On March 19, 2015, three men arrested in Chicago, IL filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago and Chicago police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by a private firm, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages. They claimed that the City of Chicago and police officers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Chicago police officers had subjected them to false arrest at the Homan Square detention facility, excessive use of force, and illegal searches; attempted to coerce them into false confessions without an attorney present; and threatened them that they would be charged with crimes if they did not provide information. The Guardian, a UK-based newspaper, profiled conditions in Homan Square through a series of articles starting in early 2015. Documents filed later in this case mention that the press coverage inspired the plaintiffs to come forward with this lawsuit. On May 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Primarily, the defendants claimed that plaintiffs' complaint was untimely and that the allegation that the police had threatened plaintiffs into not speaking about their experience was not enough to defeat the statute of limitations. On May 27, 2015, Judge Andrea R. Wood granted the defendants' motion to stay discovery pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. On March 31, 2016, Judge Wood granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in a minute order. However, Judge Wood did not issue a Memorandum Opinion and Order on the motion to dismiss until January 31, 2018. The docket does not explain the reason for this large gap in time. Given the unusual gap without a written dismissal order, the Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) dictates that a dismissal order is assumed to be filed 150 days after judgment is entered into the docket. In the opinion, Judge Wood held that the case should be dismissed because the complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired and the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not apply to the circumstances. Specifically, Judge Wood held that although the plaintiffs adequately alleged facts establishing the first two elements of equitable estoppel—that the defendants acted affirmatively to prevent them from filing suit and the plaintiffs did actually and reasonably rely on the threats while they were made—the plaintiffs did not file suit promptly after the obstacle to filing was removed and therefore failed to adequately allege facts establishing the third element of equitable estoppel. On February 6, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed Judge's Wood decision granting the defendants' motion to dismiss to the Seventh Circuit. On August 17, 2018, the defendants submitted a docketing statement arguing that the plaintiffs failed to file a timely notice of appeal as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). They argued that the district court entered a dispositive order on the docket on March 31, 2016, meaning that the plaintiffs' notice of appeal filed on February 6, 2018 was more than 30 days after the entry of judgment. A Seventh Circuit panel composed of Judges Daniel Anthony Manion, Diane S. Skyes, and Michael B. Brennan sided with the appellees in a September 30, 2019 opinion. 939 F.3d 882. They wrote that the appellants should have filed their motion to appeal within 30 days of the dismissal order, which came 150 days after the March 30, 2016 minute order dismissing the case. They did not agree with the plaintiff's argument that they should have been allowed to appeal when the written opinion was published. In addition, the panel briefly discussed the merits of the case, and wrote that this case was not filed within the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not apply. They referred back to previous cases in the Seventh Circuit that held that police intimidation was not sufficient to invoke equitable estoppel, and added that the Guardian articles providing "a newfound sense of security" to come forward was not enough to overcome that precedent, either. The plaintiffs did not appeal the decision to the Supreme Court; the case is now closed.

Summary: On March 19, 2015 three Chicago residents filed suit against the City of Chicago and several members of the Chicago Police Department for unlawful arrest and detention and excessive use of force at the Homan Square detention facility. In May 2015 defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 31, 2016, the Court granted the defendants motion to dismiss; the dismissal order came 150 days later, though a written opinion and order came down on January 31, 2018. The plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision to grant the motion to dismiss to the Seventh Circuit after the written order was issued. A Seventh Circuit panel agreed with the district court on September 30, 2019; they wrote that the appeal was not filed in a timely manner, and that the underlying case was filed after the statute of limitations had passed. This decision was not appealed and the case is closed.


On July 30, 2020, six individual plaintiffs and the Kentucky Alliance Against Racial and Political Repression (KAARPR) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. They were represented by attorneys from the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the ACLU of Kentucky Foundation, and private counsel. They brought suit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Government, the Mayor of Louisville, the Interim Chief of Louisville Police, and over a dozen Louisville Police Department officers. The complaint arose out of the protests that swept the country following the police killings of George Floyd in May of 2020 and of Breonna Taylor (by Louisville police) in March of 2020. The complaint alleged that during these protests in Louisville, protesters were met with police using tear gas, pepper balls, flash bang grenades, and, in at least one case resulting in a fatality, live ammunition. The complaint argued that these actions represented violations of the U.S. Constitution and common law tort law. Specifically, the complaint argued that the defendants' First Amendment right to free speech and assembly and their Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force. The complaint also argued that defendants' actions constituted common law battery and assault. The case was assigned to District Judge Charles R. Simpson III. By August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. This motion was denied the very next day. Plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint on September 11, 2020. The amended complaint added a plaintiff but left the substance of the complaint unchanged. The case is ongoing as of October 12, 2020.

Summary: This case arose out of the protests that took place nationally after the police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. Plaintiffs were six individuals and one political group called the Kentucky Alliance Against Racial and Political Repression. They filed a class-action suit against the Louisville and Jefferson County Metro Government and the Louisville police. The complaint argued that police tactics used to quell the protests constituted violations of the U.S. Constitution as well as common law battery and assault. The case is ongoing as of October 12, 2020


In July 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] initiated an investigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 of alleged misconduct by the Canine Section of the Prince George's County Police Department [PGPD]. The investigation followed some eighteen civil rights lawsuits filed between 1993 through 1998 by individuals that alleged dog attacks by the PGPD's canine unit. In October 2000, the DOJ expanded the scope of its investigation to include broader allegations of excessive force. The DOJ and the FBI also launched a criminal investigation which resulted in the federal indictment of two PGPD officers on charges that they ordered a police dog to attack an unarmed homeless man. See U.S. v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2003). Following the DOJ's investigation, DOJ, PGPD and local FOP officials met and negotiated agreements to address all of the DOJ's concerns. The settlement agreements took the form of a Memorandum of Agreement [MOA] as to allegations of excessive force and a Consent Decree as to PGPD's Canine Section. On January 22, 2004, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court District of Maryland (Greenbelt) along with a joint motion to lodge the proposed Consent Decree. On March 11, 2004, the District Court (Judge Roger W. Titus) approved and entered the Consent Decree. The MOA and the Consent decree required widespread reform to PGPD's use of canines and force. The agreements required the PGPD to implement the following reform measures: • revisions to use of force policies and training protocol, including documentation and review of all use of force incidents • creation of a board to review all firearm discharges • changes to the department's receipt, investigation and review of citizen complaints • implemention of a guard and bark methodology for canines, thereby restricting the use of biting • monitoring and review of all canine deployments and biting incidents • appointment of an independent monitor to oversee compliance with the MOA. Eduardo Gonzalez and the Alexander Group Independent Monitor Team (AG-IMT) were selected to serve as the independent monitor. Both agreements were set to expire three years after their effective dates, provided that the PGPD had been in substantial compliance with all provisions for at least two years. On February 2, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the consent decree. On February 12, 2007, the Court granted the motion stating that PGPD had a) complied fully with the consent decree, and b) eliminated the last vestiges of unlawful behavior and had thus satisfied the decree.

Summary: In July 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] initiated an investigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 of alleged misconduct by the Canine Section of the Prince George's County Police Department [PGPD]. The investigation followed some eighteen civil rights lawsuits filed between 1993 through 1998 by individuals that alleged dog attacks by the PGPD's canine unit. Following the DOJ's investigation, DOJ, PGPD and local FOP officials met and negotiated agreements to address all of the DOJ's concerns which resulted in a Consent Decree being entered on January 22, 2004. On February 12, 2007, the Court granted the motion stating that PGPD had a) complied fully with the consent decree, and b) eliminated the last vestiges of unlawful behavior and had thus satisfied the decree.


On June 12, 2003, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the City of Detroit. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the DOJ alleged a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Detroit Police Department (DPD), including the excessive use of force, false arrest, improper warrantless searches and failure to protect detainees. Contemporaneously with the filing of the DOJ's complaint, the parties filed a proposed consent decree and motion to appoint an independent monitor. The filing followed a DOJ investigation of the DPD which revealed concerns about excessive force, holding cell conditions and arrest and detention policies and practices. A day after the filing of the complaint, the City of Detroit filed a motion to stay entry of the consent judgment until its City Council could formally approve it. The Detroit City Council then filed a motion to intervene in the action on June 18, 2003. On July 1, 2003, the Coalition Against Police Brutality filed a motion to intervene as of right. U.S. District Judge Julian Abele Cook Jr. denied both intervention motions on July 14, 2003. On July 18, 2003, Judge Cook granted the parties' motions to appoint a monitor and approve the consent judgment and motion to amend the consent judgment. Judge Cook entered two separate consent judgments: one relating to the "Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention" and the other relating to "Conditions of Confinement." On July 23, 2003, Judge Cook appointed Sheryl L. Robinson, with the assistance of Kroll, Inc., as the independent monitor. On October 15, 2003, the Coalition Against Police Brutality filed a notice of appeal, but the appeal was subsequently dismissed for a reason that is not apparent. On December 27, 2004, Judge Cook issued an order extending the duration of the "Conditions of Confinement" consent decree to July 18, 2007. The other consent decree relating to "Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention" was conditionally set to expire by its terms in July 2008. On October 26, 2007, however both consent decrees were extended by Judge Cook until July 18, 2011. The independent monitor, Sheryl Robinson Wood, issued quarterly reports from the time of her appointment. Each report contains a "report card" as an appendix, summarizing the monitor's evaluation of DPD compliance with the various consent judgment provisions. On July 24, 2009, Judge Cook accepted the resignation of the Monitor, on the basis of documents that demonstrated that "she had engaged in conduct which was totally inconsistent with the terms and conditions of the two Consent Judgments in this litigation." In particular, she had "engaged in undisclosed communications, as well as meetings of a personal nature," with the former Mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick. Judge Cook suspended decree monitoring until selection of a new monitor, which occurred on October 5, 2009 when Judge Cook appointed Robert Warsaw to the position. Throughout the course of this litigation, the parties amended their consent decrees several times so that the defendants could more easily comply with the terms. However, on April 19, 2010, Judge Cook issued an order requiring the Defendants to resolve all of its backlogged citizen complaints within a period of 90 days. The defendants asked for several extensions, and ultimately achieved compliance in March of 2011. However, as of January 2012, there were over 400 backlogged complaints, which has reopened this facet of the litigation as this number was "totally unacceptable," according to Judge Cook. Judge Cook then issued an order on January 30, 2012, requiring the Defendants to fix the backlog of complaints. On April 23, 2012, the parties filed another Amended Consent Decree, amending various portions of the consent judgments related to the use of force and conditions of confinement. On July 19, 2013, Judge Cook issued an order with respect to the consent judgments after becoming aware that the individual identified as responsible for the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment was no longer employed by the DPD. Judge Cook ordered the defendants to identify the head of the DPD's Civil Rights Integrity Bureau (CRIB), and required that the DPD notify the court and monitor before making any personnel changes within CRIB. Judge Cook also noted that with the appointment of Kevyn Orr as Emergency Manager for the City of Detroit, the line of authority might have been complicated. Thus, Judge Cook also required the City of Detroit provide an updated description of the line of authority to clarify accountability with respect to the enforcement of the consent judgements. The defendants filed their response to Judge Cook's order on July 26, 2013. On July 29, 2013, Judge Cook issued an order extending the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment in light of the DPD's plan to transfer custody of its detainees to the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Once the monitor was satisfied with the decommissioning of the DPD's holding cells, Judge Cook would dismiss the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment. On December 11, 2013, the monitor submitted a report confirming compliance with the Conditions of Confinement Consent Judgment, and Judge Cook subsequently dismissed this consent judgment on January 27, 2014. On December 19, 2013, Judge Cook issued a new order for "enhanced monitoring." Judge Cook acknowledged that substantial progress had been made with respect to enforcement of the consent judgments, as the City of Detroit was now in compliance with 93% of the consent judgment requirements. However, Judge Cook also noted that the City was still out of compliance with 12% of the Use of Force Consent Judgment requirements. As such, Judge Cook directed the monitor to increase the frequency of visits to the City in order to expedite enforcement of the Use of Force Consent Judgment. On December 22, 2013, the defendants moved to suspend monitoring of provisions of the Use of Force and Arrest and Witness Detention Consent Judgment which have been in compliance for two or more years. However, on June 16, 2014, Judge Cook denied the motion, finding that there were no changes in circumstances which warranted a revision of the consent judgment. On May 14, 2014, due to his impending transition to inactive status, Judge Cook ordered that this case be reassigned to another judge in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case was eventually assigned to U.S. District Judge Avery Cohn on June 16, 2014. On August 8, 2014, the parties jointly moved to terminate the remaining consent judgment, arguing that the intent of the consent judgment had been substantially satisfied. The parties noted that the independent monitor found 90% overall compliance, and any remaining compliance could be achieved through a transition agreement under which the DOJ could maintain oversight of the DPD's ongoing reform efforts without the direct oversight of an independent monitor. On August 25, 2014, Judge Cohn granted the motion terminating the consent judgment, and entered the transition agreement as an order terminating on March 2, 2016. Judge Cohn also provided final comments with respect to the order, suggesting that control of the DPD be transferred away from the Emergency Manager and back to the mayor of Detroit. Judge Cohn also suggested that the Board of Police Commissioners continue as a civilian review body dealing with complaints. This case is effectively closed.

Summary: This is a case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by the Detroit Police Department, including the excessive use of force, false arrest, improper warrantless searches and failure to protect detainees. It was filed in 2003, simultaneously with a consent decree in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court adopted the decree, and monitoring has continued since. The consent judgments were terminated on August 25, 2014 after a finding of substantial compliance.


On August 28, 2014, six Missouri residents filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution against individual police officers of the City of Ferguson, Missouri and the County of St. Louis, Missouri, the City of Ferguson, and the County of St. Louis. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the City of Ferguson and the County of St. Louis, through their police forces, violated the plaintiffs' rights by subjecting them to unnecessary and unwarranted force and arresting them without probable cause. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged claims of false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, failure to train, supervise, and discipline, as well as assault and battery. This suit was filed in the wake of the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. Brown, a black male, was fatally shot on August 9, 2014, by Darren Wilson, a Caucasian police officer with the Ferguson Police Department. The circumstances surrounding the shooting are disputed, but it is undisputed that Brown was unarmed at the time. The shooting sparked protests and general civil unrest in the City of Ferguson, caused in part by racial tension between the majority-black community and the majority-white city government and police. The plaintiffs alleged that during this time of civil unrest, Ferguson police officers used wanton and excessive force under color of law. Specifically, one plaintiff alleged that she and her son were arrested on August 13 at a fast-food restaurant in Ferguson. The complaint states that they had attended a peace rally and were arrested for supposedly failing to follow police instructions to leave the establishment. Another plaintiff claimed he was shot with rubber bullets, assaulted, and sprayed with pepper-spray by police while heading to his mother's house on August 13. According to the complaint, this plaintiff was never charged with a crime. Another plaintiff claimed he was photographing protests from his vehicle when police began moving down the street where he was parked, firing tear gas and ordering people to disperse. The plaintiff was allegedly blocked in by a police vehicle and therefore unable to comply. According to the complaint, police seized his camera and pulled the memory chip from it before arresting him. The final two plaintiffs claimed they were also arrested for failing to disperse while filming the protests on August 11. On October 2, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding four more plaintiffs to the suit. The City of Ferguson and its police chief and officer (the "Ferguson defendants") filed a motion to dismiss on October 24, 2014, and St. Louis County and its chief of police (the "St. Louis defendants") filed motions to dismiss party plaintiffs on November 26, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 1, 2014. On March 16, 2015, the court (Judge Henry Edward Autrey) dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision against the St. Louis County defendants, and dismissed one of the plaintiffs' claims for assault and battery. The court denied the Ferguson defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on May 27, 2015. This amended complaint included claims of six sets of plaintiffs. The Ferguson defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent supervision in the third amended complaint, and the court granted the motion to dismiss on June 25, 2015, using the same rationale under which those claims were dismissed as against the County defendants from the second amended complaint. The case was referred to alternative dispute resolution on August 28, 2015, and after a conference on December 1, 2015, the neutral mediator reported that the parties participated in good faith but did not reach a settlement. The parties continued discovery and began to prepare for a trial scheduled in September 2016. The Ferguson defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 7, 2016, and shortly after, the St. Louis defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Judge Autrey granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on September 30, 2016. The court found that the individual police defendants were entitled to official and qualified immunity from suit, and as the plaintiffs failed to establish that qualified immunity did not apply, the supervisory defendants and St. Louis County were also entitled to summary judgment. 2016 WL 8674192. A judgment in the case was entered in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Meanwhile in the district court, the parties engaged in some litigation regarding costs, which Judge Autrey awarded to the defendants on June 28, 2017. The Eighth Circuit (Judges Diana E. Murphy, James B. Loken, and Michael J. Melloy) issued its opinion on August 1, 2017. 865 F.3d 1064. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the claims of five of the six sets of plaintiffs. The Eight Circuit did reverse in part the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the excessive force claims of one plaintiff. The circuit court found that the district court erred in granting four individual police defendants qualified immunity with regard to the plaintiff's claims that officers had held his head underwater for three to five seconds, pepper sprayed him, and took turns punching and kicking him for two to three minutes. Though the district court had dismissed the excessive force claim after finding that medical evidence undermined the plaintiff's testimony as to these events, the circuit court found this a mischaracterization of the record and said it was a factual dispute to be resolved by a jury. The Eighth Circuit therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment on that plaintiff's § 1983 excessive force claim, as well as the grant of summary judgment on his § 1983 failure to train, supervise, and discipline claim against the St. Louis defendants as it relates to the remaining excessive force claim. The Eighth Circuit responded to a motion for clarification in an August 9, 2017 order, clarifying that the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Ferguson defendants on all claims. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings related to the remaining plaintiff's excessive force claims against four individual County of St. Louis police officers and the corresponding supervisory claims against the County of St. Louis. The plaintiffs filed petitions with the Eighth Circuit for rehearing en banc and rehearing by the panel; the Eighth Circuit denied the petitions for rehearing on September 11, 2017. In the district court, Judge Autrey scheduled the action for a jury trial on October 29, 2018; it was later rescheduled for February 4, 2019. Before trial started, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on September 4, 2018 alleging that there were no facts in dispute before trial. Judge Autrey disagreed with this assessment, saying that a jury would decide if the police department's actions amounted to a failure to supervise on January 31, 2019. The jury trial took place on its scheduled date. The jurors issued a verdict in favor of the defendants on February 8, 2019. The three-month period to file an appeal on the verdict has lapsed, and the case is closed.

Summary: Several Missouri residents sued the City of Ferguson, Missouri, for acts allegedly perpetrated by Ferguson police officers in the wake of the civil unrest that followed the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity grounds in 2016. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit court of appeals, which affirmed the district court's ruling in part but reversed the grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claims of one plaintiff. A jury found in favor of the defendants at trial, and the case is closed.


This is one of four ongoing cases challenging the constitutionality of the New York Police Department's "Stop and Frisk" program. See: Floyd v. City of New York (PN-NY-0009); Daniels v. City of New York (PN-NY-0010); and Ligon v. City of New York (PN-NY-0014). On January 28, 2010, the plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority. The plaintiffs included Black and Latino New York City Housing Authority tenants and their guests who were arrested while visiting. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Legal Aid Society, and the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages and attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiffs brought their claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d); the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.; the United States Housing Act, 42, U.S.C. § 1437, et seq.; the Constitution and laws of the state of New York; and the New York City Human Rights Law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA"), through the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), maintained an unlawful patrol and trespass arrest policy that resulted in a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures, questioning, searches, and false arrests of residents of, and authorized visitors to, NYCHA residences. The NYPD conducted vertical patrols, which are top-to-bottom walk-through patrols or "sweeps" of hallways, stairwells, rooftops and landings, elevators, and other common areas of a NYCHA residence. The complaint alleged that the police stopped and questioned residents and their visitors without objective individualized suspicion of crime and unlawfully arrested them for trespass without probable cause. The plaintiffs further alleged that the trespass laws were being enforced in and around NYCHA residences on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin in an intentionally discriminatory manner, because the patrols focused on NYCHA residences, who were predominantly African American and Latino. According to the complaint, at least one resident of the building was arrested for "trespass" (although charges against him were never prosecuted). Numerous plaintiffs who were arrested for trespass while visiting building residents suffered negative employment effects due to their arrest and detention, including missed job interviews, suspension or limitation of employment, or full termination. Nine of the original eighteen plaintiffs accepted offers for settlement. (Four accepted on October 4, 2010 and five accepted on December 20, 2010). On May 4, 2011, the Court (Judge Shira A. Scheindlin) issued an order compelling the city to provide documents for discovery. The Court ordered the City to produce documents characterized as "drafts of the training curriculum/training scenarios" and as "deliberations about substantiated CCRB complaints concerning the legality of stops and arrests on NYCHA properties," and to submit a more detailed privilege log with respect to other documents. On July 5, 2011, the Judge Scheindlin denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 812 F. Supp. 2d 333. On October 17, 2011, Judge Scheindlin awarded attorneys' fees and costs to those plaintiffs who had accepted settlement offers. Discovery battles ensued, and, in several opinions, Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman further compelled production of documents and Judge Scheindlin compelled the appearance of an Integrity Control Officer for deposition. On October 4, 2012, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions for summary judgment. This opinion adjudicated only the individual circumstances of plaintiffs' arrests and tenancies; it did not adjudicate defendants' practices and policies. The Court did not rule definitively on the Equal Protection claims against the City, the Title VI claims, the Fair Housing Act claims, the state and city law claims against NYCHA, nor the United States Housing Act claim against NYCHA because those issues required further briefing. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of NYCHA regarding the equal protection claims (because plaintiffs did not show that NYCHA was liable for the arrests), to the City on state and city human rights law violations, and to defendants on the substantive due process claims (because the Court found them duplicative). The court denied summary judgment on § 1981 claims regarding two plaintiffs and denied summary judgment on plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. On March 28, 2013, Judge Scheindlin granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions for summary judgement. This opinion granted NYCHA's motion for summary judgement on all remaining NYSC claims as well as granting summary judgement on the remaining race discrimination claims. The Court denied summary judgment on section 1981, FHA, Fourth Amendment, Equal Protection, and USHA claims. 959 F.Supp.2d 324. On August 29, 2013, Judge Scheindlin certified the "Stopped Class" and "Resident Class" under Rule 23(b)(2). 2013 WL 4712501. The parties entered into settlement talks. After two years, the parties finally reached a settlement agreement in January 2015. The NYPD agreed to revise their Patrol Guide on vertical (or interior) patrols in NYC public housing and the related NYPD training materials regarding vertical patrols and enforcement of NYCHA rules. The settlement also imposed a documentation requirement for all trespass arrests in NYC public housing, and modified certain NYCHA rules concerning residents’ cooperation with police and the prohibited activity of “lingering.” Upon final court approval, the Davis case would become part of the court monitoring process that was ordered in the lawsuit that successfully challenged the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policies (Floyd v. City of New York). This settlement would be overseen by the monitor as the one in Floyd and Ligon. On April 28, 2015, the court approved the settlement and retained jurisdiction of the case to enforce the settlement. On this day, the case was also transferred to Judge Torres, who was in charge of the other stop-and-frisk cases. see Floyd v. City of New York (PN-NY-0009) for the implementation and monitoring proceedings of the settlement agreements. On August 1, 2019, The parties filed a proposed stipulation and order to incorporate new terms into the settlement. According to the stipulation and order, issued by Judge Torres that same day, the new terms included, "the duties of the Monitor and the Joint Remedial Process, for the purpose of enforcing the Stipulation of Settlement and Order as it pertains to reforms to the NYPD's practices that relate to trespass enforcement in or around NYCHA residences, including training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline of officers." On May 26, 2020, the Davis, Floyd, and Ligon plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for relief, alleging that the NYPD's discriminatory social-distancing enforcement practices in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in New York City violated the court's orders, the NYPD’s Court-approved racial profiling policy, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In their complaint, the plaintiffs cited a statistical analysis prepared by The Legal Aid Society showing that the police executed the the majority of arrests in predominantly Black and Latinx precincts, despite those precincts accounting for less than half of the social distancing complaints. Judge Torres denied the emergency motion on July 8. 2020 WL 3819566. She found that the COVID claims alleged by the plaintiffs did not "fall squarely within the scope of the policies and practices adjudicated in this litigation." Further, Judge Torres noted that the plaintiffs' requested blanket injunction would interfere with lawful police enforcement. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In January 2010, plaintiffs filed a class action suit against City of New York and the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) claiming claim that the city and NYCHA employed a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures, questioning, searches, and false arrests of residents of, and authorized visitors to, NYCHA residences. Nine plaintiffs settled, but nine remain. In 2015, the parties settled, and they are currently implementing the terms of the settlement.


On July 24, 2007, the fiancée of Sean Bell, a 23-year-old black man fatally shot by the police on the night before his wedding, and two men harmed during the shooting, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department (NYPD). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a jury trial and sought monetary damages. On November 25, 2006, Sean Bell departed a strip club in Queens with two friends at 4:00AM. The three men climbed into a car and Bell proceeded to drive. The car allegedly struck a police detective in the leg and hit a police van before five officers began to shoot at the car, firing over 50 bullets. The shooting resulted in the death of Sean Bell, as well as serious personal injuries to the two passengers. Bell's fiancé, as the adminstratrix of his estate, accused the police of wrongful death, assault, negligence and various civil rights violations. Specifically, she claimed that the police shot Bell without probable cause, that the shooting was performed negligently and recklessly, and that it was performed without reason or provocation. The NYPD's failure to adequately train these officers, combined with the officers' failure to observe existing police protocol, deprived the decedent of his Fourteenth Amendment privileges, namely: his right to due process of law, his right to liberty, his right to be free from excessive force, and most importantly, his right to life. With him in the car were two of Bell's friends, who survived the shooting and were placed under arrest. These plaintiffs sustained severe physical injuries as a result of the shooting, and alleged that the officers lacked probable cause to discharge their weapons and similarly lacked probable cause to place them under arrest. Claiming that the shooting was performed negligently and recklessly, and without reason or provocation, the plaintiffs stated that the officers deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, liberty, and the right to be free from physical injury and unwarranted use of force. The plaintiffs also asserted that they were subjected to false arrest and imprisonment. All plaintiffs in the suit sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages. After negotiations, the plaintiffs and defendants reached a settlement agreement. The parties agreed to dismiss the action against the defendants, with prejudice, but without costs, expenses, or attorneys' fees to exceed: $3.25 million to the administratrix of Bell's estate, and $3 million and $900,000 respectively to Bell's two friends that were injured in the shooting. The plaintiffs additionally agreed to release the defendants from any and all liability or claims that could have been alleged in this particular action. On October 6, 2010, Judge Roanne L. Mann entered a stipulation of the settlement and order of dismissal.

Summary: Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department, for wrongful death, assault, and various civil rights violations. The lawsuit arose from the shooting of Sean Bell, a 23 year-old black man who departed a strip club with two friends late one evening. Upon getting into a car, a group of five police officers opened fire on the three men, killing Bell and severely injuring the other passengers. The parties reached a $7 million dollar settlement agreement and the suit was dismissed, with prejudice, upon the stipulation and order of Judge Roanne L. Mann (United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York).


On behalf of the residents of New York, New York Attorney General Letitia James brought this lawsuit against the New York City Police Department on January 14, 2021 in the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleged that NYPD officers regularly used excessive force against and falsely arrested peaceful protesters exercising their First Amendment rights during the widespread racial justice protests that took place from May 28, 2020 to December 11, 2020. The plaintiff sued all defendants under 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging excessive force and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as First Amendment violations. The Attorney General also brought claims under the New York State Constitution alleging excessive force, unlawful seizure, and violation of the freedom of the press. In addition, the complaint alleges that NYPD officers committed assault, battery, false arrest and imprisonment, and negligence under state law and that the NYPD failed to use reasonable care in the training, supervision, and retention of NYPD officers. Plaintiff alleged that the NYPD dispatched thousands of inadequately trained officers to the large-scale protests challenging police conduct and authority. It further alleged that those officers employed unconstitutional policing practices, including ramming protesters with police bicycles; striking protesters with batons and fists; indiscriminately pepper spraying protesters; shoving protesters to the ground and using chokeholds or kneeling on protesters; “kettling” protesters in order to deny them an opportunity to disperse and thereafter executing mass arrests; and arresting curfew-exempt essential workers, including legal observers, medics, and jail support providers. Additionally, plaintiff alleged that New York City failed to prevent or correct the NYPD’s use of unconstitutional policing practices during the protests. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief enjoining the NYPD from implementing or applying its unconstitutional policies or practices of employing excessive force, false arrests, and retaliatory tactics against New York residents who participated in the 2020 racial justice protests. Plaintiff also sought an order required the NYPD to change its policies and training procedures and monitoring to ensure its compliance. In addition, Plaintiff sought fees and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. The case was related to Payne v. De Blasio and assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon on January 19, 2021. Judge McMahon consolidated this case with three other police conduct cases (Payne, Sow v. City of New York, and Wood v. De Blasio) for pre-trial purposes. In early March, the Detectives Endowment Association of New York City and the Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York moved to intervene in the case. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 5, 2021, detailing additional specific incidents in support of their earlier allegations and further alleging that the NYPD interfered with the right of journalists, legal observers, and the public to observe and report upon police behavior. As of March 7, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court with responsive pleadings due by March 26, 2021.

Summary: New York Attorney General Letitia James filed this lawsuit against the NYPD on behalf of New York residents on January 14, 2021. The suit alleged that the NYPD regularly falsely arrested and used excessive force against peaceful protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It also alleged violations of the New York State Constitution and state law, including instances of assault, battery, and false arrest and imprisonment by NYPD officers. The suit sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the NYPD cease unconstitutional policing practices and change its existing policies and training practices. As of March 7, 2021, the case is ongoing before the District Court.


In 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice opened an investigation into policing practices in Warren, Ohio. In March of 2006, the DOJ issued a findings letter advising the Warren Police Department (WPD) to revise and update its policies and procedures to be consistent and comprehensive. The DOJ found that many officers did not follow WPD's policies, and among other things suggested that WPD revise its policies governing use of force and retrain its officers on its body-cavity and strip search policies. On January 13, 2012, the Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the City of Warren, Ohio, and its police department. The United States, represented by the Department of Justice, brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and asked the court for a declaratory judgment that Warren Police Department's ("WPD") policing practices--especially the use of excessive force--infringed on individuals' constitutionally-protected rights. The United States also requested an order that the WPD cease such practices by implementing policies to remedy their transgressive effect. According to the complaint, the WPD's failure to implement adequate policies to guide, train, supervise, and monitor its officers resulted in a pattern of conduct involving the use of excessive force. The complaint also included allegations that the WPD's policy governing the intake and investigation of complaints was inadequate and, furthermore, that it had failed to adequately review incidents involving the use of force and discipline officers who engaged in misconduct. The parties quickly reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Benita Y. Pearson) approved January 26, 2012. The agreement required the WPD to adopt new protocols involving the use a force, develop procedures to document and evaluate uses of force, institute systems for tracking and investigating citizens' complaints, and implement training encompassing constitutional policing. In addition, the DOJ reserved the right to monitor the WPD's compliance with the agreement, and the Court retained jurisdiction for at least two years to ensure compliance. On July 3, 2019, the U.S. filed a motion stating that WPD had "faithfully and fully" complied with the requirements of the settlement agreement. The parties filed a joint motion to terminate the settlement agreement. Judge Pearson granted the motion on August 12, 2019. The case is now closed.

Summary: Following an eight-year investigation, the United States DOJ filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 against the City of Warren, Ohio and its police department. The United States alleged that the Warren Police Department had engaged in a pattern of conduct involving the use of excessive force. The parties reached a quick, court-approved settlement that required the WPD to adopt new protocols and procedures. The court terminated the decree in August 2019 after the U.S. determined that the WPD fully complied with the settlement.


Thirteen demonstrators protesting George Floyd's murder sued the city of Columbus, Ohio and various other officers in their official and individual capacities for allegedly using excessive force. The lawsuit, filed on July 8, 2020, alleged that police officers used pepper spray and rubber bullets among other methods without giving warning to the protestors. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their First Amendment right to assemble and their Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, as well as state law claims of gross negligence, battery, and malicious prosecution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief enjoining defendants from using similar conduct in the future, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Algenon Marbley. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 16, 2020. They added more individual named plaintiffs and also added another state law claim. About two months later, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from using non-lethal force such as tear gas, flash-bang grenades, or batons on nonviolent protestors. On April 30, 2021, Judge Marbley granted the preliminary injunction. 2021 WL 1725554. In a lengthy opinion that began by recounting how "formal policing took its earliest form in slave patrols," Judge Marbley enjoined the defendants from using non-lethal force (including tear gas, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, batons, etc.) to disperse non-violent protestors. Instead, defendants could only use citations or arrests. The defendants were also ordered to ensure that their body cameras were in good working order. As of May 25, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Individual plaintiffs sued the city of Columbus, Ohio and multiple police officers after protesting the murder of George Floyd. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force to infringe upon their freedom to assemble.


This class action lawsuit was filed on June 28, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The case was brought by members of the media and legal observers against the City of Portland and sixty unnamed Portland Police Bureau (PPB) officers amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd. Plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU Foundation of Oregon. The complaint alleged that PPB had a pattern of targeting and retaliating against journalists and neutral observers. The complaint alleged that defendants' actions were violations of the First and Fourth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well provisions of the Oregon state constitution that protect free speech and free assembly. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including punitive damages. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Anna J. Brown, but then reassigned to Judge Michael H. Simon shortly thereafter. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the last day of June, and the court granted it in part a few days later. The TRO ordered that neither PPB nor anyone operating with the PPB would be allowed to arrest a media reporter unless they had suspicion that the individual had committed a crime. It also made clear that orders to disperse were not to apply to reporters and observers, but that reporters and observers were to wear signs that signaled they were part of the protected class. Furthermore, police were not to seize equipment or press passes from reporters or legal observers. The order lasted two weeks. On July 10, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, which asserted the same allegations, but adding several plaintiffs (including Index Newspapers). Nearly a week later, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to submit a second amended complaint, this time adding as defendants the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Marshal Services (USMS). Again, the claims for relief did not change. Additionally, the plaintiffs and defendant City of Portland stipulated to a preliminary injunction that had the same terms as the TRO, set to expire on October 30. They also filed a motion for a TRO against the DHS and USMS with more or less the same arguments and requests that were made against the PPB in their TRO. The federal defendants submitted a memo a few days later arguing against the TRO, claiming that the plaintiffs did not have standing, were unlikely to succeed on the merits, could not demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities did not weigh in the plaintiffs' favor. To make things even more interesting, the City of Portland also filed a memo in support of the TRO against the federal officers, an indication of the City's exasperation with the federal presence. Finally, on July 22, the plaintiffs filed a rebuttal to the DHS's and USMS's memo in opposition to the TRO. The next day, Judge Simon granted the TRO against the federal defendants, with the same provisions as the TRO against the PPB. 2020 WL 4220820. Then, on July 28, the plaintiffs submitted a motion asking the court to find the DHS and U.S. Marshals in contempt of court and to issue sanctions over alleged violations of the terms of the TRO. According to the motion (and several media reports), federal agents shot at journalists mere hours after the TRO was issued. Meanwhile, the federal defendants filed a motion asking the court to reconsider the TRO. On August 10, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The motion was partially redacted to the public, in accordance with a stipulated protective order signed earlier that week. The motion for a preliminary injunction had more or less the same arguments as the motion for the TRO, granted a few weeks prior. On August 20, Judge Simon granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 4883017. In granting the order, Judge Simon made clear that the order did not give journalists or legal observers special privileges to not comply with otherwise lawful orders. The federal defendants did not claim that they had the right to declare a riot; that right was left to the PPB. However, the plaintiffs and the city had already stipulated that the PPB would not arrest any journalist or legal observer for failing to disperse. So the question was whether the federal defendants had the authority to arrest journalists and legal observers outside of federal property. Judge Simon found that they did not, and so the federal agents were in violation of the law when they arrested journalists and legal observers in areas far from the federal property. The federal defendants appealed this decision to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on August 21 and submitted a motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal on August 24. The motion to stay was denied by Judge Simon on August 25, but the 9th Circuit entered an administrative stay pending resolution of the emergency motion on August 28, finding that the defendant-appellants had a high likelihood of success on the merits and that not granting the stay would cause irreparable harm. Meanwhile, on September 4, the City of Portland and the plaintiffs filed an amendment to the stipulated preliminary injunction. The amendment added language saying that "No Journalist or Legal Observer protected under this Order may impede, block, or physically prevent the lawful activities of the Police." The stipulation was signed that day by Judge Simon. On September 21, the federal defendants submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case against them should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They also requested that the court stay discovery requests until the motion was decided. Two days later, the plaintiffs and defendant City of Portland submitted an amended stipulated preliminary injunction, which simply extended the time in which the injunction was in effect until the Court reached a decision on the merits. On October 9, the 9th Circuit denied the defendant-appellants' emergency motion for a stay pending appeal and lifted the administrative stay entered earlier in August. 977 F.3d 817. The 9th Circuit issued a 76 page opinion finding that the federal defendants did not show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal. In addition, the federal defendants failed to show that they are likely to suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction was not stayed pending appeal. Back in the district court, the parties continued briefing on the federal defendants' motion to dismiss. In early December, the plaintiffs and defendant City of Portland entered another stipulation in lieu of contempt motion. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Portland violated the preliminary injunction by arresting, threatening, and assaulting observers and journalists, as well as preventing observers and journalists from filming protesting activities. The City agreed to investigate the allegations and remove certain officers from public-order policing duty. The case is ongoing as of December 31, 2020.

Summary: This class-action lawsuit was filed on June 28, 2020 in response to Portland Police Bureau's allegedly illegal tactics in quelling the protests in that city after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The plaintiffs, who were members of media and legal observers of the protests, argued that their First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the PPB's use of pepper spray and rubber bullets, among other weapons. They sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. The court granted a TRO against the city, prohibiting the police from arresting or seizing the equipment of reporters or legal observers of the protests. The court later granted a preliminary injunction against the city. By July 16, President Trump had sent in federal officers from the DHS and USMS as reinforcement. The plaintiffs added those two organizations as defendants and filed a motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. The motion for temporary restraining order and the motion for preliminary injunction were both granted. These decisions were appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has yet to rule on them. However, on October 9, the Ninth Circut declined to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The federal defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which remains pending. The case is ongoing as of December 31, 2020.


On March 4, 2003, plaintiff, an indigent resident of Philadelphia incarcerated for failure to pay traffic fines, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and all those similarly situated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that defendant's practices, resulting in the incarceration of indigent residents that failed to pay traffic fines violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the practices violated the plaintiffs' rights, an injunction enjoining the alleged practices, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his and others' rights were violated by the City's practice of arresting individuals for alleged Motor Vehicle Code violations and then subjecting them to incarceration following Philadelphia Traffic Court proceedings conducted without the assistance of counsel, notice of specific charges against them, opportunity to prepare a defense, cross-examine witnesses, or offer evidence on their own behalf. The plaintiff and other members of the class were allegedly not released until they paid substantial amounts of money to satisfy fines levied against them. On March 18, 2003, the District Court (Judge Timothy J. Savage) ordered that no defendant brought before The Philadelphia Traffic Court shall be ordered incarcerated for failure to post bail or security pending a trial at which the defendant shall be afforded the right to counsel and shall be advised of his or her right to appeal to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. On June 11, 2003, the parties submitted a settlement agreement. Subsequently, on July 8, 2003, the District Court (Judge Savage) issued a settlement order resolving the case. The settlement order, pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, certified the proposed class solely as to the issues of declaratory and injunctive relief and acknowledged that the parties had engaged in serious, good faith negotiations relating to the establishment of procedures to resolve the issues related to the class action. More specific terms of the settlement agreement are not readily available.

Summary: Class action filed on March 4, 2003 alleging that the City of Philadelphia engaged in a practice of arresting indigent alleged traffic code violators and subjecting them to incarceration until substantial fines were paid on the basis of Philadelphia Traffic Court proceedings conducted without the assistance of counsel, notice of specific charges, opportunity to prepare a defense, cross-examine witnesses, or offer evidence on their own behalf. The District Court ( Judge Timothy J. Savage) enjoined the City of Philadelphia from incarcerating alleged traffic code violators without giving them notice of their right to counsel and appeal to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Subsequently the parties settled plaintiffs' claims, stipulating to class certification.


On June 29, 2020, six named plaintiffs filed this class-action lawsuit against the city of Pittsburgh and various elected and police officials in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon. The plaintiffs were non-violent protesters who gathered to protest police brutality in the wake of George Floyd's murder. They the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police attacked them during these protests with flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets and tear gas. The plaintiffs argued that these actions violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech and assembly and also constituted malicious prosecution in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' actions violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and unlawful arrest. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief stating that these practices were unlawful as well as injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from continuing the practices in the future. The plaintiffs also sought compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and costs as appropriate. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan. She recommended that the claims against the Mayor of Pittsburgh be dismissed, 2021 WL 1391761, and the court adopted this recommendation. 2021 WL 1390492. Magistrate Judge Lenihan then referred the case to mediation and appointed David B. White as the mediator. As of May 26, 2021, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Six named plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit against the city of Pittsburgh and various elected officials and police officials alleging that actions taken against non-violent protestors constituted violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights.


On April 7, 2008, twelve individuals, all represented by private counsel, filed a civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Rhode Island against the town of Coventry and individual members of the town's police force (Police). Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law alleging denial of due process and equal protection, unreasonable search and seizure, invasion of privacy, racial profiling and race/national origin intimidation. Specifically, plaintiffs, Hispanic members of the Central Falls High School boys soccer team, claimed that they were treated improperly when traveling to Coventry, a predominately white neighborhood, for a high school soccer game. When the game was over, members of the home team stopped the Central Falls coach and accused his team of stealing electronic devices from the locker room. The coach searched his players' bags but found nothing. The police arrived on the scene, blocking the team's bus, and asked the coach if they could search the players. The coach consented. The police searched the boys' property as members of the Coventry community looked on and shouted racist epithets and accused the boys of theft. The search lasted approximately one hour and none of the allegedly stolen items were found. On September 9, 2009, the district court (Judge William Smith) granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court held that the plaintiffs could not overcome qualified immunity in their claims. On the Fourth Amendment claim, the court found plaintiffs' case to be insufficient to overcome qualified immunity because the police officers did not violate the plaintiffs' clearly established rights, because the coach may have been acting in loco parentis when he consented to the police officers' request to search members of the team and their belongings. The court also held that the plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claim arose out of conduct for which the police officers were immune from suit. On the Equal Protection claim, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the officers had a racial motive, even if they exhibited poor judgment in searching the boys in front of an angry crowd; for the same reasons, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' state racial profiling claim. Finally, the court held there was insufficient evidence for plaintiffs' claim of supervisory and municipal liability. Plaintiffs appealed to the First Circuit. On April 1, 2011, the Circuit Court (Chief Judge Lynch, Judge Selya, and Judge Thompson) upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court found that the officers' conduct was subject to qualified immunity. As to the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and state privacy claims, the court found that it was not unreasonable for the officers to consider the coach's consent to search the team. The court also held that the plaintiffs could not overcome qualified immunity on their equal protection and state discrimination claims.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individual Hispanic members of a high school soccer team, sued police officers and the City of Coventry based on police search of the team after an away soccer game. Plaintiffs alleged Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection claims in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a number of analogous state law claims. On September 9, 2009, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all of plaintiffs' claims, and on April 1, 2011, the First Circuit affirmed.


On February 22, 2017, four plaintiffs filed suit against the City of Memphis, Tennessee in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee for violating their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs all found themselves on a “black list” created by the Memphis Police Department. They argued that the police department created the “black list,” which consisted of 81 individuals, by recording video protests of City Hall. The black list appeared to denote the individuals who the police determined required police escorts to monitor them in City Hall. The plaintiffs also claimed that police officers bought and used software to monitor various social media sites for subversive conversations. The plaintiffs claimed the creation and maintenance of this black list violated their First Amendment rights and contradicted a prior consent decree from Kendrick v. Chandler. The plaintiffs sought an order to dissolve the black list and an injunction to prevent the creation of lists in the future, an order to show cause why the defendants disregarded the order, an order to find the defendant in contempt of court, monetary damages, and costs and attorneys' fees. The Kendrick Decree resulted from a previous lawsuit in 1978. Kendrick, et al. v. Chandler, et al., Civil Action No. 2:76-CV-00449 (W.D. Tenn. 1978). The plaintiffs in Kendrick, including the American Civil Liberties Union of West Tennessee (WTCLU), filed a class action against the Mayor of Memphis, the Chief of Police in Memphis, and other officials within the Memphis Police Department. They sought, and were granted, an order preventing defendants from violating the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the Memphis Police Department, through a Domestic Intelligence Unit, collected unverified information about individuals they believed were engaging in subversive activities or promoting controversial political views. The plaintiffs alleged that none of the activities monitored by the Domestic Intelligence Unit were criminal, but instead the Domestic Intelligence Unit used the information to harass and intimidate the plaintiffs. The Kendrick Decree enjoined the defendants and City of Memphis from infringing on any individuals' First Amendment Rights. The defendants could not record any information from individuals engaged in lawful demonstrations or maintain files on individuals for reasons that did not serve criminal investigations. Importantly, the order defined the City of Memphis to include all present and future officials, employees, and agents of the city. In response to the plaintiff's 2017 complaint citing to the Kendrick Decree, the City of Memphis filed a motion to dismiss the claim, arguing the court did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the Kendrick Decree. The following day, ACLU Tennessee moved to intervene, and the court immediately granted the motion. The ACLU-TN sought similar relief as the plaintiffs—an order of contempt for violation of the Kendrick Decree, injunctive relief, and costs and attorneys' fees. On March 8, 2017, following the intervention of the ACLU-TN, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the ACLU-TN based on the same subject-matter argument it had deployed against the original four plaintiffs. On June 30, 2017, Judge Jon Phipps McCalla granted the defendant's motion to dismiss against the original four named-plaintiffs, but denied the motion to dismiss the ACLU's claim. The court found that it retained subject-matter jurisdiction over the Kendrick Decree because the injunction did not have a termination date and applied to future employees of the City of Memphis. However, the court determined that the four original plaintiffs did not have standing because prior case law in the Sixth Circuit expressed that third-party beneficiaries of a consent decree lacked standing to enforce its terms. Since the ACLU-TN is a successor to The American Civil Liberties Union of West Tennessee, Inc. (WTCLU), an original party in Kendrick, it had standing to raise the claim. The four original plaintiffs sought a final order to appeal their dismissal to the Sixth Circuit. But the district court did not grant the final order. The plaintiffs filed their appeal anyway, which the Sixth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on January 17, 2018. Meanwhile, the suit between the ACLU-TN and the defendants continued. At the end of discovery, both the ACLU-TN and the City of Memphis filed motions to dismiss. On August 10, 2018, the court granted the ACLU-TN's motion in part. The court found that the City had been engaged in political intelligence as defined by the Kendrick Decree. However, it determined a genuine dispute still existed over whether the City engaged in action for the purpose of violating any person's First Amendment rights and whether the City operated in any way for the purpose of political intelligence. The court denied the City's motion to dismiss, finding that a genuine dispute still existed over the standing of the ACLU-TN. The bench trial, held from August 20 to August 23, 2018, confirmed that the ACLU-TN had standing to bring the suit because it was a party to the original decree. Additionally, the court found the City had violated the decree by collecting information for the purpose of political intelligence and dedicating an office to do so. The City also failed to review investigations that could result in the collecting of information related to the First Amendment, including recordings of protest attendees to maintain a record. And, the City failed to train its officers on the content of the Decree. In particular, units of the Memphis Police Department investigated people associated with the Black Lives Matter movement and other political groups because of their protected political speech. As a result of the trial, the court granted ACLU-TN attorneys' fees. It required training of officers to detail that political intelligence—“any investigation into the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights, even if the investigating officer or unit does not have a partisan political motive”—could never be a permissible goal of an investigation. The court ordered the City to create new guidelines and training for officers engaging in investigations that might result in political intelligence by January 14, 2019. It also compelled the City to create a manual for social media searches and submit a list of all search terms entered into social media sites every three months to the court until ordered otherwise. Judge McCalla also determined that an independent monitor should assess compliance with the Decree. Both parties offered candidates to be independent monitors for the case moving forward. On December 21, 2018, the court appointed the defendant's candidate, former U.S. Attorney Edward Stanton III, as the independent monitor of this case. As required by the order, the City submitted a new set of training policies on January 14, 2019. The ACLU-TN filed objections to those policies, and the court asked the Monitor to investigate further. On April 5, 2019 the Monitor filed his first report, in which he mostly agreed with the ACLU-TN's criticism of the City's training measures but also accepted the City's proposed solutions to many of the issues raised by the ACLU-TN. Judge McCalla held a hearing on the matter on April 23, 2019. On May 2, 2019, the Monitor filed his first quarterly report. In it, he assessed that, to date, the City was on track to become compliant with the consent decree. He also outlined plans for soliciting public opinion on the City's practices. On August 7, 2019 the Monitor filed his second quarterly report under seal with the court. The court held a hearing to address the report on August 27, 2019. In a September 5 order following the hearing, Judge McCalla noted that the Monitor's next steps were creating and implementing a compliance plan for the City, as well as creating community focus groups. Additionally, the report said that the City and the Monitor were working to create a new social media investigations policy for the Police Department. The City the filed a motion to modify the consent decree on September 25, 2019, which the ACLU-TN opposed. In its motion, the city argued that several provisions of the decree hindered its ability to conduct law enforcement functions, including by preventing it from entering into partnerships with state and federal agencies. Judge McCalla denied this motion in a November 13, 2019 opinion, finding that the modifications requested by defendants would erode the purpose of the original consent decree but allowed for the possibility of modifications after discovery and an evidentiary hearing. On November 20, 2019, the Monitor filed his third quarterly report with the court. In it, he reported that a compliance plan had been created and was being implemented. He also noted that he received many requests for community members to be included as members of the monitoring team and opined that the creation of a civilian advisory board might be useful in this case. On December 6, 2020, the parties filed a schedule for discovery and trial on the modifications to the consent decree, with June 17, 2020 chosen for the trial, which the court adopted in a January 2, 2020 hearing. The City submitted its new social media policy to the court for review on December 21, 2019, to which both the ACLU-TN and the Monitor objected. Judge McCalla also heard objections to this policy during the January 2, 2020 hearing on modifications to the consent decree and allowed the City to respond to these objections in writing. In a February 28, 2020 letter, the Monitor informed the court that he believed the City had violated one of the sanctions imposed on it by failing to maintain records of social media search terms. The court scheduled a hearing in mid March to resolve this issue, but it was delayed to May 14, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In an August 19, 2020 order, the court found that the Memphis Police Department had failed to report searches made by officers using their personal Facebook accounts. On April 17, 2020, the City asked the court to order mediation between itself and the ACLU-TN in order to narrow the issues for the June 17, 2020 hearing. The court authorized the Monitor to mediate between the two parties in an April 28, 2020 order. The Monitor filed the first quarterly report of 2020 on May 20, 2020. In it, the Monitor reported that many of the case's outstanding issues remained unresolved, including the approval of the City's new social media policy, the City's alleged sanctions violations, and the Monitor's solicitation of feedback from the public. In advance of the June 17 hearing, both the City and the ACLU-TN filed trial briefs and, on June 8, 2020, submitted proposed changes to the consent decree. Between June 17 and 22, 2020, Judge McCalla presided over a four day evidentiary hearing over Zoom to consider the modifications to the consent decree. After the hearing, both sides provided the court with additional briefing on the proposed modifications. Judge McCalla resolved the City's motion to modify the consent decree in a September 21, 2020 hearing. He found that there was sufficient evidence to support the changes to the decree agreed to by the City and the ACLU-TN. However, he refused to make the changes the City requested unilaterally, which related to the City's ability to work with outside law enforcement agencies who were not bound by the decree. Judge McCalla found that the City's issues with the contested provisions could be resolved by better training and that the provisions did not affect the Memphis Police Department's existing relationships with other law enforcement agencies. Judge McCalla then issued an updated judgment and consent decree. The City appealed Judge McCalla's ruling to the Sixth Circuit on November 3, 2020 (No. 20-6263). As of April 6, 2021, the appeal is fully briefed, but there has been no decision. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Four residents of Memphis and the ACLU-TN sought enforcement of the Kendrick Decree against the City of Memphis. They claimed the City and its police force collected information in violation of the First Amendment right to peacefully protest. The four original plaintiffs were dismissed for lack of standing, but the ACLU-TN ultimately received court enforcement of the Decree against the City. A federal court found that the City violated its obligations under the consent decree after a 2018 trial and later, in 2020, rejected the City's request for the decree to be modified. The decree remains in effect while the city appeals that decision.


In March 2004, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation of the Virgin Islands Police Department (VIPD) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141. On October 5, 2005, the DOJ issued a technical assistance letter to the department which made recommendations regarding specific changes to the department's policies in the following areas: use of force, vehicle pursuits, holding cells, misconduct investigations, discipline, supervisory oversight, and training. On December 23, 2008, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 against the VIPD. The DOJ sought both injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that the Virgin Islands government, though its actions and omissions, was engaging in a pattern or practice of subjecting individuals to the use of excessive force. Simultaneously, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree to settle the case. U.S. District Judge Curtis V. Gomez approved the consent decree on March, 24, 2009. The Decree detailed specific actions to be taken by VIPD regarding evaluation, documentation, and review of use of force incidents; citizen complaint procedures; management and supervision; and training. On June 29, 2010, Judge Gomez allowed an amendment to the Consent Decree to make slight modifications to the monitoring timetable. On December 9, 2010, the Office of the Independent Monitor, from the firm Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, LLP, began filing regular progress/compliance reports. Due to VIPD's slow progress toward achieving compliance, on November 2, 2012, Judge Gomez adopted a jointly-proposed Action Plan, which aimed to set realistic and achievable compliance deadlines, and incorporated its deadlines into the Consent Decree. Judge Gomez also eliminated the bright-line deadline in the original Consent Decree, and amended it to provide that the Consent Decree would only expire after the VIPD had maintained substantial compliance with its terms for a period of two years. The Action Plan included particular scheduling details for when VIPD officers would receive trainings for vehicle-pursuit and spike-strip policies as well as deadlines for training its internal risk assessment team related to use of excessive force. After the VIPD requested and received multiple extensions on compliance related to specific training objectives, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Action Plan and Consent Decrees on October 1, 2013. In their proposed amendment to the Action Plan, the parties recognized that VIPD required additional time in order to build the infrastructure in training, policies, and supervisory personnel requisite to achieve compliance. However, before Judge Gomez could rule on the motion, the VIPD failed to meet the deadlines it had outlined in the proposed amendment. As such, the parties supplemented their motion to amend, and on February 25, 2014, Judge Gomez held a hearing on the proposed amendment. At the hearing, Judge Gomez noted that the VIPD leadership had continually promised to meet new deadlines and yet had failed to do so. Judge Gomez suggested that the parties instead target meaningful and achievable quarterly goals, with quarterly hearings on the compliance status of each of these goals. On March 7, 2014, the VIPD filed a notice of their proposed quarterly goals. On April 30, 2014, Judge Gomez issued an order adopting these goals, and struck the Action Plan from the Consent Decree, instead adopting a provision for quarterly goals and compliance hearings. The order was amended on May 22 to make minor adjustments to this provision. On July 10, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the Consent Decree with respect to the timing of the Independent Monitor's reports. On August 21, Judge Gomez ordered appropriate amendments to the Consent Decree to facilitate the preparation of more accurate and complete quarterly reports. On Aug. 25, the monitor submitted a status report indicating that no part of the VIPD had reached full compliance with any part of the consent decree, though the VIPD had strengthen its infrastructure for achieving compliance. A status report filed on May 20, 2016 indicated substantial compliance had been reached with regard to some of the consent decree provisions. A year later, in May 2017, the monitor filed a status report with similar findings. On Feb. 15, 2018, the monitor filed a status report indicating that hurricanes in the fall of 2017 had slowed down progress, and that full compliance had not yet been reached. Pursuant to enforcement of the consent decree, the independent monitoring team submitted quarterly reports on VIPD's compliance, and the parties each submitted monthly status reports. At a hearing on June 26, 2018, Judge Gomez advised the appointment of two independent experts to identify outstanding issues with VIPD’s compliance and provide recommendations for substantial compliance. The court ordered the parties to identify potential experts. On July 6, 2018, two experts, one for police practices and one for efficient governmental administration and policy implementation, were appointed. The experts were ordered to submit a report recommending specific steps to be undertaken by the VIPD to achieve substantial compliance with the consent decree. A joint report by the parties on September 18 indicated that VIPD had already implemented many of the recommendations, with several remaining to be implemented which was addressed in a jointly proposed order. On October 5, 2018, the court ordered subsequent reports to include VIPD’s efforts to implement expert recommendations on its quarterly reports, and monitoring continued. The parties submitted a notice for a joint position on proposed changes to the structure of the monitoring team due to ongoing medical issues affecting the independent monitor on May 10, 2019. The case was reassigned to Judge Robert A. Molloy on May 8, 2020. The enforcement of the Consent Decree is still in progress.

Summary: In March 2004, the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened an investigation into the Virgin Islands Police Department's (VIPD) practices regarding use of excessive force, and on December 23, 2008, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. On March 24, 2009, the parties signed a consent decree, detailing specific actions to be taken by VIPD. Enforcement of the consent decree is in progress.


On May 28, 2014, approximately 125 police officers from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case was assigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman. The plaintiffs each individually sued the U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Seattle, including the SPD and the Seattle Police Monitor Team, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for their roles in implementing Seattle’s new use of force policy (UF policy). The new UF policy limited police officers’ ability to use force against civilians without repercussions, and the plaintiffs argued that this policy violated their constitutional rights under the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they alleged that the policy violated their constitutional right to self-defense, as well as Due Process and Equal Protection. Initially representing themselves pro se, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. On August 21, 2014, the City of Seattle moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. It alleged that the plaintiffs had misunderstood both what their constitutional rights were and what the new UF policy did, as the officers’ claims were not supported by the U.S. Constitution or by case law. On the same day, the Seattle Police Monitor Team filed a motion to dismiss the case because the members of the monitor team had quasi-judicial immunity. The monitors were appointed by the court as part of a consent decree from an earlier settlement in United States v. City of Seattle regarding the SPD’s excessive use of force. So, the monitors argued, they could not be considered part of the city the way that the SPD could. Six days after the motions were filed, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added new factual allegations about the policy and removed those plaintiffs that no longer wished to litigate. The amended complaint emphasized the idea of constitutional self-defense as a right embedded in several amendments rather than stated outright. In September 2014, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss offering arguments similar to those found in the motions to dismiss the original complaint. On October 9, the court held oral arguments on the issue. The plaintiffs also obtained private counsel during this month. On October 17, 2014, the court granted both motions to dismiss. Because the complaint had already been amended once and amending it further would be “futile,” Judge Pechman dismissed the case with prejudice. 62 F.Supp.3d 1215. The court held that the monitor team had quasi-judicial immunity and, even without it, the plaintiffs’ claims betrayed their misunderstanding regarding what their constitutional rights were, and the constitutional right to self-defense did not exist; the plaintiffs had failed to allege that any of the defendants had violated their rights. On November 14, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision nearly three years later, on September 19, 2017, finding that neither the case law nor the constitution entitled the plaintiffs to self-defense. 871 F.3d 873. On December 28, 2017, the plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear this case. On April 2, 2018, their petition was denied. The plaintiffs exhausted their options for appealing this case, and it is now closed.

Summary: In May 2014, approximately 125 police officers from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that SPD's new policy that limited the amount of force they could use on civilians was a violation of their constitutional right to self-defense. The court dismissed the case in October 2017, holding that there was no constitutional right to self-defense. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding.


On May 22, 2020, a Nevada church filed this lawsuit against the Governor of Nevada, challenging the state’s restrictions on congregational worship during the COVID-19 pandemic. Represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom, the church filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The case was assigned to Judge Larry R. Hicks; when he recused himself, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Miranda M. Du, and later, based on relatedness to <i>Calvary Chapel Lone Mountain v. Sisolak</i>, to Judge Richard F. Boulware, II. In its complaint, the church alleged that the governor’s ban on gathering was unconstitutional. The governor had prohibited public gatherings of 10 or more people, including worship gatherings. However, numerous types of businesses were exempt, and allowed to operate at 50% capacity: restaurants, nail salons, barbershops, and others. When the church filed an amended complaint on May 28, 2020, the governor’s order had been amended: up to 50 people could gather to worship, but the list of businesses allowed to operate at 50% capacity had grown to include gyms, bars, swimming pools, museums, casinos, malls, and bowling alleys. For many of these businesses (particularly casinos), 50% capacity meant groups of several hundred. The church questioned the logic of allowing gatherings of hundreds at casinos in Las Vegas while restricting worship, under threat of criminal and civil penalties, in remote and rural Lyon County. (The Sheriff of Lyon County, also named as a defendant in the lawsuit, supported the church’s position of opposition to the governor’s statewide orders.) Additionally, state officials had declined to enforce the gathering ban on large groups of police violence protestors; the governor had publicly supported and encouraged such protests. The church alleged that the facial non-neutrality of the orders, and the state’s inconsistent enforcement of those orders, amounted to a violation of the church’s First Amendment rights of assembly, speech, and free exercise. It sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. On May 28, 2020, after unsuccessful attempts to persuade the governor to amend his orders, the church filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking to be allowed to gather on Sunday, May 31 for Pentecost Sunday. The court (Chief Judge Miranda M. Du) denied the motion the following day, concluding that it was unreasonable for the church to submit an emergency motion one business day before its desired meeting on Pentecost. The court also denied the church’s emergency motion for reconsideration. Two weeks later, on June 11, 2020, the court (now Judge Richard F. Boulware, II) denied the church’s motions for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, finding that the church had not succeeded in demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. 2020 WL 4260438. The church appealed to the Ninth Circuit on June 15, 2020, seeking an injunction pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied this motion on July 2. 2020 WL 4274901. The church then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, seeking an injunction while the appeal proceeded in the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court denied the request on July 24, 2020, over three dissents by four members of the court. 140 S. Ct. 2603. In one dissent, Justice Gorsuch stated that “The world we inhabit today, with a pandemic upon us, poses unusual challenges. But there is no world in which the Constitution permits Nevada to favor Caesars Palace over Calvary Chapel.” The church’s appeal is pending in the Ninth Circuit.

Summary: A rural Nevada church brought this lawsuit against the Governor of Nevada on May 22, 2020, alleging that the governor’s COVID-19 gathering ban was a violation of the church’s First Amendment rights. The district court denied the church’s motions for preliminary injunctive relief; the church appealed this denial to the Ninth Circuit. Both the Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court denied motions for injunction pending the Ninth Circuit’s appeal; as of August 6, 2020, the appeal is pending in the Ninth Circuit.


On Mar. 16, 2017, the New York Times and its reporter Charlie Savage brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought disclosure of agency records by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a component of DOJ which reviews all Executive Orders for form and legality and reviews legal questions raised by other parts of the executive branch. Specifically, plaintiffs sought the disclosure of records related to OLC reviews of: 1. All emails, memos, and other documents related to OLC review of proposed Trump administration Executive Orders for form and legality, including during the transition period; and 2. All emails, memos, and other documents related to OLC review of other proposed Trump White House matters, including during the transition period, including but not limited to whether the appointment of Jared Kushner to a White House role would violate anti-nepotism laws and whether the president's ongoing business operations would violate the Emoluments Clause. The complaint alleged that, on Jan. 28, 2017, plaintiffs submitted the above FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from the defendant agencies, and that plaintiffs had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. Plaintiffs sought a disclosure order of the information above under FOIA and legal fees. On Mar. 17, the case was assigned to Judge P. Kevin Castel and to Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis. On Sept. 11, the parties filed a letter with the court noting that the government completed its initial FOIA searches by Aug. 31. On Oct. 3, the parties submitted a status report noting their agreement that the government would make its first FOIA release on Nov. 10. The Jan. 19, 2018 status report, modified by a later order, stated that DOJ would provide an index of produced documents by Mar. 12. A status report filed on May 7, 2018 indicated the government had processed some but not all of the index. On July 20, 2018, the plaintiffs filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed. The documents released by the government are available through this case page.

Summary: On Mar. 16, 2017, the New York Times and one of its reporters sued DOJ under FOIA seeking records on DOJ's review of the legality of Trump's proposed Executive Orders and other matters related to anti-nepotism laws and the Emoluments Clause. The plaintiffs dismissed the case after the government released documents in response to their request.