  In this paper we study resource allocation in decentralized information local
public good networks. A network is a local public good network if each user's
actions directly affect the utility of an arbitrary subset of network users. We
consider networks where each user knows only that part of the network that
either affects or is affected by it. Furthermore, each user's utility and
action space are its private information, and each user is a self utility
maximizer. This network model is motivated by several applications including
wireless communications and online advertising. For this network model we
formulate a decentralized resource allocation problem and develop a
decentralized resource allocation mechanism (game form) that possesses the
following properties: (i) All Nash equilibria of the game induced by the
mechanism result in allocations that are optimal solutions of the corresponding
centralized resource allocation problem (Nash implementation). (ii) All users
voluntarily participate in the allocation process specified by the mechanism
(individual rationality). (iii) The mechanism results in budget balance at all
Nash equilibria and off equilibrium.

Computer Science and Game Theory