This is a case about poor conditions at a North Carolina private prison. On June 28, 2007, a group of men held at the Rivers Correctional Institution in North Carolina brought this class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sued GEO Group, Inc., the private company that owned and operated the prison, and the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Legal Aid Justice Center, and the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming statutory violations under the Rehabilitation Act, violations of the Eighth Amendment, and negligence. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the health and welfare of the class, that they had excluded prisoners with disabilities from other services and programs, and that they had deliberately deprived the plaintiffs of adequate medical, dental, and mental health care. For example, the named plaintiff suffered improper treatment of a cavity at Rivers and ultimately underwent emergency surgery, which removed the infection and saved his life but left him deformed and disabled. The plaintiffs also alleged that GEO Group had breached its contract with the U.S. Government, which required GEO Group to provide its prisoners with “medical services that are commensurate with community standards.” On July 26, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, to transfer the case on the grounds that the D.C. Court lacked personal jurisdiction over GEO Group. On September 18, 2007, the United States Bureau of Prisons also filed a motion to dismiss or transfer. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on September 25, 2007. Both parties filed motions for time extensions to file responses to the motions, but on February 28, 2008, Judge Ricardo M. Urbina, agreeing that “transferring the case furthers the interests of justice,” granted the defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of North Carolina. 535 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). The case was then transferred to North Carolina, where it was assigned to Senior District Judge Malcolm J. Howard. On October 24, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, stipulating the requests for both the class and the Disability Sub-Class (which consisted of prisoners who had been allegedly denied access to programs and services they should have been provided under the Rehabilitation Act) and demanding a jury trial. The defendants moved to strike the amended complaint on January 5, 2009, and simultaneously filed motions to dismiss the suit. On February 16, 2009, GEO Group filed a notice of subsequently decided authority, citing Judge James C. Dever’s February 13, 2009 decision dismissing a prisoner's claims to relief for failure to comply with North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j), regarding special pleading requirements for medical malpractice. The Bureau of Prisons also filed a notice of subsequently decided authority on April 14, 2009, noting that the Fourth Circuit had affirmed a district court’s finding that the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to federal prisons. The case was reassigned from Judge Howard to Judge James C. Dever on July 22, 2008, and Judge Dever issued three orders: denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss and their motion to strike the amended complaint, and denying without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. On November 9, 2009, Judge Dever granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because two of the named plaintiffs had been released and for failure to state a claim, granting the plaintiffs leave to re-file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 9, 2009, which the defendants moved to dismiss on January 22, 2010. After a hearing on the motions conducted on January 31, the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss on February 2. On September 29, 2010, Judge Dever granted GEO Group’s motion to dismiss and granted in part the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ motion to dismiss, largely because the plaintiffs still failed to state a claim; however, the judge gave the plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint. 2010 WL 3835141. The plaintiffs accordingly filed a third amended complaint on October 25, 2010. The plaintiffs continued to allege that GEO Group “manifested a pervasive and deliberate indifference to the health needs of” the prisoners at Rivers. The complaint described ten separate prisoners who had suffered deprivation of medical care or inadequate medical care while at Rivers and who had suffered injury, hospitalization, or disability as a result. GEO Group filed an unopposed motion to dismiss GEO Group as a defendant on November 29, 2010, noting that the Court had stated that it would dismiss the claims in the Third Amended Complaint as to GEO. The Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to dismiss on December 3, 2010. On July 18, 2011, Judge Dever granted GEO Group’s motion to dismiss as a defendant, citing the November 9, 2009 motion to dismiss, in which GEO argued that GEO’s actions at Rivers did not qualify as government action against which Eighth Amendment claims could be raised. However, the court rejected the Bureau of Prison’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the Bureau failed to adequately support their argument with evidence. 2011 WL 2899135. The plaintiffs again attempted to file for class certification on August 23, 2011, against which the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion to stay while they filed a motion to dismiss one of the plaintiffs. On September 26, 2011, Judge Dever granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss one plaintiff for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to the parties’ agreement. The Bureau of Prisons also filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s July 18, 2011 order. Judge Dever denied that motion on January 9, 2012, finding that the defendants failed to persuade the court that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies or that precedent required the court to dismiss the case. 2012 WL 43586. On February 23, 2012, Judge Dever denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality requirement for class certification. 2012 WL 600865. After that, a status conference was set for March 8, 2012, but before the conference could commence, the remaining named plaintiff was transferred, and the parties stipulated to dismissal on March 26, 2012. The case is now closed.

Summary: A group of prisoners at a North Carolina private prison sued the prison company and the Federal Bureau of Prisons for deliberate indifference to their medical and mental health needs. After lengthy procedural maneuvering involving a change of venue from D.C. to North Carolina and failed attempts at class certification, the last remaining named plaintiff was transferred and the court dismissed the case.


On October 23, 2009, an individual plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Hackensack Police Department, Hackensack Municipal Court, Bergen County Jail in the City of Hackensack, Bergen County Municipal Court, and Bergen County Prosecutor. The plaintiff, representing himself pro se, sought compensatory and punitive damages plus special damages for future legal fees. The plaintiff specifically claimed that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by attempting to break in and enter his home, threatening to imprison him, fabricating stories to have him incarcerated, and asserting false criminal charges, which led to plaintiff spending three months and five days in county jail. Prior to these events, the plaintiff and officers had a relationship that arose out of an automobile accident. The plaintiff stated that he collected social security checks because of lasting injuries from the accident. The officers, allegedly because the plaintiff is black, claimed that the plaintiff had faked these injuries. On October 12, 2010, the U.S. District Court (Judge Jose L. Linares) issued an order granting in part and denying in part motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. The court granted leave to the plaintiff to allow him to amend his conspiracy to maliciously prosecute and equal protection claims. The court noted that if the plaintiff failed to do so, his Second Amended Complaint would remain the operative complaint in this matter and the case would proceed solely as to the plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim as against defendant Sgt. Aiellos. 2010 WL 4025846. The plaintiff submitted an amended complaint later that month on October 27, 2010. The District Court issued an opinion dismissing the amended complaint as to all defendants except Behnke and Sgt. Aiellos on December 22, 2010. 2010 WL 5392724. The court granted Behnke's subsequent motion to dismiss on February 26, 2011. Then, on May 22, 2012, the court issued an opinion denying the plaintiff’s motions for leave to submit another amended complaint and for a stay in discovery proceedings. 2012 WL 1883812. On December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge Jose L. Linares) issued an order denying the defendant’s and plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment. 2013 WL 6865619. On January 16, 2014, the defendant appealed to the Third Circuit on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court issued an order on May 7, 2014 granting the defendant’s motion to stay the case pending interlocutory appeal. Months later, on December 2, 2014, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny summary judgment. The Third Circuit’s decision hinged on two elements, including whether the plaintiff’s criminal complaint was brought without probable cause and whether the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff. The court agreed with the district court that both issues were matters of disputed fact for a jury to decide and therefore rejected the motion for summary judgment. 594 Fed. App'x 742. Following the Third Circuit’s decision, litigation continued in the district court. The parties litigated discovery and pretrial orders vigorously. Trial was initially set for June 2018, but later postponed because in May 2018, the docket indicates that plaintiff sought to retain counsel (which terminated all pending pretrial motions). That fall and into early 2019, the parties continued settlement negotiations without success. In May of 2019, the case was re-assigned to Judge John Michael Vazquez. Later that year, the plaintiff filed a motion for recusal, which was denied by Judge Vazquez. On February 7, 2020, the plaintiff requested to stay the case while the Third Circuit decided a petition for a writ of mandamus. The stay request was denied and the parties prepared for trial. However, the trial has been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the case remains pending as of April 15, 2021.

Summary: On October 23, 2009, an individual plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Hackensack Police Department, Hackensack Municipal Court, Bergen County Jail in the City of Hackensack, Bergen County Municipal Court, and Bergen County Prosecutor. The plaintiff, bringing suit pro se, sought compensatory and punitive damages plus special damages for future legal fees. The plaintiff specifically claimed that the defendants violated his Second and Fourteenth Amendment rights by attempting to break in and enter his home, threatening to imprison him, fabricating stories to have him incarcerated, and asserting false criminal charges, which led to plaintiff spending three months and five days in county jail. The district court denied the defendant’s and plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment. In Dec. 2014, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to deny summary judgment. Settlement discussions have since been unsuccessful and the case is ongoing in the district court, pending trial once public health conditions allow.


On June 6, 2014, a deaf prison inmate who primarily communicates in American Sign Language filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Oregon against the Oregon Department of Corrections. The plaintiff brought disability discrimination claims under the ADA and a state anti-discrimination statute, as well as an unjust enrichment claim. The plaintiff, represented by private attorneys, sought $460,000 in damages, claiming that there was a failure by the prison system to communicate with him since the beginning of his sentence in late 2000 (14 years). The lawsuit claimed that, instead of providing interpreters, the prison made him train other inmates as his interpreters and that they were not qualified to help him. These interpreters were also privy to confidential information since they were his method of communication for medical, religious, and counseling services. On June 13, 2014, the defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, as well as both disability discrimination claims on statute of limitations grounds. On October 6, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which no longer included the unjust enrichment claim. District Judge Anna J. Brown denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on October 30, 2014. With respect to the plaintiff's disability discrimination claims, the Court held that the continuing-violations doctrine (ADA claim) and the continuing-tort doctrine (state law claim) applied because the defendant’s conduct constituted longstanding, continuing violations based on discriminatory policies. 2014 WL 5494895. On March 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on June 16, 2015 and a second motion for partial summary judgment on August 28, 2015. The plaintiff then filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on September 18, 2015. On February 4, 2016, Judge Brown denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court granted the defendant's motion with respect to the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief because he had been released from custody; limited the plaintiff's recovery under the state anti-discrimination law to instances of disability discrimination that occurred on or after September 23, 2013; limited the plaintiff's recovery under the ADA to instances of disability discrimination that occurred on or after May 5, 2012; and dismissed the plaintiff's claim under the ADA for emotional-distress damages as barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 2016 WL 447839. On May 2, 2016, Judge Brown issued an amended opinion and order in which he entered summary judgment in the defendant's favor against the plaintiff’s “continuing tort” theory of the case. The Court found that a question of fact existed regarding whether the plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies in order for his federal claim to proceed at all, pursuant to the PLRA. 2016 WL 2337892. On May 19, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Michael W. Mosman. In August 2016, the parties engaged in settlement discussions, but were unable to reach an agreement and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The Court bifurcated the trial and first heard arguments on whether the plaintiff complied with the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and dismissed his entire remaining ADA claim with prejudice. Following trial on the remainder of the plaintiff's state law discrimination claims, the jury returned a verdict of $400,000 in noneconomic damages for the plaintiff on November 3, 2016. On December 5, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial and an order of remittitur. On February 8, 2017, the Court denied the defendant's motion and judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $400,000. On June 9, 2017, Judge Mosman ruled on the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $911,062.21. While he did find that a fee multiplier was appropriate based on the risk involved in the case and the performance of the plaintiff's attorneys, he adopted a smaller fee multiplier than the one requested. Thus, Judge Mosman awarded the plaintiff $683,873.13 in attorneys' fees, $18,155.19 in costs, and $3,924.79 in litigation expenses. 2017 WL 2495496. Although the parties both appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in March 2017, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the appeals on September 21, 2017 for unknown reasons. The case is now closed.

Summary: A deaf prison inmate who primarily communicates in American Sign Language filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Oregon Department of Corrections, claiming they failed to communicate with him for over 14 years. The lawsuit claimed that, instead of providing interpreters, the prison made him train other inmates as his interpreters and they were not qualified to help him and were also privy to confidential information. In May 2016, the Court granted partial summary judgment for the defendant. Following a jury trial on the remaining claims, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's ADA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The jury awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in noneconomic damages. The Court awarded the plaintiff $683,873.13 in attorneys' fees, $18,155.19 in costs, and $3,924.79 in litigation expenses. Although both parties appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, they agreed to voluntarily dismiss their appeals in September 2017. The case is now closed.


On November 10, 2011, an Oregon Department of Corrections inmate filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that the defendant, Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC), violated his free speech and due process rights, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, as well as the Oregon Constitution. The case arose when ODOC rejected and returned a letter that the plaintiff sent to another inmate at Oregon State Penitentiary because of a picture the plaintiff had drawn on the front of the envelope. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, and assigned to District Judge Marco A. Hernandez. On January 2, 2012, Judge Hernandez denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Barrett v. Williams, 2012 WL 10897 (D.Or. 2012) On August 27, 2012, the State filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff did not respond and on February 22, 2013, the District Court dismissed the case. Barrett v. Williams, 2013 WL 686966 (D.Or. 2013). On March 23, 2013, the plaintiff sought reconsideration; he explained that he had missed the prior deadline because he was being transferred from New Mexico Department of Corrections to Florida Department of Corrections on the filing date and could not access to his legal documents during the transfer. On May 27, 2013, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and re-opened the defendants' motion for summary judgment. On November 14, 2013, the District Court denied summary judgment in part and granted it in part. The Court held that plaintiff's due process rights were not violated because the plaintiff was provided notice and a right to appeal. The Court also held that the defendants' rejection of the plaintiff's letter was not in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights, and denied the plaintiff's claim for damages. However, the District Court allowed the rest of plaintiff's free speech claim, addressing the regulation going forward, to proceed. Barrett v. Williams, 2013 WL 6055247, (D.Or. 2013) On December 2, 2013, the plaintiff sought reconsideration from the Court's November 13, 2013, ruling, which denied him damages. On December 16, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel. On February 26, 2014, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel but denied his motion for reconsideration from the Court's November 13, 2013, ruling. Specifically, the Court held that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for money damages because the rights the plaintiff asserted were not clearly established. Barrett v. Williams, 2014 WL 795801, (D.Or. 2014) Following a February 19, 2015, one-day trial, on March 30, 2015 the District Court issued Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The Court held that the defendants' incoming mail policy of blocking a form of expression--artwork on an envelope-- violated inmates' and their correspondents' First Amendment rights. Barrett v. Premo, 2015 WL 1477902 (D.Or. 2015). On May 14, 2015, the Court enjoined the State from enforcing a blanket ban on artwork on the front of envelopes coming into its prisons. The Court also awarded the plaintiff reasonable attorney fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 10, 2011, the plaintiff--an Oregon Department of Corrections inmate-- filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiff alleged that the Oregon Department of Corrections violated his First Amendment free speech rights, his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, when they rejected a return a letter written to another ODOC inmate because the envelope had a drawing on it. On May 14, 2015, the District Court enjoined the challenged prison policy.


On March 11, 2013, the Disability Rights Network (DRN), a Pennsylvania non-profit, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PDOC). DRN alleged that the PDOC violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in its use of solitary confinement "Restrictive Housing Units" (RHUs). There are no prisoner plaintiffs, and the case is not a class action; DRN has been designated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as an entity that can advocate for and protect the rights of Pennsylvanians with mental illness, pursuant to the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-07. According to the complaint, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated the rights of prisoners with severe mental illness by creating a cycle of solitary confinement and mental deterioration through the use of RHUs. DRN alleged that the PDOC regularly disciplined mentally ill prisoners for behavior symptomatic of their mental illnesses, and failed to take account of the role of mental illness in their behavior and the particularly detrimental effect of solitary confinement on the mentally ill, whose conditions worsened when deprived of human contact and adequate treatment. DRN further alleged that the PDOC did not maintain adequate therapeutic alternatives to RHUs for the number of mentally ill prisoners in the system and that PDOC nevertheless underutilized the treatment facilities it had by placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement, even when there were significant numbers of beds available in appropriate treatment programs. On January 5, 2015, the parties executed a Settlement Agreement providing for the dismissal of the matter without prejudice and retention of limited jurisdiction by the Court to enforce the agreement. In accordance with the parties' wishes, the Court dismissed the matter on January 15, 2015. Under the terms of the agreement, the PDOC neither admitted nor conceded any liability, wrongdoing, or violation of law, but agreed to continue with the implementation of specified improvements to its policies, practices, and facilities, under the supervisions of DRN. In particular, under the settlement, the PDOC will evaluate all incoming prisoners for serious mental illness, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and major depressive disorder, and will place prisoners with serious mental illness in the RHUs only in "exceptional" circumstances; even then, a prisoner with serious mental illness can be kept in solitary confinement for no longer than 30 days and must be allowed out of their cells for 20 hours per week. The settlement provided for a monitor to report on compliance. The PDOC also agreed to pay DRN $750,000, in full satisfaction of all existing claims, fees, and costs. On May 5, 2015 the parties jointly filed an addendum to the settlement agreement wherein it would remain in effect for 3 years (less if the defendant could demonstrate substantial compliance for a period of 18 months). If the plaintiffs feel during that three years that the defendant is in noncompliance, the settlement specifies a procedure to follow, which could lead to an order of specific performance if the court agrees. There has been no activity on the docket since May 2015 and the case is presumably closed since the three year time period set in the agreement has lapsed.

Summary: The Disability Rights Network (DRN), a Pennsylvania non-profit, filed this Eighth Amendment suit against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PDOC) for the PDOC's use of solitary confinement with severely mentally ill prisoners. On January 5, 2015, the parties executed a settlement agreement for dismissal of the matter, in which the PDOC agreed to implement certain improvements and to pay $750,000 to DRN. In particular, the PDOC will evaluate all incoming prisoners for serious mental illness, and will place prisoners with serious mental illness in solitary confinement only in "exceptional" circumstances; even then, a prisoner with serious mental illness can be kept in solitary confinement for no longer than 30 days and must be allowed out of their cells for 20 hours per week. The settlement also provided for a monitor to report on compliance, and will remain in effect for 3 years (less if the defendant demonstrates substantial compliance for a period of 18 months). There has been no activity on the docket since May 2015 and the case is presumably closed since the three year time period set in the agreement has lapsed.


On November 10, 2014, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law against the Pennsylvania Attorney General and the District Attorney of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs--incarcerated prisoners, Prison Radio, Human Rights Coalition, and an unincorporated network of educators--requested injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and attorney fees; they alleged that the defendants violated their free speech rights. One of the plaintiffs is Mumia Abu-Jamal; he was incarcerated for killing a police officer. Abu-Jamal was invited by the undergraduates of Goddard College to give the fall 2014 commencement speech via recording. (Prison Legal News, which soon got involved in the litigation, was going to record the speech and relay it to the college.) In response to this invitation, on October 4, 2014, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Revictimization Relief Act, 18 P.S. § 11.1304, an amendment to Pennsylvania's Crime Victims Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 11.10. The act allowed, in part, for attorneys and victims of personal injury crimes to enjoin those convicted of the crime from conduct that "perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim." On January 8, 2015, Prison Legal News simultaneously filed a verified complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction in an initially separate action. (Prison Legal News v. Kane, Docket 1:15-cv-45). PLN added to the First Amendment argument an argument that the Act was impermissibly vague. The District Court (Chief Judge Christopher C. Connors) consolidated these actions. The records for both are in this Clearinghouse entry. On January 23, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Revictimization Act, and that the First Amendment issue was not ripe for adjudication. In an opinion dated March 6, 2015, the District Court (Chief Judge Christopher Conner) granted the District Attorney's motion, but not the Attorney General's similar motion. The Court reasoned that the District Attorney had promised not to enforce the act pending a determination of its constitutionality, but the Attorney General's refused to disavow enforcement. 96 F. Supp. 3d 447. Next, on April 28, 2015, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for declaratory relief, declaring the Revictimization Relief Act violated the plaintiffs' free speech rights, and was impermissibly vague, and permanently enjoining its enforcement. 105 F. Supp. 3d 448. A declaratory judgment was entered on April 30, 2015. Defendants elected not to appeal the judgment. Since July 2015, there has been no activity on the docket and the case is presumably closed.

Summary: Incarcerated prisoners, Prison Radio, Human Rights Coalition, a network of educators, and Prison Legal News, filed these two consolidated lawsuits in the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. The plaintiffs claimed that the Penn. Revictimization Relief Act--which banned certain public speeches by those convicted of crimes--violated their free speech rights. The District Court agreed, striking down the law on April 2015. Defendants elected not to appeal the judgment. Since July 2015, there has been no activity on the docket and the case is presumably closed.


On May 8, 2013, a prisoner in Pennsylvania's state prisons filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as well as the superintendents of SCI-Greene and SCI-Mahanoy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff asked the court for both injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by keeping him in solitary confinement for 22 consecutive years. The parties initiated discovery. On July 3, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. After numerous extensions for replies, the parties set a date for mediation on October 30, 2013. The mediation was unsuccessful. On January 27, 2014, Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy denied defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Eddy held that the plaintiff's complaint alleged sufficiently plausible facts on both his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Specifically, the plaintiff plausibly asserted that the conditions of his confinement caused severe physical and mental distress and that the defendants not only knew about his suffering, but were deliberately indifferent to it. His Fourteenth Amendment claim was not barred by claim preclusion from prior litigation challenging his solitary confinement because of new circumstances and the extended duration of the confinement. Further, the administration violated his procedural due process rights by failing to give him adequate information for why he was being kept in solitary confinement. 2014 WL 294988 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2014). The parties continued discovery for the next ten months. On November 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On July 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 6, 2015, the defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment. After numerous extensions for responses to the summary judgment motions, Judge Eddy issued her opinion on February 12, 2016, denying both motions. She held that there were material issues of fact on both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims to warrant a jury trial. 2016 WL 595337 (Feb. 12, 2016). On May 10, 2015, the parties engaged in successful mediation and reached a settlement-in-principle.The Department of Corrections agreed to not place the plaintiff back in solitary confinement due to his prior disciplinary record or activities, to provide a single cell (and not have to share it for the rest of his life), to provide him with full mental health evaluation, and pay a monetary settlement. On July 25, 2016, Judge Eddy approved the stipulation of voluntary dismissal and the case was dismissed with prejudice. (https://abolitionistlawcenter.org/2016/07/11/media-release-settlement-reached-in-shoatz-v-wetzel/) During the period of mediation, the Department of Justice announced that it was closing an investigation against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections for its use of solitary confinement. The PDOC stipulated that it would ensure that prisoners are not sent to solitary confinement, expand mental health classification processes and streamline mental health care delivery, provide more mental health training to staff, and offer more out-of-cell activities for prisoners in solitary confinement. The DOJ letter also indicated that PDOC would commit to ensuring that all inmates with a serious mental health condition either present or in the past would be diverted to treatment units, reduce use of restraints, improve mental health staffing and recordkeeping, expand commitment units, better identify prisoners with intellectual disabilities, and improve quality assurance processes. (DOJ letter) No further activity has appeared on the docket. Presumably the case is closed.

Summary: In 2013, a prisoner in Pennsylvania state prison filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that his 22 years of solitary confinement violated the Eighth Amendment as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. In 2016, the parties concluded successful mediation as a result of systemic changes to Pennsylvania's policies concerning solitary confinement and the case was dismissed.


On February 3, 2010, eleven Virginia prisoners, represented by the Legal Aid Justice Center and private counsel, filed this class action lawsuit against the Virginia Parole Board ("the Board") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Plaintiffs challenged the Board's denials of parole for prisoners convicted of violent offenses solely because of the nature and circumstances of the crimes they had been convicted of committing. Those denials, Plaintiffs said, violated their due process rights and were unconstitutional ex post facto enhancements of their sentences. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the Board adopted and implemented practices, policies, and procedures for making parole determinations without considering all the circumstances required by Virginia law, resulting in a drastic reduction in the availability of parole for prisoners convicted of violent offenses and the de facto abolition of the provisions of Virginia law governing parole for such prisoners. Moreover, Plaintiffs claimed these practices, policies and procedures created a significant risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to their crimes at the time of sentencing. Plaintiffs brought this action on behalf of a class of persons currently incarcerated by the Virginia Department of Corrections ("DOC") for violent offenses committed prior to January 1, 1995, who were or would become eligible for parole, and who had been or were likely to be denied parole exclusively or primarily by reference to the serious nature or circumstances of the crimes they had been convicted of committing. On March 1, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. On October 25, 2010, the Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) denied discovery and dismissed the case with prejudice. Judge Payne held that Plaintiffs had only a limited liberty interest in parole that was satisfied by existing prison procedures, noting that "the Board has provided each Plaintiff with a constitutionally valid reason for denying them release on discretionary parole." In addition, Judge Payne rejected the ex post facto claims because the complaint revealed that about 120 to 230 prisoners who had been convicted of committing violent crimes were released on parole each year. On November 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59(e). In their Rule 59(e) motion, Plaintiffs requested that the Court alter or amend its order of dismissal to be "without prejudice" in order to provide Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their Complaint. On March 1, 2011, Judge Payne denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter Judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit. On July 10, 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in an opinion delivered by Judge Henry F. Floyd. Judge Floyd largely adopted the district court's reasoning, noting that discretionary decisions about whether to grant parole did not implicate the ex post facto clause. Judge Roger L. Gregory dissented, criticizing the majority's "rigidly formalistic view" of due process that allowed the Board to discharge its duties by supplying Plaintiffs written reasons for parole denials without requiring individualized consideration. Plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing, but this was denied on November 15, 2012. No further activity has occurred since that date, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On February 3, 2010, a group of 11 individuals held in Virginia prisons filed a class action lawsuit against the Virginia Parole Board for denying parole requests because of the nature and circumstances of the crimes they had been convicted of committing. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.


On October 15, 2015, a prisoner in the state of Vermont filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Vermont. The plaintiff sued the state of Vermont, the Agency of Human Services, the Department of Corrections, the Department of Mental Health, and the Department of Aging and Independent Living under 42 U.S.C. § 12182. The plaintiff, represented by Disability Rights Vermont, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. The plaintiff claimed that his continued incarceration violated Title II of the ADA and the “Integration Mandate” of the ADA. He also claimed that placement in his conditions constituted a violation of the rehabilitation act and a violation of the Vermont Fair Housing and Public Accommodations Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he had served his minimum sentence as of July 13, 2013 but he continued to be held at Southern State Correctional Facility because the defendants failed to implement disability-related support in the community. Without the support in the community, the plaintiff is at risk for continued unnecessary and harmful institutionalization. Also, had the plaintiff been placed in the most integrated setting possible, he would not have experienced exacerbated mental, emotional, and physical trauma, which included a significant suicide attempt. The plaintiff endured unnecessary pain and suffering and a continuing violation of his civil rights in the form of disability-based discrimination. The parties conducted discovery and had an Early Neutral Evaluation meeting in which a full settlement was reached. On June 7, 2016, Judge William Sessions dismissed the case according to the private settlement and ordered to reopen the action if the settlement is not consummated.

Summary: In 2015, the plaintiff filed this in the U.S. District Court of Vermont alleging disability-based discrimination while incarcerated. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief and the judge dismissed the matter after the parties reached a full settlement.


On May 10, 2016, this class-action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on behalf of over 1,000 current and former residents of Alexander County Housing Authority (ACHA) to remedy allegations of rampant discrimination based on race and family status as well as rent overcharges and a failure to maintain rental units. The plaintiffs sued ACHA under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and state law, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Represented by the Sargent Shriver National Center of Poverty Law and private counsel, the plaintiffs claimed that ACHA has persisted in racially discriminatory practices for the past 40 years, pointing to a previously settled lawsuit in which the Department of Justice found a pattern and practice of racially segregated housing. The plaintiffs also alleged that ACHA had ignored multiple requests to adequately maintain the housing units. After filing three additional amended complaints, which included adding and removing individual plaintiffs and dropping the putative class-action claims for damages, as well as engaging in some discovery, the parties started participating in settlement conferences with Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly. On July 27, 2017, the majority of the plaintiffs stipulated with the defendants to dismiss the case with prejudice and without costs. Three remaining plaintiffs failed to respond to the court on whether they intended to proceed with the case. On September 12, 2017, Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan dismissed and closed the case after the three remaining plaintiffs failed to further prosecute the case.

Summary: In 2016, current and former public housing residents filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged rampant discrimination on the basis of race and family status, rent overcharges, and a failure to maintain rental units. After participating in settlement conferences, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice and without costs in July 2017. The case is now closed.


On March 11, 2011, the NAACP and a few other individuals filed a class-action lawsuit against the city of San Jose and public officials. The plaintiffs stated that they were peacefully protesting police brutality and institutionalized racism when San Jose police fired impact munitions and attacked them with flash-bang grenades, chemical weapons, and batons. The plaintiffs contended that the defendants have exhibited a long history of targeting Black, Brown, and Muslim communities, and that the use of force in these protests was racially motivated. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the defendants violated their First Amendment right to free speech and association, their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest and excessive force, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection. Claims were also brought under the state constitution equivalents of these provisions. The plaintiffs also brought claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, arguing that the defendant's policing practices failed to make reasonable modifications that allow people with disabilities to participate in protests. Finally, the plaintiffs sued under a variety of state laws, including tort claims like assault and negligence. The lawsuit sought declaratory relief stating that the defendant's policing practices were unconstitutional, as well and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in the same behavior in the future. The class members also sought compensatory damages relief. The case was assigned to Judge Phyllis Jean Hamilton of the Northern District of California. As of May 25, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: The NAACP and individual people sued the city of San Jose and political officials for policing tactics that allegedly deprived them of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, protesting systemic racism in policing, alleged that the police used excessive force in a racially motivated manner to end the protests.


This complaint was filed on July 23, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The suit was filed by a number of political and legal organizations, as well as a news media organization. These groups included: Black Lives Matter Chicago; Black Abolitionist Network; Chicago Democratic Socialists of America; Good Kids/Mad City; #LetUsBreathe Collective; South Siders Organized for Unity and Liberation; National Lawyers Guild Chicago; First Defense Legal Aid; and In These Times. The defendants were numerous federal agents, including Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Chad Wolf, Deputy Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Matthew Albence, Attorney General William Barr, Director of Federal Protective Services L. Eric Patterson, and FBI Director Christopher Wray, among others. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and attorneys from Westside Justice Center, People's Law Office, as well as attorney-professors at Northwestern and University of Chicago. The lawsuit followed the dispersal of federal agents to quell protests that occurred in Chicago after the police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor in the spring of 2020. President Trump first sent federal agents to Portland in July, then to several other cities including Chicago later that month. The complaint did not allege that the federal troops had done anything in particular, but that their very presence was menacing. They argued that the presence of these federal agents represented violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and free protest as well as excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights. The plaintiffs requested declaratory relief that would deem the federal agents' actions illegal and injunctive relief prohibiting the policing of the protests by federal agents, ceasing the arrest of residents of Chicago, and to stop enforcing a policy of alleged "preemptive arrests." On July 31, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint which added a count of violating the Tenth Amendment. They argued that the federal agents' conducting of law enforcement was an encroachment on the policing powers left to the state and local government. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim on October 2. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the plaintiffs' alleged injuries that took place in other cities and statements by the President, Attorney General, and Acting Secretary of DHS, but failed to allege particular and concrete injuries their organizations in Chicago. In addition, even if the plaintiffs had standing, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Tenth Amendment because the plaintiffs did not cite that a specific federal law violated the Tenth Amendment or adequately allege the federal defendants encroached on a specific power reserved to the states. On January 21, 2021, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs' claims were based on the Trump administration's alleged animus against Black Lives Matter and other groups protesting for racial justice. When Joe Biden was elected President, the change in administration mooted the plaintiffs' claims. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by several black activist groups, legal organizations, and news media outlets, against the heads of various federal agencies, including the DHS, ICE, Federal Protective Services, and the DOJ. They argued that the deployment to Chicago of these federal agencies by President Trump during the protests that ensued after the police killing of George Floyd were unlawful and unconstitutional. They argued that the defendants violated the First, Fourth, and Tenth Amendments by using these agents, and that they were in conspiracy to deprive Chicago residents of their rights. When Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump as President, the change in administration mooted the case. It was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in January 2021.


On May 25, 2010, the plaintiffs -- individuals who were allegedly issued summonses without probable cause by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) -- filed this putative class action complaint in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York, against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that an unwritten 'summons quota' drove NYPD officers to issue summonses to and arrest individuals without probable cause, and in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The complaint explained that in 1994, the NYPD instituted the COMPSTAT system, which records the statistics of arrests by type and the amount of summonses issued. Summonses are tickets written by police officers in lieu of arrest for a crime that directs the recipient of the summons to appear in court to face charges. Marijuana violations, disorderly conduct, and obstruction of governmental administration (OGA) are crimes for which summonses are typically issued. The plaintiffs alleged that since the institution of the COMPSTAT system, the number of summonses issued had increased by 500%, and that more than half (50.5%) of these charges are dismissed later on. The plaintiffs alleged that the NYPD employed an illegal quota system for summonses, arrests, and quality-of-life violations. An officer's ability to meet quotas, plaintiffs claimed, was linked to officer promotion and demotion. This scheme was found by an arbitrator to be illegal under New York labor law. As alleged by the plaintiffs, as part of an effort to meet the quota system NYPD Precinct commanders ordered officers to issue summonses in cases in which there was no probable cause of a crime being committed. They introduced tape recordings of two precinct commanders issuing orders for officers to issue summonses and 'articulate' violations of the law after-the-fact. The plaintiffs further alleged that this policy was disproportionately enforced in minority communities in Brooklyn, the Bronx and Queens. As a result, they have been falsely arrested and denied their right to peaceably assemble in their own communities. On April 23, 2012, after hearing the parties on the matter of class certification, the court (Judge Robert W. Sweet) issued an unpublished opinion and order certifying the class as "includ[ing] individuals who were issued summonses that were later dismissed upon a judicial finding of facial insufficiency and who were ticketed without probable cause." The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on the issue of class certification, but the motion was denied on July 19, 2012. For the next several years, the parties engaged in discovery and litigated many issues regarding access to evidence during discovery. One notable discovery debate concerned removing the statutory seal on the records of individuals whose criminal court summonses were dismissed for factual insufficiency for the relevant time period. On February 24, 2016, the court (Judge Sweet) issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part defendants’ second motion to remove the statutory seal, concluding that unsealing the records for the purpose of aggregating statistics and discerning patterns is permissible, but doing so to identify officers who issued disputed summonses so that they can be called at trial is not. 2016 WL 817445. On April 1, 2016, the court (Judge Sweet) issued an order detailing the summons information to be provided and that which was to be withheld. On January 23, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted an executed stipulation of settlement and a proposed preliminary approval order. On January 24, 2017, the court (Judge Sweet) issued an order granting preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and notice plan, and appointing a settlement claims administrator. The parties agreed to settlement benefits of up to seventy-five million dollars, with up to $56,500,000 to be used to fund settlement payments to individual class members, service awards to the named class representatives, and costs of notice and settlement administration, and an additional $18,500,000 to pay attorneys’ fees and costs. As is detailed in the settlement, the NYPD has made changes to its policies, practices, and procedures related to criminal summonses, and will continue to make additional changes. The changes address the use of quotas, numerical measurements of performance, and other matters that have been the subject of the class’ injunctive relief claims in this case, including: signing into law the Quota Bill to prohibit discrimination against an employee for the failure to meet quotas; publishing Legal Bureau Bulletin concerning the Quota Bill; revising Patrol Guide Section 205-38 to reiterate the retaliating against service members for providing information regarding misconduct and corruption will not be tolerated; developing new Patrol Guide procedures and updating training and reference materials; announcing the “Justice Reboot” initiative; signing the Criminal Justice Reform Act (singed by Mayor de Blasio); voluntarily posting certain summons data on the NYPD website; and agreeing to make a confidential presentation to counsel for the class regarding changes to the performance evaluation system. The NYPD agreed to present additional pilots and ongoing projects. Such pilots and projects include: making reasonable efforts to ensure that the NYPD sends a department-wide email regarding quota policy, disciplinary action, and retaliation; investigating allegations regarding quotas, numeric performance goals, and misconduct; conducting such investigations by a designated parent command Investigations Unit; making reasonable efforts to conduct targeted internal review of training materials and to ensure compliance with the Quota Bill; and making reasonable efforts to make changes to its Patrol Guide and conduct training relating to the distribution of “Contact Cards.” On April 14, 2017, the parties jointly moved for final approval of the class action settlement, which the court granted on April 18, 2017. On June 19, 2017, the court entered final judgment in this case, approving the settlement agreement. The judgment, pursuant to the settlement agreement, required the defendants to pay settlement benefits in the amount of $75,000,000 and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $18,500,000. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. As of April 20, 2020 the case is ongoing for compliance purposes but there have been no new entries in the docket since the final order and judgment.

Summary: Individuals issued summonses by the NYPD without probable cause brought a class action suit against the City of New York. They alleged that the NYPD's 'quota' policy is linked to officer promotion and demotion, and as a result, leads to commanding officers ordering police officers to arrest and issue summonses to individuals without probable cause, in contravention of the federal and state constitutions. Judge Sweet, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, granted the case class action status in April 2012. On January 24, 2017, Judge Sweet preliminary approved the parties' settlement agreement, in which the parties agreed to settlement benefits of up to seventy-five million dollars. On April 18, 2017, the court granted final approval. The case is ongoing for compliance purposes.


On August 28, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the City of Steubenville pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Steubenville Police Department ["SPD"] including: using excessive force; making false arrests; lodging false charges; and conducting improper searches and seizures. The filing followed a year long DOJ investigation of the SDP. Contemporaneously with the filing of the government's complaint, the parties filed a joint application for the entry of the consent decree. In support of the joint application, the parties submitted the declaration of James J. Fyfe, Ph.D., a nationally recognized expert in police management, who consulted the DOJ during its investigation of SPD. District Judge George C. Smith entered the consent decree on September 3, 1997. The consent decree included the implementation of changes in the use of force, officer training, internal affairs investigations, officer detention and arrest of subjects, and collection and retention of department information and data. On October 20, 1997, the Fraternal Order of Police of Fort Steuben filed a motion for leave to intervene as a third-party, so that it could challenge the consent decree. Judge Smith denied that motion on July 23, 1998. In accordance with the consent decree, the parties selected Charles D Reynolds to serve as auditor. The auditor was charged with oversight of the implementation of the provisions of the consent decree and provided quarterly reports to the court. In 2001, a member of the police department who had not been chosen as the Chief of Police when that position was being filled sued in state court, alleging a violation of Ohio Civil Service law. The city defended the case on the grounds that it followed the procedures specified in the consent decree, and the matter was moved to federal court. On June 15, 2001, Judge Smith found that case (C2-01-322) related to the underlying civil rights case; both were assigned to Judge Edmund A. Sargus Jr., for decision. On June 15, 2001, Judge Sargus ordered the cases consolidated, denied the city's dismissal motion, and granted the U.S. permission to intervene as a party in the civil service case. 147 F.Supp.2d 872 (2001). On September 7, 2001, Judge Sargus granted the DOJ and the City's motion for summary judgment in the individual officer's lawsuit. That officer, the Court found, was not entitled to become the Chief against the procedures specified in the decree. 2001 WL 1681105. Monitoring and reporting by auditor Reynolds continued until early 2005. On March 2, 2005, the parties filed a joint motion for termination of the consent decree and dismissal of the case. Judge Sargus granted that motion and the case was dismissed on March 4, 2005.

Summary: On August 28, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the City of Steubenville pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Steubenville Police Department. The parties entered into consent decree contemporaneously with filing the complaint. Monitoring and reporting continued into 2005, when the parties filed and the court granted a joint motion for termination.


On July 24, 2008, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, against the City of Tenaha. The plaintiffs were all individuals who were traveling on public roads in or near Tenaha, Texas, when, they say, they were illegally stopped and their property seized. They sued under the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable searches and seizures) and Fourteenth Amendments (equal protection), actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs were represented by lawyers from Legal Aid, the American Civil Liberties Union (Racial Justice Program, Criminal Law Reform Project, Texas chapter, and national), and from private practice. They asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief including compensatory and punitive damages as well as legal costs. The plaintiffs claimed that law enforcement officials in and around the City of Tenaha had developed an illegal practice of targeting, stopping, detaining, searching, and often seizing property from people who appeared to be non-white or who were traveling with non-white passengers. The named plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of such stops. The plaintiffs sought a class certification of similarly situated persons consisting of: (1) people who were, or appeared to be, members of racial or ethnic minority groups and those in their company, and (2) were or would be traveling in, through, or near Tenaha since July 27, 2006, and (3) were, or were subject to being stopped and detained and/or arrested by one or more of the defendants without an articulable suspicion of criminal activity, to find valuable property or money. The individual plaintiffs were allegedly stopped without warrants or legal justification and were then either detained or threatened with detention, and had property seized in amounts varying from $3,969 to $50,000. Plaintiffs were allegedly falsely prosecuted for crimes such as money laundering. One couple was allegedly told that their children would be put in foster care if they did not sign papers authorizing the seizure. On August 29, 2011, the Court (Judge T. John Ward) granted in part the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Morrow v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Tex. 2011). The Court granted the class certification for Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, but did not certify the class for Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims or for monetary relief. In the opinion, the Court cited to recordings from cameras in the police vehicles at the time of the stops. The Court drew an adverse inference from the failure of Tenaha's law enforcement agencies to collect and report racial profiling evidence, as required by Texas law. The Court also drew an adverse inference from two defendants' invocation of their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, during deposition. The Court modified the class definition, because it found that there was "articulable suspicion" for the stops (albeit not reasonable suspicion). The modified definition of the class consisted of (1) people who were, or appeared to be, members of racial or ethnic minority groups and those in their company, and (2) were, or would be, traveling in, through, or near Tenaha at any time after November 1, 2006, and (3) were subject to being stopped by one or more defendant for an alleged traffic violation. The defendants twice sought a discretionary interlocutory appeal of the class certification, but were twice denied. On August 6, 2012, plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a consent decree. The Consent Decree was extensive, with key terms including the following:

All traffic stops shall be recorded in full by both video and audio recordings.
Defendants shall maintain written documentation with details about traffic stops, detention, canine sniffs, searches, seizures, and/or forfeitures.
Defendants will not use canines for routine traffic stops.
Written notice shall be provided to a person before a canine sniff, before a consent search, and before the seizure of property. Before conducting a consent search, an officer must obtain written and oral video and audio recorded consent for the search.
Defendants will track all asset forfeiture incident to traffic stops, and all such revenue will all be donated to non-profit organizations, used for audio and video equipment, or used for the annual training required by this decree.
Internal review procedures will be instituted every quarter, and an impartial monitor will address compliance.
 Defendants also agreed to pay litigation costs (attorneys' fees and notice to the class). On February 19, 2013, the Court (Judge Gilstrap) granted preliminary approval of the consent decree. Following a fairness hearing, the court granted final approval of the consent decree on August 8, 2013. The court appointed a monitor on October 9, 2013, who proceeded to file quarterly status reports. On August 7, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to extend the duration of the Consent Decree, which was set to expire the next day. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had a "poor record of compliance," necessitating an extension of the consent decree. There was a hearing on this motion on November 1, 2018, after which the parties renegotiated the settlement agreement. They filed a joint motion to approve the amended agreement on December 13, 2018, which the court approved. The agreement was substantially similar to the originally consent decree, but extended the duration to the next two years with the opportunity for the plaintiffs to file for additional extensions. This case is ongoing with some litigation over attorneys' fees as of April 17, 2020. The amended settlement is set to expire in early 2021.

Summary: In July 2008, the plaintiffs sued the City of Tenaha under the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) and the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection). They claimed that law enforcement officials in and around the City of Tenaha have developed an illegal practice of targeting, stopping, detaining, searching, and often seizing property from people who appeared to be non-white or who were traveling with non-white passengers. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of such stops and seizures of amounts up to $50,000, as well as false prosecution or detention. The parties reached a preliminary settlement in August 2012. Their proposed consent decree included: video and audio recordings of all stops; written documentation with details of the stop; no more dog searches in routine traffic stops; written and oral consent for a search; all asset forfeiture revenue must be donated to nonprofits or used for audio/video equipment or training; and use of an impartial monitor. The court approved the consent decree, which it later extended to early 2021 after the plaintiffs alleged noncompliance by the City.


This is a lawsuit about the constitutionality of President Trump’s Executive Order authorizing sanctions against individuals who assist the International Criminal Court (ICC). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on January 15, 2021 in response to the June 11, 2020 Executive Order authorizing economic sanctions against individuals who assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) in investigating or prosecuting war crimes and other grave human rights violations. The plaintiffs argued that the Trump Administration violated the First Amendment when it prevented individuals in the ICC’s justice proceedings from providing human rights expertise and representing victims. The plaintiffs were three law faculty and a human rights attorney who work with or advocate before the International Criminal Court. They sued the President in his official capacity, the U.S. Department of State, the Secretary of State, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Attorney General, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the Executive Order and block the Trump administration from implementing or enforcing it against any individual seeking to assist the ICC. They sued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and §706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction that would prevent the defendants from implementing or enforcing the Executive Order, Regulations and Designations, and IEEPA’s civil or criminal penalty provisions against the plaintiffs. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested payment for their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this action. On January 19, 2021, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero. The case was reassigned to District Court Judge Charles R. Breyer on January 29, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2021, the ACLU and private counsel brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in response to President Trump’s June 11, 2020 Executive Order authorizing economic sanctions against individuals who assist the International Criminal Court in investigating or prosecuting war crimes. The plaintiffs sued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and §706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory relief and an injunction that would prevent the Trump Administration from implementing or enforcing the Executive Order. The case is ongoing.


This case involved the District of Columbia’s signature requirements for ballot qualification during the COVID-19 pandemic. Bill B-23-0864 lowered the signatures required for third-party presidential candidates to qualify for the D.C. ballot from 5,007 to 250. The political party Alliance Party and two third-party presidential filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on August 21, 2020. They were represented by private counsel and sued the District of Columbia Board of Elections. The case was assigned to Judge Boasberg. The plaintiffs alleged that they had not been given adequate notice of the signature decrease, resulting in them abandoning their effort to collect signatures because they thought it would be impossible to collect 5,0007 signatures while adhering to social distancing guidelines. The deadline for submitting petitions to appear on the ballot had passed the day before the bill was passed on August 6, 2020. Plaintiffs alleged that independent and third-party presidential candidates who ceased attempting to collect signatures to meet the 5,007 threshold had their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights violated because they could not take advantage of the signature reduction until it was too late. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs contended that their equal protection rights were violated because notice was given to other candidates, but not independent or third-party presidential candidates. The plaintiffs also alleged that their First Amendment and due process rights were violated because they had not been given timely notice to exercise their fundamental right of political speech. In addition to declaratory relief, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the new bill, and also sought a deadline extension that would allow presidential candidates to continue gathering signatures until September 1, 2020. For future elections the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to provide at least two-weeks notice for any changes to the signature requirement. Finally, the plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees. A week after filing their complaint, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order on August 28, 2020. They now sought to extend the filing deadline to September 8, 2020. The plaintiffs made two primary arguments. First, the defendant’s lack of notice irreparably harmed non-major party candidates by effectively denying ballot access. Second, defendant could handle the deadline extension as a single worker could certify 500 signatures within two days. The court denied this motion during a motion hearing held on September 3, 2020. The 2020 general election was held on November 3. Two days later, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the law at issue would not be in effect for future elections and, therefore, the case was moot. After the plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion, the court granted it on December 7, 2020. This case is closed.

Summary: The Alliance Party and two third-party presidential sued the District of Columbia Board of Elections. The D.C. city government had lowered the signatures required for ballot qualification from 5,007 to 250 on August 6, 2020, the day after petitions to appear on the ballot were due. The plaintiffs contended that they had ceased collecting signatures because it was "impossible" to collect 5,007 signatures while adhering to social distancing guidelines, but would have continued their efforts if they knew they only had to get 250. The district court denied a motion for temporary restraining order, the 2020 election was held and this case was dismissed soon after.


On May 15, 2015, private citizens of Jefferson County, Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sued the Jefferson County Board of Commissioners, as well as the Jefferson County School Board and the official director of elections in the county, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs were represented by two public interest groups, the Florida Justice Institute and the ACLU Foundation of Florida. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to name the 2013 redistricting plan of Jefferson County unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, asking for an order enjoining the use of the 2013 redistricting plan, and, in the event that the defendants were unable to come up with a plan that was satisfactory, a court-ordered redistricting plan. The plaintiffs also sought attorney’s fees. Jefferson County, Florida was divided into five districts, each of which elected one commissioner to the Board of Commissioners. Each voting district was supposed to contain a roughly equal number of residents, pursuant to the one person one vote requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The third district contained the Jefferson Correctional Institution, a correctional facility housing 1157 inmates (according to the 2010 census). The population of the correctional facility was counted when drawing the lines of District Three, even though the vast majority of the inmates were not residents of Jefferson County, and thus were not registered to vote in Jefferson County. Because there are five districts in Jefferson County, an ideal population size for each district would be 1/5 of the population. Including the prison population, District 3 missed this goal by only 4%. Not including the prison population, District 3 missed this goal by 29.69%. The plaintiffs were concerned that the smaller voting population in District 3 gave the residents there inflated electing power. On March 9th, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their complaint, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Discovery lasted about two months, from the end of March, 2015 to September of 2015. At the end of July, the Defendants moved for summary judgment, and at the beginning of August, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment as well. On March 19, 2016, Judge Mark E. Walker granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants'. As a result, the 2013 Jefferson County redistricting plan was declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and was forbidden from being used. 2016 was an election year for Jefferson County, so the court entreated the Defendant to come up with a usable, constitutional redistricting plan, or the court would be forced to order their own redistricting plan. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants then submitted redistricting plans for Jefferson County. The plaintiffs’ plan was only to be accepted if the defendants’ plan was unacceptable. A major point of contention in the acceptability of the plans was their adherence to a 1985 consent decree, which outlined the way elections were to be run in Jefferson County. The sticking point was that the consent decree stipulated that District 3 was to be a “balance district” – that is, having roughly equal numbers of African-American and white voters. On April 18, 2016, Judge Mark E. Walker approved the defendants’ plan. Though the new District 3 did not have an equal number of African-American and white voters, the court deemed it acceptable and no longer unconstitutional. On July 13, 2016, the two parties filed a notice of settlement. They resolved the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees; the amount settled upon was not mentioned in the notice. The parties also agreed to close the case, but asked the court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the payment of the settlement. The settlement was to be made in two payments. According to the final action in this case on July 14, 2016, this case is closed pending the second of these two settlement payments. As of October 2018, there has been no further litigation, and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: In 2015, residents of Jefferson County, Florida filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the county's 2013 redistricting plan was guilty of "prison-based gerrymandering," and was thus guilty of violating the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought and received a declaration that the 2013 plan was unconstitutional as well as an injunction requiring the defendants to produce an acceptable redistricting plan. The defendants' plan was approved and parties then settled on the attorneys' fees.


On June 26, 2014, multiple residents and citizens of Arizona subject to the death penalty filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and multiple state officials associated with the organization under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With the representation of private counsel and the Federal Public Defenders Office, the plaintiffs claimed violations of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ lethal injection protocols did not follow the FDA’s regulations and that the Department was concealing information regarding protocols. The plaintiffs sought temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to order defendants to stop executing plaintiffs until they complied with FDA regulations. On July 2, 2014, the lead plaintiff, Wood, filed a motion for preliminary injunction to bar defendants from his scheduled execution on July 23, 2014 without first disclosing to him the process of his execution and the drugs to be used. On July 10, 2014, Judge Neil Wake denied the motion on the grounds that Wood’s motion, founded on the First Amendment claim in his complaint, was not likely to succeed on the merits and did not raise serious questions as to the merits. 2014 WL 3385115. Wood appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. On July 19, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision and ordered that Wood’s execution be stayed until the ADC provided specific information as to the drugs to be used in his execution and the qualifications of the personnel intended to carry out his execution. 759 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). ADC immediately filed a petition for a rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied the petition on July 21, 2014. The following day, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that Judge Wake did not abuse his discretion in denying Wood’s motion for a preliminary injunction. 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). Mr. Wood was executed on July 23, 2014. The remaining plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 18, 2014. The complaint described the defendants’ “improvisational execution” of Wood, stating that it placed “his suffering far beyond what the Constitution permits.” It alleged that he gasped for air for nearly two hours as the defendants continued to inject him with a variety of drugs. The complaint also added new plaintiffs and new claims to the original suit. It added several other citizens and residents of Arizona subject to the death penalty, as well as the First Amendment Coalition of Arizona, Inc. The complaint further alleged that the defendants had denied the press their First Amendment rights to access governmental proceedings, and that they violated the prisoners' rights against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. They also claimed that the defendants had violated the Equal Protection Clause because execution methods varied without a principled basis for such deviations. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on October 9, 2014 for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendants moved to dismiss most of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims alleging violation of their right to governmental proceedings and their Fourteenth Amendment claims. On November 21, 2014, the parties entered a stipulated agreement to resolve this motion. The stipulation set forth the following terms: Arizona would publicly release a report regarding Wood’s execution and, in light of this report, the ADC would review its death penalty procedure and propose a new protocol. If adopted, ADC would provide the plaintiffs with a copy to review and upload the final protocol on the website for public viewing. Regarding the litigation process, the stipulation stated that the defendants would not seek an execution warrant from the Arizona Supreme Court until after the issue was resolved and a final judgment was entered, that all litigation would be stayed until the new protocol was proposed, that the plaintiffs would be allowed to file a second amended complaint after the new protocol was released, if needed, and that the defendants would take appropriate steps to preserve all documents relied upon and used in the report. Both parties agreed to not seek attorneys' fees. Judge Wake lifted the stay on January 12, 2016, holding that the stipulation had been satisfied but that the state could not seek a warrant of execution until the matters pending in the case were resolved. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 29, 2016. This complaint alleged that the new protocol proposed by the defendants used a combination of drugs never used together before and still violated the same rights. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ entire second amended complaint on February 19, 2016 on the grounds that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On May 18, 2016, Judge Neil Wake granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice as to both the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims on the grounds that neither guaranteed a legal right of access to government information. This decision also dismissed the First Amendment Coalition as a plaintiff. 188 F. Supp. 3d 940. First Amendment Coalition appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile in the district court, on July 29, 2016, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim of an Eighth Amendment violation for cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants argued that they no longer had the midazolam drug plaintiffs referred to in the complaint and could not no longer obtain it. On December 19, 2016, the parties agreed to dismiss the first claim in the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint without prejudice. But, if the ADC used or showed an intention of using midazolam or any benzodiazepine drug as part of the lethal injection protocol in the future, any future prisoner, as a third-part beneficiary, could reinstate this claim. Neither party sought attorneys' fees but they did agree in the stipulation that plaintiffs were entitled to seek fees if the defendant breached the agreement. The final stipulated agreement of the case was entered on June 21, 2017. The agreement dismissed the last two claims in the plaintiffs’ complaint but the parties did not agree to settle. So, the plaintiffs’ preserved the right to appeal any claims in the case. Essentially, the agreement prohibited the defendant from ever engaging in the following conduct: using certain categories of drugs or expired drugs in the lethal injection process, forcing prisoners to pay for the chemicals to be used in their own injection, failing to provide a timely report of the drugs used upon request, changing the drugs to be used in an execution after a warrant has been sought without notifying the prisoner, and adopting any language that would allow the ADC or its directors discretion to deviate from the central issues to the established execution procedures. The agreement stated that if the defendants engaged in or showed an intent to engage in certain prohibited conduct that the claims would be reinstated and the defendants would be enjoined. First Amendment Coalition's appeal continued in the Ninth Circuit. Oral arguments occurred on September 12, 2018. On September 17, 2019, the court released its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. The court held that the ADC did violate the First Amendment right to access to governmental proceedings by restricting access to hearing sounds of an execution and reversed the district court’s decision on this count. However, the court held that the First Amendment right does not encompass knowledge of execution drugs or personnel and affirmed the district court opinion on these counts. Finally, the court held that the Arizona restrictions did not restrict plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of access to the courts. The case was remanded on the reversed count. <i> First Amendment Coal. of Ariz., Inc. v. Ryan </i>, 938 F.3d 1069 (U.S. App. 2019) The case is ongoing.

Summary: Several citizens and residents of Arizona subject to the death penalty brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) and several associated governmental employees. The plaintiffs argued that the ADC's lethal injection procedure violated their First Amendment right to access governmental proceedings, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Federal Supremacy Clause. The parties came to a stipulated agreement prohibiting the defendant from using certain chemicals for execution, among other limitation. The case is ongoing after the Ninth Circuit remanded counts for retrial.


On March 6, 2012, a group of individuals convicted of sexual offenses prior to 2011 filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan and the director of the Michigan State Police. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan's 2011 Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) could not be applied to them retroactively. Under SORA, one of the plaintiffs was required to register as a sex offender even though he was not originally convicted of a sex offense. Another plaintiff was required to register on a public registry even though he was promised privacy in his plea agreement. And two of the plaintiffs were required to remain on a public registry for life instead of 25 years. Represented by the ACLU of Michigan, Michigan Clinical Law Program, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring SORA's retroactive application. The plaintiffs claimed that SORA violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws, interfered with their fundamental rights to work, travel, speak, and raise their children without being narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest, violated the Due Process Clause, and was void for being too vague. The case was assigned to Judge Robert H. Cleland and referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. On April 24, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Nearly a year later, on March 18, 2013, the defendants’ motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court granted the defendants’ motion on the ex post facto claim, finding that SORA was a regulatory action and not a criminal statute. The court also granted the defendants’ motion on the claims that SORA interfered with the plaintiffs’ rights to travel and work. The court concluded that the extra procedures imposed by SORA, such as reporting temporary residences or prohibiting loitering in a school zone, did not significantly burden the plaintiffs’ ability to travel interstate or intrastate. Similarly, the court found that SORA did not bar the plaintiffs from electing a particular career. The Act’s only restriction on employment regarded working in a school zone, and the court found that provision to be narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate interests of the State. The court also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for claims that applying SORA retroactively was unconstitutional for the plaintiff who were originally convicted of a non-sexual offense and the plaintiff who was offered a plea agreement that stipulated they would not have to register on a public registry. Applying SORA retroactively to these plaintiffs had a legitimate legislative purpose. However, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim that SORA interfered with the plaintiffs’ rights to raise their children. The court found that the prohibition against any loitering in a school zone may have impeded on the plaintiffs’ ability to raise their children and participate in their education. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the claims from plaintiffs whose registration period on a public registry was extended from twenty-five years to life. The court denied the motion since it was unclear from the complaint whether the defendants had a rational legislative purpose for requiring lifetime registration. The court denied the motion to dismiss claims as to SORA’s vagueness, which had made it impossible for the plaintiffs to comply with its reporting requirements. The court found that additional information was needed to determine if SORA was specific enough for the plaintiffs to understand the requirements imposed on them. The court similarly denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. The court found that additional information was needed to conclude whether SORA’s requirements that the plaintiffs provide all online usernames chilled the plaintiffs’ right to free speech. 932 F.Supp.2d 803. Discovery continued for the next year. On February 20, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Less than two weeks later, the defendants also moved for summary judgment. Both motions were denied on May 1, 2014. The court instead ordered the parties to cooperate and produce one stipulated factual record, to notify the court of any disputed material facts, and to each file a Motion for Judgment. On March 31, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ June 27, 2014 Motion for Judgment and the defendants’ July 9, 2014 Motion for Judgment. The court held the plaintiffs’ claims that certain aspects of SORA were too vague were valid, since the plaintiffs had curtailed their conduct as a result of the statute's uncertainty. Specifically, the court held that geographic exclusion zones proscribing where registrants could stand were unconstitutional since they were too vague to inform registrants and law enforcement was constituted a violation. Similarly, requirements that registrants report their telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, instant message addresses, and vehicle registration were too vague to provide registrants or law enforcement with necessary guidelines for what acts triggered a reporting requirement. The court reserved ruling on the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. 101 F.Supp.3d 672. On June 5, 2015, the defendants appealed the district court’s initial ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 3, 2015, the district court ruled on the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The court held that SORA could not retroactively extend the plaintiffs’ reporting requirements from twenty-five years to life. The court found that the defendants did not show that this extension was narrowly tailored to public safety because there was no evidence that sex offenders who had not re-offended in twenty-five years were at an increased risk of committing a different sex offense. 101 F.Supp.3d 722. On October 26, 2015 the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The defendants filed another appeal on November 20, 2015. On August 25, 2016, the Sixth Circuit ruled on the appeals. The Sixth Circuit unanimously found that SORA imposed a punishment on the plaintiffs and therefore was an Ex Post Facto law. As a result, retroactive application of SORA was unconstitutional. The case was remanded to the district court to enter judgment consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. 834 F.3d 696. The defendants appealed the Sixth Circuit’s holding to the U.S. Supreme Court on December 14, 2016. The parties entered into a stipulated order on April 3, 2017 granting interim injunctive relief pending resolution of the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs would not be listed on a public registry, the defendants would not enforce any of SORAs’ provisions that became effective since 2006 against the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs’ registration periods would run for 25 years instead of life. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certiorari on October 2, 2017. The parties reopened the case in the district court the following month. The defendants moved for judgment on December 4, 2017. The defendants contended that the Sixth Circuit’s decision only affected the plaintiffs in this case and did not apply to SORA itself. On January 26, 2018, the district court issued a stipulated final judgment on remand. The court held that retroactive application of SORA’s 2006 and 2011 amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, the defendants and any other individual were enjoined from enforcing the 2006 and 2011 SORA amendments against the plaintiffs. The court further held that the plaintiffs would not be listed on a public registry and the only requirements of SORA that applied to them were to verify their address quarterly, provide fingerprints, and pay annual fees. Further, their registration period was amended to 25 years instead of life. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), when applied retroactively, violated their rights to due process, was unconstitutionally vague, violated prohibitions on ex post facto laws, and violated their fundamental rights. In 2018, upon remand from the Sixth Circuit, the district court held that SORA violated the Ex Post Facto clause and could not be applied retroactively.


On Jan. 8, 2014, six self-described "Juggalos" (or fans of the Insane Clown Posse, or any other Psychopathic Records hip hop group) filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU and private counsel. Their complaint alleged that the FBI had conducted a "threat assessment" in 2011 that classified Juggalos as a "loosely organized hybrid gang," a designation, the complaint alleged, that caused the plaintiffs various harms, including extra police attention. The plaintiffs alleged, under the APA, that the defendants had violated their constitutional rights in the following ways: (1) agency action contrary to the First Amendment's freedom of association, (2) agency action contrary to the First Amendment's freedom of expression, (3) agency action that violates due process under the Fifth Amendment, (4) arbitrary and capricious agency action, (5) agency action that fails to observe procedures required by law. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to District Judge Robert Cleland. On Apr. 9, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case. On June 30, 2014, Judge Cleland granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the alleged injuries were not sufficiently certain or precise to allow them standing to sue. Parsons v. U.S. Department of Justice, 30 F.Supp.3d 648 (E.D. Mich. 2014). The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On Sept. 17, 2015, Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation, authored a unanimous opinion reversing the district court's June 30, 2014, dismissal. Judge Sargus found that the plaintiffs did have standing to sue, and did not rule on the merits, but rather remanded the case to the district court. Parsons v. U.S. Department of Justice, 2015 WL 5446909, 801 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2015). On Jan. 29, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the district court granted the motion on Sept. 29, 2016. The court found that the alleged harms were due to actions of third parties - for example, the local police and sheriff departments - and not the defendants. These harms were therefore not legal consequences, and did not qualify for judicial review under the APA. Further, the court held that the defendants' actions were the result of legally mandated agency discretion and therefore not subject to APA review. Separately, the court did not find merit in the plaintiffs' claim that their classification violated the due process requirement to avoid vagueness as the classification did not require anything of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed notice of appeal on Oct. 13, 2016. On Dec. 18, 2017, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case under the same final agency action analysis for APA claims. Echoing the lower court's analysis, it classified the DOJ report as a product of "independent agency decision making." Because the report was purely "informational," the court ruled that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated legal consequences flowing from it. Rather, the harms alleged stemmed from discretionary reliance on the designation by third parties. We believe that the case is effectively closed.

Summary: Six Insane Clown Posse fans, or "Juggalos," sued the DOJ and FBI in the the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Administrative Procedures Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging that the FBI had designated the Juggalos as a "loosely organized hybrid gang" in 2011, which had caused various harms to the plaintiffs, including extra police attention. The district court dismissed the case upon finding that the designation was not a final agency action, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.