On June 28, 2018, Black Love Resists in the Rust and four individual plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of Buffalo under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, and under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, and the Western New York Law Center, Inc., sought both injunctive and monetary relief. They claimed that the City of Buffalo disproportionately used vehicle checkpoints in Black and Latino communities to generate revenue, resulting in disparate impact on Black and Latino people. Specifically, they claimed that over 85% of checkpoints occurred in predominantly Black or Latino neighborhoods; nearly 40% of checkpoints conducted since 2012 occurred in just three of Buffalo's seventy-seven census tracts, each with a Black or Latino population exceeding 86%. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to end and remediate these traffic enforcement practices, as well as monetary damages for financial harm, humiliation, and loss of liberty and property. According to the complaint, around 2012, the Buffalo Police Department initiated a crime "Strike Force" that implemented a vehicle checkpoint program to conduct stops and searches of drivers without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. These checkpoints lasted as long as forty-five minutes and frequently resulted in multiple citations. For example, one class member was issued four separate tickets for having four tinted windows, costing him $720 total. That class member was also forced to choose between jail or the immediate impoundment of his car; he chose the latter, resulting in an addition $125 fee. Under state law, the City of Buffalo kept almost all the revenue collected from traffic tickets. After the checkpoints were instituted in 2015, the number of traffic tickets issued increased by 92%. On May 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding several additional Buffalo residents as plaintiffs. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 28, 2018, Black Love Resists in the Rust and four individual plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Buffalo in the Western District of New York. They claimed that the Buffalo Police Department disproportionately used vehicle checkpoints in Black and Latino communities to generate revenue, resulting in disparate impact on Black and Latino people. The plaintiffs sought an injunction to end and remediate these traffic enforcement practices, as well as monetary damages for the financial harm, humiliation, and loss of liberty and property. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 21, 2020; the case is ongoing.


This case was brought by Disability Rights California (“DRC”), a nonprofit corporation, to challenge the systemic institutionalization and segregation of Alameda County residents with serious mental health disabilities. On July 30, 2020, DRC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and named the County of Alameda (“the County”), Alameda Health System, and Alameda County Behavioral Health Care Services (“County Behavioral Health”) as defendants. DRC brought the suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, or 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. DRC sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney’s fees, alleging that the defendants had violated the ADA, as well as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (28 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.) and sections 11135-11139 of the California Government Code, by detaining mentally disabled individuals for longer than needed and failing to provide them proper treatment and services. On October 13, 2020, Alameda Health System filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike the complaint. It argued that DRC lacked standing because DRC’s complaint depended on the County creating community-based mental health services, a future event that may never occur. The County and County Behavioral Health filed similar motions shortly thereafter. On January 21, 2021, Judge Charles R. Breyer issued an order granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend, finding that DRC had failed to plausibly allege disability discrimination under the relevant statutes. Specifically, Judge Breyer found that the claims against the Health System failed because they centered on the failure to provide services rather than the setting. And Judge Breyer found that the claims against the County failed because the plaintiffs had not identified specific programs being provided in institutionalized settings that could be provided elsewhere. 2021 WL 212900. Judge Breyer also found that DRC had standing with respect to all defendants because DRC adequately pleaded an injury suffered by its constituents that could be traced to the defendants’ conduct. DRC has alleged that its Constituents have been unnecessarily institutionalized and continue to face a risk of unnecessary institutionalization as a result of Defendants’ practices and lack of services; and, DRC showed that this injury could be redressed by a favorable decision. <i>Id.</i> DRC submitted an amended complaint on February 23, 2021.

Summary: On July 30, 2020, Disability Rights California brought a suit against Alameda County in the Northern District Court of California. Disability Rights California alleged that Alameda County had discriminated against residents with serious mental health disabilities by institutionalizing and segregating them instead of providing adequate treatment and services. On January 21, 2021, the Court granted Alameda County’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend and denied their motion to strike. Disability Rights California has filed an amended complaint as of February 23, 2021.


On February 9, 2015, a deaf individual filed this lawsuit against Parkview Health Systems Inc. and Parkview Medical Center Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued under Title III the Americans with Disability Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, requested attorney fees and compensatory damages on the basis that the defendants failed to provide the plaintiff with an American Sign Language interpreter when his daughter was hospitalized, severely limiting his ability to understand her condition and the doctors' procedures. Additionally, the plaintiff asked the court for an injunction ordering the defendants to stop discriminating against deaf patients and their relatives. In October 2015, the matter settled. Prior to the initiation of the lawsuit, Parkview had installed video remote interpreting (VRI) to provide immediate access to sign language interpreters, and instituted policies that pre-scheduled and outpatient services would use in-person ASL interpreters. Under the settlement, these policies remained in place. The settlement also provided that Parkview would continue to train staff that lip-reading and note-writing are often not effective in communicating medical information to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing and that staff should take care in ascertaining the preferred method of communication of the deaf or hard of hearing patient or companion.

Summary: In 2015, a deaf individual filed a lawsuit against Parkview Health Systems Inc. He claimed that he was not provided an interpreter in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which severely influenced his communications with hospital staff regarding his critically injured daughter. The case settled for changes in policy and practice.


On January 1, 2014, deaf and hard of hearing prisoners in the Kentucky prison system filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the Kentucky Department of Corrections, several other departments of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and by the Washington Lawyers' Committee Prisoners Rights Project, alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Amendment, and asked the court for preliminary injunctive relief, certification as a class action, declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminated against them by denying or reducing the plaintiffs' access to telecommunication equipment such as Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf (TDD) and videophones that would allow them to communicate with their friends, family and attorneys outside of the prison system. Plaintiffs who use American Sign Language were denied interpretive service resulting in the denial of governmental services like educational, employment training and opportunities, and heath care programs on the basis of their disability. Plaintiffs were also denied translation services during religious ceremonies and were not provided with an effective means of receiving prison announcements. Lastly, plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to provide them with interpreters or other aids at disciplinary hearings, thereby denying them the right to hear the charges against them and defend themselves. The parties reached a settlement and appointed a monitor and the court approved on June 24, 2015. The settlement required the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) to ensure a full and equal access to all services and accommodations; assign a staff member at each KDOC adult institution as an ADA coordinator; during initial intake provide effective communication, hearing assessment, and auxiliary aids and services in the form of qualified interpreters, etc.; ensure staff awareness through identification cards; provide deaf inmates with interpretation of materials; provide deaf inmates with a schedule showing when interpretation services are available; ensure deaf and hard of hearing inmates get equal access to on-site and off-site medical care, various programs, work assignments, religious services, any meetings relating to transfer and classification matters; provide interpretation for disciplinary proceedings, announcements, alarms and any other information audibly conveyed to the inmates; provide telecommunication devices and other adequate technology devices; and train KDOC employees on the implementation of new policies. The settlement was scheduled to last 5 years, and provided for appointment of a monitor, Margo Schlanger. In February 2016, the monitor filed her first semi-annual report. The report stated that the payment to plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel was made; the requirement of hiring ADA Coordinators were nearly compliant; videophone installation is apparently compliant; free access to videophone, provision of qualified interpreters for unscheduled medical emergencies, and provision of qualified interpreters for disciplinary hearings were unclear; informational materials were partially compliant; the routine and situational reporting were difficult or partially noncompliant; and training was noncompliant. In December 2016, the monitor filed her second semi-annual report. This one included in-depth discussion of needed improvements at 8 of the prisons, and proposed training for officers and staff. In May 2017, the monitor filed her third semi-annual report. It discussed ongoing compliance challenges, and included several appendices:

I. Settlement Agreement
II. ADA staff computer-based-training
III. ADA Coordinator training
IV. Site visit report for Dec. 2016 and Feb. 2017 visits, with exhibits, included aggregated recommendations
V. Recommended forms
VI. April 2017 quarterly reporting request

 The fourth semi-annual status report, filed in November 2017, focused on hearing aids. The report concluded that the process for meeting inmate audiology concerns has improved but still needs further progress. The fifth semi-annual status report, filed December 2018, explained the state's new audiology policy, and focused on a self-auditing pilot. The sixth semi-annual status report, filed April 2019, summarized that while progress was being made, problems remained:
Some institutions have implemented a timely and effective audiology process, managed interpretive services effectively, and even worked on improving communication with hard-of-hearing inmates by providing new amplification devices. That said, the most recent self-reporting cycle reveals the widespread continuation of two different kinds of problems. Procedurally, some institutions continue to struggle with keeping and sharing the records needed to comply with the agreement and to check on that compliance, including when I make requests for follow-up. And substantively, self-reporting and follow-ups reveal crucial areas of compliance weakness—areas that I have seen and described consistently in several prior reports, as many as three years ago. These include: • Identification, tracking, and reporting of inmates who are deaf/hard-of-hearing • Ensuring prompt and accurate provision of audiology services • Providing interpretation, both in-person and remote • Providing videophone services.
 The seventh semi-annual report, filed December 2019, made numerous recommendations to KDOC about continuing issues, and included the department's responses as an exhibit. The eighth semi-annual report, filed May 2020, tracked (and included) responses to those recommendations. The settlement term was set to expire in July 2020, but the parties agreed in a joint filing dated August 3, 2020, to extend it for six months. Monitoring therefore continues through the end of 2020. On December 16, 2020, the monitor filed the 9th semi-annual report, which found significant improvement. It included training presentations that had been provided by the monitor in October 2020, and stated:
In this current filing, although the COVID pandemic has created real obstacles, I am pleased to report yet more progress. I cannot say that each KDOC prison is complying with each and every settlement agreement provision. However, compliance with many of the ADA/Settlement Agreement requirements has been accomplished. And I believe there is now a system in place that can—if the prison authorities so choose—succeed in maintaining that compliance and in solving remaining problems. In order to assist in that process, I continue to offer recommendations for the period after the settlement term closes.

Summary: On January 1, 2014, deaf and hard of hearing inmates in the Kentucky prison system filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Kentucky Department of Corrections, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that they were denied access to telecommunications and denied interpretative services for religious services, job training, disciplinary hearings, public announcements, educational and vocational training effectively excluding them from many governmental services. The parties reached settlement which was entered by the court in a consent decree in June, 2015. A monitor was appointed, who will submit a semi-annual report during the five-year term of the settlement. The settlement includes provision of services and accommodations through a qualified interpreter and communication technologies, staffing, and training.


On January 2, 2015, a prisoner in Pennsylvania sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("PDOC"), several of its employees and administrators in their official and individual capacities, as well as Wexford Health Sources (the provider of medical care in state prisons), in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit was brought under the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff alleged that the PDOC systematically denied medical care to persons with severe eye conditions, including severe cataracts. The plaintiff was represented by both private counsel and attorneys from the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project and sought declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory and punitive damages; and attorneys' fees and costs. Along with his complaint, he filed a motion for class certification. Since 1999, the plaintiff had suffered from various eye and vision conditions and had received cataract surgery on his right eye in 2001. Prior to 2008, an optometrist determined that the plaintiff's left eye required cataract surgery, to which the plaintiff consented. However, the defendants denied the recommended surgery, and the plaintiff appealed the denial to no avail. The DOC allegedly had an administrative policy colloquially known as the "One Good Eye" policy, which denies cataract surgery to those who retain a threshold modicum of visual acuity in one eye, notwithstanding physician recommendations to the contrary. In 2012, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a cataract in his left eye, and his treating ophthalmologist requested surgery, which was scheduled for September 2012, but then postponed the procedure. The plaintiff filed an administrative grievance seeking surgery, but in January 2013, the defendant upheld the decision to postpone. In May 2013, the plaintiff received an additional eye examination, his left eye was diagnosed with a "very dense cataract," and he was referred for surgery. One of the defendant's staff instead scheduled the plaintiff for a follow-up consultation three months later and explained that the plaintiff was ineligible for cataract surgery on his left eye because the visual acuity in his right eye measured 20/60. Over the next two years, the plaintiff repeatedly requested further information regarding his ineligibility and filed another administrative grievance, while the cataract in his left eye caused virtual blindness in that eye and allegedly caused the vision in his right eye to deteriorate. He ultimately received cataract surgery on his left eye in Febuary 2015. Wexford filed a motion to dismiss on March 24, 2015. The other defendants filed their own motions to dismiss on April 16, 2015 and June 3, 2015, and the PDOC filed a motion for judgment and to stay discovery on July 17, 2015. Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner granted the motion to stay discovery. After a teleconference with the plaintiffs and defendants on August 24, 2015, however, the Court ordered that the defendants had failed to show good cause for keeping their cataract surgery policy confidential, although such policy has not appeared in the Court record yet. On July 17, 2015, the PDOC and its administrators filed a motion to stay discovery pending disposition of the plaintiff's motion for class certification, the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. On July 21, 2015, the Court granted the motion. On September 18, 2015, the Court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification without prejudice. The Court stated that it would allow limited discovery related to the eligibility of this case for class action certification. On January 20, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. The motions were denied as to the allegations that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA or § 504, and that some of the staff member defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in their individual capacities. The motions were granted as to the allegations that Wexford and some of the staff member defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and that the same staff member defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated Pennsylvania's constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted that the plaintiff had sought only injunctive relief against some of the defendants and, because he had received the cataract surgery, those claims were moot. 159 F. Supp. 3d 502. On February 4, 2016, the parties jointly moved to stay pretrial deadlines pending the conclusion of settlement negotiations. On February 8, the Court granted the parties' motion and ordered that counsel submit status reports every 60 days. On April 8, 2016, the plaintiff wrote a letter notifying the Court that settlement negotiations with the PDOC and two of its administrators were proceeding but that negotiations with Wexford and its physicians had stalled. On April 19, 2016, the plaintiff moved to partially lift the stay with respect to the Wexford defendants, which the Court denied on April 20, 2016. Negotiations continued throughout the remainder of the year. On January 17, 2017, Chief Judge Conner signed an order referring the case for purposes of settlement only to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. A mediation took place on February 7, 2017. On February 8, 2017, Chief Judge Conner ordered the case dismissed without costs and without prejudice under the terms of a settlement agreement to which the parties had agreed. Thirty days after February 8, 2017, PDOC agreed to adopt a new cataract policy to replace the old "One Good Eye" policy. An individual would be eligible for cataract surgery even if the individual has one eye that does not need to be operated on. Additionally, individuals who were denied surgery under the old policy would be evaluated on a rolling basis according to the new cataract policy. The PDOC would also let individuals know about the policy change, and provide surgical evaluations for individuals with cataracts and post-operative care after the cataract surgery. For 3 years after February 8, 2017, the PDOC would provide plaintiff's counsel with an accounting of individuals who have cataracts and how they were evaluated under the new cataract policy. They must also provide plaintiff's counsel with a copy of proposed changes or revisions to the new cataract policy, if any. The PDOC also agreed to pay the plaintiff $16,500 but did not agree to pay attorneys' fees. The parties agreed that the Court would retain jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of this agreement for 3 years, after which the case would be dismissed with prejudice. On March 21, 2017, the parties signed a formal settlement agreement. Litigation continued over attorneys' fees and costs. On February 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Carlson conducted a settlement conference for the parties. The parties reached an agreement, and on February 26, 2018, Chief Judge Connor ordered that a motion by the plaintiff for attorneys' fees be dismissed as moot because of this resolution. On March 30, 2018, an individual sent a handwritten letter to the Court explaining that he had not received surgery for his cataracts and that his vision was deteriorating. Judge Carlson forwarded this letter to counsel for both parties. The settlement agreement expired without any further docket activity, so the case is now closed.

Summary: In January 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections systematically denied medical care to individuals with severe eye conditions, including severe cataracts, in violation of the ADA, § 504, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The parties settled, and the Department of Corrections changed their cataract policy, no longer denying surgery to individuals who had "One Good Eye."


On May 21, 2011, multiple students of the Mobile County Public School System (MCPSS) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Mobile County School District. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought a court order mandating due process hearings before the school district issues long-term suspensions or expulsions. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the school district violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by denying students a hearing before issuing long-term suspensions or expulsions. The plaintiffs also alleged that the school district also failed to notify parents before a suspension or expulsion was issued and denied students the right to defend themselves against accusations and to have an advocate or legal counsel present at a hearing. The plaintiffs alleged the Mobile County Public School System frequently used long-term suspensions and expulsions as disciplinary measures for minor infractions. These disciplinary measures have severe detrimental impacts on students, and plaintiffs claimed that to employ these measures without a hearing is a violation of due process. School administrators often used these measures not only without a hearing, but also without informing students' parents before the suspension was issued, a violation of the School Code of Conduct Handbook. To the extent that administrators acted against the disciplinary code, the plaintiffs claimed the Board of Commissioners turned a blind eye to these actions and failed in their duties to train and supervisor administrators. On March 1, 2013, the parties entered mediation and on June 10, 2013, the District Court (Judge William H. Steele) dismissed the case with prejudice contingent on the parties agreeing to terms of the settlement agreement. On June 28, 2013, a settlement was reached. The settlement agreement stated terms for amending the Mobile County Public School System's Conduct Code. These changes included: requiring notification of parents when the principal recommended a long-term suspension; requiring a due process hearing for any long-term suspension recommendation; changing the definition of long-term suspension from eleven or more school days to five or more school days; reducing the number of infractions that suspension may be applied to; providing information sessions for parents and students to explain discipline policies; developing alternative punishments to suspension; and training administrators and establishing goals in order to reduce suspensions, among other measures. The settlement also included individual remedies for the individually named plaintiffs. This settlement remained in effect until August 2016. There has been no action on the docket since June 28, 2013.

Summary: Students in Mobile County schools sued the county for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process by denying the students a hearing before issuing long-term suspensions and expulsions. The case entered mediation and was settled on the terms of the agreement that amended the school district's disciplinary procedures and practices.


In 1870, Congress passed Mississippi’s Readmission Act returning Mississippi to full statehood following the Civil War on certain conditions including that “the constitution of Mississippi shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State.” 16 Stat. 67 (1870). On May 23, 2017, four low-income African American women filed this lawsuit on behalf of their children, students of Mississippi schools, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against various officials in Mississippi's government, including the Governor, Speaker of the House, Lieutenant Governor and presider over the Senate, Secretary of State, and the entire Board of Education. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and co-counsel, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex parte Young claiming that Mississippi failed to meet its obligations related to "school rights and privileges" under the Mississippi Readmission Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that the educational requirements under the 1869 Mississippi Constitution and the Readmission Act remain in effect and that the current Mississippi Constitution conflicts with the Readmission Act. In addition, they sought attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge William H. Barbour. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Mississippi was not upholding the Readmission Act because there was a significant disparity in the conditions and education at plaintiffs' schools where students were primarily African American and schools where students were predominantly white and wealthy. The state’s top five highest-performing school districts were predominantly white whereas thirteen of the state’s nineteen school districts with an “F” rating were more than 95 percent African American. The plaintiffs’ children attended elementary schools in the Jackson Public School District and the Yazoo City Municipal School District, both with an “F” letter grade from the Mississippi Department of Education. The plaintiffs claimed the schools lacked textbooks, supplies, and experienced teachers and were in poor condition. For example, the complaint noted that at some schools paint was peeling off the walls and the ceilings had visible water spots. On March 28, 2018, Judge Barbour dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that it was barred under Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The Court found that while the plaintiffs were only suing state officials, not the state, they were suing state officials in their official capacities, and therefore, the state was the real substantial party in interest and enjoyed sovereign immunity. Further, the Court held that the Ex parte Young doctrine that creates an exception to state sovereign immunity, was not applicable in this case because the plaintiffs were not seeking injunctive relief. The plaintiffs then moved to have the judgment altered and for leave to file an amended complaint. On January 4, 2019, Judge Barbour found the Court did not err in finding the claims barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, but altered the judgment so that the case was dismissed without prejudice. 2019 WL 3757948. He denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice. The plaintiffs promptly appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on January 25, 2019. The appeal was docketed as 19-60069. The Fifth Circuit (Circuit Judges Stephen A. Higginson, E. Grady Jolly, and James E. Graves Jr.) affirmed in part and vacated in part. 954 F.3d 729. It found the plaintiffs' claim seeking a declaration that the current version of Mississippi's Constitution violated the Readmissions Act could be pursued under the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity because the defendants were state officers sued in their official capacities and the plaintiffs alleged a continuing violation of federal law--the Readmission Act. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the claim seeking a declaration that the 1868 Mississippi Constitution remained in effect was barred by state sovereign immunity and Ex parte Young did not apply because this would require a federal court to tell state officials how to conform to state law. The Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' request for rehearing en banc (9-8). 981 F.3d 437 Circuit Judge Edith H. Jones, joined by the seven other Circuit Judges voting for rehearing, dissented, arguing that the request for a declaration the current Mississippi Constitution violated the federal Readmission Act would necessarily require the impermissible adjudication of a question of state law. On January 13, 2021, the defendants filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court (Case No. 20A126). They also filled an application with the Supreme Court to stay the mandate of the Fifth Circuit pending the Supreme Court's decision on whether to grant review. Back in the district court, the case was reassigned to District Judge Kristi H. Jonhson and then District Judge Henry T. Wingate in January 2021. As of February 5, 2021, the petition for review remained pending, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, four low-income African American mothers filed suit against the numerous officials of the State of Mississippi claiming the state failed to live up to the educational requirements set by the Mississippi Readmission Act of 1870. They sought declaratory relief that the requirements are still intact. The case was dismissed in 2018 due to the state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The defendants requested rehearing en banc, but the Fifth Circuit denied the request. The defendants then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court and a request to stay the Fifth Circuit's mandate in January 2021. The case is ongoing.


On April 8, 2009, the plaintiffs, a student discriminated against and harassed based on his sex and sexual orientation and his sister who tried to form a gay-straight student alliance at their high school, brought a suit against Indian River Central School District, the District Board of Education, and a number of individual administrative officials, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge Glenn T. Suddaby). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, sought a declaratory judgment, permanent injunctive relief, a jury trial, and nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages due to the defendants' viewpoint and content-based discrimination under the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071, et seq. and freedom of speech and association under the First Amendment, denial of equal protection due to sex and sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment, sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., and violation of New York law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that from September 1993 until January 2004, the defendants were deliberately indifferent and contributed to one of the plaintiff's severe, pervasive harassment based on his sex and sexual orientation, depriving him of equal access to educational programs and causing him to drop out of high school due to the emotional and physical harms he suffered. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant repeatedly denied students, including the plaintiffs themselves, permission to form a gay-straight student alliance in violation of their rights under the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment. On August 13, 2010, the United States moved to participate as amicus curiae, as the suit involved Title IX and Equal Protection claims based on sex. The motion was approved on December 6, 2010. On March 29, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. See Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 154 (N.D. N.Y. 2011). The Court dismissed two of the plaintiffs' New York law claims and the plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against the School District, but left the rest of the claims standing against the defendants. See id. The parties reached a private settlement agreement, which the Court recognized on June 21, 2013, and dismissed the action with prejudice on August 8, 2013. The settlement agreement required the District to: retain a consultant to advise them on how to better handle student harassment, share information about student bullying across the schools in the District, and follow certain guidelines set out in the agreement. See Lambda Legal, Lambda Legal Clients and Indian River Central School District Settle Antigay Harassment Lawsuit, Lambda Legal (August 8, 2013), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/pratt-v-indian-river-central-school-district-settlement.

Summary: This federal lawsuit was filed in 2000 in the Eastern District of California; in it, a former high school student and the Gay-Straight Alliance Network sued his school district for failure to take effective measures to remedy continuing harassment that he faced based on his sexual orientation. The case settled for a consent decree entered August 15, 2002, which required the defendants to implement a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. The decree implementation period was 6 months.


On February 18, 2007, an African-American individual filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the defendant Cook's Pest Control under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiff alleged that defendant maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that defendant discouraged African-Americans from applying for jobs with defendant by, among other things, telling them there was no job and requiring that they file applications personally at every office at which they sought employment. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages. On August 8, 2007, the defendant filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of service and the Title VII claims. On January 28, 2008, the district court (Judge L. Scott Coogler) denied the motions. On June 5, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the named plaintiff failed to failed to make a prima facie case for disparate impact or disparate treatment and failed to show any injury to himself. On December 9, 2008, Judge Coogler denied defendant's motion for summary judgment without prejudice pending further discovery. Over the next several years, extensive discovery was conducted. In December of 2010, the court stayed the case temporarily as the parties sought mediation. In October of 2011 the parties reached a settlement. Under the terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the defendant agreed to set up a settlement fund of $2,500,000 and to bear the costs of administering the payment of the class members' claims. It also agreed to establish and implement a race-neutral, anti-discrimination hiring policy with the help of a monitor, to train employees in the policy, and to keep records of the race of applicants and hires and the reason hiring decisions were made. The settlement was to last three years, with a possible extension of up to one additional year if necessary to resolve challenges still pending with the monitor. On January 27, 2012, Judge Coogler preliminarily approved the settlement and certified the class for the purposes of the settlement. The class is defined as: All African-Americans who applied for employment at any Cook’s location from March 1, 2005, through the date of preliminary approval of the settlement, and who were denied employment, excluding all judicial officers or employees of the Federal courts within the second degree of affinity; employees of Plaintiffs’ counsel; and any other person whose presence in the class would cause mandatory recusal of any judge assigned to the case. On July 17, 2012, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice, while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. 2012 WL 2923542. The named plaintiff was allotted to receive $48,000 for the service to the class. The court ordered the defendant to pay attorney's fees, costs and expenses in the amount of $928,831.55, which is $875,000.00 in attorney's fees and $53,831.55 of expenses. This case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by an African-American job applicant against Cook's Pest Control, Inc., alleging that Cooks had maintained a pattern and practice of discrimination in employment on the basis of race. The parties reached a settlement in October of 2011 and the court has granted preliminary approval and certified a settlement class. The court approved the parties' settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice in July 2012.


This class action involving store managers at Samsonite Company Stores, Inc. was filed on March 24, 2009, in the U.S. District Court, California Northern District. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification (collective class and state classes for New York and California plaintiffs) as well as compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants consistently failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. The complaint alleged that defendants misclassified plaintiffs as "exempt" from state and federal overtime laws; that defendants failed to pay all wages due and appropriate overtime compensation; that defendants failed to provide or authorize meal and rest periods; that defendants failed to maintain accurate time records; that defendants breached their contracts by promising plaintiffs vacation time based on hours worked, but did not pay for their vacation time based on their overtime hours; and that after filing this suit, certain plaintiffs were retaliated against and received pay cuts. The requested relief included damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages from 3 years immediately preceding the filing of this action, attorneys fees and costs, restitution of vacation time and other unpaid wages and premiums, and injunctive relief requiring defendants to provide timely, accurate, itemized wage statements as well as payment of meal and rest periods. Plaintiffs that alleged retaliation requested relief for backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Pursuant to court order, the parties participated in mediation. During the second mediation session, the mediator made a proposal that both sides accepted on November 5, 2009. A few weeks later, the parties agreed upon a Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The settlement notes that defendants have reclassified all of its store managers nationwide to be non-exempt employees. Defendants, which filed for bankruptcy in September 2009, proposed to pay a lump sum of $850,000 to all 89 of the class members to resolve all outstanding wage and hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state laws. This is in addition to the amount of $116,251.08 that defendants already voluntarily paid to 30 of the 89 class members since the lawsuit was filed. Specifically, the settlement provides that all class members be paid 10% simple interest on their back overtime wage; that each class member be paid liquidated damages for the full 3 years of his/her FLSA claim; that California class members are paid additional amounts for the state claims raised in the suit, which defendants disputed, and which plaintiffs are waiving in the settlement; that California and New York class members will recover alleged vacation time underpayments; and that plaintiffs will recover for each claim they have for every week in which they were eligible for any recovery, for an average of nearly $6,300 per class member. In December 2009, the court certified plaintiff's class for settlement purposes and granted preliminary approval of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. In April 2010, the court granted final approval of the Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The court also granted attorneys' fees of $241,562.77 and costs of $35,000, which comply with the 9th Circuit's benchmark for attorneys' fees in a class action (attorneys' fees equal 25% of the common fund). Also, based on the standards of Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D.Cal.1995), the court granted enhancements of $5,000 each sought by the representative plaintiffs.

Summary: Plaintiffs, all current or former store managers of Samsonite Company Stores, Inc., sought compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants consistently failed to pay appropriate overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. In November 2009, the parties attended courted ordered mediation and reached a settlement agreement shortly thereafter. The court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in April 2010, which awarded plaintiffs a lump sum of $850,000.


This is a case about the Women’s National Soccer Team (WNT) suing the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) for gender discrimination. On March 8, 2019, members of the WNT filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the USSF under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Represented by Winston & Strawn LLP, the plaintiffs sought damages & fees (including back pay), an injunction against the USSF engaging in its gender discrimination practices, a declaratory judgment that such practices were unlawful, and an adjustment to their wages and benefits. They claimed that the USSF had been paying them less than similarly situated male employees despite better performance in violation of the EPA. Their complaint also stated that the USSF has been treating them less favorably than their male colleagues in violation of Title VII, specifically with respect to “pay; playing, training and travel conditions; promotion of games; and support and development for games.” The WNT has had world-wide success. It has been ranked first in the world according to FIFA’s Women’s World Rankings for ten of the past eleven years; it has won three World Cup titles and four Olympic Gold Medals; and has won numerous other awards and accolades. Plaintiffs alleged that because of this success, they spend more time training, competing, and participating in media sessions than their male counterparts. They furthermore contended that they earned more profit and/or revenue for the USSF than the Men’s National Soccer Team (MNT) during the period relevant to this case. Despite this, the plaintiffs claimed that USSF has continued to treat its female employees worse than its similarly situated male employees. For non-tournament games called “friendlies”, the complaint calculated that if all games were won, the WNT would earn on average 38% that of the MNT. For the 2014 World Cup, the MNT earned $5,375,000 in “performance bonuses” after being knocked out in Round 16. In contrast, in 2015, the WNT earned only $1,725,000 after winning the entire World Cup. But the plaintiffs said that the disparate treatment extended to policies and practices as well. The WNT was much more often forced to play on inferior surfaces such as artificial turf, which affect the game and are more likely to lead to injury; the MNT has consistently received charter flights while the WNT has had to fly commercial; the USSF has allocated fewer resources for promoting WNT games than for promoting MNT games, and waited longer before announcing their games leading to reduced attendance; and the USSF charged less for tickets to WNT games than to MNT games, reducing the potential revenue from their games. The WNT began collective bargaining for equal pay through their union in 2012, but the USSF has continually rejected their demands. In fact, in response to their 2012 demands, the USSF countered that they would only compensate the WNT for winning games against FIFA top-ranked teams (the MNT, by comparison, were always paid no matter the outcome of the game or the rank of the opposing team). According to the complaint, in 2016, a representative of the USSF claimed that “market realities are such that the women do not deserve to be paid equally to the men,” after openly admitting that the WNT outperformed the MNT in both revenue and profit the prior year. In 2017, the WNT proposed a revenue-sharing model to test these “market realities” wherein their pay would increase or decrease based on whether the USSF derived more or less revenue from WNT’s activities. The USSF rejected this proposal. Upon filing the suit on March 8, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer the case to Multidistrict Litigation, but this was denied on June 10, 2019. Defendant filed to transfer to the Northern District of California on May 23, 2019, but this was denied on July 1, 2019. On August 20, 2019 the case was referred to mediation. On September 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which was granted on November 8, 2019. The order granted: (1) Certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class, defined as: "All WNT players on the team at the date of final judgment, or the date of the resolution of any appeals therefrom, whichever is later;" (2) Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class, defined as: "All WNT players who were members of the WNT at any time from February 4, 2015 through the date of class certification;" and (3) Conditional certification of a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), defined as: "All WNT players who were members of the WNT at any time from March 8, 2016 through the present." On February 20, 2020, both parties motioned for summary judgment. On May 1, 2020, Judge R. Gary Klausner denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted the defendant’s motion in part. The EPA claim was denied because (1) the WNT was paid more both on a cumulative and average per-game basis than the MNT, and (2) the WNT failed to offer sufficient evidence that despite this, they were being undercompensated compared to the MNT. The Title VII claim, however, survived “insofar as it is based on (1) travel conditions (specifically, charter flights and hotel accommodations), and (2) personnel and support services (specifically, medical and training support).” On May 8, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed the court's summary judgment decision. The court denied their motion on June 23, 2020, reasoning that if the plaintiff loses at trial, an appeal of all claims is likely anyway, so it would not make administrative sense to do so before the trial. On July 29, 2020, the court scheduled a jury trial for January 26, 2021. As of October 3, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: The Women's National Soccer Team alleged that the United States Soccer Federation discriminated against them in terms of pay and working conditions in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The court denied the Equal Pay Act claim because the team failed to provide sufficient evidence for gender-based unequal pay. The Title VII claim is moving forward however on the premise of unequal working conditions and is scheduled for a jury trial on January 26, 2021. The case is ongoing.


On April 22, 1999, a black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge Edward W. Nottingham, for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed he was the only black employee among 65 employees at the factory. Other employees shunned him, referred to him with the n-word and intimidated him in various ways. When the plaintiff found a black doll with a noose around it in his locker, he quit his position out of fear. He claimed that supervisors, were aware of discrimination and in fact witnessed it yet did not discipline the other employees. He claimed discrimination, ethnic intimidation, and constructive discharge in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (against the company only); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 18-2-121(2) and 13-21-106.5; and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against 10 "Doe" defendants. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, back pay, front pay, benefits, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On December 1, 1999, the court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss with prejudice the supervisor defendant from the case. On June 29, 2000, the court dispensed with both parties' motions for summary judgment. <i>Goodman v. Timpte,</I> 2000 WL 34507333, No. 99-795 (D. Colo. Jun. 29, 2000). The Court granted the defendants' motion in part as to the plaintiff's third claim for ethnic intimidation. It denied the motion in all other respects. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed his claims against the unidentified plaintiffs and the fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. On October 30, 2000, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, after a stipulated motion. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although an agreement is not publicly available. This is the last entry on the docket.

Summary: A black employee of an automotive plant sued the owner and its manager for failing to prevent racial discrimination by other workers, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law. It appears the parties settled, although an agreement is not publicly available.


On March 16, 2001, an African-American employee of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority ("WASA") filed this class action lawsuit against WASA on behalf of himself as well as current and former black employees under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages, claiming that the defendant engaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that in 1996 the defendant adopted an at-will employment system that allowed managers to hire or promote their chosen candidates or to inflate those candidates' scores. With this new system in place, the plaintiff claimed that African-American employees encountered a "glass ceiling" that prevented them from obtaining the same positions as similarly situated white employees and from advancing as rapidly as those employees. The plaintiff alleged in particular that black employees were hired at the lowest levels of the agency, were forced to wait longer than white employees for promotions, and were often skipped over for promotions in favor of equally experienced white employees. The plaintiff sought to certify a class consisting of all African-American employees who applied for and were denied positions or promotions at WASA from October 1996 through December 2000. The defendant moved to dismiss the case on May 21, 2001, claiming that because the plaintiffs requested compensatory damages and a jury trial in addition to injunctive relief, they could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements for class certification under FRCP 23(b). The District Court (Judge Henry H. Kennedy) denied the motion, explaining that the D.C. Circuit had adopted an "ad-hoc approach" to the issue and that the case law did not regard compensatory damages claims or a request for a jury trial as per se incompatible with class certification under 23(b). Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 205 F.R.D. 43, 2002 WL 5513 (D.D.C. 2002). The parties then engaged in a lengthy discovery battle. On March 13, 2007, the District Court (Judge Kennedy) certified the class as to liability under FRCP 23(b) for injunctive and declaratory relief, but it postponed any certification as to damages. Taylor v. Dist. of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 241 F.R.D. 33, 2007 WL 766229 (D.D.C. 2007). The defendant appealed this ruling, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Judge Karen L. Henderson) denied the petition as untimely on April 3, 2009. In re D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 561 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs moved to enlarge the class period on November 14, 2007, and the District Court (Judge Kennedy) denied this motion in an unpublished order on February 7, 2008. The parties then continued disputing the class composition and notice procedures until August 25, 2009, when the District Court (Judge Kennedy) acceded to the parties' request and issued a stipulation and order approving the class notice and directing issuance of the notice to class members. On November 30, 2010, at the parties' request, the District Court (Judge Kennedy) issued an order referring the case for alternative dispute resolution. The parties eventually reached an agreement and submitted a proposed settlement for approval on March 23, 2013. The District Court (Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) issued an order, on March 28, 2013, approving the class settlement. The Court announced that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), it was vacating the class certification under FRCP 23(b)(2) and recertifying the class under 23(b)(3). The approved class had 1,037 members, consisting of all African-American employees who worked for the defendant between October 1, 1996, and December 31, 2000. Under the terms of the agreement, WASA transmitted $2,885,000 to a claims administrator, with $1.9 million set aside for the payment of claims and the remaining funds to be used for attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and a service award to the lead plaintiff. The settlement also included substantial non-monetary relief. Under the agreement, WASA was forbidden from retaliating against any class members for their involvement in the litigation, and was required to provide employees with a written statement of its commitment to equal employment opportunity and post a copy of this policy in common areas of the workplace. WASA also agreed to conduct a mandatory diversity and equal employment opportunity training for all employees and take measures to ensure that employees understand their obligations to identify and report violations of the policies. WASA further agreed to develop and implement complaint procedures and a complaint tracking system, as well as a voluntary affirmative action program. A settlement compliance monitor was assigned to oversee and report on WASA's implementation of the agreement, and WASA agreed to submit reports for the monitor's review. Finally, WASA agreed to create an internal implementation team as well as institute an annual review of pay and data practices to ensure that any racial disparities in pay are due to legitimate and non-discriminatory factors. On March 16, 2015, the District Court (Judge Rothstein), after receiving a letter from class members who claimed that they had not yet been paid their monetary award, issued an order requiring the parties to provide a status report. Plaintiffs' counsel responded on March 18 and explained that there had been a delay because WASA inadvertently omitted several people from the list of eligible class members it prepared for the claims administrator. Further compounding this delay, plaintiffs' counsel stated that his co-counsel has been preparing a motion to advise the court on how the administrator calculated the payouts to individual class members. The money would not be disbursed until this motion was filed. The matter resolved in June 2015 when the court ordered counsel to furnish the five individuals with proper documents to file for disbursement. The balance of $14,025.38 in settlement funds were distributed to the District of Columbia Legal Aid Society upon a motion by the parties on October 4, 2017. The case is closed.

Summary: On March 16, 2001, an African-American employee of the District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority ("WASA") filed this class action lawsuit against WASA on behalf of himself as well as current and former black employees under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant engaged in race discrimination through its hiring and promotion practices. On March 28, 2013, the District Court approved a settlement agreement under which WASA paid $2.8 million and agreed to undertake extensive measures to address the discriminatory workplace practices.


A senior who applied to work at a Cracker Barrel store alleged he was not hired because of corporation-wide age discrimination in hiring. It appears the parties settled, though no agreement is publicly available. The plaintiff, a man over sixty years of age, sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The plaintiff contended that Cracker Barrel had a nationwide pattern or practice of asking for and illegally considering the age of all applicants for employment He demanded compensation for lost wages liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees and costs, as well as a permanent injunction against age discrimination in hiring. The complaint sought class certification for similarly situated individuals. On January 24, 2008, the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division (Judge Mary Scriven) dismissed the case with prejudice. It appears the parties reached a settlement, although the details are not publicly available at this time.


On May 13, 2004, a deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho. She sued Hollywood Entertainment Corporation (doing business as Hollywood Video) under the Idaho Human Rights Act, claiming the company discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, requested monetary relief, attorney fees and costs, and a jury trial. The complaint alleged that the defendant employer assigned fewer work hours, assigned her only menial jobs, withheld promotion, and ignored the harassment other employees inflicted upon her. On December 9, 2004, after the initial complaint and a special interrogatory to determine specific damage amounts sought by the plaintiff, the defendant filed a notice to remove the case to federal court. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho on December 9, 2004 and ultimately assigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill. The defendant moved to consolidate this case with a similar action brought under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The case was consolidated on May 26, 2005 with EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp, which can be found at EE-ID-0012. On July 26, 2006, the plaintiff filed a stipulation to dismiss after the consolidated EEOC case ended in a settlement. The court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice on the same day. In March 2006, EEOC v. Hollywood Ent Corp settled by entry of a consent decree valid for two years that required Hollywood Video to provide injunctive relief within their business environment and monetary relief to the plaintiff. The case closed in 2008 after the two-year order expired.

Summary: A deaf woman filed this lawsuit in the state court of Idaho, alleging that her former employer Hollywood Video discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. The case was removed to federal court and ultimately consolidated with an EEOC case in federal court.


AT&T changed its pension plan in November 1997, which allegedly resulted in younger employees receiving more benefits than older employees previously had, while the pension benefits for older employees were reduced. On August 5, 1998, the plaintiff filed this class-action lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey bringing 17 claims for relief alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), ERISA, and state law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the previous pension plan to be used. The plaintiffs also sought money damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The putative class-action suit proposed a class of "management employees of AT&T who were participants in the AT&T Management Pension Plan as of 12/31/1996." The case was assigned to Judge Nicholas Politan, and the plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The defendants moved to dismiss some of the claims. In an opinion issued on April 23, 1999, Judge Politan dismissed some of the plaintiffs claims. The ERISA claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the statute. Other state-law claims were dismissed because they were preempted by ERISA's framework. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 7, 1999, alleging nine claims involving the ADEA, ERISA, and other fiduciary duty claims. The defendants again moved for partial dismissal of claims on October 1. On June 19, 2000, Judge Politan granted the motion for the ADEA claims, but denied it for the other claims. After the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, Judge Politan certified the class for the ERISA claims only on June 7, 2001. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 29, 2001. After the case was reassigned to Judge William G. Bassler, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss. In an order issued on October 17, 2002, Judge Bassler dismissed multiple ERISA claims included in the third amended complaint. 2002 WL 32159586. Based on the statutory text of ERISA, Judge Bassler determined that AT&T's revised pension plan complied with the law. After this order, the plaintiffs had five remaining claims: three based on ERISA violations, a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and a claim alleging a misleading description of the pension plan. The case was then reassigned to Judge Jose Linares. After both the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for summary judgment in October 2004, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on November 23, 2004. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the fourth amended complaint, which the court granted on March 31, 2006 with regards to two more ERISA claims. 428 F. Supp. 2d 213. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of this opinion, but Judge Linares denied the motion. 2006 WL 3359722. The parties engaged in numerous discovery battles while the plaintiffs fought to keep their claims alive. In July 2006, the case was reassigned to Judge Stanley Chesler. Judge Chesler granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, reinstating two ADEA claims. 2006 WL 3626945. Subsequently, Judge Chesler's denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and also denied the defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2007 WL 14585. With their ADEA claims back in play, the plaintiffs moved to certify an ADEA class. The plaintiffs proposed a class of former or current AT&T management employees who were age 40 or over on November 19, 2001 when their employment with AT&T ended and participated in the Management Pension Plan after the change occurred. The court stayed the class certification question while it decided the defendants motion to dismiss the two reinstated ADEA claims. On March 29, 2007, Judge Chesler denied the defendants' motion. 2007 WL 958472. Two months later, the plaintiffs' proposed class was approved. 2007 WL 1557163. The plaintiffs supplemented their fourth amended complaint by seeking to reinstate two ERISA claims that had been dismissed earlier in the litigation. Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. On June 7, 2010, Judge Chesler granted the motion. 2010 WL 2326211. This order resulted in a final judgment on all remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Third Circuit. On June 22, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 2011 WL 2507089. This opinion ended the case after more than ten years of litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: AT&T management employees filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that changes to the company's pension plan violated the ADEA and ERISA. After more than ten years of litigation, the defendants were granted summary judgment on all claims.


On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a lawsuit on behalf of United States of America against the City of New York under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn Division. On July 17, 2007, the Vulcan Society--an organization of Black firefighters, and three individuals, filed an Intervenor's Complaint. Plaintiffs sued to enforce the right of Black and Hispanic candidates to be treated fairly in the application process for positions in the New York City Fire Department ("FDNY"). Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the City's reliance on two written examinations that were used to appoint entry-level firefighters to classes at the New York City Fire Academy ("Academy"). These examinations--Written Examination 7029 and Written Examination 2043--were administered from 1999 to 2007, and the City had appointed more than 5,300 entry-level firefighters based on the test's results. Although Plaintiffs identified approximately 3,100 of the examination candidates as Black and approximately 4,200 of the examination candidates as Hispanic, the City had appointed just 184 Black firefighters and 461 Hispanic firefighters from the challenged examinations. Plaintiffs asserted that the City's reliance on Exams 7029 and 2043 in selecting entry-level firefighters had had a disparate impact on Black and Hispanic candidates in violation of Title VII. The Intervenors also claimed, under a disparate treatment theory, that the City, two city agencies, the Mayor and the Fire Commissioner had long been aware of the discriminatory impact on Blacks of their examination process, and that their continued reliance on and perpetuation of these racially discriminatory hiring processes constituted intentional race discrimination. To remedy these claimed violations, Plaintiffs sought various forms of injunctive and monetary relief. The United States sought to enjoin the City from engaging in discriminatory practices against Black individuals on the basis of race and against Hispanics on the basis of national origin, and sought a specific injunction against the practices challenged in this case. It also asked the court to order the City to take appropriate action to correct the present effects of its discriminatory policies and practices and to enjoin it from failing to "make whole" those harmed by the City's policies and practices. The Intervening Plaintiffs sought similar, but broader relief, including an injunction requiring the City to appoint entry-level firefighters from among qualified Black applicants in sufficient numbers to offset the historic pattern and practice of discrimination against Blacks in testing and appointment to that position. The Intervenors sought to require the City to recruit Black candidates and implement and improve long-range recruitment programs and to provide future test scores, appointment criteria, eligibility lists, appointment data, and all other information necessary to conduct an adverse impact and job-relatedness analysis of the examination and selection process. The Intervenors also sought damages and other fees. On September 5, 2007, the Court (Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis) issued an order to bifurcate the liability and relief phases, and permitted intervention by the Intervenors. On July 25, 2008, the Court denied the Intervenors' motion to amend their Complaint, but on January 28, 2009, declined to dismiss the Intervenors' Complaint on timeliness grounds. On May 11, 2009, in a published opinion, the Court certified a class consisting of Black applicants for the position of entry-level firefighter. United States v. City of New York, 258 F.R.D. 47. On July 22, 2009, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the City's use of the two written examinations had resulted in a disparate impact upon Black and Hispanic applicants for the position of entry-level firefighter. The Court also concluded that the City had failed to present sufficient evidence that business needs justified its employment practices. Therefore, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment in their entirety. This ruling established that the City was liable for disparate-impact discrimination under Title VII. 637 F.Supp.2d 77. On January 13, 2010, in a published order, the Court held that the City's use of these two examinations constituted a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination against Blacks, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and State and City Human Rights Laws. 683 F. Supp. 2d 225. On January 21, 2010, in another published order, the Court expressly did not order any particular form of relief. Instead, the Court "outlined the broad contours of relief and resolves several basic disputes regarding the implementation of a remedy." In essence, the Court concluded that two broad forms of relief were needed to remedy the City's discrimination: (1) compensation for the identified victims of the City's discriminatory testing practices, and (2) compliance measures to ensure that the City implements and administers a fair and job-related test for entry-level firefighters. The Court noted that these forms of relief were simple in concept, but would be complex in execution. Achieving these basic aims would require ongoing oversight, attention to myriad details, and resolution of disputes among the parties. 681 F. Supp. 2d 274. Following these decisions, the Court issued a preliminary relief order directing the parties to take certain actions to begin remedying the City's violations. Among other things, the Court directed the parties to prepare for a hearing (the "6019 Hearing") regarding the validity of Exam 6019, which in turn would determine whether and how the City could hire from the Exam 6019 eligibility list on an interim basis while a new, valid selection procedure was being developed. On August 4, 2010, in a published opinion, the Court held that the City failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that its use of Exam 6019 as a pass/fail and rank-ordering device was job-related and justified by business necessity. Therefore, the Court concluded that the City's use of Exam 6019 did not comply with Title VII. Accordingly, the Court restrained and enjoined the City from taking any further steps to initiate or finalize a fire academy class using the Exam 6019 eligibility list until October 1, 2010. 731 F. Supp. 2d 291. On October 19, 2010, the Court permanently enjoined the City from hiring firefighters based on the results of Exam 6019, except under one of the interim approaches already endorsed by the Court. 2010 WL 4137536. On June 6, 2011, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for continued remedial-phase certification of the class of Black victims of the City's discrimination that the Court had conditionally certified at the beginning of the remedial phase of the litigation. In that Order, the Court certified noneconomic loss and injunctive relief subclasses, each comprised of Black non-hire and delayed-hire victims of the City's discrimination. The Court appointed the three individual Intervenors as representatives of the noneconomic loss subclass, and the Vulcan Society as representative of the injunctive relief subclass. 2011 WL 2259640. With respect to issues of "make-whole" relief, including backpay and benefits, priority hiring, and retroactive seniority, the court denied Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for certification of a single class represented by the Vulcan Society, but permitted Plaintiff-Intervenors to move for certification of non-hire victim and delayed-hire victim subclasses as to issues of make-whole relief as long as they were represented by individual subclass members. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) ("the Wal-Mart decision"), Plaintiff-Intervenors contended that the two subclasses should be certified as mandatory subclasses under Rule 23(b)(2). In the alternative, they argued that they also qualified for certification under Rule 23(b)(3). After Plaintiff-Intervenors filed their motion for certification of the two subclasses, the Wal-Mart decision was issued on June 20, 2011. The Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing addressing the effect of the Wal-Mart decision on the pending motions for certification of the two subclasses. The parties filed letters stating their views on the Wal-Mart decision on June 21, 2011. On July 8, 2011, in a published order, the Court addressed the effect of the Wal-Mart decision. Applying Wal-Mart, the Court denied the City's motion to decertify the liability-phase class; denied Plaintiff-Intervenors' motion for summary judgment as to compensatory damages for noneconomic losses; and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), certified the non-hire and delayed-hire victim subclasses as to common remedial-phase issues. 276 F.R.D. 22. On July 11, 2011, the court granted Plaintiff-Intervenors' Motion to compel the City to reduce the application fee for Exam No. 2000 from $54.00 to $30.00. On July 13, 2011, the court issued an order approving changes made to the next entry-level examinations, including inclusion of questions on race and gender. 2011 WL 2745940. On September 30, 2011, following a bench trial on injunctive relief, the Court issued a memorandum on findings of fact. 2011 WL 7661518. On October 5, 2011, the court issued an order containing a draft remedial order and informing parties of its intention to enter a permanent injunction, after reasoning that the court's involvement in remedying discrimination is required due to the City's historic lack of response to it. It aimed at compelling the City to undertake a court-guided institutional reform with several general injunctions and only few specific instructions. The draft remedial order also contemplated retention of jurisdiction by the Court for at least ten years and appointment of a Court Monitor to assess implementation of orders. 2011 WL 4639832. The court issued an order granting partial judgment and a permanent injunction on December 8, 2011. The order contained several permanent injunctions: 1) the City was enjoined from using policies previously found unlawful by the Court, or any other policies that have a disparate impact on Black or Hispanic applicants; 2) prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in the City's recruitment and selection processes; 3) prohibition on retaliation. The order also contained more specific remedies, including, among others: 1) development of an optional survey to assess effectiveness of its selection procedures with an independent recruitment consultant; 2) mitigating effects of voluntary attrition plans on Hispanics and Blacks; 3) more comprehensive screening procedure; 4) assessment of its compliance with employment laws. The Court retained jurisdiction over the matter until the City's examinations, recruitment, selection and other procedures no longer had a disparate impact on Blacks and Hispanics, and, in any event, the court's jurisdiction to modify or enforce the order would not lapse until the later of January 1, 2022, or expiration of the City's next two civil hiring lists for entry-level firefighters. 2011 WL 6131136. On December 9, 2011, the defendants filed a notice of appeal of the order to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. On February 1, 2012, the District Court denied a motion to intervene by a firefighters' union without prejudice regarding priority hiring eligibility, granted the motion with respect to the City's motion for a change in examination objection policy. 2012 WL 3134353. It also denied an individual's motion to intervene, and granted the plaintiff-intervenor's motion for partial final judgment on the issue of individual liability of the Mayor and other officials. On February 2, 2012, the plaintiff-intervenors appealed the Court's partial final judgment. On March 8, 2012, the Court issued an order denying summary judgment for the plaintiffs as to backpay liability because certain issues had to be resolved on an individual basis, but found there was no question that backpay was due. The pre-mitigation backpay was estimated to be $126,696,803.00 by statistical analysis. The court also permitted the City to amend its response to claim of failure to mitigate damages by the plaintiffs. The court also decided the issue of eligibility for backpay, settling on the definition of non-hire claimant and delayed-hire claimant. The former included any Black or Hispanic applicant who failed written exams 7029 or 2043 and did not gain position of entry-level firefighter, or passed exam 2043 and failed to gain the same position. The latter included any Black or Hispanic applicant who failed or passed written exams 7029 or 2043, but did not gain position of entry-level firefighter after a certain date. The definitions also included other qualifications, such as speaking English, not having a criminal record of a felony, and being of a certain age. The Court also denied the City's motion to delay individual relief determinations pending its appeal of the earlier summary judgment. 847 F. Supp. 2d 395. The proceedings continued with the matters concerning the fairness hearing on the relief granted to two classes of complainants. On September 28, 2012, the Court granted the City's motion to use Exam 2000 to create a list of eligible applicants. 2012 WL 4503253. Following a fairness hearing, the Court determined that none of the objections merited a change in the proposed relief order, and issued a final relief order on October 26, 2012. The final relief incorporate the proposed relief order and all the orders made by the Court in the interim (such as calculating backpay). 905 F. Supp. 2d 438. On May 14, 2013, the Second Circuit issued its decision on the City's appeal of the injunction against hiring entry-level firefighters, summary judgment against it on disparate treatment of January 13, 2010, and the plaintiff-intervenors' cross-appeal on individual liability of the Mayor and other officials. The Second Circuit vacated summary judgment against the City on disparate treatment, reasoning that the City met its burden of production to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. It also found that there was sufficient evidence for an individual claim against the Commissioner based on federal law. In light of vacating the summary judgment, the Second Circuit ruled that certain provisions of the injunction had to be modified, wherever it referenced disparate treatment by the defendants. In all other respects, the injunction was affirmed. The disparate treatment issue was remanded for a trial with an order that a different judge preside over the proceedings. 717 F.3d 72. On August 30, 2013, the District Court granted the plaintiff-intervenors attorney's fees in the amount of $3,707,313.29. The expert's fees were denied without prejudice. 2013 WL 5542459. On June 3, 2013, the District Court issued an order allowing the plaintiffs to seek noneconomic compensatory damages under New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law, based on the disparate impact claims. Afterwards, the Court continued to review the Special Masters' reports and approving lists of priority hires, and denying some claimants (for example, see Docket Entry No. 1182). 2013 WL 12318105. On January 30, 2014, the District Court granted in part the plaintiff-intervenors' expert fees in the amounts of $198,751.11, $5,856.00 and $33,642.00. 2014 WL 347605. On March 18, 2014, the District Court received a letter that the plaintiffs and the City settled as to the disparate treatment dispute. On April 22, 2014, both parties filed a joint motion for provisional approval of the settlement, which was granted on April 28, 2014. The stipulation contained promises by the City to better recruit minority firefighters and creation of a position at FDNY for that purpose. According to the New York Times, the new Mayor of New York, Bill de Blasio, decided to settle the case and agreed to pay nearly $100 million in backpay to minorities. About six months later, the United States proposed a schedule of individual monetary awards for victims of discrimination. On March 11, 2015, Judge Garaufis accepted a modified form of the United States' proposal to resolve outstanding claims for backpay and fringe benefits. The order awarded a total of $99,098,358.29 to plaintiffs and included detailed procedures for allocating the award across plaintiffs based on the plaintiffs' individual circumstances. In addition, the City reimbursed $150,000 in costs to the United States but was not required to pay attorneys' fees. The Intervenors and the agreed to negotiate in good faith to arrive at reasonable attorneys' fees. The court decided that the total settlement was fair, placing particular stress on the fact that some plaintiffs had been injured 15 years ago. It also noted that individual plaintiffs were generally favorable towards the settlement. Turning to the allocation scheme, the court recognized a paucity of precedent but decided that the formula was "lawful, consistent with the public interest, fair, reasonable, and adequate." In addition, Judge Garaufis rejected objections by individual plaintiffs that had surfaced during the preceding year. Judge Garaufis also noted that the City made a series of offers of judgment starting in April 2014 to Black claimants who suffered non-economic harm. 2015 WL 1063403. On April 16, 2015, Judge Garaufis ordered the City to pay back interest on claimant's employee pension contributions. Balancing the City's interests with those of the plaintiffs, Judge Garaufis found that Title VII's "make whole" imperative outweighs the City's potential savings. 2015 WL 1800245. In a June 5, 2015 order, Judge Garaufis adopted the parties' joint stipulation on the Intervenors' intentional discrimination claims. The City agreed to:

Recruit Black test-takers in proportion to the total population, plus 3% to correct past discrimination;

Appoint a Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer to promote diversity;

Disclose medical standards to candidates;

Place firefighters in companies close to where they live, as practical; and

Engage in outreach activities at local schools and colleges. 308 F.R.D. 53.

Over the next year, the court continued to enforce the settlement agreements. In particular, the court awarded several money judgments to individual claimants found eligible by Special Masters. In addition, the City awarded $30,950 to a firefighter who alleged retaliation by the Fire Department as part of a December 31, 2015 settlement agreement. On February 18, 2016, Judge Garaufis preliminary approved a settlement awarding $9.5 million in attorneys' fees to the Intervenors. Few class members objected to the fee award. Noting that fee awards are permissible in class actions and that $9.5 million was reasonable in light of the time spent and success obtained by the Intervenors, Judge Garaufis issued final approval of the award on June 16, 2016. 2016 WL 3417218. The parties adopted the Second Amended Protective Order on November 20, 2017, to help ensure the privacy of the class members. The Order define "confidential material" to include anything that contained identifying information of current or former firefighters or applicants and restricted use of such material to the litigation. In addition, the Order restricted how the parties could disseminate confidential information to third parties. As of April 12, 2021, the monitor continues to submit quarterly reports detailing the city's advances in diversity hiring. Its most recent report was filed on February 1, 2021. As of April 12, 2021, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: On May 21, 2007, the United States and African American and Hispanic applicants for positions in the New York City Fire Department filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District Court of New York, claiming that the test used by the NYFD resulted in disparate impact discrimination against the two groups. The Court bifurcated the case and ordered broad remedial relief, and even after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011), disallowed decertification of the class. On March 18, 2014, the District Court received a letter that the plaintiffs and the City settled as to the disparate treatment dispute. Later, the parties settled the intentional discrimination claims. The settlements awarded $100 million in backpay and required institutional reform. The case is still ongoing as the court monitors the settlement's implementation.


On March 12, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York. The DOJ sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of sex in its hiring practices. The complaint alleges that the City of New York, specifically the New York City Department of Transportation ("DOT"), implemented discriminatory recruitment and hiring procedures on the basis of sex by: (1) failing or refusing to hire women for the position of Bridge Painter on the same basis as men; and (2) by failing or refusing to take appropriate action to correct the present effects of their discriminatory policies and practices. On June 27, 2007, intervenor plaintiffs, a labor union and several females previously not hired by the DOT, were added to the action. On October 31, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied in part and granted in part on July 2, 2009. The motion was denied with respect to the allegations of pattern or practice of discrimination by the United States, but granted with respect to the same allegation by intervenor-plaintiffs. The Court reasoned that individuals cannot bring pattern or practice claims and each individual alleged wrongdoing was time barred. After more discovery and pre-trial motions, the case went into a bench trial. On May 13, 2010, the Court (Judge William H. Pauley III) issued an opinion and order, finding for the plaintiff United States. The court found that the defendant was engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, by not having objective hiring criteria, giving preference to less qualified male applicants, and maintaining a hostile work environment. It did not find the City's justifications to be compelling. The Court ordered to implement the United States proposed orders of remedial relief to establish objective hiring procedures at the DOT. Judgment on individual compensation and relief was reserved for later. On May 28, 2010, the Court issued a judgment approving the compliance injunction by the United States. Under the proposed orders, the defendant had to establish objective hiring criteria and advertise those criteria, as well as have established interviewing procedures. The proposed orders also included general injunctions: 1) prohibition against gender discrimination in recruitment and hiring of bridge painters; 2) prohibition on retaliation. It was also ordered that the City submitted three annual reports describing its compliance, kept all records pertaining to the orders, and that United States had a right to monitor compliance. On June 25, 2010, the defendants appealed against the May 28 judgment. However, the parties then settled and the appeal was withdrawn. On September 30, 2010, the Court entered stipulation and order of settlement. The agreement did not in any way modify the compliance injunction. The defendant agreed to pay $250,000.00 to four intervenor plaintiffs each ($1,000,000.00 total). The defendant had a right to apply to the court for modification of the compliance injunction. After a fairness hearing on December 7, 2010, the Court ordered the agreement to be fair and lawful, and adopted the compliance injunction as its final order.

Summary: On March 12, 2007, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York. The DOJ sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that gender discrimination in hiring and hiring procedures for the position of Bridge Painter. On May 13, 2010, the Court issue a judgment for the plaintiff, finding pattern or practice of discrimination. The defendant was ordered to implement objective hiring criteria and procedures. On September 30, 2010, the Court entered a settlement agreement deciding individual relief, whereas the defendant agreed to pay $1,000,000.00 total to four female individuals.


On April 15, 2005, a fraternal organization of police officers of Asian or Pacific Islander descent and all officers filed this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on the grounds that they were passed over for promotion because of their race. The suit alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as 42 U.S.C. §1981 and 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory damages, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The eleven individual plaintiffs in this action are Asian American police officers employed by the defendant (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey) who claimed they were denied promotion because of their race. All eleven of the plaintiffs are members of the Port Authority Police Asian Jade Society of New York and New Jersey Inc. ("Asian Jade Society"), a nonprofit organization whose purpose is to promote good relations among the members of the Port Authority police department. During the relevant period, the Port Authority utilized a promotion process where entry-level police officers could be promoted to the rank of Sergeant, the first level in the hierarchy of supervisory positions. Periodically, each facility's commanding officer would make a recommendation for officers for promotion, at their discretion, and after the applicant had passed an exam. Recommended officers would then be evaluated by the Chiefs' Board, each board member would vote for or against each officer and those who received a majority would be recommended to the superintendent; the board did not use any written guidelines. The ultimate decision to promote an officer belonged solely to the Superintendent and promotions occurred outside of this hiring process. As of January 31, 2001, no Asian American had been promoted to Sergeant. The Asian Jade Society filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on behalf of the eleven members on January 31, 2001. The EEOC determined there was reasonable cause to believe race discrimination had occurred under Title VII. The plaintiffs filed suit on April 15, 2005, alleging that the Port Authority had discriminated against Asian Americans in making promotions to Sergeant. On March 11, 2009, a nine-day trial commenced in the Southern District of New York, before Judge Miriam Cedarbaum. The jury found that the Port Authority's promotion practice had a disparate impact on Asian-American police officers and that the defendant had utilized a pattern or practice of intentional discrimination with respect to seven of the eleven plaintiffs. On April 14, 2010, Port Authority was ordered to pay the seven plaintiffs $1,637,622 in back pay and compensatory damages. Additionally, Port Authority was ordered to pay $2,357,659 in attorneys' fees and costs. The Port Authority appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support each plaintiffs' theories, that evidence barred by the statute of limitations was admitted, and that damages were awarded on time-barred claims. The four plaintiffs who did not prevail at trial cross-appealed and argued that the district court erred by excluding expert testimony. On July 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Dennis Jacobs) found the district court erred in impliedly instructing the jury that a common pattern of discrimination is an element of liability. The circuit court declined to extend the pattern-or-practice method of proof outside of the class action context (federal Courts of Appeals have consistently held that the pattern-or-practice method of proof is not available to private non class plaintiffs). The court affirmed the lower court's judgment with respect to the disparate impact and the individual disparate treatment claims. Where the plaintiffs relied on the continuing violations doctrine to prove disparate impact, the back pay and compensatory damages were reversed since the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to disparate impact proof. Failures to promote are considered discrete acts and the continuing violations doctrine requires conduct to be a part of an ongoing discriminatory policy. The Second Circuit court easily affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the four plaintiffs who did not prevail at trial, finding no abuse of discretion. Ultimately, the court remanded for new trial all compensatory damages and equitable relief remedies and affirmed the back pay only for conduct that occurred within the requisite time period. On remand, there is a notice that the parties were required to submit proposed verdict forms to the District Court by the end of June 2013. The parties entered mediation with Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. A settlement agreement was reached on February 19, 2015 and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The settlement agreement is not publicly available, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On April 15, 2005, a fraternal organization of police officers of Asian or Pacific Islander descent filed a federal lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on the grounds that they were passed over for promotion because of their race. After a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit on July 10, 2012 remanded for new trial all compensatory damages and equitable relief remedies awarded by the lower court and affirmed the back pay only for conduct that occurred within the requisite time period. The parties reached a settlement agreement in February of 2015.