  LTE/LTE-Advanced networks are known to be vulnerable to denial-of-service and
loss-of-service attacks from smart jammers. In this article, the interaction
between a smart jammer and LTE network is modeled as an infinite-horizon,
zero-sum, asymmetric repeated game. The smart jammer and eNode B are modeled as
the informed and the uninformed player, respectively. The main purpose of this
article is to construct efficient suboptimal strategies for both players that
can be used to solve the above-mentioned infinite-horizon repeated game with
asymmetric and incomplete information. It has been shown in game-theoretic
literature that security strategies provide optimal solution in zero-sum games.
It is also shown that both players' security strategies in an infinite-horizon
asymmetric game depend only on the history of the informed player's actions.
However, fixed-sized sufficient statistics are needed for both players to solve
the above-mentioned game efficiently. The smart jammer uses its evolving belief
state as the fixed-sized sufficient statistics for the repeated game. Whereas,
the LTE network (uninformed player) uses worst-case regret of its security
strategy and its anti-discounted update as the fixed-sized sufficient
statistics. Although fixed-sized sufficient statistics are employed by both
players, optimal security strategy computation in {\lambda}-discounted
asymmetric games is still hard to perform because of non-convexity. Hence, the
problem is convexified in this article by devising `approximated' security
strategies for both players that are based on approximated optimal game value.
However, `approximated' strategies require full monitoring. Therefore, a
simplistic yet effective `expected' strategy is also constructed for the LTE
network that does not require full monitoring. The simulation results show that
the smart jammer plays non-revealing and misleading strategies.

Computer Science and Game Theory;Systems and Control;Signal Processing