The default OpenSSH key encryption is worse than plaintext
Spoiler: the default SSH RSA key format uses straight MD5 to derive the AES key used to encrypt your RSA private key, which means it's lightning fast to crack (it's "salted", if you want to use that term, with a random IV).The argument LVH makes here ("worse than plaintext") is that because you have to type that password regularly, it's apt to be one of those important passwords you keep in your brain's resident set and derive variants of for different applications. And SSH is basically doing something close to storing it in plaintext. His argument is that the password is probably more important than what it protects. Maybe that's not the case for you.I just think it's batshit that OpenSSH's default is so bad. At the very least: you might as well just not use passwords if you're going to accept that default. If you use curve keys, you get a better (bcrypt) format.While I have you here...Before you contemplate any elaborate new plan to improve the protection of your SSH keys, consider that long-lived SSH credentials are an anti-pattern. If you set up an SSH CA, you can issue time-limited short-term credentials that won't sit on your filesystems and backups for all time waiting to leak access to your servers.