On December 18, 2009, plaintiffs, three Medicaid recipients diagnosed with cerebral palsy, filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services in her official capacity (DHHS). The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine and sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Disability Rights Center, Maine Equal Justice Partners, and the National Health Law Program, alleged that DHHS had violated the Nursing Home Reform Amendments to the federal Medicaid Act (NHRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS had failed to accommodate plaintiffs' disabilities and to provide medically necessary treatment in the most integrated setting possible, as required by the ADA, Section 504, and other federal law, and instead forced them into nursing homes where they were functionally segregated from the outside world. Plaintiffs claimed that they did not require intensive nursing care, and that with appropriate personal care and assistance, they all would be able to live in independently. In addition, none of the plaintiffs had ever been evaluated for or received individualized services appropriate to their needs during their confinement in the nursing facilities, contrary to the NHRA. Plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief, seeking to be placed in integrated, community settings such as their own apartments or houses, or small group homes located in the general community, or, if it was determined that their medical conditions were severe enough that they actually required treatment in nursing facilities, that they receive the personalized care required by the NHRA. They also sought litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. On August 10, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, seeking to make the suit a class action. On August 11, 2010, the Court granted the motion, and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint immediately, defining the putative class as "[all] Maine residents who currently are or in the future will be: (1) eligible for and enrolled in [the State's Medicaid program], (2) age 21 or older, (3) have [cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or a condition closely related to intellectual disabilities as defined by federal regulation 42 C.F.R. § 435.1010, not including mental illness, autism, Alzheimer's, or dementia], and (4) who are or should be screened for admission to nursing facilities pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.112 et seq.2." According to the amended complaint, more than 48 individuals had been identified as meeting this definition. On January 31, 2011, the Court (Judge John A. Woodcock, Jr.) granted the Plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. Van Meter v. Harvey, 272 F.R.D. 274 (D. Me. 2011). The amended complaint sought injunctions requiring that all class members be promptly screened and provided with personalized services as required by the NHRA, and also screened for eligibility for community-based services, and, where appropriate, transferred from nursing homes to community settings. They continued to seek declaratory relief and costs, as well. The parties began settlement discussions shortly thereafter. On August 25, 2011, the parties filed a joint motion seeking approval of their settlement, and a fairness hearing was held on April 24, 2012. On May 2, 2012, the Court (Judge Nancy Torresen) approved the settlement, dismissing the case with prejudice, retaining the level of jurisdiction required to enforce its terms for three years from the effective date of the settlement. The settlement agreement required the DHS to establish a Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver (HCBW) program, which would provide a limited number of qualifying class-members the opportunity to live in community-based settings, providing them with "home supports; community supports; employment specialist services; work supports; home accessibility adaptations; communication aids; transportation services; assistive technology; consultation services and assessments; counseling and crisis services; maintenance occupational, physical and speech therapy; [and] case management and specialized medical equipment to the extent that those services are subject to federal financial participation under the Medicaid program." DHS would allow fifteen class members to opt into the HCBW program in the first year, and add an additional ten spaces in the program each year, until the program reached its maximum size of 75 class members. The settlement indicated that the parties would prefer that the HCBW program be established as soon as possible, but acknowledged that the federal government might require the DHS first establish Intermediate Care Facilities for Other Related Conditions (ICFs-ORC) before accepting its proposal for an HCBW. The parties agreed that if ICFs-ORC were determined to be necessary, the parties would return enter mediation to determine an appropriate extension of the court's jurisdiction over the case. DHS also agreed to provide the Preadmission Screening and Annual Resident Review (PASARR) and personalized care required by the NHRA. It appears both parties bore their own costs. On July 16, 2013, the plaintiffs' filed a motion for mediation, seeking the Court's assistance resolving disputes relating to the PASARR program. They argued that mediation was necessary because the parties had failed to agree on a corrective plan for implementing PASARR within the 150 day window provided by the settlement. There have been no updates to the docket after the request for mediation, and it appears that the case is now closed.

Summary: On December 18, 2009 three young adult residents of Maine who were Medicaid recipients and who were diagnosed with cerebral palsy, filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services in her official capacity. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The plaintiffs alleged that DHHS had violated Title II of the ADA and other federal laws. The Plaintiffs alleged that the State had failed to accommodate Plaintiffs' disabilities and to provide medically necessary treatment in the most integrated setting possible, instead forcing them into nursing homes where they were functionally segregated from the outside world. In August, 2010, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint reframing the case as a class action on behalf of all similarly situated Maine residents. The parties began settlement discussions shortly thereafter. On May 2, 2012, the Court (Judge Nancy Torresen) approved the settlement. The settlement agreement required the State to establish a Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver (HCBW) program, which would provide a limited number of qualifying class-members the opportunity to live in community-based settings. The case is presumably closed.


On April 14, 2014, several same-sex couples married in Michigan on March 22, 2014 filed this § 1983 civil rights action against the State in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional when applied to Michigan's same-sex couples, to enjoin the State of Michigan from refusing to recognize those marriages, and to award attorney's fees and costs. The complaint named the governor, and the directors of the Department of Human Services, the Office of Retirement Services, and the Department of Community Health as defendants in their official capacities. The case was assigned to District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith and referred to Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. The plaintiffs had all been married in Michigan on March 22nd, 2014, during the window of time between the decision in DeBoer v. Snyder, which overturned the ban on same-sex marriage, and the stay issued by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had enjoined the state from enforcing the ban on same-sex marriage. The plaintiffs' marriages were legal at the time they were solemnized. After the stay, the governor of Michigan suspended the benefits and rights associated with the plaintiffs' marriages. The plaintiffs alleged the suspension put their marriages in a state of legal limbo and violated their rights to due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on May 29, 2014, and the defendants filed motions to stay, to dismiss, and to consolidate cases. On January 15, 2015, Judge Goldsmith ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting their motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Michigan from refusing to recognize the marriages of all same-sex couples lawfully married in the state between the district court's decision in DeBoer v. Snyder and before the issuance of the stay by the Sixth Circuit. The judge also denied the defendants' motions to stay, to dismiss, and to consolidate cases. A final declaratory judgment permanently enjoining the defendants was issued on February 24, 2015. It is unclear from the docket whether the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees in this case. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 14, 2014, several same-sex couples married in Michigan on March 22, 2014 filed this § 1983 civil rights action against the State in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional when applied to Michigan's same-sex couples, to enjoin the State of Michigan from refusing to recognize those marriages, and to award attorney's fees and costs. On January 15, 2015, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.


In July 2011, a group of minor children with developmental disabilities filed this civil rights class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to prevent reductions in Medicaid waiver services. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (NCDHHS) and Piedmont Behavioral Healthcare (PBH). The plaintiffs had received home-based Medicaid-funded services through the North Carolina "Innovations Waiver." On July 1, 2011, it was announced that the plaintiffs' services would be reduced because Piedmont Behavioral Health (PBH), a contractor of the state health department, implemented a new system to determine which services were "medically necessary." The plaintiffs claimed that although their medical conditions remained constant, essential health services had been unreasonably and arbitrarily reduced by PBH's "Support Needs Matrix" and that they had not been offered an avenue to appeal their service reductions. They alleged that some plaintiffs would be threatened with placement in institutional settings far from their communities if the services needed to remain at home were not reinstated. According to the plaintiffs, this new reduction of services violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of due process and the federal Medicaid statute. They requested class certification, declaratory relief, preliminary relief, permanent injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs filed for class certification and for a preliminary injunction on August 29, 2011. After a period of discovery and a controversy regarding the disqualification of counsel and a motion to intervene, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order on December 20, 2011. District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan denied this motion on December 28, 2011, but noted that the motion for preliminary injunctive relief was still pending. After resolving the disqualification issue, the court held a hearing on the motion for preliminary relief in March 2012. On March 29, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the class. The court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, in part because federal Medicaid provides that adequate notice and a fair hearing process be made available before denying benefits, and there was no notice or available appeal here. Such a process is also required by the Constitution and the plaintiffs had also demonstrated irreparable harm. PBH appealed the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision on May 10, 2013. K.C. ex rel. Africa H. v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit held that it was speculative at best whether a decision in the appeal would enable PBH to engage in the conduct that the District Court enjoined. The Court explained that, because the NCDHHS had not appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction, the NCDHHS would remain obligated to obey the injunction, thus making PBH bound to comply with the injunction regardless of any appellate decision. The Court cited two reasons why PBH would still be required to follow the injunction. First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) requires that any injunction binding named parties also binds the parties' agents. Because PBH was an agent of the NCDHHS due to its contract to administer plaintiffs’ Medicaid services on behalf of the state, it would be bound to follow the injunction under Rule 65(d)(2). Second, the Medicaid statute requires each state to designate a single state agency to administer its Medicaid plan, which is the NCDHHS in this case. Therefore, the NCDHHS's decision not to appeal the preliminary injunction controls. Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in May 2013, the parties engaged in extensive efforts to reach a settlement agreement. On December 12, 2014, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court for preliminary approval, notice to class members, scheduling of a fairness hearing, and clarification of the class definition. On January 2, 2015, the court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement agreement pending an opportunity for class members to object. Following a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement on April 6, 2015. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the court dismissed the action with prejudice on December 31, 2015. The settlement agreement provided for improved notification and grievance-filing procedures with respect to changes or reductions in services. Additionally, the defendants agreed not to reduce any participant's base budget for one year after the implementation of the agreement and before dismissal of the case. For the two-year period following dismissal of the case, the defendants agreed to notify participants of any base budget reduction. The agreement also provided for increased procedural protections for individuals requesting an authorization of services. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $375,000 for attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs incurred during the litigation. The agreement remained in effect for a two-year monitoring period following the dismissal of the case in December 2015. After the monitoring period, no further litigation had taken place and the case is now closed.

Summary: Individuals with developmental disabilities who received home-based services under one of North Carolina's Medicaid waiver programs, challenged allegedly unreasonably and arbitrary reductions in their services under a new formula for calculating need. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction in March 2012. The Fourth Circuit the denied the defendants' appeal of the preliminary injunction. On April 6, 2015, the District Court approved the parties' proposed settlement agreement and the case was dismissed with prejudice on December 31, 2015.


On May 20, 2003, Bill M. and other developmentally disabled Nebraska residents filed a lawsuit under Americans with Disabilities Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, federal Medicaid statutes, the Due Process Clause, against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support in the United States District Court, District of Nebraska. The plaintiffs, represented by Nebraska Advocacy Services, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the State unlawfully provided inadequate funding for developmental disability services, thereby raising the risk that the plaintiffs would be placed institutional (as opposed to residential or community) settings. On August 6, 2004, the District Court (Judge Richard G. Kopf) denied defendants' motion to dismiss based on 11th Amendment sovereign immunity. Defendants took an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On May 27, 2005, the Eighth Circuit (Judge Roger Wollman) reversed with respect to Plaintiffs' Title II claim and held that the claim should be dismissed based on Nebraska's sovereign immunity. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 408 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 2005). The Court held, however, that plaintiffs could still proceed under an almost identical claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. On remand, on September 2, 2005, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs' first claim for relief under Title II of the ADA. Magistrate Judge David L. Piester issued a Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiffs' first motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel on June 20, 2005, that recommended that class certification be denied. On June 22, 2007, Magistrate Judge Piester issued his Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiffs' second motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel, again finding that class certification should be denied. On July 17th, Judge Kopf adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied class certification. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 2007 WL 2068187 (July 17, 2007, D. Neb.) The parties filed their settlement agreement with the Court on April 2, 2008. On April 9, 2008, the Court issued a memorandum and order requiring the parties to review the consequences of the Court granting the parties' joint motion and stipulation for approval of settlement. Subject to the limitations stated in the order, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement on April 21, 2008. The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees on June 20, 2008. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 WL 2550648 (June 20, 2008, D. Neb.) Plaintiffs appealed the denial of attorney fees to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Steven Colloton issued the Court's opinion, affirming the District Court's decision, on March 9, 2009. Bill M. ex rel William M. v. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, 570 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 2009). There has been no further activity in the case.

Summary: This case was brought by individuals in Nebraska who were eligible for and had applied for or attempted to apply for home and community-based developmental disability services. Plaintiffs brought the case against the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services Finance and Support seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from violating the ADA and various Medicaid laws and requiring them to adopt practices aimed at providing eligible persons with developmental disability services in home and community-based settings. Plaintiffs also sought litigation expenses, costs, and attorney's fees.


On October 20, 2003, a lawsuit against various New York state officials was filed on behalf of individuals in New York City jails awaiting treatment for their serious chemical dependency and mental illnesses under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel and legal aid, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that they were incarcerated instead of being placed in treatment because the state failed to provide sufficient placements and programming. On August 11, 2005, the Court (Judge Richard Conway Casey) denied Defendants' motion to dismiss because it was not clear that Plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. On March 15, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathanial Fox) denied Defendants' motion for a protective order and granted Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions against Defendants for failure to comply with discovery requests. Jobe O. v. Pataki, 2007 WL 844707 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2007). On December 5, 2007, the Court (Judge Colleen McMahon) issued a decision and order dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and granting leave to substitute an appropriate named plaintiff and move for class certification within ninety days. Jobie O. v. Spitzer, 2007 WL 4302921 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007). The Court found that the named plaintiff was not appropriate because he had been released from incarceration long before the complaint was filed. When Plaintiff's counsel failed to substitute an appropriate named plaintiff within ninety days, the Court dismissed the complaint. Jobie O. v. Spitzer, 2008 WL 834002 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2008). There has been no further action, and the case has been closed.

Summary: This case was brought on behalf of individuals in New York City jails with mental illness and chemical dependency seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to require the state to provide sufficient treatment programs instead of incarceration. The case was dismissed on March 11, 2008, because named Plaintiff's claims were moot.


On March 29, 2018, four transgender people seeking to correct their Ohio birth certificates to accurately reflect their gender identity filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (in Columbus). The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the ACLU and Lambda Legal, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Michael H. Watson. The plaintiffs wished to change their birth certificates to avoid discrimination, privacy invasions, harassment, humiliation, stigma, harm to their health, and violence. They claimed that, in barring transgender people from obtaining accurate birth certificates matching their gender identity, the Department of Health had violated federal constitutional guarantees, including the rights to equal protection, due process, and freedom from compelled speech. On April 5, 2018, the court granted a request by the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously and a protective order to be referred to pseudonymously in court documents. (2018 WL 8804858). On July 6, 2018, the state filed a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not state a true violation of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Ohio argued that birth certificates purely express sex and not gender identity under Ohio statutes; that the plaintiffs failed to properly state a claim of due process violation; and that preventing birth certificate changes served state interests. On July 21, 2018, Ohio filed a motion to stay discovery until their motion to dismiss had been resolved. The state argued that the plaintiffs were already serving overly broad discovery requests at the expense of taxpayer money for a case that was primarily legal in nature, despite the fact that a successful motion to dismiss would resolve most actions in this case. The state argued that in the interests of saving resources, a stay of discovery should be ordered until a decision on their motion had been finalized. On October 10, 2018, the district court denied the state's motion to stay discovery, citing that a “garden-variety” motion to dismiss, was not sufficient grounds to stay discovery. (2018 WL 4907080). Nearly a year later, on September 12, 2019, the judge denied the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the judge found that Ohio statutes were not clear on whether a transgender individual could obtain a birth certificate change, violations of due process were properly alleged, and that the argument that preventing birth certificate changes served a state interest lacked merit. (2019 WL 11791719) Both sides moved for summary judgment on January 16, 2020. On December 16, 2020, Judge Watson granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the government's; Judge Watson based this on a logical disconnect between Ohio’s stated reasons for denying the documentation (historical accuracy and preventing fraud) and the fact that the state had, as recently as 2016, allowed transgender people to change the sex marker on state documents. (507 F.Supp.3d 925) On February 1, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees. On March 26, the court stayed this motion pending a joint status report detailing the discussions between the parties on the attorney fees motion and the government's compliance with the December 16 order. On June 23, 2021, Judge Watson signed a consent judgment which stipulated that the government would issue correct documents to the plaintiffs reflecting their gender identity, would seal the incorrect documents in a vault away from the public, and that the decision in this case would affect only the parties to the case and not other transgender people seeking similar relief in Ohio. The court ordered that a status report be submitted no later than July 26, 2021. As of the writing of this summary, the case remains open.

Summary: On March 29, 2018, four transgender persons filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment on December 16, 2020, following a failed attempt by the government to have the case dismissed for failure to state a claim. On February 1, 2021, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees. On March 26, the court stayed this motion pending a joint status report detailing the discussions between the parties on the attorney fees motion and the government's compliance with the December 16 order. The court ordered that a joint status report be submitted no later than July 26, 2021.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing lawsuit regarding Ohio state legislation that would criminalize certain abortions that was amended to include a request for relief in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order against the Department of Health's order which had banned all "non-essential surgeries and procedures" starting on March 18. The judge granted the temporary restraining order for a period of 14 days, which was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on April 6. The judge granted a preliminary injunction on April 23, which allowed abortions in situations where a medical provider determined that a delay would not be possible.
 On May 15, 2019 the plaintiffs, for-profit and non-profit providers of medical and surgical abortions in Ohio and their doctors, filed an initial complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Ohio State Department of Health, the State Medical Board of Ohio, and various county prosecutors. They contested the Ohio State Legislature's 6-week abortion ban, passed on April 10 of that year. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio and the Planned Parenthood Foundation, sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Ohio S.B. 23, which would criminalize all abortions in which a fetal heartbeat can be detected (six weeks) except in cases that would jeopardize the health of the mother, would practically eliminate abortion in Ohio, because it often takes women longer than six weeks to determine that they are pregnant. They claimed that this violated the substantive due process precedent outlined in Roe v. Wade. On May 24, the court related another case Preterm Cleveland v. Himes, but determined that each case should remain with its assigned judge. Judge Michael R. Barrett granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on July 3, 2019 (394 F.Supp.3d 796), in advance of the statute's effective date of July 11. He stated that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and enacting the ban would cause irreparable harm to Ohio women. Following this, the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 20, 2019. Both parties filed motions and answers surrounding the motion for judgment on the pleadings until the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 30, 2020, in response to the Ohio Department of Health's March 17 order. The order banned all "non-essential surgeries and procedures" to preserve personal protective equipment (PPE) starting on March 18 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that surgical abortions do not use a significant amount of PPE and that surgical abortions might be the only option for patients that are allergic to medical abortion pills. They also claimed that forcing patients to wait until the pandemic passed would not be sufficient, since abortion is a time-sensitive procedure. The order estimated the potential delay to be about eight weeks at minimum, but the order banning elective procedures was expected to possibly last up to a year. The complaint also added an equal protection claim that abortion providers were unfairly being singled out in comparison to other businesses. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to block the Department of Health order and they sought the same relief requested in the initial complaint. Judge Barrett granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order against the Department of Health order on the same day (2020 WL 1932851). This temporary restraining order lasted for 14 days and was limited to situations where a medical provider decided that delaying a surgical abortion until after the pandemic subsided would not be possible. He denied a motion to stay the temporary restraining order filed by the defendants on April 2 (2020 WL 1932492). The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal contesting the temporary restraining order on April 1. A Sixth Circuit panel, composed of Chief Judge R. Guy Cole and Judges Ralph B. Guy and John K. Bush declined to reverse the temporary restraining order on April 6 (2020 WL 1673310), saying that the narrow tailoring of the restraining order meant that not many abortions would be performed and PPE supplies would not be diminished. They stressed that the time sensitive nature of abortions justified this protection. In order to preserve the status quo before ruling on the preliminary injunction, Judge Barrett extended the temporary restraining order for an additional two weeks on April 10, 2020 (2020 WL 1932540). Judge Barrett granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on April 23, 2020 (2020 WL 1957173). He noted that, while he did not want unnecessary medical procedures being performed in Ohio, waiting to have an abortion was not an option in certain circumstances. He limited the bounds of the preliminary injunction to situations where a medical provider determined that a delay would not be possible. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 15, 2019 the plaintiffs, for-profit and non-profit providers of medical and surgical abortions in Ohio and their doctors, filed an initial complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Ohio State Department of Health, the State Medical Board of Ohio, and various county prosecutors contesting the Ohio State Legislature's 6-week abortion ban, passed on April 10 of that year. The plaintiffs won on a motion for a preliminary injunction on July 3. The plaintiffs amended their complaint on March 30, 2020 to include the Ohio Department of Health's order banning all elective medical procedures, including surgical abortions, in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis. They won a preliminary injunction for that order, as well. The case is ongoing.


On November 17, 2017, six people with physical and/or intellectual impairments that relied on ADvantage waivers and/or In-Home Supports waivers to receive health services at their homes, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA) and Oklahoma State Department of Human Services (DHS) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Oklahoma Disability Law Center, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that OHCA and DHS were planning to cut funding to the waivers that the plaintiffs depended on for home based health care services and put them in danger of forced institutionalization in a nursing home. More specifically, in October 2017, the plaintiffs received notices that their Medicaid ADvantage and In-Home Supports waivers would not be funded after December 1, 2017. This case was assigned to Judge Joe Heaton. On December 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On February 12, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. They alleged that the plaintiffs’ claims had become moot because DHS found a way to fully fund the waiver programs. Further, the defendants argued that, because there were no longer any violation of federal law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. Therefore, the amended complaint should be dismissed. The court agreed and dismissed the plaintiffs’ amended complaint for mootness on March 26, 2018. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2017, six individuals, persons with physical and/or intellectual impairments that relied on ADvantage waivers and/or In-Home Supports waivers to receive health services at their homes, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued Oklahoma Health Care Authority (OHCA) and Oklahoma State Department of Human Services (DHS) under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Oklahoma Disability Law Center, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) and the 504 Rehabilitation Act. In 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for mootness because the controversy had been resolved.


On December 19, 2013, two same-sex couples residing in Oregon who wished to have a state-recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the District of Oregon U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Oregon. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and sought a declaration that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, a permanent injunction requiring the state to grant to same-sex couples the same full and equal recognition, rights, and privileges given to different-sex couples and recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages, and an award of costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that by prohibiting residents from entering into a same-sex marriage, and by refusing to recognize legal same-sex marriages that took place out-of-state, the state of Oregon was violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. They also alleged that the ban injured them by denying them medical and government benefits available to married same-sex couples, as well as interfering with their dignity, autonomy, and family integrity. The case was consolidated with Geiger v. Kitzhaber (PB-OR-0004 in this Clearinghouse). The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment a week later on February 18, 2014. Before the Court ruled on that motion, an anti-same-sex-marriage group, the National Organization for Marriage (NOM), moved to intervene to defend the ban. NOM appealed the denial of their intervention motion and sought a stay of the injunction pending disposition of that appeal. That stay was denied, first by the District Court on May 19, 2014, then by the Court of Appeals that same day, and then by the Supreme Court on June 4, 2014. On May 19, 2014, Judge Michael J. McShane granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and found that there was no legitimate state interest that would justify the denial of the full and equal recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples. The court declared that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriages violated the Equal Protection Clause and were unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing them. The order also required that the defendants recognize same-sex-marriages formalized in other states. Rummell v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 (D. Oregon 2014). The Rummell plaintiffs reached a settlement with the defendants regarding attorney's fees and costs that was not disclosed to the Court. The Court approved the Geiger plaintiffs' agreement with the defendants over attorney's fees, by which the defendants agreed to pay $132,690 in total. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 19, 2013, two same-sex couples residing in Oregon who wished to have a state-recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the District of Oregon U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Oregon. The plaintiff was represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union and asked the court to declare that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. On May 19, 2014, the Court (Judge Michael J. McShane) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and found that there was no legitimate state interest that would justify the denial of the full and equal recognition to the marriages of same-sex couples. The National Organization for Marriage's attempts to intervene were denied. The case is now closed.


This case, filed January 29, 2020, objected to the closure of two Pennsylvania intermediate care facilities for individuals with intellectual disabilities (ICF/IID) (the Polk Center and the White Haven Center) and the rights of the individuals residing in those facilities. It is what some describe as a "reverse-Olmstead" lawsuit. (See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (ADA guarantees the right to receive disability-related services in the community, where appropriate). The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania by family members and guardians of residents of the two facilities in a class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. Defendants were Pennsylvania Governor Wolf, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, the Deputy Secretary of the Pennsylvania Office of Development Programs, the Facility Director of the Polk Center, and the Facility Director of the White Haven Center. According to WENY News, in August of 2019 Governor Wolf announced a plan to close the state centers over the course of three years. Instead, the state planned to move residents to "community residences," arguing that such residences are superior to "institutional" residences like Polk or White Haven. Plaintiffs alleged that this plan violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the cause of action under the ADA alleged that residents cannot be discharged or transferred without consent from the residents themselves or the residents' guardians. The Section 504 cause of action alleged that Pennsylvania's new plan would not administer care for White Haven or Polk residents in "the most integrated setting appropriate," therefore violating regulations that implement Section 504. Meanwhile, the Medicaid Act cause of action claimed that the new plan was not in compliance with obligations imposed on Pennsylvania by the federal government in return for federal funding. Those obligations included the option to live in an ICF/IID for qualifying Pennsylvanians. Finally, lawsuit alleged that the new plan constituted a violation of the residents' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth and/or Fourth Amendment. The complaint claimed that moving residents "to the community" would deny residents "a humane existence." The case is ongoing. Only the initial complaint, a summons to all defendants, a reissue of that summons, and a waiver of service by all defendants have been processed by the Court.

Summary: Polk Center and White Haven Center were Pennsylvania state facilities that cared for individuals with severe mental and disabilities. The centers represented a type of care facility that function by providing intense care for their residents in isolation from the rest of society. In August of 2019, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Wolf announced a plan to move residents from these two centers to "community" residences, which are not isolated and whose treatment is not as intense. The lawsuit alleged that this switch was in violation of the residents' rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, and that the switch violated residents' substantive due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.


On May 24, 2017, six patients of South Carolina’s G. Werber Bryan Psychiatric Hospital (Bryan Hospital), along with a non-profit corporation that advocates for the rights of people with disabilities - Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc - filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. This lawsuit was brought against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health and the South Carolina Mental Health Commission, which operated Bryan Hospital. The plaintiffs, represented by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc, and private counsels, claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a practice of arbitrarily preventing patients the opportunity to discharge from Bryan Hospital despite those patients being stable and capable of integrating with society. Furthermore, the defendants had a practice of isolating these patients, preventing them from contacting family and friends, and charging $503.00 daily for those that did not have access to medical insurance. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Gergel. On July 27, 2017, the court issued a scheduling order for discovery proceedings. The scheduling was amended twice. On April 3, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The plaintiffs sought the class to be defined as: “All current and future adult, non-forensic residents of G. Werber Bryan Psychiatric Hospital (“Bryan”) who, with appropriate supports and services, would now or in the future be able to live in an integrated community setting and who do not oppose living in an integrated community setting.” The parties informed the court that they had begun mediation in July of 2018, but discovery continued during this time. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class on August 21, 2018, and subsequently denied their motion to reconsider the issue on September 7, 2018. Discovery and mediation continued into 2019. On February 25, 2019, after the death of one of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to dismissal of the claims only so far as they related to that plaintiff. Two days later, on February 27, 2019, the attorneys for the defendants submitted a letter informing the court that the mediation had resulted in a successful settlement of the claims. That same day, the court dismissed the case without prejudice for 60 days, giving both parties the opportunity to reopen the action if the settlement was not consummated. The contents of the private settlement agreement were not made publicly available. On March 14, 2019, after stipulation to dismissal, the case was dismissed with prejudice. This case is now closed.

Summary: On May 24, 2017, six individuals, persons with mental disabilities and patients of South Carolina’s G. Werber Bryan Psychiatric Hospital (Bryan Hospital), and Protection and Advocacy for People with Disabilities Inc, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. This lawsuit was brought against the South Carolina Department of Mental Health and the South Carolina Mental Health Commission, Bryan Hospital was operated by these entities. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs claiming violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a practice of arbitrarily preventing patients the opportunity to discharge from Bryan Hospital, isolation these patients from the community, and charging them for their confinement. This case is ongoing.


On May 22, 2014, the plaintiffs, a group of same-sex couples, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against various state and county officials. The plaintiffs included both same-sex couples with valid out-of-state marriage licenses and same-sex couples seeking to get married in South Dakota. Represented by private counsel, they sought a declaratory judgment that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory bans on same-sex marriage violated their rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as their right to travel. The plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the state's same-sex marriage bans or from declining to issue a marriage license because the applicants were of the same sex. On November 14, 2014, the District Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier), on defendant's motion, dismissed the plaintiffs' right-to-travel claim. The plaintiffs had argued that South Dakota's same-sex marriage ban violated their right to travel by creating two Americas: one group of states where plaintiffs could travel and enjoy the protections that come with marriage and another group of states (including South Dakota) where they couldn't travel without being stripped of their marital status and accompanying legal protections. The District Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) rejected this argument; the burden that plaintiffs identified applied equally to new and existing citizens of South Dakota and was dissimilar to cases in which a violation of the right to travel was found. 61 F.Supp.3d 845. On January 12, 2015, the District Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) held that South Dakota's same-sex marriage bans violated the Constitution, granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Over the plaintiffs' objections, however, the court stayed the effects of the judgment pending appeal, citing the substantial and novel legal questions at stake. Thus, unlike in many states, no same-sex marriages occurred in South Dakota. 61 F.Supp.3d 862. On January 26, 2015, the defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. A few days later, the Eighth Circuit granted the parties' joint motion for an expedited appeal. On February 10, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the stay in the district court. On March 2, 2015, Judge Schreier denied this motion. She concluded that once the defendants filed their notice of appeal, jurisdiction over most issues in the case, including the stay, were transferred to the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the plaintiffs could file their motion to vacate the stay only in the Eighth Circuit, not in the district court. The Eighth Circuit ordered on April 29, 2015 that they would defer consideration of this case, pending the expected June 2015 resolution in the Supreme Court of Obergefell v. Hodges. While this case was pending, the plaintiffs filed a suggestion to summarily affirm a motion to vacate the stay, and the defendants filed a suggestion of mootness and a motion to vacate the District Court's judgment. On August 11, 2015, the Eighth Circuit held in a Per Curiam opinion that the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges did not render this case moot, and affirmed the District Court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs. Although South Dakota made assurances of complying with the Court's ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Eighth Circuit held that the assurances did not rendered the case moot. However, the Court did hold that the assurances may have had an impact on the necessity of the injunctive relief previously granted to the plaintiffs, but denied the current motion pending by plaintiffs, leaving that discretion to the District Court. 799 F.3d 918. Back in District Court on September 9, 2015, Judge Schreier granted the plaintiffs' motion to vacate the stay in light of the mandate from the Eighth Circuit. On September 28th, the Judge Schreier from the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs. Two days later, on September 30th, the Eighth Circuit awarded the plaintiffs' appellate attorney's fees and costs. The exact amount of attorney's fees and costs granted is not available in Pacer. A satisfaction of judgment was ordered by the District Court on October 13, 2015. This case is now closed.

Summary: On January 12, 2015, the United States District Court for South Dakota (Judge Karen E. Schreier) declared that South Dakota's ban on same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and enjoined the state from enforcing this ban or declining to issue a marriage license because the applicants are of the same gender. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment. The motion to vacate the stay was granted by the District Court on September 9, 2015. This case is now closed.


Adults with developmental disabilities who were institutionalized filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas alleging that they, along with the class of similarly situated individuals, were institutionalized unnecessarily as a result of the policies of the State of Texas. There are also two organizational Plaintiffs: the Arc of Texas and the Coalition of Texans with Disabilities. The Plaintiffs alleged that Texas failed to provide adequate habilitation and support services in the community that would allow them to avoid institutionalization or transition out of institutions. They alleged that individuals with developmental disabilities must enter institutions in order to receive necessary services in Texas. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs claimed that the state systematically violated a provision of the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) known as Pre-Admission Screening and Resident Review (PASRR), which would divert individuals slated to enter nursing facilities into community placements if institutionalization was deemed unnecessary. The Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the federal Medicaid Act, and the Nursing Home Reform Act. The Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 20, 2010 and a motion for class certification on January 19, 2011. The Defendants filed a motion to abate the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, asking the court to delay a ruling on class certification until the parties could conduct further discovery and the court could consider a motion to dismiss. The court ultimately granted this motion on September 27, 2011. Class certification is still pending in this case. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on March 8, 2011, claiming that Plaintiffs lacked standing, claims against the Governor were barred by sovereign immunity, and that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The United States (Department of Justice) filed a brief opposing the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and on June 22, 2011, the United States moved to intervene in the case. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 4, 2011, and the Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss in response on November 4, 2011. The United States filed an additional brief opposing the Defendants' motion soon after. The court heard arguments on both motions on September 12, 2012 and took the motions under advisement. The court has repeatedly agreed to continue scheduled hearings and suspend deadlines and certain discovery requirements. The court granted the United States' motion to intervene on September 20, 2012, and the United States filed its complaint in intervention. The Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on July 19, 2013 as well as a second amended motion for class certification. On August 10, 2013, the Court stayed the case pursuant to a two year interim agreement that the parties had reached, which at the time was set to expire in July 2015. While the parties agreed to attempt to resolve all claims during this time, the case could be reopened at any time upon the request of any party or on the Court's own motion. After a status conference on June 6, 2015, the parties agreed to extend the interim settlement agreement until September 30, 2015, or until a court-appointed Special Settlement Master filed a report with the court stating that settlement discussions had concluded. While the Court did appoint a Special Settlement Master, and the parties did continue to negotiate for some time, settlement talks ultimately proved unsuccessful, and the litigation continued. On May 17, 2016, the Court denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss. It held that the United States and organizational Plaintiffs had standing; that the Plaintiffs stated a claim; and that the Nursing Home Reform Act created a private cause of action. 189 F. Supp. 3d 620. The Court granted class certification on May 20, 2016. The Plaintiff class was defined as: All Medicaid-eligible persons over twenty-one years of age with intellectual or developmental disabilities or a related condition in Texas who currently or will in the future reside in nursing facilities, or who are being, will be, or should be screened for admission to nursing facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. § 483.112 et seq. The litigation continued for years and focused largely on various discovery disputes. On June 15, 2018, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the United States' claims in intervention, arguing that the United States lacks authority to bring an enforcement action under Title VI, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II of the ADA. The Court denied this motion on September 27, 2018, and it explained that the United States did not have to establish its own standing to proceed because it was an intervenor here, and the original Plaintiffs' standing satisfied Article III. In that same September 27, 2018 Order, the Court terminated the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and held that all requests for injunctive relief would be considered upon determination of the merits at trial. Since then, the litigation focused largely on discovery or evidentiary disputes as the case headed towards trial. A bench trial began on October 15, 2018, and seems to have gone on until November 15, 2018. The parties have continued filing motions regarding proposed findings of fact and law, but the Court has not issued any judgment following that trial. As of August 12, 2020, the litigation is ongoing.

Summary: Institutionalized adults with developmental disabilities filed this challenge to policies in Texas they alleged promoted the unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities. The United States (DOJ) has intervened in the case, and the Court eventually granted class certification for a class of: All Medicaid-eligible persons over twenty-one years of age with intellectual or developmental disabilities or a related condition in Texas who currently or will in the future reside in nursing facilities, or who are being, will be, or should be screened for admission to nursing facilities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e)(7) and 42 C.F.R. § 483.112 et seq. A bench trial was held in late 2018, and as of August 12, 2020, the litigation is ongoing as the parties await the court's decision.


On August 23, 2016, states and religiously-affiliated health organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and its Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claiming violations of these Acts and their First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that new regulations promulgated by HHS, which redefined the word "sex" to include gender identity, stereotypes, and termination of pregnancy, required health care providers to provide health programs and procedures which "violate their medical judgment" and "their deeply held religious beliefs" (including performing/referring transition procedures, discussing transition procedures as current standards of care, using appropriate gender-transition affirming language, providing sex-specific facilities based on gender identity, etc.). The plaintiffs, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare the regulations invalid, enjoin enforcement of the regulations, and award actual and nominal damages as well as the costs of the action and attorney fees. On September 16, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas and the River City Gender Alliance (collectively, "putative intervenors") filed a motion to intervene as defendants. On October 21, 2016, plaintiffs filed a partial motion for summary judgment and, in the alternative, a motion for preliminary injunction. On November 1, 2016, District Judge Reed O'Connor denied the putative intervenors' motion to stay preliminary injunction proceedings pending resolution of intervention. A hearing was held on December 20, 2016, and Judge O'Connor granted the preliminary injunction on December 31, 2016 on the grounds that "the regulation violates the Administrative Procedure Act ('APA') by contradicting existing law and exceeding statutory authority, and the regulation likely violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ('RFRA') as applied to Private Plaintiffs." The court did not consider the motions for summary judgment at this time. 227 F.Supp.3d 660. Defendants moved to stay the court's preliminary injunction, but the stay was denied on January 24, 2017. Furthermore, Judge O'Connor found that the putative intervenors could not intervene as of right then because it was yet unclear whether the defendants would adequately represent the putative intervenors' interests; he deferred ruling on the putative intervenors request for permissive intervention. On January 30, 2017, the putative intervenors filed an interlocutory appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On June 30, 2017, a panel of the Fifth Circuit, per curiam, dismissed the appeal because the district court had not ruled on the putative intervenors' motion for permissive intervention and therefore had not conclusively resolved the intervention issue. On May 2, 2017, while the putative intervenors' appeal to the Fifth Circuit was pending, the defendants filed a motion for voluntary remand and stay, arguing that HHS should be given the opportunity to reconsider the regulation at issue in this case, which would conserve the resources of both parties and the court. On July 10, 2017, Judge O'Connor declined to remand the case, but imposed a stay of all proceedings while HHS reconsidered the regulation. He also ordered the defendants to file a status report on or before August 4, 2017, identifying any rulemaking proceedings initiated with respect to the challenged regulation. Furthermore, he clarified that the December 31, 2016, preliminary injunction order would be unaffected by the stay and would remain in full force and effect throughout the stay. On August 4, 2017, the defendants filed a status report indicating that "a draft of a proposed rule is going through the clearance process within the Executive Branch." On August 16, 2017, Judge O'Connor ordered the defendants to file another status report on or before October 16, 2017, and every 60 days thereafter. After multiple additional status reports, the parties filed a joint motion to lift the stay on December 17, 2018, which Judge O'Connor granted. The parties resumed litigating the case, with the ACLU of Texas and River City Gender Alliance renewing their motion to intervene on February 1, 2019 and the plaintiffs renewing their motions for summary judgment on February 4. On March 21, 2019, the plaintiff State of Wisconsin requested an order from the court dismissing it from the case because it "no longer has an interest in pursuing its claims." Litigation among the remaining parties continued. HHS filed a notice of proposed rule-making that proposed to amend the HHS regulations implementing Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Shortly after, defendants filed a motion on May 31, 2019 renewing their request that the Court postpone ruling on Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motions to allow HHS to amend the regulations. They argued that, "the proposed rule, if finalized in relevant part, would likely moot this case and Plaintiffs will not be harmed in the interim because the relevant parts of the current regulations are presently enjoined nationwide." The notice would not include a definition of "sex" for purposes of discrimination on the basis of sex in the regulation, but instead incorporates the meaning as defined by Title IX. After a motion hearing on September 16, 2019, Judge O'Connor issued an opinion on October 15, 2019 that: 1) granted the ACLU of Texas and the River City Gender Alliance's motion to intervene; 2) Granted in part plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and permanent injunction; 3) Severed plaintiffs' APA and RFRA claims from their Title VII, Spending Clause, First Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and Eleventh Amendment claims; 4) Adopted the reasoning from the December 31, 2016 order granting preliminary injunction in holding that the Rule violates the APA and RFRA. The court vacated and remanded the rule for further consideration. 414 F. Supp. 3d 928. The court later went on to amend the judgment on November 21, clarifying that only the portion of the rule challenged in this litigation was vacated and remanded. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed the October 15 ruling to the Fifth Circuit, challenging the order granting in part and denying in part the motion for summary judgment. Additionally, they challenged the November 21 amendment to the judgment. As of May 29, 2020, the case is ongoing in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Summary: In 2016, states and religiously affiliated healthcare providers filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the Affordable Care Act's regulation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex (which included gender identity and termination of pregnancy) violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Religious Freedom Restoration Act and constitutional rights. In October 2016, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of this regulation, which was granted on December 31, 2016. Defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction was denied in January 2017. In May 2017, the defendants filed a motion for voluntary remand and stay, arguing that HHS should be given the opportunity to reconsider the regulation at issue in this case, which would conserve the resources of both parties and the court. In July 2017, Judge O’Connor declined to remand the case, but imposed a stay of all proceedings while HHS reconsidered the regulation. He clarified that the December 31, 2016 preliminary injunction order would be unaffected by the stay and would remain in full force and effect throughout the stay. In December 2018, the stay was lifted, and the parties resumed litigating the case. In September 2019, Judge O'Connor vacated the rule's challenged provisions. An appeal is pending before the Fifth Circuit.


On August 1, 2013, two same-sex couples filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the state of Virginia, under 42 U.S. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the national ACLU, the ACLU of Virginia, Lambda Legal and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state's refusal to allow same-sex couples to marry or to recognize same-sex couples married in other states violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit was filed just over a month after the Supreme Court's decision in Perry v. Hollingsworth. On August 16, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for class certification of same-sex couples under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(2). On the same day, the Robert McDonnell, the Governor of Virginia, moved to dismiss the case on grounds of sovereign immunity. On August 30, 2013, defendant Thomas Roberts moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The court (Judge Michael F. Urbanski) held a motion hearing on October 29, 2013 on these matters. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2013. On October 3, 2013 the State defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings until an earlier case involving the same issues, Bostic v. Rainey, resolved cross-motions for summary judgment. In an opinion dated October 18, 2013, Judge Urbanski denied defendants' motion to stay the proceedings, but allowed the defendants additional time to file their summary judgment response; defendants filed that response on November 7, 2013. On December 23, 2013, Judge Urbanski granted the motion to dismiss Governor McDonnell on sovereign immunity grounds, but denied Defendant Thomas Roberts's motion to dismiss. 988 F.Supp.2d 603 (W.D. Va. 2013). The case moved forward as Harris v. Rainey after the dismissal of Governor McDonnell. On Jan. 31, 2014, Judge Urbanski certified this suit as a class action, with two classes: (1) all same-sex couples in Virginia who have not married in another jurisdiction, and (2) all same-sex couples in Virginia who have married in another jurisdiction. While this case proceeded towards its own resolution, on February 13, 2014, in the Bostic case, the District Court (Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen) granted summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff, and entered an order enjoining Virginia from continuing to enforce the marriage ban. In addition, defendant M. Rainey, the State Registrar of Vital Records, shifted position in this case (as in Bostic). She had originally argued that Virginia's same-sex marriage ban was constitutional. But in January Virginia's Attorney General decided not to defend the ban. The other defendant here, the Clerk of the Staunton Circuit Court, likewise changed his position, which had been in support of the laws--he then declined to take a position on their constitutionality. The Bostic case proceeded towards resolution in the appellate court, on an expedited briefing schedule. On March 10, 2014, the Fourth Circuit allowed these plaintiffs to intervene on the side of the plaintiffs-appellees and file their own briefs in Bostic, set to be heard in May 2014. Accordingly, in this case, Judge Urbanski ruled on March 31, 2014 to stay the proceedings pending the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bostic. On July 28, 2014 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in Bostic, agreeing with the district court that the same-sex marriage ban violated the Constitution. The majority opinion, by Judge Henry Floyd, found that the ban impermissibly infringed upon Virginians' fundamental right to marry. A dissent by Judge Paul Niemeyer said that the state had a right to define marriage as relationships between one man and one woman. 760 F.3d 352. The Supreme Court granted a stay to the Fourth Circuit's Bostic mandate on August 20, 2014, pending their decision on the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari. However, the Supreme Court later denied writ on October 4, 2014. Same sex couples were then allowed to wed in Virginia. On October 16, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for to lift the stay in this case and enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their motion for summary judgment in light of the final decision in Bostic. On October 29, 2014, the defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that Bostic rendered the case moot, opposing the entry of any judgment in this case and arguing that the class is not a prevailing party. Though the parties had disagreements about attorneys' fees and whether the plaintiffs should be seen as a prevailing party for purposes of recovering fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988, the parties decided against litigating the issues, and agreed to resolve any remaining claims and differences through a consent order submitted to Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen in Bostic. Judge Wright Allen entered the consent order on February 13, 2015. The consent order granted the Harris class the benefit of the declaratory and injunctive relief entered in Bostic, and provided for $60,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the Harris class. On February 18, 2015, Judge Urbanski dismissed the case with prejudice following the parties stipulation of dismissal in accordance with the Bostic consent order.

Summary: Same sex-couples filed suit in August 2013 against the State of Virginia challenging Virginia laws denying same-sex couples the right to marry and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages entered into in other states as unconstitutional. The case is pending but stayed, awaiting the Fourth Circuit's resolution of another case raising the same issue.


This case was brought by the United States pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). On February 8, 1995, the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, served the Governor of Arizona with a notice letter regarding their intent to investigate allegations of sexual abuse and violations of privacy rights of female inmates in the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC). The Department of Justice sent its finding to Arizona governor J. Fife Symington on August 8, 1996. The investigation found significant evidence of physical sexual misconduct and constitutionally unacceptable invasions of privacy. This included sexual relations between inmates and employees, sexual assaults, and frequent, prolonged viewing during dressing and showering of inmates. In response to these findings the DOJ offered a series of recommendations which included: better screening of employees; improved training; investigation of any allegations of sexual misconduct or unlawful invasion of privacy; stronger sanctions including criminal prosecution for employee offenses; use of an independent outside agency to investigate allegations; as well as a number of proactive steps to address sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy. The findings letter also recommended the creation of a Women's Facilities Administrator to serve as a liaison between the women's facilities and ADOC's Director and Deputy Director. In conclusion, the findings letter provided a warning that should the ADOC not address these problems the Attorney General could institute a lawsuit to correct the deficiencies. On March 10, 1997, the United States filed a complaint against the State of Arizona and Gov. Symington in the District of Arizona (Judge Roslyn Silver). The complaint alleged that the Defendants were violating the constitutional rights of female inmates to be free from sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy. The complaint sought to enjoin the Defendants from ""continuing the acts, practices and omissions"" of allowing sexual misconduct and unlawful invasion of the privacy of female inmates. On October 2, 1998, Defendants moved for summary judgment. Prior to any ruling by the Court, the parties reached a settlement, which was filed on March 11, 1999. As part of the settlement, defendants did not admit any constitutional violations, but agreed to adopt policy and procedures from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, improve screening and training of employees, promote inmate awareness and comfort in reporting abuse, and thoroughly investigate allegations of abuse. The settlement required ""substantial compliance"" by the ADOC, to be determined by a jointly agreed monitor. The monitor would conduct three quarterly onsite tours following the filing of the settlement agreement. Provided the monitor found ""substantial compliance"" by the ADOC after the third tour, the lawsuit would be permanently dismissed. On December 13, 1999, the parties jointly filed a stipulation to dismiss which Judge Silver granted in a December 17, 1999 order.

Summary: On March 10, 1997, the United States filed a complaint against the State of Arizona and Gov. Symington in the District of Arizona (Judge Roslyn Silver), alleging that the Defendants were violating the constitutional rights of female inmates to be free from sexual misconduct and unlawful invasions of privacy. The parties reached a settlement, which was filed on March 11, 1999. As part of the settlement, defendants did not admit any constitutional violations, but agreed to adopt policy and procedures from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, improve screening and training of employees, promote inmate awareness and comfort in reporting abuse, and thoroughly investigate allegations of abuse. On December 13, 1999, the parties jointly filed a stipulation to dismiss which Judge Silver granted in a December 17, 1999 order.


This lawsuit was filed pro se by prisoners on March 27, 1986, in the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the California Department of Corrections and the California Institute for Men under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the California Institute for Men (Chino) violated their Eighth Amendment and Fifth Amendment due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged issues regarding sanitation, classification, legal access, fire safety, and other conditions. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged violations caused by the prison's housing of 212 inmates in a gymnasium not designed to house inmates. The plaintiffs asked for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. The prisoners moved for appointment of counsel but was denied twice. On August 14, 1986, the docket indicates a notice of association of counsel for the plaintiffs. Then on September 29, 1986, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint. In 1987, the parties engaged in discovery and settlement negotiations, but a settlement could not be reached at the time. Instead, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on July 13, 1987. The parties engaged in additional discovery in preparation for a trial set for October 4, 1988. However, on September 20, 1988, the trial was postponed to allow more time for renewed settlement negotiations. On September 26, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement agreement. The agreement addressed many aspects the inmates' conditions of confinement including: food, recreation opportunities, law library access, showers, laundry, medical care, procedures regarding placement when an inmate is transferred to the prison from a county jail, and asbestos removal from the facilities. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs $44,000 in attorney's fees. On October 6, 1988, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for $22,000 in attorney's fees--the first half of the agreed amount of attorney's fees. Once the settlement was finalized, the case was dismissed on October 2, 1989. The settlement agreement provided for compliance monitoring; according to the 1993 issue of the ACLU National Prison Project's Journal, this ended in 1993.

Summary: This case litigated by the ACLU in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dealt with sanitation, classification, legal access and other conditions at the California Institute for Men (Chino). In 1988, the prison and the plaintiffs entered a settlement agreement, which provided for various improvements and compliance monitoring that ended in 1993.


On May 21, 2008, a California inmate filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The plaintiff, originally proceeded pro se but eventually represented by private counsel and the Prison Law Center, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary damages, alleging that the CDCR acted unconstitutionally by segregating the prisoners by race and locking down an entire race of prisoners. The prison staff had informed the plaintiff that it was the policy of the CDCR that "when there is an incident involving any race, all inmates of that race are locked up." During court mandated settlement negotiations, Judge Jones temporarily assigned counsel to the plaintiff. That counsel ultimately agreed to represent the plaintiff for the case and filed a leave to amend the complaint in order to transform the case into a class action challenging the allegedly race-based lockdowns throughout California's men's prisons. On September 23, 2011, Magistrate Judge Edmund Brennan granted that motion. 2011 WL 4458784. In the second amended complaint, three additional plaintiffs were added as representatives of a class of all prisoners who were currently or would be in the future subject to the CDCR's policy and practice of implementing race-based lockdowns. Following the filing of the second amended complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On June 28, 2012, in his findings and recommendations, Judge Brennan concluded that the plaintiffs had indeed properly exhausted their grievances under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, so the defendant's motion to dismiss should be largely denied. 2012 WL 2521827. On July 27, 2012, the new district court judge, Judge John Mendez, adopted the findings and recommendations in full. 2012 WL 3070084. On March 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification as well as a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants then filed for summary judgment. On February 11, 2014, Judge Troy L. Nunley granted part of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, leaving the following claims: claims for injunctive relief based on Fourteenth Amendment violations, a claim for compensatory damages for violations of Fourteenth Amendment rights, and state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2014 WL 546338. On June 25, 2014, Judge Nunley denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction finding that the plaintiffs had not met the high burden required to obtain the extraordinary relief sought. 2014 WL 2895232. A month later, Judge Nunley granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2014 WL 3689287. On October 20, 2014, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the CDCR agreed to a number of terms, including: to cease race-based modified programs or lockdowns; to use individualized threat assessment forms to determine who would be retained on a modified program or lockdown; to provide outdoor activity to prisoners in a modified program or lockdown for longer than fourteen days; to revise its policies concerning modified programs and lockdowns, including modifying its definitions; to train its staff; and to provide status reports to plaintiffs' counsel for a defined period of time. The defendants also agreed to pay attorneys fees and costs. The agreement specified that its provisions would control for 18 months after the Court's preliminary approval or 4 months after final approval, whichever was later; plaintiffs could seek 12 months' extension at the end of that period. The parties sought approval of the agreement on Feb. 27, 2015, and on May 5, 2015, the court granted preliminary approval. Then, the parties jointly moved for final approval on September 10, 2015 which the court granted on October 8, 2015. 2015 WL 5920755. That same day, the court also granted the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, totaling $2.375 million in attorneys’ fees and costs. 2015 WL 5920797. On June 2, 2016, the parties jointly proposed an order of dismissal of this action with prejudice. The following day, Judge Nunley dismissed the case with prejudice while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement until the settlement agreement ends. The agreement was to last 18 months after preliminary approval, leaving the settlement to terminate on November 5, 2016. On December 20, 2016, the parties filed notice that the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement had terminated and that the case was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2008, a California inmate filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, alleging that the CDCR acted unconstitutionally by segregating the prisoners by race and locking down an entire race of prisoners due to the actions of certain prisoners of that race. The case survived the defendants' motion to dismiss and class certification was granted. In October 2014, the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the CDCR agreed to a number of terms, including to cease implementation of race-based modified programs or lockdowns; to provide outdoor activity to prisoners in a modified program or lockdown for longer than fourteen days; to revise its policies concerning modified programs and lockdowns, and to train its staff on modified programs and lockdowns. The defendants also agreed to pay attorneys fees and costs. The court retained jurisdiction for 18 months to enforce compliance with the agreement, and on December 20, 2016, the parties filed notice that the court’s jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement had terminated and that the case was dismissed with prejudice in its entirety. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative class action by five individuals held at Lompoc, a low-security prison facing one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 among U.S. federal prisons. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to undertake reasonable preventative measures, which allowed the virus to spread to 60% of those in custody. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for improved conditions of confinement, as well as a writ of habeas corpus for release. On July 14, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and granted provisional class certification. On September 18, the court denied the defendant's July 2 motion to dismiss the case. On September 10, the plaintiffs had submitted a motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction and an order to show cause which was granted on October 8. The case is ongoing. <hr> On May 16, 2020, five individuals filed a putative class action against Lompoc, a low-security prison facing one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 among U.S federal prisons, for immediate relief on behalf of a proposed class of all current and future people in post-conviction custody at Lompoc. The plaintiffs alleged that the Warden of Lompoc and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) failed to adequately treat infected prisoners and implement reasonable health and safety measures, which resulted in 60% of the population at Lompoc testing positive. The plaintiffs also alleged that despite BOP’s broadened discretion to allow for home confinement during the pandemic, prisoners reporting symptoms were instead placed in solitary confinement in converted warehouses without medical care. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that because Lompoc was incapable of providing adequate medical care, continued confinement amounted to a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California and the Prison Law Office, the plaintiffs brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, an injunctive action, and as a declaratory action under § 2201. The plaintiffs sought enlargement of custody to home confinement and for mitigation measures to be adopted in Lompoc to prevent the spread of COVID-19, including: social distancing, free soap, paper towels and cleaning supplies, access to hand sanitizer, daily showers, identification procedures for potentially infected inmates, and proper medical care for those who have COVID-19. The case was assigned to District Judge Consuelo. B Marshall and referred to Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo on May 18. On June 1, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring Lompoc to undertake health and safety measures as well as a court-supervised process for individualized consideration of each prisoner’s suitability for release on an accelerated schedule. The plaintiffs also moved for class certification on June 4. On July 2, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the habeas claim failed because inmate placement decisions are not judicially reviewable and because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust other administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). They also argued that the Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed because the defendant did not act with deliberate indifference. On July 14, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and granted provisional class certification. 107 Fed.R.Serv.3d 477. The defendants were ordered to provide the court a list identifying all members of the class and evaluate each provisional class member’s eligibility for home confinement, giving substantial weight to the inmate’s risk factors for severe illness or death from COVID-19 based on age (over 50) or underlying health conditions, among other things. On September 10, the plaintiffs submitted a motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction and an order to show cause. The plaintiffs claimed that defendant's failure to promptly release approved class members and the denial of home confinement violated the terms of the preliminary injunction. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on September 18, finding that the plaintiffs asserted a proper habeas claim challenging the fact of their confinement, and that the habeas claim is not foreclosed by the requirements of the PLRA. The court also found that the plaintiffs plead sufficient facts to satisfy the objective prong of their Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that they are are at substantial risk of exposure to COVID-19 and to satisfy the subjective prong by alleging that the defendants have ignored, and therefore have been deliberately indifferent, to the known risks of COVID-19 based on the conditions at Lompoc. The court also disagreed with the defendants that the plaintiffs failed exhaust administrative remedies for their claims, noting that the plaintiffs' complaint alleges that “since the COVID-19 outbreak in Lompoc, those incarcerated have been denied access to the administrative remedy process,” and “[s]taff have not been accepting the forms required to initiate the process, claiming they cannot do so due to the exigency of the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court-appointed inspector submitted a status report on the Lompoc facility regarding the conditions and the adequacy of the defendant's response to the pandemic. The inspector identified several deficiencies in several areas, including COVID-19 screening among detained people, lack of timely access to health care, and lack of infection control in housing areas. On October 8, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction and ordered defendants to confirm that all eligible class members were released to home confinement, and, if some class members were denied release to provide an explanation to the court. The parties attended multiple hearings over the next several months and on January 29, the plaintiffs filed another motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction. After a motion hearing, the court set a March 26 deadline for the plaintiffs to provide support for their contention that the defendants impermissibly imposed categorical bars on inmates' eligibility for home confinement. In February, an individual attempted to intervene and file an amended complaint. On March 2, the court rejected the intervention and refused to file the letter on the grounds that individual class members could not file amended complaints in a class action suit. On March 19, 2021, the intervenor appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal has not been assigned a USCA No. yet. On March 19, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte application to continue to modify the case schedule and authorize a doctor site visit, which the court granted on March 22. As of March 23, discovery is scheduled to be completed by April 30 and a pretrial conference is scheduled for July 13. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 16, 2020, five individuals filed a class action against Lompoc, a low-security prison facing one of the largest outbreaks of COVID-19 among U.S federal prisons, for immediate relief. The plaintiffs proposed a class of all current and future people in post-conviction custody at Lompoc, and sought enlargement of custody to include home confinement, and if the conditions of confinement violated constitutional rights, for prisoners to be released. The plaintiffs also sought a TRO (temporary restraining order), and a preliminary injunction requiring Lompoc to undertake health and safety measures, and attorney fees. On September 18, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case and on October 8, the court granted plaintiff's motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction. In January 2021, the plaintiffs filed another motion to enforce compliance with the preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing.


On August 22, 1980, Richard Bartkus filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Corrections Department. This case was consolidated and named lead case with five other cases filed against the defendant in 1981 and 1982. The plaintiffs in the other cases were Palmer Gaines, Joseph L. Letezeio, Jr., and Ernest Bradshaw. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union and Legal Assistance to Prisoners. Other non-profit organizations appear to have been involved in the litigation also. On June 15, 1982, the plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint for the consolidated class consisting of inmates confined at the Connecticut Correctional Institute at Somers, including pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the facility was overcrowded, unsanitary, lacking in security, and unable to provide adequately the basics of general human living needs. Because the PACER dockets for these cases begin in 1991, there is little information regarding further proceedings in the 1980s. In July 1986, the class was certified and the parties reached agreement on a Proposed Consent Judgment in October of 1989. The Decree was forwarded to Judge Robert Zampano but there is no indication that the order was executed. The case was later consolidated with a lawsuit that was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 15, 1988 (Doe v. White), which challenged certain policies of the defendant regarding HIV counseling, education, testing, and confidentiality. David Doe and other plaintiffs were represented by Jerome Frank Legal Services of Yale Law School, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Children's Advocacy. That action was certified as a class action on February 10, 1989 by order of Judge Peter C. Dorsey. On May 16, 1989, the parties entered into a Consent Judgment on Inmate AIDS Education and Pre- and Post-HIV Test Counseling and it was approved by the court. Discovery continued regarding issues not addressed in that judgment. On December 6, 1990, the court (Judge Jose A. Cabranes) approved and entered the Consent Judgment on Health Care for HIV-Infected Inmates and Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information. In Re: Connecticut Prison Overcrowding and AIDS Cases, Nos. H-80-506, H-88-562, 1990 WL 261348 (D. Conn. Dec. 6, 1990). The judgment required screening of all admitted inmates, individualized health care summaries for HIV-positive inmates, routine health examinations, and the use of drug therapies for HIV-positive inmates. It also mandated the creation of a uniform statewide system for maintaining information about medical and mental health status of HIV-positive inmates. It appears that another consent judgment, entered on November 2, 1990, called for monitoring of the facility. The court (Judge T. Graham) closed the case on April 26, 1994 but modified the Order of Dismissal so the action could remain under the court's supervision to monitor defendant's compliance with judgment. Litigation continued through July 1, 2004 concerning monitors' fees. Regarding Bartkus's overcrowding case, an amended Motion for Class Certification was granted in October of 1991 and settlement discussions began in July of 1993. On March 28, 1996, Judge Bauer entered judgment in accordance with a settlement agreement submitted by the parties. According to the Settlement Agreement, improvements had already been made in the facility and the State of Connecticut had built additional correctional facilities, reducing overcrowded conditions. The facility at Somers was converted from a maximum security prison into a medium security prison and its name was changed to Osborn Correctional Institute. The agreement required that Osborn not increase its inmate population, continue operating as a medium security facility, and allow plaintiffs' lawyers access to the facility. Litigation continued through June 15, 2000, mainly concerning monitors' fees.

Summary: On August 22, 1980, inmates filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Corrections Department. This case was consolidated and named lead case with five other cases filed against the defendant in 1981 and 1982. The plaintiffs were represented by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union and Legal Assistance to Prisoners. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the facility was overcrowded, unsanitary, lacking in security, and unable to provide adequately the basics of general human living needs. Judgments were reached that required screening of all admitted inmates, individualized health care summaries for HIV-positive inmates, routine health examinations, and the use of drug therapies for HIV-positive inmates; as well as requiring that the prison not increase its inmate population, continue operating as a medium security facility, and allow plaintiffs' lawyers access to the facility.