Breaking the Ledger Security Model
I was willing to tolerate Ledger's issues here (I'm a user and I've heavily recommended their products) if they fixed them -- the problems never should have happened, but they are marginally better than Trezor in a lot of other ways.Unfortunately, the Ledger team appear to be asshats, so there's every reason to fear using them in the future, even if they've fixed this specific issue.  If they're going to handle a legit issue like this (downplaying it, etc.), I'm not willing to trust them.I'd love to see three products created:1) Split client/server wallets (so you don't need to trust the  operator or your local machine alone); some work has been done on this.  Also, split PC + SGX or phone + secure element wallets.  This is basically software-only in cost, but at higher security, so it would be suitable for $0+ balance accounts.2) A low end ($20?) wallet with a cheap display and button.  If you retailed them at $100 but sold them to providers at $40 they could probably give them away for a lot of accounts; basically like Yubikeys but with displays.3) Some higher-end hardware wallets; essentially HSMs plus display/input.  HSM technology basically stagnated in 1995; there's a lot of need for something better today.  This could be in the $10-50k per unit range for a lot of high-value keys if actually implemented well and in a way which had no "trust us" demons.  There are hundreds or thousands of potential customers, and more by the day.