abeyance period, or for some time thereafter." The District Court agreed to place the lawsuit on hold for a year. On June 19, 2007, Plaintiff Anderson asked the Court to allow him to withdraw from the case. Apparently, he had been re-sentenced to life in prison without parole, so he was no longer facing execution. On July 10, 2007, the District Court (Judge Friot) allowed Anderson to withdraw from the case, and the case was renamed "Taylor v. Jones." On June 8, 2009 the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed the case without prejudice because the remaining named defendant lacked standing. The District Court held that "the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's denial of the plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instructions to grant the writ as to his conviction and execution subject to the State's right to re-try the case within a reasonable time." Accordingly, the District Court found that the issue was moot as to Plaintiff Taylor, which called for a dismissal of the case. The Docket shows that the case was terminated as of June 8, 2009.

Summary:
In this death penalty case challenging the Oklahoma Department of Corrections lethal injection procedure, two death-sentenced inmates sought a stay of their executions. One Plaintiff's claims became moot when his sentence was commuted to life without parole, and the second Plaintiff's case was dismissed when the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's denial of his writ of habeas corpus and remanded with instuctions to grant the writ, subect to the State's right to re-try the case within a reasonable time.

Other than the District Court's early finding that the Plaintiffs had a reasonable liklihood of success on their claims challenging the lethal injection procedure, the case failed to reach any conclusion as to the legality of the procedure.


On December 3, 2013, the University of Notre Dame, a religious nonprofit university, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Notre Dame alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for nonprofit religious organizations, violated the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Notre Dame sought preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate to avoid a violation of Notre Dame's deeply held religious beliefs. On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Philip P. Simon) denied Notre Dame's motion for preliminary injunction. The Court found that the ACA's insurance accommodation, which allowed the head of an eligible organization to provide self-certification which in turn triggered a third-party administrator to provide contraception coverage to the organization's employees, did not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of the religion. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F.Supp.2d 912 (N.D. IN. 2013) The same day, Notre Dame filed an interlocutory appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 13-3853) and a motion for preliminary injunction with the District Court pending their appeal. On December 23, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for injunction pending appeal and on December 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff's emergency motion for injunction pending appeal. On February 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Richard Posner) affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals found that the ACA's insurance accommodation was consistent with the balancing act required by RFRA and therefore it did not substantially burden the free exercise of plaintiffs. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (N.D. IN. 2014). On May 7, 2014, the Seventh Circuit denied plaintiffs' April 4, 2014, motion for rehearing. Notre Dame sought review in the Supreme Court, and on March 9, 2015, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision (after the Seventh Circuit's decision) in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 U.S. 1258 (2015) (cert. granted). In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court had held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. On remand, after hearing oral arguments on April 22, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction on May 19, 2015, holding that Notre Dame had still not met its burden of establishing an entitlement to a preliminary injunction. University of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015). Notre Dame sought a rehearing en banc on July 2, 2015. The Seventh Circuit denied the request on July 24, 2015. On June 17, 2016, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Seventh Circuit in light of the per curiam decision in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016) (Clearinghouse summary available here). In Zubik, the Supreme Court vacated a series of Court of Appeals decisions that concerned religious exemptions to the contraception mandate in the ACA and remanded those cases back to the lower courts to “afford an opportunity” for the parties and the Court of Appeals to further consider the burden imposed in requiring non-profit religious organizations (“challengers”) to fill out a form notifying the government that they objected to providing contraceptive coverage, and to arrive at an approach that would, going forward, accommodate challengers’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by the challengers’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage. As it appeared that proceedings in the Seventh Circuit would continue for some time, the case was statistically closed in the district court on March 2, 2017, until the appellate proceedings concluded. The case remains ongoing in the Seventh Circuit.

Summary: Plaintiffs, a Catholic University located in South Bend, Indiana, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the Federal Government challenging the Contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act. The case was dismissed on December 31, 2012, for lack of standing and ripeness.


On November 7, 2017, a former pretrial detainee who was incarcerated for several weeks in the El Paso County Colorado Jail filed suit against that county in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU Foundation of Colorado, sought compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The plaintiff claimed that El Paso County had an official policy and actual practice of denying pretrial liberty to defendants granted a personal recognizance (PR) bond by a state court judge, solely for their inability to pay a $55 pretrial service fee to the county. While incarcerated, the plaintiff was separated from her newborn child when child custody proceedings were initiated against her that she was unable to competently contest while she was in jail. The plaintiff also claimed that state court judges in the county believed that they could not waive this fee without express permission from a bond commissioner of El Paso County Pretrial Services; they argued that employees of that agency were disincentivized from doing so because the $55 fee is chargeable before release funded the county’s pretrial supervision program. A little over a week after the complaint was filed, the Denver Channel reported that Chief Judge William Bain of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Colorado, which includes all state courts in El Paso County, had ordered that detainees granted a personal recognizance bond but unable to pay the $55 pretrial services fee must be released from jail that same day. On December 28, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint with an expanded fact section, emphasizing that El Paso County, through its sheriff, was the sole party blocking the release of detainees unable to pay the $55 fee to the county under the former policy. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on January 11, 2018. The county alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Specifically, the county argued that the plaintiff could not demonstrate that there was such a county policy or that the county was the “moving force” of the policy as described. Before Judge Wiley Young Daniel could make a decision on this motion, the parties informed him that they were working on a private settlement. Over the next several months the judge extended several deadlines for the parties to allow them to continue exploring a private settlement. According to the ACLU’s website, the parties agreed to settle out of court for $190,000 on August 13, 2018. According to the Gazette, the agreement was finalized once it was approved by the El Paso County Board of County Commissioners on August 14, 2018. The settlement provided $60,000 to compensate the plaintiff for her incarceration and for attorney costs. The remaining $130,000 was allocated for 183 other individuals who the parties identified who had been held in the El Paso County Jail solely for inability to pay the $55 fee. Each of them are eligible for compensation based on $125 per day of incarceration. The parties eligible for this compensation must contact the county within two years to recover these funds. On August 17, 2018, Judge Daniel dismissed the lawsuit with consent of the parties. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2017, a former pretrial detainee in El Paso County, Colorado sued the county in the U.S. District Court of Colorado. Plaintiff alleged that the policy of detaining citizens granted a personal recognizance bond by a state court judge, solely for their inability to pay a $55 pretrial services fee to the county, violated their Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due Process. Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the chief judge of state courts in El Paso County, Colorado ended this practice. In 2018, the parties reached a settlement to compensate the Plaintiff and 183 other inmates who had been held according to the policy and for attorney fees. The cases concluded in August 2018.