On March 8th, 2014, several citizens of Montgomery, Alabama, who had been imprisoned for failing to pay traffic fines, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the City of Montgomery, Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and private counsel, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the plaintiffs' rights were violated, compensation for the damages caused by the city's conduct, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged they did not have the ability to pay for the traffic tickets and that the City should not have imprisoned them for failing to pay the traffic tickets when they did not attempt to determine whether the plaintiffs had an ability to pay. On May 1, 2014, the district court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) granted a motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction enjoined the city from attempting to collect monies owed to the city associated with traffic tickets by the plaintiffs. The city was also required to submit a comprehensive plan on how they will determine an individual's ability to pay for traffic fines. On August 20, 2014, the case was reassigned to Judge Myron H. Thompson, and on August 21, 2014, Judge Thompson extended the injunction until the court ordered a change. On October 31, 2014, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case because they entered into a settlement agreement about the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted this dismissal on November 17, 2014, and the court agreed to the plaintiffs’ request to maintain jurisdiction over the settlement in case of any breaches by the defendant. Within the settlement, the Municipal Court of the City of Montgomery agreed to numerous changes in its operations, including using a microphone in its courtroom proceedings, notifying this plaintiff's counsel within 12 hours of a defendant being jailed for nonpayment of a fine, and training public defenders and prosecutors on compliance with Bearden v. Georgia and Turner v. Rodgers. The terms of the settlement agreement lasted up to three years. On December 12, 2014, Judge Thompson formally closed the case, though the court retained jurisdiction over the settlement and allowed the parties to resolve the issue of attorneys' fees, which was subsequently resolved on January 16, 2015. On April 2, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a notice with the court that the defendants willfully violated the settlement agreement. The matter seemed to be resolved quickly because on April 7, 2015, Judge Thompson ordered that no further action would be taken on the notice because defendants had taken corrective action. The case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on March 8, 2014, alleging that the City of Montgomery, Alabama, improperly imprisoned them for failing to pay traffic fines. They alleged that they did not have an ability to pay the fines due to their financial circumstances and that the city did not consider their ability to pay. On May 1, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the city from collecting more money from traffic tickets of plaintiffs'. On October 31, 2014 the parties filed to dismiss the case pursuant to a settlement agreement, which included numerous changes to Municipal Court proceedings. The case is now closed.


On August 28, 2013, an indigent detainee in the Montgomery Municipal Jail filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. The plaintiff sued the City of Montgomery and the Honorable Milton J. Westry under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The petitioner, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, requested the court quash the Municipal Court order requiring the petitioner to serve an imprisonment term of 54 days. Petitioner claimed that the Municipal Court order violated Sixth Amendment, due process, and equal protection clause. The plaintiff was an indigent woman who accumulated $2,714.00 in fines and fees on traffic tickets that she received in 2008 and 2009. On August 20, 2013, the plaintiff was arrested and brought to the Montgomery Municipal Jail. The next day, the plaintiff appeared before Defendant Judge Westry, who told the plaintiff that she must pay $1,554.00 immediately or serve 31 days in jail. When the plaintiff informed Judge Westry that she would not be able to pay after only recently securing a part-time job, Judge Westry ordered the that her outstanding fines be converted into a term of imprisonment in the Montgomery Municipal Jail. Petitioner was not appointed a lawyer during the previously described court proceeding. After filing an emergency petition for writ of certiorari, the case was removed from state court to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on October 4, 2013. On the same day, the petitioner filed an amended complaint, seeking declaratory relief. Another indigent detainee filed a similar suit after he was taken into custody to serve a 54 day sentence for his inability to pay his traffic fees. Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 2014 WL 6461900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On October 28, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion to consolidate both cases. On November 12, 2013, petitioners amended their complaint and additionally sought injunctive relief. Judge Mark E. Fuller granted the motion to consolidate both cases on November 14, 2013. Discovery began on December 23, 2013. During discovery, a similar case raising comparable claims, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, was filed. 2014 WL 6461900, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). The court in Mitchell v. City of Montgomery entered a preliminary injunction that ordered the City of Montgomery to submit a comprehensive set of judicial procedures to implement for the collection of future fines. On May 14, 2014, petitioners motioned to have limited participation in the Mitchell v. City of Montgomery hearing regarding the proposed judicial procedures. 2014 WL 6461900, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On May 27, 2014, Judge Fuller granted the petitioners’ motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Fuller determined that the petitioners were only permitted to participate in the Mitchell hearings orally and through ancillary briefings to provide perspective on the legal sufficiency of the City’s proposed plan. Cleveland v. City of Montgomery, 300 F.R.D. 578, 581 (M.D. Ala. May 27, 2014). Following the petitioners' participation, all parties decided to engage in private mediation to create judicial procedures that would satisfy federal and state-law requirements. 2014 WL 6461900, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). On August 28, 2014, both parties submitted a joint motion to approve the proposed settlement agreement. In the initial agreement, both parties submitted an agreement to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees and provide a list of basic premises and procedures that the Montgomery Municipal Court would abide by with regards to indigent defendants unable to pay any court-ordered monies, including fines, court costs, or restitution. The parties filed an amended joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order on September 12, 2014. The amended motion included a joint brief in support and requested that the court issue three declarations: <blockquote> (1) Under the current status of the law, the constitutional principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), regarding incarceration for non-payment, and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011), regarding notice, apply in municipal-court proceedings, and that, to the extent applicable in a particular case, the judges of the Montgomery Municipal Court are legally required to follow them. (2) that the proposed judicial procedures facially comply with the constitutional principles set out in Bearden, regarding incarceration for non-payment, and Turner, regarding notice. In Bearden, the Supreme Court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause, a trial court cannot “automatically revok[e] probation because [a] petitioner could not pay his fine, without determining that petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.” 461 U.S. at 662. (3) the proposed judicial procedures facially comply with the requirements of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, §§ 13, 64, and 225 of the Alabama Constitution, and Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. </blockquote>2014 WL 6461900, at *3-5 (M.D. Ala. Nov 17, 2014). Judge Myron H. Thompson submitted an opinion granting the parties’ joint motion for entry of agreed settlement order and subsequent final judgment on the docket on November 17, 2014. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2013, indigent detainee filed a complaint against the City of Montgomery and a Municipal Court Judge for unconstitutionally ordering the petitioner to serve time for her inability to pay court-order fines and fees for their traffic violations. The complaint was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama and then transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, where it was consolidated with a similar case. In the amended complaint, petitioners alleged that the imprisonment orders violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Petitioners sought remedy through injunctive and declaratory relief. In 2014, the parties reached a settlement that provided new judicial procedures for the Municipal Court to follow regarding indigent defendants and nonpayment. It also included three declarations, most importantly, it declared that the constitutional principles set out in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), and Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) applied to municipal court proceedings, and awarded plaintiff's attorney fees. The case closed in November 2014.


On May 1, 2006, an inmate awaiting execution at the Supermax Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Represented by the Federal Public Defender, the inmate claimed that the procedures used to carry out lethal injections in Arkansas—specifically the use of potassium chloride in the lethal cocktail of drugs—risked unnecessary conscious suffering in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the execution practices employed by the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC). He did not challenge his sentence or challenge the use of lethal injection. On May 4, 2006, a second death row inmate in Arkansas moved to intervene. A few days later, his execution was scheduled for July 5 of that year. On May 26, the district court (Judge Susan Webber Wright) allowed him to intervene as a plaintiff. On June 16, following his addition to the case, the second plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from carrying out executions in accordance with the lethal injection protocol. At the hearing on the motion, a medical expert testified that the state's lethal injection procedure created medically unacceptable risks of inflicting pain and suffering. Judge Wright granted the motion on June 26, noting that the plaintiff had not delayed in filing to intervene because he had had to wait to exhaust all of his appeals. The order granting the preliminary injunction stayed the State of Arkansas from implementing the order for execution of the second plaintiff. And four days later, the defendants appealed. In the midst of ruling on the preliminary injunction appeal, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the original complaint, arguing that the plaintiff could not state a claim. First, they argued that the plaintiff had not exhausted all of the remedies available to him under the Department of Correction’s grievance policy. Second, the claim fell outside the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. Judge Wright disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss on June 19, 2006. On November 22, 2006, a third death row inmate sought to intervene. On December 1, 2006, Judge Wright granted the motion. On July 7, 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction granted by the district court and vacated the stay of execution issued to the second plaintiff. The Court of Appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in granting the stay of execution and the preliminary injunction. Because the inmate could have brought his § 1983 claim before it was necessary to grant a stay, the district court exceeded the scope of its power to grant the preliminary injunction. 491 F.3d 804. On July 17, 2007 the defendants filed for summary judgment. They argued that Arkansas's lethal injection protocol was substantially identical to the protocol used by the state of Missouri, which was upheld against constitutional challenge by the Eighth Circuit in <i>Taylor v. Crawford</i>, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007). In their reply to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued that they had not been provided with the opportunity to engage in discovery, and that a significant number of genuine issues of material fact remained even without discovery. On August 5, 2008 the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dissolved the stay of execution. The district court relied on the Eighth Circuit's approval of Missouri's lethal injection protocol, which the court found was sufficiently similar to Arkansas' protocol. The district court found that the plaintiffs had failed to come forward with evidence that Arkansas' protocol for execution by lethal injection "subject[ed] them to constitutionally significant risk of pain." On August 29, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an appeal. On February 8, 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment for the defendants. The Court found that Arkansas' protocol was substantially similar to Missouri's protocol upheld by the Court of Appeals and to Kentucky's protocol upheld by the Supreme Court. On November 10, 2010, the United States Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. At the time of this writing, the original plaintiff had not been executed. The second plaintiff was granted a stay in 2017. The third plaintiff was executed on April 24, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: A prisoner facing the death penalty in Arkansas sued over the form of lethal injection used by the state. The case was dismissed because of a lack of evidence that Arkansas's use of lethal injections subjected prisoners to a significant risk of pain. The case is closed, and one of the three plaintiffs was executed in 2017.


On August 23, 2018, three Maricopa County, Arizona residents who were referred to Maricopa County's Marijuana Diversion program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Maricopa County and Treatment Assessment Screening Center, Incorporated, a private company, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Treatment Assessment Screening Center jointly operated a marijuana possession diversion program that discriminated against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the defendants were, under threat of felony prosecution, subject to longer terms of imprisonment, repeated drug tests and increased fee payments due to their inability to pay fees associated with the program. One class member individually sought injunctive relief to prevent Maricopa County from keeping her in the diversion program if she could not pay the fees associated with completing the program. The case was assigned to Judge James A. Teilborg but immediately reassigned to Judge Steven P. Logan. On October 12, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge James A. Soto. That same day, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2018, adding a third representative to the class. In January 2019, the parties agreed to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction and the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich. After the submission of the amended complaint, several defendants filed motions to dismiss the case with regards to the allegations leveled against them specifically. Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich denied all these motions in a June 18, 2019 order (2019 WL 2515950). He stated that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the elements of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and that, because the violations of rights were ongoing, there is no statute of limitations concerns. As for the Treatment Assessment Screening Center, he stated that the group was not subject to qualified immunity because it was being sued as an organization, not in individual capacity. He also wrote that the County Attorney was eligible for suit because he oversaw what the plaintiffs allege is a discriminatory practice. He added that as a municipality, the County Attorney was not subject to sovereign immunity. On September 23, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint adding another representative to the class. Discovery is ongoing in the case.

Summary: On August 23, 2018, three Maricopa County, Arizona residents who have been referred to Maricopa County's Marijuana Diversion program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the Maricopa County Attorney's Office and Treatment Assessment Screening Center jointly operated a marijuana possession diversion program that discriminated against the poor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs amended their complaint twice to include new named plaintiffs for the class. The District Court denied the defendant's motions to dismiss the complaint, and discovery is ongoing both for class certification and the underlying claims.


On March 8, 2006, the Pacific News Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated the constitutional rights of the press and the public to attend, meaningfully observe, and gather and report on important information at executions being carried out by the defendants at the California State Prison at San Quentin. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' use of pancuronium bromide, a paralytic agent, acted as a chemical curtain over the lethal injection process. The plaintiffs alleged that this chemical made it impossible for witnesses to determine whether the executed inmates were being subjected to substantial and unnecessary pain before dying. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that the witnesses were denied the information necessary for the public to decide whether and how executions should be conducted. On the same day the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit, they asked the court to consolidate their case with Morales v. Woodford (CJ-CA-0004 in this Clearinghouse). On March 28, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Judge Jeremy Fogel) denied without prejudice the request to consolidate the cases. On October 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in response to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not have a First Amendment right to dictate the method that the state uses to perform a lethal injection execution. Furthermore, the defendants argued that there were legitimate and constitutional reasons for using pancuronium bromide. On November 3, 2011, the court entered a scheduling order that included a discovery cut-off date, but the plaintiffs moved to vacate the order and to direct the parties to submit a new proposed schedule "when viable lethal injection regulations are in place." On April 5, 2012 court denied the motion to vacate the scheduling order, reasoning that the ongoing state case, Sims v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation  (CDCR), could affect this case when concluded and therefore the motion was premature. In Sims v. CDCR, the Marin County Superior Court had issued a judgment on February 21, 2012 and held that CDCR failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. The state court had issued an injunction prohibiting CDCR from executing anyone until new lethal injection regulations complied with the APA. In July 2012, the parties stipulated that the court should vacate the current scheduling order. On August 10, 2012, the Court vacated the order and stipulated that the parties should submit a new proposed schedule once (1) viable lethal injection regulations were in place; or (2) the Marin County Superior Court's decision invalidating the regulations was overturned on appellate review, whichever occurred first. On May 30, 2013, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the Sims case and held that CDCR’s lethal injection regulations were invalid for failure to comply with the APA. The court permanently enjoined CDCR from carrying out the execution of any condemned inmate by lethal injection until their new regulations complied with the APA. The plaintiff dismissed the case voluntarily on December 7, 2017 because Pacific News Service was going out of business. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 8, 2006, the Pacific News Service filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated the constitutional rights of the press and the public to attend, meaningfully observe, and gather and report on important information at executions being carried out by the defendants at the California State Prison at San Quentin. On May 30, 2013, the issue in this case became moot due to a state court decision. In Sims v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the California Court of Appeals held that CDCR’s lethal injection regulations were invalid for failure to comply with the APA. The court permanently enjoined CDCR from carrying out the execution of any condemned inmate by lethal injection until their new regulations complied with the Administrative Procedure Act. This case closed after a voluntary dismissal filed by the plaintiff organization.


On April 20, 2012, a state prisoner filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued the California Department of Corrections under §1983 and California state administrative law. Represented by UnCommon Law, he asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and its Board of Parole Hearings, acted unfairly by refusing to authentically consider the appropriateness of parole for prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment. On October 18, 2012, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 28 days. 2012 WL 5187779. On November 15, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging with more detail that officials of the State of California--including the Governor, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), and various officials of the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH)--implemented a system to fabricate evidence to support their decisions to deny parole, particularly for inmates serving a life sentence ("Lifers"), and that this discriminatory scheme was used to protect their decisions from judicial scrutiny so that they could maintain the low rate of granting parole to Lifers. On March 31, 2014, U.S. District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification of a class consisting "of California state prisoners who are serving life sentences and are eligible." Judge Mueller also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' equal protection and state law claims, but denied the defendants' summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs' due process claims. 2014 WL 1309289. The defendants appealed this decision but their petition for permission to appeal was denied on June 12, 2014. On September 26, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which Magistrate Judge Claire recommended be denied in part and granted in part. Though the defendants objected to the magistrate's findings and recommendations, they were adopted by the District Court in a May 14, 2015 order. 2015 WL 2358583. As a result, the defendants got judgment on counts four (alleging "that their Due Process rights ha[d] been violated by the denial of 'notice of the evidence being used to consider their suitability for parole.'"), five (alleging "that the refusal to provide access to the data underlying the FAD reports also deprive[d] them of their Due Process right to be heard at their parole hearings"), nine (alleging "that they ha[d] a 'limited' Due Process right to 'confront and cross examine [the] putative experts' whose FAD reports [were] used to deny plaintiffs parole"), and twelve (alleging "that they ha[d] a Due Process right to call witnesses, including adverse witnesses, at their parole hearings") of the plaintiff's complaint. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to, within 30 days, file an amended complaint as to the remaining counts. The plaintiff decided against amending a complaint. In a joint status report filed on July 17, 2015, the parties indicated that they had entered into negotiations and were working toward a settlement. On October 2, 2015, the parties entered into a finalized stipulation and settlement agreement, which required reforms in the psychological risk assessment process used by the parole board, including an opportunity for Lifers to challenge factual errors in risk assessments through counsel. The defendants also agreed to consult experts on the use of risk assessments in the correctional setting and make information presented by the Board of Parole Hearing's Psychologist available to the plaintiffs and be posted online. Furthermore, the Court was to retain jurisdiction over this case until January 1, 2017. If within 30 days after January 1, 2017, the plaintiffs believed that the defendants had not abided by the terms of the settlement, the plaintiffs could seek an extension of the Court's jurisdiction over this matter for no more than 12 months. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, once the Agreement was approved, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all but one of the defendants--the Executive Officer of the Board of Parole Hearings. The plaintiffs' motion to do so was granted in an order by Magistrate Judge Claire on June 24, 2016. The issue of attorneys fees was raised in a separate motion on October 16, 2015, which was referred to Magistrate Judge Claire. On November 10, 2015, she granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys fees, and the defendants had 30 days to pay $119,796.05 to the plaintiff. The defendants challenged this order, filing a motion for Reconsideration of Timing of Fee and Cost Payment. On December 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Claire granted the defendant's request for reconsideration and edited the last sentence of the court's order to read: "Defendants shall remit payment to Plaintiffs' counsel in the amount of $119,796.05, within thirty (30) days after the Court grants final approval of the parties Amended Stipulated Settlement, subject to interest thereafter as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1961." On October 6, 2017, the court extended its jurisdiction for another year, finding that the defendants had not complied fully with the Settlement. Specifically, the court limited the extension of its jurisdiction to the following issues: (1) revision of timelines for CRAs, objections, and responses; (2) revision of provision allowing CRA reports that contain factual errors to remain in an inmate's file; (3) defendant compliance with provision that "[a]ll future CRAs will clarify that the Overall Risk Rating is relative to other life prisoners; and (4) defendant compliance with provision that "CRAs will inform the reader of the report that, generally speaking, the current recidivism rates for long term offenders are lower than those of other prisoners released from shorter sentences." On February 4, 2019, District Judge Kimberly J. Mueller issued an order stating that, because one year had passed since the October 6, 2017, the case was to be closed.

Summary: This civil rights class action was filed in 2012 in the Eastern District of California; it alleged due process violations when the state arbitrarily denied parole to nearly all lifers who had served their minimum sentence. On October 2, 2015, the parties entered into an agreement by which the defendants agreed to make changes to the psychological risk assessment processes used by the parole board. The Court approved the settlement in May 2016, and retained jurisdiction over the case until January 1, 2017, with the plaintiffs' able to get an extension of the Court's jurisdiction if the defendants fail to abide by the agreed upon terms. In February of 2019, the court issued an order stating that the defendants had complied with the order. The case is now closed.


On June 9, 2018, the plaintiff in this case was arrested in Denver, Colorado; he was then unable to make his $10 bond, because the government imposed numerous additional fees. He brought this law suit against the City and County of Denver on October 10, 2018 in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. He proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his 14th Amendment right to due process and equal protection. Specifically, he complained about a Colorado requirement that individuals arrested pay at minimum a $50 before release. The plaintiff claimed Denver had detained him solely because of his inability to make monetary payment, wrongfully depriving him of his liberty. He was represented by the ACLU and sought compensation and policy reform. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter, and later reassigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel and again reassigned to Christine M. Arguello on December 6, 2018. The plaintiff entered jail with $64.24, sufficient to pay for his $10 cash bond and even an additional $50 bond fee. However, Denver took an additional $30 for booking fees, which the plaintiff could not afford to pay. The charges against the plaintiff were later dismissed. Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, Denver stopped collecting the $30 booking fee, the $50 bond fee, and the pretrial electronic monitoring fees. On December 13, Denver submitted an Offer of Judgment in favor of the plaintiff and agreed to pay $30,000 to cover attorney’s fees and costs. On December 21, the plaintiff accepted the offer, and then on January 30, 2019, voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: In October 2018, a plaintiff sued Denver over its bond fee requirement. Within a few months, the defendants changed their policy and submitted an Offer of Judgment. The case is now closed.


On May 1, 2012, a D.C. resident whose car was seized by Metropolitan Police Department officers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under <i> Bivens</i>, claiming that their actions were a violation of the Fifth Amendment due process clause. The plaintiff, represented by the D.C. Public Defender Service, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that the D.C. policy of seizing and retaining private vehicles pending civil forfeiture proceedings without providing vehicle owners with a post-deprivation hearing before a neutral arbiter was unconstitutional. The plaintiff was charged with several crimes relating to alleged possession of a firearm and was acquitted of all charges by jury trial. When seeking the return of his car, the police officers required him to pay a bond of over $1200 in order to challenge their possession of the vehicle. After reducing the bond to $800, the plaintiff began civil forfeiture proceedings but was not allowed to use the car in the interim. On July 6, 2012, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the District's failure to provide a post-seizure hearing to plaintiff violated his due process rights and ordered District to release the vehicle pending the forfeiture hearing, ordered the plaintiff to keep his vehicle and maintain insurance during the hearing, and gave the plaintiff a security deposit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) for $1000. On October 19, 2012, the parties agreed to a private settlement that is not publicly available.

Summary: In 2012, U.S. District Court of D.C. found that the policy of seizing and retaining private vehicles pending civil forfeiture proceedings without providing a post-deprivation hearing was unconstitutional.


The city of Doraville relied on its municipal court as a source of revenue. The city received millions of dollars of its budget from court fines and forfeitures. As Doraville’s City Council heavily relied on these revenues to balance the city’s budget, its municipal court personnel, who serve at the pleasure of the City Council, had a financial incentive to convict defendants. In addition, the city’s law enforcement personnel, who also ultimately serve at the pleasure of its City Council, had an incentive to ticket and prosecute to raise revenue. On May 23, 2018, four individuals who had been ticketed or threatened to be ticketed by the City of Doraville filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court Northern District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. Represented by Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, and the Institute for Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Doraville under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the City’s policy and practice of using its law enforcement and municipal court system for revenue generation violated the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint claimed that the “financial incentive to ticket and prosecute injects an unconstitutional financial bias or an appearance of such bias into law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion.” The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief from Doraville’s policy and practice of budgeting to receive revenues from fines and fees. The defendant sought to dismiss the complaint on July 2, 2018, claiming that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law. On April 1, 2019, the court (Judge Richard Story) denied in part the motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs successfully alleged standing, as the complaint is replete with allegations showing that plaintiffs were personally harmed, and are likely to be harmed in the future, from the city’s allegedly unlawful actions. Regarding the complaint’s failure to state a claim as a matter of law, the court found itself “unable to adequately assess whether Plaintiffs’ claims are legally cognizable...as a result of the paucity of relevant case law.” As such, the court ordered a hearing to address the proper standard of review and its application in this case. 2019 WL 3557893. This hearing was held on June 4, 2019. After reconsidering the motion to dismiss, the court denied the motion on July 9, 2019. Stating that “to state a plausible due process claim for institutional bias, Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to establish two things: (1) that there is a conflict of interest and (2) that the conflict of interest is substantial”, the court found that the plaintiffs established both. 391 F.Supp.3d 1207. As of June 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 23, 2018, four individuals who had been ticketed or threatened to be ticketed by the City of Doraville filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. Represented by Strickland Brockington Lewis, LLP, and the Institute for Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Doraville under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the city’s policy and practice of using its law enforcement and municipal court system for revenue generation violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief from Doraville’s policy and practice of budgeting to receive revenues from fines and fees. The defendant sought to dismiss the case on July 2, 2018; the court denied the motion to dismiss on July 9, 2019. This case is ongoing.


On May 22, 2012, several national and local news agencies filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Southern Division, against the state of Idaho. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the policy of the Idaho Department of Correction to prohibit public viewing of the preparatory phase of the execution process, during which the inmate is restrained and the IV is inserted, violates the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Along with their complaint, plaintiffs filed an expedited motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to have the procedures in question enjoined before the execution of Richard Leavitt on June 12. The District Court (Judge Edward J. Lodge) granted the motion to expedite on May 24, but on June 5 the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Lodge found that while the plaintiffs have a strong case on the merits and the public has an interest in viewing an execution in its entirety, the motion was not filed in a timely manner, and to allow it would disrupt a scheduled execution that the public has an even greater interest in seeing carried out. Plaintiffs immediately filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On June 8, 2012, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court. A three-judge panel (Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Stephen R. Reinhardt, and Judge Marsha S. Berzon) stated in an opinion by Judge Reinhardt that its ruling in California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), had clearly indicated that Idaho's policy was unconstitutional for the reasons noted by the plaintiffs, that Idaho had had a decade to correct this policy, and thus that any problems of timing were the fault of the state and not of the plaintiffs. It further found that the District Court had abused its discretion in balancing the four elements the plaintiff must prove for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the appeals panel reversed the District Court and remanded for entry of an injunction prior to the execution of Richard Leavitt. The District Court (Judge Lodge) entered an injunction on June 11 and directed the parties to submit a joint litigation plan by June 22. On July 10, 2012, Judge Lodge entered a permanent injunction ordering the Idaho Department of Corrections, and responsible parties associated therewith, to modify their procedures to allow the witnesses to the execution of a condemned inmate to observe the entire execution from the moment the inmate enters the execution chamber through, to and including, the time the inmate is declared dead. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 22, 2012, several national and local news agencies filed a § 1983 lawsuit against the state of Idaho, alleging that the policy of the Idaho Department of Correction to prohibit public viewing of the preparatory phase of the execution process, during which the inmate is restrained and the IV is inserted, violates the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on June 5, 2012, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial, on June 8, in time for the injunction to apply to the scheduled execution of Richard Leavitt. On July 10, the District Court entered a permanent injunction ordering the Idaho Department of Corrections to modify their execution procedures to allow witnesses to the execution throughout the entire execution process.


On December 12, 2016, seven prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the State of Illinois and its attorney general under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Illinois, by its policies regarding individuals convicted of sex-related offenses, had violated their rights under the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to Judge Virginia M. Kendall. Individuals convicted of certain sex-related offenses under Illinois law are subject to overlapping statutory and regulatory schemes that make it difficult for prisoners to satisfy conditions required for their release from prison. The Illinois Unified Code of Corrections provides that for all felony convictions, the sentencing court must provide within the sentencing order a term of parole or mandatory supervised release (MSR). Individuals convicted after July 1, 2005 of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated sexual criminal assault, or criminal sexual assault, and individuals convicted after January 1, 2009 of aggravated child pornography or manufacturing or dissemination of child pornography were subject to a mandatory indeterminate term of MSR. The indeterminate duration of MSR could range from three years to life: an individual could only apply for termination of his indeterminate MSR sentence after completing three years of MSR outside of prison. A prisoner could not receive credit for MSR time served while in custody. The Prison Review Board (PRB) required that before inmates could be released from IDOC custody, they had to have an approved “host site” to reside at while serving their MSR term. IDOC only approved host sites that met all housing restrictions imposed by statute, by IDOC, and by the Prison Review Board. Illinois did not provide housing resources for inmates, and halfway homes and homeless shelters automatically rejected individuals with sex-related convictions. Each plaintiff had either submitted multiple host sites and been denied by the IDOC, or was indigent and had no housing options to select for their host site. The plaintiffs alleged that the multiple restrictions created an unmeetable condition that forced them to spend the duration of their MSR term incarcerated. For the plaintiffs that were given an indeterminate MSR sentence, the unmeetable conditions resulted in life imprisonment. On February 17, 2017, IDOC moved to dismiss the complaint on three grounds:

Two of the plaintiffs’ claims lacked standing because they had not yet completed their incarceration sentences;
The plaintiffs’ claim against the duration of their confinement should have been raised as a habeas action, not under 42 U.S.C. §1983; and
The plaintiffs’ claims failed to allege sufficient facts for their constitutional claims.
On August 18, 2017, the court granted in part IDOC’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs did not need to file a habeas action in order to receive the requested relief, and that all constitutional claims were appropriate except for the due process claim. The court granted, however, IDOC’s motion to dismiss with respect to two plaintiffs because their claims were based on post-release conditions and the plaintiffs had not yet been released. She further granted the motion with respect to the plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim because of vagueness. On December 6, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for class certification and appointment of class counsel. They sought to certify a class of inmates who had completed their sentenced term and were currently detained in the IDOC and denied release because of their inability to find an approved host site. The court approved the unopposed motion on April 6, 2018, defining the class as all individuals sentenced to serve “three-years-to-life” on MSR, currently detained in IDOC, who have been approved for release on MSR but have been denied release from IDOC custody because of their inability to obtain an approved host site. Once discovery ended, both parties sought summary judgment. On March 31, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and denied IDOC’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that the state’s host site requirement resulted in the continued deprivation of the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The court also addressed whether the proper vehicle to bring the plaintiffs’ claims was 42 U.S.C. §1983 or a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and determined that the plaintiffs properly brought their claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983 because they were not seeking release from custody, but rather the proper application of law to their situation. The court found that there was a genuine issue material fact as to whether IDOC offered a procedure for determining the validity of a decision to deny a host site, and denied summary judgment on that claim. Both parties met on May 1, 2019, for a settlement conference and held further status hearings on June 18, 2019, October 1, 2019, December 3, 2019, January 2, 2020. On January 15, 2020, the court granted a permanent injunction. According to the order, IDOC was required to present a plan, as well as quarterly reports outlining steps that would be taken to ensure that by January 2, 2021, no class member would remain in IDOC custody due to an inability to locate a host site. On January 29, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a bill of costs, and on February 18, 2020, the court awarded costs to the plaintiffs in the amount of $3,015.41. On February 27, 2020, IDOC presented a compliance plan to the court, pursuant to the injunction. The plan outlined the steps that IDOC had already taken to assist class members, such as host site policy changes and a review of host site denials. It also outlined additional steps that IDOC was then undertaking to release class members, such as finalizing a Request for Proposal for licensed transitional housing locations for sex offenders, and cooperation with the Illinois Department of Human Services to identify appropriate placements and/or services for class members who would likely qualify for that department’s services upon their release. On June 15, 2020, IDOC presented a quarterly report further outlining the steps that it was then taking to release class members. As of July 2020, the court’s supervision of the settlement is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, prisoners that had completed their sentences but remained incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections filed this class action against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the Illinois statutory scheme governing mandatory supervised release (MSR) for sex offenders and the requirement for offenders to have an approved “host site” in order to be released from custody violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court entered a permanent injunction on January 15, 2020, requiring IDOC to present a plan for releasing class members from custody, and quarterly reports outlining steps that were being taken to ensure that all class members would be properly released by January 2, 2021. As of July 2020, the court's supervision of IDOC's progress is ongoing.


On October 21, 2015, an arrestee filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiff sued Dodge City and Ford County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the Dodge City's wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and a declaratory judgment that the City's wealth-based detention practices were unlawful. The plaintiff, a Native American citizen of Dodge City, was arrested and held at the Ford County Jail because he could not pay $250 to the City of Dodge City. In Dodge City, arrestees faced two different outcomes depending on their wealth status: Wealthy arrestees paid an amount set by the bail schedule and were not held in jail, while poor arrestees were put in jail for 48 hours because they could not afford to pay the City's pre-determined bail for their offense. Bail amounts ranged from $250-$2500. Under the City's scheme, the sole criterion for determining whether a pretrial arrestee walked free or sat in jail was the amount of money that he had. The plaintiff alleged that this policy and practice of using a fixed "bail schedule" to determine the amount of money necessary to secure post-arrest release and the practice of requiring cash up-front to avoid post-arrest detention violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The plaintiff sought to certify a class on behalf of himself and all other arrestees unable to pay for their release pursuant to Dodge City's fixed bail schedule who were, are, or who will become in the custody of Dodge City. On November 25, 2015 and on February 24, 2016, the court (Judge Teresa J. James) granted motions to stay all proceedings to allow the parties to explore a non-litigation resolution. On April 22, 2016, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of final declaratory and injunctive relief and joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. On April 26, 2016, the court (Judge Daniel D. Crabtree) issued a declaratory judgment, stating that persons cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, be held in custody after a non-warrant arrest because they are too poor to post a monetary bond. It also entered an injunction, ordering the release of individuals arrested for non-warrant arrests in Dodge City for violation of municipal ordinances on Own Recognizance Bonds without further conditions of release and without requiring posting any monetary bond. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion for class certification, motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and remaining claims with prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction, but the case appears closed otherwise. 2016 WL 9051913.

Summary: On October 21, 2015, a private plaintiff sued the City of Dodge City, Kansas and Ford County in a civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the Dodge City's wealth-based post-arrest detention scheme violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and a declaration that the City's wealth-based detention practices were unlawful. The parties agreed to settle that the City would be enjoined from holding an arrestee in custody after a non-warrant arrest on the basis of inability to post bond. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the injunction but the case otherwise appears closed.


On November 30, 2015, a resident of Clark County, Kentucky, who was arrested and admitted to jail filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against the Clark County Detention Center (Jail). The complaint alleged that the Jail wrongly deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of law and charged costs of their incarceration absent court order, including for plaintiffs who were subsequently acquitted. The complaint alleged that this violated Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) §441.265, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The individual plaintiff who filed the suit had been arrested and admitted to the Jail on October 26, 2013; he remained incarcerated until his release on December 15, 2014. Plaintiff maintained that the criminal charges for which he was incarcerated were dismissed midway on April 2, 2015, because the plaintiff proved he was entirely innocent of such offenses. After release, plaintiff received a written demand from the Jail to pay in excess of $4,000 in fees relating to his incarceration. As of November 30, 2015, the plaintiff paid $20 and refused to pay the remaining balance on the grounds that KRS §441.265 allowed a jail to charge detainees the costs of their confinement only with a court order and consideration of the detainee's financial obligations. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged, the jail could not charge innocent detainees and was required to accounting for the funds collected. The plaintiff further maintained that if KRS §441.265 is interpreted otherwise, then it violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution. The plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages arising from the conduct of the defendants, and declaratory judgment and permanent injunction of the practice. On January 14, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's claims. On March 11, 2016, the court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed all claims alleged in the complaint with prejudice, and all pending motions were denied moot. In the opinion, district judge Joseph Hood found that the plaintiffs were "prisoners" within the definition of KRS §441.005(3), which allows courts to impose detention fees without the order of a sentencing court and without respect to guilt or innocence. Judge Hood found, moreover, that the facts pleaded did not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation and that the state had a legitimate interest in recouping costs from inmates. Accordingly, on March 11, 2016, the court ordered judgment in favor of the defendants. 2016 WL 1050743. The plaintiffs appealed. On December 19, 2016, the 6th Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion. 2016 WL 7338530. In that opinion, by Judge Rodgers, the Court of Appeals explained that at oral argument, counsel for the defendants "disavowed any further efforts to obtain the $4,000 beyond the $20 already received." Because the county was no longer trying to collect the bill, the court said, plaintiff didn't have a property interest to assert. Plaintiff sought rehearing en banc, but the 6th Circuit denied that motion. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2015, prisoners in the Kentucky Clark County Jail filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, alleging that the state did not afford adequate procedural right prior to unlawfully charging inmates a fee for their incarceration without an order from the sentencing court. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, permanent injunction of the practice, and monetary damages. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed all claims alleged in the complaint with prejudice, and all pending motions were denied moot. In 2016, the plaintiffs appealed but the appeals court affirmed the judgment of the district court.


On August 7, 2017, two residents of East Baton Rouge Parish filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued East Baton Rouge Parish and Rehabilitation Home Incarceration (RHI) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), and state law. The case was assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought monetary relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated federal and state anti-racketeering law, Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the plaintiffs, RHI purported to provide pretrial supervision services and profited from individuals in East Baton Rouge Parish by requiring them to pay hundreds of dollars to RHI to be released from jail, effectively holding them for ransom. People awaiting trial before a criminal court were coerced into paying hundreds of dollars to companies before and after they were released from jail, even after paying bail. The complaint alleged that RHI turned pre-trial release into a for-profit concern that fueled wealth-based incarceration, harming low-income people who had not been convicted of a crime. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge as a defendant on August 8, 2017. A few days later the plaintiffs filed a notice voluntarily dismissing East Baton Rouge Parish as a defendant. On September 27, 2017, the court approved the dismissal. On October 27, 2017, the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish filed a motion to dismiss all claims against him for failure to state a claim, arguing that even if the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated, the alleged policy of the sheriff was not the “moving force” behind the alleged violations. In February 2018, RHI and its executive director also filed a motion to dismiss with similar arguments. On June 5, 2018, Judge Dick granted the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss, finding that there was no plausible basis to support the conclusory allegations that the Sheriff was “in agreement” or part of a “scheme” with RHI. 2018 WL 2708752. Judge Dick also dismissed RHI's motion to dismiss on September 12, 2018, claiming, among other things, that Defendants utterly failed to brief the elements of both the federal and state RICO claims and failed to argue how the Complaint fails to state a claim, and the facts asserted in the complaint plausibly plead that RHI was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. 2018 WL 4355199 The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on June 12, 2019. This complaint replaced an individual plaintiff with another individual plaintiff and removed the Sheriff of East Baton Rouge Parish as a defendant. On July 2, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming, among other things, that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The parties reached a settlement agreement-in-principle and notified the court on Dec 5, 2019 that they are currently finalizing the final written settlement agreement to conclude this matter. Upon receiving this notification, the court dismissed the case, stating that upon good cause shown within sixty days, the court will reopen the action if the settlement is not consummated. The plaintiffs, having reached a confidential settlement agreement with the defendants on this case, moved to dismiss the case with prejudice on February 20, 2020. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on the same day.

Summary: This 2017 class lawsuit was brought by two residents of East Baton Rouge Parish in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs alleged that, in charging fees in addition to bail to be released from prison before trial, the defendant RHI had violated federal and state anti-racketeering law, their Due Process and Equal Protection rights, and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The parties reached a private settlement, and the case was dismissed on February 20, 2020.


On September 17, 2015, indigent former criminal defendants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of New Orleans, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court (OPCDC), the court’s judges, judicial administrators, and the city’s sheriff department, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a practice of imprisoning individuals who had failed to pay court debts without meaningfully determining whether the individuals had the ability to pay the debt. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants issued unlawful warrants for their arrest and illegally kept them imprisoned. The defendants moved to dismiss the sheriff from the lawsuit on October 3, 2015, and later on November, 2, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss several of individual defendants from the lawsuit. The defendants argued three points: first, that there was a lack of jurisdiction to retain the defendants in this lawsuit, second, that the plaintiff did not join indispensable parties to the lawsuit, and third, that the judicial defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. On April 21, 2016, Judge Sarah Vance denied the defendants request to dismiss the defendants on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to join indispensable parties. 186 F.Supp.3d 536. On May 3, 2016, Judge Vance granted in part and denied in part the defendants' request to dismiss the judicial defendants on the grounds that they enjoyed absolute and qualified immunity. On May 11, 2016, the court dismissed the judicial administrator along with several other defendants from the lawsuit. However, the court still allowed the plaintiffs to seek declaratory relief. 184 F.Supp.3d 349. The parties began settlement negotiations. On December 13, 2017, Judge Vance granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Court found that (1) judges had a policy/practice of failing to conduct any inquiry into plaintiffs’ ability to pay court debts before plaintiffs are imprisoned for non-payment; (2) this failure to inquire violated due process; (3) judges’ control over both fines and fees revenue and ability-to-pay determinations violated due process; and (4) judges faced a substantial conflict of interest when they were determining the ability to pay fines and fees. On April 24, 2018, the plaintiffs and the Orleans Parish Sheriff reached a compromise about two related civil actions, and so the court ordered partial dismissal without costs and without prejudice to the right to reopen those actions, retaining jurisdiction to enforce that settlement if it was not consummated within 60 days. On August 2, 2018, Judge Vance granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification as all persons who owe or will incur court debts arising from cases adjudicated in OPCDC, with the subclass of all members whose debts are at least partly owed to the OPCDC Judicial Expense Fund. On August 3, 2018, the court filed a declaratory judgment, holding that the Judges’ policy or practice of not inquiring into the ability of the persons falling within the certified class to pay before they are imprisoned for non-payment of court debts was unconstitutional, and that the Judges’ failure to provide a neutral forum for determination of such persons’ ability to pay was also unconstitutional. The court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state actor from arresting or detaining a criminal defendant solely for failure to pay a court-imposed debt absent a determination of ability to pay, and which also requires a state court to provide a neutral forum in which to adjudicate ability to pay. 2018 WL 3657447. On August 21, 2018, the defendants appealed to Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court on August 23, 2019. 937 F.3d 446. The defendants petitioned the Fifth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on September 6, 2019, but the court denied rehearing on September 30. The defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on December 20, 2019. Cert was denied on March 3, 2020. Meanwhile, back in the district court, the plaintiffs moved the court for supplemental relief on February 25, 2019. The plaintiffs argued that a more specific declaratory judgment was appropriate and asked the court to decree it unconstitutional for any Orleans Parish Criminal District Court debtor to be imprisoned for willful nonpayment absent (1) a meaningful inquiry into the debtor’s ability to pay, preceded by notice of the importance of that issue and including an opportunity for the debtor to be heard on it, and (2) a finding that the debtor is able to pay. The defendants filed an opposition motion on March 19. On March 30, 2021, Judge Vance granted the plaintiff's request for more specific declaratory relief. As of March 29, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2015, indigent former criminal defendants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Plaintiffs alleged that that the defendants had a practice of imprisoning individuals who had failed to pay court debts without meaningfully determining whether the individuals had the ability to pay the debt. In August 2018, granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, and held that the Judges’ policy/practice of not inquiring into the ability of the persons falling within the certified class to pay before they are imprisoned for non-payment of court debts was unconstitutional, and that the Judges’ failure to provide a neutral forum for determination of such persons’ ability to pay was unconstitutional. The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court on August 23, 2019. The defendants petitioned the Fifth Circuit to rehear the case en banc on September 6, 2019, but the court denied to rehear on September 30. The defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court on December 20, 2019. Cert was denied on March 3, 2020.


On November 11, 2019, a pretrial detainee filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging that twelve judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court ("OPCDC") unlawfully imposed secured financial conditions of release in an amount that individuals cannot afford, without any inquiry into or findings concerning their ability to pay or alternatives to incarceration. The lawsuit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201– 02 alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking declaratory relief. The Plaintiff, represented by the MacArthur Justice Center and Civil Rights Corps, sued on behalf of a putative class consisting of all individuals with pending state misdemeanor or felony cases who would, after acceptance of their charges by the District Attorney, appear before the Defendant Judges for proceedings concerning pretrial release. The complaint alleged that the Defendant judges’ imposition of bail without inquiring whether the arrestee could pay it constituted de facto orders of pretrial detention for those unable to pay. This constitutional violation was allegedly incentivized by the Defendants’ institutional financial conflict of interest. If (and only if) an arrestee uses a commercial surety to secure pretrial release, the OPCDC judges receive 0.8% of the amount of that bond that goes into a general fund used to pay a variety of expenses related to the judiciary. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 20 which added one more Plaintiff to represent the class. The case was initially assigned to Judge Greg Gerard Guidry, but after he recused himself it was reassigned to Judge Carl Barbier. It was then transferred to Judge Eldon Falon who oversaw the proceedings in Caliste v. Cantrell, a similar case that alleged improper bail practices against a magistrate judge in the Criminal District Court. Read more about Caliste v. Cantrell here. On March 13, 2020, the Defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs’ claim was not redressible because the court cannot eliminate the Judges’ roles as both adjudicators of criminal matters and administrators of the general fund. Defendants argued that Louisiana law established the Judges’ role as adjudicators and fund administrators, and the Plaintiffs attacked the Judges’ impartiality but did not challenge the constitutionality of the Louisiana statutes. The defendants filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on March 31. A hearing was held on May 27, 2020 regarding Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class and both of Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Also, Judge Fallon granted Plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate this case with Matthews v. Herman (No. 20-cv-1275) as the cases involved common parties and questions of law. 2020 WL 3036065. The Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 6, contending that the injuries were too speculative and could not be attributed to any particular judge. On August 21, Judge Fallon denied the Plaintiffs' motion to certify, finding that there was not sufficient evidence to support the assertion that the Defendant-judges acted in a uniform manner. Judge Fallon noted that the Plaintiffs could seek certification again after engaging in discovery. In the same order, Judge Fallon also denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss as the Court declined to determine whether the Plaintiffs had standing before deciding the class certification question. 2020 WL 4923626. Additionally, on July 7, the parties agreed to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the Plaintiffs' due process claim based on a financial conflict of interest in Defendants’ pretrial detention practices. As of September 7, the case is ongoing.

Summary: A class-action lawsuit sought declaratory judgment against twelve Louisiana judges, alleging that the judges violated Plaintiffs' Due Process and Equal Protection rights by imposing bail without determining whether arrestees could pay. The complaint also alleged an improper financial incentive for judges to impose bail in order to receive a portion of the money for their general expense fund.


COVID Summary: This is a class action suit regarding the legality of detention orders that are holding detainees at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison for up to years and detrimental to life during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on December 14, 2020, but withdrew the request for a temporary restraining order in January 2021. A settlement conference is scheduled for March 11, and a joint status report is due on March 21. This case is ongoing. <hr> On December 14, 2020, four individuals who were being held at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (EBRPP) filed this class action lawsuit against 5 officials of the 19th Judicial District Courthouse, the sheriff, and the warden of EBRPP in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued for violations of their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the MacArthur Justice Center, Advancement Project, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, release of class members, and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick and Magistrate Judge Scott D. Johnson. The plaintiffs alleged that hundreds of individuals, most of whom were poor and black, were confined at EBRPP for up to years as a result of the defendant judicial officials' actions. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants ignored the detainees' likelihood to appear at trial, risk of danger to the community, and ability to pay monetary conditions of release, which violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants ignored procedural protections, including failing to provide the detainees notice of hearing, opportunity to present evidence, and assistance to counsel prior to issuing pretrial detention orders, which violated due process. Additionally, they alleged that the defendants denied plaintiffs' counsel to make substantive arguments prior to issuing detention orders in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Lastly, the plaintiffs noted that EBRPP 's dilapidated conditions and history of poor medical care placed the detainees at an increased risk of the COVID-19 pandemic. On December 14, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to proceed anonymously and for certification of the proposed class of "all individuals who are in the custody of the East baton Rouge Sheriff's office after their arrest and who have been or will be subjected to the bail practices of the Judges and Commissioners of the 19th Judicial District Court." The following day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendant sheriff and warden. The plaintiffs requested release of the named plaintiffs and for the court to enjoin the defendant sheriff and warden from detaining individuals whose bail conditions were determined at hearings that violated due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs filed declarations from *** pretrial detainees, some of whom have illnesses that make them vulnerable to COVID-19, have had arraignments delayed due to COVID-19, or cite inappropriate social distancing or hygiene practices. On December 17, the plaintiffs moved for expedited discovery and on January 12, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an emergency second motion for expedited discovery and request for status conference. The court granted the motion in part and scheduled a status conference to discuss the plaintiffs' discovery request. At the January 14 conference, the court denied the plaintiff's first motion for expedited discovery as moot and granted in part the emergency second motion. The parties agreed to the scope of expedited discovery and set a discovery deadline of January 20, 2021. On January 17, the plaintiffs moved to withdraw the request for temporary restraining order, which was granted on January 19. The plaintiffs then filed a joint motion to continue hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction, which was granted on January 21 and set a deadline of March 21 for the parties to file a joint status report. The case remains ongoing with a settlement conference was scheduled for March 11, and with the defendants' responsive pleading to the complaint due on March 22, 2021.

Summary: In December 2020, four individuals at East Baton Rouge Parish Prison (EBRPP) filed this class action lawsuit alleging violations of their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights by judicial and prison officials. On December 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The request for a temporary restraining order was later withdrawn in January 2021. A settlement conference is scheduled for March 11 and the deadline for the parties to file a joint status report is March 21. The defendants' responsive pleading to the complaint is due on March 22, 2021. This case is ongoing.


On January 19, 2006, a death-sentenced inmate of the Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center in Baltimore, Maryland filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Maryland Department of Correction in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff, whose execution was scheduled to take place during the week of February 6, 2006, sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from carrying out his execution using their current practices and procedures for lethal injection. The plaintiff's specific objection was to the three-drug cocktail (sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride) used in Maryland's lethal injections. He alleged that particular skill was required to properly administer sodium pentothal, which was intended to induce general anesthesia, and that improper administration of the drug would lead to excruciating, torturous pain during the administration of the other two drugs. Due to this, the plaintiff argued that the defendants' lethal injection procedures arbitrarily and unnecessarily created a grave risk that he would suffer extreme pain during his execution, thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The next day, the plaintiff filed a similar complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, naming as co-plaintiffs the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Maryland (ACLU), and the Maryland Citizens Against State Executions (MCASE). In this complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had failed to follow Maryland law (Md. Code Ann., State Gov't §3-905) in adopting their execution protocol because it had not been formally adopted under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), thereby depriving the state's citizens of the opportunity to ensure that executions were carried out in a proper and humane manner and increasing the risk that the executed prisoners would suffer unnecessarily during their executions. They asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order and to enjoin the defendants from performing any executions until they had come into compliance with the law. On February 1, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Judge Benson Everett Legg) denied both the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and his motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Maryland's three-drug protocol did not endanger the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The court reasoned that thirty-five of the thirty-seven states who used lethal injection as a means of execution used the same protocol as Maryland, and that the Fourth Circuit had already ruled that this protocol did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff appealed the following day, asking the District Court to stay the execution pending the outcome of the appeal. On the same day, the District Court (Judge Legg) denied the request to stay the execution. On February 3, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Judge James Harvie Wilkinson III) denied without opinion the plaintiff's motion for an injunction pending appeal. On February 13, the plaintiff asked the Fourth Circuit to dismiss the appeal, and on February 15, 2006, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Wilkinson) granted that motion. From September 19-22, 2006, the U.S. District Court held an evidentiary hearing, and both sides filed motions for summary judgment. On December 1, 2006, the District Court ordered the defendants to explore the potential availability of surgeons, anesthesiologists, and certified registered nurse anesthetists to assist in the execution. On December 7, 2006, the Court ordered the defendants to submit a written plan describing the parameters of a proposed search. Meanwhile, on December 19, 2006, the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated the Maryland execution protocols until such time as they were properly adopted under the MAPA or exempted from that requirement by an act of the Maryland General Assembly. The court enjoined the defendants from utilizing its current lethal injection protocol and checklist until one of these two events occurred. Evans v. Saar, 396 Md. 256 (Md. Ct. App. 2006). On January 29, 2007, Senate Bill 239 was introduced in the Maryland General Assembly and assigned to committee. If adopted that bill would exempt the death penalty protocols from the requirements of the MAPA. On the same day, House Bill 225 was introduced in the Maryland General Assembly and assigned to committee. If adopted, that bill would repeal the death penalty in Maryland. In light of these rapid changes, the parties issued a joint motion asking the District Court to stay the proceedings in this case until the passage of one of the two proposed bills in the legislature. On February 21, 2007, the District Court agreed to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the legislation and ordered the parties to file a status report every 90 days. On March 14, 2011, the parties filed a joint status report pursuant to the Court's order of February 22, 2007. The status report stated that all executions in Maryland had been stayed until the administrative regulations governing the death penalty process are properly adopted. On August 16, 2012 the Court ordered that the case be administratively closed. Subsequently, in May 2013, the Maryland legislature repealed the death penalty for all future convictions, and in December 2014 Governor O'Malley <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/gov-omalley-commutes-sentences-of-marylands-remaining-death-row-inmates/2014/12/31/044b553a-90ff-11e4-a412-4b735edc7175_story.html">commuted the death sentences </a>of the four remaining death-row inmates to life without the possibility of parole.

Summary: On January 19, 2006, a death-sentenced inmate of the Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center in Baltimore, Maryland filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Maryland Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff objected to the three-drug cocktail (sodium pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride) used in Maryland's lethal injections. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's lethal injection procedures arbitrarily and unnecessarily created a grave risk that he would suffer extreme pain during his execution, thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff also filed a similar complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging that the defendants failed to follow Maryland law because the execution protocol had not been adopted under the Maryland Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA). On December 19, 2006 the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated the Maryland execution protocols until such time as they were properly adopted under MAPA or exempted from that requirement by an act of the Maryland General Assembly. On January 29, 2007, two bills were introduced in the Maryland General Assembly, one that would exempt the death penalty protocols from the MAPA requirement and one that would repeal the death penalty in the state. The judge agreed to stay the proceedings of this case pending the outcome of the legislation. According to the status report on March 14, 2011, all executions in Maryland had been stayed until the proper administrative regulations were adopted. On August 16, 2012 this case was administratively closed. In May 2013 the Maryland legislature repealed the death penalty for all future convictions and in December 2014 Governor O'Malley commuted the death sentences of the four remaining death-row inmates to life without the possibility of parole.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a case challenging the legality of the Small Business Administration's decision to exclude small business owners from parts of the CARES Act, passed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On July 21, the court granted a preliminary injunction extending the deadline to apply for a loan for the named plaintiffs.
 In response to the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act, which created, among other things, the “Paycheck Protection Program.” Under this program, small business owners could apply for a loan from the Small Business Administration; if they later certified that all of the loan funds had been used for qualifying expenses, the loan would be forgiven. The Act authorized the SBA to use a streamlined rulemaking process, in order to distribute the $669 billion fund as quickly as possible. The SBA’s Interim Final Rules rendered many small business owners with criminal records ineligible; the Interim Final Rules were changed several times between April and June 2020. On June 16, 2020, three organizations and two individual plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging the legality of the SBA’s decision to exclude small business owners based on their criminal histories. Represented by the ACLU, the Public Interest Law Center, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and private counsel, they sued the Small Business Administration in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Their complaint alleged that the SBA had no statutory authority under the CARES Act to add the criminal record exclusions; that the exclusions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act; that the exclusions had a disparate impact on communities of color; and that the multiple changes to the Interim Final Rules had made it impossible for some qualifying small business owners to apply before the June 30 application deadline. The case was assigned to Judge Catherine C. Blake. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring unlawful and setting aside the SBA’s rulemaking action. They also sought an injunction that would:

 bar the SBA from denying Paycheck Protection Program funds to applicants because of their criminal records,
compel the SBA to extend the application deadline three weeks (to July 21, 2020) in all of the states where the plaintiffs operated (Maryland, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, New York, and Washington), and
reserve sufficient funds ($31,500) to fill the plaintiffs’ loan requests.
They also sought attorneys’ fees and costs. The SBA issued a new set of rules on June 24, which made all of the plaintiffs eligible to apply for loans. However, in a June 29, 2020 ruling, the court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims as moot. The SBA had not demonstrated that the plaintiffs would not again be excluded from loan consideration; additionally, the SBA had not granted the requested deadline extension. In that decision, the court found that the June 24 Interim Final Rule was a permissible interpretation of SBA’s statutory authority under the CARES Act. The plaintiffs were thus unlikely to prevail on their claims that the June 24 Interim Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their arbitrary-and-capricious claims regarding the earlier incarnations of the Interim Final Rule; for that reason, the court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the deadline extended to July 21 for the named plaintiffs, but declined to issue any other requested relief. On July 4, 2020, President Trump signed follow-up legislation that gave all business owners eligible under the June 24 Interim Final Rule until August 8, 2020 to apply. As of July 29, 2020, further developments in the litigation are pending.

Summary: In response to the economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act, which created, among other things, the “Paycheck Protection Program.” Under this program, small business owners could apply for a loan from the Small Business Administration; if they later certified that all of the loan funds had been used for qualifying expenses, the loan would be forgiven. The SBA’s rules disqualified many small business owners with criminal records. Several small business owners brought this lawsuit against the SBA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, challenging this criminal record exclusion. On June 29, the court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the SBA to extend the application deadline for the named plaintiffs from June 30 to July 21, 2020. The following week, Congress passed follow-up legislation extending the deadline for all applicants to August 8, 2020. As of July 29, 2020, further developments in the litigation are pending.


On February 8, 2015, persons jailed for failing to pay fines imposed by the City of Ferguson that they could not afford filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. They made a number of allegations against Ferguson, including: (1) that the City failed to conduct an inquiry into whether plaintiffs were able to pay their fines before jailing them, in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) that the City failed to provide plaintiffs with legal counsel during the proceedings leading to their incarceration, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) that the City jailed plaintiffs indefinitely and without an adequate legal process through which they could challenge their detention, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) that the squalid and unhealthy conditions of Ferguson's jail constituted Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) that the City used jail time and the threat of jail time to deny plaintiffs the substantive and procedural protections that Missouri debtors would have against private creditors, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (6) that the City issued arrest warrants against impoverished persons for failure to pay traffic fines without any finding of probable cause, in violation the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (7) that the City detained plaintiffs arrested without a valid warrant for an extended period without a legitimate government interest, in violation the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by ArchCity Defenders, the Civil Rights Corps, Equal Justice Under Law, lawyers from St. Louis University School of Law, and private counsel including White & Case LLP, the plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. They sought class action certification, declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring Ferguson to change its practices and policies to stop violating the U.S. Constitution, damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Audrey G. Fleissig. On May 26, 2015, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss in part, dismissing plaintiffs’ claims (5) and (6). 2015 WL 3417420. However, on July 13, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, reversing the May 26 order. 2015 WL 4232917. On January 29, 2016, the parties were told to select neutral parties to act as mediators and to schedule mediation to see if they could come to a settlement agreement. On May 10, 2016, the neutral parties reported that though they had mediated in good faith, they were unable to reach a settlement. On April 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint. The defendant subsequently filed a partial motion to dismiss two weeks later in response. The plaintiffs in July filed a motion with the court to compel production of emails from the defendant in support of its claim that the City of Ferguson engaged in a "widespread scheme" of jailing individuals who could not afford small debts. While the motion to dismiss the amended complaint was denied in November, the court subsequently granted the defendant's claim of privilege on the documents and held a hearing on that issue. The motion to compel documents was eventually granted in part and denied in part to the extent that plaintiffs sufficiently narrowed search terms for the electronic documents. The case proceeded through discovery in 2017. Plaintiffs sought class certification again in June 2017 and simultaneously moved to disqualify defendant's counsel due to a conflict of interest. In August, the court granted the motion to disqualify counsel and extended a stay on the issue of class certification. According to ProPublica, the firm was disqualified because it had hired a lawyer who had previously represented one of the plaintiffs while working for ArchCity Defenders. The court denied class certification on January 29, 2018 without prejudice to refiling. Once the defendant obtained replacement counsel in September, it moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 due to sovereign immunity. This further stayed proceedings until resolution on the issue on February 13, 2018, when the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 10245936. On February 15, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals of the decision against sovereign immunity. Subsequently, the defendant moved to stay proceedings pending appeal. The plaintiffs had opposed the motion to stay, claiming that there was no ruling for the defendant to appeal. The original trial date in April was vacated. On March 12, 2018, the court granted the stay. The case was administratively closed until resolution of the interlocutory appeal. On January 10, 2019, the Eighth Circuit (Judges Steven Colloton, Raymond Gruender, and L. Steven Grasz) dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that the City was not itself entitled to sovereign immunity and could not invoke the state's sovereign immunity to justify dismissing the suit. 913 F.3d 757. The district court lifted the stay and litigation resumed. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 on March 5, 2020. After briefing, the court denied this motion in full on August 6, 2019. The court found that, contrary to the defendant's arguments, the state municipal court was not a required party whose absence (here due to sovereign immunity) required dismissal. 2019 WL 3577529. Later that month, on August 28, the defendant appealed this order to the Eighth Circuit. The defendant filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal the following day. The district court denied this motion on September 19, 2019, and discovery continued. On October 10, 2019, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without explanation. 2019 WL 8194959. The defendant appealed the October 10 Eighth Circuit decision on February 13, 2020. On March 23, 2020 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 140 S. Ct. 2515. As of April 2020, discovery is ongoing in the district court.

Summary: On February 8, 2015, persons jailed for failing to pay their legal fines sued the City of Ferguson in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the City violated the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S Constitution. They asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. The court denied multiple motions to dismiss, and the parties have engaged in extensive discovery. The case is ongoing.