On October 31st, 2016, a group of Plaintiffs who had been jailed for their inability to pay fines owed to the City of Florissant, Missouri for traffic tickets or other minor municipal offenses, sued the City for this violation of due process in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The Plaintiffs are represented by the Advancement Project, ArchCity Defenders, Inc., and private counsel. The Plaintiffs sued the City of Florissant, MO under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Plaintiffs alleged that the City held individuals in jail in “grotesque, dangerous, inhumane conditions" until all fines and fees set by the City are paid – usually by friends or relatives. Further, they alleged that the amount paid was arbitrarily and significantly reduced when the City recognizes that they are unable to profit from the plaintiffs' detention. Also, they alleged that the City issued and enforced arrest warrants for the plaintiffs' failure to appear in court or at the jail to pay their fines. They alleged that individuals were held in jail for days in inhumane conditions before they appeared before the judge. The Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating that the rights of Plaintiffs were violated by the City, injunctive relief permanently enjoining the City from enforcing these unconstitutional policies and practices, and compensatory relief for damages suffered as a result of the City’s unconstitutional and unlawful conduct, as well as payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Nannette A. Baker. Both parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction in November 2016. This case was first referred to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) on June 1, 2017. The court continued to attempt to force the two parties to resolve this dispute through mediation throughout the rest of 2017 and most of 2018. On November 16, 2018, the parties agreed on a neutral mediator, James W. Reeves. Mediation seemed poised to start in early December 2018, but the order referring the case to ADR was vacated on December 6, 2018. During that same time, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or alternatively to strike or for a more definite statement on January 13, 2017. The court denied this motion on December 12, 2017, with the court holding that the plaintiffs had filed a valid claim with the court. Throughout 2019, the case proceeded slowly, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to join an indispensable party on March 16, 2019, which the court denied on August 12, 2019. The parties also filed various requests to extend the deadlines to allow for the gathering of additional expert reports and additional data, repeatedly pushing back the end of discovery. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on January 15, 2020, nearly three years after the initial deadline for amendment of pleadings. The Plaintiffs sought to “shore up” class definitions, clarify factual issues learned in discovery, and add a claim under a Missouri statute § 544.170 that requires those arrested without a warrant to be released within 24 hours. The Plaintiffs alleged that were trying to make sure class categories match allegations in the complaint after receiving advice from an expert who helped them to sort through the information. They further alleged that the additional claim is similar enough to their initial claims that the defendants should have been given adequate notice and no additional discovery will be needed. On May 6, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint. The court allowed plaintiffs to amend the complaint to correct demographic information on the plaintiffs and remove paragraphs no longer supported by the information revealed in discovery. However, the court denied the plaintiff's request to add an additional plaintiff as class representative, add claims under Missouri statute § 544.170, and reconfigure and add class categories, ruling that plaintiffs had failed to show “good cause” for why these amendments hadn’t taken place within the original window to amend. The Plaintiffs filed motion for reconsideration of the court's ruling on May 7, 2020. On May 21, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. This case is currently ongoing with both these motions by plaintiffs pending.

Summary: On October 31st, 2016, a group of Plaintiffs who had been jailed for their inability to pay fines owed to the City of Florissant, Missouri for traffic tickets or other minor municipal offenses, sued the City for this violation of due process. This case is still in the discovery stage and has been ongoing for four years.


In 1989, Children's Rights and the ACLU filed a federal class action on behalf of children placed in foster care under the supervision of the District of Columbia's Department of Human Services (DHS), and abused and neglected children who are (or should be) known to DHS by virtue of abuse or neglect. The case asserted violations of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, due process, the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensor Act of 1986. In 1991, Judge Thomas F. Hogan of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia approved a negotiated remedial order following trial and a liability judgment against the defendant. LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). Under the consent decree DHS agreed to develop policies and procedures in the areas of protective services; family preservation and preventive services; child placement; case reviews; adoption; staffing (qualifications, training, and caseload standards); resource development (foster homes, adoptive homes, and community based services); contracts with private providers and agencies; and development of a uniform computerized information system. The decision was appealed and remanded a number of times. The District of Columbia argued that the remedy sought by the plaintiffs could not be provided under federal law; the Court of Appeals instructed the district court to modify the consent order to be based entirely on local law. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The district court kept the entire content of the order finding that local law provided adequate support for the measures in the decree. In October 1994, the plaintiffs filed a contempt motion, and the court ordered the creation of a limited receivership to address specific problems. In 1995, the judge found defendants in contempt of court and granted plaintiffs' request for appointment of a general receiver who would run the department. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1995). The District made another appeal, this time regarding orders of receivership. The Court of Appeals found two orders moot, but held that the district court could not direct the receiver to disregard District law even if it interfered with the receiver's discharge of her responsibilities. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 107 F.3d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In June 2001, the parties proposed and the court agreed to terminate the receivership and appoint a monitor. In addition, the District agreed to create of a new agency, the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), with cabinet-level control of child welfare matters and consolidated jurisdiction over neglect and abuse cases. The District also agreed to fund additional lawyers to represent the CFSA in Superior Court and a variety of child welfare reforms. In May 2003, the monitor issued a post-Receivership Implementation Plan, a comprehensive outline for reform negotiated among plaintiffs, CFSA, the District mayor, and the court monitor. The Plan envisioned that by December 2006, defendants would fully comply with the district court's 1991 remedial order. The monitor continued to assess defendants' progress in 2004 and 2005. At one point during this period, the District failed to maintain an adequate number of attorneys on staff, and this failure apparently led to a severe case backlog for children who had a permanency goal of adoption. CFSA addressed the backlog and was required to ensure that such a backlog not recur. In December 2006 (the Implementation Plan deadline), despite numerous marked improvements, CFSA had failed to comply fully with several benchmarks. Accordingly, in February 2007, the court approved a jointly-submitted Amended Implementation Plan, which established a new reform deadline of December 2008 and required CFSA to produce annual strategy plans in 2007 and 2008. Setbacks in the reform effort prompted plaintiffs to file a contempt motion against the District in July 2008. The motion cited chronic problems, including a large backlog of unresolved abuse and neglect investigations, failure to move children into permanent homes on a timely basis, and frequent moves for children in foster care. In an attempt to resolve these problems, the parties negotiated yet another stipulated order, approved by the Court in October 2008. The stipulated order set forth a number of requirements that CFSA was to meet by January 2009. However, CFSA was unable to meet these requirements, and plaintiffs renewed their contempt motion in January 2009. In April 2010, the court ruled on plaintiffs' motion, holding the District and its mayor in contempt. LaShawn A. v. Fenty, 701 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2010). The ruling cited the District's failure to implement an annual strategy plan approved by the court-appointed monitor and specifically mentioned the Mayor's failure to consult with the monitor or with plaintiffs' counsel as stipulated in the 2008 order. In addition, the court rejected defendants' argument that under Horne v. Flores, 129 S.Ct. 2579 (2009), the consent decree should be terminated altogether. The court also ordered that more funds be allocated to assist children aging out of the foster care system. Defendants appealed the district court's decision; the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in February 2011. LaShawn A. v. Gray, 412 F. App'x 315 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In December 2010, the Court approved another Implementation and Exit Plan, superseding the 2007 Amended Implementation Plan. This document set forth which outcomes needed to be maintained, which outcomes still needed to be achieved, and a strategy plan for exiting the consent decree. In accordance with this new plan, CFSA developed strategy plans in each year after 2012 to develop means to achieve compliance and exit. Regular six-month monitoring reports were filed. The parties submitted a joint motion for an order approving an Exit and Sustainability plan on August 29, 2019, which was approved by the court on October 31, 2019. The plan included 19 outcomes to be achieved, self-regulation and public reporting commitments, and placement array commitments. The court monitor would continue to provide monthly review. The exit plan also detailed that the defendants may independently seek to exit court supervision after they had maintained all outcomes to be achieved for two consecutive six-month reporting periods, by petitioning the court, or by other court order. As of May 20, 2020, reporting continues, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 20, 1989, foster care children of the District of Columbia filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights and the ACLU, asked the court to order improved policies related to protective services, family preservation and preventive services, child placement, case reviews, adoptions, and staffing, among other issues, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, the District of Columbia Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, and the District of Columbia Youth Residential Facilities Licensor Act of 1986. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that caseloads were too large, leaving many children in the foster care system for far too long with unresolved cases. Additionally, the complaint alleged inappropriate placements for children and inadequate efforts to return children home. In 1993, Judge Thomas F. Hogan approved a consent decree directing DHS to develop policies and procedures to rectify the system. After many years of oversight, and periodic contempt orders, the system has gradually improved. However, there is still a monitor in place reporting on the progress of the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) created as a result of this case.


On October 25, 2017, foster parents and three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana) filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the “ICWA”) and accompanying regulations, including regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs titled Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings (the “Final Rule”). They also challenged certain provisions of the Social Security Act (“SSA”) that predicated federal funding for portions of state child-welfare payments on compliance with the ICWA. The plaintiffs sued the United States of America, several federal agencies, and intervening Native American tribes in the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the ICWA, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1923, 1951–1952, was unconstitutional and unenforceable and an injunction prohibiting the implementation or administration of those sections of the ICWA. They also sought attorney’s fees and costs. Private counsel represented the parents. The case was assigned to Judge Reed C. O’Connor. Background on the Indian Child Welfare Act Congress passed the ICWA in the 1970s in response to concerns about the large number of Native American children being removed from families and tribes and being placed in non-Native homes. The ICWA mandated that placement preferences in foster care and adoptive homes favor placing Native children with members of the child’s extended family, or if not possible, with members of the child’s tribe or with other Native families. The ICWA required a showing of “good cause” to override that preference. Plaintiffs' Specific Claims The plaintiffs argued that the ICWA and Final Rule sets up a system based on racial and ethnic preferences in violation of state and federal law. Both the state and the individual plaintiffs alleged that the ICWA violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. All plaintiffs alleged that the Final Rule violated the APA because it was not in accordance with law. They also alleged that the parts of the ICWA, Final Rule, and SSA violated the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment by intruding into state domestic relations and violating anti-commandeering principles. The individual plaintiffs further alleged that the ICWA’s placement preferences violated their Fifth Amendment substantive due process right to an intimate familiar relationship with the children they foster. The state plaintiffs alleged that the ICWA and the Final rule also were an impermissible delegation of federal legislative and executive power to tribal nations in violation of Article I of the Constitution. Native Tribes Permitted to Intervene as Defendants On March 26, 2018, Native tribes, including Cherokee Nation, Morongo Band of Mission Indians, Oneida Nation, and Quinault Indian Nation, filed a motion to intervene as defendants, and the court granted it two days later. The four Native tribes immediately moved to dismiss the suit. The Navajo Nation, who filed a separate motion to intervene on April 26, 2018, was not permitted to join the lawsuit as a defendant. The court found that the Navajo Nation’s interest would be adequately represented by the four other tribal nation defendants. The Parties File Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Both the state and individual plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment in April 2018. The federal defendants meanwhile filed both a motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment. Several parties filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the plaintiffs, federal defendants, and tribal defendant-intervenors. These included briefs from eight states, several tribal advocacy groups, including the National Indian Child Welfare Association and National Congress of American Indians, and the Goldwater Institute. In June 2018, the Native tribes also filed a motion for summary judgment. District Court Denies Motion to Dismiss and Finds Plaintiffs Have Standing Judge O’Connor denied both the federal and tribal defendants’ motions to dismiss on July 24, 2018. He found that the state and individual plaintiffs had standing to bring suit. Further, he rejected the federal defendants’ argument that they failed to waive sovereign immunity, finding the APA waived sovereign immunity on plaintiffs’ claims challenging the agency’s Final Rule and actions and that sovereign immunity did not protect against a challenge to the constitutionality of the ICWA. He also found that Younger abstention was not applicable to this case and plaintiffs seeking relief to preclude application of the ICWA to state-court child custody proceedings did not require abstention in this case. District Court Grants Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs After a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, on October 4, 2018, Judge O’Connor granted the plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514. The court evaluated the plaintiff’s claims that the ICWA and Final Rule violated: 1) The equal protection requirements of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Tenth Amendment; and (4) the proper scope of the Indian Commerce Clause. The state plaintiffs also argued that: (1) the Final Rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”); and (2) the ICWA violated the non-delegation doctrine Article I of the Constitution. First, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims and the appropriate level of review. The plaintiffs argued strict scrutiny applied because ICWA relied on racial classifications. The defendants responded that the placement preferences relied not on racial classification, but rather political classifications, and therefore, rational basis review should be applied. The court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the ICWA classification mirrored racial classification and that strict scrutiny applied. The court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their equal protection claim because the classifications in the ICWA were not narrowly tailored and did not serve a compelling governmental interest. Next, the court evaluated the state plaintiffs’ Article I non-delegation claim and granted them summary judgment. The state plaintiffs claimed that the ICWA was unconstitutional because it delegated congressional power to Native American tribes by permitting tribes to reorder congressionally enacted adoption placement preference by tribal decree and apply these orders against the states. The court held that regardless of whether Native tribes were characterized as quasi-sovereigns or domestic dependent nations, the Constitution did not permit them to exercise federal legislative or executive power over non-tribal persons on non-tribal land. Accordingly, it held the delegation in the ICWA and Final Rule permitting tribal placement preferences to apply over those in the ICWA impermissible. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment on their Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering claim. The plaintiffs argued that the ICWA unconstitutionally required state courts and executive agencies to apply federal standards and directives to state created claims. The federal government argued that they had the power to enact the ICWA under the Indian Commerce Clause. The court determined that the ICWA violated three principles laid out in Murphy v. NCAA on the importance of the anti-commandeering doctrine: 1) protecting the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty; 2) promoting political accountability; 3) preventing Congress from shifting the cost of regulation to the states. The court rejected the idea that the ICWA preempts state law, as the ICWA is directly regulating the states. Finally, the court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on their claim that the Final Rule violated the APA by implementing an unconstitutional law, exceeding the scope of the BIA’s statutory regulatory authority, and reflecting an impermissibly ambiguous construction of the statute; and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious. The court denied summary judgment to the individuals plaintiffs on their claim that the ICWA and Final Rule violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause. The court refused to recognize a fundamental right of keeping foster families or prospective adoptive families together. Judge O’Connor entered final judgment that day, October 4, 2018, and declared §§ 1901–1923, 1951–1952 of the ICWA and the Final Rule unconstitutional. Defendants Appeal to the Fifth Circuit & Fifth Circuit Reverses District Court The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit on November 19, 2018, docket number 18-11479. The Navajo Nation once again sought to intervene on the appeal, and this time, the Fifth Circuit permitted them to intervene in support of appellants. On August 9, 2019, in an opinion written by Circuit Judge James L. Dennis, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. 937 F.3d 406. Regarding the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Fifth Circuit court determined that the classification was a political, rather than racial classification and applied rational basis review. The court reversed the anti-commandeering claim and preemption claim, stating that the ICWA regulates private individuals rather than states. Circuit Judge Priscilla Owen wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge Owen believed that the ICWA violated the constitution by directing state officers and agents to administer federal law. En Banc Rehearing Results in Highly Fractured, 325 Page Decision that Partially Reverses, Partially Affirms District Court On November 7, 2019, the Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc. On April 6, 2021, the en banc Fifth Circuit released a highly fractured opinion, totaling 325 pages. Two principal opinions were filed by Judge James L. Dennis and Judge Stuart Kyle Duncan. Neither principal opinion gained majority support on all issues. A majority of the court agreed that Congress has the authority to enact the ICWA under Article I of the Constitution. They also reversed the district court’s decision that the classification in the ICWA violated the equal protection clause. A majority of the en banc court also found that several provisions of the ICWA do not illegal commandeer the states, but affirmed the district court’s ruling that other parts of the ICWA did unconstitutionally commandeer state officials. The en banc court was split on other issues, including the district court’s ruling the ICWA violated the equal protection by preferring other Native American families over the adoptive parents, saying that the holding was “affirmed without a precedential opinion.” The en banc majority reversed the district court’s ruling on the preemption and nondelegation doctrine claims. Lastly, the en banc majority held that the BIA did not violate the APA by concluding the Final Rule may issue regulations binding on state courts but held that it did violate the APA by implementing unconstitutional provisions. Judge Costa wrote a particularly lively opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Judge Costa would find that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the circuit court lacked the power to bind state courts conducting adoption proceedings and therefore could not redress the injury. He wrote “it will no doubt shock the reader who has slogged through today’s lengthy opinions. . . this case will not have binding effect in a single adoption.” He further wrote “there is a term for a judicial decision that does nothing more than opine on what the law should be: an advisory opinion. That is what the roughly 300 pages you just read amount to.” He also criticized the other opinions for their narrow view on federal power when it was being used to sustain tribal life, rather than destroy it: “[T]he most tragic irony of today’s opinions” is that “[a]fter more than two centuries of courts' recognizing sweeping federal power over Indian affairs when that power was often used to destroy tribal life, our court comes within a whisker of rejecting that power when it is being used to sustain tribal life. . . . Contrary to what a near-majority of our court concludes, the same power Congress once relied on to tear Indian children from Indian homes authorizes Congress to enlist state courts in the project of returning them.” The case is ongoing.

Summary: On 2017, foster parents and three states filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (the "ICWA"). Plaintiffs allege the ICWA violates the Equal Protection Clause and anti-commandeering principles. The district court held the ICWA is unconstitutional which was partially affirmed in a fractured en banc opinion by the Fifth Circuit. The case is ongoing.


On August 18, 2009, three individuals receiving adult day health care services in California filed a class action lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services and its Director to enjoin the Department from making cuts to the Adult Day Health Care (ADHC) services program. Represented by Disability Rights California, AARP Foundation Litigation, and the National Senior Citizens Law Center, the plaintiffs filed their suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, and alleged numerous causes of action: violation of the 14th amendment due process clause of the U.S. Constitution; violation of the American Disabilities Act; violations of the Medicaid Act; and violation of California Government Code sections 11135 and 11139. The plaintiffs alleged that cuts or significant changes to the ADHC program would place elderly persons and adults with disabilities at great risk of permanent institutionalization. The proposed cuts would reduce ADHC services from 5 days a week to only 3, leaving a gap in service provision for elderly and disabled people otherwise unable to care for themselves. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for a class of individuals defined as "all recipients of Medi-Cal in California who receive ADHC services, whose benefits would be limited, cut or terminated" under the proposed legislation. Less than a week after they filed the case, under the impression that the reduction in ADHC services would take effect on August 27, 2009, plaintiffs sought an emergency Temporary Restraining Order. Once the plaintiffs learned that the reduction would not take place until the week of September 7, 2009, they substituted a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On September 10, 2009, District Court (Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong) issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the California Department of Health Care Services from reducing, terminating, or modifying the ADHC program until an appropriate alternative could be provided to prevent institutionalization of individuals in the plaintiffs' class. On February 24, 2010, the District Court issued a second preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from "implementing new, more restrictive eligibility requirements for ADHC services." On August 10, 2010, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court certified the class as "All Medi-Cal beneficiaries in the State of California for whom Adult Day Health Care benefits will be reduced, suspended, denied or terminated under the provisions of ABx4 5." On December 14, 2011, the District Court approved the motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement "which preserves ADHC-like services for people who are at risk of institutionalization, in a new program called Community-Based Adult Services (CBAS). Similar to ADHC, CBAS will offer center-based skilled health and nursing care, therapies, transportation and other services, to eligible low income seniors and people with disabilities. Under the settlement, the planned December 1, 2011 ADHC elimination date will be moved to February 29, 2012 to ensure a seamless transition for eligible ADHC participants to the CBAS program." On January 25, 2012, the District Court entered the stipulated judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement reached by the parties. On Sept. 15, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the judgment and for the appointment of a special master. The district court referred the motion to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley, who issued an opinion and order denying the motion on Nov. 20, 2012. In their motion, the plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to take necessary steps to prevent managed care opt-outs; that it subjected some class members to long-delayed hearing decisions; that it subjected class members to illegal Quality Assurance reviews in determining CBAS eligibility; and it had not acted to support access to CBAS and prevent loss of CBAS services due to center closures. But Judge Corley determined that the state had not violated any aspect of the settlement agreement. On March 8, 2013, Judge Armstrong accepted Magistrate Judge Corley's report and recommendation. He ordered that the plaintiffs' motion be denied.

Summary: California recipients of Adult Day Health Care services brought this class action to enjoin California from reducing or eliminating the ADHC program, which would put the plaintiffs at risk of institutionalization. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the plaintiff class a preliminary injunction in September 2009, forbidding California to modify it's adult Day Health Care program until an appropriate alternative could be provided to prevent institutionalization of individuals in the plaintiffs' class. The District Court approved a settlement agreement that created a new program which will help to prevent the institutionalization of ADHC beneficiaries.


On July 1, 1999, two individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility, filed a complaint against the City of Steamboat Springs in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado claiming the City had failed to make its bus service and other services were not accessible to persons with disabilities, in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. On April 20, 2000, the court granted the United States' motion to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs. The decree essentially dealt with all of the plaintiffs' claims, requiring the defendant to make its transportation system and other services accessible. The defendant agreed to pay attorneys' fees and costs, $9500 to one plaintiff and $2750 to the other. The defendants were required to submit annual progress reports to plaintiffs' counsel. The decree was to last for 4 years. The settlement concluded without further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: Two individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility sued the City of Steamboat Springs, for having inaccessible public transportation and facilities. The parties entered into a consent decree requiring the city to make its services and facilities accessible, pay attorneys' fees and costs, and pay $12,250 to the plaintiffs.


On January 6, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Colorado Rockies baseball club in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado after it removed accessible seats in Coors Field and raised prices on others. Plaintiffs, Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Inc., was a Denver, Colorado non-profit corporation that advocated for the disabled, a Colorado resident with spina bifida who used a wheelchair for mobility, and his father Plaintiff who accompanied him to baseball games alleged that prior to 2001, the defendant provided wheelchair accessible seats at Coors Field behind home plate, which were the only accessible seats providing a front-row or "near-in" viewing experience at the infield. These seats were $27 to $38. Inaccessible seats in the same location were approximately $100. In 2001, to create a luxury seating area, the defendant raised the prices on the accessible seats behind home plate to $100 and removed some of the seats, leaving no affordable equivalent viewpoint for disabled individuals. The Plaintiffs' complaint brought a single count under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. The plaintiffs asked for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On June 2, 2003, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. On April 2, 2004, the court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, in a published opinion. Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Col. 2004). The defendant argued that clustering accessible seating at the top of certain sections in the ballpark was permissible under the ADA. The court denied the motion, noting that "The Rockies may not 'ghettoize' wheelchair spaces or designate a few token wheelchair spaces in the luxury seating areas as has been done." A trial took place from April 19 to April 22, 2004. On August 31, 2004, the court granted a joint stipulated dismissal with prejudice of all claims. It is unclear whether the parties settled and if so what the terms of that agreement are. This order is the last entry on the docket. No documents are available through PACER.

Summary: Plaintiffs were disabled individuals who sued the Colorado Rockies baseball club after it removed accessible seats in Coors Field and raised prices on others. There was a trial held, after which the court dismissed all claims by stipulation. It is unclear, however, whether the parties settled.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 29, 2020, four individuals with disabilities and Disability Rights New York sued the Governor of New York State for the absence of live televised American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation on the Governor’s daily televised briefings. Given the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs alleged that lack of live ASL accommodations discriminated against populations with disabilities residing in New York. <hr> On April 29, four individuals with disabilities and Disability Rights New York filed this lawsuit against Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of New York State, as a declaratory and injunctive action. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of live televised American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation in Governor Cuomo’s daily televised briefings on COVID-19 discriminated against populations with disabilities residing in New York, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Further, the plaintiffs added that New York residents already faced disproportionate health risks from the pandemic and that every other state in the nation has provided some form of live televised ASL. The case was filed at the U.S District Court for the Southern District of New York and assigned to Valerie E. Canroni. The plaintiffs immediately sought a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction requiring New York to immediately include live in-frame ASL interpretation for all the governor's briefings addressed to New York residents. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees and were represented by Disability Rights New York. The state's opposition argued that they complied with the ADA and 504 by providing closed captioning and ASL interpretation through the Governor’s website. The Court granted the preliminary injunction on May 11, and ordered Governor Cuomo to immediately implement live, in-frame ASL interpretation for his daily press briefings. 2020 WL 2393285. Settlement discussions are proceeding and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 29, four individuals with disabilities and Disability Rights New York filed a complaint against Andrew Cuomo, the Governor of New York State. The plaintiffs alleged that the absence of live televised American Sign Language (ASL) interpretation in Governor Cuomo’s daily televised briefings on COVID-19 discriminated against populations with disabilities residing in New York by failing to provide a live ASL interpreter. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, declaring the lack of ASL interpretation as a violation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs also sought a TRO and preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to immediately include live in-frame ASL interpretation for all briefings addressed to New York residents. The preliminary injunction was granted on May 11, and the defendant was ordered to immediately implement live, in-frame ASL interpretation for his daily press briefings. The case is ongoing.


On January 6, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice sent a findings letter to the attorney general for the State of Rhode Island. The letter reported that the Division's investigation of Rhode Island's educational, vocational, and shelter services for persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) found that Rhode Island violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, by "unjustifiably" isolating persons with intellectual and developmental disabilities in sheltered workshops and facility-based day programs. On April 8, 2014, the Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the State of Rhode Island under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. The DOJ asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant discriminated against people with I/DD by failing to provide state services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs and by putting Rhode Island high school students with I/DD at "serious risk of segregation" by failing to inform them of or provide them with state services that would allow them to work in an integrated workplace. The plaintiff further claimed that Rhode Island failed to reasonably modify its delivery of its services to prevent them from causing unnecessary segregation on the basis of disability. On the same day that the complaint was filed, both parties submitted a proposed consent decree to settle the lawsuit; presumably, they had been engaged in negotiations since the issuance of the January findings letter. On April 9, 2014, the District Court (Senior Judge Ronald R. Lugueux) approved a consent decree between the parties that would last for ten years. The Decree required ten outcomes by Rhode Island regarding four target populations. The four target populations included: (1) Individuals with I/DD that received day activity services in settings where they perform sheltered workshop tasks, “Sheltered Workshop Target Population.” (2) Individuals with I/DD that received day activity services in facility-based day program settings, “Day Target Population.” (3) Individuals with I/DD that were transition-age youth attending a Rhode Island secondary school, “Youth Transition Target Population.” (4) Individuals with I/DD that were transition age youth who exited a Rhode Island secondary school during the 2013-14, 2014-15, 2015-16 school years, “Youth Exit Target Population.” The ten outcomes stated: (1) By January 1, 2015, defendant needed to provide all individuals within the Youth Exit Target Population person-centered planning which will result in career development plans. (2) By October 1, 2014 and September 1 of every following year, defendant needed to provide all individuals within the Youth Transition Target Population with services necessary to introduce them to work in integrated setting. (3) Defendant needed to engage in an annual person-centered planning process with all individuals within the Youth Transition Target Population. (4) Defendant needed to cease placement and funding for new entrants to the facility-based day programs. (5) By January 1, 2015, defendant needed to provide career development plans for all individuals within the Youth Exit Target Population, and by January 1, 2016, defendant must provide career development plans for all individuals within the Sheltered Workshop and Day Program Target Populations. (6) Defendant needed to institute a program that provides benefits planning information and counseling to all individuals within the Youth Exit, Sheltered Workshop, and Day Program Target Populations within one year of the individuals’ scheduled transition to supported employment placement and integrated day services. (7) By September 1, 2014, defendant was to issue a direction to ensure that the Supports Intensity Scale assessment process will be administered with the presumption that individuals with the most severe disabilities can work in integrated settings and receive services. Defendant will also ensure the resource allocation decisions are made in a manner consistent with individuals’ support needs. (8) Annually, the defendant was to provide Support Employment Placements and Integrated Day Services to all individuals within the Rhode Island Youth Exit Target Population, pursuant to year that group left school. Following this, through January 1, 2019, the defendant will annually provide at least fifty additional individuals within the Sheltered Workshop Target Population with the above services. This figure will then increase to at least one hundred additional individuals annually through January 1, 2024. (9) Annually, the defendant was to provide Support Employment Placements and Integrated Day Services for individuals in the Day Target Population. At least twenty-five additional individuals annually by 2015 and 2016, at least fifty additional individuals annually in 2017 and 2018, at least seventy-five additional individuals in 2019, at least one hundred additional individuals in 2020, at least 200 additional individuals in 2021 and 2022, and at least 225 additional individuals in 2023. (10) The defendant was to document for continuous review by the court monitor its efforts to provide the target populations Supported Employment Placements and Individual Day Programs. Over the next year, defendant made progress and initiated programs related to Outcomes 1-10, issuing the required direction in Outcome 7 in October 2014. However, by April 10, 2015, the defendant had not met any of the deadlines or benchmarks required by the consent decree. The DOJ determined that additional action was necessary for the defendant to come into compliance with the consent decree, and moved for a proposed order on May 6, 2016, which was granted on May 18, 2016. The order required the defendant to (1) appropriate additional money in the Governor’s budget for the fiscal year 2017, (2) create a live database to allow for efficient tracking of each member of the target populations, (3) provide the plaintiff and the court monitor with access to the database or list of database entries by July 29, 2016 to allow the plaintiff and court monitor to verify progress for individuals within the target populations, (4) comply with all deadlines within the Consent Decree, (5) supply additional reports regarding progress with the Consent Decree, and (6) receive a sanction, after a show-cause hearing coordinated by the court, of $5,000 per day for each provision violated, with an additional payment of $100 per day for each member of a target population whose employment or day services are delayed due to the violation, until the violation is remedied. Each ordered sanction was not to exceed $1,000,000 per year. The defendant met or conditionally met the court order provisions 1, 2, 3, and 5 by July 29, 2016. Evaluation of provision 4 was deferred. By October 31, 2016, the defendant was meeting or exceeding the supported employment placement benchmarks for the Sheltered Workshop and Day Target Populations. However, it failed to meet a number of the other benchmarks. Youth Exit Target Population supported employment placements were below consent decree requirements. Career Development Planning for all target populations also fell below required benchmarks . The state also had not met all requirements related to various other outcomes. That said, the court monitor reported that the defendant had made progress in the development of required plans and programs to assist in their compliance with the consent decree. By July 20, 2017, supported employment placement for the Youth Exit and Sheltered Workshop Target Populations fell below their benchmarks, but the Day Target Population greatly exceeded the benchmark. Career development planning and benefits planning for all target populations remained below the required benchmarks. The defendant had not yet met the integrated day services requirements with regard to target populations. Finally, the defendant had not yet reached provider capacity requirements that would enable the ability to provide the required services of the consent decree. While the defendant had not reached all required benchmarks, the court monitor reported that the defendant continued to make significant progress in the development of required plans and programs to assist in reaching compliance. Two such programs were a sheltered workshop and a facility-based day service provider, both of which were operated by Community Work Services and Birch Academy. The Court Monitor’s report on October 29, 2018, showed significant improvement since 2017. Career development planning for members of the Birch Look Back Target Population and the TTP Target Population significantly improved over the past year. TTP target population met its benchmark as acceptable career development plans were increased from 42 to 94%. However, the quality of person-centered career development planning did not increase sufficiently since the previous report. The Court Monitor noted that further action was required to improve employment placements and day services to be more personalized and self-directed. The Youth Exit Population met its benchmark. On February 14, 2019, the Court Monitor also noted that the Governor’s recommended budget for 2020 appeared adequate to meet funding requirements necessary to comply with the Consent Decree. Judge McConnell appointed Dr. A. Anthony Antosh to replace the Court Monitor on February 28, 2020. Monitoring continued. On March 18, 2020, in light of the COVD-19 public health emergency, the court ordered the Court Monitor to engage in conversations with the State, providers, family advocates, and the DOJ to make recommendations to the Court on orders that could (1) lessen the administrative burden on providers and the State; (2) assist class members and their families in maneuvering the system and securing essential services; (3) any other recommendations the Court Monitor deems appropriate. The case is still ongoing as monitoring for the consent decree continues.

Summary: On April 8, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island alleging that Rhode Island violated the ADA by segregating individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities in sheltered workshops and facility-based day programs that denied them the opportunity to associate with those who did not have a disability. On April 9, 2014, the District Court approved a Consent Decree where Rhode Island agreed to, among other things, provide employment planning services to individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities designed to encourage and assist them in working in integrated working environments, provide state support and services for those working in integrated settings and those making the transition to those settings, programs to educate relevant individuals about the programs and benefits that the Rhode Island offers to those working in integrated settings. Rhode Island must also implement policies regarding the services required by the Consent Decree, train its personnel in the new procedures and working with individuals with disabilities, and Rhode Island must help sheltered workshops change their structure to become integrated working environments.


This is a case challenging the legality of the Kanawha County Schools (KCS) treatment of students with disabilities. On January 24, 2020, a plaintiff who was a third-grade student in the Kanawha County School district, filed this class-action suit against the school district and its superintendent. The Arc of West Virginia, an advocacy organization that supports students with disabilities, also joined as a plaintiff. The student had autism and ADHD. The plaintiff had been denied effective behavioral support at his school and had been repeatedly removed from the classroom. The plaintiff sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans Disabilities Act (ADA), the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and West Virginia Policy 2419. Judge Irene Berger was assigned to oversee the proceedings. The plaintiff argued that the school district was failing to comply with the requirement under the IDEA to provide students with disabilities with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE). The FAPE standard requires "appropriately ambitious" special education, which KCS failed to meet. Similarly, KCS had not met its requirements under the ADA to adjust policies, practices, and procedures as necessary and to provide children with disabilities equal education opportunities. KCS did not have a current system in place to identify and provide resources for students with disabilities and instead used informal and formal removal techniques in response to behavior problems. The plaintiffs sought class certification for a class consisting of "[a]ll Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who (1) need but are not receiving behavior supports from KCS, and (2) have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom." The plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically asking the Court to enjoin the defendants in revising their policies in order to provide effective behavior supports to its students with disabilities, and also provide a monitor to oversee compliance with the court order. Finally, the plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims on March 20, 2020. On April 10, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, switching the organizational defendant to the Board of Education of the County of Kanawha. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required by the IDEA. The defendants also sought to dismiss the Arc of West Virginia from the case, arguing that the organization lacked standing because they did not allege that one of their members required relief. On July 16, 2020, Judge Irene Berger dismissed the claims against the superintendent but denied the school district's motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 4018285. The Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged systemic violations, and therefore they did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies. The Court also determined that the Arc of West Virginia had associational standing and was permitted to remain in the litigation. As of October 22, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In this case, a third-grader plaintiff who had autism and ADHD filed suit against the Kanawha County Schools system under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the ADA, the West Virginia Human Rights Act, and West Virginia Policy 2419. The elementary school student had been subject to disciplinary removal from the classroom and his district had failed to provide the behavioral supports and programming required by law. The case is ongoing.


On October 18, 2016, families in Flint, Michigan filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case was assigned to Judge Arthur J. Turnow. The plaintiffs sued the Michigan Department of Education (MDE), Flint Community Schools (FCS), and the Genesee Intermediate School District (GISD) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. They alleged that the state of Michigan and local educators violated federal law by not screening to identify students who needed special education services. They further argued that the defendants had violated the rights of students with disabilities in the imposition of school discipline, including illegal suspensions and expulsions. The Flint parents and children were represented by the ACLU of Michigan and private counsel. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that children attending these schools were at risk of developing a disability due to their prolonged exposure to lead. Despite that risk, the schools had a pattern and practice of systematically failing to provide ongoing screening and timely referrals for evaluations to identify qualifying disabilities. Also, the schools systematically failed to provide students with disabilities with safeguards and had a pattern of using unduly harsh disciplinary measures with students with disabilities, including physical restraints and seclusion techniques. (For more information on the Flint water crisis, which involved claims of widespread lead exposure from the City's drinking water, see Waid v. Snyder.) On December 8, 2016, FCS and MDE each filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On December 15, GISD moved for judgment on the pleadings, using the same reasoning. On July 7, 2017, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending these motions, and the court granted this request on August 24, 2017. 2017 WL 3642131. On September 29, 2017, the court denied GISD and MDE’s motions to dismiss, in their entirety. The court granted FCS's motion in part and denied it in part, granting dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim regarding universal preschool but denying the rest of the motion. On October 16, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to comply with their child-find obligations (their obligations to identify and evaluate children with disabilities) under state and federal law. That same day, the defendants appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss to the Sixth Circuit. (Docket Number: 17-2255). On October 24, the defendants moved to stay District Court proceedings, arguing that the District Court now lacked jurisdiction because the defendants had filed an appeal. The court denied this request on November 2, 2017, because denials of motions to dismiss are generally not appealable, so the defendants’ appeal would likely be dismissed. 2017 WL 5010773. On November 28, 2017, as predicted by the district court, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal. 2017 WL 6947900. The panel of judges was made up of Judge Richard Suhrheinrich, Judge Raymond Kethledge, and Judge Denise Hood. In district court, the parties moved forward with discovery and settlement discussions. On April 9, 2018, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement as to the plaintiffs’ child-find claims. This mooted out the plaintiffs’ October 2017 motion for a preliminary injunction. This settlement required the defendants to implement a screening and assessment program for the next five years and report its progress back to the plaintiffs every six months for at least the next two years. On April 12, 2017, at the request of the parties, the court incorporated this settlement agreement into a court order and dismissed the plaintiffs’ child-find claims with prejudice. As of February 7, 2020, the case is ongoing. The partial settlement only resolved the child-find issues; all of the plaintiffs’ other claims are still in dispute. The final pretrial conference is set for March 16, 2020, and the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the partial settlement agreement until April 2023.

Summary: In October 2016, a group of Flint schoolchildren (via their parents) sued the state of Michigan and the school district in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that the state of Michigan and local educators are in violation of federal law by not screening to identify students who need special education services and violating the rights of students with disabilities in the imposition of school discipline. In April 2018, the parties reached a partial settlement as to one of the plaintiffs' claims, but the rest are still in dispute. The case is ongoing.


On Nov. 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the University of North Carolina (UNC). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that UNC's current admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that UNC's current admissions policy held Asian American students to a higher standard based on their race, that UNC was engaged in a prohibited form of racial balancing, that UNC was not limiting its consideration of an applicant's race to "merely a plus factor," and that a racially neutral alternative was available to achieve the same goals of diversity. As evidence of this, the plaintiff pointed to admissions data that showed a disparity between acceptance for Asian American students at UNC and at other schools (for example, the University of California) that did not employ racial considerations in their admissions process. Additionally, the plaintiff pointed to the steady rate of acceptance of Asian American students despite the change in application rates and qualifications for those applicants. According to the plaintiff, this was evidence of a policy indistinguishable from racially based quotas for admissions. The plaintiff also pointed to a long history of admissions discrimination at UNC as evidence suggesting the current policy may have similar aims. The case was assigned to Judge Loretta C. Biggs on Jan. 12, 2015. On Mar. 20, 2015, the parties filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal of a subset of the plaintiff's claims. The parties dismissed the UNC Board of Trustees and the individual trustees named as defendants, arguing that the Board did not play an active role in creating the admissions policy. The parties also dismissed all Title VI claims against the individually named defendants from the Board of Governors, the UNC president, and various other UNC Chapel Hill administrators. Finally, the parties dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim against all defendants. On Jun. 30, 2015, a series of individual UNC students and parents of students intending to apply to UNC moved to intervene on behalf of the defendants. The intervenors identified themselves as African American, Black, Moorish, Indian, and Hispanic. On Jul. 6, 2015, the defendants moved to stay the proceedings in light of the Supreme Court's pending decision in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. Although the plaintiff initially opposed the motion, the parties filed a joint motion to partially stay proceedings on Sept. 30. They sought partial stay of the proceedings pending the resolution of Fisher in the Supreme Court, but on the condition that defendants produce "certain agreed-upon materials." The court granted the partial stay motion and then stayed all proceedings on Oct. 1. The Supreme Court decided Fisher on Jun. 23, 2016, holding that the University of Texas' use of race in the admissions process did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 S. Ct. 2198. The court here lifted the stay on Aug. 1, 2016 and discovery continued. The court granted permissive intervention to the current and prospective students on Jan. 13, 2017. 319 F.R.D. 490. On Oct. 25, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiff brought suit as "an organizational plaintiff asserting representational standing" but did not meet its burden of showing its members had "indicia of membership in an organization." The court held on Sep. 29, 2018, that the "indicia of membership" test did not apply to Students for Fair Admission, since it was a voluntary membership association with actual members. The court held that Students for Fair Admission had standing because four of its members were recent high school graduates who had applied to the University of North Carolina and were denied admission. 2018 WL 4688388 On Jan. 18, 2019, the defendants moved for summary judgement, arguing that the University employed a narrowly tailored admissions policy, using the type of holistic review endorsed by the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on Mar. 4, 2019, asking the court to find as a matter of law that the University's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored. On Sep. 30, 2019, Judge Biggs denied both motions for summary judgement. She found that there was an issue of material fact regarding UNC's use of race as a "plus" factor. UNC presented evidence that their system, which lists "background" as a factor in admissions decisions but does not assign points to students based on their race or ethnicity as it does with other categories, takes the kind of holistic approach endorsed by the Supreme Court. UNC presented expert evidence based on four years of admissions decisions that their approach considers each student individually. The plaintiffs presented conflicting expert evidence, which they claimed showed that race was a predominant factor in admissions decisions. 2019 WL 4773908 Judge Biggs also found an issue of material fact regarding UNC's efforts to explore race neutral alternatives. UNC presented expert evidence that concluded that no race blind alternatives were available that would allow the university to maintain both its academic standards and racial diversity. The Plaintiffs countered that UNC had not sufficiently attempted to use race neutral alternatives such as increasing financial aid, adopting policies using geographic diversity, including percentage plans and the use of zip codes and Census tract data, reducing or eliminating preferences for legacies, or eliminating the Early Acton admissions options. A bench trial was set for May 11, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 17, 2014, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under The Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the University of North Carolina. Plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the consideration of race in college admissions, claiming that UNC's current admissions policy discriminated against Asian American applicants. The court denied summary judgement and, as of April 9th, 2020, the suit is ongoing.


On May 9, 2003, four female former students and a former employee of Rhinebeck Central High School filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the High School and the former principal, alleging that the defendants had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the former principal had subjected female students of the school to sexual harassment that constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. The plaintiffs further alleged that district officials received actual notice of the discrimination, but did not act to remedy the situation. The plaintiffs claimed that the the deliberate indifference prevented the female students from enjoying the educational benefits and opportunities offered by the school. On March 18, 2004, Judge Stephen C. Robinson permitted the United States to file a complaint in intervention seeking relief to ensure that the School District would operate a school system that offered an educational environment free from discrimination. The parties field a Consent Decree with the court on February 15, 2006, in which they agreed that the District would: refrain from engaging in any activity that discriminated against any student on the basis of student's sex in the administration of educational benefits and services, respond promptly and appropriately to allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination, and refrain from retaliating against any student or employee because that student or employee participated in a complaint against the District alleging discrimination on the basis of sex. The District also agreed to hire an expert in sexual harassment training and prevention and to designate two compliance officers that would be responsible for receiving and identifying complaints of discrimination. The District would keep a written record of all allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex, and the investigation undertaken by the District. The parties agreed that the Consent Decree would be effective for three years, unless the parties chose to extend it. Additionally, the District agreed to furnish to the government six months after the date of the Consent Decree, and annually thereafter, a detailed report covering the District's compliance efforts for the preceding year. Finally, the District agreed to pay $152,500 as a settlement amount to the plaintiffs and their counsel. The consent decree ended in 2009 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: Former students and an employee of Rhinebeck Central High School filed suit against the School District and the former principal alleging that the District had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to rectify allegations that the principal had sexually harassed the female students. The parties reached a Consent Decree in which the District agreed to implement anti-discrimination procedures.


The plaintiff in this case was a 16-year-old rising senior at the George Nelson Temper High School (Temper), which is part of the Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 (KUSD), in Wisconsin. Plaintiff, who was assigned female on his birth certificate but whose gender identity is male, suffers from gender dysphoria, a condition recognized by the American Psychiatric Association. Over the course of several years, despite explanations from the plaintiff and despite receiving several signed letters from the plaintiff’s pediatrician explaining Plaintiff’s condition, KUSD officials repeatedly denied access to facilities matching Plaintiff's gender identity. Even after hearing from a pediatrician that Plaintiff’s gender identity was male, KUSD told Plaintiff to use either the girls' restroom, or a gender-neutral, single-occupancy bathroom in the school’s office. KUSD refused to change Plaintiff’s name or gender in school records and attendance lists, and the school also initially refused to allow Plaintiff to be nominated as prom king, relenting only after petition and other protests by Plaintiff’s fellow students. After learning of a lawsuit challenging a school in Virginia for denying transgender students access to bathrooms and other accommodations matching their gender identity, G.G. v. Gloucester School Board, Plaintiff began to use the boys' restrooms at school. In G.G, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had issued a statement of interest explaining that it was the agency’s position that Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 requires that schools receiving federal funding allow transgender students to use restrooms and other single-sex, multi-occupancy facilities that match their gender identities. When confronted by KUSD officials over Plaintiff’s use of the boys’ restrooms, Plaintiff’s mother explained to them that based on the DOJ’s position, KUSD is required to allow him access to the boys’ restrooms. However, KUSD officials nevertheless maintained that Plaintiff was not allowed to use the boys’ restrooms after that meeting. In April of 2016, Plaintiff engaged counsel who sent KUSD a letter demanding that Plaintiff be able to use the boys' restroom. When the school refused, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the US Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, alleging the school policy violated Title IX. Plaintiff later withdrew this complaint to file a suit on July 19, 2016, against KUSD and its superintendent in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and Title IX of the Education Amendment (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.). Represented by the Transgender Law Center, along with the civil-rights law firms Relman Dane & Colfax and the Robert Pledl Law Office, Plaintiff argued that KUSD’s discriminatory actions violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He asked the court to declare that KUSD has violated Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment and to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring KUSD to take various steps to prevent further discrimination against Plaintiff. District Judge Rudolph T. Randa was assigned to the case on July 20, 2016, but due to his unavailability, the case was reassigned on August 3, 2016, to Magistrate Judge David E. Jones. Plaintiff did not consent to have a magistrate judge enter final judgment on the matter and so the case was reassigned to Judge Pamela Pepper. On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint using his and his mother's full names because they had already consented to the media using their names. The same day, Plaintiff also filed for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to enjoin KUSD from its discriminatory practices. Attached to the motion were various supporting statements from healthcare professionals along with the U.S. Department of Education's Dear Colleague Letter on Transgender Students. This Dear Colleague letter was issued on May 13, 2016, and told schools that compliance with Title IX entailed treating students consistent with their gender identity (this letter was later rescinded, on February 22, 2017, under the new Trump Administration). KUSD filed a motion to dismiss the case on August 16, 2016, and the court heard oral arguments on that motion and the preliminary injunction. On September 21, 2016, Judge Pepper denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the next day she granted in part Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Pepper found that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits and enjoined the school from denying Plaintiff use of the boys' bathroom and from disciplining him in any way for using it. 2016 WL 5239829. KUSD appealed both decisions to the Seventh Circuit on September 23, 2016, arguing that the two orders were inextricably bound and that the appeals court could not review one without the other (originally the district court had certified the order denying the motion to dismiss for immediate interlocutory appeal, but soon after revoked that certification when it concluded it had erred by including certification language in the order). In the district court, KUSD also moved to stay the preliminary injunction, arguing that it would threaten the "constitutionally privacy interest" of students in the school district. On October 3, 2016, Judge Pepper denied Defendants' motion to stay. 2016 WL 8846573. Litigation continued into discovery throughout the school year. Defendants requested that Plaintiff submit to an independent medical examination. Judge Pepper denied the request as moot after Plaintiff submitted his own request governing an independent medical examination. On May 30, 2017, the Seventh Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction and denied to review the denial of the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the two issues were not inextricably bound. Notwithstanding the intervening change in position by the Trump Administration, the Seventh Circuit found that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Title IX discrimination claim. The court did not reach the question of whether transgender status triggered heightened scrutiny, but the Seventh Circuit did find that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on his Equal Protection Claim on a theory of sex stereotyping. The court also found KUSD's privacy argument was based on sheer conjecture and abstraction and that a "transgender student's presence in the restroom provides no more a risk to other students' privacy rights than the presence of an overly curious student of the same biological sex." 858 F.3d 1034 (Williams, J.). The Defendant appealed this order to the Supreme Court on August 29. Both parties agreed to a settlement hearing before Magistrate Judge William E. Callahan, Jr. on November 1, 2017. Despite the efforts of the parties, mediation did not result in settlement of the Plaintiff’s claims. On November 21, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge Pamela Pepper for further pretrial proceedings, trial, and eventual entry of final judgment. On January 22, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to approve the proposed Consent Judgment. The Consent Judgment: required the Defendants to pay $800,000 to the Plaintiff for compensatory damages, attorney’s fees, and costs; permanently enjoined the Defendants from preventing the Plaintiff from using male bathrooms and from taking retaliatory actions; and required the Defendants to inform current board members, district-level administrators, and school level principals and assistant principals of the terms of the permanent injunction. The judgment was set to last for 10 years, during which the court retained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. The Consent Judgment was signed by Judge Pepper on January 23, 2018. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the writ for certiorari. 138 S. Ct. 1260. The case is administratively closed, but remains ongoing due to court enforcement. As of April 15, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket.

Summary: A 16-year old transgender male student sued Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 (Kenosha) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on July 19, 2016, arguing that the school violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by denying Plaintiff access to the boys’ restrooms. The district court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction to use the boys' restroom throughout his senior year, which the Seventh Circuit upheld on May 30, 2017. The parties settled on January 22, 2018. The settlement required Defendant to pay Plaintiff $800,000, enjoined Defendant from prohibiting Plaintiff from using the boys’ restroom, and required the Defendant to notify all staff about the injunction.


On August 11, 2005 a group of African-Americans filed a consolidated amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Wal-Mart Stores Inc. in United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against African-Americans in hiring and sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Wal-Mart's practice of "word of mouth" hiring for over-the-road truck drivers discriminated against African-Americans. On May 16, 2007, the court (Judge Wilson) certified a class of African Americans who resided in the continental United States who had applied for employment as over-the-road truck drivers at Wal-Mart since September 22, 2001 and not been hired, and African Americans who resided in the continental United States who were deterred or thwarted from applying for positions as over-the-road truck drivers at Wal-Mart. The defendant an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals but on June 28, 2007 was denied. Discovery proceeded in preparation for trial and on January 13, 2009 the court (Judge Wilson) denied the defendant's motions for decertification and summary judgment. The parties thereafter reached a settlement that was approved by the court (Judge Wilson) on March 5, 2009. In the settlement Wal-Mart agreed to damages in the amount of $17,500,000 to be distributed to the named representatives, class members, and for attorneys fees. It also agreed to provide EEO training, actively recruit minorities, impose benchmarks for hiring minority drivers, make specific job opportunities open to minorities, and engage in recordkeeping and reporting. The case came to a close on July 10, 2010 when the last objections by class members were dismissed.

Summary: On August 11, 2005 a group of African-Americans filed a consolidated amended complaint Wal-Mart Stores Inc. in United States District Court of the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against African-Americans in hiring of over-the-road truck drivers. On May 16, 2007, the court certified a class of African Americans who had not been hired or had been deterred from applying for these jobs. Discovery continued in preparation for trial and on January 13, 2009 the court denied the defendant's motions for decertification and summary judgment. The parties thereafter reached a settlement that was approved by the court on March 5, 2009. In the settlement Wal-Mart agreed to damages in the amount of $17,500,000 to be distributed to the named representatives, class members, and their attorneys. It also agreed to provide EEO training, actively recruit minorities, impose benchmarks for hiring minority drivers, make specific job opportunities open to minorities, and engage in recordkeeping and reporting.


On March 31, 2005, a female employee of Citigroup Global Markets and its subsidiary, Smith Barney, filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, against Citigroup Global Markets Inc. in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief and damages, charging Citigroup and Smith Barney with discriminating against female financial advisors on the basis of gender with respect to business opportunities, compensation, professional support and other terms and conditions of employment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Smith Barney's policies and practices had locked in and perpetuated past discrimination, caused "cumulative advantage" effects, and caused branch management to discriminate against female brokers. Furthermore, Smith Barney refused to change policies or practices that it knew to be discriminatory against women. On November 29, 2006, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, better articulating their concerns and defining the putative class as all female Financial Advisors employed by Smith Barney in the United States at any time after August 30, 2003, and adding a subclass consisting of all female Financial Advisors employed by Smith Barney in California at any time after June 25, 2003. On May 1, 2008, after a series of negotiations, the parties reached a settlement. The stipulated to - and later approved - class was as follows: All women employed as Financial Advisors in (i) the United States branches of Smith Barney’s retail brokerage division at any time from August 30, 2003 through March 1, 2008 or (ii) the California branches of Smith Barney’s retail brokerage division at any time from June 25, 2003 through March 1, 2008. The settlement included $33 million settlement for the 2,411 members of the Settlement Class in a gender discrimination case against Smith Barney. In addition to the monetary compensation, the settlement included comprehensive injunctive relief for four years designed to increase business opportunities and promote equality in compensation for female brokers. The Northern District Court of California (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) approved the Settlement and Class on August 13, 2008, finding that the the terms embodied in the agreement were fair, reasonable, and adequate as required by law, and that proper notice to the class was given. Also on August 13, Court entered the final order and judgment in this matter, but retained continuing jurisdiction over the settlement. On September 31, 2011, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order to transfer the jurisdiction of the case to the District of Columbia. This was done so that the case could be consolidated with another case, Augst-Johnson, et al v. Morgan Stanley & Co, Incorporated, Case No. 1:06-CV-01142 (RWR) (D.D.C.); so that a Consolidated Settlement Agreement could be considered. On October 3, the Court the Court approved the stipulation and proposed order, and ordered that continuing jurisdiction of this case be transferred to the District of Columbia. The case is closed.

Summary: This case was brought by female employees of Citigroup Global Markets against Citigroup Global Markets and its subsidiary, Smith Barney, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages for the company's discriminatory practices against female employees. This case was solved by a class-action settlement on August 13, 2008, resulting in relief granted.


On September 25, 2006, the Denver Field Office and the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The EEOC sued Moreland Auto Group, LLP (doing business as Kids Automotive, Inc.; Kids Financial, Inc.; and Brandon Financial, Inc.) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing two former female employees of the defendant, sought injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from discriminating against employees based on gender or from retaliating against employees who complain about discrimination. The EEOC further sought monetary relief for the two employees. Specifically, the complaint alleged Moreland Auto Group allowed employees to sexually harass the two female employees. This harassment created a hostile work environment. The EEOC also alleged that the defendant retaliated against the complaining parties when they complained about the discrimination. The complaining parties intervened in the lawsuit in November 2006. The defendant filed a counterclaim against the EEOC in December 2006, alleging failure to fully conduct an investigation of the discrimination complaint. Following discovery and a number of status conferences, the parties settled the lawsuit. On August 22, 2008 Judge Edward J. Nottingham approved the parties' settlement agreement. The agreement included a $70,000 fund to be dispersed amongst the claimants, and an injunction enjoining the defendants from gender-based discrimination or retaliation against employees who make complaints of discrimination. It further required the defendant to implement annual trainings on employment discrimination. The settlement agreement's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more in the docket. The matter was dismissed with prejudice when the settlement agreement was ordered, and appears to have ended in 2011.

Summary: On September 25, 2006, the Denver Field Office and the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The EEOC sued Moreland Auto Group, LLP under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two former female employees sought injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from discriminating against employees based on gender or from retaliating against employees who complain about discrimination. On August 22, 2008 Judge Edward J. Nottingham approved a settlement agreement that included a $70,000 fund to be dispersed amongst the claimants, and an injunction enjoining the defendants from gender-based discrimination.


On May 3, 2000, ten black current and former special agents of the United States Secret Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (the Civil Rights Act of 1991) against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit individually and on behalf of a putative class of black special agents who were employed by the U.S. Secret Service as GS-1811's at any point from January 1, 1974 to the present. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought equitable relief including back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction, alleging that the Secret Service had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in promotions as well as in transfers, assignments, testing, hiring, and disciplinary practices. On June 30, 2000, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. After a lengthy period of discovery, on October 24, 2004, Judge Richard W. Roberts issued a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. On May 1, 2006 and August 7, 2006, the plaintiffs filed two amended complaints. On May 31, 2006 and again on September 20, 2006, the defendant filed motions for partial dismissal and/or for partial summary judgment, which the court denied without prejudice on June 26, 2008. On August 4, 2010, the Court issued a memorandum opinion and order denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification, holding (1) that the class representatives' claims were not typical of the class members' claim and (2) that there was a potential conflict of interest among the class plaintiffs and the class members. After further development, in February 2013, the Court granted class certification. 926 F.Supp.2d 8. In February of 2014, the defendants moved for a partial motion to dismiss, summary judgment, and to reopen discovery. On March 4, 2014, the Court refused to reopen discovery for the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff's class-certification does not warrant reopening discovery. Litigation continued and in 2015, the defendants moved again for summary judgment. The court had a hearing on both motions for summary judgment on May 5, 2016. On January 17, 2017, before the court decided on the motions for summary judgment, the defendant filed a notice of settlement agreement after 16 years of litigation. On January 27, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of settlement agreement, which was approved by the court on January 31, 2017. The plaintiff also filed a motion for preliminary approval of distribution of settlement proceeds, which was granted by the court on February 16, 2017. The court, however, did not address the proposed payment attorney's fees and costs. The proposed settlement provided for both monetary and injunctive relief. The agreement required the defendant to pay $24 million as a fund, including payments to plaintiffs and class members, administrative costs and attorney's fees and expenses. The defendant also agreed to start a hotline for agents to report bias, change its hiring procedures, and maintain detailed records on promotion factors as well as complaints alleging racial discrimination. On April 10, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for order granting final approval of settlement. The parties agreed on $8 million in attorney's fees and $859,049.26 in costs to be paid out of the settlement fund. On May 3, 2017, Judge Friedman granted the final approval of class action settlement as well as the plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. The settlement agreement will retain in effect until the date on which the Secret Services delivers to the plaintiffs the last statistical report, which is estimated to be in 2021. As of June 1, 2020, there has been no further docket activity.

Summary: This case was brought by ten black current and former special agents of the United States Secret Service against the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief including back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and an injunction, alleging that the Secret Service discriminated against them on the basis of race in promotions as well as in transfers, assignments, testing, hiring, and disciplinary practices. The court approved a settlement agreement that awarded $24 million in damages, $8 million in attorney's fees, and $860,000 in costs. The agreement will remain in place until 2021.


On May 10, 2002, eight Hispanic Special Agents filed a class action complaint against the United States Customs Service ("Customs Service"), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel asked the court for equitable relief, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs contended that there was a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin by the Department of Treasury's United States Customs Service. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Customs Service's personnel policies, practices, and procedures discriminated against Hispanic Special Agents regarding selections for competitive positions and promotions, assignment to undercover work, discipline, awards and bonuses, foreign language proficiency awards, training, harassment and hostile work environment, systemic retaliation, and other terms and conditions of employment. The plaintiffs requested to act on behalf of a class consisting of all current or former Hispanic Special Agents (Criminal Investigators GS-1811) who had served with the Customs Service from January 1, 1974 or January 1, 1977 to the present. On March 20, 2003, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant argued that the court should dismiss class claims due to failures by the plaintiffs to timely exhaust administrative class remedies, to assert adverse employment actions, and/or to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The defendant also argued that the individual claims should be dismissed as well because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies and/or to allege actionable adverse employment actions. Subsequently, on February 26, 2004, the court (Judge James Robertson) granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. In this judgment, the court (Judge Robertson) held that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust claims of hostile work environment and foreign language proficiency awards. Contreras v. Ridge, 305 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2004). On May 5, 2006, following a denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the pattern or practice claims, the defendant renewed its motion. On March 20, 2007 the court (Judge Robertson) granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding the plaintiffs' evidence insufficient, and thus terminating the case.

Summary: This case was brought by eight Hispanic Special Agents against the U.S. Department of Treasury's United States Customs Service. Plaintiffs sought equitable relief, compensatory damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief, alleging there was a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of national origin by the U.S. Customs Service. The Court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on March 20, 2007, thereby terminating the case.


On December 10, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Yellow Transportation, Inc., and YRC, Inc., for discriminatory employment practices on behalf of 14 current or former black employees and the class of similarly situated black employees. The EEOC alleged that Yellow Transportation (later merged into YRC) had violated §703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) by subjecting black employees to greater scrutiny, more frequent and greater discipline, lower paying and less favorable job assignments, more difficult and time-consuming work, and a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief, including economic and noneconomic harm to the employees, punitive damages, development of policies and programs to provide equal employment opportunity and eradicate the effects of its past discrimination. The EEOC also sought to recover its costs. The charging parties later intervened as plaintiffs on their own behalf, filing their complaint on October 6, 2010. The Intervenors' complaint proceeded on the same grounds as the EEOC's allegations but added claims for retaliation. Examples of the racial hostility in the Intervening Plaintiffs' work environment include repeated hanging of nooses at the workplace, racial slurs and racially motivated graffiti in bathroom stalls, displays by white employees of racially hostile symbols (such as the Confederate flag and "KKK") on clothing or in the form of tattoos, and supervisors' failure to address complaints adequately. Additional examples of the alleged disparate treatment include delaying full-time hiring of black employees (which gave white employees greater seniority), denial of work opportunities that would lead to advancement, giving shorter sick leaves to black injured workers than white, granting less overtime to blacks than whites, and denying blacks - but not whites - the opportunity to choose who they worked with. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Magistrate Judge Susan Cox) entered as a consent decree on September 25, 2012. The decree resolved this case and the related case Brown v. Yellow Transportation, Inc. , linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0329). The decree awarded a total $11 million to the class of plaintiffs from the two cases to be distributed according to the specified claims process. Attorney's fees were awarded to the Intervening Plaintiffs' attorneys in the amount of $1.1 million out of the $11 million award. No significant injunction was granted because the facility at which the Plaintiffs originally worked had closed and the facility to which those who had not been fired were transferred (Chicago Heights) was already under an adequate consent decree from the cases EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0189), and William Bandy v. Roadway Express, Inc.. The court simply requires a notice to be posted at the remaining facility. Final approval of the distribution of the settlement funds was granted on April 8, 2013. Because the duration of the notice provision is co-extensive with the duration of the Chicago Heights decree, the decree is technically in effect as of this writing. For all intents and purposes the case is closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Yellow Transportation, Inc., and YRC, Inc., for discriminatory employment practices on behalf of 14 current or former black employees and the class of similarly situated black employees. The EEOC alleged that Yellow Transportation (later merged into YRC) had violated §703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) by subjecting black employees to greater scrutiny, more frequent and greater discipline, lower paying and less favorable job assignments, more difficult and time-consuming work, and a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief, including economic and noneconomic harm to the employees, punitive damages, development of policies and programs to provide equal employment opportunity and eradicate the effects of its past discrimination. The EEOC also sought to recover its costs. The charging parties later intervened as plaintiffs on their own behalf, adding claims for retaliation. The parties reached a settlement, which was entered as a consent decree. The decree resolved this case and the related case <i>Brown v. Yellow Transportation, Inc.</i> , linked below (Clearinghouse code: EE-IL-0329). The decree awarded a total of $11 million ($1.1 million in attorney's fees) and no significant injunctive relief because of a consent decree in other litigation. The case is technically open but effectively closed.