  We consider the platoon matching problem for a set of trucks with the same
origin, but different destinations. It is assumed that the vehicles benefit
from traveling in a platoon for instance through reduced fuel consumption. The
vehicles belong to different fleet owners and their strategic interaction is
modeled as a non-cooperative game where the vehicle actions are their departure
times. Each truck has a preferred departure time and its utility function is
defined as the difference between its benefit from platooning and the cost of
deviating from its preferred departure time. We show that the platoon matching
game is an exact potential game. An algorithm based on best response dynamics
is proposed for finding a Nash equilibrium of the game. At a Nash equilibrium,
vehicles with the same departure time are matched to form a platoon. Finally,
the total fuel reduction at the Nash equilibrium is studied and compared with
that of a cooperative matching solution where a common utility function for all
vehicles is optimized.

Systems and Control;Systems and Control