  In this paper we discuss the so called "quantum omelette" created by Bohr and
Heisenberg through the mix of (ontic) objective accounts and (epistemic)
subjective ones within the analysis of Quantum Mechanics (QM). We will begin by
addressing the difficult relation between ontology and epistemology within the
history of both physics and philosophy. We will then argue that the present
"quantum omelette" is being presently cooked in two opposite directions: the
first scrambling ontological problems with epistemological solutions and the
second scrambling epistemic approaches with ontological questions. A good
example of the former is a new type of argumentation strategy attempting to
justify the use of decoherence, namely, the "For All Practical Purposes"
(shortly known as FAPP) type of justification. We will argue that 'FAPP-type
solutions' remain, at best, epistemological answers which not only escape the
ontological questions at stake -regarding the quantum to classical limit- but
also turn the original problem completely meaningless. The latter omelette can
be witnessed in relation to some criticisms raised against the epistemic
Bayesian approach to QM (shortly known as QBism). We will argue that QBists
have produced a consistent scheme that might allow us to begin to unscramble
-at least part of- the "quantum omelette". In this respect, we will show why
the epistemic QBist approach is safe from several (ontological) criticisms it
has recently received (see [42, 47, 48]). We end our paper with a discussion
about the importance of ontological approaches within foundations of QM.

Quantum Physics;History and Philosophy of Physics