On June 22, 2006, female financial advisers employed by Morgan Stanley, a financial services firm, filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that Morgan Stanley had a systemic pattern and practice of discriminating against female employees in compensation, promotions, and other areas. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley discriminated against them in promotions, compensation, business, referrals, training, mentoring, and partnership agreements. The complaint requested to certify a class of "[a]ll women employed by Morgan Stanley as financial advisers at any time between August 5, 2003 and the present." Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought: a declaratory judgment; front pay, benefits, back pay, compensatory and punitive damages; liquidated damages for the ADEA claim to the individual plaintiffs; injunctive relief barring Morgan Stanley from engaging in discriminatory practices and compelling them to develop new policies; and attorneys' fees, experts' fees, and costs. On April 24, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement agreement. They filed two revised settlement agreements on July 11 and July 17, respectively. On October 1, 2007, the plaintiffs requested final approval of the settlement. On October 26, 2007, District Judge Richard W. Roberts certified the class, approved the settlement agreement, and approved attorneys' fees and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction over administration of the settlement. The plaintiff class was defined as “all women who were employed as Financial Advisors or Registered Financial Advisor Trainees in the Global Wealth Management Group of Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated (“Morgan Stanley”) or its predecessor(s) at any time from August 5, 2003 through June 30, 2007.” The agreement contained a five-year enforcement period and required the defendant to pay $46 million, $32.5 million of which was allocated for class members' claims and $13.5 million for attorneys' fees, costs as well as monitoring and compliance. A special master was appointed to determine class members' awards based on their contributions to the defendant's business, the discrimination they faced, and other factors according to a formula detailed in the settlement. The injunctive relief included distribution of an anti-harassment policy to all employees; posting positions on an internal job bank; establishing objective promotion and hiring criteria; implementing diversity training; revising the "power ranking" system that ranks financial advisors' production; changing account distribution and referral policies; implementing a complaint process; and other changes. The parties also agreed to appoint a diversity monitor who would report semi-annually to class counsel and to appoint industrial psychologists to develop programs to recruit and promote more women. Only September 19, 2011, the parties jointly proposed to seek transfer of a related case from the Northern District of California to this court for consideration of a proposed consolidated settlement agreement. Judge Roberts approved the consolidation on December 8, 2011 and administratively closed Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. [Case No. C-051298 (PJH)]. The parties filed a consolidated settlement agreement on June 22, 2012. On February 15, 2013, Judge Roberts approved the consolidated class action settlement agreement. The class from the second case was defined as “all women employed as Financial Advisors in (i) the United States branches of Smith Barney’s retail brokerage division at any time from August 30, 2003 forward or (ii) the California branches of Smith Barney’s retail brokerage division at any time from June 25, 2003 forward.” Other terms of the consolidated settlement agreement were similar to the one from before, except that the consolidated agreement added the following: developing a computerized system to generate mail notification of new entry level positions; making recommendations for programs to increase the participation of women; reporting quarterly on efforts in areas of sourcing, recruiting, mentoring a diverse workforce, etc. This settlement agreement was binding on the parties until October 1, 2015. On September 29, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to extend the consolidated settlement agreement for two additional years because the original agreement was set to expire on September 30, 2015. On April 6, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly because Judge Roberts has retired. Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the motion to extend the settlement agreement, which was effective October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2017. There has been no docket activity since the deadline passed, so this case is presumably closed.

Summary: Female financial advisers employed by Morgan Stanley sued under Title VII and the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging that Morgan Stanley had a systemic pattern and practice of discriminating against female employees in compensation, promotions, and other areas. The parties settled, with Morgan Stanley paying $46m in damages, fees, and costs of administration, and agreeing to injunctive relief. This case was later consolidated with Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.


On October 29, 2001, more than 250 African-American current or former U.S. Capitol Police Officers filed this race discrimination lawsuit under the Congressional Accountability Act ("CAA"), 2 U.S.C. § 1311, against the United States Capitol Police Board in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs also included claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the disproportionately low number of African-Americans in the police force and in leadership positions within the force demonstrated rampant racial discrimination. Even though African-Americans comprised more than 60% of the D.C. general population, they made up only 31% of the police force and 16% of ranking positions. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief. On September 30, 2004, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the police boards' motion to dismiss the complaint. Judge Sullivan held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not cover legislative branch employees. Therefore, he held that the plaintiffs could only bring suit under the CAA to challenge employment discrimination. This too was barred because the court only had subject matter jurisdiction over claims in which the plaintiff completed counseling and mediation regarding the alleged violation within the time limits specified by the CAA. Although several plaintiffs had requested mediation, they had failed to participate. Judge Sullivan held that such actions could not satisfy the "completing mediation" requirement within the CAA, but he granted the plaintiffs the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration if they properly complied. 338 F.Supp.2d 97. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider on January 14, 2005. Judge Sullivan denied their motion without prejudice on August 4, 2005, in an unpublished order. He referred the issue to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola to determine whether any individual class members were entitled to relief. Throughout 2006, there was extensive litigation over the plaintiffs' attorneys' motions to withdraw as counsel to individual plaintiffs who had failed to pay or communicate with attorneys. These motions were denied and granted in part as to certain plaintiffs. 2006 WL 891163; 2007 WL 841019. The case was also consolidated with several others against the Police Board. Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a Report and Recommendation on March 19, 2007, in which he lamented the plaintiffs' failure to comply with Judge Sullivan's September 30, 2004, order requiring parties to clearly demonstrate their compliance with counseling and mediation as demanded under the CAA. Magistrate Judge Facciola noted that much of the evidence subsequently provided by plaintiffs was either inconsistent or insufficient. It was therefore only a "place to start." Based on the evidence provided, he:

dismissed with prejudice claims where the plaintiffs had clearly failed to exhaust administrative remedies;

dismissed without prejudice claims where the plaintiffs seemed to have exhausted the administrative remedies, but failed to provide the court with sufficient evidence; and,

upheld claims where the plaintiffs had clearly exhausted administrative remedies.

2007 WL 841019. On May 15, Magistrate Judge Facciola dismissed with prejudice the second group after the plaintiffs had failed to provide supporting documents to demonstrate compliance with the CAA. 2007 WL 1438763. On August 15, 2007, the Court adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Facciola, thereby dismissing with prejudice a substantial number of the remaining claims. 2007 WL 6847408. The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued its opinion on July 31, 2009. The case was heard before Judge David Bryan Sentelle, Judge Douglas Ginsburg, and Judge Judith Rogers. There were three aspects of the district court's ruling at issue: (1) whether the three-step process requiring counseling and mediation before an employee could file a complaint was jurisdictional, (2) whether in-person attendance by the employee was required at counseling or mediation, and (3) whether receipt of end of counseling and mediation notices demonstrated completion of counseling and mediation. The Court of Appeals (with the opinion written by Judge Rogers) affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to whether the three-step process was jurisdictional, holding that it was. Yet, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's in-person ruling, holding that the CAA did not require in-person attendance by the employee at counseling or mediation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that receipt from the Office of Compliance of written notice of the end of mediation did demonstrate the employee's completion of counseling and mediation. The case was then remanded. 575 F.3d 699. On May 10, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a Joint Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint, re-alleging that the defendant had violated the CAA and that the action was properly maintainable as a class action under FRCP 23(a). On August 12, 2010, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, alleging lack of jurisdiction. While awaiting the court's ruling, the parties continued to dispute discovery matters. On March 9, 2012, the court referred the case again to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola for resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss the fourth amended complaint. On December 14, 2012, the Magistrate Judge Facciola issued a report and recommendation regarding whether the complaint should be dismissed. In it, Magistrate Judge Facciola noted that vast majority of the plaintiffs should be dismissed for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies as required under the CAA, while the plaintiffs who submitted enough evidence of exhaustion should proceed past the motion to dismiss ("Appendix II"), and the rest of remaining plaintiffs should be dismissed with prejudice. Finally, Magistrate Judge Facciola identified five plaintiffs for whom additional clarification was necessary. Both parties responded and objected to the Magistrate Judge Facciola’s report and recommendation. On July 10, 2013, the plaintiffs sought to amend or correct the amended complaint. The defendant opposed the motion, and the court did not issue an order on the matter. From September 2013 through April 2015 there was no activity on the docket. On April 21, 2015, counsel for the plaintiffs moved for a hearing on a motion to withdraw. In a May 1, 2015, minute order, the court ordered the plaintiffs to file a motion to withdraw, and Judge Sullivan temporarily stayed the case to allow the plaintiff time to acquire new counsel. Hearings were rescheduled several times throughout 2015 and 2016. On October 13, 2016, U.S. District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan issued a memorandum opinion resolving the plaintiffs' objections to Magistrate Judge Facciola's dismissal of most of their claims, and the plaintiff's motion to file a fifth amended complaint. Judge Sullivan adopted in part and rejected in part Magistrate Judge Facciola's recommendations, thereby dismissing many, but not all, of the plaintiffs' claims on jurisdictional grounds. He also denied the plaintiffs' motion to file a fifth amended complaint. On February 14, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on one of the claims Judge Sullivan dismissed, which was denied on March 30, 2018. On February 19, 2019, one plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of a mediator to assist in the mediation of settlement discussion of all claims by this plaintiff. The court also agreed to provide court-appointed counsel for the pro se plaintiffs during the mediation phase. By July 30, 2019, one plaintiff was represented by private counsel and the other eight represented themselves pro se. On that day, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's August 12, 2010, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction for the reasons laid out in the October 13, 2016, memorandum opinion. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration on August 21, 2019. In their August 27, 2019 status report, the plaintiffs stated that the defendant's counsel had been unresponsive to communication from the plaintiffs. At the end of 2019, and again at the end of 2020, the defendant found new counsel. The court granted the plaintiff's August 21, 2019 motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2021. The court also denied without prejudice the individual plaintiff's motion for mediation from February 19, 2019, wanting to wait until the court ruled on the defendant's anticipated motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This case was brought by several African-American current or former U.S. Capitol Police Officers against the United States Capitol Police Board. Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendant engaged in a pattern and practice of race discrimination in employment. On October 13, 2016, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss most of plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider which the court denied, and the court reaffirmed its reasoning on July 30, 2019. The case is ongoing.


On August 24, 2006, the Wilmington office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against I.G. Burton of Seaford in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated ADEA-protected rights of the complainant, who worked for the defendant as a "runner," driving and delivering vehicles, by firing him on the basis of his age. On December 17, 2007, the parties entered into a consent decree, which the court adopted two days later and closed the case. Under the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $70,000 in damages to three former employees that they terminated on the basis of age. The decree enjoined the defendants from discriminating unlawfully on the basis of age, and it required them to post notice of their employees' rights in a conspicuous location at their place of business. Under the decree, the EEOC had the right to send a representative (unannounced) to the defendants' place of business to determine whether they were in compliance with the terms of the consent decree that required them to post such notice. The defendants agreed to provide EEO training to all management personnel within 180 days of the entry of the consent decree, and annually thereafter during the life of the decree. The defendants were required to send a report to the EEOC within 10 days of their completion of the training requirements of the decree. The defendants agreed to provide the EEOC with a copy of all training materials that they used to train their management personnel. They also agreed to give the EEOC the right to prior approval of the person that they hired to administer the training. The terms of the agreement were to run for 3 years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2010.

Summary: The EEOC filed this Age Discrimination in Employment Act case against I.G. Burton of Seaford alleging that the defendant had fired an employee due to his age. The parties entered into a three-year consent decree. Under the decree, the defendant agreed to pay $70,000 in damages to three former employees and provide training and take other steps to prevent further violations.


On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Autozone, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The EEOC alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought injunctive and monetary relief. More specifically, the complainant, a female employee who intervened in this lawsuit, was allegedly subjected to sexual harassment and then illegally discharged for asserting her rights. Judge Timothy Corrigan and Judge Monte Richardson were assigned to this case. The defendant sought summary judgment, but the court denied this on July 1, 2008. Judge Corrigan ordered the case to be set for settlement conferences before Judge Richardson on July 28, 2008. After some settlement discussions, the parties came to an agreement. On December 24, 2008, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. Pursuant to the consent decree, the court retained jurisdiction over the matter for two years. This decree required that: 1. The defendant was prohibited from engaging in conduct in violation of Title VII, and was prohibited from sex discrimination and retaliation. 2. The defendant was required to provide anti-discrimination training to its employees. 3. The defendant was required to pay the plaintiffs $150,000.00 for monetary relief. Around $100,000 went to the individual claimants, and $50,000 was to be used to cover attorney's fees. 4. The defendant had to report all complaints of sexual harassment or retaliation to the EEOC. 5. The defendant had to keep a record of all complaints of sex discrimination and retaliation for EEOC inspection. 6. The defendant had to post on its employee bulletin board a notice that would detail this lawsuit. The two year consent decree was carried out without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the complainant, who intervened to become a plaintiff, brought this suit against Autozone, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The case ended in a consent decree.


On June 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this sex discrimination and retaliation suit in the Fort Lauderdale U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against DTG Operations, Inc., (doing business as Dollar Rent A Car) on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged that DTG had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.) by subjecting the employee to a hostile work environment and firing her in retaliation for opposing the harassment. According to the EEOC, the employee's direct supervisor subjected her to frequent physical and verbal sexual harassment. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, back pay, reinstatement, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The Court (Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga) allowed the employee to intervene in the case on October 14, 2004. The employee amended her complaint on April 21, 2005, seeking substantially the same relief as the EEOC but suing for violation of Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. 760 et seq.), for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Kenneth A. Marra) entered as a consent decree on October 7, 2005. The 3-year decree provided the employee with $395,000 ($15,000 in lost wages, $220,805.58 in compensatory and punitive damages, and $159,194.42 in attorneys' fees and costs) and subjected DTG to a variety of injunctive provisions. Under the terms of the decree, DTG agreed not to engage in sexual harassment and not to retaliate against employees who file charges or otherwise cooperate with the EEOC. DTG was required to distribute its anti-harassment policy to all employees, to provide 4 hours of sex discrimination training annually to all managers and supervisory personnel at the facility in which the employee worked, to post an equal employment notice, to report sexual harassment claims and their resolution to the EEOC every six months, to expunge the employee's personnel file, and to provide a letter of reference. No further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On June 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation suit in the Fort Lauderdale U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against DTG Operations, Inc., (doing business as Dollar Rent A Car) on behalf of a female employee. The employee intevened in the case. The parties entered a consent decree that provided for monetary relief ($395,000) and injunctive relief, such as antidiscrimination, antiretaliation, training, and notice-posting provisions. The case is now closed.


After an unsuccessful attempt to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process, on January 25, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The EEOC alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") against Bay State Milling Company. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the defendant discriminated against a qualified applicant when the hiring manager rejected him because of his age. The hiring manager informed the applicant of the company's desire to hire a younger individual for the job. The company ultimately hired a 22-year-old with less experience than the applicant. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well reinstatement of the affected individual. District Judge Donald L. Graham was assigned to this case. The parties agreed upon a settlement agreement on November 12, 2013. The two-year consent decree settling the lawsuit, approved by the court on December 10, 2013, included injunctive relief to ban the defendant from considering age as a factor when making hiring decisions, mandatory training for the hiring manager, and interviewing officials and the company's human resources department, with an emphasis on age-related discriminatory practices and age sensitivity. The decree also provided for a number of reporting requirements, subjecting the company to additional monitoring by the EEOC for a period of two years. The monetary award was $80,185.66, which included back pay and liquidated damages. On May 5, 2014, the individual plaintiff moved to vacate the settlement, proceeding pro se because of a dispute in the settlement amount. The defendant opposed the plaintiff’s motion. On July 25, 2014, the matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Jonathan Goodman who issued a Report and Recommendation. On August 17, 2014, District Judge Graham adopted the Magistrate’s reports. He denied the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the settlement agreement and granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to enforce settlement by: (i) ordering the plaintiff to execute a W-9 form; (ii) requiring defendant to, as soon as practicable, pay the plaintiff after he provides defendant with his W-9 form; and (iii) denying defendant's request for attorney's fees. This case is closed.

Summary: On January 2013, the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Bay State Milling Company, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). . The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well reinstatement of the affected individual. The parties agreed upon a settlement agreement on November 12, 2013.


On May 8, 2013, the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000 against Dynamic Medical Services, Inc. The EEOC brought the matter on behalf of several salespeople employed by Dynamic Medical Services, a medical and chiropractic practice, and sought injunctive and monetary relief on their behalf. The plaintiffs alleged disparate treatment based on religion and a hostile working environment. Three named employees later intervened in the case as plaintiffs on their own behalf, alleging retaliation under Florida state law. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the salespeople at Dynamic Medical Services were coerced into adopting Scientology religious views and practices. The complaint states that they were required to attend weekly meetings consisting of Scientology readings and practices and coerced into attending meetings at the local Church of Scientology; one plaintiff alleges a retaliatory firing for not doing so. Examples of Scientology practices here include screaming at an ashtray and staring silently at another person for eight hours. In filing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, defendants argued that the Scientology practices in question were actually business training methods, and thus not the basis for a claim under the Civil Rights Act. Further, defendants contended that plaintiffs failed to allege that employees articulated sincerely held religious beliefs in conflict with the practices or provide evidence of disparate treatment. On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Kathleen M. Williams) issued a consent decree approving a settlement in the case. Dynamic Medical Services agreed to pay $170,000 in compensatory damages and consented to a variety of injunctive measures. Dynamic Medical Services agreed to refrain from discriminating on the basis of religion and to accommodate requests based on religious practice. Specifically, they agreed to draft an anti-discrimination policy and submit it to the EEOC for approval. Further, Dynamic Medical Services agreed to ensure that employees are not subjected to hostile work environments. The decree outlined a mechanism for complaint reporting and allowed the EEOC to review compliance with the decree. Finally, the decree called for annual employee training for each year the decree is in effect on procedures for reporting discrimination, harassment, or retaliation and procedures for requesting a religious accommodation. The decree did not include attorneys' fees. The District Court retained jurisdiction to enforce this decree for four years. As of December 8, 2018, there has been no further activity on the docket and presumably the monitoring period has ended.

Summary: On May 8, 2013, the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000 against Dynamic Medical Services, Inc., on behalf of several sales employees. Plaintiffs alleged that they were coerced into adopting Scientology religious views and practices. In December of 2013, the case was settled for $170,000 and a series of anti-discrimination measures on the part of Dynamic.


In September 2002, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against HQ Global Workplaces, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the defendant maintained policies on leave and part-time status availability precluding reasonable accommodation in violation of the ADA, terminated complainant based on her disability, and disciplined complainant's manager for providing complainant with a reasonable accommodation. Following some discovery, the parties jointly dismissed the lawsuit in May 2003.


In November 2004, the EEOC's Chicago District Office filed suit in United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, against Sears Roebuck and Company, alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. According to the complaint, Sears Roebuck failed to live up to its obligations under the ADA to make reasonable accommodations when it enacted an inflexible company policy mandating a maximum of one year leave time and refused to grant exceptions for employees with disabilities. Sears Roebuck moved to dismiss the case, but the motion was denied. On March 14, 2008, the parties notified the court that they would participate in mediation. The parties held settlement discussions while still undergoing discovery, and advised the court in the summer of 2009 that they had reached a settlement. On September 29, 2009, Judge Wayne R. Andersen signed an order approving a consent decree. The consent decree required Sears to make payment to individual claimants from a $6.2 million Qualified Settlement Fund, prohibited it from discriminating against employees by not providing reasonable accommodations and from retaliating against employees who made allegations of discrimination, and required it to provide training to human resources personnel. The order also required Sears to post notice of the decree to its employees, and required detailed record keeping and reporting. Finally, the order required revision of Sears’ workers compensation policies. Each party bore its own costs and attorneys’ fees. The consent decree lasted for three years, and the matter appears to be closed.

Summary: The EEOC filed suit against Sears Roebuck and Company, alleging that Sears violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by enacting an inflexible workers compensation policy, and failing to provide reasonable accommodations to employees seeking to return to work after injury. The court approved a consent decree, which required payment to individual claimants, revision of policies, recordkeeping, reporting, and training. The matter appears to be closed.


On February 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the Board of Trustees for Southern Illinois University (SIU) under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The Department of Justice asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against non-specified minorities on the basis of race and white males on the basis of race and gender. The plaintiffs alleged that the Proactive Recruitment of Multicultural Professionals for Tomorrow ("PROMPT"), the Bridge to the Doctorate ("BRIDGE"), and the Graduate Dean's fellowship programs were each only open to members of "underrepresented minority groups"--namely, Hispanics, African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Pacific Islanders as well as women. These discriminatory practices, they argued, amounted to employment discrimination against persons not members of those groups, on the basis of race, national origin, and/or sex. The day after the lawsuit was filed, Judge J. Phil Gilbert approved and entered a consent decree whereby SIU agreed to hire, employ, compensate, provide terms, conditions and privileges of employment to, persons for any paid fellowship position without discriminating on the basis of race, national origin or sex. In addition, the SIU Board agreed to provide mandatory training to all academic recruiters and employees in recruiting activities regarding Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination within 6 months. There were also additional records and reporting requirements in the consent decree. The consent decree was scheduled to dissolve at the end of two years from February 9, 2006. On December 2, 2008, Judge Gilbert terminated this case pursuant to the consent decree. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the Board of Trustees for Southern Illinois University under Title VII in the Southern District of Illinois. The Department of Justice asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant discriminated against non-specified minorities on the basis of race and white males on the basis of race and gender. The day after, the parties entered into a consent decree with injunctive reliefs and the case was dismissed on December 2, 2008.


On January 11, 2001, two female employees of Mid-West Wire Specialties, an Illinois company, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued their employer alleging that it had subjected them to a sex-based harassment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Represented by private counsel, they sought injunctive and monetary relief. Both plaintiffs claimed that male employees repeatedly harassed and mistreated them by forcefully kissing them, grabbing their bodies, demoting one of the plaintiffs when she rejected her supervisor’s sexual gestures, lowering their salaries, making sexually explicit comments, and asking to take off their clothes, among other actions. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of these actions by the defendant and its employees, they were harmed in many ways, including loss in pay, mental anguish, and damages to their employability and earning capacity. On August 30, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, which added a female complainant and added claims that the two initial plaintiffs represented a class of employees affected by a pattern and practice of a hostile work environment, quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation. On June 25, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, which added a fourth female complainant. The complaint asked that the class consist of all female employees, temporary employees, and applicants for employment, who have been employed or applied to be employed by the defendant on or after July 1996 and who are subject to the defendant’s employment and human resources policies, including but not limited to current or former employees, and who have been, continue to be, or may in the future be, adversely affected by the defendant’s practices. On July 26, 2002, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement, which provided damages for the named plaintiff and a class of employees, and some injunctive relief. The settlement class in the agreement covered A) all current and former full-time female employees of the defendant who worked there at any time between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2001; B) all temporary female workers at the defendant company and performed services there for any 20 consecutive work-days between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2001. The settlement agreement awarded monetary damages of as follows: 1) $500 in punitive damages to each temporary worker in the class; 2) $2,000 in punitive damages to each employee in the class; 3) $20,000 to each of the two complainants that were added in the first and second amended complaints, $15,000 of which was punitive damages and $5,000 was backpay; 4) $35,000 to each of the two initial plaintiffs, $30,000 of which was punitive damages and $5,000 was backpay. The defendant was also obligated to pay $130,000 in attorney fees. The total was capped at $283,500. In addition, there was non-monetary relief. It was all scheduled to happen within 60 days of the settlement; no period was set for enforcement. It provided: 1) Purge of specified disciplinary notices in class member personnel files 2) A ban on rehiring of a named employee (who had been accused of the most egregious harassment) 3) Retention of a Spanish-speaking administrator to report directly to the defendant's President, responsible for enforcing the Company's harassment policy, including the investigation of complaints. 4) Enforcement of a Harassment Policy promulgated February 15, 2002. After a fairness hearing, Judge Sidney Schenkier approved the settlement agreement on August 2, 2002. No further entries appear on the docket sheet. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2001, four former employees of Mid-West Wire Specialties, Inc. filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against them on the basis of their sex, female, in violation of Title VII, in that they were sexually harassed by other employees of the defendant and faced retaliation for resisting the sexual advances. In 2002, the parties reached a settlement that awarded monetary damages and backpay for for class members. The case closed in August 2002.


On July 12th, 2000 eight female employees filed suit in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois against DaimlerChrysler Corp. All of the plaintiffs worked at DaimlerChrysler's assembly plant in Belvedere, IL. They alleged a variety of claims that varied from plaintiff to plaintiff including age, gender, and race discrimination, and violations of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The principle specific allegations concerned DaimlerChrysler's failure to promote and train fairly and to accommodate one plaintiff's diabetes. Judge Philip G. Reinhard referred the case to Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney who presided over discovery. As discovery progressed the configuration of the plaintiff group changed. Several plaintiffs dropped the private counsel they had jointly employed and appeared pro se. The court dismissed the complaints of several plaintiffs with prejudice for failure to prosecute when they failed to attend discovery hearings. On May 15th, 2001 four of the original plaintiffs filed an amended complaint setting out common allegations of age, race, and gender discrimination, and violations of the ADA. On July 9th, 2001 DaimlerChrysler filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs were tardy in serving the original complaint. Plaintiffs' counsel had missed the deadline by a day. The district judge (Judge Reinhard) agreed that DaimlerChrysler was correct but exercised judicial discretion and extended the deadline, and denied the motion. Discovery continued over the next year. Several more plaintiffs were dismissed, one with and one without prejudice. Eventually individual settlements were reached with each of the remaining plaintiffs. The exact terms of these settlements are not available. The case was completely dismissed on October 29th, 2002.

Summary: On July 12th, 2000 eight female employees filed suit in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Illinois against DaimlerChrysler Corp. They alleged DaimlerChrysler engaged in age discrimination, gender discrimination, race discrimination, and violations of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). As discovery progressed various plaintiffs were added and some were dismissed from the case. Settlement negations concerning the remaining plaintiffs resulted in individual settlement agreements. The exact terms of these settlements are not available. The case was completely dismissed on October 29th, 2002.


On October 24, 2008, a group of male and female African-American financial advisors filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief, alleging that Merrill Lynch had engaged in a nationwide pattern and practice of race and gender discrimination and employed policies and practices that had a disparate impact on African-American and female financial advisors. Specifically, the employees claimed Merrill Lynch's recently announced bonus procedure disadvantaged African Americans and women because they were paid less than their white male colleagues. All nine plaintiffs in this action were involved in another action against their employer for race discrimination, which ultimately reached settlement in August 2013. In this case, on March 29, 2011, the District Court (Judge Gettleman) granted Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It held that the plaintiff's complaint contained insufficient factual allegations to make it plausible that the defendant's production-based compensation system was adopted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race. Under Title VII Section 703(h), employers are allowed to compensate employees differently on the basis of seniority, merit, or quality or quantity of production unless the differences in compensation result from an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. On October 3, 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiffs did not assert any new claims from their earlier suit.

Summary: Financial advisors who sued their employer, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., for race and gender discrimination in compensation did not state a plausible claim, so their complaint was dismissed pursuant to Title VII Section 703(h), which allows employers to compensate employees differently on the basis of seniority, merit, or quality or quantity of production. The differences in compensation are only unlawful when they result from an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.


On December 23, 2013, the Indianapolis District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued Bright Petroleum under Title VII of 42 U.S.C §2000e. The plaintiffs alleged Bright Petroleum subjected a female employee to unwarranted scrutiny and discipline and discharged her because she filed and maintained a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC asked the court for a permanent injunction enjoining Bright Petroleum from engaging in retaliatory practices or any other employment discrimination practices; an order for Bright Petroleum to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which provide equal employment opportunities; an order for Bright Petroleum to compensate a discharged employee; and punitive damages. Bright Petroleum answered the complaint on March 6, 2014 and the EEOC moved to strike insufficiently pleaded defenses on March 12, 2014. On December 19, 2014, Judge Sarah Evans Barker entered a consent decree. The consent decree stipulated that any business owned, managed, or operated by the owners of Bright Petroleum were permanently enjoined from discriminating or retaliating against any person because of opposition to any practice made unlawful under Title VII, because such person files a charge of discrimination alleging an unlawful employment action, or because such person participates in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. Bright Petroleum paid the plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The consent decree further required Bright Petroleum to write plaintiff a recommendation letter, modify plaintiff’s personnel file to remove reference to this suit, and to not reference plaintiff’s termination, charge of discrimination, or participation in the suit if contacted for references, a provision that survives the expiration of the decree. The court retained jurisdiction of the case for the three years of its term. This case is presumably closed because as of March 2019, no further docket activity has occurred.

Summary: In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against Bright Petroleum for scrutinizing, disciplining and discharging against its female employee who filed a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC and Bright Petroleum entered a three-year consent decree on December 12, 2014.


On December 19, 2005, former employees of the Boeing Company filed this class action in the United States District Court of Kansas against Boeing, Spirit Aerosystems Inc., the Onex Corporation, and Midwestern Aircraft. The employees alleged violations of various laws during the layoff and rehire process that took place in connection with Boeing's sale of its commercial airplane manufacturing facilities to Onex. In 2005, Boeing sold its Wichita and Oklahoma facilities to Onex, which created Spirit as a subsidiary specifically for the purpose of purchasing the facilities. As part of the sale, Boeing terminated all employees at those facilities in two mass layoffs in May and June of 2005. Some but not all of those laid-off employees were then hired by Spirit. Those not hired by Spirit filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, and class certification. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Boeing's layoff process started in 2002 as part of a plan to reduce the average age and wage of its workforce in order to make the facilities more attractive to potential buyers. The plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class of all former Wichita or Oklahoma facility employees who were terminated or laid off by Boeing and not re-hired by Onex and who were over age 40 or older on the date of termination, layoff, or non-hire. On February 27, 2006, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims against Midwestern, leaving Boeing, Spirit and Onex as the only co-defendants. And on November 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Monti L. Belot) granted the plaintiffs' motion for conditional class certification and notice under the ADEA. On December 18, 2006, the Court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings in part and dismissed the plaintiffs' recordkeeping and OWBPA claims. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment; on October 30, 2007, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and dismissed both the ADEA claim stemming from conduct that occurred prior to January 1, 2005 and the retaliation claim. 2007 WL 3231526. Because the Court ruled that the ADEA claims could only be granted from January 1, 2005, part of the previously certified class was dismissed as well. The claims remaining after these dismissals were the ADEA claim for conduct after January 1, 2005, the ERISA claim, and the LMRA claim. During the discovery process, the plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to dismiss all claims against Onex and add factual allegations and a civil conspiracy claim. The defendants opposed the plaintiffs' citation to documents protected by an agreed protective order and argued that the conspiracy claim was futile. On May 21, 2008, the Court (Magistrate Judge Karen M. Humphreys) ordered the parties to confer on the discovery issues and granted the plaintiffs' motion in part but denied them leave to add the conspiracy claim. The claims against Onex were dismissed on June 24, 2008, while claims against Boeing and Spirit remained. 2008 WL 191418 (D. Kan. Jan. 22, 2008); 2008 WL 5211001 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 2008). The case was reassigned to Judge Eric F. Melgren on October 21, 2008. The plaintiffs moved to recuse Judge Melgren for his previous representation of Boeing and his position as a partner at the law firm representing Boeing in this case. Judge Melgren denied the motion on July 2, 2009. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' remaining claims and asked the Court to decertify the class under the ADEA. The Court granted summary judgment on June 30, 2010 with regard to the ERISA claims, the LMRA claims, ADEA pattern or practice of intentional age discrimination claim, and ADEA disparate impact claim. 722 F. Supp. 2d 1218. The Court found that the statistical disparities in the experts' reports were not significant enough to suggest an inference of discrimination in this case. And by this point, the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was moot. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and asked the Court for additional time for discovery, which was denied on March 28, 2011. 2011 WL 1118835 (D. Kan. Mar. 28, 2011). The only claim remaining was the disparate treatment claim under the ADEA. The plaintiffs appealed the Court's two summary judgment decisions and the denial of reconsideration to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. 691 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2012). On December 6, 2012, the plaintiffs requested an order to determine whether the single file rule applied based on this Court's decision and subsequent affirmation by the Tenth Circuit, determine the date that the statute of limitations began to run again, and toll that date by 90 days after the Court's ruling. Both parties jointly filed a motion to sever the pro se plaintiffs for their individual ADEA claims of disparate treatment, which was granted by the Court on January 10, 2013. Those who did not pursue their individual claims against the defendants were subsequently dismissed. On March 22, 2013, the remaining 87 plaintiffs filed a fifth amended complaint against the defendants, claiming disparate treatment in violation of the ADEA. On July 15, 2013, Magistrate Judge Humphreys denied the defendants' motion to sever. After the defendants requested a Bill of Costs, Magistrate Judge Humphreys ordered $50,425.49 in costs for the defendants on August 26, 2013. The plaintiffs appealed this estimate on September 24, 2013 while the parties continued to litigate over the ADEA violation. On December 9, 2013, Judge Melgren denied the plaintiff's motion for the single file rule and to toll the date on the statute of limitations. 2013 WL 6440229. The plaintiffs appealed the order on January 7, 2014. During discovery disputes that followed, a number of individual plaintiffs settled with defendants and were subsequently dismissed. On June 20, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 11, 2014, the remaining plaintiffs appealed the order for costs granted for the defendants. Judge Melgren held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 22, 2015, and the plaintiffs failed to appear at the hearing. On January 7, 2015, Judge Melgran denied the motion on costs and granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the remaining 26 plaintiffs had repeatedly failed to comply with discovery requests or adequately participate in the proceedings; the court had warned that if they continued to fail to comply, the case would be dismissed. 2015 WL 93653. On February 9, 2015, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Tenth Circuit. However, this appeal was not filed timely and the plaintiffs were forced to file a motion allowing a late appeal citing a personal emergency. On April 8, 2015, Judge Melgran denied the motion because the plaintiffs had consistently demonstrated a lack of interest in the case and had not adequately pled reason for the late filing. 2015 WL 1549107. The plaintiffs appealed the motion on April 17, 2015. On June 3rd, the court ordered that the plaintiffs also file an appeal of the dismissal of the February 9th appeal within ten days of the order. When the plaintiffs failed to do so, the appeal was dismissed on June 16, 2015 for failure to prosecute. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 19, 2005 a group of former employees of the Boeing Company filed suit in the United States District Court of Kansas against the Boeing Company (Boeing), Spirit Aerosystems Inc. (Spirit), the Onex Corporation (Onex) and Midwestern Aircraft (Midwestern). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification, alleging pattern or practice of age discrimination, disparate impact and disparate treatment by the defendants during the layoff and rehire process, in connection with Boeing's sale of its commercial airplane manufacturing facilities to Onex. The plaintiffs brought eight claims, two of which were dismissed during the pleading stage, five were dismissed as the District Court granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor in two separate opinions. The plaintiffs appealed to the 10th Circuit Court, but the 10th Circuit affirmed the lower court's decisions. The remaining claim in the case after the Circuit Court decision was the plaintiffs' ADEA claim of disparate treatment. A number of individual plaintiffs settled with defendants. After the plaintiffs failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to dismiss, Judge Melgran granted the motion. The plaintiffs appealed on February 9, 2015, and the appeal was dismissed on June 16, 2015 for failure to prosecute. The case is closed.


In February 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) district office New Orleans, Louisiana brought this action against the Jonesboro Manufacturing Company in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it discriminated against her because of her sex. Specifically, she alleged that a male coworker repeatedly made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and after she complained nothing was done. The defense immediately filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the summons and complaint. While this motion was pending, the EEOC voluntarily dismissed the case.

Summary: In February 2001, the EEOC brought this Title VII sex discrimination action against the Jonesboro Manufacturing Company on behalf of an employee who claimed that a male coworker repeatedly made inappropriate sexual comments to her, and after she complained nothing was done. The defense immediately filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve the summons and complaint. While this motion was pending, the EEOC voluntarily dismissed the case.


On August 22, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation claim against Tasa, Inc., (doing business as Orr Minden Country Chevrolet) on behalf of a black employee who had a pending race discrimination charge against Tasa and who had been fired with no discipline or warnings prior to the firing. The complaint was filed with a joint motion for a consent decree, which the Court (Donald E. Walter) approved on November 11, 2005. The terms of the decree provided for damages ($60,000 to the employee) and injunctive relief. The parties bore their own costs. Under the decree, Tasa, Inc., had to provide annual Title VII training to all its employees in Louisiana, to post an EEOC poster in a conspicuous location, to report to the EEOC annually the date, attendees, and subject matters of the Title VII trainings, and to institute and follow a promotion policy. The promotion policy required that all vacant positions be posted before an employee is promoted to the positions, that all qualified candidates be interviewed, and that all applications, resumes, and interview notes be maintained. The decree expired automatically after three years. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 22, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation claim against Tasa, Inc., (doing business as Orr Minden Country Chevrolet) on behalf of a black employee who had a pending race discrimination charge and no discipline or warnings at the time of his firing. The complaint was filed with a joint motion for a consent decree, which the Court (Donald E. Walter) approved on November 11, 2005. The terms of the decree provided for damages ($60,000 to the employee) and injunctive relief. The parties bore their own costs. Under the decree, Tasa, Inc., had to provide annual Title VII training to all employees in Louisiana, to post an EEOC poster in a conspicuous location, to report to the EEOC annually the date, attendees, and subject matters of the Title VII trainings, and to institute and follow a promotion policy. The promotion policy required that all vacant positions be posted before an employee is promoted to the positions, that all qualified candidates be interviewed, and that all applications, resumes, and interview notes be maintained. The decree expired automatically after three years. The case is now closed.


On April 13, 2015, a transgender man who was fired because he refused to agree to dress and be treated as a woman while at work filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiff sued his employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 200e <i>et seq.</i>). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to back pay and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff alleged that the local branch of his former employer had discriminated against him on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the vice president of the company flew to his branch office shortly after learning that the plaintiff was a transgender man. The vice president then attempted to get the plaintiff to sign a statement that required the plaintiff to either present and be treated as a woman while at work or lose his job. The plaintiff refused to sign and was terminated. The plaintiff then filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which found that the plaintiff had been discriminated against and issued a Notice of a Right to Sue. On September 1, 2015, the EEOC filed a notice of intent to intervene in the case, and the intervention was granted on September 16, 2015. The case was assigned to District Judge Carl Barbier. On September 2, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case based on improper venue, which the court denied on October 2, 2015. 135 F. Supp. 3d 540. On November 5, 2015, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The defendant pointed out that the plaintiff signed an employment agreement that included an arbitration provision. The court agreed with the defendant that enforcement of the arbitration provision did not violate plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury, citing the standard stated by the Fifth Circuit that “in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress declared a national policy in favor of arbitration.” Therefore, the court granted the motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings on December 10, 2015. 150 F. Supp. 3d 709. The EEOC's motion to reconsider staying the EEOC's claims because its claims are not referable to arbitration was denied on March 7, 2016. The EEOC's claims were then stayed pending completion of the arbitration. 2016 WL 879995. On December 1, 2016, the plaintiff notified the court of the arbitrator’s decision. The arbitrator found that the defendant had discriminated against the plaintiff because the defendant had used sex and gender stereotypes in its treatment of the plaintiff. The arbitrator found that, by trying to force the plaintiff to present and be treated as female, the defendant had violated Title VII. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $43,162 for lost wages and $10,000 for emotional distress. No injunctive relief was granted by the arbitrator. After the plaintiff filed the arbitrator's award with the court, the EEOC continued to litigate the case. On October 5, 2017, the court entered a consent decree. The defendant agreed to revise its equal employment opportunity policies within 60 days, train employees to conform to the new policies, and post notice of what constitutes a violation of equal employment opportunity policies. The decree was to last 18 months, and was set to terminate on April 5, 2019. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission retained its ability to seek relief for any alleged violation of the decree. The parties also agreed to bear their own attorneys fees and costs. The consent decree ran without any further actions in court, so presumably the case is now closed.

Summary: On April 13, 2015, a transgender man who was fired when he refused to sign an agreement to present and be treated as a woman at work as a condition of his employment filed a Title VII sex discrimination claim in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The EEOC later intervened in the case. District Judge Carl Barbier directed the parties to arbitrate the case pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and his employer. After the conclusion of the arbitration, which yielded monetary relief for the individual plaintiff, the EEOC continued to litigate the case to obtain injunctive relief. Judge Barbier entered an 18-month consent decree which required the defendant retrain its employees and post notice of what constitutes a violation of equal employment opportunity policies.


On July 8, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black female, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Avado Brands, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant violated the terms of a prior Negotiated Settlement Agreement with the plaintiffs due to a racially hostile work environment. On September 15, 2004, the complainant filed a complaint as the plaintiff-intervenor. On October 13, 2005, the District Court (Judge Richard D. Bennett) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $9,166.21.

Summary: On July 8, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Avado Brands, Inc, alleging that it violated the terms of a prior Negotiated Settlement Agreement with the plaintiffs due to a racially hostile work environment. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay $9,166.21.


On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant did not promote the plaintiff-intervenor because of his race. On April 28, 2005, the complainant filed a motion to intervene and a complaint as plaintiff-intervenor. On December 17, 2007, the District Court (Judge Benson Everett Legg) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to promote the plaintiff-intervenor to a higher-paying position as well as pay him $60,500.

Summary: On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of an African American employee (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant did not promote the plaintiff-intervenor because of his race, African American. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to promote the plaintiff-intervenor to a higher-paying position as well as pay him $60,500.


On March 6th, 2003, African American employees of Friedman's jewelry store filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Friedman's Inc., along with Federal Insurance Company and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company. The lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Southern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought equitable and injunctive relief, alleging that they had suffered a racially hostile work environment, discriminatory policies and practices, and a pattern or practice of race discrimination in hiring, promotion, compensation, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. This case was brought after plaintiffs allegedly suffered various forms of racial discrimination. One plaintiff, a former African American employee of Friedman's, claimed to have been repeatedly turned down for promotional opportunities due to the way her hiring would affect the "racial mix" in the store. Another plaintiff was allegedly discharged from his position after opposing Friedman's racially discriminatory policies and practices. Plaintiffs also claimed that management at Friedman's had been repeatedly instructed not to hire "too many African Americans at any one store." Additional claims included African Americans being routinely paid less in similar positions that were also held by white employees and that these and other factors contributed to a racially hostile work environment and a pattern and practice of racial discrimination. In 2004, the parties reached an agreement which included monetary and injunctive relief. However, on January 14, 2004, after reaching this settlement, Friedman's Inc. filed for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Due to the bankruptcy proceedings, the settlement could not be completed. The parties agreed to a revised class settlement which included a reduced amount of monetary relief and injunctive relief, however Friedman's went into bankruptcy once again and the settlement could not be completed. After the second bankruptcy, Friedman's chose dissolution. The parties entered a final settlement in 2009. A final consent decree was approved by Judge Alexander Williams Jr. on February 12, 2009, and the named plaintiffs and class members received over a million dollars, including attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: The case was brought by African American employees of Friedman's, a jewelry store, and sought equitable and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged they had suffered from working in a racially hostile work environment and alleged that Friedman's had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in hiring, promotion, compensation, and other terms and privileges of employment. The case was finally settled on February 12, 2009, after Friedman's had entered into bankruptcy two times. The named plaintiffs and class members received over a million dollars for costs with a portion to cover attorneys' fees.


On August 28, 2017, six transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States and various Department of Defense officials, arguing that they had violated the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights, in particular the Equal Protection clause and the Due Process clause. In an amended complaint, the plaintiffs also brought a cause of action under 10 U.S.C § 1074 which entitles military members to medical care benefits. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Maryland and private counsels, sought declaratory judgments stating the Transgender Service Member Ban violated Equal Protection clause and Due Process of by denying their ability to serve and denying them access to medical treatments previously provided by their military employment. They also sought an order to permanently enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Transgender Service Member Ban, in addition to attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs comprised a group of transgender individuals that, under the Open Service Directive, publicly revealed their transgender status and were receiving medically necessary treatments related to their gender transition. The complaint alleged that President Trump’s memorandum entitled “Military Service by Transgender Individuals” set aside the Open Service Directive and replaced it with a policy that contained animus against transgender individuals. The complaint singled out the policy directives that rescinded protection against discharge of existing service members, banned new enlistments and commission, and banned medically necessary care. The plaintiffs claimed these directives directly violate their Fifth Amendment rights and discriminated against each of the plaintiffs and other service members who identified as transgender on the basis of sex. On September 14, 2017, the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from enforcing President Trump’s memorandum until final judgment was given on the case. On November 21, 2017, Judge Marvin Garbis granted the preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their Equal Protection claims against the three policy directives and the claims under due process were sufficiently plausible to withstand dismissal. Judge Garbis also dismissed the plaintiffs' cause of action under 10 U.S.C § 1074 without prejudice. 280 F.Supp.3d 747. The defendants filed an appeal against the preliminary injunction on December 6, 2017 to the Fourth Circuit and later filed a motion for clarification and stay in the appeals court and the district court. The motions for clarification and stay were denied in both courts. Following, the defendants filed a voluntary dismissal motion for their appeal of the preliminary injunction on December 29, 2017 and the court approved soon after. Back in district court, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to partially dissolve the preliminary injunction on March 1, 2018. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint and removed the 10 U.S.C § 1074 claim on April 27. On May 11, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and motion for summary judgment. On May 25, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In June of 2018, Judge Garvis retired, and the case was reassigned to Judge George Russell III on July 18, 2018. On March 1, 2019, the defendants told the court that they would shortly file a petition for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The writ of mandamus would request the appellate court to direct the district court to stay its nationwide preliminary injunction of November 21, 2017 because the Supreme Court stayed two nationwide injunctions in two similar cases on January 22, 2019. Judge Russell issued an opinion on the writ of mandamus on March 7, 2019. He stayed the preliminary injunction based on the Supreme Court's decision to stay a nationwide injunction on the transgender military ban in  Stockman v. Trump and Karnoski v. Trump. The plaintiffs attempted to suspend the stay as it relates to their individual cases, but Judge Russell did not agree with this motion, because the Stockman and Karnoski decisions attempted the same argument, and the Supreme Court rebuffed it. 2019 WL 5697228. The defendants filed a notice with the court on June 18, 2019 that the Ninth Circuit had issued an opinion regarding the stayed nationwide injunction on the transgender service ban in Karnoski v. Trump (for more on the Karnoski case, see here. In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit vacated the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington's order striking the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction because the revised 2018 policy was significantly different from the 2017 guidance that inspired the injunction. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to review if the revisions warranted dissolution of the preliminary injunction. Back in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the defendants used this opinion to support their arguments put forth in their motions to dismiss and extend the stay of the preliminary injunction. In addition, the defendants moved for reconsideration of the motion to stay portions of discovery based on this opinion on June 27. Judge Russell ruled on various outstanding motions on August 20, 2019. He granted the defendant's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction, writing that while the 2018 policy makes serving in the military while transgender more difficult, the new policy is not a blanket ban like the one the injunction was intended to correct. Using a similar argument, Judge Russell dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims related to the 2017 policy as moot. In addition, he found several of the current plaintiffs lack standing; the 2018 policy imposes restrictions on those seeking to join the military, not those that are already in, and many of the plaintiffs were already in the military. However, he refused to dismiss the plaintiff's equal protection claims, and allowed for discovery to continue on the issue. Similarly, he dismissed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, looking to further discovery to settle the issues. 400 F.Supp.3d 317. Judge Russell turned to the defendant's motion for reconsideration on September 3, granting it in part and denying it in part. He denied the motion to stay discovery, saying that it would only be necessary if the defendants sought review at the Fourth Circuit, which they have not petitioned for at this time. However, he granted the motion for reconsideration on the level of deference various military documents found in discovery will be given. 402 F.Supp.3d 153. After these discovery disputes were settled, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 6, 2019. The new complaint amended the factual allegations section to account for new developments since the case started, focusing on stigmatic injuries associated with serving as a transgender service member. Discovery in the case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 28, 2017, six transgender individuals currently serving in the United States military filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland Maryland contesting the President's ban on transgender service in the U.S. military. Judge Garbis initially granted a motion for a preliminary injunction in September, but this was later stayed in 2019 when the Supreme Court issued a stay of this nationwide injunction in two factually similar cases contesting the ban. This case changed dramatically in 2018 when the government altered its policy on transgender service in the military, eliminating an outright ban and instead putting new guidance on transgender men and women entering the service. Judge Russell, reassigned to the case in 2018, dissolved the preliminary injunction, saying that it was only meant to stay a complete ban on transgender service in the military. This also dismissed all claims against the 2017 outright ban as moot, and removed all plaintiffs that were already in the service and not seeking to join. Discovery is ongoing in the case.


This case is about racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for employees filing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaints. Three Pocomoke City, Maryland police officers brought this lawsuit on January 20, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Pocomoke City, the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Department of Maryland State Police, and a number of individuals associated with these organizations. Represented by private counsel, the Washington Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and the ACLU of Maryland, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 201) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as front and back pay, damages for physical and psychological harms, and attorneys’ fees. The officers alleged that they were subjected to a hostile environment because of their race. They also alleged that two of the officers were fired in retaliation for filing EEOC complaints against their employer. The officers asserted that the racial discrimination and retaliation they suffered while employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to Judge J. Frederick Motz. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 27, 2016. On March 16, 2016, the officers filed an amended complaint, changing the named defendants. In mid-April of 2016, the defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint. In June, Judge Motz granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted against the defendants in their official capacities under U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983 and against defendant Wells as to the plaintiffs’ retaliation claim. Two months later, Judge Motz also dismissed the claims against Worcester County State’s Attorney Beau Oglesby, holding that they were barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. On September 29, 2016, the officers filed a final amended complaint, adding the State of Maryland as a defendant. Shortly thereafter, the United States Department of Justice moved to intervene in the case, filing an intervenor complaint against Pocomoke City, the Worcester County Sheriff, and Maryland to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Before and after the intervenor complaint, the defendants again moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Judge Motz granted the United States’ motion to intervene and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on March 20, 2017, without clearly explaining his reasoning. On May 15, 2017, Judge Motz denied motions by both the State of Maryland and the plaintiffs for reconsideration of his earlier decisions on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Both parties sought an interlocutory appeal. The State of Maryland filed a motion to stay pending appeal, which was granted by Judge Motz on August 3. On July 13, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss the charges against Oglesby on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. 896 F.3d 260. It reversed the decision of the District Court with regard to the State of Maryland, holding that the plaintiff had failed to make a Title VII retaliation claim against the State’s Attorney and could therefore not make a Title VII claim against Oglesby’s employer. On remand, the case was reassigned to Judge Ellen L. Hollander, who promptly dismissed the Title VII complaint against the State of Maryland. After almost two years of on and off settlement talks, two of the officers notified the court that they had accepted settlement offers from Pocomoke City on March 27, 2019. The judgment included a consent decree enforceable for three years requiring the Pocomoke City Police Department to refrain from engaging in racial discrimination and retaliatory practices, to adopt or amend written policies and procedures to ensure proper handling of discrimination complaints and prohibit retaliation against individuals raising or participating in the investigation or litigation of such claims, and to provide training, at its own cost, to its employees on these policies and procedures. In addition, the settlement awarded monetary damages in the amount of $450,001.00 to one of the plaintiffs and $200,001.00 to the other, in addition to attorneys’ fees. Defendant also agreed to provide neutral references for the officers to any potential employers. A second settlement conference was held on May 2, 2019. On December 4, 2019, the remaining parties agreed to a settlement by consent decree. The terms of the December 2019 settlement are unknown at this time. As of September 30, 2020, the case is ongoing, but stayed pending consent motions to amend the earlier settlement.

Summary: In 2016, three Pocomoke City, Maryland police officers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered racial discrimination and retaliation by their employer in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2019, two of the officers reached a partial settlement with Pocomoke City requiring adoption of anti-discrimination policies and procedures by the police department and awarding monetary damages to the officers. As of September 30, 2020, the case is still ongoing pending a final settlement.


On August 15, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against A & R Truss Company for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.). Alleging that Defendant had repeatedly subjected a black employee at the New Buffalo facility to racially offensive epithets and had met the employee's complaints with threats and intimidation, the EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief, including compensation for emotional harm and punitive damages. The parties consented to have the case handled by a magistrate judge on December 7, 2005. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Magistrate Judge Joseph G. Scoville) entered as a consent decree on March 2, 2006. The one-year decree provided monetary and injuctive relief. The employee was paid $25,000. The decree required A & R Truss to comply with Title VII's prohibition of racial harassment and retaliation. A & R Truss further agreed to develop a Title VII-compliant harassment policy, post an equal employment rights notice, to provide all new employees with the employee handbook containing the new harassment policy, and to train all current and new managers on Title VII, racial harassment, and how to respond to an incident. The parties bore their own costs and attorneys' fees. No further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII racial-harassment and retaliation suit against A & R Truss Company for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.). Alleging that Defendant had repeatedly subjected a black employee at the New Buffalo facility to racially offensive epithets and had met the employee's complaints with threats and intimidation, the EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief, including compensation for emotional harm and punitive damages. The parties entered into a one-year consent decree that provided monetary and injunctive relief. The employee received $20,000. A & R Truss was subject to an array of anti-harassment, anti-retaliation, training, policy, and notice provisions. The case is now closed.


In December 2013, the Detroit field office of the EEOC brought this suit against Guardsmark in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that an employee who worked as a security guard for Guardsmark observed a co-worker using the security cameras to zoom in on women's private parts on a number of occasions. He complained to the co-worker and also informed a female victim. After that incident, he was discharged by his employer. EEOC alleged that Guardsmark deprived the employee of equal employment opportunities. EEOC asked the court for: (a) a permanent injunction enjoining Guardsmark from engaging in sexual discrimination and perpetuating a sexual hostile work environment, and retaliating against any employee who opposes such behaviors; (b) an order requiring Guardsmark to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs that provide equal employment opportunities; (c) to order Guardsmark to compensate the discharged employee; and (d) to pay punitive damages. The employee also filed his complaint against Guardsmark as an intervenor plaintiff claiming loss and damages. In 2015, motions for partial summary judgment were put before the court by the EEOC, plaintiff-intervenor, and defendant. On April 8, 2016, District Judge Victoria A. Roberts denied all of them. In its motion for summary judgment, Guardsmark argued plaintiffs did not have standing because Title VII does not protect employees from retaliation for opposing discrimination against non-employees. The Court found Plaintiff had standing because a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from opposing sexually inappropriate conduct in the workplace if he knew that he would be fired. Whether or not the underlying claim of sexual harassment had merit is unimportant the Court stated, because the employee engaged in protected activity by opposing what he believed was unlawful sexual harassment by another security guard. The EEOC and plaintiff-intervenor sought summary judgment because they had presented direct evidence of discrimination and retaliation and there were no issues of fact remain to be decided. The Court denied their motions because it found that genuine issues of material fact remained, including whether Guardsmark knew at the time plaintiff-intervenor was removed, that he had engaged in protected activity, and whether Guardsmark’s business reasons for removing plaintiff-intervenor from his position were sufficient to warrant removal or were instead pretextual. Meanwhile, the parties had been engaged in settlement negotiations, which led to a consent decree on September 9, 2016, which the Court approved the same day. The consent decree was to last one year. It provided that Guardsmark would not retaliate against any employee who opposed discriminatory practices made unlawful by Title VII, filed a charge of discrimination or assisted or participated in the filing of such a charge, or assisted or participates in an investigation or proceeding brought under federal laws prohibiting discrimination or retaliation. Additionally, Guardsmark would post a notice for one year informing readers that retaliation and discrimination were illegal under Title VII and listing the EEOC's contact number. Guardsmark would also pay $115,000 in monetary relief to plaintiff-intervenor: $36,641.80, in back pay, $36,641.80 in compensatory damages, and $41,716.40 in attorneys’ fees. Guardsmark also agreed to provide training to employees on sexual harassment and retaliation. An amended consent decree, with no significant changes, was entered on September 16, 2016. The consent decree ran its course without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against Guardsmark, LLC for discharging its employee who opposed sexually inappropriate conduct in the workplace. The parties entered a consent decree in September 2016, which provided Guardsmark would not retaliate against employees, would train employees on retaliation and sexual harassment, and Guardsmark would pay 115,000 in monetary relief to plaintiff-intervenor. The case is now closed.


On May 25, 2007, employees terminated by the defendant, Seagate, LLC, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC §2201. Plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, asked the court for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act relating to the enforceability of a purported release and waiver signed by many of the Plaintiffs upon their termination. Plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to adverse treatment in the terms, conditions, and privileges of their employment and termination due to their age. Plaintiffs also alleged that they did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their ADEA claims because the signed releases were invalid under the OWBPA, which sets specific criteria for effective written releases of federal age discrimination claims. The plaintiffs claimed that among other defects, the releases misrepresented the number of employees selected for termination, omitted employees from the list of those selected for termination, were not written in a manner reasonably calculated to be understood by the average employee, and failed to disclose the selection criteria and eligibility factors used to select individuals for termination. Plaintiffs claimed they suffered actual damages in the form of lost salary and wages, retirement and insurance benefits, and other forms of compensation reasonably believed to exceed $100,000 per plaintiff. The claim is pursuant to events in 2004, when Seagate laid off employees at its Normandale and Shakopee facilities in Minnesota. It gave the terminated workers severance benefits conditioned on the signing of a release that purported to waive any age discrimination claims against the employer. Plaintiffs claimed that they were asked to sign the releases immediately, without allowing them to consider it or to consult with an attorney, and that a Seagate Human Resources employee stood at the door of the facility to collect the signed releases from the terminated employees. Two of the terminated employees who did not sign releases filed the age discrimination charges with EEOC. Some 19 additional plaintiffs joined the plaintiffs in the ADEA class suit, even though they had signed releases and never filed EEOC charges. The court also said the administrative charges filed by the plaintiffs referred to the 2004 terminations and indicated that the pair were bringing charges on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated employees over age 40 that Seagate had terminated. On November 20, 2007, Seagate submitted a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that those 19 plaintiffs lack any claim for declaratory relief under the OWBPA or for individual relief under the ADEA. The company contended the waivers are valid as a matter of law, fully compliant with the OWBPA's requirements, and effectively block the plaintiffs' ADEA claims. Seagate also contended that plaintiffs who did not file EEOC charges may not seek individual relief under the ADEA. Seagate contended that its written release form complied with the OWBPA and specified that terminated employees had 45 days in which to decide to sign, as required by the act. The company argued that the plaintiffs are imposing a "hypertechnical statutory application" in interpreting the releases. Seagate contended that the pressure plaintiffs reported was "nothing more than the reality that eligibility for separation benefits was lawfully conditioned on signing the releases." Observing that plaintiffs' allegations must be accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage, Judge Michael J. Davis denied Seagate's motion regarding the validity of the releases under OWBPA. He pointed out that under relevant case law, an effective release must comply with each OWBPA prerequisite and that "substantial compliance" with the act's requirements is "not adequate." The plaintiffs may proceed with their bid for a declaratory judgment that the releases are invalid under OWBPA and therefore do not block their age bias claims, the court decided. On January 22, 2008, defendants moved for an order to certify, for interlocutory appeal, the November 20, 2007 denial of their motion to dismiss. Defendants sought certification on two grounds: whether the plaintiffs had properly exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to their age discrimination claims, and whether the Special Incentive Retirement Plan (SIRP) release that a plaintiff signed is valid and enforceable. On February 14, 2008, Judge Davis denied the motion for certification, stating that the defendants were simply challenging the Court's application of settled law. Judge Davis also stated that the defendants failed to demonstrate substantial grounds for a difference of opinion warranting interlocutory relief. On May 28, 2008, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment as to the invalidity of the releases signed by the employees upon their termination. Under the OWBPA, an individual cannot waive any right or claim under the ADEA unless the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Some of the terms were different for waivers that involved "reduction in force" (RIF) releases. Some of the terminated employees signed RIF releases, and others signed Special Incentive Employment Program (SIRP) releases. 154 employees were affected by the RIF at the Normandale facility. The RIF releases were declared invalid because they failed to disclose the proper required information of all terminated employees at the Normandale facility with respect to the 2004 RIF, they were unintelligible, and they prohibited signers from filing EEOC charges, all of which violate the OWBPA. Judge Davis declared that the releases offered to those plaintiffs terminated pursuant to the 2004 RIF were invalid as a matter of law. On October 23, 2008, Judge Davis granted plaintiffs' motion to authorize notice to potential class members, which consisted of all individuals who were employed by defendants in any United States location and who were 40 years of age or more on the date in 2004 when defendants offered them a retirement separation agreement or a termination separation agreement. On February 8, 2011, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2004 SIRP releases because they violated the 45-day consideration period for such releases under federal law. Then, on August 15, 2011, the defendants' motion for decertification was granted in part and denied in part. The court declared that only those plaintiffs terminated through RIF may proceed as a collective action. This was because the SIRP was a separate employment action that was different in scope, communication and effect than the RIF, and employees terminated through one program are not similarly situated to those employees terminated from the other program. Seagate also asserted that the SIRP was intended as a voluntary program, while the RIF was involuntary, so the employees who volunteered to participate in SIRP suffered no adverse employment action and were thus not similarly situated with the RIF plaintiffs. Taking into consideration the relevant factors in determining whether to decertify a class--age variance, type of termination, division in the company in which they worked, employment status, supervisors and salaries--the Court found that employees terminated through SIRP were not similarly situated with employees terminated through RIF. Thus, the defendants' motion for decertification was granted for the plaintiffs who signed the SIRP releases. With respect to the RIF program, the court held that at this stage, the plaintiffs have met their burden of putting forth sufficient evidence that age discrimination may have been the standard operating procedure with respect to those employees selected for termination through the RIF, and defendants' motion to decertify was denied with respect to employees who signed the RIF releases. Additionally, on August 15, 2011, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was granted. On September 29, 2011, the court dismissed without prejudice the claims of 9 plaintiffs who had signed the SIRP releases. Then, on November 15, 2011, the parties reached a settlement. On January 24, 2012, the parties stipulated that the case be dismissed with prejudice. The case was then dismissed with prejudice on January 26, 2012.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed an age discrimination action against Seagate US, LLC. Plaintiffs alleged that they were terminated under false pretenses. Upon termination, plaintiffs were forced to sign a release of liability, stating that they would not bring action against Seagate. The court declared that the Releases offered to those Plaintiffs terminated pursuant to the 2004 RIF ("reduction in force") are invalid as a matter of law. The court declared that the releases signed by Plaintiffs pursuant to the 2004 SIRP ("special incentive retirement plan") were valid, and the claims of those plaintiffs were dismissed. A private settlement was reached on November 15, 2011. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 26, 2012.


On November 17, 2004, employees of Best Buy Co. filed a complaint against their employer in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs alleged that Best Buy had discriminated against employees on the basis of their age, and that such action constituted a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") of 1967, 29 US.C. § 621. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Best Buy had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination whereby they used performance plans, job assignments, ratings, quotas, rankings or other measures to pressure its older employees and other similarly situated employees to quit and/or to justify their terminations. The plaintiffs also contended that Best Buy had discriminated with respect to training opportunities and job assignments, such as by giving younger employees the opportunity to learn new technology and assigning those employees to positions where they could utilize that new technology, while channeling many of the older employees into positions involving older technology which was becoming obsolete. They asked the court for back pay plus benefits, as well as reinstatement at their old positions or a comparable financial award. The plaintiffs never sought class certification in the case at hand, and they could not reach a settlement agreement when they tried in 2006. The court (Judge Michael J. Davis) ultimately dismissed the case with prejudice on June 12, 2007.

Summary: The case was brought by employees against their place of employment, Best Buy Co., seeking compensation for back pay and benefits, as well as reinstatement of old positions or a comparable financial award. Plaintiffs alleged that Best Buy had discriminated against them on the basis of their age. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2007 by Judge Michael J. Davis.