COVID-19 Summary: Twelve particularly vulnerable immigration detainees filed this habeas petition and complaint on March 24, 2020. The Court granted release on March 31, holding that their ongoing detention was unlawfully punitive given the grave threat posed by congregate detention during the coronavirus pandemic. On April 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, seeking class certification for all civil immigrant detainees in the Middle District of PA over the age of 45 or with underlying health conditions. On April 27, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, ruling that the plaintiffs who were detained at Pike County Correctional Facility could remain free, but those who were detained at York County Prison and at Clinton County Correctional Facility were to return to detention. Based on evidence of a plaintiff contracting COVID-19, the court granted in part plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, allowing the plaintiffs who are sick to remain free but ordering those who are asymptomatic to return to detention. A motion for classwide preliminary injunction is currently pending before the court.
 On March 24, 2020, twelve civil immigration detainees held by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at York County Prison (YCF), Clinton County Correctional Facility (CCCF), and Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) -- who because of their age or underlying medical conditions were particularly susceptible to serious illness or death in the event of a COVID-19 infection -- filed this habeas petition and complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Represented by the ACLU National Prison Project, ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, ACLU of Pennsylvania, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the warden of the above-named detention facilities, the acting directors of ICE and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the director of ICE's Philadelphia Field Office. The plaintiffs alleged that the harm posed by continued detention in conditions insufficient to prevent the rapid transmission of COVID-19 violated their substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. They sought a writ of habeas corpus ordering their immediate release or, in the alternative, injunctive relief ordering ICE to release them. The plaintiffs also sought attorney’s fees and cost and declaratory relief that "continued detention in civil immigration custody of individuals at increased risk for severe illness, including all people over ages forty-five and older and persons of any age with underlying medical conditions that may increase the risk of serious COVID-19, violates the Due Process Clause." The case was assigned to Judge John E. Jones. This complaint was filed in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S., which caused the state of Pennsylvania to declare a state of emergency. The outbreak resulted in unprecedented public health measures emphasizing and enforcing social distancing throughout the area, including the closure of non-essential businesses and a stay-at-home order for Philadelphia and surrounding counties. However, immigration detention facilities are “congregate environments,” or places where people live and sleep in close proximity and, thus, cannot practice recommended social distancing and good hygiene measures. Given the crowding and lack of adequate medical infrastructure, if COVID-19 were introduced into the detention facilities it would spread easily. The spread of COVID-19 (for which there is no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) would be especially dangerous for detainees over the age of 45 or those with certain underlying health conditions such as lung, heart, and kidney disease--characteristics that the plaintiffs possess. The plaintiffs asserted that "there is growing recognition among courts and even prison systems that release from detention is the only way to protect vulnerable detainees from COVID-19." The plaintiffs asserted that the Fifth Amendment guarantees that civil detainees, including immigrant detainees with criminal backgrounds, may not be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment. The plaintiffs claimed that continued detention in the face of a potential COVID-19 outbreak in the facilities amounts to punishment because it serves no legitimate purpose, is not "rationally related to the enforcement of immigration laws," and "because their conditions of confinement place them at serious risk of being infected with COVID- 19 and Defendants are being deliberately indifferent to this critical safety concern." The plaintiffs argued that ICE has the authority to exercise discretion in releasing vulnerable civil immigrant detainees like the plaintiffs and ensure adequate conditions for their release. Lastly, plaintiffs contended that the "only course of action that can remedy these unlawful conditions is release from the detention centers where risk mitigation is impossible." On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a preliminary injunction (PI) to enjoin "Defendants from continuing to detain Plaintiffs in violation of their constitutional rights." The plaintiffs argued that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO/PI, and that the public interest weighs heavily in favor of a TRO/PI. On March 27, the plaintiffs filed a factual update, informing the court that two of the plaintiffs had been released from PCCF. On March 29, the defendants filed a response and opposition to the plaintiffs' petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for TRO and/or PI. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs lack standing, as the "Petitioners have not alleged that COVID-19 has affirmatively spread to the Pike, York, or Clinton county facilities." The defendants further argued that a "petition for habeas relief seeking immediate release is inappropriate in the context of a conditions of confinement claim." Finally, the defendants asserted that a TRO/PI is inappropriate because the plaintiffs did not establish that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claim and that they did not demonstrate irreparable harm. On March 31, Judge James issued a memorandum and order granting the plaintiffs' motion for TRO and directing defendants to immediately release plaintiffs that same day. Judge Jones also ordered that by April 7, 2020, the defendants show cause why the TRO should not be converted into a PI. In finding that a TRO was appropriate, Judge James concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims despite no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the facilities; "'since '[a] remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event,' it is evident that the Petitioners have standing in this matter." Judge Jones further found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable injury, as they "have shown that adequate measures are not in place and cannot be taken to protect them from COVID-19 in the detention facilities, and that catastrophic results may ensue, both to Petitioners and to the communities surrounding the Facilities." Judge Jones held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim; "[c]onsidering the Facility conditions previously discussed, we can see no rational relationship between a legitimate government objective and keeping Petitioners detained in unsanitary, tightly-packed environments—doing so would constitute a punishment to Petitioners." On April 7, the defendants filed their response to the court's order to show cause. The defendants contended that a habeas petition was not appropriate in this case, as the plaintiffs challenged their conditions of confinement, not the validity of their confinement. The defendants also proclaimed that the evidence demonstrates that "the Government has taken steps to protect the Petitioners’ safety and the safety of other detainees from prevention, uncontrollable spread, diagnoses, and treatment of COVID-19." Lastly, the defendants asserted that the balance of equities and public interest favored denying injunctive relief because release is not appropriate due to the plaintiffs' criminal or immigration backgrounds. On April 13, Judge Jones issued an order extending the TRO until April 27. Judge Jones stated that this extension was warranted given the worsening situation of the COVID-19 pandemic and to give "both parties ample opportunity to augment the record before us prior to our decision on the issuance of a preliminary injunction." A few days later, on April 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, requesting that the Court "certify a class of noncitizens at elevated risk of suffering severe health consequences or dying if they contract COVID-19, and to issue expedited relief." The plainitffs' proposed class was defined as: "all noncitizens who are now, or will in the future be, detained in ICE custody in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and who have been diagnosed with, or are receiving treatment for, a preexisting medical condition and/or are over the age of 45." The plaintiffs asserted that, upon information and belief, "there are dozens more who are detained at the three ICE facilities who fit the class definition. The class is also fluid as individuals are regularly brought into the facilities as detainees." The amended complaint also added 11 civil immigrant detainees, who because of their age or underlying health conditions are at a high risk of severe illness or death if they were to contract COVID-19, as plaintiffs. On April 27, Judge Jones issued a memorandum and order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction required that three of the named plaintiffs from Pike County Correctional Facility (PCCF) remain released until the end of the COVID-19 State of Emergency in Pennsylvania or social distancing guidelines are lifted. Judge Jones declined to grant the preliminary injunction with regard to plaintiffs from CCCF and YCP and required that they "voluntarily surrender themselves to the institution from which they were released." As an initial matter, Judge Jones concluded that the plaintiffs could challenge their conditions of confinement through habeas and that the plaintiffs had standing, despite no named plaintiffs having contracted COVID-19. Furthermore, Judge Jones held because the conditions of confinement varied across facilities, only the plaintiffs held at PCCF were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim. Judge Jones also found that conditions at YCP and CCCF "had been adequately improved such that the Petitioners previously housed therein were no longer at risk of irreparable harm resulting from COVID-19." As of the filing of that order, there had been only one confirmed case between YCP and CCCF. 2020 WL 2025384. The next day, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for stay and reconsideration. The plaintiffs presented evidence that one of the plaintiffs who had been ordered to return to detention had been in the hospital for weeks, likely due to contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs argued that "the timing of events makes it nearly certain that he contracted the virus while at CCCF." The same day, Judge Jones granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Judge Jones vacated the April 27 order and permitted the continued release for two of the named plaintiffs based on the evidence that they had contracted COVID-19. Judge Jones ordered that those plaintiffs who are asymptomatic return to detention Later that day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an emergency stay in the Third Circuit (No. 20-01906) and, in the district court, an emergency motion to stay pending appeal. The plaintiffs argued that the district court had reached an erroneous decision, "based on an incomplete record, a misunderstanding of the science behind the disease, and legal errors." The plaintiffs further asserted that the facilities had not conducted an adequate amount of tests to conclude that it was safe to return the plaintiffs to detention. The next day, a Third Circuit panel denied the plaintiffs' motion for an emergency stay. The panel did not provide an explanation for its decision. On May 1, the plaintiffs filed a motion for classwide preliminary injunction. The defendant's filed a motion in opposition on May 22. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or to strike on June 15, requesting the court dispose of the 6 individual claims brought based on Zadvydas v. Davis. The plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to this motion on June 22. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents, or many of the following documents. On June 29, Judge Jones granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the individual claims under Zadvydas, stating that the plaintiffs could separately file individual habeas actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On July 8, the plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Transfers of individual plaintiffs and a corresponding Brief of Support. Defendants moved for a Protective Order on July 13, which was granted in part and denied in part. On July 14, the court issued an Order Referring Motion, where the defendants agreed to provide prior notice to plaintiffs' counsel before the transfer of any named class representative or putative class member. The plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Transfers was referred to Magistrate Judge Martin Carlson for any appropriate proceedings, if necessary. On July 21, the plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Violating Order Regarding Transfers. The next day, the court ordered defendants to arrange for direct communication with plaintiffs' counsel within 24 hours regarding transfers without prior notice in violation of the July 14 order. On July 29, the plaintiffs filed a Brief in Support of Classwide Preliminary Injunction and Class Certification. On August 3, the defendants filed a Brief in Opposition to the plaintiffs' July 21 Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt of Court for Violating Order Regarding Transfers. On August 4, the defendants filed a Reply Brief to the plaintiffs' July 8 Motion for Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Transfers. As of October 7, 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, persons critically vulnerable to the infectious disease and held in an immigration detention facilities near Philadelphia filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs filed a habeas petition, suing ICE, its directors, and the wardens of three detention facilities for violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs argued that continued detention in the face of a potential outbreak in the detention facility, which would expose the plaintiffs to substantial harm, amounted to punishment, in violation of the Due Process Clause. On March 31, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and directed ICE to release the plaintiffs immediately. This TRO has been extended to April 27. On April 17, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking class certification of all civil immigrant detainees in the Middle District of PA over the age of 45 and/or with underlying conditions. On April 28, the court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs from Pike County Correctional Facility could remain released. The next day, the court ordered the continued release of two plaintiffs who were suspected of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs filed a motion for classwide preliminary injunction, which is currently pending before the court.


COVID-19 Summary: Three residents of Michigan sued Governor Whitmer, challenging that an Executive Order issued to combat the spread of COVID-19, which required residents to stay home and suspend non-essential activity and business, violated their Equal Protection, Due Process, and First and Second Amendment constitutional rights. On April 24, the defendant issued an executive order permitting the activities that the plaintiffs alleged were unconstitutionally prohibited. The motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot, however, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion on April 28. <hr> On April 15, 2020, three Michigan residents, two owning cottages in the state and one owning a landscaping business, filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of the State of Michigan and three county prosecuting attorneys, in their official capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan state law. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Freedom Law Center, challenged Michigan's Executive Order 2020-42, which ordered all people in Michigan to stay home and suspended activities deemed unnecessary to sustain or protect life. The plaintiffs sought relief declaring that the enactment and enforcement of Executive Order 2020-42 violated "their fundamental liberties and rights secured by the United States and Michigan Constitutions and an order enjoining the same." The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Maloney. On April 9, 2020, Executive Order 2020-42 was enacted in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 in Michigan; as of April 8, Michigan reported 20,346 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 959 deaths from it. The order directed all Michigan residents to stay home, subject to exceptions for exercise and obtaining services or supplies, prohibited "all public and private gatherings of any number of people occurring among persons not part of a single household," and required that "no person or entity shall operate a business or conduct operations that require workers to leave their homes or places of residence except to the extent that those workers are necessary to sustain or protect life or to conduct minimum basic operations." The order was put in place with the goal of suppressing the spread of COVID-19, preventing the state's health care system from being overwhelmed, and allowing time for the production of test kits, ventilators, and personal protective equipment. It was set to stay in effect until April 30, 2020. The plaintiffs claimed that the Executive Order violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing it lacked any rational basis and deprived plaintiffs of their "fundamental rights and freedom," such as the right to travel to their cottages, conduct landscaping business, and travel to purchase ammunition, "yet the order provides exceptions for other activity and conduct that is similar in its impact and effects." Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the Executive Order violated their right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, as it deprived plaintiffs of "the use and enjoyment of their property without due process" and because "it broadly prohibits Plaintiffs . . . from traveling through public spaces and roadways to their cottages, and yet the executive order permits other travel with the same impact and effect of Plaintiffs’ forbidden travel." Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that the Executive Order violated their "right to contract without government interference," their right to keep and bear arms, and their right to "associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." On April 20, the plaintiffs sought a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and asked for an order temporarily enjoining enforcement of Executive Order 2020-42 pending a hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue. On April 24, 2020, the defendant issued Executive Order 2020-59, which permits: individuals to travel between their own residences and cottages within the State of Michigan, the operation of landscaping businesses within the State of Michigan, outdoor activities that include using boats with motors for recreational purposes, the sale of guns from any store via remote order and curbside pick-up, and the sale of guns in-store from stores that sell necessary supplies as well as guns in their normal course of business, and exempts from penalty religious gatherings at private residences. On April 26, the plaintiffs stated that the requested relief is no longer necessary because the stipulation rendered the TRO and PI motion is moot. The next day, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. On April 28, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, claiming that while stipulation remedied the immediate harm, it did not resolve the constitutional issues presented. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 20, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims had become moot due to the series of executive orders that permitted the activities that the amended complaint alleged were prohibited. They further argued that the State had the broad authority to implement emergency measures during an emergency. The case is ongoing but with little activity since the summer.

Summary: In April 2020, three residents of Michigan sued the Governor of Michigan and three county prosecuting attorneys in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs challenged Executive Order 2020-42, which was enacted to combat the spread of COVID-19 in Michigan and required residents to stay at home and suspend all non-essential activities. The plaintiffs claimed that the challenged measures of the Executive Order violated their constitutional rights, lacked a rational basis, and had no real or substantial relation to the objectives of the order. On April 24, the defendant issued an executive order permitting the activities that the plaintiffs alleged were unconstitutionally prohibited. The motion for preliminary injunction was dismissed as moot, however, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion on April 28. The case is ongoing.


On November 2, 2020, asylum seekers with disabilities and health conditions filed this putative class-action suit against the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Southern District of California. The suit alleged that defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by forcibly returning plaintiffs to Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocols (the “MPP”). Under the MPP, asylum seekers entering the United States from Mexico were returned to Mexico and waited outside the U.S. for the duration of their immigration proceedings. The plaintiffs stated that MPP conflicted with CBP’s own procedure at the time that asylum seekers with “known physical or mental health issues” cannot be sent to Mexico. They alleged that DHS failed to put in place effective methods to ensure that people with known physical or mental health conditions were exempt from MPP and to identify and assess, for accommodations, immigrants with disabilities. The plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the defendants from continuing forcible removal of class members under MPP and requiring the defendants to put in place practices and procedures in compliance with Section 504. They also requested attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs were represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Texas Civil Rights Project, and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Todd W. Robinson and Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal. On November 3, 2020, the case was related to Doe v. McAleenan, docket number 3:19-cv-2119, (IM-CA-0152 in the Clearinghouse). This case similarly challenged deportation under MPP. On December 22, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to stay pending the appeal of a separate case. The judge denied the motion on February 19, 2021. There were joint motions to continue on March 2, 2021. On December 23, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. They requested that defendants stop subjecting members of the putative class to the MPP. They further requested that defendants put in place mechanisms ensuring CBP’s protocols of exempting those with known physical or mental health issues was being carried out, that family members of the putative class were also excluded pursuant to the Family Unit Policy, and that defendants put in place practices and policies to identify immigrants with disabilities and provide accommodations necessary for those with disabilities to prepare for their asylum proceedings. On the same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion requesting class certification for asylum seekers with disabilities and their family members. On February 22, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. As of March 12, 2021, there has not been a ruling on the motion. This summary is up-to-date as of March 12, 2021 and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 2, 2020 asylum seekers with disabilities and health conditions filed a putative class-action suit against the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant's violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction and an order enjoining defendants from subjecting members of the putative class to removal protocols and attorney's fees. The case is ongoing.


Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, filed suit in May 2007 in United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing Company, for its participation in a U.S. extraordinary rendition program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that apprehended, transported, imprisoned, interrogated, and, in some instances, tortured the plaintiffs. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, plaintiffs brought action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, alleging that Jeppesen provided flight planning and logistical support of the extraordinary rendition of plaintiffs, with knowledge that its involvement would lead to unlawful apprehension, detention, and possible torture. In October 2007, the United States moved to intervene and moved to dismiss the case, asserting the "states secret" privilege. Then-director of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, filed declarations in support of the motion to dismiss, asserting that disclosure of information could cause serious or grave damage to national security. After conducting a hearing, the district court granted the motion to intervene and to dismiss. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Plaintiffs immediately appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case, ruling that the states secret privilege in this context operated only as an evidentiary privilege, the exact parameters of which were indeterminate until plaintiffs made an actual request for discovery of specific evidence. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 563 F. 3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by 579 F. 3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). Meanwhile, Barack Obama succeeded George W. Bush as President of the United States. His administration announced new policies for invoking the states secrets privilege and reviewed the assertion of privilege in this case. Government then requested the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc, which the court granted. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). Upon rehearing, an eleven judge panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court order of dismissal. Even though plaintiff's prima facie case and Jeppesen's defenses may not have depended on privileged evidence, the court found that "the facts underlying plaintiffs' claims are so infused with state secrets, " there was "no feasible way to litigate Jeppesen's alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets." Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1088, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit then noted possible nonjudicial relief, including government-provided reparations, a Congressional investigation and legislation restraining the executive branch, Congressional legislation enacting a private bill, and Congressional legislation enacting remedial schemes to address claims like plaintffs'. Id. at 1091-92. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which denied certiorari in May 2011.

Summary: Plaintiffs, foreign nationals, filed suit in May 2007 in United States District Court for the Northern District of California against Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing Company, for its participation in a U.S. extraordinary rendition program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, plaintiffs brought action under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Following motions to intervene and to dismiss by the United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case due to invocation of states secrets privilege. Mohamed v. Jeppesen DataPlan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1088, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010).


On September 29, 2006, the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam. The plaintiff sued Leo Palace Resort under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff, representing female employees of Leo Palace Resort, asked the court for permanent injunctive relief, a requirement of policy changes at defendant's company, and monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment and by retaliating against employees for complaining of discrimination. Specifically, three female employees alleged that they experienced frequent sexual harassment from a coworker in the form of physical touching, requests for sex, and inappropriate gestures. When the employees complained the defendant employer retaliated by reducing their hours, taking disciplinary action, and failing to keep their complaints confidential. Two employees were constructively discharged as a result. The complainants intervened in the EEOC's suit and the defendant moved to dismiss their claims and moved for summary judgment. The summary judgment motion was denied and the motion to dismiss was denied as premature. The parties engaged in discovery for the next year, and agreed to have a hearing date without oral argument. On September 10, 2007, the defendants again filed for partial summary judgment, arguing that this was only a question of negligence on behalf of the company in response to complaints of its employee, and not a sexual harassment suit. On March 13, 2008, before the court had heard the motion for partial summary judgment, the parties parties jointly submitted a consent decree. On March 21, 2008 Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood approved the consent decree. The agreement required the defendant to pay the complainants a total of $243,000. It also required the defendant to create an anti-discrimination policy; institute a complaint procedure; hire an outside consultant to ensure compliance with the decree; post and distribute a notice of equal opportunity employment rights; and conduct annual training for all employees. On May 8, 2008 the case was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: On September 29, 2006, the Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam. The plaintiff sued Leo Palace Resort under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment and by retaliating against employees for complaining of discrimination. On March 21, 2008 Judge Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood approved a consent decree between the two parties. The consent decree required the defendant to pay the complainants a total of $243,000. It also required the defendant to create an anti-discrimination policy; institute a complaint procedure; hire an outside consultant to ensure compliance with the decree; post and distribute a notice of equal opportunity employment rights; and conduct annual training for all employees.


Two refugees whose families fled Cambodia in the 1970s filed this class action lawsuit, challenging U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for arbitrarily and unlawfully detaining them. The plaintiffs represented other Cambodian refugees living in the U.S. since escaping the violence of the Khmer Rouge regime. The plaintiffs argued that ICE violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by unlawfully revoking their release from its custody and detaining them when removal was not reasonably foreseeable and without individualized determinations of danger and flight risk. The plaintiffs sought habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Represented by Asian Americans Advancing Justice and a private law firm, the plaintiffs filed this case on October 27, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The complaint sought to declare a class of approximately 1,900 individuals. The plaintiffs stated that all class members escaped the Khmer Rouge regime and its "campaign of mass murder and torture" in Cambodia in the 1970s when they were young children. They had lived in the United States ever since, growing up "in communities in crisis...struggl[ing] with unaddressed trauma, poverty, and violence-ridden neighborhoods, with almost no culturally competent resources to address their needs." Class members "made mistakes in their youth," which led to involvement in the criminal justice system, loss of their Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status, and removal proceedings. However, ICE subsequently released the class members after Cambodia disallowed repatriation. ICE allowed the class members to return to their communities but required them to regularly report back to demonstrate they were complying with the conditions of their release. Many of these class members established families in the U.S. The complaint stated that, as of October 2016, Cambodia suspended a 2002 repatriation agreement with the U.S. A year later, following a U.S. government freeze on further tourist visas to Cambodians until Cambodia agreed to aid the U.S. in removing Cambodian refugees, ICE began raiding Cambodian refugee homes and workplaces. The plaintiffs asserted that ICE conducted these raids "without cause and without providing procedural protections required by law . . . [and] without any evidence that Cambodia would now accept their repatriation." Further, the plaintiffs argued that they "received no adequate explanation of the reasons for detention, no opportunity to be heard regarding any purported reasons for detention, and no individualized consideration before a neutral decisionmaker regarding whether they pose a danger or flight risk that could warrant detention." On October 30, the case was assigned to Judge Cormac J. Carney. On December 12, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. They also filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) as to the removal of plaintiffs scheduled to begin on December 18, arguing that because they only had learned that removal proceedings were to commence on December 7, they needed the TRO so that they could have an opportunity to reopen and challenge their orders of removal. These documents are not publicly available. Judge Carney granted the TRO on December 14. While the amended complaint is not publicly available, it appears that the complaint sought to define a class "on behalf of approximately 1,900 individuals who received orders of removal to Cambodia but were subsequently released from custody and have since been living in the United States." Judge Carney granted a preliminary injunction on January 25, 2018. 306 F. Supp. 3d 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2018). He enjoined the government from executing final removal orders as to the plaintiffs and a subclass of 92 putative class members who received or were being considered for travel papers. The injunction prevented final removal orders until February 5, 2018. Judge Carney held that denying an injunction "amounts to a denial of due process" because while removal orders for many of the plaintiffs have been dormant for over a decade, "[c]ircumstances have changed in the interim that may allow Petitioners to raise serious questions regarding the validity of their underlying convictions and removal orders." On February 8, the government moved to dismiss the case; the plaintiffs responded on March 2, and the government replied on March 12. On February 23, the plaintiffs moved to relate this case to Trinh v. Homan, a case challenging ICE's detention of Vietnamese refugees stripped of their LPR status due to criminal convictions. On March 14, Judge Carney granted plaintiffs' motion to relate the cases. On March 19, the plaintiffs moved for another preliminary injunction and class certification. Meanwhile, the defendants appealed Judge Carney's January 25 preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-55389). After a March 26 hearing, Judge Carney denied the government's motion to dismiss, and granted the plaintiffs' habeas claim. 2018 WL 1941756 (C.D. Cal.). First, Judge Carney held that the Court had jurisdiction over the habeas petition and due process claim, because plaintiffs challenged not the removal order itself but the legality of the detention. Judge Carney then ordered plaintiff released from ICE custody, finding his arrest, detention, and threatened deportation unlawful. Judge Carney wrote:
Chhoeun poses no danger to the community. Prior to ICE’s wrongful re-detention of him, he was living peaceably in the community for the past fourteen years. He was gainfully employed. He had built strong ties to his family and his community. The Government simply had no justification to take away, without due process, Chhoeun’s liberty to carry out his life. . . . The Government’s argument [that an person subject to an order of removal lacks due process rights] trivializes, indeed ignores, fundamental principles of liberty and due process embedded in our Constitution. . . . And due process demands that the Government consider the totality of an individual’s circumstances before taking away his or her liberty. Ragbir v. Sessions. . . . The Government’s position, which would do away with any individualized consideration before taking away someone’s liberty, is repugnant to due process.
 On April 12, Judge Carney rejected the proposed class definition because a class consisting of 13 members was not numerous enough. On May 11, 2018, certain defendants moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. On June 4, 2018, Judge Carney denied the motion without prejudice. On May 24, 2018, the government appealed the March 26 order denying their motion to dismiss. On July 2, 2018, the plaintiffs again moved to certify the class, which the district court approved on August 14, 2018. Judge Carney certified the following class: "All Cambodian nationals in the United States who received final orders of deportation or removal, and were subsequently released from ICE custody, and have not subsequently violated any criminal laws or conditions of their release, and have been or may be re-detained for removal by ICE." Back at the Ninth Circuit, on December 7, 2018, the government moved to voluntarily dismiss their March 23 appeal of Judge Carney’s preliminary injunction. Voluntary dismissal of this appeal was granted on December 11, 2018. 2018 Us App Lexis 34850 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 2018). On December 31, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, enjoining the government from re-detaining any class member without notice. The plaintiffs alleged that the government had conducted two raids since the raid involving the plaintiffs, detaining many class members in the process. They had received credible information suggesting that another raid was forthcoming and had requested the government to provide class members with notice, which it refused to do without a court order. Judge Carney granted the TRO on January 3, 2019, requiring the government to give at least fourteen days’ notice before re-detaining any class member. Judge Carney also ordered the government to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not issue in light of the TRO. The government then successfully requested an extended period of time to file its opening brief in its second appeal, that of Judge Carney’s March 26 denial of the government’s motion to dismiss. However, shortly thereafter, the government similarly moved to voluntarily dismiss this appeal. The Ninth Circuit granted that dismissal. 2019 Us App Lexis 9447 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2019). Back in the district court, on April 10, 2019, Judge Carney vacated the order to show cause in light of the parties’ stipulation. He ordered the parties to make a good faith effort to settle the case before proceeding with their respective motions for summary judgment, but set a briefing schedule in the event that they do not. Deadlines for briefing were set for September through November of 2019. To effectuate a settlement, the court assigned a mediator on October 15, 2019. However, the parties did not reach a settlement and proceeded to summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on October 23, 2019. The defendants likewise filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on January 9, 2020. On March 4, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs held a compelling liberty interest in remaining in the United States where they had lives and families; that there would be a high risk of erroneous deprivation of that liberty interest and thus a high value in giving notice to the potential detainee; and that there were few burdens or interests that supported not giving notice before re-detaining the plaintiffs. Thus, the court concluded that notice was fundamental to protecting the plaintiffs' due process rights. The court on March 20, 2020, ordered the parties to file a joint permanent injunction proposal. On April 27, 2020, the court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and further ordered a permanent injunction that enjoined ICE from re-detaining any member of the class without first giving two weeks' written notice. The defendants appealed the district court's ruling on summary judgment and its order for a permanent injunction to the Ninth Circuit, docket number 20-55665, on June 25, 2020. As of April 16, 2021, the parties have engaged in mediation within the Ninth Circuit.

Summary: Two Cambodian refugees filed this class action suit, on behalf of Cambodian refugees living in the U.S. since the 1970s, challenging ICE for arbitrarily and unlawfully detaining them in 2017. The Court granted a TRO in Dec. 2017 and a PI in Jan. 2018, preventing the government from executing final removal orders before plaintiffs could challenge their removal. The Court granted plaintiffs' habeas claim in Mar. 2018.


On March 30, 2017, an organization called Tent City Alternative to LSD Viaducts and a community resident activist submitted a Notification of Public Assembly to the City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings. They requested a permit to erect tents on behalf of the homeless population, who would be displaced by construction. The City granted a permit as to the location for the duration sought, but without a provision that would allow the erection of tents. On May 17, the plaintiffs responded by filing a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County. On June 15, 2017, the defendant City of Chicago removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case was assigned to Judge Sidney Schenkier. In September, the court granted a motion to change the name of the plaintiffs to The Uptown Tent City Organizers. The Uptown Tent City Organizers is an unincorporated association of community members, some of whom reside in tents under the viaducts near Lake Shore Drive. On August 1, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 against the Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings, Chicago Department of Transportation, and City of Chicago. The first amended complaint claimed that denial of the permit to erect tents violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to public assembly, Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment, and rights under state law. The plaintiffs sought a reversal of the city's decision to deny the permit (granting the application for an assembly permit to run for a period of six months), declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. On August 27, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to prevent the construction work from occurring that would displace the homeless community. On September 15, Judge Sidney I. Schenkier denied the motion on the basis that the government did not have the constitutional obligation to provide individuals with a place to live and the community did not have a contractual right to live under the viaducts. On November 7, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint to add federal constitutional violations under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and a state claim of violation of the Illinois Homeless Act. The amended complaint included details of events that precipitated in September between the plaintiffs and local law enforcement. The plaintiffs again sought a reversal of the administrative hearing decision to deny the permits, declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and attorney's fees and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on January 19, 2018. Judge Schenkier granted this motion and dismissed the case with prejudice on June 5, 2018. The court held that the organization lacked standing because it failed to allege that any of its members would be personally harmed by the City's conduct. And the court dismissed the individual plaintiff's First Amendment claim because the plaintiff had not alleged that the proposed conduct would be expressive. Finally, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 2018 WL 2709431. The case is ongoing

Summary: A community organization challenged a decision made by the City of Chicago Department of Administrative Hearings to deny a permit to erect tents on behalf of the homeless population in the area. The plaintiffs brought federal claims for violations of First, Eighth, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment in addition to state law claims, and the case was removed to federal court. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' federal claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims.


On December 5, 2005, a convicted murderer on parole in Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole. The plaintiff is represented by both public and private counsel. The plaintiff asked the court for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiff asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from: imposing the sex-offender label on him without a hearing that met due process requirements; subjecting the plaintiff to conditions that were different than similar supervisees; and failing to accommodate his religious exercise. The plaintiff also alleged that he has not had the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver's license, or receive education. On June 25 2007, Judge Lee Yeakel dismissed the plaintiff's claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000. The plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were allowed to proceed. The decision allowing the claims to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was appealed. On June 23, 2008, the US Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, affirmed the decision of the district court. On March 24, 2009, Judge Lee Yeakel ordered that the defendants must afford the plaintiff due process of law, and dismissed, without prejudice, all of his other claims. This judgment was appealed. On May 20, 2010, The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, ruled mostly for the plaintiff, slightly modifying the amount of due process that the plaintiff must be afforded. On March 30, 2011, the district court (Judge Lee Yeakel) granted the plaintiff's motion for the enforcement of the March 24, 2009 judgment as confirmed by the court of appeals, and ordered that the determination of whether the plaintiff should be considered a sex offender should conform with the plaintiff's due process rights. On August 24, 2011, the district court (Judge Lee Yeakel) denied the plaintiff's second motion for enforcement of the judgment, ruling that the defendant's actions after the March 30, 2011 order had sufficiently complied with the March 24, 2009 judgment. The plaintiff's original sentence for murder ended in 2012. He will remain under mandatory supervision for possessing a weapon in prison in 1989 until 2016. On September 20, 2013, the court granted a stipulation of dismissal for the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. It appears that the plaintiff settled with the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole. On December 12, 2013, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as moot since they did not have the ability to grant the relief that the plaintiff was asking for. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice stated that only the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole had this power, and they had been dismissed from the complaint. On March 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint based on the defendant's motion to dismiss for mootness. On July 29, 2014, the plaintiff filed a sixth amended complaint alleging that the plaintiff was unable to move into suitable housing and denied employment due to the defendant's actions. Not much activity appears on the docket thereafter. On Jan. 20, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss the case. The court issued its final judgment the next day, granting the motion. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 5, 2005, a convicted murder on parole in Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Texas department of Criminal Justice and the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole. The plaintiff asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from failing imposing the sex-offender label to him without a hearing that met due process requirements, subjecting the plaintiff to conditions that were different than similar supervisees, and failing to accommodate his religious exercise. The plaintiff also alleged that he has not had the same opportunities as other supervisees to acquire a job, obtain a driver's license, or receive education. The claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 were dismissed, but the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were allowed to proceed. The court granted the Plaintiff a ruling that required the Defendant to give the Plaintiff a hearing on his sex-offender status that complied with due process requirements, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Defendants complied with this ruling. The plaintiff's original sentence for murder ended in 2012. He will remain under mandatory supervision for possessing a weapon in prison in 1989 until 2016. On September 20, 2013, the court granted a stipulation of dismissal for the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole, and dismissed the claim with prejudice. It appears that the plaintiff settled with the Texas Department of Pardons and Parole. The case is still ongoing against the Texas Board of Pardons and Parole.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 17, 2020, individuals detained in the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) filed this putative class action complaint addressing safety concerns posed by COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought emergency risk-mitigation procedures and release measures to reduce the population at the PCCF. On May 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal on October 8, 2020. <hr> On April 17, 2020, federal detainees at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) filed this putative class action complaint at the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, addressing safety concerns posed by COVID-19. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that conditions of confinement lacked reasonable preventative measures in response to the heightened health risks from COVID-19, in violation of their Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. They pointed to ongoing failures by the defendant to comply with basic safety measures under the interim guidelines provided for correctional facilities by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including its social distancing requirement. The plaintiffs sought a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), declaratory and injunctive relief, and a writ of habeas corpus ordering immediate action to reduce the population at the PCCF and institute proper hygienic measures, with an independent monitor to ensure compliance. Concurrently, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that all federal detainees held or to be held by the PCCF be granted class certification. The case was assigned to Judge Leo T. Sorokin. On April 20, the defendants filed an emergency motion to stay the consideration of the proposed class certification, or a two-week extension to file a response to the motion for class certification in the alternative. The court granted the motion on the same day. The next day, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, as there were no cases of COVID-19 in PCCF in the detainee population as of April 20, and the petitioners did not have underlying medical conditions. A second motion was filed on April 24, further submitting that the requested remedies by the plaintiffs involved a challenge to the fact or duration of their confinement, outside of the writ of habeas. The defendant submitted a status report confirming three cases of COVID-19 among employees on April 29. A hearing was held the next day. On May 1, the court ordered the defendant to answer a list of questions addressing disputed factual questions and unclear matters by May 6. Questions include housing arrangements of the proposed class, policies governing face masks, testing capacity in the PCCF, as well as the respondents’ response to the three confirmed cases of COVID-19. The defendants submitted a status report confirming two additional cases of COVID-19 among employees on May 5, and report of one additional case on May 12. On May 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs' claims fell within the scope of a habeas petition and that the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not grounds for dismissal. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction because they failed to meet their burden of establishing that they were likely to succeed in showing that the defendant had been deliberately indifferent to the risk of COVID-19. The court further ordered that the parties file a joint status report regarding how the matter should proceed, and ordered the defendant to file a status report explaining whether and how PCCF is expanding its testing in line with the institution-wide testing occurring in DOC facilities and its reasoning by May 27. On May 27, the defendants reported that they did not plan to institute institution-wide testing occurring in DOC facilities because it was the medical opinion of PCCF’s medical director that such measures were not warranted at PCCF in the present circumstances. According to the latest status report on June 2, one employee at PCCF tested positive. 28 detainees were tested with two results coming back positive. According to the June 24 status report, 53 individuals at PCCF were tested, with two positive results from pretrial detainees and one from a former detainee who tested positive following his release. The plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal on October 8, 2020.

Summary: On April 17, 2020, detainees of the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) filed this putative class action addressing safety concerns posed by COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought risk-mitigations procedures and release measures to reduce the population at the PCCF. On May 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The parties entered discovery, filed status reports, and on October 8, the plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal.


On December 13, 2005, a group of battered immigrant wives and children of lawful U.S. residents filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging the denial of food stamps, Medicaid, and other public assistance benefits to certain categories of immigrants. The plaintiffs alleged that they applied for public benefits at New York City Job Centers, but were improperly denied those benefits in violation of state and federal law. They sought emergency injunctive relief and class certification. The defendants denied the allegations and sought to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel from handling the case. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' attorneys had submitted affidavits in support of a preliminary injunction and were therefore witnesses. The district court (Judge Jed Rakoff) denied the request to disqualify. 414 F. Supp. 2d 469. On February 16, 2006, the district court entered a partial preliminary injunction that required certain immediate corrections to New York City and State public assistance agency systems relative to applications for public benefits by noncitizens. It then conducted a nine-day evidentiary hearing to further assess the case and determine whether additional preliminary injunctive relief and/or class certification were warranted. On August 29, 2006, Judge Rakoff certified the class and expanded the preliminary injunction. Judge Rakoff found that there were a substantial likelihood plaintiffs would prevail given evidence of numerous instances of wrongful denials with respect to battered aliens who were eligible for benefits, due to inadequately trained state and City personnel and faulty training materials and policy directives. 445 F.Supp.2d 400. The defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81704. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached a tentative settlement. Following a fairness hearing on May 24, 2007, the court approved the settlement agreement by order dated June 26, 2007. Under the agreement, many class members would receive "automatic" case reviews to determine whether they were entitled to retroactive public benefits. The City agreed to train 150 immigrant liaisons to review and handle the case reviews of class members and process future applications by immigrants for public benefits. The City also agreed to refrain from denying, discontinuing, or reducing public benefits based on immigration status to eligible class members. The informal relief system created by the court's preliminary injunction would be continued and quality assurance audits would be conducted every six months. The court retained jurisdiction for four years to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement. On July 16, 2007, the court entered judgment on a settlement agreement regarding attorney's fees in which the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys $2.85 million. On September 29, 2011, the court ordered an extension of the settlement agreement through February 15, 2013. Minor adjustments were made to account for problems with statutes of limitations. The defendants appealed the court's order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was withdrawn, however, on April 9, 2012. On July 3, 2013, the court again extended the term of the settlement, as well as the monitoring of compliance, for two additional cycles to August 15, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the court issued a final stipulation and order under which the City of New York and the State of New York agreed to pay $217,500 and $147,500, respectively, to plaintiff’s attorneys within 90 days. The settlement expired on August 15, 2014. There have been no further updates to this case, and there is no reason to believe it is ongoing.

Summary: This class action 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit was filed on December 13, 2005 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Plaintiffs, a group of battered immigrant wives and children of lawful U.S. residents, challenged the denial of public benefits that they applied for at New York City Job Centers. On May 24, 2007, the parties reached a Settlement Agreement in which certain class members would receive automatic case reviews in order to obtain the public benefits they sought. The Defendants also agreed to hire more employees in order to properly review the Plaintiffs' cases. Finally, the Settlement Agreement required the Defendants to pay $2,850,000 in attorney's fees and costs. The Court originally retained jurisdiction for 4 years, however, this was extended through February 13, 2012 by a court order dated September 29, 2011. Defendants appealed this order, however, they withdrew their appeal on April 9, 2012. On August 8,2014, the court issued another stipulation and order in which the City of New York and the State of New York would pay $217,500 and $147,500 respectively, to plaintiff's attorneys (The Legal Aid Society). As of this writing, the Court continues to monitor the case.


This federal lawsuit, filed by the cities of Chelsea and Lawrence, Massachusetts, on Feb. 8, 2017, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13768, dealing with immigration enforcement, which threatened to withhold federal funds from "sanctuary jurisdictions" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Boston Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that the Executive Order violated the Tenth Amendment by coercing cities to choose between losing federal funding and losing control of their municipal self-governance. The Executive Order does not include a clear definition of what it means to be a "sanctuary" jurisdiction, apart from referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The plaintiffs alleged their own compliance with § 1373, but complained first that § 1373 is unconstitutional, and second, that Executive Order threatened their funding without advance notice by unclearly extending beyond § 1373. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. had begun to designate certain cities as "sanctuary jurisdictions" and that Chelsea and Lawrence stood to be designated as such. In order to improve cooperation between immigrant residents and municipal police, Chelsea designated itself a "sanctuary city" and Lawrence took similar actions. The plaintiffs explained that they therefore feared being labeled "sanctuary jurisdictions" under the Executive Order and thus losing federal grants. As small cities with large working-class immigrant populations, the plaintiffs feared the implications of such a loss of key funding for their municipal budgets, including for public services that have nothing to do with immigration. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that Chelsea and Lawrence comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, that § 1373 is an unconstitutional infringement on municipal and state self-government authority, and that the Executive Order violates the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. In addition, they claimed that the Executive Order violates the separation of powers by penalizing § 1373 violations without Congressional approval. The case was assigned to Judge George A. O'Toole Jr. On Apr. 10, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that they have taken no action against the cities pursuant to the executive order and that the cities cannot show they have been injured by the existence of the EO. Meanwhile, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on April 25, 2017, granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against operation of the Executive Order. See San Francisco v. Trump for details. On May 2, the plaintiffs moved to stay the proceedings in light of the nationwide preliminary injunction, and the court entered a stay on May 4. The case is marked "administratively closed," which just means that it is on hold. The parties can inform the Court if they wish to resume litigation.

Summary: This federal lawsuit, filed by the cities of Chelsea and Lawrence, Massachusetts, on Feb. 8, 2017, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order dealing with immigration enforcement, which threatened to withhold federal funds from "sanctuary jurisdictions" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for a declaration that Chelsea and Lawrence comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, that § 1373 is an unconstitutional infringement on municipal and state self-government authority, and that the Executive Order violates the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. In addition, they claimed that the Executive Order violates the separation of powers by penalizing § 1373 violations without Congressional approval. On April 25, 2017 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against operation of the Executive Order. See the case San Francisco v. Trump (3:17-cv-00485-WHO) for more details. On May 2, the plaintiffs moved to stay the proceedings in light of the nationwide preliminary injunction, and the court entered the stay. On Dec. 29, 2017, the case was administratively closed. The case remains closed.


On May 8, 2006, twelve deaf Utah State University students filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against Utah State and its Board of Regents. The case was brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, with the Plaintiffs alleging that the Defendants had discriminated against them in many ways, including: denying them access to the full benefit of the University's programs, services, and activities; failing to provide for effective communication through the use of auxiliary aids and services; failing or refusing to provide timely accommodations; utilizing discriminatory policies, practices and procedures that tend to screen out students who are deaf; and failing to meet the ADA's mandate to provide services in the most integrated setting. The students were represented by private counsel. Factual allegations included: that the University failed to provide accommodations for the use of American Sign Language, by providing unqualified or under-qualified interpreters -- the University allegedly justified this by claiming that it could not find qualified interpreters, but declined to hire such qualified interpreters when students presented them the opportunity; that the University's program for providing notes to deaf students was inadequate to the point that notes were often provided to students only long after the tests or exams for which they were relevant had already occurred; that students were sometimes required to attend classes where no interpreters were provided; that in some such classes the University's proposed solution was to have students make audio recordings of classes and them have them transcribed later, forcing students to sit through classes they could not understand or participate in, and then review transcripts during their free time. There were further examples of similar alleged violations. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment an injunction requiring Utah State to adopt written policies and training programs to correct the alleged violations and to require them to provide appropriate auxiliary aids, services, and accommodations. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and damages for financial loss and emotional distress. On April 17, 2007, the parties entered a Stipulation and Joint Motion for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, requesting the court dismiss the case, which it did the following day. The parties had reached a settlement, the terms of which were not included in the Court record. According to news reports, the school promised to employ one full-time staff interpreter for every two deaf students who needed those services, with the interpreters to be available to students to interpret during classes, on-campus meetings and on-campus extracurricular activities. Transcript service and note-taking services would continue, and if students felt they were behind they could receive tutoring.

Summary: On May 8, 2006, twelve deaf students filed a class action lawsuit against Utah State University and its Board of Regents, alleging extensive discriminatory practices in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The parties agreed to dismiss the case on April 17 2007, having reached a settlement.


NOTE: There are two separate cases, in two separate districts, under the caption Hadix. This summary and documents are for the Eastern District of Michigan case, 2:80-cv-73581-JF, filed in 1980. As explained below, in 1992, the Eastern District judge, John Feikens, split that case in two, and sent part of it (the part relating to medical and mental health care, and eventually fire safety) to the Western District, where it received the docket number 4:92-CV-110. The Western District case is included in the Clearinghouse as PC-MI-19. On September 18, 1980, prisoners at the State Prison of Southern Michigan filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Michigan Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that their rights had been violated by unconstitutional conditions at the prison. The plaintiffs complained that the prison was overcrowded, infested with cockroaches, plagued by flying and nesting birds, full of bird droppings and feces, non-ventilated, smelly, and unsanitary. The prisoners also complained of deficiencies in the areas of plumbing, security, grievance procedures, work opportunities for prisoners, physical protection of prisoners, recreation, mental health, classification procedures, lighting, insulation, health care, noise level, staff training, food availability and preservation procedures, mail handling, visitation, fire safety, rehabilitation programs, parole procedures, educational opportunities, library services, clothing allowance, and dental care. On February 13, 1985, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge John Feikens) entered a consent decree in the case, settling the issues of sanitation, safety, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, security, food service, management and operations, and mail. The decree stated that the remaining issues (access to courts, classification procedures, grievance procedures, and visitation) were to be resolved by the court after a hearing on the merits. In June 1986, a member of the plaintiff class asked the district court to hold the defendants in contempt of the decree for depriving him of property without a hearing. On July 1, 1986, the court (Judge Feikens) ordered the defendants to return the prisoner's property and to hold an administrative hearing before taking any of his property away from him. The defendants appealed. On March 17, 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Albert Joseph Engel, Robert B. Krupansky, and David A. Nelson) issued a per curiam opinion reversing the district court's decision and remanding the case for further consideration. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 86-1701, 1988 WL 24204 (6th Cir. March 17, 1988). On July 1, 1988, following a bench trial, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that the inmates had been unconstitutionally denied access to courts, ordering the prison to modify its library, legal services, and administrative grievance programs. The court further held that plaintiffs' right of access to the courts necessitated the presence of Prison Legal Services (PLS) inside the walls of the prison. Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F.Supp. 259 (E.D.Mich. 1988). Following this order, the plaintiffs asked the district court for a temporary injunction to prevent the defendants from searching the PLS offices inside the prison. On November 10, 1987, the district court (Judge Feikens) issued the temporary order, enjoining the defendants from searching the PLS offices without PLS civilian personnel being present unless they gave two hours' notice of the search. The defendants appealed. On March 30, 1989, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Nelson, George Clifton Edwards, and Danny Julian Boggs) issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court's order. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 88-1144, 1989 WL 27984 (6th Cir. March 30, 1989). Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff class asked the district court to clarify a section of the consent decree dealing with the handling of a prisoner's legal materials. On April 21, 1989, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that the consent decree was not violated by the prison's rule limiting the amount of legal materials that a prisoner could posses to that which could be contained in one footlocker. The court also held that the prison was required to hold administrative hearings on excess legal materials within thirty days of seizure. Hadix v. Johnson, 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D.Mich. 1989). The plaintiffs asked the district court to award them attorneys' fees. On June 22, 1990, the court (Judge Feikens) ordered the defendants to pay the full amount of the plaintiffs' attorney fees, less telephone costs. Hadix v. Johnson, 740 F.Supp. 433 (E.D.Mich. 1990). The defendants appealed. On August 29, 1991, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Nelson, and Harry Walker Wellford) issued a per curiam opinion vacating the district court's fee award and remanding the case for further consideration on the issue of whether the plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the lawsuit. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 90-1810, 1991 WL 165653 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 1991). On remand, the district court made further findings of fact and again held that the plaintiffs were the prevailing party. The defendants appealed. On January 23, 1995, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Nelson, Alan Eugene Norris, and Martha Craig Daughtrey) issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court's decision. Hadix v. Johnson, No. 94-1158, 1995 WL 25416 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1995). On April 21, 1992, the defendants asked the district court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the consent decree; the plaintiffs asked the court to adopt the mental health orders entered in USA v. Michigan (No. 1:84-CV-63) (PC-MI-0007) by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan (Judge Richard A. Enslen). On May 15, 1992, the district court (Judge Feikens) denied both requests. On further consideration, however, on June 5, 1992, the district court relinquished control and supervision of the provisions governing mental health care and medical care, transferring them to the Western District, Judge Enslen, for further proceedings as he deemed appropriate. Hadix v. Johnson, 792 F.Supp. 527 (E.D.Mich. 1992). Sometime in 1994, a class of inmates at five different correctional institutions in Michigan asked both district courts for injunctive relief against the defendants, alleging that the defendants had violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The matter was dealt with in the Western District case. On March 31, 1994, the defendants asked the Eastern District Court to modify the consent decree's requirements for out-of-cell activities. On March 14, 1995, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that none of the defendants asserted reasons warranted modification of the decree and denied the request. Hadix v. Johnson, 879 F.Supp. 743 (E.D.Mich. 1995). The defendants appealed. On September 20, 1995, the Sixth Circuit (Judges Nelson, Norris, and Daughtrey) issued a per curiam opinion vacating the district court's order and remanding the case so that the district court could clarify the reasons for its denial of the defendants' request. Hadix v. Johnson, Nos. 93-1551, 93-1555, 93-1559, 93-1642, 93-1643, 1995 WL 559372 (6th Cir.(Mich.) Sept. 20, 1995. On June 10, 1996, the defendants asked both the district court and the Sixth Circuit to terminate the consent decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On July 2, 1996, the Sixth Circuit issued an unsigned opinion denying the motion for immediate termination and remanding the issue back to the district court. Hadix v. Johnson, Nos. 94-2008, 96-1422, 1996 WL 370152 (6th Cir. July 2, 1996). on July 5, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge Feikens) denied the request for immediate termination of the consent decree. Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich. 1996). On September 10, 1996, the United States Department of Justice asked the Eastern District Court for leave to intervene in the case for purposes of defending the constitutionality of the PLRA, and on September 16, 1996, the district court (Judge Feikens) granted the motion to intervene. The defendants renewed their motion to terminate relief under the automatic stay provision of the PLRA. On November 1, 1996, the district court (Judge Feikens) denied the motion to terminate, holding that the sections of the PLRA in question were an unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of powers. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D.Mich. 1996). The defendants appealed. On May 20, 1998, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Karen Nelson Moore) held that the automatic stay provision was constitutional and remanded the case back to the district court. Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998). The plaintiffs sought Supreme Court review, but the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Hadix v. McGinnis, 524 U.S. 952 (1998). The plaintiffs asked both district courts to grant them attorneys fees for their counsels' unpaid work up to this point in the litigation, and the defendants argued that the PLRA's cap on attorneys fees should apply to any fee award that the judge made. On December 4, 1996, the Eastern District Court (Judge Feikens) awarded the requested fees, holding that the PLRA's cap on attorneys fees applied only to work performed after the Act's effective date. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F.Supp. 1113 (E.D.Mich. 1996). (Likewise, on May 23, 1997, the Western District Court (Judge Enslen) awarded the requested fees.) Hadix v. Johnson, 965 F.Supp. 996 (W.D.Mich. 1997). The defendants appealed both decisions. On April 17, 1998, the Sixth Circuit (Justice Cornelia Groefsema Kennedy) held that the fee cap imposed by the PLRA did not apply to fee petitions, regardless of whether the work was performed before of after the PLRA's enactment date. The court then partially upheld and partially reversed the fee award, remanding the appeals back to the district courts for further consideration. Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendants sought and obtained Supreme Court review. On June 21, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) held that the PLRA limits attorney fees for postjudgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999). On March 18, 1999, the district court (Judge Feikens) transferred several additional components of the original Consent Decree (regarding water temperatures, housing temperatures and ventilation in the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, and some issues relating to housing in the Egeler Correctional Facility) to the Western District. The Eastern District explained that the rationale for transfer was that health care was implicated in these provisions. The court then terminated the part of the consent decree requiring supervision of facilities, and informed the defendants that he would terminate the consent decree entirely if they could demonstrate substantial compliance. Hadix v. Johnson, 45 F.2d 584 (E.D.Mich. 1999). Both parties appealed. On October 5, 2000, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Moore) reversed, holding that the district court had not made the necessary findings, and remanded the case back to the district court, ordering that the prisoners must be given an opportunity to submit additional evidence of ongoing violations. Hadix v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2000). On November 15, 2000, the Eastern District transferred to the Western District some additional fire safety issues. On June 27, 2001, the Eastern District issued its Order of Termination, terminating its jurisdiction over all sections of the Consent Decree remaining in the Eastern District.) An inmate named Pepper Moore asked the district court to award him money for his costs as well as an incentive award for his role as a class representative. The district court denied those requests, and he appealed. On March 10, 2003, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Moore) affirmed the district court's decision. Hadix v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 895 (6th Cir. 2003). On October 6, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, thus closing the case. Moore v. Johnson, 540 U.S. 941 (2003).

Summary: This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit was filed on September 18, 1980 by a class of prisoners against the Michigan Department of Corrections in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The prisoners complained that the prison was overcrowded, infested with cockroaches, full of bird feces, and was non-ventilated, smelly, and unsanitary, among other general complaints about the poor living conditions at the prison, including lack of access to legal materials. On February 13, 1985, the Court signed off on a Consent Decree regarding the issues of sanitation, safety, health care, fire safety, overcrowding, security, food service, management and operations, and mail. The decree stated that the remaining issues were to be resolved by the court after a hearing on the merits. On July 1, 1988, following a bench trial, the district court (Judge Feikens) held that the prisoners had been unconstitutionally denied access to courts, ordering the prison to modify its library, legal services, and administrative grievance programs. The plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees, which were awarded by the District Court initially, and again after the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals remanded back to the District Court for further consideration. On June 10, 1986, the Defendants moved to terminate the Consent Decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, however, the District Court denied this motion, eventually declaring the PLRA unconstitutional. After extensive litigation going all the way to the Supreme Court, the Plaintiffs were eventually awarded attorneys fees for all of their counsel's legal work through 1996. On November 15, 2000 the Eastern District terminated its jurisdiction over the case and transferred the remaining issues to the Western District case over the same matter.


On June 27, 2002, Barrier Busters (a disability advocacy group) and a class of disabled individuals filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the City of Erie, PA. The Plaintiffs alleged that the city of Erie had frequently failed to install mandatory curb cuts and to otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., when it performed road and sidewalk construction and alterations since the ADA was passed in 1992. The parties entered a court-approved Partial Consent Decree on March 18, 2003. On September 16, 2003, the parties entered a Second Partial Consent Decree and Partial Settlement; a third consent decree was entered on April 1, 2004, and a fourth on February 2, 2005. The Clearinghouse has not obtained these consent decrees, but it is clear from later documents that Erie made substantial commitments to both ensure adherence to the ADA curb cut requirements for new roads and future resurfacing projects, and to retrofit with curb cuts all areas where roads were built or resurfaced after the January 26, 1992 effective date of the ADA. Erie committed to make annual reports showing where new road work had taken place and where new curb cuts were built. The consent agreements also recognized that Erie was not responsible for the non-compliance of state roads and highways in Erie that were resurfaced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. In 2006, a separate case was filed against PennDOT, addressing the issues of ADA compliance and curb cuts on state roads in Erie. See Voices for Independence v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation in related cases. The plaintiffs in Voices for Independence were represented by the same attorneys as the plaintiffs in this case. In 2010, the Plaintiffs observed that the City of Erie's street resurfacing in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 should have triggered the construction of ADA-compliant curb cuts, but none were built, contrary to the earlier agreements. On September 27, 2011, the court entered a stipulated order under which Erie agreed to retrofit these sites with curb cuts and to pay Plaintiffs $31,000 in attorneys' fees and costs for the period from March 11, 2011, to August 26, 2011. This stipulated order did not abrogate the earlier Consent Agreements. Nevertheless, Erie failed to install curb cuts. In an attempt to correct the problem, the parties agreed to a second stipulated order on August 31, 2012. The city promised to take remedial action to install these curb cuts and agreed to pay an unspecified amount to the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs. On April 18, 2013, the Third Stipulated Order was entered, which changed Erie's reporting obligations to the plaintiffs to make the process more efficient. Erie agreed to pay an unspecified amount to the Plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs. The Third Stipulated Order was amended on May 22, 2014, to mandate that construction work performed on or before August 5 must include curb ramps within the same construction season. The City also committed to use “best efforts” to complete 70% of curb ramps within the same calendar year for construction performed after August 5; plaintiffs agreed that, when necessary, construction could be delayed until June 30 of the next calendar year. On March 11, 2015, plaintiffs moved to enforce the consent decrees. They alleged that the City violated the consent decrees for “an unspecified number of years” by installing fewer than six curb ramps at “T”-shaped intersections and fewer than eight curb ramps at “+”-shaped intersections. After discussions between the parties, Judge Baxter approved a fifth consent decree on May 27, 2015. The Fifth Consent Decree required the City to install 6 or 8 ramps, as appropriate, in all future construction. It also required the City to add ramps across the “leg” of the T in “T”-shaped intersections missing them at a rate of at least 75 ramps per year and included associated reporting requirements. Three years later, a new disagreement emerged about what kinds of intersections had to be retrofitted with curb ramps. Plaintiffs asserted that adding a thin layer of asphalt to a concrete intersection was an “alteration” under the ADA that required installation curb ramps. Erie disagreed. It argued that it is only required to add curb ramps when replacing old asphalt with new asphalt at asphalt intersections. On September 26, 2018, the court entered the Fourth Stipulated Order, which adopted plaintiffs’ view based on June, 2013 U.S. Department of Transportation guidelines. The Order required:

Installation of curb ramps at previously altered asphalt intersections at a rate of at least 125 ramps per year, estimated to finish by the end of 2024.
 Installation of at least 125 curb ramps at previously altered concrete intersections by the end of 2025.
 However, the parties could not reach an agreement on whether there was a legal requirement to install curb ramps at concrete intersections altered prior to July, 2013. Erie preserved its right to litigate this issue in the Fourth Stipulated Order. As of March 29, 2021, the consent decrees and stipulated orders remain in effect. The defendants continue to file annual status reports. The most recent status report was filed on February 2, 2021 and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On January 27, 2002, Barrier Busters, a disability advocacy group, filed a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Erie, PA. The Plaintiffs alleged that Erie's road resurfacing from 1992 onward lacked curb cuts mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties entered a series of consent decrees, in which Erie committed to retrofit the roads and intersections and to comply with ADA requirements on all future resurfacing projects.


On July 31, 2017, plaintiff, the Democracy Project, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief against defendants Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiff is a nonpartisan nonprofit organization whose focus is on informing the public of operations and activities of the government by gathering and disseminating information likely to contribute significantly to the public understanding of executive branch operations and activities. On April 6, 2017, President Trump ordered Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against a Syrian-government airbase without obtaining prior authorization from Congress (a Syrian-based policy promised by former President Barack Obama) and without articulating the legal justification for the strikes. The plaintiff submitted FOIA requests to the defendants the following day for all records “reflecting, discussing, or otherwise relating” to the strike “and/or the President’s legal authority to launch such a strike”. The plaintiff asked for these requests to be processed on an expedited basis. About one month later, having received none of the requested documents and having two of its expedited processing requests denied, the plaintiff brought this suit and filed a motion for preliminary injunction to have the documents produced by a date certain. On July 13, 2017, U.S. District Judge Christopher R. Cooper granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, directing the defendants to process the FOIA requests on an expedited basis, but not by a certain date, and to limit the request to documents specifically related to the legal justifications for the April 6, 2017 Syria Strikes. 263 F.Supp.3d 293. On September 8, 2017, the defendants made a production pursuant to the FOIA requests, but the plaintiff contested that the production was too heavily redacted and insufficient. On November 17, 2017, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, with the plaintiff filing a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 8, 2017, on the question of whether the defendants’ withholding of some documents was justified under various FOIA exemptions. On April 25, 2018, Judge Cooper, in reviewing the parties’ cross-motions, determined that he needed to also review the documents before it could resolve the dispute, and he ordered that the defendants produce documents that it had claimed were exempted under FOIA for an in-camera review by the court. On May 4, 2018, the defendants complied with the order and delivered the documents to the court. On August 21, 2018, Judge Cooper granted in part and denied in part each party’s motion for summary judgment. 320 F.Supp.3d 162. He found that, for the most part, the defendants’ withholdings were justified; however, he also found that some information in the documents had already been officially acknowledged, so that the defendants could not withhold that information. As of March 23, 2019, there has been no further filings or movement in the case, and the case appears to be closed.

Summary: Plaintiff, The Democracy Project, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking injunctive relief against Defendants Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Court granted a preliminary injunction for the production of all documents related to President Trump's legal justifications for his order of the April 6, 2017 Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against a Syrian-government airbase. The Plaintiff contested the sufficiency of this production, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 21, 2018, Judge Cooper granted in part and denied in part each party’s motion for summary judgment. He found that, for the most part, the defendants’ withholdings were justified; however, he also found that some information in the documents had already been officially acknowledged, so that the defendants could not withhold that information. As of March 23, 2019, there has been no further filings or movement in the case, and the case appears to be closed.


On November 1, 2006, Aaron Lee Jones filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the state of Alabama from using its lethal injection procedure against him. The complaint alleged that the procedure was not medically approved and would result in extreme pain in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The plaintiff was represented by private attorneys. On April 17, 2007, the district court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) denied the plaintiff's motion to stay his execution pending his challenge of the lethal injection procedure. His execution was scheduled for May 3, 2007. On April 27, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Joel Fredrick Dubina) affirmed. Both courts found that Jones delayed in bringing these constitutional claims. Aaron Lee Jones was executed on May 3, 2007 by lethal injection. The case is now closed.

Summary: Aaron Lee Jones filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the Middle District of Alabama seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the state of Alabama from using lethal injection procedure against him, in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. His claim was denied, and the US Eleventh Circuit of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. He was executed on May 3, 2007.