On Apr. 23, 2003, the plaintiff, a woman above the age of 40, filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 621, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. §12203 against Sprint/United Management Company in U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought to be reinstated to her former position, back pay of $75,000, front pay, lost fringe benefits, compensation for physical injury, pain and suffering, future medical, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, and other categories of actual damage, and $1 million in punitive damages. The plaintiff alleged that that defendant had engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination against her and others similarly situated such that it should proceed as a collective action under the ADEA. The plaintiff was terminated in a reduction in force (RIF) while working for Sprint Management Company. The plaintiff contended that Sprint, before and during the RIF process, routinely transferred younger employees (i.e., employees under the age of 40) to "safe" positions that would not be eliminated during the RIF. On Apr. 19, 2004, the plaintiff moved for provisional certification to proceed as an ADEA collective action. On July 2, 2004, the court granted the motion for provisional certification. At this time, 119 individuals had already opted in to the collective action. The provisional certification defined the class as employees who were all terminated as a result of Sprint’s RIF occurring from Oct. 2001 through Mar. 2003; were subjected to the same “displacement guidelines” and “reduction guidelines” utilized by Sprint management in determining which employees to select for termination during the RIF; and were subjected to the same performance rating systems. The plaintiff filed amended complaints on July 2, 2004, and again on Nov. 14, 2005. On July 19, 2004, the case was consolidated with several other similar cases for the limited purpose of coordination of discovery. The plaintiffs moved to have ten plaintiffs who had filed separate actions joined to this action; to add a disparate impact claim in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi</i>, 544 U.S. 228 (2005); and to expand the definition of the class. At this time, the class comprised employees who, among other things, were terminated on or after Oct. 1, 2001 and who were assigned to job grades 71 through 79. The plaintiffs sought to expand the class to include those whose employment was terminated beginning in late July 2001, and to include “E grade” (executive level) employees. Oral argument was held on July 26, 2005. On July 29, 2005, the court granted and denied the plaintiffs’ motion in part. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion with respect to the adding the disparate impact claim and denied the motion with respect to the other two claims. The motion to expand the class was denied on the grounds that it was untimely. The parties entered mediation in 2006. On May 18, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of collective action settlement. On May 30, 2007, the court granted preliminary confirmation of the proposed settlement and appointed a settlement administrator. On Sept. 11, 2007, Judge John Lungstrum approved the class settlement agreement. The settlement provided $57 million in monetary relief to the 1,697-member class previously certified under the ADEA. Specifically, the court found, based on the parties' joint filing, the court's knowledge of the record, and the hearing with the parties, that the terms of the Master Full and Final Settlement Agreement of All Claims ("Settlement Agreement") appeared to be "reasonable, adequate, fair, and consistent with relevant state and federal law and warrants notice thereof being given to the individual Plaintiffs." On Oct. 15, 2009, Judge Lungstrum signed an order accepting the report of final termination of the settlement fund and dismissing the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs sued Sprint, alleging ADEA violations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 621, the ADA, and 42 U.S.C. §12203. Class comprised just under 1,700 members. Eventually, parties reached $57 million settlement agreement.


On April 26, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black female applicant, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Advancemed Corporation. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant refused to hire the complainant because of her race. On March 23, 2005, the District Court (Judge Peter A. Messitte) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $22,000.

Summary: On April 26, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of a black female applicant, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Advancemed Corporation. The EEOC alleged that the defendant refused to hire the complainant because of her race. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $22, 000.


On December 6, 2004, a group of African-American police officers brought a lawsuit against their employer, the Baltimore Police Department, as well as various other municipal entities, including the City of Baltimore and the Baltimore City Council, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against and that the discrimination was illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the Baltimore Police Department had engaged in a pattern and practice of disparate discipline with respect to African-American police officers, claiming that the excessive subjectivity in the disciplinary process has resulted in both unintentional and/or intentional discrimination against African-American officers on the basis of their race. The complaint alleged that African American and white officers would commit the same disciplinary offenses, but the African American officers' offenses were rated as more severe and thus they routinely received harsher discipline--including more frequent termination--as a result. The hostile work environment alleged in the complaint included derogatory comments such as the n-word and having dog feces wrapped in an African-American-owned newspaper left on officers' desks. Other harassment allegations included nooses in lockers, being assigned to low-level duties to prevent advancement, and superior African American officers having their authority undermined by subordinate white officers. The case settled on June 18, 2009, for $4.5 million. The settlement sets up a $2.5 million fund to pay the individual claims of the 15 plaintiffs. The remaining $2 million will go toward nonmonetary relief -- leadership classes, training on the disciplinary process, and hiring a consultant to assist with antidiscrimination efforts.

Summary: This is a race discrimination class action brought by black police officers in Baltimore, alleging discriminatory discipline and hostile work environment. It was filed in December 2004, and settled in June 2009 for $2.5 million in damages to the 15 named plaintiffs and injunctive relief for the class.


On July 26, 2005, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division filed this reverse-discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City of Pontiac and the local firefighters' union. The DOJ began investigating whether the City of Pontiac's hiring and promotion policies discriminated against white men after  a firefighter filed a lawsuit in July 2004 challenging the policies. The DOJ alleged that the City of Pontiac and the local firefighters’ union pursued policies and practices that discriminated against applicants for employment and promotion based on race and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The DOJ sought an injunction preventing the City of Pontiac and the union from engaging in discriminatory employment policies and practices on the basis of race or sex and from failing to compensate those who suffered a loss due to discriminatory policies and procedures. Additionally, the DOJ sought fees and costs. The complaint alleged that collective bargaining agreements entered into by the Pontiac Fire Department and the local firefighters' union established a dual system for hiring and promotion, which discriminated on the basis of sex and race. The hiring and promotion policies required that one out of every three individuals hired or promoted be either a female or a minority. Two lists were maintained for the purposes of hiring and promotion. The first list included all candidates, while the second list included only the female and minority candidates. Hiring and promotion decisions were made from the first list, but if one out of three individuals hired or promoted were not either a racial minority or female, then the second list was consulted. The DOJ alleged these policies discriminated against men and non-minorities. The parties engaged in negotiations to resolve the dispute without a trial. On July 20, 2006, the District Court (Judge George C. Steeh) granted the DOJ's motion for the provisional entry of a consent decree. The court signed the consent decree on September 28, 2006, despite objections from a number of individuals who felt they deserved compensation but fell outside the decree’s scope. The consent decree was designed to: (1) prevent future discrimination on the basis of race and gender and (2) provide remedial relief, such as backpay, offers of employment or promotion, and retroactive seniority, for those employees and applicants affected by the allegedly discriminatory policies. The consent decree specifically enjoined the defendants from: (a) engaging in or agreeing to any act or practice that discriminated on the basis of race or sex in violation of Title VII and in relation to hiring or promotion and (b) retaliating against anyone for engaging in practices protected by Title VII, including cooperating with the investigation related to this case and seeking or receiving individual relief. The consent decree also provided for individual relief and listed individuals who were eligible for such relief. Further, the consent decree imposed record-keeping and reporting obligations on the defendant and provided that the court would retain jurisdiction for a period of two years. It does not appear that the DOJ took any action to enforce the consent decree in court over the next two years. On October 1, 2008, after the two-year period ended, Judge Steeh dissolved the consent decree and dismissed the case. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2005, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City of Pontiac and the local firefighters' union. The DOJ alleged that the collective bargaining agreements entered by the Pontiac Fire Department and the local firefighters' union discriminated on the basis of sex and race by explicitly creating and maintaining a dual system for hire and promotion requiring that one out of every thee hires or promotions be given to a minority. In 2006, the DOJ and the City of Pontiac reached a settlement that required the City of Pontiac to not engage in any act or practice that discriminated on the basis of race or sex in violation of Title VII in relation to hiring or promotion in the Pontiac Fire Department and to provide remedial relief to those employees and applicants denied hire or promotion as a result of the dual system for hire and promotion. The case closed in October 2008.


On August 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against Bell Gas, Inc. and related corporations on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that the companies had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a sexually hostile work environment created by verbal and physical harassment from her immediate supervisor, including sexual assault. The EEOC further alleged that Bell Gas had unlawfully retaliated against the employee by constructively discharging her (she was supposedly offered a transfer but was given no further information). The EEOC sought its costs, and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including reform of policies and practices, back pay, reinstatement, front pay, job search expenses, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The Court (Judge William P. Johnson) approved the employee's motion to intervene in the case on December 23, 2002. Adding her former supervisor as a defendant, she brought claims for violation of Title VII, sexual assault and battery, and several other violations of New Mexico law. She sought substantially the same relief as the EEOC. The Court clerk made an entry of default against Bell Gas for its failure to respond to the EEOC's complaint, but the default was set aside upon the Court's subsequent finding that the untimely response was an honest mistake. The employee's supervisor represented himself. After a fair amount of discovery disagreement the parties reached a settlement, which the Court entered as a consent decree on April 6, 2004. Under the agreement the employee received a total of $180,000; $60,000 up front and monthly payments of $2,000 for 60 months, secured by a mortgage lien on Defendants' property. The decree required Defendants to implement policies to keep the workplace free of sex discrimination and foster complaint lodging without retaliation, to distribute the sexual harassment policies to all employees, to provide annual training on avoiding sex-discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, to conduct complaint-investigation training, and to report to the EEOC. The docket shows no further court activity, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On August 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Albuquerque U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against Bell Gas, Inc. and related corporations on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that the companies had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a sexually hostile work environment created by verbal and physical harassment from her immediate supervisor, including sexual assault. The parties entered into a Consent Decree, which provided the employee received a total of $180,000; $60,000 up front and monthly payments of $2,000 for 60 months-and subjected Defendants to an array of injunctive provisions. The case is now closed.


The Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against Consolidated Resorts in September 2006. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendant allegedly sexually harassed a female employment, creating a hostile working environment and resulting in a tangible employment action. The parties participated in a conference with an early neutral evaluator that did not result in a settlement. The defendant moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, both of which were denied. On October 15, 2008, the parties entered into a court enforceable consent decree for a one year period. The consent decree stipulated that the defendant would pay $55,000 to the charging parties, adopt anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies, provide training to employees, and submit to reporting and record keeping requirements. The consent decree ran its course without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the EEOC sued Consolidated Reports in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging violations of Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination. The complaint alleged and employee of the defendant sexually harassed the charging party and created a hostile work environment. In 2008, the case settled when the parties agreed to a 1 year consent decree requiring the defendant to pay $55,000 to the charging party, to adopt anti-discrimination policies, provide training to employees, and comply with other requirements.


On July 12, 2005, three U.S. orchard workers from Yakima Valley who had been denied or terminated from agricultural employment, brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. Represented by Columbia Legal Services and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued Global Horizons, Green Acre Farms, Platte River Insurance Company, and Valley Fruit Orchards, under the Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. § 1801), the Farm Labor Contractors Act (42 U.S.C § 1981), and Washington anti-discrimination law. In their complaint (amended several times), the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. They alleged that the defendants systematically and intentionally preferred H-2A laborers from Thailand to U.S. workers, in violation of federal and state law. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants provided false and misleading information concerning the terms and conditions of employment, failed to comply with the working arrangement, failed to pay wages as promised, and failed to provide adequate written pay statements in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1801. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael W. Leavitt. On February 3, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, which Magistrate Judge Leavitt granted on July 28, 2006. 2006 WL 2129295. The class was defined as "All workers who were U.S. residents and who sought employment through defendant Global Horizons to work at either Green Acre Farms or Valley Fruit Orchards in 2004, and all U.S. resident who, in the future, seek employment with or obtain employment with Global, Green Acre, or Valley Fruit." It also included three subclasses: 1. Denied Workers: All workers who were U.S. residents and who sought and were denied employment with the defendant and all U.S. residents who in the future would seek employment with the defendant, 2. Green Acre Workers: All workers who were U.S. residents and who were employed through the defendant Global to work at Green Acre Farms, 3. Valley Fruit Workers: All workers who were U.S. residents and who were employed through defendant Global to work at Valley fruit. The Court also granted the plaintiffs' motion to bifercate the trial, separating the liability and damages issues. Between May 2006 and February 2007, the plaintiffs filed several motions to compel discovery; each motion was granted by Judge Leavitt. (insert citations for discovery orders) On March 23, 2007, in response to yet another motion by the plaintiffs to compel discovery and for sanctions, the defendants filed their own motion for sanctions alleging that the plaintiffs' attorneys were using abusive litigation tactics to drive up costs, such as filing motions for contempt and sanctions knowing that the defendants' attorney was in the process of applying for permission to appear pro hac vice. The defendants eventually withdrew their motion for sanctions, and the plaintiffs' motion was denied by the Court on March 27, 2007. The Court also gave the defendants additional time to produce all the requested discovery documents. When the defendants still did not produce the requested documents, the Court, in a May 2007 order, imposed sanctions in the amount of $12,500 against the defendants for the continued refusal to comply with the Court's order regarding discovery. Payment was due no later than June 1, 2007. The Court also warned that the defendant's continued failure to comply with the Court's order would result in additional monetary sanctions in the amount of $500 a day until there was full compliance. In a July 11, 2007 order, District Court Judge Alan A. McDonald granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the defendants had violated the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and the Washington Farm Labor Contract Act (FLCA). He awarded statutory damages under FLCA. As to their motion to strike the defendants' jury demand with respect to the plaintiffs' Farm Labor Contractors Act and Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act claims, the Court granted the motion, the defendants' jury demand was stricken, and the plaintiffs were entitled to $1,857,000. The plaintiffs were denied summary judgment on the claim that the defendants intentionally deprived employees of wages. Judge McDonald also imposed monetary sanctions on the defendants for their continued refusal to comply with the Court's orders. The Court ordered that the defendants immediately pay $27,000, in addition to the $12,500 previously imposed, and the additional penalty of $500 for each day the defendants failed to make payment. The Court also ordered defendant Global Horizons to appear before the court on July 24, 2007 or face criminal contempt charges. 2007 WL 2041973 The defendants filed motions for reconsideration of Judge McDonald's order regarding their failure to respond to the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motions, but Judge McDonald passed away before considering the motions for reconsideration. The case was transferred to U.S. District Court Judge Robert H. Whaley, and on August 10, 2007, he vacated the judgment with respect to the amount of damages while leaving the portion of Judge McDonald's order that found that Global committed the alleged violations of the Farm Labor Contractors Act and Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act. He also vacated the award of statutory damages in the amount of $500 per violation per person because Judge McDonald did not cite to relevant 9th Circuit case law with respect to the awarding of statutory damages. 2007 WL 2327073, E.D.Wash. In September of 2007, the plaintiffs' claims of racial discrimination, which were not resolved by Judge McDonald's order, were tried by a jury. It found that Global Horizons and Mordechai Orian violated the Farm Labor Contractors Act by failing to employ, or discharging or laying off members of the subclasses, and discriminated against the subclasses because of their race. The jury awarded $300,000 in punitive damages to the class, and awarded the following damages to the representative Plaintiffs: Ricardo Betancourt: $5099.50 for lost wages, $2500.00 for emotional distress; Jose F. Sanchez: $492.20 for lost wages, $5,000.00 for emotional distress; Jose Guadalupe Perez-Farias; $0.00 for lost wages, $4,000.00 for emotional. The Court entered judgment on October 23, 2007 consistent with the jury's findings. The claims against "Grower Defendants" (the named defendants other than Global Horizons) were tried separately by the Court. On March 27, 2008, the Court determined that Grower Defendants did not discriminate against the subclasses based on race and dismissed the plaintiffs' discrimination claims against the Grower Defendants. The Court upheld the jury verdict against defendant Global Horizon. With respect to the FLCA claims, the Grower Defendants were found liable for FLCA violations. 2008 WL 833055, E.D.Wash. The Court also addressed Global Horizons' post-trial motions, upholding the jury verdict with respect to the discrimination claim against Global and Mordechai Orian and the FLCA claims asserted against Global, but agreeing with the Global Horizons that, as a matter of law, Mordechai Orian could not be held individually liable for violations of the FLCA. On May 23, 2008, the judgment for damages for racial discrimination was amended, and the denied-work subclass definition was changed. 2008 WL 2180166, E.D.Wash. The judgment was again amended on June 15, 2009, specifying which defendant was liable to which plaintiff for what damages; Global and Grower Defendants were responsible, jointly and severally, for lost wages to each plaintiff while Global alone was responsible only for damages for emotional distress to each of the three named plaintiffs. The $100,000 amount for punitive damages awarded to each subclass category did not change in the amendment of the judgment. In April 2008, the Court ordered Global Horizons to pay the previously ordered monetary sanctions of $45,500 by May 30, 2008. The order stated that if Global Horizons failed to make the payment, its attorney would have to appeal and show cause why it failed to obey the Court's orders and why the sanctions should not be reduced to a judgment. The District Court Judge also referred the matter to Magistrate Judge James P. Hutton. After Global Horizons failed to make the $45,500 payment, the Court ordered that a representative appear and show cause as to why Global had failed to obey the Court's orders. At a show cause hearing on June 3, 2009, Global's local counsel, Gary Lowland, appeared and reported that he had no knowledge to answer a majority of the Court's questions regarding Global's financial status. Thus, the Court directed Mordechai Orian, the president and chief strategic officer for Global Horizons, to appear at a supplemental show cause hearing to be held on July 2, 2008. On that day, Orian testified as to Global's financial status. Based on his testimony, Magistrate Judge Hutton issued a report and recommendation on July 21, 2008 concluding that Global Horizons was financially insolvent, with debts far exceeding its assets. Judge Hutton also suggested that the if Global Horizons insisted on continuing litigation, the District Court should consider imposing case dispositive sanctions on Global. On August 6, 2008, Global Horizons filed a motion to seal, which was granted on January 4, 2011. On November 14, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum for "Phase II" of the class action addressing class membership, injunctive relief, statutory damages for violations of the Farm Labor Contractors Act (FLCA), and the distribution of punitive damages awarded at trial. A bench trial was held on March 3, 2009, after which Judge Whaley issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding five of the plaintiffs' motions. 2009 WL 1011180. He determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to $235,000 in statutory damages, and each individual class member was to relieve $350 or more in statutory damages. The Court also held that proof of eligibility to work would not be necessary in order to receive statutory damages. The Court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to hold two individuals personally liable for their companies' use of an unlicensed farm labor contractor as well as the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief against Global Horizons and Grower Defendants. The defendants filed motions to amend the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but those motions were denied in a June 15, 2009 Order addressing pending motions. That same day, the original judgment was amended for the second time, as previously mentioned, and the Court also issued a new judgment in favor of the plaintiffs reflecting what it had decided in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The defendants filed an appeal to this new judgment on June 19, 2009. Earlier, in May 2009, the plaintiffs had filed a motion for attorneys fees. The defendants filed motions to extend the time to respond to the motion, which was granted by the Court. The parties litigated over attorneys’ fees for several months until the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees on March 24, 2010 and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $1,452,831. Global Horizons and Mr. Orian were also ordered to pay the Court $1,424.58 for costs of interpretation fees that were provided at trial on a cost-reimbursable basis. 2010 WL 11437705. The defendants appealed this decision in April 2010, but their appeal was dismissed on December 17, 2010 because they lacked representation by a licensed attorney. On April 23, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a cross appeal to the 9th Circuit, appealing from the: - March 24, 2010 Judgment Against Global for Reasonable Attorney's Fees; - March 24, 2010 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees; - August 3, 2009 Second Amended Judgment of the Jury Verdict; - August 8, 2009 Amended Judgment of the FLCA Statutory Damages; - June 15, 2009 Order Addressing Pending Motions Re FLCA Emotional Distress Damages; - April 15, 2009 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re FLCA Statutory Damages; - March 27, 2008 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Claims against Grower Defendants; and - August 10, 2007 Order Vacating FCLA Damages Judgment The 9th Circuit (J. Richard R. Clifton, N. Randy Smith, and Edward R. Korman) heard oral arguments on July 12, 2011. It held on August 17, that the district court had erred in not awarding the workers the full amount of mandatory statutory damages under the Farm Labor Contractors Act – their damages should equal $1,998,500. It affirmed the district court’s finding on the grower defendants’ liability regarding discrimination. 447 Fed.Appx. 843. The 9th Circuit then withdrew its August 17th order and granted a petition for rehearing. 669 F.3d 927. It then certified to the Washington State Supreme Court three issues of state law. These issues were: 1. Did the Fair Labor Contractors Act, specifically Washington Revised Code § 19.30.17(2) mandate that courts order a $500 damage award per plaintiff per violation, or did courts have discretion to decide the appropriate amount? 2. If the Fair Labor Contractors Act mandated a $500 per plaintiff per violation award, did that violate Washington’s public policy or due process guarantees? 3. Could people who had not been “aggrieved” by a violation nonetheless be awarded damages under the Fair Labor Contractors Act? 669 F.3d 927. On September 27, 2012, the Washington Supreme Court held that the $500 per plaintiff per violation damage award was mandated under the Fair Labor Contractors Act and due process did not require a cap on statutory damages. Moreover, nothing in the Washington State law conflicted with Congress’s ability to enact statutes that created standing where legal rights had been violated without injury. 175 Wash.2d 518. On December 5, the 9th Circuit entered another order that the district court had erred in awarding less than $500 per plaintiff per violation, and should have ordered a total damages award of $1,998,500. 669 F.3d 927. In May 2014, it granted the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees totaling $141,513.50 for appellate litigation. Back in District Court, the plaintiffs continued to seek payment from the defendants for owed sanctions. As this case had carried on, Global Horizons had been involved in a separate case, Nasee v. Global Horizon, in which it was granted a motion for costs and fees. Because Global Horizon owed a significant amount in sanction fees for this case, On November 8, 2011, Judge Whaley in the District Court directed the award of $3,293.22 deposited into the Court's registry and disbursed to the plaintiffs’ counsel. On December 9, 2011, the plaintiffs moved for the district court to order Platte River Insurance pay a bond to be disbursed to the plaintiffs. Washington state law requires farm labor contractors to obtain bonds to “be conditions on payment of sums legally owing under contract to an agricultural employee.” Platte River Insurance held such bonds for the parties in the case. Judge Whaley granted the plaintiffs’ motion on January 18, 2012, contingent on the 9th Circuit remanding the issue to the district court. 2012 WL 12830389. On March 26, 2012, Judge Whaley directed disbursements of the funds. After receiving the 9th Circuit’s holding, the District Court amended its August 3, 2009 judgment. On March 27, 2013, it held that the Denied Worker Subclass was to recover $997,099.50, the Green Acre Subclass was to recover $410,492.20, and the Valley Fruit Subclass was to recover $596,500.00. Judge Whaley granted plaintiffs’ motion for fees on June 28, 2013 with $979,394.25 for attorneys fees and 39,842.66 for costs. The plaintiffs then moved for attorneys’ fees for post appellate work, which was granted on August 27 for a total of $41,125.55 On November 4, 2013, the plaintiffs’ attorneys submitted a Satisfaction of Judgments to the court, stating: - All judgments against Green Acre Farm and Valley Fruit Orchard had been fully satisfied; - All judgments for plaintiffs against Global Horizons and Mordechai Orian had been fully satisfied; - Judgments for attorneys’ fees and costs against Global Horizon and Mordechai Orian were still unsatisfied in the amount of $486,717,64 After the plaintiffs’ counsel attempted to find and compensate all class members to the case, $813,542.58 remained undistributed to silent members. The plaintiffs moved to distribute the money through incentive awards (for the representative plaintiffs in compensation for their work on the case); costs (for the cost of distributing the funds to class members); and cy press (to help advance the objectives of the Farm Labor Contractors Act). On April 2, 2014, Judge Whaley granted the plaintiffs’ motion as follows - $7,500 to each representative plaintiff as an incentive award - $25,258.51 to Columbia Legal Services as compensation for costs of distribution - $495,990.01 to Columbia Legal Services as cy press ($95,990 of which was to remain in reserve through the end of 2014 to pay additional class members who came forward) - $95,261.33 each to Northwest Justice Project, Laurel Rubin Farmworker Justice Project, and Northwest Communities Education Center as cy press awards. 2014 WL 1399420. There has been no further litigation and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On July 12, 2005, three U.S. farm works from Yakima Valley who were illegally denied or terminated from agricultural employment brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against Global Horizons, Green Acre Farms, and Valley Fruit Orchards under the Migrants and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801, the Farm Labor Contractors Act, 42 U.S.C § 1981 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The parties agreed to go to trial, and after years of litigation the plaintiffs received a judgment in their favor under FLCA, as well as attorneys fees, for both trial and appellate legal work. In January 2014, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for incentive payments. There has been no further movement in the case.


On December 3, 2013, a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against the organization. On January 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On February 17, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate does not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On March 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the motion for preliminary injunction on April 23, 2014 consistent with the 10th Circuit's ruling in <i> Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius</i>, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). On September 30, 2014, following the Supreme Court's ruling in the Hobby Lobby case, the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss as moot, and additionally denied defendants' motion for summary judgment without prejudice. The court also ordered plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2014, and filed a motion for summary judgment on December 1, 2014. The plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of the case with prejudice on June 11, 2015, and the court terminated the case on June 12, 2015.

Summary: On December 3, 2013, a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. On March 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Following the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Hobby Lobby</i>, the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the case.


On September 5, 2013, the voting stockholders of Midwest Fasteners, a Michigan for-profit corporation, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance. Specifically, the stockholders contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On October 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction of the HHS Mandate. They also sought a stay. On October 15, the Government filed a notice of non-opposition to the plaintiffs' motions in light of ongoing appeals in similar cases, including Gilardi v. HHS. On October 16,2013 the District Court (Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle) granted the unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case until 30 days after the resolution of Gilardi. Additionally, Judge Huvelle directed the clerk to administratively close the case until further order of the court. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby  in favor of Hobby Lobby due to their religious objection to complying with the contraception coverage of the ACA. Back in this case, on September 10, 2014 the parties jointly filed a motion for stay that was granted on September 16, 2014. In addition to granting the motion for stay, the court extended the preliminary injunction until October 20, 2014 and ordered the parties to file status reports on October 6, 2014. On October 24, 2014 Judge Ellen S. Huvelle ruled that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the defendants would be permanently enjoined from enforcing the provisions of the ACA against the plaintiffs. The parties were ordered to attempt to reach an agreement on attorneys fees within 45 days. The plaintiffs filed a motion on December 3, 2014 to extend time to file a motion for attorney's fees and a new deadline was set for January 7, 2015. There has been no further activity on the docket the case is now presumed closed.

Summary: On September 5, 2013, the voting stockholders of a Michigan for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. In light of the ruling in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby</i> the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on October 24, 2014 permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing compliance with the contraception coverage under the ACA.


This is a case about President Trump's executive order that prohibits racial sensitivity training in federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients. On October 29, 2020, the National Urban League and National Fair Housing Alliance, two civil rights non-profits, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the plaintiffs sued the President, the Secretary of Labor, and the Department of Labor under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) and All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651). The plaintiffs sought an injunction, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that the executive order violated freedom of speech under the First Amendment by denying benefits (e.g. government contracts and grants) to private entities that express ideas the Trump Administration doesn't like (e.g. implicit bias). The plaintiffs also argued that the executive order violated Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights because the order was too vague about what the standards were for prohibited conduct and enforcement. In addition, the events surrounding the executive order indicated an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and/or gender. The case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a case about President Trump's executive order that prohibits racial sensitivity training in federal agencies, contractors, and grant recipients. On October 29, 2020, the National Urban League and National Fair Housing Alliance filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the President, the Secretary of Labor, and the Department of Labor, seeking an injunction, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that the executive order violated freedom of speech under the First Amendment by denying benefits to private entities that express ideas the Trump Administration doesn't like. The plaintiffs also argued that the executive order violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because the order was too vague and created with an intent to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and/or gender. The case is ongoing.


On April 22, 2010, individuals who provide home care to disabled individuals enrolled in Illinois Medicaid-waiver programs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the State of Illinois, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Healthcare of Illinois & Indiana, SIEU Local 73, and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, sought an injunction against enforcement of the agency-fee provision of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) and a declaration that the law violated the personal assistants' fundamental rights. Plaintiffs claimed that compelling them to financially support the union for purposes of speaking to and petitioning the state infringes on their right of free association, free speech, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances under the First Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs work as part of the Illinois' Home Services Program. This program allows Medicaid recipients who would normally need institutional care to hire a "personal assistant" to provide homecare services. Under State law, the care recipients and the State both play some role in the employment relationship with the Personal Assistants. The Illinois Legislature codified this unique employment relationship by amending existing laws so as to acknowledge the right of the persons receiving care to hire and fire personal assistants or supervise them, but declaring personal assistants to be public employees of the state for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois PLRA. The Illinois PLRA authorizes state employees to join labor unions and to bargain collectively on the terms and conditions of employment. The PLRA also contains an agency-fee provision, which requires members of a bargaining unit who do not wish to join the union to nevertheless pay a fee to the union. Following a vote, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana was designated as the personal assistants' exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining. Plaintiffs challenged the mandatory contributions under the agency-fee provision. On November 12, 2010, District Court Judge Sharon Coleman dismissed plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. <http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0012-0002.pdf">2010 WL 4736500. The district court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that state employees can be required to contribute fair share fees to compensate unions for their representational activities. Plaintiffs appealed. On September 1, 2011, Judge Daniel Manion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision <http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0012-0003.pdf">656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011). The appellate court held that the State of Illinois and the care recipients are joint employers of the personal care providers, and the court stated that it had no difficulty concluding that the State employs personal assistants within the meaning of Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. 431 U. S. 209 (1977) (upholding the maintaining of a union shop in a public workplace). Plaintiffs sought certiorari and the Supreme Court granted review. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court overturned the Seventh Circuit's decision and held that the Illinois PLRA violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the First Amendment. <http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0012-0004.pdf">134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito was heavily critical of the Seventh Circuit's reliance on Abood. The Court noted the questionable foundations of that decision, highlighting its lack of adequate First Amendment analysis and failure to appreciate the distinction between core union speech in the public sector and core union speech in the private sector. The Court went on to stress the distinction between the full-fledged public employees at issue in Abood and the personal assistants at issue here. The Court noted that personal assistants are almost entirely answerable to the care recipient and not to the State, do not enjoy most of the rights and benefits that inure to state employees, and are not indemnified by the State for claims against them arising from actions taken during the course of their employment. Because Abood did not apply, the Court stated that the agency-fee provision of the law must serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. The Court found insufficient the interests contended by defendants and held the Illinois PLRA unconstitutional.

Summary: On April 22, 2010, homecare providers who did not wish to support the designated labor union filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking an injunction against enforcement of the agency-fee provision of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA) and a declaration that the law violated the personal assistants' fundamental rights. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court held that the clearest case on point, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. 431 U. S. 209 (1977), did not apply because the public employees at issue there were distinct from the care providers here. Accordingly, the Court stated the agency-fee provision must serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms. The Court found insufficient the interests contended by Defendants and held the Illinois PLRA unconstitutional.


On May 8, 2018, National Fair Housing Alliance, Texas Low Income Housing Information Services, and Texas Appleseed filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were represented by the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Fair Housing Alliance, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, Public Citizen Litigation Group, and private counsel. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. They claimed that a suspension of Fair Housing Act rules violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This case was assigned to Judge Beryl Howell. In 2009, amid widespread expert agreement that its current system for ensuring local government Fair Housing Act (FHA) compliance had failed, HUD began planning a substantial overhaul, promulgating Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule ("AFFH Rule") in 2015. The rule required cities and counties receiving federal housing assistance to submit to HUD an Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) every three to five years using a standardized template called the Assessment Tool. In the AFH, each participating local government was required to document any identified fair housing issues and outline its plans for addressing them; these plans were then reviewed by HUD for adequacy. The AFFH rule also committed HUD to providing participating cities and counties with guidance and technical support. Yet on January 5, 2018, without providing advance notice or opportunity for comment, HUD published a notice in the Federal Register immediately suspending the AFH requirement of the AFFH rule. Specifically, it released local governments from submitting new assessments before October 31, 2020, and announced that it would not review any submitted AFHs before that date. The official reason given by the agency was that "program participants needed more time to adjust to the new AFFH process" and "additional technical assistance may result in program participants better understanding their obligations under the AFFH rule." According to the plaintiffs, however, HUD had yet to take any public action to provide "additional technical assistance." In the complaint filed on May 8, the plaintiffs asserted that these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act and breached the agency's obligations under the Fair Housing Act. Yet on May 23, 2018, HUD published three related notices in the Federal Register. The first of these notices withdrew the January 5 suspension of the rule. But the second and third notices, respectively, withdrew the Assessment Tool and announced that participating jurisdictions could meet their AFFH duty if they simply "acted in accordance" with HUD's pre-AFFH system. In response, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 29, 2018 alleging that the combined effect of these latter two notices was the same as the agency's initial suspension in January. They also sought preliminary injunction and summary judgment, seeking the reinstatement of the Assessment Tool and the resumption of the normal AFH submission schedule. On June 5, 2018, several states and cities filed amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, with the State of New York also moving to intervene as a plaintiff. HUD filed its opposition brief on June 12, 2018, and later moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 9, arguing in both that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. On August 17, 2018, the court denied the plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment, and denied the State of New York's motion to intervene. It granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. However, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter judgment on September 14, 2018 and also sought to amend their complaint to further illustrate factual disputes they allege are grounds for reopening the case. Judge Howell denied the plaintiffs' motion to alter judgment and amend the complaint on August 26, 2019. Holding that a motion to alter judgment is an "extraordinary remedy" and the plaintiffs seeking reconsideration must meet a very high bar, Judge Howell found that the plaintiffs failed to meet such bar. The court found that although the plaintiffs’ claim that the final judgment was based on erroneous factual allegations, the "judgment was not premised on factual conclusions but rather on a legal assessment of the existing regulatory regime after HUD’s contested actions." 397 F.Supp.3d 1.

Summary: On May 8, 2018, several Texas organizations filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged that HUD suspended a provision of the Fair Housing Act that would require cities to report incidents of housing discrimination and that that this suspension violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, and the plaintiffs filed to reopen the case and amend their complaint. This motion was denied on August 26, 2019.


On March 7, 2003, a group of recovering alcoholics and drug addicts filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Boca Raton in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that an ordinance enacted by the city unlawfully prohibited drug and alcohol recovery facilites from operating within residentially zoned areas. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were direct targets of the ordinance which was passed in response to public outcry to remove the plaintiffs from residential neighborhoods. On February 26, 2007, the court (Donald M. Middlebrooks) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to their Fair Housing Act claims. The plaintiffs were awarded nominal damages and the city was enjoined from enforcing section 2 of Ordinance 4649 and Section 28-2 as applied to recovering individuals. After litigation over attorney fees and a failed appeal by the city, the case was closed.

Summary: A group of recovering alcoholics and drug addicts filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Boca Raton. The plaintiffs claimed that an ordinance enacted by the city unlawfully prohibited drug and alcohol recovery facilites from operating within residentially zoned areas. The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to their Fair Housing Act claims. The plaintiffs were awarded nominal damages and the city was enjoined from enforcing section 2 of Ordinance 4649 and Section 28-2 as applied to recovering individuals. This case is closed.


On October 24, 2006, owners and prospective purchasers of condominiums in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against Sunrise Lakes Condominium Apartments in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest attorneys, claimed that the condo association had prevented Hispanics from purchasing units in the condo building. Following a stipulation of dismissal on October 16, 2007, the court (Marcia G. Cooke) dismissed the case on October 19, 2007. We have no further information concerning this case.

Summary: Owners and prospective purchasers of condominiums in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against Sunrise Lakes Condominium Apartments, claiming that the condo association had prevented Hispanics from purchasing units in the condo building. Following a stipulation of dismissal on October 16, 2007, the court (Marcia G. Cooke) dismissed the case on October 19, 2007. We have no further information concerning this case.


On June 24, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, against owners and operators of an apartment complex located in Red Wing Minnesota. DOJ alleged that the defendants discriminated against the complainant, an African-American man, on the basis of race and sex when it refused to rent him a unit because of his criminal background, but rented an apartment to a white male with a felonious criminal background. The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Judge Nelson was elevated to the Court of Appeal, and the case was reassigned to Judge Donovan Frank. On July 29, 2011, Judge Frank approved a two year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. The Consent Decree provides: <ul> <li> It enjoins the Defendants from refusing to rent a dwelling or discriminating against a person in the terms and conditions of the rental of a dwelling on the basis of race or sex. <li> It requires antidiscrimination training of all of defendants employees involved in renting apartments <li> It requires posting of Fair Housing notices and use of Equal Housing Opportunity language in advertising. <li>It requires recordkeeping and notice to the DOJ in the event any additional complaints are filed. <li> It orders the Defendants to pay $15,000 in damages to the complainant. <li> It preserves jurisdiction in the district court for enforcement for 2 years. No further litigation has occurred in this case and it is presumably closed.

Summary: On June 24, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, under the Fair Housing Act, against owners and operators of an apartment complex located in Red Wing Minnesota alleging discrimination on the basis of race and sex against an African-American male. On July 29, 2011, Judge Frank approved a two year Consent Decree agreed to by the parties enjoining defendants from continuing to engage in discriminatory practices and ordering defendants to pay $15,000 in damages to the complainant.


On March 17, 2011, the National Fair Housing Alliance and Paralyzed Veterans of America filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., against Virginia-based real estate development company HHHunt Corporation, and a multitude of affiliated designers, builders, managers, and owners of nine apartment complexes throughout the Southeast. In their complaint, the plaintiffs, represented by Relman, Dane & Colfax, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the defendants discriminated against people with disabilities in violation of the FHA. Specifically, the FHA requires that certain apartment complexes built for first occupancy after March 13, 1991 be designed and constructed with accessible and adaptable features for people with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged, however, that since at least 2002 the defendants engaged in a continuous pattern or practice of discrimination by designing and building multifamily dwellings without these required features, thereby denying people with disabilities the use of these facilities. On April 5, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding as defendant J. Davis Architects, which the plaintiffs alleged was the design architect on at least one of the subject properties. The amended complaint also named as defendants several property managers, and the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin these managers from refusing to permit surveys and retrofits of the subject properties. On October 26, 2012, the District Court (Judge James C. Turk) entered a stipulated judgment, evincing the terms of a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and all the defendants except J. Davis Architects. Under the agreement, HHHunt agreed to permit accessibility surveys by a third party inspector of the nine subject properties and to retrofit inaccessible features within one to three years. Specifically, HHHunt agreed to change entry doors with high thresholds, remove large steps that block routes to entry doors, correct hazardously steep sidewalk slopes, provide adequate accessible parking, and ensure that kitchens and bathrooms have sufficient maneuvering space for wheelchair users. HHHunt also committed to pay an undisclosed sum for the plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees. The District Court retained jurisdiction to designate a Magistrate Judge or another person to resolve disputes between the parties. Following the settlement, the only remaining claims in the lawsuit were those against J. Davis Architects. The plaintiffs contended that J. Davis drafted architectural plans for at least one of the subject properties that contained design elements that violated that FHA. After some disagreement, the parties ultimately stipulated that J. Davis had a connection to two of the subject properties. J. Davis next moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that one of the plaintiffs' claims was barred by the statute of limitations. The District Court (Judge Turk) denied the motion on January 29, 2013, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the claim was timely, because the challenged conduct was not an isolated occurrence, but rather part of a pattern or practice that amounted to a continuing violation of the FHA. Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. HHHunt Corp., 919 F. Supp. 2d 712 (W.D. Va. 2013). Nearly one year passed with little court activity. On January 14, 2014, the District Court entered an order dismissing the action with prejudice, upon motion of the plaintiffs and J. Davis. The joint motion contained no additional terms, and it is unclear if it was predicated on a private settlement agreement. The District Court retained limited jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising under the settlement agreement until October 26, 2015. Since there has been no docket activity after 2014, the case is presumed closed.

Summary: In March 2011, the National Fair Housing Alliance and Paralyzed Veterans of America filed this federal suit the Western District of Virginia under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that real estate development company HHHunt Corporation and affiliated entities discriminated against people with disabilities by designing and building apartment complexes without the required accessible and adaptable features. In October 2012, the District Court (Judge James C. Turk) entered a stipulated order, under which the defendants agreed to make numerous improvements to the subject properties. Following the settlement agreement, claims concerning the liability of an architecture firm lingered, but were ultimately resolved by a stipulated dismissal on January 14, 2014. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the District Court retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the parties until October 2015. Since there has been no docket activity after 2014, the case is presumed closed.


On August 25, 2011, an individual with intellectual disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff, represented by a nonprofit impact litigation firm, sued the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff was involuntarily committed to residential services pursuant to a Florida statute but never received a periodic review of his continued need for involuntary confinement. Thus, the plaintiff asked the court for a permanent injunction that would require the defendant to adopt policies and procedures to ensure that clients who are committed to the defendant's care and custody receive state-initiated, periodic review of their involuntary commitment. On December 19, 2011, District Judge William Stafford denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the basis that the plaintiff had provided sufficient allegations to survive the motion. After the parties engaged in discovery, on May 22, 2012, Judge Stafford granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the APD successfully set up a nonadversarial scheme that allowed behavioral specialists the flexibility to perform tasks and make decisions for which they were trained, without having to spend unnecessary time in periodic court proceedings. The court reasoned that this scheme, when applied specifically to the plaintiff's case, was sufficient under the due process clause and periodic judicial review of involuntary commitment was not required. 2012 WL 1886438 (N.D. Fla. May 22, 2012). On August 10, 2012, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit held on August 20, 2013, that the Supreme Court of Florida had to answer three certified questions related to the case because the Supreme Court of Florida is the "arbiter[] of Florida law." These questions asked whether the "support plan" under a Florida statue requires that APD "consider[s] the propriety of a continued involuntary admission for residential services," if APD is required under law "to petition the circuit court for the release" of a person from involuntary admission if the circumstances surrounding the admission have changed, and if Florida law requires that involuntary admissions are periodically reviewed. 736 F.3d 959, 973 (11th Cir. 2013). On May 14, 2015, the Florida Supreme Court held that APD was not required to "consider the propriety of continued involuntary admission" and APD did not have "to petition the circuit court for the release" of a person who was involuntarily admitted but the circumstances surrounding the admission had changed. 175 So. 3d 710 (Fla. 2015). The case then returned to the Eleventh Circuit. On October 15, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit delivered an opinion reversing the Florida Supreme Court's decision and remanding the case to the district court on the basis that the APD scheme was not constitutionally adequate. The court held that Florida's system was in violation of the Due Process Clause because it did not require continued involuntary commitment to be reviewed by a decision-maker with the authority to order release. On July 25, 2016, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, and resolved the costs and fees in a separate agreement. The next day, Judge Stafford dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2011, the plaintiff, an individual with intellectual disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff sued then Director for the Agency for Persons with Disabilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1938 & 1988. The plaintiff was involuntarily committed to residential services pursuant to Florida statute but never received any periodic review of his continued need for involuntary confinement to residential services. The District Court granted the Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the Agency's scheme of review satisfied the Due Process Clause. On October 20, 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed this decision and remanded the case to the lower court.


Starting in at least 2011, officials of the State of Illinois pursued plans to close up to four State Operated Developmental Centers (SODCs) within 2.5 years. SODCs are facilities for Illinois adults with severe developmental disabilities. In February 2012, Governor Quinn announced that Illinois would close Jacksonville Developmental Center and Murray Developmental Center by October 31, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The closure plans were undertaken to shift resources towards expanding community-based care and to deal with Illinois's $13 billion budget deficit. Illinois closed the Jacksonville center on December 3, 2012. When this suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on February 19, 2013, Illinois was in the course of transferring residents of the Murray Center to community-based options in order to enable the facility's closure. The guardians of individuals residing in these institutions filed this suit individually on behalf of their charges and as a class action for all similarly situated disabled individuals. Some named plaintiffs claimed to have been told that Illinois would be closing all SODCs in the state. Thus the plaintiffs opposed the closures of the Jackson and Murray centers and the anticipated closure of the rest of the SODCs and brought the suit seeking declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and an injunction preventing the planned closures. The plaintiffs argued that Illinois had not demonstrated that the community-based setting approach would be adequate or appropriate for individuals who are severely and profoundly developmentally disabled. The plaintiffs further argued that the closure plans discriminated against the class by targeting developmental disabilities for greater funding reductions than other disabilities, providing the class members services less effective than those provided to individuals with other disabilities, creating a substantial risk of harm, and limiting non-ambulatory individuals' access to community residential settings. The plaintiffs brought their claims under The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), Olmstead v. L.C.(527 U.S. 581 (1999)), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for state infringement of equal protection), and various federal and state Medicaid laws. In effect, Plaintiffs argued for the right to remain institutionalized. On February 27, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On April 15, 2013, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a statement of interest opposing the injunction and the plaintiffs' interpretation of the ADA and Olmstead. The DOJ explained its position that the ADA is a statute for integration, not segregation. On May 30, 2013, the Court (Judge Marvin E. Aspen) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The order, which was entered on June 12, 2013, was to prevent Illinois from transferring or discharging residents of the Murray Developmental Center without their legal guardians' written consent. Illinois was also restricted from sending residents on overnight transition visits. The order was to last until the court ruled on the motion for preliminary injunction. On June 20, 2013, the Court restricted the plaintiffs' claims to those dealing with the Jacksonville and Murray centers, finding the potential closing of all SODCs to be too speculative to be ripe for adjudication. 2013 WL 3168758 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation of Olmstead, stating "[T]his is not an Olmstead case." On June 28, 2013, the Court clarified that the restraining order allowed the state to consent to the transfer of wards of the Office of the State Guardian. In other words, the state as legal guardian was empowered to consent to the transfer of certain residents. On October 8, 2013, Judge Aspen granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. The court dismissed counts IV and V against DHS and dismissed all claims against Governor Quinn. The court dismissed count III (the Olmstead claim) entirely and count IV to the extent it alleged violations of state regulatory laws relating to Medicaid. This left the equal protection claim, the ADA claim, the Rehab Act claim, and violations of federal laws pertaining to Medicaid. 2013 WL 5548929 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2013). In January 2014, the court held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and possible permanent injunction. On July 21, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and lifted the temporary restraining order previously entered on June 12, 2013. 60 F. Supp. 3d 856 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit. On October 15, 2015, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner) affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the harm to the state if the injunction were granted would outweigh the harm caused to residents if the injunction weren't granted. 803 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2015). The district court dismissed the case on March 3, 2016, after the parties filed a proposed agreed order of dismissal. Each party bore their own attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: After Illinois initiated the process of closing several State Operated Developmental Centers for adults with severe developmental disabilities, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs opposed the closures of the Jackson and Murray centers and the anticipated closure of the rest of the SODCs and brought the suit seeking declaratory relief, attorneys' fees, and an injunction preventing the planned closures. Plaintiffs brought their claims under The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), <i>Olmstead v. L.C.</i>(527 U.S. 581 (1999)), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (for state infringement of equal protection), and various federal and state Medicaid laws. Plaintiffs' claims brought under the Olmstead mandate were dismissed. Plaintiffs did obtain a temporary restraining order, but their motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by the district court and upon appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.


On December 22, 1995, People First of Tennessee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee on behalf of residents of the Clover Bottom Developmental Center, Greene Valley Developmental Center, and Winston Developmental Center. The plaintiff sued the Clover Bottom Development Center and the Tennessee Department of Health under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The complaint alleged that a Department of Justice CRIPA investigation of the facilities in 1994 found a pattern of injury, abuse, and neglect, deficient medical care, a lack of activities, and a failure to provide educations to school-age children as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. It also alleged the use of unnecessary restraints, inadequate discharge planning, and failure to provide habilitation and training. The People First of Tennessee, represented by the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and private counsel, sought injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the defendants from continuing the acts, practices, and omissions described above. On November 15, 1996, the United States Department of Justice also filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the state, alleging similar violations. That case was styled U.S. v. Tennessee Civ. No. 96-cv-01056 (M.D.Tenn.) ("United States case") (See ID-TN-0004). On December 2, 1996, the district court (Judge Robert L. Echnols) granted a motion to consolidate the People First case with the United States case. People First, the Department of Justice, and the State of Tennessee entered into a settlement agreement, which was approved by Judge Echnols on November 27, 1996. In the settlement, the state agreed to, among other things: • Create person-centered evaluation of citizens in need of services • Develop community programs and resources • Increase staffing and staff training • Improve living conditions in the centers • Provide education for school-age residents On the same date, the court granted plaintiff People First of Tennessee's motion to amend their complaint. According to the PACER docket, litigation continued after the settlement regarding defendants' compliance with the settlement agreement, the Parent-Guardian Association's (PGA) intervention in the action, and attorneys' fees. Community Rehabilitation Agencies of Tennessee (CMRA), an association of agencies providing services to individuals with intellectual disabilities, moved to intervene in the consolidate suits. The court (Judge Jon McCalla) denied the motions for each case. On August 8, 2001, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (District Judge John Feikens, Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation) affirmed the denials. U.S. v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001). On Mar. 18, 2002, the court ordered the case administratively closed in light of the ongoing settlement process. The court allowed the case to be reopened by either party. The case was reopened on Feb. 22, 2006 to address the state's motion for partial termination of the settlement regarding Greene Valley Developmental Center. The settlement agreement allowed the state to seek partial termination of the agreement after two years if the state showed compliance with provisions related to institutional care services and protection from harm. The court had to address if "the State has substantially complied with" the provisions. The court granted the motion on Mar. 16, 2006, finding that the state had achieved compliance with respect to the conditions at the Greene Valley Developmental Center. The court terminated the settlement agreement with respect to the Harold Jordan Center on Sept. 30, 2008, finding that the state showed compliance with provisions related to institutional care services and protection from harm at that particular facility. The court once again ordered the case administratively closed on Mar. 31, 2009. While the case remained closed, a series of procedural developments occurred. First, on Nov. 19, the state indicated that budgetary considerations compelled it to close the Clover Bottom Developmental Center and Harold Jordan Center. On Dec. 21, 2009, the PGA filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in response to the state's asserted intent to close the facilities without a comprehensive closure plan. The court denied the motion on Jan. 12, 2010, holding that the parties did not make a sufficient effort to confer with the state, as required by the settlement agreement, before bringing their motion. After many months of negotiation, the parties drafted an exit plan that established criteria that, if the state satisfied, would result in a dismissal of this case. The court approved the exit plan on Jan. 29, 2015. A year later, on Jan. 12, 2016, the court found that the state had complied with the exit plan provisions and ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. The court also vacated previously-granted injunctive relief, except as to class members residing at Greene Valley Developmental Center while they continued to reside there. The court maintained jurisdiction over the matter only as to these residents. On Sept. 8, 2017, after the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case as to the outstanding injunction, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the state was in full compliance with the exit plan as to Greene Valley Developmental Center. Throughout the course of this litigation, the court awarded installments of attorneys' fees and reimbursements totaling $2,778,833.84 for the plaintiffs and $753,433.86 for the PGA. The case was then closed, though the court currently retained jurisdiction solely over matters related to attorneys' fees. On November 9, 2017, People First filed a final motion for attorneys' fees. The PGA filed a similar motion the following day. On November 14, 2017, the court granted both motions, awarding People First $377,944.28 and PGA $65,750. All motions for attorneys' fees have been resolved. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: On December 22, 1995, People First of Tennessee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee on behalf of residents of the Clover Bottom Developmental Center, Greene Valley Developmental Center, and Winston Developmental Center. The parties settled, and the case is now closed.


This was a class action brought in October of 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on behalf of all legal hourly-paid agricultural workers who had been employed by fruit picking companies of Reedley, California owned by defendants. Plaintiff alleged that employees of Fruit Patch, Inc. engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. In furtherance of their scheme, defendants are alleged to have recruited over 100 undocumented immigrants to work in their plants, provided housing for them and turned a blind eye to obviously fake work papers. Plaintiff further alleged that after defendants were notified of workers using false social security numbers, the undocumented workers would then simply assume new bogus identities and continue working. Plaintiff alleges that defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), et seq. Plaintiff was represented by private counsel. Defendants moved to dismiss the case. On March 27, 2007, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's request for sanctions. Judge Wanger held that plaintiff's complaint sufficiently stated a claim for RICO violations by alleging predicate acts of knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens and harboring undocumented aliens. He, however, found that allegations of a conspiracy involving unnamed co-conspirators did not comply with notice pleading requirements. The Court granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. Hernandez v. Balakian, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (E.D. Cal. 2007). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint and defendants answered it and asserted affirmative defenses, which plaintiff moved to strike. That motion was denied. Hernandez v. Balakian, No. CV-F-06-1383 OWW/DLB, 2007 WL 1649911 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007). The parties proceeded to discovery on class issues, and, in December of 2007, the plaintiff filed his motion for class certification. Shortly thereafter, in January of 2008, the plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint, as he had been arrested and charged with a felony, and had been injured in an automobile accident that impaired his memory. He argued he was no longer a suitable class representative. The Court (Judge Wanger) allowed plaintiff 30 days to amend his complaint to substitute a suitable class representative. Hernandez v. Balakian, 251 F.R.D. 488 (E.D. Cal. 2008). However, the plaintiff filed to timely amend the complaint, and the case was dismissed without prejudice.

Summary: In October of 2006, a class action lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on behalf of agricultural workers alleging that defendant employers had engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants in an effort to depress employee wages. The case was dismissed without prejudice in May of 2008 after the plaintiff failed to timely amend his complaint to substitute in a suitable class representative.


This case is about the ability of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue new guidelines on asylum application procedures and whether DHS is allowed to issue a rule that asylum seekers must first apply for asylum in another country before applying in the U.S.. On July 16, 2019, four advocacy organizations -- the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, Al Otro Lado, Innovation Law Lab, and the Central American Resource Center -- challenged a new asylum policy of the Trump administration narrowing eligibility qualifications for asylum seekers. The rule blocked asylum for noncitizens who transited through another country prior to reaching the southern U.S. border. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court in the Northern District of California and assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. The complaint had three key arguments. First, plaintiffs argued that Congress made clear that noncitizens may apply for asylum regardless of where they enter the U.S., and that many necessarily transit through another country before reaching a U.S. port of entry. U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The complaint emphasized the distinction between firm resettlement barring eligibility for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A), and temporary transit through another country. Second, plaintiffs argued that the rule jeopardized the international law principle of non-refoulment which prohibits the forcible return of asylum seekers to countries where they would be persecuted. Third, plaintiffs argued that the government failed to follow procedural steps required by the APA, including providing notice and an opportunity to comment prior to enacting the Rule. On July 24, 2019, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the government from implementing the rule due to the government’s failure to comply with notice and comment procedures of the APA and the balance of public interests. 385 F.Supp.3d 922. On July 29, 2019, the government requested a stay of the injunction pending an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the nationwide scope of the injunction was unwarranted and would serve to undermine the constitutional and statutory authority of the Executive Branch. On August 16, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied a stay for application of the injunction inside its boundaries. The Ninth Circuit granted the stay pending appeal for all locations outside the Ninth Circuit, finding that the nationwide scope of the injunction was not supported by the record in the district court. 934 F.3d 1026. The plaintiffs then moved in the district court to restore the nationwide scope of the injunction, supplementing the record the appeals court had found inadequate. On September 9, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to restore the nationwide scope of the injunction, viewing it as the only sufficient remedy to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs, as well as necessary to maintain uniform immigration policy. 391 F.Supp.3d 974. The government again appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed an emergency motion for a stay. While the stay issue was being briefed, the Supreme Court granted a stay pending disposition of the government's appeal to the Ninth Circuit (140 S.Ct. 3). The government again appealed the injunction to the Ninth Circuit on July 6, 2020. While the injunction was on appeal, but before the change of administration, the Department of Homeland Security issued a separate “final rule” on the asylum issue that was substantially similar to the one the district court had preliminarily enjoined. On January 28, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking to enjoin the government from implementing this new rule as well. The district court granted that injunction on February 16, 2021. On January 21, 2021, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and stay of the final rule's effective date. Judge Tigar granted the preliminary injunction and stay of the effective date on February 16. In in April 2021, the Ninth Circuit upheld the original injunction and found that the rule change was arbitrary and capricious because the government did not take the evidence in front of the agency into account when making the rule change, and that the balance of harms favored upholding the injunction (994 F. 3d 962). The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the injunction along the four states bordering Mexico. The case is ongoing, but is likely to terminate soon due to the inauguration of the Biden Administration. There has been no movement on the trial court docket since the court of appeals mandate in April.

Summary: On July 16, 2019, the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, Al Otro Lado, Innovation Law Lab, and the Central American Resource Center in Los Angeles brought this suit against the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security. Plaintiffs challenged the federal immigration rule restricting eligibility for asylum for noncitizens who transited through another country prior to reaching the southern U.S. border. Plaintiffs claimed the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Plaintiffs successfully sought a preliminary nationwide injunction. However, defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit and the nationwide scope of the injunction was stayed. Then the District Court restored the nationwide scope of the injunction on September 9, 2019, but the government again appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay pending disposition of the appeal in the 9th Circuit. The District Court issued a separate preliminary injunction against another rule issued by the Department of Homeland Security in the closing days of the Trump Administration which was substantially similar to the one already enjoined. The Ninth Circuit upheld the original injunction in April, 2021. The case is ongoing but is likely to terminate soon given the change in presidential administrations.