  This paper studies the equilibrium pricing of asset shares in the presence of
dynamic private information. The market consists of a risk-neutral informed
agent who observes the firm value, noise traders, and competitive market makers
who set share prices using the total order flow as a noisy signal of the
insider's information. I provide a characterization of all optimal strategies,
and prove existence of both Markovian and non Markovian equilibria by deriving
closed form solutions for the optimal order process of the informed trader and
the optimal pricing rule of the market maker. The consideration of non
Markovian equilibrium is relevant since the market maker might decide to
re-weight past information after receiving a new signal. Also, I show that a)
there is a unique Markovian equilibrium price process which allows the insider
to trade undetected, and that b) the presence of an insider increases the
market informational efficiency, in particular for times close to dividend
payment.

Mathematical Finance;Probability