Cases like this would be covered if the decision-theoretic property of Pareto optimality ( e.g. , Feldman 1980 ) was used as the sole criterion : Formally , an object r E C has a Pareto-optimal combination of Values V iff there is no other x E C such that
welfare economics and social choice theory
Allan M Feldman
The NP the tall fat giraffe , for example , can safely refer to an element b in a situation like the one below , where b is the only element that exceeds all distractors with respect to some dimension ( a different one for a than for c , as it happens ) while not being exceeded by any distractors in any dimension : Cases like this would be covered if the decision-theoretic property of Pareto optimality ( e.g. , Feldman 1980 ) was used as the sole criterion : Formally , an object r E C has a Pareto-optimal combination of Values V iff there is no other x E C such that 1 . ]
Cases like this would be covered if the decision-theoretic property of Pareto optimality ( e.g. , @@CITATION ) was used as the sole criterion : Formally , an object r E C has a Pareto-optimal combination of Values V iff there is no other x E C such that