On May 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice, on behalf of inmates from the Miami-Dade County Corrections and Rehabilitation Department Jail (MDRC), filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against officials from Miami-Dade County for alleged violation of the inmates' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The suit alleged that the defendants failed to provide suicide protection and mental health care to the inmates, causing the inmates to suffer serious harm. On May 22, 2013, the Court (Judge William J. Zloch) entered a consent decree that revised the standard of medical care to be provided by the MDCR facilities and monitoring of the implementation of this care. The consent decree also included compliance with federal standards of mental health care and suicide prevention. The case was dismissed without prejudice. The U.S. submitted a series of eight status reports regarding compliance between November 2013 and January 2017. The parties held status conferences with the court subsequent to each report. The reports found that the County was substantially not in compliance with the consent agreement. On December 7, 2014, the parties submitted the first revised summary action plan that itemized each compliance issue with specific dates. The dates of compliance spanned from May 11, 2015 to November 30, 2016. Monitoring continued in the interim. Compliance was not reached by the deadline and parties submitted a second revised summary action plan on May 18, 2016; it was approved on May 23, 2016. The dates in the second revised summary action plan spanned July 2016 to February 2017. A full compliance tour was scheduled for September 2017 but was rescheduled for December 2017 due to Hurricane Irma. On January 11, 2017, Judge Zloch recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Beth Bloom. Status reports and conferences resumed in February and continued through May when Judge Bloom ordered the County to begin submitting monthly reports to the court due to its continued lack of compliance. The County continued submitting status reports monthly until February 2018. On January 19, 2018, the independent monitor found that the County was still not in compliance. On February 9, 2018 Judge Bloom ordered the parties to write a new summary action plan with a final deadline by which the County would achieve full compliance with the settlement agreement or face sanctions. The parties submitted a new summary action plan on February 14, 2018. The Court ordered this third plan and the final compliance date was set to be April 16, 2018. If the County was not in compliance by that date, sanctions would be filed against them. The County continued to file monitoring reports, but was still not in compliance by the final deadline in the third settlement agreement. The United States filed sanctions against the county on April 30, 2018; the Court ordered these sanctions on May 4, 2018. Also on May 4, the court approved a fourth revised settlement agreement that set the final compliance date to be June 21, 2018. The United States decided not to pursue sanctions following this order on May 11, 2018. Status reports continued throughout 2018 and early 2019 with the County making progress on the settlement agreement. On March 29, 2019, after the United States had moved for a stay on the compliance deadlines from the fourth summary action plan, the parties informed the court of a final action plan to achieve full compliance. They agreed to file a joint declaration when the County had achieved compliance with the final action plan and set the deadline for full compliance with the settlement agreement to be after the final monitoring tour of the County’s facilities on September 27-29, 2019, with the subsequent monitoring report and conference being completed by November 7, 2019. The parties filed this information in a joint declaration on June 16, 2019. On November 7, 2019, a status conference was held but the County was still not in full compliance. The Court ordered the parties to develop a compliance timetable, which they submitted on November 12, 2019. The County continued to file monthly status reports, as per the compliance timetable, however, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the parties decided to reschedule the twelfth monitoring tour for October 12, 2020 tentatively, on April 2, 2020. Compliance efforts (monitoring reports submitted by the county and monthly conference calls between the parties) would continue in the meantime. Monthly reports have continued by the County, but no further progress has been made on the case as of April 15, 2020.

Summary: On May 1, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice brought suit in the Southern District of Florida on behalf of jail inmates against officials from Miami-Dade County. The DOJ claimed that the defendant failed to provide adequate suicide protection and mental health care to the inmates. The parties agreed to a consent decree, which was entered on May 22, 2013. Timely compliance has been a challenge and as of April 15, 2020 the defendants were still not in compliance.


On February 11, 2004, two named plaintiffs filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In their complaint (as amended nine days later), the plaintiffs challenged the Cook County Sheriff's policy of strip searching all males following their return to the Cook County Jail from court after there was a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention. The plaintiffs also alleged that female detainees were not subjected to similar treatment, as they were placed in a holding cell after returning from court and processed out of the jail without being strip searched or re-entering the general housing units. The strip searches without reasonable suspicion and the differential treatment, the plaintiffs alleged, violated their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, injunctive relief and class certification. The defendants generally denied the allegations and contended that the strip searches were necessary, for there was no space in the jail to construct additional bullpens to house the discharged male detainees so that they would not be required to enter the housing units and undergo strip searches. On November 22, 2004, the District Court (District Judge Elaine Bucklo) certified the case as a class action, with the class defined as follows: all male inmates who, on or after February 12, 2002, have been subjected to defendants' policy, practice and custom of strip searching, without reasonable suspicion that the inmate is concealing a weapon or other contraband, at the Cook County Department of Corrections, following their return from court after there had been a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention, other than to be processed for release. Bullock v. Sheahan, 225 F.R.D. 227 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Discovery ensued and included substantial document production, depositions and experts. The defendants sought to preclude the testimony of one of plaintiffs' retained experts, Donald Henry. Mr. Henry was a registered architect specializing in the design of prisons and jails and was retained by the plaintiffs to inspect the jail and offer an opinion whether there was adequate space for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees. Judge Bucklo denied the motion. Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the following four claims:

 The strip searching of all male court discharged persons and not all female court discharged persons violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The strip searching of all male court discharged persons in large non-private group settings, with up to fifty inmates, while the female court discharged persons who opted to return to the housing divisions were afforded privacy, violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The strip searching of all male court discharged persons not based upon reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband violated the Fourth Amendment.
The manner in which the strip searches were conducted, in large non-private group settings, violated the Fourth Amendment.
 Defendants moved to strike portions of plaintiffs' motion (as to the second and fourth claim), asserting that plaintiffs were adding new theories of liability not pleaded in their amended complaint. Judge Bucklo denied the motion to strike, but allowed defendants to conduct additional discovery as to those claims. Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ill. 2007). On July 30, 2008, the district court (Judge Bucklo) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, and on February 27, 2009, Judge Bucklo partially granted that motion with respect to the portions of the earlier order that granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their Fourteenth Amendment claims and on some of their Fourth Amendment claims. On March 18, 2011, the court approved a proposed class settlement. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement. The defendants agreed to pay $1.4 million to class members and roughly $2 million in attorney's fees and costs. The defendants also agreed to pay the two class representatives $25,000 as "incentive awards" for serving as the representatives. However, the defendants later discovered that one of the class representatives had certified that he had no legal claims of any value during bankruptcy proceedings in 2010, so he couldn't receive this incentive award. The agreed with the defendants and issued an opinion on May 23, 2011. Over the next two years, the defendants paid claims submitted by class members. The court oversaw the payments and denied late claims and other challenges. The court terminated its jurisdiction over the case on September 1, 2012. Note: There was another (separate) strip search case against the Cook County Sheriff in the same District Court. That case, Young v. Cook County, 1:06-cv-00552, alleged an unconstitutional practice of strip searching all pretrial detainees upon their entry in the Cook County Jail for intake/booking. See JC-IL-0009.

Summary: In 2004, plaintiffs filed this class-action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs challenged the Cook County Sheriff's policy of strip searching all males following their return to the Cook County Jail from court after there was a judicial determination that there was no longer a basis for their detention. The parties settled in 2011 and the defendants paid $1.4 million in damages and roughly $2 million in attorney's fees and costs.


Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the District of Maryland against officers, the Baltimore Police Department, and police and city officials in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff sued for damages. The plaintiff was a Registered Nurse who worked at The Johns Hopkins Hospital. On April 12, 2008, she left the hospital at approximately 7:35 p.m. and began her commute home. The police had blocked an exit ramp on I-83 North because of accident with a patrol car and road flares. The plaintiff drove over the road flares. The officer entered his patrol vehicle and followed the plaintiff 4/10ths of a mile, and with weapon drawn, ordered the plaintiff to the ground. Plaintiff was arrested for minor traffic violations. Plaintiff was later stripped searched at the Baltimore central booking facility, as was the policy for all arrestees processed at the facility. In Defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, counts were dismissed as to the arresting and searching officers, but denied with respect against the supervisors of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the secretary of DPSCS, as well as the warden of the booking facility. A motion to dismiss was partially granted and denied on November 2, 2008 by Judge Andre Davis, and another motion to dismiss was partially granted and denied on September 1, 2009 by Judge Catharine Blake. A motion for summary judgment was partially granted and denied on March 31, 2011. As of 04/15/2012, this case is still ongoing, with the parties participating in several scheduling conferences, presumably in preparation for trial.

Summary: This was a strip-search case in which a nurse on her way home from Johns Hopkins was pulled over for a traffic violation, taken to the police station, and strip searched in front of a crowd of people. She claimed that the strip search was illegal. This is one of many cases pending that charge the Baltimore police department with illegal strip searches. This case is still ongoing.


On May 27, 2011, twenty persons then confined in the Suffolk County Correctional Facility (SCCF), which consists of the Riverhead Correctional Facility, a medium/maximum security jail, and the Yaphank Correctional Facility, a minimum security jail, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. The lawsuit was filed pro se as a class action, on behalf of those individuals and all others similarly situated. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages alleging that the conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged unsanitary and hazardous living conditions, including, among other things, chronic exposure to human waste and presence of fungus, mold and other hazardous matters in the shower and housing areas, which caused various ailments to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs all sought to proceed in forma pauperis. The plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on June 17, 2011, adding additional eight plaintiffs detained in the SCCF. The Court (Judge Joanna Seybert), on June 23, 2011, granted the forma pauperis status, but denied the request to proceed as a class action due to the fact that all of the class representatives were proceeding without counsel. The plaintiffs filed a motion to join four additional plaintiffs on June 30, 2011. On July 27, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Amended Complaint seeking to add seven additional plaintiffs as Supplemental Plaintiffs. The motion for joinder was granted by the order of the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) on October 7, 2011, but the Court denied the motion to join Supplemental Plaintiffs. The Court also dismissed four plaintiffs with the same order. On November 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) determined that the appointment of pro bono counsel was appropriate and directed the Court's Pro Se Office to find willing counsel. Afterwards, the Court received a large number of substantially similar complaints from inmates at SCCF, seeking damages, amounting to fifty-nine separate complaints alleging similar violations due to unsanitary conditions. On January 23, 2012, the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) appointed Shearman & Sterling LLP as pro bono counsel, and ordered consolidation of all existing fifty-nine actions as well as any future complaints of the living conditions at SCCF with Shearman & Sterling's appointment extended to all of the plaintiffs in the newly consolidated action. By April 5, 2012, there were 163 plaintiffs. On April 5, 2012, the pro bono counsel filed the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, dropping all plaintiffs but for the named six plaintiffs, but seeking to represent the interests of all 163 plaintiffs, as well as other past, present or future persons imprisoned at SCCF, by proceeding as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The New York Civil Liberties Union joined in the representation. The complaint was filed against Suffolk County, the Sheriff of the Suffolk County and his deputies in their personal and official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged violations of constitutional rights, negligence and ministerial negligence under New York common law. The allegations included, among other things, overcrowding, and unsanitary and hazardous conditions at the jail-- including flawed plumbing that leads to chronic exposure to human waste and contaminated food and drinking water, which caused the prisoners various health issues. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages. On May 16, 2012, the County moved to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint. On May 17, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On March 19, 2013, the Court (Judge Joanna Seybert) addressed both motions. The Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, dismissing without prejudice claims against the Sheriff and his deputies of personal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment. The Court explained that for such liability to exist, the plaintiffs must demonstrate the defendants' actual knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm, while the complaint pleaded only constructive knowledge. The claim under the theory of supervisory liability against the Sheriff and his deputies was also dismissed, because the complaint was void of any allegations that the defendants made the decisions that allegedly constituted the violations. All other claims survived. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, creating two classes, injunctive and damages, constituted of all persons who are at present time or will at any time in the future be detained at SCCF, with separate subclasses for those persons detained at Riverhead and Yaphank, with the named plaintiffs ordered to be the class representatives. The counsel of the named plaintiffs was ordered to be appointed class counsel. Between 2013 and 2019, the parties conducted discovery and filed respective motions for summary judgment in fall 2018. Subsequently, the court terminated these pending summary judgment motions in September 2019. In doing so, the court directed the plaintiffs to file a motion proposing those class members who had fully exhausted administrative remedies per the PLRA's requirements, or who were not subject to the exhaustion requirement, as substitute class representatives. A motion to add additional class representatives was filed in late 2019. The case remains ongoing as of November 2020.

Summary: On May 27, 2011, inmates at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility filed, pro se, a complaint alleging that the unsanitary conditions of confinement at the two jails, located at Riverhead and Yaphank, violated their constitutional rights. The Court appointed pro bono counsel on November 22, 2011; they filed the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint on April 5, 2012, seeking to represent interests of all inmates as a class action. The Court granted the class certification on March 19, 2013, and denied most of the defendants' motion to discuss at the same time. The case is ongoing.


On November 19, 2009, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division began an investigation of Parish of Terrebonne Parish Juvenile Detention Center (TPJDC) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141. On January 18, 2011, the DOJ published their findings that the TPJDC violated youth's civil rights and that youth were harmed by (1) physical and sexual misconduct by staff; (2) excessive physical restraints when lesser forms of punishment would be appropriate; (3) inappropriate use of chemical agents; (4) excessive use of isolation; and (5) inadequate suicide prevention. On October 4, 2011, the United States filed suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government, who owned and operated TPJDC, under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The complaint alleged the harms identified in the findings letter. The United States sought equitable and declaratory relief, as well as a permanent injunction against further participation in the alleged acts. The same month, negotiations began between the parties. They submitted a settlement agreement to the Court on October 19, 2011. The agreement was approved by Judge Helen G. Berrigan on October 31, 2011 and the case was dismissed. The settlement agreement included provisions to cure the alleged violations. It also included terms for monthly reports produced by monitor documenting statistics, trends, and corrective actions. The agreement would terminate once the United States certified that the Parish was in substantial compliance with all of the provisions of the settlement for twelve consecutive months. On November 19, 2014, the Court issued an order of final dismissal terminating the settlement agreement and dismissing the case with prejudice.

Summary: On October 4, 2011, the United States filed suit against Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government alleging violations of the juvenile inmates' civil rights. On October 31, 2011, Judge Helen G. Berrigan approved a settlement agreement that included provisions to cure the alleged violations. On November 19, 2014, the Court issued an order of final dismissal terminating the settlement agreement and dismissing the case with prejudice.


On March 27, 2011, Disability Rights Mississippi (the Protection and Advocacy organization for Mississippi) filed suit against Forrest County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Plaintiff, represented by counsel from the Southern Poverty Law Center in Jackson, brought action for alleged violations of three separate Protection and Advocacy acts: the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Individuals with Mental Illness Act, and the Individual Rights Program. The complaint alleged that the County did not allow plaintiff access to records and residents of a juvenile center, as Protection and Advocacy laws require. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. On April 12, 2011, the parties agreed to set up a temporary plan to allow the plaintiff access to the defendant's facilities and records. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (Hon. Keith Starrett) signed the agreement as a plan to be enforced until the parties reach a permanent plan. The temporary plan allowed plaintiff access to defendant's residents, records and facilities for investigations, as the law required, but limited access to prevent interference with defendant's programs. Later, a state youth court issued orders that were inconsistent with this temporary plan. On June 13, 2011, the Court issued an order staying all state court orders that were inconsistent with the temporary plan. Since that date, there has been no submission of a permanent plan.

Summary: On March 27, 2011, Disability Rights Mississippi filed suit against Forrest County in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging violation of Protection and Advocacy Laws in that defendant did not allow plaintiff access to investigate the county's juvenile centers. On April 12, 2011, the parties agreed to a temporary plan permitting plaintiff access consistent with Protection and Advocacy laws, but limited in a way that prevents interference with juvenile center programs. Since then, there has been no sign of a permanent plan for access.


On April 25, 2016, a minor pre-trial detainee in the Rutherford County Detention Facility (“the Facility”) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and its Commissioner, the Director of the Facility, an officer of the Facility, and Rutherford County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff, through private counsel and the ACLU of Tennessee claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged the government had unlawfully held him in solitary confinement for long periods of time as a punitive measure. Specifically, the plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement at the Facility for five days prior to the filing of this lawsuit for allegedly disruptive behavior. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. He requested a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent injunction, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Todd J. Campbell. On April 25, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent defendants from placing or keeping him in solitary confinement while awaiting adjudication. On May 4, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for relief and subject-matter jurisdiction. On May 5, 2016, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding he had not shown irreparable harm, as he was no longer in solitary confinement. The temporary restraining order terminated the same day. On May 18, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to certify a class of all current and future juveniles held in detention at secure facilities in the State of Tennessee. On June 9 and 22, 2016, the defendants again moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging the matter was moot because the plaintiff was no longer in the custody of the Facility, and alleging failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. On July 7, 2016, the plaintiff sought class certification of those juveniles detained in any facility licensed by DCS, and a subclass of those juveniles detained in the Facility. Judge Campbell denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on August 26, 2016, finding that the plaintiff’s claim was capable of repetition and therefore was not moot. On November 30, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Aleta A. Trauger. On February 9, 2017, the plaintiff again sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants from placing the plaintiff or any other class member in solitary confinement as punishment. On February 17, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to a certify class defined as “all juveniles detained in the Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center who are or were placed in solitary confinement or isolation for punitive reasons, from April 25, 2015 to the present.” 2017 WL 660681. On March 22, 2017, the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was granted. 2017 WL 1091864. The court found that the plaintiff’s claim that the solitary confinement of juveniles for punitive purposes constituted inhumane treatment was likely to succeed on the merits. On October 30, 2017, the case was referred to a magistrate for settlement. An order dated January 29, 2018, explained that after further discussion, the parties had one unresolved issue that they wish to continue mediating. The case was transferred to Judge Eli Richardson on November 14, 2018. The parties reached a settlement and then moved for preliminary approval of the agreement on January 24, 2019, but Judge Richardson denied the motion due to concerns about the agreement. The parties then revised the settlement and again moved for preliminary approval on March 27, 2019. Judge Richarson preliminary approved the agreement, and after a fairness hearing, approved the agreement on July 19, 2019. The agreement included a permanent injunction prohibiting Rutherford County from using seclusion as punishment for minors. The defendants also agreed to reporting requirements and that they would pay $250,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The court dismissed the case with prejudice that same day. The case remains ongoing for compliance with the permanent injunction of the settlement agreement. As of March 24, 2021, there was no additional activity on the docket to suggest compliance issues or disputes.

Summary: In 2016, a minor detainee at Rutherford County Juvenile Detention Center filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff alleged that the practice of placing minors in solitary confinement as punishment violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2017, the plaintiff was granted a preliminary injunction and the parties began the settlement process. The case settled in July 2019. The settlement agreement included a permanent injunction prohibiting Rutherford County from using seclusion as punishment for minors.


[Note: This case was previously known as Twitter v. Holder, then Twitter v. Lynch, then Twitter v. Sessions] On October 7, 2014, Twitter -- an online social networking service -- filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Administrative Procedure Act. Twitter, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that nondisclosure provisions set forth in a letter from the Deputy Attorney General ("the DAG Letter") and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) secrecy provisions were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Twitter also contended that the review mechanisms for seeking to modify the nondisclosure provisions violate the separation of power principles. Twitter specifically contested the FBI's practice of occasionally issuing National Security Letters ("NSLs") to communication providers, compelling them to disclose information deemed relevant for protecting against terrorism. The FBI also issues FISA orders that permit surveillance or disclosure of stored records. Recipients of a NSL or a FISA order are restricted from disclosing information from that order. In 2013, in response to these restrictions, five communication providers (including Google and Facebook) filed a lawsuit to relax restrictions for publishing information such as the total number of requests and user accounts encompassed by such requests. In January 2014, the DOJ and the five providers settled. Two pre-approved disclosure formats were set forth in the DAG Letter, which was dated January 27, 2014. Twitter, the plaintiff in this case, had a practice of releasing transparency reports that listed the number of requests from the government for account information and content removal, and how Twitter responded to such requests. At the time of the complaint, the reports did not contain information regarding NSL and FISA orders. On January 29, 2014, the plaintiff met with the defendants and sought confirmation that the DAG Letter (of January 27, 2014) did not apply to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted a draft report to the FBI seeking prepublication review; the draft included numeric information of NSL and FISA orders received. The FBI denied prepublication on a basis that the contained information exceeded the scope set forth in the DAG Letter. This first amendment complaint ensued. On October 17, 2014, the government declined to proceed before a magistrate judge, and the case was subsequently reassigned to District Court Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers on October 20, 2014. On January 9, 2015, the government filed a partial motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The government argued that: 1. The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to establish an injury-in-fact and therefore lacked standing, and because the DAG Letter did not constitute a final agency act under the Administrative Procedure Act; 2. FISA challenges should instead have been considered by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court; and 3. The Plaintiff's separation of powers challenge to the disclosure review mechanisms failed as a matter of law because deference to the Executive was entirely appropriate in this context. In February 2015, a number of popular digital media organizations filed amici briefs on behalf of Twitter, including Buzzfeed, National Public Radio, and Reddit. A hearing was held on the government’s motion to dismiss on May 5, 2015, but before Judge Rogers could rule, the defendants notified her in June 2015 of the passage of the USA Freedom Act. The USA Freedom Act reauthorized portions of the USA Patriot Act, but eliminated the Patriot Act’s bulk data collection provisions. Notably for this case, the Act added options for those who had been subject to NSL or FISA orders to publicly report information about orders received, and amended the judicial review process for NSL nondisclosure requirements. Judge Rogers subsequently called for briefings on the impact of the Act on the pending partial motion for summary judgment and on the case as a whole. The plaintiff argued that the legislative changes did not affect the defendant's pending partial motion to dismiss, should not affect Twitter’s APA or First Amendment claims, and changed, but did not moot, its First Amendment and separation of powers claim. The government argued that passage of the Act made the plaintiff's Administrative Procedure Act and First Amendment challenges moot, and that the Act reinforced the constitutionality of the NSL statutes. On October 14, 2015, after receiving all supplemental briefs, the Judge Rogers dismissed the government’s motion to dismiss as moot and ordered Twitter to file an amended complaint in light of the changes under the USA Freedom Act. 139 F.Supp.3d 1075. Twitter filed its amended complaint on November 13, 2015. In light of the new legislation, Twitter sought declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, arguing that the non-disclosure provisions of FISA were unconstitutional on their face, that the government’s actions showed a pattern of “informal, overly expansive, delayed and conflicting” actions that had a chilling effect on speech and limited Twitter’s first amendment rights. It also argued that the Espionage Act was unconstitutional as applied to Twitter, and sought declaratory relief to that effect, expressing its concern that Twitter would be prosecuted under the Espionage Act should it choose to publish its Transparency Report. The government filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on January 15, 2016. It argued that the court should dismiss the FISA claims in the interest of comity, that Twitter failed to establish standing with respect to its Espionage Act claims, and that all of Twitter’s claims should fail as a matter of law since the government may lawfully restrict disclosure of classified information. On May 2, 2016, Judge Rogers granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Rogers denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds of comity and concluded that Twitter had standing under the Espionage Act, but had not sufficiently pleaded its First Amendment claims. 183 F.Supp.3d 1007. Three weeks later, Twitter filed a second amended complaint. In it, Twitter alleged an implied cause of action under the First Amendment and a cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act. Twitter claimed that the information it sought to disclose was improperly classified, and that the government failed to specify which specific information in its report could not be published. On November 22, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. It was denied without prejudice on July 6, 2017. The government filed a motion to reconsider on September 5, 2017, which Judge Rogers denied on November 28, 2017. After a lengthy discovery process, the Court published an order on June 21, 2019 suggesting that they would reconsider defendants' motion for summary judgment based on new information provided in the classified declaration of Michael McGarrity, Acting Executive Assistant Director of the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This evidence supported the government's assertion of a state secrets privilege, showing with specificity the imminent harm to national security that disclosure of this information would constitute. On September 27, 2019, the government filed a renewed motion for Summary Judgment. On October 25, 2019, plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for Summary Judgment, contending that the government's evidence was purely speculative and hypothetical and that they failed to meet their burden to justify classification of the information in Twitter's transparency report. In April 2020, Judge Rogers granted summary judgment to the government and denied summary judgment to the plaintiff. The Court ruled that, while strict scrutiny applied, the government sufficiently showed that the national security concerns outweighed Twitter's interest in disclosure. 2020 WL 1904597. No appeal has yet been filed.

Summary: On October 7, 2014, Twitter filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the U.S. Dept. of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to file a report on information requests received from the government. The Court granted summary judgment for the government in April 2020.


On June 3, 2014, the New York Times and NYT reporter Charlie Savage filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). They sought production of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) rulings interpreting surveillance law since 9/11 after the government failed to release these documents in response to a FOIA request. Represented by in-house counsel, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the documents sought were public and must be disclosed, an order requiring the defendant to produce the documents within 20 days, and attorneys' fees and costs. As a result of Edward Snowden’s release of classified documents in 2013, it became evident that FISC engaged legal analysis interpreting constitutional rights and surveillance statutes. Though the government began selectively declassifying FISC rulings, many documents remained secret. The New York Times submitted a FOIA request on March 12, 2014 to obtain FISC documents related to rulings on the sharing of raw data without private information removed between government agencies and attempts to approve of a warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Service Act but failed to receive any documents. While this litigation was pending, the DOJ produced redacted versions of the FISC documents to the plaintiffs. The parties settled the case with plaintiffs' stipulation to voluntary dismissal. On October 28, 2015, Judge Vernon S. Broderick accepted the stipulation and dismissed the case with prejudice. The documents were then posted at Savage's website  here, and are reposted by the Clearinghouse. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 3, 2014, the New York Times and its reporter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking production of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) rulings interpreting surveillance law since 9/11. The plaintiff alleged a violation of FOIA because the defendant failed to release these documents in response to a FOIA request. While this litigation was pending, the DOJ produced redacted versions of the FISC documents to the plaintiffs. The case was voluntarily dismissed on October 28, 2015. The case is now closed.


On June 25, 2003, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a five-year old developmentally disabled girl under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Title XIX of the Social Security Act, "The Medicaid Act") against the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that ADHS was not in compliance with the Medicaid Act. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that her rights were violated when ADHS refused to provide her father with an enrollment application for community-based services and instead placed her on a waitlist for an indefinite time period. Arkansas participates in Medicaid, and ADHS is the state agency charged with the administration of the Medicaid program in Arkansas. Arkansas provides services for developmentally disabled individuals in intermediate care facilities; alternatively, Arkansas also chose to provide home and community based services for developmentally disabled individuals (known as the Alternative Community Services Medicaid Waiver Program, or "ACS"). Plaintiff was a five-year-old girl with developmental and physical disabilities resulting from Down syndrome. Plaintiff's father wished to enroll her in the ACS program and requested an enrollment application in November of 2002; instead of providing an application, ADHS required Plaintiff to complete a client choice form. ADHS put Plaintiff on a wait list at number 2285 for an indefinite period of time even though there were almost 1,000 empty slots under the ACS program. Plaintiff alleged that ADHS had taken similar actions in response to other requests for ACS services. Defendants filed an answer on July 17, 2003. During a hearing held on August 14, 2003, Defendants agreed to provide Plaintiff with an application for ACS services. Because that was the primary relief sought by Plaintiff in her Complaint, the Court (Judge G. Thomas Eisele) dismissed the case without prejudice and stated that it considered Plaintiff to be a prevailing party. On September 22, 2003, the Court issued an order awarding attorney's fees and costs. Rejecting Plaintiff's request for more than $26,000 because it was excessive in light of the relief obtained, the Court awarded Plaintiff $16,500 in attorney's fees, and $150 in costs. There has been no further action in the case, and it has been closed.

Summary: This case was brought on behalf of a developmentally disabled girl against Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) because ADHS would not provide Plaintiff with an application to enroll in community/home-based services provided through the state's Medicaid program. The case was dismissed without prejudice on September 22, 2003, when Defendant agreed to provide Plaintiff with an application for those services.


On January 20, 2010, an employee of the federal judiciary married to her same-sex partner under California law filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, against the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and a review of administrative action, alleging an equal protection violation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violates the Fifth Amendment by refusing to recognize lawful same-sex marriages for purposes of the laws governing spousal health benefits for federal employees, thereby denying her of a benefit that would be available to her if her spouse were of the opposite sex. The plaintiff, a 19-year employee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had applied for health benefits for her wife and been denied, and though the Ninth Circuit (Chief Judge Alex Kozinski) then issued an order as part of the employment dispute procedure finding that she was entitled to spousal health benefits, In re Golinski, 587 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2009), the OPM had refused to comply. As such, the plaintiff's initial complaint requested a writ of mandamus to enforce the Ninth Circuit order. On March 16, 2011, however, the District Court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) dismissed this claim, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011), and the plaintiff was forced to amend her complaint to request injunctive relief. Meanwhile, on February 23, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA was unconstitutional and that it would no longer defend the act in court. In response to this, on May 4, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) moved to intervene to defend the act, and their motion was granted on June 3. On the same day, the defendants-intervenors moved to dismiss the complaint. On July 1, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the Department of Justice filed a brief supporting the plaintiff's claim. On February 22, 2012, the District Court (Judge White) granted the plaintiff's motion and denied that of the defendant-intervenors. Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The Court stated that classifications based on sexual orientation should be subjected to heightened scrutiny, but held that the application of DOMA to deny spousal health benefits in this case did not even have a rational basis and thus constituted a violation of the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. It entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from interfering with the enrollment of the plaintiff's wife in her family health benefits plan. Defendants-intervenors appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On May 22, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Sydney R. Thomas) denied the plaintiff's motion for an initial hearing en banc and scheduled arguments before a three-judge panel for the week of September 10-14. However, the Court vacated the September 10, 2012 oral argument date, pending the resolution of the petition for writ of certiorari submitted to the Supreme Court on July 3, 2012 by the U.S. Department of Justice. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States entered an order denying the petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. On July 25, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered an order dismissing all appeals of the case, as stipulated by the parties following the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor (PB-NY-0017 in this clearinghouse) holding § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional.

Summary: On January 20, 2010, an employee of the federal judiciary married to her same-sex partner under California law filed a lawsuit against the federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, alleging that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violates the Fifth Amendment by refusing to recognize lawful same-sex marriages for purposes of the laws governing spousal health benefits for federal employees, thereby denying her of a benefit that would be available to her if her spouse were of the opposite sex. On February 22, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the application of DOMA to deny spousal health benefits in this case did not have a rational basis and thus constituted a Fifth Amendment violation. It entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from interfering with the enrollment of the plaintiff's wife in her family health benefits plan. On July 3, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a petition in the Supreme Court for certiorari prior to judgment. That petition was held without decision while the Court considered the California Prop. 8 case (PB-CA-0029 in this Clearinghouse) and Windsor, the DOMA case from the Second Circuit (PB-NY-0017 in this Clearinghouse), in which the Court granted review on December 7. The case was dismissed following the decision in Windsor holding § 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.


On December 4, 2012, a 21-year-old with muscular dystrophy filed this lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. Prior to turning 21, the plaintiff had received 615 hours of Medi-Cal funded, in-home nursing care per month. Once he turned 21 in September 2012, however, the state reduced his nursing care by 200 hours per month due to its restrictions on funded nursing hours for adults, despite the fact that his condition remained the same. The plaintiff alleged that the reduction in nursing hours put him at serious risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He also alleged a deprivation of the constitutional right to procedural due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the reduction in his in-home nursing care. On August 1, 2013, Judge William B. Shubb dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was permitted to select any combination of services available under the state plan to address his health care needs. The plaintiff could also, when medically necessary, submit a request to be reassessed for additional waiver services. The defendant agreed to pay $69,500 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiff, an individual with muscular dystrophy, filed this lawsuit alleging that the state's planned reduction in his home care nursing services (due to his reaching his 21st birthday and transition into "adult" services) puts him at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA and Section 504. The parties reached a settlement agreement and on August 1, 2013, the case was dismissed.


The plaintiffs, institutionalized individuals in the District of Columbia with disabilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on December 23, 2010. The complaint alleged that the District of Columbia has policies and procedures that force the unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities who could live in the community with appropriate services. The plaintiffs claimed that these policies, which erect barriers to receiving long-term care and arbitrarily restrict the availability of community-based services, violate the Americans with Disabilities Act's integration mandate (under the precedent of Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs filed this complaint in response to the failure of D.C. to develop and implement a working Olmstead plan. On April 27, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The defendants claimed that D.C.'s policies were adequate to prevent unnecessary institutionalization and that none of the plaintiffs had demonstrated that his or her institutionalization was a result of the District's policies or that he or she could live in the community. The United States (Department of Justice) filed a brief siding with the plaintiffs on October 3, 2011. On February 14, 2010, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle issued an opinion denying, for the most part, the defendant's summary judgment motion. Judge Huvelle agreed to dismiss the individual defendant officials from the case, noting that the claims against them were duplicative of those against the District. But, Judge Huvelle denied the defendants' motion on the substantive claims, finding that the District had no effective plan in place to prevent unnecessary institutionalization. In April 2012, the District of Columbia announced a new Olmstead community integration plan. In March of 2013, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint without the named parties. The defendants immediately filed a motion to dismiss. On March 28, 2013, Judge Huvelle granted the plaintiff's class certification as well as denied defendant's motion to dismiss. This prompted renewed litigation in conjunction, including a request for interlocutory appeal on the class certification. The defendants also filed a motion to stay pending the request for interlocutory appeal, and this motion was ultimately denied. In September of 2015, following months of discovery, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint, and the defendants filed a final motion to dismiss. This motion was again denied. After trial before Judge Huvelle, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law on October 6, 2016. On September 13, 2017, however, Judge Huvelle found that plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the existence of a concrete, systemic failure that entitled them to class-wide relief and dismissed their class-wide claims. More specifically, Judge Huvelle found that there were both systemic and individualized barriers to transitioning that were beyond the control of the defendants, so a single injunction could not remedy the plaintiffs’ institutionalization. As the plaintiffs had not sought individual relief, Judge Huvelle entered judgment for the defendants and denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law as moot. On October 18, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed Judge Huvelle's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. On July 5, 2019, a D.C. Circuit panel composed of Judges Karen L. Henderson and Robert L. Wilkins with Senior District Judge Harry T. Edwards reversed and remanded Judge Huvelle's decision. They stated that the state has the burden of proof in showing that the access plans it has in place are sufficient under Olmstead, and that the District Court erred when it focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint, not the robustness of the State's plan. 928 F.3d 1070. The case returned to the District Court for further proceedings; discovery is ongoing.

Summary: Institutionalized individuals with disabilities filed this challenge to the District of Columbia's Medicaid policies. Plaintiffs alleged that the District does not have an effective plan to prevent unnecessary institutionalization and that the inability of individuals to access sufficient community-based supports and services under DC's policies violates the ADA. Following trial in 2016, Judge Huvelle found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate entitlement to class-wide relief and entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the decision; the D.C. circuit reversed and remanded. Discovery is now ongoing.


On October 9, 2007, a same-sex couple residing in San Diego, California, with their adopted child who was born in Louisiana, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Louisiana. The plaintiffs had asked Louisiana to issue a new original birth certificate identifying plaintiffs as the child's legal parents, but the state refused to do so. The plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief finding Louisiana's actions in violation of the Constitution; for an injunction requiring Louisiana to issue the new birth certificate; and for reasonable attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs amended the complaint on June 30, 2008. Plaintiffs had adopted their child, who was born in Shreveport, Louisiana, in New York in 2006. Louisiana rejected their request for an amended birth certificate identifying both of them as the child's legal parents relying on its own law, public policy, and an advisory opinion from the Louisiana Attorney General's Office; the state concluded that it was not required to recognize an out-of-state adoption decree that violates Louisiana public policy. In particular, the state contended that it did not need to recognize out-of-state adoption decrees that name two unmarried persons as the adoptive parents because, in Louisiana, only married parents could jointly adopt a child. Plaintiffs countered that adoption orders by a New York state court are judgments that must be given full faith and credit under the Constitution by every other state. Furthermore, plaintiffs claimed that the State of Louisiana violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause because the state denied the legal benefit of an accurate birth certificate to a subset of children who are adopted by unmarried same-sex couples. On December 22, 2008, the District Court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment; the court found that the Louisiana statute in question authorizes the state registrar to issue a new birth record upon receipt of a valid out-of-state adoption decree and is entitled to full faith and credit. Thus, the court ordered the state to issue an amended birth certificate identifying the plaintiffs as the child's parents. On January 15, 2009, the state sought a new trial in the district court and, six days later, also filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 18, 2009, the District Court denied the state's motion for a new trial and granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the judgment; Judge Zainey ordered that the Louisiana State Registrar issue a completed birth certificate reflecting the names of the adoptive parents in accordance with the Court's judgment. However, on March 27, 2009, the Fifth Circuit ordered that the judgment be stayed pending resolution of defendant's appeal in that Court. On February 18, 2010, a Fifth Circuit panel held that Louisiana law, properly understood, required defendant to reissue the birth certificate with both parents' names listed. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2010). However, that opinion was vacated by the Court's decision to rehear the case en banc. Adar v. Smith, 622 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2010). On April 12, 2011, the en banc Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for dismissal. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011). The court found that Louisiana did not violate the full faith and credit clause by determining how to apply its own laws to maintain its vital statistics records, and that no right created by the New York adoption order had been denied. As to the Equal Protection claim, the court found that Louisiana's preference for stable adoptive families provides a rational basis for its decision to have its birth certificate requirements flow from its domestic adoption law (requiring that any parents wishing to jointly adopt be married). The costs on appeal were awarded to defendant as well. On May 20, 2011, on remand, the District Court Judge Zainey entered judgment in favor of defendant and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. On October 19, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Summary: Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple who asked a federal court in Louisiana to declare as unconstitutional Louisiana's refusal to issue an amended birth certificate for an adopted child listing both individuals in an unmarried same-sex couple as the legal parents, and, for injunctive relief requiring Louisiana to issue such birth certificate. After the district court held for plaintiffs, the Fifth Circuit reversed and found that Louisiana's recognition of a New York adoption order was not entitled to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that there was no Equal Protection violation.


On April 9, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in North Carolina filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of North Carolina. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel, asked the court to declare that North Carolina's ban on same-sex is unconstitutional, declare North Carolina laws prohibiting joint adoption by same-sex couples are also unconstitutional, enjoin the state from enforcing any of its laws banning same-sex marriage, direct the state to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiffs alleged that their rights under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause were violated by North Carolina's laws banning same-sex marriage. They also claimed that the laws interfered with the structure of their families because same-sex couples could not participate in second parent adoption. On June 2, 2014, the Court (Magistrate Judge Joi Elizabeth Peake) granted a petition that allowed one of the plaintiffs to prosecute this civil action on behalf of her minor child. That same day, the Court stayed further proceedings in this case pending a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Bostic v. Schaefer, which also challenged a state's ban on same-sex marriage. On June 24, 2014, this case was reassigned to Chief Judge William L. Osteen. The Fourth Circuit's July 28, 2014 ruling in Bostic held that the Virginia Marriage Laws violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit Virginia from recognizing same-sex couples' lawful out-of-state marriages. 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014). On August 27, 2014, the proceedings in this case were further stayed pending the determination of the Supreme Court whether to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in Bostic. After the Supreme Court denied certiorari review in Bostic, Judge Osteen issued an order on October 6, 2014, finding that it appeared the plaintiffs were entitled to an order granting the pending motions for preliminary injunction in light of the Fourth Circuit's mandate, but that at least two issues remained for the court's resolution: (i) what further action by the court was necessary with respect to those issues arguably resolved by Bostic, and (ii) resolution of the adoption laws at issue in the case. On October 8, 2014, Judge Osteen lifted the stay in the case and denied all prior pending motions, except the motion for preliminary injunction, as moot. The order also dismissed the North Carolina Attorney General as a defendant and allowed the State of North Carolina to intervene. The plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings that same day. The Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate filed motions to intervene. On October 14, 2014, Judge Osteen permitted their intervention, noting that it would preserve their right to appeal, but overruled their objections to the court's jurisdiction and to the application of Bostic. In an October 14, 2014 order, the court declared North Carolina Const. art. XIV, § 6, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2 unconstitutional to the extent that those laws prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit the State of North Carolina from recognizing same-sex couples’ lawful out-of-state marriages. 14 F. Supp. 3d 695 (M.D. NC 2014). The order enjoined the State of North Carolina and its officers, agents, and employees from implementing or enforcing any of the above-mentioned provisions. The plaintiffs' claims concerning North Carolina's adoption laws, as well as the pending motion for preliminary injunction, were dismissed without prejudice as moot. Speaker of the NC House of Representatives and President Tempore of the NC Senate, intervenors in this action, appealed the order on November 6, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal on November 14, 2014, seeking dismissal of the legislative intervenors' appeal by appealing the order granting the motion for intervention. On December 4, 2015, the cross appeals were consolidated before the Fourth Circuit. On February 10, 2015, the Fourth Circuit placed the case in abeyance pending the US Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court's Obergefell decision held that state bans on same-sex marriage violate the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court denied the intervenors' petition for a writ of certiorari, resulting in a mandate from the Fourth Circuit on August 12, 2015. This denial left intact the judgment in the plaintiffs' favor of October 8, 2014, rendering the plaintiffs the prevailing party for purposes of recovering attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees on October 13, 2015. The plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with the legislative intervenors for $44,501.36 on October 21, 2015. Though certain administrative errors prolonged the resolution of the remaining fees, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees and costs against the defendants on July 25, 2018 in the amount of $169,656.25. As of August 9, 2018, it does not appear that either party filed an objection to this order during the 10-day stay on the attorney's fees for the filing of objections, and it does not seem that there are any further matters to be resolved in this case.

Summary: On April 9th, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in North Carolina filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of North Carolina. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that North Carolina's ban on same-sex is unconstitutional, declare North Carolina laws prohibiting joint adoption by same-sex couples are also unconstitutional, enjoin the state from enforcing any of its laws banning same-sex marriage, direct the state to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. The court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor on October 14, 2014, declaring the North Carolina laws in question unconstitutional to the extent they prevent marriage and recognition of same-sex couples.


On December 2, 2014, seven same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their out-of-state marriage recognized in Nebraska filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The plaintiffs, represented by lawyers from the ACLU and private counsel, sued the state of Nebraska and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that Nebraska's exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples from other jurisdictions under Nebraska's "Defense of Marriage" Constitutional Amendment violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On March 2, 2015, the district court (Judge Joseph E. Bataillon) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction ordered all relevant state officials to treat same-sex couples the same as different-sex couples in the context of processing a marriage license or determining the rights, protections, obligations, or benefits of marriage. Waters v. Ricketts, 48 F.Supp.3d 1271 (D. Neb. 2015). The same day, the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the preliminary injunction. On March 6, 2015, the Eighth Circuit granted defendants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and scheduled an oral argument. On April 29, 2015, the Eighth Circuit ordered on its own motion that oral argument and any further consideration of the cases be deferred pending the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). (Clearinghouse code PB-OH-0003). On June 13, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On June 30, 2015, the Eighth Circuit vacated its order staying the District Court's preliminary injunction. On August 11, 2015, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, held Nebraska's constitutional provision to be unconstitutional, and remanded the case for entry of final judgment on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs. Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2015). On September 24, 2015, plaintiffs filed supplemental materials alleging further injuries related to a defendant's actions under state birth certificate issuance statutes. On February 4, 2016, Judge Bataillon granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction striking down Nebraska’s ban on gay marriage. Waters v. Ricketts, 159 F.Supp.3d 992 (D. Neb. 2016). The injunction ordered state officials to treat same-sex couples the same as different-sex couples in the context of processing marriage certificates or determining rights, protections, obligations or benefits of marriage. On June 14, 2016, Judge Bataillon closed this case, but retained jurisdiction to enforce its injunction for a period of at least 3 years.

Summary: On December 2, 2014, seven same-sex couples seeking marriage or recognition of an out-of-state marriage in Nebraska filed claim against the state of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and it was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on interlocutory appeal following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. On February 4, 2016, Judge Bataillon issued a permanent injunction striking down Nebraska’s ban on gay marriage.


The Plaintiffs, same-sex parents filing on behalf of their minor twins, filed this lawsuit in the District Court of South Carolina (Columbia Division) on January 7, 2016. The Plaintiffs sued the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control/State Registrar of Vital Statistics under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003)and other binding precedent, as well as violation of their fundamental right to marry and other protected liberties. The Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant’s refusal to treat same-sex spouses the same as opposite-sex spouses in the issuance of birth certificates is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs further alleged that the Defendant’s refusal to name both Plaintiffs on their twins’ birth certificates discriminates on the basis of sex and sexual orientation. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 31, 2016. They alleged that there was no dispute between the parties as to material fact and that the Defendants failed to contest the Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments or right to declaratory relief judgment. The Court agreed, and on February 15, 2017, District Judge Mary G. Lewis granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and request for declaratory judgment. 2017 WL 624803. On February 28, 2017, Judge Lewis entered a Consent Decree ordering the Defendant to (1) apply all rules, procedures, policies and practices relating to the issuance of birth certificates to same-sex spouses on the same terms as it applies them to different-sex spouses, (2) to list the birth mother on the original birth record as the “Mother” of a child born in South Carolina, (3) to list the spouse of the birth mother on the birth record as the other parent of the child (excluding instances of surrogate births), (4) to issue two-parent birth certificates to married same-sex parents on the same terms that two-parent certificates are provided to different-sex married parents, (5) to modify its existing vital records system to allow updates to its systems and forms so that the first parent is listed as “Mother/parent,” and the second parent as “Father/parent,” (6) to institute updates to allow the Mother’s Worksheet for Child’s Birth Certificate completed at hospitals to be recorded in a gender-neutral fashion, (7) to issue corrected birth certificates to the Plaintiff’s mailing address, (8) to make available to the public a statement listing these new policies and procedures, (9) and to allow any individuals who meet the requirements listed in this public statement but were previously denied issuance of a birth certificate listing both same-sex spouses as parents to obtain a corrected birth certificate for free. Furthermore, the court maintained jurisdiction of the case for purposes of monitoring compliance with and enforcing the Consent Decree, and allowed the Plaintiff’s to submit a motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to federal and local rules. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees on April 14, 2017, requesting approximately $49,000, but subsequently withdrew that motion on June 15, 2017 in light of an agreed upon undisclosed settlement between the parties. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2016, a same-sex married couple filed this Civil Rights Act of 1871 complaint in the District Court of South Carolina (Columbia Division). Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of their fundamental right to marry and other protected liberties related to the differential treatment of birth records for children with same-sex married parents. Summary Judgment was granted in favor of the Plaintiffs and a consent decree entered ordering South Carolina to make changes to the policies of their birth-record keeping, as well as the issuance of corrected birth certificates to the Plaintiffs and all who qualified under the new policies and requested such a correction. The parties reached an undisclosed settlement for attorney’s fees and the case closed in June 2017.


On October 22, 2013, five parolees in custody or under supervision of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center and the MacArthur Justice Center at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, the plaintiffs sued the Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (PRB) and the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the defendants violated the Due Process Clause by subjecting the plaintiffs to fundamentally unfair and procedurally flawed parole review proceedings, and requested injunctive and declaratory relief. The suit was brought on behalf of all parolees in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections facing parole revocation. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the PRB and DOC failed to:

appoint counsel to represent indigent parolees in revocation hearings;
provide adequate written notice of allegations and evidence against parolees;
allow parolees to develop evidence in advance of their hearings;
allow parolees the opportunity to speak on their own behalf at hearings;
allow parolees to access legal materials required for meaningful participation;
allow parolees to present written evidence and witnesses at hearings;
provide a hearing before a fair and impartial decision maker;
allow parolees to remain silent during proceedings; and
allow parolees to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the preliminary and final hearing.
The plaintiffs alleged that the process of the parole revocation proceedings amounted to essentially a rubber stamp of the recommendations of supervising parole agents. Shortly after filing, the parties began extensive settlement negotiations and the court stayed discovery. In February 2015, the parties reached an impasse in their negotiations and requested that the stay on discovery be lifted. Then the parties engaged in significant discovery. In February 2016, the parties reengaged in settlement talks, which resulted in a first proposed settlement agreement filed on October 24, 2016. Judge Amy St. Eve granted the parties joint motion for preliminary approval of the proposed settlement and then the parties proceeded to collect comments and objections from class members. On January 13, 2017, the plaintiffs informed the court that they had a final settlement agreement and submitted to the court for approval. On January 25, 2017, Judge Amy J. St. Eve granted final approval of a class action settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Parole Review Board agreed to appoint counsel to represent each qualified alleged parole violator. Counsel would be paid by the PRB, or the PRB would arrange to secure volunteer private counsel and supervised law students who would serve pro bono. The parties stipulated that the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center would create a handbook of legal resources and information that the defendants would distribute to all parolees. The IDOC agreed to make its best efforts to provide those in its custody facing parole revocation hearings for offenses in its facilities with access to means of communicating with others who would be able to provide relevant eyewitness or character testimony or other evidence. The parties jointly selected a monitor to ensure that the defendant complied with the agreement and was assigned to report to the parties on the status of compliance. In this role, the monitor met with parolees, observed hearings, and examined IDOC and PRB records to determine if the defendants were in compliance with the agreement. The defendants also agreed to pay plaintiffs counsel $225,000 for compensation. The monitor was scheduled to file a report with the parties after one year and then every six months after. The settlement was set to terminate in 24 months from the date of approval, on January 25, 2019. As of March 21, 2019, there was no additional activity on this case. This case is now closed.

Summary: On October 22, 2013, parolees in custody or under supervision of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit alleging violations of their due process rights due to procedurally unfair parole review proceedings, which functioned as essentially an automatic approval of parole board recommendations. In January of 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement which directs Illinois to revise its parole review proceedings and inform parolees of their rights.


On March 8, 2018 a transgender woman serving a ten-year sentence brought this lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Corrections and a group of its officers in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Though she had lived as a woman since the age of five, the plaintiff was incarcerated in a men’s prison and had previously been transferred from another men’s prison due to harassment and abuse by guards and prisoners. Following a settlement in a related case, the plaintiff continued to be harassed and subjected to physical and sexual abuse. As a result, she was placed in segregation and made multiple suicide attempts. In addition to continued abuse, the defendants allegedly failed to provide basic mental health services to the plaintiff. Officers also allegedly physically assaulted her and made clear that they would not protect her from other inmates. The complaint and an accompanying motion for preliminary injunction asked the court to order the defendants to transfer the plaintiff to a women’s prison. The plaintiff also sought: 1) an injunction under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which would require adequate mental health care and placement in general population rather than segregation; 2) a declaration that the defendants’ conduct and policies violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments and the Illinois Hate Crimes Act; 3) compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 4) attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel. On April 20, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to dismiss the suit because the plaintiff had yet to “exhaust <i> his </i> administrative remedies” (emphasis added) as required by the PLRA for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to follow procedure or provide sufficient information for the grievances that were filed, and in other cases failed to file a grievance for particular claims. On June 8, 2018, the plaintiff moved to withdraw her motion for a preliminary injunction, informing the court the she had been transferred to a new men’s prison facility due to her fear for her life from ongoing abuse. There, she was placed in general population and received some mental health services, seeming to moot the request for preliminary relief. However, on July 17, 2018, barely a month later, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for preliminary injunction, arguing that as soon as her prior injunctive motion had been withdrawn, prison staff had resumed discriminatory treatment against her, including verbal abuse and a failure to ensure her physical safety from other inmates and prison staff. On August 14, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint reflecting these developments. On November 7, 2018, Judge Rosenstengel issued an order granting portions of the preliminary injunction. 2018 WL 5830730. The order emphasized that since her childhood, the plaintiff's "family and community treated her as a girl and referred to her by her preferred name.” Judge Rosenstengel also noted that the plaintiff had begun "hormone treatment to physically transition to female” which was “most likely irreversible.” The court held that the plaintiff had a likelihood of success as to her equal protection claims and her Eighth Amendment claims. It ordered the defendants to train staff on transgender issues, allow the plaintiff to attend transgender support group programs, and consider all evidence for and against transferring the plaintiff to a women’s facility. The injunction gave the defendants fourteen days to comply. Magistrate Judge Reona Daly documented a report and recommendations pertaining to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 2019 WL 3046332. The report granted the defendant's motion for some claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative options. For nine other claims, though, the Magistrate Judge recommended denying the defendant's summary judgment motion because the facts supported the plaintiff's assertion that she had exhausted her administrative options. Because neither party objected to the report, Judge Rosenstengel reviewed the report only for clear error. Finding none, she adopted the recommendations on May 15, 2019. 2019 WL 2118219. The claims dismissed were dismissed without prejudice, and the surviving claims proceeded. On July 8, 2019, the plaintiff was transferred out of Illinois Department of Corrections. Shortly thereafter, on July 25, two defendants associated with Illinois Department of Corrections moved to dismiss claims against them seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The two defendants argued that the plaintiff's transfer mooted those claims. After the plaintiffs did not respond to the motion, Judge Rosenstengel dismissed the claims on February 6, 2020. 2020 WL 584193. After this motion, the five surviving claims were: three Eighth Amendment claims, a claim arising under the Illinois Hate Crimes Act, and an IIED claim. As of April 13, 2020, the parties were engaged in discovery and the case was ongoing.

Summary: A transgender woman incarcerated at a men's prison in Illinois brought this action against the Illinois Department of Corrections and its officers in federal court, for abuse, harassment, and equal protection violations. The plaintiff sought an injunction ordering the Department to transfer her to a women's facility. On November 7, 2018, Judge Nancy Rosenstengel of the Southern District of Illinois granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide basic mental health services to the plaintiff and consider all evidence as to whether she should be transferred to a women's prison.


This case addresses the Illinois Department of Corrections’ treatment of a prisoner during two decades of solitary confinement. Initially, the prisoner had been sentenced to serve seven years in prison as a young adult. However, during his first years in prison, he accumulated infractions for violent behavior caused by an untreated personality disorder. As a result, his sentence was extended to almost two lifetimes in solitary confinement. Released in August 2018 as the result of a habeas petition (one of more than 3 dozen federal lawsuits he filed challenging his confinement), he filed this lawsuit against the State of Illinois and its Department of Corrections on October 28, 2018, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by Loevy & Loevy, the MacArthur Justice Center, and private counsel, he brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Under §1983 he alleged that the Department had violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and he claimed that the Department discriminated against him by its failure to provide treatment or reasonable accommodations in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. He sought compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. Specifically, the complaint outlined the conditions he faced while in solitary confinement. The plaintiff alleged the Department did not provide him with any way to challenge his placement in solitary confinement. He spent twenty years in a cell the size of half a parking space with no sensory stimulation or human contact. Throughout the twenty years, the prison recorded dozens of instances of the plaintiff engaging in serious self-mutilation and increasingly aggressive behavior; he alleged that he was never given the acute psychiatric care he needed for his declining mental health. Initially assigned to Judge Sara L. Ellis, the case was transferred on March 27, 2019 to the Central District of Illinois, where it was assigned to Judge Colin Stirling Bruce. He disqualified and recused himself on September 18, 2019, and the case was reassigned to Judge Harold A. Baker. Two days prior to his recusal, Judge Bruce denied the Department’s motion to dismiss; however, he dismissed the State of Illinois as a defendant, even though no such dismissal had been sought. He stated that because Illinois accepts federal funding, it does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits brought under the Rehabilitation Act. However, because the Director of the Department of Corrections was sued in his official capacity (which is equivalent to a suit against the state itself), the state’s participation in the lawsuit would be unnecessary. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 7, 2020. As of July 8, 2020, two motions to dismiss are pending.

Summary: In 2018, a former prison inmate from Illinois sued the Illinois Department of Corrections. The plaintiff had spent 20 years in solitary confinement, where his mental health declined substantially. The plaintiff alleged that the Department had violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation act, by placing him in solitary confinement, providing no opportunity to appeal his placement, and providing him with insufficient psychiatric care. As of July 8, 2020, the litigation is ongoing.


On January 21, 2009, the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Indiana filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The complaint challenged the creation of housing units inside federal prisons in which prisoners lived in isolation from the outside world. Plaintiffs alleged that these cells, called Communication Management Units (CMUs) and designed to house prisoners viewed by the government as terrorists, were established in violation of federal laws requiring public notice and opportunity to comment on policy, and were disproportionately used to house Muslim prisoners. The plaintiff Sabri Benkahla was abducted at gunpoint by Saudi Arabian police and transferred to America in custody of the FBI the night before his wedding. Benkahla was charged with supplying services to the Taliban and further using a firearm in violent crime. The U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema found him not guilty, but the government forced him to testify in front of a grand jury a month later. Benkahla was convicted of perjury and sentenced to 121 months in prison in a CMU. Following this, a motion on July 27, 2009 to add parties was filed, and Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Harley G. Lappin and Joyce K. Conley were added in their official capacities. In the same motion, all pending claims against defendants B.R. Jett, Paul McNulty, Unknown Employees of Correctional Programs Divisions of the Federal Bureau of Prison, Les Smith, T.R. Henry, S Julian T. Coleman, and Agent Grass were dismissed. Further on July 27, 2009, an amended complaint was filed that declared the Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act by establishing the Terre Haute CMU and issuing the Terre Haute CMU Institution Supplement and Institution Supplement - Visiting Regulations without notice and comment rulemaking. Subsequently on September 14, 2009, all defendants were dismissed aside from the Federal Bureau of Prisons. On July 28, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss. This case was dismissed on July 29, 2010 without prejudice in the Southern District of Indiana. On August 9, 2010 a Third Party Continuing Petition to Intervene was filed on behalf of similarly situated prison inmates, and this was denied on October 20, 2010 because it was untimely and the court found that their interests are not in common with plaintiff. There is no reason to conclude this case is ongoing.

Summary: On January 21, 2009, the ACLU filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the Federal Bureau of Prisons in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The complaint challenged the creation of Communication Management Units (CMUs) in the federal prisons. On July 28, 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss. This case was dismissed on July 29, 2010 without prejudice in the Southern District of Indiana.


This case concerns discrimination against disabled prisoners by correctional facilities. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs, six individuals all currently or formerly in the custody of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the “Department”), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland (No. 19-004580) against the Department and various current and former Department officials. The plaintiffs sued all defendants under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs also sued the individual (i.e. non-Department) defendants for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Department’s discriminatory practices denied them equal access to the Department’s services, programs, and activities available to non-disabled prisoners. For example, the Department had not made all parts of their facilities wheelchair-accessible, forcing wheelchair-bound prisoners to expose themselves to dangerous conditions likely to cause physical harm, such as noncompliant bathrooms, showers, ramps, and cells. The Department had also denied the plaintiffs and other disabled prisoners equal access to the Department's vocational training and work release programs on the sole basis of their disabilities, resulting in lost opportunities to work and earn money while in prison. The plaintiffs also claimed to receive threats from prison staff when the plaintiffs spoke up against the Department's noncompliance. On October 23, 2019, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. On December 30, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Section 1983, or Maryland state law. On January 14, 2020, Judge Ellen L. Hollander transferred the case to Chief Judge James K. Bredar because one of the plaintiffs was also involved in a case with overlapping factual and legal issues assigned to Judge Bredar (Jardina v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., No. JKB-16-1255). In fact, the plaintiff in Jardina moved to consolidate his case with this one on November 26, 2019, and Judge Bredar granted that motion to consolidate on January 15, 2020. On February 5, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson for purposes of settlement, discovery, or further proceedings. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, a group of current and former prisoners filed a complaint against the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services for violating their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and Maryland State Law. A similar case was consolidated with this one in January 2020, and a motion to dismiss the complaint is pending in federal court.