On August 4, 1986, the prisoners at the Occoquan Facilites of the District of Columbia's Lorton Correctional Complex filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia government officials responsible for these medium security facilities in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that overcrowding at the facility violated their Eighth Amendment rights, and that the District of Columbia repeatedly failed to meet the standard of decent and humane prison conditions. Represented by ACLU National Prison Project attorneys and private counsel, prisoners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that their rights were being violated by reason of an excessive inmate population and by deficiencies in environmental health and safety, food services, fire safety, medical and dental care, and mental health services. The case was assigned to Judge June L. Green. On August 13, 1986, Judge Green certified a plaintiff class that included present and future persons confined to the Occoquan Facilities. Following trial and post-trial briefing, Judge Green awarded judgment in plaintiffs' favor on December 22, 1986. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 650 F.Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1986). Judge Green found that the numerous deficiencies alleged by the plaintiffs were proven to be systemic in nature and, together with chronic overcrowding, subjected plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment. To remedy this Eighth Amendment violation, the judge imposed:<blockquote>- limits to the inmate population, both for the individual dormitories comprising the three Occuquan Facilities and for the institution, cumulatively. - that defendants must provide the Court with written reports. The reports were to address (1) planned compliance with the population caps; and (2) every thirty days, the steps being taken to address the institution's many deficiencies.</blockquote> In evaluating the evidence before her, Judge Green frequently referred to standards established by professional correctional, health, and safety associations. Her opinion concluded by encouraging the defendants to adopt a goal of compliance with these professional standards. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On April 12, 1988, that appellate court, in a 2-1 decision (with its opinion written by Judge Kenneth Starr), vacated the District Court's ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Judge Starr wrote that the lower court's repeated reliance on professional agencies' standards erroneously failed to focus on whether prison deficiencies equated to deprivations of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Additionally, the appellate majority ruled that the district court exceeded its equitable powers by imposing population caps without first seeking to specifically correct deficiencies that the court had identified as constitutional violations. District Judge Harold H. Greene, sitting by designation on the appellate panel, filed a dissent. The plaintiffs sought a rehearing of the panel's ruling by the entire District Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, but this en banc review request was denied on July 8, 1988. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 850 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Circuit Judge Starr filed an opinion concurring in the denial, and separate dissenting opinions were filed by Circuit Judges Pamela Wald and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Upon remand, the District Court (Judge Green) conducted a trial. Afterward, on June 30, 1989, she ruled that Eighth Amendment violations had been proven as to matters of sanitation, bathroom facilities, fire safety, health care, and staffing. Constitutional violations had not been proven regarding food services, inmate jobs, educational and drug programming, library facilities, and general idleness. Inmates of Occuquan v. Barry, 717 F. Supp. 854, 865-868 (D.D.C. 1989). The judge required the defendants to file a written report of how they anticipated correcting the constitutional violations. Additionally, Judge Green ordered the defendants not to cause the institution's population to exceed the level as of the date of her decision, in that then-planned renovations of certain dorms otherwise could cause population stress as inmates were shifted among available facilities. Over the next decade, in most years, the case generated occasional proposals, motions, and agreed-upon and supplemental plans, as well as consent orders and other orders addressing institutional conditions. These documents can be found in this Clearinghouse record, in documents 2 through 21. The 119-page court docket reflects that Special Officers of the Court were appointed during the litigation, including Grace M. Lopes and Karen M. Schneider, to act as Masters aiding the court. Included among the post-trial documents is a December 18, 1989, agreed plan by the parties to address deficiencies in hygiene, sanitation, ventilation, asbestos presence, fire safety, health care, mental health services, and physical safety. The plan was approved by Judge Green on December 21, 1989, as partial remediation. A supplemental agreed plan filed by the parties on January 26, 1990, addressed environmental health issues (lighting and airborne disease risks), fire safety and health care staffing. It, too, was approved by Judge Green as partial remediation, but her February 7, 1990, order added that monetary penalties would be imposed upon the defendants if they excessively delayed their compliance. During 1993 and 1994, the parties' counsel met with Special Master Grace Lopes and agreed, in filings of August 1, 1993, and April 8 and December 14, 1994, that monthly reports would be filed with the Special Master describing the mental health care provided at the Occoquan Facilities. The defendants' progress in complying with remedial directives lagged, which led to plaintiffs' filing in 1995 a contempt motion and a resultant supplemental plan agreed upon by the parties and made effective via a December 15, 1995 consent order. In the order, Judge Green imposed required correctional officer staffing levels, dormitory population limits, required a security audit, made provision for improving protected inmate separation from disciplined inmates, and addressed mental health issues. She directed development of an institutional mental health care plan, set a minimum level of psychologist staffing, ordered improved tracking and recall of inmates receiving psychological services, and called for medical record consolidation and mental health screenings of all inmates. Bimonthly compliance reports were required by the order, which also set a contempt fine schedule for instances of non-compliance and provided for defendants' payment of plaintiffs' attorney fees, as well as expert and monitoring expenses, resulting from prosecuting contempt or related proceedings due to defendants' non-compliance. On July 23, 1996, a consent order similarly provided that defendants pay such fees and expenses relating to non-compliance; however, this order largely dealt with environmental health and fire safety issues. It directed plumbing repairs, water temperature improvements, a preventive maintenance plan, ventilation repairs, carbon dioxide monitoring, window/screen and kitchen equipment repairs, housekeeping and vermin control plans, mattress sanitization and fireproofing, availability of cleaning supplies, correctional officer training, kitchen wall cleaning, and food temperature improvements, and set required distances between inmates' beds to limit air borne disease transmission. Judge Green also allowed for plaintiffs' compliance inspection of facilities, with 24-hour prior notice. Her fire safety directives included smoke detector, alarm, dryer vent and lighting repairs, certain structural improvements, an operational fire alarm system, and fire drills and evacuation plans. Bi-monthly reporting of compliance progress was also required. Two notable orders were entered with the parties' consent in 1997. Judge Green, on February 5, 1997, directed defendants to hire a system-wide medical coordinator with powers to enable compliance with the court's health-related orders. The judge's November 20, 1997 order authorized the Special Master to form and retain an expert team at defendants' expense. The team would review and make recommendations on matters of security, workforce utilization, classification and safety, and maintenance and sanitation. This latter order set a date for opening a new adjustment unit to house prisoners on administrative and disciplinary segregation. The following year, on January 20, 1998, a three judge panel of the District Court, including Judge Green, convened and granted a consent order adopting a population ceiling and related procedures for the institution. (The three-judge panel was a requirement for entry of such a ceiling, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act). Judge Green then, on February 5, 1998, amended her prior orders, upon the joint motion of the parties, to allow for a substituted correctional officer deployment plan and modification of ceiling numbers earlier set for beds per certain dorms. Continued use of a Special Master and the team of experts, at defendants' expense, was approved in order to provide management assistance, staffing and prisoner population limits, classification and maintenance aid, and to develop initiatives to limit prisoner idleness. Proceedings in the case continued well into 2003, with responsibility for rulings by then having been accepted by District Judge William B. Bryant. On April 26, 2003, Judge Bryant order that the District of Columbia pay Covington & Burling $275,000 in settlement of all of plaintiffs' remaining claims for fees and costs associated with monitoring compliance with the Orders entered previously. Throughout, occasional disbursements were made for Special Masters' and expert consultants' expenses and fees. These payments came from funds the defendants were periodically ordered to deposit into the court registry. In addition to these expenses, on one occasion a $40,000 payment from these defense-provided funds was directed by Judge Bryant to the Georgetown University Law Center for the operating expenses of the D.C. Family Literacy and Street Law programs. During this period, consent orders modifying prior orders relating to staffing, population, and institutional conditions were irregularly issued. The final docket entry presently in this database reflects receipt by the court of another deposit of funds by the defendants to the court's account for the funds to be paid to the Special Master. Since this deposit to the court's account in 2005, there has been no activity on this case, which indicates that the case is closed. Additionally, the court's docket reflect a relationship between this case and two other prison condition cases challenging conditions at other components of the Lorton Correctional Complex. Also filed in the D.C. District Court (docket numbers 79-1726 and 80-2136), these cases, John Doe v. District of Columbia and Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, are designated PC-DC-0007 and PC-DC-0008, respectively, in the Clearinghouse. These cases are closed.

Summary: In 1986, the prisoners at the Occoquan Facilites of the District of Columbia's Lorton Correctional Complex filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the District of Columbia government officials' overcrowding of the facility violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the defendants had violated the constitution, and required that the prison minimize its population. The case closed in 2003.


On September 13, 2005, Prison Legal News (PLN), a non-profit legal journal devoted to reporting news and litigation concerning detention facilities, filed this action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. PLN sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the defendant's refusal to produce documents requested by PLN under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or grant a fee waiver for the document requests. The case was assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton. PLN had submitted a FOIA request to the BOP on August 6, 2003, seeking documents related to litigation expenses incurred by the BOP between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2003. In conjunction with the information request, PLN also asked the BOP to waive all associated search and duplication fees, citing the FOIA provision that required a waiver where "disclosure of the information is in the public interest. . . and not primarily in the commercial interest of the requestor." The BOP refused to grant the fee waiver, claiming that PLN had failed to explain how the information request would be of public interest, and that the request was overbroad. PLN appealed the BOP's decision to the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Information and Privacy, which concluded that PLN's request for a fee waiver had properly been denied. Specifically, PLN did not demonstrate that the information would be communicated to the public and the release of the requested information would not enhance the public's understanding—especially considering that some of the requested documents were already publicly available. After the plaintiff began this action, the defendant filed for summary judgment on November 30, 2005. PLN filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on December 30, 2005. On June 26, 2006, the court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently established that disclosure of the requested information was in the public interest because it was likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government. The court also found that the plaintiff had demonstrated its intent and ability to disseminate the information to the relevant public. The defendant stipulated to pay $48,709.72 in attorney's fees and costs. On February 15, 2007, the court first ordered the defendant to process the plaintiff's FOIA request by March 20, 2007. But the defendant continued to request extensions of time to comply. PLN did not oppose the extensions until September 2007, when it noted to the court that compliance was already long overdue. The defendant eventually produced approximately 11,000 pages in response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request, but 2,993 of these pages contained redactions. The defendant stated that these redactions were allowed under specific FOIA exemptions, but the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s justification was insufficient. PLN filed for judgment on March 28, 2008 and a court order for the defendant to properly comply with the request. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 26, 2009, the court ordered the defendant to either search for the records sought by the plaintiff or submit an affidavit indicating that the documents could be properly withheld under FOIA exemptions. On February 25, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. It agreed that the defendant had adequately searched for the requested documents, but agreed with the plaintiff that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its use of FOIA exemptions to redact or withhold information. The court requested that the defendant provide additional explanations about the relative weight of competing public and private interests at stake in a sufficiently detailed manner to enable the court to assess whether the exemptions were properly asserted. The court issued a schedule for the defendant to bring itself into compliance with the requirements of <i>Vaughn v. Rosen</i>. A Vaughn index is an itemized, detailed justification of a party’s claims that documents or portions thereof are exempt from FOIA. 484 F.2d 820. In May 2011, the defendant produced a new Vaughn index, which the plaintiff claimed did not sufficiently justify the redactions. In response, the defendant provided the plaintiff with newly redacted documents, and a second supplemental Vaughn index. The plaintiff was still unsatisfied, because the documents contained redactions of individual names, job titles, department descriptions, work addresses, dates of employment, dates of events and entire sentences of text. In a memorandum opinion issued on July 23, 2013, the court ruled in favor of the defendant: it held that the defendant had properly relied on an exemption that allows information to be redacted or withheld if there is a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy that is not outweighed by the public interest. At this time, the case was closed. The plaintiff appealed to the DC Circuit Court on August 22, 2013 (USCA Case Number 12-5269). PLN argued that the district court erred in balancing the individual's privacy interest against the public interest in disclosure. On August 5, 2015, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had not sufficiently justified its redactions; the court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the defendant had combined the privacy interests of all individuals whose information was redacted into categories based on the type of document within which the individual's information appeared. The court found several problems with this categorical methodology: because the categories were centered on specific types of filed documents, they included a wide range of claims covering various degrees of privacy interests. But these privacy interests could be different depending on the claim. The categorical approach failed to distinguish between redacting the identity of the alleged victim and the identity of the alleged perpetrator, and the defendant made no effort to distinguish between the privacy interests of employees who were victims and those who were perpetrators. The court also found that the defendant redacted inconsistently; the names of some alleged perpetrators were redacted while others were not. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals remanded the case, requiring the defendant to fashion a coherent catalogue of the documents still in dispute and instructing the district court to balance privacy and public interests in light of the defendant’s new submissions. 787 F.3d 1142. On April 3, 2017, the district court approved a settlement. The parties stipulated that the defendant had acceptably produced the documents originally requested by the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to pay $420,000 in the plaintiff's attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiff agreed to forever discharge, release, and withdraw any claims of access to records or portions of records previously made in the lawsuit. The case was dismissed and is now closed.

Summary:
On August 6, 2006, Prison Legal News (PLN) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking documents related to litigation expenses. They asked the BOP to waive all search and duplication fees under the FOIA. BOP refused to grant the fee waiver and PLN appealed the decision to the Department of Justice.

The DOJ upheld the denial of the request, so on September 13, 2005, PLN filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia. After several years of litigation, the parties settled in 2017. The BOP produced the requested documents and agreed to pay $420,000 in attorneys' fees and costs.


On October 1, 2012, four detained former Delaware prisoners, represented by private counsel, filed this lawsuit against Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Corrections (DDOC) and two directors of Central Offender Records (COR). They alleged that the defendants' failure to take steps to correct the allegedly well known and long-term (since at least 2008) dysfunction of COR constituted a violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that DDOC and COR maintained inadequate staff, training, discipline policies, and hours of operation, along with a host of other policies, that led to frequent overdetention, ranging from 12 hours to days, weeks, months, and possibly even years past court-ordered release. The plaintiffs filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individually and as a class, on behalf of all those incarcerated in a DDOC facility as of October 1, 2008 or later who were not or would not be released within 12 hours of the expiration of their sentence or the forwarding of a court order for release. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the defendants from pursing practices that caused overdetention, damages, appointment of a monitor to supervise COR, and attorneys’ fees and cost. On December 4, 2012, an additional DDOC prisoner filed pro se to intervene in the case. He claimed that errors in the calculation of his date of imprisonment and his good time could lead to 8 years or more of overdetention. Additionally, on August 15, 2013, the prisoner filed a motion for partial summary judgment to adjust his date of imprisonment and good time credit. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Christopher J. Burke for mediation on January 24, 2013. While the intervenor's motions were still pending, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint on June 2, 2014. The plaintiffs sought to add further factual support and examples of overdetained inmates. On September 29, 2014, Judge Leonard P. Stark denied the DDOC’s prisoner’s motions to intervene and for partial summary judgment because the prisoner failed to show how his interests would not be adequately represented as a member of the class. 2014 WL 4925227. At the same time, Judge Stark granted the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint. On October 3, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class and the defendants filed a motion to strike certain members of the class. The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment a few months later in March 2015. Judge Stark denied class certification, denied the motion to strike certain members of the class as moot, and granted summary judgment to the defendants on September 30, 2015. 2015 WL 5768936. Judge Stark denied class certification to the plaintiffs because some members of the proposed class were overdetained due to delays in the court system while others were detained due to delays at COR. Judge Stark granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the overdetention problem and found no causal connection between actions or policies by the defendants and the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment on October 28, 2014. Judge Stark denied the motion on March 21, 2016 because the plaintiffs’ motion seemed like an attempt to rehash arguments already made at summary judgment without any new evidence. 2016 WL 1089408. On April 19, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification, granting of summary judgment to the defendants, and denial of the motion to alter or amend the judgment to the Third Circuit. On April 19, 2017, the court of appeals affirmed Judge Stark’s decision to grant summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to establish deliberate indifference to the overdetention. (Circuit Judges Kent A. Jordan, Joseph A. Greenaway Jr., and Marjorie O. Rendell). 854 F.3d 234. Having affirmed the grant of summary judgment, the appeals court did not reach the other issues. This case is now closed.

Summary: Four overdetained former Delaware prisoners, represented by private counsel, filed this § 1983 action against the Delaware Department of Corrections (DDOC) and Central Offender Records (COR). The plaintiffs claimed that inadequate staff, training, discipline, and hours of operation, along with a host of other policies, caused dysfunction and frequent over-detention. The plaintiffs brought suit individually and as a class on behalf of all those incarcerated in a DDOC facility as of October 1, 2008 or later who were not or will not be released within 12 hours of the expiration of their sentence or the forwarding of a court order for release. In 2015, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs' failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the overdetention problem. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to the defendants. The case is now closed.


In 2004, a Mental Health Unit (MHU) prisoner at Georgia's Phillips State Prison brought this §1983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, plaintiff contended that the defendant prison administrators denied Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment by understaffing the MHU, as well as by staffing it with correctional officers without adequate mental health training. The plaintiff noted that the lack of trained staff led to overworked and overstressed staff, such as there were, who consequently took actions resulting in danger, violence, and death to prisoners. Such actions included correctional officers' excessive use of force against MHU residents and double-bunking prisoners without adequate screening or consideration of risks one presented to another. Class action certification was sought but not granted. The case's PACER docket reflects that discovery proceedings subsequently occurred, as did settlement negotiations. The latter led to the filing by the parties, on January 31, 2005 (the day before dispositive motions were due to be filed), of a joint stipulation of dismissal, which was approved by Judge Carnes on the same day. Court documents do not provide any details on settlement terms.

Summary: In 2004, a Mental Health Unit (MHU) prisoner at Georgia's Phillips State Prison brought this §1983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, , plaintiff contended that the defendant prison administrators denied Eighth Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment by understaffing the MHU, as well as by staffing it with correctional officers without adequate mental health training. Class certification was sought but not granted. On January 31, 2005, the day before dispositive motions were due to be filed, the Court approved the parties' joint stipulation for dismissal.


On January 8, 2008, a group of inmates filed a class action civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officers with the Georgia Department of Corrections had engaged in a pattern and practice of systematically beating restrained inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, the civil rights laws of the United States and the Georgia Constitution and laws. Plaintiffs alleged that the beatings and torture were afflicted primarily by members of CERT Team ("Correctional Emergency Response Team"). Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. On March 14, 2011, the Court (Judge Hugh Lawson) dismissed several claims pursuant to the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court found that several of the prisoner plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Additionally, several defendants were dismissed for failure to plead the claims in adequate detail, as required by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937. On March 14, 2012, the Court severed the claims asserted by two of the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 21, dismissed several more defendants, and set trial on the remaining claims for July 2012. On July 2, 2012, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of the lawsuit.

Summary: In January of 2008, several inmates filed suit against the Georgia Department of Corrections, alleging that it established a pattern and practice of systematic abuse of the inmates. Several claims and defendants were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to plead claims in adequate details. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in July 2012.


This case is the consolidation of two separate civil actions filed by the same plaintiff, a transgender woman housed at Rogers State Prison in Georgia, a single sex men's facility. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted several times by another prisoner while in both general population and protective custody. On May 17, 2014, she filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the Warden, Deputy Warden, and Lieutenant of the prison were deliberately indifferent to her safety, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the second case, filed {}, again, under Section 1983, she sued other prison employees based on the same allegations. The two cases were consolidated before Judge J. Randal Hall. The plaintiff is represented by private counsel. The complaint alleged that prison staff conducted a "PREA" intake (that is, an intake related to the Prison Rape Elimination Act), alerting them to the plaintiff's gender identity and presentation. They classified her as neither a PREA victim or threat, and housed her in the general population. Soon after, she was threatened and coerced into performing oral sex on another prisoner housed in the same unit. Due to explicit homophobia on the unit, both the plaintiff and the man who had assaulted her were moved to protective custody, and were housed together in a double occupancy room. While there, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted while being threatened with a razor blade. She asserts that she had put prison staff on notice that she was in danger, and that they had demonstrated deliberate indifference, effectively allowing her to be assaulted. On August 26th of 2016, the defendants sought summary judgment; it was granted. Judge Hall found that they had not violated any of the plaintiff's constitutional rights, and that they were covered by qualified immunity. 2017 WL 1078646. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on Jan. 6, 2020, issuing an opinion (by Judge Elizabeth Branch) finding that the there had been no constitutional violation, because prison officials were not actually aware of the plaintiff-specific risks of sexual assault, and the general risk (apart from her particular situation) was not significant enough to meet the constitutional test; the court emphasized that the 28 reported incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual assault in five years at prison, which had population of 1,500 inmates, did not constitute substantial risk of serious harm, as required to support prisoner's deliberate indifference claim. 798 Fed.Appx. 411. The appellate mandate issued on Feb. 5, 2020. The time to seek Supreme Court review will end in mid-July.

Summary: Plaintiff is a trans woman housed in a male prison in Georgia. She filed suit in the Souther District of Georgia alleging prison officials' deliberate indifference to her repeated sexual assault. The district court ruled in favor of the prison administration, grating their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, similarly finding that no violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.


On February 7, 2011, six Hawaii residents of Native Hawaiian ancestry held in for-profit prisons filed this state court class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. Each plaintiff had been transferred to one of two private prisons in Arizona pursuant to a state contract: Saguaro Correctional Center or Red Rock Correctional Center. Each plaintiff followed Native Hawaiian religious practices. Represented by the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation and private attorneys, they brought this action against the Hawai'i state governor, the director of the Department of Public Safety, and CoreCivic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prisons prohibited them from exercising their constitutional and statutory right to practice their religion by limiting their access to sacred items, sacred spaces, spiritual advisors, daily worship practices, and observance of Makahiki ceremonies. The initial claims arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief under state law, as well as First and Fourteenth Amendment free exercise and equal protection rights, such that the defendants would provide a policy that would allow the plaintiffs the time and space necessary to follow the practices of their faith. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested compensatory damages and attorneys' fees and costs. On March 8, 2011, the defendants removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. On March 23, they moved for a change of venue to the District Court of Arizona because of the location of the two private prisons. On May 27, Judge Barry M. Kurren denied the motion, holding its removal distinguished it from Bush v. Hawaii and Davis v. Hawaii. Section 28 U.S.C. 1441 governed once the case was removed and because the venue was not inconvenient, it remained in Hawaii. 2011 WL 2118276. On November 14, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint seeking class certification and requesting damages and classwide declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint also added claims that the defendants' conduct violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. On March 22, 2012, the plaintiffs moved to compel class certification. The defendants responded by both opposing the motion and filing for a protective order against discovery that they alleged was unduly burdensome. Discovery continued to be litigated throughout the case by both parties. The defendants also moved for a class determination no later than July, citing plaintiffs' delay in filing an action. On April 26, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, requesting immediate replacement of certain personal, religious items. On May 11, 2012, Judge Kurren granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel class certification and granted in part the defendants' protective order. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 22, 2012, with a supplemental complaint filed on behalf of one plaintiff who claimed additionally that he experienced unlawful retaliation in the form of segregation and removal from his job. On September 30, 2012, Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi denied two plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction because the likelihood of irreparable harm was minimal in these individual cases. 903 F.Supp.2d 975. In December 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies as prescribed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs failed to properly file grievances as to their alleged harms. Although the parties had vacated previously set settlement conferences, in March 2013, the plaintiffs requested and the court granted mandatory settlement conferences before Judge Kurren. Simultaneously, the plaintiffs moved for a protective order prohibiting retaliation against and intimidation of witnesses, which was denied at the first settlement conference without prejudice. On April 11, 2013, Judge Kobayashi granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust. The motion was granted as to: (1) the claims for regular meetings with a spiritual advisor made by certain plaintiffs; (2) the supplemental retaliation claims and claims for regular meetings with a spiritual advisor; and (3) and one plaintiff's claims for daily religious congregation and establishment of an outdoor altar. The judge denied the motion as to: (1) the state law claims; (2) claims for congregation with other practitioners on a daily basis, participation in certain Makahiki rituals and ceremonies, access to sacred items, and establishment of an outdoor altar; (3) one plaintiff's claims for participation in certain Makahiki rituals and ceremonies, regular meetings with a spiritual advisor, and access to sacred items; and (4) all of another plaintiff's religious claims. 2013 WL 1568425. Motions for partial reconsideration were denied. 2013 WL 2468356. On July 31, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The following September, the court ordered a judgement on the pleadings and dismissed all claims against the governor as a defendant, removing him as a party. It also dismissed claims under count XXI in the second amended and supplemental complaints, which had alleged that restrictions on observance of the Makahiki caused by the transfer to an Arizona prison violated Hawaiian state statutes and the state constitution. The court held that providing a remedy for these claims would create an implausible and infeasible obligation on the state beyond what the state constitution required. The court also dismissed the defendants' request for sanctions. 2013 WL 5204982. On October 31, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the claims filed under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and on December 23, a counter-motion for summary judgment accompanied their response to the defendants' motion. The plaintiffs moved to remand state law claims, but the request was denied. Oral arguments were held on January 27, 2014 on the motions and counter-motions for summary judgment. On March 31, Judge Kobayashi granted in part and denied in part both the defendants' motion and the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the RLUIPA claims. The court also granted the counter-motion for summary judgment brought on the behalf of one plaintiff. That left (1) those claims seeking damages and retrospective equitable relief; (2) claims against Red Rock seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief; (3) one plaintiffs claims seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Saguaro; (4) another plaintiff's claims seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief regarding restricted custody at Saguaro; (5) the state law retaliation claim. 2014 WL 1321006. The defendants subsequently moved for reconsideration of their summary judgment motion, which Judge Kobayashi granted in part in June 2014. 2014 WL 2468348 (Amended 2014 WL 2716856). The court denied the plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint in May 2014. On May 13, 2014, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the issue of sovereign immunity and damages. On July 31, Judge Kobayashi granted summary judgment to the defendants in part. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on: (1) all § 1983 claims against the Director of Hawaii Department of Public Safety seeking retrospective or declaratory relief; (2) claims seeking damages or retrospective relief under the Hawaii State Constitution; and (3) state law retaliation claims seeking punitive damages. (4) The plaintiffs remaining claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA were limited to compensatory and nominal damages only. 2014 WL 3809499. The plaintiffs also filed a second motion to certify the class and amended that motion in July 2014. On August 21, 2014, Judge Kobayashi granted a preliminary ruling on class certification on the record. The court certified a "prospective relief class" to refer to claims for prospective relief regarding daily, outdoor, group worship and access to sacred items. The court denied certification of a damages class. The court withheld a ruling on prospective relief subclasses. On September 30, 2014, Judge Kobayashi certified the prospective relief class and defined it as: a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are and/or will be confined to Saguaro Correctional Center ("Saguaro"); c) in the general population; and d) who have, according to Saguaro's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith. The court also established a subclass of those individuals of the prospective relief class held in protective custody. A class seeking nominal damages and other retrospective relief was also established and defined as: a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are or were confined to Saguaro at any time within four years prior to February 7, 2011 until the resolution of this lawsuit; c) in the general population; and d) who have, according to Saguaro's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith. From that class, the court established two classes: (1) the "SHIP Damages Subclass," defined as: a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are or were confined to Saguaro at any time within four years prior to February 7, 2011 until the resolution of this lawsuit; c) in the Special Housing Incentive Program (SHIP); and d) who have, according to Saguaro's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith; and (2) the "Protective Custody" damages subclass, defined as a) all persons who were convicted of violating crimes under the laws of the State of Hawai'i and were residents of the state of Hawai'i; b) who are or were confined to Saguaro at any time within four years prior to February 7, 2011 until the resolution of this lawsuit; c) in protective custody; and d) who have, according to Saguaros's established procedures, declared that the Native Hawaiian religion is their faith. All remaining class claims were denied and remained only to be litigated on behalf of the named plaintiffs. 2014 WL 4956454. On November 10, Judge Kobayashi entered an order addressing the remaining class claims from the court's earlier disposition on summary judgment and other claims regarding Makahiki and certain religious items. It held that those class claims still remained for plaintiffs to pursue. The plaintiffs were subsequently ordered to provide notice to members of the classes and subclasses. On November 12, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a protective order to prohibit retaliation against class participants and intimidation of witnesses. The defendants moved to recoup attorneys' fees and costs as to this motion, but the court denied it as premature on December 3. On December 24, the plaintiffs' second motion was denied. 2014 WL 7366685. The parties prepared for an estimated 10-day trial. In May 2015, the parties requested and held a series of expedited settlement conferences before Judge Kurren that month. The parties first presented a settlement agreement on the record on June 5, 2015. Settlement talks continued through September and October between the parties. Although the case settled on October 16, 2015, negotiations continued through March 2016 when the defendants requested preliminary approval of the May 14 settlement terms (as expressed on the record on June 5) and a fairness hearing. The named plaintiffs subsequently opposed it, claiming a settlement had never been reached and the terms were part of the negotiation process. On September 7, 2016, Judge Kobayashi granted preliminary approval of the settlement and ordered that plaintiffs give notice by December 1 to object or opt out of the settlement. Though the plaintiffs claimed a settlement had never been reached and a number of members of the class filed letters of objection, the court reviewed discussions under contract law and held, under an analysis of Hanlon factors for fairness, that a settlement had been reached on April 11, 2017. In the settlement, registered Native Hawaiian practitioners in the general population of the prisons and protective custody were permitted to retain in-cell one each of the requested religious items in a Ziploc bag along with other in-cell property, previously authorized sea salt, and written religious materials. Other materials would be available for check-out, including communal religious items stored in the chapel curing group programming, or purchase, including coconut oil and approved amulets. Those members of the class in administrative or disciplinary segregation would be allowed one each of standard religious items, except for coconut oil or bamboo nose flutes due to safety and security reasons. Saguaro agreed to publish an in-cell retention list and publish a communal items list in its chapel and add the lists to its policy. Donations were restricted; but replacement of communal use religious items could be requested so long as Saguaro agreed to work with the inmate population to identify a source or vendor for replacement. Practitioners were permitted outdoor worship classes six times per year for 1.5 hours each and to participate in two solstice and equinox and two Makahiki celebrations each year. They were also permitted weekly group gatherings for 1.5 hours in a secure location to be determined by the facility and access to a limited number of communal items stored in the chapel. Two additional Makahiki celebrations within a few days of the Makahiki celebrations were also permitted on a limited basis, with the same food offerings provided. Upon request and subject to availability, registered practitioners could request to meet with a spiritual advisor through the cell door for 15–20 minutes for non-disruptive ministry, prayers, or chants. Ceremonial food offering could be administered by the advisor through the cell door food slot and an inmate could receive an in-cell meal tray provided to GP inmates participating in Makahiki, given written advance request. Other SHIP inmates would be allowed to meet with the spiritual advisor in the dayroom for similar activities upon request and subject to availability for the Makahiki. However, participation in programming would be subject to restrictions for safety and security risks based on an individualized assessment of the inmate’s history and behavior. All plaintiffs, both individual and class, waived and released all claims for damages. Instead, the defendant CoreCivic agreed to pay $70,000 to the Native Hawaiian Legal Corporation for costs incurred. Except for those expressly provided in the order, the parties bore their own attorneys’ fees and costs. The parties agreed that implementation and religious items would be made available within 60 days of the agreement. They also agreed to forgo a consent decree and court-ordered monitoring. The court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. An amended settlement order was submitted May 22, 2017 to reflect CoreCivic's name change. 2017 WL 2234175. The case was dismissed with prejudice and is now closed.

Summary: Hawaiian residents of Native Hawaiian ancestry held in for-profit prisons in Arizona filed this class action lawsuit against the State of Hawaii and CoreCivic. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant prisons prohibited them from exercising their constitutional and statutory rights to practice their religion. The case involved extensive litigation, with class and sub-class certification granted. However, the case resolved via a settlement that the court held as valid under principles of contract law.


On September 22, 2003, several inmates in the Iowa State Penitentiary in Fort Madison, Iowa, filed a lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against administrative officials of the Iowa Department of Corrections in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The plaintiffs, later appointed private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the defendants were subjecting them to "religious discrimination and persecution." Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants locked them in disciplinary segregation, retaliated against them, and falsely labeled them a gang due to their affiliation with their religion, the Church of New Song (CONS). The plaintiffs asked the Court to declare (1) that they had been subject to religious persecution, discrimination, and retaliatory treatment in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (2) that the defendants had falsified investigative and disciplinary records to, among other things, close down CONS. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from further persecuting and retaliating against members of CONS and compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $1,500,000.00. On March 8, 2004, the District Court (Judge James E. Gritzner) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and on June 28, it denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. On October 21, 2004, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Bremer to determine whether a settlement conference should be held. On February 22, 2005, Judge Gritzner issued an order staying the case pending the outcome of another case, Wycoff v. Brewer, which also concerned the CONS. The Court reasoned that the proceedings in Wycoff, where prison officials sought court relief with respect to the CONS, would very likely affect the outcome of this case. On March 4, 2009, as a result of the ruling in Wycoff (which had been recaptioned Smith v. Ault) that the CONS would no longer have protected status, the Court lifted the stay. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgement on various grounds. Plaintiffs did not resist the motion, even after the Court extended time to reply. Holding that the record showed Plaintiffs had broken prison disciplinary rules and had failed to show that the motivating factor for the disciplinary measures was retaliation, the Court found in favor of the Defendants and dismissed the case on July 23, 2009.

Summary: Several members of the Church of New Song (CONS) who were inmates in the Iowa State Penitentiary in Fort Madison, Iowa, filed a lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against administrative officials of the Iowa Department of Corrections. In 2009 the Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.


On January 23, 2012, a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Idaho State Correctional Institution filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiff sued the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that IDOC's failure to provide him with a videophone meant he was denied an equal opportunity to communicate with people outside the prison. The plaintiff, represented by Disability Rights Idaho, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was initially assigned to Judge Candy W Dale, but later reassigned to Judge B. Lynn Winmill and then Judge Dee V. Benson. The plaintiff claimed that the text telephone (TTY) provided by the prison did not allow him to communicate in his primary language (American Sign Language). Furthermore, the technology was becoming obsolete as the number of people using a TTY outside of prison had decreased due to changing technology. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Larry M. Boyle when the parties agreed to a settlement conference to be held on October 31, 2012. The parties attempted to reach a settlement between 2012 and 2014 but ultimately could not reach an agreement. The defendant filed a motion for a jury trial, which was denied on May 27, 2014. The case was referred to Judge Dee V. Bensen for a Settlement Conference. The parties reached a settlement on January 16, 2015, in which IDOC agreed to provide the plaintiff with access to a videophone, as well as training for the plaintiff and designated IDOC staff members in the operation of the videophone technology. The agreement also required IDOC to pay $35,000 to the plaintiffs' attorneys, Disability Rights Idaho. On January 29, 2015, Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill ordered the case be dismissed with prejudice, based on the parties’ settlement. [Although the settlement agreement is not part of the docket, Disability Rights Idaho posted it on their website.]

Summary: On January 23, 2012, a deaf inmate of the Idaho State Correctional Institution filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho against the Idaho Department of Correction. The plaintiff alleged that refusing access to a videophone violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties settled on January 16, 2015. The settlement required the access to a videophone to the plaintiff and payment of $35,000 for attorneys’ fees. The case was dismissed with prejudice, based on the parties’ settlement on January 29, 2015.


On June 2, 2016, a group of prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed this class-action lawsuit against the IDOC in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the IDOC housed them in “extreme isolation,” which the plaintiffs defined as segregation from the mainstream prisoner population. During isolation, they claimed that they were involuntarily confined to their cells for upwards of 22 to 24 hours a day. This, they alleged, violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class-action certification. On August 22, 2016, the IDOC moved to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The court (Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams) denied the motion on March 10, 2017. The court explained that the plaintiffs had alleged they were deprived of human contact, food, and sanitary living conditions, and that the defendant was aware of the conditions because the plaintiffs had filed grievances. In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs adequately pled that they had not been allowed to challenge the defendant's decision to isolate them. 2017 WL 951406. The parties then engaged in discovery. The case was re-assigned to Magistrate Judge Mark A. Beatty on January 8, 2019. The plaintiffs filed for class certification on September 6, 2019. The court issued an order on March 6, 2020 announcing that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was fully briefed and that the court intended to set this motion for oral argument. As of April 10, 2020, the case has yet to go to oral argument and is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, a group of prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to extreme isolation in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing.


On June 18, 2009, a group of Muslim prisoners (including John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban") filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the warden of the Federal Correctional Institute. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison's allowance of only one hour of group prayer per week violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Arguments focused on Muslim tradition, which calls for five sessions of prayer of each day with group prayer being preferable over individual sessions. The plaintiffs alleged that the prison's policy of only allowing one hour of prayer per week did not serve a compelling government purpose. Furthering their belief was the living conditions of the prisoners, which allowed them to be out of their cells most of the day. The plaintiffs moved for certification of a class consisting of all Muslim prisoners aggrieved by this policy. However, the district court (Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson) denied this motion, holding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently define a class and, regardless, could not satisfy the numerosity requirement necessary to have class certification approved. The plaintiffs could only identify five Muslim prisoners under the warden's control whose beliefs on prayer coincided with their own. Both parties filed motion for summary judgment, and Judge Magnus-Stinson granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion, while denying the defendant's motion (2012 WL 379737). She held, as a matter of law, that "recitation of the five daily Muslim group prayers is a religious exercise rooted in Mr. Lindh's sincerely held religious beliefs," thus satisfying that requirement of RFRA. However, she deemed that there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding the issue of whether the warden substantially burdened the plaintiffs' religious practices. Following a bench trial, the court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law (2013 WL 139699). The court issued a permanent injunction against the Federal Correctional Institute, holding that the prison's policy violated RFRA. As such, the prison was required to change its policy regarding prayer sessions without 60 days of the issuing of the order. Under the order, the prison was required to allow prisoners to have prayer sessions at any time that the prisoners would otherwise be allowed out of their cells. The prison changed its policy to allow religious groups to pray at three assigned times per day, with no more than 10 inmates allowed in the room at any time. Feeling that the policy violated the order of the court, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendant in contempt. After the filing of the motion, the prison again changed its policy to only allow for group prayer within individual cells, with a maximum of two prisoners allowed in any cell. The plaintiffs alleged that the warden violated the express and unambiguous command of the court, and therefore must be held in contempt. The court held that its prior ruling was not clear and unambiguous, and therefore did not hold the defendant in contempt (2013 WL 3790897). However, Judge Magnus-Stinson did further clarify her past order, declaring that "the Warden is to allow group prayer during every Muslim prayer time for which the inmates are not confined to their cells. While the Warden may place a limit on the location and number of inmates who may assemble in a single place, the limitations must be reasonable and in keeping with RFRA's requirement that they are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest be employed. Put simply, just as inmates are free to assemble, socialize, and engage in other group activities in common, recreational areas during times they are released from their cells, so too must they be allowed to engage in group prayer in common, out-of-cell areas, which the Warden may designate in his discretion."

Summary: In 2009, a group of Muslim prisoners filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the warden of the Federal Correctional Institute, alleging that the prison's allowance of only one hour of group prayer per week violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The court ultimately issued a permanent injunction against the Federal Correctional Institute in 2013, holding that the prison's policy violated RFRA and, upon further clarification, ordered that the warden "is to allow group prayer during every Muslim prayer time for which the inmates are not confined to their cell."


On March 8, 2007, the Disability Law Center ("DLC") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12131, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794 against the Massachusetts Department of Correction ("DOC"). The DLC is the agency designated by the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 U.S.C. §§10801 et seq. to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to ensure that individuals with mental illnesses confined in Massachusetts prisons are protected from abuse and neglect. DLC claimed that the DOC failed to take into account mental illness when subjecting prisoners to long periods of disciplinary and other forms of isolation and segregation. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that isolation of mentally ill prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that DOC's failure to address the problem violates both the Rehabilitation Act and the American with Disabilities Act. The parties began settlement negotiations in November 2007 and in 2008 sought mediation from the court. For two years the parties were unsuccessful in their negotiations, and on August 12, 2010, the court lifted a stay on discovery. 2010 WL 3199883. Extensive discovery ensued, and eventually, the parties renewed negotiations. In December 2011, the parties reached a settlement and sought court approval. On April 12, 2012, after a lengthy exploration of judicial authority to approve private settlements in which the defendant did not admit liability, Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf approved the settlement, holding that doing so would not violate the PLRA's provision that relief be limited to what is necessary to remedy the violation. The settlement agreement established detailed procedures, training, time limits, and recordkeeping to ensure that mentally ill prisoners are not placed in isolation or segregation without a full evaluation and determination that such placement will not cause further injury. The defendants also agreed to pay $1,250,000 in attorney fees and costs. 960 F. Supp. 2d 271 (D. Mass. 2012). The court retained the case on its docket (on hold but ready to be revived in the event of a claimed breach of the settlement agreement) for three years, with an additional two years possible. On May 20, 2015 the court issued a stipulation stating that since request to reopen the case had not been made in three years, the court’s jurisdiction was terminated. However, on June 28, 2016, one of the prisoners who was a plaintiff in the original suit made a motion to reopen the case because the prison had been violating the agreement by placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement without full evaluations. On March 17, 2017, Judge Mark Wolf issued an opinion denying the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the case because the previous dismissal meant the court no longer had jurisdiction. Judge Wolf said the plaintiff could open a separate action since the previous action was not a class action. 2017 WL 1042068. As such, this case is now closed.

Summary: In 2007, the Disability Law Center filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act against the Massachusetts Department of Correction. The DLC claimed that the DOC failed to take into account mental illness when subjecting prisoners to long periods of disciplinary and other forms of isolation and segregation. The case settled in 2011, and the defendants agreed to make sure that mentally ill prisoners were not placed in isolation or segregation without a full evaluation and determination that such placement would not cause further injury; they also agreed to pay attorney fees. The case was closed in 2015 as no one had requested to reopen the case since the settlement monitoring date ended. In 2016 one of the prisoners tried to reopen the case since prison officials were violating the settlement agreement, but the judge refused to reopen the case.


On November 24, 2015, several inmates with hearing disabilities filed this class action in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction and the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Represented by a combination of Prisoners' Legal Services, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated persons. They claimed that the Massachusetts Department of Correction failed to provide interpreters, appropriate assistive technology, and accommodations to deaf and hard of hearing prisoners over the course of nearly a decade. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants denied them reasonable accommodation under the ADA. They alleged that they were denied technology such as teletypewriters and videophones that would make communicating with family possible. One named plaintiff alleged that because of the denial of assistive technology, she had not spoken to her family in several years. The plaintiffs also alleged that the lack of interpreters and accessible materials prevented them from engaging in programs that would allow them to earn good time. The denial of accommodations meant that the plaintiffs did not have meaningful access to healthcare, allegedly waiting nearly two years for hearing aid replacements and not being able to communicate with doctors. On March 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a class certification. The court denied the motion without prejudice on June 29, 2016 as premature. The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Counts I and II of the complaint on January 26, 2017. The court assigned the case to Magistrate Judith G. Dein for discovery. After over a year of discovery and its related disputes, as well as multiple status conferences before the Magistrate, the parties began the negotiation process. The judge granted a stay in proceedings until parties completed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation. On March 30, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that it could not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims without a more developed factual record. On June 27, 2018, the plaintiffs stipulated dismissal as to the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare. The plaintiffs continued to engage with the defendants in mediation proceedings until May 28, 2019 when the parties filed for preliminary approval of a class settlement. The proposed settlement established intake procedures to identify and provide the appropriate reasonable accommodations for people with hearing disabilities. The settlement emphasized that the individual's request as to what accommodation would suit him or her should weigh heavily in the Department's decision on the accommodation it would provide. It also agreed to provide qualified sign language interpreters so that individuals would enjoy meaningful access to the programs inside the prisons. The settlement's provisions on telecommunication provided that each facility would provide access to at least one of each type of technological service—Video Relay Services (VRI), captioned telephones, teletypewriters (TTY)—as well as sound amplification devices. Moreover, individuals would not be charged for use of their accommodations and would also be given extra time, considering the delays in communication that are inherent in these services. In addition to alternative means of notification, like vibrating watches and other tactile services, the settlement provided for training for prison administrators to be able to communicate more effectively with individuals with hearing disabilities. The parties agreed to third-party monitoring during the enforcement period of the settlement, with three visits per year, and auditing. However, the monitor would only provide his or her reports to the parties. Final approval of the settlement would not enter a consent decree in the case. Instead, the plaintiffs would have to provide notice to the defendant DOC if they believed the prisons were in substantial non-compliance with the agreement, and meet and confer out-of-court if the plaintiffs are not satisfied with the defendant's justification. The court remained a last resort under the agreement to invoke its "equitable" authority to provide or deny relief to the plaintiffs. The parties agreed to negotiate reasonable plaintiffs attorneys' fees and the settlement will remain in effect for three years from the time of the court's final approval. In addition, the parties held final fairness hearings in late September and early October. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In November 2015, plaintiff inmates with hearing disabilities sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction and the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution of the United States. After mediation, the parties settled in 2019. Enforcement of the settlement remains in effect for a period of three years.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought by a group of inmates in the the Maine Department of Corrections, seeking release of inmates due to COVID-19. The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the case is now closed.
 A group of vulnerable prisoners brought this lawsuit against the Maine Department of Corrections, alleging that the Department was not sufficiently protecting them against the threat of serious illness or death from the virus. Represented by the ACLU of Maine, they filed this petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine on May 15, 2020. The petition was assigned to Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department was refusing to use medical furlough to reduce the risk of infection for inmates. One caseworker had told an inmate that “there’s nobody being released because of medical conditions, so you can get that idea right out of your head.” In fact, instead of releasing prisoners in an effort to de-densify, as correctional institutions across the country had done, the Department had added “many new technical requirements” for medical furlough. The plaintiffs additionally alleged that the precautions the Department was taking to protect against outbreaks in its facilities were insufficient to protect prisoners, especially medically vulnerable prisoners, from contracting the virus. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of “all current and future inmates who, by reason of age or medical condition, [were] particularly vulnerable to injury or death if they were to contract COVID-19.” They proposed 3 subclasses:

an Imminent Release Subclass, composed of inmates scheduled to be released within one year;
a Minimum Security Subclass, composed of inmates who posed a low security risk and who were housed in minimum-security or community-security settings; and
a Disabilities Subclass, composed of people who were medically vulnerable due to underlying medical conditions that qualified as disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
 They argued that the policy of keeping vulnerable prisoners in prison, when they could otherwise qualify for medical furlough or home confinement, was a violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; that the policy was a violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for members of the Disabilities Subclass; and that because the policy was unconstitutional and unlawful, the members of the class and subclasses qualified for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2241. They sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, an order of enlargement (an order requiring the Department to release prisoners on bail during the pendency of the habeas proceedings), and/or a writ of habeas corpus. They also sought a declaration that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for the Department to categorically deny medical furlough during the pandemic. They requested an order requiring the Department to identify all members of the class and subclasses within two days, to evaluate each class member’s eligibility for medical furlough, home confinement, or other accommodation, and to release enough prisoners “to ensure that all remaining persons are incarcerated...consistent with CDC guidance.” On May 18, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The following day, the Department reported its first COVID diagnosis. On June 8, 2020, the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. The court held, among other things, that "[g]iven the relatively low number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 in MDOC facilities and what the Court expects will be a rapid resolution of the request for a preliminary injunction, the Court does not see the need for temporary injunctive relief at this time." 2020 WL 3052220. The Department moved to dismiss the lawsuit on June 22, 2020. The plaintiffs later moved to convert their claim, originally brought under 28 U.S.C. §2241, to an action under §2254. The Court granted this motion on July 15. 2020 WL 4004795. On August 14, Judge Woodcock dismissed the plaintiffs' habeas claims without prejudice, and dismissed the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. 2020 WL 4736462. Judge Woodcock found that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their state remedies as they were statutorily required to do before seeking habeas relief. Although there may have been some common issues of fact, Judge Woodcock determined that Maine state courts could determine whether or not to permit the plaintiffs consolidate those issues. As such, because the petition was dismissed, the case is now closed.

Summary: COVID-vulnerable inmates of the Maine Department of Corrections, seeking to represent a class of medically vulnerable and disabled inmates, brought this habeas action in an effort to force the Department to de-densify its prisons by releasing prisoners. Filed May 15, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, the complaint alleged that the Department had refused to grant medical furlough or home confinement to inmates; they alleged that this was in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The action was assigned to Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr. Although the Department reported its first case of COVID in May 2020, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief in June 2020. Motions to dismiss the case and to convert the case to a different form of habeas were pending as of July 28, 2020.


On October 30, 2007, a state prison inmate filed a §1983 lawsuit against the Chief Medical Officer of the Michigan Department of Corrections' Bureau of Health Care Services and three unnamed individual members of the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC). The plaintiff, who originally filed pro se but was later represented by the University of Michigan Law School General Clinic, sought declarative, monetary, and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs when they repeatedly denied his request for cataract surgery. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that after he received cataract surgery in his right eye in August 2004, defendants repeatedly denied his request for the same surgery in his left eye for several years, until he was finally given the surgery on April 14, 2008. Plaintiff was incarcerated in a Michigan state prison at the time of the complaint and throughout the litigation. The state of Michigan contracts with Correctional Medical Services (CMS) which provides primary-care services to state inmates. If an inmate's primary care physician writes a referral to a specialist, CMS is responsible for comparing the referral to the MDOC criteria for provision of off-site specialty care. If CMS denies the referral, the primary care provider can appeal the decision by arguing that the referral was warranted in his/her best medical judgment. The appeal would not reach an MDOC officer until after a second appeal by the primary care physician. The MDOC officer would submit that appeal to the chief medical officer, who would then take it to the MSAC for a decision. On August 30, 2004, plaintiff received surgery on his right eye. The physician who performed the surgery requested that plaintiff be returned in six weeks for surgery on the left eye. Plaintiff claimed that over the next four years, 16 separate requests for the surgery were denied and that each optometrist, doctor and ophthalmologist who examined the plaintiff said that he needed the surgery. (Appellate Brief, 2) Plaintiff finally received the surgery on his left eye on April 14, 2008. On June 10, 2008, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint dropping state agency defendants with Eleventh Amendment immunity and adding individual MSAC members. He also added CMS as well as two physicians who served as CMS's Michigan medical directors. At two points, in 2008 and 2009, various defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. Both times, the magistrate judge [Charles Binder] filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that those motions be denied. Both times, the district court [Judge Anna Diggs Taylor] adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and denied the motions. The defendant Chief Medical Officer of MDOC filed an interlocutory appeal, on August 25, 2010, of the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. On April 10, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit [Circuit Judge Deborah L. Cook] issued an opinion reversing the district court. The court applied a two-step test to qualified immunity claims in deliberate-indifference cases, determining 1) whether, based upon the applicable law, a constitutional violation has occurred; and 2) whether that violation involved a clearly established constitutional right. The court also asked whether plaintiff could prove two elements to prevail on his claim: first, that he suffered from a "sufficiently serious" medical need, and second, that the defendant acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." The court found that the plaintiff proved the first element but not the second. The court found that defendant may not have been aware of the seriousness of plaintiff's condition based on the medical reports, and that the provision of care that plaintiff did receive was based on defendant's medical judgment, not on deliberate indifference. On May 30, 2012, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant Chief Medical Officer of MDOC. On September 19, 2012, the parties stipulated to the entry of an order dismissing the case with prejudice, and with no award by the Court of costs or attorneys' fees. On September 21, 2012, the court dismissed the lawsuit.

Summary: On October 30, 2007, a state prison inmate filed a §1983 lawsuit against the Chief Medical Officer of the Michigan Department of Corrections' Bureau of Health Care Services and three unnamed individual members of the Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC). The plaintiff, who originally filed pro se but was later represented by the University of Michigan Law School General Clinic, sought declarative, monetary, and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs when they repeatedly denied his request for cataract surgery. On May 30, 2012, following a reversal by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants based on qualified immunity. As of November 18, 2014, the case is ongoing against the remaining defendants.


On March 26, 2013, several Muslim prisoners of the Lakeland Correctional Facility (LCF) filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Deputy Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), the dietician and food service manager of the prison, and the Special Activity Coordinator of MDOC, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Gordon J. Quist and Magistrate Judge Hugh W. Brenneman, Jr. The plaintiffs claimed that MDOC violated their First and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate nourishment to accommodate the plaintiffs’ fasting period during the 2011 and 2012 Ramadan seasons. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed, MDOC burdened the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion and inflicting cruel and unusual punishment. They also alleged that MDOC did not treat a Jewish inmate in the same way during his fasting period. On June 14, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking that the court require the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with adequate meals during the 2013 Ramadan period. On July 8, 2013, Judge Quist denied this motion because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. The court pointed to the MDOC dietitian's testimony which stated that, at most, the Ramadan meals to be provided would be 250 calories under the required amount for prisoners in a day. In a subsequent order of clarification, the court said that the reason plaintiffs did not show irreparable harm was only because of the dietitian's testimony. Despite reaffirming the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion, the order of clarification required MDOC to provide a minimum of 2,350 calories per day during the 2013 Ramadan period. On July 31, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing this lawsuit. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and the court stayed discovery pending resolution of the motions. On July 31, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt on the ground that the actual 2013 Ramadan meals provided approximately 600 fewer calories than the defendants had represented in their answer to the complaint. On April 29, 2014, the court found the defendants in contempt of court, agreeing with the prisoners that the state had provided the plaintiffs with unduly limited calories during Ramadan, contrary to the defendants’ own representations to the court and the court's order. The court ordered the defendants to pay $200 to each plaintiff. On February 25, 2014, the magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation regarding the cross-motions for summary judgment, recommending that the court grant defendants’ motion, deny the plaintiffs’ cross-motion, and dismiss the case. His report argued that the plaintiffs failed to properly exhaust their administrative remedies and that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 2014 WL 1347436. Eighth Amendment Claims On March 31, 2014, the court granted summary judgment against the prisoners, dismissing their Eighth Amendment claims. On May 12, 2014, however, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this decision, which Judge Quist granted on August 15, 2014, reinstating the Eighth Amendment claim. The defendants appealed this reinstatement to the Sixth Circuit. In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the court’s order reinstating the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs’ restricted diets during the Ramadan fasts violated a clearly established right. RLUIPA Claims Judge Quist partially agreed with Magistrate Judge Brenneman’s recommendation when on March 31, 2014 he dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief and their Eighth Amendment claims. However, he reversed the Magistrate Judge’s other recommendations and held that the plaintiffs could proceed on their First Amendment and RLUIPA claims. He said that the claims were not barred by the statute of limitations, that the defendants had not shown that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and that MDOC was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was a genuine issue of fact whether MDOC provided the plaintiffs with sufficient nutrition in Ramadan 2011 and 2012. 2014 WL 1347432. On May 13, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ 2011 and 2012 Ramadan claims. Magistrate Judge Brenneman filed a report and recommendation regarding this motion, recommending that the court dismiss all the plaintiffs’ Ramadan 2011 claims and the plaintiffs’ Ramadan 2012 claim for lack of exhaustion. 2015 WL 3936315. On June 26, 2015, partially agreeing with Judge Brenneman, Judge Quist granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing some of the plaintiffs’ Ramadan 2011 claims but retaining one Ramadan 2011 claim and all Ramadan 2012 claims. 2015 WL 3936395. On July 9, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. Judge Quist granted this motion and reinstated the 2011 Ramadan claims because the plaintiff showed that his exhausted grievance for Ramadan 2010 properly exhausted his Ramadan 2011 claim. The Second Preliminary Injunction On May 28, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs asked the court to order the defendants to provide 2,900 calories per day during the 2014 Ramadan period. Citing the defendants’ failure to comply with the court’s order of clarification for the 2013 Ramadan period, the plaintiffs also requested that the court appoint a monitor to ensure that the defendants comply with their legal obligation to provide the plaintiffs adequate nutrition during the 2014 Ramadan period. On June 27, 2014, the Court agreed with the defendants' position that providing prisoners participating in the Ramadan fast an average of 2,350 calories per day over a two-week period, rather than providing at least 2,350 calories every day, was consistent with sound nutritional practices and would not adversely affect prisoners’ health. Judge Quist ordered the defendants to provide the court a copy of the 2014 Ramadan menu and, on a weekly basis, a sworn statement from a representative at LCF confirming that the plaintiffs were served the food items listed on the 2014 Ramadan menu. 2014 WL 2920479. On June 20, 2014, the United States filed a statement of interest. The United States expressed interest in whether Michigan prison officials were substantially burdening the exercise of religion in violation of the RLUIPA if they were found to provide inadequate nutrition to prisoners observing Ramadan. If the officials were inflicting a substantial burden, the United States was interested in what remedies were needed to ensure that Michigan officials comply with RLUIPA. On September 2, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for contempt, this time for the defendants’ failure to provide the plaintiffs an average of 2,350 calories per day over a two-week cycle during the 2014 Ramadan period. In another victory for the plaintiffs, Judge Quist granted this motion on May 4, 2015. The court appointed a pro bono attorney from the Michigan State University Law School Civil Rights Clinic for the plaintiffs on July 2, 2015. Shortly thereafter, this case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Ray Kent from Magistrate Judge Brenneman on August 1, 2015. In November 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint adding claims for Ramadan 2013 and 2014. Those claims were substantially the same as the claims in the original complaint but also added a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim based on MDOC’s differential treatment of a Jewish inmate during his fasting period and a civil conspiracy claim alleging that MDOC had conspired to provide the plaintiffs with fewer calories than required by MDOC guidelines and the court’s previous orders because plaintiffs were Muslim. The court granted the motion on April 14, 2016, and the new claims were added to the previous ones. On July 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to the constitutional and statutory claims during the 2011 and 2012 Ramadan fasting, arguing that the plaintiffs were fed only 1600 calories per day. However, on August 11, 2016, the defendants filed a joint stipulation with the plaintiffs in which the plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims for injunctive and monetary relief based on the RLUIPA. Soon after, Judge Quist granted this proposed order, but the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims remained. Then, the defendants filed another motion for partial summary judgment on August 17, 2016. The defendants sought summary judgment in their favor on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established. On November 4, 2016, Judge Kent filed a report and recommendation with the court regarding the plaintiffs’ July, 30, 2016 motion for summary judgment and the defendants’ August 17, 2016 motion for partial summary judgment, recommending that the court deny all of these motions because factual uncertainties remained. Judge Kent also recommended that the court grant the defendants’ motion as to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim and the plaintiffs’ 2014 Ramadan claims against the prison’s dietitian based on his lack of personal involvement; and deny the defendants’ motion with regard to the plaintiffs’ Ramadan 2013 conspiracy claim but grant the defendants' motion with regard to the 2014 Ramadan conspiracy claim. On February 16, 2017, Judge Quist partially agreed with Judge Kent, saying that there were still triable issues of fact that precluded summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Ramadan 2011 and 2012 claims. However, he dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims based on Ramadan 2013 and 2014 because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 2017 WL 631600. The parties met for a settlement conference on June 8, 2017, but they could not reach a settlement. After some rescheduling, the court set trial for October 2, 2018. The parties went to a jury trial on October 2, 2018 and the trial lasted three days. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ proofs, defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law and the court took the motion under advisement. The defendants again moved for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of trial. This time, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the MDOC Deputy Director from the case, leaving the dietician as the sole defendant. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The damages against the remaining defendant totaled $3,900, consisting of $150 in actual damages and $500 in punitive damages per plaintiff for each month of Ramadan included in the claims. The defendant renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law after hearing the jury verdict, but the District Court denied it. After hearing the verdict, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial as to damages for their First Amendment claim, but the Court denied their motion on November 7, 2018. On November 27, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to deny their motion for a new trial as to damages for their First Amendment claim. The case was added to the docket of the Sixth Circuit a day later. The issue is pending on appeal. The plaintiffs filed a motion for expenses on December 12, 2018 and as of August 9, 2020, that motion was still pending in the District Court. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This 2013 lawsuit was brought by several Muslim inmates of the Lakeland Correctional Facility in the U.S. District for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that, in failing to provide adequate nutrition to prisoners observing Ramadan, the defendants, several agents of the Michigan Department of Corrections, had violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the RLUIPA. The case is ongoing.


On August 22, 2016, a 37-year-old transgender woman incarcerated in the Potosi Correctional Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiff sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) and Corizon LLC, the contracted medical provider for MDOC, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by Lambda Legal, she sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Judge Noelle Collins was assigned to this case. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide medical care despite the plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The plaintiff was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and deemed by her doctors to be in need of medical services. The defendants were aware of the plaintiff’s condition but denied medical care. The defendants, in defense, cited a policy called “freeze-frame.” This policy denied gender dysphoria treatment unless the individual had received gender dysphoria medical care prior to being incarcerated in MDOC. On April 4, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction asking for medical care necessary for gender dysphoria. This motion sought hormone therapy, access to permanent body hair removal, and access to gender affirming canteen items. In addition, the plaintiff asked that the court declare that the defendants’ freeze-frame policy to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment. On February 9, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction request. The court granted the plaintiff’s request that she receive the medical care needed for gender dysphoria such as hormone therapy, access to permanent body hair removal, and access to gender affirming canteen items. The court, however, denied the plaintiff’s request that the defendants’ policy should be declared unconstitutional. The court’s rationale was that there should not be a blanket rule in cases involving medical care and individuals incarcerated within a prison system. These decisions, according to the court, should be individualized. For that same reason, declaratory relief was denied. 2018 WL 806764. The plaintiff continued to challenge the defendants’ policy. On February 26, 2018, the plaintiff amended her complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. This amendment clarified that the plaintiff was not only challenging the application of the policy but also the constitutionality of the policy on its face. On March 30, 2018, the plaintiff updated her request for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction. And then, on May 22, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction. The court declared that the defendants’ failure to provide the necessary medical care was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the freeze-frame policy violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to account for individual medical needs of transgender prisoners who suffer from gender dysphoria, and the defendants were prohibited from implementing the freeze frame policy. The defendants were ordered to provide treatment medically necessary for the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria, including hormone therapy, permanent hair removal, and access to gender-affirming canteen items as long as she remained in custody. The defendants did not oppose the plaintiff’s motions and, prior to the order, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the individual Corizon defendants. Furthermore, the defendants were ordered to pay for the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The parties were ordered to reach an agreement on a reasonable amount for the attorney’s fees and costs. After some litigation, Magistrate Judge Collins ordered that the defendants must pay $289,164.02 in fees and $65,391.58 in costs on March 27, 2019. As of May 26, 2020, there are no further entries in the docket, and the permanent injunction against the "freeze-frame" policy remains in force.

Summary: In 2016, a transgender prisoner of the Missouri Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The Plaintiff alleged that the “freeze-frame” policy of refraining from providing transgender prisoners necessary medical care for gender dysphoria unless they previously received such services violated the Eighth Amendment. In 2018, the court declared that the policy violated the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and issued a permanent injunction against the policy. The court also ordered the defendants to provide the medical care necessary for the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria. Additionally, the court awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and costs.