  We model parking in urban centers as a set of parallel queues and overlay a
game theoretic structure that allows us to compare the user-selected (Nash)
equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium. We model arriving drivers as
utility maximizers and consider the game in which observing the queue length is
free as well as the game in which drivers must pay to observe the queue length.
In both games, drivers must decide between balking and joining. We compare the
Nash induced welfare to the socially optimal welfare. We find that gains to
welfare do not require full information penetration---meaning, for social
welfare to increase, not everyone needs to pay to observe. Through simulation,
we explore a more complex scenario where drivers decide based the queueing game
whether or not to enter a collection of queues over a network. We examine the
occupancy-congestion relationship, an important relationship for determining
the impact of parking resources on overall traffic congestion. Our simulated
models use parameters informed by real-world data collected by the Seattle
Department of Transportation.

Systems and Control;Computer Science and Game Theory