  Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are ubiquitously relied upon for
positioning and timing. Detection and prevention of attacks against GNSS have
been researched over the last decades, but many of these attacks and
countermeasures were evaluated based on simulation. This work contributes to
the experimental investigation of GNSS vulnerabilities, implementing a
relay/replay attack with off-the-shelf hardware. Operating at the signal level,
this attack type is not hindered by cryptographically protected transmissions,
such as Galileo's Open Signals Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA). The
attack we investigate involves two colluding adversaries, relaying signals over
large distances, to effectively spoof a GNSS receiver. We demonstrate the
attack using off-the-shelf hardware, we investigate the requirements for such
successful colluding attacks, and how they can be enhanced, e.g., allowing for
finer adversarial control over the victim receiver.

Cryptography and Security