COVID-19 Summary: This putative class action case challenges the government’s use of an emergency public health order issued under 42 U.S.C. § 265 to restrict immigration of unaccompanied minors. Pursuant to the emergency public order, the government has expelled unaccompanied children without following usual immigration laws, saying the children could spread COVID-19 if the children were processed and detained under regular immigration laws. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the order, as well as class certification and a preliminary injunction. On November 18, the court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and certified the class. The defendants appealed on November 25 and moved to stay the case pending appeal, which the D.C. Circuit granted. The case and appeal remain ongoing.
 Immigration Safeguards For Unaccompanied Children Previously, unaccompanied children arriving at the border seeking safety were awarded protection under two laws. First, provisions in the Homeland Security Act vest care for unaccompanied children with the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), giving the minors access to legal care and housing. Second, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) requires that minors must be transferred to ORR custody within 72 hours following apprehension, and removal of a child requires a decision by an immigration judge. Separately, statutes affirming internationally agreed upon protections permit unaccompanied children to seek shelter in the United States by claiming asylum, withholding of removal, and protection from torture. Furthermore, immigration laws recognize the possibility that immigrants arrive at the border with a communicable disease, however these statutes do not permit deportation without screening for persecution or torture. CDC Issues Emergency Public Health Order (Title 42 Process) On March 20, 2020, the President announced that public health provision of Title 42 of the U.S. Code would be used to suspend entry of all individuals at the border who lack proper documentation. Simultaneously, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) issued a regulation without notice and comment. Specifically invoking language contained in Section 265, the government claimed that the Surgeon General may prohibit introduction of persons that pose serious danger to the United States because of the presence of a communicable disease in their country of origin. Pursuant to the regulation, the CDC issued an order that other agencies may immediately suspend the introduction of these immigrants because of the danger they pose to Border Patrol personnel at ports of entry. The order gives the Department of Homeland Security discretion to allow exceptions based on the totality of the circumstances, and it remains silent on application for individuals seeking asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection, and circumstances for unaccompanied children. In the complaint, this regulation and subsequent order is referred to as the Title 42 Process. The Plaintiff’s Apprehension Under the Title 42 Process and Subsequent Lawsuit On August 11, 2020, border patrol agents apprehended the plaintiff, a 16-year-old unaccompanied minor fleeing persecution in Guatemala. Immediately, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) placed him into custody awaiting deportation pursuant to the Title 42 Process. Additionally, even with the presence of a relative in the United States and vacancy in an ORR facility, the plaintiff – exhibiting no COVID-19 symptoms – remained in CBP custody. In response to this treatment by the Border Patrol, on August 14, 2020, the plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, sued the leaders of numerous governmental departments, including the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Director of the Centers for Disease and Control, and officials leading CPB, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act for unlawful agency action and arbitrary and capricious enforcement. The plaintiff alleged that the Title 42 Process violates the requirements of the TVPRA, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, and the Public Health Service Act. The plaintiff requested the court certify the class as “[a]ll unaccompanied noncitizen children who (1) are or will be detained in U.S. government custody in the United States, and (2) are or will be subjected to the Title 42 Process.” In addition, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the new Title 42 Process as applied to the plaintiff and class members, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. The plaintiff filed a motion for classwide preliminary injunction on August 20th, asking the court to cease the application of the Title 42 Process to plaintiff and class members. The International Refugee Assistance Project filed an Amicus Brief in support of the plaintiff’s motion. On September 6, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey for the preparation of a report and recommendation on both the motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. On September 25, Magistrate Judge Harvey recommended that Judge Sullivan grant the class certification and the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5793305. He found that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on his claim that the Regulation and Order exceeded the authority granted by the Public Health Service Act because the Act does not authorize the government to expel the plaintiff or putative class members from the US outside of the removal process of the Immigration and Nationality Act and other safeguards in Title 8 of the U.S. Code, including protections provided in the TVPRA. On November 18, Judge Sullivan adopted Magistrate Judge Harvey's recommendations and granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and provisionally granted the motion to certify class. 2020 WL 6770508. The order declared that the removal of the plaintiff without due process exceeded the authority that public health emergency decrees usually confer. Judge Harvey noted that another court in the D.C. District Court examined the Title 42 Process in a case with similar facts also granted a preliminary injunction based on likelihood of success on the merits. For more information, see J.B.B.C. v. Wolf. On November 25, the defendants appealed the order to the D.C. Circuit, which was assigned USCA Case Number 20-5357. The defendants also filed a motion to stay pending appeal on December 3. Back in the district court, the defendants moved for reconsideration of the November 18 order, which the court denied on December 3. The defendants contended that, given the strain on the strain on the healthcare systems along the southern border and increased number of unaccompanied minors covered by the CDC Order, prohibiting the expulsion of class members deprived the government of an "important tool" to help address the public health emergency, increased the risk of transmitting COVID-19 into the United States, and further strained the country's limited healthcare resources. The court ruled that the government did not meet its its burden of showing that the circumstances justified a stay pending appeal. In response to the defendants' notices to the court regarding their compliance with the preliminary injunction, on January 22, the court ordered the parties to submit joint status reports addressing the defendants' compliance and, more specifically, updating the court on the situation regarding thirty-two minors who were returned to Guatemala in violation of the injunction. On January 29, the D.C. Circuit granted the defendants' motion to stay. On March 1, the defendants filed a joint motion to suspend the briefing schedule, which the Circuit Court granted the following day. In the District Court, the defendants filed multiple joint motions to hold the case in abeyance, which the court granted. A joint status report is due on April 22, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: In August 2020, a persecuted minor seeking asylum in the United States who was instead detained filed this class action complaint in the D.C. District Court. The plaintiff alleged that the new regulations interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 265 violate protections of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the TVPRA and sought injunctive and declaratory relief for all members of the class. On November 18, the court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction and certified the class. The defendants appealed on November 25 and moved to stay the case pending appeal. The D.C. Circuit granted the stay. The case and appeal remain.ongoing.


On December 21, 2020, Human Rights First, a nonprofit human rights organization, brought this lawsuit against then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of refugees seeking to enter the United States for asylum. Plaintiffs challenged a new rule promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security that sought to change applicants' eligibility for asylum. The new rule would have restricted who qualified as a refugee, which refugees were able to seek asylum, and how likely a given applicant could succeed in their claim. Represented by Williams and Connolly in D.C., plaintiffs alleged that the rule changes amounted to overturning legal precedent as well as being counter to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Refugee Act, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the Department of Homeland Security acted contrary to existing legal authority, in excess of the Department’s given authority, in a manner inconsistent with how procedural rulemaking ought to occur, and without comprehensive consideration of the interests involved. Plaintiffs further argued that the rules were enacted by Wolf when the latter was without proper authority as the Acting Secretary. Plaintiffs thus sought declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to their claims and to strike down the rules as well as attorneys’ fees. Judge Tanya S. Chutkan was assigned to the case. On December 22, 2020, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. However, as a result of a nationwide preliminary injunction granted in the cases Pangea Legal Services v. DHS and Immigration Equality v. DHS on January 8, 2021, the motion in this case no longer required consideration. On January 28, 2021, as a result of the administrative transition and in accordance with the aforementioned two cases, this case was held in abeyance pending the status report due in Pangea and Immigration Equality on April 19, 2021, so that the government could review and potentially revise the regulations at hand.

Summary: Plaintiff human rights organization sued the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security alleging that revisions to asylum eligibility violated several laws. Federal courts reviewing similar suits in other districts granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that applied here, and the cases are pending review and revision by the Biden administration.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action lawsuit for declaratory, injunctive and habeas relief, brought on behalf of detainees in civil immigration detention at three ICE detention centers in Florida. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus, requesting the immediate release of all individuals in custody, as well as a declaration that continued detention violated the Due Process Clause, and an order prohibiting the respondents from placing new detainees in detention. The court partially granted the petitioners’ temporary restraining order, ordering ICE to implement CDC sanitation guidelines and to review detainees for potential release, and then on June 6, granted a preliminary injunction. On July 17, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance.<hr> On April 13, 2020, a group of 34 civil immigration detainees at three Florida detention centers within the jurisdiction of the Miami Field Office of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) filed this federal class action lawsuit and petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Petitioners were represented by University of Miami School of Law’s immigration clinic, the Southern Poverty Law Center, Rapid Defense Network, Legal Aid Service of Broward County, and private counsel. Petitioner-plaintiffs ("the petitioners") challenged the detention of noncitizens in South Florida as the spread of COVID-19 in ICE detention centers. The petitioners' cause of action arose under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.; the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C §§ 701 et seq.; and the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2441. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia G. Cooke and referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman. First, the petitioners alleged that their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights were violated when the respondents failed to follow the CDC guidelines for social distancing, disinfecting, or recommended hygiene practices. They alleged that ICE’s 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards (“PBNDS”) and National Detention Standards (”NDS”) required the respondents to follow CDC guidelines, and that a failure to do so violated the APA and the Due Process Clause. Second, the petitioners alleged that the respondents’ continued detention of the petitioners was excessive in relation to any government purpose and that the petitioners were deliberately indifferent to their health and safety, which was a violation of their Due Process rights. Third, the petitioners alleged that their detention violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because respondents affirmatively subjected petitioners to an unreasonable risk of danger with deliberate indifference to employing policies that drastically increased the risk of petitioners’ contracting COVID-19. The petitioners sought to certify a class of all individuals in civil immigration detention, as of April 13, 2020, at three Florida detention centers: Krome Service Processing Center, Broward Transitional Center, and Glades County Detention Center. Petitioners also sought to certify the following subclasses: - Sub-class A: detained individuals with a stable location and/or place of residency in which they can self-quarantine and practice social distancing and hygiene pursuant to the CDC guidelines and Exec. Order No. 20-91 upon release. - Sub-class B: all other detained individuals without access to a stable location and/or place of residency in which they can self-quarantine and practice social distancing and hygiene pursuant to CDC guidelines and Exec. Order No. 20-91 upon release. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus for immediate release of all individuals in the custody of ICE's three Florida detention centers, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief against unconstitutional conditions of confinement. On the same day, the petitioners also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction. They requested the court to enjoin the respondents from transferring detainees in or out of the three detention centers and to order the respondents to implement CDC health guidelines and protocols, and to release petitioners into community-based alternatives to detention. On April 22, 2020, Magistrate Judge Goodman recommended the court grant in part the petitioners’ motion for a temporary restraining order and recommended 13 specific measures the court could take. 2020 WL 1949737. The court adopted in part Magistrate Judge Goodman's Report and Recommendation on April 30, 2020. 2020 WL 2086482. The court ordered ICE to: 1. Evaluate each of the named petitioners consistent with its regulations and inform the court which of the petitioners could be released by May 7, 2020. 2. Submit a report by May 3, 2020 describing how it intends to accelerate its review of its protocols resulting in release of detained individuals with the goal of reducing the population to 75% of capacity by May 14, 2020. 3. File weekly reports every Friday with information on the detained individuals ICE is releasing. 4. File twice-weekly reports containing information on the detained individuals remaining in custody. 5. Comply “immediately” with the CDC and ICE guidelines on providing adequate amounts of soap, water, and cleaning materials. ICE must have provided masks by May 2, 2020. 6. Provide appropriate training to its staff and detained individuals on the risks of COVID-19. Judge Cooke clarified the April 30 temporary restraining order on May 2, 2020, stating that the order included all named petitioners in the action and that ICE could still transfer detainees from all three facilities after first evaluating them and determining their eligibility for release. 2020 WL 2203576. On May 15, 2020, the court extended the temporary restraining order for an additional 14 days pending Magistrate Judge Goodman's Report and Recommendations on petitioners' motion for class certification and further hearing on the matter. On May 20, 2020, the petitioners filed a motion to compel compliance with the court's temporary restraining order, alleging that ICE had failed to comply with the court's order and CDC guidelines. On May 22, 2020, Magistrate Judge Goodman recommended that Judge Cook grant the class certification for the claims concerning conditions of confinement and for declaratory relief, but deny it for habeas corpus claims for release stating that those claims did not meet the commonality element because each release decision requires individual evaluation. The court held a remote hearing on the motion to compel and on May 28, Judge Cooke extended the temporary restraining order from April 30 for another seven days. On May 29, Magistrate Judge Goodman recommended the court deny the motion for class certification as to the requests for release, but grant class certification as to the other claims. Both parties filed objections to this report on June 3. On June 6, Judge Cooke certified the class as "all current civil immigration detainees who are now held by ICE at Krome, BTC, and Glades when this action was filed, since this action was filed, or in the future." Judge Cooke granted the preliminary injunction, requiring ICE to comply with all ICE and CDC guidelines, including providing soap, hand sanitizer, and masks to detainees, and to limit transportation. The injunction also required ICE to educate detainees on mask-wearing and other prevention and to submit weekly reports to the court regarding the number of detainees being held and their detention status. 106 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1595. On June 16, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance with the June 6 order, stating that the facilities were not implementing social distancing and not educating detainees on the importance of masks. On July 5, the court granted the motion to compel compliance and appointed a Special Master, Michael B. Chavies of Akerman LLP, "to assess whether ICE is committing an ongoing violation of the detainees’ constitutional rights.” The Special Master would have the authority to request any records, physically inspect the three facilities and take photos and videos of the conditions inside. The court vacated that order the following day and didn't issue another order on the motion until July 17, this time appointing Matthew C. Dates of Stearns Weaver Miller Weissler Alhadeff & Sitterson P.A. as Special Master instead. 2020 WL 4047334. Between July and September, several plaintiffs moved for release or home confinement, but none of the motions were granted. Several individuals also successfully moved to intervene. On January 4, 2021, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim because they've acted reasonably to implement measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 at Krome, BTC, and Glades. As to the due process claim, they argue it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim since the CDC Guidelines are not regulations with the force and effect of law. Finally, they argue that the state created danger claim also fails to state a claim for the same reason that the deliberate indifference claim fails. Plaintiffs responded on February 2, 2021, alleging that defendants ignored substantial evidence, including evidence recognized by the court in previous rulings, that contradict their claims for why summary judgment should be granted. On January 21, 2021, the court denied an emergency motion to intervene for a plaintiff that had been deported to Guatemala. The Court held that it did not retain jurisdiction over class members that had been deported out of the United States, so the motion to intervene was moot. On February 8, 2021, the court ordered that the Special Master give plaintiffs' counsel full access to his report on or before February 19, 2021, and file a redacted version of the Special Master’s report and recommendations on CM/EMF. This report details the investigations that the Special Master made during the summer of 2020 into the conditions at these facilities. Discovery and attempts at mediation remain ongoing as plaintiffs file for release or to remove themselves from the case as their circumstances change. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, immigrant detainees in three Florida detention centers filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The detainees alleged that their detention violated their Due Process rights because the detention centers were not adhering to CDC guidelines to protect them against COVID-19. The court partially granted a temporary restraining order on April 30, 2020, requiring the respondents to implement CDC guidelines for sanitation. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 6 and certified the class. On July 17, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance.


On May 25, 2011, three foreign residents of Indiana filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, against the cities of Indianapolis and Franklin and the counties of Marion and Johnson. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, the national ACLU's Immigrants' Rights Project, the National Immigration Law Center, and private counsel, filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, claiming that Indiana's Senate Enrolled Act 590 (SEA 590) violated the federal Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Section 19, which allowed local law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests of people who were subject to a removal order issued by an immigration court or a detainer or notice of action issued by the Department of Homeland Security, or who had been indicted or convicted of an aggravated felony, was preempted by federal law and constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and a violation of due process under the Fourteenth. They also claimed that Section 18, which made the use of consular identification cards for identification within the state a civil infraction punishable by fine, was preempted by federal law and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that SEA 590 violated the Constitution and a peremptory injunction barring its enforcement before it came into effect on July 1, 2011. On June 13, 2011, Mexico moved for leave to file an amicus on behalf of plaintiffs, and Brazil, Guatemala, El Salvador and Columbia moved to join it. The District Court (Judge Sarah Evans Barker) granted these motions on June 21. In the meantime, the Court (Judge Barker), on joint motion from plaintiffs and county defendants, had issued an order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of any of the individual plaintiffs' immigration status that might be implicated in discovery. Following a hearing on June 20, 2011, on June 24 the Court (Judge Barker) granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, barring enforcement of Sections 18 and 19 of SEA 590 pending further order of the Court. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, 797 F. Supp. 2d 905 (S.D. Ind. 2011). On July 14, 2011, the Court (Judge Barker) granted a stipulation by plaintiffs and county defendants that two classes should be certified: a class of people in Marion and Johnson Counties who were or would be subject to warrantless arrest pursuant to Section 19 of SEA 590 (Class A), and a class of people who possessed, or would possess, a valid consular identification card and were using it, or would use it, for non-fraudulent identification purposes (Class B). The court certified both classes and appointed counsel for them. On October 11, 2011, the county defendants filed a motion to join the United States as a necessary party. The Court (Judge Barker) denied this motion on January 9, 2012. Buquer v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:11-cv-00708, 2012 WL 76141, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2012). The Court (Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore) also denied a motion by defendants to stay the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182 (IM-AZ-0015), remarking that it was unlikely to be entirely dispositive of some of the unique issues presented by this case. Meanwhile, plaintiffs had filed a motion for summary judgment on November 20, 2011, and the City of Indianapolis had filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 21. On March 28, 2013, the District Court (Judge Barker) granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. According to the order, defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing Section 18 and Section 20 of SEA 590, as they are both violated the Supremacy Clause and the Due Process Clause. Because plaintiffs' suit was dependent upon enforcement of these sections, the matter was dismissed without prejudice.

Summary: On May 25, 2011, three foreign residents of Indiana filed a class action lawsuit against the cities of Indianapolis and Franklin and the counties of Marion and Johnson, seeking to enjoin enforcement of Indiana's Senate Enrolled Act 590, which would allow local law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests of people who were subject to a removal order issued by an immigration court or a detainer or notice of action issued by the Department of Homeland Security, or who had been indicted or convicted of an aggravated felony, and would make the use of consular identification cards for identification within the state a civil infraction punishable by fine. On March 28, 2013, the District Court (Judge Barker) ruled in favor of plaintiffs, granting their motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Sections 18 and 20 of SEA 590. Because plaintiffs' suit was dependent upon enforcement of these sections, the matter was dismissed without prejudice.


On Feb. 1, 2017, a J-1 visa holder filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, after being prevented from boarding a flight from Frankfurt to Boston on both Jan. 28. and Jan. 30, 2017. Represented by Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, the plaintiff is Iranian-born and lives in Switzerland; she was traveling to Boston to commence work at Brigham & Woman's hospital as a researcher and expert on state-of-the-art genetic sequencing technologies focusing on pediatric susceptibility to infection. The complaint alleged that on Jan. 28, 2017, a gate operator at the Frankfurt airport, who introduced himself as a representative from the consulate of the United States, told the plaintiff that she was ineligible to board a flight to the United States pursuant to an executive order issued by President Donald Trump on Jan. 27, 2017 (suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen). The complaint further alleged that when the plaintiff returned to the Frankfort airport on Jan. 31, with a copy of the Jan. 29 Temporary Restraining Order issued in Louhghalem/Tootkaboni v. Trump providing immediate protection to "holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas . . . who, absent the Executive Order, would be legally authorized to enter the United States," the plaintiff was once again prevented from boarding her flight to Boston, despite being subject to the TRO's protection as a valid J-1 visa holder. The plaintiff claimed that her continued bar to entry based solely on the Executive Order, which was enforced against her contrary to nationwide federal court stays, stood in violation of the defendants' duties owed to the plaintiff and to all persons similarly protected by the TRO. The complaint was filed as a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was assigned on Feb. 2 to Judge Allison D. Burroughs and to Magistrate Judge Jennifer C. Boal, should the trial Judge refer the matter. Also on Feb. 2, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion seeking a Temporary Restraining Order enabling the plaintiff's counsel to determine the defendants' compliance or non-compliance with the Jan. 29 TRO, as well as requesting an emergency hearing before the court. That same day, the requested emergency hearing was set for Feb. 6, 2017. On Feb. 3, the plaintiff requested that the aforementioned emergency hearing be cancelled, as she was able to travel to the United States and clear customs. Judge Burroughs declared the motion moot on Feb. 8. On Mar. 6, prompted by adverse developments in the Washington v. Trump litigation, in the Ninth Circuit, the President rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. In light of the revised Executive Order, the parties on Mar. 31 jointly requested that the court stay the proceedings and postpone the defendants' deadline to answer, for sixty days until Jun. 5, 2017. This would allow the parties enough time to monitor ongoing litigation before deciding how to proceed. Judge Burroughs on Mar. 31 granted this request for a stay. On May 31, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, mentioning the Fourth Circuit's injunction of the revised Executive Order in IRAP v. Trump. The court closed the case on June 1. This case is now closed.

Summary: On February 1, 2017, an Iranian-born researcher and J-1 visa holder filed this lawsuit after being prevented from boarding a flight to the United States on both January 28, 2017 and January 30, 2017, pursuant to an executive order issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017. On February 2, 2017 the plaintiff filed an emergency motion seeking a Temporary Restraining Order against the defendants, but on February 3, 2017 the plaintiff requested that the hearing on the TRO be cancelled, as she was able to travel to the United States and clear customs. On March 6, 2017, the President rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one. On May 31, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, mentioning the Fourth Circuit's injunction of the revised Executive Order in IRAP v. Trump. This case is closed.


COVID 19 Summary: A member of a class of immigrants and their spouses suing ICE over its removal policies was ordered released on March 25, 2020. On March 24 the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member because he was detained in a facility where an employee tested positive for COVID-19. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report that altered the terms of release for the class member and the court lifted the stay on the class member's removal by ICE. ICE imposed conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. The underlying case is ongoing.
 On February 5, 2018, an undocumented immigrant who was married to a U.S. citizen filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The case was assigned to Judge Mark L. Wolf. The plaintiff sued the United States and Suffolk County under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The plaintiff had been unexpectedly arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in January 2018 after going to an interview with her husband as part of the process of her becoming a lawful permanent resident. She was now being detained, without having had notice or a hearing, and in danger of being deported under a 2002 removal order. In addition to claiming that ICE’s actions violated the INA and APA, the plaintiff alleged that her arrest and detainment violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Massachusetts and private counsel, sought habeas and injunctive relief. On February 6, 2018, the court ordered the parties to meet and attempt to settle the dispute by February 12. The parties met but were unable to reach an agreement. On February 13, 2018, the defendants released the plaintiff from custody, granted her a three-month stay of removal, and filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to the complaint. With the plaintiff released, the defendants stated that they planned to have the case dismissed for mootness. Judge Wolf was not convinced that the defendants’ compliance with the plaintiff’s demands actually mooted the case because the court could not be sure that the defendants would not simply arrest plaintiff again if the case were closed. On February 15, the court granted the motion for an extension of time. However, it also ordered that the parties confer again to discuss what, if anything, needed to be litigated and that the defendants should file an affidavit that contained details surrounding the plaintiff’s detainment and release. On March 27, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the case was now moot and that the plaintiff had no due process right to stay in the United States while she sought permanent resident status. On April 5, 2018, Judge Wolf related two cases involving similar issues to the present case: Junqueira v. Souza (18-10307) and Dos Santos v. Nielsen (18-10310). On April 10, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding her husband and four other couples, each made up of one U.S. citizen and one non-citizen immigrant in danger of removal. The five couples sought injunctive relief on behalf of a class of all couples similarly situated. They also asked that one plaintiff, who was currently detained by ICE, be released or granted habeas relief. In response, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on April 23 with similar arguments as their initial motion to dismiss. On April 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The proposed class would consist of any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) had a final order of removal and had not departed from the U.S. under that order; (2) was the beneficiary of a pending or approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by the U.S. citizen spouse; (3) was not “ineligible” for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) was within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunctive relief. They requested that the court enjoin the defendants from unduly interfering with the plaintiffs' access to the provisional waiver process. On May 8, 2018, the court granted habeas relief to the one detained plaintiff to the extent she sought a bail hearing to determine whether she should be released. On June 11, the court issued an order finding that this plaintiff was being detained in violation of the Constitution because ICE had failed to follow its regulations, and that the court should itself decide whether her release was warranted. However, ICE had released the plaintiff subsequent to the court's May 8 oral ruling. ICE also released about 20 other noncitizens that it determined were being improperly detained. 317 F.Supp.3d 626. The parties then engaged in discovery for several months. On August 23, 2018, the Judge Wolf denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint in an oral ruling. On September 21, he issued a memorandum explaining his decision. Judge Wolf found that the court had jurisdiction over the case, that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that if their habeas petitions were dismissed, ICE would prevent them from pursuing provisional waivers in violation of due process, and that the previously-released plaintiff's claims regarding detention were not moot. 334 F.Supp.3d 370. Judge Wolf subsequently ordered the parties to confer and determine whether they could settle the case and, if not, provide additional information regarding how ICE's conduct was affecting the proposed plaintiff class. On December 7, 2018, Judge Wolf issued a decision finding that a statute prohibiting federal courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against operation of noncitizen detention provisions did not prohibit the possible issuance of class-wide declaratory relief if a putative class was certified in this case. 399 F.Supp.3d 1. On April 18, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for the court to open discovery for the named plaintiffs. After several hearings, Judge Wolf issued an order on May 17, 2019, denying the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the INA, the Equal Protection clause, and the APA. He reserved judgment on the plaintiffs' contention that U.S citizen spouses have a liberty interest in remaining in the U.S. with their noncitizen spouses, and, therefore, a right to due process before their noncitizen spouses are deported. Judge Wolf also granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, certifying two different classes. For the purposes of the plaintiffs' INA, Equal Protection, and APA claims, the court certified the following class:
"Any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) has a final order of removal and has not departed the U.S. under that order; (2) is the beneficiary of a pending or approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, filed by the U.S. citizen spouse; (3) is not 'ineligible' for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) is within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office."
For the purposes of the plaintiffs' Due Process claim, the court certified the following class:
"Any U.S. citizen and his or her noncitizen spouse who (1) has a final order of removal and has not departed the U.S. under that order; (2) is the beneficiary of an approved I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, and conditionally approved I-212, Application for Permission to Reapply for Admission into the U.S. After Deportation or Removal; (3) is not 'ineligible' for a provisional waiver under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(4)(i) or (vi); and (4) is within the jurisdiction of the Boston ICE-ERO field office."
 Judge Wolf again instructed the parties to confer regarding a potential settlement. On June 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a stay of removal of a class member. Specifically, the plaintiffs wanted the court to compel the defendants to provide an explanation as to why ICE was detaining and intending to remove the class member. The class member later expressed that he did not want to delay his removal and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion. Judge Wolf held an evidentiary hearing on June 27. He instructed the parties to file a joint statement memorializing his oral rulings at the hearing regarding notice to class members and the information regarding class members that the defendants must provide to class counsel. Judge Wolf then issued an order on August 7, 2019, in accordance with those rulings. In the order, he instructed the defendants to report information regarding class members to class counsel at the beginning of each month and provide prompt notice to class counsel when a class member is detained or when ICE intends to effectuate the removal of a class member. On July 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for order to show cause. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had continued to violate the post-order custody regulations described above, and requested that the defendants be ordered to show cause why the court should not order the release of a group of detainees appearing on the defendants' July detention report. After months of back-and-forth, the parties reported to the court on January 8, 2020, that they had resolved the issues related to the motion for order to show cause. On January 27, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enjoin the removal of two class members. The plaintiffs later partially withdrew the motion, leaving the motion pending with respect to one class member. Then, on March 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member. The plaintiffs alleged that the class member was currently detained in a facility in which an employee had tested positive for COVID-19. The plaintiffs stated that the defendants had not contended that the class member posed a threat to public safety, but rather had led to his prolonged detention by impeding the resolution of the plaintiffs' January 27 motion. Given the escalating threat to the class member's health, the plaintiffs requested that the court order his release during the pendency of the January 27 motion. In the alternative, they requested that the court hold a prompt telephonic hearing regarding the basis for the class member's removal. On March 25, Judge Wolf granted the plaintiffs' request and ordered the class member released no later than the following day, with the following conditions: he must reside with his wife and not leave their residence except for medical reasons, and he shall be subject to electronic monitoring by the defendants. In the transcript of the court's March 25 hearing where Judge Wolf orally ordered the class member's release, he explained that he concluded that district courts do have the power to order the release of immigration detainees on bail. He emphasized that the class member here was a civil detainee (someone who had never been charged or convicted of a crime), and concluded that a substantial claim had been raised by the class member's habeas petition. Finally, Judge Wolf noted that extraordinary circumstances (the COVID-19 pandemic) made the grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective. He noted that detention enhances the risk of infection and that given the mortality risk associated with COVID-19, the class member's release was required pending the resolution of the plaintiffs' January 27 motion. On April 7, 2020, Judge Wolf ordered the parties to confer and determine whether a noncitizen who had filed an emergency petition for a writ of habeas corpus and stay of deportation on April 6 is a member of the class certified in this case; and, if so, whether ICE violated any of the orders in this case with regard to him. The parties reported to the court that they agreed that this individual was not a class member and so Judge Wolf did not need to take any further action. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report. The parties explained that they had reached an agreement whereby the plaintiffs would withdraw their January 27 motion to enjoin removal of the class member that Judge Wolf ordered released on March 25. They further requested that the court lift its stay of removal as to the class member, and lift its order requiring that he not leave his residence except for medical reasons. ICE would then impose conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. Judge Wolf subsequently entered an order memorializing those terms. On November 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss both the habeas and equal protection claims. Defendants argued that the remedy plaintiffs requested, suspension of removal, is not available under habeas corpus and that intervening equal protection decisions have rejected claims that were based on an inference of animus from President Trump's campaign statements. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In February 2018, an undocumented immigrant who was married to a U.S. citizen filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff alleged that her unexpected arrest and detainment without notice or a hearing violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In April 2018, nine more plaintiffs were added, and they sought class certification, which was approved on May 17, 2019. On June 27, the district court instructed the defendants to begin providing monthly reports to class counsel regarding class members. On March 24, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate release of that class member because he was detained in a facility where an employee tested positive for COVID-19. On April 16, the parties filed a joint status report that altered the terms of release for the class member and the court lifted the stay on the class member's removal by ICE. ICE imposed conditions of supervision pursuant to the parties' agreement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 18, 2020. The case is ongoing.


This is a case about President Trump’s July 21, 2020 memorandum titled “Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census” to the Secretary of Commerce. This memo instructed the 2020 Census to exclude undocumented immigrants from the population data created for the purposes of congressional apportionment. Many felt this action was taken to deter participation by immigrant communities and communities of color in the 2020 Census, which would in turn deprive these communities of the political representation and federal financial resources to which they are entitled, and filed suit as a result. In response to the memo, Haitian-Americans United, Inc., Brazilian Worker Center, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and Centro Presente—all non-profits serving immigrants of color across Massachusetts—filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Of Massachusetts on July 27, 2020. The plaintiffs sued President Trump, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Director of the U.S. Census Bureau Steven Dillingham, and Secretary of the Department of Commerce Wilbur Ross under the Administrative Procedure Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the memo violated Article I, Section 2 of Constitution which specifies that congressional apportionment must be based on a total count of all persons because excluding undocumented residents will not result in the required of an "actual enumermation" of all persons and will chill immigrant participation in the 2020 census. The plaintiffs also alleged that the memo violated the right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment becuase the memo "is motivated by racial animus towards immigrants of color, non-US citizens, foreign-born individuals, and undocumented individuals. The plaintiffs further argued that the President and the Secretary of Commerce have conspired to violate immigrants' and non-citizens' right to equal protection. Represented by Lawyers for Civil Rights, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that the memo was unconstitutional and that any compliance with the memo's instructions to the Census Bureau to produce tabulations of population data excluding undocumented residents for congressional apportionment violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and injunctive relief preventing the defendants from providing information to the President that would permit him to exclude undocumented immigrants from the congressional apportionment base. In addition, the plaintiffs sought costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. The case was assigned to Judge Douglas P. Woodlock. On September 4, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an application for a three-judge court because Section 2284(a) requires the appointment of a three-judge court in actions challenging “the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.” On September 11, 2020 Judge Woodlock granted the plaintiffs’ application. Judge Bruce M. Selya and Judge Patti B. Saris were appointed to the three judge panel alongside Judge Woodlock. As of September 26, 2020, this case is ongoing and the defendants have yet to file an answer.

Summary: On July 27, 2020, Haitian-Americans United, Inc., Brazilian Worker Center, Chelsea Collaborative, Inc. and Centro Presente filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that the Presidential Memorandum titled “Excluding Illegal Aliens from the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census” is unconstitutional and that any compliance violates §§ 706(2) of the APA because it is contrary to constitutional power, right, privilege, or immunity and in excess of statutory jurisdiction and authority, and without observance of procedure required by law. The case has been approved for a three-judge court and is awaiting the defendants' answer.


On Jan. 24, 2018, the NAACP filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Represented by its own counsel, the NAACP challenged DHS's Nov. 2017 revocation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians living in the United States. The plaintiff alleged that DHS violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment by relying on stereotypes based on race and national origin to deprive Haitians of their rights. The plaintiff sought mandamus (for DHS to carry out the Immigration and Nationality Act's procedures for reviewing TPS) and a declaratory judgment. The case was assigned to Judge Marvin J. Garbis. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of DHS may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from safely returning, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for 6 to 18 months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Haitians following the Jan. 2010 earthquake in Haiti. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that Haitian nationals could not yet return safely (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent hurricanes), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS' termination of TPS for Haitians in Nov. 2017. The NAACP argued that DHS' decision to end the program was not based on a change in conditions in Haiti, but rather on racially discriminatory stereotypes of Haitians. These stereotypes allegedly appeared in President Trump's remarks that the plaintiffs claimed disparaged Haitians, and DHS' alleged search for evidence of Haitians' criminality and welfare dependence. On Apr. 17, the NAACP filed an amended complaint, adding two other organizational plaintiffs that advocate for Haitians living in the U.S. On May 7, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that Congress had statutorily precluded judicial review of challenges to the Secretary's discretionary decisions regarding TPS designations. As to the plaintiffs' equal protection claims, the defendants argued that the rational basis standard of review applied and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the Secretary's decision was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The case was reassigned to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on July 24, 2018. On March 12, 2019, Judge Chasanow filed an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. First, Judge Chasanow found that the court did have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Next, she held that the plaintiffs had alleged a plausible claim for relief. Instead of rational basis review, Judge Chasanow found that the proper question was whether the government's decision to terminate TPS was motivated by impermissible race or national origin discrimination; if so, the action would be presumptively invalid and only upheld if it were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government purpose. Consequently, Judge Chasanow held that it was appropriate to view any circumstantial evidence to find proof of discriminatory motive, and that the plaintiffs had provided such evidence, which was to be viewed in their favor at this stage. Judge Chasanow then dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for mandamus and declaratory relief, as their constitutional claim would provide them with full relief. 364 F.Supp.3d 568. On April 8, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay or, in the alternative, to confine discovery to the administrative record. The defendants requested that the court stay this case pending final appellate review of the preliminary injunction issued in a parallel case, Ramos v. Nielsen (located here in this Clearinghouse). In an April 26 order, Judge Chasanow informed the parties that if they could reach an agreement, discovery could be limited to what had already been produced by the government in other, parallel litigation. On March 23, 2020, Judge Chasanow granted the defendants' motion to stay. Due to the interconnected nature of the parallel litigation, particularly related to the scope of permissible discovery, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Judge Chasanow concluded it was best to stay proceedings in this case while the other cases were litigated. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Jan. 24, 2018, the NAACP sued the DHS over its Nov. 2017 revocation of Temporary Protected Status (first implemented after the Jan. 2010 Haitian earthquake) for Haitians living in the United States. The NAACP alleged that DHS violated the 5th Amendment by relying on racially discriminatory stereotypes to deprive Haitians of rights and sought mandamus and declaratory relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted in part and denied in part by the court on March 12, 2019. The court allowed the plaintiffs' 5th Amendment claims to move forward. Due to ongoing parallel litigation over the revocation of TPS for Haitians, the defendants requested a stay in this case. The court granted the stay in March 2020. The case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by immigration detainees in ICE facilities in Maryland, seeking release from detention. The detainees claimed their underlying medical conditions made them particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death from COVID-19. The court granted preliminary injunctions on April 30 and May 7, ordering the release of several detainees. Additionally, on September 18, the court granted the petitioner's motion for class certification. The court denied a motion for expedited bail hearings on January 26, 2021.
 On March 24, 2020, immigration detainees detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities in Maryland brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Represented by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, and the ACLU's National Prison Project and Immigrants' Rights Project, the detainees brought this action against ICE, the ICE Baltimore Field Office, the Worcester County Detention Center, and the Howard County Department of Corrections. Suing under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the federal habeas statute), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that because they had underlying medical conditions, their continued detention was unconstitutional and in violation of the Rehabilitation Act because it put them at a higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and release from detention. The case was assigned to Judge Theodore D. Chuang. The detainees simultaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order, seeking their immediate release from custody. The motion was denied on April 3, 2020, stating that the detainees could renew their motion in the event that a detainee or staff member at the Howard County Detention Center (HCDC) or Worcester County Detention Center (WCDC) tested positive for COVID-19, or if the defendants failed to file a Testing Certification by April 8. 451 F.Supp.3d 407. The detainees filed an amended complaint and a second emergency motion for temporary restraining order on April 26, 2020 seeking release for detainees in HCDC and WCDC. The court denied the temporary restraining order on April 27 for mainly procedural reasons, stating the current case management plan only allowed for a renewed motion for relief as to HCDC, and that relief for detainees in WCDC would require the detainees to file a notice of intent first. That same day the detainees filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to release the named plaintiff from HCDC, and on April 28, the detainees from WCDC filed a separate motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the motion as to the HCDC plaintiff on April 30. 457 F.Supp.3d 460. On May 7, the court granted another preliminary injunction, releasing several detainees from WCDC. The detainees filed an amended complaint on May 29, adding additional named plaintiffs, then on June 19, they filed a motion to certify the class. On July 1, 2020, the court consolidated this case with Mansaray v. Kavanaugh(20-cv-01304-TDC), a habeas case brought by a petitioner seeking release from immigrant detention on similar grounds. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction as to the detainee from HCDC on June 26 (USCA 20-6984). The defendants had additionally appealed the preliminary injunction as to the WCDC detainees on July 6 (USCA 20-7005) and the Fourth Circuit consolidated that appeal with Cedillo v. Bounds (8:20-cv-00780-TDC) on July 8. The Fourth Circuit dismissed these appeals on September 30, 2020. Back in the District Court on September 18, 2020, Judge Chuang granted in part and denied in part the June 19 motion for class certification. The court approved two subclasses: (1) the "Howard County Subclass" defined as "All persons who are or will in the future be in ICE detention at the Howard County Detention Center who are age 50 or older or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19;" and (2), a "Worcester County Subclass" defined as "All persons who are or will in the future be in ICE detention at the Worcester County Detention Center who are age 50 or older or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19." However, the court denied the petitioner's request that the court hold expedited bail hearings for class members. The court reasoned that due to the reduced numbers of ICE detainees in the Detention Facilities, improved mitigation measures, and test results showing no cases among ICE detainees and limited numbers of positive tests among staff, it couldn't find that exceptional circumstances required bail hearings as the only way to protect the petitioners' health and safety. 2020 WL 5593338. In light of a growing number of positive tests, the petitioners renewed their motion for expedited bail hearings, asserting unconstitutional conditions of confinement. They argued that respondents' efforts to address COVID-19 failed to protect the petitioners from a known threat to their health and safety and that the plaintiffs' confinement was impermissible because they are civil detainees, not convicted criminal prisoners. Judge Chuang denied the plaintiffs' motion on January 26, 2021. The court determined that the petitioners did not have a high probability of success in establishing that the respondents acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of the plaintiffs. The court found that HCDC's recent measures to combat COVID-19 spread, including increased testing, the distribution of N-95 masks, and the offering of vaccination to all detainees, constituted a reasonable response to the detainees' health concerns. The court also found that the respondents' offer of vaccinations undermined the claim of impermissible punishment. The court concluded that the petitioners failed to identify any specific exceptional circumstances warranting bail determinations for all high-risk ICE detainees. 2021 WL 252718 The case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a habeas action seeking the release of immigration detainees housed in ICE facilities in Maryland. The court initially denied the detainees' TRO, but eventually granted two preliminary injunctions that ordered the release of several detainees from their respective detention centers. The court also granted the petitioners' motion for class certification.


This lawsuit was filed in state court in March 2007 by a landlord in Valley Park, Missouri, to challenge the City's anti-immigration ordinances, which reached both housing and employment issues. The plaintiff was one of several parties to an earlier case, in which the court had ruled prior versions of the ordinances unlawful under state law. Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, IM-MO-1. The City then passed amended versions, which are the subject of this lawsuit, and also of a new iteration of the Reynolds case ("Reynolds II"). In Reynolds II, the plaintiffs won a temporary restraining order in April, which was then continued by consent of the parties until final resolution. See IM-MO-1 for more details on the ordinances and both Reynolds litigations. The plaintiff in this case filed a petition for a preliminary injunction, and the case was then removed by defendants to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, before Judge E. Richard Webber. In July 2007, the City repealed the immigration-related components of the housing ordinance. Accordingly, on August 9, 2007, the parties in this case agreed to dismiss the housing-related causes of action. The employment matters remained in issue; the plaintiffs argued that the employment ordinance was inoperative, because its enacting language stated that it came into effect only on the end of the injunction in Reynolds v. Valley Park, and that injunction had become permanent. After the filing of the dismissal, the City enacted legislation which made the employment ordinance effective immediately. Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a declaration that the employment ordinance was invalid and unenforceable and moved to amend their complaint. Both parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On October 5, 2007, Judge Webber issued an order granting plaintiffs leave to take nine additional discovery depositions. Plaintiff's request to depose the City Attorney was, however, denied. The depositions were completed on October 19, 2007, and the parties supplemented their summary judgment briefs to address the additional factual information gleamed from the depositions. On January 31, 2008, Judge Webber issued his Memorandum and Order in which he held that the Ordinance at issue was not preempted by federal law, nor did plaintiffs prove that the Ordinance violated equal protection, due process or Missouri state law. Accordingly, the Court denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and entered judgment in favor of the City. Following plaintiff's appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, affirmed the lower court's order on June 5, 2009. At the time this summary was written, there have been no further appeals.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in state court in March 2007 by a landlord in Valley Park, Missouri, to challenge the City's anti-immigration ordinances, which reached both housing and employment issues. Following removal to federal court, the U.S. District Court found in favor of the City. The judgment was affirmed in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought by seven medically vulnerable detainees in Mississippi. They sought release from detention because their underlying medical conditions made them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, which they alleged made their detention unconstitutional. The court denied a temporary restraining order on June 3, 2020.<hr> On April 16, 2020, seven medically vulnerable civil immigration detainees held in the Adams County Detention Center brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers' Guild, and the MacArthur Justice Center at the University of Mississippi School of Law, the plaintiffs sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the New Orleans ICE field office and the warden of the Adams County Detention Center under the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 701) and the federal habeas statute (28 U.S.C. § 2241). The plaintiffs alleged that the risks from COVID-19 rendered their continued detention unsafe and that the government did not have sufficiently compelling reasons to keep them detained, violating the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief. At the same time, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), arguing that their detention was unconstitutional and that release from detention was the only action that could remedy the violation of their rights. The defendants filed a motion in opposition to the TRO on April 30. The case was assigned to Judge David C. Bramlette III and Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker. After a hearing, Judge Bramlette denied the TRO on June 3, 2020. While Judge Bramlette determined that habeas relief was available to detainees challenging conditions of confinement who requested release, he found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits because (1) the government's interest in ensuring that detainees did not abscond justified continued detention; and (2) the defendants were taking steps to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in the detention center. So, Judge Bramlette concluded that the defendants were likely neither punishing detainees nor deliberately indifferent to their medical needs. 2020 WL 2949779. Two months passed without further substantive docket activity. On August 4, 2020, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal. The Clearinghouse does not know if the parties reached any private settlement agreement that led to the dismissal. The case is presumably now closed.

Summary: This is a habeas action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, seeking the release of seven medically vulnerable detainees in light of COVID-19, citing constitutional violations associated with their continued detention. The plaintiffs sought a TRO, but it was denied on June 3, 2020, and the plaintiffs dismissed the case on August 4, 2020.


On October 7, 2013, a group of Latino men and the Montana Immigrant Justice Alliance (MIJA) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. Plaintiffs sued the Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) and Montana Department of Justice under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed violations of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures; and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs sought class status to represent “[a]ll Latino persons who, since October 7, 2010, have been or will be in the future, stopped, detained, questioned or searched by Montana Highway Patrol officers while driving or sitting in a vehicle on a public roadway or parking area in the State of Montana.” Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had a pattern and practice of seizing Latino residents and visitors of Montana and “prolonging their detention” for the sole purpose of contacting the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based on suspicions of immigration status violations, which was not within the authority of MHP. Plaintiffs alleged MHP used racial profiling to form their suspicions regarding immigration status and used deceptive practices to detain Latino residents and visitors. Specifically, one of the named plaintiffs in this case alleged he was pulled over for a speeding violation, then asked repeated questions regarding his citizenship and whether he was in the country legally. He was a U.S. citizen, but was subjected to prolonged detention during which members of the MHP contacted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), even after production of a valid Montana driver’s license. A second named plaintiff alleged he was asked to produce identification as the passenger of a vehicle. He and the driver were detained for two hours while DHS was contacted to inquire about their immigration status; no traffic violation or any other citation was issued for this stop. On December 3, 2013, Judge Sam E. Haddon recused himself from the case. The case was reassigned to Judge Dana L. Christensen. On December 6, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued that the state law claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; that Title VI did not apply to individuals, yet plaintiffs were suing individuals; and that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims were “doubled up” with the equal protection claims. Based on an April 1, 2014 report issued by Magistrate Judge Carolyn S. Otsby, on July 25, 2014, Judge Christensen dismissed the state law claims but denied the motion to dismiss the Title VI and Fourth Amendment claims. The parties proceeded to discovery, but on April 3, 2015, Judge Christensen approved a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, MHP would adhere to its policy GR-9, which stated that Highway Patrol officers cannot detain individuals <i>solely</i> for the purpose of verifying immigration status or stop individuals on the basis of race or national origin, among other descriptors. The settlement further provided for training for MHP officers on this policy and also began requiring officers to log when and if they contacted DHS during the course of a traffic stop. In addition, the defendants agreed to pay for racial profiling studies done by an independent authority over a five year period; to post annual reports regarding racial profiling and steps taken to address it on the Montana Department of Justice website; and to establish an Independent Police Auditor to review investigations of complaints. Finally, the consent decree stated that the defendants would pay the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, but there was no later order as to the exact amount. The consent decree ended on April 3, 2020 without any motions for enforcement.

Summary: A group of Latino men sued the Montana Highway Patrol after a series of traffic stops during which they alleged they were discriminated against and unlawfully detained for prolonged periods of time while their immigration status was checked. The case settled with the MHP agreeing to reform its operations, and the consent decree is ended on April 3, 2020


The Jama lawsuit is a companion case to the class action, Brown v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., No. 98-1282(DRD) [IM-NJ-0003] and Joaquin DaSilva v. Esmor Correctional Services Incorporated, et al., No. 96-3755(DRD), which were also pending in to U.S. District Court District of New Jersey. All three cases, Jama, Brown and DaSilva were filed on behalf of undocumented aliens who were detained at a facility that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (''INS'') maintained in Elizabeth, New Jersey pending a determination of their asylum status. Plaintiffs in all cases alleged that during their detention they were subjected to torture, beatings, harassment and inhumane living conditions which included inadequate sanitation, exercise, and medical treatment. Brown was a class action, while Jama and DaSilva were filed and maintained on behalf of individual plaintiffs that opted out of the Brown class. All three cases were assigned to District Court Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise. Jama was filed on June 16, 1997 and named as defendants the INS, Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., the private corporation which operated the facility for the INS., and individual corporate officers and agents. Claims for relief included alleged violations of the First, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; numerous provisions of the New Jersey Constitution; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (''ICCPR''); customary international law; the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (''ATCA''); the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, et seq. (''RFRA''); the Fair Labor Standards Act; and New Jersey law. On April 24, 1998 the District Court (Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise) certified the Brown case as a class action consisting of a class of all detainees who were incarcerated at the Elizabeth, New Jersey facility from August 1994 to July 1995. Notice was sent to class members in March 1999. Class members were given the option to opt out of the class and pursue their own damage actions. Many of the class notices mailed out were returned as undeliverable, as detainees had been released or transferred. The defendants moved to dismiss the Jama case as applied to various groups. The District Court, Judge Debevoise) granted the motion in part and denied it without prejudice in part. Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 22 F.Supp.2d 353 (D.N.J. Oct 01, 1998). On October 29, 1998, the Jama, Brown and DaSilva cases were consolidated for the purpose of discovery. Extensive discovery proceeded for four years. During that time, the parties also engaged in protracted litigation over whether plaintiffs in the Jama and DaSilva actions failed to timely opt-out of the Brown class action. See DaSilva v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 215 F.R.D. 477 (D.N.J. 2003); Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 2005 WL 2901899, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26060 (D.N.J. Nov 01, 2005); and Dasilva v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 167 Fed.Appx. 303 (3rd Cir. 2006). The Jama plaintiffs eventually settled their claims against the U.S. and the INS, leaving Esmor and its officers as the lone defendants. In January 2003, the Esmor defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the Jama Action. A similar motion was filed in the Brown class action case in September 2003. Individual INS defendants also moved to dismiss or for summary judgment Oral arguments on all the motions for summary judgment were conducted on June 29 and June 30, 2004. The District Court Debevoise, disposed of all pending motions in two separate orders. Jama v. INS, 334 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.N.J. 2004) (addressing the Brown motions) and Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., 343 F.Supp.2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004) (addressing the Jama motions). Judge Debevoise held that the settlement agreement between plaintiffs and the U.S. settled any and all claims, that the INS was therefore entitled to be dismissed from the case. As to the Esmor defendants, Judge Debevoise ruled that plaintiffs had viable claims under 1) the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (the "ATCA"); the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 bb, et seq. (the "RFRA"); and state law claims based on Esmor's and its officers' alleged negligent failure to safeguard plaintiffs' property and negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention of employees. All other claims were dismissed. The Court then deconsolidated the Brown case from the Jama and DaSilva actions, finding that the Brown case was ready for trial. The DaSilva case was eventually dismissed without prejudice and its plaintiffs became members of the Brown action class. The Brown case ultimately settled in August 2005, while the Jama action proceeded to trial. The Jama proceedings were stayed briefly from November 2005 to February 2006, while the Courts resolved the objection that the Jama plaintiffs did not timely opt out of the Brown class action. See Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 2005 WL 2901899, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26060 (D.N.J. Nov 01, 2005) and Dasilva v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 167 Fed.Appx. 303 (3rd Cir. 2006). After the stay was lifted, the parties completed discovery, including depositions of experts. Pre-trial motions were filed and the Court was called upon to resolve disputes over expert witness testimony. Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., 2007 WL 1847385, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45706 (D.N.J. Jun 25, 2007). A jury trial began on September 25, 2007 and continued through mid-November. On November 13, 2007, the jury reached a verdict, finding as follows: 1. For defendants on the Alien Tort Claims Act claim and certain negligence claims. 2. For plaintiff Jama on Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim and awarded $1.00 in nominal damages. 3. For plaintiff Jama and against Esmor and several individual defendants on claim for negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention and awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages. No punitive damages were rendered. On November 20, 2007, the Court awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees in the amount of $137,808.04 ($29,208.04 to Debevoise & Plimpton and $108,600.00 to the Rutgers Constitutional Litigation Clinic) in connection to a prior ruling concerning spoliation of evidence. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 97-3093(DRD), 2007 WL 4166016 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2007). On March 17, 2008, the District Court (Judge Debevoise) entered an opinion denying Defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the trial record "revealed a history of grievous abuses of the religious beliefs and practices not only of Jama but also of others, utterly without justification; and there is revealed a pattern of physical and emotional abuse of detainees, including Jama, perpetrated by untrained and often sadistic guards, all of which was known or should have been known by higher officers in Esmor." Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., No. 97-3093(DRD), 2008 WL 724337 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2008). On April 16, 2008, Defendants filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the Court's denial of their motions for judgment as a matter of law. This appeal would subsequently be voluntarily dismissed on October 2, 2008. On April 23, 2008, the District Court awarded Plaintiffs attorneys' fees and expenses, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in the amount of $642,398.57. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 602 (D.N.J. 2008). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently vacated the order, holding that the District Court's "degree of success inquiry under § 1988 was based on an impermissible reconstruction of the jury verdict," and remanded for further proceedings. Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs, Inc., 577 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2009). The parties subsequently reached a settlement agreement on the question of attorneys' fees (which was not filed with the Court). The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 9, 2010.

Summary: On June 16, 1997, this lawsuit was filed on behalf of individual plaintiffs who opted out of the class action Brown v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., No. 98-1282(DRD) [IM-NJ-0003]., which was also pending in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Plaintiffs were undocumented aliens who were detained at a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey pending a determination of their asylum status. In 2007, the jury returned a verdict, finding for plaintiffs on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claims, as well as their claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision and/or retention, and awarded plaintiffs $100,001.00 in damages.


On September 20, 2007 several Latino families and individuals, represented by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund and private counsel, filed a class action suit against the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division of the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, challenging raids conducted as part of a program called "Operation Return to Sender." Plaintiffs alleged that federal agents unlawfully raided the homes of Latinos in the New York City area without warrants and often under cover of darkness, in search of fugitive non-citizens. Plaintiffs claimed that they were detained, interrogated and subjected to physical abuse, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The complaint sought damages and an injunction restraining ICE's New York Regional Office from executing unconstitutional raids. On December 7, 2007, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. On July 30, 2008, the District Court (Judge John G. Koeltl) dismissed this motion as moot, because Plaintiffs had amended their complaint. On December 21, 2009, Plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint, adding claims of Fifth Amendment violations (violations of Equal Protection due to the targeting of Latino communities); false imprisonment; reckless, negligent, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; trespass; assault and battery; and excessive force. They sought equitable relief, damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and damages under Bivens. After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal v. Ashcroft, Defendants moved to dismiss the Bivens claim against the high-ranking official defendants on March 29, 2010. And they moved to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief on May 19, 2010, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek such relief because they were unlikely to again be subjected to the allegedly unconstitutional behavior. On December 22, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a petition to certify their class. However, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dukes v. Walmart, the District Court withdrew Plaintiffs' petition for class certification and granted leave to amend. On November 22, 2011, Plaintiffs refiled their petition to certify their class. On April 16, 2012, the District Court (Judge Katherine B. Forrest) denied Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2012 WL 1344417. Plaintiffs moved for leave to appeal the District Court's decision, but this motion was denied on July 16, 2012 by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On August 1, 2011, the District Court (Judge Koeltl) dismissed Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against all but two supervisory Defendants. 811 F. Supp. 2d 803. On October 28, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to their Bivens claim. Defendants responded with a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On April 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Forrest) denied both parties' motions. 2012 WL 1538431. On September 14, 2012, Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. However, on September 27, the District Court (Judge Forrest) adjourned all pending motions, presumably due to ongoing settlement negotiations. On November 15, the court set a deadline of December 12 for the parties to submit a settlement or restore the action. This deadline was extended, after which the parties submitted a settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal on December 27. Judge Forrest signed the agreement on April 4, 2013. The settlement agreement stipulated to a payment of one million dollars from ICE to Plaintiffs ($36,000 to each Plaintiff, remainder to attorneys), termination of Plaintiffs' immigration proceedings, implementation of a policy of training ICE officers on how to obtain proper consent for home (and curtilage) entrance, and a discontinuance of "protective sweeps" unless there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion of danger. This agreement terminated the suit. Document destruction as required by the settlement continued into 2015. There has been no docket activity since 2015. The case is likely closed because the settlement required the defendants to disseminate training documents relating to the modified policies within 60 days of the settlement.

Summary: Plaintiffs brought suit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement on September 20, 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that officials unconstitutionally engaged in raids of Plaintiffs' residences as a part of a program called "Operation Return to Sender." On April 4, 2013, Judge Katherine B. Forrest signed the parties' settlement agreement, which stipulated to a one million dollar payment to Plaintiffs, and an agreement to enact a policy of training officers how to properly obtain consent before entering a person's house or curtilage. This agreement terminated the suit.


On March 6, 2008 attorneys with the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund and Education Fund and New York Legal Assistance Group filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, USCIS, Attorney General of the U.S. and the FBI. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Foley Square Division), challenging the U.S. government's failure to timely adjudicate applications for naturalization made in New York City District Office of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b), 551(13), 706(1) and 553, and the Immigration and Nationality Act § 336(b), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of: lawful permanent residents residing in the counties served by the New York City District Office of USCIS, who have submitted or will submit applications to be naturalized as U.S. citizens, and whose applications have not been or will not be adjudicated within 180 days of the date of submission, and on behalf of a sub-class composed of those members of the class who reside in the Southern District of New York and whose applications have not been or will not be adjudicated within 120 days of the date of their initial examinations. On June 19, 2008, Defendants filed its motion to dismiss. On August 7, 2008, the District Court (Judge Lawrence M. McKenna) denied Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and for class certification, and granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. On August 19, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on September 10, 2008. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On January 29, 2008, in a summary order, the Second Circuit vacated the judgments entered by the District Court on August 7 and September 10 of 2008, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the order. The parties entered settlement negotiations after the case went back to the District Court. On September 20, 2010, the District Court (Judge Lawrence M. McKenna) entered a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal which specified that it would place the matter in abeyance until July 29, 2011, and if Plaintiffs have not sought reinstatement by July 29, 2011, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement dated September 17, 2010, the action would be dismissed with prejudice. The action was dismissed with prejudice as of July 29, 2011. (Updated on 03/31/2012)

Summary: This case was brought to challenge the U.S. government's failure to timely adjudicate applications for naturalization by lawful permanent residents of the state of New York. The case was resolve by a settlement whose terms are not available.


On May 18, 2010, two organizations comprised of day laborers and/or predominately Latino immigrant workers filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the Town of Oyster Bay. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the defendants, through the passage of an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of labor from the town's streets and sidewalks, unlawfully prohibited speech related to employment and had a discriminatory animus against predominately Latino immigrant day laborers. In September 2009, the Town Board enacted the ordinance in question. It prohibited any person from standing on a street corner stopping or attempting to stop a passing car for employment-related purposes. It also prohibited drivers from stopping their cars for the same purposes. The proposed purpose of the ordinance was to promote the health, safety, and welfare of motorists and pedestrians on the streets of the town. However, the supervisor referenced the ordinance as a temporary solution to dealing with those who were not on the path to citizenship. Comments from the public showed that town residents feared groups of men unfamiliar to them standing on the streets. There was also proof of animosity towards immigrant day laborers, such as town residents saying the day laborers were unsightly, illegal, and not wanted in that town. Plaintiffs argued that since New York laws already addressed health and safety concerns on the streets, this animus against predominantly Latino immigrant day laborers was what actually motivated the passing of the ordinance and that this violated the First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. They also argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of the ordinance, day laborers had suffered a significant loss of wages and harassment from police officers and people driving by them. Two days after the complaint was filed, on May 20, 2010, the District Court (Judge Denis Reagan Hurley) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order preventing the town from enforcing the ordinance at issue. Then, on June 1, 2010, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance at issue, pending final resolution of the First Amendment claims. In response to this order, the defendants filed a notice of appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on June 21, 2010. The case was argued in the Second Circuit under the docket number 10-2505-cv. Little docket activity occurred until May 17, 2011, when the Second Circuit (Judges Barrington D. Parker, Gerard E. Lynch, and Raymond J. Lohier, Jr.) affirmed the District Court's order converting the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. After a few months of discovery, on September 29, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The parties continued through the discovery process. On March 30, 2012, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Arlene Rosario Lindsay) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a protective order to withhold from discovery certain privileged documents: The identification documents and/or immigration status of the individual day laborers known to the plaintiffs. The parties then continued to go through more discovery litigation. On June 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Hurley) affirmed Magistrate Judge Lindsay's protective order, allowing plaintiffs to withhold privileged documents in the discovery process. Additionally, the District Court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs lacked standing in this case, dismissing the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. 954 F.Supp.2d 127. On December 1, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment to permanently prevent the ordinance from ever taking effect, as it was unconstitutional. In the almost two-year interim, a similar court case, <i>Reed v. Town of Gilbert</i> was decided by the Supreme Court on June 18, 2015, which provided a rationale to dismiss this case as unconstitutional under the First Amendment and permanently enjoin the ordinance. On September 3, 2015, the District Court (Judge Hurley) cited this case as part of its rationale and issued a judgment that enjoined the ordinance permanently and declared the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Because the District Court found that the ordinance did not withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment, it did not address the plaintiffs' due process or Equal Protection claims in its judgment. 128 F.Supp.3d 597. On September 15, 2015, the defendants appealed the District Court's decision to enjoin the ordinance. The appeal continued in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals under the docket number 15-2914-cv. During this appeal, the defendants also argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this case. On August 22, 2017, the Second Circuit (Judges Dennis Jacobs, Barrington D. Parker, and Jane A. Restani) affirmed the District Court's ruling enjoining the ordinance. The Second Circuit found that the District Court did not err in finding the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment and that the plaintiffs indeed had standing to bring suit against the defendants.868 F.3d 104. In the fall of 2018, the final stages of litigation began to determine how much defendants would pay to plaintiffs in attorney's fees and costs. In July of 2019, the Court ordered that defendants pay $1,505,806 to the plaintiffs' attorneys. On November 25th of that year, a satisfaction of the judgment was entered and the case was closed.

Summary: On May 18, 2010, two organizations comprised of day laborers and/or predominately Latino immigrant workers filed a class action lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of New York under the First and Fourteenth Amendments against the Town of Oyster Bay. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and LatinoJustice PRLDEF, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the defendants, through the passage of an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of labor from the town's streets and sidewalks, unlawfully prohibited speech related to employment and had a discriminatory animus against predominately Latino immigrant day laborers. After defeating the defendant's partial motion for summary judgment due to lack of standing, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was successful. On September 3, 2015, the District Court enjoined the ordinance and declared it unconstitutional as it violated the first amendment. On August 22, 2017, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. In July 2019, the court assessed attorney fees against the defendants, and the case closed later that year.