On September 20, 2013, a group of religious-based universities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the federal government under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs, Southern Nazarene University, Oklahoma Wesleyan University, Oklahoma Baptist University, and Mid-America Christian University, alleged that the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee and student health plans provide coverage of contraception violated their religious foundings. The plaintiffs, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the ACA's contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them. On November 27, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 23, 2013, the district court (Judge Stephen P. Friot) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the government had not shown that the plaintiffs' objection to certain methods of contraception, including Plan B, frustrated the overall goal of ACA contraception coverage. The government appealed this case to the Tenth Circuit on February 11, 2014. On July 14, 2015, the Tenth Circuit (Judge Scott Matheson, Jr.) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, (794 F.3d 1151) in an opinion that joined this case with Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius. The same day, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiffs objected to using the expanded accommodation designed by the court, in which they would not have to notify their insurers directly about their religious opposition to contraception, but would have to communicate that opposition and the name of their insurer to the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs requested a rehearing en banc, but the Tenth Circuit denied the request in an order on September 3, 2015. (799 F.3d 1315). On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. The Court considered whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as Zubik v. Burwell [II]. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. In the 10th Circuit, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the case and the court granted the motion on October 23, 2017. In the District Court, the case proceeded with the parties filing joint status reports as they tried to negotiate a settlement amidst changing regulations. President Trump issued an Executive Order in May 2017 directing the Department of Health and Human Services to address conscience-based objections to the preventive care mandate. The Department of Health and Human Services followed the Executive Order, issuing an exemption to religious organizations like the Little Sisters of the Poor. On April 16, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for permanent injunction and declaratory relief, arguing that the new regulations proved that forcing religious organizations to provide contraceptive care violates the RFRA. The Court granted the motion on May 15, 2018 and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, a group of religious-based universities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against federal government. The plaintiffs alleged the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee and student health plans provide coverage of contraception violated their religious foundings. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate as applied to religious nonprofits violates the RFRA. This case was consolidated with six others. The Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, and ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. Following revised HHS policies, the District Court permanently enjoined the defendants from forcing religious organizations to provide contraceptive care. The case is now closed


This case is one of the many filed in federal district courts across the country by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the ACA's system for ensuring that employee health insurance covers birth control. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to notifying the government or their health insurer that they were claiming a religious exemption from the ACA regulation's mandatory insurance coverage for contraception. The current regulatory accommodation allows religious organizations who object for religious reasons to providing contraceptive coverage for their employees to notify their insurer, or notify the government directly, of that objection. Then, the government will work with the insurer or health benefits provider to ensure the employees have access to contraception. The religious employers claim that this approach violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because they see their action of notifying the government as starting a chain of events that results in their employees receiving contraception. This particular lawsuit was filed by Bishop Zubik of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, and the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Pittsburgh. (Their first litigation effort, filed in 2012, was dismissed as unripe. See Zubik v. Sebelius [I] for that first case.) After the current regulations were finally issued in 2013, the plaintiffs filed this second lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania on October 8, 2013. On October 8, 2013, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for expedited preliminary injunction asking the court to enjoin issuance, application, and enforcement of the contraception mandate's self-certification procedures. On November 21, 2013, the court (Judge Arthur J. Schwab) granted the plaintiffs' motion for expedited preliminary injunction. 983 F.Supp.2d 576. The court held that complying with the certification requirement contraception mandate would cause injury to the plaintiffs' religious liberties and that there was a high likelihood of success on the merits of the RFRA and First Amendment claims. On December 20, 2013, Judge Schwab granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. 2013 WL 6922024. The court recognized that the while the Diocese itself was exempt from the contraception mandate as a religious employer, the new regulation required the remaining affiliated organizations to tell the government about their religious objection to contraception. The Court held that the remaining plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their RFRA challenge, noting that requiring self-certification represented a substantial burden on their religious exercise by compelling them to start the chain of events that ends with contraceptive products and services being provided to their employees. The Court was concerned that the Church and its affiliated nonprofits had different responsibilities under the mandate. On February 11, 2014, the government appealed the permanent injunction. This case was consolidated on appeal with  Geneva College v. Sebelius and  Persico v. Sebelius. On February 11, 2015, the Third Circuit (Judge Marjorie Rendell) reversed the injunction in an order that applied to all the consolidated cases, holding that the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate does not significantly burden the religious expression of the nonprofit entities affiliated with the churches in this case. 778 F.3d 422 On April 5, 2015, in an order that applied to this case and Persico v. Sebelius, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en banc. On April 15, 2015, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for stay pending petition for writ of certiorari. On April 16, 2015, the Supreme Court granted a stay pending a response to the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari. 135 S. Ct. 1544. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case on the issue of whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objected to the contraceptive services mandate violated the RFRA, or, rather, satisfies that statute's standard as the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. 136 S.Ct. 444. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue: Priests for Life v. Sebelius, Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius, Geneva College v. Sebelius, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Sebelius, East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius, and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. Back in the Third Circuit, the parties submitted a series of status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On Oct. 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the case, which the court so ordered on Oct. 20. The settlement agreement is not currently publicly available. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, Bishop Zubik, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburg and the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Pittsburg filed a U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Federal Government challenging the the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care Act. After the Trump Administration took office, the parties settled and dismissed the case.


On November 22, 2013, a group of nonprofit religious organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception, even with the ACA's accommodation for religious organizations, would violate the organization's deeply held religious beliefs. On November 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 11, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, for summary judgment. On December 26, 2013, the district court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in their lawsuit. The same day, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (No. 13-6640) and filed a separate motion for injunctive relief pending appeal. On December 27, 2013, the district court denied this relief pending the appeal. On December 31, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted plaintiff's motion for emergency injunctive relief. On January 13, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted defendant's motion to consolidate this appeal with Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius (No. 13-2723). Oral argument occurred on May 8, 2014, before Circuit Judges Karen Nelson Moore and John M. Rogers, and District Judge John Nixon (sitting by designation). On June 11, 2014, in an opinion by Judge Moore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district judge's denial of a preliminary injunction, for all plaintiffs. Organizations exempt from the contraception mandate faced no burden on exercise of their religion, and they were therefore unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And organizations eligible to receive an "accommodation" under the law needed only to provide a "self-certification" that documented that they had a religious objection. This self-certification did not constitute an unlawful religious burden, Judge Moore explained. For similar reasons, the law did not violate the First Amendment's Free Speech, Free Exercise, or Establishment Clauses. On August 21, 2015, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision denying preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs on all claims. The plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on March 9, 2016. On May 26, 2016 the Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated the Sixth Circuit's ruling, and remanded the case back to the lower court in light of Zubik v. Burwell (See FA-PA-0016 in this Clearinghouse). On November 30, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Trauger following Judge Todd Campbell’s retirement. Following the Zubik decision, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury adopted new rules on October 6, 2017 that allowed for religious and moral objections to providing contraceptives under the ACA. As a result, on January 28, 2018 the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their lawsuit. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 22, 2013, a group of nonprofit religious organizations filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. On December 26, 2013, United States District Court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The same day, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit (No. 13-6640). On June 11, 2013, the 6th Circuit affirmed, holding that the ACA did not unlawfully burden the plaintiffs' religion. The case was remanded back to the 6th Circuit in light of a Supreme Court case Zubik v. Burwell. Following the Zubik decision, the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury adopted new rules on October 6, 2017 that allowed for religious and moral objections to providing contraceptives under the ACA. As a result, on January 28, 2018 the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed.


On February 1, 2012, Criswell College, a nonprofit evangelical Protestant college located in Dallas, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), the First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 7, 2012, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. On April 9, 2013, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court noted that the government had begun amending the regulations to provide further accommodations for religious employers by publishing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register in March 2012. 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012). The ANPRM sought to develop "alternative ways of providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing in order to accommodate non-exempt, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to such coverage." And because the government was in the process of addressing the concerns that the college had expressed, the Court concluded that the case is not ripe for judicial consideration. The court dismissed plaintiffs' case without prejudice.

Summary: On February 1, 2012, Criswell College, an evangelical Protestant college located in Dallas, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On April 9, 2013, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was not ripe for review.


On July 21, 2009, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601, against Defendants, operators of the Rolling Oaks Apartments, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The lawsuit alleged race discrimination, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, along with civil penalties. The lawsuit was based on fair housing testing that DOJ had conducted between July 2008 and January 2009, in which rental agents made a series of racialized remarks, steering white testers away from certain locations, and implying that black applicants were more likely to fail criminal background checks. Both the DOJ and the defendants cross moved for summary judgment; the Court denied both sets of motions on December 10, 2010. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached a settlement agreement. On February 02, 2011, the Court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) approved a four-year consent decree. The Decree enjoined Defendants from refusing to rent a dwelling or offer information about a dwelling on the basis of race or color; required Defendants to implement and notify the public of their nondiscrimination policy; develop and implement uniform nondiscriminatory standards and procedures for informing persons of available units; and to pay civil penalties assessed individually to Defendants that total $15,500. The decree ended in 2015 without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The lawsuit was based on fair housing testing that DOJ had conducted between July 2008 and January 2009, in which rental agents made a series of racialized remarks, steering white testers away from certain locations, and implying that black applicants were more likely to fail criminal background checks. On July 21, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601, against operators of the Rolling Oaks Apartments, seeking injunctive and monetary relief for race discrimination. After the court (Judge Mark Fuller) denied cross-motions for summary judgment, the matter settled. In February 2011, the Court entered a four-year consent decree enjoining the Defendants from discriminating on the basis of race in the operation of the Rolling Oaks Apartments and ordering $15,500 in civil penalties.


On September 30, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Southern District of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act against First United Security Bank. The Department of Justice claimed that the Bank engaged in a pattern or practice of home-mortgage lending discrimination against black applicants It asked the court to: 1) declare that the Bank's practices violated the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; 2) enjoin the Bank from continuing the discriminatory practice; 3) award monetary damages to all victims of the Bank's allegedly discriminatory practices; and 4) asses a civil penalty against the Bank. Specifically, the Department of Justice claimed that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had reason to believe that in 2004 the Bank discriminated against black applicants on the basis of race by setting higher interest rates for first-lien refinance loans and by failing to meet the lending needs of majority African-American tracts in west central Alabama on an equal basis with majority white tracts. The case was assigned to Chief Judge William H. Steele. On November 18, 2009, he entered an agreed order for resolution. This agreement stated that the Bank had implemented and would continue to implement policies and procedures that would ensure the pricing of its residential loans were not discriminatory. The bank would also compensate some African-American borrowers under a standard pricing matrix and opening branches in majority African-American areas that it serves. The bank also agreed to asses the credit needs of consumers in majority black areas and engage in consumer education. This agreement required annual reports by the bank, and was scheduled to terminate in 2014. However, on May 6, 2014 the parties filed a joint motion asking the court to extend the agreement because the bank had been unable to satisfy a provision that required a $500,000 investment in a special fund for lending to minority communities. The submission did not explain why the bank had been unable to make this investment. The agreement was extended for an additional four years or until the bank satisfied the investment requirement, and was approved by Judge Steele on May 7, 2014. On April 27, 2016, the parties filed a joint status report stating that all provisions of the agreement had been met. Judge Steele dismissed the case the same day.

Summary: On September 30, 2009 the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against First United Security Bank under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The U.S. claimed that the Bank had engaged in a pattern or practice of home-mortgage lending discrimination against black applicants. On November 18, 2009 an agreement was entered that required the Bank to change several of its practices and to pay monetary damages to some African-American borrowers. The terms of the agreement were satisfied and the case dismissed in April 2016.


On November 18, 2011, two undocumented Mexican immigrants and three Alabama fair housing groups filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Immigration Law Center, the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, LatinoJustice, and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees, alleging that an Alabama law violated the Fair Housing Act and the Supremacy and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, and threated to leave families across the state homeless. Specifically, Alabama HB 56 prohibited any individual from entering into a business transaction with the State without proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. A separate Alabama law required that owners of mobile homes obtain annual registration tags from the State. Together, these two laws put undocumented immigrant mobile home owners in a difficult position: renew the tags and be subject to a felony prosecution under HB 56, or refrain from renewing the tags and risk other civil and criminal penalties. On November 23, 2011, the District Court (Judge Myron H. Thomson) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and temporarily enjoined the State from enforcing HB 56 against mobile home owners. Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 2011 WL 5878363 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2011). Two weeks later, after denying the State's motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order and granting the plaintiffs' motion to extend the order, the District Court imposed a preliminary injunction on the State. Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Magee, 835 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (M.D. Ala. 2011). The Court held that the plaintiffs were substantially likely to prevail on their claims that the enforcement of HB 56 against individuals seeking to renew their mobile home registrations intentionally discriminates against and has an unlawful disparate impact on Latinos, in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The Court further held that the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on their claim that federal immigration laws preempted HB 56, and that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction. Based on this holding, the District Court (Judge Thompson) enjoined the State from: (1) requiring any person who attempts to pay the annual mobile home registration fee to prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status; and (2) refusing to issue mobile home registration tags to any person because that person cannot prove his or her U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. The Court further declared that it is not a criminal violation of HB 56 for an individual to obtain a registration decal without providing proof of U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration status. On December 21, 2011, the State appealed the preliminary injunction. While this appeal was pending in the Eleventh Circuit, the parties conducted discovery. On May 17, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Gerald Tjoflat, Charles Wilson, and Beverly Martin) dismissed the appeal as moot because in May 2012 the Alabama legislature amended HB 56 to exclude mobile home registrations. Cent. Alabama Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Revenue, 2013 WL 2372302 (11th Cir. May 17, 2013). The Court also vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. With the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief rendered moot by the amended statute, the parties turned to the issue of attorneys' fees and costs. On December 27, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and expenses, which was resolved after the State agreed to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys $230,000 in a private settlement. The District Court dismissed the case on May 6, 2014, upon stipulation of the parties.

Summary: In November 2011, two undocumented Mexican immigrants and three fair housing groups filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that a state statute violated the Fair Housing Act and was preempted by federal immigration law because it required mobile home owners to pay for a government-issued registration while prohibiting undocumented residents from making payments to government officials. Because the law made it illegal to possess a mobile home without registration and because it was illegal for undocumented residents to obtain the registration, the law effectively made such persons homeless. The District Court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) enjoined the State from enforcing the law. The State appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit rendered it moot because in May 2012 the Alabama legislature amended the statute to exclude mobile home registration. The District Court dismissed the case in May 2014, upon stipulation of the parties.


This case, brought by the United States in December 2011 against Countrywide Financial Corporation, resulted in the largest residential fair lending settlement in U.S. history. $335 million was paid to compensate more than 200,000 African-American and Hispanic borrowers who were allegedly charged higher fees and interest rates because of their race or national origin. The United States also claimed that Countrywide and its subsidiaries ("the Countrywide Defendants") steered thousands of African-American and Hispanic borrowers into subprime mortgages when non-Hispanic white borrowers with similar credit profiles received prime loans. Prior to entry of the Consent Decree, the Countrywide defendants had stopped originating residential loans. In addition to the monetary relief, the consent decree contained remedial provisions to become effective in the event the Countywide defendants ever reentered this business. These included implementation of policies and practices to prevent and detect potential fair lending violations not only on the basis of race or national origin, but also on the basis of marital status. Regarding monetary relief, the court required that the defendants deposit $335 million to compensate allegedly aggrieved persons for monetary and other damages they may have suffered as a result of the defendants' alleged violations of the FHA and the ECOA. Each party bore its own costs and attorneys' fees. The Consent Decree had a four-year term, beginning December 21, 2011. On January 25, 2016, the Court (Philip S. Gutierrez) entered an amended Consent Decree which extended provisions of the settlement to December 30, 2016. The amended decree required the defendants to present a proposal to the court for the distribution of all money remaining in the Settlement Fund by October 14, 2016. On April 5, 2016, the court granted am April 4 disbursement order, which granted, among sums to other organizations: (a) The National Urban League $1,000,000.00; (b) National Council of La Raza $1,500,000.00; (c) Habitat for Humanity $1,000,000.00; (d) d. Self−Help Ventures Fund $1,500,000.00; (e) Atlanta Neighborhood Development Partnership $1,000,000; (f) Opportunity Resource Fund $1,000,000.00; (g) Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago $1,500,000.00; (h) NHS of Los Angeles County $2,000,000.00. On October 27, 2016, the court approved the defendant's second disbursement plan. The was no further docket activity after this order and the case is now closed.

Summary: This case resulted in the largest residential fair lending settlement in U.S. history, with $335 million being paid to compensate African-American and Hispanic borrowers who were allegedly charged more based on their race or national origin.


On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of California against Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc., under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The Department of Justice alleged that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers in its residential mortgage lending and sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, and a civil penalty. This case was filed after years of monitoring by federal agencies. In 2009, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") determined that the defendant had substantial disparities in the rates given to minority versus non-Hispanic white borrowers. The FTC requested more information from the defendant, including loan data and the company's policies, and in 2011 the Department of Justice took over the investigation. The data obtained from the investigation showed that from 2006 through at least 2010, the defendant permitted its mortgage brokers to charge excessive fees beyond the fee caps to African American and Hispanic borrowers more frequently than white borrowers based solely on race and national origin. The defendant had a two-step process set in place where the first step determined whether the applicant satisfied objective criteria. The second step was more subjective and allowed mortgage brokers to charge fees with little checks on their discretion. The defendant did not set up objective criteria to guide the mortgage brokers in setting fees or interest rates. The disparities between the rates given to whites and minorities were prevalent in thousands of loans made in numerous states. On October 1, 2013, the District Court (Judge Marilyn L. Huff) entered a consent order between the parties. Although the defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination, the order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any discriminatory act or practice and subjected the defendant to monitoring. The defendant was also required to pay $3 million into a settlement fund to compensate those affected by its discrimination. The order was set to terminate after three years if the defendant had complied during that time period. On September 28, 2016, the parties jointly moved to extend the consent decree by one month, which was the time that Plaza needed to achieve substantial compliance. The court granted this motion and on November 29, 2016, the parties moved to dismiss the case without prejudice.

Summary: On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of California against Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc., under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, alleging that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin in its residential mortgage lending. On December 1, 2013, the District Court entered a consent order that prohibited the defendant from discriminating on the basis of race or national origin and required the defendant to place $3 million into a settlement fund. The case closed in 2016 after the defendant had substantially complied with the consent order.


On May 30, 2014, the City of Los Angeles filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The City sued JP Morgan Chase Bank under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Fair Housing Act/Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). The City sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the bank's lending practices were predatory, intentionally discriminated against minority borrowers, and had a disparate impact on minorities. Specifically, the complaint alleged disparate impact claims, based on statistical data, that: 1) lending practices resulted in disproportionate number of foreclosures in minority neighborhoods; 2) minority homeowners received disproportionate number of predatory loans. It also alleged the bank intentionally discriminated against minorities by: 1) targeting minorities for predatory loans; 2) underwriting adjustable loan rates that borrowers could not afford; and 3) inducing foreclosures by refusing to offer refinancing or loan restructuring on fair terms. The City claimed it was injured as a result of the bank's practices through loss of property tax and decrease in property value. The City also brought two other actions regarding discriminatory and predatory lending against Wells Fargo (City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Company, No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW) and Citigroup (City of Los Angeles v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-09009-ODW), respectively. On June 25, 2014, the bank filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. On August 5, 2014, Judge Otis D. Wright granted the motion to dismiss but gave the City 21 days to amend its complaint. 2014 WL 3854332 (N.D. Cal. 2014). On August 26, 2014, the City filed an amended complaint that again alleged that the defendant had engaged in discriminatory and predatory lending practices, adding that minorities in fact received predatory loan terms from JP Morgan and that these loan terms led to rapid foreclosure. The complaint further alleged that the City had been injured by the bank's practices because it still had to provide costly municipal services for properties in minority neighborhoods that had became vacant as a direct result of discriminatory loans originated or purchased by the bank. On November 14, 2014, Judge Wright denied JP Morgan's motion to dismiss, stating that the City's allegations were sufficient to withstand the pleading stage. Judge Wright found the City's allegations regarding causation to be sufficient to assert standing, and ruled that Chase's arguments for dismissing the case for failure to state a claim went to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of the pleading. In the related case against Wells Fargo, on July 17, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment against the City. 2015 WL 4398858 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015). As a result, on August 6, 2015, the City filed an ex parte application to stay this case pending appeal of the Wells Fargo action, in order to avoid duplicative litigation both in the trial court and on appeal. However, on September 2, 2015, the court (Judge Otis D. Wright II) dismissed the case with prejudice, as stipulated between the parties. We do not know if the matter was settled, or if Los Angeles simply withdrew it. No settlement papers are available.

Summary: On May 30, 2014, the City of Los Angeles filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against JP Morgan Chase Bank, under Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and Fair Housing Act/Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA). The plaintiff sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants lending practices were predatory and intentionally discriminated against minority borrowers, and had a disparate impact on minorities. On August 6, 2015, the plaintiff field an ex parte application to stay the case pending appeal of related action. On September 2, 2015, the case was dismissed as stipulated.


On November 10, 2010, the United States brought a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601-3631, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, against the manager/supervisor and owners of an apartment complex. The Plaintiff sued on behalf of two female residents of the apartment complex, claiming that the manager/maintenance supervisor subjected female tenants to discrimination on the basis of sex, including unwelcome sexual harassment. The Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, monetary damages, and civil penalties. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the Defendants made housing unavailable to female tenants because its manager engaged in a pattern and practice of offering quid pro quo agreements to provide services in exchange for sex, pervasive unwanted sexual advances, comments, and gestures, and other forms of sexual harassment, all of which interfered with the women's use and enjoyment of their tenancies. On September 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Linda R. Reade) approved a five-year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. By that time, none of the Defendants was engaged in the residential rental business. The Consent Decree required that should the owners ever re-enter the business, they were prohibited in general from discriminating against tenants on the basis of sex and specifically required to adopt and distribute a Nondiscrimination Policy to be approved by the Justice Department, to train its employees in the policy, to develop a complaint procedure an retain all document pertaining to any complaints. The manager/maintenance supervisor was forever prohibited from having any involvement whatsoever in the management, rental, or maintenance of any dwelling. Defendants agreed to pay $80,000 in compensatory damages to aggrieved persons identified by Plaintiff and $15,000 in civil penalties. The consent decree terminated in September 2016, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This sex discrimination fair housing case was brought by the United States in 2010 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa against the owners of an apartment complex and their manager, alleging sexual harassment by the manager of two female tenants. The women claimed they were subjected to offers of maintenance services in return for sex, pervasive, unwanted touching, gestures and remarks. The Plaintiff claimed these actions constituted a pattern and practice of sexual discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Though the owners had gone out of business during the course of the litigation, they entered into a five-year Consent Decree that included detailed prohibitions against sex discrimination, should they ever again engage in the business. The manager was forever banned from any job involved in any aspect of the operation of any dwelling. Defendants agreed to pay $80,000 in compensatory damages to aggrieved persons identified by Plaintiff and $15,000 in civil penalties.


On February 1, 2008, minority homeowners on behalf of similarly situated minority homeowners filed a class-action complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against H&R Block under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on minority applicants in their home financing policies and practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate, had a discriminatory impact on minority homeowners, creating a significantly higher likelihood of exposure to discretionary points and fees. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. On February 12, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On March 27, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Court (Judge Rya W. Zabel) granted the motion in relation to H&R Block Inc., but not in relation to its subsidiaries. However, the plaintiff could move to add H&R Block Inc. as a defendant after discovery. On July 9, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The complaint added several named plaintiffs. On June 21, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. On March 21, 2011, the motion was granted, subject to limitation by time. A class of "[a]ll African-American borrowers who obtained a mortgage loan from one of the Defendants" was certified. However, three months later, the Supreme Court decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). The defendants filed a motion to decertify class On October 6, 2011, in light of that case. On September 18, 2012, the Court granted the motion and decertified class. After Wal-Mart, there was no longer sufficient evidence to satisfy the commonality requirement. Statistical analysis was no longer sufficient, and the plaintiffs could not show a common method of exercising discretion by the brokers. On February 7, 2013, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiffs' appeal. On August 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice. That ended the case.

Summary: On February 1, 2008, minority homeowners on behalf of similarly situated minority homeowners filed a class-action complaint in U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against H&R Block Inc., H&R Block Bank and its wholly-owned subsidiary,under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, et seq. ("ECOA") and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on minority applicants in their home financing policies and practices. On August 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice.


On October 29, 2008, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601-3619, against a condominium association and its president. The U.S. brought the case on behalf of two residents of the condominium complex who claimed the defendants engaged in illegal discrimination on the basis of familial status by declaring in their Amended Master Deed and Declaration that no unit should be "sold or leased to a person who has a child under the age of 16 who will occupy or reside in the unit 180 days or more a year." The complainants wished to sell their unit, but the U.S. alleged that they were unable to do so because the Association interfered with the sale by actively discouraging prospective buyers who had children. The complainants intervened in the case on August 10, 2009. After discovery, the parties entered mediation, and on March 3, 2010, the Court (Judge Warren K. Urbom) approved a three-year consent decree. In addition to a general prohibition against discrimination in the sale or rental of the condominium units, the decree required the defendants to develop and post a non-discrimination policy and to amend the master deed to excise the prohibition against families with children. Defendants agreed to pay $77,500 to the complainants, an additional $35,000 to other aggrieved parties, and a $15,000 civil penalty to the United States. The consent decree terminated in 2013 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: The defendant to this 2008 family-status discrimination lawsuit brought by the United States in the District of Nebraska, was a condominium association whose "Amended Master Deed and Declaration" stated that no unit should be "sold or leased to a person who has a child under the age of 16 who will occupy or reside in the unit 180 days or more a year." The suit's complainants alleged that this clause posed an obstacle to their intended sale of their condo units. After discovery, the parties entered mediation, and on March 3, 2010, District Judge Warren K. Urbom approved a three-year consent decree. In addition to a general prohibition against discrimination in the sale or rental of the condominium units, the decree required the defendants to develop and post a non-discrimination policy and to amend the master deed to excise the prohibition against families with children. Defendants agreed to pay $77,500 to the complainants, an additional $35,000 to other aggrieved parties, and a $15,000 civil penalty to the United States.


On May 5, 2008, an association of residents of a New Jersey neighborhood filled a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The residents, represented by lawyers from South Jersey Legal Services, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendants' redevelopment plan for the Gardens neighborhood represented a violation of the Fair Housing Act, and of the Equal Protection clauses of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' redevelopment plan, which called for the razing of the existing homes located in the Gardens neighborhood, the only one with predominantly African American and Hispanic residents, made housing unavailable because of race. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the redevelopment plan had a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic households in violation of the Fair Housing Act because it destroyed their homes without providing adequate relocation assistance. The township had displaced hundreds of predominantly African American and Hispanic residents and, the plaintiffs claimed, "devastated a once stable minority community in need of only modest improvement." Only about 70 homes out of 300 remain scattered throughout the neighborhood and no new homes were constructed in 10 years. On July 18, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On October 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Noel Hillman) issued an order with respect to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Three of the allegations under state law related to local redevelopment and housing laws and open meetings laws were dismissed as moot. Two counts related to denial of just compensation under state law were dismissed as moot. In other respects, the motion was denied. On November 25, 2008, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs could not file allegations pertaining to denial of just compensation in light of the Court's opinion of October 28, 2008. On December 3, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, which added more facts and allegations of violation of the Due Process clauses under the U.S. and New Jersey constitutions. On February 13, 2009, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The injunction was sought with respect to disparate impact claim under the FHA, and the Court stated the plaintiffs did not show they were likely to succeed on the merits, and suffer and irreparable injury. Even if they lost housing, there was insufficient showing that monetary compensation would not be enough. On October 23, 2009, the Court granted in part, denied in part, and continue in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The motions with respect to claims under the FHA, EEOC, Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, were treated as motions for summary judgment, and continued until later. The Court dismissed claims of Due Process violations under the U.S. and New Jersey constitutions, claims of discrimination under state laws, and claims of violations of local redevelopment and housing laws. On January 19, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 3, 2011, the district court (Judge Noel Hillman) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the district court found that the redevelopment plan of the Gardens neighborhood did not have a disparate impact on African Americans and Hispanics. The court found that the residents were unable to make a prima facie showing that the plan had a disparate impact on protected groups because they were unable to show that the plan had a greater adverse impact on protected groups than on others, and were unable to show that the township's legitimate interest in redevelopment could be accomplished with less discriminatory impact. Finally, the court held that the defendants had not acted with the discriminatory intent necessary to violate the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In an opinion filed September 13, 2011 the court (Judges Sloviter, Fuentes, and Fisher) vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court made clear that at the summary judgment stage, the district court is to take the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Under that standard, the evidence submitted was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act. Specifically, the court held that the evidence presented by the residents that African American and Hispanic citizens were 8 times more likely to be affected by the redevelopment plan was sufficient to show a disparate impact. Furthermore, the appellate court made it clear that the district court had erred by asking whether the defendants had treated minorities the same as other residents, rather than asking whether minority residents were affected differently than the other residents. On May 22, 2012, the Third Circuit's mandate was entered. On June 11, 2012, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United State Supreme Court, asking for review of the legal question whether disparate impact claims exist under the Fair Housing Act. This was an issue on which the Court had granted review in Magner v. Gallagher (Sup. Ct. Docket 10-1032), but then that case was withdrawn by its defendant, the City of St. Paul, after full briefing but before argument. The Court granted cert., and argument was scheduled for December 4, 2013. Observers expected the Court to strike down the disparate impact theory. Instead, on November 13, 2013, the case settled. The settlement--which news reports state was funded, in part, by an organization called The Reinvestment Fund--includes provision for construction of 44 new homes, with the first to be ready for occupancy before the end of 2014. Twenty homes will go to current residents in exchange for allowing redevelopment of their existing homes. All of the phased new construction will be completed by 2018. Seven households that have elected to relocate will be compensated based in part on the appraised value of their homes. The aggregate amount that the township paid to them was $691,000.00 On November 15, 2013, the Court entered the settlement agreement and dismissed the case and the proceedings with prejudice.

Summary: An association of residents of a New Jersey neighborhood filled a lawsuit claiming that the defendants' redevelopment plan for the Gardens neighborhood represented a violation of the Fair Housing Act and the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' redevelopment plan, which razed numerous homes in a minority neighborhood, was discriminatory. The plaintiffs appealed the District Court's pretrial decision in favor of the town to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which reversed, and found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question whether disparate impact claims were available under the Fair Housing Act. About two weeks prior to the scheduled argument, the parties settled; the city will construct 44 new homes, 20 for current residents in exchange for allowing redevelopment. Seven households that elected to relocate will be compensated.


On December 13, 2007, low-income minority individuals in need of affordable housing filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Town of Smithtown in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by both private counsel and public interest attorneys, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that Smithtown operated its voucher program with a residency preference that discriminated on the basis of race, color, and national origin. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they and others similarly situated were intentionally excluded from participation in the Town's voucher program. The plaintiffs moved for class certification and also sought for the parties' proposed settlement agreement to be approved on May 6, 2009. On August 28, 2009, the court (Joanna Seybert) entered an order and final judgment approving the parties' settlement agreement. The final certified class consisted of "all African-American and Hispanic individuals who do not live or work in Smithtown, New York and who applied to the Smithtown Section 8 Voucher Program in 2002 or 2006 when the waitlist was opened and who subsequently were or would have been determined not eligible for the Section 8 Voucher Program because they did not live or work in Smithtown." Under the terms of the settlement the Town of Smithtown agreed to implement an anti-discrimination educational program for its employees, to affirmatively market the Section 8 Program to minority persons, to inform the public of its non-discriminatory policies, to maintain and preserve records for purposes of recordkeeping and reporting, and to pay $925,000 to the plaintiffs. This settlement remains in effect until 2019. This case is closed.

Summary: Low-income minority individuals in need of affordable housing filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Town of Smithtown, complaining that Smithtown operated its voucher program with a residency preference that discriminated on the basis of race, color, and national origin. The court entered an order and final judgment approving the parties' settlement agreement under which the Town of Smithtown agreed to implement an anti-discrimination educational program, to affirmatively market the Section 8 Program to minority persons, to inform the public of its non-discriminatory policies, to maintain and preserve records for purposes of recordkeeping and reporting, and to pay $925,000 to the plaintiffs. This settlement remains in effect until 2019.


On December 6, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The DOJ filed under 42 U.S.C. 3601 of the Fair Housing Act against the owner of the Burgundy Gardens Apartments, LLC. The U.S. Department of Justice asked the Court to 1) declare that the defendant's conduct was a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 2) enjoin the defendant and its workers from continuing to discriminate on the basis of race or color in the rental of dwellings, 3) award monetary damages to persons harmed by Defendant's discriminatory practices, and 4) assess a civil penalty against the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in racially discriminatory housing practices at Burgundy Gardens Apartments by failing to inform African-American prospective tenants about available apartments, telling African Americans prospective tenants that the prices for rental apartments were higher than the prices quoted to similarly situated non-African-America persons, and failing to show African-American prospective tenants available apartments, while at the same time, showing similarly situated non-African American persons available apartments and negotiating for the rental of such apartments. On April 4, 2012, the parties reached a settlement in which the defendant was enjoined from discriminating against any person in terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a dwelling because of race. The defendant also agreed to implement a Nondiscrimination Policy and to notify the public of its implementation. The defendant paid $150,000 to those harmed by its discriminatory practices. The defendant paid an additional $25,000 to the United States as a civil penalty. On June 13, 2016, Judge Kenneth M. Karas ordered the defendant to distribute $65,055.20 of the settlement fund to Legal Aid Society of Rockland County and New York Legal Assistance Group.

Summary: On December 06, 2010, the United States filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 3601 of the Fair Housing Act against the owner of the Burgundy Gardens Apartments, LLC in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Kenneth Karas). The Plaintiff, represented by the Untied States Department of Justice asked the Court to 1) declare the Defendant's conduct a violation of the Fair Housing Act, 2) enjoin the Defendant from discriminating on the basis of race in the rental of dwellings, 3) award monetary damages and 4) assess a civil penalty. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims the Defendant's rental practices discriminated against African American prospective tenants. On April 4,2012, the parties reached a settlement. The Defendant was enjoined from further discriminatory rental practices on the basis of rate, and paid $150,000 in damages and $25,000 as a civil penalty.


On September 09, 2011, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Fair Housing Act against the architects and developers of an apartment building. The plaintiff asked the Court for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendants designed and constructed the complex in a manner that was inaccessible to persons with disabilities. On October 5, 2011, the plaintiff entered into a consent decree with the developers which required extensive retrofitting of non-compliant areas in both the public/common use areas of the building and in the apartments themselves, payment of $60,000 to compensate aggrieved persons, and a $35,000 civil penalty. On January 26, 2012, the parties entered into a consent decree which required that the defendant comply with the FHA and pay a $20,000 civil penalty. The case terminated on January 26, 2012.

Summary: The United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against architects and developers of an apartment building claiming that the defendants designed and constructed the building so that it was inaccessible to persons with disabilities. The plaintiff entered into two separate three-year consent decrees; one requiring the architect to make all of its future designs compliant with the FHA and to pay a $20,000 civil penalty; the other with the developers requiring extensive retrofits to the building, $60,000 in damages and a $35,000 civil penalty.


On April 2, 2012, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act against New York-based correspondence mortgage lender GFI Mortgage Bankers, Inc., in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The United States, represented by the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief. It alleged that between 2005 and 2009, GFI's loan officers engaged in a pattern and practice of charging African-American and Hispanic borrowers in New Jersey and New York higher interest rates and higher fees for residential mortgage loans than they charged similarly situated white borrowers. It further alleged that because of these disparities, African Americans and Hispanics paid or would need to pay between $4,000 and $5,000 more than similarly situated white borrowers over the first four years of their loans' terms, and more than $20,000 over the loans' full terms. The Department of Justice received this case as a referral from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. GFI moved to dismiss the case, arguing that conduct that has a disparate impact (but no discriminatory intent) is not actionable under the Fair Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. On August 27, 2012, after Judge Katherine Forrest expressed skepticism of the defendants' argument in a scheduling order, the parties entered into a Consent Order. GFI admitted that statistical analyses of data from 2005–2009 showed its loan officers charged African-American and Latino borrowers higher discretionary fees than similarly situated white borrowers. It also admitted that it provided financial incentives for its loan officers to use discretion and charge borrowers fees unrelated to their credit characteristics. The consent order required GFI to pay $3.5 million to damaged African-American and Hispanic borrowers, and to pay a $55,000 civil penalty to the United States. GFI was required to implement specific policies to prevent pricing discrimination and limit loan officers' discretion in the future, hire senior and managerial staff to ensure compliance with these policies, and develop a fair lending monitoring program that would allow it to identify and correct for lending disparities. The order required GFI to submit these policies for approval to the Department of Justice by the end of October 2012. After the United States approved the new policies, GFI was required hire an independent third-party to provide fair lending training to all of its employees engaged in the loan origination business. The consent decree was scheduled to last for four and a half years. After minor modifications to the consent order, the decree's enforcement period expired and the case is now closed.

Summary: On April 12, 2012, the United States sued GFI Mortgage Bankers under the Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act for charging African American and Hispanic borrowers higher fees and costs for home mortgage loans than it charged similarly situated white borrowers. The parties entered a Consent Decree on August 27, 2012, which required GFI to pay $3.555 million and implement fair lending policies and a fair lending monitoring system. The case is now closed.


The Fortune Society, a non-profit organization that provides temporary and permanent housing to hundreds of formerly incarcerated individuals each year, tried to rent apartments at The Sand Castle, an apartment complex managed and owned by the Sandcastle Towers Housing Development Fund Corp. (the “Fund”). When the Fund learned that the Fortune Society served formerly imprisoned individuals, they refused to rent apartments. On October 30, 2014, the Fortune Society filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the Fund (and related entities) under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and New York State and City law. Represented by Relman, Dane & Colfax, the plaintiff sought injunctive, monetary and declarative relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant maintained a discriminatory policy that prohibited anyone with a criminal record from renting an apartment or living at The Sand Castle. Specifically, they claimed that the policy had the purpose and effect of discriminating against African Americans and Latinos. The court set up a discovery schedule, which proceeded for about a year. On May 1, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On June 25, 2015, the court ordered the parties to meet and discuss settlement in light of the recent Supreme Court decision Inclusive Communities Project v. Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. (See here in the Clearinghouse). That opinion held that the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate impact liability, but emphasized that liability followed only if the challenged policy or practice actually caused, rather than merely accompanied, a racial disparity. The plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its race discrimination claims based on disparate impact on September 30, 2016. On the same day, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The defendant claimed that summary judgment was appropriate because discovery confirmed that it did not maintain a blanket ban on residents with criminal records. On November 16, 2015, the parties met at a status conference to discuss settlement, as recommended by the court. But they failed to agree. On October 18, 2016, the United States entered a Statement of Interest. It suggested a three-step legal test that the court should use to evaluate the plaintiff's claims (Department of Justice press release available here):

The plaintiff must show the challenged practice has a discriminatory effect on a protected class;

The defendant must establish a legitimate justification for the challenged practice; and

The plaintiff must exhibit another policy to serve the same interests with less discriminatory effect.

The court (Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon) issued an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment and grating in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on July 3, 2019. The court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim but granted it with respect to the plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim. In addition, the court scheduled a status conference on August 20, 2019, to discuss settlement possibilities. The parties jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on October 11, 2019. On October 16, 2019, the defendant and the plaintiff filed a status report, stating that the matter has been resolved. According to the New York Daily News, the parties agreed to a $1,187,500 settlement. The article did not mention any injunctive relief but did note that the Fund no longer controlled The Sand Castle or any other residential property. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2014, a non-profit organization that provides housing assistance to formerly incarcerated individuals filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who owned and managed a multi-building apartment complex, had a discriminatory policy that unlawfully prohibited anyone with a criminal record from renting an apartment. After years of discovery and litigation, the parties settled for over $1 million.


On May 12, 2005, individual New York residents and the New York ACORN local chapter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Nassau County and the Village of Garden City under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, citing violations of these acts as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with discriminatory zoning practices; to order Garden City to approve a proposed zoning that would allow for affordable housing; and to order the defendants to take all actions necessary to assure that the Social Service Site be redeveloped to maximize the availability of affordable and integrated housing. The plaintiffs claimed that Nassau County and Garden City had engaged in discriminatory zoning with regard to the "Social Service Site" in Garden City. While there had initially been plans to develop affordable housing on the site, residents of Garden City strongly objected to such plans at a public hearing. Garden City acquiesced to the demands of the public and granted zoning that would allow for luxury, single-family housing rather than integrated affordable housing units. The plaintiffs claimed that this continued a practice of segregated housing in Garden City and denied individual plaintiffs the opportunity to live in integrated housing within Garden City. On November 30, 2005, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include New York ACORN Housing Company (NYAHC) as a plaintiff. NYAHC was a non-profit community developer of affordable housing that had attempted to develop affordable housing in Nassau County for many years. NYAHC had submitted a proposal for affordable housing at the Social Service Site. On March 10, 2006, both defendants submitted motions to dismiss the amended complaint. On July 21, 2006, District Judge Joseph F. Bianco denied these motions to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs did have standing in court and had not failed to state a claim. The parties engaged in discovery for several years. In late 2009, ACORN began facing organizational issues as a result of heavily edited videos that garnered public opposition to the organization. As a result, ACORN lost much of its funding and effectively closed. On June 15, 2010, District Judge Arthur D. Spatt ordered that the New York Communities for Change (NYCC) intervene as the practical, but not legal, successor to NY ACORN as plaintiff. On July 29, 2011, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 15, 2012, Judge Spatt granted defendant County's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it. Judge Spatt found that the County lacked the legal power over the zoning of the Social Services Site. Further, Judge Spatt found that the County's stated goals for the site were to increase profits, and a zoning that allowed for luxury single-family homes allowed the County to meet this stated goal. In the same order, Judge Spatt dismissed Garden City's motion for summary judgement and granted intervenor-plaintiff (NYCC) motion to amend the intervenor complaint to include the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 843 F.Supp.2d 287. The parties continued with discovery. On December 6, 2013, Judge Spatt found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish liability on the part of the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §1982. Judge Spatt did find that the plaintiffs had established liability on the part of the defendant on its other charges: (1) the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., based on a theory of disparate treatment and disparate impact; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, Judge Spatt found that in eliminating R-M zoning, which would have allowed for affordable housing units, and endorsing R-T zoning, which did not allow for affordable housing units, Garden City had acted with discriminatory intent. He based this finding on the discriminatory and racist language used by residents of Garden City at the public hearing about the housing development and based on the disparate impact of the zoning decision on minority communities. Judge Spatt directed the plaintiffs to submit a proposed remedial plan. 985 F. Supp. 2d 390. On April 22, 2014, Judge Spatt issued a final order stating: (1) Garden City cannot discriminate or interfere with fair housing opportunities; (2) Garden City must adopt a fair housing resolution for zoning and other land use process; (3) If the County decides to sell the Social Services Site, then Garden City will begin rezoning the site as an R-M site to allow for a residential multi-family development; (4) Garden City must meet an Affordable Housing Requirement in which 10% of newly constructed residential developments of five units or more will be reserved for affordable housing; (5) The city will develop fair housing trainings for all elected Garden City officials. The judgment was set to last for five years. The parties then began litigation over attorney's fees. On September 11, 2014 Judge Spatt ordered a temporary denial of attorney's fees because the case was going up on appeal. Garden City appealed Judge Spatt's judgment that it had violated the Fair Housing Act, Section 1981, Section 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs appealed the 2012 grant of summary judgement dismissing claims against Nassau County. On March 23, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision with regard to Garden City's violations. The Second Circuit vacated the lower court's decision with regard to the defendant's liability as to disparate impact and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the plaintiff met their burden of proving that "substantial legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect." The Second Circuit also affirmed the lower court's finding that the County did not have legal responsibility over Garden City's zoning. The Second Circuit remanded for the district court to address Nassau County's steering of affordable housing to certain, predominately non-white, communities in violation of the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act. 819 F.3d 581. On September 19, 2017, Judge Spatt found that the plaintiffs had met their burden at trial in demonstrating that the Garden City’s proffered reasons for its chosen zoning change could have been met by another practice, such as R-M zoning, that had a less discriminatory effect. Therefore, he reaffirmed his previous holding that Garden City was liable under a disparate impact theory. However, because the parties had agreed that further discovery was required, Judge Spatt did not address the Second Circuit’s vacation and remand of his grant of summary judgment to the County on the plaintiffs’ steering claims. 2017 WL 4174787. On November 30, 2017, Judge Spatt entered a final judgment against Garden City, finding that all the issues regarding the plaintiffs’ claims against Garden City had been fully and finally resolved. On November 11, 2018, Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay awarded the plaintiffs $5,089,525.59 in attorneys’ fees and $183,425.74 in costs, for a total award of $5,272,951.35 against Garden City. On December 10, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a letter to Judge Lindsay, requesting that she revise the total award amount to $5,255,108.94 due to some minor miscalculations by the court. On December 13, 2018, Judge Lindsay amended her original order and awarded the plaintiffs the total award amount of $5,255,108.94. Meanwhile, since the Second Circuit’s remand, the plaintiffs and the County had engaged in discovery and settlement talks. On March 15, 2019, Judge Spatt signed the parties’ stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice, except without prejudice as to the court’s jurisdiction for the purpose of interpretation or enforcement of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement required the County to pay $5,400,000 to the plaintiffs to be used for the purpose of furthering and promoting mixed-income affordable housing; $120,000 to NYCC to be used for activities related to fair and affordable housing; and $400,000 to plaintiffs’ counsel for attorneys’ fees. The settlement agreement also required the County to: prepare a development and outreach plan, within 18 months of the effective date of the settlement, to promote fairness and equity in housing; encourage the construction or development of mixed income multi-family rental housing; issue requests seeking developers who will purchase or lead land from the County on which to develop mixed-income housing; begin a campaign of advertising to provide fair housing education; allocate money towards assisting in the construction or development of mixed-income rental housing; and to not discriminate on the basis of race or color.

Summary: On May 12, 2005, individual New York residents and the New York ACORN local chapter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Easter District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Nassau County and the Village of Garden City under the Fair Housing Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with discriminatory zoning practices; to order Garden City to approve a proposed zoning that would allow for affordable housing; and to order the defendants to take all actions necessary to assure that the Social Service Site be redeveloped to maximize the availability of affordable and integrated housing. On February 15, 2012, Judge Arthur D. Spatt granted defendant County's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it. On April 22, 2014, Judge Spatt issued a final order for the plaintiffs and ordered Defendant Garden City to take a number of steps to prevent discrimination and to increase access to affordable housing. After Judge Spatt's order, both parties appealed the decision. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and remanded in part. The case is back in the lower courts on remand. On remand, Judge Spatt found that the plaintiffs had met their burden at trial in demonstrating that the Garden City’s proffered reasons for its chosen zoning change could have been met by another practice, such as R-M zoning, that had a less discriminatory effect. Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay thereafter awarded plaintiffs $5,255,108.94 in attorneys fees and costs from Garden City. On March 15, 2019, Judge Spatt signed the parties’ stipulation of discontinuance with prejudice, except without prejudice as to the court’s jurisdiction for the purpose of interpretation or enforcement of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement required the County to pay $5,400,000 to the plaintiffs to be used for the purpose of furthering and promoting mixed-income affordable housing; $120,000 to NYCC to be used for activities related to fair and affordable housing; and $400,000 to plaintiffs’ counsel for attorneys’ fees. The case is now closed.


On June 17, 2011, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1691-1691f ("ECOA") against the Nixon State Bank. The Nixon State Bank is a community-based bank in Nixon, Texas that offers a range of loan products, including mortgage loans, consumer loans, commercial loans, and agriculture loans. The U.S. alleged that in making these loans, the bank exhibited a pattern or practice of anti-Hispanic discrimination, providing loans to Hispanics at higher rates than to non-Hispanics, without justification. Settlement negotiations preceded the filing of the complaint, and on June 21, 2011, the District Court (Judge Fred Biery) approved a consent order, under which the defendant agreed to develop and establish uniform pricing policies and procedures designed to ensure nondiscriminatory pricing, and to numerous other implementation provisions, including fair credit training, systemic monitoring, complaint resolution processes, and $91,000 in damages to aggrieved persons. The provisions of the order were scheduled to last 4 and 1/4 years.

Summary: This 2011 federal fair lending lawsuit in the Western District of Texas was brought by the United States against a local bank the U.S. alleged had engaged in a pattern or practice of providing loans to Hispanics only at higher rates than to non-Hispanics, without justification. In the settlement, submitted simultaneously with the complaint, the bank agreed to develop and establish uniform pricing policies and procedures designed to ensure nondiscriminatory pricing, and to numerous other implementation provisions, including fair credit training, systemic monitoring, complaint resolution processes, and $91,000 in damages to aggrieved persons. The provisions of the order were scheduled to last 4 and 1/4 years.


On December 08, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against PrimeLending. The plaintiff asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant displayed a pattern and practice of discrimination in lending on the basis of race against African-American borrowers. On January 11, 2011, the parties entered into a consent order in which Primelending agreed to, 1) refrain from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race in any aspect of a residential real estate-related transaction, 2) alter its lending policy and procedures to prevent the facilitation of race based discrimination, 3) submit to a monitoring and reporting program to ensure compliance with the consent order, 4) provide borrowers with a general notice of nondiscrimination, 5) provide equal credit opportunity training to its employees and officers, 6) provide a total of $2 million to be distributed among those aggrieved, 7) allocate any portion of the $2 million that remains unclaimed to organizations that provide credit counseling and general financial education to African-American borrowers, 8) maintain a complaint resolution program to resolve discrimination claims by borrowers. In September 2012, the defendants finished giving $2 million to those aggrieved as per the consent order and then received permission from the court to disburse the remaining $367,900 to 15 organizations supporting African-American borrowers. The consent decree terminated in 2015, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against PrimeLending, claiming that the defendant displayed a pattern or practice of discrimination in lending on the basis of race against African-American borrowers. The parties entered into a consent order in which Primelending agreed to refrain from practicing race based discrimination, submit to a monitoring and reporting program, provide borrowers with a general notice of nondiscrimination, provide equal credit opportunity training to its employees, provide a total of $2 million to be distributed among those aggrieved, allocate any unclaimed portion of the $2 million to organizations that provide general financial education to African-American borrowers, and maintain a complaint resolution program to resolve discrimination claims.


On December 19, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against Fort Davis State Bank (FDSB), alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (ECOA). Specifically, the DOJ claimed that, from at least 2008 to 2010, FDSB engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin by charging Hispanic borrowers higher interest rates on unsecured consumer loans compared to the rates it charged similarly situated non-Hispanic, white borrowers. DOJ asked the court for injunctive relief and an award of monetary damages to all persons harmed by these policies and practices. That same day, the parties jointly filed a proposed consent order, which the District Court (Judge Robert A. Junell) approved and entered on January 2, 2014. Under the consent order, FDSB did not admit to any violation of ECOA, but agreed to:

Implement a monitoring program to ensure compliance with the consent order;
Display and provide to borrowers a notice of non-discrimination;
Provide ECOA training to its management officials, loan officers, and other relevant employees;
Deposit $159,000 into an escrow account for payment to the aggrieved borrowers;
Develop a complaint resolution process for customers alleging loan discrimination; and
Submit status reports to the DOJ.
On November 3, 2014, the District Court (Judge Robert A. Junell) entered an order administratively closing the case but retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent order. The consent order remained in effect until early 2017. Since there has been no substantive docket activity after 2014, the case is presumably closed.

Summary: On December 19, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against Fort Davis State Bank, alleging that it charged Hispanic borrowers higher interest rates on unsecured consumer loans compared to the rates it charged white borrowers, in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. In January 2014, the District Court (Judge Robert A. Junell) approved a consent order in which the bank agreed to implement a variety of practices to address these alleged violations and to pay damages to aggrieved borrowers. The consent order remained in effect until early 2017. Since there has been no substantive docket activity after 2014, the case is presumably closed.


On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against Southport Bank, under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, and a civil penalty, alleging that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin in its residential mortgage lending. Based on statistical analyses made in 2007 and 2008, the FDIC determined that the defendant had substantial disparities in the rates given to minority versus non-Hispanic ("white") borrowers. The FDIC performed an investigation, and in 2012 referred the matter to the Department of Justice to continue the investigation since there was reason to believe that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination. The data obtained from the investigation showed that in 2007 and 2008, when all other factors were accounted for, the defendant permitted its mortgage brokers to charge excessive broker fees to African American and Hispanic borrowers more frequently than white borrowers based solely on race and national origin. The defendant had a two-step process set in place where the first step determined whether the applicant satisfied objective criteria. The second step was more subjective and allowed mortgage brokers to charge fees with little checks on their discretion. The defendant did not set up objective criteria to guide the mortgage brokers in setting fees. On October 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Joseph Peter Stadtmueller) entered a consent order between the parties. The defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination. The order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race or national origin in any aspect of a residential real estate-related transaction in violation of the Fair Housing Act or any credit transaction in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Among other things, the defendant's employees would participate in a fair lending training program and would be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. The defendant also agreed to place $687,000 into a settlement fund to compensate for monetary damages that aggrieved persons may have suffered. After dispersing damages to eligible recipients who responded to notice, more than $200,000 remained in the settlement fund. On February 5, 2016, the court ordered the remaining money to be disbersed to the organizations proposed by the parties: Housing Resources, The Urban League of Racine and Kenosha, NeighborhoodWorks Badgerland, and Habitat for Humanity of Kenosha. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 26, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin against Southport Bank, under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, and a civil penalty, alleging that the defendant discriminated against African American and Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin in its residential mortgage lending. On October 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Joseph Peter Stadtmueller) entered a consent order between the parties. The defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination. The order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race or national origin in any aspect of a residential real estate-related transaction in violation of the Fair Housing Act or any credit transaction in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Among other things, the defendant's employees will have to participate in a fair lending training program and will be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. The defendant also has to place $687,000 into a settlement fund to compensate for monetary damages that aggrieved persons may have suffered. The order terminates after three years if the defendant has complied during that time period.