Individuals with Hepatitis C in the Missouri Medicaid program filed this lawsuit in response to the denial of authorization from MO HealthNet for medications prescribed to cure their infections. MO HealthNet denied authorization of medication to plaintiffs based on their fibrosis scores (a measure for severity of Hepatitis C). After being prescribed medication for their Hepatitis C but denied prior authorization for the medication from Missouri’s Medicaid program, two Medicaid recipients initiated this lawsuit on October 18, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged that MO HealthNet’s policies resulted in the denial of medically necessary treatment to Medicaid beneficiaries infected with Hepatitis C, discriminated against similarly situated Medicaid beneficiaries on the basis of their fibrosis score even though Hepatitis C guidelines recommend treatment regardless of their score, and violated the “reasonable promptness” requirement of the Social Security Act by requiring individuals to wait until they had developed more severe liver damage before getting treatment. The plaintiffs brought their claims against the Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services and the Director the of MO HealthNet under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, § 1983, and the Medicaid Act. Represented by legal services, a law school clinic, and the National Health Law Program, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees and costs, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit the defendants from implementing and following their current Hepatitis C treatment policy, as well as enjoin the defendants from refusing to provide Medicaid coverage of medically necessary Hepatitis C drug and require notice to all Medicaid beneficiaries denied coverage under the current policy. The case was automatically referred to mediation on October 18, 2016 and assigned to Judge William A. Knox. On January 30, 2017, the case was reassigned to an outside mediator. On February 2, 2017, Judge Stephen R. Bough granted the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction in part to prohibit the defendants from requiring three months of negative drug and alcohol screens prior to submitting requests for approval of their Hepatitis C medications. The defendants had also agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction to prohibit the drug and alcohol screens. The Court declined to rule on the request to prohibit defendants from applying policies based on fibrosis score until an evidentiary hearing had occurred because at least two factual disputes remained. The Court found that there was enough controversy surrounding the medical necessity of treatment regardless of fibrosis score and conflicting information on whether or not the defendants’ would deny authorization to patients with low fibrosis scores. On the same day, Judge Bough also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Judge Bough rejected the defendants' argument that there was no individualized federal right to reasonable Medicaid standards enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because this mischaracterized the plaintiffs’ allegations. The plaintiffs’ alleged that the standards denied medically necessary treatment and Judge Bough noted that this was a valid claim because the Eighth Circuit previously held that the limiting of Medicaid coverage to those recipients meeting certain conditions or criteria violated Medicaid law and 42 U.S.C. §1983. After the evidentiary hearing, Judge Bough denied the plaintiffs’ remaining request for a preliminary injunction on April 24, 2017, which would have prohibited the defendants from applying policies based on fibrosis scores. The plaintiffs did not show they were likely to succeed on the merits to the degree necessary to merit an injunction or any likelihood of immediate irreparable harm. The plaintiffs amended the complaint June 6, 2017 to add another Medicaid recipient to the claim who was similarly denied authorization for prescribed Hepatitis C medication. Additionally, plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged the defendants violated due process for failing to use reasonable, ascertainable, non-arbitrary standards and procedures for determining eligibility for medical assistance, procedural due process for failing to provide notice of the reasons for the denial of coverage, and the American with Disabilities Act for discrimination on the basis of their disability (Hepatitis C). After MO HealthNet modified its preferred drug list and prior authorization criteria for certain medications, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the case was moot. On November 20, 2017, the plaintiffs’ filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice because the claims were mooted by the new policy that no longer included restrictions based on fibrosis scores or abstinence. All three plaintiffs began to receive treatment for their Hepatitis C. Judge Bough granted the plaintiffs’ motion and denied the motion for summary judgement. The case was dismissed without prejudice with each party to bear its own fees and costs on November 20, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2016, two Missouri Medicaid recipients filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri after being denied medication to treat their Hepatitis C. The plaintiffs alleged that Missouri Department of Social Services and MO HealthNet denied medically necessary treatment to Medicaid beneficiaries with Hepatitis C, discriminated against similarly situated Medicaid beneficiaries, failed to provide "reasonably prompt" treatment, violated due process, and violated the American with Disabilities Act. In November 2017, MO HealthNet modified its policies and the case was dismissed as moot without prejudice. The case closed in November 2017.


After three plaintiffs sought to intervene in Texas v. United States, Judge Reed O'Connor of the Northern District of Texas ordered the claims to be severed and removed to a new civil action. Thus, this case was brought on 02/03/2017. The plaintiffs were cisgender women incarcerated in Texas federal prisons. They alleged that their First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when transgender female prisoners were housed in the same single-sex facilities as the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also alleged that being housed with transgender prisoners violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 et seq.). The plaintiffs were represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom. They sought a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The named defendants were the United States of America, the Attorney General of the United States, the Acting Director of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, and both of the Wardens of the prisons where the plaintiffs were held. The plaintiffs filed second and third amended complaints on March 2, 2017 and May 12, 2017, respectively. The third amended complaint included four plaintiffs alleging the same constitutional violations and seeking the same relief. On June 26, 2017, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the defendants from housing transgender women in the same facilities as the plaintiffs. The parties began to engage in settlement negotiations in September 2017, but failed to reach an agreement. Around the same time, a transgender woman incarcerated at the same facility in question moved to intervene in the action. She alleged that the plaintiffs' complaints were false and driven by anti-transgender biases and prejudices. On May 11, 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice promulgated revisions to the Transgender Offender Manual for the Bureau of Prisons. In light of the revisions, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court also ordered the plaintiffs to file a new complaint to specify the claims that would proceed after the revisions. On July 11, 2018, three female plaintiffs alleged similar claims as had been alleged in prior complaints; namely, that the housing of transgender female prisoners violated the plaintiffs' right to bodily privacy and endangered their physical and mental health. The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on September 10, 2018. The remaining plaintiff and two intervenors initially opposed the motion and tried to proceed with their claims, filing a motion to certify a proposed class of "all female inmates who have been housed or otherwise situated with genetically-males inmates identifying as female." The plaintiff was eventually released and, as such, did not oppose the motion to dismiss. On April 12, 2019, Judge O'Connor dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: Four incarcerated women alleged that their First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by being housed in the same facilities as transgender women. After years of litigation, the claims were eventually dismissed.


The plaintiff was a trans woman housed in a men's prison in Washington State. She filed this suit pro se on September 5, 2017, but later became represented by the ACLU. In the most recent complaint, the named defendants were the Secretary of Washington Department of Correction, the Chief Medical Officer for DOC, the Chief of Psychiatry for DOC, and the Director of Mental Health for DOC in their official capacities. The case was assigned to Judge Benjamin H. Settle in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. She sued them under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the failure of prison administration to provide her with medically necessary gender affirming treatment amounts to a violation of her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. She requested injunctive relief requiring the defendants to provide her with adequate transition related care, to give her access to clothing and hygiene products consistent with her gender identity, and to transfer her to a women's facility. While incarcerated, prison staff and administration denied the plaintiff access to transition-related care consistent with the WPATH standards. Due to a blanket DOC policy, the plaintiff had no access to surgical intervention despite medical necessity and her repeated requests. The prison employed a gender dysphoria consultant who supported the blanket ban on gender affirming surgery, however his guidance had been dismissed by courts in several lawsuits for being inconsistent with norms in the field and the WPATH standards. The plaintiff had also faced harassment from staff for her gender presentation, including verbal abuse and extensive time in solitary confinement. Over the course of discovery, the plaintiff withdrew her request for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to make room for a motion on partial summary judgment that she filed on May 18, 2018. The plaintiff also sought sanctions against the defendants for allowing a doctor to ask questions of the plaintiff during a psychological evaluation, but this motion was denied on September 26, 2018. Judge Settle stated that, while the questions were inappropriate, the defendants did not direct the doctor to ask the questions, and there would be no further need for sanctions, since the psychological evaluation is complete. On January 4, 2019, Judge Settle issued an opinion denying the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the DOC policy regarding medical treatment for trans inmates was not unconstitutional on its face. On that date, he referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Richard Creatura. On April 15. 2019, in response, the ACLU amended the complaint. During discovery under the amended complaint, the parties came to an agreement. This settlement agreement would allow the plaintiff to receive gender reassignment surgery if a medical examiner deemed it medically necessary. The plaintiff presented this settlement on March 20, 2020 through a motion to stay proceedings for 180 days in order to allow the settlement agreement to take place. Magistrate Judge Creatura approved the stay, and will check back in with the parties on September 9, 2020.

Summary: This case was filed by a trans woman incarcerated in a men's prison in Washington State on September 5, 2017 in the District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleges that the blanket policy in the Washington Department of Correction denying prisoners access to gender affirming surgery amounts to a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. She is represented by the ACLU, and is seeking injunctive relief. The parties came to a preliminary settlement agreement on March 20, 2020, and proceedings were stayed for 180 days in an attempt to implement the agreement.


On June 10, 2011, three indigent persons charged with crimes filed this class action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, in Skagit County Superior Court, against the City of Mount Vernon and the City of Burlington. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, asked the court to enjoin the cities from violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, claiming that the cities failed to provide adequate assistance of counsel. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the cities had failed to impose reasonable caseload limits on public defenders, failed to monitor and oversee the public defense system, failed to provide adequate funds for public defense, and failed to provide representation at all critical stages of prosecution. The Cities had jointly contracted with two attorneys to handle all public defense assistance cases, and each attorney handled over 1,000 cases per year even though such a caseload was three times the maximum allowable amount for a full-time public defender pursuant to standards established by the Washington State Bar Association. The cities had not established any system for ensuring that the attorneys investigate cases, prepare for trial, or communicate timely and adequately with clients. On July 5, 2011, the defendant municipalities removed the case to federal court, where it was assigned to Judge Robert S. Lasnik of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. In response to motions from both the plaintiff and the defendants, on February 23, 2012, Judge Lasnik denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction because the balance of hardships did not tip in their favor, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs provided evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants knew indigent criminal defendants were not receiving adequate representation and were indifferent to this inadequacy. The same day, Judge Lasnik granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. The class certified was "all indigent persons who have been or will be charged with one or more crimes in the municipal courts of either Mount Vernon or Burlington, who have been or will be appointed a public defender, and who continue to have or will have a public defender appearing in their cases." Between June 3 and June 18, 2012, the parties went to a bench trial. However, on June 28 the judge issued an order for further briefing. Specifically, Judge Lasnik sought information on the following questions

Have any federal courts taken over supervision of a public defense agency, either directly or through appointment of a supervisor/monitor, anywhere in the United States?

Have any state or federal courts held a municipality liable under Monell for constitutional defects in its public defense system?

Has any state or municipality adopted “hard” caseload standards like those that Washington is contemplating?

Is the issue of the constitutionality of the representation afforded by Messrs. Sybrandy and Witt moot? If so, what impact does that have on the available remedy, including an award of attorney fees? The responses were due for August 14th and submitted that day.

 On December 4, 2013, Judge Lasnik found that the plaintiffs established a systematic deprivation of their right to counsel and the Cities' responsibility for the deprivation. The Court granted injunctive relief (1) requiring that the cities re-evaluate their contract for the provision of public defense services to insure that indigent criminal defendants were provided the actual assistance of counsel; and (2) requiring the cities to hire one part-time public defense supervisor to supervise and evaluate the provision of legal services. The Court also granted attorney's fees. 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (2013). On April 15, 2014, the Court issued an order awarding attorneys' fees and costs. 2014 WL 11961980. Shortly after, on April 22, 2014, the Court issued an order appointing Eileen Farley as a public defense supervisor. The agreement was to last until March 30th, 2017. During that time she sent several reports detailing the improvements the defendants had made to their public defense system. In March 2017, the public defense supervisor proposed that the court extend her term and transition to a public defense auditor during the year. The Cities of Mount Vernon and Burlington responded in agreement, stating they had made the public defense supervisor's suggestions permanent and no longer needed to be supervised. In April, the court granted this extension in of supervision until July 2017, when the auditor took her place. The case is now closed.

Summary: Three indigent persons charged with crimes filed a class action lawsuit in Skagit County Superior Court against the City of Mount Vernon and the City of Burlington alleging defendants failed to provide adequate assistance of counsel. The Cities jointly contracted with two attorneys to handle all public defense assistance cases, and each attorney handled over 1,000 cases per year. The Court found the plaintiffs established their rights were systematically deprived and the Cities were responsible for the deprivation. The Court granted injunctive relief requiring the City of Mount Vernon and City of Burlington re-evaluate their contract for the provision of public defense services and hire one part-time public defense supervisor.


On November 13, 2018, Cable News Network, Inc. (“CNN”) and CNN’s chief White House correspondent, Abilio James “Jim” Acosta, filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to District Judge Timothy J. Kelly. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued President Donald J. Trump, Chief of Staff John F. Kelly, Deputy Chief of Staff William Shine, Press Secretary to the President Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the United States Secret Service, Director of the Secret Service Randolph Alles, and Secret Service member John Doe, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs argued that defendants violated the Constitution and APA when they revoked Acosta’s White House press credentials. 2018 WL 5920424. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants’ decision to revoke Acosta’s press credentials violated the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. By revoking Acosta’s White House press credentials solely based on CNN and Acosta’s viewpoint, the content of their speech, their protected First Amendment activity, and by affording Acosta no process to contest this decision, the defendants infringed Plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment rights, the plaintiffs argued. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. CNN and Acosta requested that the Court compel defendants to immediately restore Acosta’s press credentials, or immediately restore Acosta’s press credentials pending a formal written explanation as to why the pass was being revoked and an opportunity for plaintiffs to respond to the allegations. Plaintiffs also sought attorneys’ fees, and a declaration from the Court stating that the revocation of Acosta’s press credentials was unconstitutional and in violation of the APA. On November 13, 2018, plaintiffs also filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the Court require defendants to restore Acosta’s White House press credentials. On November 16, in an oral order, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion, and required defendants to immediately restore Acosta’s press credentials. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on November 19 after Press Secretary Sanders and Deputy Chief of Staff Shine returned Acosta'a White House press credentials to him. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 13, 2018, CNN and CNN’s chief White House correspondent Jim Acosta sued President Trump and several senior members of his administration for violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights by revoking his White House press credentials. under The plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgments Act, arguing that defendants violated the Constitution and APA when they revoked Acosta’s White House press credentials. On November 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the court require the defendants to restore Acosta’s White House press credentials. On November 16, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on November 19, 2018 after the Trump administration returned Acosta's White House press credentials to him. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 summary: On June 10, two Catholic priests and three Orthodox Jews filed this lawsuit against the city and state of New York, alleging that by allowing protests while prohibiting worship, they discriminated against people of faith and violating their constitutional rights. They sought declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order (TRO), a preliminary injunction, and a final injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing limitations on worship services. The court denied the TRO on June 11 but granted the preliminary injunction on June 26. <hr> As part of New York’s ban on gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic, attendance at houses of worship and outdoor religious gatherings was strictly limited. In June, state and city officials allowed mass gatherings protesting the death of George Floyd, but continued to actively enforce prohibitions against congregational worship. Two Catholic priests and three Orthodox Jews filed this lawsuit on June 10, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio, by allowing protests while prohibiting worship, were discriminating against people of faith and violating their constitutional rights. Represented by the Thomas More Society, they alleged violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments (under 42 U.S.C. §1983), the New York Constitution, and the New York Executive Law. They sought a declaration that the restrictions on indoor and outdoor worship were unconstitutional and were illegal under New York law; a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a final injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing limitations on worship services; and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Senior Judge Gary L. Sharpe. The plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order was denied on June 11 for services occurring on June 12 or 14 because there was insufficient time to make a reasoned determination given that the complaint had been filed the prior day. On June 26, 2020, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 3488742. The injunction prohibited the defendants from limiting the plaintiffs’ indoor worship beyond the limitations imposed on businesses listed in Phase 2 of New York’s reopening plan. It also prohibited any numerical limitation on attendance at the plaintiffs’ outdoor worship services. The defendants appealed the order on July 27. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 9, 2020. The amended complaint added additional plaintiffs, and also added additional defendants including the Superintendent of the New York State Police, the New York State Commissioner of Health, and various officials in the New York City Department of Education. The amended complaint kept the claims pertaining to houses of worship and added claims seeking to enjoin the defendants from closing religious schools. The plaintiffs concurrently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to the same effect, but it was denied due to failure to properly serve the defendants. On October 15, the plaintiffs filed another motion for a temporary restraining order. As of October 17, 2020, the case remains ongoing. The Court is awaiting the Defendants' answer to the plaintiffs' motion for TRO before ruling on the issue.

Summary: When mass protests against police violence were exempted from New York’s COVID-19 gathering restrictions, but congregational worship continued to be prohibited, two Catholic priests and three Orthodox Jews brought this lawsuit, alleging that New York officials were discriminating against people of faith. The court granted a preliminary injunction on June 26, 2020.


This landmark case is about racial segregation in the Detroit metropolitan area schools, and has been described as the most significant school desegregation case since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (also in this Clearinghouse). The first Supreme Court ruling is often denoted as Milliken I, and was considered crucial for clarifying the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. It confirmed that a school district would not be held responsible for segregation across district lines unless it could be shown that the district had engaged in a policy of deliberate segregation. This summary focuses on the history of the case in the Detroit community, rather than the Supreme Court jurisprudence. We only have the docket starting in 1989, so this summary is based on opinions and The Detroit School Busing Case by Joyce Baugh (University of Kansas Press, 1st ed. 2011). Background On Apr. 7, 1970, to counter racial segregation in Detroit’s schools, the Detroit school board voted 4-2 to adopt a controversial integration and decentralization plan, which became known as the “April 7 plan.” The next day, the state legislature passed Act 48 in response, which repealed the April 7 plan, required there to be neighborhood schools, and reorganized the Detroit school system into eight regions along racial lines. All four of the school board members who had voted for the April 7 plan were recalled from the board in an election on Aug. 4, 1970. On Aug. 18, 1970, NAACP attorneys filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Detroit Board of Education and other state defendants. The suit was filed on behalf of specific students (one of whom was Ronald Bradley) and these students' parents. The Detroit branch of the NAACP was also listed as a plaintiff. Later, the district court would define the class as "all school children in the City of Detroit, Michigan, and all Detroit resident parents who have children of school age.” 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The plaintiffs’ original plan before the school board recall vote had been to challenge Section 12 of Act 48, the specific provision that struck down the April 7 plan. However, the recall necessitated a change in strategy, because all the school board members that had supported the plan were recalled and no pro-integration candidates were elected to replace them, so even if a challenge were successful, there would be no one on the board to support integration. Thus, the NAACP decided to challenge school segregation citywide, not just in the areas covered by the April 7 plan. Early Days of the Lawsuit The complaint, filed on 08/18/1970, alleged that racially discriminatory policies and practices had created segregation in Detroit’s public schools and challenged the repeal of the April 7 plan along with the provisions requiring segregated student assignments and racially identifiable regions. It also requested an injunction to (1) require implementation of the April 7 plan, (2) temporarily stop all school construction, and (3) halt implementation of Act 48. The case was assigned to Judge Stephen Roth. Judge Roth denied the plaintiffs’ request for immediate implementation of the April 7 plan and suspension of all school construction; he scheduled a hearing to begin on Aug. 27, 1970. On Sept. 3, 1970, Judge Roth denied another motion by the plaintiffs to implement the April 7 plan, dismissed the governor and attorney general as defendants, and scheduled the trial to begin on Nov. 12, 1970. Joyce Baugh, The Detroit School Busing Case 88 (1st ed. 2011). The plaintiffs then filed an emergency petition to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which was heard by Chief Judge Harry Phillips. Judge Phillips expedited the appeals procedure, and oral argument before a three-judge panel took place on Oct. 2, 1970, and the panel issued its decision on Oct. 13, 1970, finding that Act 48 violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It also reinstated the governor and attorney general as defendants and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, but did not overturn the denial of the preliminary injunction that would have required the implementation of the April 7 plan. Back in district court on remand, the plaintiffs again requested implementation of the April 7 plan, this time to start at the beginning of the second semester. They also requested a delay of the trial date. Judge Roth scheduled a hearing for Nov. 4, 1970, postponed the trial by a month, and permitted the Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT) to intervene as an additional defendant. Two days after the hearing, Judge Roth ordered the school board to submit an integration plan to be implemented at the beginning of the second semester, by Nov. 16, 1970—either the April 7 plan or an alternative that would achieve “no less pupil integration.” Id. at 89. Judge Roth then permitted another group of defendants to intervene—a group of white parents in Detroit, who wanted to defend the school system against allegations of segregation. Many of these parents in this group were associated with the Concerned Citizens for Better Education (CCBE), the group behind the petition for the school board recall election. On Nov. 9, 1970, the school board submitted three options: (1) the April 7 plan, (2) a plan to create magnet schools at the junior and senior high levels that black and white students could choose to attend, to be implemented in Sept. 1971, at the start of the next school year, and (3) a part-time desegregation plan, in which high school students would take some classes at a second school, so black and white students would be in classes together for part of the day. On Dec. 3, 1970, Judge Roth issued a decision ordering the board to implement the magnet school plan the following school year. He also postponed the trial indefinitely, expressing doubt that the plaintiffs could prove their case of unconstitutional, systemwide school segregation. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On Feb. 22, 1971, a three-judge panel refused to reconsider the plaintiffs’ request to implement the April 7 plan and upheld the district court’s acceptance of the magnet school plan. However, the panel rejected the indefinite postponement of the trial, and Judge Roth scheduled trial to begin on April 6, 1971. The Trial The trial lasted for 41 days. The plaintiffs had a two-part strategy, focusing (1) on housing discrimination and its effect on school segregation, and (2) on the defendants’ actions and decisions which, the plaintiffs alleged, intentionally created and perpetuated the segregated system. As the housing phase of the case concluded, on April 20, 1971, the Supreme Court decided Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), unanimously holding that busing was an appropriate remedy to integrate a city and surrounding suburban schools, which were all in the same district. In the second phase of their case, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the Detroit school board’s policies created and maintained segregated schools. The plaintiffs characterized the constitutional violation as the containment of blacks in a set of separate, de jure black schools, that gradually expanded over a twenty-year period, but always within a state-created racial line of containment. On Sept. 27, 1971, Judge Roth issued his first ruling, finding that the Detroit schools were illegally segregated because of both housing segregation and de jure segregation by the local and state defendants. The court found that the school board had made decisions to create and maintain segregation in the schools through optional attendance zones; transportation policies for relieving overcrowding in schools; the alteration of attendance zones, grade structures, and feeder patterns; and new school construction location decisions. The opinion noted that the school board had admitted to busing black students past closer white schools with available space to farther-away black schools, despite the board’s stated policy of using transportation to increase integration. Judge Roth also found that the state defendants had acted to control and maintain the segregation pattern in Detroit schools, based on (1) funding decisions that had favored white suburban districts, (2) state approval of school construction that furthered racial segregation, and (3) passage of Act 48. A few days before the trial ended, the CCBE moved to add the other 85 school districts, which were suburban and largely white, in the tri-county area (Wayne, Macomb, and Oakland counties) as defendants. The plaintiffs and all of the other defendants were opposed to this, and Judge Roth decided to wait to rule on the motion until after the parties had submitted their desegregation plans. The state and local defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, before the district court had ordered a specific remedy. Finding a Remedy On Oct. 4, 1971, Judge Roth held a meeting with both parties to determine how to proceed and expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of a Detroit-only remedy. He ordered the Detroit school board to submit a progress report on the magnet school plan within 30 days and a desegregation plan within 60 days, and the state defendants were given 120 days to submit a metropolitan-wide plan for desegregation. A few days later, Michigan’s Republican junior senator Robert Griffin introduced an amendment to the U.S. Constitution to prohibit busing as a remedy for school desegregation. Philip Hart, Michigan’s Democratic senior senator, led a successful filibuster against the amendment. In Nov. 1971, the Detroit school board submitted its evaluation of the magnet plan. The report acknowledged that the non-magnet schools remained heavily segregated, and that the plan “accelerated the movement of white students out of majority black schools.” The authors concluded that to be more effective, the magnet plan would “have to cross district boundaries.” In Feb. 1972, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the state and local defendants’ appeals of the district court ruling, holding that since no remedy had been granted or denied, there was nothing to review. On Mar. 15, 1972, Judge Roth accepted petitions to intervene from a white citizens’ group, the CCBE, and suburban school districts, on the condition that the intervenors would not focus on issues already decided. William Saxton represented forty of the suburban school districts, and only a few of the other suburban districts chose to retain separate counsel. Hearings on the Detroit-only plans were held Mar. 14-21, 1972. On Mar. 24, 1972, before ruling on the plans, Judge Roth issued a ruling declaring that it would be appropriate to consider metropolitan plans if it were deemed necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, citing Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) and Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). On Mar. 28, 1972, Judge Roth rejected the Detroit-only desegregation plans, and criticized both the proposals submitted by the Detroit school board (the voluntary transfer and part-time desegregation programs) and by the NAACP plaintiffs (redrawing attendance boundaries, with some pairing and clustering of schools). The Detroit school board continued to deny any acts of segregation, but argued that if desegregation were going to take place, a metropolitan plan was preferable to a Detroit-only remedy. At this point, 70% of the Detroit school district’s student population was black, and the school board argued that white flight from Detroit schools would only increase in response to a Detroit-only remedy, creating an all-black district surrounded by all-white suburban districts. Judge Roth agreed. Between Mar. 28 and Apr. 14, 1972, another set of hearings was held on the various metropolitan plans that were submitted by the NAACP plaintiffs, the state defendants, the Detroit school board, and the CCBE. The state board submitted six proposals, all of which the Judge rejected as ineffective. The Detroit school board’s plan was to include reassignment of students at all grade levels in 69 of the 86 districts in the tri-county area, while the CCBE recommended a 62-district plan, with desegregation to begin after fourth grade. The NAACP plaintiffs suggested a plan that was similar but covered 54 districts. Saxton argued that under Swann), “the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy,” and thus the desegregation should be limited to Detroit, where the segregation was found. The plaintiffs then introduced additional evidence demonstrating that the pattern of one-race school construction and faculty assignments extended throughout the metropolitan area. Meanwhile, President Nixon instructed his attorney general to intervene in the Detroit case to oppose any metropolitan busing plan. Judge Roth denied the local U.S. Attorney’s request to intervene, but invited him to participate as an amicus curiae. On June 14, 1972, Judge Roth ruled that the intra-district plans were inadequate. He reasoned that the court “must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem,” designated 53 of the 85 suburban school districts plus Detroit as the “desegregation area,” and appointed and charged a special panel to prepare a specific student assignment and transportation plan within 45 days. The Detroit school board, state defendants, and suburban district-defendants all appealed the ruling to the Sixth Circuit. On July 5, 1972, the special panel reported that additional buses would be required to implement the plan. The district court added the state treasurer as a defendant and, on July 11, 1972, ordered that funds be issued to purchase the requested buses. Two weeks later, the Sixth Circuit granted the state defendants’ motion to stay the order. On July 20, 1972, the district court certified the major issues for appeal to the Sixth Circuit. On Aug. 24, 1972, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit heard oral argument. On Dec. 8, 1972, the panel unanimously affirmed the district court’s findings of de jure segregation of Detroit public schools by the Detroit school board and the state of Michigan and the inadequacy of a Detroit-only remedy. The panel vacated portions of the ruling, including the designation of the geographic “desegregation area,” and the remedy was put on hold to allow the state legislature to voluntarily craft a remedy. The defendants sought en banc review, which was granted. On Feb. 8, 1973, all nine of the Sixth Circuit judges heard oral argument. On June 12, 1973, the Sixth Circuit voted 6-3 to affirm Judge Roth’s ruling on the issue for segregation and the need for a metropolitan remedy. In the majority opinion, Chief Judge Harry Phillips concluded that the record “amply” supported the district’s findings of “unconstitutional actions by public officials at both the local and State level.” 484 F.2d 215, 242 (6th Cir. 1973). However, the opinion noted that their affirmance did not rely on the evidence about segregated housing with the exception of how school construction programs helped to cause or maintain such segregation. The opinion explained that this case was different from the “classical” school segregation case in that failing to adopt a metropolitan-wide plan “would result in an all black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems.” 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973). Finally, the opinion expressed concern that to hold that school district boundaries could not be crossed “would be opening a way to nullify Brown”. 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973). The panel agreed that a metropolitan plan was both necessary and within the power of the federal courts, vacated the remedy portion of the district court’s ruling, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings so that the suburban districts affected by the orders could be heard. The panel also vacated the July 11, 1972 order directing the purchase of school buses. On Sept. 6, 1973, the state defendants and suburban districts filed writs of certiorari, requesting Supreme Court review of the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. At that point, two other cases, Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley (filed by Saxton on behalf of 40 districts), and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley (filed by a single district), had been consolidated with the original suit. The Supreme Court - Milliken I On July 25, 1974, in a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of de jure segregation of the Detroit school district but rejected an interdistrict remedy. The opinion held that with “no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect,” the metropolitan remedy was “wholly impermissible” and not justified by Brown. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). The case was remanded to the district court to develop a Detroit-only remedy. Judge Roth died on July 11, 1974, and the case was reassigned to Judge Robert DeMascio. Judge DeMascio ordered that the plaintiffs and the Detroit school board submit each submit desegregation plans by Apr. 1, 1975. The plaintiffs’ proposal covered almost all of Detroit’s 290 schools, and aimed for the schools to more closely mirror the district’s racial composition: a range from 41% to 90% black students. The board’s plan focused on the city’s 84 majority-white schools and only some of the majority-black schools, and involved attendance zone changes, new feeder patterns, noncontiguous zoning, pairing and clustering schools, and revised grade structures. The Remedy - A Detroit-Only Busing Plan Judge DeMascio tried, unsuccessfully, to get the parties to agree to a single plan. In a written opinion dated Aug. 15, he issued a partial judgment, rejecting the NAACP’s proposal and ordering the school board to revise its plan. The ruling provided for a very limited Detroit-only busing plan. It excluded three regions from the central city area and involved only 27,524 of the district’s 247,774 students, which meant that 80% of the city’s black students were excluded from the plan. The judgment also ordered that several educational components be implemented in all of Detroit’s schools as ancillary relief: (1) a remedial reading program, (2) in-service training for faculty and staff, (3) vocational education, (4) a testing program, (5) a new code of student conduct, (6) a school community relations program, (7) a counseling and career guidance program, (8) co-curricular activities, and (9) bilingual and multicultural studies. The busing plan was successfully implemented in Jan. 1976, though the plaintiffs, state, and school board continued to disagree about various aspects of the district court’s orders. In May 1976, Judge DeMascio ordered the state to pay for half of the cost of four of the educational components: the remedial reading program, in-service training, testing, and the counseling and career guidance program. The school board was to pay for the other half of the costs through its regular budget and federal grants. The state argued that there was no constitutional violation justifying these costs, and that it should not have to pay for any of them, while the school board argued that all of the components were necessary to remedy segregation, and that the state should pay 75% of the costs. The case returned to the Sixth Circuit. A three-judge panel heard arguments on June 15, 1976. The Sixth Circuit issued a decision on Aug. 4, 1976, affirming the district court order and finding that the challenged programs were “essential to the effort to combat the effects of segregation” and that requiring the state to pay half of the costs was within the district court’s power. 540 F.2d 229, 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1976). The panel also affirmed the district court’s student assignment plan, except for its exclusion of schools in the three central city regions: “We cannot hold that where unconstitutional segregation has been found, a plan can be permitted to stand which fails to deal with the three regions where the majority of the most identifiably black schools are located.” 540 F.2d 229, 239 (6th Cir. 1976). The panel noted that it could not provide any guidelines to the district court to resolve this issue on remand, however, because it believed that “genuine constitutional desegregation cannot be accomplished within the school district boundaries.” 540 F.2d 229, 239 (6th Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court - Milliken II The state appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Nov. 1976 and heard oral arguments on Mar. 22, 1977. It issued its decision (Milliken II) on June 27, 1977. The Court unanimously affirmed the Sixth Circuit, noting that the district court’s remedial plan which extended beyond “mere pupil assignments” was “expressly approved” by Swann and United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). 433 U.S. 267, 286 (1977). The court also held that the state could bear some of the costs of the remedial programs without violating Michigan's immunity from suit established by the Eleventh Amendment. District Judge DeMascio's Recusal Meanwhile, at the district court level, in 1976, the plaintiffs moved for Judge DeMascio to recuse himself from the case, claiming a lack of impartiality and that they had been improperly excluded from meetings the judge had held with the school board and DFT. In Jan. 1977, Judge DeMascio denied the motion and this decision was upheld by another district judge; but, in 1978, the Sixth Circuit suggested that Judge DeMascio recuse himself, which he did on Aug. 8, 1980. 495 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mich. 1980). He was replaced by a panel of three district judges: Chief Judge John Feikens, and Judges Avern Cohn and Patricia Boyle. The 1980s Over the next several years, the plaintiffs, school board, and state continued to dispute the programs’ costs. In 1984, the panel disbanded the Monitoring Commission, which had been created to oversee the plan, and ended its oversight of the educational components. However, the Sixth Circuit ordered that the panel reinstate the Monitoring Commission and two of the educational components, the school community relations program and the student code of conduct. In 1985, Judge Cohn assumed sole responsibility for the case. He continued his supervisory role until Sept. 1988, when he terminated jurisdiction over the educational components. On Jan. 11, 1989, Judge Cohn declared that Detroit schools had achieved unitary status and vacated all existing orders and injunctions except for a vocational education order. On Feb. 24, 1989, nineteen years after the suit was filed, Judge Cohn held that court supervision and jurisdiction over the desegregation plan had terminated, though litigation about attorneys’ fees continued through Jan. 1995. Available Opinions Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1970). Bradley v. Milliken, 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971). Bradley v. Milliken, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1972). Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Bradley v. Milliken, 411 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Bradley v. Milliken, 411 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976). Milliken v. Bradley, 429 U.S. 958 (1976). Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). Bradley v. Milliken, 460 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Bradley v. Milliken, 460 F.Supp. 325 (E.D. Mich. 1978). Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1980). Bradley v. Milliken, 495 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Bradley v. Milliken, 585 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Mich. 1984). Bradley v. Milliken, 772 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985). Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1987). Bradley v. Milliken, No. 89-1986, 1990 WL 177183 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1990).

Summary: The NAACP and Detroit students and parents sued the Detroit school board and other state defendants in federal court, alleging unconstitutional segregation in Detroit's schools. The district court found that Detroit's schools were illegally segregated, in part because of decisions made by the school board to create and maintain and segregated system. The district court found that a Detroit-only remedy would be insufficient, and ordered a busing plan that would have affected students in city schools and 53 largely white suburban school districts, but the Supreme Court rejected this plan and a Detroit-only remedy was implemented.