On October 21, 2014, the American Immigration Council, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and American Civil Liberties Union filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the National Immigration Law Center, the American Immigration Council, the National Immigration Project/NLG and the ACLU Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to disclose documents regarding information and practices in an Artesia, New Mexico immigration detention center. Specifically, the defendants failed to disclose information concerning the expedited removal of families Artesia after 2014. There had been growing concern about the policies, procedures and practices related to the implementation of the expedited removal process in Artesia, sparking major concern from the media and the public. The facility in Artesia held women and minor children who had fled Central America, seeking refuge in the United States. Many of these migrants fled persecution and extreme danger in their home countries, and sought asylum in the U.S. However, some of these families have since been deported back to the countries from which they had fled, raising concern about the removal process. The plaintiffs sought to examine the extent to which these women and children had valid claims of asylum and if these families were receiving the process required by law. In order to understand this process, the plaintiffs submitted FOIA requests to each of the defendants for any agency records that the defendants prepared, received, transmitted, collected or maintained that concerned the policies, procedures and guidelines with respect to the Immigration and Nationality Act as well as a request for expedited processing. However, none of the defendants had made any determination as to whether they would comply with the plaintiffs’ request for the documents. The defendants also denied the plaintiffs request for expedited processing, even though the plaintiffs claimed that these documents were necessary to educate the public about time critical government activities. On February 3, 2015, Judge Lorna G. Schofield ordered that the parties submitted to the Court a proposed schedule for the production of documents responsive to the plaintiffs' request. On February 13, 2015, the parties agreed on the number of pages each defendant should produce and review per month, until all responsive documents were gathered. The parties settled on June 6, 2017. The defendants agreed to pay different amounts of money to the Plaintiffs, as the following: (i) $16,800 should be paid by the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (ii) $21,600 should be paid by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services; and (iii) $9,600 should be paid by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. The parties provided that the settlement agreement did not constitute an admission by the US or its agencies, including defendants, that plaintiffs or their counsels were entitled to fees and costs. The settlement agreement also provided that the Court should retain jurisdiction over any issue that may arise relating to it. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 21, 2014, the American Immigration Council, National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and American Civil Liberties Union filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to disclose documents regarding information and practices concerning the expedited removal of families from an Artesia, New Mexico immigration detention center. The production of the requested documents was ordered. The parties settled on June 6, 2017.


Sixteen states, led by the State of New York, filed this lawsuit against the federal government on September 6, 2017, in response to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memorandum issued on September 5, ending the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The states argued that ending DACA violated due process and equal protection rights, and also violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The states sought to enjoin the federal government from carrying out portions of the DHS memorandum and from using information about DACA grantees gathered in their applications to enforce immigration policy. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York and assigned to Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis. The complaint asserted that DACA helped its beneficiaries in several ways. First, since its inception in 2012, DACA protected approximately 800,000 young people from deportation. Second, DACA allowed individuals brought to the United States as children who met specific criteria to request deferred action for two years, subject to renewal. Indeed, the states pointed out that many of the grantees have spent most of their lives in the United States. Third, DACA allowed grantees to receive public benefits like social security, to enroll in higher education institutions, and to access other benefits like opening up a bank account and buying a car. And finally, the states noted that the federal government represented that it would not use the information obtained in the DACA application process to enforce immigration policy. The states argued that these grantees would now lose their protections and be at risk of deportation, especially since they provided the federal government with sensitive information in their applications. In light of the DHS memorandum, the federal government planned to immediately stop accepting new DACA applications. Further, it only issued renewals for grantees whose terms expired before March 5, 2018, provided they apply for renewal by October 5, 2018. The states highlighted that in addition to the losses DACA grantees will suffer, state and local economies, as well as many higher education institutions, have come to rely on the skills and productivity of the grantees and will therefore also suffer. The states pointed out that over half of DACA grantees are of Mexican origin and thus ending DACA "is a culmination of President’s Trump’s oft-stated commitments...to punish and disparage people with Mexican roots." Further, the states argued that the grantees' sensitive information is at risk since President Trump took "affirmative steps to reduce the privacy protections applicable to DACA data" with a January 2017 Executive Order directing all agencies to "exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information" Meanwhile, the states pointed out that the DHS Memorandum did not provide assurance to DACA grantees or direction to USCIS and ICE that this information could not be used for the purpose of immigration policy enforcement. Originally, the plaintiffs consisted of New York, Massachusetts, Washington, Connecticut, Delaware, District Of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. Then Colorado joined as part of an amended complaint filed on October 4, which also claimed that the United States was equitably estopped from using or disclosing DACA beneficiaries’ personal information that it previously promised to keep confidential. On October 6, the United States filed a partial administrative record in the related case Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, available here. The record included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception to the decision to rescind it. The Batalla Vidal plaintiffs then moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, arguing that the defendants had not produced all of the documents leading to the rescission. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that they omitted documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The judge in Batalla Vidal (also Judge Garaufis) granted the motion on October 19 and ordered the defendants to produce the full administrative record in both cases. The defendants appealed to the Second Circuit, which granted an emergency motion for a stay of discovery and record supplementation in the district court pending consideration by the Second Circuit on October 20. On October 27, the defendants filed a motion in the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the rescission was an enforcement action "presumed immune from judicial review" and that, alternatively, the government provided ample explanation for the rescission. On November 9, 2017, the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims that policy changes in how information provided for DACA applications could be used violated due process and equitable estoppel. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the government violated due process by failing to provide individualized notice of the rescission. In both cases, the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the DACA rescission. The court reserved ruling on the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denied all other parts of its motion. On December 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the government from rescinding DACA. Meanwhile, a series of entities filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs: United We Dream, over 100 companies, educational justice organizations, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, law enforcement leaders, workers' organizations, legal services organizations, New York University, the Mexican government, dozens of religious organizations, immigration nonprofits, various U.S. cities and counties, and civil rights organizations. On December 27, the Second Circuit lifted the stay on the district court's discovery orders. But the government still did not want to provide additional documents. It also wanted to appeal the district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss. So, two days later, the government moved to stay further supplementation of the administrative record in the district court pending its appeal on the motion to dismiss. The district court granted the government’s motion to stay on December 30. It then certified the government’s interlocutory appeal on January 8. On February 13, 2018, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the government likely lacked a legally sufficient basis for ending the DACA program. The court found that while the government could end DACA, the question was if they had provided legally adequate reasons for rescission. The court found that the decision to end DACA was based on an erroneous conclusion that DACA was unconstitutional and violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that this conclusion in turn relied on the "plainly incorrect factual premise" that courts have found the "somewhat analogous" Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program to have "constitutional defects." The court also found that the purported reason for rescission was contradictory in that the government claimed DACA must end because it was unconstitutional, and yet also provided for a wind-down period in which certain DACA renewal applications would continue to be adjudicated. As a result, the court held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious and enjoined the government from ending the program on a nationwide basis pending the court's decision on the merits of the case. The government filed notice on February 20 that it had appealed the district court’s decision to issue a preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit. On February 21, 2018, the Second Circuit again denied the defendants' request for a stay of the district court's discovery orders. On March 29, 2018, the district court granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the rescission violated the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement for notice-and-comment, finding that the rescission memorandum was a general statement of policy exempt from the notice-and-comment requirement rather than a legislative rule. This finding led the court to further dismiss the plaintiffs' claim regarding Regulatory Flexibility Act violations since an RFA violation is contingent on a notice-and-comment requirement in the first place. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the government changed its information-use policy but left the door open to other challenges of that policy. The court sustained the plaintiffs' equal protection claim that the rescission was motivated by racial animus against Latinos, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged the rescission created disparate impact. Further, the court found that while the plaintiffs may not have sufficiently alleged that Acting Secretary Duke or the Attorney General had discriminatory intent, they did sufficiently allege that President Trump may have had such intent and that his influence on the rescission could not be ignored. The government promptly appealed the March 29 district court order denying its motion to dismiss. The Second Circuit decided to hear the government’s appeal in tandem with the appeal of the preliminary injunction and the appeal of the district court’s November 9, 2017, decision on the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and similar appeals in Batalla Vidal. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear three consolidated DACA cases: Batalla Vidal, Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, and Trump v. NAACP (see related cases). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that DHS's decision to rescind DACA was subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act and that the rescission was unlawful. 140 S.Ct. 1891. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order granting preliminary injunction and affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of the government’s motion to dismiss. On July 28, 2020, the Acting DHS Secretary issued a memorandum suspending DACA while DHS reviewed it. In response, on August 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that the Acting DHS Secretary lacked the authority to issue the memorandum because he had not been lawfully appointed to his position. Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that the government’s implementation of the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and in excess of DHS’ statutory authority, and that it violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Homeland Security Act, which prohibit agency action by unlawfully serving acting officials from taking effect. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the Acting Secretary was unlawfully serving in his position, to invalidate the memorandum, and to enjoin the government from terminating, amending, or interfering with DACA. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment on August 28, 2020. Shortly thereafter, the government filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On November 14, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and denied the government’s cross-motion, finding that the Acting DHS Secretary was not lawfully serving in his position and thus that the government's implementation of the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious. 2020 WL 6695076. The plaintiffs filed another partial motion for summary judgment on November 24, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion on December 4, 2020, vacating the memorandum issued by the Acting Secretary of DHS and ordering DHS to resume processing DACA applications and to notify the public accordingly. 2020 WL 7121849. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. As of December 19, the case is ongoing.

Summary: Sixteen states filed this lawsuit against the federal government on September 6, 2017 in response to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memorandum issued on Sept. 5 ending Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The states sought to enjoin the federal government from carrying out portions of the DHS memorandum and from using information about DACA grantees gathered in their applications to enforce immigration policy. While the district court granted in part the government’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs obtained a preliminary injunction. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that DHS's decision to rescind DACA was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the rescission was unlawful. Shortly thereafter, the Acting DHS Secretary issued a memorandum suspending DACA while DHS reviewed it. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that the Acting Secretary lacked the authority to issue the memorandum because he had not been lawfully appointed to his position. The district court agreed. Accordingly, the court vacated the memorandum and ordered DHS to resume processing DACA applications. This case is ongoing.


This case deals with the Trump Administration's effort to require state police departments to cooperate in immigration enforcement, which was part of the implementation of Executive Order 13768, which promised in January 2017 to deny federal grant funding to “sanctuary jurisdictions.” The lawsuit began on July 18, 2018, when the States of New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Massachusetts, and Virginia (“the States”) a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (formally, the Attorney General) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Ex Parte Young. The States, represented by their Attorneys General as well as outside counsel, claimed that the DOJ had violated the Separation of Powers, the APA and the Tenth Amendment Anti-Commandeering requirement; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In their complaint, the States challenged the DOJ’s implementation of new conditional requirements for Byrne JAG funds in the 2017 Fiscal Year (“FY”). The Byrne JAG program provides funding for States, allowing them to prioritize chosen criminal justice programs. On July 25, 2017, the DOJ announced that applicants for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funds would have to agree to three immigration-related conditions: (1) to allow federal agents, upon request, access to correctional facilities in order to question suspected noncitizens about their right to be in or stay in the United States, (2) to respond to requests from the Department of Homeland Security to give advance notice of the scheduled release date and time of noncitizens at state or local correctional facilities, and (3) to comply with various conditions related to 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which included prohibiting states and localities from restricting their officials from communicating with immigration authorities regarding anyone’s citizenship or immigration status, monitoring compliance of all subgrantees, and notifying the DOJ if the State became aware of evidence that a subgrantee was not in compliance. The case was assigned to Judge Edgardo Ramos on July 19, 2018. Shortly after, on July 26, 2019, the Court accepted the plaintiffs’ request in   The City of New York v. Whitaker  , 1:18-cv-06474 to relate that case, brought by the City of New York, with this one; the NYC action was against the same defendants for the same conduct. On July 20, 2018, the DOJ released the FY 2018 State Solicitation. In the FY 2018 version, the DOJ added to the conditions the States must meet in order to be eligible for the funds. In response, on August 6, 2018, the States submitted an amended complaint, adding the State of Rhode Island as a plaintiff and addressing the new FYI 2018 conditions. On August 17, 2018, both the States and the City filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The States requested summary judgment on the portions of the complaint related to FY 2017, seeking specifically declaratory judgment that the immigration conditions placed the program were unlawful, an injunction that enjoined the defendants from imposing those conditions nationwide, and a writ of mandamus directing the defendants to disburse New York City’s FY 2017 award and to issue new awards without the three conditions to all grantees nationwide that previously received the award documents. The ACLU filed an Amicus Brief on August 31, 2018 in support of the plaintiffs. They argued that the actions taken by the defendants to put immigration-related conditions on the JAG funds were inappropriate claims to authority because they upset the balance of power between state governments and the federal government, and that their imposed conditions were negatively impacting the plaintiffs’ ability to supervise their own police forces. On September 14, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss both this case and the related City of New York case, arguing that the immigration-related conditions on the JAG funds did not violate the Separation of Powers, that Congress delegated authority to the DOJ to place conditions on the grants, that the conditions did not violate the Spending Clause because the conditions bear a relationship to the purposes of the Byrne JAG Program, and that even if the Court were to grant an injunction it should be limited to the parties rather than nationwide. On November 30, 2018, Judge Ramos issued an opinion and order denying the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion to dismiss, and granting the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment. 343 F. Supp 3d 213. Judge Ramos granted summary judgment on the States’ and the City’s claims holding that:

Notice, Access and Compliance conditions were ultra vires and not in accordance with law under APA (Counts II and III, City Count II)

8 U.S.C. sec. 1373(a)-(b) insofar as it applies to states and localities was facially unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment (Count V, City Count V and XI)

Notice, Access, and Compliance Conditions violated constitutional separation of powers (Count I, City Count I). Deny City Count IV (violation of the Spending Clause) as moot

The notice, access, compliance conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA (Count IV, city Count III)
He ordered the defendants to:

Disburse the FY 2017 Byrne JAG awards to the States

Stop enforcing the immigration-related conditions it tried to impose on the State’s FY 2017 Byrne JAG awards

Reissue the States’ FY 2017 Byrne JAG documents without the immigration-related conditions
In his ruling, Judge Ramos declined to issue a nationwide injunction, as requested by the plaintiffs. He noted that such a move was not necessary to afford the plaintiffs’ relief and that the scope of decisions by other district courts in like cases has been similarly limited. After a conference, Judge Ramos modified the opinion and removed the requirement to reissue the documents to the States on January 4, 2019. On January 28, 2019, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit of the injunction issued against the defendants in the district court’s November 30, 2018 opinion and order. Back in the district court, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for partial summary on March 1, 2019. The plaintiffs requested summary judgment on the portions of the complaint related to FY 2018 and sought declaratory judgment that the immigration conditions placed the program were unlawful, an injunction that enjoined the defendants from imposing those conditions, and a writ of mandamus directing defendants to disburse New York City’s FY 2018 award and to issue new awards without the three conditions to all grantees that previously received the award documents. On April 12, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, partial summary judgment. On February 26, 2020, a Second Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Ralph Winter, Jose Cabranes, and Reena Raggi) issued an opinion reversing the district court's award of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, vacating the district court's mandate and injunction, and remanding the case to the district court. Judge Raggi, writing for the panel, concluded that the plain language of the relevant statutes authorized the Attorney General to impose all three challenged conditions on Byrne grant applications. Judge Raggi found that these conditions help to enforce national immigration laws and policies and that they ensure that applicants "satisfy particular statutory grant requirements imposed by Congress and subject to Attorney General oversight." Additionally, Judge Raggi, relying on a Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. United States that made clear States may not pursue policies that undermine federal law, held that the challenged conditions intrude on the powers reserved to the States. Finally, Judge Raggi concluded that in imposing the challenged conditions, the Attorney General did not overlook their important detrimental effects so as to make their imposition arbitrary and capricious. 951 F.3d 84. As of March 3, 2020, the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is pending before the district court and the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, several states filed a complaint against the Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the immigration-related conditions being placed on funding disbursed by the Department of Justice violated the Separation of Powers, the APA and the Tenth Amendment Anti-Commandeering. In 2018, a judge granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. In 2019, the defendants appealed this judgment. And later, the plaintiffs made a motion for summary judgment on the 2018 immigration-related conditions. In February 2020, a Second Circuit panel reversed the district court's order granting partial summary judgment, vacated the mandate and injunction, and remanded the case to the district court, concluding that the Attorney General was statutorily authorized to impose the challenged conditions and that the imposition of these conditions was not arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is currently pending before the district court.


This is a case about whether the federal government must include undocumented immigrants in the 2020 Census count. On July 21, 2020, President Trump issued a memo ordering the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the state-population totals used to calculate the states apportionments. In response, on July 24, 2020, several immigration advocacy and nonprofit organizations filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sued the Bureau of the Census, the President of the United States, the Director of the United States Census Bureau, the United States Department of Commerce, and the Secretary of Commerce. The plaintiffs claimed that by excluding “undocumented immigrants from: (a) the tabulation of the total population of the states; (b) the calculation and statement of the whole number of persons in each state; and (c) the calculation and statement of the apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states” the defendants were violating the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus compelling the President to apportion the House of representatives among states based on actual enumeration of the population, including undocumented immigrants, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege excluding undocumented immigrants violated the Enumeration and Apportionment clauses of the US Constitution (Article I, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) which require all persons to be included in the congressional apportionment base. They also alleged that the memo violated their right to equal protection because it denied undocumented immigrants personhood under the Constitution on the basis of race and national origin and was motivated by a desire to harm immigrant communities of color (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ). The complaint further contended violations of the Census Act (2 U.S.C. § 2a(a); 13 U.S.C. § 141), Separation of Powers (Article I, Sec. 2, Cl. 3 of the Constitution, as amended by the Fourteenth Amendment), and the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was initially assigned to Judge Lewis J. Liman, but was quickly reassigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman. The case was related to State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce, another 2020 Census case assigned to Judge Furman. That case is in the Clearinghouse, here. On July 28, 2020, Judge Furman ordered the parties in this case to confer and submit a joint letter addressing the ten issues he identified in the order. One of the issues was whether this case should be consolidated with State of New York v. Trump. In their joint letter ( Re: State of New York v. Trump, No. 20 Civ. 5770 (JMF); New York Immigration Coalition v. Trump, No. 20 Civ. 5781 (JMF) ), submitted on August 3, 2020, the parties agreed that it should. On the same day, a rural voter entered a Motion to Intervene as a plaintiff. That motion failed to demonstrate a right to intervene, so Judge Furman was denied it the next day. On August 4, 2020, Judge Furman ordered this case to be consolidated with State of New York v. Trump, and for “all future filings [to] be in 20-CV-5770 (JMF) alone.” For additional information, on this case and State of New York v. Trump, please see State of New York v. Trump, located here in the Clearinghouse.

Summary: In July 2020, several immigration advocacy and nonprofit organizations filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that by excluding “undocumented immigrants from: (a) the tabulation of the total population of the states; (b) the calculation and statement of the whole number of persons in each state; and (c) the calculation and statement of the apportionment of the House of Representatives among the states” the federal government were violating the Enumeration and Apportionment clauses of the United States Constitution, Equal Protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Separation of Powers, the Census Act, and. In August 2020, this case was consolidated with State of New York v. Trump. For additional information, on this case, please see State of New York v. Trump.


On February 1, 2008, national, state and local chambers of commerce and other nonprofit organizations advocating for their members' business interests filed this lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest council, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that parts of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act were preempted by federal legislation. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Sections 7 and 9 of that act, which impose tax penalties on businesses that do not check the work eligibility of all of their employees in a federal database and allow discharged employees to bring discrimination suits against their employers for employing unauthorized workers, were preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on the same day that they filed their complaint, and defendants moved to dismiss the claim on February 20, 2008. On June 4, 2008, the Court (Judge Robin J. Cauthron) ruled on both motions, denying the motion to dismiss and granting the preliminary injunction. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Henry, 08-cv-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2008). The defendants appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and on February 2, 2010, the Court of Appeals (Judge Harris L. Hartz, Judge Paul Joseph Kelly, Jr., and Judge Carlos F. Lucero) affirmed the District Court's grant of a preliminary injunction barring the discrimination lawsuit provisions and the tax penalty provisions from taking effect, but reversed the grant of injunction as to the verification requirement. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010). The case was remanded to the District Court. In June of 2010, the court granted a continuance of the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (IM-AZ-0013). On May 26, 2011, the Supreme Court (Justice Samuel A. Alito) issued its opinion, holding that federal law does not preempt an Arizona law that requires businesses to verify employees' work eligibility and allows the state to revoke the business licenses of employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). On June 23, 2011, the District Court (Judge Cauthron) granted another continuance to allow the parties to assess the impact of Whiting on their positions. On December 19th, 2012, the court entered the final judgment. Section 7(b) remained good law, which require persons to contract with the State to use the employment authorization system. However, section 7(c), which creates a cause of action for discrimination against employers who terminate an authorized employee while retaining an unauthorized employee and section 9, which requires businesses to verify individual independent contractors’ authorization status and creates a withholding for work performed by individual independent contractors, were both struck down. Oklahoma is permanently enjoined from enforcing these provisions. The court ordered all parties to bear their own fees and costs in this matter. This case is now closed.

Summary: On February 1, 2008, national, state and local chambers of commerce and other nonprofit organizations advocating for their members' business interests filed a lawsuit against the State of Oklahoma, claiming that Sections 7 and 9 of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, which impose tax penalties on businesses that don't check the work eligibility of all of their employees in a federal database and allow discharged employees to bring discrimination suits against their employers for employing unauthorized workers, were preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act. The Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on June 4, 2008, and on appeal to the Tenth Circuit the injunction was upheld except for as to the verification requirement. On remand to the District Court, the case was stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Whiting, which Supreme Court later held that an Arizona law requiring employers to use E-Verify was not preempted by federal law. Pursuant to this decision, the district court entered in a judgment on December 19th, 2012, holding that Oklahoma can require persons to contract with the State to use the employment authorization system. However, the provision creating a cause of action for discrimination against employers who terminate an authorized employee while retaining an unauthorized employee and the provision requiring businesses to verify individual independent contractors’ authorization status and creating a withholding for work performed by individual independent contractors, were both struck down.


On July 11, 2008, two detainees filed a habeas petition and class action suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Warden of Allegheny County Jail challenging their continued detention pursuant to immigration detainers and alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite the fact that the criminal charges against plaintiffs had been dropped, they were continuously detained due to detainers placed on them by federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys for the Community Justice Project, sought habeas relief. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on July 23, 2008, seeking to certify a class consisting of all who are or will be detained in the Allegheny County Jail based solely on an immigration detainer and without the opportunity to object to their detention. The same day, the district court (Judge David S. Cercone) denied the habeas petition as moot, dismissed the action, and denied the motion for class certification because ICE had assumed custody of both petitioners.

Summary: In 2008, two detainees filed a habeas petition and class action suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Warden of Allegheny County Jail challenging their continued detention pursuant to immigration detainers and alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought habeas relief and class certification. On July 23, 2008, the district court (Judge David S. Cercone) denied the habeas petition as moot, dismissed the action, and denied the motion for class certification because ICE had assumed custody of both petitioners.


On August 23, 2012, law enforcement officers employed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1225 by the heads of DHS and ICE. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief preventing the implementation of a Directive issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" ("the Directive") and a Memorandum entitled "Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens" (the "Morton Memorandum"). Plaintiffs claimed that the Directive commanded ICE officers to violate federal law, compelled them to violate their oaths of office, violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), unconstitutionally usurped and encroached upon the legislative powers of Congress, as defined in Article I of the United States Constitution, and violated the obligation of the executive branch to faithfully execute the law, as required by Article II, Section 3, of the United States Constitution. On October 10, 2012, the ICE employees were joined by the State of Mississippi as a plaintiff in an Amended Complaint. On January 24, 2013, the Court (Judge Reed C. O'Connor) granted in part and denied in part the government's November 13, 2012 Motion to Dismiss. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F.Supp.2d 724 (N.D. Tex. 2013). The Court held that venue was appropriate in the Northern District of Texas. With respect to several of the ICE Agent Plaintiffs' causes of action the Court found that these Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury-in-fact, and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims. In particular, the Court found that even if following the Directive and the Morton Memorandum did require them to violate their oaths to uphold the Constitution, and to alter their employment conduct, neither effect injured them concretely enough to support standing. However, the Court found that the allegation that the Directive and Memo compelled the plaintiffs to violate a federal statute upon pain of adverse employment action did satisfy the requirements of standing. (With respect to one additional asserted cause of action, relating to the issuance of employment authorization to aliens covered by the Directive/Memo, the Court noted that the plaintiffs were not involved in employment authorization decisions and did not articulate a way in which employment authorization harmed them personally. Thus, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs' third cause of action.) With respect to the State of Mississippi, the court found that Mississippi's asserted fiscal injury was purely speculative because there was no concrete evidence that the costs associated with the presence of illegal aliens in the state of Mississippi have increased or will increase as a result of the Directive or the Morton Memorandum. The Court held that Mississippi failed to allege an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing and dismissed the state of Mississippi's claims without prejudice. The federal government also asserted that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs' claims are federal employment disputes subject to the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), but the Court deferred ruling on this claim until trial because Defendant's claim that the CSRA precludes federal-court jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims had been inadequately briefed. On April 23, 2013, the Court (Judge Reed O'Connor) held a hearing regarding Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunctive Relief. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Directive and related provisions of the Morton Memorandum violate 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), but deferred ruling until the parties provided the Court with additional briefing regarding the CSRA dispute. Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 1744422 (N.D. Tex. 2013). The CSRA was then fully briefed, and on July 31, 2013, the Court (Judge Reed C. O'Connor) dismissed the remainder of the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court found that since Plaintiff's claims were based on their challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals after Plaintiff's non-compliance with the program led to the threat of workplace disciplinary action against them, the dispute must be governed by the CSRA's comprehensive and exclusive remedial scheme provided by Congress. Thus, the Court held that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to address Plaintiffs' claims. Crane v. Napolitano, 2013 WL 8211660 (N.D. Tex. 2013). Plaintiffs appealed. On July 22, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). This ended the case.

Summary: On August 23, 2012, ICE Agents and the State of Mississippi filed claims alleging that deferred action Directive commands ICE officers to violate federal law, compels them to violate their oaths of office, violates the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), unconstitutionally usurps and encroaches upon the legislative powers of Congress, as defined in Article I of the United States Constitution, and violates the obligation of the executive branch to faithfully execute the law, as required by Article II, Section 3, of the United States Constitution. On January 24, 2013, the Court found that ICE Agent Plaintiffs had standing to proceed, but the State of Mississippi did not. On July 31, 2013, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that the dispute must be governed by the Civil Service Reform Act. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. On Aug. 7, 2013, 16 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. The amended complaint, filed on behalf of 21 individuals, asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), the Ku Kux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by the Equal Justice Center and the Transnational Worker Rights Clinic. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International. Signal was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and was in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. One plaintiff worked in Pascagoula; the remaining plaintiffs worked at Signal's Orange, Texas site. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, Plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. In July 2014, U.S. Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Magistrate Judge Hawthorn found the similarity in issues in the cases not substantial enough to warrant transfer because the current venue was otherwise proper. In June 2015, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Trial was set for December 2015. However, in July 2015, the Court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, the parties were to update the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. The parties' report on July 5, 2018 noted that 20 of the 21 plaintiffs had reached a settlement with the Burnett (immigration attorney) defendants, and the remaining one plaintiff could not be located. The plaintiffs advised that they would be dismissing their claims against them soon because the Burnett defendants had met their obligations under the settlement. Plaintiffs requested the stay remain in effect as to the Signal defendants and Dewan (recruiter) defendants. On August 24, 2018, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn issued a report and recommendation to dismiss without prejudice the one remaining plaintiff who did not respond to the court’s order. District Judge Ron Judge Clark adopted the report and recommendation on September 12, 2018 and dismissed this plaintiff without prejudice. The case is ongoing as to the Signal defendants and Dewan defendants. As of August 2, 2020, there has been no changes in the docket.

Summary: On Aug. 7, 2013, 16 Indian guestworkers filed a lawsuit in E.D.Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme by Defendant Signal International. As of July 5, 2018, 20 of the 21 plaintiffs had reached a settlement with the Burnett defendants; the remaining plaintiff's claim was dismissed without prejudice. The case is ongoing as to the Signal defendants and Dewan defendants.


On October 26, 2015, sixteen undocumented immigrants formerly detained in Dallas County, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Dallas County and the Dallas County Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction preventing the defendants from detaining the plaintiffs solely based on a request from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an immigration hold, or an immigration detainer. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their constitutional rights by holding them in Dallas County jails for an additional 48 hours after the time they would otherwise have been released, in order to facilitate their arrest by ICE. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants unlawfully detained them by prohibiting bond or by failing to release them even after they had been cleared. The case was assigned to Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater. On December 18, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and to dismiss the claims against Sheriff Valdez based on qualified immunity. On January 8, 2016, the case was consolidated with another action brought by the same counsel against Dallas County on behalf of a group of plaintiffs asserting identical claims (3:15-cv-4008). On June 7, 2016, Judge Fitzwater granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, but also granted the plaintiffs leave to replead. Judge Fitzwater held that the plaintiffs had failed to plausibly alleged that they had either paid bail or were otherwise eligible for release but were detained solely on the basis of an ICE-issued request to detain. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that Dallas County lacked probable cause to detain the plaintiffs after they were otherwise eligible for release. 2016 WL 3166306. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 5, 2016. The complaint provided facts demonstrating that Dallas County had not allowed pretrial release even where the detainee paid bond. Instead, the defendants would either continue holding the detainee for transfer to ICE, or would petition the court to find the bail insufficient. The plaintiffs alleged that because of this policy, some detainees chose not to pay bail because they knew doing so would be futile. The complaint further alleged that continuing to hold the plaintiffs after they would have otherwise been cleared for release without probable cause as to a different criminal offense constituted overdetention. The amended complaint did not list Sheriff Lupe Valdez as a defendant. Dallas County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint. On January 17, 2017, Judge Fitzwater denied in part and granted in part the defendant's motion. He held that the plaintiffs had standing and could bring suit for violations of the Fourth Amendment. He dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment because the claims were already 'covered by' the Fourth Amendment. 2017 WL 169102. On May 8, 2017, Judge Fitzwater granted a motion allowing the state of Texas to intervene as a defendant in the case. On June 16, 2017, Judge Fitzwater granted the plaintiffs’ request to consolidate this case with a related one, <i>Delcid Bonilla v. Dallas County</i> (3:17-cv-201). The plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint reflecting the consolidation and the additional plaintiffs. Due to the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a bellwether trial plan on November 15, 2017. They proposed using five exemplary plaintiffs to represent the 45 named plaintiffs in order to make discovery significantly less expensive and avoid a lengthy trial. On March 9, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge Karen Gren Scholer. On March 30, 2018, Judge Scholer denied the plaintiffs' motion for a bellwether trial plain. On April 20, 2018, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Over the next several months, twenty-six of the plaintiffs dismissed their claims with prejudice. Eighteen other plaintiffs fell out of contact with counsel and were designated by the court as pro se. As of October 18, 2018, there was only one plaintiff still represented by counsel and pursuing a claim. That plaintiff had reached an oral agreement to settle his claim with the defendants. On October 26, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the pro se plaintiffs for lack of prosecution and failure to respond to discovery. On November 30, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion for entry of an agreed final judgment between the remaining plaintiff and the defendants. The motion stated that the parties had entered into a private settlement agreement. On December 4, 2018, Judge Scholer ordered entry of the final judgment, whereby the state of Texas agreed to pay the remaining plaintiff $9,500 in complete and total satisfaction of all his claims. On January 7, 2019, Judge Scholer dismissed the pro se plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The case is closed.

Summary: On October 26, 2015, sixteen undocumented immigrants formerly detained in Dallas County, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Dallas County and the Dallas County Sheriff under 42 USC §1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought damages and an injunction preventing the defendants from detaining the plaintiffs solely based on a request from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an immigration hold, or an immigration detainer. Over time, the case was consolidated with two other lawsuits with identical claims. The state of Texas also intervened as a defendant. The district court initially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. The court then dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claims, allowing them to move forward only with their Fourth Amendment claims. By October 18, 2018, only one plaintiff was still represented by counsel and pursuing a claim (26 had dismissed their claims with prejudice, and 18 had fallen out of contact with counsel and were designated as pro se; their claims were later dismissed). That plaintiff reached a private settlement with the defendants and the court ordered entry of the final judgment on December 4, 2018. The plaintiff was to be paid $9,500. The case is closed.


This suit challenges Texas's "Sanctuary City" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the other suits in this special collection, this suit does not challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order. To start with an overview, there are, so far, four cases addressing SB4. The four cases are: Texas v. Travis County, No. 1:17-cv-00425 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0044, before Judge Sparks, and three matters before Judge Orlando L. Garcia: this one; City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00404 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0045; and City of San Antonio, Texas v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0047. The three cases pending before Judge Garcia were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking an injunction barring implementation of SB4. The other case was brought by Texas seeking a declaratory judgment upholding SB4, against pro-immigration cities and counties. On June 6, Judge Garcia ordered a consolidation of this case with the San Antonio and El Cenzino cases, with El Cenzino becoming the lead case in the consolidation. Travis County, however, remains separate. This case was quickly consolidated with the two other before Judge Garcia; please refer to El Cenizo v. Texas for further information and updates. This case was administratively closed on Oct. 24, 2017 in light of the consolidation.

Summary: This suit challenges Texas's "Sanctuary City" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the other suits in this special collection, this suit does not challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order. This case was quickly consolidated with the two other before Judge Orlando L. Garcia; please refer to El Cenizo v. Texas for further information and updates. This case was administratively closed on Oct. 24, 2017 in light of the consolidation.


After being imprisoned in Bexar County Adult Detention Center (BCADA) for about 75 days after his criminal charges were dismissed, an individual filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas August 26, 2016. Bexar County detained the plaintiff, despite the dismissal, of his criminal charges under a Bexar County policy and practice that detains individuals whenever Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents asks them to do so. The plaintiff filed suit against Bexar County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against the ICE officers and employees responsible for his illegal detention under <i>Bivens</i>. He claimed violations of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and claims for declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory relief, monetary relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was initially assigned to Chief Judge Orlando L. Garcia. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on October 18, 2016, adding claims for violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and adding the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of ICE as defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to issue detainers in accordance with the Immigration and Nationality Act’s requirements and that these defendants were charged with administering and enforcing the Act Both parties moved for summary judgment, and Judge Garcia granted in part and denied in part both motions on June 5, 2017. The court determined that the County's actions in detaining the plaintiff without establishing probable cause met the deliberate-indifference standard necessary to show a constitutional violation. The plaintiff was thus awarded partial summary judgment and damages on the § 1983 claim to be free from unreasonable search and seizures against the County. The court denied the § 1983 claim relating to the County's policy of requiring receipt of judicial authorization by fax or email before dismissing a detainee, because the plaintiff did not adequately plead that this policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violations. The court thus granted partial summary judgment to the defendant. 2017 WL 2896021. The defendants immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. At the same time, on May 23, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to consolidate the present case with <i>Trujillo v. United States </i>, 5:17-cv-00054-OLG, because the legal and factual issues were similar. In <i>Trujillo v. United States </i>, 5:17-cv-00054-OLG, the same plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the United States seeking damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act for his false imprisonment. The following day, the court granted this motion to avoid unnecessary cost or delay and to promote the administration of justice. The Secretary of DHS, the Director of ICE, and the ICE San Antonio Field Officer moved to dismiss the FTCA claims and stay the case on August 18, 2017. The motion to dismiss was granted as to DHS, ICE, and other federal employees and the motion to stay was denied on October 18, 2017. 2017 WL 6033861. The plaintiff appealed to the Fifth Circuit on November 10, 2017 and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Docket #17-51005). Back in the district court, the court reconsidered the issue after briefing. On January 17, 2019, the court vacated their original granting of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion. They instead granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and ordered the case to be closed. On February 11, 2019, the plaintiff appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit (Docket # 19-50124). On November 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss because a settlement had been reached, and a day later, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the settlement agreement. As of February 24, 2020, the docket had no additional activity and the Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement agreement or updates on its enforcement.

Summary: An individual unlawfully detained in the Bexar County Adult Detention Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages. The case settled in November 2019.


On May 3, 2011, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants filed this class action lawsuit against the State of Utah in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, challenging the state's immigration-enforcement law, House Bill 497 (HB 497). HB 497 was a severe, anti-immigrant law that criminalized everyday activities, such as driving an undocumented immigrant to the store and authorized police to stop and detail an individual simply to verify his or her immigration status. The plaintiffs, represented by the state and national ACLU, the National Immigration Law Center, and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and state law, claiming that the law was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that HB 497, in requiring state and local law enforcement to check the identification of all people they stop, arrest or detain and ascertain whether they are in the country lawfully; allowing them to make warrantless arrests on "reasonable suspicion" that a person is an alien who is (1) subject to a removal order by an immigration court, (2) subject to an immigration detainer request, or (3) charged or convicted in another state with one or more "aggravated felonies;" and criminalizing the act of encouraging or inducing illegal immigrants to come to, enter or reside in Utah, is preempted under the Supremacy Clause and in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of the law's unconstitutionality and an injunction barring enforcement of the law before it came into effect on May 10, 2011. In passing HB 497, Utah became the first state to follow the lead of Arizona in enacting aggressive immigration-related laws at the state level; Indiana, Georgia, Alabama and South Carolina were soon to follow. For the case challenging the Arizona's SB 1070, see United States v. Arizona [IM-AZ-0015]; for the case challenging Indiana's SEA 590, see Buquer v. City of Indianapolis  [IM-IN-0002]; for the case challenging Georgia's HB 87, see Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal [IM-GA-0007]; for cases challenging Alabama's HB 56, see United States v. Alabama [IM-AL-0005], Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley [IM-AL-0006], and Parsley v. Bentley [IM-AL-0007]; and for cases challenging South Carolina's Act 69, see Lowcountry Immigration Coalition v. Haley [IM-SC-0001] and United States v. South Carolina [IM-SC-0002]. On May 6, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing on May 10, the district court (Judge Clark Waddoups) issued a temporary restraining order on May 11, barring enforcement of HB 497 pending further order of the court and giving parties time to brief the court regarding the merits of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011). Over the course of the summer, various amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of plaintiffs, including those by the governments of Mexico and various Central and South American countries. On August 1, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On November 22, 2011, the federal government filed a separate lawsuit challenging the Utah law solely on preemption grounds. It was consolidated with this case on November 28, and on December 15, the Department of Justice filed its own motion for a preliminary injunction. Rather than deciding on any of the motions before it, on February 21, 2012, the district court declared that it would refrain from making any rulings until the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015) but confirmed that the restraining order would continue until it ruled on the pending motions for preliminary injunction. While the district court awaited the Supreme Court’s decision, the plaintiffs filed several notices of supplemental authority in 2013 to support its pending motions for preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs cited circuit court decisions and argued that those provided further support that HB 497 was unconstitutional on Supremacy Clause grounds. Once the Supreme Court ruled on all but few motions for United States v. Arizona, Judge Waddoups ruled on all three pending motions for preliminary injunctions on June 18, 2014. First, the court ruled against the United States and plaintiffs’ overall facial challenge against HB 497 as a whole because the constitutional language did not expressly preempt all immigration-related state legislation, and the Supreme Court did not hold that the entire field of immigration regulation is either conflict or field preempted. But the court ruled against the key provisions of HB 497, such as Section 10 and 11, which granted warrantless arrest based solely on suspicion of immigration status and made it criminal to assist or encourage undocumented immigrants. The court also put strict limits on when the police could check the identification of detained individuals to verify immigration status. 26 F. Supp. 3d 1125. HB 497 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully interfered with federal power and authority over immigration matters in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and authorized and required unreasonable seizures and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On November 25, 2014, the parties filed a joint report regarding the discussions toward agreeing on a proposed final judgment in light of the court’s preliminary injunction decision. In the proposed final judgment, the State of Utah agreed to permanently scrap the key problematic provisions of HB 497 and implement the remaining sections under restriction. For example, the parties agreed to severely limit Sections 3 and 4 of HB 497, which made it clear that police are not allowed to stop or detain an individual simply to verify their immigration status. The terms of the settlement made clear that the law does not require Utahns to carry identification with them at all times, following the federal district court decision. On December 4, 2014, the district court entered a judgment per the parties’ proposed final judgment and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs’ and the United States’ remaining claims that were not yet adjudicated. On April 28, 2015, the parties notified the court about the settlement of attorney fees and costs and later advised the Court that the payment has been made. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is one in a series of cases challenging comprehensive state immigration laws. In this case, a coalition of immigrant rights groups and individual immigrants challenged Utah's law, HB 497, on preemption grounds and as a violation of equal protection, the right to travel, and the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. A preemption case brought by the Department of Justice was later consolidated with this case. In 2011, the District Court for the District of Utah has issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the statute. Following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arizona, the Court ruled on the motions for preliminary injunctions in June 2014 and ruled against the key provisions of HB 497. In November 2014, the parties filed a joint report, in which the State of Utah agreed to permanently scrap the key problematic provisions of HB 497. On December 4, 2014, the Court entered a judgment per the parties' proposed final agreement and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice. The parties settled on attorney fees and costs and the case closed.


On November 14, 2018, Migrant Justice, Inc. and four individual members of the organization filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), and the United States under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The plaintiffs, represented by the various public interest organizations including the ACLU of Vermont, Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Immigration Law Center, as well as private counsel, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as well as federal tort claims, including Invasion of Privacy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and False Imprisonment. The plaintiffs, organizers and advocates for immigrant farmworkers, alleged that ICE has retaliated against them in response to their advocacy and public criticism, thereby chilling their speech and interfering with their freedom of association. As a result, Migrant Justice claimed that it had to take extensive and costly precautions, limiting its overall reach to the community. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that ICE has infiltrated their meetings; targeted, surveilled, and engaged in disinformation campaigns to sow distrust among their members; and arrested and/or detained twenty active Migrant Justice members pursuant to an unlawful retaliatory policy. The plaintiffs further alleged that DMV employees consistently share personally identifying information about plaintiffs with ICE in a manner that disproportionately targets and impacts non-white and Latinx residents. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 7, 2019, removing one member of the organization as a plaintiff. There were no other substantive changes made to the complaint. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice as to Wanda Minoli, the Commissioner of the Vermont DMV after entering into a settlement. The DMV agreed to not share immigration or citizenship information with ICE, DHS, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and to implement new protocols to protect against such disclosures, including training for its law enforcement employees, counter staff, and managers. The settlement also included improvements to the DMV's language access services. The DMV agreed to 18 months of auditing and $100,000 in attorneys' fees: $20,000 would go to the plaintiffs and $80,000 would be set aside for the DMV's costs in complying with the settlement. On October 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice after entering into a settlement with the remaining defendants. The U.S. agreed to pay $100,000 in damages. ICE granted the plaintiffs deferred action for five years (stopping their potential deportations), and said it would not use any information gathered during this lawsuit, deferred action requests, or employment authorization applications against the plaintiffs in any future immigration proceedings. ICE also promised to tell its agents that immigrants, regardless of immigration status, are protected by the First Amendment and have the right to freedom of speech and assembly. This included sending a memo to its Vermont employees to explain that they must act in accordance with the First Amendment, including its commitment to not profile, target on account of, or discriminate against any individual or group for exercising First Amendment rights." The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, Migrant Justice and four individual members of the organization filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. Plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) implemented retaliatory policies in response to their activism on behalf of immigrant farm workers, including extensive surveillance and false imprisonment, in violation of their First Amendment Rights and that the Vermont Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) aided these practices by consistently and intentionally sharing personally identifying information about the plaintiffs with ICE in a manner that violated their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs and the DMV settled, and the DMV agreed to implement new protocols to protect against disclosing immigration and citizenship information with ICE. The plaintiffs then settled with the remaining defendants on October 28, 2020. The settlement agreement included $100,000 in damages, deferred action for the plaintiffs so they would not be deported, and ICE informing its employees that all immigrants are protected by the First Amendment.


On July 31, 2018, two nonprofit organizations and fifteen individuals filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the Trump Administration's implementation of the waiver provision of the Travel Ban (Presidential Proclamation No. 9645). The Travel Ban indefinitely banned millions of nationals of five Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States. Pars Equality Center and OneAmerica are immigrant and refugee advocacy organizations, and the individual plaintiffs are U.S. citizens, foreign nationals lawfully present in the U.S., and individuals abroad who were been affected by the Travel Ban and the implementation of its waiver provision. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, alleging that the waiver process under the Travel Ban was being implemented in an unduly restrictive manner, violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs—represented by private counsel, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the National Immigration Law Center, and the International Refugee Assistance Project—sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the waiver provision be enjoined, that any agency guidance and policies implementing that provision be vacated and remanded to the agencies, and that the agencies be directed to issue new guidance in conformance with the APA, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Constitution. Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought to define the class as: "Individuals in the United States with an approved petition to be reunited with family members who are (i) a national of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, or Yemen, (ii) subject to the Proclamation, and (iii) currently awaiting a decision on a waiver or have been denied a waiver; Nationals of the Designated Countries who are lawfully present in the United States who, but for the uncertainty created by the Proclamation and Defendants’ implementation of the waiver provision, wish to travel abroad and return to the United States; and Individuals who have applied for a visa who are (i) nationals of the Designated Countries, (ii) subject to the Proclamation, and (iii) currently awaiting a decision on a waiver or have been denied a waiver." The case was assigned to Judge Benjamin H. Settle. On August 1, 2018, the plaintiffs notified the court of a related class-action case, Doe v. Trump, challenging the Travel Ban (IM-WA-0030 in this Clearinghouse). The present case was reassigned to Judge James L. Robart, the same judge assigned to Doe v. Trump. On September 6, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to transfer this case, but the defendants disagreed with the plaintiffs about the relation of this case to Doe v. Trump. Instead, the defendants argued that this case should either be stayed or transferred to the Northern District of California, where another class-action case, Emami, et al. v. Nielsen, et al. was pending (IM-CA-0140 in this Clearinghouse). On December 12, 2018, the court granted the defendants' motion to transfer this case to the Northern District of California. 2018 WL 6523135. The case was transferred and given a new docket number, 3:18-cv-07818. Judge James Donato was assigned to the case. On February 20, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to either consolidate this case with the Emami case or stay this case pending the outcome of the proceedings in Emami to avoid duplicative litigation. The plaintiffs opposed the defendants' proposed complete merger of this case with Emami, arguing that such a merger would unnecessarily delay these proceedings further and deprive this case of its independent character. The court heard oral argument on April 11, 2019, and decided to allow both cases to proceed, with the understanding that the parties would have to communicate so as to prevent any duplicative actions. The parties then proceeded with discovery. On June 13, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim; and, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion to dismiss for the APA claim and granted the motion to dismiss for the Fifth Amendment claim on June 5, 2020. The court also denied summary judgment. For the Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to "allege a deprivation of an interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Subsequently, discovery continued. After the Trump Administration concluded, President Biden revoked the Travel Ban and ordered that visa applications resume processing on January 20, 2021 (Presidential Proclamation No. 10141). The Secretary of State was also given 45 days to provide a report detailing the number of visa applicants being considered for a waiver when Trump signed the Travel Ban, a proposal for "expeditiously adjudicating" their pending visa applications, reconsideration of denied applications, and a way to ensure that cases of reapplicants are not prejudiced as a result of a previous visa denial. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 31, 2018, two non-profit organizations and fifteen individuals filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs challenged the Trump Administration's implementation of the waiver provision of the Travel Ban (Presidential Proclamation No. 9645), alleging that it violates the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. The case was transferred to the Northern District of California. After the Trump Administration concluded, President Biden revoked the Travel Ban and ordered that visa applications resume processing on January 20, 2021. The case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed on March 16, 2020 by nine particularly vulnerable immigration detainees, the court declined to grant preliminary relief. It held that ongoing detention was not unlawfully punitive notwithstanding the threat posed by congregate detention during the coronavirus pandemic and found that the immigration facility was taking adequate measures to stop the spread of COVID-19. The court has not yet resolved the case on the merits.
 On March 16, 2020, nine persons held in civil detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Northwest Detention Center (NWDC) in Tacoma, WA who, because their age or underlying medical conditions, were particularly susceptible to a serious COVID-19 infection filed this habeas petition and complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the ACLU National Prison Project, and the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, the plaintiffs sued ICE, two of its directors, and the warden of the Tacoma detention center. The plaintiffs alleged that harm posed to them by continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their right to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. They sought a writ of habeas corpus ordering their immediate release or, in the alternative, injunctive relief ordering ICE to release them. The plaintiffs also sought attorney’s fees, costs, and declaratory relief that "continued detention in civil immigration custody of individuals at increased risk for severe illness, including all people over fifty years old and persons of any age with underlying medical conditions that may increase the risk of serious COVID-19, violates the Due Process Clause." The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart and Magistrate Judge Mary Alice Theiler. The Northwest Detention Center is located in the Seattle metropolitan area, which experienced the first and, as of March 17, 2020, largest COVID-19 outbreak in the United States. In response, public health measures throughout the area emphasized and enforced social distancing. However, immigration detention facilities are “congregate environments,” or places where people live and sleep in close proximity and, thus, cannot practice social distancing. Given the crowding and lack of adequate medical infrastructure, if COVID-19 were introduced into the detention center, it would spread easily. The spread of COVID-19 (for which there was no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) would be especially dangerous for detainees over the age of 50 or those with certain underlying health conditions such as lung, heart, and kidney disease. The complaint included recommendations from public health experts that these high-risk individuals be released from detention for their own safety. The plaintiffs asserted that the Fifth Amendment guarantees that civil detainees, including immigrant detainees, may not be subjected to punishment, and that this right is violated when civil detainees are subjected to "conditions of confinement that amount to punishment or [the federal government] does not ensure those detainees’ safety and health." The plaintiffs contended that by continuing to detain high-risk individuals, the defendants subjected them to conditions that amounted to punishment and that failed to ensure their safety and health. The plaintiffs further claimed that continued detention with the possibility of a COVID-19 outbreak in the facility subjected the plaintiffs to a substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Lastly, the plaintiffs argued that ICE has the authority to exercise discretion in releasing vulnerable civil immigrant detainees like the plaintiffs. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) for their immediate release. Three days later, on March 19, Judge Robart issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO. Judge Robart concluded that the continued detention of these vulnerable plaintiffs amidst an outbreak of COVID-19 in the surrounding area did not amount to punishment. Judge Robart found that the conditions did not amount to punishment because there were no allegations of "express intent" to punish plaintiffs and because continued detention of plaintiffs was not excessive relative to the government's objective of "preventing detained aliens from absconding and ensuring that they appear for removal proceedings." Furthermore, Judge Robart decided that, because the plaintiffs only alleged the "possibility of harm," not that an outbreak of COVID-19 actually existed at NWDC, plaintiffs did not show that irreparable harm was likely in the absence of an injunction. In a footnote, Judge Robart stated that "the court is mindful of the gravity and rapidly changing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court emphasizes that this order is based on and extends no further than the narrow set of facts, arguments, and requested relief presently before the court." 447 F. Supp. 3d 1047. The defendants' filing opposing entry of a TRO had argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court declined to rule on this in the March 19 order because the plaintiffs had not had an opportunity to respond. On March 20, the court ordered the plaintiffs to respond and explain why this case should not be dismissed for lack of standing. On March 24, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a TRO premised on developments in how courts were responding to the possibility of a COVID-19 outbreak in immigration detention facilities. The plaintiffs cited to a Ninth Circuit decision "releasing an individual from immigration detention '[i]n light of the rapidly escalating public health crisis, which public health authorities predict will especially impact immigration detention centers'" (Xochihua-Jaimes v. Barr). The plaintiffs also referenced "other federal court orders releasing individuals 'on bail or delay[ing] their imprisonment in light of the COVID-19 crisis'" and the fact that individuals have tested positive for COVID-19 at other immigration detention facilities in the United States. In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' continued detention was not "an excessive condition in relation to the legitimate objective of immigration detention." Defendants asserted that, at the time of filing, there were no confirmed cases of COVID-19, overcrowding was not an issue, and that ICE had "implemented robust procedures and protocols to protect the detainees." The defendants also filed a notice of supplemental authority, citing cases in which courts in this district denied motions for TROs to release immigration detainees on Fifth Amendment grounds. On April 8, Judge Robart denied the plaintiffs' second motion for a TRO. First, Judge Robart found that the plaintiffs had standing, as they sufficiently alleged a concrete injury in the form of unsafe conditions, these conditions were traceable to defendants, and this injury was likely to be redressed by their release. Judge Robart also found that the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion via a habeas petition. But Judge Robart concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits because there had not yet been a confirmed case of COVID-19 at the NWDC and because defendants submitted "evidence that they are taking substantial measures at this moment to prevent an outbreak of COVID-19 at the NWDC and contain an outbreak should one occur." Judge Robart further stated that "it would be improper for this court to rely on conditions at other detention facilities to conclude that the conditions at the NWDC represent a Fifth Amendment violation." Judge Robart also concluded that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction: "the court cannot conclude either that the spread of COVID-19 inside the NWDC is inevitable, or that Respondents will be unable to contain it if it occurs." Judge Robart also ordered defendants to inform the plaintiffs and the court "within at least 24 hours after learning that any individual physically present at the NWDC tests positive for or is otherwise diagnosed with COVID-19." 2020 WL 1704324. The next day, Magistrate Judge Theiler issued an order for defendants to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted by April 30. Defendants were also ordered to file a status update with the court if the custody status of any plaintiff changed. On April 30, defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a memorandum showing why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. The Clearinghouse does not have access to many of the key documents filed during the summer and fall of 2020 because the documents are restricted on PACER. According to the docket:

The defendants filed numerous notices in response to the court's April 8 decision (often several per week) and implemented a new COVID-19 testing protocol on June 8.

Magistrate Judge Theiler filed a report and recommendation on August 17.

The plaintiffs filed objections to the Magistrate's report on August 31, to which ICE responded on September 14.

The court has not acted on the Magistrate's report as of November 16, 2020. Because the Clearinghouse does not currently have access to many recently filed documents, the status of the plaintiffs' conditions and COVID-19 spread in the NWDC are unclear. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the Seattle area, persons critically vulnerable to the disease and held in an immigration detention facility near Seattle filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued ICE and its directors for violation of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs argued that continued detention in the face of a potential outbreak in the detention facility would expose the plaintiffs to substantial harm and amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause. On March 19, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate release. The court also denied the plaintiffs' second motion for a temporary restraining order on April 8. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, which the court has not yet resolved. The case is ongoing.


On February 12, 2007, an arrestee, represented by private attorney Mark E. Merin, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in order to challenge the County Sheriff's policies and practices concerning the use of strip and visual body cavity searches in Santa Cruz County Jail. Plaintiff, who was arrested on outstanding warrants for vehicle code violations, alleged that officers routinely subjected detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned and without having any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons. He alleged that such practices violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. On July 2, 2008, the parties filed a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agree to pay $3,875,000 in damages to a class of parties who had been wrongfully strip-searched by the defendants. Members of the plaintiff class would receive $1,250 if they had been wrongfully searched when booked for a misdemeanor, and they would receive $750 if they had been wrongfully searched when booked for a felony. They would receive an additional $500 if they were under 21 or over 60, had a physical or mental disability, or were pregnant at the time of the search. The settlement also covered attorneys fees and administrative costs of the settlement. On January 28, 2009, the district court (Judge Jeremy Fogel) issued a final approval of the settlement and dismissed the case.

Summary: This class-action case was brought challenging the Santa Cruz County Jail's practice of strip searching individuals held in the jail. The case settled and was dismissed.


On February 8, 2005, private attorney Mark E. Merin filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in the Humboldt County Jail. The named plaintiff, who was a female citizen arrested for a DWI, alleged that she was forced to strip naked, such that she was nude from the waist up in the presence of male officers not involved in her search. The search was videotaped. Plaintiff alleged that her treatment was the result of the official Humboldt County Jail policy, in which officers routinely subjected detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned and without having any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. After the parties engaged in discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court (Saundra Brown Armstrong) found that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of similar complaints, which negated that a custom or practice of improper searches existed at the Jail. As such, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the County of Humboldt and its Sheriff on plaintiff's municipal liability claim. Spellman v. Humboldt County, 2006 WL 1626922 (N.D.Cal. Jun 09, 2006) Plaintiff appealed. While the case was on appeal, plaintiff refiled the case, individually naming the deputy sheriff that conducted the strip search as a defendant. That new case, which was filed on June 27, 2006, had the new case number 3:06-cv-03956-MHP and was assigned to District Judge Marilyn H. Patel. About three months later, the parties settled the matter. They filed a joint memorandum of voluntarily dismissal dated October 16, 2006, advising the Court that the parties mutually resolved their differences. Plaintiff also voluntarily dismissed the appeal of the 2005 case. The terms of the settlement were not made part of the Court record.

Summary: A female arrestee filed this strip search case against the Humboldt County Jail and various officials challenging the jail's mandatory, blanket strip search policy. The court found no pattern or practice. The Plaintiff refiled, naming the deputy sheriff who conducted (and videotaped) the search, and the case was settled. We have no further information about this case.


On April 16, 2007, Plaintiff, represented by private attorney Mark E. Merin, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California in order to challenge the Sheriff's policies and practices concerning the use of strip and visual body cavity searches in Solano County Jail. Plaintiff, who was arrested on minor criminal charges, complained that he was subsequently strip searched in a group with ten other persons pursuant to a policy under which officers routinely subjected custodial detainees to strip and visual body cavity searches prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons. Plaintiff claimed that such a policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. On July 29, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint to add four new plaintiffs. The hearing and motions regarding class certification were then repeatedly pushed back as the parties continued discovery and settlement negotiations. On September 25, 2009, the parties presented their settlement to the court. The settlement was approved 4 days later. Parties agreed that class certification was inappropriate because defendants had revised their policy on November 20, 2003 and again in 2007 to comply with federal law. To remedy the individual violations that had occurred in spite of the policy revisions, the defendants agreed to pay $12,500 to each plaintiff, $100,000 in attorney fees, and $750-$1000 to each person who contacted plaintiff's attorney alleging that they fell within the allegations in the complaint. The defendants paid a total of $210,000, and on September 29, 2009, the case was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: On April 16, 2007, Plaintiff, represented by private attorney Mark E. Merin, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California challenging the Solano County Sheriff's policies and practices concerning the use of strip and visual body cavity searches in Solano County Jail. Plaintiff alleged that such searches, conducted in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. In September 2009, two years after the defendants revised their search policies to comply with federal law, the parties settled with the defendant paying $110,000 in damages and $100,000 in attorney fees.