  An adversary who aims to steal a black-box model repeatedly queries the model
via a prediction API to learn a function that approximates its decision
boundary. Adversarial approximation is non-trivial because of the enormous
combinations of model architectures, parameters, and features to explore. In
this context, the adversary resorts to a best-effort strategy that yields the
closest approximation. This paper explores best-effort adversarial
approximation of a black-box malware classifier in the most challenging
setting, where the adversary's knowledge is limited to a prediction label for a
given input. Beginning with a limited input set for the black-box classifier,
we leverage feature representation mapping and cross-domain transferability to
approximate a black-box malware classifier by locally training a substitute.
Our approach approximates the target model with different feature types for the
target and the substitute model while also using non-overlapping data for
training the target, training the substitute, and the comparison of the two. We
evaluate the effectiveness of our approach against two black-box classifiers
trained on Windows Portable Executables (PEs). Against a Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN) trained on raw byte sequences of PEs, our approach achieves a 92%
accurate substitute (trained on pixel representations of PEs), and nearly 90%
prediction agreement between the target and the substitute model. Against a
97.8% accurate gradient boosted decision tree trained on static PE features,
our 91% accurate substitute agrees with the black-box on 90% of predictions,
suggesting the strength of our purely black-box approximation.

Cryptography and Security;Machine Learning