Your Phone Is Your Castle
> Because iOS software, backed by iPhone hardware, actively prevents a customer from installing any software on an iPhone outside of the App Store, it does also prevent attackers from installing malicious software. Because the App Store has rules about how applications (outside of their own) can access customer data, if Apple discovers a competitor like Google or Facebook is violating its privacy rules it can remotely remove their software from iPhones, even internal corporate versions of software owned by Google or Facebook employees.This is a bit inaccurate; first because the App Store has a spotty record of stopping malware from reaching your phone and also because the apps pulled there did not go through the App Store, they were actually sideloaded using enterprise deployment. Apple does have the ability to remotely disable applications downloaded from the App Store, but to my knowledge it has never used this ability.> These companies have built very sophisticated and secure defenses all in the name of protecting you from the world outside their walls, yet in reality the walls are designed to keep you inside much more than they are designed to keep attackers out. The security community often gets so excited about the sophistication of these defenses backed by secure enclaves and strong cryptography that their singular focus on what those defenses mean for attackers blinds them from thinking about what they mean for everyone else.I mean, all you have to do is look at the things that are implemented to see that Apple's goal in many cases is to protect their software, not you. There is custom silicon in every recent iPhone that does nothing but stop modification of kernel code, even in the face of code execution and arbitrary read/write in EL1: interesting from an academic standpoint, but if you stop and think about it for more than a second it's entirely useless for actually protecting users.