On November 28, 2005, the Florida Pediatric Society, the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Florida Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, Inc., and certain named individual children who were eligible to receive medical and dental care through Medicaid filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from private practice and from the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"); the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCF"); the Surgeon General; and the Florida Department of Health ("DOH"). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants systematically failed to administer the state's Medicaid program in compliance with federal law. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (also known as the Medicaid Act), by failing to provide essential medical and dental services to eligible children in Florida. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of all children who now, or in the future will, reside in Florida and who are, or will be, eligible under Title XIX of the Act for Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Services. The complaint included four counts. In Count I, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8) and (a)(10) by failing to provide "medical assistance . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." Count II claimed that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) by failing to afford equal access to medical care through a Medicaid program that ensured that reimbursement rates for providers were high enough to guarantee children access to care that equaled the access of their peers in other geographical areas. Count III charged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §1396u-2(b)(5), which requires that states obtain assurances that the HMO contractors offer a suitable range of services and access to preventive and primary care services for the population expected to be enrolled and maintain a sufficient number, mix, and geographic distribution of providers. Finally, Count IV alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) by failing to effectively inform the plaintiffs and their caretakers of the availability of child health care services. On January 12, 2007, Judge Adalberto Jordan issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court refused to dismiss the case on the theory that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that it did not need to answer this question given that the individual plaintiffs clearly had standing. The District Court proceeded to reject in large part the argument that the statutes under which the plaintiffs sued do not confer individually enforceable rights. Adopting the Supreme Court's test in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), the District Court held that the statutes from Counts I, II, and IV evinced an "unmistakable focus on the benefitted class" and therefore created private rights of action. The statute in Count III, by contrast, was held not to create a privately enforceable right because it is "aggregate and systemwide in nature" rather than focused on the needs of a particular class of people. The defendants filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider this decision and certify certain issues as immediately appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, but Judge Jordan rejected that request on April 24, 2007. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery. On March 20, 2009, Judge Jordan granted in part and denied in part two partial motions for summary judgment filed by DCF and the Surgeon General. For its part, DCF challenged the plaintiffs' standing, and the Court determined that at least one plaintiff had suffered an injury in fact because the child experienced an eighteen-month delay for an appointment in violation of Count I and because he failed to receive information about his rights to medical care in violation of Count IV. The Court further held that each of these violations could be traced to DCF. The plaintiffs did, however, fail to satisfy the causation element for Count II because DCF lacked authority to set or modify reimbursement rates, an authority that state law reposes in AHCA. Having concluded that at least one plaintiff had standing, the District Court turned to the merits of the summary judgment motion. It denied the motion with respect to the first prong of Count I (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)) and Count IV, holding that issues of material fact existed about whether DCF unlawfully prevented children from obtaining health care services and whether the agency failed to inform the plaintiffs about their rights to medical care. But the Court did rule for the defendants and grant summary judgment on the second prong of Count I (§ 1396a(a)(8)). It held that the plaintiffs had failed to produce any evidence showing that DCF afforded them unequal treatment compared to other Medicaid recipients or people not on Medicaid. As a result, summary judgment was proper on this part of Count I. The District Court then evaluated the Surgeon General's motion for summary judgment, which raised substantially the same issues as DCF's motion. The Court held that at least one plaintiff had standing on Counts I and II. Because this plaintiff's surgery was delayed by a year, he was denied medical care with reasonable promptness in violation of the first prong of Count I. The Surgeon General also violated prong two of Count I because the plaintiffs received deficient medical assistance compared to the assistance afforded other individuals. As for Count II, the District Court determined that medical care and services were not available to the plaintiffs to the same extent they were available to the rest of the population in the geographic area. The Court then held that the causation requirement was satisfied, explaining that DOH has at least some control over the Medicaid reimbursement rates paid to providers. On Count IV, however, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to allege facts showing that DOH was responsible for any lack of information concerning available medical services. The Court then denied the Surgeon General's summary judgment motion on Counts I and II because of the plaintiffs' factual showings on DOH's failure to provide medical services with reasonable promptness and to ensure that payments to providers were sufficiently high to guarantee quality care as compared with that received by other children. The parties tried mediation for the next few months, but on June 9, 2009, they reached an impasse. On June 25, Magistrate Judge Chris McAliley issued a recommendation that the District Court grant the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Judge Jordan then issued an order on September 30 adopting the magistrate's report and granting in part the motion for certification. After concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue Counts I, II, and IV against AHCA, the Court certified a class consisting of all children under the age of 21 who now, or in the future will, reside in Florida and who are, or will be, eligible under Title XIX of the Social Security Act for Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Services. Also on September 30, 2009, Judge Jordan issued an order denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Court again rejected the argument that the statutes at issue do not confer individually enforceable rights. It also rejected the defendants' contention that the term "medical assistance" in §§ 1396a(a)(8) and 1396a(a)(10) is narrowly defined and precludes relief for failure to provide medical services. After more discovery, a bench trial began on December 9, 2009. The trial consisted of 94 sessions and ended in January 2012. On November 21, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jordan) issued an order requiring the parties to submit memoranda of law explaining whether the new Affordable Care Act provisions moot or otherwise affect the issues in this case. These provisions, which took effect on January 1, 2013, require Medicaid to match Medicare's rate of payment for primary care treatment for any services performed over the next two years. On March 18, 2013, Judge Jordan denied the defendants' request to dismiss certain claims as moot because of Florida's state plan amendment, which gave to Medicaid providers Medicare's higher reimbursement rates. The Court explained that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services had yet to approve the amendment, which means that medical providers in the state still have not been paid the higher rates that the plaintiffs demanded. As a result, the claims in the case remain viable. Judge Jordan again rejected the defendants' mootness arguments in an order issued on July 10, 2014. The Court held that a temporary two-year increase of Medicaid reimbursement rates to Medicare levels did not moot the case given the uncertainty about whether the state legislature would keep funding the rate increases past their expiration date on December 31, 2014. Moreover, Florida's decision to place 98 to 99 percent of children eligible for Medicaid in managed care similarly did not render the case moot because of the 1 to 2 percent of excluded children and because the managed care system would not be live until October 1, 2014. On November 25, 2014, Judge Jordan denied the defendants' request to reopen the record for trial on liability and their suggestion of mootness. In declining to reopen the record, the Court explained that allowing more discovery and trial sessions would cause substantial prejudice and would improperly prolong the process of determining liability. The Court then rejected the defendants' mootness arguments. Even though DCF made significant changes in its system for determining Medicaid eligibility, including implementing a new computer system with new income eligibility standards and a new streamlined Medicaid application, the Court held that because these changes were relatively recent it remained unclear whether they would fully resolve all of the plaintiffs' complaints. About a month later, on December 30, 2014, Judge Jordan issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law in an opinion that spanned more than 150 pages. The Court began by reaffirming its pretrial determination that the individual plaintiffs have standing to bring this case. (It declined to reach the organizational plaintiffs' standing but reserved the right to do so in a future revised order.) The Court also reaffirmed its pretrial class-certification ruling and its determination that the statutes underlying Counts I, II, and IV confer individually enforceable rights under which the plaintiffs can bring this action. After making extensive factual findings, the District Court held that Florida's Medicaid program violated federal law in several respects. The program has failed to compensate physicians and specialists at rates that are competitive with those of Medicare or private insurers. Specifically, the state's system for reimbursing physicians prioritizes budget neutrality and fails to consider statutory mandates like ensuring that reimbursement rates are sufficiently high to incentivize physicians to treat Medicaid patients. As a result, about one-third of Florida children on Medicaid do not receive the preventative care to which they are entitled, a violation of the Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment requirements for preventative medical care under §§ 1396a(a)(8) and (a)(10). The District Court held that the defendants violated these requirements for specialty care as well. On the issue of dental care, the Court reached similar conclusions, holding that children in Florida are not receiving such care with reasonable promptness and that dental reimbursement rates are too low. The Court then identified the defendants' additional violations of federal law, including those relating to outreach efforts. On March 31, 2015, Judge Jordan issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law in response to a motion filed by the defendants. The Court's changes related primarily to the expiration of a state statute that had delegated to DCF certain outreach responsibilities. Given the statute's expiration, the Court held that DCF could no longer be sued under Count IV for failing to perform these duties, although AHCA and DOH remained subject to liability. The Court's other changes involved the standing of some of the individual plaintiffs. After a scheduling conference, the district court informed the parties that the next phase of the case would focus on whether there remains an ongoing controversy to justify awarding any declaratory or injunctive relief. The court directed the parties to file their respective offers of proof in preparation for a hearing to be held on April 24, 2015. The defendants argued that a recent case, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, required that the court dismiss all of the plaintiffs' claims. However, on May 1, 2015, the Court dismissed only Count II based on the new case law. After several months of settlement discussions, the court approved a final settlement agreement on June 28, 2016. The state agreed to implement an incentive program providing rate increases to eligible medical services providers upon achievement of certain objectively measurable patient access and outcome measures. The state also agreed to increase access to and utilization of pediatric dental services. The agreement calls for at least quarterly meetings between state agencies and the plaintiffs to address plan changes, changes in primary care provider assignments, and timely activation and enrollment of newborn babies with Medicaid coverage from birth. The state also agreed to ensure that communications are made through various media and non-media channels to inform parents and guardians of enrolled Medicaid children of available EPSDT services and to inform parents and guardians of unenrolled children of the availability of the Medicaid program. Finally, the state agreed to improve the Medicaid eligibility process for children by making all reasonable efforts to minimize wrongful terminations of Medicaid eligibility, monitor files on eligible unborn babies, evaluate the application process. The parties agreed to quarterly meetings to monitor the Medicaid eligibility process. The Court has jurisdiction over the litigation until September 30, 2022. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $12,000,000 to cover attorneys' fees and costs. As of June 17, 2020, the docket reflects no further activity, but the term of the Court's jurisdiction is still ongoing.

Summary: On November 28, 2005, the Florida Pediatric Society, the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Florida Academy of Pediatric Dentistry, Inc., and certain named individual children who are eligible to receive medical and dental care through Medicaid filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sued several state defendants in their official capacities, claiming that these defendants violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (also known as the Medicaid Act), by failing to provide essential medical and dental services to eligible children in Florida. After extensive discovery and a lengthy trial, the District Court (Judge Adalberto Jordan) held that the defendants were liable in several respects. After several months of settlement discussions, the court approved a final settlement agreement on June 28, 2016. The Court has jurisdiction over the litigation until September 30, 2022. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $12,000,000 to cover attorneys' fees and costs.


On December 28, 2011, two Hawaii-based religious organizations filed a lawsuit in United States District Court against the State of Hawaii. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that a law prohibiting discrimination against gay couples seeking space for their civil unions or marriages violated their First Amendment religious freedoms. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Act 1, the Civil Union Act contained no exceptions for churches and other places of worship, and therefore violated the First Amendment rights of religious organizations whose doctrines made allowing gay marriages in their churches or houses of worship unacceptable. On January 19, 2012, the case was stayed by agreement of the parties while the Hawaii legislature worked towards amendments to Act 1. On July 6, 2012, Governor Abercombie signed a law that amended Act 1 to exempt religious organizations for the requirement of non-discrimination in the use of space for civil unions. On October 3, 2012, the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The judge held that the issue was not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff had failed to show that they had standing to bring the suit and because they had failed to update the complaint to reflect the amendments to Act 1, which effectively resolved the primary dispute.

Summary: On December 28, 2011, two Hawaii-based religious organizations filed a lawsuit in United States District Court against the State of Hawaii. The lawsuit alleged that a California law set to take effect in 2012 was chilling plaintiffs' religious freedom and unconstitutional under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was stayed, and the law changed in July of 2012. On October 3, 2012, the case was dismissed for lack of standing.


This class action was filed on behalf of impoverished parents and legal guardians who have lost, are at risk of losing, or cannot regain custody of their children from the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) because they are homeless or unable to provide food or shelter for their children. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services in 1989 in the U.C. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' policies violated provisions of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the policies and practices of taking and retaining children of impoverished parents; failing to assist parents to secure food, cash, shelter, and other subsistence through coordination of services; failing to make reasonable efforts at reunification; and abridging the liberty and property interests of parents in retaining custody of their children while requiring them to maintain the means to support themselves and their families. Two class members secured a preliminary injunction, requiring defendants to issue sufficient funds to secure housing and utilities, restore Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, and identify all other sources of financial assistance. On March 28, 1992, the court approved a consent decree, providing for detailed policies and development of new programs for cash and housing assistance, and for extensive monitoring. After defendants failed to meet several deadlines, the parties negotiated the scope of the decree, its implementation, and mandated compliance reports. On March 10, 1995, the parties entered an agreed order to extend the monitor's term for two years, to have DCFS hire a housing specialist to create a system for ensuring that families are reunified speedily, to investigate a new pre-court "screening" to prevent unnecessary removal of children, and to provide for an ombudsperson to resolve individual class member problems. The court reduced the monitoring period to one year. When DCFS refused an extension at the expiration of the monitor's term, plaintiffs filed a motion for continued monitoring and/or declaratory and injunctive relief for noncompliance. Defendants argued that the decree was unenforceable after Suter v. Artist M. absent a finding of contempt. Defendants also argued that DCFS had "substantially complied" with the decree, and, therefore, the court could neither make a finding of contempt nor grant relief. On April 11, 1996, the court ruled against defendants, ordering continued monitoring on limited issues. Monitoring continued for one year, and the parties entered into a limited out-of-court agreement for continued monitoring. Counsel for plaintiffs continue to work with impoverished parents to ensure that they are able to access Norman services.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed this class action against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services in 1989 in the U.C. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois claiming that the agency failed to provide services to assure family unification and instead removed children from parents and guardians who were unable to provide food or shelter. The case resulted in a Consent Decree whereby the agency agreed to assist families in obtaining housing and food assistance.


On September 8, 2014, a same-sex couple filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a county clerk and the Indiana Department of Health. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state's ban on same-sex marriages violated their 14th Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs were legally married in Illinois, but Indiana refused to recognize their marriage as part of its same-sex marriage ban. The couple claimed that the state's ban injured them by denying them "access to all protections, benefits, rights, and responsibilities afforded to married persons and their children under state law." After the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Indiana's same-sex marriage ban in Baskin v. Bogan , 2014 WL 4359059, the plaintiffs in this case moved for a temporary restraining order to force Indiana to recognize their out-of-state marriage. But before the Court (Judge Joseph Van Bokkelen) ruled on the motion, the parties jointly stipulated that Indiana would recognize the plaintiffs' marriage while Bogan was pending appeal before the Supreme Court. On September 11, 2014, the Court denied as moot Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and stayed the case pending final resolution in Bogan. The court stated that once the Bogan appeal was resolved, Plaintiff should move to lift the stay. On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Bogan case, 135 S. Ct. 316. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's ruling in favor of the plaintiff couple in Borgan was upheld. The plaintiffs filed voluntary notice of dismissal on December 19, 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: On Sept. 8, 2014, a same-sex couple filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a county clerk and the Indiana Department of Health. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's ban on same-sex marriages violated the their 14th Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. After the 7th Circuit struck down Indiana's marriage ban, the state agreed to recognize the plaintiffs' out-of-state marriage pending a final resolution to the case.


On July 26, 2013, a same-sex couple married under the laws of Ontario filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the governor, attorney general, secretary of state of Kentucky and two county clerks. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky's laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and voiding within Kentucky marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into under the laws of other states or countries. On August 16, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding two more same-sex couples married under the laws of other states as plaintiffs in the suit. The plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Amendment 223A of the Kentucky Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that the Kentucky statutes KRS 402.045(2) and KRS 402.045(1) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs asked the court to enjoin the State from denying same-sex couples the right to marry in Kentucky and denying recognition of marriages validly entered into under the laws of other states and countries. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on December 16, 2013, and on February 12, 2014, U.S. District Judge John Heyburn, II, found for the plaintiffs, concluding that Kentucky's refusal to recognize valid same-sex marriages from other states violated the United States Constitution's guarantee of equal protection under the law, even under the most deferential standard of review. Two weeks later, on February 27, 2014, the Court held that the order would go immediately into effect. That same day, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which was granted, and appealed to the Sixth Circuit on March 18, 2014. Despite the stay, Judge Heyburn II held on July 1, 2014 that Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriage violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and did not further any conceivable legitimate government purpose. Love v. Beshear, 2014 WL 2957671 (W.D. Kentucky 2014). The order declared all Kentucky laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were void and unenforceable. In the same order, the Court stayed the decision pending further order in the Sixth Circuit. On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled on this and other cases from four states. DeBoer v. Snyder (PB-MI-0004 in this Clearinghouse). Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). Henry v. Hodges (PB-OH-0004 in this Clearinghouse). Tanco v. Haslam (PB-TN-0005 in this Clearinghouse). It was unwilling to find a Constitutional basis to deny states' authority to define marriage. On the Due Process and Equal Protection claims raised in this case, the court found that the bans were plausibly rational, and neither in violation of the Constitution nor due to illegal animus or discrimination. It also held that "[i]f it is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is also constitutional for the State to stand by that definition with respect to couples married in other States or countries." (DeBoer v. Snyder Page p. 38). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 772 F.3d 388. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 16, 2015 to review these cases in Obergefell v. Hodges. The Court rephrased the questions presented as: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? On June 26, 2015, the Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. The Court held that the right to marry was fundamental, and it demeaned gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore did not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a dissent. The case was remanded and reassigned to Judge Charles R. Simpson III. On January 13, 2016, Judge Simpson III granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees totaling $1,115,632.96. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, three same-sex couples married under the laws of other states filed a lawsuit, individually and on behalf of their children, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, challenging the constitutionality of Kentucky's laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and voiding within Kentucky marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into under the laws of other states and countries. Judge John Heyburn found for the plaintiffs on July 1st, 2014, and issued the final order declaring Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriages to be unconstitutional. This order was stayed and then reversed by the Sixth Circuit. The case is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.


New York City implemented an overhaul to its welfare system in order to meet federal and state welfare requirements, which were revised in the mid-1990s. Under the city’s program, “income support centers” (locations where public assistance benefits were applied for and distributed, sometimes during the initial visit by an applicant) were to be converted to “job centers.” These job centers put greater emphasis on making sure those receiving public assistance obtained employment from the private sector while doing so and added bureaucratic layers to the application process for public assistance compared to income support centers. Over half of the city’s income support centers had been converted to job centers at the time the suit was filed. The plaintiffs each claimed to be qualified welfare beneficiaries who had been improperly denied assistance by one of the job centers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, the city’s obligations under 7 U.S.C. §2020 (the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program—then referred to as Food Stamps), and 42 U.S.C. §1396 (Medicaid). The plaintiffs also alleged state law violations. They sought class certification for all similarly situated New York City residents, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 16, 1998, with Judge William H. Pauley presiding. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (1) enjoining the city from converting further income support centers into job centers; and (2) directing the city to expeditiously process the applications of the named plaintiffs. The court entered a temporary restraining order on the same day directing the city to provide emergency food stamps and cash assistance to the named plaintiffs. The court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs on January 21, 1999. Finding the plaintiffs and others like them would suffer irreparable harm without intervention and that the evidence showed the conversion of income support centers to job centers was done with insufficient self-study and a statistical drop in the number of successful applicants for emergency assistance despite legal obligations, the court ordered the city to (1) allow applicants for public assistance to apply for benefits the first day they visit a job center, (2) cease conversion of income support centers to job centers without a formal hearing, (3) make eligibility requirements for food stamps and Medicaid separate from the eligibility determination from cash assistance, (4) send applicants timely notice of the city’s decision on whether they qualify for benefits, and (5) form a corrective plan for achieving its policy goals while also meeting the needs of public assistance applicants. The city submitted a corrective action plan and requested modification to the preliminary injunction in March of 1999. On May 24, 1999, the preliminary injunction was modified to allow the closure of up to three more income support centers after an individualized hearing on the adequacy of city audit procedures. The court also approved of the city’s corrective action plan in the same order. The city moved to vacate the preliminary injunction on December 10, 1999, after procuring more evidence surrounding the efficacy of the job centers in achieving their welfare obligations. Meanwhile, the State of New York moved to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a claim. Judge Pauley denied both motions and granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on July 21, 2000. The certified class consisted of "all New York City residents who have sought, are seeking, or will seek to apply for food stamps, Medicaid, and/or cash assistance at a Job Center." Following a September 2000 audit of the city’s welfare distribution schematic, the court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs on December 30, 2004. The permanent injunction directed both the city and state to: (i) provide expedited food stamp service to eligible applications within 7 days; (ii) separately process applications for food stamps when the applications for cash assistance are denied or withdrawn; (iii) send notices to applicants confirming voluntary withdrawals for Medicaid in accord with 42 C.F.R. 435.913 and document such withdrawals pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 273.2(c)(6); and (iv) provide adequate and timely notice by correctly completing certain documentation. The injunction also required the state to supervise the city and make sure it met the obligations of the injunction. On January 13, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the part of the December order in which the court concluded that 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a) did not confer a privately enforceable right of action and that plaintiffs’ claim under New York Social Services Law § 133 was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion and reversed its earlier decisions on these points on February 14, 2005. Final judgement was entered on December 14, 2005; at this time, the court also granted the plaintiffs a declaratory judgment that city officials had failed to provide the class with the obligations required of them by the relevant federal programs and further specified the parameters of the permanent injunction. A stipulation and order resolving the issue of attorney fees was reached on January 31, 2007. The city agreed to pay the plaintiff class a total of $2,559,675.94 for the attorneys' fees incurred up through December 14, 2005. The state agreed to pay $639,918.98 for the plaintiffs' fees for the same period. Both the state and the city appealed the permanent injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on January 12, 2006, but the city dropped its appeal shortly afterward. On October 31, 2007, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that the state did not have a non-delegable duty to administer the decentralized Medicaid and Food Stamp programs, the state’s efforts in supervising the city since the permanent injunction was issued were adequate, and the district court exceeded its authority by issuing a permanent injunction despite New York State’s affirmative supervisory steps it had taken to assure compliance. The Second Circuit ruling dismissed the claims against the state defendants, reversed the permanent injunction, and altered those parts of the December 14, 2005 judgement addressing the state government. In a second stipulation and order from April 23, 2010, the City of New York agreed to pay a further $275,000.00 to the plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs from December 15, 2005 through December 14, 2008. A third stipulation and order from December 22, 2010, had the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA), the agency in charge of implementing the changes at issue in this case, identify households which required but did not receive a separate food stamp determination between December 15, 2005 and November 30, 2006, as a result of an application at a job center in which a request for public assistance was denied, and restore those benefits. A final stipulation and order was issued on July 22, 2011, in which the city agreed to pay $86,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs sought to the plaintiffs for the period between December 15, 2008 and June 14, 2010. This was the most recent item on the docket; the case is now closed.

Summary: This class action was about whether the City of New York improperly denied federally sponsored cash assistance to qualified New York City residents under a program implemented by the city in the late 1990s. The plaintiffs each claimed to be qualified welfare beneficiaries who had been improperly denied assistance by one of New York City’s new job centers in violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process, the city’s obligations under 7 U.S.C. §2020 (the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program—then referred to as Food Stamps) and 42 U.S.C. §1396 (Medicaid), in addition to violating state law; the plaintiffs sought class certification for all similarly situated New York City residents, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 16, 1998, with Judge William H. Pauley presiding. The court entered a temporary restraining order on the same day directing the city to provide emergency food stamps and cash assistance to the named plaintiffs. The court granted a preliminary injunction in-part to the plaintiffs on January 21, 1999. The court ordered the city to (1) allow applicants for public assistance to apply for benefits the first day they visit a job center, (2) cease conversion of income support centers to job centers without a formal hearing, (3) make eligibility requirements for food stamps and Medicaid separately from the eligibility determination from cash assistance, (4) send applicants timely notice of the city’s decision on whether they qualify for benefits, and (5) form a corrective plan for achieving its policy goals while also meeting the needs of public assistance applicants. The city moved to vacate the preliminary injunction on December 10, 1999, after procuring more evidence surrounding the efficacy of the job centers in achieving their welfare obligations. Meanwhile, the State of New York moved to dismiss the complaint against them for failure to state a claim. Judge Pauley denied both motions and granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on July 21, 2000. The court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs on December 30, 2004. The permanent injunction directed both the city and state to: (i) provide expedited food stamp service to eligible applications within 7 days; (ii) separately process applications for food stamps when the applications for cash assistance are denied or withdrawn; (iii) send notices to applicants confirming voluntary withdrawals for Medicaid in accord with 42 C.F.R. 435.913 and document such withdrawals pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 273.2(c)(6); and (iv) provide adequate and timely notice by correctly completing certain documentation. The injunction also required the state to supervise the city and make sure it met the obligations of the injunction. On January 13, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the part of the December order in which the court concluded that 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 387.8(a)(2)(i)(a) did not confer a privately enforceable right of action and that plaintiffs’ claim under New York Social Services Law § 133 was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court granted the motion on February 14, 2005. Final judgement was entered on December 14, 2005; the court also granted the plaintiffs declaratory judgment. Both the state and the city appealed the permanent injunction to the Second Circuit on January 12, 2006, but the city dropped its appeal. On October 31, 2007, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that the state did not have a non-delegable duty to administer the decentralized Medicaid and Food Stamp programs, the state’s efforts in supervising the city since the permanent injunction was issued were adequate, and the district court exceeded its authority by issuing a permanent injunction in light of New York State’s affirmative supervisory steps it had taken to assure compliance. In a series of stipulations and orders from January 31, 2007 to July 22, 2011, the City of New York agreed to pay a total of $2,920,675.94 to plaintiffs for attorney fees and costs sought; the state agreed to pay a further $639,918.98. The case is now closed.


This Clearinghouse entry describes two closely entwined lawsuits: O'Toole v. Cuomo, U.S. v. New York, and Disability Advocates Inc. v. Pataki.
 On June 30, 2003, Disability Advocates, Inc. (DAI) filed a lawsuit on behalf of New York residents in large "adult homes," privately owned but state-funded facilities for individuals with mental illness or other disabilities, and on behalf of all individuals at risk of being institutionalized in adult homes. Plaintiffs filed their case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, against the Governor of New York, the State Departments of Health and Mental Health, and several other state officials. The complaint focused specifically on 26 of the adult homes in New York City, each of which housed more than 120 people and where at least 25%, and often more than 75%, of the residents had mental illnesses. The complaint compared the treatment received by mentally ill individuals who had been discharged and placed in community-based supported housing or other integrated living settings with those individuals placed in the adult homes, where personal freedom, choice, and privacy were limited, as were opportunities to interact with family and non-mentally ill persons. Recreational programming and personal rights were often non-existent. The adult homes were alleged to present frequent health, safety, and sanitation violations. The complaint also alleged instances of home operators and other staff taking financial or other improper advantage of mentally ill residents, as well participating in schemes to excessively bill the State. In addition to Plaintiff organization's own attorneys, Plaintiffs were represented by lawyers from a large private firm and from the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, the New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, MFY Legal Services, Inc., and the Urban Justice Center. The DAI complaint alleged that the decision to discharge mentally ill patients from hospitals to adult homes resulted from the state's unlawfully insufficient provisioning for supported housing. Plaintiffs also contended that increasing the capacity of supported housing settings would be of equal or lower cost to the State than maintaining the adult homes. The complaint cited state and city evaluative reports and prominent newspaper articles that indicated the State had known for at least 25 years that the living conditions and quality of care and life in the adult homes were inadequate. The Plaintiffs estimated that at least half of adult home residents with mental illness could live community-integrated settings successfully. The DAI case alleged that the State violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against persons with disabilities by failing to administer medically necessary services and programs in the most integrated setting, and by failing to make reasonable and appropriate accommodations for these persons, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12131 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (Title II of the ADA and its implementing regulations) and of 29 U.S.C § 794 (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). The ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), mandates that disabled persons, including those individuals with serious mental illnesses, not be subjected to "unjustified isolation" and that government services providing medically necessary care be provided "in the most integrated setting appropriate to [the patients'] needs." Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as an award of attorneys' fees and costs. On April 29, 2004, the first judge assigned, Robert M. Levy, granted Defendants' motion for recusal in light of his prior service on the Plaintiff organization's board of directors and past employment with New York Lawyers for the Public Interest. The case was reassigned. On February 19, 2009, the Court (Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis) denied the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. The Court found that DAI had standing to bring the suit, that Title II applied to DAI's claims, and that the Governor was a proper party. On May 8, 2009, the Court ruled on various motions in limine. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 1312112 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2009). Following a five week bench trial, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 9, 2009. The Court found that DAI had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that its constituents were not receiving services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and had thus established a violation of the integration mandate of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. As a result, the Court held that DAI was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 653 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). In response, three parties moved to intervene in the action: the United States, represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division; the Empire State Association of Assisted Living; and the New York Coalition for Quality Assisted Living. On November 23, 2009, the Court granted the United States' motion to intervene. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 450631 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2009). The Court denied the other two parties' motions on December 23, 2009. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2009 WL 5185807 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009). The Court issued a remedial order and judgment on March 1, 2010. The Order detailed Defendants' future obligations and ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs. The Court denied Defendants' motion for a stay pending appeal on March 11, 2010. Disability Advocates, Inc. v. Paterson, 2010 WL 933750 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010). Defendants appealed, and on May 31, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the action. The Second Circuit found that the primary plaintiff in the case, Disability Advocates, Inc., did not have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Among other standing requirements, the Supreme Court has held that organizations seeking to assert the injuries of their members or constituents must show that they sufficiently represent the interests of those constituents and that the constituents have some control over the actions of the representative body. In New York, DAI was a contractor of the state's federally mandated Protection and Advocacy (P&A) System. Although other circuits are split on the issue of whether the state P&A can stand in for individuals with disabilities for the purpose of Article III standing, the Second Circuit found that DAI's status as a contractor of the P&A system makes it an inadequate stand-in for the people it seeks to represent. The Court also found that although the United States could sue to enforce its statutes, the federal government's late intervention in the case (nearly 7 years after it was filed) did not cure the standing problem. The Second Circuit Court decision formally ended the DAI case. However, after that decision was announced, the plaintiffs--both DAI and the United States--decided to refile the litigation to solve the standing problem. Private plaintiffs were recruited, and DAI switched its role to be among the plaintiffs' counsel, along with Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Mobilization for Justice, Urban Justice Center, New York Lawyers for Public Interest, and Disability Rights New York. Both the private plaintiffs and the United States then filed nominally new litigation on July 23, 2013: O'Toole v. Cuomo, 13-cv-04166 and United States v. New York, 13-cv-04165, simultaneously with a negotiated settlement. In addition, they filed a request that the case be assigned to Judge Garaufis, saying that the case presented nearly identical facts to that in DAI, thereby saving judicial resources. On August 8, 2013, a group representing 19 of the impacted homes asked the court to delay its decision regarding the proposed settlement until it had time to confer with the parties. The group argued that they disagreed with the underlying premise of the proposed agreement; namely with the contention that the presence of mentally ill persons in adult homes violated the ADA and the Olmstead mandate. The potential intervenors also alleged that they were wrongfully denied the opportunity to participate in negotiation proceedings before the proposed settlement was filed. Finally, they listed several disagreements with the substantive components of the proposed settlement, claiming that it would pressure and coerce residents into leaving adult homes and would ignore the rights of adult home operators. Judge Garaufis did not respond to the adult home operators’ objections at this time. On October 10, 2013, the court issued an order finding that the parties’ proposed agreement did not include sufficient mechanisms for the court to monitor and supervise its implementation. In accordance with the order, the parties submitted a proposed modification to the agreement on December 10, 2013. On January 14, 2014, counsel for the group of adult homes submitted a letter to the court asking it to modify the proposed consent judgment because of continued disagreement with its terms. Nonetheless, on January 30, 2014, the parties submitted an amended stipulated settlement agreement. The terms were similar to those in the original agreement, but included additional mechanisms for court monitoring. In the meantime, on November 20, 2013, Judge Garaufis certified the plaintiff class, defined as persons with serious mental illness residing in NYC Adult Homes. After fairness hearings, on March 17, 2014, the court issued final approval of the modified settlement agreement, finding it to be fair and reasonable. Regarding the objections of the adult home operators, the court found that, as non-parties to the case who had not formally intervened, the operators did not have standing to object to the settlement. Nonetheless, Judge Garaufis addressed each of their concerns in the March 17 Order, and concluded that the Agreement adequately addressed each of them. The terms of the court-enforced settlement provided individuals with mental illness residing in twenty-three New York City adult homes the option of transferring to community-based supported housing in the most integrated setting possible. It required that those opting for the transfers have access to flexible support services and community-based mental health care suited to their individual needs. At the time of the settlement, approximately 4000 individuals were eligible for these transfers. The State agreed to provide funding for 950 such housing units scattered throughout the Bronx and Staten Island, with 1050 more units in Queens and Kings Counties. Individuals with mental illness that rendered them a danger to themselves or others were not eligible for supported housing. The Agreement also required that all adult home residents be assessed for eligibility in the supported housing program within five years of the effective date of the settlement, with housing providers conducting “in-reach” to explain housing options to residents. It mandated that State compliance be monitored by an Independent Reviewer, who would make annual reports on the implementation of the settlement terms and who would otherwise observe, review, report findings, and make recommendations to the parties. The Court's retention of jurisdiction was set to expire after the fifth and final report of the Reviewer, unless the Plaintiffs alleged non-compliance or the parties agreed to extend the agreement. In addition, the parties were required to submit quarterly reports. Finally, the settlement provided $200,000 in attorneys' fees and costs for the DIA v. Pataki plaintiffs' legal expenses. From the time the order was approved until April 2015, the State filed quarterly status reports on its implementation of the agreement without apparent incident. However, in May 2015, the Independent Reviewer filed a notice stating that the team had experienced difficulty obtaining access to various records it needed to accurately review the State’s progress. Accordingly, the Independent Reviewer filed a Proposed Order regarding its access to records to ensure that his team would have the records access it needed. The court issued the Order, mandating that the involved entities provide any records requested by the Independent Reviewer for monitoring and compliance purposes. The first status report of the Independent Reviewer generally indicated that progress was slow. However, in February 2016, representatives for several of the adult homes again submitted a letter to the court claiming that various pieces of information had been withheld during status reports and status conferences. Specifically, the letter claimed that, because of pressure to move residents out of adult homes at a faster pace, some residents who were inappropriate candidates for supported living had been moved out of their group homes and suffered adverse consequences. After receiving the letter, the court ordered the parties to discuss the allegations at their next status conference. The next annual report filed by the Independent Reviewer indicated that the State had made significant strides and that, contrary to the adult home operators’ contentions, those who had transitioned into the community were generally doing well and were happy with their decisions. As far as areas for improvement, the report indicated that the pace of transition was still lagging and that additional support for transitions and in-reach was needed. On February 28, 2017, the New York State Office of the Attorney General (OAG) moved to withdraw as counsel for the defendants in this case and related cases, citing fundamental disagreements between counsel and Defendants and stating that Defendants had made it unreasonably difficult to represent them. The problems cited by OAG arose out of a separate but related New York case, Doe v. Zucker, litigated in Albany, in which a former resident of an adult home moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of certain regulations that arose in conjunction with the Settlement Agreement in this case, because those regulations had prevented Doe's plaintiff from returning to an adult home, even though that's what he wanted. Specifically, the challenged regulations restricted adult homes’ ability to accept new residents. OAG represented State defendants in that case. OAG claimed that the State defendants informed counsel of their intention to support the injunction against their own regulations the morning of the TRO hearing, and that the State had apparently been communicating with the adult home operators without notifying OAG. At the hearing in Doe v. Zucker, OAG counsel neither supported nor opposed the issuance of the TRO, but deferred to their clients. A week later, OAG appeared at a status conference for the present case. Judge Garaufis asked the Attorney General to explain why the office had apparently supported the TRO in the Albany case but was simultaneously defending the regulations in this case. OAG contended that it did not in fact support the implementation of the TRO in Albany, but that it had been blindsided by its clients’ actions. As such, OAG maintained that it was necessary to withdraw as counsel in the federal case. At a hearing on March 22, 2017, Judge Garaufis expressed serious concern that matters so closely related to the settlement were being litigated at the state level without his knowledge--the State never informed him of the proceedings. He explained that it seemed that the State had conspired with the adult home operators to attempt to thwart the regulations limiting admittance to adult homes. He ordered the parties to engage in discovery regarding the OAG’s and the State’s actions leading up to the issuance of the TRO in Doe and scheduled a hearing on OAG’s motion to withdraw for May 17, 2017. He also ordered OAG to inform the state court in Doe v. Zucker about the existence of the settlement and that, because the case was moot, the TRO should be rescinded. Further complicating matters, the TRO issued by the state court in Doe v. Zucker triggered an obligation in the Settlement Agreement for the parties to meet and confer if enforcement of any of the regulations pertinent to the Agreement was stayed. The Agreement required that, in such a case, if the parties were unable to agree on modifications within 120 days, the entire Agreement would be null and void. For reasons that are unclear, OAG withdrew its motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendants on May 4, 2017. The same day, the parties filed a stipulated order to modify the Agreement. The stipulation indicated that the parties agreed to delete the section of the Settlement Agreement that required the parties to meet and modify the agreement in the event of a stay of enforcement of any pertinent regulations. It also indicated that the parties could continue to negotiate possible additional revisions. Judge Garaufis granted the order on May 18 in lieu of having a hearing on May 17. As a separate matter, because Doe v. Zucker was just one of several cases brought by former residents of adult homes and adult home operators to enjoin enforcement of the regulations that arose out of the actions in NY v. U.S., Judge Garaufis became concerned that the class members in such cases were being manipulated into bringing suits against the State without fully understanding the situation or, in some cases, without consent. As a result, on June 15, 2017, he appointed guardians ad litem for the class members who were named as plaintiffs in this group of lawsuits. In early December 2017, the parties were ordered to reenter mediation under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Steven Tiscione. While the United States and class counsel were against it, defendants wanted a short time to negotiate for a revised settlement agreement. They were directed to submit a report to Judge Garaufis no later than February 7, 2018 detailing the outcome of the negotiations. By that time, parties submitted a joint motion for extension of time to negotiate, but Judge Garaufis denied that motion. On March 12, the United States submitted a motion to approve the settlement agreement. Four days later the U.S. submitted a supplement to the Second Amended Stipulation and Order of Settlement (from May 4, 2017). A month later, Judge Garaufis preliminarily approved the agreement, final approval pending a fairness hearing that took place in June. On September 6, 2018, the court granted final approval and the supplementary was also granted. The agreements provided for a quality assurance program, more specific timelines and thresholds for measuring task compliance, and a shift in lodging responsibilities, among many other provisions. Relatively little has occurred in the way of litigation since the September 2018 approval. The state continues to submit monthly status reports and the Independent Review team submits yearly reports. The most recent report, the 6th Annual Report, was filed on April 1, 2020. The report states that, while some reforms have been made, "structural and process problems still exist," especially in that many members of the class do not wish to move to community services. The report claims that this is likely due to family members discouraging them from that choice. The case is ongoing as of June 29, 2020.

Summary: This case was brought by Disability Advocates, Inc. against the Governor of the State of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel Defendant to provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate. The District Court issued judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. After the Defendants appealed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the action due to lack of standing. The DOJ continued to pursue a settlement. On July 23, 2013, the State and the DOJ filed a settlement to provide approximately 4000 qualifying adult home residents the option of living in community-supported private homes scattered throughout New York City. The settlement was approved in March 2014. The settlement was amended and changed several times from 2014 to 2018. The case is ongoing and the court maintains jurisdiction.


On November 3, 2004, plaintiffs, two lesbian couples, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against the United States and the State of Oklahoma. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Article 2 § 35 of the Oklahoma Constitution (the "Oklahoma Amendment," which banned same-sex marriage licenses from being issued in Oklahoma and acknowledging same-sex marriages issued in other states) violated the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs alleged that DOMA and the Oklahoma Amendment violated the Due Process, Equal Protection, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. In August 2006, the Court denied a motion to dismiss filed by the Oklahoma Attorney General and Oklahoma Governor, rejecting their sovereign immunity argument. The state officials appealed and the Court stayed the proceedings pending appeal. On June 5, 2009, the Tenth Circuit issued an unpublished decision reversing the Court's failure to dismiss the claims against the Oklahoma officials and remanding the case for entry of an order dismissing the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit's reversal was based on the plaintiffs' lack of standing to pursue their claims against the named state officials. On November 24, 2009, the Court dismissed Oklahoma from the case. The remaining defendants, the United States and the Tulsa County Clerk, filed a motion to dismiss on October 13, 2009. On February 25, 2011, prior to the Court's issuing a decision on the pending motions to dismiss, the United States notified the Court that it would cease defending the constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA, thereby abandoning other portions of its previously filed motion to dismiss. On July 21, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives filed a motion to intervene "as a defendant for the limited purpose of defending Section 3." On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), (PB-NY-0017 in this Clearinghouse), which held that Section 3 of DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the Federal Government, and Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), (PB-CA-0029 in this Clearinghouse), which held that the official proponents of Proposition 8 lacked standing. On January 14, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the Oklahoma ban on same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court entered an order permanently enjoining enforcement of the ban against same-sex couples seeking a marriage license. But, it wrote "in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court's issuance of a stay in a nearly identical case on appeal from the District Court of Utah to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, see Herbert v. Kitchen (Jan. 6, 2014), the Court stays execution of this injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals." The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the Section 3 of DOMA. On January 16, 2014, the Tulsa County Clerk appealed the Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, and on January 24, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision as to DOMA. The appeals court issued its decision on the first of these appeals on July 18, 2014, affirming the District Court's decision that same-sex marriage violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The main opinion was by Judge Carlos Lucero; Judge Jerome Holmes joined, and Judge Paul Kelly dissented. The Court stayed its decision pending resolution of a petition for review in the Supreme Court. Bishop v. Smith, 2014 WL 3537847 (N.D. Oklahoma 2014). On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271, 190 L. Ed. 2d 139 (2014). On October 6, 2014, the Court issued an order lifting the stay on its original mandate and permanently enjoined the defendant from enforcing the Oklahoma Amendment to deny any same-sex couples marriage licenses based solely on their status as a same-sex couple. On May 1, 2015, the Court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs in the amount of $298,742.77. And on June 15, 2015, the Court awarded supplemental attorney's fees, bringing the total fee award to $309,485.27. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs are lesbian couples who filed suit on November 3, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, against the United States and the State of Oklahoma, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and Article 2 § 35 of the Oklahoma Constitution (the "Oklahoma Amendment") violate the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs alleged that DOMA and the Oklahoma Amendment violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The court found for the plaintiffs, holding on Jan. 14, 2014 that the ban on same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Tenth Circuit found for the plaintiffs on July 18, 2014, and after the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari (on October 6, 2014), the Court lifted the stay on its original mandate and enjoined the Defendant from enforcing the Oklahoma Amendment and denying same-sex couples marriage licenses. The Court awarded $309,485.27 in attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.


On October 26, 2004, the Asociacion de Trabajadores Fronterizos and five of its individual members filed a lawsuit under the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§2296 & 2320, against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from Texas RioGrande Legal Aid and Public Citizen Litigation Group asked the court for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and litigation costs, claiming that the Department of Labor violated the Trade Act in its administration of job benefits by providing remedial education instead of bilingual vocational training sufficient to make participants job-ready upon completion. Plaintiiff Asociacion de Trabajadores Fronterizos (ATF) is a membership organization comprised of workers whose jobs were lost or threatened by foreign competition resulting from NAFTA. Its name translates to "Association of Border Workers." The members of ATF are primarily garment workers of Mexican national origin who communicate in Spanish and have limited English-communication abilities. The named plaintiffs Plaintiffs are members of ATF whose primary residences are in El Paso County, Texas. Defendant Department of Labor (DOL) is the federal agency responsible for administering the Trade Adjustment Assistance job training benefits to displaced workers provided for under the Trade Act of 1974. On April 3, 2002, Plaintiffs, along with another party, first filed a lawsuit against the DOL that also named the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC), the Upper Rio Grande Workforce Development Board, and the commissioners and directors of these organizations as defendants. This lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas El Paso Division, included the Trade Act violations in its causes of action. This case is not in our database, but its docket number is 3:02-CV-00131. Judge Frank Montalvo severed the claims against the DOL on October 20, 2004 according to a motion by the plaintiffs. Prior to the severance, ATF filed a lawsuit on June 17, 2004, as the sole plaintiff, against the DOL under the Trade Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On October 20, 2004, the order to transfer the case to the Western District of Texas was granted, with the transfer occurring on December 1, 2004. This case is also not in our database, but its docket number is 1:04-CV-00993. These events resulted in the two concurrent cases in the Western District of Texas under Judge Montalvo. Plaintiffs filed the complaint in this case on October 26, 2004 and filed a motion for summary judgment on November 5, 2004. Following a hearing on the summary judgment motion on May 24, 2005, the case was referred to Judge Edward Leavy for mediation on June 03, 2005. On December 29, 2005, upon completion of mediation, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to dismiss that included an executed copy of the settlement agreement reached by the parties. On December 30, 2005, Judge Frank Montalvo granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the case with prejudice and entered a final judgment. In the final judgment, the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms the settlement agreement. The motion to dismiss, corresponding order and the final judgment were filed under this case and the original Texas case. Therefore, the other Texas case concluded with the same settlement agreement and closed on December 30, 2005. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the DOL and other defendants must dedicate $6 million in funding to establish a project for Limited English-Proficient (LEP) displaced workers in the El Paso Area. This program will make vocational training, customized training, on-the-job training and remedial education available to eligible participants. Policy changes included recognition of the effectiveness of, and a focus on, dual-language training and a required 80% wage replacement goal. The DOL was also required to issue the Training and Employment Guidance letter within 30 days of the agreement. In addition, counsel for the Plaintiffs, Texas RioGrande Legal Aide, was awarded $30,000 for litigation costs.

Summary: This case was brought by workers with limited English proficiency, whose jobs were lost or threatened by foreign competition against the U.S. Department of Labor, seeking injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment and costs for the DOL's failure to provide adequate training under the Trade Act of 1974. The case was settled on December 30, 2005 and resulted in the establishment of a program for Limited English-Proficient workers in the El Paso area by the DOL as well as widespread policy changes as to the administration of the job training benefits.


On September 13, 2013, an African American prisoner in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Corrections. He alleged that the prison assigned him to a particular cell on the basis of his race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the State of Arizona persisted in continuous and systematic racial segregation in the areas of housing and personal care of the prisoners. On October 30, 2013, the judge assigned to this case, Judge Cindy A. Jorgenson, granted a motion by attorneys from the law firm Kendall, Brill, and Kelly to represent the plaintiff. Among those attorneys was Bert Deixler, who had litigated Johnson v. California, in which the Supreme Court held that racial housing assignments in prison were usually unconstitutional. Johnson is PC-CA-0041 in this Clearinghouse. On February 4, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against all the defendants adding the governor of Arizona as a defendant. The governor and the director of the Department of Corrections moved to dismiss the case on March 13, 2014. They argued that the plaintiff improperly sued them based on a letter mailed to him and denial of a grievance appeal, despite admitting that the defendants had no involvement in housing, work, or other assignments in the Tucson prison. On March 17, 2014, the Warden of the Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson also filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the plaintiff improperly sued based on a letter mailed to him. The plaintiff withdrew the claims against the Division Director of Offender Operation for the Arizona State Department of Corrections, and the Governor. He also filed to substitute the public officer with the Division Director of Operations. On May 8, 2014, Judge Jorgenson granted the voluntary dismissal of the claims against the governor, and then denied the governor's motion to dismiss as moot. Judge Jorgenson also granted the substitution of the public officer (the Division Director of Offender Operations). On June 9, 2014, the Division Director of Offender Operations filed a motion to dismiss. This defendant claimed that he was superfluous to this lawsuit and should be dismissed. But, on July 23, 2014, Judge Jorgenson denied the motion. As discussed in a joint settlement status report filed November 14, 2014, all parties requested a Magistrate Judge to be appointed to the case in order to act as settlement judge in this matter. On November 24, 2014, their request was granted, and Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle was chosen to oversee settlement negotiations. On December 22, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to stop segregating prisoners by race in housing, except for in individual cases where a prisoner had a documented history of racial animosity. The defendants also agreed to curtail racially discriminatory practices in prison employment opportunities. They agreed to narrowly tailor any consideration of race in connection to employment assignments to address a compelling state interest, and to only ever consider race as one factor in a comprehensive and objective assessment of employment assignment or service. The change in policy would apply to Arizona Department of Corrections prison complexes in Douglas, Eyman, Florence, Lewis, Perryville, Phoenix, Safford, Tucson, Winslow, and Yuma. The defendants also agreed to pay $5,000 in monetary damages to the named plaintiff, and to pay $195,000 to the plaintiff's counsel in attorneys’ fees and costs. The agreement was intended to last until at least 2023, and contained a clause prohibiting either party from moving to terminate the agreement during that period. The plaintiff’s counsel were designated as monitors over the defendants’ compliance with the terms of the agreement, and the defendants agreed to provide plaintiff’s counsel with documents, reports, and access to its facilities for monitoring purposes. In the event of a breach of the agreement, a process is in place to resolve the issue out of court first, after which the plaintiff’s counsel may seek court enforcement. The agreement bars the court from ordering the defendants to construct new prisons or to hire a specific number or type of staff unless the defendants propose to do so as part of a plan to remedy a failure to comply. On February 8, 2016, Judge Jorgenson issued an order approving the settlement agreement, and agreeing to enforce its terms. There have been no further substantive developments in the case as of May 26, 2020.

Summary: On September 13, 2013, an African American inmate in the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson filed this lawsuit against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Department of Correction in the District of Arizona. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The inmate alleged that the prison segregated him by race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The parties reached a settlement on December 22, 2015, under which the defendants would narrowly limit racial consideration in prison housing and employment opportunities, and pay $5,000 in monetary damages to plaintiff as well as $195,000 to plaintiff’s counsel in attorneys’ fees and costs.


On December 1, 2005, a group of California prisoners with mental illness filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The prisoners filed against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The prisoners, represented by the Legal Aid Society, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison system's policies regarding prisoners with mental disabilities violated the ADA. Specifically, the prisoners challenged the prison system's policies of 1) adding four classification points to any prisoner with mental illness; 2) preventing prisoners with mental illness from attending programming; 3) requiring that any prisoners taking specific medications be kept inside during yard when the temperature increased over 90 degrees; and 4) preventing prisoners with mental illness from taking jobs inside prison, among other allegations. The case was assigned to Judge Lawrence Karlton. (The procedural history comes from Docket 124-3.) Following the defendants' motion to dismiss, the relationship between this case and Coleman v. Brown came into issue. Coleman, PC-CA-0002 in this Clearinghouse, was a class-action lawsuit filed by mentally ill California inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CDC alleging that mental health care provided at most California penal institutions violated their constitutional rights. Coleman was also in front of Judge Karlton. In this case, instead of ruling on the motion to dismiss (and before the prisoners were able to file a motion to certify the class,) on March 15, 2007, Judge Karlton referred the case to the special master of the Coleman case to make "a report and recommendation as to whether the claims raised [in Hecker] can be resolved within the remedial phase of [Coleman]." The case was stayed pending that report. 2007 WL 836806. On June 12, 2007, the Coleman special master and the deputy special master gave their report and recommendation. The report concluded that the parties' were not able to "negotiate[e] an agreement to consolidation or merger of the Hecker claims into the Coleman case at this time." On December 14, 2007, the prisoners filed a motion to lift the stay. The Court did not rule on the motion. In the meantime, intense litigation proceeded in Coleman. The prisoners filed a renewed motion to lift the stay on September 19, 2012. On October 19, 2012, the Court denied the prisoners' motion without prejudice to its renewal, as appropriate, not later than March 1, 2013, and the parties were directed to meet and confer with the Coleman Special Master to determine whether any Hecker issues could be resolved in the Coleman remedial process. In the midst of that meet and confer process in January 2013 the state moved to terminate the Coleman case. Therefore, the parties were not able to agree to resolve Hecker issues within the Coleman remedial process. (In the end, the Coleman termination motion was not granted.) On March 1, 2013, the Hecker plaintiffs filed a renewed motion to lift the stay. On April 12, 2013, Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd denied the prisoners' motion "without prejudice to its renewal, as appropriate, not later than September 5, 2013." He ordered the parties to continue to meet and confer with the Coleman Special Master, and directed that any renewed prisoners' motion to lift the stay be "accompanied by a joint report by the parties and approved by the Coleman special master." In July 2014, the parties reached a settlement. Judge Karlton granted preliminary approval of the settlement on August 7, 2014, before retiring later that month. The case was assigned to Judge Kimberly Mueller, who approved the settlement agreement on March 2, 2015. The CDC agreed to implement revised policies to ensure that prisoners with psychiatric disabilities would not be unlawfully excluded from prison programs and services or be discriminated against because of their disabilities. The Settlement Agreement also provided that the implementation of these revised policies would be monitored by the Special Master appointed by the Court in Coleman. The Court in Coleman would also retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The parties also agreed that the CDC would pay attorneys' fees and costs through the periodic fees process in Coleman. The settlement agreement stated that termination of the Coleman litigation would terminate the issues that had been or were being resolved under the agreement. As of March 23, 2020 monitoring and implementation of the settlement agreements in both cases is ongoing.

Summary: In 2005, a group of California prisoners with mental illness filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation alleging that the prison system's policies regarding prisoners with mental disabilities violated the ADA. The parties settled in 2015 and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement.


On September 9, 2014, Disability Rights Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. This suit was brought against the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) and Wexford Health Sources, an FDC contractor, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff, represented by private and in-house counsel as well as Florida Legal Services, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiff alleged that abuse and discrimination against inmates with mental illnesses as well as inadequate care for such inmates violated their Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officials at Dade Correctional Institution (Dade CI) subjected inmates with serious mental illness in their inpatient mental health units to physical beatings, verbal harassment, deprivation of food, and torture. The plaintiff claimed that FDC was on notice of these conditions and failed to investigate the allegations of abuse and adequately punish those responsible. Disability Rights Florida, the plaintiff, is a federally-funded protection and advocacy system responsible for protecting the rights of individuals with mental illness in the state. In this lawsuit, the organization sought several forms of relief to protect prisoners with mental illnesses. First, the plaintiff requested that the court declare the defendants’ conduct unlawful and unconstitutional. Second, the plaintiff requested an injunction requiring FDC to cease all actions that violated the constitutional and statutory rights of mentally ill inmates at the Dade CI inpatient unit, to take immediate action to investigate and stop the ongoing abuse of such inmates, to train and supervise officers assigned to the unit, to develop a system of periodic independent oversight of the unit, and to take immediate steps to ensure timely investigations of abuse upon these inmates. Third, the plaintiff requested an injunction requiring Wexford to mandate that its employees report allegations of abuse and ensure that inmates with mental illness receive adequate care. Fourth and finally, the plaintiff requested an injunction requiring FDC to stop discriminating against inmates in the Dade CI inpatient unit on the basis of disability. At around the same time, the estate and survivors of a mentally ill prisoner who died after being forced to shower in scalding water for hours sued FDC and several FDC guards and prison officials (Chapman v. Florida Department of Corrections, docket number 1:14-cv-24140-RNS). The representative alleged that the defendants violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Eighth Amendment, and sought damages. On November 14, 2014, the court issued an order consolidating Chapman with this case. On April 10, 2015, Disability Rights Florida and the defendants submitted a private settlement agreement that Judge Robert N. Scola, Jr. approved on April 14, 2015. Among other things, the state agreed to:

Provide Crisis Intervention Training to all staff at Dade CI.
 Provide specialized training for correctional officers who work directly with inmates with mental illnesses.
Upgrade its video monitoring system and begin a pilot program for an audio monitoring system.
Try to provide full staffing at Dade CI.
Create an additional Assistant Warden position at Dade CI and a Mental Health Ombudsman position at FDC's central office and Region III office. These officials will lead and supervise mental health care efforts.
Install televisions in the common areas of the inpatient units at Dade CI for both therapeutic and recreational activities.
Allow a team of psychiatrists and security experts to visit Dade CI to review records, observe therapeutic and non-therapeutic activities, evaluate safeguards against abuse and neglect at the facility, and make recommendations for any needed changes and improvements.
 In addition, Wexford Health Sources agreed to implement all of these provisions as well as provide training, hire additional behavioral health staff, and conduct internal and external audits of its program. The parties agreed to monitor compliance with the agreement through May of 2017. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the matter for 6 months, and during that time, the plaintiff could seek to reopen the case and resume the litigation if the state’s implementation of the agreement was systematically deficient. Meanwhile, on February 1, 2016, the plaintiff in Chapman moved to reopen the case, lift the stay on litigation entered with the settlement agreement, and start discovery because the settlement had no bearing on the issues addressed in its complaint. The court, finding that Chapman should have automatically reopened on March 16, 2015 when the last stay expired, reopened the matter and ordered the defendants to respond to the complaint by April 4, 2016. On April 12, 2016, the defendant answered the plaintiff’s complaint, raising several affirmative defenses, including failure to state a cause of action, failure to state a claim, and that the FDC was entitled to sovereign immunity. On May 16, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The FDC and Dade CI’s warden subsequently filed motions to dismiss on July 1, 2016. Meanwhile, discovery commenced. On October 28, 2016, the court granted the FDC’s motion to dismiss while denying that of Dade CI’s warden. As to the warden, the court found that the plaintiffs had stated a plausible claim of supervisory liability based on the warden’s alleged knowledge of widespread abuse of mentally ill inmates at Dade CI. As to the FDC, the court dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought on behalf of the decedent’s surviving family members for lack of standing, but upheld the same claims as brought by his estate. Discovery continued and, after fruitless mediation, a trial was scheduled for March 2018. Meanwhile, Disability Rights Florida identified deficiencies in the defendants’ compliance with the settlement agreement. On May 19, 2017, it and FDC moved to extend the deadline by six months so that FDC could implement reforms, including hiring a different mental healthcare provider. At the end of the six-month extension, both parties asked the court to dismiss that portion of the consolidated case with prejudice. The court did so on November 8, 2017, but clarified that the dismissal did not affect the ongoing litigation between the estate and the FDC defendants. The court also retained jurisdiction to resolve any disputes over attorneys’ fees that might emerge. There is no evidence in the docket that any attorneys’ fees disputes with respect to the Disability Rights Florida litigation reached the court. However, on January 17, 2018, the remaining parties notified the court that they had settled the case privately and in full. The court ordered the case administratively closed that day. While the Clearinghouse is not aware of the terms of the new settlement agreement, subsequent litigation revealed that it included $4.5 million in monetary damages. On May 24, 2018, the court entered an order requiring the plaintiffs to file a stipulation of dismissal by July 23, 2018. However, one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers tried to put a charging lien on the pool of settlement funds, and the estate of one of the decedent’s relatives attempted to intervene to claim some of the proceeds. The court declined to address these new disputes, and after the lawyer voluntarily withdrew an Eleventh Circuit appeal on the lien issue, the court approved the settlement on October 26, 2018. On November 21, 2018, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal of the action. The same day, the court ordered the dismissal of the case and stated that the court reserves jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, Disability Rights Florida filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiff alleged that certain inmates with mental illness at Dade Correctional Institution had been subject to torture, beatings, verbal harassment and food deprivation in violation of their Eighth Amendment Rights. They also alleged that these inmates had received insufficient care in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Federal Rehabilitation Act. Disability Rights Florida requested declaratory and injunctive relief to deem these practices unlawful and unconstitutional, and assurance that such practices would not continue. The parties reached a settlement agreement which required improved conditions for prisoners and ran through November 2017. Subsequent litigation in this case resulted from its consolidation with a related civil rights case seeking monetary damages. That portion of the litigation settled for $4.5 million in 2018. As of July 2020, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.


On August 3, 2016, a prisoner with a hearing disability incarcerated at Central State Prison in Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC) Commissioner, wardens, and counselors at his prison under 42 USC § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The complaint alleged that the current TTY system at the GDOC was inaccessible, inoperable, outmoded, and obsolete. The plaintiff had been in prison for nine years, and during that time was unable to communicate with family, friends, and lawyers. Further, he alleged that he had no access to religion or education in his native language (American Sign Language). He claimed that he had exhausted all administrative avenues for relief, and that prison administrators had ignored or denied all of his requests. The plaintiff initiated the lawsuit pro se, but was later represented by the ACLU, the National Association of the Deaf, and private counsel. He sought injunctive relief in the form of inmate calling services, TTY, and/or VRS services. He also asked for $15 million in damages for pain and suffering as well as violation of his constitutional rights. The case was assigned to Judge Marc Thomas Treadwell and then referred to Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 26, 2017, adding several defendants but no new claims. On February 15, 2017 Magistrate Judge Hyles ordered that the plaintiff’s action could go forward against all named defendants. 2017 WL 1380511. The plaintiff was released from prison on February 18, 2017. The plaintiff spent the next several months serving all of the defendants. On September 8, 2017, multiple defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and stay discovery. Several months of relative inaction followed, until the plaintiff, now represented by the ACLU, the National Association of the Deaf, and private counsel, moved to file a second amended complaint on June 20, 2018. In the eighty-two paged proposed second amended complaint, the plaintiff sought to withdraw his RLUIPA claim and clarify other claims. In his new claims, he highlighted how the prison, probation, and parole systems fail deaf prisoners by not providing sign language interpretation to explain rules and conditions of their release and then punishing the deaf individuals for violating the rules. He sought to add claims related to his post-incarceration probation or parole. He also asked to add thirteen additional plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of deaf or hard of hearing people currently or formerly incarcerated by GDOC. Finally, the plaintiff sought to eliminate all defendants who did not need to be parties to the case, while adding other defendants, including GDOC, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles (GBOP) and Georgia Department of Community Supervision (GDCS), On September 13, 2018, Judge Treadwell issued an order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as moot and granted the plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint in part. 2018 WL 4365503. He granted the plaintiff’s motion to clarify his ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claims, to withdraw his RLUIPA claim, to add one of the thirteen proposed additional plaintiffs, to eliminate unnecessary defendants, and to add GDOC and GBOP as defendants. The plaintiff’s request to add claims relating to his post-incarceration probation or parole was denied because these claims did not arise out of the alleged failure to provide effective communication inside Georgia’s prisons. The court denied the plaintiff’s request to join all but one additional plaintiff because the other proposed plaintiffs remained incarcerated, and thus, had different interests—the incarcerated individuals had an interest in enjoining GDOC’s future behavior whereas the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief was moot because he had been released. On the same day, Judge Treadway also issued a show cause order for why the case should not be consolidated with another, similar case, Woody v. Bryson. Civil Action No. 5:16-CV-467-MTT. Neither party replied to the order to show cause. The plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss his claims, and on September 28, 2018, the court dismissed the case without prejudice. From the docket and reported activity online, it was unknown what prompted the plaintiff to dismiss the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: Deaf inmate at the Georgia Department of Corrections filed lawsuit for injunctive relief in the form of communication aids and damages for pain and suffering. The case was dismissed following a show cause order from the judge suggesting that case should be consolidated with a nearly identical case.