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You are a consequentialist, if you believe that any action can be good because the ultimate outcome it contributes to is good.
Christians, and by implication their God, are not consequentialists.  They believe that some things are Sins and everything else isn't.  
Sins are morally wrong in and of themselves, completely independently of any causes or consequences they may have.
There is no reason to think that a world run by an omnibenevolent being would contain no sins. It may be that without the opportunity to sin, being moral actually is meaningless, and everyone is better off if the system allows for sin.  It may be that all the sinless universes exist, but it is still good that this universe exist also.  Or it may be some other ineffable thing that human's can't guess or understand.
Not a Christian, but I don't think that's an accurate understanding of the Christian answer to the problem of evil. Most often the argument seems to be that evil is a consequence of God creating beings with free will. Your understanding would imply that Christians believe our reality is the best possible reality, which they obviously do not. >

How could they not? How could an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent deity not create the best of all possible worlds.  
If it could have created a better would and didn't, it's not omnibenevolent. 
If a better world exists, and it can't create it, it's not omnipotent. >

You're just restating the problem of evil here in different terms. I already explained what I think is the most common Christian answer to the problem of evil in the comment above. >

Yeah but that would imply that free will is somehow worth the suffering it brings, also there are studies to show most people have a lot less free will than they think just by changing environmental factors, so in my opinion it's possible free will is an illusion >

Christians do think free will is worth the suffering it brings. They think that a world where everyone was forced to be good and worship God would be less meaningful and therefore less worthwhile compared to a world where everyone willingly chose to be good and worship God despite having the ability not to.
I'm not sure it matters what science implies about free will. Your view specifically addressed Christians and you are thus presumably looking for the Christian perspective on this issue. Christians almost universally believe free will exists. If you want to argue that they're wrong about that, be my guest, but that's a separate conversation from the view of yours we're trying to change in this thread. >

But then the question is shifted, why doesn't god just make a world where everyone is good that's just as meaningful as this one? If he can, but doesn't, he's not omnibenevolent, if he can't, he's not omnipotent. >


make a world where everyone is good that's just as meaningful as this one

Are you proposing that an omnipotent being should be able to change the moral value of something? I guess that gets into the Euthyphro dilemma where we have to ask if what's valuable is determined by God or is valuable independently of him. But I think usually Christians would say that it's the latter. Just like God cannot make 1 + 1 = 3 because that just doesn't logically make sense, he also can't make it meaningful to have a world without free will. That's not inconsistent with the idea of omnipotence. >


Just like God cannot make 1 + 1 = 3 because that just doesn't logically make sense

Pretty sure he could. A lot of miracles straight up defy known laws of reality, and also doesn't Genesis imply that God also made the natural laws? If Jesus can turn water into wine just by touching it, or God could ignite a bush without a lighter, why couldn't he make it so that 1 + 1 = 3? The whole thing with Jesus multiplying fish and loaves of bread already messes with the laws of division. >

There’s a difference between physically impossible and logically impossible. Things like food magically replicating as it changes hands through a crowd, a bush igniting for no reason, water turning into wine, and so on are all physically impossible, but not logically impossible. Things like these cannot happen under ordinary circumstances, but they still make sense to talk about—they’re logically coherent ideas. Making it true that 1 + 1 = 3 is actually logically impossible, in the same vein as making water that isn’t wet, or making a boulder too heavy for an omnipotent entity to lift.