  We develop a general model of discrete choice that incorporates peer effects
in preferences and consideration sets. We characterize the equilibrium behavior
and establish conditions under which all parts of the model can be recovered
from a sequence of choices. We allow peers to affect only preferences, only
consideration, or both. We exploit different types of variations to separate
the peer effects in preferences and consideration sets. This allows us to
recover the set (and type) of connections between the agents in the network. We
then use this information to recover the random preferences and the attention
mechanisms of each agent. These nonparametric identification results allow
unrestricted heterogeneity across agents and do not rely on the variation of
either covariates or the set of available options (or menus). We apply our
results to model expansion decisions by coffee chains and find evidence of
limited consideration. We simulate counterfactual predictions and show how
limited consideration slows down competition.

General Economics;Economics