This case is about discrimination that students with disabilities face in the Oregon Public School system. On January 22, 2019, plaintiffs brought a class-action suit against the Oregon Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs sought to address the long-standing problem in Oregon of denying students with disabilities the ability to attend a full-day of school or in some cases, the chance to attend school at all. J.N., the lead plaintiff, was a 6-year-old public school student. He had a disability and was eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA. Due to behaviors related to his disability, J.N. had been subjected to a shortened school day. When he was in kindergarten, J.N. was forced to attend a truncated form of school for the entire 2017-2018 school year. For a few months, this meant that J.N.'s entire day of schooling was only an hour. Other plaintiffs also were subject to shortened school days, including schooling under an hour a day, as a result of their disability. The plaintiffs argued that the discriminatory consequences of the shortened school day policy violated the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Under the IDEA, every state has to "ensure" that it provides "special education" and "related services" to all children with disabilities aged 3 to 21 who reside in the state. The IDEA also requires that every child be provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE). Under Title II of the ADA, individuals with disabilities cannot be excluded from participating in, excluded from the benefits of, or be discriminated against in public school. Title II also requires that all students regardless of disability status be provided with an equal education. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires that institutions receiving federal funding provide assistance and benefits to individuals with disabilities. In the complaint, the plaintiffs requested the following relief: a permanent enjoinder of defendants from subjecting the plaintiffs to policies that violate the IDEA, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; an order requiring defendants to create and implement new policies that would ensure compliance with FAPE standards; and an order demanding that defendants develop and maintain policies and practices to ensure that the State of Oregon and individual Oregon school districts do not discriminate against students with disabilities, including exclusion of students with disabilities from a full school day. The case was assigned to Judge Ann L. Aiken. On April 19, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded to this motion, but both parties began to participate in settlement talks in October 2019. However, the no settlement agreement was reached, and on February 3, 2020, the plaintiffs motioned to certify the class. On September 1, 2020, Judge Aiken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had standing to proceed. 2020 WL 5209846. The defendants filed their answer to the complaint shortly thereafter. As of November 1, 2020, the case remains open.

Summary: In this case, a 6-year-old plaintiff brought a class action suit against the Oregon Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs had been deprived of their right to a free appropriate public education and had been subject to shortened school days, which hindered their learning and social relationships. After the filing of the initial complaint, the parties participated in settlement talks; however, they did not reach an agreement. In September 2020, the presiding Judge Ann L. Aiken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged standing. Oral argument regarding the motion to certify the class and memorandum in support is set for November 15, 2020. The case remains open.


On August 10, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against owners, designers, builders and managers of an apartment complex, claiming the multifamily dwellings built for first occupancy after March 13, 1991 were not accessible to persons with disabilities in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601-3619. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that, among other things, the public use portions of the dwellings were unusable to persons with disabilities; that doors on ground floor units are not wide enought to allow passage by persons using wheelchairs, that the interior of the dwellings do not contain required features of adaptive design, such as accessible routes, light switches, electrical outlets, or useable batrooms and kitchens. Further, Plaintiff claimed that exterior areas including parking lots have excessive abrupt level changes, excessive running slopes, and cross slopes that make maneuvering wheelchairs and other mobility aids dangerous. On December 8, 2011, the Court approved a three-year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. Besides a general injunction against discrimination on the basis of disability, the decree required, among other things, specific retrofits to be made and reviewed by a neutral inspector, recordkeeping and release of information concering any new construction, training of employees as to the requirements of the decree, and a total payment of $275,000 to identified aggrieved persons. On December 15, 2014, the Court (Judge Charles R. Simpson, III) entered an order upon the expiration of the Consent Decree. The United States did not move to extend the decree. The case was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: This 2010 fair housing case was brought by the United States in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, challenging the failure of the owners, operators, designers, and builders of a multi-family apartment complex to make the public use spaces and the apartments themselves accessible to persons with disabilities. The case was resolved in 2011 with a three year consent decree that, in addition to general anti discrimination provisions, included specific requirements for retrofitting non-compliant areas of the complex, and payment of $275,000 to persons damaged by the violations.


This is a case about racial discrimination in hiring practices with background checks. On July 8, 2020, an African-American individual who had his job offer from Sallie Mae Bank rescinded filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. He sued Sallie Mae Bank for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought damages, declaratory relief, and attorney fees as a result of Sallie Mae Bank's actions, claiming that the defendant's policy and practice of rescinding or terminating employment based on background history has a disparate impact on African-American applicants that is in violation of Title VII. The case was assigned to Judge Leonard P. Stark. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, an African-American individual who had his job offer from Sallie Mae Bank rescinded filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The plaintiff alleged that Sallie Mae Bank's policy and practice of rescinding or terminating employment based on background history is in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This case is ongoing.


On February 26, 2013, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division sent notice to the Alabama Department of Corrections that it would be conducting an investigation of the Julia Tutwiler Prison. The investigation sought to address allegations that prisoners were subjected to sexual abuse by prison staff in violation of their constitutional rights; allegations that the prison failed to report and prevent sexual abuse; and allegations that the prison failed to provide adequate mental health and medical care to victims of sexual abuse. On January 17, 2014, the DOJ issued a findings letter. The department's findings detailed unconstitutional conditions that subjected women prisoners to a substantial risk of harm. These conditions included staff sexual abuse and sexual harassment of prisoners, prison officials' failure to adequately respond to and investigate allegations of sexual abuse and harassment, and systemic deficiencies that directly contributed to staff and prisoner sexual abuse and staff sexual harassment. On May 28, 2015, the DOJ Civil Rights Division filed this lawsuit against the state of Alabama and its Department of Corrections (ADOC) under CRIPA for the heinous sexual abuse committed by the ADOC's male officers at Tutwiler. And the parties had reached a settlement agreement and subsequently submitted a motion for its approval, which Judge Myron Thompson accepted on June 18, 2015. The court issued a consent decree and designated an independent monitor. The settlement required the ADOC and Tutwiler to make recommended changes and file compliance reports every six months. The substantive part of the settlement agreement contained sections on General Policies and Procedures, staffing and training, risk assessment and education, rights to privacy and reporting, and response and investigation procedures to reports of sexual assault. The policy section of the agreement required ADOC and Tutwiler to:

 Develop, submit to the Monitor and DOJ for review, and implement policies and procedures regarding the management of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and gender nonconforming prisoners;
 Comply with its policy ensuring women receive essential supplies;
 Develop and implement policies and procedures that incorporate gender-responsive strategies, including policies and procedures governing the use of force against women prisoners and other disciplinary actions;
 Develop, submit to the Monitor and DOJ for review and implement facility-specific policies and operational practices specific to Tutwiler' s population regarding the supervision and monitoring necessary to prevent inmates from being exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm from sexual abuse and harassment; and
 Revise and/or develop and implemen any other policies, practices, procedures, protocols, training curricula, and other written documents as necessary, including but not limited to, screening tools, logs, handbooks, manuals, and forms.
 The consent decree was set to be in effect until ADOC was found in substantial compliance in three consecutive compliance reports. The monitor filed the first report on February 26, 2016 on the assessment period for May–Dec. 2015. The monitor noted positive progress and granted a 3-month extension for compliance on the general policies and procedures and training. From February 2016 through August 2019, the monitor filed a total of eight reports indicating steady progress. In the eighth and most recent report, the monitor noted that Tutwiler and the ADOC achieved "substantial compliance" with 41 sections of the settlement agreement and "partial compliance" with two sections of the agreement. As of August 2019, Tutwiler's and the ADOC's general policies continued to work toward preventing sexual abuse and harassment. The monitor noted that staff exhibited knowledge of procedures related to reporting sexual harassment, safety for inmates, and investigative processes. In addition, the monitor found that Tutwiler and the ADOC fully implemented the required Behavior Intervention & Discipline Policy and Disciplinary Segregation policies. Tutwiler's and the ADOC's use of camera recording also satisfied the monitor, although the monitor found that audio capabilities would further surveillance efforts. Further, the ADOC's and Tutwiler's inmate education program communicating the right to be free from sexual abuse and harassment and right to privacy satisfied their duties as outlined in the agreement. The monitor found some challenges still exist at the Tutwiler facility. Specifically, staffing vacancies could impact safety and security at the facility. Additionally, recruitment and retention problems with women candidates do not allow for a finding of substantial compliance with terms in the agreement. As of November 2019, the monitor will conduct further research on compliance and submit a ninth report to the court in December. The case is ongoing. (There were also two earlier CRIPA matters involving Tutwiler. The first was in the mid 1980s. For information, see PC-AL-0023. The second was in the mid 1990s. See PC-AL-0006.)

Summary: In 2013, the DOJ Civil Rights Division investigated the Julia Tutwiler Prison in Alabama. After sending the state Department of Corrections a findings letter in January 2014, the DOJ filed this suit against the state of Alabama and Department of Corrections in 2015 for heinous sexual abuse committed by the ADOC's male officers the prison. The parties reached a settlement agreement approved by the court in an enforceable consent decree, which required the ADOC and Tutwiler to make recommended changes and file compliance reports every six months. The case is ongoing.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker.
COVID-19 Summary: This is an action brought by South Carolina voters, candidates, and democratic organizations, seeking to enjoin various voting restrictions in the South Carolina law. Some of their claims were mooted as to the June elections as South Carolina legislation passed on May 12 allowed voters to vote by absentee ballot. On May 25, the court partially granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining the witness requirement for the June 2020 primaries.
 On May 1, 2020 several South Carolina political candidates and voters, as well as the South Carolina Democratic Party, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking relief from five voting provisions in the state law:
(1) the "Absentee Ballot Age Restriction," which prohibited all voters under 65 from casting mail-in ballots unless they are disabled or confined in jail; (2) the "Postage Tax," which required voters to pay postage for their absentee ballot if they wished to vote; (3) the "Election Day Cutoff," which rejected ballots not received by 7 pm on election day; (4) the "Absentee Assistance Ban," which prohibited candidates or paid campaign staff from assisting absentee voters; and (5) the "Witness Requirement," which required a witness to sign the absentee ballot in order for the vote to be counted.
The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued the South Carolina State Election Commission and the Election Commissioner. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 for violations of the First, Fourteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301-02. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that South Carolina's laws surrounding absentee voting unconstitutionally burdened the rights of some voters, especially in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The case was assigned to Judge Michelle Childs. On May 7, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from enforcing the Absentee Ballot Age Restriction, the Witness Requirement, and the Election Day Cutoff. They also requested the court to consolidate the motion hearing with  another action where the plaintiffs had filed a motion for preliminary injunction against the same defendants. The South Carolina Republican Party moved to intervene on May 11, which was granted on May 12. Additionally, on May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June 9 primary and the June 23 runoff election. These legislative changes mooted the plaintiffs' requests as to the Excuse Requirement and the Absentee Ballot Age Requirement for the June primaries. In light of the hearing scheduled for May 15, the plaintiffs attempted to extend their request for relief beyond the June primaries. The court limited the issues for the hearing, stating that the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction clearly sought only relief for June, and as such, the defendants had not been given proper notice. The defendants and intervenors filed oppositions to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on May 14. On May 25, the court granted the motion for preliminary injunction in part, enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Witness Requirement for the June 2020 primaries. The defendants were also ordered to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters of the elimination of the witness requirement. 2020 WL 2617329. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 1, voters and candidates in South Carolina, as well as local and national Democratic organizations filed this lawsuit to enjoin absentee ballot voting restrictions in South Carolina in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. They obtained relief in the form of an partial grant of their requested injunction as to the witness signature requirement on May 26.


On October 11, 2006, individuals with disabilities in need of long-term care filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and California law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, claimed that Defendant failed to provide them with services in the most integrated setting appropriate. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants' policies and practices resulted in Plaintiffs' unnecessary isolation at Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center (Laguna Honda). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendants to provide them with timely access to home and community-based long-term care services. Named Plaintiffs were a number of current adult residents of Laguna Honda who had disabilities but had been recommended for discharge or who had been identified as being able to live in the community with appropriate service provision. At the time of filing, Laguna Honda housed more than 1,000 individuals. It had been repeatedly cited for standard of care deficiencies, and CMS had threatened to withdraw federal funding from the hospital. In 2003, the Department of Justice issued a letter of findings against Defendant for violations of the ADA with respect to Laguna Honda. The DOJ ordered Defendant to implement certain remedial measures, but they had not been implemented at the time Plaintiffs filed their complaint. On January 30, 2007, the court (Judge William Alsup) denied the parties' joint request to stay litigation for the purposes of settlement. The court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification on July 12, 2007. Defendants had filed a statement of non-opposition. The class was defined as: "All adult Medi-Cal beneficiaries who are: (1) residents of Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center; (2) on waiting lists for Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center; (3) within two year post-discharge from Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center; or (4) patients at San Francisco General Hospital or other hospitals owned or controlled by the City and County of San Francisco, who are eligible for discharge to Laguna Honda Hospital and Rehabilitation Center." On November 16, 2007, the court issued an order regarding preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. The court ordered the parties to meet with Judge Alsup to consider preliminary approval of the settlement agreement before ruling on the request for administrative relief. On November 26, 2007, the court issued an order regarding the request for administrative relief. The parties had agreed that no individual claims for damages by class members were waived under the settlement agreement. The parties also jointly recommended a $300,000 fee award to class counsel for fees and costs, and $200,000 for compliance oversight. In light of the agreement, the Court approved the parties' joint request for administrative relief. The parties signed a settlement agreement in December 2007. The parties agreed as follows: the parties would assess the services and housing being provided to named Plaintiffs who had been discharged from Laguna Honda; San Francisco would provide a rental subsidy for independent housing for named Plaintiffs where appropriate; Defendant would alter or begin certain practices to maximize opportunities for class members to access home and community-based services through the Nursing Facility/Acute Hospital Waiver; Defendant would make a Diversion and Community Integration Program fully operational; Defendant would provide case management and wrap-around services; Defendant would preserve, provide, and monitor community-based housing for appropriate class members; Defendant would enhance mental health and substance abuse services at Laguna Honda; and Defendant would limit the capacity of Laguna Honda. The settlement agreement also established grievance procedures for class members and data collection and reporting obligations. The agreement was scheduled to terminate three years from the date of final approval by the Court. On September 18, 2008, the Court granted final approval of the settlement agreement. The Court entered judgment, awarded attorney fees and costs as agreed by the parties, and retained jurisdiction for the purpose of assuring compliance. The parties filed a series of joint case management statements from 2009 through 2011 detailing the status of the implementation of the settlement agreement. On Feb. 7, 2011, the court issued an order stating that its jurisdiction would end on Sept. 18, 2011 "as to all rights and obligations of the parties except with regard to the Laguna Honda Hospital Rent Subsidy Program," and on Sept. 18, 2013 "as to all other rights and obligations of the parties." On Sept. 3, 2013, the court issued an order indicating that the defendants had complied with the last of the Settlement terms. In the order, the court modified a Settlement term requiring the defendants to subsidize 500 rental homes for Laguna Honda residents down to 270 homes due to significantly lower demand for such homes. There has been no further litigation, and it appears to be closed.

Summary: This case was brought by adult individuals with disabilities who were in need of long-term services against the City and County of San Francisco seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendants to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate. The case was settled in September 2008, resulting in injunctive relief for Plaintiffs, as well as attorneys' fees and costs.


On December 17, 2012, a group of disabled persons filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York Department of Human Resources and its director in his official capacity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2020(e)(2)(b)(i) and (e)(11), and New York State and City Statutes. Plaintiffs alleged that D-SNAP, an emergency food stamp program implemented after Hurricane Sandy, discriminated against disabled persons by having only one application center and an in-person registration requirement. Both of the limited availability of registration centers and the requirement for in-person registration were absent from the defendant's standard food stamps program precisely because, as the plaintiffs argued, they discriminate against persons with disabilities who may not be able to travel to the registration center. The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society of New York, asked the court for a preliminary injunction, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. On March 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Katherine B. Forrest) denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as the plaintiffs failed to prove that irreparable harm would result if the injunction was not granted. Judge Forrest also dismissed plaintiffs' complaint finding that the plaintiffs needed to sue the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in his official capacity in order to properly bring the suit as they authorized the D-SNAP plan and also paid part of the liabilities under D-SNAP. On March 29, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture in his official capacity and the U.S. Department of Agriculture as defendants. The new complaint also added a claim for retroactive award of D-SNAP benefits to those who were excluded from the program due to the alleged discriminatory practices. On September 16, 2013, the District Court certified two subclasses: (1) "disabled individuals who were eligible to apply for benefits from the Sandy D-SNAP Program," and (2) "individuals who may be eligible to apply for benefits from a future D-SNAP program and who will need reasonable accommodations because of a disability (or disabilities)." 2013 WL 5295221. On November 14, 2013, the District Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture for lack of subject matter jurisdiction primarily on two grounds: (1) the Department of Agriculture assured the District Court that if the other defendants were found liable, then the federal government would pay its share of the D-SNAP benefits, and (2) plaintiffs cannot sue the Department of Agriculture because there is no clear cause of action concerned that if it were to recognize a cause of action against a government agency for providing emergency support to local governments then federal agencies would be more reluctant to lend help and advice during future emergencies. 2013 WL 6057949. On January 22, 2014, the court referred the action to Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck for settlement discussions. The parties proceeded with settlement negotiations and periodic status conferences, and filed a joint motion for approval of class-action settlement on March 30, 2015. The settlement provided for retrospective relief ensuring that D-SNAP benefits were distributed in accordance with waiver requests, and prospective relief ensuring the administration of future D-SNAP benefits would comply with laws prohibiting disability discrimination. On March 31, 2015, Judge Forrest granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement. Following a June 25, 2015 fairness hearing, Judge Forrest entered final judgment approving the class action settlement and dismissing the case on July 7, 2015. On December 28, 2015, Judge Forrest approved the stipulation and order of settlement of attorney's fees, which provided that the State of New York would pay $180,000 in fees and the City of New York $270,000 in fees. Pursuant to the settlement, the court was to retain jurisdiction over the action for 24 months, or 12 months if the city defendants appointed and convened a Disability Advisory Community Panel. The defendants notified the court that they had convened the panel by letter dated May 9, 2016. On August 9, 2016, Judge Forrest terminated the court's jurisdiction over the settlement and the case is now closed.

Summary: On December 17, 2012, a group of disabled persons filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York Department of Human Resources under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. Plaintiffs alleged that D-SNAP, an emergency food stamp program implemented after Hurricane Sandy, discriminated against disabled persons by having only one application center and an in-person registration requirement. The parties settled the case in 2015.


On July 27, 2018, a group of parents (filing under pseudonyms) filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of their minor migrant children in the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) concerning the defendants’ alleged denial of mandatory asylum procedures to minor migrant children such as the plaintiffs, who had been forcibly separated from their parents. Based on the preliminary injunction issued in a related case, Ms. L v. ICE, children and parents who had been separated would be reunified but would then be subject to the defendants’ policy of immediate deportation following reunification. The plaintiffs alleged this immediate removal would deprive these children of their individual rights to seek asylum prior to repatriation and thus violated their due process rights. The plaintiffs in this case, represented by private counsel, sued under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Mandamus Act. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief in the form of an order ending the defendants’ policy to remove families before granting minor migrant children access to asylum procedures they were entitled to by law. The case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. On July 27, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent children from being removed before permitting them the opportunity to exercise their right to seek asylum. The plaintiffs sought class certification to represent all non-citizens under the age of 18 who were separated from their parents or guardians on or after entry into the United States and who are, have, been, or will be detained by the US government any time since January 1, 2018. Specifically, the plaintiffs in this lawsuit were six minor children under the age of 13 whose native language was Spanish, represented by their parents. All were seeking asylum in the United States from Honduras and Guatemala. All were forcibly separated upon arriving in the United States under the US government’s “zero tolerance policy” initiated in early 2018, under which migrant children who had crossed the border from Mexico with their families were separated and transferred to the custody of ORR to be detained. Following the injunction in the Ms. L case, all were reunited with their parents. However, while they were separated or immediately following reunification, these children’s parents, who had final removal orders, alleged that they were coerced into waiving their children's right to removal proceedings under the INA. Parents were offered the choice between reunification for the purpose of repatriation or repatriation without reunification, ignoring the children’s independent rights to seek asylum and implying that the only opportunity for family reunification was through repatriation. As a result, many parents chose to waive their children’s rights in order to be reunited with them, but once families were reunited, the US government further refused asylum procedures to these children, depriving them of their right to seek asylum separate from their parents’ requests. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that these forms were only offered in English to parents who did not speak English and did not understand what they were signing. The plaintiffs alleged they were also denied a separate alternative asylum procedure, the “credible fear” interview. But for the separation policy, the plaintiffs would have been subject to “expedited removal proceedings” requiring referral to an asylum officer for a “credible fear” interview if a migrant indicated fear of persecution. If a child migrant demonstrated “credible fear,” the finding normally would have extended to the parents. The same was true for parents who expressed “credible fear” on behalf of their children. All six children expressed fear at being returned to their respective countries of origin for fear of violence against themselves or their parents. However, the defendants’ separation policy prevented these children from receiving these interviews or having their parents’ “credible fear” extended to them. Instead, the defendants transferred the children to ORR custody, treating them as “unaccompanied minors” and placing them in separate immigration proceedings. Post-reunification, they were not able to seek “credible fear” interviews in cases where they had been denied to the children who would otherwise have relied on their parents to seek asylum on their behalf, or where parents had first received a negative decision owing to being too distraught to meaningfully participate in their own interviews after separation from their children. On July 30, the defendants responded to the complaint and requested to transfer venue to the Southern District of California, where the Ms. L case was being heard. Arguments for the temporary restraining order were heard on July 31. On August 3, Judge Friedman transferred the case to Judge Dana M. Sabraw in the Southern District of California. 319 F.Supp.3d 290. Judge Sabraw granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on August 16, 2018. 347 F.Supp.3d 526. On October 5, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement, preliminary certification of the settlement class, and approval of class notice. This motion was unopposed and was granted on October 9th. The plaintiffs in this case and the Ms. L case were named as settlement class representatives and the settlement was approved pending a notice and fairness hearing. The settlement included a parent class and a child class. Both classes included individuals who were separated from their parent or child and had been or would be reunified with their parent or child under the preliminary injunction issued in Ms. L. The settlement required that parents who initially received negative credible fear findings and had final orders of removal receive a good faith review of those findings, including a meeting with an asylum officer to present additional information. Children who had been issued their own Notice to Appear or were in independent removal proceedings would instead join their parents’ proceedings, and could be given their own credible fear interviews if those children also expressed fear of return. If the parent received a positive credible fear finding, their children would join their asylum proceedings in immigration court; if the parent received a negative finding, the children would be entitled to their own interview and if their finding was positive, they could pursue asylum in immigration court. The settlement did not provide any monetary relief for its members. On October 10th, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency order requiring implementation of the settlement. The plaintiffs stated that, under the settlement, 60 class members currently in detention were due to have their asylum procedures immediately. These proceedings had not yet occurred because the defendants informed the plaintiffs that proceedings would not begin until the settlement was finally approved by the court. Judge Sabraw granted the motion on October 18th, pointing to the agreement itself that indicated that the process detailed in the settlement agreement was to start “no later than 3 days” following the execution of documents requesting a credible fear interview, and that this portion of the agreement was not dependent on court approval. Over their objections, the defendants were ordered to begin the agreed-upon asylum process for those 60 members in detention who had executed the proper forms. Judge Sabraw granted final approval of the settlement on Nov. 15, 2018, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court certified two settlement classes. The court designated the parent class as:
"All adult alien parents who entered the United States at or between designated ports of entry with their child(ren), and who, on or before the effective date of this agreement: (1) were detained in immigration custody by the DHS; (2) have a child who was or is separated from them by DHS and, on or after June 26, 2018, was housed in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child; and (3) have been (and whose child(ren) have been) continuously physically present within the United States since June 26, 2018, whether in detention or released. The class does not include alien parents with criminal histories or a communicable disease, or those encountered in the interior of the United States."
 The court designated the children class as:
"All alien children who are under the age of 18 on the effective date of this agreement who: (1) entered the United States at or between designated ports of entry with an alien parent, and who were separated from their parents, on or before the effective date of this settlement agreement; (2) have been or will be reunified with that parent pursuant to the preliminary injunction issued by the Court in Ms. L v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 18-428 (S.D. Cal. June 26, 2018); and (3) have been continuously physically present in the United States since June 26, 2018."
 On February 22, 2019, pursuant to the plaintiffs' earlier motion to enforce the settlement, Judge Sabraw ordered defense counsel to advise ICE that class members subject to the settlement may not be removed without first providing them with notice of the settlement and an opportunity to decide whether they wish to take advantage of the settlement procedures or waive them. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Parents of minor child migrants sued on behalf of their children, saying the US government was depriving the children of their independent right to seek asylum by coercing parents into waiving their children's right to removal proceedings and by denying those children credible fear interviews or the ability to be included in their parents' credible fear interviews. The court certified a settlement class with a parent and child class in October 2018. The settlement required that the government provide certain asylum procedures to class members.


On November 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d against Harvard College. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that Harvard's admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Harvard's admissions policy held Asian American students to a higher standard based on their race and intentionally limited the number of Asian Americans admitted each year. Moreover, the plaintiff claimed that Harvard generally considered race to an impermissible degree in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of The Civil Rights Act by engaging in a prohibited form of racial balancing, not limiting its consideration of an applicant's race to "merely a plus factor," and not using an available, racially neutral alternative that would achieve the same goals of diversity. As evidence of this, the plaintiff pointed to admissions data that showed a disparity between acceptance for Asian American students at Harvard and at other schools—for example, the University of California, which does not employ racial considerations in its admissions process. Additionally, the plaintiff pointed to the stagnant acceptance rates for Asian American students, despite increases in application rates and qualifications of Asian American applicants. According to the plaintiff, this was evidence of a policy indistinguishable from racially based quotas for admissions. The plaintiff also pointed to Harvard's long history of admissions discrimination, which suggested that their current policy had similar aims. After Harvard denied the allegations, the two parties proceeded with discovery. Other proposed defendant intervenors, including nine potential Harvard minority applicants and five current Harvard minority students, moved to intervene in the lawsuit in defense of Harvard's admissions policy on April 29, 2015. Judge Allison D. Burroughs denied their motion to intervene on June 15, 2015. 91 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1962. The proposed defendant-intervenors appealed this decision on July 13, 2015. Judge Burroughs ruled that the nine potential Harvard minority applicants did not have a direct, protectable interest in the lawsuit since none of them had yet submitted a pending application, therefore making their interests too removed and speculative to justify intervention. As for the current Harvard students, Judge Burroughs ruled that, because these students had already been admitted and were enrolled at Harvard, they no longer had a remaining interest in Harvard's use of race in its admissions policies. Though the students claimed that they had a personal interest in Harvard continuing to have a racially diverse student body, the judge held that this was not a significantly protectable interest to justify intervention. On July 6, 2015, Harvard moved to stay the proceeding pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Fisher v. University of Texas. On August 5, 2015, the proposed defendant-intervenors also moved to stay the proceeding pending their appeal to the First Circuit on whether they were rightful intervenors in the lawsuit. Meanwhile, the two parties disputed over the scope of discovery. On July 16, 2017, the plaintiff submitted a motion to compel production of Harvard's admissions files. They claimed that Harvard had agreed to submit a statistically significant sample of their files, which the plaintiff had proposed as 400 completed application files from each of the largest racial categories from each of the past four years, split evenly between admitted and denied. However, Harvard only agreed to produce 160 completed files from the past four years, half of which they proposed to hand pick, claiming that the plaintiff could perform their proposed statistical analysis from the Admissions Office database without the complete application files and that the discovery request was too burdensome. The parties also disputed over whether Harvard should have to produce information connected to its alumni interviewer program and about its use of race in transfer admissions. On October 9, 2015, Judge Burroughs granted the proposed-defendant-intervenors motion to stay in part and denied it in part. She decided to stay the action until the Court of Appeals decided whether the proposed defendant-intervenors had a right to intervene, but ordered Harvard to continue producing the documents that the original two parties had agreed to during their July 12, 2015 status conference. Specifically, Harvard had to continue producing information pertaining to its admissions policies and procedures, information pertaining to its alumni interviewer program, training manuals, and electronic admissions data from its database from the past two admissions cycles. On December 9, 2015, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment to deny the proposed defendant-intervenors' motion to intervene. 93 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 792. Subsequently, on March 11, 2016, Judge Burroughs ordered a further partial stay on the action until the resolution of the Supreme Court case Fisher v. University of Texas. Some discovery was allowed to continue during the stay, but the parties were barred from taking depositions, requesting information pertaining to alumni interviewers, requesting discovery from third parties, and generally requesting any large scale electronic discovery. However, the parties were allowed to file proposals as to what other additional discovery should go forward during the stay. The Supreme Court decided Fisher on June 23, 2016, which held that the University of Texas at Austin's undergraduate race-conscious admissions program was lawful under the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, on September 7, 2016, Judge Burroughs issued an order on the parties' scope of discovery going forward. Specifically, she ruled that Harvard should produce comprehensive data from its admissions database from the past six full admissions cycles from 2009–2015 as well as limited admissions data for the 2007–2009 cycles. Harvard did not have to produce information from past alleged discriminatory policies towards Jewish-Americans or about its matriculated students' academic performance-however, it did have to produce information about aggregate graduation data from 2007–2015 and anything pertaining to prior investigations or reports related to Asian American discrimination. Finally, Judge Burroughs limited the plaintiff to 20 depositions, 15 of which could be witnesses from Harvard. On September 23, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on two of the plaintiff's causes of action as well as a motion to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Harvard argued for judgment on the claims that 1) Harvard violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act because it was not using race merely to fill the last few places in its entering freshman class and 2) that all past Supreme Court decisions upholding the consideration of race in admissions were wrongly decided, and that the Supreme Court should now hold that diversity "is not an interest that could ever justify any consideration of race." On the first count, Harvard claimed that the plaintiff's Title VI violation allegation was not grounded in substantive law, and indeed was contradicted by Supreme Court precedent affirming the use of holistic, individualized review that includes race. On the second count, Harvard claimed that the plaintiff did not have the power to call for overruling Supreme Court precedent. Finally, in its motion to dismiss, Harvard argued that the plaintiff did not have the standing to sue on behalf of its constituents because it lacked the characteristics of a genuine membership organization, such as members having control over leadership, power to influence conduct, and financing or participating in its activities. On June 2, 2017, Judge Burroughs denied Harvard's motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff was a genuine membership organization with standing to sue on behalf of its constituents. 2017 WL 2407255. However, she granted Harvard's motion for partial judgment on the two counts, ruling that the plaintiff cannot overrule Supreme Court precedent and that its allegation that admissions offices can only use race-conscious admissions for the last few places in its entering class was unsupported by law. 2017 WL 2407254. Discovery in the case closed on August 4, 2017. On June 15, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that "no rational factfinder could reasonably conclude" that Harvard complies with Title VI because Harvard intentionally discriminates against Asian American applicants, engages in racial balancing, and failed to give "good faith" consideration to other workable alternatives to achieve its claimed interest in diversity. That same day, Harvard also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing and that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Harvard does not discriminate against applicants of any race. On July 24, 2018, Judge Burroughs granted leave for any interested party to file an amicus brief on the pending dispositive motions. Several amicus briefs have been filed. Multiple universities (Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Princeton, etc.), the American Council on Education, and the American Civil Liberties, among others, filed amici briefs in support of defendants. The United States, among others, filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiff. On September 28, 2018, after several interested non-parties appeared as amici regarding the summary judgment motions, Judge Burroughs denied the cross-motions for summary judgment on all counts without prejudice to the parties reasserting their arguments at trial. 346 F. Supp. 3d 174. The case proceeded to trial. A fifteen-day bench trial took place from October 15 to November 2, 2018. On September 30, 2019 and in a 130-page findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court held that Harvard's race-conscious admissions process was fair and does not discriminate against Asian American applicants. The court detailed the importance of diversity in educational settings and that ensuring diversity "relies, in part, on race conscious admissions." This interest was sufficient to provide a compelling interest that could withstand strict scrutiny. The opinion summarized and acknowledged the statistical evidence presented by the parties, and concluded later in its analysis that the program was narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest without unduly burdening Asian American applicants. On the contrary, the court posited that removing race consideration would significantly burden some Asian American applicants. The court also found that Harvard did not engage in racial balancing, which would constitute an impermissible and unconstitutional quota. The court agreed with Harvard that race-neutral alternatives would not suffice. And though the court acknowledged that Harvard could benefit from implicit bias trainings for its officers or more clear guidelines, statistics alone were not enough to demonstrate that Harvard engaged in intentional discrimination. 397 F. Supp. 3d 126. The plaintiffs appealed (Docket No. 19-2005). The Department of Justice filed an amicus brief stating that Harvard’s expansive use of race in its admissions process violates federal civil-rights law and Supreme Court precedent. The brief specifically argued that the evidence from trial showed that Harvard engages in unconstitutional racial balancing, which particularly affects Asian Americans. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d against Harvard College. Plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that Harvard's current admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. The two parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied in September 2018. After a 15-day bench trial, the court issued an opinion on September 30, 2019 that Harvard did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race. The case is ongoing on appeal.


On August 3, 2020, the National Association for the Deaf and five plaintiffs who are deaf and use American Sign Language (ASL) as their primary and preferred language brought this action against President Trump and other members of the White House staff (ECF 1). Following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the White House began holding televised briefings with the White House Coronavirus Task Force. The briefings did not include in-frame ASL interpretation, the approach adopted by many governors in their own Covid-19 briefings. The plaintiffs sued President Trump and other members of the White House alleging that the defendants' failure to provide in-frame ASL interpretation constituted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg of the District Court for the District of Columbia. On September 9, 2020, Judge Boasberg signed an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief. 2020 WL 5411171. The order was stayed until the parties conferred regarding the proper remedy. The parties reached general agreement on the conditions of the injunction, and on September 23, 2020, Judge Boasberg issued an order defining the scope of the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5757463. Under the preliminary injunction, defendants were required to include a qualified ASL interpreter in the White House Communications Agency feed for all White House Coronavirus briefings. The interpretation was required to either take the form of an in-frame interpretation by an interpreter near the speaker or a simultaneous stream with an interpreter from a remote location in a picture-in-picture format (PIP). If Defendants used the PIP approach, they were required to make that video feed available to television networks so that they can use the ASL interpretation in their own broadcasts. Following the court's order of a preliminary injunction, the defendants appealed to the DC Circuit and moved to stay District Court proceedings until the appeal was resolved. Judge Boasberg ordered a stay on all further proceedings pending the resolution of Defendants' appeal. The case remains open.

Summary: On August 3, 2020, the National Association for the Deaf and five deaf plaintiffs who use ASL as their primary language sued President Donald Trump and other White House officials for injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' failure to provide in-frame ASL interpretation at White House Coronavirus Briefings violated their rights under the Rehabilitation Act and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, which Judge James E. Boasberg granted on September 9, 2020. Under the preliminary injunction, the defendants are required to provide in-frame interpretation at all White House Coronavirus Briefings, either in the form of live ASL interpretation from the location of the briefing or live interpretation from a remote location in picture-in-picture format. The Defendants appealed the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction to the DC Circuit. The case is currently stayed in district court pending the resolution of the appeal.


COVID-19 Summary: Four incarcerated individuals filed this class-action lawsuit against the Clayton County Jail based on conditions-of-confinement claims, as well as a habeas claim, a Rehabilitation Act claim, and an ADA claim. The suit remains ongoing.
 Four individuals incarcerated in the Clayton County Jail filed this complaint against the Clayton County Sheriff, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, on July 1, 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic was sweeping through jails and prisons across the country, and the plaintiffs alleged that the jail was ignoring the health and safety of its inmates. Instead of decreasing its population, like jails and prisons across the country and across Georgia, the jail was increasing its population. The jail was infested with mold, mildew, cockroaches, and rodents, inmates were told to use underwear for face coverings, and many were forced to sleep on the floor next to open toilets. Social distancing was nonexistent, jail staff did not educate inmates about COVID-19 risks or prevention, and inmates who became ill were waiting up to a week to be treated by medical staff. Represented by the ACLU, the ACLU of Georgia, and the Southern Center for Human Rights, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because their incarceration was unconstitutional, they argued, the court should issue a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §§2241 and 2243. They also brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and sought a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §2201-2202. The petition was assigned to Judge Eleanor L. Ross, but she later recused herself and the case was reassigned to Judge J. P. Boulee. The plaintiffs sought certification of two classes, each with two subclasses:
the Pretrial Class, composed of all inmates who were at the jail awaiting trial, including:

a Medically Vulnerable Subclass (inmates with medical conditions which placed them at higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19), and
a Disabilities Subclass (inmates whose medical conditions also qualified as disabilities under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act); and

the Post-Adjudication Class, composed of all inmates who were serving time in the prison following conviction of a crime, including:

a Medically Vulnerable Subclass (inmates with medical conditions which placed them at higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19), and
a Disabilities Subclass (inmates whose medical conditions also qualified as disabilities under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act).
They sought release or transfer for all members of the Medically Vulnerable and Disabilities Subclasses; an injunction requiring the jail to adopt measures to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 infection for the remaining inmates (including social distancing and personal protective equipment); a writ of habeas corpus directing the immediate transfer or release of the Medically Vulnerable and Disability Subclasses; and attorneys’ fees and costs. The court denied the request for preliminary injunctive relief on July 9, 2020, stating that such a request must be made by separate motion, not in the complaint. The plaintiffs filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction on July 27, 2020. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims on August 3. The defendants argued that they were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and that the plaintiffs failed to state both a habeas claim and an ADA claim. Before ruling on the motion, the Court granted the plaintiffs motion for an expedited discovery. On September 16, 2020, Magistrate Judge Christopher Bly recommended that one plaintiffs claims be dismissed as he had been released from jail, but advised that the other claims should proceed. As of October 30, Judge Boulee had not granted or denied the motion and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Inmates at the Clayton County Jail sued the Sheriff of Clayton County, alleging that the jail was not sufficiently protecting its inmates against the threat of the COVID-19 pandemic. They alleged that the jail was infested with mold, cockroaches, and rodents, inmates were given insufficient personal protective equipment, social distancing was impossible, and many prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor next to open toilets. They brought this petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, seeking, on behalf of a class, an order requiring the jail to immediately release prisoners in an effort to de-densify, and to take other precautions against a possible outbreak of COVID-19.


On August 30, 2004 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging racial discrimination against herself and others similarly situated by her direct employer, Protiva, Inc., individuals who managed that company, and Texaco, Inc. and Shell Oil Company, the owners of the gas station where she worked. Specifically she alleged that she had been unlawfully demoted from her position as store manager in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII because she was Caucasian and defendant operators wished to only employ managers of their racial descent, South Asian. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment as discovery proceeded. On September 21, 2006 the Magistrate Judge submitted a report recommending that the defendants' motions be granted. On March 28, 2007, however, the district court (Judge Carnes) granted the defendants' motions regarding belatedly raised retaliation claims but denied the other motions for summary judgment on the basis that the defendants had failed to demonstrate that they either were not the plaintiff's joint employer (in the case of Shell and Texaco) or that the stated reasons for demoting the plaintiff were not a mere pretext (in the case of Protiva). The parties reached a settlement awarding the plaintiff unspecified monetary damages on August 9, 2007.

Summary: On August 30, 2004 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging racial discrimination against her by her direct employer, Protiva, Inc., individuals who managed that company, and Texaco, Inc. and Shell Oil Company, the owners of the gas station where she worked. Specifically she alleged that she had been unlawfully demoted from her position as store manager in because she was Caucasian. On March 28, 2007 the district court (Judge Carnes) granted the defendants' motions regarding the belatedly raised retaliation claims but denied the other motions for summary judgment. The parties reached a settlement awarding the plaintiff unspecified monetary damages on August 9, 2007.


On September 17, 2012, the College of the Ozarks filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, the plaintiffs believed that the Contraceptive Mandate violated its sincerely-held religious beliefs by requiring that the College’s health insurance plan contain coverage or access to coverage for elective abortion services, certain FDA-approved abortifacient drugs, and related education and counseling. The Mandate exposed the College to substantial fines for the exercise of its religious beliefs. This violated the College’s rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the Mandate’s requirements compelled the College to operate in a manner contrary to its religious beliefs, thus violating the guarantee of free speech as set out in the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sent a notice of voluntary dismissal on January 14, 2013. Judge Wimes thus ordered the dismissal without prejudice on January 16, 2013. This case was likely closed due to a private settlement, but we don't have any further information.

Summary: On September 17, 2012, the College of the Ozarks filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs were granted voluntary dismissal of the case on January 16, 2013.


On October 30, 2008, a pre-trial detainee of the Los Angeles City Central Jail filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Los Angeles County officials, the Los Angeles County Sheriff, and a medical doctor that served the jail. The plaintiff alleged that the conditions of confinement, specifically lack of a bed and infestation, violated his constitutional rights. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged he was denied prompt medical care when the defendant doctor failed to supply prescribed medication for 43 days. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages in the amount of $33,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $333,000. The plaintiff had entered jail custody in July 2006, and as he was being processed, there was a string of racially charged violent disturbances at several jail facilities. Officials locked down multiple facilities, which delayed in-processing. As a result, the plaintiff was held at a facility without sufficient bench space for sleeping, and no beds or mattresses. He slept on the floor. On November 9, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, which the Magistrate Judge Alicia G. Rosenberg recommended be granted in part and denied in part. On June 6, 2010, the District Court (Judge John F. Walter) adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and dismissed all claims except the claim against the Sheriff in his individual and official capacities for failure to provide adequate sleeping accommodations. On September 14, 2010, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against the Los Angeles County Sheriff in his official and individual capacities, alleging substantively the same claims for conditions of confinement. In response to the defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended complaint, the District Court dismissed all claims except the claim against the Sheriff in his individual capacity for failure to provide adequate sleeping conditions. On April 30, 2013, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim. A magistrate judge found that the newly supplemented record demonstrated that the Los Angeles County jail had faced difficult exigent circumstances in the aftermath of the disturbances and lockdown, and that this meant there had been no constitutional violation. The District Court agreed, dismissing the case on July 18, 2013. 2013 WL 3791419. Plaintiff appealed, and On July 30, 2013, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit. After appointing counsel to represent the plaintiff pro bono, on January 11, 2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion by Judge Consuelo Callahan. Olivier v. Baca, 913 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2019). In light of the exigent circumstances, the opinion explained, there was no constitutional violation, and the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 30, 2008, a pre-trial detainee at the Los Angeles City Central Jail, filed a complaint alleging that the jail violated his constitutional rights when he was forced to sleep on a concrete floor, forced into a room infested with rats and lice, and not given prescribed medication for his health. The District Court dismissed all claims in light of the exigent circumstances caused by a series of violent disturbances at LA County jail facilities. The Court of Appeals affirmed in 2019.


On June 30, 2018, eight Hurricane Maria evacuees from Puerto Rico who were receiving Transitional Shelter Assistance from Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The case was assigned to District Judge Timothy S. Hillman. The plaintiffs sued FEMA under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by LatinoJustice PRLDEF (Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund), Hector E. Pineiro, and Manatt Phelps and Phillips, LLP, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that FEMA was planning to unlawfully terminate the TSA program which provided direct funding to hotels and motels that served as shelters for Puerto Ricans who evacuated the territory due to Hurricane Maria. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that FEMA was planning to terminate its TSA program for Puerto Rican evacuees, without any plan to transition the evacuees into longer-term housing. The plaintiffs argued that this was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Stafford Act that require nondiscrimination in disaster assistance. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff’s sought to extend the provision of the TSA program until all eligible individuals either received temporary housing or found permanent housing. On June 30, 2018, the same day the complaint was filed, Judge Leo T. Sorokin entered a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), enjoining FEMA from terminating the TSA program until at least midnight July 3, 2018, enabling Plaintiffs and the class to remain in transitional shelters until checkout time on July 4, 2018. Right as the initial TRO was set to end, Judge Hillman extended it until at least midnight July 23, 2018. Judge Hillman extended the TRO to give the parties an opportunity to fully brief the important and complex issues raised by plaintiffs’ complaint and their corresponding motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Hillman subsequently extended the TRO on two more occasions: July 19, 2018 (extending it until August 7, 2018) and on August 22, 2018 (extending it until August 31, 2018). In plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed on July 12, six named plaintiffs were dropped from the suit and two additional plaintiffs were added. Plaintiffs also asserted new claims for violation of their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. Presumably because the plaintiffs had already received several extensions granting them access to temporary housing, on August 30, 2018, Judge Hillman denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not have a high likelihood of success on the merits - the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry. Judge Hillman ordered the defendants to refrain from terminating the program that provided the payment for shelter for the plaintiffs (including the class) until midnight September 13, 2018, in order to give the evacuees time to make alternative housing arrangements. On September 20, 2018, Judge Hillman granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the case entirely. The contents of this order are unavailable to us at this time. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 30, 2018, eight Hurricane Maria evacuees from Puerto Rico who were receiving Transitional Shelter Assistance from Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) filed a class-action lawsuit, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Judge Hillman, of the District of Massachusetts, initially issued multiple Temporary Restraining Orders, but ultimately dismissed the case.


On June 13, 2000, thirty-one minor children in the legal custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCAF") filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs were represented by the advocacy organization Children's Rights and by private counsel. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class of all children who are or will be in the legal custody of DCAF as an alleged or adjudicated dependent child; plaintiffs also sought certification of a subclass of all children who are black or perceived by DCAF as black. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that systemic deficiencies in the operation of DCAF subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm. The alleged problems included: overuse of shelters; failing to comply with permanency plans; keeping siblings apart; overcrowding of residential facilities; overworking of caseworkers; denying children safe and permanent homes; overmedicating children; using non-least restrictive placements; failure to provide for foster children's education; operating a foster care system for "financial benefit"; and discriminating on the basis of race and ethnicity, particularly against black children. On August 30, 2000, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding new claims, including challenges brought under the Adoption and Safe Families Act; Early Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment; and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. On September 11, 2000, plaintiffs moved to certify the class. On October 27, 2000, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Both motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Robert L. Dube. On April 20, 2001, Magistrate Judge Dube issued a Report and Recommendation largely denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Magistrate denied defendants' motion with respect to all counts, except for the EPSDT claims, for which the Magistrate dismissed certain of the named plaintiffs. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV-Moreno Dube, 2001 WL 1840843 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2001). Defendants subsequently filed objections to the R&R. On May 10, 2001, Magistrate Judge Dube issued a Report and Recommendation largely granting plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Magistrate certified plaintiffs' proposed class and subclass, but excluded certain groups because they had been members of prior classes. Specifically, the Magistrate excluded the following from the class and subclass: (a) children who reside in Broward/District 10; (b) children who were in the custody of DCAF prior to July 24, 1995, but only for claims which arose prior to that date; and (c) any claims for the failure to provide mental health and/or developmental services. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV, 2001 WL 1400051 (S.D. Fla. May 10, 2001). Defendants filed objections to this R&R. In the meantime, on March 23, 2001, plaintiff Leslie F. moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin defendants from terminating her foster care services. Leslie F. had turned eighteen but was still enrolled in high school. On April 30, 2001, the Court (District Judge Federico A. Moreno) denied the requested preliminary injunction. The Court held that, inter alia, Leslie F. lacked standing because she had not yet had her benefits terminated (and thus had not suffered an injury in fact), and that her claims were not yet ripe. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, while also seeking a temporary injunction from the District Court pending appeal. The Court (Judge Moreno) again denied plaintiff's request, noting that defendants had agreed to continue to provide services for 45 days or until the Eleventh Circuit ruled. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, No. 00-2116-CIV-MORENO, 2001 WL 1840845 (S.D. Fla. June 8, 2001). Plaintiff subsequently appealed this ruling as well. The two appeals were consolidated by the Eleventh Circuit. On October 15, 2001, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Court must abstain under the Younger v. Harris doctrine. At this time, the defendants' objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation denying defendants' motion to dismiss was still under consideration by the Court. On December 4, 2001, the District Court (Judge Moreno) granted defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court held that plaintiffs' claims under the ASFA were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and that certain of plaintiffs' Title VI claims were barred by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) and Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that, by reading Sandoval in pari materia with Harris, the disparate impact regulations do not contain a substantive private right under disparate impact regulations). The Court also abstained under Younger from considering plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims, as well as plaintiffs' claims under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments for plaintiffs not in extended foster care. And while the Court did not dismiss all claims with respect to those plaintiffs, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice due to plaintiffs' failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The Court also set a deadline within which plaintiffs could file a second amended complaint. Bonnie L. ex rel. Hadsock v. Bush, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Eleventh Circuit. On February 14, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' appeal regarding the preliminary injunction because the parties had reached a partial settlement agreement. Per the terms of the settlement agreement, certain of the named plaintiffs released defendants from all claims, while others released defendants only from their EPSDT and Title VI claims. Those plaintiffs continued to press their constitutional and ASFA claims by appealing the District Court's December 4 dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 8, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Carnes) held that (1) certain named plaintiffs' claims had become moot; (2) the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' statutory claims, as those statutes do not give rise to enforceable rights; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under Younger. The Eleventh Circuit only vacated the district court's opinion and remanded with instructions regarding certain named plaintiffs, whose claims were moot or who lacked standing. Thus, this appeal affirmed the district court in all substantive respects and ended the case. 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 984.

Summary: On June 13, 2000, thirty-one minor children in the legal custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCAF") filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs brought an array of systemic challenges to the operation of Florida's foster care system. On December 4, 2001, the District Court (Judge Federico A. Moreno) granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that certain claims were barred and abstaining under Younger v. Harris from hearing other claims. On May 8, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims.


On September 29, 2010, a class of male employees 50 years of age or older filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, against Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for lost compensation in front pay and back pay, attorneys' fees and costs, declaratory and injunctive relief, lost pension benefits, and liquidated damages, claiming that they were abruptly terminated without explanation. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their employment was terminated because of their age in violation of the ADEA. On November 29, 2010, the defendant moved to dismiss Count III of the complaint for failure to state a claim because plaintiffs were not employees of defendant at the time of the alleged retaliation. On December 22, 2010, the plaintiffs moved to dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for breach of contract, alleging that the ADEA waiver in its releases was invalid and unenforceable. On May 9, 2012, the Court (Judge Nora Barry Fischer) granted plaintiffs' motion for conditional certification because all members of the proposed class were over age 50 when they were terminated, all of their terminations were in the course of a single, company-wide reduction in force, and the plaintiffs relied on common evidence to prove their alleged discrimination. On July 20, 2012, the Court denied the defendant's motion for interlocutory appeal because the Court's decision regarding certification was merely conditional and therefore not a final ruling. In February and August 2013, five plaintiffs dismissed their claims with prejudice. In 2016, after trial, the court ruled in favor of plaintiffs for $922,060.

Summary: In September 2010, a class of male employees over the age of 50 filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against their employer, alleging age discrimination after their employment was terminated. As of December 20, 2013, this case is still ongoing.


On June 20, 2011, Philadelphia school children with autism filed a class action lawsuit against the School District of Philadelphia in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and relevant state law. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the District's Automatic Autism Transfer Policy was illegal under the IDEA, Section 504 and the ADA. The challenged policy routinely transferred students with autism from school to school at a certain age solely because they were disabled as a result of autism. On October 31, 2011, the District Court (Judge Legrome D. Davis) denied the defendant's motion to strike class action allegations and motion to dismiss the suit. P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 2011 WL 5127850 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2011). On February 19, 2013, Judge Davis granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 2013 WL 618540 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2013). The Court concluded that the policy violated the IDEA, but that it did not violate Section 504 or the ADA. The Court ordered the school district to alter its policy to meet the procedural requirements under the IDEA and provide parents the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the educational placement of their autistic children. In addition, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. P.V. ex rel. Valentin v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 289 F.R.D. 227, 228 (E.D. Pa. 2013). The class included all children with autism in the School District of Philadelphia in grades Kindergarten through eight who had been transferred, were in the process of being transferred, or were at risk of being transferred, as a result of the School District's upper-leveling process; the parents and guardians of those children; and future members of the class. The parties entered into settlement negotiations in May 2013. The parties filed their preliminary settlement agreement on April 15, 2014. The proposed class settlement: (1) required the district to publish a list of all of its schools with autistic-support classrooms and provide notice of these schools in two separate letters to the parents of children with autism, (2) allowed class members to retain their individual rights to challenge the circumstances of their particular transfers, and (3) provided for the court to retain jurisdiction over the agreement's settlement through Jan. 2, 2017, though the agreement was to remain enforceable after this time. The parties also agreed to $325,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The court granted final approval of the agreement on June 4, 2014. The settlement ended in 2017 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 20, 2011, Philadelphia school children with autism filed a class action lawsuit against the School District of Philadelphia in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant's Automatic Autism Transfer policy violated the IDEA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the American with Disabilities Act and relevant state law. The parties settled on June 4, 2014 in an agreement that (1) required the district to publish a list of all of its schools with autistic support classrooms and provide notice of these schools in two separate letters to the parents of children with autism, (2) allowed class members to retain their individual rights to challenge the circumstances of their particular transfers, and (3) provided for the court to retain jurisdiction over the agreement's settlement through Jan. 2, 2017 though the agreement was to remain enforceable after this time. The parties also agreed to $325,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs.


In December 2001, a federal grand jury returned a 36-count indictment against Tyson Foods, Inc., the world's largest poultry processor, and several individuals, charging the defendants with conspiring to smuggle undocumented aliens into the U.S. and employing them at Tyson's chicken processing plants throughout the country. Shortly after the criminal indictment, plaintiffs filed a nationwide class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against Tyson and several of its top management personnel, alleging civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., and the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that Tyson engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. The scheme allegedly involved the use of temporary employment agencies to recruit and lure undocumented immigrants from Mexico to work in its chicken plants. Plaintiffs further alleged that the scheme consisted of what plaintiffs termed a "willful blindness policy," which included management turning a blind eye to obviously fake work papers and ignoring other factors that suggested that the workers it hired were not legally entitled to work in the U.S. The civil case was initially assigned to Judge R. Allan Edgar. Tyson and its officers responded by moving to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that plaintiffs' RICO claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Tyson also asserted that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim, in that employee wages were the product of Union collective bargaining and therefore could not have resulted from the hiring of undocumented workers. The District Court (Chief Judge Edgar) granted the motion and dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 840 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) Plaintiffs appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004). On remand, Tyson moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds as to two of the plaintiffs. That motion was denied. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2006 WL 319022, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17448 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 8, 2006). Tyson also filed a second motion to dismiss the case on the pleadings, and that motion, too, was denied on September 18, 2006. The District Court (Chief Judge Curtis L. Collier) also denied defendants' request to certify its ruling for purposes of immediate appeal. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2006 WL 2868980, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71500 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 29, 2006). Shortly thereafter, the District Court (Chief Judge Collier) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2006 WL 2924938, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74114 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2006). A case management conference was held in January 2007 and the Court entered a discovery schedule and set the case for trial on March 3, 2008. In 2007, the District Court issued a series of rulings on a variety of discovery and procedural issues. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 951869, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23329 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2007) (ordering defendants not to redact certain portions of Tyson company minutes submitted for in camera review); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 1091217, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26611 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 10, 2007) (ruling that defendants are not entitled to affirmative defenses of estoppel and statute of limitations); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 1574275, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38882(E.D. Tenn. May 29, 2007) (denying Tyson's motion to dismiss); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 3231793 (E.D. Tenn. Oct 30, 2007) (denying motion to continue an expert witness hearing and the trial date); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 4260817, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88866 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 3, 2007) (approving class notice as modified by order). See also McGrew v. Trollinger, No. 4:02-cv-00023, 2007 WL 4106067 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 16, 2007) (ruling that witnesses in Arkansas that were subpoenaed for depositions had to appear.). On February 13, 2008, the District Court (Chief Judge Collier) entered an order granting summary judgment for the defendants and dismissing the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 842 (E.D. Tenn. 2008). The Court found that plaintiffs had failed to produce evidence demonstrating the presence of at least ten unauthorized employees at any given Tyson facility; it further found that plaintiffs' evidence only demonstrated that Tyson was harboring or concealing undocumented aliens at all at one facility, and that this evidence was insufficient to show proximate causation of any injuries. The Court (Chief Judge Collier) denied a motion for reconsideration on May 2, Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2008 WL 1984264, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33101 (E.D. Tenn. May 2, 2008), and the case was closed.

Summary: This is a nationwide class action case filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against Tyson Foods, Inc., claiming that Tyson had engaged in a massive scheme of hiring undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. The District Court originally dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, but was reversed by the Sixth Circuit. It went on to certify a class action, but ultimately granted summary judgment to defendants on February 13, 2008. Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration was denied and the case was closed.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 summary: This case sought emergency voting measures related to COVID-19 for the Florida presidential primary on March 17, 2020. These were denied, but a motion for measures relating to future elections remains pending.
 The Florida presidential primary occurred on March 17, 2020. At that time, Florida had reported 149 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and the State of Florida had taken numerous restrictions in response to COVID-19. Universities sent students home, Supervisors of Elections closed or moved numerous polling stations, and numerous individuals were in quarantine. Concerned about the potential large-scale voter disenfranchisement due to COVID-19 restrictions, on March 16, 2020, Dream Defenders, the New Florida Majority Education Fund, Organize Florida, and several individuals prevented from voting due to COVID-19 restrictions, filed this lawsuit against the Governor of Florida in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sought emergency injunctive and declaratory relief that would order the state to implement additional voting measures and enjoin it from enforcing the existing voting deadlines. They alleged that the State of Florida “failed to take reasonable emergency measures” for voter participation, such as extending deadlines for absentee ballots and expanding vote-by-mail options. Represented by the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, DEMOS, and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit under § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants deprived the plaintiffs of their opportunity to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment and failed to provide reasonable accommodations as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. They asked the court to order the state to expand access to vote-by-mail options, extend deadlines, permit curbside voting, and communicate these changes to Floridians. The defendants did not respond to the emergency motion; however, noting that the temporary restraining order had been filed at 11:16 pm on the eve of the primary, Judge Robert Hinkle denied the motion on March 17, 2020, stating that granting the order would be “adverse to the public interest.” The plaintiffs renewed their request later that day, discarding the request for curbside voting, but continuing to request extended access to vote-by-mail and absentee options. On March 18, 2020 Judge Hinkle denied this motion with respect to the March 17 primary. He noted it “would be adverse to the public interest to enter a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction blocking the Secretary of State and Supervisors of Elections from processing the results of the March 17 presidential primary in accordance with the governing Florida statutes.” The motion for a preliminary injunction with respect to future elections remained pending. On March 18, 2020, the Court set the schedule for briefing on the remaining part of the preliminary-injunction motion: the defendants response is due on April 20, 2020, the discovery deadline is June 5, 2020, and a consolidated hearing on the preliminary injunction will occur during the two weeks after July 20, 2020. On April 20, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, and by mid-May they requested leave to file a second amended complaint.

Summary: Florida voting rights organizations tried unsuccessfully to institute emergency measures before the Florida Presidential Primary after emergency measures initiated in response to COVID-19 kept Floridians from requesting absentee ballots in time or travelling to the polls.