  The International Monetary Fund is one of the largest international
organizations using a weighted voting system. The weights of its 188 members
are determined by a fixed amount of basic votes plus some extra votes for
so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDR). On January 26, 2016, the conditions for
the SDRs were increased at the 14th General Quota Review, which drastically
changed the corresponding voting weights. However, since the share of voting
weights in general is not equal to the influence, of a committee member on the
committees overall decision, so-called power indices were introduced. So far
the power distribution of the IMF was only computed by either approximation
procedures or smaller games than then entire Board of Governors consisting of
188 members. We improve existing algorithms, based on dynamic programming, for
the computation of power indices and provide the exact results for the IMF
Board of Governors before and after the increase of voting weights. Tuned
low-level details of the algorithms allow the repeated routine with sparse
computational resources and can of course be applied to other large voting
bodies. It turned out that the Banzhaf power shares are rather sensitive to
changes of the quota.

Computer Science and Game Theory