  The software defined networking paradigm relies on the programmability of the
network to automatically perform management and reconfiguration tasks. The
result of adopting this programmability feature is twofold: first by designing
new solutions and, second, by concurrently making room for the exploitation of
new security threats. As a malfunction in the controller software may lead to a
collapse of the network, assessing the security of solutions before their
deployment, is a major concern in SDNs. In light of this, we have conducted a
comprehensive review of the literature on the experimental security analysis of
the control plane in SDNs, with an emphasis on vulnerabilities of the
controller software. Additionally, we have introduced a taxonomy of the
techniques found in the literature with regard to the experimental security
analysis of SDN controller software. Furthermore, a comparative study has been
carried out of existing experimental approaches considering the security
requirements defined by the Open Network Foundation (ONF). As a result, we
highlighted that there is a need for a standardization of the methodologies
employed for automated security analysis, that can meet the appropriate
requirements, and support the development of reliable and secure software for
SDNs.

Networking and Internet Architecture;Cryptography and Security