  We study the problem of screening in decision-making processes under
uncertainty, focusing on the impact of adding an additional screening stage,
commonly known as a 'gatekeeper.' While our primary analysis is rooted in the
context of job market hiring, the principles and findings are broadly
applicable to areas such as educational admissions, healthcare patient
selection, and financial loan approvals. The gatekeeper's role is to assess
applicants' suitability before significant investments are made. Our study
reveals that while gatekeepers are designed to streamline the selection process
by filtering out less likely candidates, they can sometimes inadvertently
affect the candidates' own decision-making process. We explore the conditions
under which the introduction of a gatekeeper can enhance or impede the
efficiency of these processes. Additionally, we consider how adjusting
gatekeeping strategies might impact the accuracy of selection decisions. Our
research also extends to scenarios where gatekeeping is influenced by
historical biases, particularly in competitive settings like hiring. We
discover that candidates confronted with a statistically biased gatekeeping
process are more likely to withdraw from applying, thereby perpetuating the
previously mentioned historical biases. The study suggests that measures such
as affirmative action can be effective in addressing these biases. While
centered on hiring, the insights and methodologies from our study have
significant implications for a wide range of fields where screening and
gatekeeping are integral.

Theoretical Economics;Computer Science and Game Theory