comment: >
  
  Because there is absolutely no way to counter it. If we are just claiming that happiness is good in a vacuum, this doesn't involve any tricky comparison like the ones I mentioned above. It's just a straightforward, self evident statement.
context: Colour is an interesting example, because we can see objects that reflect the same colours of light differently based on context. A classic example would be an optical illusion where two squares of the same colour appear to be different colours because on is contrasted with a lighter background.
  Out of curiosity, how do you resolve difference between two people's moral sense? 
  If for example two people disagree about whether two light are the same colour, we could compare the wavelenghts of light they emit and measure it objectivly.
  What's the equivilent for one person saying we should have the death penalty and one person saying we shouldn't? >
  
  It's possible a scientific comparison could be made, we just aren't there yet. For example, we could identify brain processes that create "happiness", figure out how to quantify those levels of happiness, and then if we agree to use a utilitarian framework, we could base our decisions on what maximizes happiness in the world. >
  
  But any choice of what framework to value is going to be subjective. Wanting to maximise happiness or wellbeing is a subjective assessment, even if you can objectivly quantify those values.
  "This action maxmises happiness." doesn't objectively mean "We should take that action." >
  
  That's where I would disagree it is subjective. There might be subjectivity involved when discussing the finer details, but certain frameworks are clearly more objectively correct than others. A world where everyone suffers is clearly more wrong than a world where everyone is happy. >
  
  That's just the assertion that there's objective morality, it doesn't demonstrate it. 
  Though that raises an interesting question of how you can transition from morality being subjective to objective. Where the threshold is that morality becomes objective as large scales. >
  
  The problem is that it gets tricky when you start comparing different entities. Does happiness for some justify despair for others? Do higher levels of happiness for some justify lower levels for others? That's where things become less obvious, leading to philosophical and political disagreements. >
  
  But that still doens't explain how you conclude that happyness for everyone is objectively good, or that good isn't inherently subjective.