Reversing the Petya ransomware with constraint solvers
Well, since we're talking about 16 bit software ...In 1991, my company was sandboxing commercial software. This was for try-before-you-buy. Except, instead of recompiling a crippled version, we would take a retail SKU, encipher the executables and then deliver with a device driver: a VxD. The VxD would hook the low level Int13 IO calls to pass all disk IO through a write-through cache. The installed app could read from anywhere on the disk. But, all attempts to write would copy the changed sectors to the cache. This would allow a perfect uninstall; simply remove the cache and the disk reverts back to its preinstalled state. This was because most software, back in 1991, assumed that you'd never want to uninstall. So, it would scatter its junk all over the place.Now imagine if the VxD was part of the OS. Any downloaded exe could access the HD, but all writes would write-through to a separate cache. That was 25 years ago. This is a roundabout way of asking: how feasible is sandboxing to avoid malware?