>


when morality is so subjective

Who gets to decide when morality is subjective? I'm sure both you and I agree abortion is subjective, but there are many pro-choicers and pro-lifers who beg to differ. This judgment is, of course, subjective as well...

I think it's generally a mistake to think in absolutes when it's such a controversial issue. 

A couple of hundred years ago, slavery was also controversial and "subjective." but I wouldn't fault an abolitionist for being absolute in their conviction.
All morality is subjective. Why is murder wrong? Because we decided it is. Because we decided to value life. For no reason other than the fact that that's what we decided. But that doesn't mean we just throw up our hands, say "murder is subjective," and move on with our day.
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I think it's worth reflection on what you're actually saying here. What does "if the fetus was a fully fledged person" actually mean? Does it make any sense to call something that has no capacity to exist outside a womb as "fully fledged"? But if the hypothetical is that the fetus is more fully developed than a real fetus, then that changes everything because you could probably just do a c section as an alternative. But for that matter, are newborn babies even "fully fledged people"?
I guess I'm trying to understand what you actually mean here without turning your view into a pointless tautology. Like, if you define "fully fledged person" as something that by definition should be saved, then of course you should save it, but I don't think you've really said anything. >

hmm, since the pro-life position is usually comparative to a baby, I'd say "fully-fledged" should mean "equivalent to a newborn infant in moral worth"

But if the hypothetical is that the fetus is more fully developed than a real fetus, then that changes everything because you could probably just do a c section

but since it's a thought experiment, let's just say we can't. 
This is a kind of circular reasoning on your part, no? The idea that only fully-fledged people can be delivered via c-section because fully-fledged people must be able to survive outside the womb. >

I think about the organ donation more like this: say you were to get into a horrible car accident, you were 100% at fault no way around it. You and the person you hit were rushed to the hospital, they lost a lot of blood, the hospital didn’t have their blood type, you were the exact same blood type. Would it be okay for the government to FORCE you to give them your blood? Yeah you’d be rude not too, but should the government have the ability to tell that you HAVE to give your blood? >

imo, yes.
and they kind of already do, since you'd be charged with manslaughter if they die. >

You’d be charged with manslaughter because hitting someone with your car is illegal. Not because you declined to give them your blood. >

right, and you'd be charged with manslaughter in the abortion case because forcing someone into existence without their consent and then starving them should be illegal. >

What you’re talking about making illegal is sex. You can’t “force someone into existence.” You can have sex, but sex only has a chance of conception. A chance that, I might add, is impossible to eliminate no matter how hard you try. 
Do you actually think sex should be illegal? >

no.
drunk driving is illegal, but driving is legal.
similarly, if you have sex without contraception, you should not be able to get an abortion. but if you have sex with contraception, you're golden. >

How would you go about determining who did or didn't use contraception before allowing them to get an abortion? >

That’s for the court to decide beyond a reasonable doubt.
Then again, I’m not talking about legal implementation, only moral imperative. >

I mean, in this comment thread at least you were very much talking about legality. >

Well my bad >

The analogy that was most convincing to me was this:
There are thousands of people on transplant lists around the country/world. Many of them will die imminently without a transplant. Most of us could spare some parts of some organs. Should we have to give them to others? What if it has no lasting effect on our health? What if it does but that it’s mild? Very few people would support a scheme where people had to share organs with others.
Now, many of those organs are still useable when you die. Should we force everyone to, upon their deaths, donate all of the organs that remain in good working form to save the lives of others?
If you believe a person should have autonomy over what happens to their body even AFTER death, despite the fact that taking away that autonomy would save the lives of others, then you cannot be anti-choice even if the fetus is a fully-fledged person from conception. >


Very few people would support a scheme where people had to share organs with others.

yep. but the distinction in my analogy is that u gave them the disease.

Should we force everyone to, upon their deaths, donate all of the organs that remain in good working form to save the lives of others?

ABSOLUTELY >

To further your analogy with a more realistic and natural example, imagine you cause a car accident. Your fault and all that. The other person affected now requires some form of transplant or blood transfusion. Could any form of authority force you to give your blood/organs to this person just because it is your fault that they are in this situation? >

Because the next argument will be that the driver of the other car tacitly consented to this by driving, take it a step further and say that you injure an innocent child in the back seat of the other car who had no choice in being in the car or not.
Do you owe the innocent child a blood transfusion because you caused it's injury and are the sole reason it requires one? Of course not. >


Do you owe the innocent child a blood transfusion because you caused it's injury and are the sole reason it requires one?

yes. 

Of course not.

why not? >

Because you have bodily autonomy, and it is a ridiculous restriction of your most basic right to force someone to give a part of themselves medically to another person for any reason. Show me anywhere on the planet where a person is legally obligated to do it, show me a respectable moral framework where they're morally obligated to do it. You can't because it isn't an obligation because your right to your body outweighs basically everything, your right to life, a random third parties right to life, your victim's right to life are all traditionally subsumed to your right to not have your blood and organs harvested without your consent. >

this is not an argument. this is just a paragraph of "but bodily autonomy is absolute and better than all other rights because I said so" >

Singapore is the only country on the planet with opt-out organ donation post mortem, and even they let you opt out, of donating organs, after you aren't even a person anymore. That's how absolute bodily autonomy is as a general legal right, your right to no touchy your dead organs is worth more than anyone else's right to life. That's how things are, it isn't because I said so, it is how every government on the earth rules it. >


it is how every government on the earth rules it.

the CCP, north Korea, Republicans, middle eastern states, Russia, etc. happen to disagree...

it is how every government on the earth rules it.

funny, I remember these things called vaccine mandates... >


the CCP, north Korea, Republicans, middle eastern states, Russia, etc. happen to disagree...

They don't disagree, (well China has stolen organs from people who've been executed before, but they weren't supposed to do that, by their own laws). All those places agree at the absolute nature of bodily autonomy in general, they do however mysteriously make a carve out when it comes to the specific bodily autonomy of a woman carrying a child. 
I just don't see what the difference is, why would Republicans, the CCP, Russia all agree that corpses deserve the right to keep their organs functions to themselves but pregnant women don't? Why should we model our behavior on regressive authoritarian countries?

funny, I remember these things called vaccine mandates...

So, the thing about that is that the mandate wasn't a requirement. It was a logical list of things and places you couldn't do if you were unvaccinated because you'd be a risk to others. Like suspending your license if you're blind or otherwise disabled in certain ways, or quarantining someone with Ebola (or typhoid, or smallpox, or the plague for historical examples). 
It isn't that you don't have a right to your own body, it's that you don't have a right to play laser tag and go to Canada if you're potentially carrying a deadly disease. >

Now, I feel that you are having trouble pursuing arguments on morality because (1) your arguments are too reductive, and (2) you are struggling to bridge the gap between what you feel are intuitively (im)moral, and what established principles say is immoral.
Now, let me go through with you a couple of ethical theories that can perhaps help you better articulate the standards for morality. Because our "what is intuitively moral" is varied, unreliable, and often fail to resolve deliberate examples (or puzzles)
Deontology says that you do "what is right in the moment". This usually means that we establish some inviolable rules and principles to act upon. In this aspect, we can for example, say that murder is wrong, because killing someone (ending an existence) in itself is wrong (even if it may lead to better outcomes in the end) and so we shouldn't commit murder. You say that "no rights are absolute", but that might not be true under some deontological views - rights may be absolute, as long as they are not in contention with other rights.
(Act) Utilitarianism says that you should "maximise satisfaction (or happiness)" of everyone (or more commonly known as "the end justifies the means"). The famous utilitarian example is the trolley problem (diverting a travelling trolley to kill 1 person instead of 3), but here is an alternative example that is more relevant. Under utilitarianism, if five people in an hospital need different organs for a transplant, you can (theoretically) take someone in the hospital and give their relevant organs to the dying patients (assuming compatibility, of course). Needless to say, this hospital example doesn't really fly under any deontological theory.
But act utilitarianism also runs into problems - if you could walk in a hospital, and be randomly chosen to be killed for the sake of other people, no one would go to the hospital anymore! Rule utilitarianism comes in here - which says that we should establish rules to follow that give the maximum happiness to everyone.
Now, you can see how both deontology and rule utilitarianism are valid, similar in that we establish inviolable rules to follow (and similar enough to be confused in the debates of right to life vs bodily autonomy), but they can be  valid to different people.
From my view, the pro-life view is strongly related to deontology, and pro-choice view towards act utilitarianism. The pro-life view may arise from some deontological theory that champions the right to life above all others (the most 'absolute' right of them all, whichever origins it come from), and so it is immoral to violate this right, even if it is for the sake of other 'rights'.
The pro-choice view is strongly related to rule utilitarianism, and might come from some rule-utilitarian view, where the right to bodily autonomy is (one of) the most important. After all, if you could be forced to do things against your will in a hospital, no one would go to a hospital, and this stance in the abortion debate is a mere consequence of this view that champions bodily autonomy.
I cannot convince you that both views are valid, and we subscribe to each view, perhaps based on our moral intuition. I don't think this is a debate of rights, IMO this is a conflict of moral theories masquerading as a discussion of rights.
I can also comment on the vaccination policy in another thread with respect to rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism (in my view) does not support mandatory vaccination policies, but you can bet that it protects others' ability (or autonomy) to protect oneself from catching COVID, and "being shunned for being unvaccinated" is also a consequence of that. >

Wouldn't the pro-choice position also fall into deontology? Just, instead of championing the right to life, it champions the right to bodily autonomy? (in the case where the fetus is prescribed personhood) 
If we agree that both are based mostly or purely on personal intuitions, why put them into different buckets? 
Also, if the core differences on this topic stem from personal moral intuitions, its seems reasonable for that to be the position from which people argue about it. Even if it results in mostly people talking past each other. >


The only cure is 9 months of blood transfusions from you and you only, which will automatically be delivered via teleportation. You decide to have sex anyway, and your child gets leukemia. Would it be moral for you to exercise ur bodily autonomy and terminate the automatic blood transfusions?

This analogy is a bit silly, because it unnecessarily involves "magical" technology. The more natural analogy is to say that the blood transfusions are just ordinary blood transfusions, or to specify that the baby must remain physically connected to you for nine months.
But regardless, the obvious answer to this hypothetical is: yes, of course. The inalienable right to bodily autonomy means that you're never morally obligated to do something like this. Your body is your body: you can't be morally obligated to give it to someone else. (In particular, since this right is inalienable, you can't lose it through your own actions. Your choice to have sex can't have the effect of alienating you from your right to bodily autonomy.) So even as stated, your analogy doesn't seem to prove what you want it to prove. >

It sounds like you believe bodily autonomy trumps the right to life, no matter what.   I’m curious if maybe some of the following hypotheticals would change your mind.
What if the transfusion only had 5 minutes left, and the person wasn’t just a violinist, but a doctor who you knew saved lives on the reg?
What if pregnancy itself only lasted 1 day and was pain free?   
What if you were walking next to a swimming pool and noticed a 2 year old fall in, would it be morally wrong to exercise your right to bodily autonomy and just keep walking? Or is there some level of moral obligation to reach over and pull the child out of the pool?
The level of inconvenience matters in my opinion.  Pregnancy is a massive inconvenience.  Also, if a child were 1000 yards away drowning, I can’t be expected to swim out there to save them.   
Personally, I am prochoice but I do not believe bodily autonomy should trump the right to life in all circumstances. I believe in most circumstances, the right to life trump’s bodily autonomy. As do most people.
The vast majority of people are against 9 month abortions for the purpose of convenience.  Luckily, those types of abortions are super rare anyway. >


What if the transfusion only had 5 minutes left, and the person wasn’t just a violinist, but a doctor who you knew saved lives on the reg?

You have no moral obligation to continue the transfusion.

What if pregnancy itself only lasted 1 day and was pain free?

You have no moral obligation to allow your body to undergo this process. Note that this doesn't mean that you necessarily have a right to kill the fetus: you have a right not to undergo the pregnancy process if you don't want to, and you have a right to medical care that stops that process in the most expedient and safe way possible.

What if you were walking next to a swimming pool and noticed a 2 year old fall in, would it be morally wrong to exercise your right to bodily autonomy and just keep walking? Or is there some level of moral obligation to reach over and pull the child out of the pool?

This doesn't touch on the right to bodily autonomy at all, since it's not interfering with the integrity of your body, not taking away or changing the function of any of its parts. So you do have some level of moral obligation here. >


This doesn't touch on the right to bodily autonomy at all, since it's not interfering with the integrity of your body, not taking away or changing the function of any of its parts. So you do have some level of moral obligation here.

Of course this is an issue of bodily autonomy. By stating that there is a moral obligation to save the child, this places limitations on what one can do with their body. 
Your initial post stated "Your body is your body: you can't be morally obligated to give it to someone else" in the case of blood transfusions. We can say something similar in the case of the child drowning. In fact, we can imagine the child needs to climb up your body to get out of the pool for whatever reason. You could also respond with "Your body is your body: you can't be morally obligated to give it to someone else."
Now, you say something about bodily integrity, but that is just a restatement of bodily autonomy, so it gets us nowhere. You then say the drowning child does not take away or change the function of any of your parts.
But this is not true. Just as blood transfusion changes the function of some of your parts (i.e. function of your blood), helping a child changes the function of some of your parts (i.e. the function of your limbs, possibly your heart rate, your brain as it needs to form new intentional states, etc.). >

This is very silly. A child climbing up my body to get out of a pool is not in any sense giving my body to someone else. It's still my body; I am just using it to get the child out of the pool. Nor does it change the function of my body: changing its state does not change its function. >


A child climbing up my body to get out of a pool is not in any sense giving my body to someone else. It's still my body;

Of course, it's still your body. But the child is using it, which means you gave the child your body. This also applies during pregnancy. 

Nor does it change the function of my body: changing its state does not change its function. 

Not sure what this distinction is supposed to be getting at. But I addressed function in the last paragraph. >


Of course, it's still your body. But the child is using it, which means you gave the child your body.

No? Allowing someone else to use something it not at all the same as giving them that thing. >

What's the morally relevant difference? >

The difference is that if I use my arm to pull a child out of a pool, it's still my arm the whole time, and it continues to be my arm after I pull the child out. Conversely, if I give blood to a child with leukemia, it's no longer my blood. >

So you think bodily autonomy is violated only if you permanently lose bodily tissue?
Two questions:

If I rape someone without permanently taking away any of their bodily tissue, is that not a violation of bodily autonomy?
Let's say that we know that if you try to save the drowning child in the pool, you will scrap your knee, resulting in a small loss of blood. Now, would you say that there is no obligation to save the drowning child, because this violates your bodily autonomy? >

Others have mentioned the bodily autonomy issue, that it doesn't make sense to require someone give up part of their body for someone else. However, I feel that we are getting the morality and legality issues confused.
Legally speaking, it doesn't make sense to have laws against abortion even if the fetus is a person. This is because legally speaking, you are never required to give up your body for someone else's life. You never have to give blood or organs if you don't want to, even after you die! In any situation where someone would rely on your body for their own life, no matter who's "fault" it is or how you got into the situation, the law prioritizes bodily autonomy, except in conservative areas where they want to put down women.
But what about morally speaking? That's what this is really about. Morally speaking, it would be considered wrong and awful for someone to get really drunk and injure themself in an avoidable way and then take up a bed at the emergency room. However, we still treat them and try to save them anyways. Morality is very subjective. It would certainly be wrong to have unprotected sex and then use abortion as your form of birth control. But the question is how often does this really happen? How often do women have abortions willy-nilly without considering the consequences? The answer is never. An abortion is a traumatic surgery physically and psychologically. And I think that's a piece missing from the conservative argument that abortions are wrong because they end human life. You can't divorce the theory from the reality, which is that abortion is expensive, rare, and traumatic.
So you can argue about the theoretical and about how taking a life is wrong, but you are ignoring the real experiences of women in society. You're not thinking about the many factors they take into account before deciding to go through with it. You're trying to make a blanket statement basically about what is right and wrong without the nuance of the real cases and real stakes. And when morality is so subjective, I think it's generally a mistake to think in absolutes when it's such a controversial issue. So if I could change your view just a bit, I'd hope to make you rethink the absolutes and realize that morality isn't great at making such blanket statements. Even if you say "cold blooded murder is wrong" I can come up with examples of when it might be morally justified. Clearly, the same would be true for abortion.