  Many real-world scenarios involve teams of agents that have to coordinate
their actions to reach a shared goal. We focus on the setting in which a team
of agents faces an opponent in a zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Team
members can coordinate their strategies before the beginning of the game, but
are unable to communicate during the playing phase of the game. This is the
case, for example, in Bridge, collusion in poker, and collusion in bidding. In
this setting, model-free RL methods are oftentimes unable to capture
coordination because agents' policies are executed in a decentralized fashion.
Our first contribution is a game-theoretic centralized training regimen to
effectively perform trajectory sampling so as to foster team coordination. When
team members can observe each other actions, we show that this approach
provably yields equilibrium strategies. Then, we introduce a signaling-based
framework to represent team coordinated strategies given a buffer of past
experiences. Each team member's policy is parametrized as a neural network
whose output is conditioned on a suitable exogenous signal, drawn from a
learned probability distribution. By combining these two elements, we
empirically show convergence to coordinated equilibria in cases where previous
state-of-the-art multi-agent RL algorithms did not.

Multiagent Systems;Artificial Intelligence;Computer Science and Game Theory;Machine Learning