On May 1, 1984, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division informed the Governor of Connecticut that it would investigate the living conditions at Southbury Training School, an institutional care facility for people with intellectual disabilities (ICF/MR) in Southbury, Connecticut, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. On September 11, 1985, the Department of Justice announced its findings. Three lawsuits, including this CRIPA lawsuit, followed. A class action, Messier v. Southbury Training School, ID-CT-0003 in this Clearinghouse, appears to have been treated as a companion case at some points during litigation. Another private action, McCoy v. Belmont, ID-CT-0006, appears to have been separately litigated. Judge Ellen B. Burns of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut adjudicated all or part of these three lawsuits. The United States filed this lawsuit against the State of Connecticut, its Department of Mental Retardation, and the Director of Southbury on July 25, 1986. The United States alleged that living conditions at Southbury placed residents in grave danger of bodily harm and death. According to the Complaint, the individuals with developmental disabilities placed at Southbury were subject to systematic abuse and neglect. Southbury did not provide adequate medical and psychological care and employed too few medical and direct care staff. In addition, Southbury's facilities were unsafe and unsanitary. Instead of offering residents individualized habilitative programming, Southbury used physical and chemical restraints to control most residents' behavior. On July 25, 1986, the parties also entered a consent decree, under which the State admitted no wrongdoing but agreed to dramatically change Southbury's operations. For instance, the State agreed to institute individualized habilitation programming for all residents and to only use chemical and physical restraints in emergencies or when medically or therapeutically indicated. In addition, the State agreed to improve medical care by hiring more medical staff, developing a medical recordkeeping system, and improving the availability and overall quality of medical care and physical therapy. In addition, the state agreed to improve staff-to-resident ratios by either hiring and training more direct care staff or reducing the number of Southbury's residents (in 1986, Southbury had over one thousand residents). In addition, Southbury agreed to strategically address any new deficiencies or risks to residents' health or lives. Although the consent decree could only be enforced by those party to it, the defendants agreed to submit quarterly progress reports to the court. The court approved the consent decree on December 26, 1986, just four days after denying the Messier plaintiffs' petition for intervener status. Connecticut's compliance with the consent decree was rocky from the start. On July 28, 1987, the State petitioned the court to extend some of the consent decree's original deadlines because approval of the remedial plan was taking longer than expected. The court did not approve the remedial plan until July 22, 1988. On April 24, 1990, the court issued a remedial order directed to deficiencies in individualized planning, program staffing, medical treatment, and mental health care. Under the 1990 remedial order, Southbury's staff was required to monitor medicated residents for side effects, especially tardive dyskinesia. In addition, the court mandated monthly human rights reviews for residents with aggressive or self-injurious behaviors and for residents on psychotropic medications. Finally, the State was instructed to hire more physicians (general practitioners and specialists) and nurses to serve residents at Southbury. On December 1, 1991, the court modified the 1990 remedial order. Dissatisfied with the effects of the consent decree, Southbury's residents filed Messier v. Southbury Training School in 1994. On March 5, 1996, the court denied the Messier plaintiffs' motion to consolidate their lawsuit with United States v. Connecticut. The court, however, agreed that Southbury was still not providing adequate services to persons with developmental disabilities. On June 19, 1996, the court held the State in contempt of the consent decree, remedial plan, and remedial orders and appointed a Special Master (David Ferleger) to oversee compliance. United States v. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. 974 (D. Conn. 1996), appeal dismissed, No. 96-6218, 1997 WL 321594 (2d Cir. June 13, 1997). The court was especially concerned by the rates and causes of mortality at Southbury. For instance, one resident died from severe burns after he lit his clothes on fire while smoking. The court noted that Southbury knew that the resident smoked unsafely, but neither taught him how to smoke safely nor observed him when he smoked. Between July 30, 1997, and February 22, 2006, the Special Master submitted twenty-six status reports, sixty-three topic-specific reports, and numerous other reports, recommendations, and analyses. Based on the docket, it appears that the Special Master addressed (1) individualized planning, (2) community placement policies, (3) abuse and neglect, (4) the rights of persons with disabilities, (5) human rights and behavioral programming reviews, (6) occupational and physical therapy, (7) medical and dental care, (8) dosage benchmarks, (9) physical restraint techniques and standards, (10) mortality investigations, (11) case management and advocacy, (12) quality assurance plans, (13) facility upkeep, safety, and sanitation, (14) transportation, (15) employment of direct care staff, medical professionals, and specialized therapists, and (16) staff development. The defendants contested most of the Special Master's reports, but the court ultimately accepted all of them. For instance, on February 22, 2004, the court accepted and adopted the Special Master's report on Southbury's development of mortality review procedures. It appears that the court began removing components of the consent decree from active judicial oversight in August 2000. On November 22, 2002, the Messier plaintiffs again requested intervener status, but the court denied their request on January 7, 2003. On June 24, 2004, the court similarly denied a motion by the Messier plaintiffs to file an amicus curiae brief about compliance with the consent decree. On June 20, 2005, the parties filed a revised joint settlement agreement, which would have released all outstanding elements of the consent decree from active judicial oversight. The court, however, refused to endorse the agreement on July 21, 2005. The court was apparently concerned about continued deficiencies in habilitation programming and medical care. On September 16, 2005, the State filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but did not request that the district court proceedings be stayed. On January 17, 2006, the Special Master reported that the State had successfully implemented comprehensive habilitation programming for all persons served at Southbury. On February 26, 2006, the Special Master's medical consultant issued a similar report regarding the adequacy of medical care. On March 25, 2006, the court issued an order purging the defendants of contempt and concluding judicial oversight of the consent decree and remedial plan. The court, however, retained jurisdiction over the consent decree and remedial order for enforcement purposes. Between March 24 and June 25, 2006, the court declared all outstanding motions moot, finalized payment to the Special Master, and ordered the return of unused Special Master funds to the State. On June 25, 2006, Connecticut withdrew its joint settlement agreement appeal. Today, Southbury's website embraces the philosophy of community placement and acknowledges that future challenges will require Southbury to continue to grow and develop. On November 2, 2009, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the case because the parties agreed that the consent decree and remedial plan were fully implemented.

Summary: Following an investigation by the United States Department of Justice, the U.S. filed this lawsuit against the State of Connecticut, its Department of Mental Retardation, and the Director of Southbury Training School (Southbury) on July 25, 1986, alleging that living conditions at Southbury placed residents in grave danger of bodily harm and death. On the same day, the parties also entered into a consent decree that required Southbury to provide better programming, disciplinary procedures, medical care, recordkeeping, and increase staffing. After some problems with compliance and placing the state in contempt, the Court assigned a special master to monitor Southbury. After making significant progress, on March 25, 2006, the court ended judicial oversight, but retained jurisdiction over the consent decree and remedial plan. On November 2, 2009, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the case because the parties agreed that the consent decree and remedial plan were fully implemented.


After budget cuts, an intermediate care facility serving individuals with intellectual disabilities operated by Washington State was ordered to cut costs by up to $1.8 million. To comply with the October 2010 order, management moved 27 residents from the intermediate care facility to its nursing facility and simultaneously reduced programs and staffing at both sites. After bringing problems to the attention of state agencies, investigations by Disability Rights Washington (DRW)—the state National Disability Rights Network organization—found materially significant loss of services, findings which were confirmed by the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS). In fact, CMS found over 40,000 violations of the NHRA pertaining to these 27 individuals alone. CMS found that Washington State failed to comply with Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA), that residents were housed in inappropriate settings, the transfer violated federal law, and as a result the state had received federal funds in error. CMS then announced an expansion of the investigation to other state-operated, Medicaid-certified nursing facilities. Pertinent state departments issued a corrective action plan in response to CMS’s findings. DRW claimed the correction plan was inadequate in a complaint it filed on April 16, 2014 on behalf of a class of plaintiffs of people with intellectual disabilities. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, the plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services and the Director of the Washington State Health Care Authority in their official capacities under the Medicaid Act and the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA). The plaintiffs, represented by both DRW and a private firm, sought injunctive and declaratory relief to require defendants to establish an adequate system to provide Pre-admission Screening and Resident Review (PASRR) screenings, assessments, specialized services, and, when appropriate, community-based integrated placement for class members who reside in privately-operated Medicaid-certified Nursing Facilities. Defendants filed an answer on May 8, 2014. The plaintiff moved for class certification on October 17, 2014 and filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the proper standard for PASRR screenings and evaluations. On November 10, 2014 defendants responded to plaintiffs’ motions and moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims and for partial summary judgment. The motions were resolved by the court on April 10, 2015 with Judge James L. Robart ruling mostly in favor of the plaintiffs. 99 F.Supp.3d 1297. The Judge granted part of defendant’s motion to dismiss, but gave plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint and file a valid claim. The Court certified a class (April 10, 2015) comprised of all individuals who: (A) are or will be residents of Medicaid-certified, privately-operated nursing facilities in the State of Washington; and (B) who are Medicaid recipients with an intellectual disability or related condition(s) such that they are eligible to be screened and assessed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. § 483.122 et seq. The defendants appealed the class certification on April 24, 2015 to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Docket #:15-80076. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff’s only allegation was that he should have been a part of this class, so therefore was not qualified to represent it. On August 10, 2015, Judges Michael Daly Hawkins and Andrew D. Hurwitz of the Ninth Circuit denied permission to appeal. After negotiations, in August of 2016, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for approval of a settlement agreement, class certification, and a settlement approval hearing and process. The settlement agreement required copies to be sent to every member of the class. Class members would also be notified of the date and time of the final settlement hearing. Any objecting class member had an opportunity to speak at the final hearing. After giving time for notice to be provided to all class members, the final settlement hearing took place on January 9, 2017. The court approved the final settlement agreement on January 10, 2017. 2017 WL 123011. The settlement provided for a comprehensive reform of defendant’s PASRR screenings required under the NHRA, establishing procedures for timeliness of evaluations, Post-PASRR meetings, provision of specialized services to increase class members’ independence and/or discharge planning for class members who are medically able and willing to live in an alternative placement in the community. It also established metrics for monitoring implementation of new PASRR system, with reporting to class counsel on a quarterly basis. The court retained jurisdiction over the case and the settlement agreement. Lodestar attorneys’ fees of over $600,000 were scheduled to be paid by defendants. The settlement is still ongoing and under court supervision through September 30, 2020. The settlement agreements provides for a joint court order to terminate the case if the defendants show that they have completed all requirements before the September 2020 date. EXTERNAL RESOURCES WEBSITE: https://www.disabilityrightswa.org/cases/dunakin-v-lashway/

Summary: Disability Rights Washington filed this class action on behalf of individuals with intellectual disabilities in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in April 2014. They sued the State healthcare authority and department of social services, alleging that budget cuts resulted in inadequate services in violation of the Nursing Home Reform Act. The parties reached a preliminary settlement one year later and the final settlement was approved in January 2017. The settlement is ongoing and under court supervision through September 30, 2020.


In 1990, prior to the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a group of residents of the Wyoming State Training School, an institution that housed individuals with intellectual disabilities, brought this lawsuit. Represented by the Wyoming Protection and Advocacy System, the plaintiffs sought to remedy unconstitutional conditions and statutory violations at the institution and aimed to force Wyoming to create community living options for many of its residents. Though it predated the ADA (and the ADA interpretation endorsed by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C.), the lawsuit alleged numerous legal violations. The plaintiffs alleged violations of state and federal disability-focused statutes, most prominently Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Medicaid. The plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (now the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act) based on the institutions' failures to assess the individual needs of and provide educational services to school-age children in the institution. Finally, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the institution and its officials violated the U.S. Constitution (including a number of Due Process-based liberty interests and Equal Protection). The Complaint detailed an extensive set of inhumane and neglectful circumstances that led to these violations. Individuals in the Wyoming State Training School were not individually assessed or provided with sufficient habilitation, training, and treatment for their needs. Staff routinely failed to protect residents from abuse and physical injuries (including self-inflicted injuries). There was insufficient space and lack of privacy for the residents. Residents were not provided socialization, stimulation, education, therapy, or training in self-care. Staff were overwhelmed, unsupported and not provided with adequate training. The Complaint further alleged that the plaintiffs had a right to live in the community where possible, and that the state was responsible for providing the services that would allow Training School residents to live in integrated settings. The litigation process moved toward settlement. On April 27, 1990, the parties stipulated to the certification of the class and entered a Stipulation to Establish the Framework for Settlement. In this Stipulation, the parties laid out areas to resolve, appointed an expert committee to carry out the negotiation, made plans to provide for the immediate needs of the plaintiffs, and set ground rules for future negotiation. In July 1990, the parties entered a stipulation on the immediate needs of the plaintiffs, which included the creation of an Immediate Needs Assessment Team to engage in the necessary individualized planning for each plaintiff. After several more months of discovery and negotiations, the parties entered a complete Settlement Agreement on March 31, 1991 to address the needs of both those residing at the institution and individuals with disabilities who would be at risk of placement in the institution without additional support services. The Agreement sought to substantially improve conditions at the Wyoming State Training School. It covered the nature of the institution, its staffing, educational opportunities, and individualized planning, with substantial monitoring and reporting requirements. The agreement also sought to increase the availability of community placement options. The parties selected a Compliance Advisory Board (CAB) composed of two experts who would both assist in carrying out the agreement and report to the court on its implementation. The CAB continued to report to the court until the fall of 1994. During this period, a bout of litigation emerged in the case over the placement of class member Sara Kawulok. With the Kawulok issue resolved and substantial progress documented, the parties agreed to relieve the CAB of its reporting requirements in late 1994. The parties entered a permanent settlement in October 1994 and in December 1994, the court dismissed its jurisdiction over the case.

Summary: Individuals with intellectual disabilities residing in the Wyoming State Training School filed this lawsuit in 1990 to challenge conditions at the School and a lack of community placement options. The parties agreed in 1991 to a settlement that was designed not only to improve conditions in the institution, but also to prevent unnecessary institutionalization and create options for community living for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Wyoming. The court's jurisdiction was ended in 1994.


This case is the reincarnation of a previously filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Legal Arizona Workers Act (the "Act"). The District Court (Judge Wake) dismissed that suit, Arizona Contractors Assoc., Inc. v. Napolitano, on December 7, 2007 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that there was no justiciable case or controversy against the Governor or Attorney General, as they did not have the power to enforce the challenged Act. The court noted that only county attorneys had that power. Immediately after the dismissal of Arizona Contractors, on December 9, 2007, a coalition of trade organizations and Arizona employers filed a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2201 in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix division [Arizona Contractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, 07-2496]. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel at this stage, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees, challenging the constitutionality of the Act. The Act required Arizona employers to verify the employment eligibility of each employee through a federal verification program and established sanctions against Arizona employers that employed aliens who were not authorized to work. The Act provides the Superior Court of the State of Arizona with the power to suspend or revoke the business licenses of employers who intentionally or knowingly employ illegal aliens. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Act was pre-empted by federal immigration law. A companion case was also re-filed on December 12, 2007 by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Immigration Law Center, the ACLU Foundation Immigrants Rights Project and the Arizona ACLU. [Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Goddard, 2:07-cv-02518-SMM]. The District Court (Judge Neil V. Wake) consolidated these two remaining cases on December 14, 2007. Plaintiffs in the consolidated action alleged, as they had in the previously filed case, that the Act violated the Supremacy Clause of the U. S. Constitution as it was preempted by federal immigration law and the federal government's exclusive authority to regulate immigration. Plaintiffs also asserted that the Act violated the due process rights of employers and workers. The Arizona Contractor plaintiffs also asserted violations of the Commerce Clause, the Fourth Amendment and the Arizona state constitution. Prior to consolidation, plaintiffs had requested a preliminary injunction in each case. Defendants moved to dismiss the cases. On February 7, 2008 Judge Wake found that federal immigration law did not preempt the Act, and it did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Commerce Clause. Arizona Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Candalaria, 534 F.Supp.2d 1036 (2008). Specifically, Judge Wake found that Section 1324a(h)(2) of the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) expressly authorized the Act at issue in this case. The relevant section of the federal statute reads "the provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens." Judge Wake found that the Act was a licensing or similar law and thus fell within the federal statute's savings clause. Furthermore, Judge Wake held that the Act's requirement of mandatory use of the federal E-Verify program did not conflict with federal objects or purposes, even though Congress had decided to make the program optional. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, the plaintiffs renewed their argument that federal law expressly preempted the Act. Moreover, the Act's mandatory requirement to use E-Verify, the plaintiffs contended, was impliedly preempted by federal law because it conflicts with the policies envisioned in the voluntary nature of the program under federal law. On September 17, 2008 the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (Judges Mary M. Schroeder, John M. Walker, Jr., and N. Randy Smith) affirmed the District Court's finding Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (2008). In doing so, the Court of Appeals held that federal immigration law did not preempt the Act. The court explained that the Act was not expressly preempted because it fell within ICRA's savings clause allowing for state licensing and similar laws to regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens. Moreover, the court found that federal law does not impliedly preempt the Act's provision mandating the use of E-Verify. The court found it telling that "Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid state laws from requiring E-Verify participation." On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the named petitioners of the consolidated cases that made it to the Supreme Court, argued that the Court of Appeals had misinterpreted ICRA's savings clause and consequently had incorrectly ruled that the Act was not preempted. Furthermore, the petitioners argued that even if the Act was not expressly preempted by ICRA, federal law impliedly preempted it because it conflicted with the structure and function of federal law. The respondents replied in their brief that the Court of Appeals had been correct when it held that federal law did not preempt the Act. On May 26, 2011 the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, affirmed the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's judgment. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011). In doing so, the Court held that the Act fell within ICRA's savings clause and was thus not expressly preempted by federal law. Specifically the Court found that "The Arizona law, on its face, purports to impose sanctions through licensing laws[,]" which placed it squarely within ICRA's savings clause that allowed for States to regulate the employment of unauthorized individuals through licensing and similar laws. The Court was particularly unmoved by the petitioners' argument that the Act was not a licensing law because it only dealt with the revocation of licenses rather than the granting of them. In fact, the Court flatly rejected that argument. Moreover, the Court found that federal law did not impliedly preempt the Act because "Arizona's procedures simply implement the sanctions that Congress expressly allowed Arizona to pursue through licensing laws." Lastly, the Court found that the Act's requirement that employers use E-Verify was not impliedly preempted because it did not conflict with federal law. The district court's dismissal of the matter therefore stood, and the case was ended.

Summary: These 2007 consolidated cases were brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona to challenge the "Legal Arizona Workers Act", which mandates investigation and prosecution of employers who knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens and requires the revocation of the licenses of employers found to have done so. It also makes mandatory a previously voluntary verification process. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the Act fell within ICRA's savings clause and thus was not expressly preempted by federal law.


On July 6, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Arizona against the State of Arizona and the Governor. The plaintiff, represented by the Department of Justice (DOJ), sought declaratory and injunctive relief, against the recently enacted S.B. 1070, which contained several provisions designed to "discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens" in Arizona. The DOJ argued that S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that it was preempted by federal law. The DOJ filed a motion for a preliminary injunction the same day to enjoin the defendant from enforcing S.B. 1070 until the Court made a determination as to its constitutionality. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that S.B. 1070 impermissibly infringed on the federal government's right to enact and enforce immigration policy. Note that this case was related to two others, Friendly House v. Whiting and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Arizona, in which plaintiffs filed suit against the State of Arizona also seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the implementation of S.B. 1070. On July 28, 2010, the court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (703 F.Supp.2d 980). The court found that the DOJ was not likely to succeed on the merits in showing that certain provisions of the legislation were preempted by federal law, but that the DOJ was likely to succeed on other provisions. Some of the enjoined provisions included a portion of Section 2 of S.B. 1070 "requiring that an officer make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped, detained or arrested if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in the United States" and Section 3 of S.B. 1070 "requiring verification of the immigration status of any person arrested prior to releasing that person and creating a crime for the failure to apply for or carry alien registration papers." In the two weeks immediately following the complaint filing, several groups filed motions for amicus briefs, including a collection of states in support of the defendants and the American Bar Association in support of the DOJ. The court denied these amicus pleadings in an order on September 3, 2010, as moot, because the court had not considered the briefs before issuing the preliminary injunction. Immediately following the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit (Judge Paez) upheld the district court's decision in an opinion filed on April 11, 2011. The court found that Congress intended for "systematic state immigration enforcement (to) occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General" and that S.B. 1070 on its face impermissibly interfered with that intent. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction as issued by the district court. (641 F.3d 339) The defendants appealed that ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted cert on December 12, 2011, and arguments were held April 25, 2012. On June 25, 2012, Justice Kennedy announced the decision of the Court, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court held that several provisions of S.B. 1070 were properly enjoined but declined to strike down Section 2(B), which required state police to check the immigration status of people arrested under non-immigration state law. However, the Court did not uphold the provision either, instead deciding that if it was construed to not authorize extra detention time, it might be constitutional. (183 L.Ed.2d 351). On August 8, 2012, the Ninth Circuit (Judges John T. Noonan, Richard A. Paez, and Carlos T. Bea) returned the case to the district court for "further proceedings consistent with the opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court." (2012 WL 3205612) On September 18, 2012, pursuant to the stipulation between the parties and the prior Supreme Court ruling, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction of Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070. The court also permanently enjoined Sections 3 and 6, which created criminal penalties for immigrant who did not federally register or carry federal registration documents, and authorized law enforcement officers to arrest without a warrant anyone they had probable cause to believe committed a removable public offense. On March 7, 2013, the parties filed a joint status report indicating two of the plaintiff's claims remained unresolved: (1) plaintiff's claim regarding Section 2(B), and (2) plaintiff's claim against Section 4 of S.B. 1070, which amended the Arizona statute that established criminal penalties for "smuggling of human beings for profit or commercial purpose." The parties agreed to the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of plaintiff's claim against Section 2(B) in light of the Supreme Court decision. The parties proposed that adjudication of plaintiff's claim against Section 4 of S.B. 1070 be stayed pending the Ninth Circuit's decision in Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting (No. 12-17152), because the courts' resolution in that case was likely to have an effect on the smuggling provision in Section 4. The plaintiffs in that case challenged a portion of Section 5 of S.B. 1070 that imposes criminal penalties under certain circumstances for transporting or harboring an unlawfully present alien and encouraging or inducing an alien to enter or reside in Arizona in violation of law. On October 8, 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court issued a decision in Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 2013 WL 5526525. The court found that the challenged provision was both void for vagueness and preempted by federal law. The court therefore affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction against the provision. On April 21, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari filed by the State and Governor of Arizona in Valle del Sol, thus ending any further review of the Ninth Circuit decision. On May 29, 2014, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement in principle to resolve the plaintiff’s claims regarding Sections 2(B) and 5 of S.B. 1070, under which the United States dismissed without prejudice its facial challenge to Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, and the defendants stipulated to a permanent injunction against implementation of Section 5 of S.B. 1070. The parties noted that they had not been able to reach any agreement regarding Section 4 of S.B. 1070. On June 9, 2014, the court ordered all claims in the United States’ complaint challenging on its face Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 to be dismissed without prejudice and Section 5 be permanently enjoined. On July 18, 2014, the U.S. moved for judgment regarding the one claim remaining in this action challenging Section 4 of S.B. 1070. On November 7, 2014, the court granted U.S.'s motion for judgment, stating that the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting dictated that federal law preempted the state law on both field and conflict preemption grounds. On January 6, 2015, the defendants filed an appeal in 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, but subsequently filed a motion to dismiss. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 6, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution against the state of Arizona and the Governor of Arizona in her official capacity in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff claimed that the recently enacted S.B. 1070, which contains several provisions designed to "discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens" in Arizona, impermissibly infringes on the federal government's right to enact and enforce immigration policy. On July 28, 2010, the district court issued a preliminary injunction. The defendant appealed the grant of the injunction. On April 11, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, issued an opinion upholding the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted cert on December 12, 2011 and issued their opinion on June 25, 2012. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, striking down most of the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070.


On May 17, 2010, a group of organizations and individuals filed this lawsuit against the sheriff and district attorney of each of the fifteen counties in Arizona, in their official capacities, in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff, represented by organizations such as the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center along with private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that S.B. 1070 conflicted with federal law and procedures and that local law enforcement agencies were ill-equipped to deal with the complexities of immigration law. For example, one provision of S.B. 1070 allowed police officers to ask for identification during a routine stop if there is a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual is not a U.S. citizen. The plaintiffs claimed that this provision was written primarily to provide a pretextual reason to stop an individual for some other state or local law violation in order to investigate that individual's immigration status. Immigration status, however, is not easily determined through an identification card of some kind—federal authorities may be aware of an individual's presence in the country but may not be pursuing deportation proceedings. The plaintiffs contended that local law enforcement lacked the training and knowledge to investigate immigration status. On June 4, 2010, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) held a hearing on June 22, 2010, and stated that the motions would be held under advisement. On June 18, 2010, the court granted the State of Arizona and the governor's motions to intervene as defendants. On June 25, 2010, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to transfer related case. In this order, the court allowed the transfer of four other cases challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 1070. On October 8, 2010, the court granted in part and denied in part motions to dismiss filed by several of the defendants. The plaintiffs' first preliminary injunction motion, regarding certain provisions of S.B. 1070, was denied. At oral argument, the plaintiff withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction regarding part of S.B. 1070 based on the NInth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach. The court found that a preliminary injunction was moot because an injunction was already issued in the related case United States v. Arizona. This case and United States v. Arizona challenged enforcement of the same provisions of S.B. 1070. On January 7, 2011, the plaintiffs filed another motion requesting a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the provision of S.B. 1070 affected by the Redondo Beach case. On May 10, 2011, the court denied this motion without prejudice to its refiling at a later time because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet issued their opinion from the en banc court. In October 2011, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and a third motion for a preliminary Injunction. On February 29, 2012, the court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the defendants from enforcing A.R.S. § 13-2928 (A) and (B). This section of the law was intended to prevent employment solicitation on roadways where it interferes with the proper flow of traffic. The State of Arizona, as an intervenor-defendant, appealed the issuance of the preliminary injunction and, on May 9, 2012, filed their opening brief with the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiff sought class action status in their original complaint and on December 12, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. While that motion was pending, on June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its decision in Arizona v. United States, affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court held that several provisions of S.B. 1070 were properly enjoined but declined to strike down Section 2(B), which required state police to check the immigration status of people arrested under nonimmigration state law. The Court explained that the legality of the provision would depend on how it was construed—if it did not authorize extra detention time, it may be constitutional. Following that Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs in this case filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 17, 2012, seeking an injunction against two sections of the law. The plaintiffs requested that the court preliminarily enjoin § 2(B) on preemption, Fourth Amendment, and Equal Protection Clause bases, and A.R.S. § 13-2929 on preemption grounds. On March 27, 2013, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the day labor provisions. On April 9, 2013, the district court dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Arizona v. United States. The parties went through discovery and on March 17, 2015, the defendant moved for summary judgment with regard to plaintiffs' claims under the Supremacy Clause (Count One), Equal Protection Clause (Count Two), the First Amendment (Count Three), the Fourth Amendment (Count Four), Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution (Count Five), the Due Process Clause (Count Six), and 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Count Seven). On September 4, 2015, the district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment for Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, and Seven. The district court, however, entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim in Count Three. In other words, the court found that plaintiffs had not presented any evidence that police would enforce S.B. 1070 differently for Latinos than other people and that the plaintiffs failed to prove that § 2(B) was unconstitutional. The court also found that parts of the law targeting day laborers violated the First Amendment free speech protections. The parties filed cross-appeals to the Ninth Circuit. Before that appeal was decided, however, the plaintiffs and intervenor-defendants settled. The parties stipulated that the defendants would release an informal attorney general opinion, which would provide guidelines for the implementation of §§ 2(b) and 2(d) of S.B. 1070, among other sections. The parties also stipulated that A.R.S. §§ 28-3511A (1)(d) and (e) would be enjoined, and asked the court to enjoin those provisions. Finally, the plaintiffs would receive attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $1.4 million. On September 19, 2016, the court entered an order enforcing all of these stipulations. There have been no further developments in this case; the case is presumably closed.

Summary: On May 17, 2010, a group of organizations and individuals filed a lawsuit against the Sheriff and Attorney of each of the 15 counties in Arizona, in their official capacities, in the U.S. District Court of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The plaintiff, represented by organizations such as the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center along with private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted S.B. 1070 was a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that S.B. 1070 conflicts with federal law and procedures and that local law enforcement agencies are ill equipped to deal with the complexities of immigration law. The district court granted a preliminary injunction in February 2012, which the defendants appealed. In a related case, Arizona v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down most of S.B. 1070. The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the remaining provisions of S.B. 1070 and while the parties were going through discovery disputes, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on March 17, 2015. The plaintiff filed a response to the defendant's summary judgment and on September 4, 2015, the district court ruled in favor of the defendant with regard to plaintiff's claims under the Supremacy Clause, Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment, Article II, Section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, the Due Process Clause, and 42 U.S.C. §1981. Notably, the court also entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on count three claim which was appealed. Finally, on September 15, 2016, both parties conferred and filed a joint case disposition in which the plaintiff settled for $1.4 million.


This is a class action about conditions of confinement in the "hold rooms" used by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for short-term detention of noncitizens apprehended near the border. The case deals with all the hold rooms in the Tucson Sector, which consists of nine "stations" covering most of Arizona and accounted for 18% of all border patrol apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border in 2014. Most recently, the District Court entered a comprehensive opinion finding conditions unconstitutional. On June 8, 2015, civil detainees confined in a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) "hold room" within the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). All plaintiffs were apprehended at or near the U.S. border with Mexico and then detained. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Arizona, the National Immigration Law Center, American Immigration Council, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, and the law firm Morrison & Foerster, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that they were subjected to inhumane and punitive conditions while being detained in holding cells. As expedited discovery proceeded, the plaintiffs moved in August 2015 for sanctions against defendants, asserting that defendants had violated discovery rules by destroying critical video evidence of unconstitutional conditions of confinement in the Tucson Sector CBP facilities. On Sept. 28, 2015, Judge Bury granted the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions in part. He found that defendants had caused spoliation of evidence and created prejudice against the plaintiffs because the destroyed videos contained the only visual evidence of conditions of confinement in these facilities. Consequently, Judge Bury ordered that defendants immediately produce all existing and retained video evidence of detainee holding areas that were the subject of this case. 2015 WL 13021467 (D. Ariz. 2015). On December 4, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking an immediate order for improved conditions in the hold rooms. Briefing on the motion was stayed for a short time until the resolution of the class action and motion to dismiss issues. On Jan. 11, 2016, Judge Bury certified the case as a class action. The class consisted of all individuals who at that time or in the future were detained for one or more nights at a Tuscon Sector CBP facility. 163 F.Supp.3d 630 (D. Ariz. 2016). A few weeks later, Judge Bury shifted the wording slighting, ordering that "one or more nights" be understood to mean "more than 8 hours within the same calendar day." And on June 27, 2016, Judge Bury again amended the Jan. 11 order certifying the class, to include all individuals at that time or in the future who were detained at a Tuscon Sector CBP facility (regardless of duration). 2016 WL 8199309 (D. Ariz. 2016). The same day as he granted certification of the class, Judge Bury issued another order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs' APA claims were dismissed (on grounds that the challenged CBP conduct was not "final agency action"), but their constitutional claims remained. 2016 WL 3484403 (D. Ariz. 2016). Once the class was certified and the motion to dismiss denied, briefing continued on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The defendants sought to seal various court documents, but Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., moved to intervene for the limited purpose of opposing that motion. Judge Bury granted intervention on June 26, 2016, holding that the public interest in access to the record outweighed the defendants' rationale for keeping the documents sealed. Rejecting the defendants' general reasons based on privacy and law enforcement, Judge Bury asked the defendants for a more specific showing of harm from the disclosure of any document not already covered by a protective order, and ordered the unsealing of several documents. The preliminary injunction issue finally got to a hearing on Nov. 14-15, 2016; on Nov. 18, Judge Bury granted a preliminary injunction. He found that the plaintiffs had established a likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims and that violation of a constitutional right would constitute irreparable injury. Judge Bury stated that if defendants held detainees long enough for detainees to need to sleep, then defendants must maintain conditions of confinement adequate for the detainees' physical needs during that time (as there was no security rationale overriding this obligation). 2016 WL 8188563 (D. Ariz. 2016). The defendants moved for reconsideration on Dec. 2, which Judge Bury denied on Jan. 3, 2017. He did, though, clarify that the twelve-hour confinement period began when a detainee arrived at a CBP station. 2017 WL 467238 (D. Ariz. 2017). On Jan. 9, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for sanctions against the defendants for civil contempt, alleging violation of the court's Aug. 14, 2015, and Sept. 28, 2015, orders mandating that defendants produce relevant video evidence. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to preserve from destruction videos of the Tucson Center hold rooms, and had failed to inform the plaintiffs or the Court of this problem. The defendants responded on Feb. 3. On Mar. 2, 2017, both parties filed notices to appeal to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, from Judge Bury's Nov. 18, 2016, and Jan. 3, 2017, orders. The 9th Circuit, on Mar. 3, opened two new dockets, Nos. 17-15381 and 17-15383, and set a briefing schedule. The 9th Circuit then set a mediation hearing for Mar. 20, but on that date, the Court declined to include the case in its mediation program. Back in the District Court, on Mar. 13, 2017, Judge Bury granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' Jan. 9, 2017 motion for sanctions against the defendants for civil contempt. 2017 WL 7520602. Judge Bury found that the defendants had failed to take all reasonable steps within their power to preserve video evidence. While some violations were not good-faith or reasonable interpretations of court orders, other violations were merely technical or de minimis. Judge Bury ordered the defendants to improve certain aspects of their data archiving, to meet with plaintiffs about their progress, and to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this data discovery. Defendants responded on Mar. 20, stating that they were now either in compliance or on track to being in compliance with all requirements of the Court's Mar. 13 order. In the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, on Mar. 30, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their brief on cross-appeal. The plaintiffs acknowledged that the District Court had correctly recognized the detainees' due process rights to medical care, beds, and personal hygiene. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argued, the District Court had erred as a matter of law by allowing CBP to deny detainees medical screenings and prescriptions by trained personnel, to deprive detainees of beds when held overnight, and to provide merely body wipes in lieu of showers. The defendants submitted their brief on cross-appeal on Apr. 27. They argued that the detainees' due process rights did not include sleeping mats for all detainees after twelve hours, and that the District Court had not abused its discretion in the terms of the preliminary injunction, considering the unique challenges faced by the Tuscon Sector Border Patrol. The plaintiffs filed another brief on cross-appeal on May 25, and the defendants filed a reply brief on June 8. The 9th Circuit (Judges Tallman, Callahan, and Ezra) held oral argument on Oct. 16. In the District Court, on Apr. 13, 2017, the defendants followed up on the Mar. 13 civil contempt order. The defendants informed Judge Bury of potential corruption and gaps in relevant video recordings, and maintained that these were good-faith errors and that defendants were working to fix them. Also on Apr. 13, the defendants moved to stay the District Court proceedings until the 9th Circuit ruled on the parties' cross-appeals of the District Court's preliminary injunction order. On May 25, 2017, Judge Bury granted in part and denied in part the motion to stay. Only expert discovery was stayed, while all other discovery was to proceed. Judge Bury stated:
The hardship and inequity falls decidedly on the Plaintiffs. Staying this discovery, suspends not only resolution of the case but puts the Plaintiff at an evidentiary disadvantage. It creates a chronic state of evidentiary suspension, with any end in sight being totally dependent on the Government’s ability to correct a problem which it has been unable or unwilling to correct for over a year.
 On Dec. 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit (Judges Tallman, Callahan, and Ezra) affirmed the District Court's Nov. 18 preliminary injunction order. 878 F.3d 710. (The order had required defendants to provide detainees after 12 hours with mats and blankets, but not beds, showers, or medical care provided by medical professionals.) The opinion, written by Judge Callahan, found that the District Court had not abused its discretion in the limited preliminary injunction. According to the opinion, the District Court had broad discretion to craft this remedy to balance the detainees' constitutional rights with the government's interests. On Feb. 5, 2018, the plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en banc. Plaintiffs argued that the Ninth Circuit's Dec. 22 decision conflicted with prior decisions of that court and the Supreme Court on (1) whether civil detainees' right to adequate medical care encompasses a right to screening conducted by properly trained individuals supervised by medical professionals, and (2) whether, having found the existence of constitutional violations, a district court may decline to fully remedy them based on government expense. However, on Mar. 13, the Ninth Circuit denied the rehearing petition. The Ninth Circuit mandate issued, putting into effect the judgment of its Dec. 22 decision. On May 4, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a sealed proposed motion for partial summary judgment. The clerk was to file the motion if the plaintiffs' motion to seal is granted. Throughout the rest of 2018, the parties litigated what evidence would be permitted in the motion for summary judgment and whether exhibits would be sealed. When this was resolved (by an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to seal) the clerk filed the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' obligation to provide beds. The plaintiffs asserted that civil pretrial detainees must be provided beds or mattresses raised off of the floor if held for any period requiring sleep and that "anything less, including floor mats, is a violation of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.” Further, the plaintiffs argued that the use of floor mats led to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions that are “reprehensible and dehumanizing.” The plaintiffs contended that there are no disputed facts precluding partial summary for their claim that civil detainees are constitutionally entitled to beds. On March 15, 2019, Judge Bury issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 2017 WL 7520603. Judge Bury held that Ninth Circuit case law does not support plaintiffs' request for judgment as a matter of law that providing floor mats rather than raised beds is an unconstitutional practice. Judge Bury concluded the court was to consider the severity and duration of the conditions, along with the operational needs of the detention facility, to determine whether these conditions constituted objective deprivation of the constitutional right to humane shelter. Judge Bury determined that this was a fact-intensive inquiry and could not be properly made on the summary judgment record. Judge Bury ordered a 13-day bench trial set for January 13, 2020. For the remainder of 2019, the parties litigated various issues in preparation for trial. Beginning on January 13, 2020, the parties participated in a seven-day bench trial. On February 19, 2020, Judge Bury issued the court's finding of fact and conclusions of law, finding in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants. 2020 WL 813774. Judge Bury concluded that the defendants' holding facilities were designed for short-term holds, "lasting hours not days." Judge Bury found that the conditions of extended confinement in defendants' holding facilities were "substantially worse than detainees face upon commitment to either a civil immigration detention facility or even a criminal detention facility, like a jail or prison." Accordingly, Judge Bury concluded that extended confinement in these facilities did not advance the government's legitimate interest in immigration enforcement and resulted in conditions, including detainees' inability to sleep for several nights, that were "presumptively punitive" and violated the Constitution. Based on these conclusions and finding of fact, Judge Bury issued an order enjoining defendants from holding detainees considered to be "processing complete" for longer than 48 hours unless defendants provide "conditions of confinement that meet basic human needs for sleeping in a bed with a blanket, a shower, food that meets acceptable dietary standards, potable water, and medical assessments performed by a medical professional." Judge Bury adopted a "no longer than 48 hour" rule to accommodate logistic difficulties of transporting detainees after they are processed. Judge Bury maintained that anything beyond 48 hours forced CBP to perform the role of other civil immigration detention agencies and thus required it to provide the conditions of confinement standard at the facilities of other agencies. On April 17, 2020, the court entered an order for a permanent injunction, setting minimum standards with respect to detention length, available care, and compliance. The permanent injunction adopted many of the same standards as both the preliminary injunction and proposed permanent injunction. The court required defendants to collect and maintain data about each individual's time in the detention center, provide that data to the plaintiffs on a quarterly basis for a two-year period, and allow plaintiffs to request class access visits on a quarterly basis for two years. Further, the defendants were also ordered to conduct internal compliance evaluations and provide them to plaintiffs. The Court gave the defendants 90 days to attain compliance with the order. It also retained jurisdiction to reopen the case and enforce the permanent injunction and action. On September 11, 2020, two months following the defendants' third and final monthly status report, the plaintiffs filed a report alleging noncompliance. However, the court declined to act on the plaintiffs' report and instead noted on November 18, 2020, that the court's jurisdiction over the permanent injunction was to be narrow and only could be invoked if clear and convincing evidence of noncompliance were shown. Defendants filed appeals as to both the court's finding and the permanent injunction, and plaintiffs filed cross-appeals to each. On November 10, 2020, defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal, after which plaintiffs also dismissed their cross-appeals on November 18, 2020. The case remained on the district court docket for overseeing compliance with the injunction. As of March 5, 2021, however, there was no additional activity on the docket.

Summary: On June 8, 2015, civil detainees confined in the Tucson Sector of the U.S. Border Patrol filed a class action lawsuit, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the APA due to inhumane and punitive conditions while they were detained in holding cells. The district court granted a PI mandating that defendants must maintain conditions of confinement adequate for the detainees' physical needs and provide detainees with mats and blankets after 12 hours. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the PI order. In 2018 the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of defendants' obligation to provide raised beds for detainees held for any period requiring sleep; the district court denied this motion. After a 7-day trial in January 2020, the district court held that these extended confinement conditions violated the Constitution and issued an order enjoining the defendants from holding detainees for longer than 48 unless they provided conditions of confinement that meet basic human needs. This permanent injunction was ordered and has been in effect since April 2020.


This case challenged the hotel chain Motel 6 reporting guests to federal immigration officials. Eight individuals who stayed separately at Arizona Motel 6 locations filed a class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on January 23, 2018. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs sued Motel 6 Operating L.P., its parent company G6 Hospitality LLC, and 10 unnamed Motel 6 employees in Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), requested class certification, and sought declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief, as well as a civil penalty and attorneys' fees and costs. Judge David G. Campbell was assigned. Plaintiffs claimed Motel 6's policy of disclosing guests' information to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) without requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity violated the Fourth Amendment, as well as federal and state laws. Defendants allegedly violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by discriminating against plaintiff’s race or national origin by denying Latino guests the full and equal enjoyment of the contractual relationship with Motel 6. Additionally, by assisting DHS and ICE agents, the plaintiffs alleged that Motel 6 violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by engaging in a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff's rights. Thirdly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by disclosing the plaintiffs' personal information to federal immigration officials without a warrant or reasonable suspicion of a crime. The plaintiffs also alleged a variety of state law violations, including various tort and breach of contract claims. The parties filed a joint notice of settlement on July 6, 2018. A joint request for conditional class certification and preliminary approval of settlement terms was filed on July 6, 2018. Plaintiffs sought one primary class and two subclasses. The primary class consisted of all persons who stayed at a Motel 6 between February 1, 2017, and November 2, 2018, and had their information shared with federal immigration authorities. The first subclass was all persons who were questioned or interrogated by federal immigration authorities at a Motel 6 as a result of guest information being shared. The second subclass was for all persons who had been placed in immigration removal proceedings due to disclosed guest information and the resulting encounters with federal immigration authorities at a Motel 6. The proposed settlement included a two-year enforcement period under a consent decree that would enjoin Motel 6 from providing guest information to DHS and ICE absent a warrant, subpoena, or the immediate risk of harm to a guest, employee, or another individual. Additionally, parties sought three categories of monetary damages totaling $7.6 million. First, $50 in damages per guest whose information was shared with federal immigration authorities, up to a class-wide total of $1,000,000. Second, $1,000 in damages to each class member questioned by federal immigration authorities during their stay. Finally, an amount of at least $7,500 to each Class Member who was placed in immigration removal proceedings in connection with their encounter with federal immigration authorities during their stay. On May 30, 2019, the court mooted the parties' joint motion. The parties had advised the court that they would be filing a new motion for preliminary approval of a class settlement. Plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint on June 5, 2019. The amended complaint contains largely the same allegations and claims as in the original complaint. Plaintiffs now sought a primary class and one subclass. The primary class was all persons who stayed at a Motel 6 and had their information disclosed to federal immigration authorities between February 1, 2015, and the date of judgment in the present case. The subclass included guests at a Motel 6 that had been interrogated, arrested, or placed in removal proceedings by federal immigration authorities due to guest information being disclosed. The parties again filed a joint motion for approval of the class action settlement and to certify class on July 5, 2019. The court granted preliminary approval of the class action settlement on August 2, 2019. On January 17, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion requesting five actions. First, final approval of the settlement. Second, certification of the proposed classes. Third, a consent decree for injunctive relief. Fourth, authorization to distribute the settlement monetary damages in accordance with the agreement. Finally, payment of attorneys’ fees and costs. The court granted final approval of the third amended class action settlement on February 18, 2020. The court found that the amount of funds going to class members was sufficient and that the amount of funds held for four immigration rights organizations was "consistent with the underlying objectives of the claims in this case, serves the interests of the silent class members, and is not too remote from the class." Judge Campbell signed a consent decree on February 18, 2020, making effective injunctive and recordkeeping provisions for three years. The injunctive provisions mandated Motel 6 do the following:

Maintain a 24-hour hotline for employee use when they receive a federal request for guest information.

Not share any guest information with federal immigration authorities without a warrant, subpoena, or credible risk of imminent danger.

Motel 6 to create an online form for guests to report if guest information was improperly shared.

Maintain documentation related to reporting.

Annual meeting with parties to ensure compliance with consent decree.

The parties attended the first required annual meetings on March 4, 2021. According to a joint status report filed on March 29, 2021, Motel 6 had complied with the consent decree. The aforementioned 24-hour hotline, online reporting system, and policies have all been implemented. Motel 6 has explicitly required that franchise locations also adopt the above requirements. The court retains jurisdiction over the matter for the duration of the consent decree.

Summary: In 2018, former Latino/a guests at Motel 6 locations in Arizona filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They alleged that Motel 6's policy of disclosing guests' information to DHS and ICE agents without requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity violated the United States Constitution and federal and state law. They also alleged Motel 6 conspired with DHS and ICE agents to violate guests’ Fourth Amendment rights. In February 2020, the parties agreed to class action settlement terms and the district court approved the settlement agreement. The court retains jurisdiction over the matter for the duration of the consent decree.


On March 16, 2018, a prisoner at the Coconino County Detention Facility (CCDF), in Flagstaff Arizona, filed this class action lawsuit in the Superior Court of Coconino County, Arizona on behalf of himself and similarly situated prisoners. The complaint sought declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, challenging the prolonged detention of inmates for whom CCDF received a detainer from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). It named as defendants the Coconino County Sheriff, the Jail Commander, and other officials. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU’s Immigrant Rights Project and by private counsel. The complaint explained that the plaintiffs had been arrested, criminally. But then their detention at CCDF was prolonged because the facility cooperated with an ICE detainer request. The ICE detainers asked local authorities to prolong the confinement of individuals accused of immigration violations until officers from ICE took custody of those individuals and placed them in removal proceedings. The named plaintiff, for example, claimed that there were people willing to post bond to secure his release, but they were told by CCDF personnel that he would be held for an additional 48 hours following the bond payment pursuant to the ICE detainer request. Fearing that posting bond would trigger the 48-hour hold and subsequent detention by ICE, he chose to remain in custody until his trial date. According to the plaintiffs, CCDF’s policy of prolonging plaintiffs’ detention despite meeting all conditions of pretrial release violated Article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs requested preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, to secure the named plaintiff’s immediate release upon the payment of his bond. and to enjoin the holding of other similarly situated detainees pursuant to CCDF’s policy. The plaintiffs also sought a court declaration that the CCDF detainer policy was unlawful. Because the complaint raised a federal claim, the defendants removed it to the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on April 2, 2018. It was assigned to District Judge David Campbell. On April 6, 2018, the plaintiffs sought an order to show cause as to their request for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order and to halt the continued implementation the CCDF’s immigration detention policies. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on April 30, 2018. In addition to repeating the allegations described in the original complaint, the amended complaint also asserted that CCDF’s polices violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On May 5, 2018, the U.S. Government filed a statement of interest, seeking to convince the District Court to deny the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. According to the Government, ICE’s cooperation with local law enforcement in the detention of those accused of immigration violations was lawful under Arizona and federal law. Though the detainer authorized the confinement of an individual 48 hours beyond the time when the individual would have otherwise been released, the Government clarified that the detainer should not, “impact decisions about the alien’s bail, rehabilitation, parole, release, diversion, custody classification, work, quarter assignments, or other matters.” Further, the Government claimed that the named plaintiff did not have a basis to challenge the legality of ICE’s cooperation with the County, because he never elected to post bond. On July 6, 2018, Judge Campbell denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. According to the Court, the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, but nonetheless raised serious questions that required further litigation. The Court reached this decision by finding the plaintiffs’ arguments inconclusive as to whether Arizona sheriffs possessed common law authority to cooperate with ICE without explicit statutory authorization. However, the Court also held that local law enforcement officers’ unilateral authority to prolong the detention of an individual on immigration grounds absent a formalized agreement with the federal government was a serious question demanding further litigation. Because both the plaintiffs and the Government would sustain significant hardships on account of the absence or presence of court interference, the Court concluded that a preliminary injunction would not be appropriate relief in this case. 324 F.Supp.3d 1053. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case, to which the defendants provided no objection. According to plaintiffs’ counsel (as reported in local news sources), the denial of the preliminary injunction made the dismissal necessary. They explained that continuing to fight the case would result in their client spending another six months to a year in jail. The Court granted the motion, dismissing the case as to the defendants without prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: Following his arrest and confinement at the Coconino County Detention Facility (CCDF), plaintiff challenged the prolonged detention of inmates at CCDF triggered by detainer requests from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE). Plaintiff claimed this policy violated Article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He sought class-wide declaratory and injunctive relief for all CCDF detainees subject to this prolonged detention policy despite their eligibility for pretrial release. The U.S. District Court for the district of Arizona denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, citing his inability to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the case thereafter, which was accepted by the court.


On June 15, 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity brought this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Plaintiff filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California and the case was assigned to Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel (whom Trump had previously disparaged in an unrelated case). The case combined several different challenges to the Trump Administration's planned border wall, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. After an initial complaint and a First Amended Complaint, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on Sept. 6. According to the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff is "an environmental conservation organization that works to protect native wildlife species and their habitats." In the wake of President Trump's Executive Order (EO) No. 13767, authorizing expanded border wall construction, plaintiff feared that such construction would harm the environment, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and other environmental statutes. Plaintiff was also concerned that the border wall would harm plaintiff's members who frequented borderland wildlife areas. The first issue was under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). On May 2, 2017, the plaintiff had submitted a FOIA request to DHS and CBP. The requested records related to the agencies' statutorily mandated environmental analysis, as well as compliance with other environmental laws, for the border wall prototype project. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, by failing to respond, had violated FOIA or alternatively the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The second issue was about compliance with NEPA's requirement of public participation in agency decisionmaking. On June 1, plaintiff notified DHS that it believed the wall would violate the environmental statutes. However, DHS provided no notice-and-comment or public participation procedure, nor did it respond to plaintiff's communications. This too was argued to violate NEPA, its implementing regulations, and the APA. The third issue was about both substantive and procedural application of the environmental laws. On Aug. 2, 2017, DHS announced that under its interpretation of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 and subsequent amendments, IIRIRA allowed DHS to waive the application of the NEPA, ESA, and many other federal statutes for the purposes of implementing the EO. Plaintiff claimed that in fact IIRIRA did not authorize this waiver, because its grant of waiver authority to DHS had already expired and had not been renewed. Plaintiff also alleged that in waiving the applicability of the environmental statutes, defendant had violated IIRIRA, NEPA, and ESA, as well as the U.S. Constitution's Take Care Clause, Separation of Powers Doctrine, Nondelegation Doctrine, and Presentment Clause. On Sept. 15, the court related this case to another recent case filed by environmental groups challenging the border wall, Defenders of Wildlife v. Duke, following the request of plaintiffs in the latter case. On Oct. 6, the government moved to dismiss. DHS first argued that, according to IIRIRA's waiver provision, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's nonconstitutional claims. Moreover, DHS claimed, to the extent the Court could review the statutory claims, the government had not exceeded its authority under its executive power and IIRIRA's waiver provision. Turning to the constitutional claims, defendant then denied any violations. Finally, DHS argued that no APA claim existed because FOIA provided an adequate remedy. The parties jointly requested on Oct. 20 that this case be consolidated with Defenders of Wildlife v. Duke and California v. U.S.. On Oct. 24, Judge Curiel granted the motion. 2017 WL 4861650. The consolidated cases continue on this case page. On Nov. 22, all plaintiffs moved separately for summary judgment. The Center for Biological Diversity and the Animal Legal Defense Fund both argued that the Trump administration had exceeded its statutory authority under IIRIRA (or, in the alternative, its constitutional authority under the Take Care Clause, Presentment Clause, Separation of Powers Doctrine, and Nondelegation Doctrine), by reviving IIRIRA's waiver provision for the new border wall projects. The State of California advanced a similar argument and also alleged that the Trump administration had violated the APA, NEPA, and Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). On Dec. 20, DHS opposed plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and cross-filed for summary judgment. First, DHS argued that California had not established standing. Substantively, DHS argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' constitutional claims under IIRIRA's waiver provision. DHS also maintained that the provision was constitutional. Plaintiffs responded on Jan. 5, 2018, and DHS replied on Jan. 23. Judge Curiel held a Feb. 9 hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. On Feb. 27, he issued an order denying plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and granting DHS's motions for summary judgment, except for plaintiffs' FOIA claim. First, Judge Curiel held that defendants had violated no clear and unambiguous interpretation of IIRIRA's waiver provision, and therefore that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear statutory, nonconstitutional claims under that provision. This bar applied to plaintiffs' statutory claims under IIRIRA, APA, NEPA, ESA, and CZMA. Turning next to the constitutional claims, Judge Curiel held that defendants had not violated the Nondelegation and Separation of Powers Doctrines, because Congress had properly delegated its legislative authority under an intelligible principle. Neither had plaintiffs sufficiently argued that defendants had violated the Take Care Clause, Congress' delegation to the executive of power to waive criminal laws, the Presentment Clause, or the Tenth Amendment. Further, plaintiffs had not shown that the challenged provision deprived them of their rights under the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment right to petition, or Article III. 284 F.Supp.3d 1092. Plaintiffs' FOIA claim survived Judge Curiel's Feb. 27 order. However, on Mar. 23, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the FOIA claim, because defendants had provided the requested records. On Mar. 26, Judge Curiel granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. On Apr. 9, plaintiff appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-55474). On Apr. 19, 2018, the Circuit Court consolidated plaintiff's appeal with appeals from the consolidated cases (No. 18-55475 and 18-55476). The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on Aug. 7. While the Ninth Circuit's decision was pending, on Aug. 23, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The issue that plaintiff requested the Supreme Court to answer was "whether IIRIRA § 102(c)—which grants the Secretary of Homeland Security sweeping power to waive any or all legal requirements in her sole discretion, and then insulates that exercise of discretion from judicial review—violates the separation of powers." On Dec. 30, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari. 139 S.Ct. 594. On Feb. 19, 2019, the Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges M. Margaret McKeown, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Jacqueline H. Nguyen) affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants. The panel first concluded that the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the "predicate legal question" of whether IIRIRA authorized the contested projects. Next, the panel held that under the plain text of the section, the defendants had the authority to construct the projects. This was because section 102(a) granted the Secretary of the DHS authority to “take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads (including the removal of obstacles to detection of illegal entrants) in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States.” The panel found that the border barrier projects constituted “additional physical barriers" and are “in areas of high illegal entry into the United States.” The panel further concluded that the fencing requirements and deadlines in Section 102(b) did not establish limits applicable to Section 102(a); "Section 102(b)’s provisions for priority projects do not swallow section 102(a)’s independent authorization to build 'additional physical barriers.'" Lastly, the panel held that that the environmental claims were precluded by the Secretary’s waiver of the NEPA, the CZMA, and the APA and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider any argument challenging the waivers themselves. 915 F.3d 1213. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit took effect on April 5, 2019. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2017, the Center for Biological Diversity sued DHS and CBP, bringing challenges to the Trump Administration's proposed border wall (FOIA, environmental statutes, APA, IIRIRA). After consolidation with several cases, on Feb. 2018, the Court granted the government's motion to dismiss (except for the FOIA claim) and denied plaintiffs' SJ cross-motions. The parties jointly moved to dismiss the FOIA claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. Lastly, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari regarding the constitutional issue of separation of powers in the IIRIRA. The case is now closed.


On May 23, 2018 the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU-NC) filed this lawsuit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The ACLU brought suit in the U.S. District Court for Northern California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. ACLU-NC requested records relating to ICE’s purchase of two private databases of automated license plate reader (ALPR) data. The complaint stated that “[t]he potential use by ICE of data for civil immigration enforcement, an entirely different purpose for which it was originally collected by local police—local criminal investigations—has generated widespread media interest and public concern.” The complaint maintained that access to information about ICE’s use of ALPR databases was necessary to inform meaningful public debate over the scope of government conduct.” According to the complaint, ACLU-NC submitted FOIA requests on March 19, 2018 and March 21, 2018. The requests sought records including impact assessments and communications between ICE and the vendor of ALPR data. ACLU-NC had yet to receive the requested information at the time of the complaint. ICE contended that, following the initial filing of the complaint, ACLU-NC had access to an interim release of records that occurred on July 13, 2018. In addition, ICE argued that further requested information may be exempt from public disclosure. As a result, ICE moved to dismiss the complaint all together. The parties later agreed that the remainder of the requested documents would be released on a rolling basis. ACLU-NC received the documents by November 2018. On February 26, 2019, Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero granted a stipulation and settlement reached by the parties. The agreement required ICE to pay ACLU-NC $8,597.68 in attorneys' fees and would dismiss the case with prejudice. Following Judge Spero's order granting the settlement, the case closed in February 2019.

Summary: On May 23, 2018 the ACLU of Northern California filed this lawsuit against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act, alleging that ICE had not provided the ACLU with documents they had requested related to ICE's purchase of automated license plate reader data. The parties agreed to a schedule for the documents to be released on a rolling basis, which was completed in November 2018. A settlement also required ICE to pay attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.


On March 27, 2018, immigrant detainees who had been held for more than six months without a bond hearing during the pendency of their removal proceedings petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for a writ of habeas corpus; they also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Represented by Centro Legal de la Raza, the American Civil Liberties Union of California, and private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this class action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241, and 1651. The named plaintiffs were San Francisco Bay area fathers who had been arrested by ICE in fall 2017 and were subsequently detained for over six months without a bond hearing. The government was prohibited from deporting them because an Asylum Officer found that they each had a “reasonable fear of persecution.” Consequently, they had live claims in the Immigration Court and were fighting deportation in “withholding only” proceedings. They had also moved for bond hearings in their cases before the Immigration Court, but their motions were denied for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs sought a court order requiring that the defendants provide individualized bond hearings before an Immigration Judge after 180 days of detention and every 180 days thereafter if denied. The plaintiffs also sought a declaration that failure to provide such a hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the statutory requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. § 703. Once filed, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley. On April 12, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class of “all individuals who are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) in the Ninth Circuit by, or pursuant to the authority of, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and who have reached or will reach six months in detention, and have been or will be denied a prolonged detention bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.” The class was defined to exclude classes of similarly-situated individuals involved in other litigation, such as Rodriguez v. Hayes, available here in this Clearinghouse and which reached the Supreme Court as Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The relevant statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), authorizes the detention of individuals with final orders of removal. However, the plaintiffs in this case challenged their removal orders and, as a result, the government was prohibited from deporting them. On the same date, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the government from continuing to detain class members for over 180 days without a bond hearing. The defendants filed their opposition to these motions on May 3, 2018. The parties’ primary disagreement related to whether the Supreme Court decision in Jennings had effectively overturned Ninth Circuit precedent on this issue. Specifically, the plaintiffs relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Diouf II which held that an individual facing prolonged detention (i.e., over 180 days) under 8 U.S.C. section 1231(a)(6) “is entitled to release on bond unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community.” Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1082 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs filed their reply on May 17, 2018. On June 5, 2018, Judge Corley found that Jennings did not overrule Diouf II and that they were not irreconcilable. She granted a preliminary injunction and class certification so that people who have been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) with “live claims” (i.e., before the Immigration Court, Board of Immigration Appeals, or a circuit court of appeals) cannot be held by the government for more than 180 days without a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. At these hearings, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would bear the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that prolonged detention was warranted (i.e., that a detainee is a flight risk or a danger to the community). According to the ACLU, the ruling is expected to affect hundreds of people detained throughout the Ninth Circuit. According to Centro Legal de la Raza, this order does not extend to arriving aliens held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or mandatory detainees held under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). 325 F.R.D. 616. On July 20, 2018, Judge Corley issued an order clarifying her June 5, 2018 in response to a motion for clarification filed by the defendants on June 20, 2018. She ordered that the preliminary injunction applied only to immigration detainees who have “live claims” before an adjudicative body, and not to any detainee held in ICE custody for over 180 days. On August 3, 2018, the defendants appealed the class certification and injunction to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 18-16465). On November 16, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court requesting enforcement of the court's June 5 order as to class members transferred to detention facilities outside of the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs claimed that, as class members, they are entitled to the protection of the court's order. Defendants argued that upon transfer outside the Ninth Circuit they are no longer class members and no longer entitled to prolonged detention bond hearings after 180 days. On January 25, 2019, Judge Corley denied the plaintiffs' motion. In her order, she explained that the plaintiffs' reading of the certified class was too broad to embrace class members transferred outside of the Ninth Circuit, and that the plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants had otherwise failed to comply with the June 5 order. 2019 WL 330466. On March 13, 2019, the District Court further required the defendants to provide the plaintiffs with a class list periodically in order to demonstrate compliance. On April 7, 2020 the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's June 5, 2018 order. The Court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that § 1231(a)(6) requires the government to provide class members with an individualized bond hearing in accordance with Diouf II. It also agreed that Diouf II was not clearly irreconcilable with Jennings and that the burden was on the government to show that a detained class member was a flight risk or a danger in order to continue holding them without violating due process. 2020 WL 1684034. Back in the district court, on April 10, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to enforce and amend the preliminary injunction. On June 19, 2020, this motion was granted in part and denied in part. 2020 WL 3402227. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought to require the defendants to do three things: (1) hold bond hearings within seven days of a class member's 180th day in detention; (2) notify class members of their scheduled bond hearings by their 165th day in detention and (3) explain any delays in bond hearings that occur after seven days of a class member's 180th; day. The court denied the plaintiffs' second request (notification of their scheduled bond hearing by their 165th day in detention), reasoning that a detainee did not become a class member until their 180th day and thus relief could not be granted to non-class members. The court observed that the defendants were able to provide the vast majority of class members with a hearing within 15 days of their 180th day; thus, the court amended the June 2018 order to require an explanation by the defendants when they failed to provide a bond hearing within 15 days of a class member's 180th day in detention. Further, the court amended the June 2018 order to require defendants to post a notice of the preliminary injunction in detention facilities that includes a list of the requirements to qualify as a class member so that detainees may pro se identify their class membership in the event that the defendants erred in identification. The court further required the defendants to more clearly report bond hearing outcomes. Specifically, classifications of "no action" were required to be changed so that a clearer result of the hearings would be known. The court, however, denied the plaintiffs' motion as it pertained to requiring more information regarding how the defendants identified potential class members, reasoning that such heightened requirements were unnecessary. On September 11, 2020, the defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court asking them to review the Ninth Circuit's April 2020 affirmance of the preliminary injunction. No. 20-322. As of April 16, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: Two San Francisco Bay Area fathers filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California after being detained for over 6 months in ICE custody without a bond hearing. The court granted a preliminary injunction and class certification ordering that individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) pending a determination as to whether they can remain in the United States with “live claims” before an adjudicative body cannot be detained for more than 180 days without a bond hearing. The government appealed both orders to the Ninth Circuit, and on April 7, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. Following plaintiffs' motion to enforce the preliminary injunction, the court granted it in part, finding that the defendants had not substantially complied with certain requirements, but denied it in part. As of April 16, 2021, this case is pending a writ of certiorari in front of the Supreme Court.


On June 7, 2018, attorneys from the Immigrants' Rights Clinic at Stanford Law School alongside the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the U.S. District Court of Northern California. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), claiming that DHS and ICE improperly withheld records related to the Trump administration’s immigration prosecutorial discretion policies and practices. DHS and ICE failed to respond to a request for records sent on March 2, 2017. The case was certified for Alternative Dispute Resolution in August 2018 and negotiation discussions continued for two years. On August 10, 2020, the parties settled. Under the agreement, defendants agreed to turn over the documents that the plaintiffs requested. The defendants also agreed to pay $16,350.10 to the plaintiff. The court ordered the execution of the stipulation of settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 7, 2018, Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto and the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for failure to comply with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted on March 2, 2017. The parties settled in August 2020, resulting in a $16,000 litigation expenses and the release of the requested documents.