  To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a
leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function.
However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and
influence the final game outcome. Through a carefully contrived payoff function
misreported to the learning leader, the follower may induce an outcome that
benefits him more, compared to the ones when he truthfully behaves.
  We study the follower's optimal manipulation via such strategic behaviors in
extensive-form games. Followers' different attitudes are taken into account. An
optimistic follower maximizes his true utility among all game outcomes that can
be induced by some payoff function. A pessimistic follower only considers
misreporting payoff functions that induce a unique game outcome. For all the
settings considered in this paper, we characterize all the possible game
outcomes that can be induced successfully. We show that it is polynomial-time
tractable for the follower to find the optimal way of misreporting his private
payoff information. Our work completely resolves this follower's optimal
manipulation problem on an extensive-form game tree.

Computer Science and Game Theory;Artificial Intelligence;Data Structures and Algorithms;Theoretical Economics