  The Shapley value is one of the most important solution concepts in
cooperative game theory. In coalitional games without externalities, it allows
to compute a unique payoff division that meets certain desirable fairness
axioms. However, in many realistic applications where externalities are
present, Shapley's axioms fail to indicate such a unique division.
Consequently, there are many extensions of Shapley value to the environment
with externalities proposed in the literature built upon additional axioms. Two
important such extensions are "externality-free" value by Pham Do and Norde and
value that "absorbed all externalities" by McQuillin. They are good reference
points in a space of potential payoff divisions for coalitional games with
externalities as they limit the space at two opposite extremes. In a recent,
important publication, De Clippel and Serrano presented a marginality-based
axiomatization of the value by Pham Do Norde. In this paper, we propose a dual
approach to marginality which allows us to derive the value of McQuillin. Thus,
we close the picture outlined by De Clippel and Serrano.

Computer Science and Game Theory