  In this paper we consider an extension to the classical definition of
congestion games (CG) in which multiple users share the same set of resources
and their payoff for using any resource is a function of the total number of
users sharing it. The classical congestion games enjoy some very appealing
properties, including the existence of a Nash equilibrium and that every
improvement path is finite and leads to such a NE (also called the finite
improvement property or FIP), which is also a local optimum to a potential
function. On the other hand, this class of games does not model well the
congestion or resource sharing in a wireless context, a prominent feature of
which is spatial reuse. What this translates to in the context of a congestion
game is that a users payoff for using a resource (interpreted as a channel) is
a function of the its number of its interfering users sharing that channel,
rather than the total number among all users. This makes the problem quite
different. We will call this the congestion game with resource reuse (CG-RR).
In this paper we study intrinsic properties of such a game; in particular, we
seek to address under what conditions on the underlying network this game
possesses the FIP or NE. We also discuss the implications of these results when
applied to wireless spectrum sharing

Computer Science and Game Theory;Multiagent Systems