comment: >
  
  I'm telling you we aren't wrong though. We know how organisms experience distress, we know how they respond to it and show outward signs of it, we know their neurological anatomy, we aren't wrong. The only thing we cannot know is how it actually feels to them. We do know how stress feels and we know all these things about them. We aren't wrong to empathize with it being in distress.
context: Taxonomic classifications are built out around recognizable similarities in animals biological structures. Setting aside how precisely we understand brain function in non-human species, it takes little effort to see that most vertebrates are structured in a way that heavily overlaps with human biology. They are similar. Why would you assume they aren't?
  And if you go from a "philosophical" perspective and ask how we could possibly know what they feel, you may well extend that to humans. How do I know you experience qualia?
  You're getting so caught up in precision that you're overlooking obvious similarities. Can't see the forest through the trees. That animal has a nervous system and demonstrates a pain response. How much more detail do you need to be able to understand it feels pain?
  For creatures without similar structures, we don't make the same assumptions about pain and suffering. Do carrots feel fear? Do mollusks weep? No one thinks about that. >
  
  Except for the fact that many people claim to empathize with invertebrates or even plants. You clearly understand enough biology to think clearly about this topic. All I'm saying is that everyone else should make an attempt to meet that minimum standard of understanding. >
  
  
  many people claim to empathize with invertebrates or even plants.
  
  Very few claim to empathize with invertebrates, but crabs and lobsters and other crustaceans have pain responses too, so it's still not an example on your side here. My point was that people see similarity in responses and behavior, and that's made possible by our very real similarities. That Doctor so-and-so knows the science of it all and Dennis your vegan high school classmate does not makes no difference. 
  The science explains why we have similarities and why we see and feel similarities that allow us to empathize. But not knowing the science doesn't invalidate the emotional feeling—the right answer is right whether or not you show your work.
  As for people who "empathize" with plants, they fall into two categories: [1] People who are personifying plants because it's a useful rhetorical technique, but don't actually believe plants feel complex emotions; and [2] extreme outliers that don't merit serious consideration. If "crazy people believe crazy things" is your best defense here, you've lost focus on the "philosophical" question your post is about. >
  
  We might just have different experiences when it comes to people's claims about the range of their empathy. I know plenty of not-crazy individuals who either claim to or speak as though they understand the feelings of an invertebrate. I might have a sampling bias because I spend a lot of time around animals and teach HS biology. 
  I agree that the right answer is right whether or not you show your work, but showing your work is necessary to distinguish between the right answer and an answer that seems right, but isn't. It certainly seems like it'd be painful to be a clam being eaten by an octopus. This might even illicit a little bit of sadness for the clam... But upon further reflection I might realize that clams don't have centralized nervous systems. They don't have families that will mourn their demise. They don't have unfulfilled dreams or projects. I've now shown my work and realized that my previous answer was incorrect. >
  
  Again, you're pushing out to extremes to justify your position, but if you have to run all the way to mollusks, animals without a central nervous system, to stick to your view, it sure seems like you've abandoned it for every animal that does have one.
  And for those, there's no need for people to show their work. Because they're right. Someone else can check it for them. Verified. Instinct to empathy validated. >
  
  Not necessarily. I used mollusks because it's a simple and easy case. I can make my point without getting lost in the details. We can ask the same question for animals of increasing complexity. You begin at simple cases, then move on to more difficult cases. >
  
  
  Most people's opinions about animal rights and animal suffering are informed by a gut feeling of indignation/guilt/sadness when they see an animal responding to a negative stimulus.
  
  Sure I guess I agree with this. I'd say it goes beyond pain though. 
  
  Here's the issue: pain is a really complex set of processes that are intrinsically linked to the structure of an organism's nervous system.
  
  Agreed
  
  Feeling empathy for an abused dog only makes sense insofar as the dog has neurological structural similarities to you. 
  
  Disagree. While that helps, humans like to map our own experiences onto other organisms regardless of how similar they are to us neurologically. 
  
  The further away we get on the evolutionary tree, the less empathy makes sense. Empathy for a spider? An octopus? A crow?
  
  Again disagree. People don't take evolutionary closeness into account in any context. Organisms that may be distantly related to us could have evolved similar attributes via convergent evolution. This is completely irrelevant. 
  
  Uf you claim to care about animals you should drop any pretense to understand what they're feeling and get a basic understanding of the variety of nervous systems in the animal kingdom and how those systems respond to stimuli.
  
  You seem to disagree with yourself here. One, with lots of animals we have a pretty good understanding of their behavior when in distress, take any lab animal as an example of this. Second, many animals will exhibit traits similar to humans when in distress. Now I'll agree that it's important to not misinterpret an animals responses but some are quite unmistakable and we do research into animal behavior as well. 
  It seems to me you're proposing we stop using empathy so we can research how animals react and experience distress then, once we know, go back to using empathy. >
  
  I don't see how you disagree with points 3 and 4. You're making claims about what humans like to do and what humans actually do. I'm making claims about what humans have rational justification for doing. I'm saying that it's nonsensical to attempt to empathize with a spider. I know that some people will disregard the structural dissimilarities, and that's the problem. >
  
  I'm saying, why? Why can't we empathize with it? Is your requirement that we understand how spiders exhibit stress, discomfort or distress? If so, and if someone knows those expressions and a spider is expressing them why is empathizing with it bad? Why is it bad to empathize when a bug misses a meal? Or when it loses a leg? Certainly it isn't experiencing those things as a human would but I see no reason why we can't empathize with them. >
  
  Then you're not empathizing, you're just having a strange fantasy about the inner life of bugs. >
  
  What? No, you're empathizing with a creature in distress. >
  
  If you're experiencing something and I claim to be empathizing with you, but I completely mischaracterize the experience you're actually having, am I actually empathizing? >
  
  Yeah well that's why I was saying we know how animals experience and respond to stress. You don't have to know exactly how it feels to empathize with an animal experiencing stress. >
  
  How wrong can I be about the experience of another organism for my "empathy" to be reduced to a fantasy?