On May 27, 2015, this lawsuit was brought in the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri by a person arrested by the City of St. Ann (the City), Missouri, who was jailed for a prolonged period after he was unable to pay the fee demanded for his release under the city’s “secured bail” policy. Under that policy, persons arrested for ordinance violations were required to post a bail from $150-350 or spend upwards of 3 days in jail, without any consideration of the person’s ability to pay. The plaintiff argued that the City’s policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by public interest organizations ArchCity Defenders and Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff asked the court for class certification to represent other similarly situated individuals, for a declaration that the City had violated the constitutional rights of arrestees who were unable to pay the City’s secured bail, for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the City to stop jailing arrestees for their inability to pay the City’s secured bail, for damages to the named plaintiff to compensate for his period of confinement, and for legal costs and attorneys’ fees. That same day, plaintiffs moved for class certification for the proposed class: "all arrestees unable to pay for their release pursuant to St. Ann's fixed bail schedule who are or will become in the custody of St. Ann." The next day, the parties asked the judge assigned to the case, Judge Rodney W. Sippel, to grant them a stay in proceedings so that they could conduct settlement negotiations. To that end, plaintiffs dropped their request for preliminary injunctive relief pending the outcome of the negotiations. The day after that, on May 29, 2015, Judge Sippel granted a stay, and asked the parties to report the outcome of the negotiations to him by August 3, 2015. On September 2, 2015, Judge Sippel asked the parties, who had failed to meet his August 3 deadline, to show cause for why he shouldn’t dismissed the case with prejudice or issue sanctions. That same day, the parties issued a joint motion showing the judge their provisional settlement agreement, and explaining that they wanted to see how the changes that the agreement required in the City’s policies worked over the coming year. The next day, Judge Sippel agreed to give the parties twelve months to test the effects of the policy changes, and ordered the defendants to comply with the provisional settlement agreement during that period. Under the provisional settlement agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to drop most of their non-equitable claims (the claims for monetary damages). The defendants agreed to meet most of plaintiff’s demands for injunctive relief, and to give the named plaintiff a $10,000 fee for acting as a class representative. Namely, the defedants agreed to stop requiring arrestees to post a secured bail for release. Instead, they agreed to release arrestees if they agreed to provide an unsecured bond (a bond which requires persons to pay the court only if they fail to adhere to the conditions of their bail) or a recognizance (an alternative set of conditions for preventing persons from violating the terms of their bail to the payment of a monetary fee), except for cases in which the arrestee was a threat and detention was required to protect the community. The defendants also agreed to improve their procedures for notifying arrestees of their court dates, and to release persons arrested for failure to attend court dates on unsecured bonds. The parties agreed that the plaintiff and their counsel would notify defendants of any perceived breach in the agreement, and that the plaintiff and their counsel reserved the right to pursue judgment against defendants if they failed to remedy the breach. The parties also reserved the right to seek modification of the agreement, and if they fail to reach an agreement on modification, to terminate the agreement and resume litigation. On June 5, 2017, Judge Sippel ordered the parties to show cause for why their respective cases should not be dismissed. He noted that both parties had failed to file official settlement documents by the required date he had set. Both parties responded, and a status conference was set. A consent judgment was filed by the defendant and signed on May 4, 2018 by Judge Sippel. In the consent judgement, the defendant specifically agreed to (1) not utilize secured money bail for persons in the custody of the Defendant on arrest; (2) offer any arrested person release from the custody of the Defendant on recognizance or on an unsecured bond as soon as practicable after booking (with the only exception are persons charged with assault, or if release would pose a danger to the community); (3) notify all arrestees in writing upon release from custody when and where they are required to appear in court; (4) specific procedures in relation to traffic stops; (5) mail a notice of a motion for bond forfeiture, should the released person fail to appear in court; and (6) to take appropriate and lawful steps to convert any unsecured bond into a money judgment at any time after non-appearance. The court retained jurisdiction over the consent judgement for two years starting on May 4, 2018. Subsequent to the dissolution of the consent judgment, the defendant agreed to continue to (1) ensure that indigent persons arrested were afforded the necessary protections under the law; and (2) comply with applicable state and federal laws pertaining to the setting of conditions upon pre-trail release from custody. As of May 20, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket and the case is presumed to be closed.

Summary: On May 27, 2015, a person jailed by the City of St. Ann, Missouri (the City), for failing to pay the fee required under the City's secured bail system, sued the City in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, arguing that the City had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and asking for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. On September 3, 2015, the Judge assigned to the case, Judge Rodney W. Sippel, granted a stay in the proceedings to allow the parties to test the effects of a provisional settlement agreement, under which plaintiff agreed to drop his non-equitable claims, and under which the City agreed to end its secured bail policy and pay the plaintiff a $10,000 fee for acting as a class representative. On May 4, 2018, a Consent Agreement was signed by Judge Sippel, whereby most of the original relief sought was agreed to by the Defendant. The Court retains jurisdiction for two years, which may be extended for one more year upon agreement.


On August 9, 2016, a group of individuals who were placed in jail because of an inability to pay fines, penalties, and other charges, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued thirteen St. Louis County municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 2201. The plaintiffs, represented by ArchCity Defenders and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant municipalities, through their police departments, municipal court systems, city prosecuting attorneys’ offices, and jails, engaged in a deliberate and coordinated conspiracy to fill their coffers by extorting money from thousands of poor, disproportionately African-American people in the St. Louis region. Specifically, they claimed that the municipalities imprisoned people for a failure to pay debts owed for minor offenses without inquiring as to their ability to pay in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; failed to provide adequate legal counsel at hearings in which indigent people were imprisoned in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; incarcerated people indefinitely and without adequate procedural protections in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; sought, issued, and served warrants without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and imposed unduly restrictive methods of debt collection, through incarceration and the threat of incarceration, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 30, 2016. On December 2, 2016, in response to the amended complaint, the court (Judge Rodney W. Sippel) denied the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. The defendants again moved to dismiss on December 14, 2016. On April 24, 2017, Judge Sippel dismissed the claims against all defendant municipalities except the City of St. Ann, finding that the amended complaint failed to state a claim for conspiracy. Judge Sippel ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint against the City of St. Ann and to limit their claims to actions taken by St. Ann. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the conspiracy claim and the dismissal of all other defendants aside from St. Ann, which Judge Sippel denied on July 5, 2017. On July 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint limited to the actions and policies of the City of St. Ann. On September 8, 2017, the City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that the real defendant in interest in the matter was the St. Ann municipal division of the Missouri State Circuit Court, an arm-of-the-state entitled to sovereign immunity. The same day, the City filed a motion to dismiss the remaining count alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations for failure to state a claim. The court denied the defendants' motion on September 14, 2018. The court issued an order on October 4, 2018 severing the plaintiff's count relating to conditions of the City of St. Ann's jail. It was then placed on the court's docket as a separate action, and discovery proceeded for the remaining claims. On March 16, 2019, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to join an indispensable party. Before oral argument on that motion, however, Judge Sippel referred the case to mediation. The parties filed a joint motion to vacate the mediation order on June 19, 2019, but Judge Sippel denied this motion the following day. In a memorandum and order issued on September 3, 2019, the court denied the defendants' motion. 2019 WL 4169215. As of April 18, 2020, the mediation deadlines have been extended several times and are currently set to terminate on June 30, 2020. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 9, 2016, a group of individuals who were placed in jail because of an inability to pay fines, penalties, and other charges filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued thirteen St. Louis County municipalities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 2201. The plaintiffs, represented by ArchCity Defenders and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming violations of the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant municipalities engaged in a deliberate and coordinated conspiracy to fill their coffers by extorting money from thousands of poor, disproportionately African-American people in the St. Louis region. On April 24, 2017, the case was dismissed as to all defendant municipalities except the City of St. Ann. The case (including mediation efforts) is ongoing against the City.


On June 14, 2017, a man awaiting criminal trial and Lexington National Insurance Corporation, a bail bond company, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The case was assigned to Judge Jerome Simandle. The plaintiffs sued the state of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that a New Jersey state law, the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA), violated the bail provision of the Eighth Amendment, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The CJRA required that pretrial release by monetary bail occur only if a criminal court court found that non-monetary conditions were inadequate. The plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. On the same day that the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction that would enjoin the provisions of the CJRA that they deemed unconstitutional. On July 28, 2017, the state filed a brief in opposition to the motion for a preliminary injunction and moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The same day, the American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey, Drug Policy Alliance, Latino Action Network, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People – New Jersey State Conference jointly moved to participate as amici curiae in support of the defendant. All of these civil rights organizations would be represented by one ACLU lawyer. These prospective amici also filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 21, 2017, the court denied the the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court held that the plaintiffs’ case was unlikely to succeed on the merits and that the plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. Judge Simandle also stated that the accused plaintiff was a bad class representative for a potential class action because the crime that he was on pretrial release for was particularly violent. 277 F. Supp. 3d 707. (Though the plaintiffs had not yet moved for class certification, their complaint indicated that they intended to seek it.) Four days later, on September 25, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision regarding the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (Docket Number: 17-03104). In the meantime, the plaintiffs sought to pause litigation in the District Court pending a decision in the Appellate Court. The defendant protested; the Appellate Court’s decision would not affect the District Court’s decision on the merits of the case, so the state wanted to move forward. Still, the District Court granted the stay, holding that the litigation would not continue in the District Court until the Third Circuit had decided the appeal. The District Court therefore terminated the defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding it in abeyance until after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision. The Third Circuit heard oral arguments on this case on February 21, 2018. The panel was made up of Judge Thomas L. Ambro, Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo, and Judge Julio M. Fuentes. In an opinion issued on July 9, 2018, they affirmed the district court's denial of preliminary injunction. The opinion held that there is no "federal constitutional right to deposit money or obtain a corporate surety bond to ensure a criminal defendant's future appearance in court as an equal alternative to non-monetary conditions of pretrial release." 895 F.3d 272. The plaintiff petitioned for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court on October 1, 2018. His petition was denied on October 29. 139 S.Ct. 440. The plaintiff subsequently dismissed the suit voluntarily, and the case was terminated on October 31, 2018.

Summary: In June 2017, a man awaiting criminal trial and Lexington National Insurance Corporation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs alleged that that the Criminal Justice Reform Act violated the bail provision of the Eighth Amendment, due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the act favored non-monetary pre-trial release conditions over bail. After and appeal to the Third Circuit regarding denial of preliminary injunction and a subsequent denial of certiorari in the Supreme Court, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case. This case is now closed.


On May 11, 2011, three individuals given extra-judicial sentences of post-release supervision filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The named defendants were the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and the New York State Division of Parole (DOP). They claimed that the defendants administratively assigned sentences of post-release supervision (PRS) and that only a judge could impose an additional sentence under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, class certification, and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 20, 2011, which added two named plaintiffs to the action, bringing the total to three. On November 15, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground of qualified immunity. On February 10, 2012, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin denied the motion. Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court found that the plaintiffs had made plausible factual allegations that the defendants were responsible for the deprivation of their constitutional rights and that the plaintiffs' rights were clearly established under Earley v. Murray, 451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006). The defendants appealed from the denial of their motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's holding on July 8, 2014. The appeals court held that, under Earley, the administrative imposition PRS terms not imposed by the court was unconstitutional, thus precluding a finding of qualified immunity in this case. On July 16, 2014, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge James C. Francis for settlement purposes. On January 28, 2015, Judge Scheindlin granted the plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class. The court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirements of class certification. The class consisted of “all persons who were sentenced to prison in New York State for a fixed term that did not include a term of PRS, but who were nevertheless subjected to PRS after the maximum expiration dates of their determinate sentences and after June 9, 2006.” On May 8, 2015, the defendants requested summary judgment. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the personal involvement of certain defendants. The defendants also moved to modify the class to exclude certain class members’ claims that they alleged were barred by statute of limitations, and to exclude class members whose claims they alleged were precluded. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the question of personal liability for three officers. On August 6, 2015, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment. The court found that since the defendants had failed to make reasonable efforts to comply with precedent that the imposition of post-release supervisory sentences was unconstitutional, they were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court further found that the three individual defendants cited in the plaintiffs' motion could be held personally liable as a matter of law, while the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the remaining DOP defendants. Regarding the defendants' remaining claims, the court held that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations or collateral estoppel. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for an order certifying defendants' interlocutory appeal as frivolous. On October 14, 2015, the District Court found that dual jurisdiction was warranted between the District Court and the Court of Appeals because the defendants' renewed qualified immunity claims were frivolous. Thus, the District Court determined that it retained jurisdiction despite the interlocutory appeal. However, on December 16, 2015, the Court of Appeals ordered a stay of proceedings in the District Court pending resolution of the defendants' interlocutory appeal. On September 16, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of qualified immunity to the defendants. Betances v. Fisher, 837 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2016). During this period of time, the case was reassigned to District Judge Deborah A. Batts. On May, 30 2018, the parties consented for the rest of the case to be heard by a magistrate judge. The case was then assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Robert Lehrburger. Following several years of additional discovery and intermittent attempts at settlement discussions, in August 2018 the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and to modify or decertify the class. Specifically, the defendants sought to: (1) dismiss class members whose claims were untimely; (2) dismiss class members who had claims for compensatory damages and award them nominal damages; (3) if the court deemed any class members' damages could be more than nominal, dismiss claims for damages not caused by the defendants; (4) modify the class to exclude plaintiffs if they were referred for resentencings, or limit their damages; (5) decertify the class for purposes of damages; and (6) preclude claims for false imprisonment. Judge Lehrburger decided the defendants' motions for summary judgment and class certification on February 21, 2019. He denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, except to the extent that it applied to plaintiffs who had sentences of PRS imposed to fix clerical errors by their sentencing courts. Judge Lehrburger barred these plaintiffs from receiving more than nominal damages. He also completely denied the class decertification motion. After the defendants' motions were denied, the case slowly crept towards trial, which was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. On March 1, 2021, Judge Lehrburger set a trial date of June 16, 2021. As of April 12, 2021, the case remains pending.

Summary: Persons in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) brought this class action against DOCS and the New York State Division of Parole (DOP) for the extra-judicial imposition of sentences requiring post-release supervision. The defendants' motion to dismiss was denied by the District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted with respect to several defendants, but denied on the issue of qualified immunity; and plaintiffs' cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for three officers was granted. The defendants appealed the qualified immunity decision, but the Second Circuit affirmed. On remand, the defendants moved for summary judgment again, but that motion was denied. The case is currently scheduled for trial in Summer 2021.


Individuals incarcerated in the Tulsa jail sued Tulsa County, the Tulsa County Sheriff, fifteen Special Judges and a district court judge in challenging the constitutionality of the county's wealth-based pretrial detention system. On June 6, 2018, the four plaintiffs, represented by Civil Rights Corps, filed this class-action lawsuit in the Northern District of Oklahoma. The case was assigned to Judge Claire Eagan. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgement Act, alleging that defendants violated their Equal Protection, Due Process, and Sixth Amendment rights by depriving them of their fundamental right to pretrial liberty and failing to provide counsel at bail hearings. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the defendants from assigning bail without inquiring as to whether criminal defendants can pay it. The plaintiffs also asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from denying the putative class-members the right to a speedy, individualized hearing with counsel. The plaintiffs were each arrested and informed that they had to pay bail ranging from $500 to $50,000 in order to be released from jail before their hearing. They were not asked whether they could afford the bond; because none of them had the financial resources to post bail, they were held for up to 11 days before their hearing without access to legal counsel. The plaintiffs alleged that this "wealth-based detention scheme" jailed presumptively innocent people for at least a week before they are able to challenge their detention. Such a system, the plaintiffs contend, violates the the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The same day that the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs asked for the court to certify their class. The plaintiffs proposed class consisted of "all people who are or will be detained in the Tulsa County Jail because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release." The Tulsa County Sheriff answered the complaint on August 3, 2018, and the defendant-judges moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The defendant-judges argued that the plaintiffs failed to use available state court remedies, such as criminal appellate or habeas processes, that could provide relief. Additionally, the defendant-judges also argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege specific misconduct beyond the judges' lack of addressing bail at arraignments. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2018. However, on November 19, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the plaintiffs' motion for class-certification, and the defendant-judges' motion to dismiss as moot. 2018 WL 6048016. The court found that the plaintiffs paid their bonds and were released from jail in the days following the original complaint and therefore no longer suffered an actual injury. The court also determined that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception did not apply because these four plaintiffs were expected to comply with the law and therefore this injury was not expected to repeat with regards to these plaintiffs. Additionally, the Court found that the claims were not "inherently transitory." On December 11, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the court's judgment. The plaintiffs objected to the court's characterization of their claims. The plaintiffs argued that they did not challenge their pretrial detention per se, but rather challenged their pretrial detention without counsel and a hearing. The plaintiffs argued that this characterization fit the "inherently transitory" exception to mootness because the Court could not reasonably consider a class certification motion before any named plaintiffs’ individual claims became moot. Judge Eagan agreed with the plaintiffs and, on March 15, 2019, granted their motion for reconsideration. 2019 WL 1231675. The court reinstated the plaintiff's amended complaint and motion for class certification, and also reinstated the defendant-judges' motion to dismiss. With the case active again, the defendant-judges filed their answer on March 25, 2019, and responded in opposition the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on April 15. The defendants also moved to stay the proceedings until the Oklahoma Senate considered a bill that would require individualized considerations of the ability to pay bail. On May 9, Judge Eagan granted the motion until the end of the legislative session or until the bill was signed into law. On June 14, the stay was lifted as the legislative session had ended. The defendant-judges again moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on December 10. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, since their pre-trial detention had ended and therefore they were no longer suffering an injury. After engaging in settlement talks but failing to reach an agreement, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. They contended that the COVID-19 pandemic altered the conditions of detention such that injunctive relief was required in order to prevent irreparable harm to people detained solely based on their inability to pay bail. Judge Eagan denied the plaintiffs' motion on May 11, finding that the preliminary relief was inappropriate given the lack of COVID cases in Tulsa County jails at that time and because a preliminary injunction would not solve the bail issue raised before the pandemic began. 2020 WL 2393855. As of January 13, 2021, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Civil Rights Corps sued Tulsa County and various judicial officers, alleging that the court system operated a wealth-based detention system by detaining arrestees without inquiring into their ability to pay bail. While the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction was denied, the plaintiffs motion for class certification is still pending.


On March 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a consumer class action on behalf of consumers nationwide who had been the subject of misleading and inaccurate background reports sold by the defendant, RealPage, Inc., to landlords. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from Community Legal Services, sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), asking the court for damages and declaratory relief. They alleged that the defendant, RealPage, Inc., adopted and maintained a policy and practice of failing to timely update the criminal record information it maintained so as to eliminate records of cases that have been expunged, thus not accurately reflecting the final disposition of these cases. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant systematically violated FCRA by failing to provide complete and accurate disclosures of all information the defendant maintained about consumers to these consumers upon request. On October 26, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to stay, which was granted in a January 25, 2016 opinion by U.S. District Court Judge John R. Padova. This order further stated that the case would be stayed until the U.S. Supreme Court decided <i>Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins</i>. On June 20, 2016, the case was put back on the docket for final disposition. On June 24, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss count two of the plaintiffs' complaint, but this motion was denied in an October 18, 2016 order by Judge Padova. On June 19, 2017, this case was consolidated with Jenkins v. Realpage, No. 15-cv-3894, for purposes of settlement. On June 30, the parties moved for preliminary approval of settlement, which the court granted on August 3. The settlement established the following three classes: "The Chart Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States of America (including its territories and Puerto Rico) who, from November 5, 2012 through the date when the Court enters its Preliminary Approval Order, requested a copy of their consumer report from Defendant, and received with the disclosure a chart that failed to provide the full address and phone number for every agency responsible for enforcing any provision of the FCRA." "The Expungement Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States of America (including its territories and Puerto Rico) about whom, from March 3, 2013 through the date when the Court enters its Preliminary Approval Order, Defendant prepared a consumer report which included information regarding one or more criminal cases which at the time the report was prepared by Defendant had been expunged or sealed and a Lifecycle File identified the record as having been expunged or sealed prior to the date of the report." "The Source Settlement Class: All persons residing in the United States of America (including its territories and Puerto Rico) who, from November 5, 2012 through the date when the Court enters its Preliminary Approval Order, made a request pursuant to Section 609(a) of the FCRA [15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)] for a file copy, and received a disclosure containing a criminal record in their file which did not include the identity of the public record vendor which had retrieved the criminal record(s) included in their file disclosure." For the Chart Settlement Class, the parties agreed to ask the court for an injunction ordering that the "Defendant shall provide the complete chart of federal agencies responsible for enforcing any provision of the FCRA, including the address and any appropriate phone number of each agency." For the Expungement Class, the parties agreed to move for the court to issue an injunction compelling the defendant to ensure that any criminal records identified as expunged would not be included "in any database used to produce its tenant screening reports." The injunction was to last for two years, and each subclass member was to receive an equal share from a $143,000 settlement fund up to a maximum of $1,100. For the Source Settlement Class, the parties agreed to ask the court to issue an injunction ordering that "[w]hen a consumer makes a request...for a copy of that consumer’s file, Defendant agrees to disclose the name of the vendor that retrieved any criminal record information in the consumer’s file at the time of such request." The injunction was to last for two years, and each subclass member was to receive an equal share from a $936,200 settlement fund up to a maximum of $200. On February 6, 2018, the court granted final approval of the settlement, issued the requested injunctions, and awarded class counsel $359,733.33 in attorney's fees. The plaintiffs filed an opposed motion for approval of the second distribution to class members on November 7, 2018. After oral arguments on the motion on February 7, 2019, Judge Padova granted the motion and the distribution proceeded. There was no further docket activity during the settlement term, which expired in 2020, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On March 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a consumer class action on behalf of consumers nationwide who had been the subject of misleading and inaccurate background reports sold by the defendant, RealPage, Inc. to landlords. The plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), alleging that the defendant, RealPage, Inc., adopted and maintained a policy and practice of failing to timely update the criminal record information it maintained so as to eliminate records of cases that have been expunged, thus not accurately reflecting the final disposition of these cases. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant systematically violated FCRA by failing to provide complete and accurate disclosures of all information the defendant maintains about consumers to these consumers upon request. The parties settled, and the defendant agreed to provide consumers additional information about federal agencies responsible for enforcing FCRA, refrain from including expunged criminal records in tenant screening reports, and disclose the names of vendors who retrieved criminal record information to consumers, plus damages. The settlement term ended in 2020, and the case is now closed.


This federal civil rights case successfully challenged a Davidson county Tennessee rule requiring garnishment of bail bonds, as applied to a non-profit bail bond service. Davidson County, TN, has a local rule that allows the County Criminal Court to garnish bond deposits made by criminal defendants to pay prior judgment fees--including fines, court costs, and restitution. If incarcerated people do not agree to potential garnishment, they are not allowed to post bond. In practice, the Nashville Community Bail Fund (NCBF), a non-profit that provides bail bonds to indigent arrestees, was exempted from this rule for years. But in September 2019, the County Criminal Court judges revoked the exemption. On February 5, 2020, the NCBF filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (in Nashville). The plaintiff sued the Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the ACLU, Civil Rights Corps, and a Nashville-based non-profit law firm Choosing Justice Initiative, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. NCBF claimed that the revocation of its longstanding exemption violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail as well as the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process. On March 17, 2020 District Judge Aleta Trauger granted NCBF’s motion for a preliminary injunction. This injunction prohibited the County Criminal Court Clerk from requiring NCBF to agree to the garnishment rule for bonds that it sought to post. 446 F. Supp. 3d 282. Judge Trauger denied the plaintiff’s request to enjoin the enforcement of the garnishment rule altogether in the Davidson County court system. The Court also denied two government motions to dismiss the case, first in the Preliminary Injunction opinion on March 17, 2020, and again in an opinion on October 26, 2020, 496 F. Supp. 3d 1112. With the strength of these preliminary victories, on November 11, 2020, the plaintiff sought final summary judgment. Instead, the parties entered into a consent decree which was approved by Judge Trauger on December 19. The settlement made the preliminary injunction permanent. Although the defendant reserved the right to appeal the prior denial of his motion to dismiss in the consent decree, in fact he never filed such an appeal. The settlement permanently preserved the district court's jurisdiction to enforce its terms. The matter is ongoing as the parties are litigating over who should pay attorneys fees and how much.

Summary: In 2020, the Nashville Community Bail Fund filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that a local rule which required it to agree to garnishment of judgment fees from bail bonds before it could post bail for indigent arrestees violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and threatened its ability to operate as a non-profit. The District Judge granted a preliminary injunction in March 2020 enjoining the County Criminal Court Clerk from garnishing fees from bonds posted by the Bail Fund. In December 2020, the District Judge approved a consent decree where the Bail Fund and the County Government agreed to make the injunction permanent. The matter is ongoing as the parties are litigating over who should pay attorneys fees and how much.


On May 3, 2016, two indigent citizens who were jailed for not paying traffic and misdemeanor fines, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the City of El Paso under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas Constitution. Represented by lawyers from the Texas Civil Rights Project, the plaintiffs alleged that the City violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as their rights under the Texas Constitution. The plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcing their current debt collection program. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the City adopted a 25-percent plan in 2006 that required those assessed fines, including fines from Class C Misdemeanors and traffic tickets, to either pay 25 percent of their fines or go to jail. The plan did not account for people unable to pay 25 percent of their fines. The repayment plan, alleged the plaintiffs, was adopted as a method of revenue generation for the city. The plaintiffs asserted in their complaint that the City made $19 million from such fines in 2015 and that the policy was pursued purposely, by training municipal court clerks to tell debtors that their only options were the 25-percent payment or jail. The plaintiffs were never informed of their right to assert indigence, and they alleged that the City became aware of issues with its debt collection process but failed to reform the system. On January 12, 2017, Judge David Guaderrama issued an order denying in part and granting in part the City's motion to dismiss, which was filed on June 6, 2016. Judge Guaderrama only looked at the due process claims because the City failed to address the equal protection claims. The plaintiffs' main due process claim was that the City's clerks failed to inform indigent debtors of their right to assert indigence. The court dismissed this claim. Judge Guaderrama held that the city had no constitutional duty to inform the plaintiffs of their right to assert their indigence. Judge Guaderrama only addressed the § 1983 action concerning the violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He allowed the equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and Texas Constitution to stand because the City had failed to address them in their motion to dismiss. On January 20, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and on February 3, 2017, the City responded with a new motion to dismiss, which the Court denied on April 25, 2017. One month later, the Court scheduled a jury trial to take place in March of 2018. After some months of discovery disputes and negotiation between the parties, the defendants again moved to dismiss the case, but the Court rejected the motion as untimely on December 11, 2017. The parties continued negotiating and ultimately did reach a settlement agreement, which led the parties to file for a stipulated dismissal on May 23, 2018. That same week, on May 29, 2018, the Court reviewed the stipulated dismissal and entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. This case is now closed, but the parties may litigate noncompliance with the contractual terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement included the following: a full release of any and all claims by both sides; an agreement that each side would bear its own costs; and an agreement that the City would, for three years following the settlement, continue certain administrative practices. These administrative practices related to: (a) notices to defendants of policies and procedures; (b) forms and procedures associated with payment plans, including a policy that payment plans required no money down, and that defendants could request an extension at any time; (c) notices to defendants regarding court hearings and court schedules; (d) policies and procedures related to indigency hearings and the issuance of warrants; and (e) a promise by defendants not to create any notice, form, procedure or policy that is inconsistent with the notices, forms, policies, and procedures that were attached to the settlement agreement.

Summary: In May of 2016 two indigent people brought a suit against the City of El Paso in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas for jailing them for failure to pay fines, despite their inability to do so. The plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and allege that the Defendants violated their Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs request declaratory and injunctive relief. They want to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing their current debt collection program, which jails people who can't pay a certain portion of their fines for traffic and misdemeanor offenses. The Plaintiffs allege that Defendants adopted their debt collection program to generate revenue for they city, and the individual plaintiffs were not informed that they could assert their indigence. Rather, the Plaintiffs were simply told they had to pay or go to jail. On January 12th, 2017 Judge David Guaderrama granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss in part. Judge Guaderrama dismissed the Due Process claims, but did not reach the Equal Protection claims. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in January 2017, and after the Court denied two motions to dismiss filed by defendants over the course of 2017, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the action pursuant to a settlement agreement. In the settlement agreement, defendants agreed to maintain certain administrative practices for three years. Among other things, these practices related to notice to defendants, policies and procedures for: payment plans; notice to defendants of court hearings and schedules; and indigency hearings and warrants issued for non-payment.


On January 14, 2016, two indigent women that previously served imprisonment terms at the Randall County Jail filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the city of Amarillo under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages, claiming the City of Amarillo violated their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Amarillo installed its own debtor’s prison through its municipal code that required residents that owed fees and fines to “Pay or lay.” Although the city provided an installment plan in order to make payments, once an individual missed a payment, a warrant for his or her arrest would be immediately issued. Hearings to determine a person’s indigency or alternate methods of enforcement are not required by the municipal code. The plaintiffs were both single mothers with part-time jobs as their only source of income. Both struggled to secure consistent employment. One plaintiff had an income of $40.00 a month and the court ordered a payment plan that required her to pay $232.00 in biweekly payments until her debt was paid. When the plaintiff informed the court she would be unable to meet this plan and request modification, she was immediately denied modification and sent to jail for eighteen days. The other plaintiff was unaware that she could assert indigency or request a payment plan, she believed her only option was to “pay or lay.” The plaintiff did not have the money to pay all of her fines and served eighteen days in jail. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all indigent persons adjudicated by the City of Amarillo Municipal Court that owed fines or court costs and ordered to serve imprisonment terms for failure to pay the adjudicated fines and costs. The defendant responded to the complaint with a motion to dismiss on February 11, 2016. The defense argued that a city could not be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged policy of wrongfully jailing persons because the decisions are solely made by the municipal judges who are acting in their judicial capacity and the city of Amarillo have no control or influence. The defendant further argued that the complaint failed to allege an official policy promoted by a municipal policymaker that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation claims. The Court did not immediately address the defendant’s motion, instead, it permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on March 2, 2016. In the amended complaint the plaintiffs addressed the concerns provided by the defendant in its earlier motion to dismiss and expanded its Fourteenth Amendment violation claim to include court administrators and the police department. The plaintiffs alleged that the police department had a policy and practice of jailing indigent people without inquiring as to their reasons for nonpayment, determining whether they were indigent, or considering adequate alternatives to incarceration. On March 16, 2016, the City of Amarillo filed another motion to dismiss on similar grounds of its previous motion to dismiss and that the plaintiffs’ new claims were conclusive and not supported by any factual underpinnings. Once again, the Court did not immediately address the defendant’s motion to dismiss and permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The discovery period began and plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on April 4, 2016. The new complaint addressed the defendant’s previous issues and added four new plaintiffs that also served imprisonment terms as punishment for their inability to pay ticket fines and court fees. On April 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class on behalf of all indigent persons adjudicated by the City of Amarillo Municipal Court that owed fines or court costs and ordered to serve imprisonment terms for failure to pay the adjudicated fines and costs. The defendant filed several briefs in response to the plaintiffs motion and discovery continued. On August 8, 2016, Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson entered an opinion and order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as to all of the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify class as moot due to the previous order to dismiss the case. Judge Robinson entered her final judgment in favor of the defendant and declared that the defendant was entitled to reasonable and necessary costs as a result of the action. The plaintiffs objected to the defendant’s bill of costs on August 30, 2016. On October 12, 2016, Judge Robinson partially sustained the plaintiffs’ objections and ordered for the plaintiffs’ to pay $3,660.00 to the defendant in costs. There are no further entries on this docket, inferring that this case is closed.

Summary: In January 2016, two indigent women that served imprisonment terms at the Randall County Jail filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Amarillo's municipal code created a modern-day debtors' prison and violated their Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In August 2016, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and ordered the plaintiffs to pay $3,660.00 in litigation costs.


The advocacy organization Children's Rights, Inc. filed this lawsuit in June 2002 against the state of Georgia and the Departments of Family and Children Services (DFCS) in Fulton and DeKalb Counties, on behalf of children in foster care in Fulton and DeKalb counties. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Georgia State Constitution, the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Medicaid Act, and the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994. The complaint alleged that children did not receive necessary treatment and services while spending months in emergency shelters, experienced abuse and neglect as a result of an insufficient number of caseworkers, and received inadequate health care and emotional services while in foster care. Plaintiffs originally brought suit in Georgia state courts, but the stated removed the case to federal court because the cause of action included federal laws. Judge Marvin Shoob of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification in August 2003, and at the same time granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part regarding certain claims about the operation of emergency shelters, because the shelters had been closed. The Court denied a later motion for summary judgment filed by the counties and found that children in foster care in Georgia have a state statutory and constitutional right to effective counsel in child abuse and neglect proceedings. Kenny A. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005). In July 2005, Georgia agreed to a settlement that limited the caseload of case workers and required the state to meet benchmarks in numerous areas of service to children, including medical, dental, and mental health screenings and treatment. The court assigned two independent monitors to report on Georgia's progress towards meeting the benchmarks. The county defendants entered into a consent decree with plaintiffs in May 2006; it approved the right-to-counsel settlements and established independent monitors for each county until the counties remain in substantial compliance for a continuous eighteen month period. The consent decrees established staffing requirements and caseloads for child advocate attorneys, and other bureaucratic changes to how Fulton County manages its County Child Advocate Attorneys office. DeKalb County and Fulton County were released from federal oversight in October 2008 and April 2011, respectively, because they had improved the quality of representation provided to foster children. In August 2008, the plaintiffs filed a contempt motion against the state, citing its failure to meet court-ordered requirements to place hundreds of children in permanent homes. The state and plaintiffs jointly filed an agreement to consult national welfare experts in order to review the cases of all children in the backlog and to place them in permanent homes. The court Monitor has made six-month reports on the Georgia's progress towards meeting benchmarks. On November 2, 2015, the parties agreed to a joint stipulation and order to modify the consent decree. The original consent decree required two independent accountability agents, but the parties agree to reduce that to one agent. On February 16, 2016, the independent monitor team submitted a report finding the State was still not compliant with the court-ordered benchmarks. On February 24, 2016, the case was transferred from Judge Shoob, who had had it since its inception in 2002, to Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. On December 5, 2016, the court granted a joint motion to modify the consent decree, adding additional clarifications and stipulations regarding placements, visitation, outcome measures, process and infrastructure requirements, terms upon which State Defendants may move for the termination of the consent decree, and dispute resolution provisions. The modified consent decree also provided for biannual reports from the Monitoring and Technical Assistance Team on the ongoing and attained outcomes. The civil case was closed on August 17, 2017, but biannual monitoring reports continue to be filed. As of June 2018, the monitoring report noted that the Dekalb and Fulton County directors were prioritizing increasing the staff size and quality of training while emphasizing keeping families together and reducing the foster population. However, the report also found that there were inconsistencies in the data relating to caseload, vacancies, new hires and turnover. As of April 2020, the biannual monitoring reports continue to be filed. The January 2020 report shows that the counties have continued to increase their efforts to initially search for and place children with relatives, visitation has improved in all areas, and the state met the threshold for timelines to adoption and guardianship after parental rights have been terminated or released. However, the region continues to struggle with children and teenagers re-entering care and with meeting educational and mental health needs of children in care. <i>Attorneys fees</i> In addition to the litigation regarding enforcement of the consent decree, this case also included extensive litigation regarding the award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The consent decree with the State did not resolve the issue of attorney's fees and the parties had left that to the court to decide. The plaintiffs submitted a request for more than $14 million in attorney's fees. Half of that amount was based on their calculation of the lodestar (the number of hours spent working on the case multiplied by the attorneys' hourly rate). The other half was a fee enhancement for superior work and results. The defendants objected to the fee request, contending that some of the proposed hourly rates were too high, that the hours claimed were excessive, and that the enhancement would duplicate factors that were reflected in the lodestar amount. On October 3, 2006, the district court awarded fees of approximately $10.5 million. 454 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ga.2006). The court determined that the lodestar was $6 million and then enhanced that amount by 75% to account for superior performance and results. The defendants appealed this determination to the Eleventh Circuit. After oral argument, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's award because it was not an abuse of discretion to award that amount of attorney's fees on July 3, 2008. 532 F.3d 1209 (2008). The eleventh circuit judges were divided over the district court's enhancement. The Eleventh Circuit denied the defendants' request for a rehearing en banc but was also divided over this ruling. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari seeking review solely as to the $4.5 million enhancement, which the Supreme Court granted. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on October 14, 2009. Then, on April 21, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that enhancements are permitted in extraordinary circumstances, but held that the district court had not provided proper justification for the enhancement it awarded in this case. The Supreme Court outlined standards for enhancements: 1) there is a strong presumption that the lodestar is sufficient; 2) factors subsumed in the lodestar calculation cannot be used as a ground for increasing an award above the lodestar; and 3) a party seeking fees has the burden of identifying a factor that the lodestar does not adequately take into account and proving with specificity that an enhanced fee is justified. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the District Court had not applied these standards. 559 U.S. 542 (2010). Accordingly, on September 2, 2010, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and judgment entered on October 3, 2006, awarding the plaintiffs attorney's fees, costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision and opinion. 616 F.3d 1230 (2010). The parties submitted new briefs and the district court heard oral argument on the issue. On July 19, 2011, the district court held that plaintiffs were not entitled to an enhancement under the new guidelines established by the Supreme Court.

Summary: Foster children in Georgia's Fulton and DeKalb Counties brought suit against the state and counties Division of Family and Children Services. The class of children alleged that they did not receive necessary treatment and services while spending months in emergency shelters, experienced abuse and neglect as a result of an insufficient number of caseworkers, and received inadequate health care and emotional services while in foster care. In 2005 and 2006, the plaintiffs reached settlement agreements with the state, Fulton County, and DeKalb County. As of November 2018, the State is still under the supervision of the independent monitor in order to meet the court-ordered benchmarks, having not yet completed sufficient improvements.


On August 4, 1999, a group of children in the legal and/or physical custody of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) filed this lawsuit against the State of New Jersey and DYFS in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Represented in part by Children's Rights, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that DYFS failed to protect them from abuse, failed to provide them with services such as medical care, and failed to provide DYFS caseworkers with adequate resources and training. The plaintiffs claimed these actions violated federal common law and federal statutes. They named, in particular, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27, 670-679; Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, as amended by the Interethnic Adoption Provisions of 1996; Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act; Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that New Jersey and DYFS’s actions violated the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the rights to association, privacy and family integrity under the First and Ninth Amendments. With the complaint, the plaintiffs also moved for class certification. On October 12, 1999, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. On January 27, 2000, U.S. District Judge Garrett E. Brown granted the motion with respect to the plaintiffs’ substantive due process cause of action. The court dismissed the substantive due process claim to the extent it was alleged on behalf of children who were voluntarily in state custody. The court held there was no substantive due process right to “not remain in state custody unnecessarily” or “to be housed in the least restrictive, most appropriate and family-like placement while in state custody.” The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ cause of action under the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 because the plaintiffs failed to allege that they were denied the opportunity to become an adoptive or foster parent on the basis of race, color, or national origin.. The court denied the motion for all the other asserted causes of action, and noted that "[t]here [was] no term other than tragic to summarize the facts" alleged in this case. Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476 (D.N.J. 2000). After some procedural wrangling, in October 2000, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint as well as a modified motion to certify class action. By March 2001, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from conducting an audit of DYFS case records. The court then ordered the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered. On June 28, 2001, the court again denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify class action, concluding that the plaintiffs’ class definition was overly broad. On July 30, 2001, the plaintiffs again filed a third motion for class certification, which the court granted on March 7, 2002. During this time, on September 28, 2001, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction after determining that the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm and that injunctive relief was warranted. The parties proceeded towards trial and commenced discovery. Meanwhile, on January 27, 2003, the New York Times and other newspapers moved to intervene in the case in order to modify the confidentiality orders. The court granted the motions in part for purposes of reporting to the public about the state of the child welfare system. Charlie H. v. Whitman, 213 F.R.D. 240 (D.N.J. 2003). The New York Times published a series of articles focused on the New Jersey child welfare system, including several pieces about the death of Faheem Williams, a seven-year-old boy whose case had been closed by DYFS even though there were outstanding issues of abuse. Once discovery concluded, on February 27, 2003, the court entered an order referring the parties to mediation and appointed former New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart G. Pollack. Through mediation, the parties reached a settlement agreement in July 2003. After a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement on September 2, 2003. Under the core principles that the foster care placements be as temporary an arrangement as possible, with its goal being to provide to children in out-of-home environment safe permanent placements, the settlement agreement mandated the creation of an expert panel (the New Jersey Child Welfare Panel) which was tasked to begin the planning process for improvements in the child welfare system and overall supervision and technical assistance during the 18 month period. The agreement also set out planning procedures, definition of improved outcomes for children, and review process. Areas of immediate mandates included securing funds ($14.3 million) to hire additional man power, conducting safety assessments, reviewing high-risk facilities individually, reviewing standards for licensing, reviewing hiring processes, among others. The agreement also mandated the appointment of a monitor. On February 26, 2004, the plaintiffs moved to appoint a guardian ad litem on behalf of three class members, currently in DYFS custody, to protect their interests in any claims for damages they may have against DYFS. On April 5, 2004, after oral argument on this motion, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to appoint a guardian ad litem. The plaintiffs then moved for $150,000 in attorneys’ fees and expenses on September 27, 2004. The court granted that motion on November 5, 2004. In October 2005, the court-appointed monitor found that the state was making "seriously inadequate progress" in implementing the terms of the settlement agreement. During this time, the Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA) were granted leave to appear as amicus curiae. After unsuccessful negotiations between the parties to improve progress levels, in December 2005, the plaintiffs moved to hold the defendants in contempt for noncompliance with the consent decree. However, the newly elected governor created a new cabinet-level children's agency and began new negotiations with the plaintiffs. As a result, the parties modified the settlement agreement in July 2006. The modified settlement agreement provided for phased implementation. In Phase 1, lasting from July 2006 to December 2008, the state committed to working in collaboration with the Monitor to develop a case practice model that addresses issues of regular case planning, development of individualized service plans, and training for caseworkers. Among the increased services for youth are mental health services, services for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and questioning youth, and regular medical examinations. Phase II, from January 2009 until termination of the agreement, required completion of certain outcomes based on numerous indicators—e.g., that all children are safe from abuse and that siblings are placed together. The settlement provided for bi-annual reports by a monitor and established a dispute resolution process. Until November 2015, the monitor filed reports in accordance with the modified agreement. On November 4, 2015, the second modified settlement agreement was entered. The 2015 agreement identified as areas to be achieved: timely and quality completion of investigations on alleged child abuse and neglect, timely execution of initial and subsequent family team meetings, proper needs assessment, timely and quality planning of cases, proper management of intake/adoption workers' caseloads, proper parent-child/siblings visitations, stable placements (with siblings, where possible), prevention of repeat maltreatment and re-entry to placement, timely discharge to permanent placement, provision of services to support transition and independent living assessment of older youth. The agreement stipulated that once defendants demonstrated compliance during a period longer than 12 months, the court would terminate its jurisdiction over the case. The first monitor’s report for the new agreement was filed in June 2016. Enforcement of the settlement agreement is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiffs, who are children in the custody of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS), brought suit against the state alleging abuse, neglect, and lack of services. After the New York Times published several articles about the deaths of children in the care of DYFS due to lack of care, in 2003 the state entered into a settlement agreement providing for a systematic overhaul of the state child welfare system. The latest modification of the agreement was made in 2015 and remains in force.


This federal class action was brought by children in the custody of the New York City Child Welfare Administration ("CWA"), and children who, while not in the custody of CWA, are or will be at risk of abuse or neglect and whose status is known or should be known to CWA. It was filed on December 13, 1995 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights Inc., Lawyers for Children, and private counsel, sought class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief against both the city and the state (collectively, the defendants). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment program of the Medicaid Act, the Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants systematically:<ul><li> failed to protect the plaintiffs from abuse and neglect and to provide them and their families with appropriate, legally required services; <li> failed to appropriately accept reports of child abuse and neglect for investigation; <li> failed to investigate those reports of child abuse and neglect that are accepted in the time and manner required by law; <li> failed to provide mandated pre-placement preventive services to enable children at risk of being placed in foster care to remain at home safely with their families whenever possible; <li> failed to provide children in need of foster care placement with the least restrictive, most family-like placements designed to meet their individual needs; <li> failed to provide foster children, their birth families and their foster families with the services that are essential to ensuring that the children do not deteriorate in CWA's custody; <li> failed to provide foster children with disabilities with placements and services appropriate to their individual needs and necessary to allow these children fully to participate in the City's child welfare system; <li> failed to provide foster children with appropriate case management, case plans and services; <li> failed to provide children for whom adoption is appropriate with services necessary to ensure that they are adopted quickly; <li> failed to provide teenage children who will leave the foster care system to live on their own with services adequate to prepare them to live independently; <li> failed to provide foster children with the administrative, judicial and dispositional reviews to which they are legally entitled; <li> failed to provide caseworkers with sufficient training, support and supervision; and <li> failed to maintain an adequate information system to monitor, track and plan for children, and to manage the child welfare system effectively. </ul>As a result of these systemic deficiencies, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants jeopardized their well being. On June 18, 1996, District Judge Robert J. Ward certified a class of children in foster care and those reported to be abused or neglected. The court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, interpreting children's constitutional right to protection from harm to include harm that results from unnecessary separation from parents and from extended stays in foster care without a permanent family. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662 (1996). Some procedural skirmishes dealing with the defendants' interlocutory appeal followed. On September 26, 1997, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's certification of the plaintiff class and directed that the district judge divide the classes into subclasses for organizational and management purposes. Marisol A. v Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997). In July of 1998, the parties began settlement negotiations. Over the objections of would-be intervenors representing a subclass of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender youths in the custody of the city agency, the court approved separate settlement agreements with the city and the state defendants in March 1999. Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 185 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Objectors appealed, but on July 10, 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's approval of both the city and state settlement agreements. Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2000). The class action settlement required the city to use independent outside child welfare experts to guide and assist it in undertaking systemic reform. The advisory panel had complete access to all aspects of the city's child welfare agency, and was empowered to provide recommendations, issue progress reports on the status of the reform effort, and determine whether the city is acting in good faith in implementing systemic reform. The city settlement was successfully concluded in 2001. The plaintiffs returned to court in January 2001, seeking an order directing compliance by the state with specific terms of the state settlement agreement. The areas of alleged noncompliance included the failure to implement a statewide child welfare management information system. After an August 2001 evidentiary hearing, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part, holding that the state had acted with insufficient diligence in implementing the information management system. Marisol A. ex re. Forbes v. Giuliani, 157 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Judge Ward extended the term of the agreement in this area, and directed that the state file semi-annual reports with the plaintiffs until the Court determined that the state had fully complied with the relevant portions of the agreement. Very little activity appears in the docket after that ruling. The state filed a report required by the settlement agreement in July 2008, and then there was nearly a 10-year gap. In 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge George Daniels and then Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker. Also, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (“OCFS”) filed one of its required semi-annual reports stating that OCFS was taking reasonable efforts to develop and implement a diligent and sufficient information management system for child welfare needs. A status conference was held on July 26, 2018. After that conference, the court issued an order relinquishing its jurisdiction over that portion of the settlement agreement on August 6. Since the other parts of the settlement had terminated in 2001, the case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs, children in the custody of the New York City Child Welfare Administration ("CWA"), and children who, while not in the custody of CWA, are or will be at risk of abuse or neglect and whose status is known or should be known to CWA, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against both the city and state for systematic deficiencies that jeopardized their well-being. The case was filed on December 13, 1995, and the parties reached to two separate settlement agreements, one with the city and one with the state, on December 2, 1988. The plaintiffs returned to court in January 2001, seeking an order directing the state to comply with specific terms of the state settlement agreement. The court found that the state had acted with insufficient diligence in implementing the information management system, and therefore extended the terms of the agreement in this area and directed that the plaintiffs receive semi-annual reports. The defendants provided a January 2017 report to show that they were continuing to develop, implement, and update their information systems for child welfare needs. A year later, the court ended its supervision of the portions of the settlement that it had retained jurisdiction to enforce.


On May 12, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that New York's Administration for Children's Services (ACS) routinely forces children in foster care to be unnecessarily institutionalized in psychiatric hospitals rather than placed in home-like settings. The plaintiffs alleged that ACS was using placement in psychiatric institutions as punishment for misbehavior and that many children placed in these hospitals did not have a diagnosis of mental illness. The plaintiffs also alleged that children were forced to stay in institutions long after it was determined that they could be placed in a less restrictive environment, but that ACS's policies made discharge difficult. The named plaintiffs, three currently institutionalized children, requested their release from institutions. They also sought to represent a class of children and demanded that the court order ACS to discontinue its "illegal pattern and practice of 'dumping' children in foster care in psychiatric hospitals and refusing to let them out." The plaintiffs alleged that these policies violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, state laws and regulations, the New York Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case moved quickly toward settlement, with the parties stipulating to certify the class and postpone a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The class was certified as:<blockquote> Children under the age of 18 who are in the custody of the New York City Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") and who are currently admitted or will be brought to and admitted to acute psychiatric hospitals and who, once admitted and deemed ready for discharge, are not moved by ACS and/or one of its contract agencies to the least restrictive setting appropriate to their needs.</blockquote>In November 2010, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court for preliminary approval. District Judge Brian M. Cogan held a fairness hearing on March 11, 2011, and gave final approval to the terms of the Stipulation and Order of Settlement filed on February 28, 2010. In the settlement, ACS agreed to promulgate new policies and procedures with respect to the placement of children in foster care in institutions. ACS will improve tracking, monitoring, and individualized planning so that children are not ignored and left to languish in institutions. They also agreed to develop new training programs for ACS staff and contractors. The agreement also provides for ongoing monitoring. A separate agreement, entered on June 29, 2011, provided specific relief (including damages and attorneys' fees) to the three named plaintiffs. On July 7, 2011, Judge Cogan entered a settlement order, in which the parties agreed to dismiss all claims and release defendants from liability in exchange for payment. The case was then dismissed with prejudice. On January 22, 2016, the parties filed a joint motion to alter the judgment. Judge Cogan signed the Stipulation and Order of Settlement the same day. The amended agreement extended the jurisdiction of the Court over the matter for an additional four months, until June 30, 2016, with the potential for extension of such jurisdiction for six months from the time the Court's jurisdiction was scheduled to terminate. The docket does not reflect any extension of the Court's jurisdiction, so it presumably expired on June 30, 2016.

Summary: This was a class action challenge to New York's unnecessary institutionalization of children in foster care in psychiatric facilities. The initial settlement agreement, entered on February 28, 2011, provided for increased community-based placement opportunities for children in foster care with mental illness as well as individualized planning, staff training, and monitoring. In addition to the initial settlement agreement, on July 7, 2011, the plaintiffs agreed to release defendants from all liability in exchange for payment from defendants. On January 22, 2016, the parties agreed to extend the Court's jurisdiction until June 30, 2016, at which time its jurisdiction presumably expired.


On May 30, 2013, an eleven-year-old child in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas, Abbeville County, South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against SCDSS, the Boys Home of the South (BHOTS), and individuals employed by both organizations. Plaintiff, represented by Children's Rights, Inc. and private counsel, asked the court for damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff claimed that Defendants' policies and customs failed to comply with federal and state law, which violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that their gross negligence caused him permanent mental harm and injury. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that while he was placed at BHOTS--a "low management" group home licensed by SCDSS that did not require awake staff at all times--he was repeatedly attacked and sexually assaulted by older boys at the home. He claimed that Defendants violated his rights to a safe and secure placement in state custody, his right to adequate supervision, and his right to prompt mental health treatment under both federal and state law. On June 28, 2013, Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Over the next few months, the parties engaged in fact and expert discovery. As discovery proceeded, Plaintiff agreed to stipulate to the dismissal of several of the individual Defendants. The remainder of the Defendants, including SCDSS and BHOTS, moved for summary judgment. On February 4, 2014, while the motions for summary judgment were pending, Plaintiff and the BHOTS Defendants reached a settlement for an undisclosed sum of money, including $188,285.27 in costs. The settlement document did disclose, however, that as a result of the litigation, BHOTS was ceasing operations and would be filing for articles of dissolution with the South Carolina Attorney General. The Court (Judge Anderson) later approved the settlement on March 10, 2014. On February 14, 2014, the Court (Judge Anderson), in a brief, two-page order, denied the SCDSS Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court simply stated that, "[b]ased on the filings of both sides, and their arguments during the hearing, this Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist." On March 28, 2014, following mediation and shortly before jury selection was to begin, Plaintiff and the SCDSS Defendants (the remaining Defendants) reached a settlement for an undisclosed sum of money, including $17,186.58 in costs. With the SCDSS settlement, all parties had either settled or been dismissed, and the case concluded.

Summary: On May 30, 2013, an eleven-year-old child in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas, Abbeville County, South Carolina, against SCDSS and the Boys Home of the South (BHOTS), alleging that, as a result of Defendants' failures, Plaintiff was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions, causing him severe and permanent mental injury. Following removal to Federal Court, in early 2014, Plaintiff settled with both SCDSS and BHOTS for an undisclosed sum of money. BHOTS also permanently closed as a result of the lawsuit.


On January 12, 2015, eleven named minor children in the legal custody of the South Carolina Department of Social Services ("SCDSS") filed this putative class action lawsuit (by their Next Friends) against the Governor of South Carolina and SCDSS in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The named plaintiffs were represented by two advocacy organizations, Children's Rights and Appleseed, and by private counsel. Plaintiffs intended to seek certification of a class of all children who are or will be involuntarily placed in foster care in the legal custody of SCDSS as a result of emergency protective custody and/or a referral, report, suspicion, allegation and/or adjudication of abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging systemic deficiencies in the operation of SCDSS subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm. The alleged problems included: whether SCDSS maintains an adequate number and kind of foster homes, resulting in over-institutionalization of foster children, repeated movement of children between placements, and deprivation of meaningful familial contacts; whether SCDSS has excessive caseworker caseloads, resulting in a workforce that cannot monitor children's safety, maltreatment in SCDSS care, and failure to investigate maltreatment; and whether SCDSS fails to provide initial and periodic medical, dental, and mental health assessments, treatments, and screens, leading to emotional and psychological deterioration of children in SCDSS custody. On March 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On March 30, 2015, with Defendants' motion pending, the District Court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) entered a text order asking the parties to engage in early mediation. The Court indicated that Senior District Judge Michael Duffy had agreed to mediate, should the parties consent. Later that week, the parties indicated that they were willing to engage in early mediation. On September 28, 2015, the parties entered into an interim settlement agreement. As part of the "Consent Immediate Interim Relief Order," the plaintiff class was certified and "limited co-monitors" were appointed. SCDSS also agreed to undertake several remedial steps, including phasing out use of SCDSS offices, hotels and motels as placements and no longer recommending that children remain in juvenile detention because of a lack of foster homes. SCDSS also agreed to undertake a workload study, adopt workload limits, conduct a placement needs assessment, and create a plan to end the placement of children ages six and under in non-family group placements. Judge Gergel approved the parties' final class action settlement agreement on October 4, 2016. The agreement defined the class as "all children who are involuntarily placed in DSS foster care in the physical or legal custody of DSS either now or in the future." Pursuant to the agreement, the court appointed two co-monitors to issue periodic public reports on the parties' compliance with the settlement agreement. SCDSS agreed to (1) complete a foster care workload study and adopt workload limits; (2) ensure that worker-child visitation happens with appropriate frequency; (3) adopt enhanced investigation procedures; (4) adopt procedures to ensure appropriate child placement; (5) provide for family visitation; and (6) develop a health care improvement plan. The settlement agreement was to remain in effect until the Court issued an order dismissing the case. Regarding attorneys' fees, the parties agreed to submit the amount and terms of fees and expenses to final and binding arbitration by the mediator (District Judge P. Michael Duffy). In the September 2018 report, the co-monitors outlined several areas of accomplishment: leadership changes and internal restructuring; development of a five-year budget; building infrastructure to meet children's healthcare needs; conducting a data audit; and development of a training plan and case practice model. The co-monitors also identified several areas in need of focus and improvement. One of these areas was investigative practice within SCDSS’s Out-of-Home Abuse and Neglect (OHAN) unit. The co-monitors noted that a lack of resources meant that staff had excessive case loads and did not have the time, direction, or tools to complete their work. Another area in need of improvement was SCDSS's placement array and processes. While SCDSS made some progress in reducing the number of children placed in congregate care and staying overnight at SCDSS offices, there had been little improvement in the period leading up to the September 2018 report. Finally, the co-monitors noted a need for improvement in the area of workforce recruitment and retention. In response to the September report, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendants in contempt for non-compliance with the settlement agreement on November 26, 2018. On December 5, 2018, the Court issued an order stating that, starting in January 2019, the Court will hold monthly status conferences to assess SCDSS's implementation of the reforms mandated by the settlement agreement. Prior to the first status conference, SCDSS must submit plans about the three main areas in need of reform: workloads, placement, and healthcare. The order also required that SCDSS appoint staff responsible for those three areas. Finally, the order required that the parties conduct a mediation session prior to the January status conference. The parties participated in mediation, and the monitoring arrangement continued with monthly status conferences. On August 15, 2019, the court issued an order stating that the settlement agreement required the defendants to have reached a set of benchmarks by July 1, 2020, that they had yet to achieve. The order further stated that the expectation remained that they would meet these benchmarks. As of May 22, 2020, the most recent biannual monitors' report was filed on March 2, 2020. The report detailed only moderate success, noting that budget restrictions created significant obstacles to compliance. Monitoring of the settlement is ongoing.

Summary: On January 12, 2015, a class action lawsuit was filed against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS) in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging numerous deficiencies in the operation of the state's child welfare system. On September 28, 2015, the parties reached an interim settlement agreement, providing for an end to certain SCDSS practices, as well as for studies of additional SCDSS practices. Monitoring revealed incremental improvements in conditions, and the settlement remains in effect.