On December 13, 2011, four inmates of the Fresno County Adult Detention Facilities filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Fresno County Sheriff's Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2011 WL 11557976. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Law Office, Disability Rights California, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated prisoners' Constitutional rights by failing to provide minimally adequate health care and failing to protect prisoners from injury and violence from other prisoners. The case was assigned to Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill and Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. On January 25, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add three individual plaintiffs to the suit, and brought additional claims against the defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs also expanded the scope of the injunctive relief requested, seeking the compulsion of reasonable accommodations to prisoners with disabilities. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint due to failure to state a claim for which the court could provide a remedy. Judge O'Neill denied this motion on May 16, 2012, finding that the plaintiffs' complaint had sufficiently pleaded their claims. 2012 WL 1799179. The parties stipulated to and the Court ordered the substitution of the individual defendants with the county of Fresno on November 16, 2012. This stipulation also dismissed the claims of three of the named plaintiffs, without prejudice. On May 28, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the consent decree they had drafted. The parties agreed to an extensive remedial plan to be implemented by the defendants covering all of the substantive areas in dispute: health care, personal safety, and disability discrimination. The plaintiffs' counsel agreed to be responsible for monitoring compliance with the consent decree and the remedial plan. The decree was court enforceable, and the parties agreed it would last for four years after its approval -- unless the court earlier determined that the defendants were in substantial compliance, or it was extended based on non-compliance. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $900,000 in attorneys' fees and $40,000 per year for monitoring fees and expenses. On July 21, 2015, Judge O'Neill preliminarily approved the settlement, setting it for a fairness hearing at the end of September. That hearing was held before Magistrate Judge McAuliffe on September 28, 2015; on October 7, 2015, she recommended approval of the decree without amendment. 2015 WL 5916741. On November 2, 2015, Judge O'Neill adopted Magistrate Judge McAuliffe's recommendations in full, granted final approval to the consent decree, granted certification of the settlement class, approved attorneys' fees for class counsel, and retained jurisdiction for monitoring of the consent decree. The class was defined as "all prisoners who are now, or at some time in the future during the terms of this Consent Decree are, incarcerated in the Fresno County Jail." On December 11, 2015, Magistrate Judge McAuliffe denied a motion to unseal court records filed by a non-party to this action and sought support for a separate civil rights action against the Fresno County Jail. 2015 WL 13236882. She found that compelling reasons to keep them sealed, such as potential prejudice to the defendants if expert reports were unsealed, outweighed any minimal prejudice to the non-party. On February 1, 2016, she denied the non-party's motion for reconsideration. 2016 WL 374550. On February 12, 2016, the non-party sought a writ of mandamus from the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on April 4, 2016. On February 11, 2016, Judge O'Neill granted the parties' joint request for appointment of a court expert to complete a comprehensive review of the facilities and report on the County's progress regarding the remedial plan. A second expert was appointed on April 11, 2016. On October 3, 2018, Judge O'Neill granted additional attorneys' fees to plaintiffs's counsel to compensate their monitoring work which had become more intensive than previously anticipated. As of May 20, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket but presumedly the case remains open for monitoring of the consent decree.

Summary: In 2011, several inmates of the Fresno County Adult Detention Facilities filed a lawsuit against the County of Fresno, California, alleging that it violated prisoners' Constitutional rights by maintaining dangerous facilities and failing to provide basic health care. In 2015, the parties settled the case. The defendants agreed to implement a remedial plan and to pay $900,000 in attorneys' fees and $40,000 per year for monitoring fees and expenses.


On March 4, 1993, prisoners at the Merced County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Merced. Plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their constitutional rights. Among other issues, plaintiffs challenged the overcrowding of the jail and their lack of access to a law library. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 25, the Court (Judge Garland E. Burrell) granted a lodged stipulation by the parties and ordered the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the content of which is unclear from the docket. On April 16, 1993, again following a stipulation by the parties, the Court (Judge Burrell) issued an injunction which granted the following relief: (1) the County was enjoined from bedding prisoners on the floor, (2) the maximum bed capacity at the mail jail was set at 182, (3) the addition of more beds was prohibited, (4) the sheriff was authorized to release prisoners if the jail system came within ten percent of being filled and to refuse additional prisoners if the jail was filled. The parties also stipulated that the class should be certified, and on June 30, 1993, the Court (Judge Burrell) issued an order granting certification. A settlement was preliminarily approved, and a hearing on its fairness, reasonableness and adequacy was scheduled for September 14, 1994, but there is no indication on the docket that the settlement ever received final approval. On February 9, 2000, after issuing an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed and receiving no reply, the Court (Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows) dismissed the case.

Summary: This is a class action suit brought in 1993 by prisoners at the Merced County Jail to challenge their conditions of confinement. The District Court for the Eastern District of California issued some initial injunctive relief to prevent overcrowding, and a settlement was preliminarily approved but seemingly never finalized. The case was dismissed in 2000.


On June 10, 2011, the plaintiffs--family members of the decedent--filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Northern District of California. The decedent, a father to one of the plaintiffs, had been beaten and killed by several deputy sheriffs in Santa Rita Jail after he made a mess in his cell after being denied medical treatment for alcohol withdrawal. The plaintiffs sued Alameda Country as well as Corizon Health, Inc., the corporation responsible for providing medical treatment to the inmates of Alameda County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Their complaint alleged that Alameda County had violated the decedent’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment as well as his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; the complaint also included state law claims. On June 16, 2011, the case was assigned to Judge Claudia Wilken. Later, on Feb 12, 2013, the case would be assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. On November 19, 2012, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The parties began settlement negotiations, and on December 18, 2012, the defendant Corizon Health filed a motion to dismiss. On April 18, 2013, Judge Tigar denied this motion, finding that the plaintiffs had stated valid claims against Corizon Health. On August 30, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. In November 2013, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgment or in the alternative, partial summary judgment. On April 11, 2014, Judge Tigar granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court ruled in the defendants’ favor for all claims except the claim of assault and battery. On January 5, 2015, Judge Tigar referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for a mandatory settlement conference. The following month, the parties reached a settlement agreement and filed two stipulations with the court. One offered a proposed order of settlement. The other dismissed with prejudice all claims against the defendants pursuant to the settlement agreement. On February 27, 2015, the court granted both. The settlement agreement consisted of monetary relief in the amount of $8,300,000 and injunctive relief. The injunctive relief required Corizon Health to provide nurses for conducting patient assessments of all inmates in Alameda County. The settlement also required Alameda County to provide health training for the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office as well as to provide documentation of the training processes. The injunctive relief is to last for four years and the court will retain jurisdiction over the settlement. Later that year, an individual with a similar case filed a motion to intervene in order to gain access to a deposition transcript from the present case. On January 21, 2016, Judge Tigar granted the motion to intervene. The injunctive relief was set to end February 1, 2019. Presumably, the settlement lapsed and this case is now closed.

Summary: This 2011 lawsuit alleged that Alameda County had violated the decedent's constitutional rights in its agents' use of excessive force. The suit further alleged that Corizon Health, Inc. was negligent in its failure to provide decedent with treatment for alcohol withdrawal. In February, 2015, the parties settled for $8,300,000 in damages and injunctive relief that included health training. The injunctive relief is set to end February 1, 2019, and little activity had appeared on the docket since 2016.


On November 14, 2016, five prisoners in the Santa Clara County Jail system with mobility disabilities filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Santa Clara under the American with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights Advocates and Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, sought declaratory relief that the County had violated their rights and injunctive relief prohibiting further violations. The plaintiffs claimed that the Santa Clara County Jail system did not provide adequate facilities for people with mobility disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that they were kept in restrictive medical units which prevented them from using jail facilities and common areas, were denied access to educational, religious, and rehabilitative programming due to their disabilities, were often denied access to devices intended to increase their mobility (including wheelchairs and canes), and did not have access to a functional grievance system to report any of these circumstances. On April 13, 2017, the case was referred to mediation. From August 17, 2017 to May 31, 2018, Magistrate Judge Nathaniel M. Cousins presided over nine settlement conferences. The parties' joint motion for class certification was approved by Judge Lucy H. Koh on February 6, 2018. The class of plaintiffs was defined as “[a]ll individuals with mobility disabilities who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated in the Santa Clara County Jails, which consist of three facilities: (1) the Santa Clara County Main Jail Complex (“Main Jail”), consisting of Main Jail North and Main Jail South, in San Jose, California; (2) facilities for male inmates at the Elmwood Correctional Complex in Milpitas, California (“Elmwood”); and (3) the Elmwood Complex Women’s Facility in Milpitas, California.” Following class certification, the parties jointly moved for a preliminary class settlement on November 13, 2018. The preliminary settlement was approved by Judge Koh, and a joint motion for approval of a final settlement was made on January 14, 2019. The court granted approval on March 21, 2019. The settlement consisted of a consent decree that required Santa Clara County to make physical improvements to the jail system so that the jails would be accessible to inmates with mobility disabilities. The consent decree also directed Santa Clara County to incorporate features into a new jail, then under construction, so that the facility would be accessible when it was completed. The decree was administered by monitors who were to be chosen after the settlement was approved. The decree extends until one year after the completion of the new facility. The consent decree also provided for an attorney fee award for work performed prior to the consent decree, as well as work performed in the future until the expiration of the decree. Because the new jail is still under construction, this case is still ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, prisoners in the Santa Clara County Jail System filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the jail facilities were not accessible to inmates with mobility disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. In 2019, the parties jointly settled the case under a consent decree which would force Santa Clara County to make its jails accessible. The case is ongoing


On December 31, 2018, three female pretrial detainees housed at the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of a class of all women who were, or will be in the future, incarcerated in the Alameda County Jails, in the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law. They claimed denial of basic human rights, cruel and unusual punishment, and intentional infliction of emotional stress due to the jail’s practice of interrupting the sleep of the plaintiffs. Represented by a private counsel, they sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge James Donato. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the jail had a policy of keeping lights on at all times and scheduling meals and activities designed to prevent inmates from sleeping for more than five and a half hours per night. The plaintiffs also contended that, in addition to the 24-hour light-on policy, the jail routinely engaged in actions that disrupt the inmates’ sleep, such as repeatedly shining bright white flashlights into prisoners’ eyes, banging keys and flashlights on metal doors, operating machines, and making announcements over the public address system. On January 31, the court denied the plaintiffs’ <i>ex parte</i> motion for a temporary restraining order, but granted a preliminary injunction on March 27, 2019. In the order granting preliminary injunction, the court instructed the parties to jointly submit a proposal for a detailed version of the preliminary injunction that would meet the health needs of the prisoners while still satisfying the administrative requirements of the jail. The plaintiffs submitted a proposal, and the jail attempted to re-litigate the issuance of the injunction. The court adopted the plaintiffs’ proposed injunction on April 22, 2019. 377 F. Supp. 3d 1027. On June 27, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for certification of a class on the question of whether the county’s “policies and practices depriving and disrupting women prisoners’ sleep violates plaintiffs’ and class member’s constitutional rights.” The court terminated that motion without prejudice on March 24, 2020. In September 2019, the parties jointly requested that the case be referred to a magistrate judge for settlement discussions. As of July 2020, settlement negotiations are in progress.

Summary: In 2018, female prisoners at the Santa Rita Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ policy of keeping the lights on for 24 hours and other conduct that disrupt the inmates’ sleep violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying the basic human right to sleep and serving as a cruel and unusual punishment. As of July 2020, settlement negotiations are in progress.


On November 11, 2019, prisoners at Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, California, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, the California Forensic Medical Group and Aramark Correctional Services under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988. Two private Bay Area civil rights lawyers represented the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants deprived plaintiffs of the rights to free speech and free association, to their right to the presumption of innocence, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to protection and due process under the law, in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Santa Rita’s unsanitary confinement conditions, wrongful denials of attorney visits, failure to provide medical care, and retaliation against inmates for speaking out and filing grievances violated these constitutional rights. In particular, this suit was filed less than one month after a sizable prisoner’s strike on October 17, 2019, in Santa Rita Jail protesting these conditions. Plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory compensatory, and punitive relief. Plaintiffs sought class certification for all men incarcerated at Santa Rita Jail from November 12, 2017, through the present. Plaintiffs alleged that over 2,000 inmates were denied access to adequate food and conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment as well as violation of their First Amendment free speech and Fifth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiffs alleged that Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, in conjunction with for-profit medical provider California Forensic Medical Group and for-profit food provider ARAMARK have established inhumane living conditions at Santa Rita Jail. These conditions included presence of human bio waste and infestations of insects in the bathrooms, infestation of rat and bird droppings in food, lack of clean linens and toiletries, denial of outdoor recreational time, and grossly inadequate medical care. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants violated state regulations permitting regular visits and grievance procedures for prisoners. As of February 9, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 11, 2019 prisoners at Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, California filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, the California Forensic Medical Group and Aramark Correctional Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, and 1988. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants acted in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Santa Rita’s unsanitary confinement conditions, wrongful denials of attorney visits, failure to provide medical care, and retaliation against inmates for speaking out and filing grievances violated these constitutional rights. The case is ongoing.


On January 4, 2018, six women prisoners filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging systematic, misogynistic mistreatment of women prisoners at the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, California. The plaintiffs sued Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. Represented by private counsel, they sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. Specifically, the complaint alleges that pregnant women prisoners were denied medical attention and other accommodations including weather-appropriate clothing, nutritious food, feminine hygiene products, and fresh air. The specific conduct targeted toward pregnant women took place within an environment marked by general hostility toward women prisoners and indifference to women’s medical and hygienic needs. Further, the complaint alleged that the Alameda County Jail systematically discriminated against the women prisoners, compared to men prisoners, in access to reasonable facilities and services. In the complaint, the women prisoners sought recognition of class certification consisting of a main class of women prisoners with a sub-class of pregnant prisoners. The plaintiffs claimed that the conduct of the Alameda County Jail staff violated women prisoners’ rights protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On the same day that the initial complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent further harm to the pregnant plaintiffs. The women prisoners also sought relief in the form of compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys’ fees for the litigation. The case proceeded before Judge James Donato. On April 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs elaborated on the allegations in the original complaint of the mistreatment against pregnant women prisoners and discrimination against women prisoners in general. The second amended complaint also added additional causes of action under California state law. The second amended complaint delineated the named plaintiffs into various groups: current women prisoners, women who were formerly imprisoned, pregnant prisoners currently in custody, and formerly pregnant prisoners who suffered a miscarriage due to mistreatment while in custody. The complaint also identified additional named defendants beyond the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office and individuals employed therein, including the California Forensic Medical Group, retained to provide medical services to prisoners and Aramark Correctional Services, a for-profit food services provider at the Jail. The amended complaint also amended the relief sought by the women prisoners. The plaintiffs requested that the court certify the plaintiff class of women prisoners and the subclass of pregnant women prisoners, and that the court issue emergency remedy, by decree, to ensure that the women prisoners receive the medical care and other accommodations they needed to be safe while in custody at the Alameda County Jail. Finally, in addition to the injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages requested in the original complaint, the plaintiffs requested that the court affirmatively direct the defendants to fully comply with all state statutes and regulations regarding medical treatment, nutrition, activities, and personal hygiene for women prisoners. On December 31, 2018, one named plaintiff moved to relate the case to Upshaw v. County of Alameda. The parties began engaging in settlement negotiations and entered an agreement in principle on May 14, 2018. Settlement proceedings were heard by Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. The parties initially agreed to resolve money damages and other substantive relief and the plaintiffs agreed to withdraw the motion for class certification. The parties held a number of settlement conferences between May 14, 2018 and December 12, 2019. On May 7, 2019, one named plaintiff moved to relate the case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. Though opposed by the defendants, on May 15, 2020, the court related this case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. For further information, refer to the Clearinghouse page, available at this link.

Summary: On January 4, 2018, six women prisoners filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging systematic, misogynistic mistreatment of women prisoners at the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, California. The plaintiffs sued Alameda County and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their rights under the U.S. Constitution and state law. On April 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The plaintiffs elaborated on the allegations in the original complaint of the mistreatment against pregnant women prisoners and discrimination against women prisoners in general. The second amended complaint also added additional causes of action under California state law and identified additional named defendants beyond the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office and individuals employed therein, including the California Forensic Medical Group, retained to provide medical services to prisoners and Aramark Correctional Services, a for-profit food services provider at the Jail. The plaintiffs requested that the court certify a plaintiff class of women prisoners and the subclass of pregnant women prisoners, and that the court issue emergency remedy, by decree, to ensure that the women prisoners receive the medical care and other accommodations they needed to be safe while in custody at the Alameda County Jail. Finally, in addition to the injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages requested in the original complaint, the plaintiffs requested that the court affirmatively direct the defendants to fully comply with all state statutes and regulations regarding medical treatment, nutrition, activities, and personal hygiene for women prisoners. The parties began engaging in settlement negotiations and entered an agreement in principle on May 14, 2018. On May 7, 2019, one named plaintiff moved to relate the case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. Though opposed by the defendants, on May 15, 2020, the court related this case to Gonzalez v. Ahern. For further information, refer to the Clearinghouse page, available at this link.


COVID-19 Summary: This putative class-action lawsuit, brought by inmates in Orange County Jail, argued that county and the sheriff violated the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in failing to provide adequate care amidst the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. The court granted the motion for provisional class-certification and partially granted a temporary restraining order, but the defendants appealed and the Supreme Court stayed the injunctive relief while the appeals to the Ninth Circuit proceeded.<hr> This putative class-action lawsuit was filed on April 30, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The lawsuit was filed by several inmates in Orange County Jail. The suit arose out of the COVID-19 pandemic that swept the world in early 2020. As the virus raged throughout the country, it became particularly problematic in jails and prison systems. This lawsuit alleged that Orange County Jail's management of the virus was wholly inadequate and in violation of the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The suit alleged that requisite social distancing was not possible due to the high density of inmates in the jail, that the masks were simply pieces of fabric (and were not always used by guards), and that isolation policies were ineffective. The plaintiffs were medically vulnerable inmates in Orange County Jail and they were represented by ACLU National, ACLU Fund of Southern California, and ACLU Disabilities Rights Program attorneys, the UC Irvine Civil Rights Litigation Clinic, and private counsel. They sued Orange County and the Sheriff of Orange County. The complaint alleged that defendants' failure to adequately mitigate the spread of COVID-19 in the jail system represented violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They argued that the conditions represented an unconstitutional punishment and unconstitutional confinement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees that the state provide for reasonable health and safety of inmates. As for the Eighth Amendment, they argued that the lack of precautions constituted deliberate indifference to the health of the inmates as to be cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs also argued that the failure to protect medically vulnerable inmates (particularly those with co-morbidities), constituted discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs sought class certification, a writ of habeas corpus to identify all members of a Medically-Vulnerable Subclass and Disability Subclass and grant them release, injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, or habeas corpus that would mitigate the spread of COVID-19, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. On May 11, the plaintiffs submitted an application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction and a motion for provisional class certification. On May 26, the court granted the motion for provisional class-certification and granted in part and denied in part the application for a temporary restraining order. The grant of provisional class status created two classes, a Pre-Trial Class and a Post-Conviction Class. Under each of those were Disability Subclasses and Medically-Vulnerable Subclasses. The partial grant of the TRO mandated defendants to follow CDC social distancing guidelines, expand testing, and enhance sanitation efforts in the jails. It did not grant release to any prisoners, though. 2020 WL 2754938. Defendants appealed this decision two days later and applied to stay the case pending a decision from the 9th Circuit (docket #: 20-55568). In both the district court and the 9th Circuit, the defendants filed emergency motions to stay the lower court decision, but the district court denied this motion on June 2. 2020 WL 4039073. The 9th Circuit then denied this motion on June 17. However, they remanded the case to the district court to gauge whether any changed circumstances might require alterations to the TRO. 2020 WL 3547960. The defendants then filed an ex parte application with the district court to dissolve the TRO, which the district court denied yet again in late June. The defendants tried to argue that the declining rate of COVID-19 in the Orange County Jail represented a significant enough change to warrant dissolution of the preliminary injunction. On July 1, the defendants appealed once more to the 9th Circuit (docket #: 20-55668). And, once again, the 9th Circuit denied the motion on July 3. Then on July 21, the defendants brought the case to the Supreme Court, submitting an emergency application for stay of injunctive relief. In a 5-4 decision, the Court granted the stay on August 5. There was no majority, opinion, but Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent arguing that, even if the majority would have granted the stay at the district court, it was not so clearly wrong as to warrant granting certiorari. 2020 WL 4499350. On August 25, the plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss as moot each of the pending appeals in the 9th Circuit. They argued that the preliminary injunction had expired and therefore the appeals were moot. The defendants sought to continue litigating the appeals and alleged that without review by the appellate court, there was nothing to stop the district court from entering preliminary injunctions every 90 days throughout the life of the case. On October 15, 2020, the two appeals were consolidated. The case is ongoing and in discovery as of February 17, 2021.

Summary: This putative class-action lawsuit, brought by inmates in Orange County Jail, argued that county and the sheriff violated the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in failing to provide adequate care amidst the 2020 coronavirus pandemic. Plaintiffs sought habeas corpus, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. The district court granted class certification and partially granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which mandated more social distancing, providing for more PPE, and improved sanitation policies. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, and applied in both the district court and the Ninth Circuit to stay the case in the lower court until the appeals court had ruled. Both denied these applications, however the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court saying that the defendants could try to modify the injunction if there were any changed circumstances. Defendants did so, but the district court denied any modifications once again. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which likewise rejected the defendants' motion. Finally, the defendants went to the Supreme Court and asked them to stay the injunction while the Ninth Circuit heard the case on the merits. The Supreme Court obliged on August 5, staying the injunction. The case is ongoing as of February 17, 2021.


On February 23, 2006, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs claimed that D.C. Jail officials violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights in detaining them beyond their release dates and violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights for conducting blanket strip searches. The Barnes case followed a nearly identical class action lawsuit styled Bynum v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 02-956 (RCL), JC-DC-0004 in this Clearinghouse. The Bynum case resulted in a $14 million settlement. The Barnes plaintiffs alleged that while the District agreed to stop its practices of overdetention and strip searches, and did so in the context of the Bynum settlement. The Final Approval Order in the Bynum case did not require that those practices stop. The Barnes plaintiffs alleged that despite the Bynum settlement, the unlawful practices of overdetention and strip searches had been reconstituted, such that injunctive relief was now necessary. The Barnes plaintiffs, who were represented by some of the same attorneys as in Bynum, sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. The District moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. That motion was denied on March 26, 2007, by the District Court (Judge Royce C. Lamberth). The Court certified an Overdetention Class and a Strip Search class, just as it had done in the Bynum case. On January 20, 2011, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint for individual money damages and class injunctive relief and jury demand. Following the close of liability discovery, the parties cross-motions for summary judgment were granted in part and denied in part. On June 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge Lamberth) ruled on both parties' summary judgment motions. Judge Lamberth granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their claims related to the strip searches and on the District’s liability for overdetentions from 2005 to 2006. Judge Lamberth granted the District summary judgment on its claims of overdetentions from 2008 to the present. 793 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011). Then, the plaintiffs asked for leave to file another amended complaint. The parties moved again for summary judgement. But on December 7, 2011, the District Court (Judge Lamberth) held that 1) the court would not grant the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint and that the court would not entertain further motions for summary judgment. Judge Lamberth also addressed additional discovery issues, how the issue of general damages would be tried, and that the class would be decertified to try the issue of special damages. 278 F.R.D. 14 (D.D.C. 2011). After Judge Lamberth had decertified the special damages class, the plaintiffs had moved to stay the decertification order and to make the stay of decertification order retroactive to date of that order. On February 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge Lamberth) stayed the decertification order was appropriate, but only as of when the plaintiffs’ moved for the stay. Leading up to the trial, both parties filed various motions regarding discovery and evidence that the court addressed. In March 2013, there was a week-long jury trial. Afterward, the District moved for judgment as a matter of law, which was denied. But on March 11, the jury found that the plaintiffs were unconstitutionally overdetained at the D.C. Jail between 2007 and 2008, but that the District wasn't liable; the jury didn't find evidence of "deliberate indifference" to the inmates' rights. Because Judge Lamberth had already granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on claims related to the strip searches and on the city's liability for overdetentions from 2005 to 2006, the parties moved for the case to be referred to mediation and the litigation stayed. On November 4, 2013, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court approved on March 18, 2014. The District agreed to provide monetary compensation for each plaintiff, based on the length of time they were "overdetained" and for qualifying strip searches. The District also agreed to pay a total of $6.2 million to the plaintiffs, the class members, and to cover costs and attorney's fees. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. As of February 2016, the District had filed two status reports with the court on the payments to the plaintiffs.

Summary: In 2006, inmates in the D.C. Jail filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs claimed that D.C. Jail violated their Constitutional rights by detaining them beyond their release dates and conducting blanket strip searches. In 2014, after summary judgment rulings and a jury trial in 2013, the parties settled the case and D.C. agreed to pay the plaintiffs $6.2 million.


On December 2, 2002, nine female plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed this 42 U.S.C §1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs challenged the practice of the U.S. Marshal's Service and the District of Columbia of conducting blanket strip, visual body cavity, and/or squat searches ("strip searches") of female arrestees that were being held in the Superior Court Cell Block of the D.C. Superior Court while awaiting presentment before a judicial officer. Specifically, the plaintiffs complained that the policy and practice of subjecting all female arrestees to strip searches in the absence of reasonable individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs further complained that the practice of subjecting female arrestees but not similarly situated male arrestees to blanket strip searches violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. The class action complaint was amended twice in 2006. Defendants denied all allegations and, on May 31, 2006, sought dismissal of the case on numerous grounds, including the defense of qualified immunity. On November 14, 2006, the District Court (Judge Rosemary M. Collyer) denied Defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety. Johnson v. District of Columbia, 461 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2006). Defendants initially appealed, but the appeal was subsequently voluntarily dismissed. Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 2007 WL 1760078 (D.C.Cir. Jun 11, 2007). On February 8, 2008, the District Court granted the plaintiff's motions for class certification. The Court designated two groups of classes, the Fifth Amendment Class and the Fourth Amendment Class. The court defined the Fourth Amendment Class as, "Each woman who, during the Class Period (December 2, 1999, until April 25, 2003), was, (i) held in the Superior Court Cell Block; (ii) awaiting presentment under a statute of the District of Columbia; (iii) subjected to a blanket strip, visual body cavity and/or squat search; (iv) under similar circumstances for which male arrestees were not subjected to a blanket strip, visual body cavity and/or squat search." The court defined the Fifth Amendment Class as, "each woman who, during the Class Period (December 2, 1999, until April 25, 2003), was, (i) held in the Superior Court Cell Block; (ii) awaiting presentment under a statute of the District of Columbia on either (a) a non-drug, non-violent traffic offense, (b) a non-drug, non- violent misdemeanor, or (c) a non-drug, non-violent felony; and (iii) subjected to a blanket strip, visual body cavity and/or squat search; (iv) without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that she was concealing drugs, weapons or other contraband." In this opinion, the District Court also dismissed all charges against the United States Marshall's Service. On February 28, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a cross-claim against United States Superior Court Marshall Todd Dillard on the grounds that he caused them (separately and concurrently) to be subjected strip searches at the D.C. Superior Court cellblock in violation of the 4th and 5th amendments. And that by instituting and implementing a policy which subjected the plaintiffs, all women, to strip searches without individualized suspicion, the co-defendant is liable to the District for all, or part of the claims asserted by the plaintiff against the District of Columbia in this action, by virtue of his practice and policy. This crossclaim was partially in response to the District Court having previously dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the United States Marshall's Service. On May 23, 2008, the District of Columbia filed for summary judgment for the charges against the District of Columbia. The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on October 31, 2008. The Court found that the District of Columbia cannot be liable to the plaintiffs as a matter of law on any of the theories they advance inasmuch as the Marshal was a federal official and not an employee, servant, agent or actor under the control of the District of Columbia, and inasmuch as the District of Columbia had no choice but to turn over arrestees to the Superior Court Marshal for presentment. This dismissal left the Marshall (Todd Dillard) as the sole defendant in this case. On January 14, 2010, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend their complaint for the third time. On April 5, 2010, the defendant filed for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' remaining claims against the Marshall. On April 21, 2011, the District Court issued an opinion that granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court conceded that the record shows that during the class period female arrestees were subjected to a blanket practice of strip searches while many, if not most, male arrestees were not. It is nonetheless clear that former Marshal Dillard is entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment claims. The Fifth Amendment claims similarly fail as the plaintiffs proffered no evidence that former Marshal Dillard purposefully discriminated by intending a gender disparity in search procedures. Summary judgment was denied to the plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claims and granted to Marshal Dillard on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims. Accordingly the case was dismissed from District Court. On May 4, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the DC Circuit Court. On August 13, 2014 the DC Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the District Court's summary judgment ruling for Superior Court Marshal, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. And also affirming the District Court's summary judgment ruling for the District of Columbia, concluding that because the Superior Court Marshal in charge of the cellblock was at all times a federal official acting under color of federal law, the city had no authority to prevent the strip searches.

Summary: In 2002, nine female plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed this 42 U.S.C §1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs challenged the practice of the U.S. Marshal's Service and the District of Columbia of conducting blanket strip, visual body cavity, and/or squat searches ("strip searches") of female arrestees that were being held in the Superior Court Cell Block of the D.C. Superior Court while awaiting presentment before a judicial officer. After granting the plaintiffs class certification, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims.


On February 1, 2013, a deaf jail inmate filed this lawsuit on behalf of himself in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff claimed that the officials at DC’s Correctional Treatment Facility denied him (1) effective access to qualified interpreters (2) effective access to telecommunications, (3) access to jail alerts and announcements, and (4) adequate access to visitation. This effectively prevented the plaintiff from communicating with staff and inmates inside the jail, and family and friends during visitation hours. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiff sought damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiff claimed that officers at the D.C. Correctional Treatment Facility denied him adequate accommodations from the moment he arrived. The plaintiff’s native language was American Sign Language. He had relied on interpreters and auxiliary aids when communicating with people who did not know American Sign Language. Although he could communicate via notes in written English, it was his second language and no substitute for the accommodations guaranteed by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Yet no interpreter was present for intake, orientation, or at any point during the plaintiff’s fifty-one day sentence. The lack of accommodation prevented the plaintiff from obtaining adequate health care, accessing the facility’s rehabilitative services, and communicating with visitors. During in person visits, the plaintiff wore handcuffs. The plaintiff analogized that this was equivalent to gagging a hearing prisoner. On April 4, 2013 the case was reassigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Over a year later on August 2, 2014, Judge Jackson referred the case to a magistrate judge for mediation. But by October, the parties had not reached a settlement. The case proceeded through discovery. On November 14, 2014 the plaintiff moved for summary judgment with respect to claim (1) that he had been denied access to an interpreter, and claim (2) that he had been denied effective telecommunication technology. On September 2, 2015, the judge granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his claims that the facility had denied him adequate access to interpreters and telecommunications technology. 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). On September 29, 2015 the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment the court had filed against them. Judge Brown denied this motion on November 25, 2015. 146 F.Supp.3d 197 (D.D.C. 2015). The case then went to trial with respect to the plaintiff’s remaining Rehabilitation Act claims, and on May 11, 2016 the jury returned a judgment for the plaintiff and awarded $70,000 in damages. The city appealed. The District of Columbia sought and obtained an order to withhold attorneys' fees from the judgment until the appeal had been resolved. The Defendant appealed on the following issues: the calculation of the plaintiff's damages, whether there was a duty to conduct disability assessment before admitting the plaintiff, whether there was a genuine issue of fact that the jail afforded the plaintiff an interpreter and on the plaintiffs non-interpreter claims, and whether the court erred in allowing opinions from the plaintiff's experts. Before the appeal resolved though, the parties entered a settlement agreement on November 11, 2016. Information regarding this settlement is not available on the docket. Subsequently, the D.C. appellate court entered a stipulated dismissal, requiring each party to pay their own attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: D.C. jail denies accommodation to plaintiff while they were incarcerated. As a result, the plaintiff could not participate in the court-ordered rehabilitation services offered by the jail. The D.C. jail later placed the plaintiff in voluntary solitary confinement without communicating to him that his solitary confinement was voluntary. The court found in favor of the plaintiff on summary judgment and a subsequent jury trail awarded him $70,000 in damages.


On June 29, 2009, two inmates at the Manatee County Jail filed a pro se lawsuit in the Middle District Court of Florida challenging the constitutionality of the jail’s new mail policy. The inmates filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated at the jail, alleging that the new policy, which only allowed inmates to receive post-cards, was unconstitutional. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that jail personnel were opening their privileged mail and were allowing trainees to search legal bins and legal mail without the owner being present, and that the defendants were violating their constitutional rights by allowing trainees to perform training exercises on them and other prisoners, including cavity searches. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunction and declaratory judgment claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On July 8, 2009, the case was dismissed without prejudice, because the plaintiffs raised several unrelated claims in the same complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended pro se complaint on July 24, 2009, which only challenged the Manatee County Jail mail policy. The Court dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice because the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se and were purporting to bring a class action for themselves and all others similarly situated. On September 4, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, alleging that the new mail policy at Manatee County Jail and the Defendants' practice of opening privileged mail and censoring the newspaper given to inmates violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court appointed counsel to the Plaintiffs on October 26, 2009. Plaintiffs' counsel--the Florida Justice Institute and private counsel--filed an amended complaint on February 18, 2010, claiming that the new mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the inmates and the inmates family members and friends. The plaintiffs' group included two inmates and two family members of inmates. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. On April 15, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. Later, on May 12, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify Judge Kovachevich for bias or prejudice. The defendants alleged that one of Judge Kovachevich's staff attorneys undertook a factual investigation regarding the plaintiffs' claim. Allegedly, the staff attorney contacted the jail and requested legal precedent regarding the defendants' mail policy. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the staff attorney made a sua sponte request for counsel to represent the plaintiffs. On May 28, 2010 Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court held that postcard only mail policies were reasonably related to penological interests and cited precedent from the Middle District of Florida. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 85, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). On June 23, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the case. Specifically the plaintiffs argued that the case should be reconsidered because the case was dismissed while there was a pending motion for the recusal of Judge Kovachevich. Furthermore, the court dismissed the case sua sponte before the defendants explained why their practices carried out a legitimate penological interest, nor were the plaintiffs allowed to present evidence to the contrary. On March 11, 2011 the court issued an order to have both parties report on whether the case was moot before ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. The order stated that both inmates had been released from the jail and that any argument for granting injunctive relief on account that the plaintiffs might be future inmates was without merit. The plaintiffs’ counsel responded on March 25, 2011 and argued that the case was not moot because the plaintiffs still had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of the proposed class of persons similarly situated. On March 29, 2011 the defendants responded that the claims were moot because the plaintiffs were no longer inmates and thus no longer had a personal stake in the matter. What happened next is unclear. Two of the lawyers for the Florida Justice Institute filed motions to withdraw, because they were moving out of state. Both motions stated that other counsel would remain involved (both motions were granted). But there is no other recorded activity in the docket. As of October 15, 2016, there are no new orders regarding the motion, and apparently the Manatee County Jail still has a strict post-card old policy in place. We assume the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2009, inmates of the Manatee County Jail challenged the constitutionality of a post-card only jail policy in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In 2010, the court ruled that the policy was reasonably related to penological interests. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but as of October 15, 2016, the Court had not issued any orders regarding the motion.


On April 8, 1999, inmates at the Foster County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia, who had tested positive for HIV, filed this class action lawsuit against county officials. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the defendants' policies, which denied even basic medical care to HIV-positive prisoners, were sufficient to meet the deliberate indifference standard required to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that the same practices also violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought improvements in medical care and a reduction in overcrowding. On April 16, 1999, the court (Judge Marvin H. Shoob) held a preliminary injunction hearing, at which the parties presented a proposed settlement. The court entered a consent order as to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief on the same day. Subsequently, on January 10, 2000, the parties filed a joint motion to provide notice of class action settlement. On January 24, 2000, the court (Judge Shoob), after a hearing on the settlement, entered a final order and closed the case. The defendants were required to improve medical care and reduce overcrowding in the jail. The final settlement agreement specifically required that the defendant provide timely medical access to all present and future HIV-positive inmates [the class], and treatment that met the standard of care set forth by the United States Department of Health and Human Services. The court also appointed Dr. Robert B. Greifinger, MD, as healthcare monitor, to monitor the defendants' compliance with the Settlement Agreement and to work and consult with them as necessary. The defendants were required to pay all costs associated with the healthcare monitor's services. On March 3, 2000, the plaintiffs filed a non-compliance civil action, seeking monetary and injunctive relief alleging that the defendants were not complying with the settlement. The appointed health care monitor submitted a status report to the court on March 7, 2000, detailing areas in need of improvement at the jail. On April 11, 2000, the court (Judge Shoob) entered an order adopting the recommendations of the report, including that the scope of the settlement agreement reached to intake processes and medical care for all inmates, and aspects of communicable diseases. Furthermore, the agreement required the elimination of overcrowding at the jail. Foster v. Fulton Co., No. 1:99-CV-900-MHS, 2000 WL 34016360 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2000). For approximately the next two years, the monitors continued to submit status reports, and the defendants continued to adjust policies to comply with the court's orders. On November 5, 2001, the court directed the parties to respond to the monitor's report that ten areas were "far from compliance" with the settlement agreement. On April 16, 2002, the court (Judge Shoob) issued an order finding the defendants in breach of the settlement agreement, and requiring them to employ a sufficient number of trained staff, to refer HIV-positive inmates to outside specialists in a timely manner, and to improve overall jail conditions, including overcrowding, security, and nutrition. Foster v. Fulton Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2002). On July 12, 2002, the court (Judge Shoob) denied the defendants' motion to stay implementation of actions ordered in the April 12, 2002 opinion. The court held that the defendants were required to develop a unified system for providing counsel and the opportunity to review their charges for detainees within 72 hours of arrest, and to develop a meaningful discharge plan for physically and mentally ill prisoners. Foster v. Fulton Co., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2002). According to the PACER docket, on October 28, 2002, the court (Judge Shoob) withdrew portions of its orders issued on April 12, 2002, and on July 12, 2002, required the appointment of counsel to indigents charged with minor offenses and the provision of all purpose hearings in state court within 72 hours of arrest to combat overcrowding. On November 13, 2002 the Court terminated the case, with the consent of all parties, after the county promised to continue outside monitoring of jail health care for 18 months. The docket reflects no further entries regarding the litigation of this case. In 2003 and 2005 the plaintiffs filed copies of the notice they posted in the jail detailing the terms of the settlement. In addition, in 2011 there was an entry regarding "unclaimed exhibits," which the plaintiffs' attorneys then retrieved. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 1999, inmates at the Foster County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia, who had tested positive for HIV, filed this class action lawsuit against county officials. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 2000, the parties reached a settlement agreement that required improved medical care and reduced overcrowding.


On January 27, 2009, current and former detainees at the Cook County Jail (CCJ), in Chicago, filed this class action lawsuit against Cook County and the Sheriff of Cook County in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought certification of two sub-classes: "all inmates housed at Cook County Department of Corrections on or after January 1, 2007, who have made a written request for dental care because of acute pain and who suffered prolonged and unnecessary pain because of lack of treatment" and "all persons presently confined at the Cook County Jail who are experiencing dental pain and who have waited more than seven days after making a written request for treatment of that pain without having been examined by a dentist." For the first class, the plaintiffs sought monetary relief. For the second class, the plaintiffs sought both monetary and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jail's failure to provide adequate dental care constituted deliberate indifference to their medical needs in violation of their constitutional rights. The case was assigned to Judge Joan H. Lefkow. On November 18, 2010, the judge certified the second class of plaintiffs while denying the first class's certification. 2010 WL 4791509. Other judges in the same district had denied class certification in similar circumstances, and defendants (and the court) cited principles of comity to support denial of certification in this case. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this denial, citing recent Supreme Court case law. On August 17, 2011, the judge granted this motion and certified both sub-classes. 2011 WL 13136965. The defendants then appealed the August 17 decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The sole issue on appeal was if a district court, when deciding a motion for class certification, should defer, based on the principles of comity, to a sister court's ruling of on a motion for certification of a similar case. On June 19, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of class certification by holding that another federal district judge's rulings on class certification was not preclusive. 683 F.3d 373. On December 22, 2014, the district court issued an opinion decertifying the injunctive class, rendering the plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction moot. 2014 WL 7330792. The court also modified the definition of the damages class, narrowing it in a way to be determined at a later date. The court noted that positive changes in the provision of dental services at CCJ had made it so that injunctive relief would be so vague as to be pointless or too detailed to be practical. The plaintiffs immediately appealed the decision to deny the injunction to the Court of Appeals and moved to sub-divide the class to address the issues perceived by the court. The defendants also filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal of the decision not to decertify the damages class, but it was denied by the Seventh Circuit on February 25, 2015. On July 6, 2016, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' appeal of the decertification and renewed request for injunctive relief. 828 F.3d 541. On October 13, 2016, Judge Lefkow denied the plaintiff's motion to sub-divide the class and strongly suggested that settlement would be appropriate. 2016 WL 5939704. Then, after many months of negotiations, the parties reached a settlement agreement and moved for preliminary approval of the agreement on May 1, 2018. The agreement required that the defendant County establish a settlement fund in the amount of $5,563,000 to cover damages for class members associated with their dental care, incentive awards, fees and costs of counsel, resolution of three separate lawsuits, and administration of this settlement. The court was to retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the agreement. After a fairness hearing on August 21, 2018, the court approved the settlement. As of April 9, 2020, the case remains open for the purposes of enforcement.

Summary: On January 27, 2009, current and former detainees at the Cook County Jail filed a lawsuit against the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, IL in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs asked the court for damages and injunctive relief to improve their dental treatment. In May 2018, the parties reached a settlement whereby the defendant County would establish a settlement fund in the amount of $5,563,000. The case is ongoing.


On June 6, 2014, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Cook County. The plaintiff, represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and a private law firm, sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that overcrowding led to unsanitary living conditions and the deprivation of basic necessities. The plaintiff also claimed that Cook County was aware of severe overcrowding and failed to provide adequate funding to the jail. The court granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss on October 15, 2014 to the extent it sought to strike allegations of punitive damages against the sheriff in his official capacity and Cook County, since a municipality is not exposed to punitive damages because of the bad-faith actions of its officials. The court denied the rest of defendants' motion to dismiss. On August 24, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs' counsel's motion to withdraw class certification, and denied plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The court dismissed the motion on file based on counsel's representation that the two alleged counts were unsupported. <i>Malewski v. Preckwinkle</i>, 2015 WL 5037073 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2015). Plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the filing fees on September 22, 2015, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the case on June 22, 2016. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2014, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, alleging overcrowding and lack of funding that led to violations of Indiana state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court dismissed the case based on counsel's representation that the alleged counts were unsupported. The case is now closed.


On December 19, 2014, individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Marion County Sheriff and the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought money damages for a class of individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system for unreasonable periods of time. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable seizures and detentions and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The plaintiffs also alleged the defendants incarcerated the plaintiffs for longer than legally authorized because the plaintiffs were detained after their release was ordered and/or after the legal authority for their detention had ceased. The case was assigned to Judge Richard L. Young. The Marion County Sheriff's Department stated to multiple individuals that the sheriff had a period of seventy-two hours after a release order to process prisoners out of jail. The plaintiffs argued that this is an unreasonable period of time. Additionally, the Sheriff had a practice of re-arresting and re-imprisoning individuals who had been released on their own recognizance or had their charges vacated or dismissed, at which point the Sheriff no longer had any legal right to detain them. The plaintiffs claimed that these procedures constituted unreasonable seizures and detentions, deprivation of liberty without due process, false imprisonment, and negligence. The plaintiffs sought the creation of a common fund from which all class members could claim compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Early in the litigation, the plaintiffs filed three separate amended complaints. The third amended complaint, filed on May 13, 2015, added three plaintiffs and factual allegations to accommodate the new plaintiffs. Two days prior, on May 11, 2015, a non-party to this case filed a motion to transfer this case to the Indiana Supreme Court. The court denied this motion on October 14, 2015, reasoning that the moving party was not a party to this action nor could he be a member of the putative class because the class had not yet been certified. Furthermore, Judge Dinsmore noted that the court did not have the authority to transfer the case to the Indiana Supreme Court. (Two-and-half years later, on January 19, 2018, this non-party filed a notice of appeal of this decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, however, noting that this pro se appellant had neither paid the $505.00 appellate fees nor filed a motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis in the district court.) On October 15, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for class certification of a general class and five subclasses. The general class consisted of "all individuals who, from December 19, 2012 to the present, were held in confinement by the Marion County Sheriff after legal authority for those detentions ceased." The five subclasses were based on the reasons the Sheriff ceased to have authority. The reasons were that the defendants were: "operating under a standard of seventy-two (72) hours to release prisoners who are ordered released" (72-hour subclass); "not accepting cash or surety bonds but instead outsourcing the payment and processing of these bonds to the Marion County Clerk" (cash subclass); "employing a computer system inadequate for the purposes intended with respect to the timely release of prisoners" (computer system subclass); "re-arresting and imprisoning individuals who are released on their own recognizance, found not guilty or acquitted, or who have had their criminal charges vacated or dismissed, and for whom the Sheriff no longer has any legal right to detain" (wrongful arrest subclass); and, "keeping inmates imprisoned who the courts have released to Community Corrections for electronic monitoring" (Community Corrections subclass). On September 30, 2016, the district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Judge Young granted the motion as to the wrongful arrest subclass and the Community Corrections subclass. The class was certified as: <blockquote>"All individuals who, from December 19, 2012, to the present, were held in confinement by the Sheriff after legal authority for those detentions ceased due to the Sheriff’s policies or practices of: (1) re-arresting and imprisoning individuals who are released on their own recognizance, found not guilty or acquitted, or who have had their criminal charges vacated or dismissed; and (2) keeping inmates imprisoned who the courts have released to Community Corrections for electronic monitoring."</blockquote> The court denied the motion as to the 72-hour subclass, the cash subclass, and the computer system subclass. Dissatisfied with this order, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's denial as to the 72-hour and computer system subclasses. 2016 WL 5946839. Subsequently, on November 2, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay case proceedings pending resolution of this appeal. On December 5, 2016, Judge Dinsmore filed a report and recommendation regarding the plaintiffs' motion to stay, recommending that the court grant the motion. Agreeing with Judge Dinsmore, Judge Young adopted the report and granted the motion. On June 15, 2017, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion vacating the district court's decision and remanding the case. In this opinion, the appeals court found the district court's reasoning for denying the computer system subclass to be without base. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted that the district court erred in relying on a 48-hour presumption of reasonableness with regard to detention as a basis for denying certification of the 72-hour subclass. 859 F.3d 489. Given this opinion, the plaintiffs moved to amend the class certification order on July 10, 2017, asking the district court to certify the computer system subclass and modify its 48-hour presumption to a 6-hour presumption. In response, on September 19, 2017, arguing that the Seventh Circuit's opinion did not order the district court to certify the two subclasses, the defendants filed a motion to set a class certification hearing to resolve factual disputes. Agreeing with the defendants, the district court granted the defendants' motion for hearing and denied the plaintiffs' motion on December 14, 2017. The hearing was originally set for February 16, 2018, but was later rescheduled and held on October 8, 2018. The court certified the class of plaintiffs on November 5, 2019 with respect to the following classes: 1) the Sheriff's practice of operating under a standard allowing up to 72 hours to release prisoners who are ordered released; and 2) the Sheriff's practice of employing a computer system inadequate for the purposes intended with respect to the timely release of prisoners. On June 28, 2019, Indianapolis and Marion County moved for summary judgment. That same day, several of the named defendants also filed for partial summary judgment. As of April 9, 2020, they are still awaiting a ruling on these motions. This case is ongoing as of April 9, 2020.

Summary: In 2014, individuals who were incarcerated in the Marion County correctional system filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Marion County sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought monetary relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Marion County Sheriffs Office. The plaintiffs claimed that they were incarcerated for longer than legally authorized as a result of unreasonable processing and release procedures. The case is ongoing.


Built in 1991, the Campbell County Detention Center was designed to hold 135 prisoners. It quickly became overcrowded. In the weeks before this lawsuit was filed in the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, on April 29, 2005, the jail's population reached a high of 276 prisoners, many of whom were forced to sleep on the floor. Many of the inmates were awaiting transfer to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), which was also named as a defendant in this lawsuit. The KDOC addressed overcrowding at the jail by simply reducing the required floor space for each prisoner from 50 to 40 square feet. This lawsuit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by attorney Robert B. Newman of the Cincinnati, Ohio, law firm Newman & Meeks, alleged the overcrowding violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, the class of inmates at the detention center, sought injunctive relief and nominal damages. The parties reached a settlement agreement on November 23, 2005, and notice was provided to the class and a fairness hearing held on January 25, 2006. The Court (Judge William O. Bertelsman) approved the settlement, after allowing one class member to opt-out, signing the consent decree on February 7, 2006. To settle the suit, County officials and the KDOC agreed to a number of measures aimed at reducing overcrowding. These included the building of a new Restricted Custody Center to house felons headed for the KDOC, expansion and remodeling of the old jail, and the implementation of new policies to prevent overcrowding. At the detention center, County officials agreed to add 256 beds, as well as a new kitchen and laundry facility, and to convert the old kitchen and laundry space into an upgraded infirmary. A full time nurse position was also created and filled. The jail also agreed to install more bunk beds and renovate dormitory showers; replace a boiler and all air conditioning units; upgrade the security system; and replace a leaky roof. In addition, the County agreed to decline regular requests to house federal prisoners, and the KDOC agreed to remove prisoners from the detention center within 45 days or sooner after the imposition of a prison sentence. The county reached an agreement with Boone County to house up to 30 prisoners at Boone County's new jail if necessary. County officials agreed to appoint a "Population/Pretrial Officer" responsible for managing the number of prisoners at the detention center; implement a "Pretrial Conditional Release Program" to reduce the number of prisoners housed at the detention center; and initiate an objective jail classification system. Finally, a Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) was to be be created and maintained to foster communication between judges, defense attorneys, and probation and parole officers in order to address issues that might reduce jail population. As an element of the CJAC, Campbell County police chiefs agreed to instruct their officers to simply ticket and release misdemeanor offenders (except those charged with domestic violence or driving under the influence) who are not a threat to public safety or a flight risk. On April 14, the Court required that status reports be filed every six months. The first report was filed on October 16, 2006. Subsequent reports were filed on April 16, 2007, and November 2, 2007. Agreeing that the defendants had implemented the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties moved to dismiss the case. On June 30, 2008, the Court granted the joint motion to dismiss the case.

Summary: Built in 1991, the Campbell County Detention Center was designed to hold 135 prisoners. It quickly became overcrowded. In the weeks before this lawsuit was filed in the district court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, on April 29, 2005, the jail's population reached a high of 276 prisoners, many of whom were forced to sleep on the floor. Many of the inmates were awaiting transfer to the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), which was also named as a defendant in the lawsuit. The KDOC addressed overcrowding at the jail by simply reducing the required floor space for each prisoner from 50 to 40 square feet. This lawsuit, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by attorney Robert B. Newman of the Cincinnati, Ohio, law firm Newman & Meeks, alleged the overcrowding violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, the class of inmates at the detention center, sought injunctive relief and nominal damages.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action challenged COVID-related conditions at the Prince Georges County jail and sought mitigation and release for pretrial and post-conviction detainees. On May 21, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order. Defendants appealed and were denied a stay pending their appeal. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, pointing to the lack of mental health services during an indefinite lockdown. On August 27, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings pending settlement talks. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 21, 2020, pretrial and post-conviction detainees at Prince George’s County Jail, many of whom have pre-existing medical conditions, some of whom were exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms, and all of whom were scared of contracting the virus, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Prince George’s County Department of Corrections in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The plaintiffs, represented by Civil Rights Corps, sought constitutionally sufficient procedures to protect their health and safety consistent with CDC guidelines and the judgment of correctional health specialists. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been deprived of their rights to reasonably safe living conditions under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and that defendant’s policy of detaining COVID-positive people in the jail who are legally entitled to release violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, a subclass of medically vulnerable pre-trial plaintiffs claimed they were being held in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction, requested a hearing, and moved to certify a class. On April 23, District Court Judge Paula Xinis ordered the defendant to file a response to plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO by April 25, and for plaintiffs to reply by April 27. Judge Xinis also directed the parties to submit a joint recommendation for an Independent Inspector by April 27, or two recommendations each, with supporting documents, if they were unable to agree. The defendant filed their response in opposition to plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on April 25 under seal. The plaintiffs filed their reply on April 29. On April 30, each party individually recommended two experts. On May 1, Judge Xinis appointed Carlos Franco-Paredes, MD, MPH as inspector, pursuant to the plaintiffs' recommendation. On May 21, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion for the temporary restraining order. The court ordered a written plan or protocol to be completed within five days that addressed: 1. The identification, monitoring, treatment, and housing of detainees who are “high risk” (aged 65 or over and/or have an applicable medical condition) for suffering adverse outcomes if infected with COVID-19. 2. The training, education, and supervision of defendant's staff (medical and corrections officers). 3. A protocol for testing and isolation of detainees. The court also ordered the defendants to submit the following within fourteen days: 1. The total number of tests administered and the total number of confirmed COVID-19 positive detainees. 2. A written plan or protocol regarding the provision of adequate cleaning supplies and face masks, as well as social distancing measures. On May 26, the defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay pending appeal. The defendant's motion to stay pending appeal was denied by the district court on June 3, and by the Fourth Circuit on June 10. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal on June 4. As of June 18, 715 individuals at the jail had been tested for COVID-19, with 26 positive results. Those with a positive test result were moved to medical isolation. Status conferences were held between June 22 and July 2. On July 2, the court denied the plaintiff's preliminary injunction and the temporary restraining order expired. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, stating that in the four months since the initial complaint was filed, indefinite lockdown had continued at the jail, with detainees reporting no more than one or two hours of time out of their cells per day. The plaintiffs alleged a violation of the detainees' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, pointing to a lack of mental health services while detainees are anxious, depressed, and suicidal due to the indefinite lockdown. On July 17, the defendant moved to dismiss the case, or alternatively, sought summary judgment. The defendant claimed that all of the released plaintiffs’ claims are moot because they are no longer in their custody, and that therefore the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief. On August 12, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the defendant's appeal as moot, agreeing with the plaintiff that the district court recently extinguished the injunctive relief order and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings on August 27 pending settlement talks. Settlement conferences are currently ongoing. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In April 2020, pretrial and post-conviction detainees at Prince George's County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that in light of COVID-19, they were being held in conditions that violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. A subclass of pretrial, medically vulnerable plaintiffs also alleged that they are being held in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On May 21, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order. Defendant appealed and were denied a stay pending their appeal. On July 7, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, pointing to the lack of mental health services during an indefinite lockdown. The parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings on August 27 pending settlement talks. The case is ongoing.


On April 8, 2005, two inmates at the Camden County Jail in New Jersey filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of the jail and Camden County officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendants had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights by strip searching them at the jail. They argued that they should not have been strip searched because they had been charged only with petty crimes and traffic violations. They also argued that a subclass of plaintiffs had paid their bail and were unlawfully detained at the time of their strip search. On March 27, 2006, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Joel B. Rosen) dismissed without prejudice the City of Camden, the Camden City Police Department, and the police chief, and the deputy police chief. The Court noted that all parties had agreed to dismiss these defendants pursuant to the settlement talks that were in progress. On February 28, 2007, the District Court (District Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, pursuant to an agreement of the parties. On July 17, 2007, the parties asked the District Court to dismiss the case, notifying the Court that they had reached a settlement agreement. On June 9, 2008, Judge Rodriguez granted the request and issued an order of dismissal. In the settlement agreement, the defendants affirmatively stated that they had stopped strip searching detainees on a blanket basis as of April 27, 2005. They also stated that they had stopped strip searching non-indictable detainees in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The defendants maintained that their written policy as of 2007 was constitutional, and had been reviewed by the New Jersey Department of Corrections for compliance with state law, but they agreed to consider formally revising their policy as needed. The defendants agreed to retrain all corrections officers regarding the strip search policy, requiring all officers to sign a form reflecting their understanding of the policy. The defendants also agreed to release, in due time, inmates who had paid their bail, rather than holding them unnecessarily. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $7.5 million into a settlement fund, to be distributed to plaintiffs as damages, with the named class representatives to receive $15,000 each, and with $200,000 also deducted from the larger sum to pay the costs of administration and notice regarding the settlement. Likewise, prevailing parties' attorneys fees would be deducted from the larger sum, leaving a "distribution amount" from which payments would be made to the class. Final Judgment was issued on September 22, 2008. The court maintained jurisdiction throughout the course of the consent decree. As of January 31, 2018, there was no further substantial activity in the court, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On April 8, 2005, two inmates at the Camden County Jail in New Jersey filed a class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of the jail and Camden County officials in which they alleged that the defendants had violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights by strip searching them at the jail. On March 27, 2006, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Joel B. Rosen) dismissed without prejudice the City of Camden, the Camden City Police Department, and the police chief, and the deputy police chief. On June 9, 2008, Judge Rodriguez approved a settlement and dismissed the case.


In March of 2002, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., commenced an investigation into the confinement conditions at the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center (SFCADC) in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Detention Center violated the constitutional rights of convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. By letter dated March 6, 2003, the DOJ advised Santa Fe County of minimal remedial measures it should implement in order to remedy unconstitutional practices relating to: (1) medical and mental health care; (2) suicide prevention; (3) protection of inmates from harm; (4) fire safety; (5) sanitation; and (6) inmate grievance procedures (including court access). Santa Fe County agreed to make the recommended reforms. On November 11, 2004, to avoid litigation, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). MOA detailed the agreed reforms and set forth timetables for completion. By its terms, MOA was to last for a period of three years, after which it would expire if substantial compliance had been achieved. Because the County had not substantially complied with the MOA, on February 28, 2008, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The U.S. sued the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The U.S. claimed that the defendants had engaged in and continued to engage in a pattern or practice of failing to protect inmates at the SFCADC from serious harm and undue risk of serious harm by failing to provide adequate medical and mental health care and failing to provide safe and sanitary living conditions. The case was originally assigned to District Judge Robert Hayes Scott and Magistrate Judge Alan C. Torgerson. After the United States filed a notice of refusal to proceed before Magistrate Judge Torgerson, however, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Christina Armijo. On March 6, 2008, the parties jointly moved for approval of a settlement agreement. The court granted this motion on April 30, 2008, retaining jurisdiction over the matter and conditionally dismissing the case subject to the defendants achieving substantial compliance with the agreement. This agreement replaced the MOA and required the defendant to provide adequate services to address the serious medical and mental health needs of all prisoners. The agreement required the defendants to have adequate staffing and provide training under the new policies. To ensure compliance, the agreement included monitoring, implementation of a grievance process, reporting, and record keeping. The agreement was to terminate after 2 years so long as the county had substantially complied with all provisions. On July 2, 2008, the parties filed a status report with the court showing no significant problems with compliance. On October 30, 2009, pursuant to the recommendations made by the parties, the court dismissed the case with prejudice and terminated the settlement agreement and its associated order. On November 1, 2009, after a two year extension to compel Santa Fe County to meet the benchmarks in the agreement, the DOJ allowed the terms of the agreement to expire. According an article in a local paper, the DOJ is no longer monitoring the county.

Summary: In March of 2002, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., commenced an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Detention Center violated the constitutional rights of convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. On November 11, 2004, the DOJ and Sante Fe County entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, which detailed the agreed reforms and set forth timetables for completion. By its terms, the Agreement was to last for a period of three years, and remedy unconstitutional practices relating to: (1) medical and mental health care; (2) suicide prevention; (3) protection of inmates from harm; (4) fire safety; (5) sanitation; and (6) inmate grievance procedures (including court access). On November 1, 2009, after a two year extension to compel Santa Fe County to meet the benchmarks in the agreement, the DOJ allowed the terms of the agreement to expire. The DOJ is no longer monitoring the county.