This action, filed Jan. 31, 2017, challenges President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint alleges that in preventing the plaintiff, a Syrian national with a valid U.S. visa, from returning to the U.S. pursuant to the EO, the defendants violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and international law. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Prof. Bernard Harcourt of Columbia Law School, was a physician resident in the University of Illinois Chicago/Advocate Christ Hospital. He returned to the United Arab Emirates to get married on Jan. 23, and upon returning to the U.S. to continue his residency, he was detained at Abu Dhabi International Airport on Jan 29. Despite his valid visa, he was detained pursuant to the EO. If the plaintiff could not return to the U.S., he faced the risk of being deported to Syria, where he is a citizen but has never been a resident. That same day, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Elaine Bucklo. At a status hearing on February 1, the parties told the judge they had reached a "settlement in principle." Judge Bucklo set a status hearing for February 9 at which they could update her on the progress towards settlement or otherwise. On February 2, according to news reports, the plaintiff successfully entered the United States at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. On February 8, the plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, with leave to reinstate on or before August 1. Judge Bucklo on February 9 granted the plaintiff's motion and terminated all pending dates and motions as moot, but noting that the plaintiff still had leave to reinstate on or before August 1, 2017. Only the complaint is publicly available for this case. This case is now closed.

Summary: This action, filed Jan. 31, 2017, challenges President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint alleges that in preventing a Syrian national with a valid U.S. visa from returning to the U.S. pursuant to the EO, the defendants violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and international law. The case was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Bernard Harcourt of Columbia Law School, is a resident in the University of Illinois Chicago/Advocate Christ Hospital. He returned to the United Arab Emirates to get married on Jan. 23, and upon returning to the U.S. to continue his residency, he was detained at Abu Dhabi International Airport on Jan 29. Despite his valid visa, he was detained pursuant to the EO. If the plaintiff cannot return to the U.S., he faces the risk of being deported to Syria, where he is a citizen but has never been a resident. That same day, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Elaine Bucklo. At a status hearing on February 1, the parties told the judge they had reached a "settlement in principle." On February 2, the plaintiff successfully entered the United States at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. On February 8, the plaintiff filed a motion for voluntary dismissal and leave to reinstate on or before August 1, 2017. Judge Bucklo granted this motion and terminated the case. This case is now closed.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It was consolidated with Achari v. Signal International and continues on that page. On Aug. 14, 2013, 13 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. The plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on January 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), as well as claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to the defendant, Signal International, a company based in Pascagoula, Mississippi with operations in the Gulf Coast region, in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. On Oct. 17, 2013, the District Court (Judge Robert H. Walker) entered an order consolidating this matter with the Achari case. The Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) then transferred this case and Achari, Chakkiyattil v. Signal International, and Krishnakutty v. Signal International LLC to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On October 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the Achari case. The Court closed the Achari case on May 26, 2017 without prejudice due to settlement agreement. The settlement established a claims process and ensures that all aggrieved individuals included in the litigation may receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. In addition to monetary relief, Signal International's CEO issued a statement acknowledging the company's wrongdoing and apologizing for its treatment of the guest workers. The Court retained jurisdiction such that any party may reopen the case if any of the unlocated plaintiffs are located so that they may be paid pursuant to the settlement agreement.

Summary: On Aug. 14, 2013, 13 Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case. The Achari case was dismissed due to settlement agreement but the court retained jurisdiction.


In early 2015, six refugees filed this class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York (Judge David Hurd). The plaintiffs sued the Utica School District under the Declaratory Relief Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, claiming violations of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C § 1703; Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; New York Education Law § 3202(1); the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause; the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; and the New York State Constitution’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, alleged that the defendants consistently denied Utica residents between the ages of 17 and 20 who were limited English proficient (LEP) and immigrants access to educational opportunity. Defendants diverted this largely refugee population to alternative education programs rather than allowing them to enroll at the only public high school in Utica. The alternative education programs provided either only English as a Second Language (ESL) classes or a combination of ESL and GED classes, both of which provided a substantially inferior education to normal high school courses. When students inquired as to the reason for the diversion, defendants indicated that the students were too old to enroll in the high school. In fact, under New York law, individuals have a right to attend high school until they reach age 21. The plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was litigated for several months, and after mandatory mediation did not result in a settlement, litigation continued until early 2016 when the parties commenced settlement negotiations. On June 3, 2016, Judge Hurd ordered a consent decree stipulating the terms of the settlement between the parties. The terms included that the defendants were to provide any student between ages 17 and 20 with the opportunity to attend the public high school, while taking steps to overcome language barriers students may face. Defendants were to also train all Utica City School District employees on the enrollment process for LEP students, and take efforts to inform the community that all students between ages 17 and 20 can enroll at the public high school. The consent decree is set to expire on June 3, 2020. While the case is still open in order to ensure enforcement of the consent decree, as of May 20, 2020 nothing further has happened.

Summary: In 2015, six refugees living in Utica, NY filed this class action in the Northern District of New York against the Utica School District Board of Education and the Utica City School District. The plaintiffs alleged that that the defendants consistently denied Utica residents between the ages of 17 and 20 who were limited English proficient (LEP) and immigrants access to educational opportunity. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement requiring the defendants to end their discriminatory practices and enact a detailed remedial plan. Enforcement of the consent decree is ongoing as of November 2018.


This is a class action suit about bond hearings for detainees under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The issue is whether due process under the Fifth Amendment allows the government to place the burden of proof for whether the person being detained poses a flight risk (and therefore shouldn't be released) on the detainee themselves. Another issue is whether Immigration Judges are required by the INA or Department of Justice regulations to consider the detainee's ability to pay bond and possible alternatives to bond at bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The case was brought on behalf of people detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)) at the Batavia Federal Detention Facility in upstate New York, as well as a subclass of people who are detained in Richwood, LA but have their hearings in front of judges at the Buffalo/Batavia immigration court. On March 10, 2020, the case was filed by two civil immigration detainees held under § 1226(a) pending their removal proceedings; they were represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union (an ACLU affiliate). The presiding judge is Elizabeth A Wolford, in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Plaintiffs filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241, alleging violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Fifth Amendment. Claims were also asserted on behalf of class members who had been denied bond before particular Immigration Judges who allegedly had a policy of not granting bond hearings or alternatives to detention in most cases. In a September 2020 order, Judge Wolford denied class certification for the post-hearing class , but granted Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion as to the main pre-bond hearing class in September and found that plaintiffs had stated a Due Process Claim that the government is required to bear the burden of proof at bond hearings for individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). The court partially denied Plaintiffs’ sub-class claims and partially granted Defendents' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the claims regarding the no-bond policy on the ground that Plaintiffs had not named the warden of the Richwood detention center as a defendant. Finally, Judge Wolford rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that the INA required Immigration Judges consider non-bond alternatives to detention or the ability of detainees to pay, but found that Plaintiffs had stated a claim for violation of the INA on different grounds – namely, that the Immigration Judge at one plaintiff’s bond hearing had stated she was unable to consider alternatives to money bond. In late September 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration relating to the issues they had lost,. Before this was acted upon, defendants filed a notice of appeal for the portion of the September decision and order that granted, in part, the preliminary injunction. (483 F. Supp. 3d 159). In a decision and order dated March 29, 2021, Judge Wolford rejected Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. Later in April, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal regarding the September order and partial denial of the preliminary injunction. The appeal remains pending and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, two immigration detainees in the Batavia Federal Detention Facility in Batavia, NY, filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. Plaintiffs claimed that they and others similarly situated had been improperly denied bond, that non-bond alternatives to detention had not been properly considered by their immigration judges, that such considerations were required by the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that the policy of placing the burden of proof on the Plaintiffs to show they posed no flight risk violated their Fifth Amendment Rights. The court granted relief for pre-hearing detainees, agreeing that they pled sufficient facts to state a Due Process Claim that the government is required to bear the burden of proof at bond hearings for individuals detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a). It denied Plaintiffs' request to certify the putative post-hearing class. Both parties appealed; the case is ongoing.


On May 26, 2015, a group of parents and guardians of children born in Texas, and a nonprofit advocacy organization, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid and the Texas Civil Rights Project, the plaintiffs sued the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, all Mexican citizens, asked for the release of certified copies of their U.S.-citizen children's birth certificates. The defendant had, according to the plaintiffs, recently changed longstanding regulations and was now refusing to accept official Mexican-issued identification (matricula consular) as proof of parents' identity and relationship with their children. Consequently, lacking birth certificates for their children, the plaintiffs could not prove their children's U.S. citizenship nor their parent-child relationships. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was discriminating on the basis of national origin and only withholding the birth certificates because of the parents' immigration status and national origin. Further, the plaintiffs maintained, the defendants were interfering with exclusive federal authority over matters involving immigrants' documentation and diplomatic affairs with consulates issuing identity documents. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged, the defendant's actions violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Further, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Texas State Administrative Procedures Act. On July 22, DSHS moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, and failure to state a claim under the requirements of § 1983, preemption doctrine, and the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs responded on August 5, arguing that this case properly stated jurisdiction and a valid claim; the defendant replied on August 13. On August 21, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that, without the birth certificates, the parents and children would suffer irreparable harm by being unable to access rights such as education, housing, and healthcare, to protect the children from deportation, to maintain family unity, and to ensure the children's ability to freely travel between other countries and the United States. However, on October 16, 2015, Judge Pitman denied the plaintiffs' request for emergency application for a temporary injunction. Judge Pitman found that, although the plaintiffs had met the burden of showing irreparable harm to the children ("it simply begs credulity for Defendants to argue a birth certificate is not a vitally important document"), the plaintiffs had not demonstrated they would likely succeed on the merits. Regarding the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the state interest in preventing fraud in birth certificates might be found to justify disfavor of Mexican-consular identity documents. The plaintiffs had not shown they were likely to prevail on the preemption claim, because the state policy did not facially preempt federal immigration policy, and the state had a compelling interest in regulating birth certificates. 2015 WL 6118623 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2015). The plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on Mar. 29, 2016, adding additional plaintiffs from Mexico and Central America. Some parents possessed no acceptable documents, while some had presented one acceptable document but had been denied a birth certificate anyway. The parties soon entered mediation and reached a private settlement agreement on July 22, 2016. According to news reports, Texas agreed to accept some identity documents that it had been rejecting, including Mexican voter identification cards presented with secondary identification. Parents from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras could also present consulate-issued documents. Texas also established a review process for rejected birth certificate applications and training for registrar officials issuing the certificates. The Court set a compliance monitoring period of nine months. The Court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 9, 2017. This case is now closed.

Summary: In May 2015, parents of children born in Texas sued the Texas Department of State Health Services. Plaintiffs, all Mexican or Central American citizens, asked for the release of their U.S.-citizen children's birth certificates, which defendant would not issue after refusing to accept the parents' consular identity documents. The parties privately settled in July 2016.


This suit seeks to support Texas's law Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the suits that seek to challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order, this suit aims to support the work of federal immigration officials. The Four Texas Cases There are, so far, four cases addressing SB4--this one was the first filed. The four cases are this one, which is before Judge Sam Sparks, and three that are in front of Judge Orlando Garcia: City of El Cenizo v. Texas, No. 1:17-cv-00404 (W.D. Tex.) IM-TX-0045 in this Clearinghouse. El Paso County v. Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00459 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0046 City of San Antonio, Texas v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00489 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0047 This case was brought by Texas against pro-immigration cities and counties; the other three were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction barring implementation of SB4. On June 6, Judge Garcia, consolidated the three other cases, with El Cenizo becoming the lead case in the consolidation. This case, however, remains separate. Summary of this litigation On May 7, 2017, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment approving SB4. Defendants are Travis County, City of Austin, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). In their complaint, the plaintiffs accused defendants of being "openly hostile" to cooperation with federal immigration officials both in policy and in practice. Judge Sam Sparks was assigned to the case. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on May 24, 2017. They argued that the state filed the suit prior to SB4 going into effect and that it had suffered no direct injury. That same day, the state filed a motion to consolidate this case with the City of El Cenizo case. On May 31, 2017, Texas filed an amended complaint, adding its Attorney General as a new plaintiff, and many of the City of El Cenizo plaintiffs as defendants in this case, including the League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC), El Paso County, and the Texas Organizing Project Education Fund. 2017 WL 9362209 (W.D.Tex.). In response, the defendants filed amended motions to dismiss on June 2, 2017. The state voluntarily dismissed MALDEF from the case on June 16, 2017. On June 28, 2017, defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Texas lacked standing. The next day, the city of El Paso filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court dismissed the case without prejudice on August 9, 2017, finding that Texas lacked actual or imminent injury, which was required for Article III standing to seek declaratory judgment. 272 F.Supp.3d 973 (W.D. Tex. 2017). The court wrote that "[t]he State's alleged injury turns on the legal consequences of some act that may or may not occur - that is, Defendants' decision to violate the law. The State has produced no evidence that at the time of filing suit, it was clear Defendants planned to violate the law once it takes effect. Expressing public disagreement with a law does not constitute a violation of the law, nor does articulating the desire to challenge the constitutionality of the law equate to a violation of it." Id. at 980. The court noted that its holding was in line with a well-established ban on advisory opinions, and that do otherwise would be to “'open a Pandora's box and invite every local government to seek a court's judicial blessing' on a law prior to it taking effect." Id. Texas appealed the dismissal to the Fifth Circuit on Aug. 31, 2017. On May 25, 2018, the Fifth Circuit granted MALDEF's motion to dismiss itself as a party in the case. On December 12, 2018, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim after full briefing and oral argument. 910 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2018). Judge Stephen A. Higginson, writing for a three-judge panel, affirmed this case's dismissal. It found that the district court lacked federal-question jurisdiction over this case, because section 1331 does not encompass “suits by the States to declare the validity of their regulations despite possibly conflicting federal law." This relied on a 1983 Supreme Court decision in Franchise Tax Board of the State of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California. Judge Higginson did not discuss the district court's Article III standing analysis, finding that it was not necessary to reach that issue because of Texas's failure to articulate a federal question in this suit. The case is now closed.

Summary: This suit seeks to support Texas's law Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the suits that seek to challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order, this suit aims to support the work of federal immigration officials. There are, so far, four cases addressing SB4. On May 7, 2017, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment approving SB4. Defendants are Travis County, City of Austin, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on May 24, 2017. The court dismissed the case without prejudice to refiling on August 9, 2017, finding that Texas lacked actual or imminent injury, which was required for Article III standing to seek declaratory judgment. Texas appealed to the Fifth Circuit, who affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim on December 12, 2018. The case is closed.


On May 3, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) notified Harrison County, Mississippi of its intention to investigate conditions of the county jail under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq. Following the investigation, the DOJ sent a letter notifying the president of the Harrison County Board of Supervisors of its findings. The DOJ found there were too few staffed officers per inmates and significant deficiencies in the officers' training. These underlying problems lead to excessive discipline of inmates, lack of access to legal materials, and unsecured dangerous objects, including kitchen knives and prescription medication. The DOJ also found the suicide prevention program, as well as general medical and mental health care of the inmates, to be inadequate. The DOJ findings letter then made recommendations as to the minimum remedial measure needed to meet constitutional standards. Negotiations led to settlement; the Attorney General filed a CRIPA action against the jail on January 6, 1995. Although it is not mentioned in the docket sheet, presumably the parties provided the court with their proposed consent decree. Six days later, Judge Walter J. Gex III approved a consent decree, which laid out steps the county must take to improve issues discussed in the DOJ's letter of findings and recommendations. The consent decree mandated that the county double the number of officers per shift, have a female officer on duty at all times. The officers were to have 80 hours of training before starting their employment, with 40 hours of training per year thereafter. The decree prohibited using the 'strip cells', or cells without amenities, to house inmates. The county was also required to implement procedures that identified and properly stored dangerous materials and open a law library that was accessible at least eight hours a day, five days a week. For medical care, the county agreed to hire a medical professional and to both screen and monitor the inmates health. The county also agreed to hire a psychologist on at least a half-time basis and develop a suicide prevention program. The county was given one year to be in compliance with this decree. On November 4, 1996, the county sheriff submitted a report, claiming substantial compliance with the consent decree. On April 15, 1999, the case was placed on the inactive docket of the court. In 2000 two inmates from the county jail sent the court letters claiming the constitutional rights were continuing to be violated. The court dismissed these petitions, but the county jail restarted submitting status reports regarding the conditions of the jail. On May 28, 2003, the DOJ filed a motion for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the 1995 consent decree. On March 23, 2004, Judge Walter J. Gex III held a hearing regarding the motion. Judge Gex ultimately determined to stay the issue of contempt, predicated on the defendants' agreement to allocate funds towards the jail and hire certain numbers of additional staff to address the concerns raised in the DOJ's motion. This defendants were also required to continue to file status reports regarding the facility quarterly. Throughout the next ten years, Judge Walter J. Gex III issued several minute orders requiring the defendants to be more thorough in their status reports. On May 9, 2014, the case was reassigned to Chief District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. On August 11, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for dismissal, citing increased physician, psychiatrist, and mental health staffing; the creation of a chronic care program; and implementation of new auditing and quality assurance mechanisms. In the motion, the defendants stated that they would continue to use their best efforts to make progress in their auditing, their peer review of medical services, policies and practices, and to appoint a specific representative for persons with mental illnesses whose job would be to advocate for alternatives to institutionalization and seek funding for mental health services. Judge Louis Guirola, Jr. terminated the 1995 consent decree and dismissed the case with prejudice the next day.

Summary: On May 3, 1993, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated the Harrison County, MI jail. The DOJ found violations of inadequate staffing and medical care. Apparently after negotiation, the Attorney General filed an action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997 et seq., against the jail in 1995. Six days later, Judge Walter J. Gex III approved a consent decree. The consent decree mandated doubling the number of officers, increased training, and hiring of medical professionals for the physical and mental health of the patients. The decree was enforced sporadically throughout the next ten years. On August 11, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for dismissal, with the county agreeing to continue to use its best efforts to improve its mental health and medical care. The case was dismissed on August 12, 1995.


On October 31, 2003, three plaintiffs represented by private attorneys with law firms in New York and Washington, D.C., filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. They alleged that the Erie County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered either the Erie County Holding Center or the Erie County Correctional Facility, regardless of the crime charged and without reasonable suspicion that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and class certification. The parties engaged in contentious discovery, resulting in numerous discovery motions and request for sanctions. District Judge John T. Curtin and Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott made numerous unpublished rulings on these issues. See, e.g., Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 1455484 (W.D. N.Y. May 22, 2006) and Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 2927852 (W.D. N.Y. Oct 12, 2006) (order relating to the deposition of an Assistant County Attorney). Additionally, the judges issued opinions regarding discovery of e-mails sent by a former Assistant County Attorney to individual defendants and other Sheriff's Department officials regarding the Sheriff's Department's evolving policies regarding inmate strip searches. See Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 3858475 (W.D. N.Y. Jan. 04, 2006); objections overruled by Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2006 WL 3872844 (W.D. N.Y. Apr. 17, 2006); vacated and remanded by In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413 (2nd Cir. 2007) (Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs); on remand, the Court found that dissemination of attorney's advice did not waive attorney-client privilege. Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2007 WL 1703832 (W.D. N.Y. June 12, 2007). On reconsideration, the Court found that the defendants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the disputed e-mails by placing the information in those communications "at issue" in the litigation. Pritchard v. County of Erie, 2007 WL 3232096 (W.D. N.Y. Oct 31, 2007). On September, 2009, the plaintiffs sought class certification of the class of all persons who have been placed into the custody of the Erie County Correctional Facility and/or the Erie County Holding Center after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were strip searched upon their entry into the Erie County Correctional Facility and/or the Erie County Holding Center pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of the Erie County Sheriff's Department and the County of Erie. The plaintiffs requested that the Court certify this action as a money damages class action under Rule 23(b)(3). In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought partial certification under Rule 23(c)(4). The court held in favor plaintiff and found that all the requirements for class certification had been met. 269 F.R.D. 213, 219. But, the court defined two separate classes for the Erie County Holding Center and Erie County Correctional Facility, respectively, based on its finding that the two facilities did not share enough commonality due to the different procedures each had in place. 269 F.R.D. 213. However, in 2010, the Supreme Court courted decided Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012), and held that searches in a New Jersey jail did not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments. In response, the plaintiffs in this case submitted a brief distinguishing this case from Florence. The plaintiffs argued that the strip searches in Florence were private, individual searches, while the searches in this case were in groups. (In ECHC, class members were searched in groups of three in a shower area, and in ECCF, class members were searched in larger groups in a large common room). The plaintiffs further argued that the Florence  decision was limited to the facts addressed in that case. The Court instructed the parties to provide a joint submission regarding the procedural posture of this action based on the Florence decision, but the parties did not reach an agreement. Instead, on May 23, 2012, the plaintiffs requested that the Court allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. As of March 22, 2016, the court had not ruled on the request for leave to file an amended complaint and no other action has occurred in the case.

Summary: In 2003, prisoners filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the Erie County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional policy and practice of strip-searching prisoners when they entered the county facilities. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that a similar strip search policy was constitutional in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. The plaintiffs in this case argued that their case was distinguishable from Florence. However, no further action occurred in the case after 2012.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by individuals in the Shelby County Jail who alleged that their underlying medical conditions made them especially vulnerable to COVID-19. They alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act and requested release. The court denied both preliminary relief and motions to dismiss. The parties moved for preliminary approval of class action settlement, which was granted on January 28, 2021. A final approval hearing is scheduled for March 5, 2021.<hr> Two individuals with medical conditions that rendered them especially vulnerable to COVID-19 filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 20, 2020 against the Shelby County Sheriff's Office in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. They sought to represent a class of Shelby County Jail detainees with disabilities or who were medically vulnerable to COVID-19. Represented by lawyers from the ACLU as well as private counsel, they alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 701). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that conditions in the jail, like housing detainees in close proximity to one another, constituted a failure to provide reasonable safety as well as unlawful punishment of pretrial detainees. They also claimed that defendants were violating the ADA and Rehabilitation Act because they had not made reasonable modifications to their policies to avoid discriminating against detainees with disabilities, who were particularly likely to be affected by COVID. Judge Sheryl H. Lipman was assigned the case. Simultaneously with the initial petition, plaintiffs sought class certification, a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of habeas corpus that would immediately release the named plaintiffs, and a TRO, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus that would create a process by which class members could be released. Plaintiffs filed a motion to expedite consideration of the TRO and preliminary injunction. The following day, Judge Lipman granted the motion to expedite consideration of the TRO and preliminary injunction, instructing defendants to file a response by May 26. Defendants did so, filing a motion to dismiss, a response in opposition to the motion for class certification, and a response in opposition to the motion for a temporary restraining order. Defendants' responses indicated that they had a thorough process for dealing with COVID-19 and were trying to decrease the population of the jail. By June 10, Judge Lipman issued an order denying defendant's motion for dismissal. She explained that habeas relief was properly sought because plaintiffs challenged the "fact," not conditions, of confinement. Judge Lipman also denied in part and granted in part plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court granted class certification but narrowed its scope. The certified class consisted of detainees (1) age 65 or older; or with (2) chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma; (3) serious heart conditions; (4) immunodeficiencies; (5) severe obesity; (6) diabetes; (7) chronic kidney disease undergoing dialysis; (8) chronic liver disease; or (9) hemoglobin disorders. The court also certified a subclass defined as "All persons currently or in the future held at the Jail in pretrial custody during the COVID19 pandemic who are at increased risk of COVID-19 complications or death because of disabilities as defined in the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." 2020 WL 3108713. Two days later, Judge Lipman addressed the motion for a temporary restraining order. She found that the factual record was not developed enough to rule and ordered the parties to agree on an "Independent Inspector" who would visit the jail and report back to the court. A few days later, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint which added two more named plaintiffs. Meanwhile, by June 18 the parties had settled on Michael K. Brady as Independent Inspector. The Inspector filed his report on June 30, 2020. He found that the jail was run by "consummate professionals" but still needed to make several adjustments to ensure the safety of its detainees, including issuing additional masks, improving sanitation, and sequestering new arrivals and high-risk detainees. On June 30, defendants submitted another motion to dismiss, this time targeting plaintiffs’ amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court denied the motion on July 24, 2020. Judge Lipman criticized defendants' "needless filing" of a second motion to dismiss. She noted that defendants' arguments either had been raised and rejected in the first motion to dismiss or should have been raised in the earlier motion. Judge Lipman then rejected the new arguments on the merits because (1) pretrial detainees can bring unconstitutional punishment claims; (2) neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act required proof of discriminatory intent; and (3) habeas relief was available for detainees alleging that their continued detention violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. 2020 WL 4668756. On August 7, the court rejected plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief and habeas relief. Judge Lipman noted that habeas relief was only available if plaintiffs showed that it was impossible for the jail to detain them in compliance with the Constitution, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act. But she found that "any shortcomings are remediable," while acknowledging continuing concerns about the lack of social distancing, testing, and quarantine at the jail. 2020 WL 4668757. On September 15, 2020, plaintiffs moved to modify class certification and file a second amended petition for habeas corpus, alleging that defendants had "temporarily made improvements to certain conditions, apparently in preparation for the inspections by court-appointed inspector," but those improvements "lapsed shortly after the inspections occurred," as well as adding additional named plaintiffs, and including a more detailed request for injunctive relief. After attending mediation, on December 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement, and on January 22, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. On January 28, the court preliminarily granted the motion, which are to be approved by the class and subclass. The consent decree stated that the defendants must provide the Inspector and plaintiffs with a monthly report that details the population of the jail, number of COVID-19 tests conducts for detainees and staff, number of staff on leave in the past 30 days due to COVID-19 symptoms, number of detainees who died and exhibited symptoms of or tested positive for COVID-19 prior to death, and type of housing for class and subclass members. The decree also mandated unannounced inspections and reports by the Inspector at least every 90 days and unrestricted communications with the jail's Expeditor. A final approval hearing is scheduled for March 5, 2021.

Summary: Two detainees in Shelby County Jail in Tennessee filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus. They claimed that failure to take sufficient COVID-19 precautions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and they sought release. The court appointed an "Independent Inspector" to assess conditions at the jail and, based on his report, denied preliminary relief. The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss, and a trial is scheduled for May 2021. An Independent Inspector was tasked with inspecting the jail to evaluate the conditions. While praising defendants' professionalism, he wrote that several adjustments needed to be made in order for the jail to be a safe place for detainees. After attending mediation and filing a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, the court preliminarily granted the consent decree requiring monthly reports on the status of COVID-19 in the Jail and unannounced, periodic inspections by the Inspector. A final approval hearing is scheduled for March 5, 2021.


On August 2, 2014, detainees at the Franklin County Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Franklin County. The plaintiffs, represented by Columbia Legal Services, claimed that jail officials’ excessive use of force and the jail’s squalid living conditions violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. They asked the Court to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the County from permitting such abuses. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that jail staff regularly utilized restraint chairs and chained detainees to fixed objects for long periods of time, pepper sprayed detainees without cause or proper supervision, and locked detainees in segregation or isolation without cause and in inhumane conditions for up to 23 hours per day. The plaintiffs also claimed that jail officials seized detainees’ property without notice or cause, denied detainees outdoor exercise, and prohibited detainees from visiting with friends and family. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the County did not provide any educational services, programming, or religious services for detainees. As a result, the plaintiffs suffered emotional, physical and psychological injuries. On August 5, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order barring the County from chaining detainees to fixed objects. Judge Stanley A. Bastian denied the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to make an adequate showing of immediate irreparable harm and because they sought to alter, rather than preserve, the status quo. On January 12, 2015, Judge Bastian referred the case to Magistrate Judge James P. Hutton for a settlement conference. Then, on December 16, 2015, Judge Bastian referred the case to Magistrate Judge John T. Rodgers for a settlement conference. On February 12, 2016, both parties filed a joint motion to stay further proceedings in the litigation. The parties had come to a settlement agreement on February 5, 2016, that was confirmed by Magistrate Judge Rogers. On March 16, 2016, Judge Bastian granted the joint motion. On March 28, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class for the purposes of settlement and for preliminary approval of settlement. They requested that the court certify a settlement class defined as “All individuals who are now, or in the future will be, detained in the Franklin County Correctional Center during the term of the parties’ Settlement Agreement.” The settlement agreement required a three year term during which the defendant would be monitored by an independent third party to ensure compliance. The agreement required the defendant to hire additional staff, enter into a new contract for medical services, renovate and repair parts of the jail, adopt new policies, end a 23-hour lockdown policy and other practices, and train jail staff on these new policies and procedures. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. Plaintiffs would be awarded reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as well. On April 28, 2016, Judge Bastian granted the joint motion to certify the class. On July 8, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for settlement requesting final approval, which the court granted on July 21, 2016. A few months later, Judge Bastian appointed Phillip Stanley as the monitor for the settlement agreement. On December 13, 2016, the court granted a joint motion to award plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs, accepting the $400,557.66 as reasonable. After three years of monitored compliance with the settlement, the agreement expired, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice on December 13, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: In August 2014, detainees at the Franklin County Jail filed a lawsuit alleging that jail officials used excessive force against them and that the jail provided inhumane living conditions, in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In March 28, 2016, the parties settled. The defendant paid $400,557.66 in attorneys’ fees and was required to hire additional staff, renovate the prison, and adopt new mental health services policies.


For the complete Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA Matters, see our special collection.
This case involves a dispute over administrative subpoenas known as National Security Letters (NSLs). In 1986, Congress empowered the FBI to issue NSLs as part of authorized investigations to protect against international terrorism and clandestine intelligence activities. NSLs are directed to electronic communications service providers in order to obtain specified limited information; they are not used to obtain the content of communications. Because of national security interests, the NSL statute imposes a nondisclosure obligation on the NSL recipient. In 2006, Congress revised the nondisclosure provisions in order to avoid unnecessary disclosure restrictions: the nondisclosure requirement no longer applied automatically, and Congress provided a specific statutory mechanism for judicial review of a nondisclosure requirement itself, separate from review of the NSL. In 2011, the FBI issued a National Security Letter (NSL) to an unnamed electronic communication service provider, seeking certain subscriber information. By certifying that the disclosure of the existence of the NSL may result in "a danger to the national security of the United States," the federal government could prohibit the provider from disclosing the existence of the NSL. This entry describes the lawsuits between the recipient and government that arose from this NSL and subsequent NSLs issued to the same recipient. In early 2011, the NSL recipient filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to set aside the NSL under 18 U.S.C. § 3511. The recipient, represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the nondisclosure provision in the NSL Statute (18 U.S.C. § 2709) violated the First Amendment. More specifically, the recipient argued that the nondisclosure provision of the statute was an unconstitutional prior restraint and content-based restriction on speech, both on its face and as applied. The federal government opposed the petition and filed a motion to compel the recipient to comply with the NSL. The government also filed a separate lawsuit seeking a declaration that the recipient was required to comply with the NSL on June 3, 2011 (No. 11-2667). We have an incomplete docket for the government's declaratory judgment action and no docket for the original case—it's entirely under seal. On March 14, 2013, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston granted the petition to set aside the NSL, declaring that 18 U.S.C. § 2709 on its face violated the First Amendment. She noted that § 2709 allowed the government to suppress speech without initiating prompt judicial proceedings and determined that the law was not narrowly tailored because it prevented NSL recipients from disclosing not just the content of NSLs but also their very existence. So, she enjoined the government from issuing additional NSLs or enforcing § 2709's nondisclosure provision in any case. 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064. The government appealed, and the district court stayed proceedings during the appeal on August 7, 2013. Despite the court's March 14 order, the government issued two new NSLs to the recipient of the original NSL. The recipient filed another lawsuit to challenge the new NSLs (No. 13-80089). On August 12, 2013, Judge Illston refused to set aside the new NSLs pending the appeal because they included procedural safeguards. For example, the FBI notified the recipient that judicial review was available and agreed to produce upon challenge evidence of a "good reason" that nondisclosure was required to protect against terrorism. Around the same time, other electronic communication service providers began to challenge NSLs. For more information on these cases, see here. Before the Ninth Circuit could decide the appeal in this case, Congress amended both 18 U.S.C. § 2709 and 18 U.S.C. § 3511 as part of the USA FREEDOM Act on June 2, 2015. In light of the significant changes to the statutes, the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Illston's order and remanded the case on August 24, 2015. On March 19, 2016, Judge Illston found that Congress's revisions cured the NSL process's constitutional defects. The revised § 2709 allowed NSL recipients to require the government to seek judicial review of nondisclosure requirements, and the revised § 3511 required courts to "rule expeditiously" when reviewing NSL nondisclosure requirements. Moreover, the government would bear the burden of proof in the subsequent proceedings and had to provide specific facts to support a claim that disclosure could cause harm. Finally, the new § 3511 allowed the FBI and courts to authorize limited disclosures, which showed that the statute was narrowly tailored. The court then analyzed whether nondisclosure was appropriate for the challenged NSLs. It found that the government adequately supported nondisclosure in case 11-2173 but not 13-80089, and it stayed its ruling pending appeal. The government then voluntarily lifted the nondisclosure requirement in case 11-2173. As a result, the recipient was able to reveal itself as CREDO Mobile. (Information about specific customer accounts remained undisclosed in all cases.) The Ninth Circuit (Judges Sandra S. Ikuta, N. Randy Smith, and Mary H. Murguia) affirmed the district court's decision on July 17, 2017. The court found that § 2709's nondisclosure requirement was content based, applied strict scrutiny, and upheld the restrictions because § 2709 required the government to establish a reasonable likelihood that harm would result from disclosure on a case-by-case basis. The court then questioned whether § 2709 was a prior restraint but concluded, assuming it was, that the law passed muster because it provided quick judicial review. 863 F.3d 1110. The Clearinghouse does not know if CREDO Mobile continues to seek disclosure of those parts of the NSLs that have not already been made public.

Summary: In early 2011, an electronic communication service provider that had received a National Security Letter (NSL) from the federal government filed a petition to set aside the NSL in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The recipient asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that a nondisclosure provision of the NSL Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2709, violated the First Amendment. On March 14, 2013, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston granted the petition to set aside the NSL, declaring that § 2709 violated the First Amendment. The government was therefore enjoined from issuing NSLs under § 2709 or from enforcing the nondisclosure provision in this or any other case. The government appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, but while the appeal was pending, Congress amended § 2709 and 18 U.S.C. § 3511 as part of the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015. The district court and Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the revised § 2709 and § 3511. But the district court held that the government failed to justify nondisclosure in one case involving the recipient, and the government found that nondisclosure was no longer required in another case involving the recipient. As a result, the recipient could reveal itself as CREDO Mobile.


On May 14, 2014, the plaintiff, a freelance investigative reporter, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the National Security Agency (NSA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that the defendants violated the Freedom of Information Act by improperly withholding records concerning the NSA's collection of metadata of judges within the federal judiciary, failing to conduct an adequate search for such records, and failing to grant his requests for a fee waiver. The plaintiff sought both injunctive relief and damages. On September 26, 2014, the DOJ and NSA moved for summary judgment. On July 31, 2015, U.S. District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. She held that while the defendants made a good faith effort search both their facilities and records systems for the requested information, they "failed to conduct an adequate search and adequately explain the basis of their search in certain limited respects." Judge Chutkan ordered them to search again through NSA directives and the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel's draft legal memoranda. Thus, there were still material issues of fact. 118 F. Supp. 3d 302. The defendants completed the new searches and subsequently moved again for summary judgment on October 14, 2015. On July 11, 2016, Judge Chutkan denied the defendants' motion, holding that simply asking two senior attorneys in the Office of Legal Counsel whether they were "aware of any projects OLC projects concerning the propriety of surveilling federal or state judges" did not provide a reasonable basis for concluding that OLC was unlikely to possess responsive records. Judge Chutkan further held that the defendants did not establish that it would be unduly burdensome for them to search the emails of departing OLC attorneys for any draft memoranda or opinions concerning such surveillance program. 196 F.Supp.3d 67. Judge Chutkan directed the parties to submit another status report and scheduling order by October 11, 2016. In August 2016, the parties reported to the Court that they had agreed to new terms under which defendant would search. On October 11, 2016, the parties reported that the search was complete and no documents were gathered. The parties then reported that the only remaining issue to be resolved was payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs. On January 26, 2017, the parties reported that a tentative settlement agreement was reached regarding plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs– that we know of, there is no public information as to the amount of attorney's fees. The settlement agreement was approved on February 27, 2017 and the Court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: In 2014, an investigative reporter filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act against the National Security Agency and U.S. Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were improperly withholding records concerning the NSA's surveillance of federal and state judges. The Court ordered the defendant conduct an email search for draft memoranda or opinions concerning such surveillance program. The search wielded no results. A settlement agreement was reached paying plaintiff's attorney's fees on February 27, 2017.


On September 16, 2016, The Associated Press, Gannett Satellite Information Network LLC, and Vice Media, LLC filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, et seq. The plaintiffs sought to compel the FBI to provide records about the publicly acknowledged purchase of a tool allowing the government access to the phone of one of the perpetrators of the mass killings in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015. ' The defendant completed document review through January, 2017 to determine whether FOIA exemptions would apply to the documents. On January 30, 2017, the defendant moved for summary judgment citing to various exemptions to have the claim dismissed. The plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on February 20, 2017. The Court (Judge Tanya S. Chutkan) granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2017. Plaintiff sought the identity of the vendor who unlocked the phone and the purchase price of the vendor. The Court found the defendant properly invoked exemption 1 (information specifically authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy by an Executive Order), exemption 3 (information exempted by statute), and exemption 7 (information compiled for law enforcement purposes). However, the Court found Exemption 4 (trade secret and commercial or financial information) did not apply. 265 F. Supp. 3d 82. The docket was last updated on September 30, 2017.

Summary: On September 16, 2016, The Associated Press, Gannett Satellite Information Network LLC, and Vice Media, LLC, filed a lawsuit seeking information about the recently purchased tool allowing government access to the phone of one of the perpetrators of the mass killings in San Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015. The Court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on September 30, 2017, finding information at issue was protected under FOIA exemptions 1, 3, and 7.


On January 17, 2006, a group of organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and a number of individuals, filed a law suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the National Security Agency (NSA), under Bivens and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs challenged the legality of NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) as violating their free speech and privacy rights as well as the Separation of Powers doctrine. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction. The plaintiffs alleged that their regular conduct (e.g., journalism, the practice of law, and scholarship) have been impaired by the TSP, which violated various portions of the U.S. Constitution. The NSA countered that the plaintiffs: (1) lacked standing; and (2) could not establish a prima facie case without the use of state secrets, so that the state secret privilege barred plaintiffs' claims. On August 17, 2006, the District Court (Judge Anna Diggs Taylor) disagreed with most of the NSA's arguments, and issued a judgment and permanent injunction order: (1) the TSP violated the Separation of Powers doctrine, the Administrative Procedures Act, the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and (2) the NSA was enjoined from utilizing the TSP including conducting wireless wiretaps of telephone and internet communication, as violating the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Title III. The plaintiffs' data-mining claims were denied. The same day, the NSA filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit. The 6th Circuit stayed the operation of the the district court's injunction, 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2006) and then on July 6, 2007, vacated the District Court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). On March 3, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review. 552 U.S. 1179.

Summary: On January 17, 2006, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the National Security Agency alleging that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was unconstitutional. On August 17, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge Taylor) agreed and enjoined the program. On July 6, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit vacated the order and instructed to dismiss the case based on lack of standing.


The plaintiff in this federal lawsuit was a naturalized U.S. Citizen. He was denied boarding to a flight from the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") to the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List. He filed the lawsuit on May 30, 2013, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, against the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Terrorist Screening Center ("TSC"), which created and maintained the No Fly List. Represented by the Council on American Islamic Relations as well as private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants placed him on the No Fly List to coerce him into becoming an informant for the FBI. The plaintiff further alleged that during an interview in Sudan he was denied counsel by defendants and urged to become an FBI informant in order to have his name removed from the No Fly List. Because the plaintiff refused to become an informant, he further alleged that the defendants retaliated by instigating and facilitating his torture in the UAE. Based upon the foregoing allegations, the plaintiff alleged six claims for relief: (1) violation of the right to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) an unidentified cause of action pertaining to torture; (3) denial of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment; (4) violation of his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; (5) violation of his Fifth Amendment substantive due process right to return to his homeland once abroad; and (6) denial of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment because the defendants failed to inform him on the basis for his inclusion on, or the means of removing his name therefrom the No Fly List. The plaintiff sought a declaration that his right to counsel was violated; redress for the defendants' instigating and facilitating his torture in the UAE; an injunction preventing the defendants from violating the above-mentioned rights; and monetary damages in the amount of $30,000,000. The case was assigned to Judge Anna Brown. On June 17, 2013, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to add an additional defendant. On November 4, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court heard oral argument on the defendants' motion on March 14, 2014 and took the motion under advisement. On May 29, 2014, Judge Brown granted the official-capacity defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing all counts except three (denial of his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment) and four (violation of his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment). The plaintiff had leave to file a second amended complaint consistent with the opinion and order no later than June 27, 2014. 23 F.Supp.3d 1268 (D. Or. May 29, 2014), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73174. The plaintiff eventually filed a series of amended complaints. In 2015, the government revised the redress procedures available through administrative procedures as a result of the decision in Latif v. Holder, 28 F.Supp.3d 1134 (D.Or. 2014), which held various aspects of the process inadequate under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the APA. As a result, the official-capacity defendants moved for a stay or, in the alternative, an extension of time to allow the defendants to reconsider the plaintiff's application under the new procedure. However, after completing the re-evaluation, the defendants determined that the plaintiff should remain on the No-Fly List. On January 14, 2015, Judge Brown granted in part and denied in part the official-capacity defendants' unopposed motion. The court agreed that it was appropriate for the official-capacity defendants to reconsider the plaintiff's DHS TRIP inquiry under the new procedures, but the court found that a stay was unnecessary to permit the defendants to do so. In addition, the court noted that this case was now over 18 months old and had not yet proceeded beyond the pleading stage. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants to complete a substantive reconsideration of the plaintiff's DHS TRIP inquiry no later than March 9, 2015, to move the case along. The plaintiff filed their corrected fourth amended complaint on April 6, 2015. The defendants again filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. On November 4, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient (1) to state a substantive due process claim based on right to international travel; (2) to state procedural due process claim based on right to international travel and to be free from false government stigmatization; (3) to state a claim for injunctive relief under the Fourth Amendment because the plaintiff was subject to surveillance without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion; and (4) to state a claim under the Wiretap Act. However, the court also held that the plaintiff's allegations were not sufficient to state a claim under the Stored Communications Act and that he had failed to plead a valid waiver of sovereign immunity for his claim that the FBI failed to comply with FISA. And the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive relief on the claim that the FBI placed him on the No Fly List while he was abroad in order to subject him to custodial interrogation without the assistance of counsel, because that issue no longer affected him, personally. 142 F.Supp.3d 1152, 2015 WL 6756121, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151522. The court again gave the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies, and on November 29, 2015, the plaintiff filed his fifth amended complaint. On March 16, 2016, Judge Brown found that plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory relief on their claim that was brought under the Fourth Amendment. On May 9, 2016, the defendants notified the court that the plaintiff was removed from the No Fly List. On September 28, 2016, the courted issued an opinion and order, in which it granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint, and denied as moot the defendants’ motion to stay the plaintiff’s due process claims. 2016 WL 5539591, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133307. On October 6, 2016, the plaintiff filed a notice in which he stated his non-objection to the court dismissing this action as to the individual capacity defendants, the actions of which were subsequently dismissed without prejudice by the court on October 24, 2016. On December 23, 2016, the plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 2, 2017, the appellant submitted their opening brief, arguing that (1) the court must reject defendants’ attempt to moot plaintiff’s claims by removing him from the No Fly List years after the start of the litigation; (2) the complaint states a Fourth Amendment Claim for Unlawful Surveillance, Search, and Seizure; and (3) the district court improperly concluded that declaratory relief was not available for the fourth amendment claim. In response, the government argued that (1) the plaintiff’s No Fly List claims are moot because he is no longer on the No Fly List; (2) the government had demonstrated that the alleged wrongful conduct is not likely to occur; (3) the plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief for speculative future claims do not save his current claim from mootness; (4) the plaintiff’s No Fly List claims are not capable of repetition yet evading review; and (5) the district court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’s surveillance claims. Oral argument was scheduled for May 9, 2018 before Judge Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Judge Morgan B. Christen, and Judge Marvin J. Garbis. On June 28, 2018, Judge Marvin J. Garbis retired and was replaced by Judge Milan D. Smith. On September 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit found that the allegations in the plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint were vague and conclusory, and did not give rise to a plausible claim for relief. Moreover, since the plaintiff had several opportunities to amend his complaint, and repeatedly failed to do so, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his Fourth Amendment claim with prejudice. 738 Fed.Appx. 545 (Mem), 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26939, 2018 WL 4537720. In a separately filed opinion by Judge Christen, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action as moot, that alleged the FBI violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by placing and maintaining him on the No Fly List. The panel held that plaintiff’s removal from the No Fly List was more likely an exercise of discretion than a decision arising from a broad change in agency policy or procedure, and further held that the government had not assured plaintiff that he would not be banned from flying for the same reasons that prompted the government to add him to the list in the first place, nor had it verified the implementation of procedural safeguards conditioning its ability to revise plaintiff’s status on the receipt of new information. The panel subsequently reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s due process claims and remanded for further proceedings. 904 F.3d 1033, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 26880. Costs were taxed against the appellees. On October 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants/appellees’ unopposed motion for an extension to file petition for panel rehearing on or before December 5, 2018. The plaintiff filed a petition on that date, but the Ninth Circuit unanimously denied the petition on January 2, 2019. On May 19, 2019 the plaintiff filed another amended complaint. This one removed previously unresolved claims, added additional factual allegations for the due process claims, and added the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator as defendant. The plaintiffs wanted to add the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) head as a defendant as well, but Judge Brown did not allow this in her order partially granting and denying the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint on May 8. 2019 WL 2030724. The case was reassigned to Judge Michael W. Mosman on July 15, 2019. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on July 20, 2019. Oral argument before Judge Mosman on the motion was held on November 14; after argument, the Judge granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice. He stated that arguments based on travel limitations were moot, but granted the plaintiff the opportunity to amend the complaint to further discuss stigma and reputational damage surrounding previous placement on the No Fly List, which is disseminated nationally and internationally. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint expanding on the reputational harm of being on the No Fly List on December 18, 2019. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 22, 2020; a hearing on that motion is set for June 15, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The plaintiff, an individual citizen and lawful resident of the United States that was denied boarding a flight from the United Arab Emirates to the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the No Fly List of the federal government, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiff specifically alleged that his inclusion on the No Fly List was to coerce him to be an FBI informant. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for the federal government's various alleged constitutional violations and torture. To date, the case remains pending.


On May 8, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") of Washington filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. The ACLU sued the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DOJ to disclose and release records describing the operation and maintenance of the the National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, which was maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), a component of the DOJ. The National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"), a nationwide clearinghouse of reports operated by the FBI, provides direct online access to its computerized index of criminal justice information for local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement officers, government agencies, financial institutions, prospective employers, etc. This database includes a Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File ("VGTOF"), which contains entries on suspected terrorist organizations and individuals. In 2003, there were over 7,000 individuals listed on the VGTOF as terrorists, though many of them had no criminal records. The ACLU was concerned that this could lead to grave ramifications, for instance, during a traffic stop where after running someone's credentials, the officer is alerted to the individual's status on the VGTOF and warned to approach that person with extreme caution. The VGTOF warning also instructs the officer to call the Terrorist Screening Center immediately and a number is provided on the officer's screen. The Terrorist Screening Center sends back one of four responses to the officer: "arrest, detain, investigate, or query." There is no option for letting the individual go among these responses. In a 2005 test conducted by the Terrorist Screening Center, the VGTOF was found to contain a 40% error rate, most of which were in the portion of the database that instructs officers how to approach and interact with individuals who have entries in the VGTOF. On December 19, 2008, the ACLU sent a letter to the FBI submitting a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request for "any record held by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation describing the operation and maintenance of the National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File." Though the ACLU received a letter dated January 5, 2006 indicating that the FBI received it's request, the FBI never followed up or provided any records requested by the ACLU. As a result, the ACLU filed this 2009 lawsuit claiming that the FBI violated it's rights under the Freedom of Information Act by failing to disclose and release the requested records. On June 18, 2010, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it had conducted an adequate search for the requested documents, and properly withheld records and portions of records under applicable exemption under the Freedom of Information Act in order to protect classified information. On March 10, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Robert S. Lasnik granted the DOJ summary judgment in part, but ordered the DOJ to edit any inappropriate redactions and provide more facts that would justify redacting or not providing a certain document. On March 24, 2011, the DOJ filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to stay the Court's order on their motion for summary judgment. On May 19, 2011, the Court granted the DOJ's motion for reconsideration in part, requiring that after the DOJ supplemented the Vaughn index regarding the documents discussed in sections 1, 4, and 5, the parties would attempt to resolve their differences regarding production of these documents. If the parties were unable to reach agreement, plaintiff could, within thirty days of production of the revised Vaughn index, file a supplemental memorandum to assist the Court during in camera review of the contested documents. On May 24, 2011, the DOJ filed a second motion for reconsideration questioning the Court's jurisdiction to review a designation by TSA, which was granted on June 20, 2011. On June 22, 2011, the DOJ filed the supplemental Vaughn Declarations, and on July 6, 2011, submitted documents for in camera review. On September 21, 2012, Judge Lasnik issued an order following in camera review, which required the DOJ to make certain disclosures. On October 1, 2012, the DOJ filed a third motion for reconsideration, claiming that it had further evidence to present the Court as to why exemption 1 applies to document numbers 79, 80, and 84. The Court granted the DOJ's motion for reconsideration to allow the DOJ to deliver to chambers an ex parte declaration addressing applicability of the exemption to these documents. Shortly thereafter, the parties began negotiations for settlement. On March 7, 2013, they agreed upon a Stipulation and Proposed Order for Compromise Settlement and Release of Claims. On March 11, 2013, Judge Lasnik officially ordered the Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release of Claims, whereby the United States was to pay the ACLU $50,000 within 60 days via wire transfer, as full settlement for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the ACLU in this lawsuit. This case is closed. As a result of this lawsuit, the ACLU got many thousands of pages of materials. As far as we know, they are not publicly available--but they were used as the information base for a 2016 report titled "Trapped in a Black Box: Growing Terrorism Watchlisting in Everyday Policing."

Summary: On May 8, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") of Washington filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. The ACLU sued the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The ACLU asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DOJ to disclose and release records it was improperly withholding from the ACLU regarding the National Crime Information Center Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File ("CVGTOF"), which contains entries on suspected terrorist organizations and individuals. Though the DOJ moved to dismiss the case, on March 10, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Robert S. Lasnik only granted the motion to dismiss in part, and ordered the DOJ to edit any inappropriate redactions and provide the Court with more facts that would justify a claimed exemption. After some back and forth regarding the confidentiality of the requested documents, the DOJ was required to release certain documents and on March 7, 2013 the parties came to an agreement whereby the United States was to pay the ACLU $50,000 within 60 days via wire transfer, as full settlement for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the ACLU in this lawsuit. This case is closed.


On October 5, 2017, the NAACP together with its Boston and Connecticut branches filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the U.S. Department of Commerce (the parent agency of the U.S. Census Bureau) to compel prompt compliance with its request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiffs sought expeditious disclosure of the Bureau’s plans for digitization, reaching “hard-to-count” populations, hiring practices, and other preparations for the 2020 census, as well as a declaration that plaintiffs were entitled to a full fee waiver and an award of any costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had violated 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) for failing to respond to the initial complaint within 20 days, 15 C.F.R. § 4.6(f)(4) for failure to respond to their request for expedited processing, and § 552(a)(4)(iii) for erroneously denying plaintiffs’ public interest fee waiver. Back on June 29, 2017, plaintiffs had first submitted a FOIA request to the Census Bureau relating to the 2020 census. They were concerned about the digitalization, understaffing, and underfunding of the Bureau that could lead to undercounting of minority populations and security vulnerabilities. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs alleged that the Bureau failed to respond to that request within 20 days after it received the request as required by law. However, the Bureau claimed that it did not receive the request until July 6. Then, on August 7, the Bureau gave itself a month-long extension. The plaintiffs claimed the extension cited the wrong statute, failed to comply with the correct statute’s procedural requirements, and violated a 10-day limit for extensions. The Bureau then delayed an additional month due to purported lack of clarification on two of the requested items. On October 3, the Bureau sent “several internet links and four documents,” saying it would provide additional records on a rolling basis but failing at the time to disclose most of the requested documents. Additionally, the Bureau denied plaintiffs’ fee waiver request on the basis that plaintiffs were not an academic institution. On March 7, 2018, plaintiffs submitted a second FOIA request that became included in the dispute. The parties jointly filed a motion to meet and confer on March 19, 2018, which Judge Warren Eginton granted on March 21. However, according to a joint status report filed on June 14, the parties could not reach an agreement. Defendants then moved for summary judgment on July 26, 2018. The plaintiffs responded with a memo in opposition and a cross motion for discovery on September 17, 2018. On November 5, 2018, defendants agreed to disclose some documents but maintained their motion for summary judgment. Following several extensions for time, plaintiffs agreed to settled on February 4, 2019. The stipulation was granted by Judge Eginton on February 5. The agreement required defendants to provide most of the documents for both FOIA requests no later than February 14, and all other documents by the end of February or mid-March. On September 23, 2019, the judge approved an agreement between the parties that the defendants would pay plaintiffs $18,400 for attorneys' fees and costs within 60 days. There has been no further docket activity that would indicate any disputes over enforcement occurred. So, the case is likely closed.

Summary: In 2017, the NAACP filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Dept. of Commerce for failure to provide it with records under the FOIA concerning its preparations for the 2020 census. The plaintiffs alleged the Census Bureau was failing to adhere to deadlines, failing to confirm certain requests, and refusing to disclose documents in a timely manner in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 552 and 15 C.F.R § 4.6. In 2019, the parties reached a settlement that required disclosure of the documents within several weeks and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. The case likely closed in September 2019.


The plaintiff in this case, Jacqueline Jones, has quadriplegia as a result of a spinal cord injury and requires assistance in carrying out daily life activities due to her mobility impairment. For many years, her parents were able to care for her, but as they approach old age they no longer have the physical capacity to do so. Ms. Jones was on the waitlist for Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury (TBI/SCI) Medicaid waiver for several years. In 2009, the state conducted an assessment interview of Ms. Jones in which they determined that she was at risk for imminent placement in a nursing facility, it could not provide her with services. On December 2, 2009, Ms. Jones filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging that the failure to provide services to allow her to remain in the community violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. She filed an accompanying motion for preliminary injunction. A few weeks later, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action as moot, as they began the process of providing Ms. Jones with waiver services. The court then postponed hearing Ms. Jones' motion for preliminary injunction, but did not dismiss the case immediately. In early January 2013, Jones filed a motion for class certification, as she sought to represent all individuals on the TBI/SCI waitlist. Before the court resolved the class certification motion, similarly situated plaintiff (and potential class representative) Michele Haddad filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Discovery continued as the timeline on these motions was extended and multiple briefs were filed. The Court (Judge Marcia Morales Howard) denied Haddad's motion on May 7, 2010, because no class had been certified and Haddad therefore could not represent herself or others in Jones' case. (Haddad later filed a separate action. See Haddad v. Arnold). The United States (DOJ) filed a motion to intervene in the case, seeking to represent the interests of individuals in Florida who are on the waitlist for services under the TBI/SCI Medicaid waiver. But because Ms. Jones had began receiving services, she stipulated to a voluntary dismissal and the case was closed in January 2011. The DOJ motion to intervene was not considered.

Summary: Jacqueline Jones filed this lawsuit challenging Florida's failure to provide her with sufficient home care services via the Traumatic Brain Injury/Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid waiver. Although she sought to expand her case to represent a class of plaintiffs, the state began providing her with appropriate services after her lawsuit was filed and she agreed to a voluntary dismissal.