comment: >
  
  I would argue that moral intuition is far less like a sense and more like an emotion. I think it's telling that moral institutions align strongly with things we emotionally want to be true. And if we think about how moral intuitions work, it would lead to some pretty absurd results if we tested senses like sight and hearing the same way. For example, there's no such thing as an empirical claim that's too offensive to be true.
context: Colour is an interesting example, because we can see objects that reflect the same colours of light differently based on context. A classic example would be an optical illusion where two squares of the same colour appear to be different colours because on is contrasted with a lighter background.
  Out of curiosity, how do you resolve difference between two people's moral sense? 
  If for example two people disagree about whether two light are the same colour, we could compare the wavelenghts of light they emit and measure it objectivly.
  What's the equivilent for one person saying we should have the death penalty and one person saying we shouldn't? >
  
  It's possible a scientific comparison could be made, we just aren't there yet. For example, we could identify brain processes that create "happiness", figure out how to quantify those levels of happiness, and then if we agree to use a utilitarian framework, we could base our decisions on what maximizes happiness in the world. >
  
  But any choice of what framework to value is going to be subjective. Wanting to maximise happiness or wellbeing is a subjective assessment, even if you can objectivly quantify those values.
  "This action maxmises happiness." doesn't objectively mean "We should take that action." >
  
  That's where I would disagree it is subjective. There might be subjectivity involved when discussing the finer details, but certain frameworks are clearly more objectively correct than others. A world where everyone suffers is clearly more wrong than a world where everyone is happy. >
  
  That's just the assertion that there's objective morality, it doesn't demonstrate it. 
  Though that raises an interesting question of how you can transition from morality being subjective to objective. Where the threshold is that morality becomes objective as large scales. >
  
  The problem is that it gets tricky when you start comparing different entities. Does happiness for some justify despair for others? Do higher levels of happiness for some justify lower levels for others? That's where things become less obvious, leading to philosophical and political disagreements. >
  
  But that still doens't explain how you conclude that happyness for everyone is objectively good, or that good isn't inherently subjective. >
  
  Because there is absolutely no way to counter it. If we are just claiming that happiness is good in a vacuum, this doesn't involve any tricky comparison like the ones I mentioned above. It's just a straightforward, self evident statement. >
  
  The reason why moral intuition isn't treated like a sense is because morality is taught, it isn't genetic or biological at all.  Also why objective morality cannot exist, since morality is inherently subjective.  
  The issue with this logic is that morality isn't like...say...taste.   We can disagree that on whether something tastes good or not, but not that it has a taste.  With that, it can be easy to make the association between morality as a concept vs the ability to address morality (i.e. the 'tastes good or bad' vs 'can taste').  
  With that said, you could argue this is a function of a sense.   Like we can, in a way, sense if something is immoral, but that's not a particularly accurate, in the same way we don't 'sense' a snake is dangerous, but we do know it is by seeing it and associating prior knowledge to it.  
  In a less long winded way, morality is basically just the name we gave to how we expect others to behave within the internal framework of self preservation.   It isn't a way for us to experience the world in any way, it is a way to work together for our own survival >
  
  
  The reason why moral intuition isn't treated like a sense is because morality is taught, it isn't genetic or biological at all.
  
  Exact morals are taught, but one can find plenty of studies showing some intrinsic sense of justice in infants, for example.
  
  We can disagree that on whether something tastes good or not, but not that it has a taste.
  
  We certainly can disagree on that - people lose their sense of taste.  Same goes for any sense. >
  
  Out of interest, can you point me to those studies? >
  
  
  I don't see a fundamental reason to privilege other senses above moral intuition.
  
  What comes to mind for me is that there is a universality to -red- or -loud- that there isn't to -right- and -wrong-. -Loud- as a result from hearing is something everybody who is able to hear is going to relate to. 
  But right and wrong are yet another step removed, as you need two senses to work together. One to actually perceive whatever you are thinking about (like an ear and hearing) and then the foundation that you build your judgement from (it's late at night and you think it improper to be loud at night). To me that second step just seems to wildly differ between different people. >
  
  
  But I've seen an interesting point here: what is moral intuition? It seems to function like a sense; it's not that different to feel that something is wrong and to feel that my hands are in front of me. But the project of "explaining and making coherent our sensory inputs" isn't dismissed as a domain of knowledge; it's actually well-regarded, and often called science. Like moral intuition, the (rest of) our senses are evolved, we sometimes disagree (whether by hallucinations or just different perspectives), and so on.
  
  There is broad agreement about sensory data. And cases with disagreement tend to be down to identifiable differences in processing of the data, not the sensory information itself. For instance, in the famous blue or gold dress illusion, everyone is receiving the same wavelengths of light, but our second order processing recognizes things like what a color fabric looks like in shadow differently.
  There is not such broad agreement about moral intuition, precisely because it is, if anything a third level processing of information.
  When we get sensory information, we're receiving photons, or scent particles or pressure felt by nerve endings. The sensory data itself is just recognizing that physical input.
  Then our brain works to reconstruct from that raw data a picture of the world based on that- and it's actually an interesting field of study in both philosophy and science how that happens.
  But when we have a moral intuition, it's not direct input from the physical world being sensed. We first have that sensory data, we see or hear information. THEN our processing makes sense of what those photons and vibrations mean and construct a model of the situation. THEN we somehow create a moral judgement based on that situation, drawing on some combination of mirror neuron reactions, social upbringing and other personal and biological sources. But the important thing is we're not at all directly sensing something, we're processing, and we're processing a couple layers deep. >
  
  
  There is not such broad agreement about moral intuition, precisely because it is, if anything a third level processing of information.
  
  Sure there is.  Essentially every human being on the planet will agree that hurting someone in what they consider to be their tribe is wrong.  The disputes arise more on how we generalize that, or don't.
  
  But when we have a moral intuition, it's not direct input from the physical world being sensed. We first have that sensory data, we see or hear information. THEN our processing makes sense of what those photons and vibrations mean and construct a model of the situation.
  
  As far as I've always heard, what we see is also well-established to be a model of the situation with substantial processing involved to generate an intelligible image.  Humans don't experience much without processing it, including, if I'm not mistaken...
  
  THEN we somehow create a moral judgement based on that situation, drawing on some combination of mirror neuron reactions, social upbringing and other personal and biological sources. 
  
  Extensive heuristics based on our experience and so on. >
  
  You are confusing a sense and a feeling. A sense is something that allows you to get input from the external world, even though your interpretation of it will be relative. As such, we can hope to rely on our senses in order to learn facts about the world.
  Feelings don't say anything about the outside world, they only say something about how you experience things. If you think a food is gross, for example, it doesn't say anything objective about the food, it's a value judgment your brain is making. Feelings of "wrong" are based on the same sort of phenomenon. If morality is objective, it has to be based on facts and logic. >
  
  
  A sense is something that allows you to get input from the external world
  
  Proprioception is a sense.  But more generally, the correspondence to the external world is an assumption we make because it holds up with experience: sight is an internal state, but it tends to correlate to certain external conditions; so does a sense of "wrong".
  
  Thinking a food is gross, for example, doesn't say anything objective about the food, it's a value judgment your brain is making.
  
  "Gross" also doesn't have a distinct sensation; it's strictly a judgment.  The physical feeling of disgust is a package of sensations which may correspond, or not, to anything external.
  
  If morality is objective, it has to be based on facts and logic.
  
  Objective morality and moral facts are (at least to the level of discourse I'm familiar with) more or less the same dispute, so that's just begging the question. >
  
  
  sight is an internal state, but it tends to correlate to certain external conditions; so does a sense of "wrong".
  
  How so? What is the external consistency that allows us to say our sense of wrong is right? The only consistency we might find is that a lot of people agree about it. There is no feedback from the external world.
  
  The physical feeling of disgust is a package of sensations which may correspond, or not, to anything external.
  
  It's the same with the sense of wrong. >
  
  
  The only consistency we might find is that a lot of people agree about it. There is no feedback from the external world.
  
  Feedback from the external world through... our senses?  The only mechanism for feedback we have is our senses, so framing it this way simply begs the question by assuming initially that moral intuition doesn't count as a sense.
  
  It's the same with the sense of wrong.
  
  Yes.  And with a variety of physical sensations; it would be unreasonable to deny that the physical sensations of disgust (as distinct from the emotion) provide physical data.
  And, for that matter, it's the same with the usual senses - it's fairly normal to hear with no stimulus (e.g. ringing ears) and not unheard of to see with no stimulus (hallucinations). >
  
  
  it would be unreasonable to deny that the physical sensations of disgust (as distinct from the emotion) provide physical data.
  
  They provide physical data, but they don't justify that the thing should be disgusting. It only tells you that your body is wired to find it disgusting.
  The data provided could be that it carries illnesses or is unhealthy. But relying on your feelings of disgust is not a reliable way to determine those things. We have science for that. And then, we have to decide if we consider those things wrong or not. You can't make the jump that something is wrong because it is disgusting. By the same token, you can't make the jump that because something feels wrong then it must be wrong. This could be an unreliable sensation. >
  
  I'd have to look it up, but basically the issue lies in the fact that morality is not one thing, it's like five different things, and different people prioritize those differently. I wanna say they are: Reciprocity, Respect for Authority, Care, Loyalty, and Purity. However, clearly these things can be interpreted in a LOT of different ways, hence, people arguing about ethics. Not to say it's impossible to quantify those, but there it is. >
  
  
  It seems to function like a sense; it's not that different to feel that something is wrong and to feel that my hands are in front of me
  
  It doesn't function like a sense at all. With senses we have sensory receptors that respond to specific stimuli and send signals to the brain that are then processed to provide what we consider perception. This is not how "intuition" works at all.
  Regardless of the culture or era you grow up in, if you touch something hot you're going to feel a burning sensation. But culture can greatly impact our moral intuition. When and how we grew up will impact our moral intuition. Today most people find slavery immoral. That wasn't always the case. Moral intuition does not function like a sense. >
  
  How does moral intuition function like a sense? Our sensory organs (when functioning properly) respond to specific, measurable stimuli that (in principle) anyone can observe. It’s taking in external (to the brain) information. There is no such corollary when it comes to morality, no equivalent to ‘sensory inputs’. >
  
  I guess everything can kind of be viewed as a black box with input and output - including senses and morality. It is just that to us, it is seemingly easier to understand what parts of those inputs and outputs are for the senses - it is more concrete. But for morality, it is seemingly more vague and hard to grasp.