COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed by four medical providers and an individual seeking medical services to challenge the state’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 28, the court filed a notice of hearing regarding certification of issues to the Michigan Supreme Court. On June 16 the court stayed the case until the Michigan Supreme Court resolved the state law questions. On June 25, the defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Governor's executive orders exceeded her authority on October 2, 2020. The case is ongoing. <hr> On May 12, 2020, four medical providers and an individual seeking medical services filed a suit against Michigan’s Attorney General, Governor, and Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services to challenge the state’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that executive orders 2020-17 and 2020-77 violated the Michigan Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs were permitted to continue their business operations. They also sought injunctive relief preventing the defendants from enforcing the orders against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and monetary damages, and they were represented by the Mackinac Center Legal Foundation and private attorneys. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, and assigned to District Judge Paul L. Maloney. On March 11, The Governor of Michigan proclaimed a state of emergency under both the Emergency Management Act and the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945 (the Emergency Powers Act). Under the initial announcement, the Governor issued various stay at home orders and restrictions, including order 2020-17, which prohibited any bariatric or joint replacement surgeries except for emergencies starting March 21. On May 7, the Governor issued order 2020-77, which continued the restrictions of the previous stay at home orders with limited exceptions to “critical infrastructure workers,” defined as those “necessary to sustain or protect life.” The plaintiffs argued that the Governor did not have the authority to issue executive orders 2020-17 and 2020-77 under the Emergency Powers Act and the Emergency Management Act beyond the 28 days after the announcement of the state of emergency without the approval of the Michigan Legislature. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Emergency Powers Act violated the Separation of Powers and the nondelegation clauses of the Michigan Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the executive orders violated due process and were void for vagueness. The plaintiffs argued that executive order 2020-17 did not give the plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, as the assessment of which medical treatments are deemed essential are largely left to the discretion of healthcare providers. Additionally, they alleged that order 2020-77 did not provide any explicit standards for determining whether particular operations were “critical infrastructure” activity. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause under the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing order 2020-17 and 2020-77 on May 18, which was dismissed on May 27. On May 28, the court filed a notice of hearing regarding certification of issues to the Michigan Supreme Court. The district court noted that parts of the plaintiff’s complaint presented questions that required interpretation by the Michigan Supreme Court since they had never been considered by the Michigan Court of Appeals or the Michigan Supreme Court before. The following questions were at issue: (1) whether the Governor of Michigan had the authority to renew executive orders related to the pandemic under the Emergency Powers Act and Emergency Management Act; and, (2) whether the Emergency Powers Act violated the separation of powers or nondelegation clauses under the Michigan Constitution? Michigan’s Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss on June 2, and the Governor of Michigan and Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services also filed a motion to dismiss on June 5. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the public health benefits of the executive orders outweighed the burden to the plaintiffs. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a dormant Commerce Clause claim. In response to the district court’s notice of hearing regarding certification of issues, the plaintiffs submitted a brief requesting the two questions to be taken to the Michigan Supreme Court. The defendants also filed a brief requesting the court to either dismiss the questions as moot, decline jurisdiction of the issues as state law claims, or hold the questions in abeyance pending resolution. A hearing was held on the issue on June 10. On June 11, the defendants filed a motion opposing certification. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the questions as state law claims, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. The request was denied on June 16; instead, the district court certified the two questions. 2020 WL 3248785. The same day, the court stayed the case until the Michigan Supreme Court resolved the state law questions. On June 25, the defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit (No. 20-1650). On June 30, the Michigan Supreme Court scheduled an oral argument on the two questions for September 2. 2020 WL 3571909. The Michigan Supreme Court held on October 2, 2020 that (1) the Governor lacked authority under the Emergency Management Act to issue or renew any executive orders related to COVID-19 after her first order expired on April 30, 2020; and (2) the Emergency Powers Act violated the Michigan Constitution's nondelegation clause. The Court's decision as to the Emergency Management Act was unanimous. Justice Stephen J. Markman explained that the Act's requirement that "[a]fter 28 days, the governor shall issue an executive order or proclamation declaring the state of disaster terminated, unless a request by the governor for an extension . . . is approved by resolution of both houses of the legislature" implied that the Governor could not bypass the legislature by issuing an executive order terminating a state of emergency and then immediately declaring a new state of emergency for "identical reasons." The Court produced several opinions about the Emergency Powers Act. Justice Markman, joined by Justices Brian K. Zahra and Elizabeth T. Clement, wrote that the Act authorized emergency action by the Governor because the phrase "public emergency" included the COVID-19 pandemic. But he held that the Act violated the Michigan Constitution's nondelegation clause because it allowed the Governor to exercise "a substantial part of the entire police power of the state" for an "indefinite duration" subject only to the constraints that the governor's actions be "reasonable" and "necessary," which failed to supply "genuine guidance to the Governor as to how to exercise the authority delegated [or] constrain[] . . . in any meaningful manner." Justice David F. Viviano concurred. He noted that the Emergency Powers Act only allowed the Governor to declare emergencies "when public safety is imperiled" and argued that public health emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic did not imperil public safety. Chief Justice Bridget M. McCormack argued that the Emergency Powers Act was constitutional. She noted that the Act allowed only "reasonable" and "necessary" actions to protect public safety during emergencies, so it supplied an intelligible principle for the Governor as federal nondelegation precedent required. Justices Richard Bernstein and Megan K. Cavanagh agreed; Justice Bernstein also wrote a concurrence expressing similar themes. 2020 WL 5877599. The appeal before the Sixth Circuit is pending as of October 5, 2020, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed by four medical providers and an individual seeking medical services to challenge the state’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 16, 2020, the court stayed the case until the Michigan Supreme Court resolved the state law questions. On June 25, the defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Governor lacked the authority to extend her emergency powers beyond the 28 days provided by Michigan law or exercise emergency powers under the Emergency Powers Act on October 2, 2020. The case is ongoing.


On October 31, 2013, two same-sex couples who wished to have a state-recognized marriage, filed a lawsuit against the state of Texas in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare that Texas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, to declare that Texas must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the ban on same-sex marriage, and to award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Texas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. They further claimed that the ban interfered with their ability to be recognized as a family and obstructed the social and administrative benefits of marriage. The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification on February 28, 2014. They wished to form a Plaintiff Class consisting of all Texans who -- though they met all other necessary qualifications -- were denied the right to marry a member of the same sex. On March 12, 2014, the defendants filed a Motion to Stay Case pending an interlocutory appeal in De Leon v. Perry. On September 10, 2014, Judge Sam Sparks dismissed the Motion for Class Certification and granted the Motion to Stay the Case pending the interlocutory appeal in De Leon v. Perry. The stay was lifted and action on the case began again on February 19, 2015. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled on a different case challenging a same-sex marriage ban, Obergefell v Hodges, on June 26, 2015. The Court held in this case that marriage is a fundamental right protected by the 14th Amendment, therefore a state cannot ban same-sex marriage. Back in the Western District of Texas, this ruling in Obergefell led the plaintiff to file a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 20, 2015 and the defendant to file a Motion to Dismiss as Moot two days later. Judge Sam Sparks held a hearing on August 21, 2015 to hear all of these matters pending in the case, but a Stipulation of Dismissal by and among the parties was filed on September 4, 2015. On September 22, 2015 Judge Sam Sparks granted the Stipulation and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On October 31, 2013, two same-sex couples who wished to have a state recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Texas. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Texas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, to declare that Texas must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states, to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the ban on same-sex marriage, and to award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. On September 22, 2015 Judge Sam Sparks granted the Stipulation of Dismissal by and among the parties and dismissed the case with prejudice.


In August 2012, a 28 year old female plaintiff, a naturalized United State citizen of Moroccan origin and an adherent of the Muslim faith, brought this suit against Walt Disney Company in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The suit was brought under title VII of 42 U.S.C § 2000e (discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of religion, national origin and color and failure to remedy and prevent harassment), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, etc. In this case, it is alleged that Disney discharged the plaintiff who worked as a hostess at a cafe in a complex operated by Disney because she complained about repeated ethnic and religious slurs from her colleagues and also wore a hijab for her sincere religious faith. The plaintiff asked for: (a) a declaration that Disney's actions constitute illegal harassment and discrimination; (b) an order enjoining Disney from enforcing its policy or practice of prohibiting employees who are adherents of the Muslim faith from wearing hijab while in positions involving interaction with customers unless such hijabs are concealed by a hat or other object; (c) training of Disney employees and managers regarding harassment and discrimination; and (d) damages. The allegation states that the plaintiff began working as a hostess at the Storytellers Cafe in the Grand Californian Hotel and Spa, a part of Walt Disney complex in Anaheim, California. During her work, she suffered from repeated slurs, e.g. "terrorist", "camel", and "Kunta Kinte," the slave from the famous book Roots by Alex Haley. Her co-workers also mocked her by stating that Arabs are terrorists, that she speaks the terrorist language and that she was trained to make bombs. She repeatedly reported the harassment to her managers but they never took action. In 2010, after two years of working at Disney, she began wearing a hijab permanently in accord with her religious beliefs. She asked her supervisors for permission, but they denied it since it would violate Disney's "look" policy. Disney suggested that she either (1) work in the rear of the restaurant where she would not be exposed to customers, or (2) wear several hats on top of her hijab. She refused and Disney discharged her from further employment. On March 3, 2014, the parties submitted a joint stipulation to dismiss the case, and the court issued an order granting a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice.

Summary: In August 2012, a female plaintiff, naturalized United State citizen of Moroccan origin and an adherent of the Muslim faith, brought this suit against Walt Disney Company for harassment, discrimination and discharging based on her ethnic origin and religious appearance. The court dismissed the case by a joint stipulation to dismiss case submitted by Disney on 03/03/2014.


On December 15, 2010, the United States, on behalf of several Asian-American students who were allegedly discriminated against based on their race, color, and/or national origin, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the School District of Philadelphia. The plaintiff, represented by the U.S. Attorney's Office and the U.S. Department of Justice, asked the Court for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against Asian-American students based on their race, color, and/or national origin through their deliberate indifference to severe and pervasive harassment of this group of students at South Philadelphia High School (SPHS). The plaintiff claimed that this indifference to harassment also resulted in a denial of equal access to educational opportunities, as these actions resulted in interference with the students' ability to attend school without fear for their safety. This harassment allegedly took place over the course of several years, and consisted of verbal and physical abuse based on the students' race, color, and/or national origin on school grounds. On December 3, 2009, dozens of Asian students were repeatedly attacked on and near school grounds. On December 22, 2010, the Court (Judge Stewart Dalzell) approved the parties' settlement agreement. The agreement remained in effect until June 30, 2013, and required the school district, monitored by the United States, to develop an action plan that involved introduction of training guidelines, reporting requirements, and revision of district policies in order to combat and prevent harassment of students. The agreement also provided for alternative dispute resolution procedures to be utilized by the parties. The last action in the case was on May 11, 2011. The case is now closed.

Summary: The United States brought suit under Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause against a school district on behalf of Asian-American students discriminated based on their race, color, and/or national origin. The discrimination, enabled by the defendant's policies and indifference, took place over the course of several years in the form of physical and verbal harassment based on the students' race, color, and/or national origin. On December 22, 2010, the court approved a settlement agreement between the parties that required the school district, monitored by the United States, to develop an action plan that involved introduction of training guidelines, reporting requirements, and revision of district policies in order to combat and prevent harassment of students. The agreement also provided for alternative dispute resolution procedures to be utilized by the parties.


On November 24, 2008, several Lawful Permanent Residents ("LPRs") who reside in Tennessee filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Tennessee Department of Safety, under the right to freedom of association under the First Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to freedom of travel under Article IV, Section II of the U.S. Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendant unlawfully withheld and confiscated the plaintiffs' green cards while the plaintiffs applied for a driver license or driver license renewal. The plaintiffs pointed to two statutes passed in 2007 that demonstrated Tennessee's history of discriminatory treatment of foreign-born residents of Tennessee who are legally present in the U.S. The issue at hand here was with regards to Tennessee Department of Safety employees withholding or confiscating the green cards of LPRs without following the multi-step process already set in place by the agency. The plaintiffs alleged that there was no reason for their green cards to be confiscated. Since plaintiffs did not have their green cards, they were unable to obtain a driver license, unable to travel around or outside of the U.S., were at risk of violating a federal law requiring them to always have their green cards in their possession, and suffered other forms of emotional distress. On March 26, 2009, the District Court (Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant) granted the plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal.

Summary: On November 24, 2008, several Lawful Permanent Residents ("LPR's") who reside in Tennessee filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Tennessee Department of Safety, under the right to freedom of association under the First Amendment, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to freedom of travel under Article IV, Section II of the U.S. Constitution, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendant unlawfully withheld and confiscated the plaintiffs' "green cards" while the plaintiffs applied for a driver license or driver license renewal. On March 26, 2009, the District Court (Magistrate Judge John S. Bryant) granted the plaintiffs' notice of voluntary dismissal.


On January 6, 2004, current and former employees of Mohawk Industries Inc., a giant carpet and rug manufacturer, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. In furtherance of their scheme, defendants were alleged to have: traveled to border towns to recruit undocumented immigrants to work in their plants, provided transportation and temporary housing to undocumented workers, turned a blind eye to obviously fake work papers, assisted undocumented workers in evading detection by law enforcement, hid workers during immigration enforcement raids, "recycled workers" (rehired workers under a different name that had previously been fired after being "discovered" to be illegal and unauthorized to work), and concealed the scheme by destroying documents. The plaintiff alleged that defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) et seq. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel. Mohawk moved to dismiss the case. The district court (Judge Harold L. Murphy) denied the motion with respect to the plaintiffs' RICO claims and the claim that the defendant was unjustly enriched by paying wages less than it would have been forced to pay, had it not hired undocumented workers. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim with respect to having fewer workers' compensation claims on account of undocumented workers. Accordingly, the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision with respect to the RICO claims, but held that all unjust enrichment claims should have been dismissed. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded the case to the 11th Circuit for further consideration in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006). Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams, 126 S.Ct. 2016 (2006). On remand from the Supreme Court, the 11th Circuit restated its prior opinion, with a slight modification. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). Further review by the Supreme Court was denied. On December 19, 2007, the plaintiffs moved to certify the following class: "All persons legally authorized to be employed in the United States who are or have been employed in hourly positions by Mohawk Industries, Inc., its subsidiaries or affiliates in Georgia at any time from January 5, 1999, to the present, other than Excluded Employees," where "Excluded Employees" were employees whose time at Mohawk had been limited to a specific list of facilities. The district court denied the motion on March 3, 2008, holding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Mohawk's operations, including its use of temporary employment agencies and wage-setting practices, were decentralized; rather than decisions being made on the corporate level, operations were conducted on a facility-by-facility basis, and so the plaintiff class lacked commonality. For typicality, some of the named plaintiffs did not work at facilities using temporary employment agencies, did not work at all of the facilities listed in the class definition, or lacked standing for injunctive relief. The district court also concluded that the proposed class would be unmanageable. The plaintiffs appealed in March 2008 to the Eleventh Circuit, which vacated the district court's decision to deny the class certification on May 28, 2009. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' complaint did raise questions common to all members of the class and that the "atypical" plaintiffs' claims were based on the same legal theory. Because of the district court's conclusion about commonality, it erroneously concluded that the proposed class would be unmanageable. The appeals court remanded the case, instructing the trial court to consider "whether the common issues predominated over individual issues and whether a class action was superior to individual actions." Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied the petition for cert on November 2, 2009. On April 9, 2010, the parties proposed a settlement agreement to the district court. The agreement included a commitment from the defendants to conduct training regarding verification of employment eligibility and a settlement fund. The latter would start with an initial deposit of $12 million, and go up to $18 million as necessary. In addition to paying the named plaintiffs and individual class members (based on length of employment at Mohawk), the settlement fund would also be used to pay for settlement administration costs and attorneys' fees. The proposed settlement class was all employees who worked at Mohawk between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 2009. The district court granted final approval of the settlement on July 22, 2010, and entered judgment on August 19, 2010. The case subsequently closed.

Summary: On January 6, 2004, current and former employees of Mohawk Industries Inc., a giant carpet and rug manufacturer, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. Plaintiff alleged that defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 <i>et seq.</i>, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On July 22, 2010, the District Court approved a settlement between the parties, which included an $18 million settlement fund and a commitment from the defendants to conduct training regarding verification of employment eligibility. This case has finished.


This case deals with the legality of seizing the property of unhoused individuals by the city of Seattle, Washington without adequate notice. The plaintiffs - initially consisting of two individuals, the Episcopal Diocese of Olympia, and the organization Real Change - filed this lawsuit on January 19, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by the ACLU of Washington and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the City of Seattle, the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), and the Secretary of Transportation for WSDOT under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article 1, § 7 and Article 1, § 3 of the Washington Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, on their policy of “sweeping.” The City rules governing the sweeps were promulgated as the Multi-Departmental Administrative Rules 08-01 (MDARs), while WSDOT adopted the Guidelines to Address Illegal Encampments. The plaintiffs claimed that the practice of sweeping seized or destroyed their property without adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, or a meaningful remedy to reclaim undestroyed property. The plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief that federal and state constitutions forbid the policies of defendants, injunctive relief forbidding sweeps until constitutionally respective procedures are adopted, and attorney fees. The District Court assigned the case to Judge Ricardo Martinez. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the policies of the City violated protections from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to protection from invasion of home under the Washington State Constitution, and the right to due process under the Washington State Constitution. The City viewed the policies themselves, also referred to as “cleanups,” as necessary for public health and safety. In contrast, the plaintiffs contended that the policy of the City violated constitutional notice requirements for the residents of these encampments and others who lacked a permanent home. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that items the City of Seattle viewed as “garbage” were in fact constitutionally protected property, thus requiring both due process protections and recovery protections. A day after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The proposed class included all unhoused persons who lived outside within the City of Seattle and who keep their belongings on public property. On February 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the practice of sweeping. Judge Martinez denied the motion for the TRO on February 14, 2017, finding that the plaintiffs inadequately satisfied their burdens of success on the merits and irreparable harm, but allowed the plaintiffs' concurrent but unfiled motion for a preliminary injunction to proceed. 2017 WL 591112. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 2, 2017, adding another individual and the Trinity Parish of Seattle as plaintiffs. In response, the City of Seattle filed a counterclaim on March 16, 2017, seeking a declaratory judgment that the City’s newly adopted MDARs was sufficiently constitutional. The new MDARs was set to go into effect on April 2, 2017. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint on May 23, 2017, adding an additional individual plaintiff. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on June 14, 2017. Reviewing the motions for preliminary injunction and class certification in tandem, Judge Martinez denied both motions on October 4, 2017. 2017 WL 4410029. Judge Martinez denied the class certification because the plaintiffs failed to establish commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Judge Martinez denied the preliminary injunction because he found plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm because speculative injuries are not immediate, threatened injury. Judge Martinez found that the balance of equities and the validity of the public interest weighed in favor of defendants because the speculative claims of plaintiffs did not outweigh the defendants' interest in maintaining public property free of items that may pose a threat to citizens. On January 23, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of the class certification to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Sandra Ikuta, Judge Morgan Christen, and Judge Jennifer Choe-Groves heard the case. The panel affirmed the denial of class certification on November 29, 2019, finding the lack of sufficient evidence and commonality dispositive enough to warrant the District Court’s denial of the class certification. 943 F.3d 882. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Christen found that the plaintiffs presented distinct facial challenges to the cleanup policies. With the Ninth Circuit finding no abuse of discretion by the District Court, the City of Seattle filed a motion to convert the preliminary injunction into a final judgment on the merits on March 5, 2020. The plaintiffs responded on March 12, 2020, by filing a motion to voluntarily dismiss their claims and the City’s counterclaim. On June 11, 2020, Judge Martinez denied the City’s motion for conversion and granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. 2020 WL 3100855. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2017, the plaintiffs, consisting of unhoused individuals in Seattle, Washington and local organizations, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the City of Seattle and the Washington State Department of Transportation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the "sweeping" policy and practices committed by the City. They alleged the City's policy violated their protections from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to protection from invasion of home under the Washington State Constitution, and the right to due process under the Washington State Constitution. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought class certification. The City of Seattle counterclaimed and sought a declaratory judgment affirming the constitutional validity of their policies. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs' appealed the denial of class certification to the Ninth Circuit, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification. Consequently, the plaintiffs moved for and were granted dismissal of all claims without prejudice on June 11, 2020. The case is closed. closed.


On September 1, 2000, the mother of a physically and developmentally disabled individual filed a lawsuit under § 1983 against the Director of Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Plaintiff, represented by Prairie State Legal Services, alleged that a reduction in the level of private-duty nursing provided to her son at home would violate the federal Medicaid statute and deprive her son of due process of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiff's son was diagnosed with brain cancer as a child; as a result of the cancer, a stroke, and subsequent treatment, he presented a very complex medical case requiring round-the-clock care and about 25 medications per day. From the time between when the Plaintiff's private medical insurance terminated and the time her son turned twenty-one, the Plaintiff's son received sixteen hours of in-home nursing per day under the Medicaid Program for Medically Fragile, Technology Dependent Children (MFTDC program). After he turned twenty-one, the Department of Healthcare and Family Services (HFS) reduced this to five hours of in-home nursing per day. The Plaintiff desired community-based treatment, and state treatment professionals found that it was appropriate. The cost of care for the Plaintiff's son in a hospital ($29,000 per month) would exceed the cost of care in his home ($20,000 per month). On September 1, 2000, the district court (Judge James B. Zagel) granted the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, requiring IDPA to continue funding at-home care. However, on November 6, 2000 the court denied the Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, holding that her complaint did not state a viable federal claim. The Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, also requesting an injunction pending appeal. However, in February 2001, amendments to the Illinois State Medicaid Plan eliminated private duty nursing care as a service provided under the state plan. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit ordered the District Court to vacate its judgment on the merits and dismiss all previous orders as moot. On December 1, 2001, the Plaintiff again filed suit against IDPA, this time in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois. The original claim alleged violations of various Illinois state laws. After adding claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), the Plaintiff moved the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on December 14, 2001. On April 30, 2002, the Court (Judge John W. Darrah) granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court. The Court remanded Plaintiffs' state law claims and retained jurisdiction of Plaintiffs' federal law claims. The Federal Court granted Defendants' motion for judging on the pleadings on September 10, 2002. The Court held that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000), required that Plaintiffs' ADA claim under Title II fail. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' RA claims, holding that the RA does not require the State to create and fund a program that does not already exist; instead, the RA requires even-handed treatment of developmentally and physically disabled persons relative to persons who do not have disabilities. On September 8, 2004, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Ilana Rovner) reversed the District Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Radaszewski v. Garner, 383 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2004). First, the Court recognized that the Supreme Court's holding in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) recognized the right of a private plaintiff to assert an ADA claim for injunctive relief against a state official in federal court. The Court then proceeded to the merits of Plaintiff's claim and concluded that the Court held that the District Court erred in entering judgment on the pleadings in Defendants' favor. On March 29, 2006, the District Court found that there was no final enforceable settlement agreement between the parties. Radaszewski v. Maram, 2006 WL 861243 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2006). The parties had exchanged numerous settlement offers, both written and verbal, and had submitted memoranda regarding the status of the settlement proceedings. The parties had disagreed about whether an enforceable settlement agreement had been reached. There was a bench trial beginning September 10, 2007. At the time of trial, the Plaintiff's son was receiving 16 hours of private-duty nursing per day pursuant to the injunction entered by the state court. The Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law after the bench trial on March 26, 2008. Radaszewski v. Maram, 2008 WL 2097382 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2008). The Court held that Plaintiff had sufficiently stated and proved a claim under the ADA and RA. The Court entered judgment in Plaintiff's favor; the parties were ordered to meet, confer, and submit a proposed order setting forth appropriate relief consistent with the Court's opinion. On May 9, 2008, the Court issued a permanent injunction. The order enjoined the Defendant from reducing coverage for Plaintiff's son to fewer than sixteen hours per day of skilled nursing services at his parents' home. Plaintiff was also awarded costs and fees, and the Court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the injunction. The case is now closed, and there has been no further litigation.

Summary: This case was brought on behalf of a developmentally and physically disabled individual against various Illinois state officials alleging that his rights were violated when in-home nursing services were greatly reduced when he turned twenty-one. The Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in March 2008, resulting in a permanent injunction.


This is a class action lawsuit about the legality of the policies and practices of the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). On January 14, 2020, an individual detained by USMS filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Marshal for the District of Columbia Superior Court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.) and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Represented by a public defender, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and habeas relief. The case was assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth. The plaintiff alleged that USMS officers exceeded their statutory authority by unlawfully detaining individuals, who were ordered to be released by a Superior Court judge or whose cases the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute, on the grounds that they violated civil immigration statutes. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), only certain law enforcement agencies with expertise in immigration law, not including USMS, can enforce civil immigration law, such as by making warrantless arrests and detaining individuals suspected of civil immigration violations. USMS was limited to obeying, executing, and enforcing all orders of the courts, including the U.S District Courts. On the date of the filing of the lawsuit, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and to certify a class. On March 26, 2020, the National Immigrant Justice Center and the District of Columbia entered amicus briefs on behalf of the plaintiff. On May 7, 2020, the court preliminarily enjoined USMS from seizing individuals for suspected civil immigration violations, and certified the plaintiff class as “all indigent criminal defendants in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia: (1) who were, are, or will be detained by officers of the United States Marshals Service for suspected civil immigration violations, and (2) as to whom Immigration and Customs Enforcement has not effectuated a warrant of removal/deportation (a form I-205) and/or has not obtained an order of deportation or removal.” 335 F.R.D 337. On June 4, 2020, USMS moved for reconsideration of the opinion, citing for the first time a nonpublic, unpublished 2002 Order of the Attorney General that purportedly authorized USMS to carry out civil immigration arrests. On July 24, 2020, the court denied USMS’ request for reconsideration, stating that USMS failed to provide the 2002 order at the appropriate time and that the order was facially invalid under the APA. 2020 WL 4260739. On September 28, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to clarify the order granting a preliminary injunction and certifying the class. USMS responded to the motion on October 23, 2020, and the plaintiff’s response is due by November 6, 2020. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In January 2020, an individual detained by the U.S. Marshals Services (USMS) sued the U.S. Marshal for the District of Columbia Superior Court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by a public defender, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that the USMS lacked authority to enforce immigration law. On May 7, 2020, the court preliminarily enjoined the USMS from seizing individuals for suspected civil immigration violations and certified a class of indigent criminal defendants detained by the USMS. This case is ongoing.


On February 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed this class action seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, basing their lawsuit upon alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and federal common law. They also claimed violations of numerous state constitution provisions, statutes, and regulations governing services for handicapped persons, public accommodations, public assistance programs, health care, and due process. The plaintiffs, also seeking an award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, were represented by private counsel and attorneys from The Legal Aid Society (New York City) and the Urban Justice Center. The plaintiffs, indigent New York City residents with psychiatric disabilities who are under the supervision of the New York State Division of Parole ("DOP"), or who are soon to be released to New York City from a New York State prison under DOP supervision, alleged that their psychiatric disabilities' symptoms interfere with major life activities such as thinking, concentrating, interacting with others, caring for oneself, working, and remembering and processing information. Qualified to participate in the parole, conditional release or post-release supervision programs (collectively referred to as "the parole program"), the plaintiffs asserted that they require disability accommodations in the form of pre-release planning and appropriate transitional services in order to be successful in the parole program and have access to the services it offers. Due to their lack of financial resources, the plaintiffs qualified for one or more public benefits programs, but stated that they required accommodations for their disability in the form of assistance with pre-release applications and post-release services to obtain and maintain access to these benefits programs. The defendants consisted of the DOP, additional state agencies responsible for mental health and benefits programs, and various state officials administering these agencies. The plaintiffs alleged that the release from prison of members of their class without having been provided appropriate pre-release planning services results in a "revolving door" system in which they are likely return to prison because they fail while on parole supervision, the state not having accommodated their disabilities. In this regard, plaintiffs stated that adequate pre-release planning for prisoners with psychiatric disabilities includes assisting them in completing, submitting, and monitoring the processing of applications for public benefits such as Medicaid, Social Security disability benefits, Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance (collectively referred to as "Temporary Assistance"), and Food Stamps, such that those benefits are available to the prisoners promptly upon their release from prison into the Parole Program. Adequate pre-release planning also, they alleged, includes helping prisoners secure community mental health services, supportive housing, and enrollment in vocational, educational and/or substance abuse programs. Their complaint added that parolees with psychiatric disabilities also need continued assistance throughout their time in the parole program with securing benefits, programs and services not secured prior to release, with implementing a coordinated plan of mental health care, and with addressing additional needs or problems that arise while on parole. The case was assigned to District Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum. On several occasions in the ensuing months, she extended the period of time for the defendants to file answers and motions in response to the complaint. The PACER docket entries for the case reflect that these extensions result from settlement discussions between the parties. Also, due to the settlement negotiations, the plaintiffs withdrew on April 23, 2007, their motion for class certification without prejudice to the right to re-file it, should no settlement occur. On February 14, 2011, after many years of extensions on the defendants' time to answer the complaint, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice.

Summary: On February 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit challenging the lack of pre-release services, also known as discharge planning, for people with psychiatric disabilities being released from New York State prisons. This case was voluntarily dismissed on February 14, 2011.


City Attorneys from the City and County of San Francisco (the City) filed this suit on April 5, 2018, challenging the Department of Justice's (DOJ) bulk rescission of documents that provided guidance of the DOJ's interpretation of laws protecting various groups of people. In so doing, the City argued that the DOJ undermined civil rights protections for marginalized communities and undermined regulated entities like the City from being able to effectively comply with federal law. The City argued that the DOJ did not provide a meaningful reason for the rescission, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The City sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. The City argued that these documents provided guidance to various regulated entities and "helped to protect civil rights of marginalized individuals," including "immigrants, the poor, people of color, and people with disabilities." The City argued that the reason given for the rescission was a press release that merely stated the documents were "unnecessary, inconsistent with existing law, or otherwise improper." The City argued this reasoning was conclusory and lacked particularized justifications for specific documents. While some parts of the DOJ website explain the withdrawal of particular documents, the City argued that the DOJ did not provide justification for withdrawing six particularly important documents. These six documents included guidance for state and local governments regarding removing unlawful juvenile offender fees, discrimination protection for disabled individuals, and discrimination protection under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The complaint highlighted that this rescission occurred in the context of a DOJ guided under Attorney Jefferson Sessions that "has shown a shocking disregard for protecting the rights of vulnerable communities, rolling back civil rights initiatives in a wide variety of areas." The case has been assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. It was reassigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar on June 14, 2018. The Justice Department filed a motion to dismiss on June 18, 2018, but Judge Tiger determined this motion to be moot on August 1, 2018, when the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. This new complaint maintained the APA causes of action from the first complaint, but added an additional rescission of DOJ documents in July 2018 to the facts of the case and modified the plaintiff's argument for standing. After the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint, the DOJ filed an additional motion to dismiss on September 27, 2018. Judge Tigar granted the motion to dismiss on December 10, 2018. He wrote that the plaintiffs did not plead a particularized enough injury in order to have standing under the APA, and that municipalities are not subject to reduced pleading requirements like states are in APA claims. He added that regulatory or economic uncertainty was not enough for a municipality to have standing; the injury must be imminent or the municipality must have a plan or process in place to violate the new rule in order for it to have standing. The plaintiffs did not appeal the ruling, and the case closed.

Summary: The City and County of San Francisco (the City) filed this suit on April 5, 2018, challenging the Department of Justice's (DOJ) bulk rescission of documents that provided guidance of the DOJ's interpretation of laws protecting various groups of people. In so doing, the City argued that the DOJ undermined civil rights protections for marginalized communities and undermined regulated entities like the City from being able to effectively comply with federal law. The City argued that the DOJ did not provide a meaningful reason for the rescission, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The City sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Judge Jon S. Tigar granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing.


On April 28, 2005, Brenda Jean Clustka died by suicide while inside her cell at the Washoe County jail. On November 3, 2005, her daughter and administrator of the estate, represented by two civil rights lawyers, brought a complaint in the District of Nevada (Judge Howard D. McKibben) against the City of Reno, Nevada and two officers of the Reno Police Department. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants performed, participated, aided and/or abetted in acts that led to the death of Ms. Clutska. The plaintiff alleged that the police officers escorting Ms. Clutska to the jail did not report her apparent earlier attempt to commit suicide while in the back of their police van. The plaintiff brought this action against the police officers for not putting Ms. Clutska on suicide watch and against the City of Reno for not properly training its police officers to deal with this type of situation. The plaintiff alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the part of the police officers for abridging Ms. Clutska's right to be free from deliberate indifference to risk of suicide. The plaintiff also brought a separate cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Reno for failing to properly train its police officers with respect to their obligation to report suicide attempts by detainees. Plaintiff sought declaratory that these acts were illegal and unconstitutional, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages for these alleged violations. A First Amended Complaint, filed on December 12, 2005, added the estate and Clustka's son as plaintiffs in addition to the daughter. On August 29, 2006 the defendants, moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs could not establish a §1983 claim because they could not show that Ms. Clustka was an objectively serious suicide risk while in custody and that the officers failed to take appropriate steps to protect her. The court agreed that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Clustka's serious medical needs, or that the conduct of the defendants was the actual cause of Clutska's harm sufficient to constitute liability under §1983. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and awarded judgment in favor of the defendants on March 8, 2007. The plaintiffs then appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. On July 24, 2009 the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2009). The 9th Circuit (Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Judge Mary M Schroeder, and Judge Dorothy W. Nelson) held that a reasonable jury could find that the police officers were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their deliberate indifference to Clustka's serious medical need, and that their actions were a cause in fact and a proximate cause of her suicide. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. In their May 6, 2010 petition, the defendants argued that the Ninth Circuit's decision exacerbated a circuit split over §1983 municipal liability for not training law-enforcement officers to diagnose suicide risk, and that the Ninth Circuit created a new circuit split by erroneously imposing on officers a constitutional duty to diagnose and report suicidal tendencies. On April 4, 2011 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011). In Connick, the Supreme Court addressed the liability of a district attorney's office for its prosecutors on a failure-to-train theory under § 1983. On remand and in consideration of Connick, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court had been correct to hold that the municipality was not liable. On September 6, 2011, the Ninth Circuit reinstated its original opinion except for the part on municipal liability. Conn v. City of Reno, 658 F.3d 897 (D. Nev. 2011). On the district court level, the case then proceeded to trial against the two police officers only. After a six-day jury trial, with proceedings beginning March 7, 2012, the jury found in favor of the officers. On March 13, 2012, the plaintiffs had objected to the qualified immunity jury instruction:
The jury instruction objected to asks "whether the officers reasonably misapprehended how the law would govern their situation.'' This is a legal question and one the Ninth Circuit has decided. Should the jury find that the officers were indeed deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Brenda Clustka, then there can be no qualified immunity because the Ninth Circuit found that law clearly established, and the officers cannot have reasonably misapprehended it.
The court denied the objection during the trial proceedings that day. On March 14, 2012, the jury deliberated for approximately three hours before returning a verdict in favor of the defendants. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs. A small amount of litigation occurred after trial over the defendants' awards for costs. In an order of September 19, 2012, the court found that as the defendants prevailed on all claims, they were entitled to an award of all allowable costs. In response to the plaintiffs' argument that the court should deny costs because of the plaintiffs' indigency and the the fact that it was a case of substantial public importance, effecting an immediate change in the way suicide threats were handled locally. Considering these circumstances, the court adjusted the costs to reflect the plaintiffs' economic circumstances and the desire not to chill future plaintiffs from bringing actions raising substantial constitutional issues, reducing the costs awarded to the defendants by fifty percent. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 28, 2005, Brenda Jean Clustka committed suicide while inside her cell at the Washoe County jail after making an unreported attempt in a police vehicle two days earlier. On November 3, 2005, her daughter and administer of the estate, represented by two civil rights lawyers, brought a complaint in the District of Nevada against the city of Reno and two officers of the Reno Police Department. The plaintiff alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the police officers for deliberate indifference to the mother's risk of suicide and against the city for failing to train its police officers to report suicide attempts. After several rounds of appeals of summary judgement, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judgement for the city but denied summary judgement with respect to the police officers. The case then proceeded to trial against the two police officers only. The jury found in favor of the officers. The case is now closed.


On November 18, 2014, the plaintiffs, persons with disabilities that require the use of a wheelchair, brought this class action lawsuit against the defendant, Colorado's Regional Transportation District (RTD). The plaintiffs were represented by the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition Legal Program and the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center. The plaintiffs alleged disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Judge Christine Arguello presided over this case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants did not make their transportation services readily accessible for persons using wheelchairs and in that light rail operators repeatedly denied persons who require the use of wheelchairs access to the light rail. The plaintiffs, in particular, alleged that the defendant discriminated in two ways. Firstly, the walkways within their light rail vehicles had narrow walkways that restricted the mobility of persons using wheelchairs. This equated to the vehicles not being readily accessible for wheelchairs which was required under the ADA. And Secondly, despite RTD designating seating locations for persons using wheelchairs, in practice, those locations were often unavailable. Oftentimes, the light rail operators would allow non-disabled persons that had either a stroller or bicycle to occupy designated wheelchair seating location. And if a person with a stroller or bicycle occupied those areas, the light rail operator sometimes denied transportation services to a person using a wheelchair. Instead of giving priority to persons using wheelchairs--as required by their own policies-- the operator would often refuse access to the person with the wheelchair if someone onboard with a stroller or bicycle already occupied that space. The plaintiffs sought class certification, attorney fees and costs, declaratory relief, and an injunction. After a period of discovery and the like, the parties settled. Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for certification of the class for settlement purposes, and for approval of the preliminary settlement on November 14, 2016. The Court agreed on April 3, 2017. After a hearing on the settlement, the court finally approved it, along with attorneys fees, on July 11, 2017. The settlement agreement had three terms. Firstly, the agreement called for 172 of the light rails vehicles to be retrofitted to accommodate persons that use wheelchairs. The retrofit would make it so that persons using wheelchairs have more mobility within the transportation vehicles. This would allow for wheelchair users to not obstruct other passengers, and that at least two people with wheelchairs can board the vehicles. Secondly, the settlement agreement required policies that both direct light rail operators to not discriminate against persons with disability the use of a wheelchair, and to train/retrain these operators to ensure that these anti-discriminatory measures are upheld. And thirdly, the agreement required that the defendant pay the plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs. The court approved the agreed amount of $ 375,000 for attorney fees and costs. The court maintains limited jurisdiction over the case for five years to resolve disputes that require court intervention as set forth in the settlement agreement.

Summary: Individuals requiring the use of a wheelchair brought a class action lawsuit against Denver’s Regional Transportation District (RTD) for violating the American with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. RTD did not provide readily accessible transportation services for persons using wheelchairs. RTD agreed to a settlement that requires them to make their transportation vehicles more readily accessible for persons with vehicles, and to train their light rail operators to promote non-discriminatory policies, practices, and procedures going forward.


Summary posted to the Clearinghouse on August 4, 2020: On May 26, 2011, an agnostic graduating senior at Medina Valley High School, his older brother (a former student at the school), and their parents filed suit against the Medina Valley Independent School District in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by Americans United for Separation of Church and State and by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees, alleging that the School District had violated their First Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school district, was in violation of the Establishment Clause by engaging in a course of conduct that included “presenting, sponsoring, encouraging, inviting, or coercing prayers at school and school-sponsored activities and events; displaying and permitting the display of crosses and other religious icons; and retaliating against students who complain[ed] about the unlawful promotion of religion or who decline[d] to participate in religious prayers, practices, or rituals.” The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on the same day that they filed their complaint, hoping to enjoin the school district from featuring prayer at the upcoming high school graduation ceremony scheduled for June 4, 2011, two weeks after the complaint was filed. After a hearing on May 31, the District Court (Judge Fred Biery) granted their motion on June 1, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that failing to issue an injunction would result in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. It ordered the terms “invocation” and “benediction” stricken and any official group prayer removed from the graduation program. The school district made an emergency interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and on June 3, 2011, a three-judge panel (Judges W. Eugene Davis, Jerry E. Smith and Leslie H. Southwick) issued a per curiam opinion granting the motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The panel stated that they were not persuaded that the plaintiffs were “substantially likely to prevail on the merits, particularly on the issue that the individual prayers or other remarks to be given by students at graduation were, in fact, school-sponsored.” The injunction was dissolved, and although the terms “invocation” and “benediction” had already been removed from the printed program, the graduation ceremony the following day included prayer as originally planned. On July 11, 2011, the district court urged the parties to attempt to settle rather than engage in protracted litigation, and the parties agreed to try mediation. At the end of the summer, however, they reported that they had been unable to reach an agreement. On September 6, 2011, the school district moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. This motion was mooted by the plaintiffs’ submission of an amended complaint on November 2, but the school district submitted a second motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction on December 9, 2011. A month later, the district moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of school prayer. The court never ruled on any of these motions, however, because the parties were able to settle their dispute in February 2012. On February 8, they submitted a joint motion to approve a proposed agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the school district agreed to stop initiating, soliciting, or directing prayers at school events, displaying religious symbols and texts at schools, and inviting religious speakers to proselytize, or to play any part in writing or editing student graduation speeches. It further agreed to train its staff in how to comply with the agreement, educate students on religious diversity, and refrain from retaliating against or disparaging the plaintiffs. The agreement allowed student-led prayer at events. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement for ten years. On February 9, 2012, the court entered a consent decree approving the settlement. The following month, the court was called upon to enforce it—the school superintendent and the high school band director each made statements that could be construed as disparaging of the plaintiffs (the former referring to the lawsuit as a “witch hunt” and the latter calling the plaintiffs liars) shortly after the settlement was approved. On March 19, 2012, the court issued an order requiring the district to apologize, and requiring the plaintiffs to accept the apology. Both did so. As of August 4, 2020, the case is inactive, but the court retains jurisdiction through February 2022.

Summary: On May 26, 2011, an agnostic graduating senior at Medina Valley High School, his older brother (a former student), and their agnostic parents filed suit against the Medina Valley Independent School District, alleging that the district was violating the Establishment Clause by inciting and soliciting official group prayer at school events, displaying religious icons and texts at school, and retaliating against students who complained about their endorsement of religion. The parties came to a settlement on February 8, 2012, under which the school district agreed not to engage in any of the above activity. The case is open for enforcement of the settlement until February 2022.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by a church against the State of Colorado's enforcement of stay-at-home orders, including the policy prohibiting in-person religious activities. Following a Supreme Court decision denying a similar application for injunctive relief, plaintiffs withdrew their request for injunctive relief. They later filed an amended complaint and a renewed motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, which was denied on June 16.
 The "safer at home" executive orders issued by Colorado Governor Jared Polis in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 prohibited religious gatherings of over 10 people. High Plains Harvest Church, a small, rural church, and one of its pastors alleged that the orders violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs sued Governor Polis and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 on May 25, 2020. The plaintiffs, who simultaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO), sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' costs and fees. The case was assigned to Judge Raymond P. Moore and Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. The plaintiffs alleged that the executive orders were unconstitutional both facially and as-applied, violating their freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and equal protection rights. The plaintiffs asserted that the orders burdened their sincerely held religious beliefs by "permit[ing] other similarly situated businesses or non-religious entities to continue while prohibiting faith-based gatherings." Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the orders violated their "freedom of speech by prohibiting them from engaging in religious speech through their church services." Finally, plaintiffs contended that the orders, which permitted "critical businesses" such as grocery, gun, and hardware stores to remain open, violated their equal protection rights by "impermissibly discriminat[ing[ between certain non-religious gatherings and religious or faith-based gatherings." Plaintiffs sought an injunction or TRO enjoining defendants from enforcing the executive orders against plaintiffs and an order declaring the orders unconstitutional. 2020 WL 2630282. In their May 28 response to the motion for TRO, defendants asserted that "the purpose of these orders is to protect the public from the COVID-19 pandemic," not to target or discriminate against plaintiffs' first amendment rights. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs had "no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims" because the orders were enacted in good faith and in furtherance of public safety. The next day, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest, stating that "The Court should grant the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, and Plaintiffs’ group prayer should be allowed to proceed without fear of prosecution." The DOJ explained "that because Colorado appears to be treating similarly situated non-religious activity, such as in-person dining in restaurants, better than places of worship these actions may constitute a violation of the church’s constitutional right to the free exercise of religion." That same day, the Supreme Court, in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, denied an application for injunctive relief similar to the relief sought in this case. There, the Supreme Court stated that the "restrictions [on places of worship] appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." On May 30, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiffs withdrew the request for preliminary relief. On June 1, the defendants filed a status report containing draft guidelines for restrictions on places of worship. The guidelines suggested an indoor capacity of no more than 50% or 50 people, along with social distancing, masks, and sanitation measures. In the next few days, thousands of people protested police violence. On June 10, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging that the defendants “permitted and encouraged these protest gatherings while continuing to impose draconian restrictions on religious gatherings.” Concurrently, they filed a renewed motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The court denied the motion on June 16, stating that the "notion that the non-enforcement of social distancing during a protest means that the State is engaged in a variety of constitutional misconduct directed at religious institutions is far from apparent" and that "the assertion that Defendants are treating Plaintiffs differently from comparable secular gatherings is 'improbable.'" The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 25, 2020, a small church and its pastor filed this suit against Governor Palis and a Colorado public health official in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiffs challenged Colorado's "safer at home" executive orders, which prohibited religious gatherings of more than 10 people, alleging that the orders violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest suggesting that the executive orders likely violated plaintiffs' right to the free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs withdrew their request for injunctive relief after the Supreme Court denied an application for similar injunctive relief, and filed an amended complaint on June 10. They also filed a renewed motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, which was denied on June 16. The case is ongoing.


On October 29, 2007, attorneys with the ACLU of Washington, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and private counsel filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of lawful permanent residents of the United States whose naturalization applications had been pending for over two years with the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"), awaiting the results of a FBI "name check." Plaintiffs asserted that the unreasonable delays caused by the FBI "name check" process violated the Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. Plaintiffs requested that the Court grant plaintiffs' naturalization applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b), or in the alternative, compel the government to render decisions on them. Plaintiffs sought additional declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Plaintiffs proposed certification of a class consisting of all persons residing in the Western District of Washington who have submitted naturalization applications to CIS and whose naturalization applications are not adjudicated within 120 days of the date of their initial exam due to pendency of a "name check." On April 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Marsha J. Pechman) certified the proposed class. Roshandel v. Chertoff, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (W.D. Wash. 2008). The Court granted a joint motion by the parties to amend the class definition on June 3, clarifying the class's temporal and geographic scope. Roshandel v. Chertoff, No. 2:07-cv-01739, 2008 WL 2275558 (W.D. Wash. June 3, 2008). Meanwhile, on January 8, 2008, the defendants had filed a motion to dismiss or remand to CIS for adjudication. The Court (Judge Pechman) denied this motion on May 5, striking some aspects of the motion to dismiss as outside of the complaint, finding the others to be without merit, and finding the arguments for remand to be inapplicable in light of class certification and the addition of more named plaintiffs to the amended complaint. Roshandel v. Chertoff, No. 2:07-cv-01739, 2008 WL 1969646, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90899 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2008). On May 29, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the class members' right to a judicial determination of application for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). The Court never ruled on the motion, however, as the parties came to a settlement on August 11. The agreement set out a timeline for adjudication of class members' applications and subsequent naturalization proceedings, and gave the Court continued jurisdiction to enforce its terms. It also required defendants to pay plaintiffs' counsel $185,000 in fees and costs. The Court approved the settlement on August 25, 2008, and remanded to CIS to adjudicate the class members' claims. By November 20, 2008, all claims had been adjudicated, and thus the settlement agreement was terminated and the case was dismissed.

Summary: This is a class action suit filed by attorneys with the ACLU of Washington, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and private counsel in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of lawful permanent residents of the United States whose naturalization applications had been pending for over two years with the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS"), awaiting the results of a FBI "name check." The parties came to a settlement in August of 2008, and the applications of all class members were adjudicated by November of the same year.