  We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with
additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and
efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and
Pareto-optimality. While envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations may not exist
for arbitrary utility profiles, previous work has shown that such allocations
exist with high probability assuming that all agents' values for all items are
independently drawn from a common distribution. In this paper, we consider a
generalization of this model where each agent's utilities are drawn
independently from a distribution specific to the agent. We show that envy-free
and Pareto-optimal allocations are likely to exist in this asymmetric model
when $m=\Omega\left(n\log n\right)$, which is tight up to a log log gap that
also remains open in the symmetric subsetting. Furthermore, these guarantees
can be achieved by a polynomial-time algorithm.

Computer Science and Game Theory