This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The district court in this case denied a preliminary injunction but issued a preliminary injunction covering California in a related case. This preliminary injunction was stayed pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for certiorari from the Second and Seventh Circuits on similar injunctions. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. Healthcare Providers and Nonprofits Sue Over the Public Charge Rule On August 16, 2019, several healthcare providers and nonprofit organizations serving immigrant communities filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being implemented and enforced. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley but was reassigned to District Judge Haywood S Gilliam, Jr after the plaintiffs declined to proceed before a magistrate judge. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The Rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” The traditional conception of public charge has meant "someone who is primarily dependent on the government to avoid destitution." Under the Rule, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid (the plaintiffs have alleged that over one-half of U.S. citizens can be expected to use one of these programs at some point in their lifetime), or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times article, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The plaintiffs asserted four claims for relief against the defendants. First, the plaintiffs asserted that the Rule's definition of public charge was "contrary to the plain and well- established meaning of that phrase, and to how it has been interpreted and applied since 1882." In support of this claim, the plaintiffs stated that Congress has repeatedly declined to change the longstanding definition of public charge. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, as it departs from prior law and practice without adequate explanation of the reasons for the departure and consideration for the consequences of the change. Next, the plaintiffs asserted that in enacting the Rule, "defendants acted with improper discriminatory intent and bias against non-white immigrants," in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that the Rule was invalid because it was issued by the acting head of the USCIS and that his designation as acting head of USCIS violated the Constitution and federal law. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the implementation and enforcement of the Rule to prevent harm to themselves and the immigrant families they represent; "The Rule has and will continue to divert Plaintiffs’ resources, both to address the harmful effects of the Rule and to educate immigrant families about those effects, preventing Plaintiffs from carrying out other aspects of their missions and ensuring that their patients, members, and clients do not forgo critical services to lead healthy, productive, and successful lives." The case was ordered related to City and County of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (IM-CA-0156) on August 30, 2019. Accordingly, the case was reassigned to the judge presiding over that related case, Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton. Plaintiffs Seek A Nationwide Preliminary Injunction On September 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule and an order postponing the effective date of the Rule pending judicial review. The plaintiffs argued that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because of their likely success on the merits and that absent an injunction, the Rule would cause plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm "by interfering with their missions, forcing them to divert resources from providing their core services to handling the effect of the Regulation, and depriving them of revenue." In their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have "no basis for turning their abstract policy disagreement with the Executive Branch into a nationwide injunction." The defendants asserted that because the plaintiffs are "municipalities rather than [noncitizens] governed by the Rule," they cannot meet jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, the defendants contended that the Rule was not unlawful, as it "reflects Congress’s delegation of broad authority to the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of 'public charge'" and was "the product of a well-reasoned process that considered the plain text of the statute, legislative intent, statistical evidence, and the substance of hundreds of thousands of comments submitted by the public." The Court Grants a Geographically Limited Preliminary Injunctions Following a hearing on October 2, 2019, on October 11, 2019, Judge Hamilton issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, but granted preliminary injunctions in two related cases that would enjoin the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057. Judge Hamilton denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in the current case, finding that the plaintiffs "have not met their burden to demonstrate that there are serious questions concerning whether they are within the challenged statute’s zone of interest, and certainly they have failed to demonstrate a likelihood that they are able to bring the APA actions underlying their present motion." Judge Hamilton concluded that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in the two related cases because the plaintiff states and counties were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claims and would be irreparably harmed absent an injunction. However, Judge Hamilton did not grant the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the implementation of the Rule nationwide. Because the plaintiff states and counties did not establish "the necessity of such relief," the scope of the injunction was limited to California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Stay the Preliminary Injunctions On December 5, 2019, a Ninth Circuit panel issued an order in a related case, City and County of San Francisco, granting the government's emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. In the same order, the Ninth Circuit panel stayed a nationwide injunction that was issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington in State of Washington v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Following the stay, on December 10, plaintiffs in this case filed notice that they would appeal the district court's October 11 decision denying their preliminary injunction. However, they withdrew their appeal shortly thereafter, and it was dismissed by the Ninth Circuit on February 4, 2020. 2020 WL 1170719. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court, in State of New York, issued a stay on all nationwide injunctions enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. 140 S.Ct. 599. Following this decision, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Back in the district court, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on April 22. In response, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 20. Defendants filed a new motion to dismissed the amended complaint on June 10. On August 7, Judge Hamilton granted the motion to dismiss in part. He deferred ruling on the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the new public charge rule pending a Ninth Circuit ruling on the preliminary injunction. 477 F. Supp. 3d 951. He held that plaintiffs did not lack standing, and so denied that part of the motion to dismiss. However, he granted dismissal of plaintiffs' invalid appointment claims, holding (1) that President Trump had the authority to appoint Acting Secretary of DHS McAleenan; and (2) the Public Charge rule wasn't promulgated under Acting Secretary of USCIS Cuccinelli’s authority, making his appointment irrelevant to the complaint. Judge Hamilton also granted dismissal of, but with leave to amend, the equal protection claim. He held that the disparate impact was real but not dispositive; that none of the statements pointing to racial motivation were stated by anyone directly involved in promulgating the Rule; and that fast-tracking the Rule was not indicative of discriminatory intent. Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the ruling on September 10. On November 25, Judge Hamilton granted the motion to reconsider and amended his August 7 order. 2020 WL 6940934. He reversed his dismissal of the claims against McAleenan's appointment, finding that factual investigation would be required to determine whether President Trump's tweet appointing McAleenan violated the order of succession outlined in Executive Order 13753. Preliminary Injunction is Affirmed in the Ninth Circuit then Stayed On December 2, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction from the related case of City and County of San Francisco. 981 F.3d 742. However, Judge Hamilton stayed the order on December 17, as did the Ninth Circuit on January 20, 2021, pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for certiorari from the Second and Seventh Circuits. President Biden Issues Executive Order to Review the Public Charge Rule On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On March 9, 2021, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the Rule had been implemented by DHS Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan. Pointing out that this court and others throughout the country had determined Mr. McAleenan was serving invalidly, the plaintiffs argued he therefore lacked authority to implement the rule. They also argued that defendants' attempts to ratify the rule through Chad Wolf instead suffered from similar issues of lacking authority. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated Also on March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide from (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS) and Second (New York v. DHS) Circuits. On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Ninth Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. On April 9, 2021 the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to deny the motion to intervene without an opinion. 2021 WL 1310846. However, Judge Vandyke wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the Biden administration was now colluding with the plaintiffs in the Public Charge lawsuits, making their interests at odds with the interests of the states who were seeking to intervene. He explained that this case was clearly still worth pursuing, since it had sufficient merit to warrant Supreme Court review and the government was circumventing APA requirements. Moreover, even though the Rule had been vacated, there was still a chance the Supreme Court may reverse that decision, making this lawsuit not yet moot. As of April 15, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The parties are currently conferring on how this will impact litigation. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 16, 2019, several health care providers and nonprofit organizations serving immigrant communities filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its statutory authority, claimed that the Rule was "arbitrary and capricious," and asserted that the Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In October 2019, a district court judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction enjoining the government from implementing the Rule, but issued an order for preliminary injunction in a related case that would enjoin the implementation of the rule in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. This preliminary injunction was stayed by the Ninth Circuit in December 2019. It was affirmed a year later in December 2020, but the order was stayed pending petitions to the Supreme Court in the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. The Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.


On November 20, 2014, Joe Arpaio, the Sheriff of Maricopa County in Arizona, filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court against President Obama, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Attorney General. Sheriff Arpaio sued under the Declaratory Judgment Act(28 U.S.C. § 2201) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed that two federal programs constituted unconstitutional abuses of the President's power: 1) The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program started on June 15, 2012; and 2) Several additional programs-- referred to by the plaintiff as Executive Order Amnesty (EOA) programs-- started on November 20, 2014 DACA allowed some undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as children to receive a renewable two-year period of deferred action from deportation and become eligible for a work permit in the U.S. EOA extended DACA to defer action for childhood arrivals who arrived after the earliest cut-off date and for parents and other relatives of U.S. citizens or persons lawfully present. Specifically, Sheriff Arpaio claimed that the challenged programs constituted a dramatic departure from prior interpretation and application of existing law and regulations and that the President cannot effect these changes by Executive Order. Plaintiff also argued that even if the Court deemed these dramatic changes constitutional, the challenged programs should have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under the APA. Alternatively, Plaintiff challenged these actions pursuant to the APA as unlawful and invalid as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, unreasonable, and/or otherwise not in accordance with law. On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff sought a Preliminary Injunction and filed a brief, which the court construed as a motion to dismiss. On December 23, 2014, District Judge Beryl A. Howell denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Howell found that the plaintiff did not suffer a legally cognizable injury, and thus held that the Plaintiff lacked standing. Sheriff Arpaio, the Court explained, did not suffer injury in fact in his personal capacity because he sought to vindicate only a general interest in proper application of Constitution and laws. Although he alleged that undocumented immigrants had targeted him for assassination as a result of his stance on illegal immigration, neither of the challenged programs threatened the sheriff's life; in fact, his stance on illegal immigration existed prior to this case and the challenged programs. In addition, Sheriff Arpaio did not suffer injury in fact in his official capacity because he was asserting generalized grievances against federal policy and alleged injuries were largely speculative. The plaintiff also failed to show causation because neither challenged program authorized the conduct of which he complained. Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F.Supp.3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014). On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. On August 14, 2015, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court in an opinion by Judge Cornelia T.L. Pillard. This ended the case.

Summary: On 2014, Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County in Arizona, filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) against President Obama, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Attorney General, claiming that the federal programs deferring immigration action for various categories of out-of-status aliens were unconstitutional abuses of the President's power, or should have been done via formal rulemaking. In December 2014, the D.C. District (Judge Beryl A. Howell) dismissed the case, holding that Sheriff Arpaio lacked standing. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in August 2015.


COVID-19 Summary: A class of asylum seekers detained by the New Orleans ICE Field Office filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that defendants be compelled to conduct individual parole reviews for every detainee and to consider the risk of COVID-19 to them in determining their eligibility for parole. On April 21, 2020, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction.
 On May 30, 2019, asylum seekers detained under the jurisdiction of the New Orleans ICE Field Office filed this class action lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act and 28 U.S.C.§§ 1361 and 1651 against the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Acting Director of ICE; the Acting Executive Associate Director ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations; and the Acting Director of the New Orleans ICE Field Office. Represented by the ACLU of Louisiana and Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs argued that DHS has ignored a 2009 Parole Directive, denying parole to more than 98% of arriving asylum seekers. The plaintiffs also argued that the New Orleans ICE Field Office conducted sham parole reviews and blanket denials of parole, violating their Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the defendants from detaining the plaintiffs without individualized parole reviews that determined the risk of flight or danger to the community. The plaintiffs' proposed class was "all arriving asylum seekers who receive positive credible fear determinations; and who are or will be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; after having been denied parole by the New Orleans ICE Field Office." On May 30, 2019, the case was related to Damus v. Neilsen. here. On June 28, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to certify class, proposing that the class be defined as: "(1) all arriving asylum seekers (2) who are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture and (3) who are or will be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customers Enforcement; (4) after having been denied parole under the authority of the New Orleans ICE Field Office." On July 18, 2019, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from continuing to detain asylum seekers without individualized consideration of flight risk or danger to the community. On August 5, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that some of the plaintiffs were no longer in ICE custody, others had had their parole requests adjudicated, and additional plaintiffs were no longer eligible for parole. On September 5, 2019, Judge James E. Boasberg issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. In granting the preliminary injunction, Judge Boasberg found that the New Orleans ICE Field Office had ceased to follow the 2009 Directive. Class certification was granted because the proposed class met the requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants' motion to dismiss was only granted in regards to plaintiffs' due process claim. 2019 WL 4225322. On November 1, 2019, the defendants filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court. On November 18, 2019, the appeal was docketed as 19-5306. On January 9, 2020, Judge Boasberg issued an order directing the defendants to distribute copies of the class notice to all provisional class members. On March 31, 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought to compel the defendants to conduct immediate case by case parole assessments for all class members to address the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs also requested that defendants be required to consider the risk of COVID-19 to individuals when conducting their individualized assessment. On April 7, 2020, the defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to the emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. They argued that the motion should be denied because plaintiffs had failed to show that ICE had violated the Parole Directive, had failed to establish irreparable harm if they were not given new parole reviews, and that the plaintiffs' request was not in the public interest. On April 8, the plaintiffs filed their reply to the defendants' memorandum. The plaintiffs pointed out that the COVID-19 pandemic continued to worsen and that the continuation of blanket parole denials put the health of plaintiffs and detention officials at the risk of irreparable harm. On April 21, 2020, Judge Boasberg denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a preliminary injunction, asserting that the court had already enjoined the defendants to follow their parole direct, and thus it was unnecessary to do so again. The court left open the possibility that plaintiffs could file a motion for contempt asserting that defendants had not complied with the court's original injunction. The plaintiffs did just that and filed a motion for order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the 2019 preliminary injunction order, expedited discovery, and the appointment of a special master on May 12. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants continue to disregard the Parole Directive in violation of the preliminary injunction. They claimed that parole grant rates remained below 25% for redetermination applications and below 20% for first-time applicants and in some cases facilities held zero parole redeterminations in March and April. In their response filed on June 16, the defendants argued that in the recent months ICE had granted parole at rates closer to 30% and that there was not clear and convincing evidence that they were not following the preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the defendants filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal on June 16. The D.C. Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal on June 29. 2020 WL 3635095. Back in the district court, on July 22, 2020, Judge Boasberg granted the plaintiffs’ motion seeking discovery regarding compliance with the preliminary injunction, a finding of contempt, and appointment of a Special Master in part. He found the plaintiffs raised sufficient question of compliance and ordered limited discovery. He denied without prejudice the motion with respect to the finding of contempt and the appointment of a special master, with these requests to be renewed following discovery and a potential hearing on the defendants’ violations. The parties then began engaging in limited discovery with a joint status report on the discovery due October 30, 2020. As the parties engaged in limited discovery, on August 20, 2020, The Center for Investigative Report filed a motion to intervene to unseal the defendants’ monthly production of parole determinations and any future productions in order to inform the public debate over DHS’s application of parole procedures to asylum seekers. Judge Boasberg granted the motion to intervene on October 10. He ordered for DHS’s future monthly submissions to include a public version of the parole determinations without personally identifiable information and for DHS to file redacted versions of prior reports. The defendants continued to file monthly status reports and both parties continued joint status reports. A status hearing is scheduled for March 4, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In May of 2019, asylum seekers detained under the jurisdiction of the New Orleans ICE Field Office filed a class action lawsuit against DHS, ICE, and the New Orleans ICE Field Office, alleging that they were giving blanket parole denials without individualized reviews. In September 2019, the court granted preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from continuing to detain asylum seekers without individualized consideration. In March 30, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunction, seeking immediate reviews of class members still detained. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for order to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the 2019 preliminary injunction order, expedited discovery, and the appointment of a special master. The court granted limited discovery. The case is ongoing.


On June 5, 2005, attorneys with the Legal Aid Justice Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Virginia Justice Center for Farm and Immigrant Workers filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of a group of over 1500 migrant workers in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against their former employer, Eller and Sons Trees, Inc. Plaintiffs, who were from Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico, were admitted to the U.S. under the H-2B temporary farm worker program. The plaintiffs alleged that they planted trees and performed other forestry related work for the defendant, but that the defendant took advantage of them by grossly underpaying them in violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case was assigned to Judge Clarence Cooper. The District Court granted class certification on September 28, 2006. Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73781 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2006). That same day, Judge Cooper issued a discovery order and held that the applicable statute of limitations for the AWPA claims was six years. Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc., 452 F.Supp.2d 1282 (N.D. Ga. 2006). Defendants appealed the class certification order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the order granting class certification. De Leon-Granados v. Eller and Sons Trees, Inc. 2007 WL 2456206 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2007). While the case was on appeal, discovery continued, as the District Court refused defendants' request to stay the case proceedings. On November 15, 2007, plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on one of their multiple claims under FLSA--their claim for reimbursement of passport, visa and travel expenses incurred in coming to work for Defendants--as well as on their claim of non-compliance with the AWPA. On October 7, 2008, the court granted Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion for the FLSA claim. De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1313 (N.D. Ga. 2008). The court found that Eller and Sons failed to reimburse their guest workers for travel and visa expenses incurred when they came to the United States to work for the company, failed to provide them all the hours of work they were promised in their H-2B work contracts, and failed to maintain accurate records of the hours they worked. Plaintiffs were awarded $57,001.28 in damages (after court granted plaintiffs' motion to correct summary judgment order). However, the Court was unable to rule on the AWPA claim. The defendants had moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert witness, a veteran wage and hour investigator who had reviewed the defendants' records. Without that testimony, the Court could not rule on the AWPA claim, so it would have to wait until the motion was resolved. On October 30, 2008, the defendants withdrew their motion to strike the plaintiffs' expert witness. They then moved for an interlocutory appeal on November 4, 2008. The interlocutory appeal was fought over until September 14, 2009 when the Court denied the appeal because (1) it "would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation," and (2) final judgment would likely follow a damages hearing, and the defendants could just appeal then. 2009 WL 10696537. In the same order, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgement on the AWPA claim, holding that the defendants' payroll had failed to meet the AWPA requirements. It found that, following testimony by the plaintiffs' expert witness, there was no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants had kept inaccurate records and were sometimes intentionally underreporting workers' hours to evade wage payment obligations. The plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint on July 22, 2010, clarifying requested damages. They then moved for statutory damages on August 6, 2010. The defendant filed for bankruptcy on September 23, 2010, but the Court ordered on November 4, 2010 that litigation would proceed anyway. The parties proceeded with negotiations in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana until June 4, 2012 when that court issued an order that the parties had come to a settlement agreement. Back in the district court, on September 28, 2012, Judge Cooper granted the plaintiffs' motion for statutory damages pursuant to the AWPA claim. Finding that the defendants were clearly aware of the requirements but willfully ignored them, that these were far more than "mere technical violations," and that each class member would be receiving only a small amount, he awarded statutory damages to the plaintiff class near to the maximum allowable: $499,858.74. 2012 WL 13065433. On October 29, 2012, he then issued a final judgment for the plaintiffs, granting full damages in excess of $11 million.

Summary: A group of public interest law firms filed this class action lawsuit in June, 2005 on behalf of migrant workers against their former employer, alleging gross underpayment in violation of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (AWPA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Court granted, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, class certification for the plaintiffs in September, 2006. The plaintiffs won partial summary judgments in 2008 and 2009, resulting in an eventual award of $11 million in a final judgment in October, 2012.


On May 1, 2018, the Council on American-Islamic Relations - Chicago (CAIR-Chicago) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case was assigned to Judge Robert Gettleman. CAIR-Chicago sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within DHS, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Represented by private counsel, CAIR-Chicago sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 1, 2017, CAIR-Chicago filed a FOIA request for records containing demographics and processing times of naturalization, change of status, and asylum since the 2008 institution of the Controlled Application Review & Resolution Program, a policy that imposes rules to delay or deny immigration benefits. CAIR-Chicago sought expedited processing of its FOIA request because it suspected religious discrimination against Muslim applicants, but defendants denied this request. The defendants did not respond to the FOIA request within the statutory time period and still had yet to respond. The plaintiff alleged that this conduct was a wrongful delay of release of records in violation of FOIA. A status report filed on August 21, 2018 indicated the parties were attempting to avoid litigation and that the government would conduct the necessary searches for responsive records. On June 28, 2019, CAIR-Chicago voluntarily dismissed the suit without explanation. Presumably, the parties resolved the disputes related to the records and the defendants provided the records to CAIR-Chicago. This case is closed.

Summary: In May 2018, the Council on American-Islamic Relations - Chicago (CAIR-Chicago) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services for failing to process its FOIA request for immigration records since the 2008 institution of the Controlled Application Review & Resolution Program, alleging that this conduct was a wrongful delay of release of records in violation of FOIA. The plaintiffs dismissed their claims without explanation on June 28, 2019.


On March 2, 2007, a resident alien and two organizations that represent indigent aliens, the Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project (PAIR) and the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC), filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, challenging the mandatory detention provision of Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The plainitff also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requesting his immediate release from detention. Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that Section 236(c) of the INA, in effect since October 9, 1998, requires the mandatory detention without bond of virtually all immigrants who commit a specified removable offense upon the immigrant's release from the criminal custody that resulted from the offense. Section 303(b) ("Transitional Period Custody Rules" or "TPCR") of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") provision, in effect until October 9, 1998, also required detention upon release for those who committed specified removable offenses, but did not preclude bond. Plaintiffs contended that the government misinterpreted both of those provisions and as a result, improperly detained individuals in contravention to the statutes. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the PAIR and CLINIC lacked standing and because the complaint failed to state a claim. All parties then moved for summary judgment. On July 12, 2007, the District Court (Judge Richard G. Stearns) held a hearing on the limited issue of the plaintiff's writ of habeas corpus and deferred ruling on the other claims and defenses. Before the Court ruled on the habeas corpus petition, the plaintiff was released from custody, and he voluntarily dismissed his claims. Another detained alien, then moved to intervene in the case and be substituted as the named individual plaintiff. The District Court (Judge Stearns) then took up the remaining motions. He denied the the second detained alien's motion to intervene and dismissed the remainder of the case, holding that organizations lacked standing to continue to pursue the case on Parinejad's behalf once he was released from custody. The Court noted that if the second detained alien wished to litigate the lawfulness of his detention, he needed to file his own lawsuit. -- F.Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL 2372627 (D.Mass.). As of the date of this summary, plaintiffs had not filed a notice of appeal and the case remained closed.

Summary: On March 2, 2007, a resident alien and two non-profits filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, challenging the mandatory detention provision of Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiff also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, requesting his immediate release from detention. On July 12, 2007 district court held a hearing on the writ of habeas corpus, however, before ruling on the issue the plaintiff was released from custody. The court then dismissed the remainder of the case.


This case addressed the termination of an immigration program granting deferred action to seriously ill individuals. The Irish International Immigrant Center (a.k.a. the Rian Immigration Center) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on September 5, 2019. The plaintiff sued U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and President Trump under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief claiming violations of the APA and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. For decades, USCIS allowed people battling serious illnesses to request deferred action. In August 2019, the Trump Administration prohibited USCIS field offices from granting deferred action to the individuals who could ordinarily be protected by this program. The plaintiff alleged this prohibition was illegal. Plaintiff was represented by the ACLU of Massachusetts, Lawyers for Civil Rights, and private counsel. Judge Indira Talwani was assigned. The parties jointly moved to stay the case on October 29, 2019. The parties sought a settlement or other nonjudicial resolution. The court granted the stay two days later. This followed the USCIS announcement that it would reinstate the deferred action program, but requests would only be granted “based on compelling facts and circumstances.” Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 28, 2020. The defendants first argued that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review defendants' enforcement discretion. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment. The motion was denied three days later. 2020 WL 6395575. On June 15, 2021, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice regarding all claims in this case. As of July 13, 2021, no further reasoning was stated in the notice itself or on the ACLU of Massachusetts's website. This case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2019, the Irish International Immigrant Center sued U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services and President Trump. Plaintiff alleged defendants illegally terminated an immigration relief program that granted "deferred action" to seriously ill individuals and their families. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of Equal Protection and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted a joint motion to stay the case on October 31, 2019, so parties could seek a nonjudicial resolution. This followed a USCUS announcement that the deferred action program would return but requests would only be granted “based on compelling facts and circumstances.” Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on June 15, 2021.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. This case was filed in the fall of 2018, after the State Department made changes to its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) that revised the public charge rule. The State Department officially implemented the rule in the fall of 2019, shortly after DHS announced its own implementation of the rule. Although the DHS rule was quickly enjoined, the State Department's rule wasn't enjoined until July 29, 2020 in Make the Road New York v. Pompeo. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for government agencies to review actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. While DHS formally abandoned the rule on March 9, 2021, the State Department's rule is still official policy, though still enjoined. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Sue Over Changes to the Public Charge Rule in the Foreign Affairs Manual On November 28, 2018, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, Maryland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The City sued U.S. President Donald Trump, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Bivens for violations of Fifth Amendment equal protection. The plaintiffs, represented by the Democracy Forward Foundation and the City of Baltimore Department of Law, sought attorneys’ fees and declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from enforcing January 2018 changes to the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual. The changes were to instructions to consular officers on how to determine the likelihood a visa applicant would become a public charge if admitted to the United States. The City alleged that the increase in public benefit listed in the new definition would, in effect, decrease the number of immigrants eligible to apply for visas. The changes were made without providing the public legally required notice, explanation, and opportunity for comment. The case was assigned to Judge Ellen Hollander. The changes to the FAM increased the types of programs that the federal government would consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if a consular officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa. The plaintiffs asserted that the effect of this Rule would be to force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain entry to the U.S. Defendants Move to Dismiss The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on February 25, 2019. They argued that the City of Baltimore lacked subject matter jurisdiction and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Moreover, even if the City overcame these hurdles, the defendants argued that it still failed to plausibly allege that the FAM changes violated either the APA or equal protection. On September 20, 2019, Judge Hollander denied the motion. She held that the City was affected by the changes and could sue on behalf of the immigrants affected. She also found that sufficient allegations had been provided to sue President Trump under the equal protection claim. Finally, she upheld the APA claim on the grounds that changes to the FAM are subject to notice and comment, and that there could be grounds for an injunction. The Rule is Officially Implemented by the State Department On October 11, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security's similar public charge rule (DHS Rule) began to be enjoined by courts around the country. That same day, DOS formalized the changes to the FAM by implementing the Interim Final Rule. This rule mirrored the DHS Rule, explicitly expanding the definition of "public charge" for the purposes of granting visas. The Fight Over Discovery On October 20, defendants filed their answer to the complaint, and a Scheduling Order for discovery was issued on November 5. On top of requesting documents from DOS, the City requested interrogatories of Secretary Pompeo and President Trump. In response, the defendants moved to amend the Scheduling Order on November 18, arguing that no discovery was needed beyond production of the administrative record. What followed was a "flurry of submissions," and on December 19, Judge Hollander granted the motion in part. She vacated the previous Scheduling Order and denied discovery beyond the administrative record on the equal protection claim, holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to discovery because this was an immigration issue and that the administrative record would suffice. However, she denied the motion for the APA claims, finding that the plaintiffs could proceed with the administrative record and pursue extra-record discovery afterward if needed. 429 F.Supp.3d 128. On February 7, 2020, the City supplemented its complaint to include the Interim Final Rule. Parties Move for Summary Judgment On May 15, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On June 12, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and also filed a cross motion for summary judgment. The FAM Changes and the Interim Final Rule are Enjoined On July 29, the FAM changes and the Interim Final Rule were enjoined nationwide by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Make the Road New York v. Pompeo. 475 F.Supp.3d 232. The DHS Rule was similarly enjoined in State of New York v. DHS. 2020 WL 4347264. Subsequently, on August 6, Judge Hollander ordered the parties to explain to the court the import of these cases. Changes with the Biden Administration On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for government agencies to review actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On February 19, defendants moved to stay proceedings while the new administration reevaluated the rule. The court granted the motion that same day, ordering a status report due by May 24. On March 9, DHS formally abandoned the rule. DOS, however, did not. As of March 14, 2021, the FAM revisions and Interim Final Rule are enjoined nationwide. The court has yet to rule on summary judgment, and proceedings are currently on hold until May 24, 2021.

Summary: In 2018, the City of Baltimore filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff alleged that certain changes to the Public Charge rule by the U.S. President, Secretary of State, and Department of State were made without following proper administrative procedure and in violation of equal protection. The rule increased the number of immigrants barred from applying for visas for having previously received public assistance. The rule was preliminarily enjoined in a different lawsuit on July 29, 2020. The lawsuit is ongoing, but proceedings are stayed until May 24, 2021.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action habeas petition brought on May 4, 2020, by two individuals in ICE custody, seeking better access to phone calls. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 29. No outcome so far. <hr> On May 4, 2020, two individuals in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) brought this lawsuit against ICE and its parent agency, the Department of Homeland Security. They complained about ICE's restrictions on telephone access--the high cost of phone calls and the denial of incoming calls. Both restrictions predated the COVID-19 pandemic. But they alleged that because in-person visitation had become impossible, the phone restrictions unconstitutionally violated their Fifth and First Amendment rights, preventing communication with counsel and denying their right to legal representation. One plaintiff alleged that since pandemic restrictions began, communications with his attorney have been very challenging. Another pointed to a delay of a month in his asylum hearing (prolonging his detention) because he had been unable to have a meaningful preparatory call with his counsel. The plaintiffs’ proposed class includes "all current and future adult immigration detained persons who are or will be held in ICE custody in El Paso or Otero." Represented by private counsel and the American Immigration Council, the plaintiffs framed the lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico and assigned to Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth. The case was later reassigned to Judge James A. Parker on June 5. On June 29, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and the plaintiff's failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs could not bring claims relating to injuries they have not personally suffered and that the plaintiffs could not bring this case in district court as the Immigration and Nationality Act contains a jurisdiction-channeling provision that requires exclusive review in the federal courts of appeals. The plaintiffs responded that the jurisdictional bar does not apply where claims address systemwide detention conditions that are collateral to the removal process and are effectively unreviewable through a petition for review. They further argued that they have standing to bring the action on behalf of the proposed class and that they stated a proper Due Process claim. The plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction on August 26, claiming that despite the increased reliance of telephone calls due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ICE's acknowledgment of a need to expand telephone access, restrictive practices at Otero have rendered all communications nearly impossible. In its opposition to the preliminary injunction on September 9, the defendants argued that because the court has not certified a class, any injunctive relief must be limited to the named plaintiffs. They also argued that the named plaintiffs have not established a likelihood of success on the merits, nor imminent and irreparable harm. The plaintiffs filed a reply on September 23 and on October 6 filed an unopposed motion for a hearing on their motion to certify the class, their motion for a preliminary injunction, and the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Gonzales referred the plaintiffs' motions to certify the class, for a preliminary injunction, and for a hearing, and the defendants' motion to dismiss to Magistrate Judge Kevin R. Sweazea. On December 10, Magistrate Judge Swazea ordered a mandatory settlement conference to occur on January 15, 2021. The conference was eventually held on January 19, but the case did not settle. On January 19, Judge Swazea ordered a motion hearing to occur on March 10 regarding the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

Summary: On May 4, 2020, two individuals in ICE (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement) custody sued ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. They claimed that restrictions to telephone access by impsing costs and denying access to incoming calls during the COVID-19 pandemic when in-person visitations have been rendered impossible is unconstitutional. Specifically, they alleged that their Fifth and First Amendment rights had been violated by preventing communication with counsel, denying their right to legal representation, and other resources critical to support their cases. The case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: The SPLC, Innovation Law Lab, Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. and Santa Fe Dreamers Project filed for an emergency temporary restraining order challenging the continued operation of the immigration courts despite the current public health crisis. On April 1, 2020, Judge Karin J. Immergut denied the plaintiffs' motion, finding the relief requested to be too attenuated from the claims underlying the plaintiffs' initial complaint. On July 31, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration on September 4, which was denied on September 15.
 On December 18, 2019, six immigration legal service providers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, alleging that the federal government had manipulated the immigration adjudication system in a way that makes it virtually impossible for asylum seekers to win their cases. The organizations (Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., Innovation Law Lab, Santa Fe Dreamers Project, and Southern Poverty Law Center), sued President Trump, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), under the U.S. Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Represented by Innovation Law Lab, Southern Poverty Law Center, and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as provisions of the INA and the APA. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Stacie Beckerman. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had abused their authority to perpetuate “asylum-free zones”—immigration court jurisdictions where asylum is virtually impossible to win, thus nullifying the U.S. asylum statutory scheme. The plaintiffs also claimed that by burdening the immigration courts with a backlog of more than a million cases, the defendants had undermined fairness in the system and impaired the INA’s case-by-case decision-making process. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that by implementing new performance metrics for immigration judges (the Metrics Policy) and a rapid-removal family docketing directive (the FAMU Directive), the defendants had impaired the impartiality of immigration judges and undermined the fairness of proceedings for recently-arrived families. As immigration legal service providers, the plaintiffs stated that the defendants’ efforts had denied them a fair forum in which to vindicate their organization missions. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 20, 2020. On March 27, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In their request, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ actions in response to the pandemic had turned the immigration court system into a public health hazard. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants were continuing to require attorneys, respondents, judges, and staff to appear in person at many immigration courts, refusing to extend deadlines despite the danger associated with compliance, failing to provide adequate notice of emergency court closures and procedures, and ordering immigration judges to fast-track cases to completion (i.e. deportation) in the absence of respondents and counsel. The plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction under the All Writs Act to require the defendants to take reasonable steps to the protect public health in the immigration courts, including: no longer compelling respondents to appear in person or holding hearings without the consent of the respondent or their counsel, no longer invoking in absentia procedures to order removal in cases where respondents fail to appear, tolling deadlines, waiving certain filing requirements, and allowing attorneys not to appear in person without being held in contempt. The same day, the case was reassigned to Judge Karin J. Immergut. A group of former immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration Appeals filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs’ request for a TRO on March 30, 2020. On April 1, 2020, Judge Immergut denied the plaintiffs’ motion. In an April 2 order, she explained that the relief sought by the plaintiffs was too attenuated from the claims alleged in their complaint to sustain their burden for a temporary injunction under the All Writs Act. Judge Immergut also noted that the defendants demonstrated that they had taken significant steps to reduce in-person contacts and modify immigration court functions in the wake of the pandemic. Consequently, she did not find it necessary to grant the sweeping relief sought by the plaintiffs. On July 31, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims that sought enjoinder of “asylum-free zones”—i.e. immigration courts with unusually high rates of denials for asylum applications— for lack of jurisdiction. 2020 WL 4431682. However, all of the remaining claims were allowed to proceed. The defendants sought reconsideration on September 4. They argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from or relating to removal proceedings. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendants' motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, as it repeated and expounded upon arguments previously made without a new basis for reconsideration. The district court also noted that it was bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, which recognized organizational standing for immigration services organizations when they can establish their own injury. The court also found that it had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' asserted injuries did not arise from any removal proceeding and were not cognizable under the petition-for-review process. The case is ongoing.

Summary: A group of immigration legal service providers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on December 18, 2019, alleging the federal government had manipulated the immigration adjudication system in a way making it virtually impossible for asylum seekers to succeed. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order due to the COVID-19 pandemic, alleging that the immigration courts had failed to take adequate public health measures to protect judges, respondents, attorneys, and staff. On April 1, 2020, the District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion. On July 31, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendants sought reconsideration, which was denied on September 10.


On April 15, 2009, two longtime permanent residents of the United States who had been detained in Pennsylvania prisons for periods exceeding six months while they pursued challenges to decisions to deport them filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the prisons that held them in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging violations of their Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their prolonged detention pending immigration proceedings without a hearing to determine whether such detention was justified violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On August 10, 2009, the Court (Judge John E. Jones III) declined to certify a class action or to grant habeas class relief but granted the plaintiffs' individual habeas petitions. Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2009). The court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to provide class relief, as the statute that authorized plaintiffs' detention explicitly barred class action to enjoin or restrain its application, but also interpreted that statute as authorizing mandatory detention only "for the period of time reasonably necessary to promptly initiate and conclude removal proceedings," and held that "[i]f an alien detained pursuant to [the statute] makes a showing via a habeas petition that detention is no longer reasonable, the alien must be afforded a hearing before the habeas court at which the government bears the burden of justifying continued detention based on traditional bail factors such as the alien's risk of flight and potential danger to the community." Id. at 11-12. The court gave the parties twenty days to indicate whether they wanted to present testimony or evidence related to the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' detentions at a bail hearing. Rather than do so, the parties came to an agreement whereby defendants would release the plaintiffs without requiring that they post bail. One plaintiff was released in late January of 2010 under minimal reporting requirements, and the other was released in late March of the same year, subject to electronic monitoring.

Summary: On April 15, 2009, two longtime permanent residents of the United States who had been detained in Pennsylvania prisons for periods exceeding six months while they pursued challenges to decisions to deport them filed a class action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the prisons that held them, claiming that their prolonged detention without a hearing to determine whether such detention was justified violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On August 10, 2009, the Court (Judge John E. Jones III) declined to certify a class action or grant habeas class relief but granted the plaintiffs' individual habeas petitions. Alli v. Decker, 644 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2009). Rather than present evidence on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' detention at a bail hearing, the parties came to an agreement whereby defendants would release the plaintiffs without requiring that they post bail. One plaintiff was released in late January of 2010 under minimal reporting requirements, and the other was released in late March of the same year, subject to electronic monitoring. <br />


On October 12, 2011, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, against the State of Carolina and Charleston County. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of South Carolina, the national ACLU's Immigrants' Rights Project, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Immigration Law Center, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the South Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, and private counsel, filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, claiming that South Carolina's comprehensive immigration law, Act 69, violated the federal Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged Sections 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Act, which require state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest whenever they have a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual lacks immigration status, require them to determine the immigration status of all people being detained in prisons or jails, allow them to arrest individuals solely for failing to carry registration documents, make it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant or to be harbored or transported by others if one is an undocumented immigrant, and impose civil liability on the police for failing to enforce its provisions to the maximum extent possible. They claimed that these sections are preempted by federal law and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and further claimed that the Act as a whole is preempted. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Act violated the Constitution and a peremptory injunction barring its enforcement before it came into effect on January 1, 2012. (In passing Act 69, South Carolina joined Utah, Indiana, Georgia and Alabama in enacting immigration laws similar to Arizona's Senate Bill 1070. For the case challenging the Arizona law, see United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015); for the case challenging Utah's HB 497, see Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert (IM-UT-0002); for the case challenging Indiana's SEA 590, see Buquer v. City of Indianapolis (IM-IN-0002); for the case challenging Georgia's HB 87, see Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal (IM-GA-0007); and for cases challenging Alabama's HB 56, see United States v. Alabama (IM-AL-0005), Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley (IM-AL-0006), and Parsley v. Bentley (IM-AL-0007).) The district court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) originally issued an order directing the parties to brief the issue whether the United States should be joined as a necessary party; the court set the issue aside when the United States filed a related action. See United States v. South Carolina (IM-SC-0002). After a joint hearing on motions for summary judgment by plaintiffs in this case and by the federal government in United States v. South Carolina (IM-SC-0002), on December 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Richard M. Gergel) issued an order in large part granting both motions. Lowcountry Immigration Coalition v. Haley, No. 2:11-cv-02779, 2011 WL 6973241, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151549 (D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2011). It enjoined Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act, but declined to enjoin Sections 1 and 7 or the Act as a whole, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge them. Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but the case was stayed until the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015), which dealt with a very similar statute in Arizona. That occurred in June 2012, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); the Court struck down much of the Arizona statute, but declined to facially review the "show me your papers" provision. Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a "limited remand" in this matter, directing the district court to decide in the first instance if its order should be adjusted in light of the Arizona opinion. On November 27, 2012, the district court left in place most of its prior preliminary injunction, again the sections of the law that aimed to criminalize unlawful presence and giving a ride or renting an apartment to an undocumented immigrant. But the district court followed the Supreme Court's lead on the "show me your papers" provision. It noted: "This litigation is only at the preliminary injunction stage, and this Court's decision to dissolve the injunction regarding these status-checking provisions does not foreclose a future as-applied challenge based upon subsequent factual and legal developments. In the course of this litigation, the parties will have the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the actual practices and procedures associated with the implementation of Sections 6(A) and 6(C)(1), and this Court can then address these issues with the benefit of a full record." On December 7, 2012, the State of South Carolina filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the district court's November 27 order. On July 13, 2013, the Fourth Circuit, per Judge Davis, upheld the preliminary injunction issued by the lower district court. The order would enjoin enforcement of Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2) of the law. Section 4 made it unlawful for a person who was illegally present in the United States to conceal, harbor, and transport herself from detection, and it made it illegal for a third party to assist in that endeavor. Section 5 made it illegal to fail to carry and illegal alien registration card, and 6(B)(2) made it illegal to display false identification. South Carolina tried to argue that the Plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the Supremacy Clause. Judge Davis dismissed this argument, pointing out that there is a long history of citizens seeking, and obtaining, injunctive relief against state laws that are preempted by federal laws. South Carolina also argued for <i>Younger</i> abstention, a doctrine which provides that federal courts should not exercise their jurisdiction over a matter if significantly interferes with a state judicial proceeding or prosecution. Judge Davis pointed out that no such proceeding or prosecution was ongoing here. He further argued that injunctive relief is particularly compelling where constitutional rights are at issue as they are here. On the merits, Judge Davis affirmed the lower court's finding that all three sections were preempted. Judge Dvais noted that there was no presumption against preemption because immigration is regulated heavily by the federal government. Judge Davis then established that each section of the law at issue was preempted. Section 4 of the Act was preempted because the Supreme Court in Arizona v. United States stated that unlawful presence is not a criminal offense. Section 4 made it illegal for unlawful aliens to shelter, harbor, or conceal oneself. This essentially criminalized unlawful presence. Judge Davis noted that Congress is unwilling to do this; instead; it has established a civil proceedings system that facilitates the removal of unlawful aliens. For the subsections of Section 4 dealing with third parties aiding unlawful residents, Judge Davis agreed with the district court that this area is so heavily regulated by federal law that there is no room left for this state regulation. Judge Davis also found Section 5 to be preempted. The Supreme Court reviewed a similar statute in Arizona v. United States and there held that there was federal law governing the registration of unlawful aliens. It was thus unnecessary for there to be state law on the same issue. Judge Davis also found Section 6 to be preempted by a host of federal laws governing false and fraudulent identification. After about 6 more months of litigation, Judge Gergel issued final judgment. Judge Gergel permanently enjoined South Carolina from enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2) of Act 69. Section 7 and the remainder of Section 6 would be enforced according to the guidelines stipulated in a memo by South Carolina's Attorney General. The memo stipulated that, under Section 6, officers could not prolong stops based on a suspicion of a person's immigration status. It also said that, under Section 7, officers could not prolong the detention of an individual to ascertain their immigration status or hold individuals in detention because of a belief about their immigration status. Not even to transfer them to federal custody. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their claims against Sections 6 and 7 without prejudice. On July 7, 2014, Judge Gergel granted a motion to award $98,000 in attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs' lawyers.

Summary: This is a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a South Carolina immigration law which requires state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest whenever they have a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual lacks immigration status, allows law enforcement officers to arrest individuals solely for failing to carry registration documents, makes it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant or to be harbored or transported by others if one is an undocumented immigrant, and imposes civil liability on the police for failing to enforce its provisions to the maximum extent possible. The law was patterned after Arizona's SB 1070. The District Court has issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the law, and this injunction has been appealed to the Fourth Circuit; in the meantime, the case, along with several others like it from different states, are stayed at the District Court or U.S. Appellate level pending the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Arizona. After Arizona v. United States was decided the issue was remanded to the District Court. The district court left in place most of its original preliminary injunction, enjoining the state from enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 6 (B)(2). The 4th Circuit per Judge Davis agreed and affirmed the order on July 13, 2013. In March of 2014 Judge Gergel permanently enjoined South Carolina from enforcing Sections 4, 5, and 6(B)(2). Furthermore the state agreed to more favorable interpretations of Section 7, and the remainder of Section, encouraging the Plaintiffs to dismiss their claims on those sections without prejudice.


This lawsuit came on the heels of immigration raids conducted by federal authorities at Swift meat packing plants throughout the country. Shortly after the raids, on December 15, 2006, a group of Swift employees filed a class action lawsuit against their employer, Swift Beef Company, Inc., and related companies, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Swift engaged in a longstanding scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. In furtherance of its scheme Swift recruited undocumented immigrants to work in its plants and assisted in providing them fake immigration documents. Plaintiffs, who were represented by private counsel, alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.; Immigration Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324 et seq.; and § 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as statutory damages and exemplary damages in the amount of $23 million. Defendants responded by moving to dismiss the case. For reasons that are not apparent from the PACER docket, on October 4, 2007, the parties agreed to dismiss without prejudice two of the defendants, Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst Inc. and HM Capital Partners of Dallas, LLC. On December 20, 2007, the Court (Judge David C. Godbey) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court found that while the plaintiffs had adequately pled a claim for harboring illegal aliens under RICO, they had not pled their claim for hiring illegal aliens with sufficient factual support to satisfy the standard detailed by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Since plaintiffs had not alleged that defendants had actual knowledge that the illegal aliens hired had been smuggled into the country, the Court found that their illegal hiring claim was inadequate and therefore dismissed it. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 14, 2008, but the Court (Judge Godbey) again dismissed their illegal hiring claims on May 28, finding that they remained insufficiently specific. Following some discovery disputes, plaintiffs moved for class certification on October 6, 2008. The Court (Judge Godbey) denied the motion on January 13, 2009, finding that the proposed class of all Swift employees who had the legal right to work in the United States was not clearly ascertainable, as it would not be possible to determine who belonged without "an extensive factual inquiry into thousands of employees' work authorization." The next entry on the docket is on June 18, 2009, when the parties entered an unexplained stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. The case was terminated on the same day.

Summary: On December 15, 2006, a group of employees at Swift Beef Company's meat packing plants filed a class action lawsuit against their employer and related companies, alleging that Swift had engaged in a longstanding scheme of hiring undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages, and that in furtherance of its scheme, Swift had recruited undocumented immigrants to work in its plants and assisted in providing them with fake immigration documents. After the Court dismissed plaintiffs' illegal hiring claims as insufficiently specific and denied their motion for class certification, the parties stipulated for a dismissal with prejudice on June 18, 2009, and the case was terminated.


This action challenged the Trump Administration's third attempt to suspend the United States Refugee Admissions Program (the "USRAP"), a program administered by a consortium of federal agencies and nonprofit organizations working to identify and admit qualified refugees for resettlement into the United States, by issuing the Executive Order on Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and accompanying Memorandum (together, "EO-3").The executive order imposed new restrictions on refugees and delayed the cases of refugees on the cusp of resettlement for two years. The complaint was filed on November 13, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiffs were individuals unable to reunited with family members or close friends because of the EO-3, refugees in the USRAP in limbo as a result of EO-3, and organizations dedicated to assisting such refugees. Claiming that EO-3 violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, Administrative Procedure Act, Establishment Clause, and Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing any portion of EO-3. Plaintiffs moved for such an injunction on November 16. On November 21, the court (Judge James Robart) ordered the plaintiffs to show cause as to why the current case should not be consolidated with a case filed earlier on related grounds, Doe v. Trump. Eight days later on November 29, the parties agreed that the cases could be consolidated so long as the actions retained their separate character, the parties to one action would not be designated as parties to the other, the parties could continue to file separate briefing so long as it was not duplicative, and consolidation would not affect the parties' page limits. On November 29, 2017, the court consolidated this case with Doe v. Trump. Further updates on this case may be found on the Doe page, available here. The parties reached a settlement agreement in the consolidated cases on November 13, 2019. According to the settlement, the government was required to expedite the refugee resettlement applications of over 300 refugees affected by the ban. In addition, any refugee benefitting from the settlement who traveled to the United States would be counted among refugees settled in the year of 2018, ensuring that they would not take any slots away from the 18,000 refugees that the Administration planned to resettle in 2020. Further information about the settlement can be found here . The judge accordingly dismissed the case, leaving the parties the opportunity to reopen the case within 60 days if the settlement was not perfected. That window passed without further activity on the docket, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This action challenged the Trump Administration's third attempt to suspend the United States Refugee Admissions Program. On Nov. 29, 2017, this case was consolidated with Doe v. Trump. Further updates on this case, which settled in 2019, may be found on the Doe page, available here.


On August 20, 2018, 23 inmates at the Pulaski County Jail (PCJ) filed a pro se civil class action against the PCJ and six officials of the PCJ in their official and personal capacities in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that they were being kept locked in their cells because the jail was not properly staffed. On September 12, 2018, Judge James Moody Jr. entered an initial order providing guidelines for proceeding pro se and finding that a request for class certification at this stage was premature; accordingly, he severed the case as twenty-three separate lawsuits. On November 1, 2018, Judge Moody dismissed the case without prejudice due to lack of prosecution, as the plaintiff had failed to comply with the court’s order directing him to provide a current mailing address. On November 20, 2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of change of address, and on December 3, 2018, he filed a motion to reopen the case. On February 13, 2019, Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray granted the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the case, but directed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint clarifying how he was personally harmed by the alleged constitutional violations and explaining how each defendant was personally involved in violating his constitutional rights. On March 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Twenty-one of the other cases were all dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution by the other inmates. This instant case and one other case (docket no. 4:18-cv-00552), which was also dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution and reopened, are the only two ongoing cases out of the total twenty-three cases initially filed on this matter. On June 23, 2019, the Magistrate Judge J. Thomas Ray recommended that plaintiff’s complaint and amended complaint be dismissed and the dismissal of the case be counted as a “strike” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (barring inmates from bringing suit if they have previously brought three frivolous lawsuits). The court reasoned that despite its clear instruction to the contrary, the amended complaint “still contains only conclusory allegations that fail to identify any specific individuals, explain how each of them were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, or provide any specific facts demonstrating how these alleged constitutional violations resulted in him sustaining any physical injuries,” among other things. The court dismissed the case on July 8, 2019. 2019 WL 2929016. The plaintiff sought to reopen the case, objecting to the court’s order of dismissal, on July 22, 2019. On July 25, the court declined to reopen the case, as the plaintiff did not put forth any grounds justifying relief from the judgment and order of dismissal. The plaintiff sought to appeal the case, but his petition for appeal was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on March 11, 2020. This case is closed.

Summary: In August 2018, an inmate filed a civil class action lawsuit against the Pulaski County Jail (PCJ) and six PCJ officials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, on behalf of himself and twenty-two other inmates, asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that he and other inmates were being kept locked in their cells because the jail was not properly staffed. On September 12, 2018, U.S. District Judge James Moody Jr. entered an initial order providing guidelines for proceeding pro se and finding that a request for class certification at this stage was premature; accordingly, he severed the case as twenty-three separate lawsuits. Twenty-one of the other cases were eventually all dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution by the other inmates. This instant case and one other case (docket no. 4:18-cv-00552), which was also dismissed without prejudice due to lack of prosecution and reopened, are the only two ongoing cases out of the total twenty-three cases initially filed on this matter.


On January 18, 2012, prisoners at the Los Angeles County Jail filed this class action in the United States Court for the Central District of California. The prisoners sued the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The prisoners, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Specifically, they claimed that violence by LASD deputies—"sadistic beat[ing] of inmates" that included "broken legs, fractured eye sockets, shattered jaws, broken teeth, severe head injuries, nerve damage, dislocated joints, collapsed lungs, and wounds requiring dozens of stitches and 22 staples"—violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. This case's origins lie in the landmark case Rutherford v. Block (JC-CA-0018 in this Clearinghouse). That case resulted in the appointment of a special master to monitor and report reform efforts in the Los Angeles Jail system. The 30 semiannual reports submitted in that litigation highlight the illegal treatment of mentally ill detainees and the incidences of violence in the Los Angeles Jail system. The ACLU also submitted annual reports on the Los Angeles County Jail system in the Rutherford litigation. Its reports alleged the rise of a gang of deputies who were supervising the jail. The plaintiffs alleged that this gang, the "3000 boys," incited and committed violence against prisoners, and competed with other jail deputy gangs for control of the jail, involving the prisoners in their struggle for control. Members of the gang were said to have a "3000" tattoo on the back of their necks. The plaintiffs in this case cited reports from prisoners, ACLU reports, and quotes from the Sheriff of Los Angeles that confirmed the existence of the gang, though the activities of the gang were disputed. The plaintiffs also alleged that a culture of violence had taken root in the county jail, citing multiple incidences of mentally ill prisoners being beaten and men being beaten for witnessing other beatings. The plaintiffs also alleged that several of these beatings resulted in disciplinary segregation for the victims. Other incidents were witnessed by chaplains, in-jail educators, and visitors. The plaintiffs described taunting and beatings that were were racially motivated, disproportionately affected the mentally ill, and constituted punishment for perceived slights rather than violations of jail policy. They also claimed that prisoners conferring with the ACLU were targeted in particular. There were 51 specific incidents set forth in the complaint that occurred in 2010–2011, however the plaintiffs alleged that the violence had been ongoing for at least 12 years. On June 7, 2012, the Court (Judge Dean Pregerson) issued an unpublished order that certified the plaintiff class and denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss. 2012 WL 2061694 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012). Then, the parties continued with discovery and entered into settlement talks from 2012–2015. On January 6, 2015, both parties filed a joint motion for a settlement. The settlement was approved in April 2015. Under the settlement agreement, the Sheriff's Department agreed to adopt a detailed and far-reaching plan to reform department policies and practices on use of force. A panel of three court-appointed experts, who were assigned to write the plan, also monitored the department's compliance with all aspects of the remedial plan. The defendants agreed to pay $950,000 in attorneys' fees and to pay reasonable attorneys' fees for ongoing work to ensure compliance with the settlement up to $30,000 per year. The plaintiffs' attorneys also acted as monitors. The settlement included enhanced training in use of force for all deputies and methods for tracking and review of use of force incidents and detainees' complaints and grievances. To apply to the court for termination of the agreement consistent with the PLRA, the defendant had to maintain compliance for 18 months as monitored by the panel. On April 21, 2015, the Court (Judge Dean Pregerson) approved the settlement and dismissed the case. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement. The case was later reassigned to Judge Michael R. Wilner in 2016. Judge Wilner issued an order governing the disclosure of records following his appointment on June 17, 2016. Following the approval of the settlement until May 31, 2019, the panel of monitors filed five reports evaluating the defendant’s compliance with the settlement action plan. In compiling the reports, the panel spoke with detainees and met with the Sheriff, the Department’s Inmate Grievance Coordinator, and the Inmate Grievance Teams. After the second report, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in September 2017. The parties stipulated to continuing the motion and hearings on the motion for the next year and half, until it was withdrawn by the plaintiffs in May 2018. Judge Wilner granted attorneys' fees in the amount of $60,000 for work performed in 2015 and 2016 by the class attorneys on October 19, 2017. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, prisoners in the Los Angeles County Jails filed this is a class action in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged a long-standing and widespread pattern of violence and abuse by deputies against inmates and sought an injunction requiring training, supervision, and disciplinary policies for deputies. In 2015, the parties reached a settlement that required a detailed and far-reaching remedial plan. The case is ongoing with monitoring.


On February 29, 2016, two detainees with disabilities filed this class-action lawsuit against San Bernardino County in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the Prison Law Office and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the county violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment rights of the nearly 6,000 people incarcerated in its jails. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the jail’s medical, mental health, and dental care were unconstitutionally deficient; that jail staff used excessive force and failed to take the basic steps to prevent violence; and that jail staff discriminated against people with disabilities by locking them in housing units without accessible toilets or in tiny cells for 22 hours a day. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that San Bernardino County’s ongoing practices violated their constitutional and statutory rights, and sought injunctive relief compelling the county to address the issues alleged by providing adequate health care, protecting people from violence, providing equal access to programs, services, and activities, and ceasing the use of excessive force. On September 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On November 18, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On January 27, 2017, Judge Virginia A. Phillips granted the parties’ joint motion to certify two classes of plaintiffs composed of (1) all people who are currently, and in the future, who will be incarcerated in the San Bernardino County jails, and of (2) all people who are currently, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the San Bernardino County jails and who have a psychiatric and/or intellectual disability as defined by the ADA. Having reached a settlement agreement, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed consent decree on March 28, 2018, that would, if approved by the court, settle all claims for injunctive relief in this suit. The settlement agreement named the plaintiffs as the prevailing party and required the defendant to adopt what the parties called the remedial plan. The remedial plan was designed to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfill the defendant’s obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to ensure that unlawful force is not utilized in the jails, to avoid the unlawful use of segregated or restrictive housing in the jails, and to ensure compliance with the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plan required that the defendant develop and implement appropriate and adequate plans, policies, and practices to ensure compliance with the agreement; report on the use of these policies; provide notice to class members; and adopt a more effective dispute resolution process. The defendant also was required to pay the plaintiffs $350,000 in attorneys’ fees. The duration of the settlement was four years, and the court would retain jurisdiction over the matter. The court issued a preliminary approval of the consent decree on December 12, 2018 which it finalized on December 14, 2018. The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. After the order approving the consent decree, there was no action in the docket until February 13, 2020, when the parties entered a joint stipulation to enforce the judgment against the defendant. On February 20, 2020, the court replied by issuing a class action order regarding mental health staffing. Specifically, the court ordered the the defendant to hire an additional 20 mental health clinicians. As of April 8, 2020, the case is ongoing

Summary: On February 29, 2016, two detainees with disabilities filed a class action lawsuit against San Bernardino County under § 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the county violated the detainees' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In March 2018, the parties reached a settlement and proposed a consent decree. The court approved the consent decree on December 14, 2018. The case remains ongoing for enforcement.


On April 2, 2002, prisoners at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado Springs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against El Paso County and its former and current sheriffs. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU, alleged that the jail failed to protect and adequately provide for prisoners with serious mental health needs. When the lawsuit was filed, nine prisoners had died in the jail in recent years, and in the first year that the lawsuit was pending, two additional prisoners in the jail died from suicide. In almost every case, the deceased prisoner was suicidal, seriously mentally ill, or displaying symptoms of psychosis from overdose or withdrawal. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as class certification. Since the filing of the complaint, at least three separate reports by outside investigators have documented the inadequate state of mental health care in the jail: a report by a citizen's panel appointed by the Sheriff from October, 2002, a report by the National Institute of Corrections from May 26, 2003, and a report by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care from June 25, 2004. On July 29, 2003, the District Court (Judge Richard P. Matsch) denied both the defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Shook v. El Paso County, 216 F.R.D. 644 (July 29, 2003). Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the class certification, and they won a ruling in the Tenth Circuit on October 18, 2004. Shook v. El Paso County., 386 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2004) After the case returned to the district court, on April 1, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Complaint. Additional prisoners intervened as plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification. On June 28, 2006, Judge Matsch denied class certification a second time. Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of El Paso, No. CIV.A. 02CV00651RPM, 2006 WL 1801379 (D. Colo. June 28, 2006). On September 22, 2006, Judge Matsch dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed again to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 29, 2008, Judges Timothy M. Tymkovich, Neil M. Gorsuch, and Jerome M. Holmes of the Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Matsch's decision. Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Cnty. of El Paso, 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008).

Summary: On April 2, 2002, prisoners at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado Springs filed a class action lawsuit uagainst El Paso County, the Board of County Commissioners, and former and current Sheriffs. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, alleged that the jail failed to protect and adequately provide for prisoners with serious mental health needs, particularly in preventing suicides. On June 28, 2006, Judge Richard P. Matsch denied class certification and on September 22, 2006, he dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.