On June 22, 2005, attorneys for the local ACLU and the ACLU National Prison Project filed a class-action § 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi on behalf of inmates confined in Unit 32 of the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. The lawsuit alleged dangerous and inhumane conditions of confinement in Unit 32, a "supermax" facility operated by the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The plaintiffs immediately moved for class certification. The MDOC was already operating under an injunction issued in Russell v. Johnson, PC-MS-0003 in this Clearinghouse, which concerned conditions of confinement and medical and mental health treatment for the subclass of death row prisoners confined to Unit 32. Magistrate Judge Jerry A. Davis, who oversaw the Russell case, urged the parties to discuss settlement. Following protracted negotiations, the parties reached a settlement of the issues in the form of a proposed consent decree. After a fairness hearing on April 28, 2006, Judge Davis formally approved the settlement. The consent decree called for the MDOC to make many changes to the conditions of confinement for non-death row inmates of Unit 32, including compliance with the ACA Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (4th Ed.) and with the essential National Commission on Correctional Healthcare (NCCHC) Standards for Health Services in Prison (2003). Following the entry of the consent decree, the plaintiffs began monitoring the implementation process. Experts employed by the plaintiffs, Dr. John Robertson (medical expert) and Dr. Terry Kupers (mental health expert), conducted an audit of the medical and mental health services in Unit 32. The experts identified continuing deficiencies which they believed warranted urgent correction. The plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt on November 21, 2006, seeking an order to compel defendants to immediately comply with the medical and mental health care provisions of the consent decree. On April 4, 2007, Judge Davis called the case for an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to compel. Before the hearing began, the State agreed to entry of a supplemental consent decree on medical care. The hearing went forward on the plaintiffs' contentions that mentally ill prisoners were still being denied basic psychiatric care and routinely subjected to excessive force and abuse. The hearing was adjourned and the parties were directed to discuss settlement of the remaining issues. The case was reset for a settlement conference and continuation of the contempt hearing on November 15, 2007. Following that conference, the parties arrived at a supplemental consent decree on mental health care, use of force, and classification, which supplemented the original consent decree entered April 28, 2006 and the supplemental consent decree on medical care entered April 16, 2007. On November 15, 2007, the parties entered into another supplemental consent decree on mental health care, use of force, and classification. On September 16, 2008, Judge Davis denied the plaintiffs' motions for discovery and attorneys' fees as moot. On August 2, 2010, Judge Davis ordered the case dismissed without prejudice by agreement of the parties. The defendants agreed to close Unit 32, transfer the entire population of Unit 32 to other facilities over the course of the next several months, move all seriously mentally ill prisoners to MDOC's mental health facility in Meridian, MS and remedy the inadequate medical and mental health care in Unit 32 so long as any prisoners remain there. As part of the agreement, the ACLU would also monitor during the next year the medical and mental health care provided at all of the facilities in the state to which Unit 32 prisoners were transferred to ensure they meet constitutional requirements. On November 12, 2010, Judge Davis denied one of the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees upon being advised by the parties that the issue of attorneys' fees had been resolved. On January 14, 2011, Judge Davis issued a stipulated order awarding the plaintiffs $295,000 fees and expenses. Disputes over attorneys' fees continued until January 13, 2012, when the parties settled but did not disclose the details of the settlement.

Summary: In 2005, the ACLU filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of inmates confined in Unit 32 of the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi, alleging dangerous and inhumane conditions of confinement. The parties initially settled in 2006. Then, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt in late 2006, seeking an order to compel defendants to immediately comply with the consent decree. After two more settlements, the defendants agreed to close Unit 32 in 2010 and the case was dismissed.


On May 30, 2013, prisoners in the East Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Mississippi Department of Corrections commissioner, deputy commissioner, and chief medical officer in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU National Prison Project and the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary relief, claiming that conditions in the EMCF violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the living conditions at EMCF, designed to house and treat Mississippi's most seriously mentally ill prisoners, were so inhumane as to cause harm to the inmates through known problems with healthcare, mental healthcare, isolation, excessive force, protection from harm, nutrition, and food safety. In September 2014, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. While this motion was pending, on October 9, 2014, District Judge Tom S. Lee recused himself and the case was reassigned to District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. On September 29, 2015, the Judge Barbour granted class certification, and the defendants attempted to appeal this order, but the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' motion to file an appeal on November 2, 2015. After engaging in discovery, a bench trial began on March 5, 2018 and concluded on April 9, 2018. On August 24, 2018, Judge Barbour stayed the proceedings in the case pending the receipt of supplemental expert reports, which were to be filed by November 16, 2018. Judge Barbour found that during the bench trial, it had become apparent that conditions at the prison had changed, in part, due to the appointing and hiring of new administrators and implementation of new policies and procedures. Therefore, he found the stay necessary in order ensure that any award of injunctive relief in this case would not run afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). After the parties submitted their supplemental expert reports, the parties attempted to settle. However, on January 24, 2019, the parties notified Magistrate Judge John C. Gargiulo, who oversaw the settlement conferences, that the parties were unable to settle and that future settlement conferences would not be productive. The case proceeded, and on 12/31/2019, the Court entered judgment for the Defendants, stating <blockquote> It is clear that many changes have been made at the subject prison that pertain to the claims alleged in this lawsuit. The changes include, but are not limited to, new administrators, new prison personnel, and new service providers. The Court concludes that the alleged constitutional violations that may have existed at the time this lawsuit was filed no longer exist and, therefore, that the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs has not been shown necessary. Accordingly, judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims.</blockquote> Plaintiffs appealed the judgment to the Fifth Circuit on 1/30/2020. Meanwhile, the District Court taxed costs of $104,380 against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for a review of the taxation, arguing that the indigent plaintiffs brought a close case, and therefore should not be assessed the plaintiffs costs. The plaintiffs also objected to the defendants’ billing of expenditures that included hotel stays, travel, and dining. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” and therefore entitles them to compensation for costs. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2013, prisoners in the East Mississippi Correctional Facility (EMCF) filed a class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Mississippi Department of Corrections, claiming that EMCF violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the inhumane living conditions at EMCF, a prison for the mentally ill, harmed inmates. In 2015, the court granted class certification. After engaging in discovery and a bench trial, the parties attempted to settle. After the parties submitted their supplemental expert reports, the parties attempted to settle. However, on January 24, 2019, the parties notified the court that the parties were unable to settle and that future settlement conferences would not be productive. As of March 25, 2019, the case is ongoing.


This case is about the refusal of North Carolina's Department of Public Safety (DPS) to recognize Humanism as a faith group within the state prison system. On February 2, 2015, an inmate in a North Carolina prison and the American Humanist Association filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety that are involved in policy decisions related to recognition of faith groups in state prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the American Humanist Association's own legal team as well as private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' disparate treatment of Humanists violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and attorneys' fees. On July 28, 2017, both the plaintiffs and defendants filed for summary judgment. On March 29, 2018, Judge Terrence W. Boyle granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 303 F.Supp.3d 421. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the American Humanist Association did not have standing in this case. Judge Boyle found that the American Humanist Association had associational standing because of its representation of other Humanist inmates incarcerated by the North Carolina Department of Public Safety. Regarding the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, the court found that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause because the defendants did not have a secular purpose for denying Humanism recognition as a religious group or for their decision to prohibit Humanist inmates from organized group meetings. In addition, the defendants failed to put forth any evidence to support space, resource, or security concerns applicable to Humanist inmates that did not apply equally to other religious groups. Regarding the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim, the court found that a violation because the defendants' authorized other non-theistic religions but not Humanism and there was not a rational connection between the defendants' cited interests in space, resources, and security and their refusal to recognize Humanism. Judge Boyle granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction, ordering DPS to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to permit a Humanist study group to meet within North Carolina state prisons on the same terms as other faiths are allowed. He also granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment, stating that the defendants violated the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause by refusing to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to allow it to be designated on an inmate's prison records. Because the plaintiffs suffered constitutional violations at the hands of defendants, the court awarded nominal damages ($1.00) to the plaintiffs. Judge Boyle also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court retained jurisdiction to make any further orders necessary to carry out the terms of the relief. On July 9, 2018, the court ordered defendants to pay $5,905.25 to the plaintiffs for various court costs. On July 10, 2018, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, because the parties privately settled the matter of attorneys fees and expenses. Since the entering of the permanent injunction and motions regarding attorneys fees and costs, there has been no activity in this case. The permanent injunction remains in effect.

Summary: This case is about the refusal of North Carolina's Department of Public Safety (DPS) to recognize Humanism as a faith group within the North Carolina state prison system. On February 2, 2015, an inmate in a North Carolina prison and the American Humanist Association filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety that are involved in policy decisions related to recognition of faith groups in state prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on March 29, 2018, Judge Terrence W. Boyle granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion. He entered a permanent injunction ordering DPS to recognize Humanism as a faith group and to permit a Humanist study group to meet within North Carolina state prisons on the same terms as other faiths are allowed and entered declaratory judgment. The court also awarded nominal damages and attorneys' fees and costs. Since the entering of the permanent injunction, there has been no activity in this case. The permanent injunction remains in effect.


On October 16, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, private counsel representing a group of New Jersey state prisoners filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against contract medical care providers, their executives, and New Jersey corrections officials. In that complaint and a later, amended version, the prisoners alleged that they and their class had been exposed in the state's prisons to the Hepatitis C virus (HCV), or had been admitted to the prisons but not treated for the virus, or had contracted the virus in the prisons. They attributed these conditions to the deliberate indifference of the defendants, which allegedly violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' conduct constituted negligence, medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress under state common law, and that the conduct also violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq. The plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief. The class plaintiffs sought to represent included all past or present New Jersey state prisoners from between January 1990, and the date of filing the amended complaint, whether or not they had contracted HCV. By the time the court adjudicated the class action issue, in May 2008, the New Jersey Department of Corrections had adopted major changes in how people with HCV were treated. According to papers filed with the court, its new program lined up with the federal Bureau of Prisons approach. In particular, the court (Judge Noel Hillman) found: a. The health care provider for the department, CMS, subcontracted with the Cooper Health System and its Infectious Disease Department to provide infectious disease consultations to inmates. Cooper Hospital is also in the process of reviewing every HCV inmate's medical care to assure compliance with the FBOP's HCV Guidelines. b. All inmates who meet the treatment criteria in the FBOP's HCV Guidelines are offered HCV pharmacologic treatment which they can accept or reject. Inmates who accept HCV medications are given a combination of pegylated interferon in combination with ribavirin. This pharmacologic treatment is FDA approved and recommended for use in the FBOP's HCV guidelines. c. Inmates in New Jersey, including in excess of 7,000 admitted prior to February 1, 2003, have been given a Blood Borne Pathogen Risk Assessment. Inmates identified with a positive risk factor for HCV have been encouraged to consent to a HCV test. d. Any inmate who requests an HCV test is given the test. e. All inmates are given extensive counseling and education materials, a NJDOC video on HCV and direct communications with their healthcare providers. f. The inmates' Electronic Medical Records have been updated with comprehensive HCV forms to assure more consistent and thorough HCV documentation. g. The care and treatment of all HCV inmates is closely tracked. h. CMS compiles and analyzes statistical data regarding New Jersey's HCV program to measure and analyze the effectiveness of the program. The data is shared with the NJDOC. i. The NJDOC monitors the HCV care and treatment given to inmates and CMS is subject to contractual penalties if it does not comply with its contract. Given that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was this same set of reforms, Judge Hillman denied the request for injunctive relief as moot. In addition, the court found that only prisoners who already had HCV were appropriate plaintiffs in the case--and that there was no evidence that this subset of the putative plaintiffs class was sufficiently numerous to justify class action status. It therefore denied class certification. As to two individual class members who had HCV, the court held there was sufficient evidence in the record to go to trial on their constitutional claims (though not on their Americans with Disabilities Act claims), and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In October 2009, the case settled for money damages. It seems from some papers filed by one of the plaintiffs that he may never actually have received his money, but when he sought the assistance of the court in enforcing the settlement against his lawyer, Judge Hillman ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction, and directed him to file a collection action in state court.

Summary: This was a prison medical care case filed in 2002 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking damages and an injunction against contract medical care providers and New Jersey corrections officials. The plaintiffs that the New Jersey prison system was failing to treat them for Hepatitis C. By the time the court adjudicated the class action issue, in May 2008, the New Jersey Department of Corrections had adopted major changes in how prisoners with HCV were treated; it updated its procedures to match those of the federal Bureau of Prisons, and "backscreened" all the prisoners willing to be screened for the virus. Given that the injunctive relief requested by the plaintiffs was this same set of reforms, Judge Hillman denied the request for injunctive relief as moot. As to two individual class members who had HCV, the court held there was sufficient evidence in the record to go to trial on their constitutional claims (though not on their Americans with Disabilities Act claims), and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. In October 2009, the case settled for money damages. (However, it seems from some papers filed by one of the plaintiffs that he may never actually have received his money. But when he sought the assistance of the court in enforcing the settlement against his lawyer, Judge Hillman ruled that the court lacked jurisdiction, and directed him to file a collection action in state court. )


On December 3, 2008, plaintiff, a prisoner who is an ordained Pentecostal minister, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. ("RLUIPA") against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the Administrator at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP). The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for nominal damages and to enjoin defendants from prohibiting plaintiff from preaching and ministering to other inmates, from leading religious services, and from teaching religious classes. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment right by implementing a policy banning all prisoners from preaching in the prison. Plaintiff had preached at weekly worship services at NJSP for more than a decade when prison officials issued a blanket ban on all preaching by inmates, even when done under the direct supervision of prison staff. On February 23, 2009, the U.S. District Court (Judge Anne E. Thompson) issued an order denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. The court noted that prisoners may preach to small groups of no larger than six people, but may not lead large groups for security reasons. On November 25, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, as the claims in the action had been resolved by the parties.

Summary: On December 3, 2008, plaintiff, a prisoner who is an ordained Pentecostal minister, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. ("RLUIPA") against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the Administrator at the New Jersey State Prison (NJSP). Specifically, plaintiff claimed that defendants violated plaintiff's First Amendment right by implementing a policy banning all prisoners from preaching in the prison. During the litigation, the state changed its policy to allow the plaintiff to preach to groups of six or fewer prisoners, and on November 25, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Dismissal, as the claims in the action had been resolved by the parties.


On July 31, 2015, an inmate at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) living with hepatitis C filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Nevada. Representing himself, the plaintiff sued numerous medical and administrative personnel at the prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. He claimed that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting from his hepatitis C. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages. Plaintiff's bloodwork had revealed he was suffering from irreparable liver damage and was at risk of death from liver failure. Plaintiff had repeatedly informed defendants of his condition since his incarceration in 2012, but received no treatment. Specifically, his requests for Harvoni, a treatment that would cure his hepatitis C, were denied for being "too expensive." According to the complaint, one defendant, a doctor who sits on the hepatitis committee at the prison, told plaintiff that "the courts look to us [NNCC doctors] for medical opinions. So whether you need treatment or not, if we say you don't, the Court will side with us." In January 2016, the court stayed the case to allow opportunity for the parties to settle. An Inmate Early Mediation Conference was scheduled for May 17, 2016. Plaintiff filed a motion for an Inmate Advocate, whose role is to help the inmate to understand mediation proceedings, but was denied. On May 6, 2016, the parties asked for a time extension, as they were confident they would soon settle the case through informal settlement negotiations and wanted to avoid waste of judicial resources as well as the plaintiff's $350 filing fee. Plaintiff had previously filed to proceed in forma pauperis, but would still be responsible for the $350 regardless of the court's ruling on his motion, which would only occur if mediation failed to resolve the case. Ten days later the parties filed to dismiss the case with prejudice, with each party bearing their own costs. The terms of the private settlement agreement are unknown. The case is now closed.

Summary: In July 2015, an inmate at the Northern Nevada Correctional Center living with hepatitis C filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Nevada in Reno. Representing himself, he claimed that the defendants, medical and administration personnel at the prison, violated his Eighth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference to serious medical needs resulting from his hepatitis C. In May 2016, the parties reached a private settlement agreement, the terms of which are unknown.


On May 5, 1980, inmates of the Special Housing Unit in the Attica Correctional Facility in New York filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the New York Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society and Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged the following constitutional violations: the use of excessive force by prison guards, inhibition of religious exercise, inadequate ventilation, inadequate exercise, inadequate health care, denial of food, lack of sanitation, deprivation of clothing, improper classification, and denial of access to courts. On January 28, 1988, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York (Judge Michael A. Telesca) granted preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed. On June 13, 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judge Wilfred Feinberg) affirmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80 (2nd Cir. 1988). Previously, on October 9, 1985, the prison correctional officers' union (Council 82) asked the District Court to allow them to intervene as defendants in the case. On April 1, 1988, the District Court (Judge Telesca) denied the request for intervention. The would-be interveners appealed. On January 12, 1989, the Second Circuit (Judge Joseph Edward Lumbard) dismissed the appeal. Eng v. Coughlin, 865 F.2d 521 (2nd Cir. 1989). On November 2, 1992, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement, which the District Court (Judge William Skretny) entered as a Consent Decree in the case. On February 10, 1995, the court approved a stipulated dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims regarding food, exercise, sanitation, and religion. On March 9, 1998, the District Court approved the voluntarily dismissal of plaintiffs' claims relating to the mental health issue. Discovery and negotiations continued on the remaining issues for several years. On April 29, 2002, the District Court approved the plaintiffs' voluntary stipulation of dismissal and dismissed without prejudice the remaining claims of inadequate access to the law library and to legal research materials for monolingual Spanish speaking inmates. No further substantive action is reflected on the PACER docket.

Summary: This case was brought, pro se, by a prisoner housed in the Special Housing Unit of New York's Attica prison, and then litigated by NY Prisoners Legal Services. It concerned conditions of confinement in that unit, including excessive force, religion, sanitation and nutrition, access to courts, and medical and mental health care. The parties settled, piecemeal, between 1992 and 2002.


On September 29, 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They asked the court for injunctive relief on behalf of all Native American prisoners in New York's correctional facilities who, because of the defendants' policies, were denied the opportunity to possess symbolic items necessary for religious practice; to engage in spiritual practices, including seasonal ceremonies and meetings for prayer or study; and to chant and dance, both in congregations and individually. For approximately the following year and a half, the parties engaged in discovery. On March 24, 1999, and then July 9, 1999, the court (Judge Charles J. Siragusa) held settlement conferences. On that date, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, approved by the court the same day. The parties agreed to create a Native American chaplain position, to allow inmates to practice their religion through group meetings, to possess certain religious items, and to celebrate religious holidays with family members. The Agreement also provided for staff notification and training as to the Native Americans' rights, and for a two-year observation period to follow entry of the Agreement in order to ensure compliance. On February 16, 2000, the parties filed a Joint Supplemental Response to the Plaintiffs' Report of Comments, dated December 14, 1999, reflecting their agreed-to interpretation of certain provisions of the Settlement Agreement. These provisions included the role of the chaplain, the burning of Indian tobacco after corrections facilities become smoke-free, and the guests able to be invited to religious ceremonies. Subsequently, on September 8, 2000, the court (Judge Siragusa) entered a decision and order approving the dismissal of the action pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The case was closed the same day.

Summary: In 1997, prisoners at various facilities within the New York State Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by Prisoners Legal Services of New York, brought the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, challenging the systemic deprivation of religious rights of Native American prisoners, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2000, the parties reached a settlement and the court dismissed the case.


On September 29, 2003, a group of paraplegic prisoners, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against prison officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care in violation their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they alleged that prison officials failed to provide adequate bladder care and treatment, such as proper use of disposable catheters, properly sterilized catheters, and access to urologists. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against them by failing to construct wheelchair-amenable cells and failing to provide recreational activities, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs sought money damages and injunctive relief. By the time the amended complaint had been filed, all plaintiffs had been transferred to facilities in the Western District of New York. Judge Deborah A. Batts considered and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for improper venue. In her unpublished order of August 26, 2005, however, Judge Batts granted the defendants' motion to transfer venue to the Western District of New York. Under the new case number 05-cv-6504, the case was reassigned to Judge Charles J. Siragusa. On December 14, 2005, Judge Siragusa granted a temporary restraining order directing the defendants to supply plaintiffs with six new single-use catheters per day. This was lifted on September 15, 2006, and Judge Siragusa ordered the defendants to instead supply the plaintiffs with soap and water sufficient for cleaning catheters after reuse. On May 29, 2007, the plaintiffs filed the third and final amended complaint. On May 30, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. However, the court held the plaintiffs' motion in abeyance from 2010 through 2011 while the parties engaged in settlement discussions. On May 31, 2013, Judge Siragusa approved a joint stipulation that an expert visit the correctional facilities to review the conditions raised by plaintiffs. The expert was supposed to report back by August 16, 2013. However, as of April 23, 2014, there had been no activity in the docket. Although the judge ordered that counsel provide a joint status report to the court by December 11, 2015, the parties failed to do so. On October 10, 2017, the judge ordered the parties to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. In the plaintiffs' response, they said their lack of reporting to the court was based on a misunderstanding and that the parties had resumed settlement negotiations in September 2017. The plaintiffs noted that they had submitted a settlement proposal to the defendants and that the parties were in the process of negotiating. After several months of mediation, the parties were unable to reach a settlement agreement. On October 4, 2019, the court certified the plaintiffs' class, and pre-trial preparations began. The order identified the class as "Plaintiffs and all prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional and Community Supervision who suffer from a mobility disability limiting one or more of the prisoners major life activities and that requires the use of a wheelchair." On November 15, 2019, the court ordered plaintiffs' counsel to file a status letter within 30 days, and for the parties to confer and indicate to the court whether or not the matter this action was ready for trial. After nearly ten months passed with no status letter, the court issued an order to show cause on August 6, 2020. The plaintiffs responded and the court directed them to contact Magistrate Judge Mark W. Pedersen for a scheduling conference. In early 2021, the court set a discovery schedule. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 29, 2003, a group of paraplegic prisoners, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against prison officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care in violation their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. After extensive settlement negotiations and mediation, the parties were unable to reach and agreement. This case is proceeding to trial.


On January 21, 2003, Plaintiff. a prisoner in an Oklahoma correctional center, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that his Constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause were being violated by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet. In June 2003, the court (Judge Wayne Alley) consolidated Plaintiff's case with two other similar complaints. All three prisoners filed their complaints pro se and were appointed counsel. The prisoners won both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide them a Kosher diet at no personal cost. On the merits, the district court (Judge Lee West) noted that in the Tenth Circuit, 'prisoners have a constitutional right to a diet conforming to their sincerely held religious beliefs, unless a state's decision to deny inmates access to such a diet 'is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,'' citing Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2002). The court then conducted a four-part test per Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and concluded that the balance of the factors weighed in favor of the prisoners. At the worst, the state's budgetary concerns paled in comparison to the irreparable harm of the loss of a First Amendment freedom for the plaintiffs. The court granted the prisoners' motions for summary judgment, giving plaintiffs seven days to submit a proposed judgment and permanent injunction. That permanent injunction, issued February 8, 2006, ordered the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 'to immediately provide to the plaintiffs Kosher diets at no cost, [while complying with nutritional requirements currently applicable to all other ODOC prisoners].' The court held that 'the injunction is necessary to remedy a violation of these plaintiffs' rights to freely exercise their Orthodox Jewish religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' See Fulbright v. Jones, 2006 WL 222807 (U.S.D.C. W.D. Okla.). The court also awarded attorneys' fees. On September 26, 2012, the Court found that the judgment entered in this case only applies to the claims pursued by the three named plaintiffs, and the permanent injunction relief does not apply to all Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmates.

Summary: On January 21, 2003, an Oklahoma Department of Corrections prisoner filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, alleging that his Constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause were being violated by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections' refusal to provide him with a Kosher diet. The case was consolidated to include the complaints of two other prisoners. The prisoners won both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the Oklahoma Department of Corrections to provide them a Kosher diet at no personal cost. The permanent injunction, issued February 8, 2006, ordered the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections 'to immediately provide to the plaintiffs Kosher diets at no cost, [while complying with nutritional requirements currently applicable to all other ODOC prisoners].' On September 26, 2012 the Court found that the judgment entered in this case only applies to the claims pursued by the three named plaintiffs, and the permanent injunction relief does not apply to all Oklahoma Department of Corrections inmates.


The plaintiff was a transgender woman who filed this pro se suit in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on November 7, 2013. At the time of filing, she was housed in a men's prison. The prison had denied her access to transition-related care and accommodations, which she claimed amounted to a violation of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint named as defendants the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, the Chief Medical Officer of the DOC, the Warden of the prison, the Correctional Health Services Provider, and the psychologist and doctor who provided the plaintiff care while incarcerated. Each were named in both their individual and official capacity. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti in District Court and Judges Gorsuch, O'Brien, and Holmes in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiff had requested injunctive relief, including medical staff trained to prescribe transition-related care consistent with the WPATH standards, an adequate and reliable dosage of Hormone Replacement Therapy, clothing and undergarments consistent with her gender identity, and transfer to a women's facility. At the time of filing her complaint she also filed motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Both were denied by the District Court on May 9, 2014 (2014 WL 1875102). The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without comment on the TRO for lack of jurisdiction on Feb 3, 2015 (601 Fed.Appx. 632). On January 21, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that recommended the court grant the defendant's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment. On Mar 18, 2015, Judge DeGiusti adopted this recommendation in its entirety. On the same day, he dismissed the claims against all defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice, and all the claims against them in their official capacity with prejudice. The plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation. On March 30, 2015, she filed a Motion for Independent Action for Relief from Judgment. Two weeks later, on April 13, 2015, the court denied the motion. The court affirmed that the rulings in the March 17, 2015 order were correct, finding that the plaintiff failed to state sufficient facts challenging the findings. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 7, 2013, a trans woman housed in a mens prison in Oklahoma filed a pro se case against prison staff and administration in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. She claims that she has been denied appropriate transition related care and accommodations, amounting to a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Her request for a TRO and preliminary injunction were denied at the district court level, and the circuit court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction without comment on the TRO for lack of jurisdiction. On April 3, 2015, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against all defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice, and all the claims against them in their official capacity with prejudice. Though the plaintiff objected to the dismissal, the Court denied her motion and affirmed the dismissal.


On December 7, 2011, plaintiff, a male prisoner, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of himself and an injunction preventing defendants from continuing their unconstitutional housing, recreation, and restraint patterns, practices and policies on behalf of all current and future United States Penitentiary (USP) Lewisburg prisoners. On July 27, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint against all defendants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to share a cell with a hostile prisoner, which caused a threat of violence, and by placing him in painful restraints that caused injury for prolonged periods on multiple occasions for refusing dangerous cell assignments with hostile prisoners; and that defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of any meaningful process prior to and during their use of punitive measures against him. Plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of placing hostile inmates together and putting those who refuse placement in brutal restraints for long periods of time. In 2008, the Bureau of Prisons created the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP Lewisburg to serve prisoners who present unique security and management concerns including prisoners who participated in or led group/gang-related activity. Prisoners participate in intake interviews, in part to allow officials to gather information about the prisoners so as to make safe and appropriate placement decisions. On April 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss and declined to certify the class. 2013 WL 1452962. The plaintiff subsequently filed a petition to for leave to appeal the denial of class certification on April 23, 2013 to the Third Circuit, and the docket number 13-8046 was assigned. On October 3, 2014, the U.S. District Court granted an enlargement of time for discovery until after the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issues a decision on Richardson's appeal of his class certification claims, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has decided that Richardson's appeal will be held pending their decision in Shelton v. Bledsoe. On October 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court issued an order staying the case, pending further order of the court, and ordering the action administratively closed until after the Third Circuit Court of appeals issues a decision on Richardson's appeal of his class certification claims. On July 15, 2016, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded, determining that the class-wide claims for injunctive relief were not moot even though the individual plaintiff no longer had a personal stake in the class action. 829 F.3d 273. The Court of Appeals additionally ordered costs from appellees. The district court lifted the stay on November 1, 2016 following the remand. The parties filed a joint case management plan on January 20, 2017. Plaintiff moved to certify the class on January 27, 2017. On June 26, 2017, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommended that the court provisionally certify the class. The court denied the motion to certify the class without prejudice on October 17, 2017 because the plaintiff had not introduced any evidence to support the motion for class certification and therefore, the plaintiff had not affirmatively shown compliance with Rule 23's requirements of sufficiently numerous parties and common questions of law or fact. The plaintiff was granted leave to refile the motion for class certification within a reasonable time after discovery was complete. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Susan Schwab on June 6, 2018 for discovery disputes. On April 12, 2019, in the midst of ongoing discovery, the court ordered the resolution of the final discovery dispute. The court ordered the plaintiff to disclose the names of prisoners who may have information relevant to the claims in this case listed on his privilege log. On July 10, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiff's motion and its supporting brief for class certification was due by September 30, 2019. The defendant's opposition to the class certification was due by November 18, 2019, and the plaintiff's reply was due by December 9, 2019. As of October 31, 2019, the case was ongoing.

Summary: On July 27, 2012, plaintiff, a male prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by forcing him to share a cell with a hostile prisoner, which caused a threat of violence, and by placing him in painful restraints that caused injury for prolonged periods on multiple occasions for refusing dangerous cell assignments with hostile prisoners; and that defendants violated his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution by depriving him of any meaningful process prior to and during their use of punitive measures against him. On April 9, 2013, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss, declining to certify the class. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of class action certification on June 15, 2016, but the district court again denied certification. Litigation is ongoing.


On May 18, 2015, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint arose out of the plaintiff’s hospitalization for Hepatitis C. The plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Bureau of Health Care Services of the DOC. The initial complaint claimed violations of First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff claimed that, while hospitalized, the plaintiff’s attorneys were barred from visiting him and all communication between plaintiff and his attorney was prohibited. Represented by a local public interest firm called the Abolitionist Law Center, the plaintiff requested monetary damages and motioned for an immediate preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to allow the attorneys access to the plaintiff. District Judge Robert D. Mariani was assigned to the case. The plaintiff is a high-profile Black Panther activist from Philadelphia. In 1982, he was convicted of murdering a Philadelphia police officer in a high-profile case. However, the plaintiff did not allege specific discrimination here. On May 26, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew his motion for preliminary injunction, notifying the court that the defendants allowed the attorneys access to the plaintiff. On November 24, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended complaint that added the medical facility as defendants and alleged new claims. That complaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that defendants violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. The complaint also alleged that the DOC was negligently liable for medical malpractice. Specifically, the complaint alleged that plaintiff was denied treatment after he was diagnosed with Hepatitis C and a severe skin condition. The plaintiff alleged that during his hospitalization, he was denied available antiviral drugs. On August 24, 2015, plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction. He requested that the court order the defendants to immediately administer the antiviral drugs and grant the plaintiff a right to in-person consultation with a doctor of his choice. The motion also requested that the court grant a permanent injunction permitting the plaintiff attorney-client and family visits once he received inpatient medical treatment. On September 18, 2015 Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick recommended that plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and because the plaintiff had failed to show irreparable injury. 2015 WL 12116641. Essentially, the judge found that although Hepatitis C is a serious medical need, given the number of inmates who file and want the court to intervene in their treatment, the plaintiff's condition had not progressed to the point where any court intervention was warranted. On December 7, 2015, the DOC medical staff (medical defendants) filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, and on January 4, 2016, the DOC also filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Both parties began briefing both the motions to dismiss and the preliminary injunction. After several requests for extensions, Judge Mariani ordered both parties to submit briefs on the motions by March 11, 2016. On April 4, 2016, defendants filed a motion to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that it was immaterial. Judge Mariani denied that motion on June 3, 2016, finding that nothing was irrelevant or immaterial in the cited paragraphs of the amended complaint. On June 21, 2016, DOC defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. At the same time, the court denied the medical defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants had argued that the plaintiff failed to exhaust all his administrative remedies through the prison before filing the suit, specifically claiming that he had not filed a grievance specific to his Hepatitis C treatment. Judge Mariani disagreed, finding that the plaintiff had filed the appropriate grievances through the prison. On August 5, 2016, the court granted in part and denied in part the DOC defendants’ motion to dismiss. Judge Mariani dismissed plaintiff’s request for monetary damage from the prison superintendent on the grounds that plaintiff could not recover against him in his official capacity. The state negligence claims were also dismissed -- defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity because he was not a health care employee under Pennsylvania State Law. That same day, he granted the medical facility’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff was granted time to file an amended complaint, which he filed on August 16, 2016. The following week, Judge Mariani denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In his opinion he concluded the plaintiff had been denied proper medical treatment, but that the named defendants were not the appropriate defendants. The named defendants were not members of the Hepatitis C Treatment Review Committee and therefore the court could not properly issue an injunction against them. Though reaching the same result, Judge Mariani refused to adopt Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick's report and recommendations from 2015 because Judge Mariani found that the court had significant new evidence from the evidentiary hearing that raised new issues. On January 10, 2017, Judge Mariani dismissed the defendants’ summary judgment motion as moot, and on January 17, 2017 the plaintiff filed a third amended complaint. On May 4, 2017, Judge Mariani granted a motion to consolidate this case with another, <i> Abu-Jamal v. Wetzel </i> because of the common questions concerning Pennsylvania medical care. On June 26, 2017, Judge Mariani referred the case to the Court’s Prison Litigation Settlement Committee to facilitate discussions. On August 23, 2017, the plaintiff filed his fourth amended complaint, which the defendants moved to dismiss. The court-appointed mediator reported on October 27, 2017 that a settlement had not yet been reached. On May 10, 2018, Judge Mariani denied the medical defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the medical defendants were personally involved in the failure to treat his Hepatitis C and that he received only superficial treatment by the medical defendants. Judge Mariani next reviewed the DOC defendants’ motion to dismiss: he granted the DOC defendants’ motion to dismiss the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a defendant because the plaintiff did not oppose that dismissal, but denied the DOC defendants’ motion in all other respects. On June 11, 2018, the DOC defendants appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and dismissed appeal in part on July 19, 2019 (779 Fed.Appx. 893). On January 30, 2020, both the DOC defendants and the medical defendants filed for summary judgment and are awaiting the court's response as of September 15, 2020.

Summary: In 2015, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied him necessary medical treatment, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. In May 2018, the district judge denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, which the defendants appealed to the Third Circuit. As of March 23, 2020, the case is still ongoing.


On June 9, 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Yvette Kane. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants’ failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived of medication, received puzzles and coloring pages in lieu of treatment, and had five-minute conversations in the public showers with mental health professionals instead of formal therapy sessions. Represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, Washington Lawyers’ Committee, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 11, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The class would consist of all persons who were, as of the filing date of the complaint in this case, or are now, or will be in the future, confined to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons in the United States Penitentiary Lewisburg and suffer from a Serious Mental Illness or a Mental Illness, requiring treatment under one or more of the BOP’s CARE levels. On October 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgement. In the two weeks after filing the motion, the defendants filed a motion to stay the plaintiff’s motion for class certification pending their motion to dismiss and a statement of material facts containing records of the plaintiff’s interactions with mental health services. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not sufficiently demonstrate that the defendants failed to provide treatment; rather, it merely demonstrated that the plaintiffs disagreed with the treatments that the medical professionals prescribed for them. On December 7, 2017, the court granted the defendants’ motion to stay class certification until after the defendants’ motion to dismiss was decided. On June 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued a report recommending that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied. She found that the plaintiffs had not actually raised separate Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in their complaint, but invited the plaintiffs to do so in an amended complaint if so desired. With regard to the Eighth Amendment medical care claims, the Magistrate Judge found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference, and so denied the motion to dismiss on that basis as well. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' complaint violated the favorable termination rule (by challenging the duration of their confinement), but the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court temporarily deny the motion to dismiss on that objection. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendation saying that they did not challenge the duration of their confinement, nor did they raise Eighth Amendment conditions claims. On October 26, 2018 Judge Yvette Kane adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation insofar as it denied the defendants motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, and motion to stay discovery. The case was then reassigned to Magistrate Judge Schwab. Over the following months, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued several orders. The first, on November 27, 2018, granted the plaintiffs motion for a protective order. The second, on February 22, 2019, denied class certification without prejudice. Discovery continued in the wake of these orders. On November 20, 2019, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner issued a verbal order reassigning the case from Judge Yvette Kane to Judge Jennifer P. Wilson, and the plaintiffs again moved for class certification. On January 29, 2020, Magistrate Judge Schwab issued an order requiring that plaintiffs show cause why their claims should not be denied as moot and also issued a recommendation that the plaintiff's motion for class certification be denied due to lack of numerosity, among other grounds. On February 24, 2021, Judge Wilson declined to adopt Magistrate Judge Schwab's recommendation to deny the class certification due to lack of numerosity and recommitted the matter to Magistrate Judge Schwab with instructions to make further findings on whether the plaintiff's claims had been rendered moot by the closure of the Special Management Unit at USP Lewisburg. On March 23, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal after conferring with Defendant's counsel. Both parties agreed that the subject of the plaintiff's legal action had been mooted by the closure of SMU at USP Lewisburg and the transfer of the named plaintiffs to other prisons within the BOP. The case was terminated on March 24, 2021.

Summary: In June 2017, three mentally ill prisoners of the U.S. Penitentiary at Lewisburg (USP Lewisburg) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued USP Lewisburg and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the defendants’ failure to provide adequate treatment for prisoners with mental illness constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs eventually dismissed their claims.


On October 8, 2008, 47 prisoners filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346, against the federal government, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of Hurricane Rita they were subject to inhumane and unsanitary conditions of confinement. Plaintiffs also alleged that the conditions under which they were employed at a UNICOR factory manufacturing Kevlar helmets for a Department of Defense contract were similarly inhumane. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of a delay in production caused by Hurricane Rita they were forced to work grueling days in unsanitary conditions, while also being subject to confinement at the Beaumont Federal Correctional Institution which was heavily damaged by Hurricane Rita and not fit to house prisoners. In February 2009, the U.S. moved to dismiss the case, and in the alternative for summary judgment. Briefing was voluminous, but appears to have ended in October 2009. As of March 2012, the judge had not decided the motion -- and issued a notice stating his intention to decide it soon. This did not happen, however. While the motion was pending, in October 2012, the plaintiffs' lawyer died. No other lawyer appeared to take his place. A year later, in December 2013, Magistrate Judge Giblin recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. District Court Judge Marcia Crone adopted that recommendation, and dismissed the case without prejudice should one or more of the plaintiffs decide to refile. It does not appear that any plaintiff objected.

Summary: 47 inmates at the Beaumont Federal Correctional Institution in Midland, Texas filed a complaint against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions at Beaumont were unsanitary and inhumane, and that as a result of damage to the building caused by Hurricane Rita, they were subjected to confinement in a building unfit for inhabitants. Plaintiffs also alleged they were entitled to damages for working conditions endured while working in a UNICOR factory manufacturing Kevlar helmets. Defendant moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the alternate. Several years later, but before the district court ruled, plaintiffs' counsel died, and the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.


On May 21, 2012, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued five TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: the Director of TDCJ, the Director of Chaplaincy Department, two chaplains, and the Deputy Director of Prison and Jail Operations. He claimed that TDCJ policies violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that the TDCJ policies burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs by preventing him from: 1) smoking a prayer pipe during Native American pipe ceremonies; 2) wearing a religiously significant medicine bag other than within his cell and to and from religious ceremonies; 3) growing long hair, or alternatively, a kouplock, which is “a one inch square section of hair at the base of the skull.” Furthermore, he claimed the grooming policy violated his right to equal protection, because female prisoners were permitted to wear their hair long, but males were not. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring TDCJ to: 1) hire more Native American chaplains; 2) have security personnel available to supervise ceremonies until more chaplains could be hired; 3) allow the plaintiff to grow his hair, or alternatively, a kouplock; 4) smoke a prayer pipe at pipe ceremonies; and 5) wear medicine bags at all times. In addition, the plaintiff sought damages and attorney’s fees and costs. Immediately after filing the complaint, the plaintiff moved to join another Native American prisoner claiming to experience the same deprivations, to whom the Court granted leave to join in June 2012. On June 12, 2012, Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos ordered the consolidation of Davis v. Thaler, docket number 2:12-cv-169 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, with this case because the two were duplicates of each other. At an evidentiary hearing held in front of Magistrate Judge B. Janice Ellington on June 21, 2012, the plaintiff orally moved for and was granted permission to add three employees as defendants: the Program Analyst for Designated Units, the Director of Rehabilitative Programs, and the McConnell Unit Chaplain. The plaintiffs again moved to add an additional defendant on July 12, 2012, and Judge Ellington permitted the Regional Chaplain to be added the following September. On August 16, 2012, the initial plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief. He alleged that he was not being allowed adequate time with his co-plaintiff in the law library to work on their lawsuit. Judge Ellington recommended denying this motion because the plaintiff had not explained what he could accomplish with more law library time and thus, did not suffer an irreparable injury. 2012 WL 4955289. Judge Ramos adopted these recommendations and denied the motion on October 16, 2012. 2012 WL 4959409. On August 30, 2012, the McConnell Unit Chaplain filed a motion to dismiss, to which the plaintiffs agreed. The claims against McConnell Unit Chaplain were dismissed with prejudice. On October 10, 2012, the Program Analyst moved to dismiss the claims against him. Judge Ellington recommended dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for monetary damages against the Program Analyst in his official capacity, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity, and retaining the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim for monetary damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. On January 7, 2013, Judge Ramos adopted this recommendation. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on February 11, 2013 and consented to having a Magistrate Judge conduct all further proceedings. Shortly after, on February 22, 2013, they voluntarily dismissed all of their claims except their three RLUIPA challenges against the TDCJ Director in his official capacity and their First Amendment claim seeking damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. The defendants also consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge and Judge Ramos reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Ellington for all further proceedings on April 29, 2013. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2013. The plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 19, 2013. Judge Ellington granted the defendants’ motion and entered a final judgment in the defendants’ favor for all claims on February 27, 2014. 2012 WL 4959409. On the RLUIPA claims, Judge Ellington found that the policies were a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of their sincerely held beliefs, but that the defendants had demonstrated that they were employing the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interests in security, controlling costs, and prison administration. On the First Amendment claim, Magistrate Judge Ellington found the Program Analyst defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs had not established their First Amendment rights to exercise their religion had been violated. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit on April 2, 2014 and the docket number 14-40339 was assigned. On July 6, 2016 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in part and vacated in part. (Circuit Judges Leslie H. Southwick and Gregg J. Costa, District Judge Halil Suleyman Ozerden). The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claim and the medicine bag RLUIPA claim because the plaintiffs failed to offer explanation as to how the district court erred in granting summary judgment in their appeal. In addition, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the pipe ceremony RLUIPA claim, agreeing with the district court that the logistical, health, and security concerns of permitting the plaintiffs to purchase their own pipes and store them in the chaplain’s office outweighed the need for a religious accommodation. However, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the grooming policy claim under RLUIPA because it was unclear if the district court considered all of the plaintiffs’ summary judgment evidence. Furthermore, the legitimacy of TDJC’s cost and security concerns over the wearing of a kouplock remained disputed, and the district court didn’t consider the plaintiffs’ claim in light of their individual circumstances as low security risk prisoners. 826 F.3d 258. On remand, the district court ordered additional briefing. The defendants filed a motion for clarification of appeal, and on August 8, 2016, the Fifth Circuit clarified there was not a need for a trial at this time. Only additional briefing and a reexamination of the motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA grooming policy claim was necessary. The parties then filed numerous replies and responses. On March 7, 2017, Judge Ellington denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ RLUIPA grooming policy claim because there remained a material dispute as to whether the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of maintaining institutional security. 2017 WL 896299. Judge Ellington recommended that the Fifth Circuit remand the case for trial. In November 2015, the initial prisoner plaintiff was released. In response, on December 21, 2017, the defendant moved to dismiss his claims. The defendant argued that the grooming policy no longer affected this plaintiff’s right to practice his Native American faith and the plaintiff lacked an injury that was likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Judge Ellington agreed and granted the motion on January 25, 2018. On March 2, 2018, the Court on its own motion ordered the consolidation of cases Casey v. Davis (2:14-cv-13) and Cobb v. Morris (2:14-cv-22) with this case. The plaintiffs in these cases challenged the same policies of TDJC, alleging that these policies conflicted with their right to practice their Native American faith in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Similar to Goodman v. Davis, only the plaintiffs’ RLUIPA grooming policy claim survived summary judgment and was set for trial. The cases were accordingly consolidated for trial in front of Judge Ramos. On March 5, 2018, the Court appointed pro-bono counsel from a private firm to represent each of the plaintiffs in the consolidated action. The plaintiffs had previously attempted to get counsel appointed four times, but each time were denied. In July 2018, trial was set for August 29, 2018. Additionally, during this time, the plaintiffs filed a consolidated amended complaint, setting forth their RLUIPA grooming policy claim against the TDCJ Director together. A bench trial was held before Judge Ramos from August 29, 2018 to August 31, 2018. Judge Ramos issued the Court’s findings of fact and conclusion of law on January 24, 2019. He granted the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief permitting them to grow their hair long, consistent with their Native American religious beliefs. The Court noted that the differences between male and female grooming policies was unrelated to any differences in violence, contraband, or hygiene. The Court highlighted how most jails, most state Department of Corrections, and the federal prison system allow male prisoners to have long hair. Furthermore, TDCJ’s employees testified they had never found contraband in long, loose hair and only nuisance contraband in braided hair, casting doubt on their alleged security interests. Finally, the defendant was unable to show that searches would take longer or that the plaintiffs, whom all had little or no history of disciplinary violations, posed any particular danger or threat to prison security. Judge Ramos entered a final judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor on February 26, 2019 and enjoined the defendant from enforcing its male grooming policy against the plaintiffs with respect to the rules preventing the plaintiffs from growing their hair without restriction and wearing it loose. The plaintiffs were also awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Costs were later determined to be $9,803.19, and attorney's fees were $131,298.45. On March 27, 2019, the defendant appealed Judge Ramos’ findings and final judgment to the Fifth Circuit, and the docket number 19-40279 was assigned. Shortly after, the defendant moved to dismiss its own appeal, and the Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on July 9, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, a Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) filed this pro se federal civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He sued multiple TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that TDJC policies that prevented his smoking a prayer pipe during Native American pipe ceremonies, limited his ability to wear a religiously significant medicine bag, and prevented him from growing long hair violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. He sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorney's fees and costs. An additional Native American prisoner plaintiff joined the suit shortly after filing. In February 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, and voluntarily dismissed all of their claims except their three RLUIPA challenges against the TDCJ Director in his official capacity and their First Amendment claim seeking damages against the Program Analyst in his individual capacity. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On February 27, 2014, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted and a final judgment entered in their favor. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit and were successful in getting judgement on the RLUIPA grooming policy claim vacated and remanded. On remand, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the RLUIPA grooming claim was denied. As the RLUIPA grooming policy claim moved towards trial, the initial prisoner plaintiff in the case was released and his claims were dismissed. The Court ordered the consolidation of cases Casey v. Davis (2:14-cv-13) and Cobb v. Morris (2:14-cv-22) with this case, as the two cases also were brought by Native American prisoner incarcerated at the McConnell Unit and involved RLUIPA grooming policy claims moving towards trial. After a bench trial, Judge Ramos granted plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief permitting them to grow their hair long, consistent with their Native American religious beliefs and entered a final judgment on February 26, 2019. The defendant appealed, but moved to dismiss the appeal shortly after. The Fifth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the appeal on July 9, 2019. This case is closed.


On October 17, 2005, a Sunni Muslim incarcerated at Keen Mountain Correctional Center in Virginia filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiff sued officers at the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) and the Keen Mountain Correctional Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The plaintiff alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment. Specifically, he alleged that during his Ramadan fast the defendants deprived him of adequate nutrition and calories in 2002 – 2004, when instead of providing a full 2,200 calories including two hot meals, the defendants only provided 1,000 calories of cold-bag meals. As a result, the plaintiff said he lost 13 pounds and had a diminished religious experience because he was constantly hungry. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged the defendants refused to permit him and other Muslims to conduct the Eid prayer service and Eid-al-Fitr feast to celebrate the completion of Ramadan. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged the loss of nutrition and calories violated his right to Equal Protection and Due Process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff sought punitive damages of $545, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to revise the Ramadan menu to ensure all Ramadan fast participants received adequate nutrition and calories, the option for two hot meals, and the opportunity to participate in the Eid-al-Fitr Observance. The parties consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge and the case was assigned to Judge Pamela Meade Sargent. On January 12, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff voluntarily fasted and was permitted to partake in the Eid-al-Fitr prayer service and feast at a different time than alleged in the complaint. On February 9, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion to supplement his pleadings with similar allegations against the defendants for Ramadan 2005, which occurred in October and November 2005. Judge Sargant granted the motion on February 22, 2006. As the 2006 Ramadan fast approached, the defendants indicated there would be no changes to their Ramadan procedures. In response, on August 30, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to provide an amount of food equivalent to that provided to non-fasting prisoners. On the same day, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel, but Judge Sargent denied the request for counsel on September 8, 2006. On September 22, 2006, the court issued two orders on the outstanding motions for summary judgement and for preliminary injunctive relief. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the court granted it in part and denied it in part. 479 F.Supp.2d 569. In a 53 page opinion, the court found that the 2002 claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for some of the 2003, 2004, and 2005 claims. The court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the following claims, and ordered they be set for trial: -First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was denied adequate nutrition and calories during Ramadan 2004 and the associated Due Process claim regarding this allegation; -First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was denied the Eid-al-Fitr meal following Ramadan 2003 and 2005; and - First Amendment and RLUIPA claims that he was deprived of the Eid-al-Fitr prayer service following Ramadan 2004. In ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court granted the plaintiff's request and ordered the defendants to provide daily food containing approximately 2,200 calories, between sunset and dawn during the 2006 Ramadan period, beginning the next day. The court granted the preliminary injunction because the defendants did not present evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s claim that he suffered weight loss due to the reduced caloric intake during Ramadan and the same weight loss would likely happen during the 2006 Ramadan period. The court held that such weight loss was irreparable harm and the requested relief would not disrupt Keen Mountain food service. On February 16, 2007, the parties participated in a settlement conference. On March 19, 2007, the parties reached an undisclosed settlement and moved for voluntary dismissal of the claims. Judge Sargent dismissed the case and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. The settlement agreement provided plaintiff a $2,250 cash payment and a change in policies surrounding the provision to allow prisoners to celebrate Muslim feasts and their yearly fasts. Prison officials agreed to determine dates for Ramadan in advance by mutual agreement with plaintiff and assistant of an expert from the Islamic Center of Virginia. Further, defendants agreed to not schedule a quarterly lockdown during the Ramadan period, unless emergency necessitated one. The settlement did not proceed smoothly. On January 30, 2009, the plaintiff accused the defendants of acting in bad faith and not providing adequate food. However, the record does not indicate what, if any, actions the court or defendants took to address the new allegations. Since there has been no activity on the docket for over ten years, the case is presumably now closed.

Summary: A Sunni Muslim incarcerated in Virginia Department of Corrections facility (VDOC) brought suit against the officers of the VDOC for failing to provide adequate food to him during his Ramadan fasts and interfering with his participation in post-Ramadan religious events. The court issued a preliminary injunction. In 2007, the parties agreed to settle and the case was dismissed.


On December 19, 2014, three Virginia prisoners placed in administrative segregation at Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), various VDOC prison officials, and the External Review Team, Dual Treatment Team, and Unit Management Team of the Virginia Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the VDOC Operating Procedure 830.A, a self-described Segregation Reduction Step-Down Program designed to help prisoners progress in stages toward a return to the general prison population, violated plaintiffs’ rights. Specifically, they alleged that they had been assigned to the most restrictive status (“IM”) without adequate due process. Due to their classification, they had also been denied the opportunity to participate in the step down process. They claimed that the IM classified prisoners were treated in a discriminatory manner as compared to other prisoners in administrative segregation, and that these conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. They sought to abolish the procedure, be reassigned to a lower classification, and to be granted monetary damages. On January 14, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class and to appoint counsel. On March 6, 2015, District Judge James P. Jones denied both these motions, finding that the circumstances were not “exceptional” so as to justify appointing counsel. Therefore, because the plaintiffs were still bringing the case pro-se, Judge Jones found it inappropriate to grant class certification. On April 8, 2015, Magistrate Judge Robert S. Ballou severed this action into three separate civil suits, one for each plaintiff; the immediate case is for the named plaintiff’s action. Judge Ballou held that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required prisoners to file separate filing fees. The purpose of the act was to force “prisoners to think twice” before filing civil litigation. The court subsequently filed the original complaint under separate dockets for the two other plaintiffs. Both cases were referred to Magistrate Judge Ballou. He dismissed one case (Velazquez v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 7:15-cv-00157-JPJ-RSB) on September 27, 2016. The plaintiff in the other case (Rivera v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 7:15-cv-00235-JPJ-RSB) moved to voluntarily withdraw his action on May 28, 2015. On May 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In it, he alleged that OP 830.A discriminated against IM inmates, who suffered a much more restrictive environment than inmates in other forms of administrative segregation; that IM status permanently prevented an inmate from working his way out of segregated confinement; that officials arbitrarily assigned him to IM status without allowing him to be present or offer argument, contradictory testimony, witnesses, or evidence; that review between the various privilege level status steps was not meaningful; that spiteful officers could falsely report poor behavior or fail to accurately record participation in programming, thus preventing progress to the next step; and that officers routinely approved their own recommendations during the step-down program reviews, in violation of VDOC policy. The plaintiff also complained that OP 830.A affected inmates’ opportunities for parole and earning good conduct time. On July 28, 2016 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgement. On September 28, 2016, Judge Jones granted the defendants’ motion. He held that the plaintiff had failed to show that his conditions of confinement were atypical or significantly harsh as compared to conditions expected within a prison environment. Nor, according to Judge Jones, had the plaintiff shown that the procedure violated his due process rights. Moreover, Judge Jones rejected the plaintiff’s equal protection claim because he held that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to the other prisoners in less restrictive confinement. Judge Jones dismissed all claims against the Virginia Department of Corrections as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). He held that neither the Commonwealth of Virginia nor any governmental entity acting as an arm of the state, such as the VDOC, was a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. 2016 WL 5415903. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s September 28th ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On March 30, 2017, the Circuit Court assigned counsel for the plaintiff. On October 26, 2017, oral arguments were held before Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Robert B. King, and Henry F. Floyd. On November 22, 2017, the Circuit Court panel, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment on the reasoning of the district court. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 19, 2014, three Virginia prisoners placed in administrative segregation at Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the VDOC Operating Procedure 830.A, (a self-described Segregation Reduction Step-Down Program designed to help prisoners progress in stages toward a return to the general prison population), violated plaintiffs’ rights. On September 28, 2016, Judge James P. Jones granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgement. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s September 28th ruling to the Fourth Circuit. On November 22, 2017, a panel of the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, affirmed the judgment on the reasoning of the district court. The case is now closed.


On May 6, 2019, twelve prisoners at the Red Onion and Wallens Ridge supermax prisons, who had each been in solitary confinement for between two and twenty-three years, filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) and the wardens of both Red Onion and Wallens Ridge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs - represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Virginia - sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to damages. The plaintiffs claimed breach of an earlier settlement agreement and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiff alleged that VDOC implemented a renamed version of the “Phase Program,” which was supposedly shut down in an earlier settlement, that “warehoused” prisoners in solitary confinement without any opportunity to re-enter general population conditions. The earlier settlement had ended the "Phase Program" at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center. A class action lawsuit, Brown v. Hutto, was filed in 1981, alleging inhumane conditions and constitutional violations by VDOC. A VDOC investigation revealed that Mecklenburg could not fill its solitary confinement beds with its own prisoners. Instead, the prison had solicited other prisons to refer their prisoners for solitary confinement at Mecklenburg. Unlike the Special Management Unit, which housed prisoners unlikely to be reintroduced to the general population, the "Phase Program" track was designed to allow solitary confinement prisoners to reenter the general population by earning "privileges" for good behavior. But in practice, prisoners were very rarely phased down and prison staff could revoke privileges without oversight or appeals. The parties settled the case in 1985, with VDOC agreeing to end the Phase Program and to not start a similar program in the future. In this case, the Red Onion and Wallens Ridge prisoners alleged that the Step-Down Program was used to keep prisoners in solitary confinement in order to utilize solitary confinement space and justify the high cost of keeping both supermax prisons open. This program was alleged to be a new version of the Phase Program used at the since-demolished Mecklenburg facility. The prisoners alleged that staff at each facility were not trained or knowledgeable about the specific requirements of the Step-Down Program, leading them to keep prisoners in solitary confinement despite evidence that they should be stepped down to the general population. These decisions were not subject to meaningful review, and the review process was not appealable. The prisoners alleged this program caused significant mental and physiological harm to each of them and was implemented without any scientific basis. On May 31, 2019, VDOC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 14, 2019, the remaining defendants also filed a motion to dismiss. Both motions alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As of October 2, 2019, District Judge Robert E. Payne has not issued a decision on either of these motions. The case is ongoing. A documentary about the solitary confinement conditions of Red Onion can be found here.

Summary: On May 6, 2019, twelve prisoners who had been held in solitary confinement in two Virginia supermax prisons for at least two years filed this putative class action lawsuit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that each prison had violated their Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights by continuing to implement a program that intentionally held prisoners in solitary confinement without the possibility of re-entering the general population. They alleged that this program also violated an earlier settlement agreement, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The defendants, the Virginia Department of Corrections, its employees, and the wardens of each prison, filed two motions to dismiss. District Judge Robert E. Payne has not yet issued a decision on either motion.


On February 19, 2016, the plaintiff, a Muslim inmate at the Red Onion State Prison, filed this pro se lawsuit alleging a violation of right to free expression in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia. He sued the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) under 28 U.S.C. 2201, 48 U.S.C. 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He sought declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions, costs, damages, and a jury trial. In the complaint, the plaintiff contested three specific prison policies that he alleged hindered his ability to practice his Sufi Islamic faith. First, he alleged that the prison's policy for Jum'ah, the weekly Islamic gathering, for inmates in solitary confinement like he is, violated his rights. In the general population, Jum'ah is broadcast in common spaces, but for inmates in solitary confinement, a taped version of Jum'ah is given to inmates with televisions. The plaintiff had neither a television nor a means to get a job that would allow him to purchase a television, since he alleged that he was being kept in solitary confinement as a result of his beard length. His second allegation stemmed from the prison's beard policies, saying that he was unable to grow his beard out to the four inches mandated by his faith due to the prison's quarter-inch beard policy. Finally, he focused on prison food policies, saying that his halal dinners no longer became halal once they entered the contaminated food slot all solitary confinement inmates use, and he was not given facilities to make his food halal again. Judge James P. Jones denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction on all issues on March 23, 2016, saying that the claims presented in the complaint did not meet the bar of imminent harm. 2016 WL 1179225. The plaintiff appealed this decision on April 14, 2016. In a December 22, 2016 opinion, the Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's decision regarding the halal food issue and beard issue, but remanded the Jum'ah decision, saying that the court did not provide specific facts to support its decision. 672 Fed.Appx. 259. The case returned to the District Court, and on May 10, 2017, Judge Jones denied the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief on the issue of Jum'ah. 2017 WL 1929669, W.D. Va. This supported Magistrate Judge Pamela Meade Sargeant's recommendation to not grant injunctive relief on March 20, 2017 (2017 WL 9517164 W.D. Va.). This time, the Judge detailed that, since the prison gave him an option to improve his behavior to allow him to get a job that would pay for a television and the plaintiff did not take it, his religious exercise rights were not being infringed. The plaintiff appealed this decision on June 1, and the Fourth Circuit issued a short memorandum opinion declining to take the case on October 31, saying that it had enough information to uphold the District Court's decision. 699 Fed.Appx. 280. On December 15, 2017, Judge Jones issued an opinion on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was filed back before the preliminary injunction appeals on July 13, 2016. He denied the motion for the plaintiff's claims under the RLUIPA, saying that the defendants did not counter the plaintiff's allegations that his continued stay in solitary confinement is related to his refusal to trim his beard as his religion instructs, and that this stay is blocking him from accessing televised Jum'ah. However, he granted summary judgment on the First Amendment free exercise claims on the beard, halal food, and Jum'ah policies, saying that these policies were not an undue burden under existing precedent. The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for summary judgment addressing the RLUIPA issues on January 12, 2018, stating that the plaintiff remains in solitary confinement for disciplinary infractions unrelated to his beard length. Judge Jones granted this motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2018, saying that the defendants presented enough evidence to support this motion this time. 2018 WL 4512074, W.D. Va. The plaintiff appealed this summary judgment decision on October 23, 2018. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment motion and remanded the case on December 6, 2019, saying that the VDOC's use of access to television for religious services as an incentive program unduly burdens the plaintiff's rights to practice a bona fide religious belief. The panel stated that religious practice should be a right, not a privilege that can be taken away through an incentive program. 944 F.3d 243. The case returned to District Court, where the defendants could file another motion for summary judgment consistent with the Fourth Circuit's ruling. The case is ongoing as of May 25, 2020.

Summary: In 2016, the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the Virginia Department of Corrections alleging that their policies for beards, halal food, and television access for religious services for inmates in solitary confinement violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Judge John P. Jones denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief in 2017 and initially granted summary judgment in favor of VDOC in 2018, but the Fourth Circuit overturned him on appeal in late 2019, saying that VDOC's use of access to television for religious services as an incentive program unduly burdens the plaintiff's rights to practice a bona fide religious belief. The panel stated that religious practice should be a right, not a privilege that can be taken away through an incentive program. The case is ongoing.