  Recent years have seen the Internet become a key vehicle for citizens around
the globe to express political opinions and organize protests. This fact has
not gone unnoticed, with countries around the world repurposing network
management tools (e.g., URL filtering products) and protocols (e.g., BGP, DNS)
for censorship. However, repurposing these products can have unintended
international impact, which we refer to as "censorship leakage". While there
have been anecdotal reports of censorship leakage, there has yet to be a
systematic study of censorship leakage at a global scale. In this paper, we
combine a global censorship measurement platform (ICLab) with a general-purpose
technique -- boolean network tomography -- to identify which AS on a network
path is performing censorship. At a high-level, our approach exploits BGP churn
to narrow down the set of potential censoring ASes by over 95%. We exactly
identify 65 censoring ASes and find that the anomalies introduced by 24 of the
65 censoring ASes have an impact on users located in regions outside the
jurisdiction of the censoring AS, resulting in the leaking of regional
censorship policies.

Cryptography and Security