  In crowdsourcing markets, there are two different type jobs, i.e. homogeneous
jobs and heterogeneous jobs, which need to be allocated to workers. Incentive
mechanisms are essential to attract extensive user participating for achieving
good service quality, especially under a given budget constraint condition. To
this end, recently, Singer et al. propose a novel class of auction mechanisms
for determining near-optimal prices of tasks for crowdsourcing markets
constrained by the given budget. Their mechanisms are very useful to motivate
extensive user to truthfully participate in crowdsourcing markets. Although
they are so important, there still exist many security and privacy challenges
in real-life environments. In this paper, we present a general
privacy-preserving verifiable incentive mechanism for crowdsourcing markets
with the budget constraint, not only to exploit how to protect the bids and
assignments' privacy, and the chosen winners' privacy in crowdsourcing markets
with homogeneous jobs and heterogeneous jobs and identity privacy from users,
but also to make the verifiable payment between the platform and users for
crowdsourcing applications. Results show that our general privacy-preserving
verifiable incentive mechanisms achieve the same results as the generic one
without privacy preservation.

Computer Science and Game Theory;Cryptography and Security