After a two-year investigation initiated in December 2016 under CRIPA and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a Notice on December 19, 2018 concluding that the Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority (“HRRJ”) failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care to prisoners and placed prisoners with serious mental illness in restrictive housing for prolonged periods of time. The DOJ also concluded that HRRJ’s housing practices discriminate against prisoners with mental health disabilities in violation of the ADA. In the Notice, the DOJ set forth factual findings about the conditions at HRRJ that violated prisoners’ constitutional rights. Principally, the DOJ found that medical and mental health care at HRRJ was constitutionally inadequate. In all stages of medical and mental health care (including patient intake, chronic care and emergency care, treatment and therapy, continuity of care, and security and care for suicidal prisoners), the quality of care and access to care was found to be severely deficient, subjecting prisoners to a serious risk of harm due to delays and lack of care. The DOJ also found a lack of oversight and accountability and a deliberate indifference by HRRJ officials in identifying and mitigating risks. Furthermore, HRRJ utilized prolonged restrictive housing which disparately affects prisoners with mental illnesses, thereby denying them access to activities and programming that they would otherwise be eligible for, and putting them at risk for serious harm. Officials at HRRJ knew of these substantial shortcomings and the associated risks and failed to take appropriate action. On August 5, 2020, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against HRRJ in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia based on the findings in the December 2018 report and HRRJ’s subsequent failure to take sufficient remedial steps. The DOJ alleges that HRRJ’s policies and practices violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners. As a result, the DOJ asked Judge Rebecca Beach Smith to declare that HRRJ’s practices violated the constitutional rights of prisoners and violated the ADA, and to enjoin HRRJ to take immediate action to amend its policies and practices to ensure that lawful conditions of confinement are afforded to prisoners. By the time that the complaint was filed, the parties had already negotiated a settlement. On the same day as the complaint was filed, the parties filed a joint settlement motion. In the settlement agreement, HRRJ agreed to implement a comprehensive list of reforms including appropriate screening and assessment for medical and mental health needs by qualified professionals, adequate treatment planning for medical and mental health concerns, suicide prevention practices, specialized mental health housing units, oversight of restrictive housing placement, increased medical and mental health staff, increased training for staff, increased collaboration between mental health staff and jail leadership, and a Quality Assurance program to identify and correct deficiencies with the medical and mental health care system to be overseen by a Quality Assurance Committee which will provide monthly reports to the monitor and the DOJ. The settlement agreement noted that HRRJ would designate an Agreement Coordinator to coordinate compliance with the agreement. HRRJ agreed to create annual Implementation Plans to describe how it will fulfill its obligations under the agreement, including deadlines within the first year by which HRRJ must draft or revise policies and procedures, complete a staffing plan, develop and deliver training to HRRJ staff, develop and implement a Quality Improvement Committee, and develop and implement monthly quality assurance mechanisms to report on data relevant to prevent to prevent or minimize harm to prisoners. A key provision of the settlement agreement was the mandatory appointment of an independent third-party monitor, to oversee HRRJ’s compliance with the agreement. The monitor was agreed to be retained for a period of three years and provide biannual status reports to the DOJ, HRRJ and the court. The monitor would also undertake compliance reviews, on-site inspections and issue monitor reports every six months to assess compliance and HRRJ’s progress on the various reform efforts. The reports will also be filed with the court. In the event of noncompliance with the agreement, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia retains jurisdiction to enforce the agreement at the request of the DOJ. On August 31, 2020, the court approved the settlement agreement and subsequently, on September 10, 2020, the court approved the appointment of James Conrad Welch to be the third-party monitor. The settlement agreement is effective as of August 31, 2020. By the terms of the agreement, HRRJ will implement all provisions of the agreement within four years and the agreement will terminate in five years, so long as HRRJ has attained substantial compliance with the agreement and maintained that compliance for at least one year. HRRJ will have the burden to prove that it has achieved and maintained substantial compliance with the agreement and has been operating in accordance with the requirements of the ADA and the U.S. Constitution continuously for one year. The agreement will terminate by order of the court. As such, this case remains ongoing.

Summary: On August 31, 2020, Judge Rebecca Beach Smith in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia approved a settlement between the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division and Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority. The agreement resolved the DOJ’s claims alleging unlawful conditions at the Hampton Roads Regional Jail (HRRJ) in violation of CRIPA and the ADA. Under the agreement, HRRJ will develop and implement policies, procedures, and training regarding adequate medical and mental health care and appropriate housing for prisoners with serious mental illness. These measures include specialized mental health housing units, increased training for medical, mental health, and security personnel, proper screening and assessment for medical and mental health concerns, adequate treatment planning and suicide prevention measures, and a quality assurance program. Per the agreement, the parties jointly appointed a monitor to assess and assist with compliance with the agreement. HRRJ must come into substantial compliance with the agreement within five years. The agreement can be terminated by court order.


On June 25, 2009 the plaintiff, a former female prisoner, filed suit against the State of Washington, the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and several correctional officers in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Washington State Constitution. The suit arose from the treatment of her when she gave birth while incarcerated. She alleged that in violation of prison policy she had been shackled throughout labor and after she had given birth. She was only unshackled for an emergency cesarean section and was immediately shackled again after surgery. She sought declaratory relief, damages, and attorney's fees and costs for her great emotional and physical pain. As the suit proceeded, all individually named defendants were dismissed with the exception of two correctional officers. The plaintiff indicated she would no longer seek declaratory relief against the State of Washington and acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment precluded her from recovering damages against the state of any state agencies. On May 3, 2010 the court (Judge Robert Jensen Bryan) issued an order concerning cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied, the officers' claim of qualified immunity was denied, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. The case came to a close on May 7, 2010 when the court (Judge Bryan) entered a stipulated order dismissing all remaining claims against all defendants after the parties reached a settlement. The details of the settlement are not known.

Summary: On June 25, 2009 the plaintiff, a former female prisoner, filed suit against the State of Washington, the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and several correctional officers in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. She alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Washington State Constitution based on the treatment of her while she was giving birth. On May 3, 2010 the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case came to a close on May 7, 2010 after the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claims. The details of the settlement are not known.


On November 17, 2015, four prisoners in Washington state brought a class action lawsuit against the state's Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Corrections (DOC) and the Secretary of the DOC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly arbitrarily withholding necessary medical care from patients with serious and painful medical conditions. The prisoners, who went untreated or under-treated for serious ailments, including kidney failure, kidney stones, hernia, and chronic and substantial pain, alleged that the denial of care while incarcerated constituted cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. The Washington DOC only administered direct medical care for "medically necessary" conditions. All others required approval by a Department of Corrections Care Review Committee (CRC) consisting of doctors and other medical professionals across the state. Of all petitions for care, about 60% were being denied by the CRC. And complaints of chronic and substantial pain were ignored. The plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the Washington DOC's policies and practices governing the approval of medical care requests by DOC providers and outside specialists violate the Eighth Amendment; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the DOC from denying, without reasonable medical justification, necessary care for class members' serious medical needs; and (3) reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiffs also sought to certify the following class: "All current and future prisoners, incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the Washington Department of Corrections, whose access to necessary medical care has been denied, or will be subject to denial, under the Department’s policies and practices governing access to health care requiring prior approval." Judge Richard A. Jones denied class certification on September 18, 2017, holding that the proposed class lacked the necessary commonality for class certification. The court found that the plaintiffs had "not adequately identified common policies and practices to show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to inmates’ needs." The plaintiffs sought to appeal the decision, but the Ninth Circuit denied their petition to appeal on December 21, 2017. The plaintiffs filed to amend the complaint in March 2018 to reflect a new Secretary of the DOC. Later in June 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the proceedings of the case for six months while the parties tried to resolve the case. The motion stated that the DOC revised the Offender Health Plan. Days later, the court granted an order to dismiss one of the named plaintiffs and refused to stay the case, opting instead to vacate the trial date for six months. In December 2018, the court pushed the trial date even further, settling on September 2019. On January 14, 2019, the court granted requests from two plaintiffs for dismissal, leaving only one remaining plaintiff. Three months later, in March 2019, the final plaintiff moved to terminate the case. The court granted the dismissal of the party and in turn closed the case on March 27, 2019 as no plaintiffs remained. It is unknown why the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed and the case is now closed.

Summary: Washington state prisoners with serious medical problems sued the Washington Department of Corrections for failing to provide adequate medical care. The plaintiffs believed that the DOC applied the term "medically necessary" too narrowly and denied immediate care and that decisions to provide outside treatment are decided arbitrarily, without medical justification. The plaintiffs sought class action certification but Judge Richard A. Jones denied the certification on September 18, 2017 on the grounds that the proposed class lacked commonality. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied an appeal by the plaintiffs later that year. Between June 2018 and March 2019, each remaining plaintiff filed to dismiss himself as a party. As a result, the court closed the case on March 27, 2019 when no plaintiffs remained.


On October 20, 2017, four minor plaintiffs, represented by their parents or guardians, filed a class action lawsuit against King County and the Kent School District in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Columbia Legal Services, alleged that King County has violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400), by holding children in solitary confinement at King County’s Maleng Regional Justice Center. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief to end King County’s solitary confinement policy. The plaintiffs alleged that King County denied these children, who had not yet been convicted of any crimes, meaningful social interaction and education by holding them in isolation cells for weeks or months on end. These children were given only a few minutes of face-to-face educational instruction and denied access to reading or writing materials. The plaintiffs alleged that these deprivations could cause trauma, depression, anxiety, as well as permanent interference with a child’s psychological and social development. The vast majority of children affected by King County’s actions were children of color and many suffered from mental illness. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 23, 2017 to add additional named plaintiffs and an additional claim of discrimination. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all children currently incarcerated at the RJC and all such children who would be held there in the future. Besides declaratory judgment, they also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the defendant from carrying out the allegedly unlawful policies and practices. In addition, the plaintiffs asked the court to issue declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of a subclass of such children who have disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and were in need of special education and related services. The parties quickly began settlement negotiations. On August 20, 2018, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion to approve a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the proposed settlement, the plaintiffs would receive $240,000 from King County and $25,000 from the Kent School District. King County agreed that the solitary confinement of juveniles was banned in all King County detention facilities, except when necessary to prevent physical harm to others, and that any use of solitary confinement would be discussed at a daily meeting. The parties also agreed to appoint a monitor to review alternatives to solitary confinement, and issue quarterly monitor's reports. The settlement was set to expire on January 31, 2022 if defendant complied with all terms.

Summary: On October 20, 2017, four minor plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against King County and sought injunctive and declaratory relief for King County’s policy and practice of holding children in solitary confinement at King County's Maleng Regional Justice Center. The Court approved the parties' settlement agreement and the plaintiffs will receive $240,000 from King County and $25,000 from the Kent School District. The settlement is set to expire on January 31, 2022 if defendant complies with all terms.


On April 3, 2008, two Muslim prisoners incarcerated in the Wyoming State Penitentary (WSP) sued officials of the Wyoming Department of Corrections in the United State District court of Wyoming. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq. (RLUIPA). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that a prison policy requiring prisoners to consume their meals within twenty (20) minutes substantially burdens their ability to practice their religion, as they must choose between eating their meals and praying. The complaint specified that Jewish inmates experienced similar difficulties. After brief litigation, the parties entered a Consent Decree which was approved by the court (Judge Clarence A. Brimmer) on November 19, 2008. The Consent Decree permits prisoners who receive their meals in their cells or pods to take up to thirty (30) minutes to eat, and prisoners receiving religious meals may keep those meals in their cells until the next meal is served. Prisoners who eat in the dining hall are permitted to go to the front of the line and receive a 10-and 5-minute announcements before being escorted from the hall. Additional provisions in the Consent Decree substantially change the defendants' policies and practices concerning the observance by Muslims of fasting, special meals, and prayer time, and also guaranteed that a second microwave would be installed, from which pork products would be banned. The consent decree did not establish an expiration date. As of March 2018, there had been no further litigation.

Summary: On April 3, 2008, Muslim prisoners sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections for violations of First Amendment Rights and the RLUIPA for failure to accommodate their religious practices. The case was resolved by Consent Decree on November 19, 2008.


On December 2, 2010, two non-profit organizations, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar and the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition brought this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) against the Governor of Colorado, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that Colorado violated the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments by deferring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants. This Colorado practice was due to a 1992 statute which provided that misdemeanor indigent defendants' applications for appointment of counsel "shall be deferred until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-7-301(4). The plaintiffs argued that the practice of deferring counsel was a violation of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rothgery v. Gillespie County where the Court held that the accused is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any "critical stage" of criminal trial proceedings. 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). Judge John L. Kan was assigned to the case. On January 31, 2011, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the matter was best resolved in the legislature, not courts. On February 25, 2011, the plaintiffs filed the first amendment complaint, adding as defendants all of the Colorado district attorneys, and the defendants again moved to dismiss. Litigation continued and Judge Kan set a date to hear oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 20, 2012, which the defendants again moved to dismiss. The plaintiffs continued to litigate until a team of legislators took on the issue. In the 2013 regular legislative session, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees considered House Bill 13-1210 to repeal the statute. The bill was approved by both Committees, and the Appropriations Committee set aside approximately $8 million to hire additional public defenders to represent indigent clients in these matters. On January 10, 2013 the plaintiffs filed a notice to the court that legislation was being considered that would moot the issues presented in the case. In May 2013, Governor Hickenlooper signed the bill removing the requirement that misdemeanor defendants confer with a prosecutor before legal counsel is appointed. The law resolved all the claims in the lawsuit and on May 30, 2013, Judge Kan dismissed the case.

Summary: Two non-profit organizations, the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar and the Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition brought this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) against Colorado on December 2, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that a Colorado statute was unconstitutional, violating the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments by deferring the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants until after the prosecuting attorney has spoken with the defendant. This case was voluntarily dismissed after the Colorado legislature passed a new statute that removed the requirement and subsequently allocated significant new funding to provide attorneys at initial appearances.


On January 14, 2016, arrestees in New Orleans who were declared eligible to receive appointed counsel from the Orleans Parish Public Defender’s Office (OPD) but were placed on a waiting list, sued in a class action OPD and the Louisiana State Public Defender office under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. OPD’s refusal to represent plaintiffs meant that they remained in jail without counsel. Plaintiff class seeks attorney’s fees and a declaration that OPD’s placement of class members on a waiting list for an indefinite amount of time violates their constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection. OPD refused to accept plaintiffs as clients due to budgetary shortages and excessive caseloads. After hearings in which OPD discussed its budgetary crisis in late 2015, the Chief District Defender announced it would start declining certain felony cases in mid-January of 2016. The withdrawals would occur at a defendant’s first appearance before the magistrate. Plaintiffs credit OPD’s situation to the State of Louisiana’s underfunding of its public defender system. On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. 231 F.Supp.3d 128. On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. 905 F.3d 905. This case is now closed.

Summary: Individuals who were eligible to be assigned a public defender in New Orleans, but were placed on a waiting list due to budgetary shortages, sued the city (OPD) and Louisiana state public defender's offices for violating their Constitutional rights to counsel, due process, and equal protection. They seek attorney's fees and a declaratory judgment that their rights were violated. On June 15, 2016 the parties filed a joint motion for judgment granting final declaratory and partial injunctive relief. On October 27, 2016 the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, giving both parties a chance to submit briefs addressing the issue. On January 31, 2017 the court (Judge James Brady) dismissed the case, citing grounds of federalism and comity. On September 25, 2017 plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 4, 2018 the Fifth Circuit dismissed the case as moot because it found that since the appeal was filed, Louisiana lawmakers had reallocated funding for appointed counsel sufficient to render the waitlists for non-capital defendants nonexistent. This case is now closed.


On September 12, 2013, a juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Etowah County. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and both the national and local American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Sheriff's office and particular police officers violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth Amendment's protections for substantive due process and against deprivations of liberty without due process. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("the Act"), Ala. Code § 15-20A-4(12). The primary plaintiff, James Doe, was required to register as a juvenile under the Act. As part of the Sheriff's Office's program, uniformed officers, including defendants and other unidentified officers, conducted warrantless searches of the plaintiffs' home without consent at least nine times between April 2012 and August 2013. On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case after being informed that the parties reached a written agreement regarding merits of the action and litigation costs. The private settlement agreement stated that police would have to conduct all home visits outside of the home, and would not enter without the registrant's written consent. In addition, police would perform these visits in civilian clothes and unmarked vehicles for the registrant's privacy. The case is now closed.

Summary: A juvenile sex offender and his parents filed a lawsuit in 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama objecting to the Sheriff's Office's program of unannounced, random, and suspicion-less compliance investigations of every individual in the county who is subject to requirements of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, Ala. Code § 15-20A-4(12). On February 13, 2014 the Court dismissed the case because they were informed that the parties reached a written agreement on the merits of the action and litigation costs


On the morning of April 7, 2003, protesters gathered at the Port of Oakland for a peaceful demonstration against the Iraq war and against specific companies that profited from the war and did business at the Port. Demonstrators formed a picket line and encouraged workers and truck drivers to refuse to enter the facilities, but did not to obstruct their access. That morning, the officers of Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) met to decide whether its members should report to work given the demonstration and the police presence. Several members of the Union were posted at the gates to the terminals of two of the companies against which the demonstration was held, with the purpose of letting Union members know that a decision was pending and that they should not enter until it was reached. Most or all of the Union members present waited outside of the gates in a group separate from the demonstrators. Also present were several legal observers from the National Lawyers Guild. At about 7:15 AM, the Oakland Police issued a dispersal order, alleged to be inaudible to most of the demonstrators and unclear in its directive. The demonstrators cleared away from the gates and allowed traffic to pass through more easily. The police formed lines blocking access to the route to the BART station by which most of the demonstrators arrived, and also to the parking lots where others had parked. At about 7:30, allegedly without any further warning or provocation, the Oakland police officers began barraging the demonstrators with a variety of "less-lethal weapons" including "sting ball" grenades filled with rubber pellets and tear gas, and wooden dowels and lead shot-filled bean bags fired from shotguns. The officers did not distinguish between the demonstrators, legal observers, and members of the Union, subjecting them all to this barrage. The demonstrators and others attempted to retreat along the only open routes, and the Police pursued, continuing to fire "less-lethal" weapons into the crowd and to strike at them with battons. Some demonstrators were intentionally struck by officers' motorcycles, in accordance with the Oakland Police Department's (OPD) standard practice for crowd dispersal at the time. The officers fired these weapons at demonstrators who arrived after any notice to disperse was given, and on bystanders. The police allegedly also purposely singled out and fired their weapons at legal observers, videographers and journalists, and individuals who appeared to be leaders because they carried bullhorns. On June 26, 2003, two separate suits were filed against the City of Oakland, the OPD, and related defendants, in response to the OPD's actions on April 7. Both suits were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Because the cases involved substantially similar questions of fact and law and arose out of the same events, on August 11, 2003, the Court ordered that the cases be officially related and heard before the same judge. The cases were not consolidated under the same docket, but most or all of the substantive orders and opinions issued by the Court thereafter bore the docket numbers and captions of both cases and applied to both cases. The cases were also officially related to a third case, Allen v. City of Oakland, a landmark case filed in 2000 that had settled in March 2003 with the City agreeing to implement comprehensive reforms to its policing practices and to submit to monitoring by court-appointed experts (Allen has a separate entry in the Clearinghouse, see related cases below.) One of the two cases addressed here, Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland, was filed as a class-action on behalf of all persons who attended the April 7 demonstration or who might attend future demonstrations in Oakland, and who were or would be subjected to the Defendants' alleged policy and practice of using excessive and arbitrary force to disperse or control demonstrations. In addition to the class plaintiffs, the suit also named as plaintiffs Local 10 ILWU and nine of its members, who were "standing by" in the vicinity of the demonstration but not active participants in it. All of the Union member plaintiffs had been hit by projectiles fired by the police. The other suit, Coles v. City of Oakland, sought relief for several individual demonstrators who were allegedly injured by the OPD. These individuals were all demonstrators who allegedly had been shot by the police with less-lethal munitions, struck with motorcycles, and/or wrongfully arrested. One plaintiff was struck in the torso by a police baton, hit by a motorcycle, and shot in the face and neck with a lead-filled bean bag. In both cases, Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' actions were prohibited the Constitutions of both the U.S and California. They alleged violations of their guaranteed rights to freedom of speech and association, their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, their rights to equal protection and due process, their right to be free from the use of excessive and arbitrary force, and their right to privacy. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows private actions to be brought against States for violations under color of state law of rights guaranteed by federal constitutional and statutory law. The Union also alleged that the Defendants had violated California privacy law by conducting investigations into its political affiliations and activities prior to the scheduled demonstration. In both cases, Plaintiffs sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as to recover legal costs. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the Defendants' actions to have been unlawful violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitutions of the U.S. and of California and of statutory law. They sought injunctions that among other things would prohibit the Defendants from unlawfully interfering with the constitutional and statutory rights of participants in public demonstrations and protests; from intentionally striking demonstrators with motorcycles; and from using "less-lethal" weapons as a method of crowd control against non-violent crowds or demonstrations. They sought an order compelling compliance with the already mandatory terms of the Settlement and Consent Decree reached in Allen v. City of Oakland. On December 24, 2004, the parties entered a court-approved partial settlement addressing the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to the extent that those claims related to the Defendants' crowd control policies. At the same time, class-action elements of the Local 10 ILWU case were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. In the settlement, the Defendants denied any wrongdoing. The claims for damages and costs, and for other injunctive relief, remained to be litigated. The Court retained jurisdiction over the issues resolved by the settlement for purposes of enforcement. The City of Oakland and its Police Department adopted a new official Crowd Control/Crowd Management Policy in light of the settlement. The Crowd Control Policy restricted the City's power to declare an assembly unlawful only to those circumstances where demonstrators had already acted illegally or where they posed a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It forbade the OPD from dispersing demonstrations that had not been declared unlawful. It also required the OPD to provide an opportunity for demonstrators at assemblies declared unlawful to safely disperse prior to arrest, and required that repeated and sufficiently amplified announcements of the dispersal order, specifying available routes, be made. It also forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal munitions directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were already violent. It prohibited the use of intentional motorcycle strikes and certain less-lethal weapons, such as wooden dowels and tasers, against crowds, and required that bean-bag munitions only be used against specifically targeted violent individuals or individuals who otherwise present an imminent risk to themselves or others. In 2011-12, the City of Oakland allegedly violated this policy repeatedly when it used less-lethal munitions against non-violent demonstrators at Occupy Oakland demonstrations and other protests. See related cases below (Campbell and Spalding). On April 27, 2005, the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) denied the Defendants' motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims in both cases for the use of excessive force in instances where plaintiffs were not arrested. The Defendants did not seek to have dismissed the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims of those plaintiffs who had been arrested. The Judge held that whether the police actions intended to physically move the plaintiffs constituted seizures (and therefore would qualify for protection under the Amendment) was a question that would need to be resolved at trial. The order also denied the Defendants motion to dismiss the Union's First Amendment claims, because the Union alleged that the police had investigated the Union prior to the protest and knew that many of its leaders supported the demonstrators and their cause. On September 27, 2005, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and legal costs, determining that the Plaintiffs were entitled to fees but declining to order the Defendants to pay the amount requested, totaling about $1,100,000, although not declaring this amount to be unreasonable. The order required the parties to negotiate further, and to return to the Court for a judicial determination of the amount to be paid only if the negotiations failed. Coles v. City of Oakland, 2005 WL 2373724 (N.D. Cal. 2005). On December 6, 2005, Judge Henderson issued an order that granted in part and denied in part the parties' various motions for partial summary judgment or adjudication, resolving all outstanding questions of law and fact except the Fourth Amendment issue described above, which he held would need to be argued orally. He granted the Local 10 Plaintiffs' unopposed motion for summary judgment on their privacy claim, and the Defendants' unopposed motions to dismiss certain claims against some of the individual police officer defendants. After this order, the Plaintiffs in the Local 10 ILWU case entered settlement negotiations with the Defendants, and on July 31, 2006 the action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in light of settlements reached between the parties. These settlement agreements have not been obtained by the Clearinghouse and their terms are unknown, but they did include attorneys' fees and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case in order to enforce the earlier settlement that established the Crowd Control Policy. The Plaintiffs in Coles also reached settlements with the Defendants. One plaintiff received $210,000 inclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. Another received $8,000, inclusive of costs. Other plaintiffs settled for $30,000, $10,000, $31,250, and $48,000, exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs. The amount received by the remaining plaintiff is unknown. On January 4, 2007, Judge Henderson granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees in the Cole case. The Court ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs' attorneys $621,512.12. This included attorneys' fees and costs for the Coles portion of the earlier settlement for injunctive relief that lead to the Crowd Control Policy. As of the time of this writing, July 2013, there has been no activity on either docket since this last order. The settlement establishing the Crowd Control Policy does not appear to have a termination date, and so it is possible that the case could be reopened.

Summary: On June 26, 2003, two separate suits were filed against the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department (OPD), and related defendants, in federal court. The suits were filed in response to the OPD's actions on April 7 at a peaceful antiwar demonstration at the Port of Oakland. The Police, without giving sufficient notice to disperse and without provocation, barraged demonstrators with a variety of "less-lethal" munitions, while blocking the main exit routes. Police pursued demonstrators and others present when they attempted to disperse, while continuing to fire at them and intentionally strike them with motorcycles. On August 11, 2003, the Court ordered that the cases be officially related and heard before the same judge. One of the two cases, Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland, was filed as a class-action on behalf of all persons who attended the April 7 demonstration. The suit also named as plaintiffs Local 10 of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union, plus nine of its members who were "standing by" in the vicinity of the demonstration but not active participants in it. The other suit, Coles v. City of Oakland, sought relieve for several individual demonstrators who were allegedly injured by the OPD. In both cases, Plaintiffs sought compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as to recover legal costs. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the Defendants' actions to be unlawful violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the Constitutions of the U.S. and of California and of statutory law. They sought injunctions that among other things would prohibit the Defendants from unlawfully interference with the constitutional and statutory rights of participants in public demonstrations and protests. On December 24, 2004, the parties entered a court-approved partial settlement addressing the Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief to the extent that those claims related to the Defendants' crowd control policies. Oakland adopted a new official Crowd Control Policy that forbade the police from dispersing crowds that had not behaved illegally or that did not pose a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It also forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal weapons directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were violent. The remaining issues eventually settled, with awards of damages and attorneys' fees well in excess of $1,000,000.


The plaintiff, a demonstrator involved in the Occupy Oakland protest movement, alleged that in the early morning hours of November 3, 2011, he was wrongfully beaten and imprisoned by two Oakland police officers, in the presence and with the approval of their supervising Sergeant. He alleged that the day prior he had participated, with several thousand other individuals, in a protest against recent police brutality and for economic justice. After the protest he went for dinner, and when walking home after midnight he encountered a police line obstructing his path. The plaintiff, an Army veteran of the war in Afghanistan, alleged that he questioned and criticized the officers' actions, and that in retaliation to his criticism two of the officers brutally beat him with clubs, sprayed painful chemicals in his face, and then arrested him. The beating caused lacerations to his spleen and internal bleeding, but rather than taking the plaintiff to a hospital, the police detained him in handcuffs at various locations near Oakland City Hall and then later transferred him to the Alameda County Jail. He was not taken to a hospital until approximately 18 hours after his arrest, after a friend paid his bail. He alleges that while detained his pleas for help were mocked or ignored by jail personal, including the jail medical staff. When he was taken to the hospital, his internal bleeding was discovered. The medical staff had to permanently cut off blood flow to his spleen, leaving him with a non-functioning organ. He was kept in intensive care for five days. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on November 29, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The suit was filed against the officers individually and in their official capacities, against other unknown individuals involved in his detention, and against the City of Oakland. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that the police's actions violated his First Amendment right to free speech, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, and the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as his rights to be free from excessive and arbitrary force, to personal liberty, and to freedom of movement. He also alleged analogous violations of California constitutional and statutory law, and a California statute requiring that certain misdemeanor plaintiffs be cited and released rather than jailed. Other allegations included assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. The plaintiff sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees and legal costs, and further relief as deemed appropriate by the court. On January 7, 2013, the plaintiff amended his complaint. The amended complaint appears to be substantially the same as his first complaint, expect with a paragraph describing the injury to his spleen in more specific terms. The parties entered into settlement negotiations. After two settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement which was ordered by the court on January 30, 2014. The Defendants paid $645,000 to the plaintiff to compensate his claims including attorney's fees. The case is closed.

Summary: The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on November 29, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, a demonstrator involved in the Occupy Oakland protest movement, alleged that when he was returning home from a protest, two Oakland police officers brutally beat him with clubs, sprayed painful chemicals in his face, and arrested him. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged that the polices' actions violated his First Amendment right to free speech, his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, and the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. After two settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement which was ordered by the court on January 30, 2014. The Defendants paid $645,000 to the plaintiff to compensate his claims including attorney's fees. The case is closed.


This is a case about protestors being detained and arrested in downtown Los Angeles between November 24-26, 2014. On January 12, 2016, four protestors represented by private counsel and the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) filed this § 1983 class action suit against the City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against the City and the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), declaratory judgments that their rights had been violated, nullification of the arrests, and various damages and attorney’s fees. They claimed that the LAPD had violated their First Amendment rights through unlawful detention during a protest; that they were unreasonably detained, searched, and arrested in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights; that not being permitted release on recognizance while held in custody based on a perceived affiliation with nation-wide protests and purported engagement in “civil disobedience” violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process; and that their right to privacy under California state law was violated by compulsory disclosure and subsequent upload to a nationwide protestor database of personal information. The protestors were marching in response to a grand jury’s refusal to indict a police officer for the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. At some point during the demonstration, protestors were kettled in by LAPD officers and prevented from leaving. The protest was deemed unlawful because it was blocking motorists, but plaintiffs contended in their complaint that the only traffic interference originated from the LAPD. The captain of the police then issued a “dispersal order,” informing them they would only be let go after individual questioning. Few of the protestors heard this order (the complaint states that the LAPD captain later admitted it was “inadequate”). The subsequent questioning involved being restrained in zip ties, patted down and searched, recorded on video, and forced to provide private identifying information. This was not the first time the City and LAPD had been sued for similar practices. In 2005, the City agreed to a settlement in a lawsuit (National Lawyers Guild v. City of Los Angeles) brought by NLG that provided the LAPD would no longer prevent sidewalk protests, would not kettle protestors using their motorcycles, and would attempt to arrest individuals responsible for any unlawful conduct prior to declaring an unlawful assembly. The City had to settle again in 2009, stipulating that it would facilitate protests that may temporarily block traffic and set specific requirements for declaring an unlawful assembly. For more information, see MIWON v. City of Los Angeles. The complaint in this case alleged that the City had repeatedly failed to train its officers to adhere to any of these provisions, all of which were violated during the protests. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on July 14, 2016. The court granted their motion in part on May 25, 2017. It certified a class entitled to seek damages defined as the "approximately 130 persons who were detained and arrested at 6th and Hope Streets on November 26, 2014, denied release on their own recognizance but never prosecuted." But the court declined to certify a class of protestors at a different intersection because the putative class representative was an NLG observer rather than a protester. It also declined to certify a class for injunctive relief consisting of all past and future protestors because "no objective criteria" existed to determine membership. 2017 WL 10776036. On February 27, 2017, the parties began court-ordered mediation. However, after over a year of failure to agree on a settlement, the parties were ordered into private mediation on July 8, 2018. The parties agreed to a provisional settlement on January 10, 2019, which after some modification Judge John A. Kronstadt approved on May 11, 2020. The plaintiffs were awarded a total of $750,000. $215,878.51 was put in a settlement fund for distribution to class members; $20,000 was awarded to the class representatives; and $476,801.93 was granted as attorney’s fees (the rest went to various court fees). Injunctive relief was not part of the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: Protestors in downtown LA alleged they were unlawfully detained, searched, interrogated, and some arrested during demonstrations in November, 2014. They brought a class action lawsuit against the City alleging violations of their 1st, 4th, and 14th amendment rights, as well as California state rights. A settlement was reached on May 11, 2020, granting plaintiffs $750,000 of attorney's fees, court fees, and class damages.


This is a case about harm caused by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) misclassifying residents as gang members or gang associates. On August 2, 2020, five residents of Los Angeles filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. They sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by attorneys from the Justice X Law Group, the plaintiffs sought damages for harms that arose from being falsely linked to gang activity, including imprisonment, excessive charging, job loss, inability to acquire housing, and loss of access to financial aid for college. Plaintiffs asserted that they were subjected to unnecessary and outrageous searches and seizures that violated the Fourth Amendment; that they were unlawfully confined in violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; and that the City of Los Angeles was responsible for and complicit in these LAPD policies. Much of the alleged misconduct in this case arose from section 186.22 of the California Penal Code (CPC). That law enhances sentences for crimes committed in association with a gang. Plaintiffs alleged that, since its inception, officers have abused it by knowingly or recklessly misclassifying people as gang members or gang associates while charging them with minor crimes to support convictions. Plaintiffs alleged they were misclassified for visiting family in a neighborhood with gang-related activity or having a cousin who was an alleged gang member. The magnitude of this abuse became clear in 2016 when, according to plaintiffs' complaint, a state audit found that California’s statewide gang association database (CalGangs) contained abundant “questionable entries and errors such as the inclusion of year-old children.” The issues of false classifications led to the California Department of Justice suspending CalGangs in June of 2020 and revoking LAPD’s access to it in July of 2020. The L.A. County District Attorney’s Office filed a criminal complaint against three LAPD officers on July 9, 2020 for conspiring to falsify police reports and fabricate court documents. An LAPD memorandum confirmed that as of July 10, 2020 twenty-four LAPD officers are under investigation for similar charges. The case is ongoing as of September 13, 2020.

Summary: In 2020, residents of Los Angeles filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that false claims of gang association and gang identity led to unreasonable searches, seizures, and imprisonment that violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. The case is ongoing as of September 2020.


This class-action lawsuit was filed on July 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The suit came in response to police tactics used to quell protests in Denver that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Plaintiffs, seven private individuals, were represented by the civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy and brought this suit against the city and county of Denver, as well as 10 anonymous officers of Denver Police Department (called Does 1-10). The class-action suit established two separate, putative classes: the Arrest Class, made up of those who were arrested in the protests, and the Direct Force Class, composed of protesters who suffered injuries from police using weapons. The suit alleged that on May 28, 2020 the Denver Police used weapons like tear gas, flashbang grenades, pepper spray, pepper balls, and rubber bullets on peaceful protesters. According to the complaint, these actions violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The First Amendment count claimed that the defendants' actions violated the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of Free Speech and Freedom to Petition. They also argued that the city's curfew itself was unlawfully executed because it only applied to protesters and not to non-protesters. The Fourth Amendment count argued that the defendants' actions in arresting and firing weapons at protesters constituted unreasonable search and seizure and excessive force. Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment count claimed that defendants violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Direct Force Class was denied Due Process when the police fired weapons at them "indiscriminately" and the Arrest Class was denied Due Process and Equal Protection when the police arrested them for violation of curfew, according to the complaint. Plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from further violations, and general and punitive damages. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. A week later, plaintiffs submitted a notice of related cases, citing two cases with common facts and claims and with at least one party in common: Abay v. Denver and Black Lives Matter 5280 v. Denver. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on July 23, 2020. The case was reassigned to Judge Lewis T. Babcock, since not all parties consented to jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. Then on July 28, the case was reassigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson, consistent with the reassignment in Black Lives Matter 5280 v. City and County of Denver. On August 4, the two cases were consolidated together with BLM 5280 designated as the lead case. Additional information on this litigation can be found under the BLM 5280 entry. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.

Summary: This class action lawsuit was filed in response to police actions amidst the nationwide protests that ensued following the police killing of George Floyd. The complaint, filed by seven private individuals, argues that the police use of weapons like pepper balls, pepper spray, and rubber bullets constituted violations of the protesters' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The suit established two classes of plaintiffs, the Arrest Class and the Direct Force Class. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.


On August 4, 2014, a 71-year old grandmother living in Washington, DC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia. The plaintiff, represented by the non-profit organization Equal Justice Under Law, sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, claiming that her constitutional rights were violated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the police verbally and physically abused her during a search of her home that was conducted despite the fact that she was under no suspicion of any wrongdoing. The incident happened on October 27, 2012 when two officers were on patrol and passed the plaintiff's home and saw three men near her property "outside the fence line." One of the men was the plaintiff's grandson. After conversing with the men, the three were arrested for possession of an open container of alcohol and possession of synthetic marijuana. A handgun was also found. One of the other men admitted that all of the illicit items belonged to him and no charges were pressed against the plaintiff's grandson. Even though no charges were pressed against the plaintiff's grandson, the police sought to search the plaintiff's home on the basis that there might have been evidence related to illegal firearms in the home. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the search warrant application was vague and did not specify any specific reason for searching the home. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the basis given for the warrant was inadequate. Both before and after obtaining the warrant, the plaintiff alleged that she was kept from entering her home and treated abusively by the police. After the search did not turn up anything illegal, the plaintiff claims that she reentered her home to find that it had been torn apart by the police. On September 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the officers' conduct was lawful, that the officers conduct was protected by qualified immunity, and that plaintiff failed to allege a <i>Monell</i> claim against the Metropolitan Police Department. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2015, which added several officer defendants to the action. On September 30, 2016, Judge Randolph D. Moss ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss, granting in part and denying in part. 211 F. Supp. 3d 150 (D.D.C. 2016). Specifically, the Court found that the officers had failed to establish the following: (1) that the firearm found gave them probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest; (2) that the protective sweep of the home was lawful; and (3) that the application for the warrant for the subsequent search was supported by probable cause. The Court did find, however, that all defendants who executed the search except for one acted lawfully. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleged that the purportedly unconstitutional search of the home was the result of the District's "pattern policy, and practice" of an affiant officer falsely claiming that his training and experience led him to believe that evidence of a crime would be present. On May 1, 2017, the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the case pursuant to a private settlement agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiff brings this lawsuit under the Fourth Amendment, claiming that her rights were violated by a search of her home that was conducted without probable cause. She claims that she was prevented from entering her home while the police conducted an illegal search based on misinformation and poorly conceived police procedures. She claims that the officers during the arrest were abusive mentally and physically. On September 30, 2016, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. In May 2017, the parties reached a private settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which is now closed.


Black Lives Matter - D.C. and several individual protestors brought this lawsuit on June 4, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. in response to President Trump's use of military police to disperse peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square Park on June 1st, 2020. Protesters had gathered as part of the nationwide outcry following the police killing of George Floyd. Around 6:30 in the evening, following an order to clear the square from Attorney General Barr, military and federal police forces used tear gas, pepper spray capsules, rubber bullets, and flash bombs to disperse the protesters in order to clear the path for President Trump to walk to nearby St. John's Church for a photo-op. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, ACLU D.C., Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law, and private counsel. Named defendants included President Donald Trump, Attorney General William Barr, and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, as well as the heads of several military and law enforcement agencies. The plaintiffs also sued unnamed officers, members, and agents of the U.S. Park Police, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Armed Forces, the Arlington County Police Department, and other federal and non-federal law enforcement agencies. The complaint alleged violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (conspiracy to deprive rights), and 42 U.S.C. 1986 (failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; compensatory and punitive damages, including damages for pain and suffering; and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. On June 9, 2020, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that sought class certification, added an individual plaintiff, and added Michael Carvajal (Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons) as a defendant. The plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of themselves and two classes of an individuals: 1) an injunctive relief class and 2) a personal injury class. A second amended complaint was filed two months later. This amended complaint added two individual plaintiffs. It also removed General James McConville, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, as a defendant and added the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia and unnamed Metropolitan Police Department officers. It also added First and Fourth Amendments claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. On August 19th, 2020, Judge Friedrich ordered the parties in this case and Buchanan v. Trump to propose a consolidated briefing schedule or to explain why briefing should not be consolidated given the similar factual and legal questions in each case. The following day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on September 3rd, identifying a number of individual law enforcement officers as defendants. In the following months, the defendants filed a number of motions to dismiss. As of April 21, 2021, the court has yet to issue decisions on any of the motions to dismiss and the lawsuit remains pending.

Summary: On June 1st, 2020, President Trump and Attorney General Barr ordered military and federal police to attack peaceful protesters using chemical weapons. Protesters were gathered in response to the May 25th killing of George Floyd. The complaint, which eventually sought class certification, claimed that the government's actions represented violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and constituted conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to prevent conspiracy to deprive rights. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. As of April 21, 2021, the lawsuit is ongoing.


On November 24, 2009, patrons of Atlanta Eagle, a gay bar in Atlanta, Georgia, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Atlanta, the chief of police, and officers of the Atlanta Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private lawyer Dan Grossman, and public interest lawyers from Lambda Legal Defense and the Southern Center for Human Rights, asked the Court for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to redress defendants' violations of plaintiffs' rights under the U.S. Constitution and Georgia Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the police action was taken without any particularized reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that any individual was involved in any criminal activity. The plaintiffs also sought redress for the numerous state law torts committed by individual defendants, including false imprisonment, assault, battery, and trespass. According to the complaint, on September 10 and 11, 2009, a paramilitary, SWAT-type force of Atlanta police officers entered the Atlanta Eagle without a warrant, claiming to be searching for public sex, drugs, and illegal weapons. The police forced dozens of bar patrons to lie face-down on the floor, which was covered with spilled beer, dirt, and broken glass. Officers allegedly made threats of violence and anti-gay slurs. Plaintiffs claim that although they were not suspected of any criminal activity, police officers emptied their pockets, confiscated their IDs, and entered every patron's name into a police computer. After the raid, not a single patron was charged with any crime, and no weapons, drugs, or evidence of sex was found. In December 2010, the parties reached a settlement that required the Atlanta Police Department to rewrite their policies regarding arrest, search, and seizure, and to make other changes to protect the public from police misconduct. The settlement required, among other provisions:

Changes in search and seizure policy to accord with a set of legal principles spelled out in the settlement, covering the requirements for arrests, stops, and searches.

All Atlanta police officers in uniform must wear a conspicuously visible nametag, and any Atlanta police officer who is in uniform or has displayed a badge or other indicia of police authority must identify himself by name and badge number upon request at some point before the end of an encounter with a civilian.

Atlanta police officers may not interfere in any way with a citizen's right to record police activity

Payment of $1,025,000 by the City of Atlanta.

 Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. issued an order to approve the settlement agreement on December 8, 2010. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the City of Atlanta's compliance with the terms of the settlement if it failed to implement the actions set forth in the settlement agreement within 180 days of the entry of the order. On June 16, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions on the grounds that the Atlanta Police Department had not implemented the police reform policies outlined in the settlement agreement. The police department agreed to implement the policies if plaintiffs withdrew their motion for sanctions. After three years of inactivity, on March 17, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt sanctions on the grounds that the police department had still not implemented police reform policies. The plaintiffs requested post-judgment discovery. On May 19, 2015, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion. In response to a joint motion by the parties, the court ordered the appointment of a special master, Joe D. Whitley, on June 22, 2016 to monitor the Atlanta Police Department's compliance with court orders and assist the parties in addressing any obstacles with compliance or relevant discovery. On September 23, 2016, the court granted the parties' Consent Order Setting Forth Initial Special Master Monitoring, Discovery, and Dispute Resolution Procedures. The consent order laid out detailed procedures for ensuring compliance and a feedback mechanism for the creation of a civil rights training program. The consent order also provided a detailed monitoring scheme. Further, all post-judgment discovery requests were stayed without prejudice. In two 2016 status reports, Mr. Whitley found that the police department had complied or attempted in good faith to comply with the requirements of the court order. However, after six months, it became clear that there were existing areas of disagreement between the parties regarding the following elements of the court order: (1) the identification requirement for officers; (2) the requirement of no interference with audio or video recordings; (3) documentation of warrantless seizures and identification checks; and (4) timely resolution of citizen complaints. But at that point, Mr. Whitley still believed that all of the issues could be resolved, particularly through increased communication between the parties. After nine months had passed, however, Mr. Whitley determined that there were fundamental disagreements between the parties regarding the court order's requirements and how compliance should be evaluated. At Mr. Whitley's urging, on July 25, 2017, the Court issued two orders: one requiring that the police department show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court order and another requiring that the department show cause as to why it is entitled to relief from any of the court order's provisions. On September 25, 2017, the police department filed a motion to disqualify the special master and reassign matters to the district court, as well as an emergency motion to stay the special master's activities. However, the court did not grant the emergency motion and the special master continued to carry out his responsibilities. And on November 28, 2017, the court denied the police department's motion to disqualify the special master and adopted his October 2017 status report. On February 12, 2018, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by responding to the police department's emergency petition. The court called for briefing and a special master report and recommendation on the issue of whether the attorneys' fees sought were reasonable. Throughout 2018, the parties engaged in extensive settlement discussions with the goal of reaching an agreement with respect to the show cause order on contempt issues and the police department's compliance with the original settlement agreement. They proposed a new consent order on November 28, 2018, and the court approved it the following day. The order required the police department to modify 1) training procedures; 2) standard operating procedures; 3) handing citizen complaints; 4) "stop and think" forms; and 5) identification procedures. It also provided the plaintiffs the right to engage in post-judgment discovery, and the right to address any failure to comply in court. Additionally, the city agreed to pay the plaintiffs attorneys' fees. The case remains open such that the parties may resume litigation if the defendants fail to comply with the consent order.

Summary: In 2009, patrons of an Atlanta gay bar sued the Atlanta Police Department, alleging that a raid on the bar had taken place without particularized reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The parties reached a settlement requiring the police department to reform its policies. However, after the judgment, the plaintiffs filed for sanctions twice because the police department had not implemented the policies. In response to a joint motion by the parties, the Court ordered the appointment of a special master on June 22, 2016 to monitor the Atlanta Police Department's compliance with court orders and assist the parties in addressing any obstacles with compliance or relevant discovery. After some time, the special master noted several disputes between the parties. The Court ordered the police department to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating the court order. However, as of September 2018, the parties were close to reaching a settlement agreement.


On November 13, 1974, eighteen named individuals and fifteen named groups, relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, brought a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Chicago's mayor and police officials. The plaintiffs claimed that the police defendants engaged in a broad range of activities constituting unlawful intelligence gathering of suspected subversives in violation of the plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as their rights under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (regarding electronic surveillance). In addition to class action status for their case, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Private counsel and the Cook County Public Defender's Office represented the plaintiffs. District Judge William J. Lynch, on May 16, 1975, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting their justiciability, statute of limitations and insufficient pleadings-based challenges to the complaint. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Il. 1975). In an unpublished ruling on July 31, 1975, then-District Judge Joel M. Flaum issued a protective order to limit disclosure to plaintiffs' attorneys of documents produced in discovery. In succeeding months, the defense sought to extend the protective order to certain depositions and interrogatories. Discovery proceedings proved contentious during the following year. On March 5, 1976, District Judge Alfred Y. Kirkland, Sr., denied a defense request for a protective order to shield the mayor from having to provide an oral deposition. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 428 (N.D. Il. 1976). Separately, Judge Kirkland also ruled upon plaintiffs' motion to compel a response to written interrogatories, finding (among other things) that no "informer's privilege" existed to resist disclosure of the identity of persons who participated in intelligence gathering on lawful activities, as opposed to those who provided information on violations of law. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D 430 (N.D. Il. 1975). Later that year, Judge Kirkland revised the protective order to protect the defendants' data gathering system from public disclosure, since it had not yet been shown to be illegal. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Il. 1976). Soon thereafter, the judge enjoined the defendants from joining or infiltrating the plaintiffs' legal team, a tactic which the plaintiffs' documentary evidence showed had been employed, earlier, by the defense. The court also enjoined the defendants from using data they or their agents obtained as a result of joining plaintiffs' legal team and by gathering information about plaintiffs' case by means other than orderly discovery procedures. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 435 (N.D. Il. 1976). In another ruling that day, to sanction the defendants for failure to answer interrogatories in a meaningful way, Judge Kirkland held that plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of parts of their complaint, shifting to defendants the burden of showing that they had not engaged in certain activities. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 438 (N.D. Il. 1976). On October 3, 1975, a second, similar lawsuit, ACLU v. Bell, was filed in the same court by several individual and organizational plaintiffs represented by private counsel and an assistant federal public defender. Over a period beginning in 1977, the FBI, Justice Department, CIA, various officials of these agencies, and the Secretary of Defense were added as defendants. The two cases were consolidated for discovery purposed on July 2, 1976. In mid-1977, discovery battles continued, with Judge Kirkland granting in part the federal defendants' request to stay class discovery pending interlocutory appeal of class certification (he allowed discovery relating to the named plaintiffs), and rejecting defense invocations of the informer's privilege. Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. Il. 1977). Earlier, Judge Kirkland had certified two classes of plaintiffs subjected to the alleged illegal surveillance and intelligence gathering-one of individuals and the other of organizations-with the certification applicable to the declaratory and injunctive relief requests only, excluding the damages aspect of the complaint. The defendants' interlocutory appeals failed, Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 558 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1976) (table) and 565 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1977) (Circuit Judge Robert A. Sprecher), and the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to review the class certification. Rochford v. Alliance to End Repression, 434 U.S. 828 (1977). Continued litigation of discovery issues, including objections based upon informer's and state secrets privilege assertions, resulted in judicial suggestions to explore settlement. American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 609 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1979) (District Judge James E. Noland, by designation); American Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Circuit Judge Walter J. Cummings). Eventually, with trial slated to occur in 1981, the parties reached accord on two settlement documents, one referred to as the FBI settlement and the other as the CIA settlement. Most plaintiffs approved of the settlements. Two dissenting political organizations and a few individual plaintiffs dismissed their claims, rather than settle. On February 13, 1981, the court conducted a fairness hearing regarding the proposed settlements and, afterward, continued to receive input, objections, and clarifying information about the terminology and scope of the settlements. District Judge Susan Getzendanner accepted and approved the two settlements on August 11, 1981. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 91 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Il. 1981). Separately, proposed settlements between most plaintiffs and the City of Chicago and the Defense Department defendants were approved by Judge Getzendanner. Her March 30, 1982, order noted that the settlement with the city provided the plaintiffs with the injunctive relief they requested, barring political spying and harassment and limiting investigative activities based on First Amendment protected conduct except in four specific types of investigations: criminal, dignitary protection, public gatherings, and regulatory investigations, all governed by a commencement standard of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The settlement's restrictions on domestic intelligence gathering activities by the Defense Department prohibited unlawful activity by the agency and its agents. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Il. 1982). Appendices to that opinion contain the text of the settlement with the city and related documents. Id. Despite the settlements, decades of litigation followed. On March 7, 1983, the Department of Justice issued new Guidelines on Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. Plaintiffs had Judge Getzendanner enjoin the FBI from implementing in Chicago the portion of the new guidelines that gave less protection from investigations based on First Amendment-protected activity than was provided for under the settlement agreement. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F.2d 575 (N.D. Il. 1983). On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit deemed the injunction unwarranted, in the absence of any indication of substantial and imminent danger of the FBI violating the decree, and changed the injunction to a declaratory judgment. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984) (District Judge Edward Dumbauld, by designation). The court then voted to hear the case, en banc. After re-argument, the court reversed the district court, saying that the new investigative guidelines were not inconsistent with the consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner). In an October 24, 1985 unpublished order, Judge Getzendanner sanctioned the city defendants for a years-before non-disclosure of certain files to plaintiffs, ruling that several paragraphs of the plaintiffs' complaint concerning dissemination of information would be deemed true without being subject to rebuttal, and allowing one of plaintiffs' attorneys fees incurred in seeking the files and the sanctions. By the end of 1985, cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed by the remaining parties (two organizational plaintiffs, three individual plaintiffs, and the city defendant). Judge Getzendanner ruled that the actions of the city police as to lawful speech activities of a retired social worker, a civil liberties organization, and a peace organization violated these plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court awarded the organizations $20,625 apiece, plus costs, and the individual $10,000, plus costs. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Il. 1985). Related attorneys' fee litigation occurred over the next few years, as discussed below. Meanwhile, by 1989, the Chicago Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador ("Chicago CISPES") petitioned the district court for discovery under and enforcement of the settlement. They alleged that from March 1983 through June 1985, they were unlawfully investigated as a part of a national CISPES investigation that stemmed from unreliable and unverified informant information. On June 28, 1989, Magistrate Judge Joan Lefkow directed the FBI to provide discovery. Conceding defects in the CISPES investigation, the FBI had disciplined personnel connected with it, segregated and archived away from the FBI records gathered during the investigation, and conducted nationwide training on how to deal with activities protected by the First Amendment. These remedial actions, the FBI said, mooted CISPES' request for relief. In turn, CISPES cross-moved for summary judgment. On October 3, 1991, in an unpublished ruling, Judge Ann C. Williams granted CISPES' motion, finding the FBI had violated the settlement decree and the controversy was not moot, since the FBI had not shown that its misconduct was incapable of reoccurring. CISPES later prevailed in seeking additional discovery from the FBI concerning its interviews of Arab-Americans during the time period surrounding the Persian Gulf War in early 1991, when (in an April 9, 1992, unpublished decision) Magistrate Judge Lefkow ruled that such discovery would be relevant to whether the FBI's training was adequate as contemplated by the consent decree. In an also-unpublished order dated June 26, 1992, Judge Williams denied the FBI's objection to the discovery ruling. On October 14, 1992, Judge Williams directed expunging of data identifying Chicago CISPES members and associates from government records regarding the CISPES investigation. Later unpublished rulings awarded plaintiffs' counsel attorneys' fees for efforts in monitoring compliance with the court's decree. The award and the finding of intentional noncompliance with the court's decree were reversed by the Seventh Circuit, which ruled that negligent violation of the decree during nationwide efforts in the CISPES investigation did not merit the district court's earlier findings; in turn, the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties entitled to attorneys' fees. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 119 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1997) (Circuit Judge Terence T. Evans). Separately, three activist groups filed an enforcement petition under the consent decree. They alleged misconduct by city police in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in 1996. Following a hearing, Magistrate Judge Edward A. Bobrick's unpublished October 27, 1999, report recommended granting summary judgment for the city. The plaintiffs' objected. On review, District Judge Joan B. Gottschall sustained the objections, in part. Using the "clear and convincing" standard of proof to determine whether violations of the decree had been established, the judge found that the plaintiffs' evidence failed to meet this standard in most instances; but some testimony, if believed by a fact-finder, could provide clear and convincing evidence that, because of plaintiffs' First Amendment-protected views and activities, police engaged in conduct violating the decree. As to events shown by this testimony, Judge Gottschall's unpublished May 8, 2000, order denied the city's summary judgment motion. Later, a four day bench trial occurred regarding these events. The judge ruled, in an unpublished order on December 22, 2000, that the plaintiffs' evidence failed to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof. Earlier, the judge's unrelated, unpublished order of September 21, 2000, rejected a petitioner's claim that police had violated the decree by mistakenly retaliating against him, a police officer, for his supposed leaks to the press during an investigation into police corruption. By then, Judge Williams had denied the city's motion to modify the nearly twenty year old consent decree. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 66 F. Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Il. 1999). In a different motion, the city submitted a number of hypothetical questions to the court, in hopes of receiving guidance to help avoid violations of the decree. The court ruled in a May 2000, unpublished order that Article III limitations precluded it from providing an advisory opinion. The city appealed Judge Williams' 1999 denial of their modification request. A Seventh Circuit panel, on January 11, 2001, reversed the lower court, directing it to modify the decree as the city had requested. Judge Posner noted that the city had not asked for abrogation of the decree and would still be bound to adhere to its' core protections and enforcement provisions. He observed that changing circumstances since the decree's entry-particularly the increased threat of terrorism-warranted ensuring that the police had the ability to monitor statements, build a file, or plant an undercover agent among a group discussing the desirability of committing acts of violence in pursuit of an ideological agenda. Unless the motives of the police were improper or the methods forbidden by other provisions of federal or state law, other cities' police could perform basic investigative functions inhibited by the decree in Chicago. Because prior misconduct of police should not impair public safety in the present and because the modified decree amply protected First Amendment rights, the appellate court ruled in the city's favor. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001). On remand, Judge Gottschall's unpublished March 2, 2001, order granted the city's motion and modified the consent decree. A police union official attempted, in December 2001, to use the decree to sanction police officials who, allegedly, investigated him because of his union-related statements. On February 26, 2003, Judge Gottschall granted the city's motion to dismiss the union official's enforcement petition. (We do not have a copy of the motion or of the order granting it.) From 1985 through 2004, many rulings addressed denials and awards of attorneys' fees. Litigation centered on the applicability of the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, passed after the lawyers reached the 1981-82 settlements but effective after the court approved the settlements. To track the course of these disputes, review (1) Judge Getzendanner's unpublished orders of October 24, 1985, and September 4, 1986; (2) Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 820 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1987) (Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook); (3) Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 899 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); (4) Judge Williams' unpublished order of August 9, 1990; and (5) Judge Gottschall's unpublished orders of May 26, 2000, September 21, 2000, and November 2, 2000. In 2000, the district court approved payment of attorneys' fees. Over $1 million in fees were awarded to plaintiffs' counsel for services performed during between 1994 and 2001. (We do not have a copy of the district court's ruling(s) granting these payments.) On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the award. The panel opinion by Judge Posner observed that the legal services provided during the 1994-2001 period involved two failed contempt proceedings; the plaintiffs' failed opposition to the modification of the decree; and efforts to monitor the city's compliance with the decree, which efforts merely led to the failed contempt proceedings and which efforts were entirely uncalled for by the decree (which made monitoring duties a responsibility of a public body rather than of plaintiffs' counsel). Thus, the court could not say the applicant attorneys had represented "prevailing parties" in any of the efforts, nor that they acted pursuant to some obligation imposed by the decree or other law. Even when their services responded to the city's attempt at modification of the decree, the attorneys were not entitled to fee recovery because their opposition to modification "verged on the unreasonable." Judge Posner noted that the absence of a sunset provision or termination date in the decree posed a considerable defect, one not present in more modern decrees. He observed that, after the decree's modification, something of a sunset provision had been provided in that, after the completion of the independent audit in or before 2006, the district judge was to consider whether the decree had outlived its usefulness. Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 356 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2004). On September 30, 2008, the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Gottschall) denied the City's motion to dissolve the modified consent decree. The court found that although the decree was "probably ripe for dissolution," the City had failed to conduct an independent audit that would allow the court to review the City's compliance. The City appealed to the 7th Circuit, which dismissed the appeal on August 4, 2009. In the meantime, the district court (Judge Gotschall) dissolved the modified consent decrees in related cases (1:74-cv-3268 and 1:75-cv-3295). On April 13, 2011, Judge Gotschall granted the City's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. According to the order, petitioners were permitted to seek reinstatement of the petition if the City failed to conduct an audit and allow the court to review the results, as required by the modified consent decree. The court (Judge Gotshchall) gave the petitioners 45 days to file a motion to reinstate the petition, after which time the case would be dismissed without prejudice. There was no further court involvement in this case.

Summary: In November 1974, several individuals and groups filed a civil rights action against Chicago's mayor and police officials, claiming that they had engaged in unlawful intelligence gathering and electronic surveillance. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and they sought both damages and injunctive relief. After the case was consolidated with a number of related cases, in August 1981, the parties entered into a consent decree settlement. The consent decree barred the City from political spying, harassment, and investigation of certain activities protected by the First Amendment. Despite the settlement, decades of litigation addressing enforcement of the decree followed. In April 2011, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss the case. The court's order permitted the plaintiffs to file a motion to reinstate the consent decree within 45 days if the City did not conduct an audit showing compliance with the terms of the agreement. There was no further legal action taken by either party.


On October 21, 2004, a group of former Chicago Police Department (CPD) detainees filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the CPD. Represented by the Chicago civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy, the plaintiffs alleged that the CPD were engaged in a unconstitutional pattern and practice of detaining persons under its control for excessive periods of time and under poor conditions. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Department routinely and secretly detained suspects in police station interrogation rooms for lengthy periods of time, up to 48 hours without sleep or food, in attempts to develop legal grounds for detaining them. These unlawful detentions, plaintiffs alleged, amounted to physical and psychological "soft torture" and produced scores of false confessions. Plaintiffs sought monetary damages and class certification. On June 13, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for certification of three separate classes: (1) those subjected to interrogation room detentions for over 16 hours; (2) those held in the department lock-up and deprived of adequate accommodations for sleep; and (3) those detained by police for over 48 hours without a probable cause hearing. Defendants objected to certification of Class I and III, but consented to certification of Class II. On October 5, 2005, U.S. District Judge Robert W. Gettleman granted plaintiffs' motion with respect to the Class II and III. Class II was defined as: "All persons held in a CPD lock-up or detective division facility between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. at any time from October 12, 2002, to the date of this order." Class III was defined as: "All persons arrested on suspicion of a felony without an arrest warrant and who were detained by the CPD in excess of 48 hours without a judicial probable cause hearing at any time from August 15, 1999, to the date of this order." Judge Gettleman denied certification as to first class because the claims of the only proposed representative of the first class was barred by the statute of limitations. 231 F.R.D. 367 (N.D.Ill. Oct 05, 2005). The plaintiffs later added a new representative for Class I and renewed their motion to certify this class. Judge Gettleman granted the motion on June 2, 2006. While the certification issues were being resolved by the court, the parties engaged in substantial discovery. Many disputes arose, causing the parties to appear before U.S. Magistrate Judge Sidney I. Schenkier over 20 times. The CPD was ordered to produce, among other materials, computerized arrest data and a sampling of 3,000 paper arrest records. The plaintiffs used the arrest data to create a database which would be used to identify the members of the various classes. Judge Schenkier held a series of settlement conferences beginning on September 21, 2006 and continuing over the next year. On October 6, 2010, the Court gave final approval of the negotiated class action settlement. The defendants were required to fund a settlement fund of up to $16.5 million to pay settlement class members. The agreement specified the following awards for each class: • Members of Class I (detained for longer than 16 hours) were eligible for an award of up to $2,000; • Members of Class II (detained overnight without adequate accommodations for sleep) were eligible for an award of up to $90; and • Members of Class III (detained for longer than 48 hours without a probable cause hearing) were eligible for an award of up to $3,000. The defendants were also required to pay for all costs related to the claims administration for the settlement. The agreement also allowed for an attorneys' fee award not to exceed $5 million, and attorneys' costs and expenses not to exceed $70,000. On April 19, 2013, Judge Schenkier issued an order stating that the entirety of damages had been paid and any remainder of the settlement fund would be returned to the City of Chicago.

Summary: In a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs challenged Chicago Police Department's alleged unconstitutional pattern and practice of detaining persons under its control for excessive periods of time and under conditions plaintiffs claimed reached the level of "soft torture." This case settled on October 6, 2010 for $16.5 million.