On June 22, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Schott North America, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendant, a glass manufacturer, allegedly classified quality assurance workers in its Duryea facility according to gender. When it created a new quality assurance classification combining men and women, it allegedly gave preference to men in a variety of ways, including hiring more men than women, giving men an unfair advantage in its application system, and dismissing women instead of men. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as punitive damages against the defendant. The female complainants intervened in the EEOC's suit and alleged that the employers' policies resulted in disparate impact and disparate treatment of female employees. Judge James Munley was assigned to this case. On November 5, 2007, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs offered no evidence of sex discrimination that would offer relief. The court, however, disagreed and denied this request on September 29, 2008. The parties underwent pre-trial proceedings on February 6, 2009, and jury trial was set for June 2, 2009. Before a trial could be held, on May 6, 2009, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement. About a month later, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. This consent decree required that: 1. The defendant pay $1,450,000.00 to eleven individuals the plaintiffs identified as claimants. 2. The defendant would be prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination and retaliation. 3. The defendant was obligated to post notices on all bulletin boards to be visible to its employees. 4. The defendant was obligated to revise anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures 5. The defendant had to promote supervisor accountability in anti-employment discrimination efforts. This required the managers and supervisors to receive training, to report any incidents of employment discrimination, and to ensure compliance with the defendant’s policy. 6. The defendant had to provide anti-employment discrimination training to all its employees. 7. The defendant had to retain records of any and all employment discrimination complaints. 8. The defendant had to report regularly to EEOC to ensure compliance anti-employment discrimination efforts. The court docket shows no further activity, and the consent decree duration has lapsed. Therefore, this case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and complainants, that intervened as plaintiffs, filed this suit against Schott North America, Inc, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2009, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. This decree required that the defendants provide monetary relief for the claimants, comply with Title VII, provide anti-discrimination training to all its employees, retain records of employment discrimination, and regularly report to the EEOC. In 2012, this case closed.


The Memphis District Office and Nashville Area Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Whirlpool Corporation on June 9, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Judge John T. Nixon was assigned to this case. The complaint alleged sexual and racial harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief for the individual complainant and attorneys fees for the EEOC. Specifically, the complaint was brought after an African-American employee of Whirlpool complained that a fellow employee had racially and sexually harassed her. The harassment eventually led to the harasser physically attacking the complainant. Prior to the attack, the complainant complained to her supervisors about the harasser’s racialized and sexualized comments toward her, but her supervisors did very little to address her concerns. At one point, she complained to the supervisor and he responded by saying: “why don’t you just go ahead and f#@k him and get it over with?” After constantly rejecting the harasser’s sexual advances, the harasser physically attacked the complainant. The complainant eventually quit her job with Whirlpool Corporation because her therapist and psychologist advised her to do so. The complainant intervened in the case on July 24, 2006. For the next two years, the parties engaged in discovery. On December 21, 2009, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court awarded monetary relief in back pay, front pay, and compensatory damages in the amount of $1,073,261. The court did not award any punitive damages. The court also did not grant any injunctive relief, stating that "because the workplace at issue, Defendant’s LaVergne Division, closed as of August 15, 2008 and Plaintiffs did not renew their request for this relief in their post-trial papers, the Court will not now grant injunctive or declaratory relief." On February 20, 2010, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs. The court granted the plaintiff $215,015 in attorneys fees and costs on August 2, 2011. Meanwhile, on April 26, 2011, the defendant appealed the district court's December ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Without stating a reason, the parties then jointly moved to dismiss the appeal. The Sixth Circuit granted this joint motion on June 12, 2012, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. A month later, the complainant intervened into the case as a plaintiff. Judge T. NIxon was assigned to the case. Plaintiffs alleged sexual and racial harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant, an African American woman, experienced sexual and racial harassment by a fellow co-worker, a white man, at the Whirlpool Corporation. The complainant’s supervisors failed to take action, and the events escalated until the co-worker physically attacked the complainant. In 2009, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs that granted $1,073,261 in monetary relief. And in 2011, the court awarded $210,039 in attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff.


On December 19, 2018 two US Airmen under pseudonym and OutServe-SLDN, a network of LGBTQ military service-people, filed suit against the U.S. Department of Defense, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Plaintiffs argued that the Department of Defense had violated equal protection under the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs, represented by Winston and Strawn LLP, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Outserve-SLDN, sought declaratory and injunctive relief allowing HIV-positive service members to continue to serve, as well as money damages. The plaintiffs alleged that they were discharged from their duties in the Air Force due to their HIV status. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were discharged based on their HIV status. The complaint explains that what it means to be living with HIV has changed significantly since its origin, “for most people living with HIV, medication renders their HIV inconsequential to their daily lives.” Both plaintiffs Roe and Voe were service members in good standing. Both had been successfully deployed to foreign countries twice and were excelling in their positions when they were diagnosed with and began treatment for HIV. Both of the plaintiffs were able to get their viral loads to an undetectable status quickly, however they were both dismissed from the Air Force solely on the basis of the HIV status. When the Air Force discharged Roe and Voe, the Air Force described HIV as rendering the service members ineligible for deployment to the Central Command area of responsibility. The Air Force also noted the service members were precluded from being able to deploy world-wide without a waiver. The case was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. On January 11, 2019 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo until there was a judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs claims. The plaintiffs requested that the injunction prevent the defendants from restricting Roe and Voe and others similarly situated from being promoted, changing duty station, or re-training on the same terms as other service members living with HIV who were not being separated. On January 25, 2019, the Department of Defense opposed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and also filed a motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. A hearing was held before Judge Brinkema on February 15, 2019. The same day, Judge Brinkema issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendants from separating or discharging from military service Richard Roe, Victor Voe, and any other similarly situated active-duty member of the Air Force because of their classification as ineligible for worldwide deployment or deployment to the United States Central Command area due to their HIV-positive status. Judge Brinkema also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. 359 F.Supp.3d 382. The same day the order was issued, the plaintiffs OutServe-SLDN filed a motion to amend the preliminary injunction. In the motion, the plaintiffs asked the court to remove the phrase "active-duty." There was a member of the Air National Guard who faced separation from service on the basis of HIV-positive status. Four days after the motion was filed, the court denied to amend the preliminary injunction, and Judge Brinkema said that this airman was not similarly situated to the named plaintiffs because he is not on active-duty and he is part of the National Guard, which is a separate institution from the Air Force. Judge Brinkeman dismissed this motion without prejudice. On March 22, 2019 plaintiffs OutServe-SLDN filed a motion to compel documents and information withheld on the basis of deliberative process privilege. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were withholding 161 documents because they allegedly involved Defendants’ decision-making regarding policies affecting service members living with HIV. The documents at issue were related to the determinations that Plaintiffs Roe and Voe were limited in their ability to deploy, documents that defendants relied upon in writing or amending Air Force policies relating to individuals living with HIV, and documents related to the deployability of other Airmen living with HIV, and the decisions to separate or retain those Airmen. The defendants opposed this motion, and a hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis on March 29, 2019. The motion to compel production was held in abeyance by Judge Davis pending review of a similar issue in the companion case, Harrison v. Spencer. On April 5, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to modify the preliminary injunction to include the following language:
If an Airman wishes to be excepted from this Order and be separated or discharged, the Air Force shall provide them a written notice that their consent to separation is not required and that a federal lawsuit may result in his or her retention. After receiving such a notice, the Airman may make a written request to proceed with his or her separation or discharge, and then the Air Force may proceed with the separation or discharge.
 The plaintiffs did not oppose this motion, and three days later, Judge Brinkema granted the motion and amended the February 15 Order as proposed. The defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on April 16, 2019. They appealed the February 15, 2019 decision denying the defendants motion to dismiss that granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. (Appellate Docket No. 19-01410). Amicus briefs were filed by the HIV Medicine Association (with the American Academy of HIV Medicine, GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, and Infectious Diseases Society of America), former military officials, and the American Public Health Association (with Duke Law Health Justice Clinic, Southern AIDS Coalition, The National Alliance of State and Territorial AIDS Directors, and NMAC). All three amicus briefs were in support of the appellees. Oral argument was held on September 18, 2019 before a panel of Fourth Circuit Judges comprised of Judges James A. Wynn Jr, Albert Diaz, and Henry F. Floyd. Back in the district court, on May 3, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in part. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue since Outserve was not injured by the military's policies nor was it the type of institutional plaintiff that can sue based on injury to its members. The plaintiffs rejected both of these contentions. On May 31, 2019 oral argument was held before Judge Brinkema, and on the same day, Judge Brinkema ordered that the motion to dismiss be held in abeyance so that the parties could engage in additional discovery. On June 18, 2019, following a decision in the companion case Harrison v. Shanahan, regarding the production of documents where the defendants similarly opposed the motion on the basis of deliberative process privilege, Magistrate Judge Davis issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel documents and information. Judge Davis denied the motion to compel with regard to one document because it was not relevant to plaintiffs' claims because it was an appeal of a physical evaluation board hearing for someone who was not a party to this case. Based on the decision in Harrison v. Shanahan, Judge Davis ordered the defendants to produce the other requested documents because they were relevant to the plaintiffs' case, there is no other source of information, and the possible negative effect on the government is outweighed by the plaintiffs need for the information. In July 2019, the plaintiffs filed another motion to compel documents and information withheld on the basis of deliberative process privilege. After the June 2019 order by Magistrate Judge Davis, the defendants produced many documents, however, the defendants refused to produce complete versions of eight emails to and from senior officials regarding the Air Force’s decision to refer asymptomatic HIV-positive Airmen into the Disability Evaluation System and to separate them from service. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 23, 2019 with respect to their claim that the determinations of Roe and Voe's deployability and separability violated the APA, and their claim that the determinations of Roe and Voe's deployability and separability are arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. On July 19, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the summary judgment briefings and the bench trial set to begin on September 9, 2019 because of the Fourth Circuit appeal in this case. Oral argument before a panel of Fourth Circuit judges was set for September 18, 2019. On August 1, 2019, Judge Brinkema cancelled the district court trial scheduled for September 9 and stayed all proceedings until further order of the court. On appeal, on January 10, 2020 the Fourth Circuit published an opinion affirming the decision of the district court. Four days later the Fourth Circuit published an amended superseding opinion written by Judge Wynn and joined by Judges Diaz and Floyd, once again affirming the decision of the district court. The district court previously concluded that Roe and Voe were likely to succeed on their claims that their discharges were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, and irrational, in violation of Roe and Voe’s Equal Protection rights. On the motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least one claim (either that discharging Roe and Voe violated the APA or that the deployment policies violate the APA), and that absent judicial review the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm. 947 F.3d 207. On the preliminary injunction, the Fourth Circuit said the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their deployment policies at issue violate the APA because the government has not and cannot reconcile the policies with current medical evidence. Judge Wynn wrote that the district court rightly found that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the Air Force’s discharge decisions were arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA. Department of Defense regulations require individualized determinations based on objective evidence to determine a service member’s fitness for duty or separation under the Disability Evaluation System. The Fourth Circuit said that the government's explanation for why is has effectively imposed a ban on deploying HIV-positive service members to the Central Command area of responsibility is "at odds with modern science." Because the Air Force ignored developments in knowledge and treatment that allow HIV-positive service members to carry out their duties without posing any substantial risk of transmission, the Air Force denied these service members an individualized determination of their fitness for military service. 947 F.3d 207 OutServe-SLDN and the American Military Partner Association merged in August 2019 and formed the Modern Military Association of America (MMAA). Due to this merger, On March 10, 2020, plaintiffs Voe and Roe filed a consent motion to substitute parties. The plaintiffs requested that the court substitute the Modern Military Association of America for OutServe-SLDN in this case, which the court did the next day. On March 27, 2020, Judge Brinkema denied the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss and in a separate order also denied the plaintiffs' motion to compel documents and information. Judge Brinkema found that MMAA (formerly Outserve) had direct standing as the organization personally suffered an injury due to the increased staffing required by the greater number of HIV-related calls. 2020 WL 1493557. On May 4, 2020 plaintiff Roe filed a motion for summary judgment. One month later, the defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing before Judge Brinkema is scheduled for August 4, 2020. The case remains open.

Summary: On December 19, 2018 two US Airmen under pseudonym and OutServe-SLDN, a network of LGBTQ military service-people, filed suit against the U.S. Department of Defense, James Mattis, and Heather Wilson in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Plaintiffs argued that the U.S had violated equal protection under the fifth amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs represented by Winston and Strawn LLP, LAMBDA Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Outserve-SLDN (now known as the Modern Military Association of America) sought declaratory and injunctive relief allowing HIV positive service members to continue to serve and damages. The Plaintiffs allege that they were discharged from their duties in the Air Force due to their HIV status. The case was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. On January 11, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from restricting Roe and Voe and others similarly situated from being promoted, changing duty station, or re-training on the same terms as other service members living with HIV who are not being separated. A hearing was held before Judge Brinkema on February 15, 2019. The same day, Judge Brinkema issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendants from separating or dicharging from military service Richard Roe, Victor Voe, and any other similarly situated active-duty member of the Air Force because they are classified as ineligible for worldwide deployment or deployment to the United States Central Command area due to their HIV-positive status. The defendants appealed to the decision on the preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. Oral argument was held on September 18, 2019 before a panel of Fourth Circuit Judges comprised of Judges James A. Wynn Jr, Albert Diaz, and Henry F. Floyd. In January 2020, the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's decision. In the district court, both parties have filed motions for summary judgment, and oral argument is set for August 4, 2020. The case is ongoing.


On September 28, 2006, the San Francisco district office of the EEOC brought this lawsuit against United Airlines in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The EEOC alleged that United Airlines had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant had refused reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities by disallowing them to work fewer than thirty hours per week. The EEOC claimed that these actions adversely affected their status as employees due to their disabilities and sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as attorney’s fees. On February 14, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied on March 21 by Judge Thomas S. Zilly. The court held that there are material issues of fact as to the fundamental job duties of the employment position at issue and what constitutes a reasonable accommodation. In addition, the court held that the defendant’s offer of a three-year unpaid leave is not a “reasonable accommodation” for a disabled claimant who did not have a temporary medical condition. On May 29, three other employees of United Airlines filed a motion to intervene as putative class representatives, but the court denied their intervention as class representatives and granted them leave to intervene as individual plaintiffs-intervenors on July 16. Both the EEOC and proposed intervenors’ motions for reconsideration of this decision was denied on August 7, 2008. On August 18, the proposed intervenors appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on November 6, 2008 and remanded to the district court. Back in the district court, on June 5, 2009, the intervenors filed a complaint and motion to certify class. On July 6, 2009, the motion for class certification was stricken with prejudice as inappropriately. On February 4, 2010, more employees of United Airlines filed a second motion to intervene. On March 6, the first three intervenor plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case and the second motion to intervene was withdrawn. On August 26, 2010, the defendant filed a sealed motion for summary judgment. On December 17, 2010, the parties filed notice of a settlement agreement with an attached consent decree. That same day, the court approved the consent decree. The decree stipulated the following injunctive relief: 1) non-discrimination policies: United Airlines will permit reduced-hours schedules as reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with disabilities in good faith and on a case-by-case basis. The parties also agreed that working fewer than 16 hours per week (the minimum schedule for United Airline's part-time workers) would be an unreasonable accommodation and would not be allowed. 2) training: United Airlines will train all supervisors involved in administering the reasonable accommodation process with respect to the interactive accommodation process, the requirements of the consent decree, among others. The trainer would be a qualified outside consultant, approved by the EEOC and knowledgeable in the ADA. 3) record keeping and reports: United Airline will mail to counsel a report of training provided and requests for reduced hours accommodations. In addition, United Airlines will pay $600,000 as damages to the plaintiff and each party will bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees. The consent decree was set to terminate three years from date of entry unless the EEOC asked for a continuation. The case is closed, as there are no further activity on this case's docket as of March 2019.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought an anti-discrimination lawsuit against United Airlines. The claim was that United Airlines discriminated against its employees when it denied employees with disabilities a reduced hours schedule as an accommodation. On December 17, 2010, the court approved a consent decree which required United Airlines to consider a reduced-hours schedule as a reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities and awarded the plaintiff $600,000 in damages. The consent decree was set to terminate three years from date of entry unless the EEOC asked for a continuation. The case is closed, as there are no further activity on this case's docket as of March 2019.


On August 14, 2013, private citizens filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the First Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm Thomas More Society, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Due to the ACA mandate, the plaintiffs' employer, the State of Missouri, only offered a health insurance plan that includes contraception coverage. The plaintiffs claimed paying for this health insurance plan violated their Catholic religious beliefs and their right to family integrity. On September 10, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs do not have claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants' motion argued that the ACA contraception mandate applies only to employers, not private individuals. Furthermore, defendants argued that if the government began allowing individual exceptions to certain aspects of insurance policies the group insurance model would fall apart. On October 16, 2013, the court (Judge Jean C. Hamilton) granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The court found that because plaintiffs' alleged injuries were linked with the independent discretionary actions of the State and his health insurance provider, neither of which were parties to the action, plaintiffs alleged only indirect causation between the contraception mandate and their alleged injuries. Moreover, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an injunction of the government's' policy would alter the behavior of these third parties. These third parties would retain discretion not to offer plaintiff a health plan that excludes contraception and abortion. 978 F. Supp. 2d 1008. Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the case was heard before a panel of three judges: Judge Roger Wollman, Judge James Loken, and Judge Diana Murphy. On July 20, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed. In an opinion by Judge Wollman, the court pointed out that, prior to the enactment of the contraception mandate, the insurance provider and the state had been willing to offer the plaintiffs a contraceptive-free healthcare plan. It concluded that this was persuasive evidence that the insurance provider might well alter its policy if the plaintiffs succeeded on the merits of their claim, and therefore that the injury was not too speculative for adjudication. The case was remanded to the district court for decision on the merits. 793 F. 3d 949. The defendants filed another motion to dismiss. On January 8, 2016, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part: the plaintiffs’ constitutional and APA claims were dismissed with prejudice, but the RFRA claim remained at issue because the plaintiffs alleged that the mandate imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 2016 WL 98170. On May 24, 2016, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Three weeks later, the plaintiffs did so as well. On July 21, 2016, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants’. Judge Hamilton entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining the defendants from requiring the plaintiffs’ health insurance issuer to provide them with health insurance that includes contraceptive coverage. The order applied only to health plans provided to the plaintiffs.196 F. Supp. 3d 1010. On August 18, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to recover attorneys’ fees, but agreed to stay briefing on this motion on September 1 after the government indicated that it would likely appeal the district court's decision. The government duly filed its notice of appeal with the Eighth Circuit on September 16. On November 2, 2016, however, the government moved to hold the appeal in abeyance pending the Eighth Circuit's decision in a closely related case, Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs.. Sharpe was one of several RFRA-based challenges to the contraceptive-coverage mandate consolidated and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in order to allow the parties to reach an acceptable compromise. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.Ct. 1557 (2016). In the wake of that decision, on July 21, 2016, HHS sent out a Request for Information (RFI) to determine "whether modifications to the existing accommodation procedure could resolve the objections asserted by the plaintiffs in the pending RFRA cases while still ensuring that the affected women seamlessly receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage." Since the Eighth Circuit had already decided to withhold further action in Sharpe until after the government filed a status report on the RFI on November 30, it likewise agreed on November 23 to abey proceedings in this case. On February 13, 2017, the date when the abeyance was set to expire, the government wrote to the Eighth Circuit indicating that both parties agreed to extend the abeyance by an additional sixty days. The government explained that the change in presidential administrations that year would likely bear significantly on the issues of this case, with the possibility of the dispute being mooted entirely. Following President Trump's May 4 executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the ACA's contraceptive-care mandate, the parties agreed to have the case dismissed on November 13, 2017. The Eighth Circuit obliged three days later, and on December 13, the plaintiffs withdrew their district court motion for attorney's fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: Private citizens sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act mandate requiring employers to provide contraception coverage on that basis that paying for this insurance plan violated their Catholic religious beliefs. On October 16, 2013, the Eastern District of Missouri (Judge Jean C. Hamilton) dismissed the claim for want of standing, but on July 20, 2015, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for merits decision. Judge Hamilton dismissed all but one of the plaintiff's claims but granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff on that claim, enjoining the defendants from requiring the plaintiffs to pay for contraception through their insurance. The government appealed this determination, but following President Trump's May 4, 2017 executive order directing a change in regulations to allow for conscience-based exceptions to the contraceptive-care mandate, the parties agreed to have the case dismissed. The case is now closed.


On May 17, 2018, a Catholic foster care and social services agency and {} filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and by conservative public interest organization the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, alleged that city of Philadelphia revoked new referrals of foster children to their organization because of their faith-based opposition to same-sex marriage. The complaint sought monetary and injunctive relief for violations of under 42 U.S.C. §1983, breach of contract, the First Amendment, Pennsylvania Constitution, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Petrese B. Tucker. Plaintiffs asserted that Philadelphia's decision to revoke new foster care referrals breached their contract with the city and targeted them on religious grounds. According to the plaintiffs, the city had previously excepted them from providing foster care services to same-sex couples, and therefore the city's contract was ambiguous on whether they were required to provide these services to same-sex couples. They also alleged that the public statements made by the Mayor of Philadelphia and other public officials criticizing their refusal to serve same-sex couples indicated the city's decision to suspend the contract constituted religious discrimination. On June 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction requesting that the Court reinstate referrals of foster children to the plaintiff. The defendants' opposition argued that the plaintiffs violated the City's Fair Practice Ordinance, which forbids discrimination against individuals in public accommodations, and was clearly included in the contract. Since the defendants were acting on behalf of the city, and the city was previously unaware of the plaintiffs' refusal to serve otherwise qualified same-sex couples, the defendants argued that they were within their right to suspend the contract. On July 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and TRO. Judge Tucker held that the parties' intent was clear: the Fair Practices ordinance applied to the contract and that plaintiffs' services fell within "public accommodations"; therefore, the plaintiffs were required to serve anyone who sought their services. 320 F.Supp.3d 661. The Court rejected the defendants' claims that this violated the Free Exercise clause; it held that the city's policy was neutral and also found that there was insufficient discriminatory intent to trigger strict scrutiny review. The plaintiffs appealed on the same day of this decision. On April 22, 2019, the United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, in an opinion by Judge Thomas L. Ambro. The Court of Appeals held that the City's nondiscrimination policy was neutral and the religious views of the plaintiff did not entitle it to an exception from the policy. Additionally, the Third Circuit found that the City had not targeted the plaintiffs "for its religious beliefs" nor was its decision "motivated by ill will against [the plaintiff's] religion, rather than sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." 922 F.3d 140. The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on July 22, 2019. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 24, 2020. 140 S.Ct. 1104. Numerous parties filed amici curiae briefs for both the plaintiff and the defendant. A group of United States Senators advocated for granting the injunction on religious liberty grounds, while others argued for preserving the lower court's decision and reasoning. The case is ongoing with oral arguments scheduled for the upcoming 2020 Supreme Court term.

Summary: On May 17, 2018, the plaintiff, a catholic foster care and social services agency, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia. The plaintiffs alleged that the City's decision to stop referring foster care discriminated against them for their religious beliefs and violated their contract, constitutional rights, and state law. On June 13, 2018, Judge Petrese B. Tucker denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction holding that the City of Philadelphia was entitled to suspend the contract for violations of the City Fair Ordinance which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The plaintiffs appealed on the same day, and the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on April 22, 2020. The case is ongoing, and the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari on February 24, 2020.


On January 5, 2017, two residents of the City of McCrory that were living in a trailer worth approximately $1500, filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and private counsel, sued the City of McCrory and its Police Chief under 42 U.S.C §1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the City’s Trailer-Banishment Ordinance—which forbid anyone from residing in a home or trailer worth less than $7500—violated both the Eight and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs sought both monetary and injunctive relief. That same day, the plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the City from enforcing the ordinance. The next day, the Court (Judge D. P. Marshall Jr.) scheduled a hearing on the temporary restraining order, but in an answer filed that same week, the City promised not to enforce the ordinance against anyone and to immediately submit a replacement ordinance to the City Council. In response, the Court found the claim for preliminary injunctive relief moot, and it stayed the case to allow the City to alter the ordinance at issue. On January 10th, the City Council passed a new ordinance, removing the challenged provision and establishing a new one that contained no reference to the value of one’s home or trailer. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, but on May 23, the Court found that the plaintiffs still had a viable claim for compensatory damages based on any harm suffered during the months the ordinance was in effect. The defendants again moved to dismiss the claim but the Court found the plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim based on lost wages and transportation expenses totaling $800. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 16, 2017, seeking monetary relief and permanent injunctive relief to stop the City from passing a similar ordinance in the future. The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiffs' trailer was a public nuisance. The parties reached a private settlement, and the Court granted a voluntary motion to dismiss both parties claims on November 30, 2017. According to Stephanie Storey, spokeswoman for Equal Justice, the settlement totaled just over $20,000. We have no further information on the litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs challenged a city ordinance prohibiting residents from living in trailers or homes worth less than $7500. Less than a week after plaintiffs filed their complaint suit, the City changed the ordinance and eliminated the provision at issue. Ultimately the parties settled outside of court for roughly $20,000.


The background to this case concerns a policy known as the Small Area Fair Market Rent (“FMR”) rule that was set to go into effect on January 1, 2018, after years of advocacy, research, and public debate. The rule required the public housing agencies (PHAs) that administered the Housing Choice Voucher program (formerly Section 8) to set voucher values in 24 metropolitan areas based on the prevailing private market rents for each distinct zip code within those regions. The revised methodology recognized the existence of very different local rental markets within each metropolitan area and calibrated the vouchers more closely to the amount needed to live in various neighborhoods. It thus enabled voucher holders to access a wider range of housing, outside of voucher-concentrated, racially-segregated areas. However, in August 2017, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) abruptly announced it would be delaying the rule’s implementation for two years, claiming that further study was needed. HUD stated the agency was waiting for a final review of the Small Area FMR report and a further review of public comments. Additionally, HUD determined that the Public Housing Authorities had not been given enough guidance and technical assistance to implement the use of Small Area FMRs. On October 23, 2017, Open Communities Alliance and two individual plaintiffs, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against HUD and its Secretary. The complaint challenged HUD’s decision to suspend a rule that would have assisted low-income families in securing affordable housing. The Plaintiffs claimed that the delay would only further racial and economic segregation, and argued that HUD’s failure to implement the Small Area FMR rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the statute that governs how federal agencies propose and implement regulations. The Plaintiffs, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and private counsel, sought to temporarily and permanently enjoin the suspension of the rule. On December 23, 2017, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requiring HUD to reinstate the Small Area Fair Market Rent regulation, criticizing HUD's decision to suspend final rules for two years without notice or comment or evidentiary findings. 2017 WL 6558502. The Defendants requested an extension to contemplate how to proceed with the litigation. The extension was granted, and the Defendants' response was due February 15, 2018. On February 15, 2018, the parties stipulated that the HUD would no longer delay implementing the FMR rules and allowed the court to enter judgment for the Plaintiffs. HUD acknowledged that it was in the process of implementing the FMR rules. The Plaintiffs then moved for attorney's fees. On February 15, 2018, the Court entered final judgment for the Plaintiffs. Attorney's fees of $154,272.11 were awarded on June 15, 2018. 2018 WL 8622230. HUD paid the fees, and the court closed the case on August 15, 2018.

Summary: In August 2017, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) abruptly announced it would delay, by two years, a rule designed to allow low-income families greater choice in their housing options. The Plaintiffs argued that HUD’s failure to implement the rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and they sought a preliminary injunction, which was granted. HUD then agreed to implement the rule and paid the Plaintiffs' attorney's fees.


On January 18, 2001, the United States filed a complaint under the Fair Housing Act and the American with Disabilities Act against the Edward Rose Construction, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On September 3, 2002, the United States initiated a related lawsuit against the same defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendants were developers, builders, and operators of rental apartment complexes in the Northern District of Indiana and numerous additional locations. These complexes contained multi-family dwellings, built after the effective date of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C). Plaintiff claimed that defendants' pattern and practice of failing to design these dwellings so that that were readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities violated rights granted by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619; Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189; and qualified as discrimination against a person or group of persons under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§12181-12189. On September 3, 2002, the parties agreed to resolve both the Indiana and Michigan cases without an evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. On September 30, 2005, the plaintiffs presented a consent order to the court, which Judge Allen Sharp signed on October 3rd. Under the Consent Order, the defendants agreed to retrofit 49 apartment complexes in Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Nebraska to enhance their accessibility to individuals with physical disabilities. The agreement affected more than 5,400 ground floor apartments. The consent decree also required the defendants to pay $1,060,000 to a fund for those who may have been harmed by the lack of accessibility features at the complexes. The consent order terminated in 2010, and the case is now closed. Contemporaneous with the submission of the Consent Order, the parties stipulated to the transfer of the Untied States' claim against the defendants in the Indiana Action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Michigan Consent Order is separate and resolves the claims raised by both the Michigan and Indiana actions against all Defendants.

Summary: This case was brought in Indiana federal court and in Michigan federal court by the United States against the developers, builders, and operators of rental apartment complexes in Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Virginia. The plantiff claimed the defendants had designed and built apartments that are not accessible to persons with disabilities. The consent decree that resulted calls for millions of dollars in retrofits to apartments in six different states, and compensatory damages in the amount of $1,060,000.


On September 28, 2020, the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center (“MFHC”) and Housing Works, Inc. (“Housing Works”) filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the Secretary of HUD (“Secretary”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703, alleging that a new HUD rule (“the 2020 Rule”) limiting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs argued that the 2020 Rule contravened the language and intent of the FHA, as well as longstanding practice, by introducing new pleading and proof requirements and new defenses that would make it harder for victims to bring disparate impact claims and easier for violators to evade liability. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until after this case was resolved. The case was assigned to Judge Mark G. Mastroianni. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion on October 25, 2020, finding that the defendant's purported justifications for the new rule appeared "inadequately justified." 2020 WL 6390143. Accordingly, the court enjoined the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until this case was resolved. As of December 21, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: On September 28, 2020, the Massachusetts Fair Housing Center and Housing Works, Inc. filed a complaint against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of HUD in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703, alleging that a new HUD rule (“the 2020 Rule”) limiting disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from implementing the 2020 Rule until after this case was resolved and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on October 6, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion on October 25, 2020, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the 2020 Rule was arbitrary and capricious. This case is ongoing.


On November 7, 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent its "findings letter" to Kentucky's governor, advising him of the results of the November 2001, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Oakwood Developmental Center ("Oakwood"), a state-operated center in Somerset, Kentucky, for developmentally and mentally disabled persons. (Although legally a "commonwealth," Kentucky will be referred to in this summary as a state, as it is more commonly known.) The investigations occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended Oakwood and state government staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation. The investigation found multiple deficiencies in resident care at Oakwood, in that numerous conditions and services there substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at the facility were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies existed in conditions of resident care and treatment due to Oakwood's failure to provide adequate: (1) protection of its residents from harm due to abuse, mistreatment, neglect, improper use of restraints, pica behavior (ingestion of non-food items), and an overall lack of environmental safety; (2) behavioral and psychology services, including adequate treatment team meetings, individual and behavioral support plans, and training programs; (3) psychiatric services; (4) medical care, including neurological care; (5) nursing care; (6) staffing and staff training; (7) nutritional management; (8) physical therapy, and (9) quality assurance mechanisms designed to self-correct institutional problems. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all of these categories. This summary provides examples of these details, using the numeric indicator from the prior paragraph, as follows: (1) numerous and recurring incidents of abuse and neglect by staff; continued employment of documented abusers; inadequate investigations of incidents; unacceptably high volume of abuse and neglect incidents; inadequate supervision and communication regarding residents known for pica or self-injurious behaviors; (2) inadequate interdisciplinary care team meetings and individual/behavior support plans; overuse of chemical and physical restraints; inadequate resident training programs; insufficient psychological staff resources; (3) incorrect psychiatric diagnoses and use of psychotropic medications without psychiatric diagnoses; no peer review of psychiatric care nor any functional system for treatment of movement disorders; untrained staff; (4) poor preventative care, medical monitoring, communication among medical professionals, record keeping, and mortality review; inadequate evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment for seizure disorders leading to improper medication usage; (5) fragmented, incomplete, and inconsistent nursing assessments and documentations; high level of medication errors; vague medical emergency protocols and inadequate documentation of emergencies by poorly trained staff; outdated and ineffective infection control practices; haphazard staffing; (6 and 7) inadequate individual meal management plans; unmonitored, unaided meals for residents with swallowing difficulties; under-staffing at mealtimes resulting in cold food; (7 and 8) absence of a positioning program; overuse of wheelchairs; inadequately trained direct care staff; understaffed physical therapy department; and (9) no quality improvement program capable of addressing systemic crises in clinical services; absence of formal feedback system; nursing performance goals not objective and measurable, precluding reliable assessment and monitoring; and a total lack of a management information system. In addition to the remarkable list of deficiencies at Oakwood, the letter also noted that the state regularly deprived Oakwood residents who desired to live in the community and who reasonably can be accommodated an adequate opportunity to do so, in violation of the state's obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and ADA-related regulations. Ten pages of minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter provided notice that, absent a resolution of the federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at Oakwood. Subsequently, on September 21, 2004, the state and DOJ entered into a memorandum of understanding, setting out a "Strategic Action Plan" that aimed to resolve the many deficiencies in care and conditions at Oakwood (which, by this time, had been re-named and re-organized as the Communities at Oakwood). It included the appointment of a jointly-selected monitor, Dr. Nirbhay N. Singh, Ph. D., to oversee, at state expense, Kentucky's implementation of the memorandum and its plan. The plan, an attachment to the memorandum, set specific goals and target dates for achieving them. On August 31, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against the state and a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing and attaching the strategic action plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures. The settlement named the same monitor, who would also now report compliance progress to the court. The lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, described practices at Oakwood that violated the residents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure, and to periodically document its progress in ensuring, improvements that would bring the facility up to generally accepted professional standards of care. The state also obliged itself to educate Oakwood employees about the requirements imposed by the settlement agreement. The settlement provided for the United States to conduct regular compliance reviews, with facility inspections and interviews of staff and residents, and to fully access and review relevant documents. District Judge Karen K. Caldwell approved the settlement on September 13, 2006, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the strategic action plan. Following several years of the parties providing periodic updates to the court, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Dismissal and the court signed an order closing the case on September 29, 2011.

Summary: On August 31, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against the state and a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing and attaching the strategic action plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures at the Oakwood Developmental Center. The court monitored implementation of the agreement until 2011, when the case was closed.


On June 7, 2007, attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of about 2,700 Mexican migrant workers who entered the United States with H-2A visas and harvested and packed tomatoes and performed other agricultural work in Bradley County, Ark., from 2002 to 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that the employers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to pay the prevailing wage and overtime wages, and not reimbursing workers for travel, visa and hiring fees. Plaintiffs sought money damages, injunctive relief and class certification. Defendants included former employers Candy Brand, LLC, and Arkansas Tomato Shippers, LLC, and several individual supervisors. Defendants initially responded by filing a motion for more definite statement. The trial court denied that motion. Perez-Bemotes v. Candy Brand, LLC, 2007 WL 4189499 (W.D.Ark. Nov 21, 2007). On December 9, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to include a statement about the grounds of jurisdiction over a class action claim. On October 13, 2008, the Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) granted plaintiffs' conditional motion to certify a class and motion requesting information of potential class members from defendants. 2008 WL 4809105. After discovery, on March 23, 2010, the Court granted class certification for the plaintiffs, designating two classes. The first class included "all nonsupervisory workers employed by Defendants any time between 2003 and the date of judgment in this matter who were employed pursuant to H-2A temporary work visas;" and the second included "all nonsupervisory workers employed in the Defendants' packing shed operations at any time between 2003 and the date of the judgment in this matter--irrespective of visa status--who did not receive overtime pay during workweeks when they worked more than forty (40) hours." 267 F.R.D. 242. The defendants tried to appeal this decision, though permission for interlocutory appeal was denied by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Following class certification, the Court approved a stipulated dismissal as to defendant Dale McGinnis, though none of the other business defendants were dismissed. On August 30, 2010, the Court dismissed individual and joint motions for summary judgment by the defendants, allowing plaintiffs more time for discovery. The Court found that defendants were legally deemed employers for the H-2A guestworkers, and did not qualify for an exemption from paying overtime. The Court also held that defendants, in accordance with the FLSA, were required to reimburse plaintiffs for travel expenses if they brought plaintiffs' income below minimum wage, during the first work week. According to the employment contract, defendants were also required to reimburse plaintiffs for daily travel expenses and to pay plaintiffs overtime. Accordingly, on May 20, 2011, the Court denied defendants' numerous motions for summary judgment, and granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment related to violations of the FLSA and H-2A employment contracts, as well as their motion for summary judgment on the issue of employer status and liability of defendants. 2011 WL 1978414. The Court denied defendants' motion for reconsideration of the matter the next month. Following the grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the Court instructed the parties to submit briefs regarding whether defendants mitigated damages by providing housing, whether defendants were liable for other expenses not presented in the motions for summary judgment, and whether plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees pursuant to the FLSA. A jury trial was set for January 23, 2012. Before this date, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the Court granted a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class action settlement. The settlement agreement required the defendants to pay plaintiffs $1,212,500 in damages and attorney fees; it also provided terms for how to handle breach of payment and administration of the settlement agreement. Later that year, defendants breached the settlement agreement, and on September 4, 2013, the Court entered judgment against the defendants, requiring payment in the amount of $790,625 with an interest rate of 5%, with interest building from January 1, 2012 until paid. Additional attorney fees were to be calculated at the time of collection.

Summary: On June 7, 2007, attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas on behalf of about 2,700 Mexican migrant workers who entered the United States with H-2A visas and harvested and packed tomatoes and performed other agricultural work in Bradley County, Ark., from 2002 to 2007. Plaintiffs alleged that the employers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to pay the prevailing wage and overtime wages, and not reimbursing workers for travel, visa and hiring fees. On May 20, 2011, the Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Later, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and a final version of the agreement was approved by the Court on April 9, 2012, requiring the defendants to pay $1,212,500 in damages and attorney fees to plaintiffs. Defendants breached this agreement and the Court entered judgment against them on September 4, 2013.


On August 31, 2010, hourly employees filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against their employer and its owner/president for violating various federal and state employment and non-discrimination statutes including the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants failed to pay required minimum and overtime wages, to pay in a timely manner, and to provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiffs also alleged that their employer discriminated against them on the basis of their race and/or alienage by paying them less, failing to pay them overtime, and depriving them of other employment benefits. In addition, plaintiffs accused defendant of committing unfair business practices and fraud. An amended complaint was filed on March 30, 2011, and only maintained the claims under the FLSA and the California Labor Code. The amended complaint did not mention discrimination or plaintiffs' immigration status. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys at the ACLU of Southern California and private counsel, sought class certification, damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. According to plaintiffs, defendants required them to work as many as fourteen hours a day without compensating them with mandatory overtime pay. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants created two fraudulent schemes to evade paying plaintiffs the required overtime. On January 28, 2011, the District Court (Judge Percy Anderson) ordered the parties to a settlement conference, but no settlement was reached. On April 18, 2011, the court dismissed the FLSA claims without prejudice per the plaintiffs' submitted stipulation. The parties dismissed the claims to enable plaintiffs to participate in a civil action filed by the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Labor against defendants for FLSA violations. On April 22, 2011, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims because all claims over which the court had original jurisdiction had been dismissed.

Summary: On August 31, 2010, hourly employees sued their employer under federal and state employment and non-discrimination statutes for requiring plaintiffs to work as many as fourteen hours a day without compensating them with mandatory overtime pay. The plaintiffs dismissed their federal claims in order to participate in a civil action filed by the U.S. Department of Labor against defendants and the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims.


On December 19, 2013, four immigration detainees of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 against ICE and the Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that ICE violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that ICE restricted their access to telephones, contrary to the agency’s National Detention Standards, thereby denying or severely limiting the plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights to retain counsel, to communicate with retained counsel, to gather and present evidence, to obtain a fair hearing, to apply for immigration benefits, and to petition for documents that might help them avoid deportation. The plaintiffs were in ICE custody pending deportation proceedings. Most detainees were geographically isolated from family, courts, and attorneys. As a result, telephone access was critical. Many detainees would qualify for one or more of the several forms of “relief from removal,” but because of ICE policies restricting telephone access many plaintiffs were unnecessarily detained for months. Many were forced to seek multiple continuances while they attempted to gather information and documents to contest their deportation. Others would accept deportation much earlier if they were able to obtain legal consultation over the telephone. The following are examples of the practices restricting telephone access, some of which violated ICE’s own detention standards: Detainees are confined for up to 22 hours a day and are permitted to make calls only during inconsistently scheduled “free time,” which is often early in the morning or at night. Detainees have no privacy when using telephones. Phone calls from the facilities are prohibitively expensive, especially for indigent detainees. Detainees are completely unable to receive incoming calls. Telephone systems in the facilities disconnect after 15 minutes, or if a recorded greeting begins to play (including voicemail or automated systems requiring the selection of options to reach a live person). Although ICE policy requires that detainees have access to a free-call platform for contacting nonprofit legal services, that platform is often unavailable and usually ineffectual. On April 16, 2014, the district court (Judge Edward M. Chen) granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 300 F.R.D. 628. Then, on April 28, 2014, the court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for settlement negotiations. Settlement discussions went on for over two years. During that time, the court approved an expansion of the plaintiff class on July 27, 2015. 308 F.R.D. 203. That expansion included detainees at newly-constructed detention facilities in California. The plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint on August 27, 2015, which included allegations against telephone policies in the new facilities. On March 18, 2016, the court ruled that the detainees had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the telephone policies did not violate the plaintiffs’ statutory rights to counsel. 171 F. Supp. 3d 961. However, the court allowed the due process and First Amendment claims to proceed. On July 1, 2016, the court granted preliminary approval of the parties’ settlement agreement; on November 18, 2016, the court approved the settlement agreement and awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $405,000. With this class-action settlement, restrictions on the detainees’ use of telephones were lifted such that they could make outgoing calls and ultimately obtain legal assistance. The terms of the preliminary settlement agreement included the following:

Adding free and private numbers to housing unit telephones, eliminating automatic telephone cutoffs of 20 minutes, and extending cutoff times to 40 or 60 minutes,
Adding 40 phone booths and additional phone rooms in housing units to facilitate privacy,
Provisions ensuring timely access to phones and messages such as providing facilitators to process phone requests, and
Provisions for implementation of and compliance with the agreement.
On April 23, 2019, the parties filed a proposed order to extend certain terms of the settlement agreement. The court granted this order on the same day. The parties filed another proposed order to amend the settlement agreement on December 13, 2019, which the court again granted the same day. The proposed orders can be found in the Documents for this case on the Clearinghouse website. The parties held a mediation conference with Magistrate Judge Ryu on March 24, 2020. Subsequently, they filed another proposed order on April 1, 2020, which was granted on the same day by the magistrate judge. The case is ongoing.

Summary: A class-action lawsuit on behalf of people facing deportation proceedings, who are detainees at facilities contracted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, resulted in a settlement agreement. The plaintiff-detainees alleged that ICE restricted their telephone access, violating their rights under the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The terms of the settlement agreement included provisions for longer access to free and private phone calls in a timely manner, as well as attorneys’ fees.


On June 4, 2013, plaintiffs, natives of Mexico who had agreed to voluntary departure from the United States, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §1101 and state law against the acting director of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's agencies in southern California violated INA and their Fifth Amendment due process rights by coercing plaintiffs into accepting voluntary departure through misstatements, omissions, threats, and/or pressure, in violation of defendants' own regulations. On June 14, 2013, the defendants filed their response and over the next few months, filed a motion to change venue and a motion to dismissed. On November 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On December 4, 2013, the parties began settlement negotiations. On December 9, 2013, the Court (Judge John A. Kronstadt) referred the case to Magistrate Judge Paul L. Abrams to provide oversight over settlement conferences. On January 1, 2015, the parties moved for final settlement approval, and on March 11, 2015, Judge John A. Kronstadt certified the class settlement. The final certification of the class was defined as: <blockquote>All Individuals who returned to Mexico pursuant to a Qualifying Voluntary Return between June 1, 2009 and August 28, 2014, and who are described in both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section: (a) Based on the facts as they existed at the time of his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return, the Individual: (i) Last entered the United States with inspection prior to his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return and satisfied the non-discretionary criteria for submitting an approvable application to adjust status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), based on a bona fide immediate relative relationship defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); (ii) Was the beneficiary of a properly filed Form I-130 Petition for Alien Relative based on a bona fide family relationship, which was pending or approved at the time of the Qualifying Voluntary Return; (iii) Satisfied the non-discretionary criteria to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; or (iv) His or her Qualifying Voluntary Return occurred on or after June 15, 2012, and he or she satisfied the non-discretionary criteria for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") listed on page one of the June 15, 2012 memorandum from former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano; and (b) At the time of application for class membership, the Individual: (i) Is physically present within Mexico; and (ii) Is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B), due to his or her Qualifying Voluntary Return**, except that this requirement does not apply to an Individual seeking recognition as Class Member under Paragraph (a)(i) above. </blockquote> **"Qualifying Voluntary Return" was defined as "any Voluntary Return that occurred within the Relevant Area during the period starting June 1, 2009, and ending on the date of the District Court's Preliminary Approval of the Classwide Settlement." In exchange for the release of all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants, the defendants agreed that for a period of 180 days, they would accept applications from class members who wanted to return to the United States. If the application was granted, the class member could physically return to the United States and would be placed in the same position with regard to immigration law and regulation as they were prior to their Qualifying Voluntary Return. The defendants were responsible for class member notification costs up to the lower of 50% of total costs or $150,000, with the class counsel responsible for the remaining amount. Class counsel was awarded $700,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. There has been no action on the docket since April 22, 2016 and the case is likely closed.

Summary: On June 4, 2013, plaintiffs, natives of Mexico who had agreed to voluntary departure from the United States, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §1101, and state law against the acting director of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") and Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's agencies in southern California violated INA by coercing plaintiffs into accepting voluntary departure through misstatements, omissions, threats, and/or pressure in violation of defendants' own regulations. The parties settled on March 11, 2015, where defendants agreed to allow applications from the class members that would enable their return to the United States and their legal position prior to acceptance of voluntary departure.


In December 2017, the ACLU of Northern California submitted a request to the Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement seeking documents related to the agency's use of a private contractor known as G4S Secure Solutions to restrain, process, and transport immigration detainees. G4S had reportedly been involved in instances of assault and neglect against detainees in their custody, including a 2014 incident during which a detainee died. The ACLU specifically sought records regarding the policies and procedures used by G4S and the manner in which the company was awarded its contracts with the government, totaling in excess of $200 million. The agency did not provide the records to the ACLU. On July 10, 2018, the ACLU filed this suit against Immigrations and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The ACLU, represented by private counsel and in-house attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they sought an order directing the defendant to release the requested records; a declaration that the defendant's refusal to provide the records was illegal; and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laura Beeler. The parties began filing case management updates shortly after filing the suit. Magistrate Judge Beeler put a minute entry into the record on March 8, 2019 asking the plaintiffs to provide a narrowed version of their FOIA request within a week. Subsequent case management statements showed that the plaintiffs submitted a narrower request within the deadline, though a June 13, 2019 case management statement from the ACLU indicated that the plaintiffs were concerned that the defendants would not process the revised requests in a timely manner. On June 26, 2019, the court received notice of a possibly related case from G4S, <i>Liborio Ramos v. G4S Secure Solutions</i>, 19-cv-02757 in N.D. Cal. This new case was filed by a private citizen represented by the ACLU alleging assault, battery, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress in ICE custody via G4S. The defendants resisted relating the two cases, but Magistrate Judge Beeler filed an order relating the two cases on July 8, 2019. Document production continued after the cases were combined. In a September 26, 2019 case management conference, Magistrate Judge Beeler ordered the defendant to increase production of documents from 500 a month to 750 a month. COVID-19 moved document production and further case management conferences online in late March. A May 7, 2020 case management report shows difficulty in getting monthly document productions over to the plaintiffs in March and April, but the defendants promised to work with the plaintiffs to figure out the cause of the issue. Production is ongoing.

Summary: On July 10, 2018, the ACLU of Northern California filed this FOIA suit against U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. The plaintiff sought records pursuant to a FOIA request about the defendant's use of a contractor to process and transport immigration detainees, some of whom had allegedly suffered injury and death due to the contractor's malfeasance. The plaintiff sought an order from the court that the defendant provide the records. This case was combined with a suit from a private plaintiff alleging mistreatment in ICE and G4S custody in July 2019. Document production appears to be continuing smoothly at a rate of 750 pages per month, but shifting production online due to COVID-19 has yielded some issues in getting documents over to the plaintiff. Document production is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the State of California regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. California continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 19, 2020.
 Background Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially "student visas") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an "operational change plan" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. The Lawsuit On July 9, three days after the directive was issued, the State of California filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleged two violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). First, it argued that the directive was arbitrary and capricious because: 1) the defendants gave no explanation for the sudden shift in policy; 2) defendants relied on factors Congress did not intend for them to rely on in making the shift; 3) defendants failed to consider the reliance interests of students and universities after they had issued the original exemption; and 4) defendants failed to provide any cogent explanation for the shift in policy. Second, the state alleged that defendants did not go through proper notice-and-comment rulemaking processes when they issued the new directive. The State of California sought declaratory relief that would call the new directive illegal, an order setting aside the July directive, and injunctive relief that would force defendants to reinforce the original March 13 exemption. California declined to have a magistrate judge conduct the proceedings. The next day, July 10, the case was assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. On July 13, California submitted a motion requesting a preliminary injunction. The proposed injunction would prohibit the government from acting on the new directive. Also on July 13, Regents of the University of California filed a motion to relate the case to the case they had filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California three days prior. Judge Tigar found that the cases are related and reassigned the suit by University of California (which was filed after this suit by the state of California) to himself on July 14. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, President and Fellows of Harvard College, the parties conferred and the defendants agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. On July 14, the parties filed a joint stipulation that stated that because the government agreed to rescind the July directive by removing it from its website and replacing it with the March guidance, California's claims were therefore mooted, and the state agreed to withdraw its motion for a preliminary injunction. Over the next two months, the plaintiffs continued to monitor the changes ICE made to its website in order to fully effectuate the rescission and submitted status reports to the court. On October 13, 2020 the government filed a motion to dismiss and on October 19, California filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.

Summary: This case was filed in response to the July 6, 2020 directive by ICE that would effectively force international students studying under F-1 and M-1 visas to attend in-person classes or risk deportation. The state of California filed this suit against ICE and DHS on July 9, arguing that the directive was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in two ways. First, the directive was arbitrary and capricious in that it failed to take into account students' and universities' reliance interests and the defendants gave no reasoned basis for the new order. Second, the defendants were in violation of procedural elements of the APA, because they failed to use proper notice-and-comment rule-making when issuing the new order. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance and as a result, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. California continued to monitor the alterations ICE made to its website between July and September and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 19, 2020.


The American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) filed suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on July 20, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AILA claimed that DHS had violated the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §701-06) by failing to properly respond to a FOIA request. On February 6, 2009, AILA had submitted a FOIA request to DHS seeking the disclosure of the guidance it gives to agencies when investigating fraud in H-1B visa applications. DHS denied the request, citing various administrative exemptions. After an AILA administrative appeal and second request on April 12, 2009, DHS released a limited number of redacted documents along with "Vaughn submissions," providing a description of the exempted information. After an unsuccessful appeal, AILA brought suit, seeking an order for DHS to conduct a reasonable search for relevant documents, an order to refrain from withholding information relevant to the FOIA request, and a declaration that the information is not exempted from FOIA. On December 10, 2010, DHS moved for summary judgment, arguing that all segregable information had been released, along with adequate Vaughn submissions. On January 14, 2011, AILA filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Vaughn submissions were inadequate, and seeking full disclosure of documents. However, on February 24, 2011, DHS withdrew its motion for summary judgment, offering to conduct a further search for segregable documents. On May 31, 2011, AILA moved again for summary judgment, arguing that DHS still had failed to adequately respond to their FOIA request. On June 27, 2011, DHS filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, again arguing that they had submitted all segregable information, along with proper Vaughn submissions. On March 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Emmit G. Sullivan) granted AILA's motion for summary judgment in part, and denied DHS's cross-motion for summary judgment. Judge Sullivan ordered DHS to provide Vaugh submissions that sufficiently describe the information to AILA, so that AILA can make a proper segregability determination. This was the last action in the case.

Summary: On July 20, 2010, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) filed suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for failing to adequately respond to FOIA requests regarding USCIS procedures for inspecting potential H-1B visa fraud. On March 30, 2012, the District Court ordered DHS to provide adequate description of the exempted information in response to the FOIA request so that AILA could make a proper segregability determination. This was the last action in this case.


On August 22, 2014, mothers and children from El Salvador and Honduras, who were held in a detention center in Artesia, New Mexico, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The plaintiffs brought their suit under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT), implemented in the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA). The Plaintiffs allege that their rights to seek asylum and related relief, and to a fair hearing to present their claims, have been violated. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that they have been subjected to a process in which they are provided virtually no notice of when critical proceedings are scheduled to occur; asylum officers and immigration judges rush them to answer questions regarding the violence, death threats, and sexual abuse they fear - all while their children are listening; their children are ordered removed without being individually screened to determine whether they have a separate basis for fearing persecution; and their claims are denied for failing to properly respond to questions about their asylum claims phrased in complicated legal terminology. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), National Immigration Project and National Immigration Law Center, asked the court for: a declaratory judgment; a corrective action plan to be approved by the court; attorneys' fees; the return of deportees; and an injunctive order for the opportunity for plaintiffs to be given the opportunity to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief before any removal order is executed, including a new credible fear interview. They also requested, if relevant, a new immigration judge credible fear review hearing, with a reasonable amount of advance time to obtain and meet with counsel and prepare for each, as well as notice to Plaintiffs and their retained counsel as to the time of each such interview and/or hearing. On January 30, 2015, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims without prejudice. In their notice, Plaintiffs indicated that, as a result of the filing of the lawsuit, DHS had taken steps to remedy the failures at the Artesia facility. Furthermore, the individual Plaintiffs were able to secure representation from volunteer attorneys. In each Plaintiff's immigration case, the federal government revisited the negative decisions, vacated the expedited removal orders, and placed each Plaintiff in regular immigration proceedings. One Plaintiff had already secured asylum for herself and her children. The notice also stated that, on December 18, 2014, the federal government closed the Artesia detention facility.

Summary: Central American mothers and children detainees brought suit against the Department of Homeland Security and its various agencies for the government's unlawful expedited removal policies at the Artesia Family Residential Center. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in January 2015 after DHS remedied the violations of Plaintiffs' rights in their immigration proceedings and closed the Artesia facility.


This case arose in response to President Trump's 2018 family separation policy. On April 6, 2018, the U.S. Attorney General announced a “zero-tolerance” immigration policy, which criminally prosecuted all adult entrants crossing the border without documentation, including asylum seekers accompanied by minor children. The Trump administration stated that its zero-tolerance policy was intended to reduce illegal border crossing, migration, and the burdens resulting from fraudulent asylum requests. However, enforcement of the zero-tolerance policy resulted in widely-publicized separation of children from their parents. Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) held authority over detainment of adult non-citizens, minor children were not permitted to be held in federal criminal detention facilities. Therefore, accompanying children were held separately under the guidelines of the Flores Settlement Agreement (FSA), which required the government to limit the time accompanied minors spent in detention to 20 days. In cases where the parents were not released in 20 days, minors were considered unaccompanied non-citizen children, under the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Public pressure prompted an executive order from President Trump, which mandated the DHS to maintain custody of immigrant families on June 20, 2018. This allowed immigrant parents and children apprehended at the border to remain together during the pendency of their criminal or immigration proceedings. On June 20, 2018, three immigrant parents forcibly separated from their children filed a lawsuit against various immigration federal agencies and officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking immediate reunification with their children. Represented by Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, the plaintiffs alleged that family separation was a punishment in violation of Due Process and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to immediately reunite with their children as well as declaratory relief. They also sought attorney fees. The case was initially assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan, then re-assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman as he had an earlier related case. Specifically, the plaintiffs, all of whom entered the U.S. with accompanying children, crossed the US-Mexico border from Central America after the announcement of the zero-tolerance policy, prior to the issuance of the June 20 executive order. Plaintiff M.G.U. crossed the U.S.-Mexico border with her children, then presented herself with her children at the San Ysidro, California port of entry on May 4, 2018. Initially detained together with her children at the South Texas Family Residential Center (STFRC), Plaintiff M.G.U was moved to an adult detention facility from the STFRC due to a past criminal conviction. Her children were determined as non-citizen children without a suitable legal guardian, separated to be transported to New York in custody of the ORR. Plaintiff E.F. and Plaintiff A.P.F. were prosecuted for entering the U.S. without inspection after crossing the US-Mexico border with their children. In accordance with the Trafficking Victim Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), their children were similarly transferred to the custody of the ORR. On June 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO), allowing them access to daily information on the children’s well-being as well as consistent communication with the children during the period of the separation. At the hearing held on June 27, 2018, the defendants claimed that most of the information requested by the plaintiffs was already available, or available upon request. Judge Friedman withheld the TRO application and suggested a joint status report between the plaintiffs and defendants. The parties submitted the joint status report on July 5, 2018, which resolved several issues. However, the parties could not reach an agreement on matters regarding communication between the plaintiffs and children, or the release of specific information on the location of Plaintiff E.F.’s child. On July 16, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ TRO for the matters above. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction for immediate reunification with their children. A hearing was held on July 12, 2018, during which Plaintiff E.F. informed the Court that she was awaiting a review decision on a negative credible fear determination. A credible fear determination by an asylum officer determines whether an individual has reasonable fear of returning to their home country. If negative, the plaintiff would be removed, which risked Plaintiff E.F. being removed from the U.S. without her son. On July 13, 2018, an immigration judge had affirmed Plaintiff E.F.’s negative fear determination. For that reason, the Court prohibited defendants from removing Plaintiff E.F. from the U.S. prior to the preliminary injunction decision. Meanwhile, in another case, on June 26, 2018, Judge Dana M. Sabraw of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California issued a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring reunification of children under the age of five with their parents by July 10, 2018, and children over the age of five by July 26, 2018. For more information, see Ms. L v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. On July 18, 2018, Judge Friedman granted Plaintiff E.F.’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to reunite her with her 9-year-old son by July 20, 2018. Plaintiff M.G.U. and Plaintiff A.P.F. had been reunited with their children prior to the court order on July 11, 2018, and July 17, 2018, respectively. On November 9, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs' claims were based on the separation from their children, who were now united. Additionally, they asserted that there was no fundamental right of parents to be detained with their children while they were detained pursuant to a criminal charge. On December 23, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to add two additional plaintiffs, plaintiffs P.M.B. and C.O.M., a mother subject to a final order of deportation, and daughter, whose asylum was pending. The mother and daughter were initially detained together near Dilley, Texas, but faced imminent separation, as the defendants argued that the proposed plaintiff was not a class member because the family had not been forcibly separated previously. The plaintiffs filed for an emergency TRO to preserve the status quo detention of P.M.B. and C.O.M., preventing their separation, which was granted on December 24, 2018. On January 26, 2019, the defendants released the proposed plaintiffs from detention to lawfully pursue immigration relief in the U.S., subject to an ankle monitor. Since releasing C.O.M. and P.M.B., the defendants indicated they no longer had intent to separate the plaintiffs while they pursued immigration relief. Consequently, Plaintiffs sought dissolution of the TRO and withdrew their motions without prejudice. On February 19, 2019, the court granted the plaintiff's motion. On July 19, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 20, 2018, three immigrant parents separated from their children filed a civil action against various federal agencies and officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for immediate reunification with their children.The plaintiffs were detained after crossing the United States-Mexico border without inspection with young accompanying children, seeking asylum. After plaintiffs were apprehended at the border, the children were separated under the “zero-tolerance” immigration policy announced April 6, 2018, which criminally prosecuted adult entrants crossing the border illegally and placed accompanying minors in custody of the government. All three plaintiffs crossed the border prior to the Executive Order issued on June 20, 2018, which allowed immigrant parents and children apprehended at the border to remain together during the pendency of their proceedings. The plaintiffs alleged interference of family integrity in violation of Due Process, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to immediately reunite plaintiffs with their children. The plaintiffs obtained preliminary relief and were (along with another parent who joined the case later to prevent separation from her daughter) ultimately re-united with their children. The case is now closed.