This case addressed First Amendment claims concerning President Donald J. Trump’s blocking of Twitter users from his account. On July 11, 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, as well as various political writers and professors, filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued President Donald J. Trump, White House Press Secretary Sean M. Spicer, and other agents of the executive branch alleging First Amendment violations. The plaintiffs argued that President Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum and alleged that by blocking Twitter users who had criticized President Trump or his policies, the defendants had unconstitutionally limited those users’ right to free speech. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald. On October 13, 2017, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims, that the plaintiffs could not establish a state action, and that blocking the individual plaintiffs did not violate the public forum doctrine. On November 3, 2017, the plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account was a designated public forum and that blocking the individual plaintiffs was an unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. On May 23, 2018, the Court granted in part and denied in part both motions for summary judgment. Judge Buchwald concluded that the court had jurisdiction but found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Sarah Huckabee Sanders and Hope Hicks, two other press officials in the Trump Administration. Thus, the two were dismissed as defendants. Next, the Court found that the type of speech the plaintiffs sought to engage in was protected by the First Amendment and that the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account was susceptible to analysis under the public forum doctrine. Lastly, Judge Buchwald concluded that the viewpoint-based exclusion, or blocking, of a Twitter user from the account was proscribed by the First Amendment and could not be justified by the President’s personal interests. 302 F. Supp. 3d 541. On June 4, 2018, the defendants appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. A panel consisting of Judges Barrington D. Parker, Peter W. Hall, and Christopher F. Droney upheld the district court's ruling in a July 9, 2019 decision. They found that the President's Twitter account was not a private platform and produced government speech as part of a public forum. Under this classification, discrimination based on viewpoint was not permissible, and blocking the Twitter users amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The panel added that "workarounds" such as logging out of Twitter to see the President's tweets without the ability to comment placed an unfair burden on expression, too. Therefore, the President was no longer allowed to block Twitter users from the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account. 928 F.3d 226. The defendants applied for a rehearing en banc after this opinion was filed, but Judge Parker denied their motion on March 23, 2020, reiterating the positions held in the previous opinion. Circuit Judges Michael Park and Richard Sullivan dissented, questioning the broadening of the scope of public forum doctrine to include Twitter accounts. They also contested the decision that a government official using Twitter amounted to government speech. 953 F.3d 216. Trump petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2020. However, after President Biden's inauguration (Jan. 2020), President Biden was substituted as petitioner. On April 5, 2021, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Second Circuit’s judgment from July 9, 2019, (928 F.3d 226) was vacated and the case was remanded to the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. In a concurring statement, Justice Thomas’ elaborated that <i>United States v. Munsingwear</i> allowed the Court to vacate the Second Court’s decision because of a change in Presidential administration. Additionally, Thomas wrote that the “more glaring concern must perforce be the dominant digital platforms themselves” and their influence over speech. 141 S.Ct. 1220. On June 9, 2021, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees. Plaintiffs argued that they were entitled under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as they had secured a ruling that “materially altered the legal relationship of the parties and also achieved the benefit Plaintiffs sought.” This was referencing the District Court’s ruling on May 23, 2018. Notably, plaintiffs sought only a portion of the fees that they claimed the EAJA entitled them to. Specifically, plaintiffs declined to pursue many of the costs associated with their private counsel. Instead, plaintiffs mainly sought to be compensatedfor their “distinctive knowledge or specialized skill in the areas of the First Amendment and constitutional law,” citing an apparent “limited availability” for qualified experts in that area. The motion included a chart of costs sought which totaled approximately $717,000. As of July 6, 2021, this motion is pending. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University sued President Donald Trump and other executive branch officials, alleging unconstitutional violations of the First Amendment right to free speech after the named individual plaintiffs were blocked from the Twitter account @realDonaldTrump for being critical of President Trump and/or his policies. After the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the opinion and directed the Second Circuit to dismiss the case as moot because there was a change in presidential administrations due to the 2020 election.


This case was brought by former President Donald J. Trump, his children, and other affiliates (“Plaintiffs”) in response to Congressional subpoenas issued to the former President’s banks, Deutsche Bank AG (“Deutsche Bank”) and Capital One Financial Corp. (“Capital One”). The banks notified him they would be complying with the subpoenas absent court intervention. Trump initiated this suit against the banks in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in his capacity as a private citizen on April 29, 2019. The complaint alleged that the Congressional subpoenas, which were issued by the House Committee on Financial Services (“Financial Services Committee”) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“Intelligence Committee”), were initiated to harass the President, because they requested tax returns and other personal financial documents. In addition, the complaint alleged that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose, and therefore exceeded the Committees’ authority under the Constitution. The complaint also claimed that the subpoenas violated the Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a) because they did not comply with RFPA certification procedures. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief quashing the subpoenas, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting the disclosure of documents, and attorneys’ fees. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the Plaintiffs argued that they would face irreparable harm if the subpoenaed documents were disclosed. Specifically, they claimed that the disclosure of confidential documents could compromise the President’s reputation, thereby hindering his ability to do his job. They also claimed that disclosure would set a precedent that undercuts judicial review of the constitutionality of such subpoenas, thereby “immuniz[ing] the subpoena from challenge.” In addition to arguing irreparable harm, the Plaintiffs also claimed that the House Committees lacked a legitimate legislative purpose for the subpoenaed documents, noting that the Committees “have never identified a single piece of legislation within their respective jurisdictions that they are considering.” On May 3, 2019, the House Committees filed a motion to intervene to oppose the President’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The Financial Services Committee asserted that the purpose of the request was to conduct investigations into financial policies to ensure sound lending practices and the prevention of loan fraud. The Intelligence Committee sought to conduct investigations into “efforts by Russia and other foreign entities to influence the U.S. political process during and since the 2016 election.” Judge Edgardo Ramos granted the House Committees’ motion on May 3. Judge Ramos denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on May 22, 2019. 2019 WL 2204898. The Plaintiffs responded by filing an interlocutory appeal the next day. On December 3, 2019, Judge Jon Newman of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part the District Court’s ruling, finding that the Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their statutory and constitutional claims, a requirement for receiving preliminary injunctive relief. Judge Newman remanded the case to a limited extent to exclude private documents that the Judge found to be lacking in relation to a legitimate legislative purpose. 943 F.3d 627. The Plaintiffs appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 6, 2019, staying this case until the hearing on a related case, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, concluded. On July 9, 2020, in the hearing for Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, the Supreme Court noted its concern about maintaining the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. In the interest of preserving the separation of powers, the Court articulated a higher standard that Congress failed to meet when issuing a subpoena to the President. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts explained that courts needed to apply the following standards when examining Congressional subpoenas:

Carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers;

Insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support this objective;

Be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a legislative purpose; and

Carefully assess the burdens imposed on the President by a subpoena.

The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its order. Trump v. Mazars, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019. As of March 18, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a case about former President Donald Trump’s dispute with Congressional subpoenas requesting personal tax and financial documents. The case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by Donald Trump, his children, and other affiliates, on April 29, 2019. The complaint alleged that the Congressional subpoenas were issued to harass the President and lacked a legitimate legislative purpose. The case was eventually consolidated with <i>Trump v. Mazars, LLP</i>, which was heard by the Supreme Court in July 2020 and later remanded for further proceedings.


COVID-19 Summary: A group of Orthodox Jewish synagogues brought this lawsuit against the Governor of New York on October 8, 2020, alleging that the governor's restrictions on gatherings in light of surges in COVID-19 cases violated the Free Exercise Clause. After the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, they appealed to the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the injunction in part to block the enforcement of the executive order's attendance caps pending the outcome of the appeal in the Second Circuit. The case is ongoing.
 On October 8, 2020, Agudath Israel and affiliated Orthodox Jewish synagogues in New York City filed this lawsuit challenging an executive order issued by Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of the State of New York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' costs and fees. Executive Order 202.68 ("EO 202.68") placed restrictions on gatherings at synagogues and other houses of worship in light of a surge in rates of COVID-19 infections in hotspots identified by the New York State Department of Health. Plaintiffs are an Orthodox Jewish group, Agudath Israel of America, three synagogues in Brooklyn and Queens, Agudath Israel of Kew Garden Hills, Agudath Israel of Madison, Agudath Israel of Bayswater, and their leaders. Represented by Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, the plaintiffs sued under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, as well as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. On March 7, 2020, pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 29, Governor Cuomo issued the original Executive Order 202, implementing the State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and declaring a statewide disaster emergency as a result of the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. Over the next few months, Governor Cuomo issued multiple supplemental Executive Orders, continuing the temporary suspension and modification of certain laws relating to the state of emergency. In response to a spike in the rate of positive COVID-19 cases in five "hotspots" located in Brooklyn and Queens, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.68 ("EO 202.68") on October 6, 2020, which directed the New York State Department of Health to identify yellow, orange, and red “zones” based on the severity of outbreaks, and impose correspondingly severe restrictions on activity within each zone. EO 202.68 established central “red zones,” where non-essential gatherings were cancelled and schools and nonessential businesses were prohibited from operating in-person. Red zone houses of worship were permitted to remain open with a capacity of 25% maximum occupancy or 10 people, whichever was fewer. Similarly, in orange zones, non-essential gatherings, schools, and certain nonessential businesses were subject to more severe restrictions than houses of worship. Precautionary “yellow zones” were subject to lesser restrictions then red and orange zones. EO 202.68 was temporary and the zones were re-evaluated based on changes in the underlying data. The executive order was issued in advance of three special holidays for the Orthodox Jewish community to be held on October 9, 10, and 11, for the purpose of "tackl[ing] the risk posed by mass gatherings, including those taking place in houses of worship." When the complaint was filed, two synagogues were located in red zones and one was in an orange zone. The plaintiffs claimed that EO 202.68 violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and sought a declaratory judgment preventing its enforcement. They argued that the executive order was facially discriminatory towards religious practices compared to similar secular activities and that religious institutions were targeted for punitive reasons because of their religious nature. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for an order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto and Magistrate Judge Robert M. Levy. The court ordered the defendants to show cause by October 9 as to why the requested injunctive relief should not be granted. After the parties submitted briefing and held a hearing, Judge Matsumoto denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction because they failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment claim. The court held that EO 202.68 was neutral, generally applicable, and did not burden Plaintiffs’ free exercise rights. Judge Matsumoto noted that the order also shut down nonessential businesses and schools in hotspots as well and found that the new rules were not motivated by an intention to discriminate against Orthodox Jews. On October 19, the plaintiffs appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and filed a motion for an injunction. The case was scheduled to be heard in tandem with a related case, The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Docket No. 20-3590. Their request for a stay in the district court pending appeal was denied. On November 9, the Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction primarily for procedural reasons because they failed to first request an injunction pending appeal in district court before seeking relief in the Court of Appeals. 979 F.3d 177 (Nov. 9, 2020). But, the order also addressed the similar substantive claims raised in the related case, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, and held that the order did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that the order was not substantially underinclusive as plaintiffs had alleged because "within each zone, the order subjects religious services to restrictions that are similar to or, indeed, less severe than those imposed on comparable secular gatherings." The plaintiffs then filed an emergency application for injunctive relief to the Supreme Court on November 16 to prohibit the enforcement of EO 202.68 until the Second Circuit could issue a decision on the merits. Case Number 20A90. The Supreme Court granted the injunction in part on November 25, resting on the reasoning outlined in the related case, Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ____ (Nov. 25, 2020). The Court barred the enforcement of the 10- and 25-person occupancy limits because it found that the executive order was not neutral and that less restrictive rules could have been employed instead. Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented. Meanwhile, back in district court, the defendant notified the court in a letter on November 3 of the party's intent to file a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis that it was moot because the holidays it was based on had already passed. The case is currently pending appeal in the Second Circuit.


On March 5, 2019, the State of Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for violating Title X’s “Nondirective Mandate,” the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Title X generally, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706). On March 4, 2019, HHS published a Final Rule, scheduled to go into effect on May 3, 2019, which would alter longstanding regulations governing Title X grants for family planning services. Washington sought declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the Final Rule and prohibit HHS from implementing or enforcing it, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. On March 18, 2019, this case was consolidated for pretrial proceedings with a separate case filed by the National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association (NFPRHA; a national membership organization of Title X providers that operate or administer more than 3,500 health centers providing family planning services to more than 3.7 million patients each year), and two health care professionals, challenging the same HHS Rule on behalf of themselves and their patients. These plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU and private counsel. The original Washington case and consolidated case were assigned to Judge Stanley A. Bastian. The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule would eliminate a Title X requirement that pregnant patients receive nondirective pregnancy counseling (“Nondirective Mandate”); deny Title X funds to entities that provide comprehensive reproductive health care services at the same clinical site (such as abortion services); and impose numerous additional requirements that would undermine the quality of medical care, interfere with provider-patience relationships, reduce access to services, and contravene Title X’s purpose. Washington alleged that the Final Rule would expel providers representing 89% of Washington’s Title X network, require a DOH program contrary to Washington Law, and result in a loss of Title X funds that would irreparably harm Washington and its most vulnerable residents by reducing the effectiveness of Washington’s family planning program and causing financial harm to State Medicaid and related programs. Washington and the NFPRHA parties filed preliminary injunctions on March 22, 2019, seeking to prohibit HHS from implementing the Final Rule. HHS filed a motion in opposition on April 12, 2019, and a motion hearing was held on April 25, 2019. After the hearing, Judge Bastian granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Final Rule nationwide until further order of the court. 376 F.Supp.3d 1119. The decision noted that, “although Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that all four factors [likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest] tip in their favor, the irreparable harm and balance of equities factors tip so strongly in Plaintiffs’ favor that a strong showing of likelihood on the merits was not necessary.” On May 3, 2019, defendants filed a notice of appeal and motion to stay the preliminary injunction, as well as a notice of interlocutory and preliminary injunction appeal regarding plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction. On May 4, 2019, defendants filed a motion to expedite the hearing on their motion to stay plaintiff’s preliminary injunction, which was denied three days later. On May 24, 2019, defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal. Defendant’s motion to stay plaintiff’s preliminary injunction pending appeal was denied on June 3, 2019, and defendant’s motion to stay proceedings pending appeal was denied on June 14, 2019. On June 20, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a three-judge panel per curiam decision granting defendant’s motion to stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Final Rule was challenged in federal court in California, Oregon, and Washington (this case), and district courts in each case granted plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motions on nearly identical grounds. HHS appealed in each case and sought to stay the injunctions pending a decision of the merits of its appeals. The panel found that HHS was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and that the remaining factors also favored a stay pending appeal. On June 25, 2019, plaintiffs in the Oregon and Washington cases filed an emergency motion for reconsideration en banc regarding the stay. On July 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that the three cases (California, Oregon, and Washington) be reheard en banc pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and Circuit Rule 35-3, and that the motions for stay pending appeal granted by the Ninth Circuit panel would not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit. On July 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit en banc court denied the motions for administrative stay of the three-judge panel’s order granting defendant’s motion to stay pending appeal. The en banc court stated they would proceed expeditiously to rehear and reconsider the merits of Defendant-Appellants’ motions for stay of the district courts’ preliminary injunction orders pending consideration of the appeals on the merits. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 5, 2019, the State of Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for violating Title X’s “Nondirective Mandate,” the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Title X generally, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706). On March 4, 2019, HHS published a Final Rule, scheduled to go into effect on May 3, 2019, which would alter longstanding regulations governing Title X grants for family planning services. Washington sought declaratory and injunctive relief to invalidate the Final Rule and prohibit HHS from implementing or enforcing it, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. On March 18, 2019, this case was consolidated for pretrial proceedings with a separate case filed by the National Family Planning & Reproductive Health Association (NFPRHA; a national membership organization of Title X providers that operate or administer more than 3,500 health centers providing family planning services to more than 3.7 million patients each year), a Washington-based NFPRHA member organization, and two health care professionals, challenging the same HHS Rule on behalf of themselves and their patients. Washington and the NFPRHA parties filed preliminary injunctions on March 22, 2019, seeking to prohibit HHS from implementing the Final Rule. Judge Bastian granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the Final Rule nationwide until further order of the court. On May 3, 2019, defendants filed a notice of appeal and motion to stay the preliminary injunction, as well as a notice of interlocutory and preliminary injunction appeal regarding plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction. On June 20, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a three-judge panel per curiam decision granting defendant’s motion to stay pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Final Rule was challenged in federal court in California, Oregon, and Washington (this case), and district courts in each case granted plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motions on nearly identical grounds. HHS appealed in each case and sought to stay the injunctions pending a decision of the merits of its appeals. The panel found that HHS was likely to prevail on the merits of the case, and that the remaining factors also favored a stay pending appeal. On June 25, 2019, plaintiffs in the Oregon and Washington cases filed an emergency motion for reconsideration en banc regarding the stay. On July 3, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that the three cases (California, Oregon, and Washington) be reheard en banc, and that the motions for stay pending appeal granted by the Ninth Circuit panel would not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit. On July 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit en banc court denied the motions for administrative stay of the three-judge panel’s order granting defendant’s motion to stay pending appeal. The en banc court stated they would proceed expeditiously to rehear and reconsider the merits of Defendant-Appellants’ motions for stay of the district courts’ preliminary injunction orders pending consideration of the appeals on the merits. This case is ongoing.


On July 30, 1964, a group of African American families filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs included African American families whose children who were attending free public schools controlled by the Jefferson Parish School Board. The plaintiffs—represented by private attorney Gideon T. Carter, III, who specialized in civil rights and desegregation cases—sued the Jefferson Parish School Board and its agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For more than ten years after <a href= "https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5479"Brown v. Board of Education was decided, the defendants had continued a compulsory bi-racial school system and assigned students and school personnel to schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from segregating schools. Alternatively, the plaintiffs sought a decree requiring the defendants to present and initiate a plan to desegregate its schools. Establishing a Consent Decree During a hearing for the preliminary injunction in August 1964, the Court (Judge Herbert W. Christenberry) found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction. Because the Court found that issuing the injunction for the 1964-1965 school year would cause serious disruption to the school system, it delayed the entry of the order until January 25, 1965. On that date the Court issued a preliminary injunction effective at the start of the 1965-1966 school year and ordered the defendants to submit a desegregation plan. The defendants submitted a desegregation plan in March 1965. The plan integrated one to three grades each year, until it reached all grades in 1970. The plaintiffs objected to the plan, saying it should take at most until 1968 to achieve full integration. The court held a hearing on the plan in June 1965 and ordered the defendants to implement a plan that would achieve full integration by 1968 and allow students to assign themselves to a school (subject only to overcrowding). Immediately after African American students were enrolled in formerly all-white schools, there were numerous incidents between African American and white students. The plaintiffs filed a motion for additional relief alleging that law enforcement failed to provide adequate protection to African American students. In particular, a group of thirty-six newly enrolled students had been prevented from entering their classroom by white students. The principal had ignored their attempt to report the incident and ordered them out of his office, then suspended the group of students for departing from the school without permission. On September 30, 1965, the court issued a Temporary Restraining Order requiring the school to reinstate the students immediately. The defendants moved to dissolve the Order, but both the District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the request. The parties continued to litigate for several years over the desegregation plan and the defendant’s compliance. On multiple occasions the Court granted motions to transfer students or to close schools and transfer the entire study body. Pursuant to the 1965 order, the defendants submitted a plan that would achieve full integration. The Court approved this plan on June 26, 1969. In April 1971 the Supreme Court issued a decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education that upheld busing programs aimed to speed up the integration of public schools. In May 1971, the plaintiffs moved for further relief seeking a new desegregation plan pursuant to the holding in Swann and asking that the faculty of each school be integrated. On July 9, 1971, the defendants submitted a follow-up plan that did not conform to the holding in Swann. While the Court had in 1966 declined to order desegregation of the busing system, in 1971 it found that the plaintiffs were entitled to further relief in light of the Supreme Court decision and refused to accept the defendants’ follow-up plan. The same day, the Court issued an order requiring that the defendants’ plan conform to the holding in Swann and requiring the defendants to integrate the faculty of each school such that the ratio of African American to white teachers in an individual school reflected the ratio of African American to white teachers in the school system as a whole. The defendants submitted a new plan but presented evidence that instituting the new plan would be burdensome and cause some schools to be unable to begin the school year smoothly. On August 10, 1971, the Court adopted the plan submitted by the defendants, finding that the School Board’s concerns did not justify continuation of a less than unitary school system. 332. F. Supp. 590. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seeking suspension and stay of the injunction pending appeal, but the Circuit Court denied the motion. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking a stay of proceedings. The Supreme Court (Justice Marshall) denied certiorari, reasoning that the difficulties the parish would face in complying with the order were those normally incident to the transition to a unitary school system. The Court also noted its disapproval of the defendants’ efforts to drag the litigation out: “The schools involved have been mired in litigation for seven years. Whatever progress toward desegregation has been made apparently, and unfortunately, derives only from judicial action initiated by those persons situated as perpetual plaintiffs below. The rights of children to equal educational opportunities are not to be denied, even for a brief time, simply because a school board situates itself so as to make desegregation difficult.” 404 U.S. 1219. On February 11, 1972, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court’s decision from August 1971. The Circuit Court found that the 19 remaining one-race schools in Jefferson Parish were vestiges of former school segregation and that requiring the School Board to bus students was justified. 456 F.2d 552. The 1971 plan was amended by consent decree in 1978 but otherwise remained in effect for many years. Obtaining Unitary Status In August 2006, a member of the School Board proposed a plan creating a “unitary” system that would end busing practices and allow children to attend schools closer to home, as well as a plan to seek federal grant money to overhaul low-performing schools. The proposal was met with strong resistance from critics who believed the plans would re-segregate schools, and the board member ultimately withdrew the proposal a few months later. However, the School Board still sought to convert four predominantly African American, low-performing schools into magnet schools in 2007 in the hopes of boosting academics and increasing school diversity. On March 8, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to supplement the desegregation plan to authorize the School District to use a magnet school program as a voluntary desegregation method. On the same day, the Court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) granted the motion and ordered the parties to file a report that identified which aspects of the school system remained segregated and what action was needed to desegregate them. Judge Zainey then reassigned the case to Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt in February 2008. The parties proceeded to file a proposed consent order addressing the requirements from the March 2007 order. On March 14, 2008, the Court approved portions and rejected other portions of the proposed order with instructions to revise it and report back to the Court. On May 14, 2008, a fairness hearing was held regarding the revised proposed order and the order was approved. That order excluded magnet schools and decreed that a new consent order for those schools be submitted. The amended Consent Order and corresponding plan required the School Board to modify attendance zones and upgrade facilities consistent with its desegregation obligations. The order was set to terminate on June 30, 2011. The defendants submitted a plan for the magnet schools in October 2008 and requested approval of the magnet schools. The Magnet Plan sought to redraw the school attendance zones that had been approved by the Court on May 14, 2008. On January 5, 2009, the Court approved the motion for approval of new magnet schools but denied the Magnet Plan itself, finding that the defendants could not show that the proposed change in attendance zones would not lead to fewer desegregated schools. The defendants filed an amended plan and on January 29, 2009, after a fairness hearing on the amended Magnet Plan, the Court approved the plan. After the Magnet Plan was implemented, disputes arose regarding the School Board’s compliance with the Consent Order. In particular, the Court found that inaccurate information may have been provided to some parents of students regarding the magnet school application procedures and ordered the School Board to eliminate the confusion. Furthermore, allegations arose in 2010 that qualified African American students had been denied admission to one of the magnet schools. Issues with irregularities in admission to magnet schools lessened after the School Board adopted written guidelines for assessing applications beginning in the 2010-2011 school year. Before the Consent Order expired, the Plaintiffs moved to extend the Consent Order and moved for further remedies and specific performance. In particular, the Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had failed to undertake corrective action for the 2011-2012 school year, that the defendants’ efforts to recruit African American students into magnet schools and other advanced programs was inadequate, that African American students were subject to disparate treatment under the school system’s disciplinary process, and that the defendants were using the Consent Order as a pretext to conceal attempts to continue a system of racially segregated schools. The Court granted an extension, but before the Court decided on the other motions, the parties reached a final agreement. The parties conferred and worked to resolve remaining issues that prevented Jefferson Parish from achieving unitary status. According to the Final Settlement Agreement, the School Board would continue to implement several plans, including the creation of new magnet school programs and Academic Academies, school modifications, modification of attendance zones, operation of a Majority-to-Minority Transfer Program, and implementation of other special educational programs and services. The Agreement included all essential steps that the School Board would have to take to achieve and maintain unitary status. The agreement would remain in effect for three years. On August 2, 2011, the Court approved the final settlement agreement and declared Jefferson Parish School System unitary. No further activity appeared on the docket during the next three years, so the case is presumably now closed. Even after the litigation ended and the agreement terminated, the Dandridge task force overseeing the implementation of the Agreement criticized the school system’s compliance. The parties entered into a voluntary agreement in 2015 in an attempt to institutionalize the practices that had been mandated by the court order. Available Opinions Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 332 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 404 U.S. 1219 (1971). Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). Dandridge v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 249 F.R.D. 243 (E.D. La. 2008).

Summary: In 1964, a group of African American families filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant Jefferson Parish School Board had violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by continuing to segregate the school system. The Court granted injunctive relief, mandated desegregation of the school system, and required that the defendants use busing to speed up the integration process. The injunction remained in place for several decades. In 2007, the School Board sought to implement a magnet school program in the hopes of boosting academics and increasing school diversity. The parties jointly moved to supplement the desegregation plan to include the magnet school program, and the Court issued Consent Orders in 2008-2009 that enabled the School Board's plans. However, issues arose in the following years with the School Board's implementation of the plan. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were using the Consent Orders as a pretext to conceal attempts to continue a system of racially segregated schools. After the Consent Orders expired, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the Court declared Jefferson Parish Schools unitary in 2011.


This case involved a challenge to Caddo Parish School Board's decision to merge two all-black high schools: Booker T. Washington and Fair Park. Cooksey marks one challenge in a long history of school desegregation litigation efforts in the Caddo Parish School District, captured in SD-LA-0002 in this clearinghouse. The case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth E. Foote in the Western District of Louisiana. A 1981 consent decree required Caddo Parish School Board to provide a qualitatively equal education at Booker T. Washington and Fair Park relative to other schools in the district. This order remains ongoing to this day. In 2017, the Caddo Parish School Board decided to merge these two schools and turn Fair Park into a middle school. The decision, according to the Board, would save money and resources. On May 5, 2017, the plaintiffs, parents of students attending Fair Park and a Fair Park alumni association, brought this suit to enjoin the merger and declare the School Board's actions unconstitutional. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, as well as violations of the 1981 Consent Order and state law. On the same day, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the defendant from merging the schools through the duration of this case. Three days later, on May 8, the School Board responded in opposition to the TRO. It argued that the claims were unrelated to the 1981 Consent Order and that the conversion of Fair Park was unrelated to race and would aid the students. But on May 16, plaintiffs reported that they no longer intended to move for preliminary relief, and they voluntarily withdrew their motion the next day. At this point, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Karen L. Hayes for a scheduling conference. A trial was set for June 18, 2018. On July 26, 2017, however, the plaintiffs moved for an extension of time to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs informed the court that they intended to amend their complaint to make their suit a class action, involve more schools of the Caddo Parish, and include additional issues related to their case. The court granted the extension, giving the plaintiffs until August 27, 2017. August 27 came and went. The plaintiffs never filed their amended complaint, and during this time, the school merger was completed. There was no action on the docket until February 13, 2018, when Magistrate Judge Hayes ordered a conference. At this conference, both sides reported that the terms of the 1981 Consent Order did "not affect matters of public policy," and thus, the Consent Order was unrelated to the Board's decision to merge schools. The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal, and the court granted the dismissal on February 20, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case involves a challenge to Caddo Parish School Board's decision to merge two all-black high schools: Booker T. Washington and Fair Park. On May 5, 2017, parents of students at Fair Park alleged that this violated the Equal Protection Clause and a 1981 consent decree, and sought to enjoin the merger. The plaintiffs ultimately stipulated that the consent decree was unrelated to the merger, and they voluntarily dismissed their claims. The case is now closed.


On Dec. 3, 1997, an applicant to the University of Michigan Law School brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the University of Michigan Law School. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed that, in denying her admission, the school discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. She claimed that the school used the race of its applicants not merely as a plus factor in determining admission, but as one of the predominant factors. Moreover, she claimed, the school had no compelling interest to justify their use of race in the admissions process, nor did they ever employ any race-neutral alternatives. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On Jan. 7, 1999, the Court (Judge Bernard A. Friedman) certified the class. In March 2001, after a bench trial, Judge Friedman ruled for Grutter and determined that the law school's admissions policy was unconstitutional. By using race to ensure the enrollment of a certain minimum percentage of underrepresented minorities, the court held, the law school had "made the current admissions policy practically indistinguishable from a[n unconstitutional] quota system." 137 F. Supp. 2d 821. The district court also concluded that the achievement of racial diversity is not a compelling state interest. The law school appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which heard the appeal en banc. On May 14, 2002, the court (Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr. wrote the majority opinion) reversed the district court. The court held (1) that the Supreme Court had established in <i> Bakke </i> that achieving a diverse student body was a compelling interest, and (2) that the school's policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 288 F.3d 732. Grutter petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, which granted it in December 2002. On June 23, 2003, the Court affirmed the 6th Circuit decision, and held that the law school's desire to obtain a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students counted as a narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions process. Moreover, the Court held, the school's use of race furthered its compelling interest in "obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." Because the law school engaged in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant, giving serious consideration to all the ways the applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment, it ensured that all factors that could contribute to diversity were meaningfully considered alongside race. Its admissions process was not unconstitutional. The majority opinion (written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) did note that affirmative action should not be allowed to exist forever, but, rather, that at some future date (the opinion mentions 25 years hence), only colorblind policies should be allowed. Justice Thomas issued an opinion concurring only with the majority opinion's implication of a 25-year window of affirmative-action legitimacy. He dissented from the rest of the opinion, stating that the law school had no compelling interest in maintaining an elite, but racially diverse, campus. If the school wanted to achieve greater diversity, he wrote, it could relax its test score and GPA requirements. On March 17, 2004, Judge Friedman ordered the case closed.

Summary: On Dec. 3, 1997, Barbara Grutter brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the University of Michigan Law School. She claimed that, in denying her admission, the school discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which held that the law school's desire to obtain a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students counted as a narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions process and was not unconstitutional.


On Oct. 14, 1997, two applicants who had been denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the university. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, claimed that the university's admissions policy treated race as a predominant factor in granting admission, and that they, as white applicants, had been discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. On Dec. 23, 1998, the court (Judge Patrick J. Duggan) certified the class comprising "[t]hose individuals who applied for and were not granted admission to the College of Literature, Science & the Arts of the University of Michigan for all academic years from 1995 forward and who are members of those racial or ethnic groups, including Caucasian, that defendants treat less favorably on the basis of race in considering their application for admission." On Dec. 13, 2000, Judge Duggan granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with respect to the university's admissions policy during the years 1995-1998---during which time a specific number of admissions were reserved for minority applicants---and declared those policies unconstitutional. But the court also granted defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to the admissions programs for the years 1999-2000---during which time applicants were graded on a 150-point scale, and underrepresented minorities automatically received 20 points based on their membership to one of the identified minority categories. Judge Duggan determined that "the educational benefits flowing from a racially and ethnically diverse student body are a sufficiently compelling interest to survive strict scrutiny," and the point system in place at the time of the decision was narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose, though the policies in place from '95-'98 were not. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The Dec. 13, 2000, Order and Opinion limited itself to the question of whether the university's admissions policies passed constitutional muster as narrowly tailored means of achieving diversity. In a Feb. 26, 2001 opinion, Judge Duggan ruled on whether the policies passed constitutional muster as a narrowly tailored means of remedying past and current discrimination by the university. 135 F. Supp. 2d 790. The court determined that the school's policies could not be justified as measures to remedy either the current effects of past discrimination, or the discriminatory impact of the university's other admissions criteria, and so denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment . Both parties appealed the court's decision, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit heard the case en banc on the same day as <i> Grutter v. Bollinger </i> (see SD-MI-0002 in the Clearinghouse). The 6th Circuit later issued an opinion in <i> Grutter </i> which upheld the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy. The petitioner in that case also sought a writ of certiorari for this case, even though the Court of Appeals had not yet rendered a judgment in it, so that the Supreme Court could address the broader context of race in university admissions policies at one time. The Court granted certiorari. On June 23, 2003, the Court (majority opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist) held that the university's point system is not narrowly tailored to achieve the school's asserted interest in diversity. 539 U.S. 244. The policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The school's policy failed to provide for the individualized consideration of each applicant that <i> Bakke </i> required. Moreover, the fact that 20 points automatically accrued to underrepresented minorities turned race into a decisive factor in the admissions process. On remand, the parties settled all remaining claims, and on Jan. 31, 2007, Judge Duggan dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On Oct. 14, 1997, two applicants who had been denied admission to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the university. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, claimed that the university's admissions policy treated race as a predominant factor in granting admission, and that they, as white applicants, had been discriminated against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the school's admission policy that automatically awarded 20 points out of a possible 150 to underrepresented minorities was not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of diversity in education and so violated the Equal Protection Clause.


This is a case about the violent insurrection and disruption of Congress on January 6, 2021 as Congressional members approved the results of the Electoral College in order to elect the next President and Vice President of the United States. On February 16, 2021, a member of the United States House of Representatives, in his personal capacity, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel and the NAACP, the plaintiff sued the President of the United States in his personal capacity, the President’s personal lawyer, Proud Boys International, and Oath Keepers under the Ku Klux Klan Act 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). The representative sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in future violations of the act, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. He claimed that the defendants plotted, coordinated, and executed a common plan to prevent Congress from discharging its official duties in certifying the results of the presidential election. He also claimed that in furtherance of this plan, the defendants spread misinformation to disrupt the legally required presidential election process. These actions allegedly prevented the plaintiff from performing his official duties and deprived him of his right to be free from intimidation and threats while doing so. This case has been assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta and is ongoing.

Summary: On January 6, 2021, there was a violent insurrection and disruption of Congressional processes as members approved the results of the Electoral College in order to elect the next President and Vice President of the United States. On February 16, 2021, a U.S. Representative, in his personal capacity, sued the President of the United States in his personal capacity, the President’s personal lawyer, Proud Boys International, and Oath Keepers under the Ku Klux Klan Act alleging that the defendants plotted, coordinated, and executed a common plan to prevent Congress from certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election. This case has been assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta and is ongoing.


On June 8, 2012, two naturalized U.S. citizens and a national non-profit dedicated to increasing civic participation among Latinos filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 against the State of Florida in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Florida, the ACLU, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Florida's voter purge procedures violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"). Specifically, the state had implemented "voter registration list maintenance activities" such as forwarding list of "potential non-citizens" to Supervisors of Elections and requiring these Supervisors to remove the names from registration. The plaintiffs claimed that these procedures required Section 5 pre-clearance from the federal government before they could be legally implemented. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §1973c, is a temporary provision that prohibits changes in election practices or procedures in states and political subdivisions with a documented history of discriminatory voting practices until the new procedures have been determined not to have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. On July 13, 2012, the defendant—Florida’s Secretary of State—filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs did not have a claim upon which relief could be granted for several reasons: Florida was not a jurisdiction that Section 5 covered, Florida changed it’s voting procedures that would be subject to Section 5 before the plaintiffs filed their suit, the plaintiffs failed to acknowledge any of Florida’s voting procedure changes subject to Section 5 pre-clearance, and the statewide injunction sought by the plaintiffs was inappropriate because the alleged violation existed in only five of Florida’s 67 counties. The plaintiff’s filed an amended complaint on July 27, 2012 to update and expand the list of facts underlying their claims. On August 20, 2012, the defendant re-filed the motion to dismiss in accordance with the plaintiffs' amended complaint. On July 30, 2012 the Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge, Joel F. Dubina assigned Circuit Judge Charles R. Wilson and District Judge James S. Moody to hear the case alongside District Judge James D. Whittemore. In his order, Chief Judge Dubina assigned this combination of judges to allow for a simultaneous appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, if the situation were to arise. Judge Whittemore denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint on September 18, 2012. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court decided Shelby County v Holder, holding that Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. Section 4(b) contained the formula that determined which jurisdictions would be subject to the pre-clearance requirements listed in Section 5. Back in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the defendant filed notice that further litigation in this case was unnecessary. Because the Supreme Court in Shelby County found the process for determining which jurisdictions would be covered by the Section 5 pre-clearance requirements to be unconstitutional, the defendant argued Florida was no longer covered by the Section 5 pre-clearance requirements and therefore the plaintiffs no longer had a claim upon which relief could be granted. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, both parties agreed that the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed, but they disagreed over whether or not it should be dismissed with prejudice. On July 10, 2015, the defendant filed a notice that the claim should be denied with prejudice because the invalidation of Section 4 invalidated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act as well, meaning there was no way that the plaintiffs would be able to reopen their case. The plaintiffs however, filed a notice on July 11, 2013 to have the case dismissed with prejudice only to the extent Section 5 of the VRA was predicated on Section 4. This would allow the plaintiffs to reopen their case should Congress pass a new bill or should a future court find Section 5 was not predicated on Section 4. The plaintiffs filed this official motion request on July 15, 2013. The District Court ultimately agreed with the defendant that the plaintiffs’ proposed order “would essentially constitute an impermissible advisory opinion” and dismissed the case with prejudice on July 24, 2013. This case is now closed.

Summary: On June 8, 2012, individual and organizational plaintiffs challenged Florida's voter purge procedures in U.S. District Court in Florida's Middle District, Tampa Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the national and Florida ACLU, private counsel, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, claimed such procedures violated their rights under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c. This case was dismissed with prejudice on July 24, 2013 in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Shelby County v Holder.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: Two third-party nominees for the Georgia State House of Representatives filed this case alleging that, in light of public health risks associated with COVID-19, requiring them to collect over 20,000 signatures to get on the ballot violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On July 9, the court ordered the defendants to reduce the relevant signature requirements by 30% for the 2020 general election.
 The two plaintiffs in this case, the Green Party and Libertarian Party nominees for seats in the Georgia State House of Representatives, filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on March 26, 2020. Their complaint alleged that Georgia state laws requiring extensive collection of signatures to get on the ballot as a third party candidate should be relaxed in light of the COVID-19 public health emergency. Their complaint names one defendant, the Secretary of State for the State of Georgia. This case has been assigned to Judge Eleanor Ross, and the plaintiffs are represented by private counsel. The requirements to get on the ballot as a third party candidate in Georgia require a nominee to collect signatures from 5% of the registered voters in the district where they are running. For the two plaintiffs in this case, that would require gathering over 20,000 signatures each. Their complaint argued that requiring them to do this before the deadline of August 14, 2020, would be virtually impossible given the circumstances stemming from COVID-19, making the requirements a violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They are seeking declaratory and equitable relief. Specifically, they have asked the court to prorate the signature requirement to account for days lost due to COVID-19. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 8, 2020. On May 29, the defendants responded to the motion, requesting a denial of the preliminary injunction or grant in part with only a 30% reduction of the petition requirements, which they argued was an appropriate balance between the burdens of COVID-19 and the State's interest in requiring a showing of voter support for ballot access. Following a hearing, on July 9, the court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, but refused to impose the requested remedy. Instead, the court ordered the defendants to reduce the relevant signature requirements by 30% for the 2020 general election. On August 21, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for summary judgment based on the court's ruling on the preliminary injunction, as the only remaining claim is a declaratory judgment. The case is ongoing.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action suit brought by a nonprofit organization and an individual against the state of Georgia to challenge the state’s requirement to purchase postage stamps for mail-in ballots. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring election officials to provide prepaid returnable envelopes for absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications. On April 30, the preliminary injunction was denied for the June primaries and on August 11, the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to Count I of the amended complaint, and which was accordingly dismissed.
 On April 8, 2020, Black Voters Matter Fund and an individual voter filed a class-action lawsuit against the Secretary of State of Georgia and the Dekalb County Board of Registration & Elections to challenge the state’s requirement to purchase postage stamps for mail-in ballots. The plaintiffs filed the suit after anticipating mail-in votes to skyrocket for the June and November 2020 elections, given that the COVID-19 pandemic posed health risks for in-person voting. The plaintiffs argued that because election officials required voters to pay postage, the state unconstitutionally forced voters to pay in order to participate in the election. They also alleged that the poll tax posed an undue burden on the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief injunction requiring election officials to provide prepaid returnable envelopes for absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications. The plaintiffs also filed a preliminary injunction and sought attorney fees. They were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and ACLU of Georgia. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and assigned to Judge Amy Totenberg. On April 20, the defendants filed an opposition to the preliminary injunction, claiming that the Secretary had already taken various steps to mitigate the risk of harm to Georgia primary voters during the COVID-19 outbreak. On April 23, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On April 30, the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to the June primaries. 2020 WL 2079240. This was, in part, because the state had already begun mailing ballots to voters and as such, the plaintiffs' proposed remedies would be difficult to implement. The court noted that the requested relief for subsequent elections remained pending and would be addressed in a separate decision. On May 11, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to add two other voter plaintiffs and the Director of Voter Registration and Elections as a defendant. The same day, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the original complaint as moot. The next day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint. On May 12, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction, and sought to expedite the briefing process to implement the requested relief in time for the August runoff. The request was denied on May 15, and the court noted that the emergency motion did not raise any new facts or arguments, instead “‘incorporat[ing] by reference all prior filings and evidence submitted in connection with the Original Plaintiffs’ prior motion for preliminary injunction’ and seek[ing] relief for the August runoff and November general elections.” On May 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, stating that the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment and legislative immunity. On May 31, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a defendant class of all Georgia boards of registrars, their members, their election directors, county registrars, and municipal absentee ballot clerks, as well as a plaintiff class of all registered Georgia voters. The plaintiff class was subdivided into a subclass of all registered Georgia voters who satisfy one of the COVID-19 risk factors identified by the Center for Disease Control. On August 11, the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction was denied as to Count I of the amended complaint, which alleged that the state imposed an unconstitutional poll tax in violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. 2020 WL 4597053. While the court noted that the plaintiffs “presented compelling evidence that the state’s handling of the June 2020 election was plagued with difficulties, including many instances of voters not receiving their absentee ballots, and as a result being unnecessarily exposed to the virus[,]” the court found that such issues were “beyond the scope of this litigation, which is focused on the postage requirement for absentee voting.” The court also pointed to other courts in this district considering direct challenges regarding those issues and that variations may lead to different outcomes. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint was granted for Count I of the complaint but denied as to Count II. The case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This suit was brought on May 19, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and three voter plaintiffs against the state of Louisiana to challenge Louisiana’s Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and Cure Prohibition. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. On June 22, the court dismissed the case.
 On May 19, 2020, two non-profit organizations and three individual voters brought suit against the state of Louisiana to challenge its election laws. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 52 U.S.C. § 10301, alleging that the requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, and was assigned to Chief Judge Shelley D. Dick. On April 15, the Secretary of State proposed an emergency election plan expanding the category of excuses needed to request an absentee ballot and waiving the Witness Requirement for the July and August elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The proposed plan was rejected by the Louisiana Senate and Governmental Affairs Committee. On April 20, the Secretary of State presented a revised emergency election plan, which did not waive the Witness Requirement and presented fewer categories to fulfill the Excuse Requirement, which was approved. The plaintiffs noted that there was no emergency action plan in place for the November and December elections and that even with the plan in place, the narrow category of excuses and the need for a witness forced voters to choose between exercising their right to vote and potentially endangering themselves. Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged that Louisiana’s Excuse Requirement and Witness Requirement imposed undue burdens on the fundamental right to vote, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs also challenged the lack of notice and opportunity to cure defects with mail-in votes. The plaintiffs alleged that the “Cure Prohibition” violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying certain populations the right to due process. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on May 29. Meanwhile, in a separate case, Power Coalition v. Edwards, its plaintiffs also filed a suit to challenge the Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and the Cure Prohibition. Power Coalition v. Edwards and Clark v. Edwards were consolidated on June 3. On June 5, the State of Louisiana filed a motion to intervene as defendants, which was granted on June 8. The same day, they filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not adequately alleged state action. The defendants also claimed that because of the proximity of the election, there should not be last-minute electoral meddling. On June 15, the defendants filed a joint motion to amend, which was denied on June 17. The same day, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to remove the Parish Registrars of Voters as defendants. On June 22, the court granted the motion to dismiss and all claims against the defendants were dismissed with prejudice. 2020 WL 3415376. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not adequately allege an injury in fact sufficient to give rise to standing, because the demonstrated injury was not traceable to state action. The hearing scheduled for the preliminary injunction was accordingly canceled. On June 25, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment to dismiss their claims without prejudice, which was granted on June 30.

Summary: This suit was brought on May 19, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and three voter plaintiffs against the state of Louisiana to challenge Louisiana’s Excuse Requirement, Witness Requirement, and Cure Prohibition. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Excuse and Witness Requirement, as well as provide absentee voters with notice and opportunity to cure defects in their absentee ballots for all elections in 2020 held in Louisiana. On June 22, the court dismissed the case.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This is an action brought by four individuals facing a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and the Family Unit, a non-profit organization, against the enforcement of South Carolina’s witness signature requirement and the excuse requirement. On May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June primaries. On May 25, the court granted the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motions in part, granting relief as to the witness requirement. On September 18, the Witness Requirement was enjoined for the November 2020 General Election in a separate case, and the district court stayed the case. The defendants sought reconsideration.
 On April 22, four individuals facing a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and the Family Unit, a non-profit organization, filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina against the enforcement of South Carolina’s witness requirement and the excuse requirement, which were required in order to vote by an absentee ballot. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (ACLU), the ACLU of South Carolina, and the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, the plaintiffs brought this action against the South Carolina State Election Commission and the Governor of South Carolina. They sought sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10302(b), and 10501. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of South Carolina’s witness signature requirement during the pandemic posed an unconstitutional barrier to voting and that the exclusive category of "persons qualified to vote by absentee ballot," did not include voters fearful of COVID-19 transmission. The plaintiffs alleged that the two requirements threatened to disenfranchise thousands of eligible South Carolina voters and that COVID-19 would have a disproportionate impact on older populations, voters with disabilities, and African-American voters. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the requirements during COVID-19, as well as modification of election materials to reflect the elimination of the requirements before the June 2020 primaries. The case was assigned to Judge Michelle Childs. On April 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the two requirements, include self-isolation as an excuse exempting the witness requirement and enter an expedited schedule requiring the defendants to respond within seven days. The motion to enter an expedite the schedule was granted in part, but the specific schedule proposed by the plaintiff was denied. The South Carolina Republican Party (SCRP) filed a motion to intervene alleging voter fraud concerns on May 1. On the same day, the Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities, an independent non-profit corporation, requested to file an amicus brief. The motion to file an amicus brief was granted on May 6. And, on May 8, SCRP’s motion to intervene was granted. 2020 WL 2306615. On May 11, the defendants and the SCRP each submitted a motion opposing the preliminary injunction. Meanwhile,  another action was filed by individuals and the South Carolina Democratic Party on May 7, challenging the absentee ballot requirement in South Carolina against the same defendants. The Middleton plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the witness requirement, election day cutoff, and the absentee ballot age restriction limiting the categorical prohibition of all voters under 65 from casting a mailed absentee ballot. On May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June 9 primary and the June 23 runoff election. Two days later, the court determined that the injunctive relief sought by both Thomas and Middleton plaintiffs would be limited to the June 2020 primaries, as the defendants did not receive proper notice to prepare arguments regarding elections following the June 2020 primaries. On May 15, there was a consolidated hearing to address the pending motions for preliminary injunctions in both the Thomas and Middleton cases, with the remaining issues limited to the June primaries. On May 25, the court granted the preliminary injunction motions pertaining to the witness signature requirement, to be applied only for the June 2020 primaries. 2020 WL 2617329. The defendants were also ordered to immediately and publicly inform South Carolina voters of the elimination of the witness requirement. On July 13, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP as plaintiff while dropping one plaintiff. In addition, the plaintiffs withdrew the claim alleging that the witness requirement violated Section 201 of the Voting Rights Act, while adding the claim that the requirement discriminates against the plaintiffs in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On July 24, the SCRP sought to re-intervene for the amended complaint. On August 4, the court noted that they had already allowed SCRP to intervene and that intervention is still in effect. On August 10, 3 individual plaintiffs, The Family Unit, and the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP voluntarily dismissed the case. The same day, the defendant and the SCRP both filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that none of the requirements violated the Constitution, the VRA, or the ADA. On August 11, the Attorney General of South Carolina sought to file an amicus brief for the case. On August 12, Jay Lucas, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Harvey Peeler, the President of the Senate, sought to intervene, which was granted on August 24. 2020 WL 4934305. The intervening defendants submitted responses in support of both motions for summary judgment, arguing that determining how to conduct South Carolina's elections was a legislative function, not a judicial one, and that the challenged provisions of South Carolina law were lawful. On August 14, the parties filed a stipulated motion to dismiss without prejudice as to the defendant Governor of South Carolina. On September 15, 2020, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation suspending the Excuse Requirement by allowing all qualified voters to vote by absentee ballot for the November 2020 General Election due to the current state of emergency. Three days later the court enjoined the Witness Requirement for all South Carolina voters in the upcoming November 2020 General Election in the Middleton case. In light of the suspension of the challenged provisions for the November 2020 General Election, the district court stayed the case. 2020 WL 5593847. The court instructed that the plaintiffs may request to lift the stay when the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic or future statewide elections in South Carolina are sufficiently determinable. The defendants sought reconsideration of the stay, arguing that staying the case on grounds that the Middleton injunction resolved the issues to be tried in this case, would effectively grant the Thomas plaintiffs their requested relief "without having to ever prove anything at all . . . [which is] unjust and an abuse of discretion." The plaintiffs sought to consolidate the current case with Middleton v. Andino, however, the court denied the motion on September 22, reasoning that a district court did not have jurisdiction to consolidate an action before it with an action pending before an appellate court. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 22, four individuals facing a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and the Family Unit, a non-profit organization, filed an action against the enforcement of South Carolina’s witness requirement applied to absentee voters, and the excuse requirement applied in order to vote by an absentee ballot. On May 12, the South Carolina General Assembly passed legislation allowing all qualified South Carolina voters to vote by absentee ballot for the June primaries. On May 25, the court granted the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motions in part, pertaining to the witness requirement. On September 18, the Witness Requirement was enjoined for the November 2020 General Election in a separate case, and the district court stayed the case. The defendants sought reconsideration. The case is ongoing.


On December 13, 2011, registered voters in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). The plaintiffs sued the State of Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, and the Division of Motor Vehicles. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, claimed that the voter ID requirement implemented by 2011 Wisconsin Act 23 (Act 23) placed an undue burden on their right to vote, constituted a poll tax, and has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. The plaintiffs claimed that their fundamental right to vote under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA had been violated. Specifically, they alleged that the voter ID requirement placed a substantial burden on the right to vote, particularly for black and Latino voters, by requiring photo ID that many voters do not have and cannot easily obtain. The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Lynn S. Adelman. A group of eleven plaintiffs immediately filed for a preliminary injunction, which was revised as a motion for all plaintiffs on April 23, 2012. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on the same day. The court did not rule on these issues. Instead, the parties engaged in extensive discovery, which culminated in a trial in early November 2013. In an April 29, 2014 decision, the district court held that the Voter ID requirement disproportionately and negatively impacted minority voters in violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 F.Supp.3d 837. Judge Adelman ordered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the voter ID law. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (docket number 14-2058). In a decision by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook on October 6, 2014, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that the voter ID law did not violate the VRA or the Equal Protection Clause. 768 F.3d 744. The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was denied. 135 S.Ct. 1551. The plaintiffs then returned to district court to pursue constitutional claims that were not considered by Judge Adelman in his initial April 29, 2014 decision about this case. The plaintiffs claimed their rights were violated because certain forms of IDs were not accepted, and some voters would have to turn over out-of-state IDs to get an acceptable Wisconsin ID, which plaintiffs argue was essentially a poll tax. In an October 19, 2015 decision, the district court found that concerns about technical college IDs being unacceptable were unripe. 141 F.Supp. 3d 932. Additionally, allegations of a poll tax were found to be moot, and claims about veterans IDs being unacceptable were dismissed on the merits. The district court held that it could not address the request for relief for those voters “who lack photo ID and face systemic practical barriers to obtaining an ID” by issuing an injunction allowing individuals to sign an affidavit instead because this issue was before the court in 2014 and the Seventh Circuit decision reversed without remanding for further proceedings on this claim. 141 F.Supp. 3d 932. Following this decision, the Wisconsin legislature amended Act 23 to include veterans’ ID as acceptable forms of voter identification. The plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that the district court did not properly reconsider their core argument: that voters face barriers to obtaining an acceptable ID and therefore are entitled to relief. In a decision made April 12, 2016, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that the district court could consider this argument and remanded for further proceedings. 819 F.3d 384. On July 19, 2016, after further proceedings, Judge Adelman granted a preliminary injunction allowing voters without IDs to sign an affidavit in place of the ID requirement for the November 8, 2016 election. In this decision, he also certified the class of plaintiffs in this case, defining the class “as all eligible Wisconsin voters who cannot with reasonable effort obtain qualifying ID.” 196 F. Supp. 3d 893. Shortly after, the parties filed cross appeals to the Seventh Circuit (docket numbers 16-3003 and 16-3052) and the defendants moved to stay the preliminary injunction. On July 29, 2016, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to stay the preliminary injunction. 2016 WL 4059226. However, the Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction pending the cross appeals on August 10, 2016. 2016 WL 4224616. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order staying the injunction, but the Seventh Circuit denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit found that emergency procedures in place by the state to permit anyone who enters the ID Petition Process (a process through which any applicant must receive a photo ID on request unless the state shows certain grounds disqualified them) to get a receipt that would serve as a valid ID for the November 2016 election meant that further temporary relief was unnecessary at that time. The plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for rehearing en banc of the order staying the injunction, but the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for hearing en banc for similar reasons. 835 F.3d 649. The plaintiffs moved to add a new plaintiff to the case and for a temporary restraining order to ensure that the new plaintiff’s provision ballot would be counted despite not having a valid ID. On November 10, 2016, Judge Adelman granted the plaintiffs’ motion to file a supplemental complaint but denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. 2016 WL 6651323. The supplemental complaint was filed the same day. On February 24, 2017, oral argument was held on the cross appeals. As of December 2019, this case was ongoing and the cross appeals remained pending in the Seventh Circuit.

Summary: In 2011 voters in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs alleged that their fundamental right to vote had been violated by Act 23, Wisconsin's law implementing a voter ID requirement. After much litigation, in 2016 a judge granted a preliminary injunction allowing voters without IDs to sign an affidavit in place of the ID requirement for the 2016 presidential election. The state appealed the injunction to the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction pending the appeal. As of December 2019, the appeal remained pending in the Seventh Circuit.


On June 21, 2016, individuals who had been subject to a $50 "extension fee" for inability to pay their monetary penalties in full, under threat that they would otherwise go to jail for non-payment of court fines and costs, brought this putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Bogalusa City Court and the sole judge who sits on the Bogalusa City Court for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed that the defendants: systematically jailed and threatened to jail individuals who cannot pay fines and court costs that were used to fund expenditures of the city court; and have created an illegal extension fee to generate additional revenue. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, as well as to certify a class and subclass for equitable relief and a separate class for damages. The class for equitable relief was to be defined as "all individuals who will appear in the Bogalusa City Court for criminal cases or who have unpaid fines and costs assessed by and opened by the City Court. The Subclass was to be defined as "all individuals who were or will be adjudicated guilty in the Bogalusa City Court, who have been worn will be given a future date by which to return to City Court, and who have not paid the assessed fines and costs in full prior to returning to City Court." The class seeking damages included those individuals who paid an extension fee between June 22, 2015 to the time of the complaint. In a June 23, 2016 order, U.S. District Court Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, and held their request for a preliminary injunction in abeyance. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to explore a possible settlement. As settlement negotiations were getting under way, the parties reached an interim agreement, which they filed on June 27, 2016. Once approved by the Court, it was to govern the next 75 days. During this time period, the defendant judge agreed not to incarcerate any Bogalusa City Court defendant on the sole basis of nonpayment of fines or costs or contempt fee, nor assess or collect (i) any court cost authorized by La. Stat. Ann. § 13:1899; (ii) any “extension fees” or similar payments required by the City Court to allow a defendant additional time to pay court debt; or (iii) any contempt fees that are retained by the City Court and deposited into the City Court’s judicial expense account. In addition, for the same interim time period, the defendant judge agreed to provide to the plaintiffs’ counsel a copy of daily jail logs for the Bogalusa City Jail, and an up-to-date copy of the Bogalusa City Court’s “Criminal Account-Citizens Income Statement.” Both parties agreed to submit a joint written status report in 45 days to report on the status of settlement discussions and the parties’ respective positions on how the Court should proceed with the pending motions for preliminary injunction and class certification. This agreement was repeatedly renewed through motions to continue until the parties reached a full settlement on September 5, 2017. On June 28, 2016, Judge Lemelle granted the joint motion and further ordered that the plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class and their Motion for Preliminary Injunction to be dismissed without prejudice. On January 17, 2017, plaintiffs amended their complaint with allegations that defendants, without the authorization of state law and after agreeing to halt the $50 dollar “extension fee,” began assigning community service as a sanction for non-payment, instead of jail-time, and established a $25 “enrollment fee” for individuals to complete community service. On June 7, 2017, a partial settlement agreement was reached. The defendants agreed to issue $50 dollar refunds to all parties who paid the “extension fee” on and after June 21, 2015. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the fifth claim for relief of their first amended complaint, which sought compensatory damages for the payment of the extension fee, and agreed to dismiss defendant Bogalusa City Court from the suit. On June 21, 2017, plaintiff’s motion for class certification was dismissed without prejudice. On September 5, 2017, a full settlement was reached. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their lawsuit against the defendant. In exchange, the defendant agreed, for a period of thirty months, to stop jailing indigent individuals for failure to pay court debt solely due to their inability to pay the debt, agreed to discontinue use of any extension fees except as explicitly authorized by state law, and agreed to discontinue use of an enrollment fee for community service. The defendant also agreed to implement warrant amnesty days that would enable individuals with arrest warrants for failure to comply with an order to appear, subpoena, or summons to appear at the city court to receive a new hearing date and clear any warrants. The defendant also permanently agreed to no longer collect or assess any court costs that would be deposited into an account controlled directly by the city court. Instead, these costs or fees would be deposited into a special account maintained by the City of Bogalusa, who would have control of the account and any disbursements made therefrom. The court was also required to submit a yearly budget request to fund operations of the city court, which the mayor and city council must approve in accordance with the city charter. The City of Bogalusa would maintain discretion to allocate funds from the special account to the court to fund operations of the court. Finally, the defendant agreed to a six-month reporting period wherein the defendant would notify the plaintiff’s counsel when any city court defendant was being placed in jail for nonpayment of a fine, costs, or failure to complete a form of alternative payment. The court maintained jurisdiction over the case. There has been no action on the docket since September 5, 2017.

Summary: On June 21, 2016, individuals who had been forced to pay a $50 "extension fee" for inability to pay their monetary penalties in full, or go to gail for non-payment of court fines and costs, brought a putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Bogalusa City Court and the sole judge who sits on the Bogalusa City Court, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants (1) systematically jail and threaten to jail individuals who cannot pay fines and court costs that fund the city court; and (2) have created an illegal extension fee to generate additional revenue. Shortly after U.S. District Court Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, and held their request for a preliminary injunction in abeyance, the parties decided to explore settlement options. They filed a stipulated agreement with the District Court, which was granted.