On June 16, 2008, people with mental disabilities who had been arrested and detained in the Doña Ana County Detention Center (“DACDC”) brought this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiffs sued the Board of County Commissioners for the County of Doña Ana, the DACDC, and law enforcement. The Plaintiffs, represented by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law and private counsel, sought sought class-wide preliminary and permanent injunctive relief for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the New Mexico Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Additionally, the named Plaintiffs sought damages for the violations of their rights and for the negligent acts and omissions that gave rise to tort claims. There were two groups of Defendants: County Commissioners and Law Enforcement, in this matter. The first group of Defendants encompassed the Board of County Commissioners for the County of Doña Ana, which was responsible for all county operations including the Doña Ana County Detention Center. The second group of Defendants was comprised of two subgroups of law enforcement, City of Las Cruces Police Department and Doña Ana County Sheriff’s Office. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that at least thirty percent of DACDC’s approximately nine hundred detainees had mental disabilities. According to the Plaintiffs, the DACDC Defendants had continually and persistently ignored the mental health needs of detainees, and had failed to provide them with constitutionally adequate mental health services. The Defendants never instituted an effective system for making routine assessments of detainees with symptoms of mental illness. Nor did the Defendants implement an effective system for tracking detainees who needed mental health care. The DACDC Defendants failed to provide regular monitoring of detainees’ mental health care needs, and failed to provide the treatment they need. As stated in the Plaintiffs’ complaint, failure in treatment led the Defendants to rely too heavily on the use of segregation for detainees with mental health care needs. A significant number of detainees in the segregation units exhibited obvious symptoms of serious mental illness. Notwithstanding isolation’s particularly harmful effects on the mental health of detainees, the Defendants failed to conduct regular medical rounds and assessments of their needs. The Defendants also failed to engage in meaningful discharge planning for detainees with mental disabilities. The Defendants discharged detainees without access to the medications they may have been taking in jail, without referrals to community mental health programs, and without any other essential discharge planning services needed to manage their mental illnesses. The predictable result was recidivism and a cycle of arrests and detentions. The Law Enforcement Defendants were aware of the DACDC Defendants’ failure to meet the serious mental healthcare needs of detainees. Nevertheless, according to the Plaintiffs, the Law Enforcement Defendants persisted in a discriminatory pattern and practice of arresting persons with mental disabilities and transporting them to DACDC, instead of taking them to appropriate community based services or otherwise diverting them from the criminal justice system. Additionally, the Law Enforcement Defendants’ failed to effectively train law enforcement personnel to recognize the signs of mental disabilities and respond appropriately. On January 3, 2008 the Plaintiffs entered an amended complaint for Class Action injunctive relief and damages. On the same day the Defendants moved to remove the case to federal court. The Plaintiffs submitted multiple amended complaints, and the Defendants sought to dismiss the claims based on the U.S. Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution as well as the class action claims. In August 2008, the parties began engaging in settlement conversations. As these conversations continued, on May 2, 2009, the Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Defendants from continuing to subject the Plaintiffs and other people with mental disabilities to the actions and inactions set forth in the complaint. The injunction was denied on November 20, 2009 at the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth because public policy weighed against doing so without clarity of facts regarding key allegations. On July 2, 2009, Judge William P. Johnson affirmed Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen’s Report and Recommendation to sanction the County Defendants for failure to report their change of position regarding settlement talks after a year and a half of attempted settlement discussions. Specifically, the County Manager, who had engaged in settlement conversations, failed to inform the Plaintiffs that the Board of Commissioners had rejected the new direction of the talks. The Court ordered that the County Defendants to pay sanctions to Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,394.00. On July 9, 2009, the Plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice their claims against the City Defendants, since the Plaintiffs and the City Defendants had reached a settlement in the case. Six months later, on December 15, 2009, the case was settled with the County Defendants before Judge William P. Johnson. The settlement, found on the Bazelon Center website, called for expanded training, new policies and procedures, increased resources to divert people with mental illnesses from the criminal justice system. It also included a monetary payment totalling $150,000 as damages for the named plaintiffs and attorneys fees. It included no payment to class members. . On January 15, 2010 the Plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice (closing the case) the matter against the County Defendants.

Summary: This class action was brought on behalf of people with mental disabilities arrested and detained in the Doña Ana County Detention Center (“DACDC”), to redress violations of their constitutional rights, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. After two years of settlement talks, the parties reached a settlement agreement..


On October 16, 1997, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 1, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution against the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, a Detective, unknown female officers, and Plaintiff's cousin in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging she was falsely arrested, police used excessive force when arresting her, that she was strip-searched in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that Defendants committed battery. Plaintiff alleged claims against her cousin for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress because Plaintiff was arrested after her cousin filed a complaint against her. On January 21, 1997, Defendant Detective arrested Plaintiff for a misdemeanor. Plaintiff alleged Defendant used excessive force by bruising her arm when the Detective handcuffed her. Plaintiff was subjected to a strip and body cavity search at Central Booking by two female Corrections Department employees, in accordance with a City policy of strip-searching all arrestees, and without any reasonable suspicion. Plaintiff was released on her own recognizance the following day and the charges against her were eventually dropped. Plaintiff was traumatized and humiliated, was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, entered therapy, and took antidepressants. On July 17, 1998, Defendants offered Plaintiff $25,001 plus reasonable attorney's fees accrued up to that date. Plaintiff did not accept the settlement offer. On April 26, 1999, Plaintiff settled her claims against her cousin for $2,500. On May 7, 1999, the United States District Court (Judge Robert P. Patterson, Jr.) awarded plaintiff $19,645 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages against the city according to a jury verdict following a three day jury trial. The Court granted a directed verdict for Plaintiff regarding the strip-search. The Court found that Defendant's strip-search policy violated the Fourth Amendment and there was no evidence the officers believed Plaintiff concealed contraband. The jury found for Defendants on Plaintiff's claims of unlawful arrest, excessive force, and battery. Defendant appealed award of punitive damages. On June 15, 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Guido Calabresi, Robert Katzmann, Pierre N. Leval) reversed and remanded. The Court held that the city was immune from punitive damages because municipalities are only responsible for punitive damages where taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an outrageous abuse of constitutional rights. Judges Calabresi and Katzmann filed separate concurring opinions. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236 (2nd Cir. 2000). Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees and costs. Defendants cross-moved for costs incurred subsequent to their offer of pre-trial judgment. On October 13, 2000, the District Court (Judge Patterson) granted these cross-motions. The Court held that Plaintiff was liable for Defendants' costs from the date of their offer because their offer was more than her jury award. Plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to July 17, 1998, a total of $419,116.45. Defendants were granted $8,038.40. Ciraolo v. City of New York, No. Civ. 8208, 2000 WL 521180 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2000). On November 13, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 531 U.S. 993 (2000).

Summary: This case was brought by a woman who was arested, subjected to excessive force and a strip/cavity search all on the basis of a false complaint filed by a family member. A jury awarded her $19,645 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the punitive damages award as not available against municipalities, and reduced the compensatory damages award because Plaintiff had been offered slightly more as settlement.


On June 24, 2009, four individuals previously incarcerated at the Delaware County Jail filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Delaware County under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary relief for severe emotional distress, psychological damage, and significant pain and suffering, personal humiliation, and degradation. The plaintiffs claimed that the Sheriff failed to properly train, supervise, or control deputies and jailers while they were in charge of female inmates. They alleged that the jailers' negligence and misconduct deprived them of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ due process and equal protection clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Sheriff’s Office of Delaware County had engaged in rape, sodomy, sexual battery, and blackmail. The parties commenced discovery the following year. Settlement conferences were anticipated as early as August 2010. Additionally, from the day of the initial complaint until February 11, 2011, the plaintiffs amended the complaint four times to increase the number of plaintiffs. The final complaint included 17 individuals with similar stories of sexual abuse by a law enforcement official while in vulnerable situations such as the bathroom or shower in the county jail as well as on medical visits. In June 2011, Judge James Payne granted an unopposed motion to dismiss one plaintiff. Additionally, later that month, the judge found a motion to dismiss another plaintiff as moot. Again, in September 2011, another plaintiff was dismissed by the judge on a joint stipulation from both parties. Settlement conference dates were pushed back multiple times until the parties filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement and to enter judgment on November 7, 2011. On December 1, 2011, Judge Payne entered judgment enforcing a full and final settlement of the action. The agreement awarded $13,500,000 to the plaintiffs with no liability admitted on behalf of the Sheriff of Delaware County, or the Board of Commissioners of Delaware County or Delaware County. By May 2012, the defendant has paid the amount in full and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2009, former inmates at the Delaware County Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff's Office of Delaware County was guilty of rape, sodomy, sexual battery, and blackmail. The alleged negligence and misconduct of jailers deprived inmates of their the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments Rights. The parties reached a settlement in 2011 for monetary damages. The case closed in May 2012.


On April 21, 2005, a woman represented by private attorneys from several Philadelphia, New York, and D.C. law firms filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She alleged that the City of Philadelphia of had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all pre-trial detainees remanded to the custody of the Philadelphia Prison System, regardless of criminal charge or reasonable suspicion. Plaintiff alleged that the policy required all arrestees to disrobe in front of a corrections officer, who then conducted visual inspection of the genitals and body cavities, using a flashlight to illuminate body cavities. Plaintiff claimed the practice violated the Fourth Amendment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and class certification for the thousands who allegedly suffered the same indignities. The City of Philadelphia, the prison system, and officials responsible for that system, as defendants, answered by generally denying the allegations. Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. By order dated June 9, 2006, the District Court (Judge Mary A. McLaughlin) denied the motions, advising the parties that the motions could be refiled after resolution of the issue of class certification. Plaintiff moved for class certification on February 16, 2007, and for a preliminary injunction on March 23, 2007. Both motions were still pending at the time of this summary. Between the motion filings, on February 23, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a male plaintiff and naming only the City of Philadelphia as the defendant. Discovery proceedings continued and, on July 3, 2007, Judge McLaughlin's unpublished order directed that the matter was set for a settlement conference on July 24, 2007, before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey. On February 20, 2009, the parties entered into a $5.9 million settlement. The agreement established the following two settlement classes: Subclass I: All persons in the Settlement Class, EXCEPT for persons who (1) were charged with certain violence, drug and/or weapons (hereinafter "VDW") related misdemeanor charges at the time of their admission, or (2) were charged with bench warrants and/or probation violations where the underlying charge was a VDW misdemeanor charge, or (3) had convictions for felonies and/or VDW misdemeanor charges predating the date of their admission. Subclass II: All persons in the Settlement Class who were (1) charged with VDW misdemeanor charges at the time of their admission, or (2) were charged with bench warrants and/or probation violations where the underlying charge was a VDW misdemeanor charge, or (3) had convictions for felonies and/or VDW misdemeanor charges predating the date of their admission. On November 3, 2009, the court entered a Memorandum and Opinion and a separate Memorandum and Order, granting final approval of the proposed settlement.

Summary: On April 21, 2005, a woman filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She alleged that the City of Philadelphia of had an unconstitutional practice of strip searching all pre-trial detainees, regardless of criminal charge or reasonable suspicion. On February 20, 2009, the parties entered into a $5.9 million settlement. <br />The Court entered final approval of the settlement on November 3, 2009.


On August 22, 2007, a prisoner filed suit against the County of Lancaster and the Lancaster County Prison Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was strip searched in front of other inmates upon arrival at the Lancaster County Prison after being arrested for a parole violation. He claimed that the blanket policy of strip searching all newly-arrived detainees regardless of the offense and without judgment as to whether or not such a search was reasonable violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. His cause of action was 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and he was represented by private counsel. He sought class action certification, declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and punitive damages. The parties proceeded into discovery and also pursued a settlement. In a one sentence opinion on June 13, 2008, the court (Judge Paul S. Diamond) denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification without prejudice. The parties continued negotiations and submitted a settlement agreement with the court on July 29, 2009. The settlement specified a class of those stripped searched upon admittance to Lancaster County Prison for minor offense not involving drugs, weapons, or violence between August 22, 2005 and July 28, 2009. It affirmed the new policy of the defendants not to strip search such detainees, specified that the defendant would train all of its employees to comply with the new policy, and allowed class counsel to monitor compliance. It also created a fund of $2,507,200.00 to be used to compensate class members. Provisional class certification and preliminary approval of the settlement was granted by the court (Judge Diamond) on September 1, 2009. The case came to a close on April 9, 2010 when the court (Judge Diamond) certified the class and granted final approval to the settlement. Two years later, documents under seal were unsealed pursuant to local rules. There has been no further activity, and the case now appears to be closed.

Summary: On August 22, 2007, the plaintiff filed suit against the County of Lancaster and the Lancaster County Prison Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. He alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was strip searched in front of other inmates upon arrival at the Lancaster County Prison after being arrested for a parole violation. He sought class action certification, declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and punitive damages. The parties entered a settlement agreement with the court on July 29, 2009 that affirmed a new policy of not strip searching detainees arrested for minor offenses and created a fund to compensate those who had been strip searched. The case ended on April 9, 2010 when the court certified the class and granted final approval to the settlement.


Plaintiff was an inmate in the Northampton County Prison (NCP); he brought § 1983 lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the county, the wardens of the jail, the medical service contractor, and specific health care providers for unsanitary conditions in the jail, the inadequacy of the medical care provided, and the failure of developing a quarantine protocol that lead to the plaintiff contracting multiple Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infections. MRSA infections can be deadly. After Magistrate Judge Perkins dismissed the case as to the specific medical staff working at the facility, the case was settled pursuant to Local Rule 41(b) on March 18, 2010, which allows a court-sanctioned dismissal after the parties have notified the court of reaching a settlement agreement. The terms of that settlement are unknown.

Summary: Plaintiff, a county jail inmate who suffered scarring and isolation from multiple MRSA infections was successful in obtaining a settlement against county defendants for their alleged failure to implement appropriate quarantine protocols and correct medical care, and for maintaining unsanitary conditions at the jail.


On September 16, 2007, prisoners of the Dauphin County Prison ("Prison") filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County of Dauphin, PA, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that the Prison's blanket policy of strip searching all detainees regardless of criminal charge or reasonable suspicion violated the 4th Amendment. On October 11, 2007, Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint. On November 20, 2007, the Plaintiffs submitted an Amended Class Action Complaint addressing some of the terms discussed by the Defendant's counsel in the motion. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint; however, the motion was dismissed without prejudice by the Court (Hon. Thomas I. Vanaskie) on August 21, 2008. On December 18, 2009, the court entered its Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Judgment. Dauphin County was required to eliminate their strip search policy and create a new one, provide retraining of corrections officers, and guarantee enforcement of the new policy. In addition, the plaintiffs were awarded a sum of $2,160,500 in damages, costs, and attorneys' fees.

Summary: This class action case was brought by prisoners of the Dauphin County Prison against the County of Dauphin, PA, seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief for conducting unconstitutional and unnecessary strip searches upon all persons placed in the Dauphin County Prison, as of September 16, 2005. The case was settled in 2009, resulting in monetary and injunctive relief granted.


COVID-19 Summary: The ACLU of Pennsylvania filed this class action suit on behalf of pretrial detainees in a PA jail and a subclass of those who were at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. The complaint alleged that the conditions in the jail failed to meet CDC recommendations and amounted to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties moved for settlement by entry of a consent order implementing public health measures on May 26, which mooted the request for a preliminary injunction. The remainder of the litigation concerning the ADA and habeas claims remains ongoing. <hr> Plaintiffs in this class action lawsuit, three people detained at the Allegheny County Jail (ACJ), filed this complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on April 8, 2020. They were represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania, Abolitionist Law Center, and Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project. The complaint alleged that the conditions in the jail increased the likelihood that they will contract COVID-19 in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as writs of habeas corpus. The case was assigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon and the named defendants were Allegheny County and the warden of the jail. The proposed class included a broader class with two subclasses. The broader class encompassed all current and future detainees at ACJ. The two subclasses were people who, by reason of age or medical condition, were particularly vulnerable to injury or death if they were to contract COVID-19 (“Medically-Vulnerable Subclass”), and persons who, by reason of their disability, were particularly vulnerable to injury or death if they were to contract COVID-19 (“Disability Subclass"). According to the complaint, after the declaration of a national emergency in light of COVID-19, the jail managed to decrease its population by 20% but failed to take the additional necessary steps to protect the people detained there. Rather than implementing best practices as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control, jail administration instead consolidated how people were housed, leaving an entire floor empty and increasing the number of people housed in cells with another person. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2020, seeking immediate release from ACJ. After a status conference in May, the parties began working jointly on a consent order. They moved for settlement by entry of consent order on May 26, 2020. The consent order included requirements that the defendants adopt and effectively implement a comprehensive policy entitled “Continuing of Operations Plan: COVID-19 (Updated)." This policy details updates to be made across all facets of operation in ACJ. The 17 major categories the policy covers are: 1) Employee screening; 2) Procedures for screening and housing determinations for new arrests/admissions to ACJ; 3) Treatment and isolation; 4) Specimen testing; 5) Contact study review; 6) Healthcare operations; 7) Prevention and education; 8) Non-essential services; 9) Courts, transfers, legal services, and releases; 10) Social distancing in general population units; 11) Dietary; 12) Environmental cleaning in employee areas, housing units, intake areas, and of restraints; 13) Inmate phone calls, hygiene, and recreation; 14) Population management; 15) Provision of sanitation and hygiene products; 16) Notification to PA Department of Health; and 17) Employee illness/staffing levels. The consent order also included weekly reporting requirements to plaintiffs' attorneys regarding illness in ACJ. The court granted the consent order on May 27 and in doing so denied as moot the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in light of the agreement. The order explicitly did not resolve the plaintiffs' claims under the ADA or the habeas petitions. The plaintiffs moved to extend the consent order on August 24, which Judge Bissoon granted that same day. The consent order was further extended on November 23 and February 22. The case is ongoing in alternative dispute resolution and discovery.

Summary: The ACLU of Pennsylvania filed this class action suit on behalf of pretrial detainees in a PA jail with subclasses of those who were at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. The complaint alleged that the conditions in the jail failed to meet CDC recommendations and amounted to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on April 9, 2020 seeking immediate release from ACJ. The parties then began working on a consent order to implement public health measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 in the jail, which was approved by the court on May 27. The consent order was extended on August 24 and the plaintiffs habeas and ADA claims remain in dispute. The case is ongoing.


On October 6, 2010, the Prison Legal News filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Berkeley County. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Berkeley County Detention Center (BCDC). On May 3, 2011, the United States filed a complaint in intervention pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 42 Persons Act of 2000, U.S.C. § 2000cc. The U.S. sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Sheriff's Office and the Sheriff prohibited receipt and possession of virtually all mail and other expressive materials by persons incarcerated at BCDC. The U.S. specifically alleged that prisoners at BCDC could not receive books, magazines, newspaper or other expressive materials sent through the mail, regardless of whether the materials were routed directly from publishers or sent by friends, family members or community organizations. The U.S. also alleged that the defendants prohibited a wide range of religious materials to BCDC prisoners of various faiths, only allowing prisoners to possess the Bible. On January 10, 2012, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement requiring the defendants to pay $100,000 in full and final settlement of all plaintiff's claims for damages and $499,900 in full and final settlement for attorney fees and costs through January 13, 2012. On January 13, 2012, the Court (Judge Sol Blatt) issued the consent injunction requiring the defendants to implement an "incoming publications policy" (governing access to publications and publishers' right to send publications to detainees), a "staples policy" (governing access to publications containing staples), and a "religious materials policy" (governing access to religious materials). In addition, the defendants were ordered to train personnel on the new policies and allow the plaintiff and the U.S. to assess the defendants' compliance with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The detainees were to be permitted to receive and retain any and all publications that do not threaten BCDC safety or security. On April 18, 2014, the Court granted the defendants' motion to terminate the consent injunction because the defendants had achieved the minimum of one year of substantial compliance with the provisions of the consent injunction. On July 2, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees, but this issue was seemingly never resolved as the court dismissed the case on August 14, 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 6, 2010, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Berkeley County. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Berkeley County Detention Center (BCDC). On May 3, 2011, the United States filed a Complaint in intervention pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 42 Persons Act of 2000, U.S.C. § 2000cc. On January 13, 2012, Judge Sol Blatt, Jr., issued the consent injunction requiring the defendants to implement new policies regarding incoming mail and access to religious materials.


On June 19, 2017, a former inmate of Davidson County Jail (DCJ), filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued CoreCivic of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary relief, including punitive damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiff alleged that, in deliberately failing to adequately screen those entering the DCJ, respond to inmate requests for medical attention, treat those infested with the parasite, quarantine the infected individuals in its care, or take any other precautions to prevent the spread of scabies outside the facility, the defendant violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiff and class members. The case was assigned to Judge Aleta A. Trauger. The plaintiff requested that the court permanently enjoin the Defendant from continuing to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and to immediately cease intimidating, threatening, and retaliating against inmates for demanding medical care for their serious medical needs. The plaintiff also sought a permanent injunction requiring the Defendant to provide a full medical staff adequate to meet the needs of those infected with scabies and capable of dispensing medication and monitoring their treatment until completion. On September 24, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the present case with the case of Wendy Snead v. CoreCivic of Tennessee. The following day, Judge Trauger granted the motion to consolidate. To read the subsequent proceedings in the consolidated cases, see Snead.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by a former inmate of the Davidson County Jail in the U.S. District for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to prevent the spread of scabies in the prison. The case is ongoing. The plaintiff has not yet filed a motion to certify class.


This jail conditions case was brought in December 2011 by a deaf man who speaks American Sign Language and has little or no ability to lip read. He has very limited ability to read or write in either Spanish or English. On March 2011, he was arrested and detained by El Paso County Sheriff's deputies and taken to the Downtown Detention Facility. His repeated requests for an interpreter were ignored. Late that night, he was driven to a store and approached by a woman whom the officers described as a judge. He again requested an interpreter and again was ignored. The following day, the plaintiff was placed in the Annex jail, where he was imprisoned with no explanation for 11 days. He was handcuffed and unable to use the old and malfunctioning TTY/TDD phone. Plaintiff, represented by the Paso Del Norte Civil Rights Project and other attorneys, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, claiming his treatment violated the Texas Human Resources Code, § 121.003(a), the Americans With Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. According to the docket, the parties stipulated to dismissal of the case after reaching a settlement on July 6, 2012. Although the settlement is not publicly available, according to reports, videophones have now been installed at the jails.

Summary: A deaf prisoner of the El Paso County jails sued the County in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas for their failure to accommodate his disability. He was held for eleven days without access to an attorney or an interpreter, in violation of the Americans With disabilities Act ans Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. A private settlement was reached in July 2012 which, according to reports, required installation of videophones in the County jails. We have no further information about this case.


On March 15, 2012, a group of juvenile prisoners in Central County Jail in Polk County filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Though plaintiffs amended their complaint twice to include different defendants, the lawsuit proceeded against the Sheriff of Polk County and Corizon Health, Inc., the health care provider retained by the Sheriff to provide medical services for the prisoners. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, claiming that the youths' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The plaintiffs also requested class certification. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, as juveniles, they were housed in an adult correctional facility. The plaintiffs claimed they were left unattended for long periods of time, and punished regularly with chemical agents, isolation and lockdown. The plaintiffs were forced to eat in their cells, and clean their own toilets with the soap provided for personal hygiene. The plaintiffs claimed a complete lack of rehabilitative services and extremely poor educational services. On May 4, 2012, the Court (Judge Steven D. Merryday) granted the motion to dismiss for two named individual defendants, but denied the overall motion to dismiss the case. On August 13, 2012, the Court issued an order stating that K.G. (the representative of the sub-class of juvenile prisoners needing mental health treatment), as a pre-trial detainee, could only represent other pre-trial detainees, and therefore K.G., and the resulting subclass could not sue under the Eighth Amendment. However, Judge Merryday once again denied the overall motion to dismiss the case. On November 19, 2012, the complaint was amended to include lack of adequate medical care. The plaintiffs alleged that medication was not provided to juveniles with serious mental and psychiatric problems, or that the medication was given irregularly and not in the way prescribed. The plaintiffs further alleged that no medical or counseling services were offered to children professing suicidal ideations. Instead, such children were put on "suicide watch." "Suicide watch" consists of placing the child in a open cage, with only a hard bench along one side. The children would be left there for at least 23 hours, but often for days. "Suicide watch" was also given to children punitively. Children also had to strip publicly and put on a 'turtle' suit, which left them vulnerable to the chemical agents, which continued to be used against children on "suicide watch." On April 30, 2013, the Court granted class certification and denied the requested preliminary injunction. The first subclass was defined as: "each person who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (that is, including preadjudicates and excluding direct files) and who is now or in the future incarcerated in the Polk County Jail." A Second sub-class was compromised as each person: "(1) who is now or in the future incarcerated in the Polk County Jail, (2) who is under eighteen or under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and (3) who suffers from a 'mental disorder.' " With a person who suffers from a mental disorder defined as: "diagnosed by a mental health care professional, qualified in Florida both to diagnose mental disorders and to prescribe psychotropic medication, and who is suffering from a 'moderate' or 'severe' 'mental disorder,' as defined in the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV and (2) whose current diagnosis, including any prescription for psychotropic medication, appears in the person’s 'intake' records presented to the Polk County Jail at the time the person is presented to, and accepted by, the Polk County Jail for detention." On June 12, 2013, Judge Merryday denied defendants' motions for summary judgment, and the parties proceeded to a bench trial, which ran from November 18, 2013 to December 18, 2013. At its close, Judge Merryday ordered both parties to submit proposed finding of facts and conclusions from both the plaintiff and the defendant. On April 16, 2015, Judge Merryday issued an opinion denying relief to the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that either the Sheriff or Corizon demonstrated deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs and that plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' policies and customs violated their constitutional rights. Judgment was entered for the defendants and against the plaintiffs. On September 1, 2015, Judge Merryday denied the defendant's motion for sanction for insufficient proof of malicious intent by the plaintiff. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 15, 2012, a group of juvenile prisoners filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida against the Polk County Jail, claiming violations of their physical and medical care. Preliminary injunction was denied. Class certification was granted. A bench trial was held on from November 18, 2013 to December 18, 2013. On April 16, 2015, Judge Merryday issued an opinion denying relief to the plaintiffs, holding that plaintiffs failed to show defendants' violations of their constitutional rights. The case closed in 2016.


On September 4, 2019, three minors represented by their legal guardians filed a complaint against the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, represented by lawyers from the Southern Poverty Law Center, Florida Justice Institute, and Florida Legal Services, sought class action certification to represent several thousand juveniles (and several hundred in a subclass of juveniles with disabilities) who were or would be in custody in a Florida Department of Juvenile Justice operated secure detention center and subjected to solitary confinement. The plaintiffs alleged that through policy and practice, the DJJ subjected children to solitary confinement, often repeatedly and without any time limit. The plaintiffs cited scientific material that discusses the side effects of isolation: trauma, depression, anxiety, an increased risk of suicide and self-harm, and permanent interference with development. The plaintiffs also alleged that the DJJ failed to provide mental health exams prior to confinement and failed to provide meaningful mental health services during confinement to prevent the onset or exacerbation of mental illness. The plaintiffs brought claims of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff class sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring defendants to cease the statewide policy and practice of using solitary confinement in secure detention centers. On October 28, 2019, the defendants filed to dismiss the case by arguing that the plaintiffs did not have a right of action. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged entitlement to much more than the law required and failed to provide sufficient facts regarding the policy or actual injury from it. Judge Mark E. Walker denied the motion to dismiss on December 6, 2019, saying that the plaintiffs alleged actionable complaints on the quality of prison conditions and the awareness by Department of Juvenile Justice officials of the conditions. 424 F.Supp.3d 1109. Judge Walker referred this case to mediation on December 17, 2019. Mediation talks are ongoing as of May 25, 2020.

Summary: Three minors represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., and Florida Legal Services, filed suit on September 4, 2019 in the Northern District of Florida against the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Plaintiffs sought class action certification to represent children subject to solitary confinement in DJJ-run detention centers. The defendant's summary judgment motion on the merits was denied on December 6, 2019, and the case is in ongoing mediation talks.


On August 16, 2004, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) began this investigation of the conditions at the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility ("HYCF") in Kailua, Hawaii, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 ("Section 14141"). Following an extensive investigation, the DOJ issued its findings letter on August 4, 2005 in which it detailed the numerous constitutional deficiencies at the HYCF. The findings letter described the HYCF "as existing in a state of chaos" and lacking any policies or procedures to govern the operation of the facility, which created an environment where abuse of youth often went unreported and uninvestigated. The DOJ also found that youth confined at HYCF were subjected to dangerous suicide risks at the facility. Access to mental health and medical care services and required education services were also lacking. Following the DOJ investigation and findings, the HYCF and various Hawaii state agency officials agreed to implement a series of DOJ recommended reforms at HYCF in the areas of protection from harm, training, and access to medical and mental health care and special education. The reforms were recorded in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was executed by the parties. The MOA provided that Russell Van Vleet would serve as the Monitor to oversee the three-year remediation process. On February 7, 2006, the DOJ filed this lawsuit seeking an order to permanently enjoin the the defendants to provide legal and constitutional conditions of care to the detained youth. The same day, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal. In the joint motion, the parties requested that the Court enter the Order and place the case on its inactive docket while retaining jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement until it enters a final order dismissing the case with prejudice. The motion was granted by the District Court (Judge Samuel P. King) on February 9, 2006. The memorandum of agreement was extended for one year to terminate on February 9, 2010, as a mutually binding agreement. The case is closed but docket does not show that a final order was entered on the case.

Summary: DOJ's investigation of the conditions at the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility ("HYCF") in August 2004 concluded that the facility lacked policies to protect the detained youth from abuse or suicide risks. DOJ recommended reforms at the HYCF through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that was executed by the parties. This case was brought to retain jurisdiction of the district court of Hawaii's jurisdiction over the case until a final order is entered to dismiss the case with prejudice.


On May 16, 2008, the Attorney General, on behalf of the United States, filed suit against the state of Ohio, its governor, the director of youth services, and the superintendents of its juvenile correctional facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 for an alleged pattern or practice of violating the rights of juvenile detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. The United States alleged that Ohio failed to protect the youth at its facilities from harm and undue risk of harm, failed to meet their medical and mental health needs, and failed to provide adequate special education services. The alleged harm and undue risk included unwarranted use of force and seclusion, and inadequate grievance and investigation procedures, while the alleged inadequacies of the health and education services were more total and included lack of dental care, and inadequate intake, screening, and treatment. The facilities sued were Circleville Youth Center, Cuyahoga Hills Boys School, Indian River School, Marion Juvenile Correctional Center, Mohican Youth Center, Ohio River Valley Youth Center, Scioto Juvenile Correctional Center, and the Freedom Center. The suit was filed as a result of Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into the conditions of confinement at the Scioto and Marion centers that began in 2005. On June 12, 2008 in accordance with a joint motion of the parties, the court (Judge Algenon L. Marbley) ordered the entry of a stipulation to injunctive relief for the Scioto and Marion centers and conditionally dismissed the claims against the other facilities. The other facilities were already under a stipulated injunction from the related case S.H. v. Stickrath, linked below (Clearinghouse code: JI-OH-0004), so the claims were dismissed on the condition that the United States have access to all relevant Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) policies and the monitor from the Stickrath. The Independent Fact Finder's 214-page  report from that case contains useful background for the issues in this case. The Court entered the Stipulation for Injunctive Relief on June 24, 2008. The injunction required Ohio to develop a wide variety of policies, procedures and practices to remedy the undue harm, inadequate medical and mental health care access, and inadequate special education services to which it subjected the juveniles detained in its facilities. In addition, the injunction appointed a monitor, Fred Cohen, to conduct investigations and report periodically on the state's compliance and required the state to train its employees, develop any additional documents or forms necessary to comply with the injunction, and to create and collect data to assess its performance. The terms of the injunction also guaranteed the Department of Justice access to the youth and staff at the Scioto and Marion centers and to all relevant records. Ohio had one year to revise its policies, training materials, and assessment tools so as to comply with the injunction, which was to last for three years or terminate early upon a showing of a year of substantial compliance. Monitor Fred Cohen, who had acted as the monitor for both the S.H. case and this case, resigned from monitoring duties only for this case on September 24, 2009. On December 15, 2009, the Court approved modification of the stipulation to provide a new monitoring scheme in which the DOJ acted as monitor through a team of experts. The modification also recognized that the injunction ceased to apply to the Marion facility, which had been closed. On February 26, 2010, the court ordered ODYS to develop a new meal policy that would ensure that it fed the juveniles committed to the facilities. ODYS had promulgated a protocol that said that youth who refused to go to the cafeteria would not receive a meal. It was applied inconsistently and appeared to deny food to those who refused out of fear. The issue led to a show cause hearing because of discrepancies in the summaries and data provided to the court and to a subsequent order to submit a new policy. By the consent of the parties, the court amended the injunction on June 6, 2011, to remove many provisions. The monitoring section was redone, and the DOJ relinquished that role to a team of experts. Most notable was that the 3-year expiration clause was removed, making the injunction terminable only on a showing of substantial compliance for two reporting periods. The court adopted a revised version of the injunction that reflected the two amendments in a single document on June 28, 2011. On January 18, 2013, as a result of problems with the Progress Unit indicated in the Monitor's Third Report, the parties entered into a consent order that laid out a series of requirements meant to ensure that youth on the Progress Unit are not subjected excessive seclusion, that they receive structured programming, that they be screened to ensure they were not sent to the unit for symptoms of mental illness, and that they be given treatment plans that include reasonable goals designed to enable them to leave the unit. The order would be terminated only upon a showing of substantial compliance for six months. The Monitor's Fourth Report and the First Status Report on Progress Unit were completed in 2013 and included an evaluation of the Scioto Facility. Both reports stated that Ohio was not in substantial compliance with the respective injunctions. As a result of the State's inability to comply with the consent order, on March 12, 2014 the Department of Justice moved to supplement its original complaint by also including the state's use of unlawful seclusion at all of its juvenile correctional facilities. The court approved this motion on March 28, 2014 and DOJ filed a supplemental complaint on March 31, 2014. At the time that DOJ filed its supplemental complaint, it also sought a temporary restraining order to stem the state's seclusion of juveniles with mental health disorders. The Department of Justice announced a final agreement with the State of Ohio on Wednesday, May 21, 2014. While Ohio was working to eventually eliminate disciplinary seclusion of youth, this agreement included interim measures that would taken to ensure that seclusion only occurred under certain conditions and for a limited duration. The state also agreed to reduce the potential harms caused by seclusion by increasing access to therapeutic, educational and recreational services while a young person is in seclusion. On Feb. 11, 2015, the monitoring Correctional Institution Inspection Committee, issued a report showing a dramatic decline in use of seclusion. The court-appointed monitors submitted final reports in 2015, establishing that the defendant had achieved substantial compliance with the agreement's provisions. The report on the DYS facilities for boys was submitted June 10, 2015, and the report on the DYS-contracted facilities for girls was submitted on November 30, 2015. The monitors submitted their final status report, "The Ohio Model: A Report on the Transformational Reform of the Ohio Department of Youth Services, 2007-2015," on December 7, 2015. The report documented improvements including recording and review of uses of force; a meaningful grievance system; abolition of disciplinary seclusion and dramatic reductions in pre-hearing seclusion; educational programming; increased family visitation; improved mental health treatment; and reduction of the incarcerated population. On December 3, 2015, the parties made a joint motion to terminate the consent decree. The consent decree was terminated on December 9, 2015, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Attorney General filed suit against the state of Ohio, its governor, the director of youth services, and the superintendents of its juvenile correctional facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 for an alleged pattern or practice of violating the rights of juvenile detainees under the 14th Amendment, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The United States alleged that Ohio failed to protect the youth at its facilities from harm and undue risk of harm, failed to meet their medical and mental health needs, and failed to provide adequate special education services. The suit was filed as a result of Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into the conditions of confinement at the Scioto and Marion centers that began in 2005. The Marion facility closed soon after the first injunction in this case. Ohio achieved substantial compliance in 2015, and the consent decree was terminated on December 3, 2015.


On November 1, 2000, a juvenile who had been arrested for violating curfew filed a civil rights class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of South Dakota, challenging the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the Detention Center, without any reasonable suspicion that the juveniles were concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief. The County and individual County officials denied the allegations and argued that the individual officials were entitled to qualified immunity. On March 20, 2002, the District Court (Judge Lawrence L. Piersol) certified the case as a class action, establishing a damages class and an injunctive relief class, consisting of: "All persons ... who, when they were under the age of eighteen years, were charged with minor offenses at any time on or after November 1, 1997 and up to a date in the future to be set by the Court, or who were charged with non-felony offenses at any time on or after April 16, 1999 and up to a date in the future to be set by the Court, and were strip searched at the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center." After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. The District Court (Judge Piersol) entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the Fourth Amendment claim and denied the individual officials' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Smook v. Minnehaha County, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D.S.D. 2004). Reconsideration was denied. Smook v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 353 F.Supp. 2d 1059 (D.S.D. 2005), and the defendants appealed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that (1) the search of the named plaintiff, requiring her to strip to her undergarments, was not a full strip search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) county officials were immune from suit even if the search was deemed illegal, because it did not vindicate a clearly established right; and (3) the plaintiff class lacked standing to seek injunctive relief. Since the claim of the named plaintiff was dismissed, the case was remanded to the District Court to determine whether the class should be redefined or decertified and whether there was an adequate class representative to replace the named plaintiff. Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir.(S.D.) Aug 09, 2006), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied (Sep 27, 2006). Plaintiff's petition for certiorari was denied. Smook v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 127 S.Ct. 1885 (2007). On remand, the plaintiffs added three additional individuals as named plaintiffs for the class. In an effort to avoid having to litigate the case again, the two sides agreed to a monetary settlement. The agreement included a payment of $450,000 by the defendants, including $182,500 in attorneys' fees and $182,500 to be divided among members of the class.

Summary: The juvenile plaintiff brought suit against the Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center, challenging the center's policy of strip-searching all juveniles admitted to the Detention Center, without any reasonable suspicion that the juveniles were concealing weapons or contraband. The Eighth Circuit overturned the District Court's ruling, holding that the search of the named plaintiff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. On remand, the parties reached a monetary settlement before having to relitigate the case.


On May 7, 2004, individuals in the custody of the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the conditions of their confinement at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida. Plaintiffs were all involuntarily civilly confined at the FCCC pursuant to Sexually Violent Predator Act §§ 394.910, et seq. Fla. Stat. (2003). Plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights, specifically their 14th Amendment rights, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et. seq. (ADA) by the denial of effective sex offender treatment programs, lack of appropriate mental health care, and the failure to identify and accommodate inmates with disabilities in a way that would allow them to participate effectively in sex-offender treatment. Attorneys for the Southern Legal Counsel, Inc., the Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc. and the Legal Advocacy Center of Central Florida, Inc. represented plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Defendants named in the Complaint were the DCF and the private corporation Liberty Behavioral Healthcare Corp. which operated the FCCC pursuant to a contract with the DCF. Discovery and discovery related disputes comprised the majority of the case activity for the next several years. On January 16, 2007, the District Court (Judge John E. Steele) granted Liberty's motion to be dismissed as a defendant, on the grounds that Liberty no longer operated the FCCC and that the plaintiff class sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but not money damages. Plaintiffs moved to join GEO Group, Inc., the company contracted to run the facility for a five-year term beginning on January 1, 2007, as a defendant. This motion was granted, but because of likely delays that would have resulted from GEO's participation as a party, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed GEO on June 4, 2007. The case continued against DCF. Discovery disputes and failed attempts by other inmates to join the case as intervening plaintiffs dominated the case docket for the next two and a half years. The case was scheduled to go to trial in September 2009, but on July 16, 2009 the parties moved to have the case stayed while a settlement was finalized. The case settled on November 23, 2009, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The settlement established a Final Action Plan, which itself was not, the parties agreed, a judicially enforceable settlement or court issued injunction. The Plan called for improvements to the oversight and staffing of the inpatient mental health unit, the implementation of policies addressing the screening and referral process for the use of anti-androgens, comprehensive discharge planning for Phase IV residents, modifications to the special needs treatment track, and additional training for clinical staff and housing staff. The Final Action Plan also acknowledged significant improvements implemented by DCF and GEO during the pendency of the case. All of the issues in the plaintiffs complaint were either addressed by the terms of the Final Action Plan, or had been addressed by changes to FCCC's policies during the pendency of the case. The Final Action Plan was scheduled to be fully implemented by February 2010. The defendants agreed to pay $249,000 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs' attorneys. Several class members objected to the settlement. They argued, inter alia, that the settlement should have required a federal monitor or court oversight to ensure compliance. The district court rejected this argument when it approved the settlement, and several class members then filed separate appeals to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied each appeal, and on February 24, 2010 affirmed the District Court's approval of the settlement.

Summary: This suit was filed May 7, 2004. Plaintiffs were individuals who had been involuntarily civilly confined pursuant to Sexually Violent Predator Act into the custody of the Florida Dept. of Children and Families in the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC). Plaintiffs argued that the State failed to provide adequate rehabilitive treatment necessary for their eventual recovery and release. In November 2009, after five years of discovery and motions practice, the case settled, with the State agreeing to implement policies that addressed all the plaintiffs' allegations.


On February 27, 2002, four individuals involuntarily detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (“SVP Act”) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU, they sought a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, and the right of all class members to bring subsequent individual lawsuits for damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the state failed to provide adequate and meaningful health treatment to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated; the treatment and care that was given was, they alleged, punitive and constitutionally inadequate. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had failed to properly train their staff, provide individualized treatment programs, allow for family participation in rehabilitation efforts, allow for fair grievance procedures, afford reasonable opportunities to residents for activities, and to institute a procedure to guarantee appropriate therapist/patient confidentiality. The defendants also allegedly required, as a precondition to participation in all but the most basic treatment, that plaintiffs admit to many crimes for which they were not convicted. The conditions of confinement, according to the plaintiffs, were also unreasonable restrictive. Examples included routine strip searches, routine shackling with restraints used in “super-max” prisons, intrusive and frequent cell searches, constant surveillance and in general having their freedom of movement restricted in a variety of arbitrary ways. On March 19, 2002, this case was reassigned from Judge Matthew F. Kennelly to Judge Harry D. Leinenweber. Shortly thereafter on March 27, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion to maintain class action. Judge Leinenweber granted the motion on June 28, 2002. 2002 WL 1433729 (N.D. Ill. 2002) On May 14, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ class action complaint. Judge Leinenweber denied the motion on July 25, 2002. 2002 WL 1732911 (N.D. Ill. 2002) Following trial, on January 13, 2005, Judge Leinenweber granted the plaintiffs declaratory relief concerning the Special or Secure Management Status (“SMS”) used at the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the “TDF”), holding it unconstitutional. SMS referred to the status and set of conditions that a patient would be placed under when determined to be a danger to himself or others. However, he denied all of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The court stated that while the low rates of treatment participation, progress, and release at the TDF was disappointing, it did not amount to a constitutional violation. In addition, because the SMS policy had been amended several months before trial, the court denied injunctive relief on that issue. The new SMS policy, the court held, cured the defects in the prior policy. 2005 WL 399300 (N.D. Ill. 2005) On January 28, 2002 the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider. However, Judge Leinenweber denied the motion on March 25, 2005. Finally, on July 26, 2005 Judge Leinenweber declined to award attorney’s fees or other costs to either party, directing both parties bear their own fees and costs. Outside of an acknowledgment of receipt of sealed document #75 on January 14, 2010, there has been no activity on the docket since October 3, 2005. Therefore, it seems that the case is closed.

Summary: On February 27, 2002, four individuals involuntarily detained by the Illinois Department of Human Services ("DHS") pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (“SVP Act”) on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide adequate and meaningful health treatment to the plaintiffs and those similarly situated and the treatment and care that was given was punitive and Constitutionally inadequate. In 2005, Judge Leinenweber granted the plaintiffs’ demand for declaratory relief concerning the previous Special or Secure Management Status (“SMS”) used at the Joliet Treatment and Detention Facility (the “TDF”) stating that it was unconstitutional; however all of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims were denied including the claim of inadequate treatment.


On August 14, 2014, a number of prisoners in Louisiana state prisons filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that, despite their being found not guilty by reason of insanity of criminal offenses, they were still being incarcerated in Louisiana prisons. The named plaintiffs claimed that their continued imprisonment violated their Fourteenth Amendment right under the Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504). The named plaintiffs were all found not guilty by reason of insanity during their criminal trials and they were all committed by the courts to the Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System (ELMHS), which runs a state mental health facility. Nevertheless, at the time of the complaint, all named plaintiffs still remained incarcerated in state prisons, despite the fact that no other criminal charges had been filed against them. Plaintiffs claim that by continuing to incarcerate them, the state is discriminating against them on the basis of their mental illness and denying them appropriate mental health services. After the plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint, the Judge Shelly Dick granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. 2014 WL 7334911. She granted the motion as to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims seeking monetary damages against the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Services on sovereign immunity grounds. But she denied the motion as to all other respects. The Court denied then plaintiffs' class certification on December 22, 2014, finding that numerosity was not satisfied because the putative class consisted of only thirty-six individuals. 2014 WL 7338846. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint on January 26, 2015, and a third amended complaint on May 13. Discovery and litigation continued, and on February 3, 2016, this case was consolidated with <i>Advocacy Center v. Kliebert</i> (Docket No. 3:15-cv-00751). After several months of settlement discussions, on July 18, 2016, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice to the right to reopen it within sixty days if the parties did not settle. On September 2, 2016, the parties reported that they had reached a settlement, moving jointly to reopen the case for purpose of entering that agreement as a court order. The Court granted the motion and approved the settlement on November 16, 2016. The terms of the settlement agreement apply to "All individuals who, after having been found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity or Incompetent to Stand Trial are remanded by a court to a mental health facility for treatment." The settlement requires the defendants to maintain a record of all such persons, conduct prompt behavioral health assessments after the court orders commitment or inpatient treatment, admit such persons currently on a waitlist to a mental health facility or appropriate program, create a procedure for expedited admission of such persons to the appropriate facilities in the event of an emergency need, maintain pre- and post-admissions procedures for ensuring appropriate placement of such persons, work to develop less constricting and new placement options, and report back to the plaintiffs on a monthly basis. The settlement agreement also awards the plaintiffs with attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $466,000 and possible future fees related to the execution of this settlement agreement. The case was set to remain open to enforce the settlement decree until November, 2020. Since no motions were filed to enforce the settlement decree by the deadline, the case is presumed closed.

Summary: On Aug. 14, 2014, a number of prisoners in Louisiana filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the state violated the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and their 14th Amendment due process rights by keeping them incarcerated despite their being found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed by the court to the state's mental health facility. On July 18, 2016, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice to the right to reopen it within sixty days if the parties did not settle. The parties subsequently settled, agreeing to send individuals found not guilty due to insanity to mental health institutions.


On October 31, 2001, the Center for Public Representation, the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, and a private law firm filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1396, against the Governor of Massachusetts and other state officials, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of Rosie D. and eight other Medicaid-eligible children, aged 6 to 15, who were hospitalized or at risk of hospitalization due to a lack of home-based services. The class they sought to represent included tens of thousands of children in Massachusetts who were eligible for Medicaid (MassHealth) and had emotional, behavioral, or psychiatric disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to provide medically necessary services as required under the federal Medicaid Act, and that it had failed to inform parents and children that they were entitled to these covered services. On December 19, 2001, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 29, 2002, the district court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied the motion to dismiss and certified the case as a class action. The defendants appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. On November 7, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the defendants’ appeal, holding that children had an enforceable right under the Medicaid Act to medically necessary treatment. 310 F.3d 230. The district court issued an order compelling the defendants to produce requested documents for the plaintiffs on April 14, 2003. 256 F. Supp. 2d 115. On December 16, 2004, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On March 25, 2005, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the case headed for trial. The case went through a six-week trial in the spring of 2005. On January 26, 2006, the court issued a 98-page decision that found that Massachusetts had violated the EPSDT provisions of the federal Medicaid Act (requirements for “Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment” services) by failing to provide home-based services to thousands of children across the state. 410 F. Supp. 2d 18. The result of this failure was that thousands of Massachusetts children with serious emotional disturbance were forced to endure unnecessary confinement in residential facilities or to remain in costly institutions far longer than their medical conditions required. As a result of the judgment, the parties entered into negotiations to create a remedial plan. After six months of negotiations that failed to produce agreement, both sides presented separate plans to the court. On February 22, 2007, the court approved a modified version of the defendants’ plan. 474 F. Supp. 2d 238. The court’s adopted plan sought to restructure the children's mental health system by incorporating intensive home-based services, including behavioral health screenings, assessments, case management, crisis intervention, and in-home therapeutic supports. The plan’s strict timelines required full implementation by June 2009. The court also appointed a monitor to oversee the implementation, to mediate disputes between the parties, and to determine compliance with the court’s order. On January 16, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to modify the judgment and to give them until July 1, 2010 to implement the plan. On February 27, 2009, the district court granted some extra time to the defendants, allowing them until December 1, 2009, to fully implement the remedial plan. Both parties submitted periodical implementation reports on the remedial plan. On November 29, 2011, the court partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion to insure timely access to remedial services. The court ordered the defendants to propose a new plan for standards governing enrollment in Intensive Care Coordination, and a new timetable for implementation of these standards. The court also ordered that the defendants must appear before it every 60 days to report on their compliance progress. Over the next few years, both parties continued to submit status reports, and the court proceeded to extend the monitor’s role in six-month increments and endorsed the parties’ agreement regarding the monitor’s budget. On February 7, 2019, the court denied the defendants’ motion to terminate monitoring. It noted that despite “persistent prodding from the court, Defendants are still grossly failing” to bring themselves into compliance with the remedial plan. Specifically, the defendants had failed to demonstrate they could provide “reasonably prompt” care to a substantial portion of the plaintiffs, which was defined as offering an initial appointment within fourteen days after initial contact. Citing this, and the defendants’ apparent lack of effort at compliance, the court retained its power to continue its supervision. The defendants appealed this decision to the First Circuit on March 11, 2019. On March 13, the court denied the plaintiffs’ two outstanding motions, “in light of the general rule that…the filing of an appeal deprives a district court of the power to act substantively in a case until proceedings on appeal conclude.” The same day, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard G. Stearns. On July 1, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to extend the appointment of the court monitor, subject to the First Circuit’s ruling on appeal. On May 4, 2020, the First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court. It held that because the parties’ agreement had provided for the monitor’s appointment to conclude on December 31, 2018, the district court had improperly extended the monitor’s appointment. On remand, the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to show “good cause” to modify the agreement by extending the monitor’s appointment; the district court should analyze the question in light of Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail. 958 F.3d 51 The First Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing en banc (before the entire court, rather than the typical 3-judge panel) on June 17, 2020. As of August 2020, further proceedings are pending in the district court.

Summary: This was a class-action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs alleged that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had failed to provide medically necessary services as required under the federal Medicaid Act, and that it had failed to inform parents and children that they were entitled to these covered services. The district court found that the Commonwealth violated provisions of the federal Medicaid Act by failing to provide home-based services to thousands of children across the state. In 2007, the district court approved a remedial plan intended to restructure the children’s mental health system by incorporating intensive home-based services, including behavioral health screenings, assessments, case management, crisis intervention and in-home therapeutic supports. It also appointed a monitor to oversee implementation and compliance. The parties agreed to extend the monitor’s appointment several times, with the final extension expiring on December 31, 2018. In July 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to again extend the monitor’s appointment; the First Circuit overturned this ruling on May 4, 2020. As of August 2020, the extension is before the district court on remand.


On August 11, 2016 , the Attorney General and Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Mississippi. The DOJ sued the State of Mississippi under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). The DOJ asked the court to enjoin the State of Mississippi from discriminating against adults with mental illness and from failing to provide them with appropriate integrated community programs. The DOJ claimed that Mississippi violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by "administering the State's mental health service system in a manner that denies qualified adults with mental illness the benefits of the State's mental health services." See Complaint. Further, the DOJ argued that State hospitals were segregated because they restricted contact with people without disabilities, and presented a lack of meaningful choice for patients in opportunities such as choosing friends, food, living space, activities, and employment. On October 24, 2016, the State filed a motion to consolidate this case with Troupe v. Barbour, a case filed in the Southern District of Mississippi that commenced in 2010. In that case, four minor plaintiffs made claims against the State regarding its treatment of them as children with mental illness. On December 6, a magistrate judge found the cases to have common questions of law and fact and ordered their consolidation. But soon afterward, the plaintiffs in both cases filed a motion for reconsideration of the consolidation. On March 19, 2017, District Court Judge Henry T. Wingate vacated the December 6 consolidation order, finding that there were few common questions of fact between the cases and that consolidating them would result in undue delays and injustice to the plaintiffs. After months of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgement on December 21, 2018, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and had failed to prove that a reasonable modification of Mississippi's mental health system was available. The court denied the motion on May 13, 2019, finding that plaintiffs had standing and that they had met the burden of suggesting a plausible accommodation to the mental health system (Judge Carlton W. Reeves). After four weeks of a bench trial, the court issued an opinion on September 3, 2019. The court found that Mississippi's health system fell short of the requirements established by law and that the state operated a system that unlawfully discriminated against persons with serious mental illness. As a remedy, Judge Reeves ordered that the parties propose three names of special masters to oversee the state's move to community-based care and set a hearing to discuss the potential special master. The master will be tasked to help the parties craft the appropriate remedy. The hearing was set for December 2, 2019. The case was ongoing as of November 27, 2019.

Summary: The U.S. sued the State of Mississippi under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The U.S. alleged that the State knowingly failed to provide adequate mental health programs for adults with mental illness and segregated adults with disabilities in their State-run hospitals. After a four-week bench trial, the court found that the health system violated the ADA and required a special master to determine and oversee the remedial process. The case is ongoing.


Plaintiff, a student at Hunter College of the City University of New York, referred to in this case as Jane Doe, brought this private lawsuit against the College on August 20, 2004. She also brought claims against the College's President, Jennifer Raab, and its Acting Vice President, Eija Ayravainen, in their individual capacities and their capacities as administrators of the College. Plaintiff suffered from Major Depressive Disorder and was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. In June of 2004, she attempted suicide in her dormitory room at the College. She had also overdosed on medication earlier that year while at school. Pursuant to a school policy stating that students who attempt suicide would be asked to take a leave of absence from their Residence Halls for a semester, following the incident on June 5, the College notified plaintiff that she would not be allowed to live in the dorm during the fall 2004 semester. The College also told her she would be required to visit with Deans and counselors on campus. In her Amended Complaint, filed on October 7, 2004, plaintiff brought the following claims: 1) intentional discrimination under the Fair Housing Act; 2) intentional discrimination and failure to accommodate in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and 3) intentional discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on October 27, 2004, alleging that as a state institution, the College and its officials were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. On August 25, 2005, Judge Sidney H. Stein denied defendants' motion to dismiss and ordered the parties to begin discovery. The parties engaged in negotiations and, on August 22, 2006, jointly filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. On the same day, the parties filed a Settlement Agreement. The Agreement indicated that defendants would pay a total of $100,000 in attorneys' fees and would pay approximately $63,000 in damages to plaintiff over a period of 48 months. The case is closed.

Summary: Plaintiff, a student at Hunter College of the City University of New York, brought this action against the College and its administrators on August 20, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, brought claims under the Fair Housing Act, the ADA, and Section 504 after the College forced her to leave its dormitory following her suicide attempt in June 2004. The case eventually settled, with defendants paying plaintiff attorneys' fees and damages.


On March 15, 1996, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, against the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (DMH/MR) and the Memphis Mental Health Institute (MMHI), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Memphis Division. The government asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants were depriving patients of MMHI of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendants failed to provide adequate medical care, failed to provide individualized psychiatric care and treatment, and failed to provide adequate trained direct care and professional staff. The CRIPA investigation began in 1990. On November 2, 1990, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began sending internal memoranda recommending a CRIPA investigation of conditions at MMHI. The preliminary findings indicated that conditions there included inadequate psychiatric care and treatment, inadequate supervision and neglect caused by an inadequate number of professional and direct care staff, as well as general medical care deficiencies, including overuse and misuse of medication and an unsafe and unsanitary environment. On December 12, 1990, the DOJ sent the Governor of Tennessee a letter indicating an intention to investigate. And, on April 4, 1991, the DOJ sent another letter to the Governor presenting interim findings. In that letter, the DOJ indicated it found MMHI did not have a sufficient number of psychiatrists, nurses, or psychiatric technicians, and that DMH/MR planned to cut additional staff positions at MMHI. On February 6, 1992, the DOJ sent another letter to the Governor presenting its findings. In that letter, the DOJ indicated it found that MMHI failed to provide patients with adequate general and emergency medical care, had inadequate psychiatric care and medication practices, and employed improper and excessive use of physical restraints. Further, in its findings letter, DOJ demanded implementation of certain remedial measures. Apparently, the parties began negotiating a settlement before the CRIPA lawsuit was filed. On March 15, 1996, the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of a consent decree. Under the settlement agreement the defendants agreed to implement all policies, systems, procedures and rules currently in place, to provide quarterly status reports, provide the government access to the facilities, records, patients, and employees of MMHI, and to confer in good faith on the provisions of the consent decree. Further, the consent decree contained provisions detailing staffing requirements, patient treatment and discharge plans, and non-psychiatric medical care. On March 27, 1996, the District Court (Judge Julia S. Gibbons) approved the consent decree, and retained jurisdiction of the action until the consent decree was terminated with respect to all requirements. And, on May 21, 1997, the Court entered judgment in accordance with the consent decree and terminated the case, retaining jurisdiction for necessary enforcement of the decree. And, on September 18, 1998, the District Court (Judge Gibbons) granted the parties' joint motion for a stipulation and order, effectuating the consent decree. On June 21, 2005, the District Court (Judge Bernice B. Donald) granted the parties' joint motion for an order partially terminating the consent decree and approved the parties' stipulation for supplemental relief. We have no more information on this file.

Summary: On March 15, 1996, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, against the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (DMH/MR) and the Memphis Mental Health Institute (MMHI), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Memphis Division. On March 15, 1996, the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of a consent decree. Under the settlement agreement the defendants agreed to implement all policies, systems, procedures and rules currently in place, to provide quarterly status reports, provide the government access to the facilities, records, patients, and employees of MMHI, and to confer in good faith on the provisions of the consent decree. On May 21, 1997, the Court entered judgment in accordance with the consent decree and terminated the case, retaining jurisdiction for necessary enforcement of the decree. And, on September 18, 1998, the District Court (Judge Gibbons) granted the parties' joint motion for a stipulation and order, effectuating the consent decree. On June 21, 2005, the District Court (Judge Bernice B. Donald) granted the parties' joint motion for an order partially terminating the consent decree and approved the parties' stipulation for supplemental relief.


Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Nim Henson Geriatric Center ("Henson"), a county-operated skilled nursing facility in Jackson, Kentucky. The investigation resulted in a findings letter being sent to Breathitt County's judge executive on March 6, 2003. The letter stated that in June 2002, DOJ and certain of its expert consultants toured the facility, interviewed administrators, residents and staff, and reviewed medical and other records. The DOJ's investigation led it to conclude that certain conditions at Henson violated residents' federal constitutional and statutory rights. According to the DOJ, residents at Henson suffered from deficiencies in the following areas: 1) general medical care, 2) chemical restraints, 3) wound and nutritional care, 4) restorative care, 5) psychiatric care, and 6) incident management and quality assurance. The findings letter described that the DOJ investigators determined that the facility's medication management practices; its medical notes and documentation; and its oversight and management of medical care did not meet generally accepted standards of care. Among the identified systemic deficiencies were unjustified use on residents of polypharmacy and psychotropic medications, inadequate monitoring of medications' effects, and failure to re-evaluate the continued necessity or dosage units of certain drugs. The investigation found poor or absent (i) physician-pharmacist consultations, (ii) medication policies and guidelines, (iii) diagnosis and treatment of underlying disorders (rather than symptoms), (iv) medical notes and documentation, and (v) oversight and management of medical care. The facility employed sedation for reasons not associated with a medical condition, and the intermediate care unit within the facility provided substandard wound assessment, identification, care and tracking. Failure to appropriately respond to instances of weight loss and overuse of feeding tubes reflected poor nutritional care at the facility. Henson's failure to provide active (as opposed to passive) group activities, an absence of functional furniture, and care plans that failed to include restorative interventions addressing preventable declines in residents' functioning were other shortcomings described in the findings letter. Particularly in the intermediate care unit, DOJ found that the nursing staff lacked a systematized approach to resident assessment and to the provision of early intervention regarding significant changes in resident status. Additionally, at least half of the residents sampled were receiving psychiatric care that substantially departed from generally accepted standards. No psychiatric and no behavioral professionals were available to the facility; physicians and nurses at the facility had no training in geriatric psychiatry generally, or in treating individuals experiencing dementia or depression; and residents who badly needed acute psychiatric care were rarely transferred to psychiatric hospitals. Henson's incident management efforts failed to pull relevant disciplines together to identify and provide needed supports and services to prevent falls and injuries. Likewise, the facility lacked an effective quality assurance system to track significant trends and events and ensure that proper corrective action occurs. Regarding discharge planning, the DOJ found that Henson's staff did not adequately evaluate or assess residents for their discharge potential. It failed to have its treatment professionals periodically assess whether community-based treatment was appropriate. These latter inadequacies violated the Americans with Disabilities Act-imposed obligation to treat residents in the most integrated setting appropriate to their individual needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 and 42 C.F.R. § 35.139(j). The DOJ findings letter proposed remedial actions to remedy the multiple deficiencies, invited the county to address the issues, and alerted the county to the possibility of a CRIPA lawsuit brought by the United States to compel remedial action. On February 17, 2004 the United States filed a complaint against Breathitt County, Kentucky, and Breathitt County Geriatric Corporation for violating CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. §1997, within the Nim Henson Nursing Home for the violations noted in the findings letter above. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants failed to protect residents from harm and, further, failed “to provide adequate medical, nursing, nutritional, wound, restorative, and psychiatric care to residents” in the nursing home. Moreover, the complaint alleged that the defendants failed to continually assess whether the treatment needs of residents were being met. On February 19, 2004, a settlement agreement was entered with the court. Through the settlement agreement the parties agreed to the following terms: Defendants would ensure that residents shall be promptly assessed, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and, when necessary, reassessed, diagnosed, and treated with current, generally accepted standards of care, including documentation adequate to withstand clinical scrutiny. Defendants would develop policies to fully monitor medication distribution, and the effects of medications on patients. Defendants would keep accurate, current, complete, and organized medical documentation. Defendants would cease using restrictive controls and chemical restraints except in narrow situations. Defendants would create and maintain a documentation system, as well as a formulary, for patient wound care. Furthermore, defendants would ensure that nurses knew “the wound status of each resident in their care.” Defendants would monitor the weight and nutrition of residents and ensure that necessary interventions occurred. Defendants would ensure residents are able to have the highest quality of life possible and develop a restorative care plan for all residents. Defendants would provide necessary psychiatric care for residents. Defendants would investigate and follow up on all “unusual incidents” or incidents involving injury. Defendants would routinely assess residents to see if community placement is necessary. Defendants would provide the United States Department of Justice with status report within 90 days and provide continual, unrestricted access to buildings and facilities, staff, residents, and records relating to the settlement agreement, staff, or residents Two years after the settlement agreement, the government found that the Nim Henson Nursing Home had been complying with all the terms of the settlement agreement. As a result, the case was dismissed.

Summary: On February 17, 2004 the United States filed a complaint against Breathitt County, Kentucky, and Breathitt County Geriatric Corporation for violating CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. §1997, after the county failed to take action to remedy the violations laid out after the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Nim Henson. On February 19, 2004, a settlement agreement was entered with the cour, and two years after the settlement agreement, the government found that the Nim Henson Nursing Home had been complying with all the terms of the settlement agreement.