This is one of several federal lawsuits addressing North Carolina Session Law 2016-3, House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”), which was passed in March 23, 2016. For the others, see related cases section, below. On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed Ordinance 7056, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, passenger vehicle for hire, and city contractors. The city ordinance was set to take effect on April 1, 2016. In response, on March 23, 2016, the North Carolina legislature held a special session and passed House Bill 2; it was signed that same day by North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory. HB2 prohibited municipalities in North Carolina from enacting anti-discrimination policies and removed the statutory and common-law private right of action to enforce state anti-discrimination statutes in state courts. It also required that while in government buildings, individuals only use restrooms and changing facilities that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates. For many transgender people, this prevented them from using the restroom consistent with their gender identity (in North Carolina, only people who undergo sex reassignment surgery can change the sex on their birth certificates; some other jurisdictions have even more restrictive rules). In addition, the legislation changed the definition of sex in the state's anti-discrimination law to "the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate.” This change prevented discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. On May 4, in a letter to Governor Pat McCrory, the Justice Department informed him that the U.S. had concluded that HB2 violated federal law. The DOJ asked the Governor to respond by close of business on May 9 that he would remedy the violations, "including by confirming that the State will not comply with or implement H.B. 2." Instead of providing the demanded assurances, the Governor sued the United States on the morning of May 9, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking declaratory relief that HB2 didn’t violate federal law. That case is McCrory v. United States. On that same day, this suit was brought in the same court by the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives. They sought the same declaratory relief sought by Governor McCrory as well as a declaration by the court that the DOJ had exceeded the federal government’s separation of powers, violated the Tenth Amendment, and was arbitrary and capricious under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706). Plaintiffs made a number of constitutional arguments to support their position. They began by alleging that transgender people weren't a protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus could not be protected under Title VII, which is authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment. They based their Tenth Amendment federalism claims primarily on the argument that regulation of bathrooms didn't affect interstate commerce and were thus a police power reserved to the states. They also suggested that there was a constitutional right to privacy in bathrooms that would be violated if states were forced to allow transgender individuals access to bathrooms in accordance with their gender identities. Plaintiffs further made arguments that the DOJ’s position wasn’t acceptable under administrative law. Plaintiffs suggested that the DOJ’s reasoning on the VAWA would require North Carolina to provide prisoners claiming transgender status access to bathrooms and showers matching their gender identities, which they claimed would violate earlier regulations promulgated by the DOJ on that subject. They also claimed that the states couldn’t have foreseen that they would be forced to allow transgender individuals access to bathrooms when Title IX was enacted, which would mean that the DOJ was exceeding its authority by adding meaning to the statute that Congress hadn’t originally intended or expected it to have. This case was assigned to Judge Louise Wood Flanagan. The plaintiffs sought consolidation with the McCrory case, which was before Judge Terrence W. Boyle. On June 13, 2016, Judge Boyle issued an order stating that he would allow the cases to be consolidated. On June 15, Judge Flanagan scheduled a hearing to determine whether the cases should be consolidated. In the hearing, the court denied the motion to consolidate and instead transferred this case to the Middle District of North Carolina, where three other HB2 cases were in progress, with no objection from any of the parties. The transfer order was given on June 29, 2016, and this case was assigned to Judge Thomas D. Schroeder and Magistrate Judge Joi Elizabeth Peake. On July 14, the judge ordered the parties in this case and the three associated HB2 cases in North Carolina to appear on August 1 on their various motions pending in a consolidated hearing, and indicated the trials would take place in October or November. The Judge requested they file a joint statement of agreements reached and explaining their respective positions by July 22 for a pretrial scheduling conference. On July 25, the court consolidated these cases for the purpose of discovery only. On July 28, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal given that they were pursuing the same claims as United States of America v. North Carolina and their claims were duplicative of those in that case. More information on the litigation in the consolidated case can be read here.

Summary: After the DOJ indicates that it believes a North Carolina law limiting transgender individuals access to bathrooms violates federal law, president Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives bring suit in federal court asking the Eastern District Court of North Carolina to declare that the law doesn't violate the laws cited by the DOJ and to declare that the DOJ action is illegal and unconstitutional.


On June 10, 2014, a same-sex couple who had been legally married outside the State of Alabama filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Alabama's refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs were married in Massachusetts in June 2012. They have been together for 17 years and now reside in Alabama. The plaintiffs have a seven-year-old daughter. The plaintiffs' suit challenged the constitutionality of Section 36.03 of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama Code § 30-1-19 which prohibit the State from recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples entered into in other jurisdictions. The plaintiffs claimed that Alabama's refusal to recognize their marriage unlawfully denied them numerous benefits and legal protections available to opposite-sex couples, including the right to make medical decisions for an incapacitated spouse, file joint tax returns, and gain access to health insurance, retirement benefits, property protections, and inheritance. On September 22, 2014, the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Judge R. David Proctor) dismissed the claims against the Alabama governor, granting the parties' joint motion. On February 5, 2015, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's pending decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse), Judge Proctor granted the parties' joint motion to amend the scheduling order: all potentially dispositive motions were due by July 31, 2015. On July 21, 2015 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss this claim on the grounds that the Obergefell decision resolved the question underlying plaintiffs’ claim and that there was no longer a live case or controversy. On October 13, 2015, Judge R. David Proctor dismissed this case without prejudice, and costs were to be taxed against the defendants. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189368. On December 8, 2015, the district court denied plaintiffs’ renewed motion for attorney’s fees. The court held that there had not been any court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the parties, and that the plaintiffs have not shown that they (or their actions) generated any judicial relief. This case had become moot because the defendants voluntarily complied with new law created by decisions in other cases (namely, Obergefell), and the plaintiffs were therefore not "prevailing parties" entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on January 5, 2016. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189369. On January 30, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and concluded that there was no judicially sanctioned change in the relationship of the parties that would justify an award of attorney’s fees. 678 Fed. Appx. 792. On May 26, 2017, the parties submitted informal notice that counsel no longer sought to pursue costs in this action. There has be no further action on this case.

Summary: In June 2014, a same-sex couple who had been lawfully married outside the State of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Alabama's refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Subsequent to the Obergefell decision in June 2015 by the Supreme Court, Judge R. David Proctor dismissed this case without prejudice in October 2015, and costs were to be taxed against the defendants. The plaintiffs’ appealed to the Eleventh Circuit in January 2016, but in February 2017, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that there was no judicially sanctioned change in the relationship of the parties that would justify an award of attorney’s fees. Parties submitted informal notice that counsel no longer sought to pursue costs in this case in May 2017, and there has been no further action in this case.


On July 15, 2013, three same-sex couples filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Arkansas' laws prohibiting the marriage of same-sex couples and forbidding the recognition of legitimate same-sex marriages entered into in other states. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Amendment 83 of the Arkansas Constitution violated plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Two of the plaintiff couples sought to marry under the laws of Arkansas. The third plaintiff couple, married under the laws of New York, sought recognition of their marriage in Arkansas. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Amendment 83 and other Arkansas laws denying same-sex couples from marrying were unconstitutional, and to require that the State permit same-sex couples to marry and recognize same-sex couples married under the laws of other states. On July 18, 2013, Judge James Leon Holmes recused himself from the case due to long-standing, close personal and professional relationships with the drafters of Arkansas Amendment 83. The defendants answered on November 21, 2013 and moved to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment. The court (Judge Kristine G. Baker) heard both motions on November 20, 2014 and issued its opinion and order on November 25, 2014. Judge Baker struck down Arkansas' gay-marriage ban as unconstitutional on the basis that it restricted the plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry in violation of the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the district court put its ruling on hold pending a timely appeal to the Eighth Circuit; the defendants filed notice of appeal on December 23, 2014. The Eighth Circuit deferred further consideration on April 29, 2015, pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy found that the right to marry is fundamental, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. On August 11, 2015, in light of the decision in Obergefell, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that the challenged laws are unconstitutional. 796 F.3d 976. The district court awarded the plaintiffs $19,950.00 in attorneys' fees, and the Eighth Circuit granted the plaintiffs $7,463.75 in attorneys' fees for the appeal. The case is now closed.

Summary: Three same-sex couples filed suit challenging Arkansas' ban on same-sex marriage. The couples sought a declaration that the Arkansas laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and denying recognition of same-sex marriages legal under the laws of other states were unconstitutional. Judge Baker struck down Arkansas' gay-marriage ban as unconstitutional, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed after the Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.


Clayworth Healthcare Pharmacy (a Medicaid service provider) and two Medicaid recipients filed a civil suit challenging California's then-pending 5% reduction in the reimbursement rate paid to Medicaid providers. The suit was filed on March 19, 2003 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, against Diana M. Bonta, the Director of the Department of Health Services of the State of California (DHS), in her official capacity, and against the DHS. On November 07, 2003, another suit raising substantially similar issues was filed by the California Medical Association and thirteen other groups representing Medicaid providers, together with the Disabled Rights Union, a non-profit association of disabled persons. The suit was brought against Ms. Bonta in her official capacity. The Court determined on November 19, 2003, that the two cases were sufficiently related that they should be heard before the same judge and magistrate, but declined to officially consolidate them as a single case with a shared docket. All the substantive orders and opinions subsequently issued by the Court decided issues relating to both cases. Both are included here. The Plaintiffs alleged that the 5% reduction in the reimbursement rate violated the quality of care and equal access provisions of the Medicaid statute. They also argued that the reduction was a de facto amendment to California's federally approved Medicaid plan, and that all such amendments required Federal approval. They sought a preliminary injunction preventing the DHS from implementing the reduction while the issue was in court, and a permanent injunction to enjoin California from reducing the rates paid to providers for services and to require the State to rely on cost studies to ensure rates were reasonably related to the cost to the providers of providing services to Medicaid recipients. They also sought a declaration from the Court that the 5% reduction was unlawful, and to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The Court (Judge David F. Levi) granted the motions of the Plaintiffs in both cases for preliminary injunctions in an Order and Opinion dated December 23, 2003. He held that a cause of action existed under 42 U.S.C § 1983 allowing private plaintiffs to sue states for denying Medicaid beneficiaries their federally guaranteed right to equal access to quality medical services. He held that California had approved the reduction in provider costs without considering the impact the reduction would have on such access, and that therefore the pending rate reduction was arbitrary and unlawful. In the same decision, he dismissed the claims against the DHS itself, but not those against Ms. Bonta, as barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Clayworth v. Bonta, 295 F.Supp.2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2003). On January 8, 2004, the remaining Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 2, 2005, the three-judge panel unanimously reversed the decision of the of the lower court, holding that no cause of action existed under § 1983 that would allow Medicaid providers or recipients to challenge the State's level of compliance with the equal access and quality of care provisions of Medicaid, citing the decision in Sanchez v. Johnson (416 F.3d 1051), which was issued by the same three-judge panel on the same day as this opinion (see related cases). Clayworth v. Bonta, 140 Fed.Appx. 677 (9th Cir. 2005). In light of the decision from the Appellate Court, the District Court dismissed both cases, Cal. Med. Assoc. on November 1, 2006, and Clayworth on December 1, 2006.

Summary: In March and November of 2003, two separate cases (Clayworth v. Bonta and Cal. Med. Assoc. v. Bonta) were filed by Medicaid service providers and recipients seeking to enjoin California from reducing its disbursement rate to Medicaid providers by 5%. The cases were both filed in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, and the Court found that the issues in the cases were substantially similar and therefore chose to relate them, assigning them to the same Judge. The Judge at the District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing California from implementing the rate reduction, finding that to do so would violate the federally guaranteed right to equal access to quality medical services for Medicaid beneficiaries. The Defendant appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision, finding that their was no cause of action that would allow Medicaid providers or recipients to challenge a State's compliance with the equal access provisions of Medicaid. The cases were later dismissed.


On April 30, 2010, the California Association of Health Facilities filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On the same day, the Developmental Services Network and the United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children's Foundation of Los Angeles and Ventura Counties also filed a lawsuit against the same defendants in the same court. The plaintiffs in both suits were represented by private counsel. In the first case, the plaintiffs represented intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled as well as freestanding pediatric subacute care facilities. The plaintiffs in the second case also represented intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled. The plaintiffs in both cases sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent California from implementing aspects of legislation passed by the State Assembly that would freeze Medicaid reimbursement rates for these facilities at either their 2008-09 or 2009-10 levels (the Clearinghouse contains several related cases filed in response to this and similar legislation). Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (the Medicaid Act), such modifications must be approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being put in place. The legislation passed by the California assembly was not conditioned on such approval. The plaintiffs alleged that no studies or other analyses had been conducted that could show that the rate freezes were consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care requirements of 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(30)(A). The plaintiffs in both cases sought relief under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, arguing that the California law was incompatible with federal Medicaid law and therefore preempted. The plaintiffs in Developmental Services Network also claimed as a cause of action 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a private cause of action for state violations of federally guaranteed rights under color of law. On May 27, 2010, the plaintiffs in Developmental Services Network filed an amended complaint, which made further arguments in support of the plaintiffs' standing to bring the suit, but the complaint did not appear to have added any substantive claims or requests for relief. On June 15, 2010, the Court granted the defendants' motion to consolidate the two cases. From this point on, all orders and opinions referred to both cases, and the plaintiffs from both cases were required to file joint briefs. On June 24, 2010, Judge Christina A. Snyder stayed the case pending the outcome of several petitions for certiorari review to the Supreme Court from related cases. California Association of Health Facilities v. Maxwell-Jolly, 2010 WL 2612694 (C.D. Cal. 2010). On February 9, 2011, the Supreme Court granted cert in these cases, consolidating them for the purpose of review. See Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California. On March 28, 2011, the Court granted the plaintiffs' ex parte motion to lift the June 2010 stay, and on May 5, 2011, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the implementation of the Medi-Cal reimbursement rate freezes for intermediate care facility services for the developmentally disabled as well as for freestanding pediatric subacute facilities. Cal. Assoc. of Health Facilities v. Maxwell-Jolly, 2011 WL 6938438 (C.D.Cal. 2011). The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 26, 2011 and the docket number 11−55852 was assigned. Pending the outcome of this appeal, the case was again stayed. On November 30, 2011, the Appellate Court (Judges Ferdinand Francis Fernandez, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Ralph R. Erickson, district judge sitting by designation) vacated the order granting the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the District Court, finding that although California did have an obligation to submit Medicaid plan amendments to CMS and obtain approval prior to implementing these amendments, there was no individual cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 available to the plaintiffs. Developmental Services Network v. Douglas, 666 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 2011). The defendants applied for a rehearing at the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Court failed to address recent events and newly issued opinions which it argued should have led to a holding that a State may modify its reimbursement rates without receiving prior approval. The Appellate Court declined to grant a rehearing. In a February 7, 2014 status report, the parties reported a pause in action due to a stay pending the petitions for writ of certiorari in Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, et. al. and California Medical Association v. Sebelius, et. al., Supreme Court Docket Nos. 13- 253 and 13-380, respectively, which were denied on January 13, 2014. The parties were considering a joint motion to dismiss at this time. On March 19, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motions in both cases to amend their complaints. On the same day, the Court ordered the cases stayed, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Independent Living Center, which remanded that case and the related cases to the Ninth Circuit for further deliberation. On June 2, 2014, the court lifted the stay in the case. On June 9, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The next day, Judge Snyder dismissed the consolidated case and each party would bear its own attorney’s fees and costs. The case is closed.

Summary: On April 30, 2010, entities that represented Medicaid service providers filed this lawsuit in federal court against the California Department of Health Care Services. The plaintiffs represented intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled and other facilities. The plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing California from implementing legislation that would freeze Medicaid reimbursement rates for these facilities. The Plaintiffs sought relief under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted a preliminary injunction, which was vacated and remanded following the defendants’ appeal. On June 9, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The next day, Judge Snyder dismissed the consolidated case and ordered each party to bear its own attorney’s fees and costs. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an action filed in response to the CARES Act and an interim final rule from the Department of Education regarding how funds could be distributed between private and public schools. The court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the interim final rule on August 26, 2020. On November 9, the court approved a permanent injunction that prohibited the defendants from implementing the interim rule and from taking any action inconsistent with the proportional share formula provided by Congress. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
 This lawsuit arose out of the funding provisions for elementary and secondary schools in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020. Filed by eight states (California, Michigan, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), Washington D.C., and four school districts (Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and San Francisco), the lawsuit challenged a July 1, 2020 interim final rule from the Department of Education about how the funds may be distributed between private and public schools. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020 was passed on March 27, 2020 to provide trillions of dollars in financial relief, and other assistance, to Americans suffering from the effects of the coronavirus pandemic. The CARES Act set aside approximately $16 billion to help elementary and secondary schools, particularly those schools with low-income students. The money was to be allocated based on the amount of Title I funding each state and school district received in the most recent year. Private schools were eligible to receive funds in certain circumstances consistent with established Title I criteria-the number of children from low-income families who attend the school. The Department of Education issued non-binding guidance on April 30, 2020 directing that private schools should get a share of CARES Act money based on their overall student population not just their number of low-income students. Widespread pushback followed, but nonetheless, on July 1, 2020, the Department published an interim final rule instructing that CARES Act money be apportioned to private schools based on the number of all children enrolled, not just low income children, or apportioned based on low-income private school children and incur poison pill requirements on how the public school share of the money may be used. In response, Michigan, California, Washington D.C., Maine, New Mexico, and Wisconsin filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of Education (Betsy Devos) and the Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for Northern District of California on July 7, 2020. The plaintiffs argued that the rule exceeded the Department's authority, was not in accordance with the governing law, violated separation of powers principles, and violated the Constitution's spending clause. In addition, the states argued that the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the Department acted arbitrary and capricious and bypassed notice and comment procedures required by the APA. The plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and costs, a declaration that the July 1 rule and the April 30 guidance document are unlawful, and preliminary and permanent relief preventing the Department from enforcing the rule. On July 17, 2020, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add additional states (Hawaii, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) and four school districts (Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and San Francisco) as plaintiffs. The case was assigned to Judge James Donato. With the school year approaching, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the rule on July 20, 2020, arguing that the rule threatens imminent and irreparable harm to to schools and students across the country. The plaintiffs stressed that as a result of the rule, public schools would lose CARES Act funding in contradiction to Congress intent. The court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction on August 18, 2020. On August 26, 2020 Judge Donato granted a preliminary injunction against the rule. 2020 WL 5074397 (Aug. 26, 2020). Michigan v. DeVos, --- F.Supp.3d ---- (2020). Judge Donato explained that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim rule was an unlawful action under the APA because it exceeded the Department's authority. Congress's intent was plain and clear that the funds should be distributed according to formula in Section 1117 of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which is based on the number of low-income families who attended private schools. Judge Donato called the Department's argument for the rule "'interpretive jiggery-pokery' in the extreme," and questioned why Congress would include Section 1117, if it did not intend the formula to be used: "If Congress did not mean to use the formula in Section 1117, wouldn't it simply have omitted any reference to it in the first place? But since Congress expressly referred to Section 1117, what exactly does the Department think that means?" On October 9, the Department of Education issued new guidance that replaced the rule. On November 6, the defendants consented to the entry of a permanent injunction that prevented the defendants from implementing the April 30 guidance and taking any action inconsistent with the proportional share formula in Section 1117 or other restrictions or penalties on the use of CARES Act funds. The defendants waived their rights to seek reconsideration of or appeal of the decision. On November 9, the court approved the permanent injunction and issued a judgment on November 11. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.

Summary: This lawsuit arose out of the funding provisions for elementary and secondary schools in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) of 2020. Filed by eight states (California, Michigan, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin), Washington D.C., and four school districts (Chicago, Cleveland, New York City, and San Francisco), the lawsuit challenged a July 1, 2020 interim final rule from the Department of Education about how the funds may be distributed between private and public schools. On August 26, 2020, the court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the interim final rule. On November 9, the court approved a permanent injunction that prevented the defendants from implementing the April 30 guidance and July 1 rule and from taking any action inconsistent with the proportional share formula in Section 1117 or other restrictions or penalties on the use of CARES Act funds. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.


Title XIX of the Social Security Act (SSA) has provided medical care assistance to certain vulnerable populations under a cooperative federal-state arrangement, approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). In 2010 Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (“Obamacare”) that expanded Medicare coverage to include an additional group of low-income adults under the age of 65. While all states were obliged to comply with the Medicaid Act, states had a choice on whether to expand Medicaid. States that chose to participate in the program and comply with minimum federal requirements, such as expanding coverage, received funding from the federal government to provide the care. In certain narrow cases, states were permitted to waive certain Medicaid Act requirements under § 1115 of the SSA, but only when the waiver promoted the objectives of the Medicaid Act. Otherwise, states were forbidden from picking and choosing individuals within a covered group. Arkansas was one of the first states to expand Medicare after the ACA was passed, starting in January 2014 to include adults under the age of 65 through private care. The expansion was renamed “Arkansas Works” (AW) when it was renewed in in 2016 and extended through 2021. At this time, Arkansas requested to institute a work requirement in Medicaid as a requirement for health coverage, which was denied by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) because it was inconsistent with the purposes of the Medicaid program. However, in 2017 the Trump Administration called on federal agencies to undo the ACA and introduced another purpose to Medicare, which was to promote enrollees to work. This resulted in CMS inviting states to implement exceptions to the SSA. In March 2017, Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson proposed amendments to the AW to institute a work requirement and shrink retroactive health coverage. Changing its original position from 2016, the Secretary of the HSS approved the Arkansas Works Amendments (AWA), including the work condition, on March 5, 2018. On August 14, 2018, three individuals filed a lawsuit against HHS and CMS in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the SSA by the federal government in approving the AWA in March 2018. The AWA, according to the plaintiffs, sought to undermine the ACA and the expansion of Medicaid through a fundamental alteration of those statues. The plaintiffs claimed that the AWA was in violation of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which limits presidential power from rewriting congressional statutes, and ensures execution of laws passed by the Congress. All three plaintiffs were beneficiaries of Medicaid who lost or risked losing medical coverage due to changes in the AW program, which required 80 hours of employment per month for able-bodied adults from 19-49, reported online, as a requirement for health coverage. One of the plaintiffs lost his Medicaid coverage and subsequently his job after he failed to meet the AWA work requirement by not reporting his compliance in June 2018. The two other plaintiffs, employed at the time of the lawsuit, anticipated losing their Medicare coverage due to the new work requirements. The plaintiffs alleged that the HHS violated the US Constitution and federal laws in approving the Medicaid work requirement and that the SSA did not permit the Secretary of HHS to waive federal Medicaid requirements. Represented by Legal Aid of Arkansas, Southern Poverty Law Center, and the National Health Law Program, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the AWA and attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge James E. Bosaberg. On November 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with additional plaintiffs who also faced loss of coverage. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the same day, asking the court to strike down the Medicaid work requirement, alleging that the federal government approved the requirements without due process. The state of Arkansas also intervened as a defendant on November 30, 2018. Judge Bosaberg held that government action was arbitrary and capricious if the government failed to adequately consider an important aspect of a problem under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which requires courts to set aside government actions that are “arbitrary, capricious” or unlawful. The court stated that the Secretary had a duty to determine whether the proposed AWA would promote the objectives of Medicaid, including whether it advances or hinders health coverage to the needy. In considering the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, Judge Bosaberg considered whether the Secretary, in concluding that the AWA program promoted the objectives of the Medicaid Act, acted arbitrarily or capriciously. This challenge was previously considered in a separate suit in Stewart v. Azar, where the court determined if an agency had adequately considered whether a waiver proposal from Kentucky would advance medical assistance to its citizens. The court in Stewart v. Azar vacated the waiver in question, which also included a work requirement, because the agency failed to sufficiently consider the impact of the proposed project on Medicaid coverage. On March 27, 2019, the court found that the Secretary of the HHS failed to adequately consider how the AWA would lead to loss of coverage for a substantial number of Arkansas residents, including the needy. Because coverage to the needy was a core objective of Medicaid, the court held that the AWA did not advance the purpose of Medicaid. Therefore, its approval was arbitrary and capricious. Correspondingly, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants’ cross-motions on April 10, 2019. Like the holding in Stewart v. Azar, the approval for Arkansas’s program was also vacated. 363 F.Supp.3d 165. On April 10, 2019, the federal defendants and the state of Arkansas each appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, docketed as 19-5094 (federal defendants’ appeal) and 19-5096 (state of Arkansas’s appeal). The parties briefed the appeal and oral arguments were held on October 11, 2019. On February 14, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment vacating the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas Works Amendments. See Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The decision applied to both appeals as a consolidated matter. Written by Senior Circuit Judge Sentelle, the opinion emphasized that providing healthcare coverage is the primary purpose of Medicaid. The defendants' alternative objectives of better health outcomes, financial independence, and transition to commercial coverage, on the other hand, were not consistent with Medicaid. The appellate court found the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas program to be arbitrary and capricious due to the failure to consider whether the program would result in loss of coverage, an important aspect of the approval analysis. As of May 11, 2020, the defendants had not filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. The deadline to file was extended until July 13, 2020. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2010, the U.S. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (“Obamacare”) that expanded Medicare coverage to include additional groups of beneficiaries. Arkansas approved a work requirement in Medicaid as a requirement for health coverage in its amendments on March 5, 2018. On August 14, 2018, three individuals filed a suit against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), as well as administrators involved in implementing the Arkansas Works Amendments (AMA) in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the SSA and the Constitution in approving the AWA in March 2018. All three plaintiffs were beneficiaries of Medicaid who lost or risked losing medical coverage due to changes in the AWA. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the AWA and attorney fees. On March 27, 2019, the court held that the AWA work requirement does not advance the purpose of the SSA. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and vacated the approval for Arkansas’s program. On April 10, 2019, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On February 14, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment vacating the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas Works Amendments. The court emphasized that providing healthcare coverage is the primary purpose of Medicaid. The defendants' alternative objectives of better health outcomes, financial independence, and transition to commercial coverage, on the other hand, were not consistent with Medicaid. The court found the Secretary's approval of the Arkansas program to be arbitrary and capricious due to the failure to consider whether the program would result in loss of coverage, an important aspect of the approval analysis.


This is a case concerning the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 United States census. On July 30, 2018, the Campaign Legal Center (CLC), a nonprofit aimed at increasing access to democratic participation, brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The CLC sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), § 5 U.S.C. 552. Represented by private and staff counsel, the CLC sought injunctive relief to compel the DOJ to release documents responsive to a FOIA request concerning the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census, filed by the plaintiff on February 1, 2018. They claimed that, to date, the DOJ has produced no documents related to this "citizenship question," despite the fact that the DOJ has sent a letter to the Commerce Department to include such a question on the 2020 census. The CLC's 2018 FOIA request sought the release of documents concerning several key words and phrases related to the inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 census. The CLC filed this request to find records pertaining to a request made by the DOJ to the Census Bureau to include such a question. The case was assigned to Judge Tanya Chutkan. In September 2018, the defendant released 59 pages of partially redacted responsive materials, while withholding an additional 43 pages of responsive materials. Then, in November 2018, the defendant released an additional 11 pages of materials. The CLC continued to contest the adequacy of the defendant's search for responsive materials, and the defendant claimed that the materials it withheld were privileged, and therefore fell under a FOIA exemption. On May 8, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 22, 2019, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. On June 1, 2020, Judge Chutkan granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's, holding that the defendant's search was inadequate and that the withheld materials were not protected by an exemption. The DOJ appealed on July 31, 2020. USCA 20-05233. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the Campaign Legal Center filed this lawsuit to compel the Department of Justice to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request by produce documents pertaining to the inclusion of a citizenship question on the 2020 United States census. In 2020, summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff. The government has since appealed.


This is a case about the Trump Administration's limits on LGBTQ protections under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (42 U.S.C. § 18116). On June 22, 2020, a group of LGBTQ-focused private healthcare providers, organizations providing community services, health professional associations, and individual providers filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706), claiming that the defendants violated the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by both Lambda Legal and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees. Specifically, they alleged that the revised regulation issued under § 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) by HHS under the Trump Administration limits protections for LGBTQ individuals and causes harm to them and healthcare providers. In 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law. Section 1557 prohibits discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, age, and disability. In 2016, HHS enacted a final rule (the "2016 Rule") to implement the nondiscrimination requirements of Section 1557. The 2016 Rule defined sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex stereotyping and declared that healthcare providers and insurers cannot discriminate against LGBTQ individuals in medical and coverage decisions. In June 2020, however, the Trump Administration issued a revised regulation (the "2020 Rule"), which rolled back the 2016 Rule. The 2020 Rule eliminated the unitary legal standard for enforcement of violations of Section 1557 and introduced broad exemptions for discrimination based on personal religious or moral beliefs. This case was assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. On July 9, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, motion to stay pending judicial review. The defendants filed their opposition on July 24, and the plaintiffs answered the defendants' opposition on July 29. On September 2, the court enjoined the Administration from implementing two provisions: (1) the 2020 Rule's elimination of "sex stereotyping" from the 2016 Rule's definition of "discrimination on the basis of sex" and (2) the 2020 Rule's use of Title IX's exemption of certain religious organizations from the statute’s nondiscrimination mandate. The court limited the injunction to claims it concluded had a likelihood of success, and thus denied relief for the plaintiffs' claims that the 2020 Rule erroneously eliminated the 2016 Rule’s prohibition on categorical coverage exclusions for gender-affirming care, improperly repealed the 2016 Rule’s notice requirements, and violated Section 1554 of the ACA. Because the court did not find those claims to have a likelihood of success, it also did not award relief for the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The injunction applied nationwide. In its opinion addressing the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court also analyzed whether or not the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. Citing the fear instilled in the LGBTQ community as evidence of imminent injury, the court found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing for their four common-injury claims and two of their five organizational-injury claims of injuries caused by the 2020 Rule. The court also held that the plaintiffs had third-party standing to assert the equal-protection, substantive-due-process, and free-speech rights of third-party LGBTQ patients. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In June 2020, the Trump Administration's Department of Health and Human Services issued a revised regulation under Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act that limited protections for discrimination against LGBTQ individuals. A group of LGBTQ-focused private healthcare providers, organizations providing community services, health professional associations, and individual providers filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the revised rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act, First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. On September 2, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing for most of their claims, and enjoined the Administration from implementing two provisions: (1) the 2020 Rule's elimination of "sex stereotyping" from the 2016 Rule's definition of "discrimination on the basis of sex" and (2) the 2020 Rule's use of Title IX's exemption of certain religious organizations from the statute’s nondiscrimination mandate. It denied relief for the 2020 Rule's elimination of the 2016 Rule’s prohibition on categorical coverage exclusions for gender-affirming care, repeal of the 2020 Rule's notice requirements, and alleged violation of Section 1554, in addition to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The case is ongoing.


In 2008, the U.S. Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section) launched an investigation into the treatment of individuals with mental illness in the Delaware Psychiatric Center (DPC), a state hospital. The investigation was later expanded to assess the state's liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its integration mandate under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). On November 9, 2010, the DOJ issued a findings letter documenting violations of both the ADA and the U.S. Constitution. DOJ found that, in violation of the ADA, individuals were unnecessarily institutionalized when community placement would be appropriate, and that individuals with mental illness living in the community were placed at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. DOJ also found "inadequate risk assessments; inadequate mental health treatment, especially the failure to provide appropriate behavioral interventions for individuals with identified risks; inadequate restraint and seclusion practices; inadequate investigations of serious incidents; and inadequate discharge planning/community integration to ensure individuals live in the most integrated setting." Following negotiations, the United States filed a complaint and settlement agreement concurrently in July 2011. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware (Judge Leonard Stark) approved this consent decree on July 15. As part of the agreement, the state of Delaware agreed to augment its services to keep individuals with mental illness out of institutions, create additional supports, and reform the conditions at DPC to remedy constitutional violations. Delaware also agreed to create a crisis system to divert individuals from being hospitalized unnecessarily; develop case management and additional community supports; and support integrated housing options. The agreement was designed to reduce the institutionalized population by half and to replace institution-based services with Medicaid-reimbursable community-based services. In accordance with the agreement, a Court Monitor filed reports on the State's progress through 2016. On October 6, 2016, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case. The parties' brief noted that the State had greatly improved its services for people with serious mental illness; expanded its capacity to deliver those services; and reduced its reliance on segregative institutions. Furthermore, the State had enacted legislation aimed at ensuring it could continue improving its outcomes for people with mental illness absent court supervision. As of that date, the State was in full compliance with the agreement. Accordingly, on October 11, 2016, Judge Stark dismissed the case.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division entered into this court-enforceable settlement agreement with Delaware in 2011 to remedy unconstitutional conditions in its state psychiatric hospital and to provide community-based services to prevent the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with mental illness. The State achieved full compliance with the agreement, and the case was closed in 2016.


On January 15, 2008, a group of Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities that were confined to a nursing-home facility filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act against the state's Health Care Administration and Department of Elder Affairs. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state discriminated against them by failing to offer services that would enable them to live in a community setting. On June 7, 2008, the Court (Judge Robert L. Hinkle) denied defendants' motion to dismiss. On October 14, 2008, Judge Hinkle certified the class consisting of any Florida Medicaid-eligible adult who, at any time during the litigation, resided in a nursing home that received Medicaid funding, and who could and would have resided in the community with appropriate community-based services. At the same time, the judge granted a preliminary injunction with regard to one of the named plaintiffs, Clayton Griffith. Griffith lived in a nursing home, the cost of which was covered by the state's Medicaid program. He had applied for and been determined eligible for a waiver that should have allowed him to live in the community rather than an institution. But the state's long waiting list precluded him from accessing the program. Nevertheless, he moved out of the home and into an apartment. Judge Hinkle entered an injunction ordering the state to provide Griffith Medicaid coverage for a certified nursing assistant. The state appealed the preliminary injunction, which the 11th Circuit affirmed on June 22, 2010. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment; the judge denied both motions on January 19, 2011. After a February 2011 bench trial, Judge Hinkle issued an order and opinion on January 3, 2012 that made permanent the injunction regarding Griffith, dismissed the other named plaintiffs' claims as moot, and decertified the class. To start, all but one of the other named plaintiffs had died during the course of litigation; the remaining one had decided to stay in the nursing home. The judge decertified the class in part because the state legislature had passed a new law which greatly improved the rate at which Medicaid-eligible adults were transitioned from nursing homes to community living. Post-legislation, Judge Hinkle reasoned, it was no longer true that the state had refused to act on grounds that applied generally to the class. He concluded that where the conditions that made class-certification appropriate are no longer present, the court has discretion to decertify, which he chose to do.

Summary: On January 15, 2008, a group of Medicaid-eligible adults with disabilities that were confined to a nursing-home facility filed a class action in U.S. District Court against Florida's Health Care Administration and Department of Elder Affairs. The plaintiffs claimed that the state discriminated against them by failing to offer services that would enable them to live in a community setting. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for one of the named plaintiffs and decertified the class that he had previously approved. In part because of recent legislation that greatly improved the state's efficiency at moving eligible persons from nursing homes to community living, the court determined that the conditions allowing for the class no longer existed.


On September 6, 2011, a resident of Florida and applicant for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) assistance filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action against the Florida Department of Children and Families in the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Florida and the Florida Justice Institute, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Florida's TANF application requirements violated the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the requirement that all applicants undergo suspicionless drug testing in order to be considered for assistance constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Judge Mary S. Scriven was assigned to the case. The plaintiff moved on September 6, 2011 for a preliminary injunction and on September 13, 2011 for class certification. The plaintiff proposed a class consisting of all individuals residing in Florida who were applying for, or would in the future apply for, Temporary Cash Assistance (Florida's program to distribute TANF benefits) and who would be subject to defendant's suspicion-less drug testing. Defendant opposed both motions. On October 24, 2011, the District Court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction but denied his motion for class certification. Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The court found that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Fourth Amendment claim and issued an injunction that barred the defendant from requiring the plaintiff to take a suspicionless drug test. Since the defendant stipulated that it would apply the court's ruling to all people similarly situated to the plaintiff, the Court found that class certification was unnecessary and dismissed the plaintiff's motion to certify without prejudice. Defendant appealed the injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. But the Circuit Court (Barkett and Jordan, Circuit Judges, and Hall, District Judge sitting by designation) affirmed the District Court's injunction in an opinion issued on February 26, 2013. See Lebron v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013). Defendant petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a rehearing en banc. Defendant’s petition was denied on April 23, 2013. On November 4, 2011, the plaintiff renewed his motion for class certification, arguing that certification would avoid litigation over mootness should the plaintiff find employment. The District Court (Judge Scriven) agreed and certified the class in an order dated December 7, 2011. Lebron v. Wilkins, 277 F.R.D. 664 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The parties continued with preparing for trial. On September 10, 2012 the plaintiff filed for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Section 414.0652 of the Florida Statutes, which requires all applicants for TANF benefits to submit to suspicionless drug testing, is not constitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On the same day, the defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that TANF applicants consent to the drug testing and, even if the consent argument failed, that the State had a special need to drug test applicants. On December 31, 2013, the District Court issued summary judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that the State had failed to establish a special need to drug test all TANF applicants. In the same judgment the Court declared the statute facially unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the State from reinstating and enforcing the law. The defendant appealed the District Courts issuance of Summary Judgment to the Eleventh Circuit. And on December 3, 2014, the Circuit Court (Hull and Marcus, Circuit Judges, and TOTENBERG, District Judge sitting by designation) affirmed the District Court’s decision on the grounds that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial special need to drug test all TANF applicants without any suspicion of drug use. Lebron v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014). The Circuit Court granted appellate costs for the plaintiff and against the defendant, but the plaintiff did not move for attorney’s fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 6, 2011, a resident of Florida and applicant for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) assistance filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action against the Florida Department of Children and Families in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division. The plaintiff claimed that Florida's TANF application requirement that all applicants undergo suspicionless drug testing in order to be considered for assistance constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court has issued a preliminary injunction and has certified the class action; an appeal of the injunction to the Eleventh Circuit is pending.


On July 20, 2004, a lesbian couple living in Florida filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the U.S. Attorney General and Clerk for the Circuit and Country Courts of Hillsborough County, Florida, challenging the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Florida's implementation of the statute. Plaintiffs brought their lawsuit after a clerk in the Circuit Court's Office in Hillsborough Country refused to recognize their Massachusetts marriage license. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare DOMA and the corresponding Florida statute unconstitutional and enjoin their enforcement. The plaintiffs alleged that the two statutes violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs asserted that Florida is required to recognize their valid Massachusetts marriage license because DOMA exceeds Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. They also argued that twelve U.S. Supreme Court Cases, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and ending with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), demonstrate a recent trend by the Supreme Court to expand the fundamental liberty of personal autonomy in connection with one's intimate affairs and family relations. The plaintiffs urged the Court in the case at bar to expand on these cases and find that the right to enter into a same-sex marriage is protected by the Constitution. On September 27, 2004, the U.S. filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that DOMA does not infringe on any of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights and is a legitimate exercise of the power granted to Congress by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. On January 19, 2005, Judge James S. Moody, Jr., granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, saying that Congress' actions are an appropriate exercise of its power to regulate conflicts between the laws of two different States, in this case, conflicts over the validity of same-sex marriage. Florida is not required to recognize or apply Massachusetts' same-sex marriage law because it clearly conflicts with Florida's legitimate public policy of opposing same-sex marriage. The Court went on to say that it was bound the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), who dismissed for want of a substantial federal question the appeal of Minnesota's Supreme Court ruling that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is not a fundamental right of all persons (and thus a similar state statute to the one in the case at bar did not violate the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause). Regarding Due Process, the Court said the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence only determined that a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual sodomy failed under the rational basis analysis, and in no way can be interpreted as creating a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. The Court also expressed its reservations about elevating rights to fundamental status, since to do so would remove policy decisions from the hands of the people and into the guardianship of unelected judges. Willams v. Pryor, 378 F.3d 1232, 1250. Therefore, the Court found that the right to marry a person of the same sex is not a fundamental right under the Constitution. On the issue of Equal Protection, the Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit has held that homosexuality is not a suspect class that would require subjecting DOMA to strict scrutiny, Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818 (11th Cir. 2004), and that DOMA does not discriminate on the basis of sex because it treats women and men equally, In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 143 (W.D. Wash. 2004), and therefore it must apply rational basis review. The Court held that encouraging the raising of children in homes consisting of a married mother and father is a legitimate state interest, See Lofton, 358 F.3d at 819-20, and DOMA is rationally related to this interest. On March 7, 2005, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remainder of the case (involving the State of Florida) and the case was closed on March 8, 2005.

Summary: Plaintiffs were a lesbian couple who filed a complaint on July 20, 2004 challenging the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, as well as Florida's implementation of the statute, as violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and sought declaratory relief. On January 19, 2005, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that DOMA falls within Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the right to same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right under the Constitution, and that DOMA passes the rational basis review test and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court dismissed the case.


This case emerged from Haddad v. Arnold. With slightly differing facts from others in the proposed class in Haddad, plaintiffs Luis Cruz and Nigel de la Torre filed this separate complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 2011. The plaintiffs have spinal cord injuries that caused quadriplegia. Both have paralysis, use a wheelchair for mobility, and require assistance in their homes in order to perform daily life activities. Although both plaintiffs receive some in-home nursing through Medicaid, this is insufficient to meet their needs (about 2 hours a day of care). They are both on the waitlist for Florida Medicaid's traumatic brain and spinal cord injury waiver services, and the state administrators have responded negatively to their inquiries, indicating limitations in the program that would prevent the plaintiffs from receiving waiver services in the foreseeable future. The plaintiffs argued that this placed them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization and thus violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the precedent Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Following a Report and Recommendation from Magistrate Judge Andrea Simonton, District Court Judge Ursula Ungaro granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on November 24, 2010, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and that they stood to suffer irreparable harm without waiver services. The injunction ordered the state to provide such services. With waiver services in place for the plaintiffs, the parties agreed to dismiss the case on April 15, 2011. The case was reopened for the purpose of determining attorney's fees and the parties litigated this issue for a year, with a Magistrate Judge finding in favor of the plaintiffs and awarding fees in February 2012. The parties settled soon after.

Summary: Plaintiffs were individuals with quadriplegia who did not receive adequate in-home care services via Florida Medicaid and who were on the waitlist for the state's spinal cord injury waiver services. After arguing that this was a violation of the ADA and Section 504, the plaintiffs received a preliminary injunction in 2010 and the state initiated waiver services soon after. The case finally settled in 2012.


Represented by Disability Rights Florida (the Protection & Advocacy Agency for Florida), individuals with developmental disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on March 23, 2011, challenging their continued placement on the waitlist for Florida's developmental disability Medicaid waiver services. Some of the plaintiffs lived in the community but alleged that the state's inability to provide them with services via the waiver would put them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. Other plaintiffs resided in ICF/DD institutions (intermediate care facilities for the developmentally disabled) but claimed that they could live in the community if the state provided them with waiver services. The plaintiffs allege that the state's current policy of only allowing limited waiver enrollment for individuals deemed "in crisis" violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Medicaid. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the court (Judge Richard Smoak) denied the motion on August 30, 2011. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for class certification. On October 14, 2011, Judge Smoak denied the motion for class certification, finding that the institutionalized plaintiffs and the non-institutionalized plaintiffs did not sufficiently share interests. In fact, they would probably compete with each other for enrollment slots if any opened up on the DD Waiver. Institutionalized plaintiffs will necessarily never reach the point of being in "crisis" (and are thus categorically prevented from enrollment under the current policies), but plaintiffs in the community could possibly get off the waitlist if their lack of sufficient services caused a crisis situation. Because Disability Rights Florida, as the state Protection and Advocacy Agency, has organizational standing to sue on behalf of individuals with disabilities, however, the case was able to proceed. Discovery continued, and the parties litigated the issue of standing for some of the plaintiffs whose status had changed throughout the course of the lawsuit. In July 2012, the parties entered a private settlement agreement and agreed to dismiss the lawsuit. The settlement agreement contained a few separate provisions. First, the Florida legislature had recently included a budget proviso requiring funds to be made available to transfer individuals from ICF/DD placement to the DD waiver. The Agency for Healthcare Administration will request this budget proviso in future years. The state also agreed to expedite the enrollment of individuals deemed in crisis, and to provide employment support services. Finally, the state will create a DD Waiver working group and will include stakeholders representing the disability community.

Summary: The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to challenge their continued placement on the waitlist for Florida's Developmental Disability Medicaid waiver, alleging that the lack of available waiver services contributes to unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA. After a period of litigation, the parties settled and the state agreed to help individuals in institutions receive waiver services.


The Plaintiffs, individuals with developmental disabilities and/or mental illness, challenged Georgia's reduction in coverage in home-based support services. The Plaintiffs were receiving services from Georgia Medicaid's Service Options Using Resources in a Community Environment (SOURCE) program when the state announced that it would change the program to cover only individuals over aged 65 who had physical disabilities. As a result of this change, each plaintiff was given a notice that he or she would be terminated from the program. The Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on September 10, 2010, alleging that the reduction in coverage placed the Plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the state to continue providing SOURCE benefits to the Plaintiffs during litigation. The United States filed a brief supporting this motion on October 6, 2010. On October 7, 2010, the court (Judge Timothy C. Batten) granted a 60-day preliminary injunction ordering the state to allow the Plaintiffs to continue receiving SOURCE benefits. Throughout the next two years, the parties successfully petitioned the court for extensions of the preliminary injunction. Ultimately, the parties entered a settlement agreement on December 17, 2012. The state agreed to provide Plaintiffs with either continuation of the SOURCE program benefits or other Medicaid-funded community-based services that would allow the Plaintiffs to remain in the community.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individuals in Georgia with developmental disabilities and/or mental illness, challenged the state's change in coverage for a Medicaid-funded community-based program, alleging that this change put them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA. The parties ultimately settled and the state agreed to provide the Plaintiffs with community-based services.


On September 18, 2008, a child with severe mental and physical disabilities filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, under the Medicaid Act 42 U.S.C. §1396, and 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the agency that is responsible for administering Medicaid in the state of Georgia. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Georgia Advocacy Office, sought temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, and declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated his rights and due process in their procedure for deciding how many hours of private duty nursing hours he would receive. On September 9, 2008, the district court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash Jr.) granted a temporary restraining order compelling the defendants to provide all hours of private duty nursing that the plaintiff's treating physician had requested (168 hours/week). On November 3rd, the court (Judge Thrash) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the defendants from enforcing any of their policies that would limit or reduce the number of private duty nursing hours a patient could receive that were not based on medical necessity. The injunction also decreased the number of hours of nursing the plaintiff received based on a schedule created by a physician working for the defendant. Following a surgical operation, plaintiff required increased nursing hours and filed for a second temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On February 17, 2010, the District Court (Judge Thrash) granted these motions, compelling the defendants to provide significantly increased hours of private nursing. Counsel for the plaintiff filed its second, and final, amended complaint on September 27, 2011. This complaint named five plaintiffs, all of whom had significant health problems. This final complaint reaffirmed the allegations from the first while adding a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment cause for action, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act's (ADA) prohibition on policies that have the discriminatory effect of segregating individuals with disabilities from the general population. Plaintiffs argued that the non-medically based denial of private, in-home nursing care will lead to the institutionalization, and thus segregation, of the plaintiffs. <i>See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring</i>, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The district court (Judge Thrash) granted a motion on behalf of the only plaintiff who was eighteen years old for a temporary restraining order compelling the defendants to provide the nursing care requested by a treating physician. On June 15, 2012, the court entered an order and opinion granting a permanent injunction that extended the effect of that restraining order. The defendant initially appealed this decision but it was voluntarily dismissed. On August 2, 2012, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to certify the class because the plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that indicated how many people would be able to make the same allegations against the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on January 30, 2013, claiming that the plaintiffs had not provided enough evidence to prove their allegations regarding the Medicare Act, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the ADA. The United States filed a brief as an interested party hoping to clarify the law regarding the ADA claim, urging the District Court to deny the motion for partial summary judgment. On May 22, 2013, the court issued an order granting the motion for partial summary judgment as it pertained to some elements of the Medicare Act claim as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court denied the motion with regard to other Medicare Act allegations in addition to the ADA claim. On August 5, 2013, the defendants offered the four remaining defendants a settlement consisting of individual nursing care plans and admitting no fault. Two of the defendants accepted this settlement offer. On September 27, 2013, following a three day bench trial, the District Court (Judge Thrash) issued an opinion and order the prohibition of the defendant from reducing the number of hours of private nursing care below eighteen per day, for a period of 180 days or until further order of the court. This decision applied to both of the plaintiffs. On October 25, 2013, the defendant filed to appeal this order and the order granting the permanent injunction to the eighteen-year-old plaintiff (US Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit case #13-14950). The appeal was declared moot with regard to two of the plaintiffs, one of whom passed away, while the other turned twenty-one, precluding him from the relevant Medicare statute. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on January 5, 2015. The court denied plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees without prejudice on September 30, 2014. Plaintiff filed a second motion for attorneys' fees on January 20, 2015, and the court granted this motion on August 19, 2015, awarding the plaintiff $837,847.50 in attorneys' fees and $13,208.65 in expenses for a total award of $851,056.15. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.

Summary: In September of 2011, one eighteen-year-old and four minor residents of Georgia with significant medical issues sued the agency responsible for administering Medicaid in Georgia. They alleged that the agency's decisions to deny or reduce hours of in-home, private nursing care violated the Medicaid act, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Two of the Plaintiffs settled and some of the Medicare, as well as the Fifth an Fourteenth Amendment Allegations were dismissed on summary Judgment, however, the District Court found for the Defendants on the remaining allegations. The defendant appealed this decision and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The district court also awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.


On March 25, 2010, this class-action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) and the Director of the Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning of FSSA. The named plaintiffs were minor Medicaid recipients with serious disabilities who had been receiving medically-necessary therapies, paid for by the State's Medicaid program and administered by the FSAA. The FSSA had denied the named plaintiffs and others similarly situated individuals continued access to these therapies. It cited two provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code, one of which limited the provisions of these therapies to two years unless patients demonstrated significant progress to a "higher functional state," and the other which generally prohibited all "maintenance therapies," i.e. therapies designed to prevent deterioration rather than improve a patient's condition. The plaintiffs filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and argued that the FSSA's refusal to provide the therapies unlawfully violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, et seq. (the "Medicaid Act" or the "Act"), which require states that participate in Medicaid to provide early screening, physical therapy and related services, and preventative services, respectively. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from refusing or limiting Medicaid coverage for therapies recommended or prescribed by a Medicaid recipient's physician, and preventing the enforcement of both of the contested provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code. The plaintiffs also sought legal costs and attorneys' fees. On September 20, 2010, the parties filed a joint stipulation, wherein the defendants agreed to provide the named plaintiffs with funding for their therapies while the case awaited its final outcome. This was in lieu of a preliminary injunction. On October 1, 2010, the plaintiffs, upon order from the court, filed a document clarifying their claim that the FSSA had violated federal Medicaid law. The following day the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint integrating these changes. On November 22, 2010, the Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson certified the plaintiff class. The class was defined as: "Any and all persons in Indiana who are or will be enrolled in the Medicaid program and who are or will be under the age of twenty-one (21) who have been or will be denied coverage for physical therapy, occupational therapy, respiratory therapy, and/or speech pathology (“therapies”), or who have had or will have coverage for these therapies otherwise limited, which denial or limitation is based upon 405 IAC 5-22-6(b)(6) and/or 405 IAC 5-22-6(b)(7), notwithstanding the fact that a physician acting within the scope of his or her practice under Indiana law has or will recommend and/or prescribe these therapies for the Medicaid recipient." A.M.T. v. Gargano, 2010 WL 4860119 (S.D. Ind. 2010). On February 10, 2011, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, issuing a permanent injunction preventing the defendants and their successors from limiting or denying coverage for prescribed physical, occupational, or respiratory therapy, and/or speech pathology, for any person under 21 enrolled in the State's Medicaid program when such denial or limitation was based upon the two disputed provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code (405 I.A.C. 5-22-6(b)(6) and (b)(7).) The Court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees and costs. A.M.T. v. Gargano, 781 F. Supp. 2d 798 (S.D. Ind. 2011) On February 23, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the final judgment and for attorneys' fees and costs. On June 9, 2011, they withdrew this motion, "the parties having resolved the matters without the necessity of Court intervention." The docket reflects no further litigation activity after June 10, 2011, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On March 25, 2010, plaintiffs, minors with serious disabilities who were Medicaid recipients, filed this class-action lawsuit was filed in federal court against the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) and Director of the Office of Medicaid Policy and Planning of FSSA. They all had been receiving medically necessary therapies paid for by the State's Medicaid program, administered by the FSAA, for several years. These therapies were necessary to ensure the plaintiffs' conditions would not deteriorate and that they would not lose functional ability. The FSSA had denied the named plaintiffs and others similarly situated continuing access to these therapies, citing two provisions of the Indiana Administrative Code. On February 10, 2011, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, issuing a permanent injunction preventing the Defendants and their successors from limiting or denying coverage for prescribed physical, occupational, or respiratory therapy, and/or speech pathology, for any person under 21 enrolled in the State's Medicaid program when such denial or limitation was based upon the two disputed provisions.


On March 28, 2018 the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Prince George’s County, Maryland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Census Bureau, the Secretary of Commerce, and the President of the United States for “conspicuous neglect” of their duty to ensure the “actual enumeration” required by Article I of the U.S. Constitution. The case was assigned to Judge Paul W. Grimm. The plaintiffs claimed that this neglect had led to undercounting in the past, and would lead to higher undercounting in the 2020 Census, particularly affecting disadvantaged and minority populations. Prince George’s County alleged that its population had been undercounted by 1.9% in 2000 and 2.3% in 2010. These undercounts impacted redistricting, distribution of public funds, and apportionment of representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. The plaintiffs claimed that the 2010 Census undercounted African Americans by roughly 1.5 million, while overcounting other demographic groups such as home owners and non-Hispanic whites. Census design flaws, underfunding, and lack of staff and leadership, together with Prince George’s County’s demographics and history of being undercounted, suggested a likelihood that the detrimental effects of undercounting were likely to be exacerbated for the county in the 2020 Census. For example, whereas the Bureau’s budget has typically grown with each successive Census, it has decreased from $4.2 billion in 2010 to $3.9 billion in 2020. Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed that the plan to administer more of the Census digitally would lead to undercounting for areas with little broadband access, and leave the Census open to cyber attacks. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the government had an obligation to administer a fair and accurate census, and to enjoin the government from violating that duty. Moreover, the plaintiffs requested that the court issue an injunction requiring the government to propose and implement a policy that ensures a hard count subject to court monitoring. The plaintiffs subsequently filed two amended complaints adding the parties’ addresses. The government moved to dismiss on July 13, 2018, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the claim was not ripe, the decision constituted a political question beyond judicial review, and that the Enumeration Clause required only that the government conduct a person-by-person headcount of the population. The plaintiffs responded a month later. They argued that they had standing, citing the specific injury of a “severe differential undercount” resulting in vote dilution and loss of federal funding. On ripeness, the plaintiffs claimed to be at imminent risk of harm, and waiting until the census began would leave them without remedy. Against the government’s claim of unreviewable discretion in conducting the census, the plaintiffs cited decades of census-related litigation. In November 2018, the plaintiffs submitted a supplemental notice of Judge George Hazel’s recent ruling in La Unión del Pueblo Entero v. Ross, a similar case in the District of Maryland, rejecting government arguments in a similar motion to dismiss. The court set a hearing for January 14, 2019. However, the government moved to continue the hearing in light of the government shutdown and resulting lapse in appropriations. The plaintiffs opposed the motion, as the census count would occur in just over a year, and other courts had refused to delay ongoing census litigation for the same reason. They argued that the shutdown would disrupt census preparations, leading to further inaccurate results. The court denied the motion to continue the hearing, finding that the case involved the protection of property, that the shutdown supported the plaintiff’s argument that the government would not be prepared to conduct an accurate census in 2020, and that this type of motion has been denied in similar pending cases. The court ruled on January 29, 2019, granting in part the motion to dismiss. 382 F. Supp. 3d 349. The court noted this case was unique from other pending census litigation, as this suit did not include a challenge to final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Instead, it challenged the agency’s action before it had finalized the 2020 Census preparations. The court thus denied without prejudice the request for injunctive relief, finding this claim not yet ripe because preparations were ongoing. However, the court recognized the potential for declaratory relief to ensure sufficient funds for census preparations, found that the plaintiffs had standing on this claim, and allowed this claim to proceed. On February 28, 2019, the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, adding a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, but not allowing a restatement of the Enumeration Clause claim. The government moved to dismiss the amended claims. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on April 1, 2019. This complaint, among other things, removed President Donald Trump as a defendant. On April 15, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. This motion to dismiss was granted on August 1, 2019. The court found that “the 2019 Appropriations Act moots the funding claim,” and “the Final Operational Plan is not final agency action” reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. 399 F.Supp.3d 406 On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed. Oral argument was heard on October 30, 2019, and the Fourth Circuit (Judges Roger Gregory, Barbara Keenan, and Julius Richardson) issued its opinion on December 19, 2019. It agreed with the district court that “plaintiffs’ APA claims, as pleaded, do not satisfy the jurisdictional limitations on judicial review set forth in the APA.” It disagreed, however, with the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Enumeration Clause claim, “mindful of the Supreme Court’s recent guidance affirming judicial review of ‘both constitutional and statutory challenges to census-related decisionmaking,’ Dept’t of Commerce v. New York.” The Fourth Circuit remanded that portion of the case to the district court. 945 F.3d 183. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on January 10, 2020. In addition, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on January 21, 2020, asking the court to compel the government to expend 2020 Census funds in specified ways. On February 11, 2020, the government sought to dismiss the case, and sought summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 5, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held, among other things, that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the government had “refused to spend the appropriations from Congress in the specific manner that Congress directed,” and “if the census proceeds as planned, there will be a differential undercount of the magnitude they fear, or that if [the court] were to order the funds spent as they want, the 2020 census would not produce an equal or worse undercount for hard-to-count communities.” In addition, the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, on April 16, 2020. The court held that the plaintiffs did not “plausibly allege that the Census Bureau’s plan fails to bear a reasonable relationship to an actual enumeration or that any of the Census Bureau’s actions unreasonably compromise the distributive accuracy of the census.” As such, the court ruled the remaining motions moot, and directed the clerk to close the case. 2020 WL 1890531. The case is closed.

Summary: On March 28, 2018, the NAACP and Prince George’s County, Maryland filed a claim against the U.S. Census Bureau and President Donald Trump for neglecting their constitutional duty to administer a fair and accurate census of the US population. The plaintiffs alleged that underfunding and the flawed design of the 2020 Census might lead to undercounts of the US population in violation of the Enumeration Clause and to the detriment of minority populations, as the census count is tied to both public funding and governmental representation. The plaintiffs requested an injunction to require the US to develop a plan to ensure a fair and accurate count. The court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief as unripe because census preparations were ongoing, but allowed the claim on underfunding to continue. The court also allowed the plaintiffs to add two claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. On April 16, 2020, the court granted the government’s motion to dismiss; the case is closed.