  Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial
examples, and these malicious samples often transfer, i.e., they maintain their
effectiveness even against other models. With great efforts delved into the
transferability of adversarial examples, surprisingly, less attention has been
paid to its impact on real-world deep learning deployment. In this paper, we
investigate the transferability of adversarial examples across a wide range of
real-world computer vision tasks, including image classification, explicit
content detection, optical character recognition (OCR), and object detection.
It represents the cybercriminal's situation where an ensemble of different
detection mechanisms need to be evaded all at once. We propose practical attack
that overcomes existing attacks' limitation of requiring task-specific loss
functions by targeting on the `dispersion' of internal feature map. We report
evaluation on four different computer vision tasks provided by Google Cloud
Vision APIs to show how our approach outperforms existing attacks by degrading
performance of multiple CV tasks by a large margin with only modest
perturbations.

Machine Learning;Cryptography and Security