  Collective motion is ubiquitous in nature; groups of animals, such as fish,
birds, and ungulates appear to move as a whole, exhibiting a rich behavioral
repertoire that ranges from directed movement to milling to disordered
swarming. Typically, such macroscopic patterns arise from decentralized, local
interactions among constituent components (e.g., individual fish in a school).
Preeminent models of this process describe individuals as self-propelled
particles, subject to self-generated motion and 'social forces' such as
short-range repulsion and long-range attraction or alignment. However,
organisms are not particles; they are probabilistic decision-makers. Here, we
introduce an approach to modelling collective behavior based on active
inference. This cognitive framework casts behavior as the consequence of a
single imperative: to minimize surprise. We demonstrate that many
empirically-observed collective phenomena, including cohesion, milling and
directed motion, emerge naturally when considering behavior as driven by active
Bayesian inference -- without explicitly building behavioral rules or goals
into individual agents. Furthermore, we show that active inference can recover
and generalize the classical notion of social forces as agents attempt to
suppress prediction errors that conflict with their expectations. By exploring
the parameter space of the belief-based model, we reveal non-trivial
relationships between the individual beliefs and group properties like
polarization and the tendency to visit different collective states. We also
explore how individual beliefs about uncertainty determine collective
decision-making accuracy. Finally, we show how agents can update their
generative model over time, resulting in groups that are collectively more
sensitive to external fluctuations and encode information more robustly.

Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems;Multiagent Systems;Neurons and Cognition