On April 1, 2005, a pretrial detainee filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Will County and a Will County Sheriff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages, claiming that the police and prosecutors of Will County had fabricated charges against him in order to extend his detention, violating his Fourth Amendment rights, and constituting malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that a Will County Sheriff had entered his cell while the plaintiff was detained here, and struck him in the face without provocation. Defendants countered with a claim against the plaintiff for aggravated battery. The plaintiff was successful in defending against the aggravated battery charge at trial, and filed this action. The Court (Judge David Coar) entered an order on July 17, 2006 dismissing the case because the plaintiff had informed the Court that the case had been settled. We have no further information about this case.

Summary: Plaintiff was an inmate in the Will County jail. A Will County corrections officer had entered his cell and struck plaintiff in the face, then claimed the officer had been assaulted by the inmate. Plaintiff was exonerated in the criminal aggravated battery case, and brought this action, which the county settled.


On October 20, 2016, Color of Change and Center for Constitutional Rights, nonprofit civil rights advocacy and communications organizations, brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by an attorney from the Milton Kramer Law Clinic at Case Western, an attorney from the Center for Constitutional Rights, and an attorney for Clifford Chance, sued the U.S. Department of Homeland security ("DHS") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief to compel the defendants to produce records related to federal government surveillance and monitoring of protest activities related to the Movement for Black Lives ("MBL"). Following the shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, MBL gained national scope and influence, drawing public attention to police violence and advocating for police reform and racial justice. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that government documents, news reports, and first-hand accounts demonstrated that the defendants, and state and local law enforcement agencies, had engaged in surveillance and monitoring of MBL demonstrations and individual activists aligned with the movement, using tactics and measures commonly reserved for counterterrorism and national security related purposes. They further alleged that this monitoring of legitimate protest activities undermined the First Amendment's protection of political speech, and would chill valuable public debate about police violence, including use of deadly force, criminal justice, and racial inequities. On July 5 2016, the plaintiffs submitted their FOIA request to DHS and the FBI: DHS On July 18, 2016, DHS's privacy office sent a letter to the plaintiffs acknowledging receipt of the request. DHS denied the plaintiffs' request for expedited processing and a fee waiver, which the plaintiffs appealed. On August 29, 2016, DHS acknowledged that it had received the appeal, but never responded to it. On September 27, 2016, the plaintiffs received a response from the Office of Intelligence & Analysis, a component of DHS, claiming that a search of its files revealed no records responsive to the plaintiffs' request. The plaintiffs appealed that decision based on the Office of Intelligence and Analysis' failure to perform an adequate search for records and its improper reliance on FOIA exemptions to avoid searching for, or producing, responsive records. On October 20, the plaintiffs received an acknowledgment from DHS regarding the appeal, but did not receive any other response or correspondence. FBI On July 28, 2016, the FBI sent a letter acknowledging receipt of the plaintiffs' request. Unlike DHS, the FBI granted the plaintiffs' request for expedited processing, however, it did not indicate whether processing had begun or when it would be complete. On September 20, 2016, the plaintiffs sent the FBI a letter requesting that the FBI notify them of when to expect to receive documents responsive to their request, but the FBI never responded. An initial pretrial conference was originally set for January 20, 2017, before U.S. District Court Judge William H. Pauley III. After several motions to push back the date of the initial pretrial conference, the conference was held on February 24, 2017. Another status conference was held on April 21, 2017. During this conference, the parties agreed to the discovery schedule of 500 pages per month of responsive documents. During discovery, both parties narrowed the requested documents, and prepared to file motions to contest or uphold exemptions. In line with timelines set in a February 9, 2018 scheduling conference, both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment surrounding release of a non-finalized intelligence assessment titled "(U\\FOUO) Growing Frequency of Race-Related Domestic Terrorist Violence." On July 9, 2018, Judge William Pauley ruled in favor of the defendants, saying that this document falls under FOIA's exemption 5 for process-related documents. He wrote that, because this document was written by an analyst and an intern, it revealed the processes of how DHS assesses and analyzes intelligence. With this motion for summary judgment decided and the cooperation of the parties outside of the contested DHS memo, all issues in the case were settled outside of the allocation of attorney fees. With this in mind, after an August 7, 2018 status report, Judge Pauley filed an order to partially dismiss the case, closing all claims outside of attorney fees. The case was briefly stayed in late 2018 and early 2019 due to the U.S. federal government shutdown. On March 12, 2019, Judge Pauley received a status report indicating that the parties reached a settlement on attorney fees. He ordered dismissal on April 11 and published the terms of the agreement; the FBI would pay $12,527.11, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) would pay $1,742.81, the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) would pay $11,655.40, and DHS Intelligence and Analysis would pay $11,655.40 to the plaintiffs. The case is closed.

Summary: After filing a FOIA request with the defendants, Color of Change and Center for Constitutional Rights, a nonprofit civil rights advocacy and communications organization, brought this action under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland security ("DHS") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other appropriate relief to compel the defendants to produce records related to federal government surveillance and monitoring of protest activities related to the Movement for Black Lives ("MBL"). Specifically, the plaintiffs sought documents regarding surveillance of MBL demonstrations and individual activists aligned with the movement, which they argued undermines the First Amendment's protection of political speech. After discovery, the parties determined releasable documents among themselves except for one DHS Intelligence and Analysis document, which Judge William H. Pauley III protected under FOIA. The parties settled attorney fees in 2019 and the case is now closed.


On July 13, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee at a distributor of fruits and vegetables (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Pennsylvania, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Tom Lange Company, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment. On July 26, 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint alleging the same as the plaintiff above but adding state claims against her supervisors. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Terrence F. McVerry) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $100,000, and pay plaintiff-intervenor's counsel $50,000 in attorneys' fees.

Summary: On July 13, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee at a distributor of fruits and vegetables (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Pennsylvania, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Tom Lange Company, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Terrence F. McVerry) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $100,000, and pay plaintiff-intervenor's counsel $50,000 in attorneys' fees.


In June 2006, the Phoenix District Office and Denver Field Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against distribution center operators Albertson's, Inc., Albertson's LLC, Supervalu, Inc. and Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and/or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants maintained a hostile work environment and subjected the complaining parties to other adverse terms and conditions of employment. The plaintiffs alleged long-term, continuing, and pervasive harassment and discrimination by supervisors and co-workers, including offensive and disparaging racial comments and graffiti, assignment of minorities to harder and less desirable duties, favoring of non-minorities in promotions, disciplining minorities more harshly, and Albertson’s failure to take appropriate, timely, and effective remedial action. Supervalu, Inc. and Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. were dismissed from the lawsuit in October 2006. The parties engaged in discovery from 2006 through 2009. On December 3, 2007, the Court (Judge Wiley Y. Daniel) granted motions to allow four plaintiff intervenors to intervene, and the four plaintiff intervenors filed complaints that day. On April 28, 2008, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The case was reassigned to Judge Christine M. Arguello on October 22, 2008. Proceedings were stayed beginning in February, 2009 pending negotiation and finalization of a consent decree. At the time the consent decree was developed, Albertsons had represented that it planned to close its Colorado distribution center in late fall 2009 for business reasons unrelated to the action. On December 11, 2009, the parties made a joint motion to consolidate this lawsuit with two other EEOC proceedings involving the Aurora, Colorado Albertson's distribution center. Judge Arguello granted the motion on December 14, 2009, and entered the consent decree that day. The consent decree included provisions against retaliation, a neutral reference for complaining parties, an equal employment opportunity training for supervisory and management employees, and certain terms should Albertson's open or reopen a distribution center in Colorado during the time of the consent decree. The consent decree also provided that Albertson's pay $8,900,000.00 to a class settlement fund to be distributed as determined by the EEOC. The consent decree remained in effect for four years, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2006, the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Albertson's, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging discrimination based on race, color, and/or national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the plaintiff brought claims of hostile work environment and disparate treatment with respect to terms and conditions of employment. After years of discovery, the parties entered a consent decree on December 14, 2009. The case is now closed.


This is one of four ongoing cases challenging the constitutionality of the New York Police Department's "Stop and Frisk" program. See: Floyd v. City of New York (PN-NY-0009); Daniels v. City of New York (PN-NY-0010); and Davis v. City of New York (PN-NY-0013). On March 28, 2012, twelve New York City residents and one former New York City resident filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. They challenged the city's "Operation Clean Halls" initiative (later renamed the "Trespass Affidavit Program"), which allowed police officers to patrol in and around private residential apartment buildings, and allegedly resulted in thousands of illegal stops, searches, summons (citations), and arrests. The plaintiffs were represented by a group of public interest lawyers from the New York Civil Liberties Union, Bronx Defenders and LatinoJustice. They filed the lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act and state law, alleging violations of the Federal and State Constitutions. The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that the NYPD's practices were unlawful and an injunction against those practices. Operation Clean Halls had the stated purpose of combating illegal activity in apartment buildings with records of high crime. In Manhattan alone, there were at least 3,895 Clean Halls buildings. Searches and seizures occurred in public areas such as courtyards, lobbies, and sidewalks, and NYPD officers engaged in vertical patrols (floor-by-floor sweeps), much like those that were challenged in litigation surrounding New York City Housing Authority residences. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been stopped without suspicion of unlawful behavior, and that they had been arrested or issued summons (citations) without probable cause. In multiple instances, plaintiffs were arrested for trespassing despite having another resident vouch for them. The plaintiffs alleged that these incidents were part of a larger pattern and practice in buildings enrolled in Operation Clean Halls, without meaningful correlations to actual crime levels. The residents of Clean Hall buildings were disproportionately Black and Latino. The plaintiffs also alleged that the City had been deliberately indifferent to these violations in their failure to train and supervise the NYPD. The plaintiffs asked for a class certification for all residents of Clean Hall buildings and their families, guests, and visitors and for all individuals who had been or were likely to be unlawfully stopped or arrested for being in or around buildings in the Operation Clean Halls initiative. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Fourth Amendment; First and Fourteenth Amendments (free association and due process); the Fair Housing Act (discriminatory implementation); the New York Constitution; and New York Common Law (false arrest and malicious prosecution). The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that these laws had been violated. The plaintiffs also demanded an injunction that required the defendants to refrain from these violations, to establish citywide standards regarding Operation Clean Halls, to establish a system for tracking and monitoring NYPD practices (with care paid to tracking race, national origin, and geography), develop appropriate training for NYPD officers; and report to the plaintiffs and the court about the steps taken to cure the violations. The plaintiffs also asked for compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs. On June 12, 2012, the Court (Shira A. Scheindlin, J.) issued a memorandum opinion and order. Ligon v. City of New York, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81526, 2012 WL 2125989 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012). The defendants wanted access to paperwork on the plaintiffs' prior arrests, even if they were terminated in the plaintiffs' favor and were now sealed pursuant to state law. Judge Scheindlin ruled that there was no legitimate reason for the defendants to access those files unless they were for charges of trespass or related crimes in the past ten years. The Court also ruled that the plaintiffs must make other disclosures about the length of time they were incarcerated and any injuries they suffered as a result of prior arrests, but that that could be done by sworn affidavit. On August 21, 2012, Judge Scheindlin issued an opinion and order allowing the plaintiffs' evidentiary hearing to proceed, regarding their request for a preliminary injunction. Ligon v. City of New York, 2012 WL 3597066 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012). The defendants had asked the Court to deny the plaintiffs' motion summarily, prior to a hearing. The defendants had argued (among other reasons) that there was overlap in the plaintiff classes between this case and Floyd, so there was a risk of inconsistent adjudications. The Court pointed out that both matters were assigned to the same judge and gave the defendants a choice: they could cease delaying Floyd with interlocutory appeals or they could agree to let these plaintiffs pursue preliminary injunctive relief. The Court wrote: "the City cannot have it both ways." This case went forward with the preliminary injunction proceedings. The preliminary injunction hearing took place in October and November 2012. On January 8, 2013, Judge Scheindlin ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that they had demonstrated the likelihood that they would prevail on the merits, and proved the city's deliberate indifference toward a widespread practice of unconstitutional trespass stops by the NYPD outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. Judge Scheindlin summarized that her conclusion was based on five categories of evidence: (1) the testimony of a Bronx Assistant District Attorney that the NYPD frequently made trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx for no reason other than that the officer had seen someone enter and exit or exit the building; (2) a sample of "decline to prosecute" forms prepared by the Bronx District Attorneys' Office, which revealed the alarming frequency of unlawful trespass stops in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (3) the testimony of eight plaintiffs and a non-party witness, who described remarkably similar encounters with the police when stopped in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (4) the analysis by Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, plaintiffs' expert, of an NYPD database of recorded stops, which provided further evidence of the frequency of apparently unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx; and (5) NYPD training materials that misstated the minimal constitutional standards for making stops. The Court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the NYPD to immediately cease performing trespass stops (in which a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter) outside TAP buildings in the Bronx without reasonable suspicion of trespass. In addition, Judge Scheindlin set out proposed relief, and consolidated a hearing on it with the already-scheduled remedial hearing in the related Floyd litigation. The proposed relief included requirements to develop constitutionally adequate policy guidance on stops, to collect data on each such stop, and to improve supervision and training. Ligon v. City of New York, 2013 WL 71800 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2013). On January 11, 2013, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On January 22, 2013, District Judge Scheindlin granted the defendants' stay of relief, pending their appeal in the circuit court. On February 11, 2013, Judge Scheindlin granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification solely for the purpose of preliminary injunctive relief. The class included "all individuals who have been or are at risk of being stopped outdoors without legal justification by NYPD officers on suspicion of trespassing in Bronx apartment buildings enrolled in the NYPD's Trespass Affidavit Program (commonly referred to as "Operation Clean Halls"). Ligon v. City of New York, 2013 WL 500272 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2013). After a nine-week bench trial, on August 12, 2013, Judge Scheindlin issued an order in Floyd, finding that the City had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by acting with “deliberate indifference” toward the NYPD's practice of making suspicion-less “stops” and “frisks” and by adopting “a policy of indirect racial profiling by targeting racially defined groups” for “stops” and “frisks.” That same day, Judge Scheindlin issued an order imposing remedies in Floyd and Ligon in the form of various “reforms” to the NYPD's “stop and frisk” practices to be overseen by a court-appointed monitor. The Court appointed Peter Zimroth, former New York Corporation Counsel and former First Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan, to oversee the implementation of the relief. With respect to specific remedies, the Court ordered the NYPD to adopt a written policy spelling out the specific circumstances where stopping a person suspected of trespass outside a TAP building is legal. Additionally, the Court ordered the city (1) to develop procedures to ensure proper paperwork is completed for each stop outside a Bronx TAP building; (2) to develop and adopt a system for reviewing the legality of stops outside Bronx TAP buildings; and (3) to revise the NYPD's training materials and training programs to enter conformity with the law. Additionally, the Court ordered that attorney's fees and costs be rewarded on appropriate application. The City appealed in both cases and sought a stay. In September 2013, four police unions filed notices of appeal and motions to intervene in the District Court. Three of the unions moved to intervene in both Floyd and Ligon. One union only moved to intervene in Floyd. On October 31, 2013, the Second Circuit granted the City’s motion for a stay and ordered that the cases be reassigned from Judge Scheindlin to another district judge. The Second Circuit wrote that the "District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges" in (a) speaking to the press and (b) encouraging the plaintiffs' counsel in Daniels to file the Floyd litigation, separately, rather than litigating racial profiling as part of Daniels -- particularly in stating that she would treat the new case as related. 538 F. App'x 101 (2d Cir. 2013). After the Second Circuit ruled, both Floyd and Ligon were reassigned (as related) to District Judge Analisa Torres. On November 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals rejected Judge Scheindlin's motion asking to be heard on the disqualification issue and clarified the reason for reassigning the case. The Second Circuit held that the rationale for the reassignment was an appearance of impropriety, not its actual presence. 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013). In the meantime, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio was elected, and took a very different approach to these cases. The city moved for limited remand from the Second Circuit to the district court for the purpose of exploring settlement. On February 21, 2014, the Second Circuit granted the City’s motion to remand to the district court to explore settlement for 45 days. The Second Circuit declined to decide the police unions' motion to intervene, preferring to let the district court decide that motion first. 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014). On March 4, 2014, the parties informed Judge Torres that they had “reached an agreement in principle for resolving the City's appeals in both Floyd and Ligon. The City agreed to substantially comply with the injunctive relief set forth in Judge Scheindlin's August 12, 2013, remedial order, subject to the parties' application to Judge Torres to limit the term of the court-appointed monitor to three years. When the monitor’s term ended, the City agreed to authorize the Inspector General of the NYPD to take over monitoring and reporting responsibilities. The parties agreed that the agreement could be terminated once the City has maintained compliance for two years. On July 30, 2014, Judge Torres granted the parties' joint motion to modify the remedial order and to enter it as an embodiment of their agreements. On July 30, 2014, Judge Torres also issued an order denying the police unions' motions to intervene, finding, inter alia, that the motions were untimely and that the police unions did not assert a legally protectable interest. 302 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The police unions appealed. However, on August 6, 2014, with the consent of the plaintiffs in Floyd and Ligon, the City moved to voluntarily dismiss its remaining appeals, with prejudice, stating that the parties had reached an agreement that resolved all the issues raised by the City's appeals in both Floyd and Ligon, and cleared the way for the parties to begin the remedial process and settlement negotiations. On October 31, 2014, the Second Circuit granted the City’s request to voluntarily dismiss all appeals, with prejudice. In addition, the Second Circuit held that the unions’ motions to intervene were untimely and that the unions failed to establish legally protectable interests, as required to allow intervention. 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014). The parties continued to work with the monitor on developing appropriate reforms. On February 3, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order regarding the procedure for the monitor to develop and the City to implement the reforms of NYPD’s stop-and-frisk activities. The monitor would consult with the parties to create a final recommendations for the implementation of remedies. Then, the court would approve or deny the final recommendations. First, on February 23, 2015, the monitor submitted and Judge Torres approved, a memo that was read by the NYPD at 10 consecutive roll calls in all precincts detailing the reforms ordered by Judge Scheindlin in Floyd. The memo was also posted in police stations and provided to all officers. The document detailed the constitutional standards governing stop and frisks, explicitly prohibited racial profiling by police, ordered officers to include a narrative explanation for stops in their UF250 forms, and ordered the start of a pilot program outfitting police officers with body cameras. Meanwhile, on March 18, 2015, the City suggested a way for all five police unions to participate in the remedial process. Under the City's approach, the City would share proposals with the unions before providing them to the monitor and the plaintiffs. The unions could then offer their comments, which the City would convey to the monitor. This approach would afford the unions an opportunity to inform the monitor of their viewpoints before the monitor reached conclusions and submitted the final recommendations to the Court. On March 19, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order approving this framework. On August 7, 2015, the monitor submitted his final recommendations for reforms on racial profiling and street encounters. The new racial profiling policy imposed a categorical prohibition on racial and national origin profiling; it also prohibited other forms of biased policing not covered in the NYPD’s current policy, such as profiling on the basis of religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, and housing status. The new street encounters policy regarding placed clearer legal limits on stops and frisks. It required supervisory review of officer conduct to ensure compliance with the Constitution. On August 24, 2015, Judge Torres approved the final recommendations. On December 8, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order modifying the remedial order’s requirement that NYPD institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras would be used for a one-year period. Judge Torres modified the order so that the NYPD would use a randomized experimental design for the body-worn camera pilot program. By February 2017, the parties had a settlement agreement and began the formal process for court approval of a class-action settlement. Judge Torres approved the stipulation of settlement on July 19, 2017. The settlement includes payment to the named plaintiffs totaling $235,000 and attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses totaling $2,640,533. The stipulation also articulates specific standards for stopping, frisking, searching, arresting, and issuing summonses in and around TAP buildings and requires the NYPD to implement and consistently adhere to those standards. In addition to the specific reforms outlined in the settlement, it provides that further reforms will be developed as part of the remedial process described in the August 2013 Floyd/Ligon joint remedial order. While the settlement of the claims in this case was being negotiated, the joint remedial process, part of the 2013 remedial order, included a comprehensive input process regarding recommended reforms. The input process concluded in April 2017, and in January 2018 the plaintiffs, describing the parties' impasse regarding the remedial process, requested that the facilitator issue a report and the parties hold a status conference. In an order of January 29, 2018, Judge Torres provided a schedule for the parties to work with the facilitator regarding reforms under the joint remedial process. Monitoring is ongoing in this case; see Floyd (PN-NY-0009) for the implementation and monitoring proceedings of the settlement agreements. In February of 2018, the monitor filed proposed training materials for newly promoted lieutenants and sergeants. The materials involved guidebooks and powerpoint presentations that would be used during a four week training course (for lieutenants) and a six week training course (for sergeants). The next month, Judge Torres approved the materials. In June 2018, the monitor filed additional training materials regarding In-Service Stop and Frisks by Patrol Officers, which were approved by Judge Torres the next month. On July 19, 2018, Judge Torres issued an order about the recommendation to document police-citizen encounters. The order stated that by September 13, 2018, the parties must submit a joint proposal for a pilot program to study the electronic recording of first- and second-level police-citizen encounters, to be overseen by the monitor. The proposal shall consider social science best practices. In developing the proposal, the parties shall consult with experts and the monitor. The monitor shall report to the Court whether the benefits of recording lower-level encounters outweigh the financial, administrative, and other costs, and whether the program should be expanded or terminated. On July 27, 2018, the monitor filed a report on the use of body cameras by NYPD officers that outlines how the data from the pilot program will be used to analyze police/civilian interactions, police activity, and police lawfulness. On August 13, 2018, Judge Torres approved a stipulation of fees for the time period of July 1, 2016 through December 31, 2017. The City agreed to pay fees of $275,149.00 to the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation. In December of 2018, the monitor issued a report recommending the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) Guide on Processing and Investigating Complaints of Profiling and Bias-Based Policing Patrol, and two Internal Investigations courses on profiling and police bias as training materials. Judge Torres granted these recommendations in January 2019. On May 9, 2019, Judge Torres approved a stipulation of fees for the time period of January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2018. The City agreed to pay fees of $85,352.00 to the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation. On May 28, 2019, the monitor made a recommendation regarding training materials for Housing Bureau members, including housing one-day training scenarios on lobby trespass, stairwell trespass, shots fired interior patrol, and roof trespass, which the Judge granted the next day. Judge Torres approved a proposed confidentiality order regarding the pilot study, which severely restricted public access to data collected on police encounters with civilians. The confidentiality order will protect the information that is obtained and created by trained observers studying officer behavior in the NYPD pilot study from disclosure to anyone other than the monitor and his team. In the related Floyd case, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the confidentiality order, and Judge Torres denied this motion on October 25, 2019. Floyd v. City of New York, 2019 WL 5537875 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2019). On June 2, 2020, Judge Torres issued an order instructing the NYPD to systematically obtain and report various categories of information. This information included declinations of prosecutions by district attorneys in New York, suppression decisions by courts excluding evidence as a result of unlawful stops and searches, court findings of incredible testimony by police officers, denials of indemnification and/or representation of police officers by the New York City Law Department, and judgments and settlements against police officers in civil cases where, in the opinion of the New York City Law Department, there exists evidence of police malfeasance. This information will be compiled regularly by the NYPD and sent to a committee, who will review the information and make assessments of individual officers, as well as the extent and manner of the intervention to be applied. This committee will also track metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the program. The committee, in conjunction with the monitor, will also develop a program for receiving and assessing information regarding adverse conduct of police officers, and this information will be provided to the Police Commissioner. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, on June 2, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the defendants to produce information about the NYPD's use of investigative encounters and social distancing enforcement practices. The city has filed its opposition brief in response to this motion, and the monitor filed a letter opposing the plaintiffs' motion. On June 12, Judge Torres denied the plaintiffs' motion. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, twelve New York City residents and one former New York City resident filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). They challenged the City's "Operation Clean Halls" initiative, which allowed police officers to patrol in and around private residential apartment buildings, and allegedly resulted in thousands of illegal stops, searches, summons (citations), and arrests. In 2013, the court entered a preliminary injunction ordering remedies addressing unlawful enforcement practices by the NYPD. The parties reached court-approved settlement in 2017, which included ongoing court-ordered monitoring of changes to NYPD practices, policies, training, and supervision. Monitoring is ongoing in this case, and as of June 2020, the case remains open.


On February 28, 2006, Al-Haramain Oregon (a non-profit organization) and two of its attorneys filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 against the U.S. Government. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the government violated FISA by conducting warrantless electronic surveillance of their communications. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the government's actions violated the separation of powers, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On September 7, 2006, Judge Garr M. King denied the government's motion to dismiss but granted its motion to prevent access to a sealed classified document that had been inadvertently released to plaintiffs. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2006). The plaintiffs appealed. In January, 2007, the Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel transferred the case to the Northern District of California, as part of a multi-district litigation consolidation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, NS-CA-11, in this Clearinghouse. On April 30, 2007, the Ninth Circuit officially consolidated the plaintiffs' appeal with with Hepting v. AT & T, NS-CA-0004, in this Clearinghouse. However, on November 16, 2007, the Ninth Circuit severed the two cases from each other and ordered that the cases would no longer be consolidated for any purpose. Hepting v. AT & T, 508 F.3d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 2007). On November 16, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued a second opinion specifically addressing the appeal from this case, reversing and remanding the district court's order. Judge McKeown held that (1) state secrets privilege did not protect the subject matter of the plaintiffs' challenge; but (2) that privilege protected the sealed document the plaintiffs relied on; (3) the district court should not have permitted in camera review of affidavits attesting to the plaintiffs' attorneys' memories of the document; and (4) the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge without the sealed document. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007). Meanwhile, in January, 2007, the case was transferred to the Northern District of California, as part of a multi-district litigation consolidation. On July 2, 2008, Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of California held that FISA preempted the state secrets privilege with respect to foreign telecommunications surveillance. Judge Walker also held that the plaintiffs could not use a sealed classified document to establish their status as "aggrieved persons" within the meaning of FISA, but he also granted them leave to amend the complaint, which the plaintiffs did. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008). On January 5, 2009, Judge Walker denied government motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (N.D. Cal. 2009). On May 22, 2009, Judge Walker denied the government's third motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for discovery pursuant to 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). The order provided for plaintiffs' counsel to obtain top secret/sensitive compartmented information security clearances and ordered the government to review its classified submissions in this case and determine whether any could be declassified. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., MDL. 06-1791VRW, 2009 WL 1468792 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2009). On March 31, 2010, Judge Walker ordered entry of a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Judge Walker held that (1) the private remedy provision of FISA implicitly waived the government's sovereign immunity; (2) the prior mandate did not preclude plaintiffs from attempting to establish standing under FISA; (3) the defendants were equitably estopped from arguing that a valid FISA warrant existed; (4) the defendants violated FISA; and (5) the FBI director was not liable in his official capacity. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2010). On December 22, 2010, Judge Walker awarded the plaintiffs about $2.5 million in attorneys' fees and about $41,000 to two of the three plaintiffs in liquidated damages. The defendants appealed. On December 5, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge McKeown held that (1) the government did not waive sovereign immunity under the civil liability provision of FISA, reversing the district court's order, and (2) the FBI director was not liable, affirming the district court's order. As a result, the Ninth Circuit dismissed all of the claims, ending the case. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2012). This opinion amended and superseded the opinion from August 7, 2012, 690 F.3d 1089, which is almost identical to the amended opinion. The amended opinion simply omits a more detailed explanation of the procedures Congress required for certain sections of FISA (Section 2712(b)) where there was a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Summary: In 2006, an Islamic non-profit in Oregon and two of its attorneys filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 against the U.S. Government. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the government violated FISA by conducting warrantless electronic surveillance of their communications. The claims were dismissed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2012.


The plaintiff in this case is a transgender female. She was denied medically necessary healthcare and suffered repeated sexual assault and harassment throughout her incarceration. The plaintiff suffered from gender dysphoria and—despite her feminine appearance—the defendant assigned her to a maximum-security male prison. In these facilities, transgender inmates often face the highest risk of sexual violence. The plaintiff brought this action in the Middle District of Georgia on February 19, 2015 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendant staff at the Georgia Department of Corrections, Rutledge State Prison, and Valdosta State prison. The plaintiff claimed deliberate indifference to her medical needs in denying medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria, violations of her Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment, failure of guards to protect her from serious sexual assault, and failure to train prison personnel regarding transgender inmates' health and safety. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, the plaintiff requested declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the Georgia Department of Corrections to adhere to professional standards of care in treating inmates that suffer from gender dysphoria. The plaintiff was first imprisoned in 2012. Within the first month of her imprisonment, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by six gang members. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted by other inmates more than half a dozen times throughout her three-year incarceration. The defendants also denied her medically necessary hormone treatment. But the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim. They also asserted qualified immunity defenses. In the meantime, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order, on April 20, 2015. At this hearing, the court put consideration of her preliminary injunction on hold to investigate new policies that the Georgia Department of Corrections had implemented since the beginning of the suit. 131 F. Supp. 3d 1353. Less than five months later, the plaintiff was released from prison. She was only three years into an eight year sentence on August 31, 2015. The court then ruled on the defendants' various motions to dismiss on September 14, 2015. First, the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were mooted and dismissed without prejudice as a result of her release from prison. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim and failure-to-protect claim because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Further, the court held that defendant prison personnel were not entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim and that the defendant medical director was not entitled to qualified immunity on the failure-to-protect claim. Finally, the court held that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that defendant medical director failed to train subordinates regarding the safety of transgender inmates and that this failure resulted in deliberate indifference to Diamond’s constitutional right to reasonable protection—the defendant medical director was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The parties reached an undisclosed monetary settlement and filed a stipulated dismissal on February 11, 2016. As a result of the lawsuit, the Georgia Department of Corrections no longer uses the “freeze frame” policy that prohibited transgender inmates from receiving treatment or updating treatment plans as needed. Many transgender inmates in Georgia now receive hormone therapy. Moreover, the defendants have adopted a sexual assault prevention policy that adheres to federal standards. These prevention policies are supplemented by training programs for prison staffers that address the unique needs of transgender inmates. The case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiff in this action, a transgender female inmate, suffered repeated sexual assault during her incarceration. Additionally, the Georgia Department of Corrections denied her medically necessary treatment for her gender dysphoria. She reached a settlement agreement on her monetary damages claims, and had her injunctive and declaratory relief claims mooted when she was released from prison before the court decided her case. The case is now closed.


On December 3, 2018, a U.S. citizen detainee filed this lawsuit under § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to challenge his unlawful arrest and detention by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office. The plaintiff alleged that the Sheriff's Office carelessly and aggressively arrested him for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) between the two agencies, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and his right to be free from false imprisonment under Florida law. The BOA scheme provided the Sheriff with $50 per arrest for detaining individuals arrested for ICE. The plaintiff claimed that despite his repeated protests to multiple jail officers and his offer to produce proof of his U.S. citizenship, the Sheriff’s Office held him so that ICE could deport him to Jamaica. The plaintiff would have been deported to Jamaica but-for a last-minute intervention in which a friend sent a copy of the plaintiff's birth certificate to an ICE agent. The plaintiff sought declaratory and compensatory damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Chief Judge K. Michael Moore was assigned to the case, but was reassigned to Judge Kathleen M. Williams. On February 11, 2019, Judge Williams set a jury trial on February 3, 2020. In the meantime, the parties engaged in negotiations with a mediator. Ultimately, the parties failed to reach a settlement agreement. The trial date was reset for July 20, 2020, and discovery continued. On February 18, 2020, both the plaintiff and defendants filed for summary judgment. The case was stayed for a few months in mid-2020, in part due to interruptions caused by COVID-19. In the ensuing months, the parties jointly asked for multiple stays for trial proceedings. Currently, the parties are supposed to file their motions in limine by May 17, 2021 and their pretrial stipulation and deposition designations by June 7, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: On December 3, 2018, a U.S. citizen detainee filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to challenge his unlawful arrest and detention by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office. He alleged that the defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his right to be free from false imprisonment under Florida law. After multiple stays due to COVID-19, the case remains ongoing.


This class action, filed Jan. 28, 2017, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It was filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention) and a civil complaint, on behalf of two individuals and the class of "all individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States, but who have been or will be denied entry to the United States on the basis of the January 27, 2017 Executive Order." Counsel for plaintiffs were the American Civil Liberties Union, the International Refugee Assistance Project at the Urban Justice Center, the National Immigration Law Center, Yale Law School’s Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization and the firm Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton. They filed the case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, along with a motion for class certification; it was initially assigned to Obama appointee Judge Ann Donnelly, who was on duty for any emergencies that weekend. The lead plaintiffs were detained at JFK Airport by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and threatened with deportation even though they had valid visas to enter the United States. One plaintiff, Hameed Darweesh, had worked for the U.S. military in Iraq; his life was in danger in Iraq due to that relationship. The other plaintiff’s wife and son were threatened because of their perceived ties to the United States. The complaint argued that their continued detention based solely on the EO violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, and exceeded the government's authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The EO's singling out of seven majority-Muslim nations for disfavored treatment unconstitutionally discriminated against Muslims, it said. At 7:30 pm the day the matter was filed, Judge Donnelly heard an emergency motion to stay all removals (that is, deportations) under the order; after a hearing, she granted a nationwide stay of removals to all members of the class. At the hearing, Judge Donnelly further required the defendants to provide a list of all individuals detained as a result of the EO. The next day, on Jan. 29, 2017, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Court to "immediately clarify that its Jan. 28th Order is nationwide and order Respondents to enforce the stay of removal." They explained that they had received information that members of the class were continuing to be deported, in other states. Later that day, the plaintiffs filed a "notice" that said that the U.S. had "acknowledge[d] that the Order does in fact apply nationwide." The notice explained, "Petitioners continue to monitor reports of noncompliance and are working with Respondents’ counsel to attempt to resolve them. Petitioners will update the Court as to any issues of noncompliance should further clarification or enforcement be necessary." In addition, on Jan. 29, 2017, a member of the class filed an emergency motion with the court seeking declaratory relief to clarify that she will not be detained or deported. The class member is an Iranian national and lawful permanent resident of the U.S. with a visa. Her husband, a U.S. citizen, sponsored her for permanent residence in the U.S. The initial assignment had been for emergency purposes over the weekend; on Monday, Jan. 30, 2017, the case was randomly reassigned to Judge Carol Bagley Amon. On Feb. 2, J 2017, udge Amon extended the TRO to Feb. 21, 2017 for good cause shown. In addition, the New York State Office of the Attorney General filed a Motion to Intervene, which was granted on Feb. 10. On Feb. 6, 2017, the government filed a notice of supplemental authority which noted the Feb. 3 letter written by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services at the Department of State. This Feb. 3 letter reversed the provisional revocation of all visas previously issued by the Deputy Assistant Secretary. On Feb. 7, 2017, the petitioners moved for the court to enforce its Jan. 28, 2017 order. The Jan. 28, 2017 order had directed the government to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of all individuals detained pursuant to President Trump's Jan. 27, 2017 EO, including individuals previously released or removed. On Feb. 8, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' petition and complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants' motion also opposed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Additionally, the court issued a Feb. 8 2017, order instructing the parties to submit memos and a briefing schedule in preparation for a hearing originally scheduled on Feb. 24. After the parties requested an expedited hearing on the stay motion and the motion to dismiss, because the government would not consent to an extension of the stay beyond Feb. 21, the court agreed to hold a hearing on Feb. 21, 2017. From Feb. 13-16, 2017, numerous organizations filed amicus briefs, including the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, several members of Congress (represented by the Constitutional Accountability Center), the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, seventeen universities (Brown, Carnegie Mellon, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Duke, Emory, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, MIT, Northwestern, Princeton, Stanford, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt, and Yale), and many others. On Feb. 16, 2017, 167 members of Congress filed an amicus brief arguing, among other things, that the EO is irreconcilable with Congress's clearly expressed intent in the Immigration and Nationality Act. On Feb. 16, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the government's motion to dismiss the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that though the named plaintiffs had been admitted to the U.S., the case was not moot because: 1) the relief that the named plaintiffs received represented only a voluntary cessation of the challenged policy; 2) the case's class claims were inherently transitory; and 3) there were still individuals who, pursuant to the EO, had been unconstitutionally denied entry or admission into the US. In the meantime, in Washington v. Trump, in the Western District of Washington and then the Ninth Circuit, the EO had also been enjoined, and a stay of proceedings denied on Feb. 9 2017, ; on Feb. 16, 2017, the Trump administration announced that rather than continuing to litigate the EO's lawfulness, it would rescind the order and soon replace it with a revised version. The parties in this case therefore jointly requested on Feb. 17, 2017, that the court stay proceedings related to the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction and the government's motion to dismiss. The parties also requested that the court cancel the Feb. 21, 2017, hearing that was to be set on these motions. The court granted the parties' joint motion, and further determined that the injunction issued in Washington v. Trump provided sufficient protection so as to not require that the Jan. 28, 2017 injunction be extended beyond Feb. 21 2017. However, should the Washington injunction be vacated while the EO was in effect, the Jan. 28, 2017, injunction would be reinstated and the court would schedule a prompt hearing on whether the Jan. 28 2017 injunction should be extended further. The plaintiffs then on Feb. 20, 2017, filed a reply in support of their Feb. 7, 2017, motion for the court to enforce its Jan. 28, 2017, order directing the government to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of all individuals detained pursuant to the EO. In the reply, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants should release the names of "all individuals excluded on the basis of the EO" after this action was filed, and not just those individuals which the plaintiff's counsel identified. Judge Amon on Feb. 21, 2017, granted the plaintiffs' Feb. 7, 2017 motion in part. She read Judge Donnelly's Jan. 28, 2017, order as requiring defendants "to provide a single list of putative class members being held pursuant to the EO at any time from the signing of the order and for a reasonable period thereafter, which would include through the following day." Judge Amon also interpreted Judge Donnelly's use of "the term 'detained' "to be in the everyday sense, meaning those being held for questioning pursuant to the terms of the EO, as distinguished from individuals formally placed in removal proceedings." The plaintiffs in this case specifically, noted Judge Amon, were not placed in removal proceedings but were nonetheless "detained." Accordingly, Judge Amon ordered defendants by Feb. 23, 2017, to provide plaintiffs with a list of all individuals with approved refugee applications, valid immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, or other legal authorization to enter the United States, from the seven banned countries, who were held, including being processed, by CBP pursuant to the EO from Jan. 28, 2017, at 9:37pm (when Judge Donnelly ordered defendants to produce the list) through Jan. 29, 2017, at 11:59pm. The government filed two status reports on Feb. 23, 2017. The first status report informed the court that the government had prepared the list as ordered by Judge Amon on Feb. 21 ("putative class members being held pursuant to the EO at any time from the signing of the order and for a reasonable period thereafter"), and that the parties were working through the last-minute terms of the protective order. The second status report informed the court that the parties had agreed to a protective order covering the list containing the names of all individuals processed at any time from 9:27 PM on Jan. 28 to 11:59 PM on Jan. 29 pursuant to the Jan. 27 EO, including those previously released or removed, and that the government had provided the list to the petitioners. The petitioners reserved the right to challenge the government's designation of any information in the list for being overbroad. That same day, the parties filed a joint motion for an order protecting the confidentiality of the individuals named in the list, which the court granted. The parties appeared for oral argument on Feb. 24, 2017, before Judge Amon. During oral argument, the government stated that they would inform the petitioners as to which individuals on the Feb. 23, 2017, list were ultimately admitted into the U.S. The petitioners stated that they would provide the government with the names of individuals who they believed were not included on the list, but who should have been, so that the government may investigate accordingly. Also during oral argument on Feb. 24, 2017, the parties requested to adjourn the present briefing schedule regarding a potential motion to dismiss the Intervenor Plaintiff, the New York State Office of the Attorney General. The request was granted and the parties agreed to submit a new briefing schedule, if necessary, within seven days after a new EO is issued. Many religious organizations filed an appearance on Feb. 27 2017. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On the same day, defendants filed a notice about the release of this new EO to take effect on Mar. 16, revoking and replacing the previous one. Defendants argued that the new EO differed substantially from the previous one and thus would not be affected by Judge Amon's TRO. Specifically, defendants noted that the new EO did not ban Iraqi nationals. Defendants stated that they would, as previously agreed, file a proposed joint scheduling order by Mar. 13. Following this, the New York State Attorney General sent a Mar. 9, 2017, letter to the court, specifying that in light of the new EO, the AG would not pursue the case and would not file its proposed Feb. 2 Complaint in Intervention. On Mar. 13, 2017, the parties then submitted a letter to Judge Amon, indicating that they were in settlement discussions and requesting a stay. Judge Amon granted such stays repeatedly for two and three weeks at a time. On May 1, 2017, both plaintiff and defendants wrote separately to Judge Amon, informing her that the parties were unable to reach a settlement. After several conferences in May, the court re-scheduled the follow-up conference several times, as defendants twice requested an adjournment. (Judge Amon on May 31 mentioned that "[t]he Court is not pleased with respondents' request.") Conferences, follow-ups, and extensions continued over the next few months. In the meantime, Judge Amon on Aug. 15 stayed sua sponte a ruling on plaintiff's Jan. 28 class certification motion, while settlement discussions proceeded. Judge Amon held a settlement conference on Aug. 28, 2017, and a follow-up telephone conference the next day. The parties stated that they had reached a settlement in principle. Judge Amon asked them to confirm the details in the next settlement conference on Aug. 31, 2017. They did so, and entered the terms of the settlement agreement on the record. The parties then on Sept. 1, 2017, filed the settlement agreement and stipulation of dismissal. According to the settlement agreement, defendants would within 14 days notify all persons barred from entering the U.S. under the Jan. 27 EO, and who were still outside the U.S., that they could re-apply for a visa. The letter would include a list of free legal services providers. The parties agreed that no applicants would be automatically entitled to a visa just by re-applying. After completing this notification, defendants would notify plaintiffs of their compliance, and plaintiffs would then file a stipulated dismissal of all claims, relief, damages, and jurisdiction for this matter. The docket reflects that the court closed this case on Sept. 21, 2017. Additional information may be available at the ACLU or the Yale Law School Clinic pages for this case.

Summary: This class action, filed Jan. 28, 2017 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It was filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention) and a civil complaint, on behalf of two individuals and the class of "all individuals with refugee applications approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen legally authorized to enter the United States, but who have been or will be denied entry to the United States on the basis of the January 27, 2017 Executive Order." The complaint argued that their continued detention based solely on the executive order violated their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights, and exceeded the government's authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. At 7:30 pm the day the matter was filed, Judge Donnelly heard an emergency motion to stay all removals (that is, deportations) under the order. After a hearing, she granted a nationwide stay of removals to all members of the class. Judge Donnelly also required the defendants to provide a list of all individuals detained as a result of the EO. The case was randomly reassigned to Judge Carol Bagley Amon on January 30, 2017. On Feb. 2, Judge Amon extended the TRO to Feb. 21, 2017 for good cause shown. On Feb. 7, the plaintiffs moved for the court to enforce its Jan. 28 order, which had directed the government to provide the plaintiffs' counsel with a list of all individuals detained pursuant to the EO, including individuals previously released or removed. On Feb. 8, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' petition and complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants' motion also opposed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Although a hearing on the stay motion and the motion to dismiss was scheduled for Feb. 21, it was cancelled after the court determined that the injunction issued in Washington v. Trump provided sufficient protection. On Feb. 21, Judge Amon granted plaintiffs' Feb. 7 motion to enforce the Jan. 28 order in part. Judge Amon ordered defendants by Feb. 23 to provide plaintiffs with a list of all individuals with approved refugee applications, valid immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, or other legal authorization to enter the United States, from the seven banned countries, who were held, including being processed, by CBP pursuant to the EO from Jan. 28 at 9:37pm (when Judge Donnelly ordered defendants to produce the list) through Jan. 29 at 11:59pm. On Mar. 6, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On Mar. 13, the parties submitted a letter to Judge Amon, indicating that they were in settlement discussions and requesting a stay, which was granted repeatedly. The parties reached a settlement agreement and filed a stipulation of dismissal on Sept. 1, 2017. According to the settlement agreement, defendants would notify all persons barred from entering the U.S. under the Jan. 27 EO, and who were still outside the U.S., that they could re-apply for a visa and would provide a list of free legal services providers. This case is now closed.


On August 18, 2009, the plaintiff, a high school student verbally and physically harassed due to his sex and sexual orientation brought suit against Mohawk Central School District in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (The Honorable David N. Hurd). The plaintiff, represented by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the New York Civil Liberties Union, alleged denial of equal protection on the basis of sex and sexual orientation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation and negligent supervision under New York state law; and sex discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Based on these claims, the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs, and compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages. The plaintiff claimed that from 2007 to 2009, he suffered physical and emotional harms due to the defendant's deliberate indifference to a pattern of severe, persistent, and violent harassment of the plaintiff at the hands of fellow students based on his sex and sexual orientation. These physical and emotional harms also affected the plaintiff's ability to learn and caused him to leave school for two weeks at the end of the 2009 school year. The plaintiff and his parents informed school administrators and teachers of the harassment on many separate occasions, but no effective measures were taken by the school to remedy the situation. On August 19, 2009, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The Court issued a consent order granting the preliminary injunction on August 27, ordering the defendant to immediately put in place a number of safeguards to protect the plaintiff and to comply with school sexual harassment policies. The United States (U.S. Attorney's Office) moved to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff in the action on January 14, 2010. The court denied the motion on March 29, 2010 as it granted the parties' stipulation and settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff $50,000 in addition to attorney's fees and costs ($25,000) and the cost of obtaining counseling services up until June 30, 2013. The agreement also required that the defendant retain an expert to review the defendant's policies and practices regarding discrimination and harassment, to review these procedures themselves, and to record compliance with harassment and discrimination complaints. The case was dismissed with prejudice on April 27, 2010.

Summary: A high school student who was verbally and physically harassed based on his sexual orientation and sex brought suit against his school district, claiming that school officials were deliberately indifferent to his harassment. On March 29, 2010, the court approved a settlement agreement between the parties. The plaintiff was awarded $50,000, the cost of three years of counseling, and $25,000 in attorneys' fees. The agreement also required that the defendant retain an expert to review the defendant's policies and practices regarding discrimination and harassment, to review these procedures themselves, and to record compliance with harassment and discrimination complaints.


On August 30th, 2018, several student groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs sued the Michigan Secretary of State, Ruth Johnson, and the Director of the Michigan Bureau of Elections, Sally Williams under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and §1988 for alleged constitutional violations of the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by a combination of public interest and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the State from enforcing Public Act 118, also known as Roger’s Law, which plaintiffs alleged put significant barriers in place for college aged students who wanted to vote. The case was assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Roger’s Law placed two major barriers in the way of students seeking to vote: Strict matching requirements and requirement that a person first vote in person. The strict matching requirement prohibited college students, who had their home address listed on state identification, from using said identification to register to vote in their college town. The in-person voting requirement prohibited college students, who would need to return to their permanent addresses to vote, from voting if they were far from home. Plaintiff claimed that these laws were driven to enactment by discriminatory intent, as shown through the explicit statement by the legislation’s drafter that he didn’t care if college-aged students couldn’t vote. The complaint was later amended on September 7th, 2018, to add new plaintiffs, specifically more student groups. On September 8th, 2018, a motion for preliminary injunction was filed, but stayed while the parties negotiated a potential settlement. Along with the motion, the plaintiffs filed an expert report from Stanford Political Science Professor Jonathan Rodden supporting their arguments. 2018 WL 10072776. On September 25, the plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their preliminary injunction. They did this because of their preparations for the 2018 midterm elections, and the potential impact that the elections would have on the outcome of the case. Status updates were moved to January 9, 2019. Status updates were further delayed as the Whitmer administration was sworn in and implemented policies that expanded access to vote-by-mail programs. The plaintiffs submitted a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case on June 5, 2019, perhaps because of progress toward the plaintiff's asks by the Whitmer administration. Judge Cleland dismissed the case on June 11; the case is closed.

Summary: On August 30th, 2018, several student groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs sued Michigan Secretary of State, Ruth Johnson, and Director of the Michigan Bureau of Elections, Sally Williams under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and §1988 for alleged constitutional violations of the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the State from enforcing Public Act 118, also known as Roger’s Law, which plaintiffs alleged put significant barriers in place for college aged students who wanted to vote. After the 2018 midterm election brought a Democratic administration to Lansing, the plaintiffs stayed settlement negotiations and eventually withdrew the lawsuit, perhaps due to progress made in expanded vote-by-mail programs.


On February 14, 2014, the ACLU of Rhode Island and several citizens of the City of Cranston filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs sued the City of Cranston under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Policy Initiative, the ACLU, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claim that the 2012 Redistricting Plan violated the rights of the plaintiffs to equal representation under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the inclusion of the prison population of Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), located in Ward 6, inflated the actual voting population of ward 6. As a result, every three citizens of Ward 6 represent the same voting power as four citizens of the other five wards. On March 13, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. On September 8, 2014, Judge Ronald R. Lagueux denied the motion, holding that the court could not say that the 2012 Redistricting Plan was constitutional as a matter of law. 42 F.Supp. 3d 325 (D.R.I. 2014). The court scheduled discovery for the next nine months. On July 9, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 6, 2016, a cross-motion for summary judgment was filed by the plaintiffs. On May 24, 2016, Judge Lagueux granted plaintiffs’ summary judgment and denied defendants'. 188 F.Supp.3d 146. The court entered declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants from holding any new elections under the current 2012 Redistricting Plan. Furthermore, the defendants were required to come up with a new redistricting plan within 30 days. Judge Lagueux determined that while districts are generally divided according to equal populations, the prison inmates at ACI were not engaged in the civil process like other non-voters. Therefore, to include them in the total population of Ward 6 would an unconstitutional dilution of Ward’s 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5’s voting power. On May 31, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to appeal. On September 21, 2016, Judge Sandra Lea Lynch of the First Circuit Court of Appeals entered judgment in favor of the defendants. 837 F.3d 135. Judge Lynch held, following the Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Evenwel v. Abbott</i>, that in the absence of discriminatory intent, the courts should defer to local election authorities and the political process. Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Sept. 26, 2016. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 14, 2014, ACLU chapter of Rhode Island and four citizens filed suit in the U.S. District Court of R.I. under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the inclusion of a prison in one county ward, thus creating an unconstitutional dilution of their voting power under the 14th amendment. The court found for the plaintiffs and ordered a new redistricting plan, but the defendants appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals granted judgment for the defendants, holding that the courts should defer to local election authorities.


On June 16, 2009, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612, against the owners and managers of a 98-lot mobile home park located in Gulfport, Mississippi. The defendants leased lots to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to house persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. claimed, based on evidence from particular complainants and witnesses and on fair housing testing, that the site's management applied various park rules more harshly against African American tenants and members of interracial households, openly made racial slurs, declared that they didn't want any African American residents living at the park, and generally harassed and intimidated black tenants. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as civil penalties. The case was assigned to Judge Louis Guirola. On November 15, 2010, the Court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment; the court found that the U.S. had produced sufficient evidence of discriminatory rule enforcement, racial bias, and harassment. Though the case was scheduled for trial, shortly before that date arrived, the parties agreed to a three-year settlement on January 7, 2011. The agreement included a standard prohibition against discrimination, but it also included restrictions on the defendant manager in any future involvements in the rental real estate business. These restrictions included regulating the conduct of the defendant-owner in the event it re-entered the rental real estate business, including notice to the plaintiff, fair housing training, notice provisions, non-discrimination policies, detailed reporting and recordkeeping requirements to allow plaintiff to monitor its compliance, and consent to periodic compliance testing. Defendants agreed to pay $45,000 in monetary damages to twelve named aggrieved persons, $45,000 to the United States, and a $5,000 civil penalty. The case closed on January 18, 2011.

Summary: This fair housing case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi was brought in June 2009 by the United States, against the owner and managers of a 98-lot mobile home park located in Gulfport, Mississpppi. The defendants had leased lots to the the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to house persons displaced by Hurricane Katrina. The plaintiff claimed that the site's management applied various park rules more harshly against African-American tenants, openly made racial slurs, declared that they didn't want any African-American residents living at the park, and generally harassed and intimidated black tenants. After District Judge Louis Guirola denied defendants' motions for summary judgment, the parties agreed to a three-year settlement. The agreement contained detailed provisions regulating the conduct of the defendant owner in the event it re-entered the rental real estate business, including notice to the Plaintiff, fair housing training, notice provisions, non-discrimination policies, detailed reporting and recordkeeping requirements to allow the plaintiff to monitor its compliance, and consent to periodic compliance testing. The agreement also awarded $45,000 in monetary damages to 12 named aggrieved persons, $45,000 to the plaintiff, and a $5,000 civil penalty. The case closed on January 18, 2011.


On July 27, 1995 Colorado inmates incarcerated at Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) in Texas filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys. Plaintiffs' complaint, filed in November of 1995, alleged an abusive, overcrowded, unsanitary, and unhealthful environment at BCCF. It alleged forced idleness, fire danger, deficient medical care, and lack of access to the courts due to an inadequate law library. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that BCCF violated the Establishment Clause by paying inmates to attend a Bible study class when there was little or no paid work available to other inmates and no other religious activities. Defendants moved for transfer and change of venue. The district court (Judge John L. Kane, Jr.) denied these motions. Knapp v. Romer, 909 F.Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1995). A number of lawsuits were filed in the District of Colorado regarding conditions at BCCF. The cases were consolidated until September 30, 1997, when Judge Kane issued an order ending consolidation and certifying the case as a class action to be represented by counsel for one of the claims, Leggions, et al v. CO Dept. Corrections, et al. Litigation continued, with the court granting many plaintiffs' motions for exclusion from class representation and several motions for joinder. The PACER docket for this case ends on February 25, 1999 so no information regarding further proceedings is available.

Summary: On July 27, 1995 Colorado inmates incarcerated at Bowie County Correctional Facility (BCCF) in Texas filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys. Plaintiffs' complaint, filed in November of 1995, alleged an abusive, overcrowded, unsanitary, and unhealthful environment at BCCF. It alleged forced idleness, fire danger, deficient medical care, and lack of access to the courts due to an inadequate law library. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that BCCF violated the Establishment Clause by paying inmates to attend a Bible study class when there was little or no paid work available to other inmates and no other religious activities. A number of lawsuits were filed in the District of Colorado regarding conditions at BCCF. The cases were consolidated and many plaintiffs moved for exclusion from the class or for joinder. The PACER docket for this case ends on February 25, 1999 so no information regarding further proceedings is available.


On December 3, 2014, three women with relatives buried in a mass grave of more than one million deceased individuals on New York City’s Hart Island filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Sections 3, 6, and 8 of Article I of the New York State Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that New York City’s policy barred people from visiting the graves of relatives buried on the island, only allowing them to visit a “gazebo” on the edge of Hart Island. The “gazebo” is out of sight of the graves and visitors were not permitted to leave sentimental items like flowers. The case was assigned to District Judge Vernon S. Broderick. On September 28, 2015, the court granted class certification, defining the class as: "All parents, step-parents, children (biological or adopted), stepchildren, spouses, siblings, step-siblings, half-siblings, grandparents, grandchildren, uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, first cousins, second cousins, legal guardians of deceased individuals buried on Hart Island; wards of deceased guardians buried on Hart Island; and domestic partners of deceased individuals buried on Hart Island, who wish to visit the gravesites of said deceased individuals." On February 19, 2016, the parties agreed to a settlement. The City of New York agreed to provide the plaintiff class with ferry transportation to and from Hart Island, and access to the gravesites of their family members, on at least one weekend day per month. Visitors to the gravesite would be allowed to leave certain sentimental items, like flowers, small stuffed animals, and photographs, at the grave site. The City of New York also agreed to pay the plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs totalling $58,645.00. In December 2016, the parties met and conferred regarding the settlement and agreed to increase the maximum number of visitors able to visit the gravesites during each visitation period from 25 to 35. The court approved the amended stipulation on January 24, 2017. The court continued to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement until December 1, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: In December 2014, three women with relatives buried in a mass grave on New York City’s Hart Island filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that New York City’s policy barred people from visiting the graves of relatives buried on the island and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In 2016, the parties agreed to a settlement that allows a class of all individuals with familial or marital ties to the deceased individuals buried on Hart Island to visit the gravesites on at least one weekend day per month.


This case is one of several federal cases challenging the Trump Administration’s ongoing attempts to reduce Medicaid eligibility under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The case arose from federal and state efforts to limit the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Medicaid, established under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, requires states to cover all individuals of a mandatory covered population group and prohibits states from imposing additional eligibility requirements. However, Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows DHHS to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements when necessary to allow a state to carry out an experimental project that is likely to promote the Act’s objectives. In 2010, the ACA expanded Medicaid coverage to include adults with household incomes less than 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Michigan passed legislation authorizing the Medicaid expansion but sought a waiver under Section 1115 to require new enrollees to pay premiums and copayments that could be reduced by the individual’s engagement in certain “healthy behaviors.” For enrollees with incomes above the FPL, the monthly premium was set at two percent of the individual’s income. DHHS granted the waiver application, effective through December 31, 2018, but specified that no individual may lose or be denied Medicaid eligibility for failure to pay premiums or copayments. In January 2018, DHHS issued a letter to state Medicaid directors announcing its intention to approve Medicaid waiver applications containing work requirements. This action was consistent with President Trump's January 20, 2017 executive order instructing federal agencies to scale back the ACA “[t]o the maximum extent permitted by law." In response, Michigan submitted a Section 1115 waiver application that would add mandatory work requirements. The work requirements consisted of 80 hours of specified work or work-related activities per month and mandatory monthly reporting of work activities, with the loss of coverage for enrollees who do not report the required hours for three months in a 12-month period. The application also included mandatory healthy behaviors and heightened, mandatory premiums for enrollees with incomes above the FPL who received coverage for 48 cumulative months. Failure to pay a premium within 60 days after the invoice date would result in termination of coverage. Enrollees in the same subgroup also had to complete a health risk assessment or specified healthy behaviors in the 12 months before their annual redetermination to remain eligible. DHHS approved these three HMP waivers, effective January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2023, and granted Michigan permission to implement the measures starting January 1, 2020. The work requirements went into effect on January 1, 2020. The state deferred the implementation of the healthy behavior requirements and new premium requirements until October 1, 2020. The plaintiffs, all members of Michigan’s Medicaid program, filed this class-action lawsuit on November 22, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The plaintiffs challenged amendments to the Healthy Michigan Plan (HMP), including work requirements that would result in the loss of health coverage for 61,000 to 183,000 individuals. Represented by the National Health Law Program, the Center for Civil Justice, and the Michigan Poverty Law Program, the plaintiffs requested an injunction against the defendants’ implementation of Michigan’s amended HMP eligibility requirements and declaratory relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed to undergo the required rule-making process in issuing a new policy on Medicaid waivers and acted outside the scope of their waiver authority under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act in approving Michigan’s application that imposed additional Medicaid eligibility requirements. According to the plaintiffs, these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.), the Social Security Act, and the Take Care Clause in Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sued on their behalf and on behalf of all Michigan residents enrolled in the HMP on or after January 1, 2019. On February 19, 2020 the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) filed an unopposed motion to intervene, which was granted the next day. On February 25, 2020, MDHHS filed a motion for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of whether the federal approval of the work and community-engagement requirements in the HMP section 1115 demonstration project was lawful. In light of the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Gresham v. Azar, striking down the work requirements of the Arkansas Medicaid program under the Section 115 waiver, Judge Boasberg granted MDHHS’s motion for partial summary judgment. The December 21, 2018 approval of the work and community engagement requirements in the Healthy Michigan Plan Amended Demonstration Extension Application by the defendant, Secretary Azar, was vacated. Michigan could not enforce the Medicaid work or community engagement requirements that went into effect on January 1, 2020. On April 2, 2020, MDHHS filed a motion to stay in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The same day, the court granted the motion and the case is stayed until the earlier of 1) the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency, or 2) 45 days before the date Michigan begins to implement the premiums that are conditions of continued Medicaid eligibility or the healthy behavior requirements that are conditions of continued Medicaid eligibility. As of June 2020, the Medicaid work and community engagement requirements cannot be enforced. The plaintiffs challenged the payment of premium and cost sharing, community engagement, and healthy behavior components of the HMP. The plaintiffs did not specifically challenge the rest of the waiver, but the complaint asked the court to permanently enjoin the entire HMP. When the case resumes, the court will need to decide on the appropriate remedy, whether to disband the entire HMP, or to only vacate some or all of the specifically challenged portions. Background Medicaid beneficiaries in four other states have filed similar suits challenging the Administration's use of Section 1115 waiver authority. See Stewart v. Azar (Kentucky), Gresham v. Azar (Arkansas), Philbrick v. Azar (New Hampshire), and Rose v. Azar (Indiana). In Stewart v. Azar, the court struck down Kentucky's waiver, which included work requirements, on the basis that the agency failed to sufficiently consider the impact of the proposed project on Medicaid coverage. Similarly, in Gresham v. Azar, the court found that the agency failed to adequately consider how the imposition of work requirements in Arkansas's program would lead to loss of coverage for a substantial number of beneficiaries including the needy, a core group under Medicaid.

Summary: This is one of a series of cases challenging the Trump Administration's decision to allow states to impose eligibility requirements on Medicaid beneficiaries. A group of Michigan Medicaid beneficiaries sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to block its decision to allow Michigan to impose work requirements and payment obligations on them. The plaintiffs claimed that DHHS' actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Social Security Act, and the Constitution. The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services intervened, and filed a motion for partial summary judgment on federal approval of the work and community-engagement requirements of the Healthy Michigan Plan. The court granted this motion, declaring federal approval of these provisions unlawful. Michigan cannot enforce the Medicaid work and community engagement requirements. As of May 2020, due to COVID-19, the case is stayed.


On February 29, 2016, a U.S. Army Captain and member of the Sikh faith filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the United States Department of Defense and the Army, among others, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the Sikh Coalition, and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief prohibiting the U.S. Army from forcing him to compromise his religious exercise. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the U.S. Army violated his First Amendment right to free expression of his religion. The defendants had required him to undergo extensive and repetitive testing to confirm that he could properly wear a combat helmet and a safety mask, while other soldiers with long hair and beards had not been subjected to the same testing. Prior to this action, the plaintiff was given temporary accommodations to keep his hair and beard unshorn and to wear a turban. However, these accommodations were set to expire on March 31. On February 29, the plaintiff filed a temporary restraining order preventing the defendants from subjecting him to non-standard or discriminatory testing. On March 3, Judge Beryl A. Howard granted the plaintiff’s motion and enjoined the defendants from subjecting the plaintiff to any such testing during the pendency of the litigation. 168 F.Supp.3d 216. The plaintiff also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on February 29, requesting that the U.S. Army grant him a permanent religious accommodation for his beard, hair, and turban. Judge Howell denied this motion on May 6, 2016, partially because the preliminary injunction would essentially encompass the relief sought in the underlying complaint. In the same memorandum opinion, Judge Howell also denied the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate his case with another Sikh accommodation case because the plaintiffs in that case were reservists awaiting training rather than a West Point graduate on active duty as in this case. Additionally, the plaintiffs in the second case had not been forced to undergo the same testing that this plaintiff had objected to. 185 F. Supp. 3d 11. On March 31, 2016, the defendants filed a notice that they had extended the plaintiff’s temporary accommodation to one year, or less in the event that military necessity assigned the plaintiff to another unit. In response, on May 23, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint stating that the extension did not negate the Army’s discriminatory regulations and practices. On June 20, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 4, 2016, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. In his filing, the plaintiff’s dismissal was made with the expectation that Sikh Americans would be successfully integrated into the U.S. military outside the context of this legal proceeding. This conclusion was supported by the following facts: (1) the defendants granted the plaintiff a ‘long-term accommodation’ which extended his earlier accommodation for at least one year from March 31, 2016; (2) the defendants had repeatedly written assurances that the plaintiff would not be subject to heightened, individualized testing concerning his helmet and safety mask; (3) while the Assistant Secretary of the Army intended to re-evaluate the plaintiff’s accommodation the following year, the plaintiff would not need to submit a new accommodation request; (4) the defendants planned to develop uniform standards for religious accommodations; (5) the plaintiff was not required to submit a new accommodation request with every new assignment, transfer of duty station, etc.; (6) no change would be made to the plaintiff’s accommodation without the evaluation being expeditiously forwarded to the Assistant Secretary; and (7) that a modification that substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise would only be permissible where the defendants could prove that they had a compelling interest to require modification, that modification was in furtherance of that interest, and that there was no less restrictive means of furthering that interest. These facts indicated that the plaintiff would not be subjected to adverse treatment by virtue of his faith for at least one year, by which time the plaintiff expected that the army would have legally sufficient accommodation guidelines in place. On July 5, 2016, the case was dismissed without prejudice and signed by Judge Beryl A. Howell. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 29, 2016, a U.S. Army Captain and member of the Sikh faith filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the United States Department of Defense and the Army, asking the court to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the grooming regulations as it pertained to his religious exercise. The defendants extended his temporary accommodations, but still required the extensive and repetitive testing of helmet and gas mask fit that they did not require of others who had been given exemptions. On July 4, 2016, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice, based upon written assurances by the defendant that he would not be subjected to adverse treatment by virtue of his faith for at least one year, by which time the plaintiff expected that the army would have legally sufficient accommodation guidelines in place. The case was dismissed on July 5, 2016, and there are no updates as to whether the defendant has developed further guidelines.