not adopt a per se rule that all probationers must have the assistance of counsel in every revocation hearings, 
but rather stated: 
“We find no justification for a new, inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of 
counsel.  We think rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case 
basis in the exercise of sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering 
the probation and parole system. . . . Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in 
cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee makes such a 
request based on a timely and colorable claim. . . . In passing on a request for the appointment of counsel, 
the responsible agency should also consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether probationer appears to be 
capable of speaking effectively for himself.  In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or 
final hearing is refused, the grounds for refusal shall be stated succinctly in the record.” 
9 
At Some Post-Trial Proceedings 
The Sixth Amendment’s right to the assistance of counsel does not stop when the jury finds the defendant 
guilty.  When an out-of-custody defendant is found guilty at the end of a trial, the judge may remand 
the defendant to custody- has the bailiff take the defendant into custody and transport them to the jail- 
and revokes conditions of bail if there had been any. Counsel must assist the defendant through the end of 
the sentencing hearing, and the defendant’s attorney has the legal obligation to make post-trial motions to 
preserve the defendant’s rights. 
The Court has distinguished between the defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel on mandatory 
appeals and discretionary appeals. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court found that 
indigent counsel should be provided to individuals when an appellate court must review their appeal or an 
appeal of right. Once the first appeal has been dismissed or resolved, however, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 
(1974), holds that indigent defendants do not have a right to appointed counsel for discretionary review 
in either the state supreme court or with the U.S. Supreme Court. The Ross majority reasoned that the 
defendant did not need an attorney to have “meaningful access” to the higher appellate courts because all 
the legal issues would have already been fully briefed in the intermediate appellate court. Additionally, the 
Court noted that the concept of equal protection does not require absolute equality.  The majority opinion 
states, 
“We do not believe that the Due Process Clause requires North Carolina to provide the respondent 
with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State Supreme Court. At the trial stage of a criminal 
proceeding, the right of an indigent defendant to counsel is fundamental and binding upon the States 
by virtue of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.  But there are significant differences between 
the trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding. The purpose of the trial stage from the State’s 
point of view is to convert a criminal defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. To accomplish this purpose, the State employs a prosecuting attorney 
who presents evidence to the court, challenges any witnesses offered by the defendant, argues rulings 
9.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli,  411 U.S. 788, 790 (1973). 
ALISON S. BURKE, DAVID CARTER, BRIAN FEDOREK, TIFFANY MOREY, LORE RUTZ-BURRI, AND SHANELL
SANCHEZ
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