  In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the regulatory framework for credit
union operations has become a subject of controversy. Competing financial
enterprises such as thrifts and other banks have argued that credit unions have
received preferential treatment under existing tax and regulatory codes,
whereas credit unions complained of undue restrictions on their ability to
scale up and increase their scope of operations. Building on previous location
models, this analysis focuses on credit union headquarter locations immediately
following the 2008 financial crisis. We offer a new perspective for
understanding credit union behavior based on central place theory, new
industrial organization literature, and credit union location analysis. Our
findings indicate that credit unions avoid locating near other lending
institutions, instead operating in areas with a low concentration of other
banks. This finding provides evidence that credit unions serve niche markets,
product differential, and are not a significant source of direct competition
for thrifts and other banks.

General Economics;Economics