A statute provides: A person commits the crime of rape if he has sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife, without her consent. Dunbar is charged with the rape of Sally. At trial, Sally testifies to facts sufficient for a jury to find that Dunbar had sexual intercourse with her, that she did not consent, and that the two were not married. Dunbar testifies in his own defense that he believed that Sally had consented to sexual intercourse and that she was his common-law wife. At the conclusion of the case, the court instructed the jury that in order to find Dunbar guilty of rape, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had sexual intercourse with Sally without her consent. The court also instructed the jury that it should find the defendant not guilty if it found either that Sally was Dunbar's wife or that Dunbar reasonably believed that Sally had consented to the sexual intercourse, but that the burden of persuasion as to these issues was on the defendant. The jury found Dunbar guilty, and Dunbar appealed, contending that the court's instructions on the issues of whether Sally was his wife and whether he reasonably believed she had consented violated his constitutional rights. Dunbar's constitutional rights were 
violated by the instructions as to both issues. violated by the instruction as to whether Sally was his wife, but not violated by the instruction on belief as to consent.  violated by the instruction on belief as to consent, but not violated by the instruction as to whether Sally was his wife.  not violated by either part of the instructions.