On Aug. 22, 2005, a paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair sued Chipotle, alleging that two of the defendant's restaurants did not provide full and equal access to customers in wheelchairs. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that when he had visited two Chipotle restaurants, one in Encinitas and one in San Diego, 44-inch high walls in front of the food preparation area obstructed his view, and thus he was denied full and equal access as non-disabled people have the opportunity to view foods available for selection and the construction of their food. He also alleged that there were structural barriers at the entrance to the restaurants, dining tables, parking lots, and restrooms, making them inaccessible to those in wheelchairs, in violation of (1) the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12102; (2) the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504 (as amended 29 U.S.C. § 794); (3) the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, codified as California Civil Code §§ 51, 52, and 54.1, 54.3, and 55; and (4) other statutory measures which refer to the protection of the rights of "physically disabled persons." The plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the defendants to provide full and equal access (by removing architectural barriers), statutory damages, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The defendant filed cross-complaints against the owners and operators of the properties on which the restaurants are located. The defendant also completed modifications to the restaurants to address the alleged lack of compliance with the ADA by Oct. 5, 2006. On Jan. 12, 2007, the defendant moved to dismiss the case or in the alternative, to consolidate it with Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Case No. 3:06-cv-02671, a lawsuit filed on Dec. 6, 2006 by the same plaintiff, involving the same defendant and questions of law, this time as a putative class action. On Mar. 20, 2007, Judge Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. for the U.S. District Court for the District of Southern California, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case and granted their motion to consolidate for purposes of discovery only and leaving open the question of consolidation for trial. Meanwhile, on Feb. 23, 2007, the defendant had implemented a written nationwide "Customers with Disabilities" policy ("the Policy"), and formally began training its employees on the policy between March and May 2007. Among other things, the Policy required managers to greet disabled customers and ask them whether they required accommodations, and instructed managers and crew that efficiency was secondary to ensuring a positive experience for disabled customers. On Apr. 16, 2007, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under the ADA were moot because the defendant had modified the restaurants to comply with the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG"), including adoption and implementation of the effective nationwide Policy. On June 14, 2007, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant's food-preparation counters complied with state and federal accessibility laws and thus denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant had argued that its Policy that required its staff to offer suitable accommodations for customers with disabilities (including, for example: (1) showing samples of the food to the customers in soufflé cups, (2) offering customers an opportunity to see and even sample food at a table in the dining area, (3) describing foods and food preparation processes to customers if they wished, or (4) any combination of above accommodations that was requested or appropriate) provided "equivalent facilitation" under Section 7.2(2)(iii) of the ADA. As for parking, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's ADA claims, since the defendant cured the defects in both parking lots and only injunctive relief was available under the ADA. On the state law claims, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's because it was undisputed that parking at both restaurants previously violated the ADAAG and therefore, the Unruh Act and the California Disabled Persons Act (DPA). The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on his claim that the tables at both restaurants violated the ADA because these claims were not part of the Complaint or any timely amendment to the Complaint. The court also granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claims relating to the entrances at the San Diego restaurant and the bathrooms at both restaurants. The court denied motions to reconsider by both parties. 2007 WL 2456223 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2007). On Sept. 6, 2007, the defendant moved to consolidate cases for trial. At this time, the individual case was already ready for trial, and the class action was still in the formative stages. On Sept. 7, 2007, the Court found that consolidation for purposes of trial was not merited because the potential for delay and prejudice outweighed any savings of time or effort. 2007 WL 2669531 (Sept. 7, 2007). The cases remained consolidated for discovery purposes. A four-day bench trial was held in late November 2007 and early December to determine the following issues: (1) whether the defendant’s prior practice of accommodating customers with disabilities constituted equivalent facilitation; (2) whether the Policy constituted equivalent facilitation; (3) whether the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall in front of the restaurants’ food preparation counters; and (4) the amount of damages, if any, that the plaintiff is entitled to under the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA) based on his visits to the restaurants. On Jan. 10, 2008, Judge Jones concluded that the defendant's prior practice of informally accommodating customers had been insufficient to comply with the ADA, but that the Policy was sufficient. The court also found that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall, but that the plaintiff was entitled to $5,000 in damages for the occasions on which he encountered barriers to his entrance into the restaurants. 2008 WL 111052 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). On Apr. 21, 2008, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend findings of facts and for additional findings of fact. Later that month or in May 2008, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the defendant cross-appealed. On Feb. 6, 2009, Judge Jones awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $136,537.83, less than a quarter of the $550,651.33 in fees and costs the plaintiff had sought, and ordered the parties to pay their own costs. The plaintiff appealed, and on May 15, 2009, Judge Jones ordered a stay regarding attorneys' fees pending the decision of the Court of Appeals. 2009 WL 1390811 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 2009). During this period, Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz replaced Judge Jones as the district judge assigned to the case. After a hearing on Nov. 16, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision that the Policy was compliant with the ADA, finding that the Policy was not equivalent because the “substitute experience” for disabled customers lacked the customers’ personal participation in the selection and preparation of the food that the full “Chipotle Experience” furnished and, therefore, violated the ADA. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine the scope of injunctive relief necessary to remedy the plaintiff's inability to view the food preparation counters. On Nov. 18, 2010, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorneys’ fees on appeal to the plaintiff, and referred the determination of the appropriate amount of fees to the court’s special master, Appellate Commissioner Peter L. Shaw. On Nov. 29, 2010, Judge Moskowitz entered judgment against the defendant for violation of the ADA. The district court declined to enter injunctive relief, as the defendant represented that its food-preparation counters at all of the defendant's restaurants in California, including the two restaurants at issue in this case, had been lowered to a suitable height that made them visible to wheelchair-bound customers. Because the defendant had not yet furnished evidence of these modifications or that the modifications would be permanent, the court ordered that limited discovery and briefing take place. Judge Moskowitz referred the question of additional damages to the magistrate judge for a settlement conference. Finally, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to more than the $136,357.83 in attorneys' fees awarded in the original district court action, but would wait to determine the amount until the other issues were resolved. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment, on Apr. 22, 2011, and for attorneys' fees, on Apr. 29, 2011. The plaintiff died on May 9, 2011, and on May 20, 2011, his widow and successor in interest to the claim filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff, and the motion was granted. On Mar. 21, 2012, Judge Moskowitz granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses. The plaintiff's death rendered moot any claim for injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA, thus the court denied the requested injunction requiring the defendant to maintain the current heights of the walls at the food preparation areas. Regarding damages, California Civil Code § 54.3 entitled a CDPA plaintiff to statutory minimum damages award of $1,000 for "each offense" established by the plaintiff. Upon determining that the defendant's unwritten policy constituted a violation of the ADA (and thus the CDPA as well) and that the original plaintiff had made five "bona fide" visits to the defendant's restaurants while that policy was in effect, the district court granted the plaintiff's request for $5,000 in statutory damages for each of his "bona fide" visits to the restaurant. Previously, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit had vacated the damages award and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the plaintiff sought an additional $3,000 in damages because the original plaintiff had made three additional visits for the purposes of gathering evidence for this litigation. Here, the district court denied the plaintiff's request for $3,000 in additional damages, finding that these litigation-related visits should not be considered for the purposes of assessing damages, as he admitted in his deposition that his goal during the visits was to have bad experiences, and "allowing § 54.3 statutory damages for visits made with the express intention of advancing a CDPA plaintiff's position in litigation would enable CDPA plaintiffs essentially to write their own damages check." 2012 WL 12845619 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2012). Last, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees without prejudice, finding that it was premature. On May 2, 2012, the plaintiff entered another motion for attorneys’ fees. On July 17, 2012, Judge Moskowitz granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion. The court granted the plaintiff an award of $545,079.05 in attorneys' fees and costs (in addition to the $5,000 in statutory damages). The plaintiff filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit for attorneys' fees and costs and was awarded an additional $353,469.95 in attorneys’ fees and expenses related to the appeals work that took place in 2008-2010. As of January 22, 2014, the case appears to be closed.

Summary: A paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair sued Chipotle for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and California state law in two of its California restaurants. The defendant implemented a new "Customers with Disabilities" which the district court found to be in compliance with the ADA, but the Ninth Circuit found otherwise, that viewing the ingredients behind the counter was part of the "Chipotle Experience." Ultimately, the defendant lowered the heights of the walls in front of the food-preparation areas in all of its California locations so that customers in wheelchairs could see the ingredients, and the plaintiff was awarded $898,549 in attorneys' fees and costs and $5,000 in statutory damages.


In March 2012, the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) filed a complaint in the Alameda County Superior Court (San Francisco, CA) alleging that the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) discriminated against and routinely failed to grant appropriate accommodations for test takers with disabilities on the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). DFEH claimed that LSAC violated the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, which incorporated by reference all ADA violations. DFEH brought this claim on behalf of 17 California-based LSAT test takers. In April 2012, because the case involved alleged violations of a federal statute, LSAC removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. DFEH claimed that LSAC violated the ADA in several ways. First, DFEH alleged that LSAC counted "mitigation measures" (steps taken to reduce the effects of a disability) as undermining a claim by test takers that they had a disability, even though that approach was explicitly prohibited by the ADA under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Second, DFEH alleged that LSAC's disability policy failed to "best ensure" that the test measure what it intended to rather than the test taker's disability in violation of the testing provision of Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12189) and its accompanying regulation (28 C.F.R. 36.309). Third, DFEH alleged that LSAC's policy of "flagging" (annotating the score reports to indicate when a test taker has received an accommodation) violated the ADA, including its prohibition against intimidation or threats against the exercise of ADA rights. Finally, DFEH alleged that LSAC had a pattern of denying reasonable accommodations to test takers, again in violation of the ADA. On May 17, 2012, LSAC filed a motion to dismiss. It argued that 1) DFEH did not have subject matter jurisdiction; and 2) that even if DFEH was within its power under California law, it failed to state a federal claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 27, 2012, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest supporting DFEH's interpretation of the ADA. DOJ then moved to intervene as a plaintiff in the case on September 5, 2012. In its motion, DOJ cited eight more complainants who were denied accommodations on the LSAT. The Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center also filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs on July 27, 2012. On September 18, 2012, Judge Edward M. Chen issued an order granting in part and denying in part LSAC's motion to dismiss. Judge Chen denied LSAC's motion with respect to each of the substantive claims in the complaint. The Judge granted LSAC's motion to dismiss the case with respect to the defendants whose names were unknown to DFEH at the time of filing. 896 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D. Cal. 2012). On October 12, 2012, Judge Chen granted the United States' motion to intervene. The court also allowed the Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center to intervene, but only to the extent that it represented its three individual complainants. 2012 WL 5077126 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2012). On November 9, 2012, LSAC filed a motion to partially dismiss on the basis of improper venue with respect to non-California residents added in the amended complaint. The defendant alleged that that unreasonable expansion of litigation beyond the scope of California residents would impose undue costs and burden. On January 29, 2013, the motion was denied. DFEH filed a First Amended Group and Class Action Complaint on February 7, 2013 seeking damages and injunctive relief. DFEH moved to proceed for class or group relief on February 21. On March 27, it filed a Second Amended Group and Class Action Complaint. The motion to proceed as a group or class was granted on April 22, 2013. On September 27, 2013, Judge Chen granted DFEH's motion to file a third amended complaint. The complaint added allegations that LSAC violated California Education Code 99161.5 by: [1] requiring excessive and unnecessary documentation before it would give accommodations; [2] providing an arbitrary and unreliable system of appeals from its accommodations decisions; and [3] by flagging tests that received accommodations in clear violation of the text of the statute. These charges were added after a California Court of Appeals Decision reversed a trial court injunction prohibiting California from enforcing 99161.5 of the Education Code as it violated LSAC's rights under the California Constitution. See LSAC v. California DR-CA-0047. Meanwhile, the case was referred to Judge Joseph C. Spero for settlement conferences in March 2013. Conferences throughout 2013 and 2014 resulted in a settlement: on May 20, 2014, the parties entered into a proposed consent decree, which included injunctive relief. Set to last for 4 years, it required the LSAC to comply with the ADA, its implementing regulations and relevant California Law and cease from score flagging. The agreement requires:

LSAC must permanently discontinue practice of "flagging" scores of individuals who received accommodations.
LSAC must provide the same or similar accommodations to individuals who have previously received them on tests for admission to any post-secondary educational institutions so long as the individuals provide documentation indicating that they were approved for such accommodations and the individual indicates that he or she is still experiencing the disability (there is an exception for testing accommodations that cannot be administered in one day)
LSAC's request for documentation shall be reasonable and limited to the testing accommodation requested.
LSAC must give "considerable weight to accomodations previously received under 504 or IEP plan.
LSAC may not refuse accommodations based solely on the fact that the applicant has not previously received accommodations.
LSAC must remove its requirement for an explanation on a request for accommodation form from an evaluator why an individual with a mental impairment was not evaluated while on medication.
LSAC is required to appoint an independent monitor.
LSAC is required to diversify the variety of expert consultants it uses to evaluate requests for accommodations.
LSAC, the United States, and DFEH appointed members to a panel of experts in ADA compliance that will create best practices that LSAC will be required to follow in regard to among other things, the appropriate documentation LSAC can request, whether more than one qualified profession should review applications for accommodations.

Any party could appeal the panel's report to the District Court if it believed that the recommendations violated the ADA or its implementing regulations, or California law where applicable, or conflicted with provisions of the Decree.
For the length of the decree the LSAC will keep records of all individuals requesting accommodations on the LSAT and make report of those records to the monitor, the United States, and the DFEH.
LSAC paid a total of about $8,730,000. This included a civil penalty of $55,000 for violating the ADA (though LSAC denied that it violated the ADA); $7,675,000 in compensatory damages to individual complainants and a fund to compensate those who took the test under the accommodations policies in place from January 2009 to May 2014; and $1 million in attorneys' fees to DFEH and the Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center.

 On January 26, 2015, the panel issued its report, which recommended many additional policy changes. Examples included automatic review by an outside expert when the council denies requests; submission of medical documentation dating to when the test taker was 13 years old, in certain cases; and different levels of supporting documentation depending on the accommodations sought. LSAC appealed the bulk of the report in court on March 26, 2015, arguing that the recommendations conflicted with the decree. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero, who on August 7, 2015, granted in part and denied in part the defendant's appeal, holding that the panel had substantially stayed within its mandate. The ruling did invalidate several minor recommendations. For instance, he said, the council did not have to accept evidence that was more than five years old in support of a claim of mental or cognitive impairment; council staff who review accommodations didn't have to complete their reviews within two business days; and the council didn't have to allow at least one panel member to help train the staff who reviewed accommodation requests. 2015 WL 4719613 (N.D. Cal. Aug 7, 2015). On October 27, 2017, DFEH filed motions of contempt and in limine, claiming that the defendant had violated court orders and deficiencies in the monitor's reports. With the consent decree scheduled to lapse in May 2018, DFEH requested that the court extend the term of the consent decree by two years, replace the ADA monitor and require quarterly audits, grant the DFEH and DOJ access to LSAC's records, and award attorney's fees and costs. DFEH also sought to exclude any findings and reports found by the appointed Monitor. A number of organizations filed amicus curie briefs to support the plaintiffs' motion of contempt, alleging LSAC's history of disability discrimination in its accommodations practices. On March 5, 2018, Judge Spero granted the motion for a contempt finding and denied the motion in limine. Concluding that the Monitor's conclusions held no bearing on LSAC's contempt of the consent decree, the court found that LSAC's use of "50% emails" to respond to requests for accommodations was in violation of the court's order of compliance because it was an effective denial of disability accommodations in some instances and acted as a "further inquiry" into candidates' eligibility for accommodation. Additionally, "no decision reports" and LSAC's repeated refusal to grant DFEH access to certain files and records for candidates in California also violated the consent decree. LSAC did not substantially comply with the consent decree enough to shield it from an order of contempt. The court granted an extension of two years of the term of the consent decree, incorporation of the Best Practices report into the decree, additional audits by the Monitor, and fees and costs. 2018 WL 1156605. The consent decree will run until six years of the original court filing date, ending on May 20, 2020. While expressing concerns for the Monitor's performance, the court did not order replacement. Instead, it laid out concrete expectations for his duties moving forward with the decree, including two additional annual audits of LSAC for the remainder of the term. This case closed.

Summary: The California Department of Fair Employment and Housing filed this ongoing lawsuit on behalf of several LSAT test takers against the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC). The State claims that LSAC routinely denies reasonable accommodations to test takers with disabilities in violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2014, the parties have agreed to a consent decree that the court approved.


On May 11, 2000, plaintiffs with mobility impairments sued a public transit agency the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, for violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act alleging their bus system presented numerous barriers to access, subjecting the plaintiffs to delay, embarrassment, and ridicule by passengers and drivers. Specifically, Plaintiffsclaimed that the buses had inoperative lifts; drivers did not know how to operate the lifts; the defendant failed to provide adequate alternatives when accessible buses were not available; drivers, staff, and passengers harassed the plaintiffs and did not assist them; that drivers retaliated against the plaintiffs when they complained; and many other problems, all in violation of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., 28 C.F.R. Part 35, and 49 C.F.R. Parts 37 and 38; the Americans With Disabilities Act provision that deals with retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.134(a); and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On June 28, 2001, the court approved a consent decree. The decree required the defendant to make the following changes to its bus operation: implement a computerized system to track complaints and reports on disabled access; ensure all buses have operating lifts; train drivers and make changes to the driver disciplinary policy; require drivers to test the lifts before each shift; provide alternate transportation if a disabled individual could not use a lift; and give disabled passengers the option of being secured on the bus, rather than requiring their wheelchair or other devices to be secured. Undercover disabled individuals would monitor compliance with the decree. They would make three monitoring trips per day on random routes for the first year and one trip per day for the second year. The decree would last five years from the date of approval. The defendant was to pay $250,000 in damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. For each violation of the decree, the defendant agreed to pay $75 in liquidated damages. Any disputes would be resolved through mediation and, if that failed, the district court. The settlement concluded without further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: Disabled plaintiffs sued a public transit agency for violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging their bus system presented numerous barriers to access, subjecting the plaintiffs to delay, embarrassment, and ridicule by passengers and drivers. The parties entered a consent decree, in which the defendant agreed to remedy the problems with its bus system and pay $250,000 in damages, fees, and costs.


On July 23, 1997, patrons of a concert venue who use wheelchairs for mobility, their relatives, and an advocacy group filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the owners and operators for obstructing wheelchair seating areas. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that though the state-of-the-art concert venue had a capacity of 18,000, the wheelchair seating area accommodated only about 20 wheelchairs. The plaintiffs complained that this area was often blocked with equipment or additional staging, obstructing the view and restricting the movement of the plaintiffs when they attended concerts. The staff were either unhelpful or offered the plaintiffs seating on a steep slope or in an aisle way where people were constantly moving. They claim these conditions violate the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq; the Colorado Revised Statute § 24-34-601, the Public Accommodations Law; the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, C.R.S. § 6-1-112(1); negligent misrepresentation; and constituted fraud and fraudulent concealment. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief and certification of two classes: 1) all persons with permanent disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric carts for mobility who have been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations at Fiddler's Green on the basis of disability, and 2) all persons with a relationship or association with members of the first subclass who, as a result of the relationship or association, have been denied full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of Fiddler's Green." On September 28, 1998, the District Court certified a settlement class. On December 23, 1998, the District Court approved a class action settlement agreement. The agreement required the defendants to pay $1750 to each of the named plaintiffs and $25,000 in attorneys' fees for work before February 17, 1998 and reasonable fees for work thereafter. To the class members, the Defendants agreed to pay each class member a maximum of $175.00. The defendants also agreed to make "capital improvements" to the facility, set forth in a separate exhibit, and not to obstruct or place equipment in wheelchair seating areas. On December 30, 1998, the District Court dismissed all claims and entered a notice regarding attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: Disabled patrons of a concert venue filed a class action against the owners and operators of the venue for failure to remove barriers to access. The parties settled, with Defendants agreeing not to obstruct wheelchair areas and to pay damages and attorneys' fees and costs.


On December 2, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, by failing to make its intercity rail stations accessible to individuals with disabilities by July 26, 2020, as required by the Act. The government sought to enjoin Amtrak from discriminating on the basis of disability and require the company to comply with the ADA. The government also sought compensatory damages for disabled individuals who had been harmed by Amtrak’s inaccessible stations. The case was not docketed or assigned to a judge, however, because the government reached a settlement with Amtrak on the same day it filed its complaint. The settlement agreement required Amtrak to design at least 135 accessible stations, finish construction at 90 stations, and be in the process of constructing at least 45 stations within 10 years of the settlement date. The agreement also required Amtrak to train staff on ADA compliance and to establish a monitor-approved process for managing ADA complaints. Pursuant to these obligations, Amtrak created the Office of the Vice President of Stations, Properties, and Accessibility. Amtrak also created a $2.25 million settlement fund to compensate mobility-impaired individuals who traveled or attempted to travel at Amtrak’s 78 most inaccessible stations. The settlement was monitored by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Department of Justice.

Summary: On December 2, 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, by failing to make its intercity rail stations accessible to individuals with disabilities by July 26, 2020, as required by the Act. The case was never properly docketed or assigned to a judge, however, because the government announced its settlement with Amtrak on the same day. The settlement agreement required Amtrak to design at least 135 accessible stations, complete construction at 90 stations, and be in the process of constructing at least 45 stations within 10 years of the settlement date. The agreement also required Amtrak to train staff on ADA compliance, establish a monitor-approved process for managing ADA complaints, and create a settlement fund to compensate individuals who were harmed by Amtrak’s most inaccessible stations. The settlement was monitored by the Federal Railroad Administration and the Department of Justice.


On July 22, 2013, attorneys from United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the State of Florida. The DOJ alleged that nearly two hundred children with disabilities were unnecessarily segregated from their communities and the general population by the State, which had placed them in nursing homes. The DOJ sought an injunction requiring the State to comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12134, which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), forbids the unnecessary institutionalization of disabled individuals, and mandates that their rehabilitative and medical needs be provided in a manner that enables disabled individuals to be independent and integrated members of the community. The federal regulations implementing the ADA require that disabled recipients of government benefits receive those benefits in the most integrated setting," i.e., and environment that "enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible..." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d), App. B., at 673 (2011). According to the DOJ's complaint, the unnecessary institutionalization of children denies them the opportunity to develop bonds with family and limits their ability to interact with people without disabilities. The DOJ also asserted that placement in nursing homes denies children important experiences that contribute to healthy child development. The nursing homes in which these children were institutionalized resembled hospitals, with children housed in rooms shared by one to three other patients. According to the DOJ's complaint the facilities did not prove adequate, age-appropriate stimulation. The children had limited very limited control over how they spent their time. The complaint provides as an example an instance an institutionalized teenager asked to be taken in his wheelchair to an activity area. The teen was taken to a room where he was left with a group of toddlers listening to nursery rhymes. The DOJ also alleged that Florida's policies and practices of limiting community-based services and its reductions to these services, and the State's unnecessarily burdensome recertification processes for individuals receiving these services, put at risk of unnecessary institutionalization children who were dependent on these services and who received care in their family homes or in small, community-based facilities. The complaint noted that Florida's reimbursement rates for home-based health services had not been raised or modified since 1987. The complaint also noted that the State's reductions to in-home care services coincided with an increase in the number of children placed in nursing facilities. In 2004 there were about 136 spots in nursing facilities designated to serve children, and by 2012, more than two hundred children resided in such facilities, in addition to a significant number of adults who remained in the facilities after entering as children. In September 2012, after conducting a six-month investigation, the DOJ had provided notice to Florida that it had found the State to be in violation of the ADA. The complaint acknowledges that Florida had made some improvements to its policies, but alleged that the State's processes for transitioning institutionalized children into community-based settings remained deficient. After several months of negotiations, the DOJ determined that the State would not comply with the ADA requirements voluntarily, and therefore it filed this suit. The DOJ sought injunctions barring Florida from failing to provide adequate community-based services and support for institutionalized disabled children and those children at risk of institutionalization. They also sought compensatory damages for injuries suffered by these children as a result of Florida's failure to comply with Title II of the ADA, and a declaratory judgment holding Florida to have violated the ADA. On June 26, 2014, the Court consolidated this case with another pending case, <i> A.R. v. Dudek </i>, No. 0:12-cv-60460-WJZ in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and ordered that no more filings occur with this docket entry. The consolidated case is in the Clearinghouse as PB-FL-0007.

Summary: On July 22, 2013, attorneys from United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the State of Florida. The DOJ alleged that nearly two hundred children with disabilities were unnecessarily segregated from their communities and the general population by the State, which had placed them in nursing homes. The DOJ sought an injunction requiring the State to comply with Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131-12134, which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), forbids the unnecessary institutionalization of disabled individuals, and mandates that their rehabilitative and medical needs be provided in a manner that enables disabled individuals to be independent and integrated members of the community. In June 2014, the case was consolidated with another pending case, which is in the Clearinghouse as PB-FL-0007.


The lead plaintiff in this action was a Detroit-based 501(c)(3) non-profit that assisted and advocated for people with disabilities. On September 9, 2005, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, suing the City of Detroit and claiming that the city had failed to meet federal and Michigan accessibility standards in altering intersections and sidewalks. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed that the city had violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701), and Michigan state accessibility laws codified at M.C.L. § 37.1301-02. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages. On December 6, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint that added Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America as a plaintiff in the action. This complaint added more specific allegations as to the city's alleged failure to provide accessible surfaces. On June 29, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Before a ruling could be issued on this motion the parties entered into negotiations and reached a partial settlement. On August 31, 2006, the district court (Judge Gerald E. Rosen) approved a plan for correcting the affected city surfaces. The plan required that any future alterations of streets, intersections, sidewalks, or curb ramps would be done in compliance with ADA requirements and Michigan state disability laws. It also required that the City of Detroit install curb ramps into all resurfaced intersections. The City of Detroit was required to file annual reports proving their compliance with the order. The City of Detroit was also required to pay attorneys fees and costs accrued by the plaintiffs. On October 16, 2006, the City of Detroit submitted a corrective action plan pursuant to the Court's August 31, 2006 order. This showed how the City planned to implement the settlement agreement in its existing resurfacing projects. After this, the City began remedying the affected areas, filing periodic status reports on their progress. On August 13, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that the City's rebuilding of sidewalks on Bagley Avenue failed to meet ADA standards. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion, stating that the plaintiffs had not met the high standard for obtaining a temporary restraining order. Instead, the court scheduled a status conference for the parties to discuss the issues raised in the motion. 2008 WL 3833764 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2008). On September 30, 2008, Judge Rosen appointed a special master to organize the corrective action plan of the settlement. The special master continues to work with the parties in carrying out the agreement. On February 10, 2012, the court issued a stipulated order regarding partial settlement as to retrofitting of 397 intersections. The District Court then issued periodic orders directing the defendant to pay attorney and special master fees. As of May 13, 2020 the City of Detroit was still working on updating its sidewalks and surfaces in compliance with the settlement agreement.

Summary: In 2005, two organizations that advocates for people with disabilities filed this lawsuit n the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the City of Detroit, claiming that the city had failed to meet federal and Michigan accessibility standards in altering intersections and sidewalks. In 2006, the parties negotiated a plant to correct the affected intersections and sidewalks. As of 2018, a special master continues to monitor implementation of the agreement.


An individual who uses a wheelchair and his mother filed this Fair Housing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on July 27, 2006. The plaintiff had moved into a ground floor unit in a development known as the Uptown Apartments, part of a "new urbanism" complex that includes about 300 apartments, a pool, club house, exercise gym, meeting areas and a business office. The developers had also cooperated with Canton Township to build adjacent shopping and entertainment facilities. When the plaintiff moved in, he discovered multiple accessibility problems inside the unit. Defendants assured him they would be fixed, but they never were. Additionally, at the front door to the apartment, there were concrete steps, making it impossible for him to enter. Instead, he had to use the back door after navigating driveways and parking lots whose slopes made entering his home treacherous. The conditions at the development trapped the plaintiff in his home. His only outside access was the back parking lot. He was unable to get to the common areas and had virtually no contact with his neighbors. Finally, after making repeated requests that the necessary modifications be made, the plaintiff filed suit against the owner/contrator, the architect, and the engineer responsible for constructing and operating the inaccessible development. His mother intervened as a plaintiff because the conditions, along with her own disabilities, made it extremely difficult for her to visit her son. The local fair housing center ("the FHC"), which had first taken the plaintiffs' complaint and investigated, also intervened, and on September 7, 2007, the individual plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding Canton Township as a party. After months of acrimonious meetings, the parties entered into various settlement agreements. The individual plaintiffs entered a confidential settlement agreement with the non-public-entity defendants for an undisclosed sum of money, plus attorney fees and costs, after significant modifications had been made, including rebuilding the front of the building to eliminate the steps. They then settled with the Township for $75,000.00 and retrofitting of sidewalks and curb ramps On July 28, 2009, the FHC entered into a settlement with the owner/ contractor, engineering, and architect defendants requiring exterior modifications to the development, including accessible routes and parking, and interior modifications to the covered residential units including, at the request of the tenant, beveling exterior sides of primary entry doors, increasing turning space, retrofitting of bathrooms, and other modifications required by the Fair Housing Act and its implementing regulations. Defendants agreed to pay $45,000.00 in damages to the FHC. The case was closed on July 29, 2009.

Summary: This was a case brought to make a 300 unit apartment complex in Canton Township, MI accessible to persons with mobility impairments. It was filed in 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by two individuals and the Fair Housing Center of Southeastern Michigan. The suit eventually resulted in about three quarters of a million dollars in retrofits, damages to the plaintiffs and attorney fees and costs.


On July 10, 2012, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, against the Mississippi Department of Education (MDE), under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The proposed plaintiff class, represented by a named plaintiff, consists of disabled students in the Jackson Public School District (JPS). The complaint alleged individual and systemic violations of IDEA by the School District, and that the State has continually failed to ensure that the School District meets its federally mandated obligations under IDEA. IDEA requires that a state provide a free appropriate public education to all students with disabilities, and that this education be provided in the least restrictive environment with minimal segregation from their non-disabled peers. The Plaintiffs allege that the State's failure to enforce IDEA has resulted in potentially thousands of students being denied their guaranteed free and appropriate public education, and seek injunctive relief requiring the State to execute its responsibilities under IDEA. The named plaintiff and a class of similarly situated students had, in September 2010, filed an administrative complaint against the Jackson Public School District with the State, alleging systemic violations of IDEA and the failure to provide a free and appropriate public education("FAPE"). Alleged violations included: that the School District denied the students an appropriate level of related services to address their behavioral needs and goals, and denied many students with any such services; that the School District failed comply with IDEA's disciplinary regulations with regards to functional behavioral assessments ("FBA"), behavior intervention plans ("BIP"), and manifestation determination reviews ("MDRS"); that the School District failed to confer meaningful educational benefit; that they failed to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements relating to the development and implementation of individualized educational programs ("IEP"); that they failed to provide educational services in the least restrictive environment ("LRE"); that the School District failed to provide students with necessary and appropriate transition services; and that it failed to provide students with necessary and appropriate extended school year ("ESY") services. The State Department of Education investigated and in November of 2010 issued a report that substantiated every one of the violations. The Plaintiffs alleged in the July 2012 complaint that the School District continued, despite this investigation, to violate the rights of the Plaintiff class, and that the State exhibited complete indifference to the ongoing violations, and that it failed to take appropriate action to compel JPS to correct its violations of IDEA. The Plaintiffs allege that the State bears the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that local school districts comply with IDEA, and that the State has completely failed to exercise this responsibility. Less than ten percent of students with disabilities graduate from the School District. During the 2010-2011 school year, only 9% of eighth grade students with disabilities scored proficient or above in state-wide science testing, while only 4% of eighth grade students with disabilities were considered proficient in language arts as measured on the Mississippi Curriculum Test. The Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the court that the State's failure to comply with the mandates of IDEA is unlawful. They seek an injunction enjoining the State from subjecting disabled students to practices that violate their rights under IDEA and compelling the State to fulfill its duties under IDEA. They also seek reasonable costs and attorney's fees. On September 17, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint that added two additional named plaintiffs and which made minor changes to the formulation of their arguments. The allegations remained substantially the same. One November 4, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Class, on November 11, 2012 the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and on November 27, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. These motions remained pending until May 28, 2013. See below. At a January 23, 2013 settlement conference, the parties agreed to put a temporary stay on the case while they pursued settlement. Two days later, one of the added named plaintiffs from the Amended Complaint withdrew from the case. His claims were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Apparently settlement negotiations failed, because on May 28, 2013 the stay was lifted and the pending motions terminated without decision. The parties were instructed to refile their motions, in light of any new facts that may have developed in the intervening period. On June 14, 2013 the plaintiff refiled their motion for class certification and on June 28, 2013 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded with a motion for discovery and an accompanying request to convert the defendant's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment due to the advanced stage of proceedings. However, the plaintiff's motion was denied on September 6, 2013. The parties continued to file responses and replies to the defendant's motion to dismiss until April 18, 2014 when parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings while they attempted to negotiate a settlement. Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted the order and recommended the case back to Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball for settlement negotiations. After approximately four and a half months, on September 29, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to administratively close the case after reaching a settlement agreement. The agreement noted that as of February 12, 2014, JPS had corrected any and all violations under the IDEA. The agreement further stipulated that the MDE would assist JPS with the implementation of a Program Sustainability Plan for the 2014-2015 school year. The agreement also included that the MDE would conduct quarterly assessments of JPS's progress, compile a report regarding progress, and supply the reports to the plaintiff. On September 11, 2015 District Court Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted a motion to dismiss with prejudice, and it seems the case is closed.

Summary: A class action lawsuit was filed on July 10, 2012, against the Mississippi Department of Education, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA), alleging that the defendant had failed to execute its responsibilities under IDEA, by not ensuring that the Jackson Public School District provide disabled students with a free and appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, even after conducting an investigation into the School District and identifying its systemic failure to meet its IDEA obligations. The parties reached a settlement on September 29, 2014 stipulating the implementation of a Program Sustainability Plan for the 2014-2015 school year. On September 11, 2015 District Court Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted a motion to dismiss with prejudice.


On August 3, 2005, a group of people with disabilities filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York Human Resources Administration (NYHRA). The complaint was brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violation of these Acts, as well as the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions and the New York State and City civil rights statutes and regulations. Represented by the Legal Aid Society and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the NYHRA discriminated against them by involuntarily transferring their public benefits cases from their neighborhood welfare center to one of three "hub" centers that were exclusively designated for people with disabilities. The plaintiffs further claimed that these "hub" centers segregated people with disabilities and failed to provide reasonable accommodations to those whose disability made it difficult to travel. The plaintiffs asked the court for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney's fees. On September 19, 2005, Judge Laura Taylor Swain approved a stipulation between the two parties where the defendant agreed to (1) transfer the named plaintiffs back to their local welfare centers, (2) stop the involuntary transfer of disabled persons, (3) provide the plaintiffs with notice of any voluntary transfers and (4) combine the hearing on the temporary restraining order with the hearing on the preliminary injunction. On November 11, 2005, the Court approved another stipulation where the defendant agreed to stop involuntary transfers and give notice of voluntary transfers. On April 19, 2006, Judge Swain certified a plaintiff class defined as "recipients of public assistance, food stamps and/or Medicaid who have received or will receive a notice from the New York City Human Resources Administration involuntarily transferring their case to one of three 'hub centers' in Manhattan, the Bronx or Brooklyn in connection with the WeCARE program". In the same order, Judge Swain issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the NYHRA from reassigning class members' cases to the hubs and requiring the NYHRA to give the transferred plaintiffs the right to return their case to their local center. This preliminary injunction was suspended on May 16, 2006, after the NYHRA informed the court that it was closing the hub centers. On December 11, 2006, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to request that the court order the defendant to reopen cases that were closed due to class members failing to attend mandatory meetings at the hub centers. For the next five years, discovery and negotiations dominated the case. The case was reassigned in November of 2011 to Judge Katherine B. Forrest. On March 27, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether any of the plaintiff class would be excluded from the collection of compensatory damages, which was denied by Judge Forrest as premature. Following two more years of discovery, on November 25, 2014, the parties entered into a partial settlement. The agreement included compensation for foregone Cash Assistance benefits, reimbursement for Medicaid-covered expenses, and expungement of sanctions incurred while class members were assigned to hubs. Then, on March 11, 2015, Judge Forrest reviewed a proposed settlement of all claims, preliminarily approving it subject to a fairness hearing. Under the proposed settlement, the defendant agreed to implement a broad set of policies and practices for class members. This included implementing "Disability Inquiry Methods", written scripts and screening protocols for the staff to identify client disabilities that may pose barriers to complying with program requirements and maintaining access to benefits, as well as any needed Reasonable Accommodation (as defined by the ADA). The agency agreed to have a non-exhaustive list of reasonable accommodations available to identified clients. The agency agreed to help facilitate successful federal disability benefit applications, including a referral to a vendor to assist with appealing a denial of benefits. The agreement also outlined procedures for mandatory pre- and post-reminders for appointments, and protocols for hospitalized and homeless class members. The agency also agreed to additional training, to accept feedback from a Disability Advisory Community Panel, to have court supervised monitoring, and to have more accessible materials available. On June 22, 2015, Judge Forrest approved the class action settlement. After three years of negotiations and the parties agreeing to multiple extensions, on January 26, 2018, the City of New York agreed to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $6,500,000, with $5,434,936 going to The Legal Aid Society and the remainder going to private counsel. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 3, 2006, plaintiffs, a group of disabled persons receiving public benefits filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the South District of New York against the New York Human Resources Administration alleging that it discriminated against disabled persons by involuntarily segregating them by transferring their public benefits cases from local benefit centers to three hub centers that only serviced people with disabilities. The Court approved a proposed settlement agreement in June of 2015.


On January 26, 2021, this class-action suit was filed against the New York City Department of Education, the City of New York, and the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education on behalf of a class of nearly 2,000 Staten Island children with disabilities who alleged that they were being taught in segregated and unequal settings in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the New York City Human Rights Law. The three named plaintiffs were students with disabilities and the advocacy group Disability Rights New York. The plaintiffs were represented by The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights New York, and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall and Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy. The New York City Department of Education maintained and operated an entirely separate school district for students with disabilities known as District 75. Students in District 75 were pulled from Staten Island public schools. Across the city, 25,000 students with disabilities attended District 75 schools, and 2,000 students with disabilities attended Staten Island District 75 schools. Students attending District 75 schools were taught in settings that were almost entirely segregated by disability, with very little facetime between students with disabilities and students without disabilities. Students with disabilities were funneled into the Staten Island District 75 system in violation of the IDEA's requirement that students be educated in the "least restrictive environment" possible. Additionally, Staten Island District 75 schools lacked many of the amenities that traditional public schools provide to their students like elective courses, extracurricular activities, and sports programs. The students did not seek monetary damages; instead, they sought injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction to stop the defendants from violating the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and state law. They also sought to order the defendants to create and implement a remedial plan to ensure that students can learn in the most integrated environment possible. The case remains open.

Summary: Students sued the New York City Department of Education, the City of New York, and the chancellor of the New York City Department of Education to seek injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and New York state law. The student plaintiffs are either student in Staten Island District 75 schools or vulnerable to being sent to those schools, which are separated from New York City community schools. District 75 students receive their education in a restrictive setting where they are largely isolated from interactions with students who do not have disabilities. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction against future violations and an order for a remedial plan to reimagine policies, practices, and norms that will permit each student to learn in the most integrated setting possible. The case remains open.


On May 2, 2012 Brown and three other blind or visually impaired individuals filed a lawsuit against the Free Library of Philadelphia, the city's public library system, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against by the Library, which had developed a program to make e-reading devices available to be borrowed at no cost by patrons 50 years old and older. To implement this program, the Library purchased 65 Nook Simple Touch e-reading devices, which the plaintiffs alleged were completely inaccessible to blind users. The plaintiffs alleged that accessible alternative devices were readily available on the market. The e-reader program was funded in part by a $25,000 federal grant from a program established by the Library Services and Technology Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9121, et seq. The Plaintiffs, in their complaint, argued that the Library had been alerted by several groups of the federal requirement to acquire only accessible technology and its obligation to conform its practices to federal law. Among these sources were the American Library Association, of which the Library is a member; in 2009 it passed a resolution recommending that members ensure electronic resources comply with federal accessibility guidelines. In addition, a 2010 "Dear Colleague Letter" from the United States Departments of Justice and Education had warned educational institutions not to procure or use inaccessible e-reader technology because the use of such technology would violate federal law. On October 22, 2012, the parties reached a settlement, and on October 23 the parties filed a Notice to Dismiss the case with prejudice, referencing the settlement. In the Settlement Agreement, the library denied any legal liability related to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint, but agreed to make its e-reader program fully accessible to blind patrons. To this end, the settlement implements a timetable, committing to procure 10 mainstream e-reader devices accessible to both sighted and blind patrons within sixty days of the Settlement Agreement, which initially were to be available to patrons with visual impairments or other print disabilities. The library agreed that, within four years of the agreement, it would stop lending inaccessible devices and ensure the full accessibility of all the e-readers it made available. The Library also agreed to train relevant staff members on the accessibility features of the devices, and to publicize the availability of the accessible devices. It further agreed to use its best efforts to ensure that all new contracts with its vendors contain an accessibility clause requiring that information technology products and services sold to the Library to not cause the Library to be in violation of its obligations under the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA. The agreement remains in effect until 2016.

Summary: Four blind or visually impaired library patrons sued the Free Library of Philadelphia in in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the ADA. They alleged that the Library's new program to lend e-reading devices was discriminatory, because the Nook Simple Touch devices the library had procured were inaccessible to visually impaired users, and because accessible alternative devices were available. The parties entered a settlement and the case was dismissed. The library agreed to transition to the exclusive use of accessible devices within four years, and to add ten accessible e-readers within 60 days of the settlement date.


On January 20, 2011, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), and Millcreek Township. The Plaintiffs alleged that the pedestrian walkways, sidewalks, and intersections in Millcreek Township were not in compliance with the accessibility mandates of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701. They alleged that the walkways and intersections were dangerous and that people using wheelchairs were forced to travel in the streets because of the absence of curb cuts. They further alleged that PennDOT and Millcreek had altered the sidewalks, walkways, and intersections, using federal and state funds, in ways that triggered mandatory compliance with ADA guidelines. The number of proposed class members was large; at the time the complaint was filed, Millcreek Township was home to approximately 2000 residents categorized by the US Census Bureau as "Go Outside of Home-Disabled Residents, Noninstitutionalized," and 1000 residents in the category "Sensory-Disabled Residents, Noninstitutionalized." The Plaintiffs alleged that members of the proposed class were segregated from full participation in Millcreek because of the lack of accessible sidewalks. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. On October 12, 2011, the court approved a Consent Decree and Partial Settlement between the Plaintiffs and Millcreek Township. PennDOT was not a party to this agreement. Millcreek agreed to ensure all future alterations to or construction of roads made by the Township would have ADA-compliant curb cuts at the intersections. Millcreek agreed to report all road work to the plaintiffs. The agreement contained provisions allowing exceptions where curb cuts were technically unfeasible. Millcreek also agreed to make a report of all newly constructed or altered roads dating back to January 1992 (when the ADA came into effect). The Plaintiffs and Millcreek agreed that they would meet and confer, when this list was completed, to determine a timetable for the retrofitting of these areas where necessary. The agreement acknowledged that Millcreek was not responsible for ensuring the compliance of state roads and highways running through the town. Millcreek agreed to pay $27,2479.97 in attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Consent Decree. Between 2014 and 2016, the parties continued to negotiate for a total of four Consent Decrees and Partial Settlement orders between Plaintiffs and Millcreek Township. Additionally, the court approved three Partial Settlements between Plaintiffs and PennDOT. On November 23, 2016, the court approved a Joint Partial Settlement Agreement among all parties. The Joint Partial Settlement Agreement resolved both of Plaintiff's claims (the Bus Stop claim and the Road Shoulder claim) and required Plaintiffs to make updates to existing infrastructure to comply with ADA requirements. Additionally, the parties agreed that any sidewalk construction within Millcreek Township would comply with ADA guidelines. On November 30, 2017, the parties proposed a fifth Consent Decree and Partial Settlement, which Judge Hornak approved on December 1, 2017. Under the fifth Consent Decree, the requirements of the four prior consent decrees remain in effect, with the additional incorporation of the Millcreek Transition Plan. The Transition Plan, consistent with the April 2017 preliminary agreement of the parties, identifies the "remaining physical obstacles that limit accessibility of the facilities or park where Millcreek offers a program, service, or activity." It outlines and provides a timeline for the planned improvements and corrections to ensure that Millcreek's programs, services, and activities will be readily accessible to and useable by individuals with disabilities. The case is ongoing but administratively closed as of May 10, 2019. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this and the prior consent decrees.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed a suit in federal court on January 20, 2011, against Millcreek Township, PA and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). Plaintiffs alleged that the sidewalks and intersections in Millcreek were not in compliance with the disability accessibility mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. On November 23, 2016, the parties partially settled, with the Township and PennDOT committing to adhere to ADA requirements in the future and to retrofit sidewalks and intersections where necessary. A series of consent decrees, over which the court retains jurisdiction, have been entered and the case is ongoing.


On December 13, 1996, parents of a student with autism filed this lawsuit on his behalf in the Eastern District Court of Arkansas. The plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Department of Education, the Williford School District, and individuals acting in their official capacities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the court for injunctive relief, including compensatory education for the student, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs claim that the Williford School District failed to implement any method of teaching to assist or promote the disabled students' learning. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the student was not provided with an integrated and appropriate education that would meet state standards. The plaintiff was diagnosed with autism at age 5, though the claims about his education begin with his enrollment in 7th grade. Plaintiff's parents claim that the school district failed to provide — and the state failed to oversee — an education that benefited the student. He was excluded altogether from Williford classrooms and schools, leaving him isolated from his peers. The plaintiff was only given "home bound" instruction, at a frequency well below the state's standards, and he was deprived of large parts of the high school curriculum. Furthermore, plaintiff's parents claim that the classes their son did take at the school — performance art and drawing — were pursued under their own initiative and required them to forego jobs and other necessities in order to assist the instructors in teaching their son. Additionally, the "home bound" instruction was primarily done on the computer, and required the parents to obtain the materials and teach their son themselves, instead of the district personnel. Plaintiffs claim that the defendants' treatment of the student deprived him of a proper education, and thus placed them in violation of the IDEA, ADA, and Section 504. In a case proceeding the one at hand, the family complained to the Arkansas Department of Education about the student's education in an IDEA hearing. The family then complained to the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) for a failure of due process. The DOE found that the Arkansas Department of Education delayed 3 of its 5 hearing decisions, ruling well beyond the 45 day limit. On November 21, 1997, Judge Moody granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, but stayed the proceedings pending the 8th Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling on whether the 11th Amendment barred a federal court from having jurisdiction over an IDEA claim. The 8th Circuit held that Arkansas had waived its 11th Amendment immunity with respect to the IDEA claims by participating in the federal spending program, and the case was remanded to the district court. In December 1997 the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal, but the 8th Circuit dismissed his claim in September the following year. In November 2000 this case was consolidated with  Jim C. v. Arkansas Department of Education with this as the leading case. After an initial denial, Judge Moody granted class action certification for school-age children with disabilities and their parents and guardians in September 2001. On September 18, 2001, both defendants were denied summary judgement. Defendants appealed. On November 4, 2002, The 8th Circuit held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden under Section 504, failing to show that school officials acted in bad faith or with gross misjudgment. Furthermore because the plaintiffs failed to ask for appropriate remedy under § 1983 and IDEA, the state officials were entitled to immunity. The 8th Circuit reversed Judge Moody's decision and remanded for further proceedings. On May 12, 2003, Judge Moody dismissed all claims for money damages against individual defendants. Following a trial, Judge Moody found that neither the state nor Williford School District violated the federal statutes. He held that the school district had developed a reasonable program to educate the plaintiff, and that, under the totality of the circumstances, had not created a hostile educational environment. On September 10, 2004, Judge Moody issued a judgement for the defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice. A subsequent appeal to the 8th circuit ultimately affirmed the judgement in May 2006.

Summary: In 1996, parents of a student with autism filed this lawsuit on his behalf against the Arkansas Department of Education and the Williford School District under the IDEA, the ADA, Section 504, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The parents claimed that their son was unfairly discriminated against due to his disability and was deprived of an appropriate education. In 2004, the Eastern District of Arkansas Court held that neither defendant had violated the federal statutes and found for state and the school district.


On September 29, 2000, a former high school student harassed for his perceived sexual orientation ("student plaintiff"), filed this federal lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the Visalia Unified School District and school administrators and officials. On January 24, 2001, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, now represented by both private counsel and the ACLU of Northern California, and joined by a second, organizational plaintiff, the Gay-Straight Alliance Network ("GSA Network"), a youth-led non-profit organization dedicated to eliminating intolerance and homophobia in schools, was added to the first amended complaint. In the amended complaint, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and damages for the creation of a hostile school environment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that from 1996 to 2000, the defendants participated in and failed to take effective measures to remedy continuing and severe harassment that the student plaintiff experienced due to his sexual orientation. This harassment created a climate hostile to LGBT students, interfered with their enjoyment of educational opportunities, and caused them physical and emotional harms. On March 28, 2001, the Court (Senior Judge Oliver W. Wanger) granted the defendants' request for judicial notice of certified copies of official records showing registration of school district with public agencies, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, motion to strike (in part), motion for summary judgment/summary adjudication. The Court found that the GSA Network had standing to bring their claims, but struck GSA Network's prayer for punitive damages against the District. Gay-Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2001). However, on April 11, 2001, the Court corrected its March 28 opinion and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the student plaintiff's request for punitive damages against the School District, finding the School District immune from exposure to punitive damages from state law claims. The parties then settled the case: On August 15, 2002, the Court entered a consent decree and granted the parties' stipulation of dismissal, dismissing the case with prejudice. The decree required the defendants to provide for a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. It was scheduled to last for six months. The docket does not indicate any subsequent substantive activity.

Summary: This federal lawsuit was filed in 2000 in the Eastern District of California; in it, a former high school student and the Gay-Straight Alliance Network sued his school district for failure to take effective measures to remedy continuing harassment that he faced based on his sexual orientation. The case settled for a consent decree entered August 15, 2002, which required the defendants to implement a mandatory staff training program, revise its policies, select compliance coordinators, develop systems for reporting harassment and discrimination, allow students to form a gay-straight alliance, and create a community advisory group. The decree implementation period was 6 months.


On Oct. 27, 2016, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) sued the U.S. Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to compel compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that on Jan. 11, 2016 it submitted a request under FOIA, seeking all documents pertaining to the investigation of Princeton University in Case No. 02-08-6002. The defendant allegedly acknowledged receiving the request in a letter dated Jan. 13, 2016, but repeatedly stated that it did not have a specific completion time available or did not respond to the plaintiff's numerous requests for updates about when the request would be completed. As of Oct. 27, 2016, the date that the suit was filed, the defendant had still not produced the requested records. The plaintiff requested that the court (1) order the defendant to search for the records, (2) order the defendant to produce the records, (3) enjoin the defendant from continuing to withhold the records, (4) grant the plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs, and (5) grant the plaintiff such other relief the court found just and proper. On Oct. 28, 2016, the case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. On Dec. 1, 2016, the Department of Education (DOE) notified Princeton University that the plaintiff had requested documents related to the DOE's investigation of Princeton and that the plaintiff had filed a lawsuit to compel the DOE to produce the requested materials. Princeton objected to the disclosure, arguing that the materials were exempt under FOIA Exemptions 4, 6, and 7(c). On Mar. 1, 2017, the DOE informed Princeton that it had reviewed the objections and concluded that none of FOIA's exemptions required it to withhold the materials from the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the DOE informed Princeton that it would be producing the requested materials to the plaintiff, with personally identifiable information redacted, in 10 business days. On Mar. 17, 2017, Princeton filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the DOE seeking to enjoin the disclosure of the materials identified in the plaintiff's FOIA request. Trustees of Princeton University v. U.S. Dep't of Education, No. 17-cv-00485 (D.D.C.). This case was also assigned to District Judge Chutkan. On the same day, the defendant notified the plaintiff that it would not be producing the requested documents due to Princeton's lawsuit. Soon after, the plaintiff notified Princeton and the DOE that, due to the overlapping nature of the parties' cases, the plaintiff would move to intervene in Trustees of Princeton University v. U.S. Dep't of Education, No. 17-cv-00485, and to consolidate it with the present case. Both Princeton and the DOE consented to the motion. On Mar. 30, 2017, the DOE moved to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the parties' anticipated cross-motions for summary judgment in the related case. On May 9, 2017, the present case was consolidated into Case No. 17-cv-00485. On. Dec. 7, 2017, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of this case without prejudice. On Dec. 11, 2017, in light of the joint stipulation of dismissal filed by the parties, Judge Chutkan issued an order converting the administrative dismissal into a dismissal without prejudice.

Summary: The plaintiff, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued the U.S. Department of Education to compel compliance with its FOIA request related to its investigation of Princeton University. The defendant notified Princeton of the request and the lawsuit, and Princeton then filed a lawsuit against SFFA to enjoin the disclosure of the materials requested under FOIA. The present case was consolidated into that suit, and the parties jointly stipulated to this case's dismissal.


On Mar. 17, 2017, the plaintiff, Princeton University, filed a "reverse Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)" lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education and its sub-agency, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR), pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act; 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; FOIA; 5 U.S.C. § 552; the Trade Secrets Act; and 18 U.S.C. § 1905, in order to prevent the disclosure of certain commercially sensitive documents and information relating to the University's undergraduate admissions program submitted to the OCR in the course of an OCR compliance review. The materials at issue were the subject of a pending FOIA request and accompanying lawsuit to compel disclosure, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education. The materials fell into two categories: documents and information about undergraduate applicants to the University, and documents and information about the University's proprietary admissions processes. The materials pertained to an OCR compliance review had begun in January 2008 after OCR received a complaint alleging that the plaintiff had discriminated against the complainant on the basis of race and national origin in the admissions process. OCR concluded its investigation in September 2015, finding no evidence that the plaintiff had discriminated against the complainant specifically, nor against Asian applicants generally. The plaintiff maintained that the materials at issue were exempt from disclosure pursuant to a FOIA exemption that exempts from disclosure "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). The plaintiff argued that disclosure of the materials would put it at a substantial competitive disadvantage to identify, evaluate, and enroll prospective students, while potentially also discouraging applicants from applying to the University in the future if they questioned the confidentiality of their application materials. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctive and declaratory relief to set aside the Department of Education and OCR's final decision to disclose the documents and information as arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. On March 30, 2017, Students for Fair Admissions filed a consent motion to intervene as a defendant in the present case and consolidate the case with Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Education. On May 9, 2017, the order was granted and the cases were consolidated. On July 17, 2017, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to remand and stay. The motion was granted on a week later, on the condition that the parties submit a status report to the court by September 25, 2017, and every 30 days thereafter. On October 25, 2017, the Department of Education informed the court that it had received and was reviewing supplementary material that the plaintiff had submitted. On November 24, 2017, the Department provided an update stating that it planned to respond to the plaintiff on or before December 8, 2017, informing the school of whether the agency found the records exempt from production. On December 8, 2017, the parties jointly stipulated to dismissal. Three days later, Judge Chutkan signed an order of dismissal, converting the administrative dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice. Each party had to pay their own costs. The docket does not include any details about the conditions of the parties' joint stipulation to dismissal. The case is now closed.

Summary: Princeton sued U.S. Department of Education and OCR in a "reverse FOIA" to stop them from releasing documents related to an OCR compliance review to Students for Fair Admissions, Inc., which had submitted a FOIA request and filed a lawsuit against the DOE to compel disclosure. Parties voluntarily dismissed case.


On October 26, 2010, a group of students with disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Department of Education and the Orleans Parish School Board. The plaintiffs, represented by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Southern Poverty Law Center, and private counsel alleged that the defendants acted and continued to act in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA) of 2004 (20 U.S.C. § 1400), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (ADA) of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101). The plaintiffs sought to represent a class consisting of all New Orleans students with disabilities. Plaintiffs alleged that the New Orleans public schools had denied admission to students with disabilities; refused to evaluate needs for special education; failed to implement individualized education plans; and used abusive restraint techniques on students with disabilities. They sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring the defendants to: (1) make their facilities and programs accessible to all students with disabilities; (2) adequately evaluate children with disabilities; (3) implement appropriate education accommodations; (4) and provide students with disabilities with a free appropriate public education. On March 12, 2014, there was a hearing on the motion for class certification. The District Court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) ordered a stay for filing post-hearing briefs pending the outcome of settlement negotiations between the two parties. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations during the spring and summer of 2014. On December 19, 2014, the parties submitted a proposed Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment defined the affected class as present or future New Orleans students who have requested but not received a special education evaluation; have disabilities, attend charter schools, and have been removed from school for 10 days or more without the timely provision of the disciplinary safeguards required by IDEA; have not received services contained in their Individualized Education Plans; have a disability and have been denied admission or told not to apply to a public school because of their disability; or have mobility impairments and have been denied access to programs and services of New Orleans schools because of physical barriers. Judge Zainey issued preliminary approval of the Consent Judgment on January 8th, 2015. Following preliminary approval of the settlement, in early February, 2015, several parents of class members submitted objections to the Consent Judgment. Before the final hearing on the Judgment, plaintiffs' counsel met with those parents to discuss their concerns. On March 25, the court entered an order granting final approval of the Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment required schools to develop processes for finding and evaluating students with disabilities for special education services, implement special education services and related services, review and reform disciplinary policies, and educate charter schools about their legal obligation to enroll students with disabilities. It also dictated reporting requirements and appointed an Independent Monitor to periodically assess defendants' progress. The state would cover the costs of the Independent Monitor. It also provided for the State defendants to seek $700,000 in legislative appropriations to cover their share of plaintiff's attorneys' fees. Additionally, the intervenor defendants, the Orleans Parish School Board, would pay $100,000 to plaintiff's counsel for their share of attorneys' fees. The Consent Judgment would remain in effect until the state achieved substantial compliance with each of the substantive provisions for two consecutive years. In a July 17, 2018 order regarding the status of the proceedings, the court noted that this meant defendants must first achieve substantial compliance and then maintain that compliance for an additional two consecutive years. The court also clarified that substantial compliance would be interpreted with regard to the compliance with the Consent Judgment itself, not individual compliance with the IDEA. The August 9, 2018 monitoring report found that the defendants had been in substantial compliance with the Settlement Agreement's substantive provisions for the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 periods. But in response to an inquiry from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the monitors discovered substantial data errors which led to schools being improperly selected for monitoring. The independent monitors then identified the schools that were improperly subjected to monitoring and the schools that should have been monitored. Finally, the monitors recommended that in light of these errors, the parties meet and discuss an appropriate resolution for moving forward in compliance with the consent judgment. The court set a status conference to discuss the school selection problems in October 2019, and there have been no further docket entries as of May 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On October 26, 2010, a group of students with disabilities filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Department of Education for failing to provide accessible free public education to students with disabilities. After negotiations, the court approved a Consent Decree in March 2015. An Independent Monitor continues to file periodical assessments as the State works toward full compliance under court supervision.


On January 13, 2003, several student members of the Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, against the City of Westfield, Massachusetts. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated the plaintiffs' freedom of speech, assembly, and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, and unlawfully discriminated against them based on the religious content of their speech in violation of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also alleged violation of their freedom of expression under Massachusetts state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Alliance Defending Freedom (formerly "Alliance Defense Fund"), a Christian non-profit organization, requested a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Westfield High School's policies and practices which prohibited and punished them for distributing religious literature, were discriminatory, content-based, vague, and acted as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The alleged discrimination began during the 2001-2002 school year, when the plaintiffs were denied permission to distribute candy canes along with a religious story of the candy cane and Bible verses, to students at the school during non-instructional time. In 2002, the plaintiffs were again denied permission to distribute the literature, on the basis that the material was "offensive." The plaintiffs distributed the materials with the religious content anyway and were suspended as a consequence. On January 13, 2003, along with their complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, requesting the Court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the allegedly unconstitutional policies and the suspensions on the plaintiffs. Both the ACLU of Massachusetts and the United States filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the plaintiffs' motion, on February 26 and February 20, respectively. Following a hearing, the District Court (Judge Frank H. Freedman) granted the plaintiffs' motion on March 17. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98, 108-109, 127-28 (D. Mass. 2003). On April 7, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which the Court denied on April 16. On April 16, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the City of Westfield as a defendant and remove Westfield Public Schools as a party. The plaintiffs also moved for summary judgment. On June 13, 2003, the Court entered a stipulation of dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants. On June 16, 2003, the Court entered a consent decree, which proclaimed that the defendants had replaced the school speech policies with new agreed-upon rules. The defendants also agreed to rescind punishment of the plaintiffs for the distribution of the religious materials, remove prior restraints and content-based restrictions of distribution of materials during non-instructional time without complying with substantive and procedural safeguards, so long as distribution doesn't substantially and materially disrupt the operation of the school or the new policies. The plaintiffs were awarded $28,500 in attorneys' fees and costs and the case was closed.

Summary: Several student members of a high school religious club brought suit against the city of said high school alleging violation of their freedom of speech, assembly, and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. The plaintiffs also alleged unlawful discrimination based on the religious content of their speech in violation of the Equal Access Act and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in addition to violation of their freedom of expression under Massachusetts state law. On June 16, 2003, the Court entered a consent decree between the school and the plaintiffs. As per the decree, the defendants agreed to rescind punishment of the plaintiffs for the distribution of the religious materials, remove prior restraints and content-based restrictions of distribution of materials during non-instructional time without complying with substantive and procedural safeguards, so long as distribution doesn't substantially and materially disrupt the operation of the school or the new policies. The plaintiffs were awarded $28,500 in attorneys' fees and costs and the case was closed.