comment: >
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  If I understand, you are asking if a moral reflex (feeling bad about laughing at injured kid) is different than other senses (sight, smell, hearing, touch, etc.)
  Yes, they are all sourced (triggered, started, eletrified?) in different sections of the brain, so this should be enough to classify as different than other senses. >
  
  For neuroscience, fair point.  Is that relevant to how we reason about it in this context?
  ...well, at least it conceivably could be that we should treat different "levels" of impression differently. !delta.  I wouldn't be able to confidently commit one way or the other, but it's at least good reason to doubt (and quite the oversight on my end). >
  
  Confirmed: 1 delta awarded to /u/NotGnnaLie (1∆).
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  Colour is an interesting example, because we can see objects that reflect the same colours of light differently based on context. A classic example would be an optical illusion where two squares of the same colour appear to be different colours because on is contrasted with a lighter background.
  Out of curiosity, how do you resolve difference between two people's moral sense? 
  If for example two people disagree about whether two light are the same colour, we could compare the wavelenghts of light they emit and measure it objectivly.
  What's the equivilent for one person saying we should have the death penalty and one person saying we shouldn't? >
  
  It's possible a scientific comparison could be made, we just aren't there yet. For example, we could identify brain processes that create "happiness", figure out how to quantify those levels of happiness, and then if we agree to use a utilitarian framework, we could base our decisions on what maximizes happiness in the world. >
  
  But any choice of what framework to value is going to be subjective. Wanting to maximise happiness or wellbeing is a subjective assessment, even if you can objectivly quantify those values.
  "This action maxmises happiness." doesn't objectively mean "We should take that action." >
  
  That's where I would disagree it is subjective. There might be subjectivity involved when discussing the finer details, but certain frameworks are clearly more objectively correct than others. A world where everyone suffers is clearly more wrong than a world where everyone is happy. >
  
  That's just the assertion that there's objective morality, it doesn't demonstrate it. 
  Though that raises an interesting question of how you can transition from morality being subjective to objective. Where the threshold is that morality becomes objective as large scales. >
  
  The problem is that it gets tricky when you start comparing different entities. Does happiness for some justify despair for others? Do higher levels of happiness for some justify lower levels for others? That's where things become less obvious, leading to philosophical and political disagreements. >
  
  But that still doens't explain how you conclude that happyness for everyone is objectively good, or that good isn't inherently subjective. >
  
  Because there is absolutely no way to counter it. If we are just claiming that happiness is good in a vacuum, this doesn't involve any tricky comparison like the ones I mentioned above. It's just a straightforward, self evident statement. >
  
  So how do you react to someone saying 'humans don't deserve happiness.' That people being happy is unjust because suffering is what they deserve. >
  
  Those people are being irrational because of religious thinking or something.
  Or maybe they are masochists and they actually enjoy the suffering. >
  
  The reason why moral intuition isn't treated like a sense is because morality is taught, it isn't genetic or biological at all.  Also why objective morality cannot exist, since morality is inherently subjective.  
  The issue with this logic is that morality isn't like...say...taste.   We can disagree that on whether something tastes good or not, but not that it has a taste.  With that, it can be easy to make the association between morality as a concept vs the ability to address morality (i.e. the 'tastes good or bad' vs 'can taste').  
  With that said, you could argue this is a function of a sense.   Like we can, in a way, sense if something is immoral, but that's not a particularly accurate, in the same way we don't 'sense' a snake is dangerous, but we do know it is by seeing it and associating prior knowledge to it.  
  In a less long winded way, morality is basically just the name we gave to how we expect others to behave within the internal framework of self preservation.   It isn't a way for us to experience the world in any way, it is a way to work together for our own survival >
  
  
  The reason why moral intuition isn't treated like a sense is because morality is taught, it isn't genetic or biological at all.
  
  Exact morals are taught, but one can find plenty of studies showing some intrinsic sense of justice in infants, for example.
  
  We can disagree that on whether something tastes good or not, but not that it has a taste.
  
  We certainly can disagree on that - people lose their sense of taste.  Same goes for any sense. >
  
  Out of interest, can you point me to those studies? >
  
  This doesn't show an "intrinsic" set of justice. These children were raised by people being instilled with social expectations of justice. All this shows is they have A sense of justice, but it's still entirely likely this sense of justice is given to them by their caregivers rather than some innate sense of justice. >
  
  
  I don't see a fundamental reason to privilege other senses above moral intuition.
  
  What comes to mind for me is that there is a universality to -red- or -loud- that there isn't to -right- and -wrong-. -Loud- as a result from hearing is something everybody who is able to hear is going to relate to. 
  But right and wrong are yet another step removed, as you need two senses to work together. One to actually perceive whatever you are thinking about (like an ear and hearing) and then the foundation that you build your judgement from (it's late at night and you think it improper to be loud at night). To me that second step just seems to wildly differ between different people. >
  
  
  But I've seen an interesting point here: what is moral intuition? It seems to function like a sense; it's not that different to feel that something is wrong and to feel that my hands are in front of me. But the project of "explaining and making coherent our sensory inputs" isn't dismissed as a domain of knowledge; it's actually well-regarded, and often called science. Like moral intuition, the (rest of) our senses are evolved, we sometimes disagree (whether by hallucinations or just different perspectives), and so on.
  
  There is broad agreement about sensory data. And cases with disagreement tend to be down to identifiable differences in processing of the data, not the sensory information itself. For instance, in the famous blue or gold dress illusion, everyone is receiving the same wavelengths of light, but our second order processing recognizes things like what a color fabric looks like in shadow differently.
  There is not such broad agreement about moral intuition, precisely because it is, if anything a third level processing of information.
  When we get sensory information, we're receiving photons, or scent particles or pressure felt by nerve endings. The sensory data itself is just recognizing that physical input.
  Then our brain works to reconstruct from that raw data a picture of the world based on that- and it's actually an interesting field of study in both philosophy and science how that happens.
  But when we have a moral intuition, it's not direct input from the physical world being sensed. We first have that sensory data, we see or hear information. THEN our processing makes sense of what those photons and vibrations mean and construct a model of the situation. THEN we somehow create a moral judgement based on that situation, drawing on some combination of mirror neuron reactions, social upbringing and other personal and biological sources. But the important thing is we're not at all directly sensing something, we're processing, and we're processing a couple layers deep. >
  
  
  There is not such broad agreement about moral intuition, precisely because it is, if anything a third level processing of information.
  
  Sure there is.  Essentially every human being on the planet will agree that hurting someone in what they consider to be their tribe is wrong.  The disputes arise more on how we generalize that, or don't.
  
  But when we have a moral intuition, it's not direct input from the physical world being sensed. We first have that sensory data, we see or hear information. THEN our processing makes sense of what those photons and vibrations mean and construct a model of the situation.
  
  As far as I've always heard, what we see is also well-established to be a model of the situation with substantial processing involved to generate an intelligible image.  Humans don't experience much without processing it, including, if I'm not mistaken...
  
  THEN we somehow create a moral judgement based on that situation, drawing on some combination of mirror neuron reactions, social upbringing and other personal and biological sources. 
  
  Extensive heuristics based on our experience and so on. >
  
  
  Sure there is. Essentially every human being on the planet will agree that hurting someone in what they consider to be their tribe is wrong. The disputes arise more on how we generalize that, or don't.
  
  Did you see the switch you made there?
  When you talk about moral agreement you talk about broad, abstract principles. When you talk about the way moral intuition resembles a sense, you talk about immediate reaction to a particular stimulus. >
  
  
  When you talk about moral agreement you talk about broad, abstract principles. When you talk about the way moral intuition resembles a sense, you talk about immediate reaction to a particular stimulus.
  
  Sorry, it's hard to phrase these things unambiguously.  I meant when you actually see it happening in front of you, not as an abstract concept. >
  
  You are confusing a sense and a feeling. A sense is something that allows you to get input from the external world, even though your interpretation of it will be relative. As such, we can hope to rely on our senses in order to learn facts about the world.
  Feelings don't say anything about the outside world, they only say something about how you experience things. If you think a food is gross, for example, it doesn't say anything objective about the food, it's a value judgment your brain is making. Feelings of "wrong" are based on the same sort of phenomenon. If morality is objective, it has to be based on facts and logic. >
  
  
  A sense is something that allows you to get input from the external world
  
  Proprioception is a sense.  But more generally, the correspondence to the external world is an assumption we make because it holds up with experience: sight is an internal state, but it tends to correlate to certain external conditions; so does a sense of "wrong".
  
  Thinking a food is gross, for example, doesn't say anything objective about the food, it's a value judgment your brain is making.
  
  "Gross" also doesn't have a distinct sensation; it's strictly a judgment.  The physical feeling of disgust is a package of sensations which may correspond, or not, to anything external.
  
  If morality is objective, it has to be based on facts and logic.
  
  Objective morality and moral facts are (at least to the level of discourse I'm familiar with) more or less the same dispute, so that's just begging the question. >
  
  
  sight is an internal state, but it tends to correlate to certain external conditions; so does a sense of "wrong".
  
  How so? What is the external consistency that allows us to say our sense of wrong is right? The only consistency we might find is that a lot of people agree about it. There is no feedback from the external world.
  
  The physical feeling of disgust is a package of sensations which may correspond, or not, to anything external.
  
  It's the same with the sense of wrong. >
  
  
  The only consistency we might find is that a lot of people agree about it. There is no feedback from the external world.
  
  Feedback from the external world through... our senses?  The only mechanism for feedback we have is our senses, so framing it this way simply begs the question by assuming initially that moral intuition doesn't count as a sense.
  
  It's the same with the sense of wrong.
  
  Yes.  And with a variety of physical sensations; it would be unreasonable to deny that the physical sensations of disgust (as distinct from the emotion) provide physical data.
  And, for that matter, it's the same with the usual senses - it's fairly normal to hear with no stimulus (e.g. ringing ears) and not unheard of to see with no stimulus (hallucinations). >
  
  
  it would be unreasonable to deny that the physical sensations of disgust (as distinct from the emotion) provide physical data.
  
  They provide physical data, but they don't justify that the thing should be disgusting. It only tells you that your body is wired to find it disgusting.
  The data provided could be that it carries illnesses or is unhealthy. But relying on your feelings is not a vey reliable way to determine those things. We have science for that. And then, we have to decide if we consider those things wrong or not. You can't make the jump that something is wrong because it is disgusting. By the same token, you can't make the jump that because something feels wrong then it must be wrong. It could be a sign, but you still have to use facts and logic to determine if it is actually wrong. >
  
  
  They provide physical data, but they don't justify that the thing 
  should
   be disgusting. It only tells you that your body is wired to find it disgusting.
  
  True; we are also wired to see things as red.  With the "should" here, I'm not arguing that disgust is the relevant sense; it's not exactly disgust that someone will feel if you punch their friend.
  
  By the same token, you can't make the jump that because something feels wrong then it must be wrong. It could be a sign, but you still have to use facts and logic to determine if it is actually wrong.
  
  Well, yes, the subject of dispute is whether that sensation is relevant to identifying facts.  Not everything that looks red is actually emitting or reflecting that wavelength, but it's relevant data. >
  
  I'd have to look it up, but basically the issue lies in the fact that morality is not one thing, it's like five different things, and different people prioritize those differently. I wanna say they are: Reciprocity, Respect for Authority, Care, Loyalty, and Purity. However, clearly these things can be interpreted in a LOT of different ways, hence, people arguing about ethics. Not to say it's impossible to quantify those, but there it is. >
  
  
  It seems to function like a sense; it's not that different to feel that something is wrong and to feel that my hands are in front of me
  
  It doesn't function like a sense at all. With senses we have sensory receptors that respond to specific stimuli and send signals to the brain that are then processed to provide what we consider perception. This is not how "intuition" works at all.
  Regardless of the culture or era you grow up in, if you touch something hot you're going to feel a burning sensation. But culture can greatly impact our moral intuition. When and how we grew up will impact our moral intuition. Today most people find slavery immoral. That wasn't always the case. Moral intuition does not function like a sense. >
  
  How does moral intuition function like a sense? Our sensory organs (when functioning properly) respond to specific, measurable stimuli that (in principle) anyone can observe. It’s taking in external (to the brain) information. There is no such corollary when it comes to morality, no equivalent to ‘sensory inputs’. >
  
  I guess everything can kind of be viewed as a black box with input and output - including senses and morality. It is just that to us, it is seemingly easier to understand what parts of those inputs and outputs are for the senses - it is more concrete. But for morality, it is seemingly more vague and hard to grasp. >
  
  I would argue that moral intuition is far less like a sense and more like an emotion. I think it's telling that moral institutions align strongly with things we emotionally want to be true. And if we think about how moral intuitions work, it would lead to some pretty absurd results if we tested senses like sight and hearing the same way. For example, there's no such thing as an empirical claim that's too offensive to be true. >
  
  
  And if we think about how moral intuitions work, it would lead to some pretty absurd results if we tested senses like sight and hearing the same way. For example, there's no such thing as an empirical claim that's too offensive to be true.
  
  Why would we assume that offensiveness is a criterion of truth?  We don't assume that lights that hurt our eyes therefore don't exist.  Offensiveness, if treating moral intuitions as a sense, would be evidence of... offensiveness, much like red is evidence of red (and then we do the work to correlate that to a wavelength and so on). >
  
  Treating moral intuitions as senses implies treating how a thing makes us feel as evidence for the truth value of some moral claim, i.e. "this is offensive therefore it's wrong." But we can clearly see that this not only doesn't work but is a commonly recognized fallacy (the argument from dignity) for sight or hearing or touch. >
  
  
  Treating moral intuitions as senses implies treating how a thing makes us feel as evidence for the truth value of some moral claim, i.e. "this is offensive therefore it's wrong."
  
  "Wrong" (in this sense) isn't equivalent to "false". >
  
  If moral intuitions are senses then that implies that moral claims have a truth value that we can determine through those senses and saying that something is right or wrong is making a statement about what's morally true. >
  
  Yes, but that doesn't mean that offensive would equate to false.  Wrong, with a truth value - not false. >
  
  It means that offense would equate to some moral claim being true or false since that's what having a truth value entails. >
  
  Yes, it would mean that, if offense is taken as a moral claim, the claim "that is offensive" is true or false.  It would not mean that "the statement which is offensive is false". >
  
  Let me clarify with a concrete example. Let's say someone claims that murder is good. What does moral intuition being a sense mean in relation to that claim? Can we just observe that it's not true because it contains our intuitions, the same way we can reject a claim like "the sky is pink" because it contains what we see? >
  
  "Murder is good", in the abstract, is more something you would test with an established theory, like "the Earth orbits the Sun": it's not really immediately sensible (compare to, say, "my moral impression is that you were wrong to murder my friend Bob"), but rather something we have to reason about. >
  
  
  Why should we treat the experience of "wrong" any different?
  
  How do you measure, objectively, how "wrong" something is?
  And does moral subjectivity preclude the existence of such a scale? I would argue that it does (as opposed to measuring wavelengths, which have objective measures).
  I guess it comes down to the idea that you can't really measure subjective things.
  E.g., I can't tell you "how much" more I like one band over another >
  
  
  How do you measure, objectively, how "wrong" something is?
  
  How do you measure objectively how red something is?  First you look across humans to identify consistent - never strictly universal - correlations with physical phenomena, then you use that as the criterion.  There are certainly equally broad correlations with basic phenomena, like "hurting my friend".
  
  And does moral subjectivity preclude the existence of such a scale? I would argue that it does (as opposed to measuring wavelengths, which have objective measures). I guess it comes down to the idea that you can't really measure subjective things.
  
  It being uncorrelated to anything objective is the matter in dispute. >
  
  
  How do you measure objectively how red something is?
  
  The length of a wave is objective, but exactly how wrong it is to steal a cookie, is not.
  People debate the severity of punishments for crime constantly (for example): why would that be if morality were objective?
  
  It being uncorrelated to anything objective is the matter in dispute.
  
  Right, that's why we're here. How good something is has no objective measure; therefore, your view should change. >
  
  
  The length of a wave is objective
  
  Yep, but that's not red, it's a wavelength.  We determined that the wavelength usually corresponds to the human experience of red by working off of what people tend to agree on and looking for correlations.  Some people won't see it as red anyway (e.g. colorblindness).
  What I'm asking is this: what, specifically, about the sense of "stealing my cookie is wrong" - which would have a similar level of agreement to "my shirt is red"* - makes it inappropriate to investigate for correlations, much as we might look for a wavelength to explain color?
  To be clear, I mean essentially everyone would have an immediate sense that stealing their* cookie is wrong, not that stealing quantum_dan's cookie is wrong. >
  
  
  Yep, but that's not red, it's a wavelength
  
  You can measure the wavelength to determine that it's red light because it's objective fact.
  You can figure out from the data you're looking at that it represents "red" light.
  You can't look at the data about how wrong something is (because it's impossible) and determine that it's a cookie theft. 
  And, 'how wrong' something is will vary person-to-person, unlike the wavelengths of light that create 'red' to our eyes.
  Again, this is just objectivity vs. subjectivity, which cannot be reconciled in this context. >
  
  
  You can figure out from the data you're looking at that it represents "red" light.
  
  Right.  If you were hypothetically starting from scratch, you'd get together a large sample of people, identify what light sources they see as what colors, and look for correlations.  The overwhelming majority will agree that so-and-so wavelengths are red.
  
  You can't look at the data about how wrong something is (because it's impossible) and determine that it's a cookie theft because 'how wrong' it is will vary person-to-person.
  
  Sure you can.  Give a large sample of people a cookie and then randomly take it away.  The overwhelming majority will have an immediate sense that it is wrong.  We have a measurable phenomenon corresponding to a particular sensory response.
  The standard assumption is that this is somehow invalid, yes.  I am asking why that is the case. >
  
  
  The overwhelming majority will agree that so-and-so wavelengths are red.
  
  Mathematical measures are not the same as opinions, no matter how many people hold said opinion.
  Are you saying that the majority's taste in music is "correct"?
  If 7 out of 10 people like purple, is purple really the "best" color?
  Am I 'wrong' if I don't like a food "the overwhelming majority agrees" is good?
  No, of course not.
  
  Give a large sample of people a cookie and then randomly take it away. The overwhelming majority will have an immediate sense that it is wrong. We have a measurable phenomenon corresponding to a particular sensory response.
  
  A binary "yes" or "no" is not actually a 'measurement,' though. And, further, some people may not even care about the cookie; therefore, 'how wrong' it is is in no way 'objective'
  
  The standard assumption is that this is somehow invalid, yes. I am asking why that is the case.
  
  Because it's subjective. Majority-opinions are not facts, they're still opinions.
  The fact that people would disagree about how wrong it is (or if it's even wrong at all) is the difference.
  People will not disagree on things you can actually measure because they're verifiable and repeatable and not dependent on the measurer's mood (for example), whereas 'how wrong' something is entirely depends on mood and subjectivity, culture, etc. >
  
  
  People will not disagree on things you can actually measure because they're verifiable and repeatable
  
  I agree with everything you wrote except this unfortunately lol. We Americans in particular love to disagree about easily verifiable and repeatable things lol >
  
  Ok, can you show me (credible) debates about wavelength measurements?
  How fast light travels?
  How far Paris is from New York?
  These measurements are different from someone's feelings about a 'wrong' action.
  Is a cookie theft 7-units of wrong? 8? Actually, it would depend on the subjects mood when you ask. And if that degree depends on the subjects mood, which 'degree of wrongness' does, then it's not a fact, it's an opinion.
  The distance between Paris and New York doesn't shift based on mood, does it? Then they are not 'the same.'
  
  We Americans in particular love to disagree about easily verifiable and repeatable things lol
  
  This in no way makes "every" disagreement valid, though. So this doesn't actually speak to your point, or mine.
  It just reminds everyone how uneducated Americans can be about what opinions are vs. facts.
  Think of flat-Earthers: they're just flat-out wrong (pun intended).
  Certain facts have no subjectivity. Just because some Americans don't know what facts are doesn't negate them as facts.
  Your view is conflating opinion with fact, which is a false conflation. >
  
  
  Ok, can you show me (credible) debates about wavelength measurements?
  
  Credible debates? No. But I can show you mountains of stupid people who don’t believe very obvious things. Sorry I wasn’t attacking you or anything like I said I very much agreed with your points more a joke at flat earthers, anti evolution, climate denial etc.‘s expense. >
  
  A common example agaisnt moral intuition is incest.(assume consenting adults). Stop giggiling in the back. Incest is generally considered morally wrong. But in cases where there is no reproduction causing genetic issues, why? Normally we consider sexual activity between consenting adults to be fine.
  It's hard to avoid the conclusion that it's because we find it disgusting. But something being disgusting doesnt make it wrong. Otherwise we are no better than toddlers declaring that peas are bad. 
  But this is kind of what we do. 
  So the test for moral intuition would be. If incest is wrong, justify why. If you cant do that without your answer essentially being "because its icky" then our moral intuition is no better than a personal preference like preferring vanilla ice cream. >
  
  
  Why do you need some outside force or structure to justify your own beliefs.
  
  I personally don't - I am entirely comfortable with, for lack of a better term and not meaning it in a technical sense, moral perspectivism.  What I'm posting about here is an interesting factual claim that might require me to revise my stance, if it holds up. >
  
  The "feel" in "feel that something is wrong" is different than the "feel" in feel my hands in front of me. The former means something along the lines of "to be aware of by instinct or inference; to believe or think", while the latter means "to perceive by a physical sensation coming from discrete end organs (as of the skin or muscles)". Just because they use the same verb doesn't mean they are meaningfully similar experiences. Otherwise any belief would be a "sense", given that one can always say "I feel the earth is flat". >
  
  
  The former means something along the lines of "to be aware of by instinct or inference; to believe or think" ... Otherwise any belief would be a "sense", given that one can always say "I feel the earth is flat".
  
  There are physical sensations associated with moral intuition that are not associated with general belief.  No, it's not the same style of "feeling" as, say, touch... but what about a sense like just "knowing" where my hands are?  I think these are similar sensations. >
  
  Knowing where one’s hands are is an example of proprioception, and is similar to the second definition in my previous comment.
  I don’t agree that there are physical sensations associated with moral intuition but not with non-moral intuition. >
  
  
  I don’t agree that there are physical sensations associated with moral intuition but not with non-moral intuition.
  
  (I'll note here that my use of the word "intuition" is admittedly ambiguous; I don't know a better word for it.)
  So you would say there's no particular sensation associated with the immediate impression that "this is wrong" or similar?
  (I have to run, but I'll check back in a few hours.) >
  
  Physical sensation? No. I might feel outraged, or horrified, or devastated, or a general sense of injustice, but there are obviously all emotions, not physical sensations.