  Our main purpose here is to study some qualitative aspects of space and time.
These include the notion of space and time regarded as the containers of
respectively bodies and events, the divisibility of space, and the
unrepeatability of events. We thereof argue that the ideas of an empty space,
portions of empty space and a homogenous space are misleading when they are
applied to realized space, and that they are therefore not suitable for space
as a condition of corporeal world (as it is often assumed). We also show that
smallest (indivisible) and "final" ("ultimate") parts of space and bodies have,
at most, a conventional character, and not a "fundamental" one (as it is
usually claimed). With respect to time and events, analogous conclusions
follow. However, we claim that between space and time there exist rather big
qualitative differences, which make time's nature much more difficult to grasp
than that of space. In this sense, we discuss the impossibility of repetition
of events and some of its applications in modern science, notably,
probabilistic and statistical science. Some other implications of this study in
conceptual ("philosophical") aspects of modern physics are briefly discussed,
such as the "timeless" interpretation of general relativity, the notion of
space-time, among others. Finally, some considerations about the usual
conception and the scope of modern science in general, and modern physics in
particular, are addressed throughout the article.

History and Philosophy of Physics;General Physics