The story around the Linode hack
Some hopefully-helpful clarifications of the inside baseball talk from just the overview (I haven't read the full zine), enhanced with inside and general knowledge I've gained in my travels on this mortal coil:- HTP claims to have{, had} access to name.com, which Linode currently uses. This access enables an unauthorized party to update authoritative nameservers for your domain; i.e., if you host at Amazon, very likely your authoritative nameservers are Route 53 on your account. HTP would not have access to modify the zone directly through the registrar and would instead have to hijack the entire domain with a working, completely-transferred zone on their own nameservers. For this to go down entirely unnoticed is extraordinarily difficult. I won't say impossible, but damned close without a copy of the zone in hand and with Linode running AXFR disabled (you should be too). There are subzones of linode.com; they wouldn't have gotten them all, and it would have been noticed within minutes.- In order to attack SwiftIRC, to get back at some script kiddies DoS attacking them after their last release (because you know, that's a good target to burn registrar access on and all), HTP decided to backdoor SwiftIRC via their nameservers which are hosted at Linode. That's not the same as the registrar nameservers discussed above, but is instead the DNS data actually stored on a Linode on SwiftIRC's account. They do not hint what they were going to do with it once they had hijacked the nameservers, and I will not theorize. I could guess, though.- Before utilizing their registrar access (from the first bullet point) to hijack the linode.com zone and intercept manager logins silently by redirecting traffic via DNS -- also fairly difficult to pull off without a good linode.com certificate in hand, in terms of keeping the TLS session non-suspicious to a browser -- they instead discovered a zero-day in ColdFusion (Linode's stack) and got in that way. That's much quieter and much more likely to not be noticed. If we take the FBI's actions at HTP's word, the FBI was the only reason Linode was made aware of this outside of HTP's control; a DNS hijack would have been immediately noticed by Linode administrators.- Knowing what I know (let's leave it at that), a successful exploit on Linode's ColdFusion stack entails a database of Linodes, DNS, credit cards, e-mails, addresses, and keys to decrypt the actual card numbers, and a lot more data. You have to decide whether to take HTP at their word that they deleted credit cards. Consider your credit card and all prior credit cards compromised if it were in the system before April.- The access that HTP obtained does not, full stop, lead to root on Linode instances without at least one shutdown job or change of root password job showing up in your Linode's history that you did not ask for. Your Linode's root password is not stored in any Linode system aside from on your Linode itself. Your LISH password, as they say, is, and according to them is stored in plaintext; if you see things on your Linode's console (located under the Remote Access tab) that you did not type, that access was used upon you. If not, it wasn't. If you used the same root password on your Linode that you did for your LISH password, consider that password compromised. I'm suspicious of the claim that they rooted all those (assuming) customers without any of them noticing their Linode being rebooted to apply the new root password to allow HTP in, and I would read that as "potential access" instead of "access". They probably bounced some nmap.org servers to reset their root passwords -- a Linode system requirement -- without fyodor noticing. Which is interesting for a couple reasons.- Also, the access they obtained does not lead to root on the Linode host fleet itself, unless they are holding back some extra access they obtained such as a shared password between the ColdFusion stack and administrator credentials for Linode systems, which I consider unlikely for a couple reasons. With several days to get familiar with the architecture, HTP could have used their database write access to do things on the hosts, but it's a fairly limited set of things. Dumping Linode's database is bad, but root on their hosts is far, far worse, and by indications, I don't think they got it.- How does this relate to the Bitcoin hacks of yesteryear, you ask? The Bitcoin hackers probably got in the exact same way -- Linode hinted at a compromised admin credential, which is close enough to do everything HTP was able to do -- then shut down and reset root passwords on the Bitcoin Linodes they were after, which then gave them filesystem access.So ends clarifications, thus begins conclusions:- PAY ATTENTION WHEN YOUR SERVERS ARE REBOOTED WITHOUT YOUR COMMAND.- PAY ATTENTION WHEN YOUR SERVERS ARE REBOOTED WITHOUT YOUR COMMAND.- Linode added a feature that shoots you an e-mail when your Linode is manipulated in any way via jobs, such as resetting your Linode's root password (a la Bitcoin/HTP hacks). It's depressing they had to do this, but pay attention if you get the mail. External monitoring like Nagios that pages you when your server goes down is also a good idea, as long as it is hosted at another provider.- EDIT: After reading the zine, yet again, /CFIDE is the vector. There's no excuse for not hiding your administrative tools, generally the soft underbelly of the whole smash, from the Internet. None. It's one rewrite in nginx. Match /CFIDE from the public, redirect to /. Done.- EDIT: Again, after looking at how trivial the exploit was, it's probably time to reconsider using Adobe ColdFusion from a business continuity standpoint. Half Linode's fault for not hiding /CFIDE, half Adobe's fault for the engineering missteps that lead to this capability for a remote attacker. We should be just as hard on ColdFusion as we are on Rails.- SwiftIRC is a den of inquity, up there with EFnet; if you run a hosting provider, think twice about permitting SwiftIRC anywhere near you. To reiterate that, Linode was a casualty of someone going after SwiftIRC. Delink their nodes, cancel them, and kick them to the curb if you're interested in preserving your business. Not worth the money. Same with damned near all the IRC networks except OFTC and, to a far lesser extent, Freenode. There will always be targets but harboring SwiftIRC is probably a malicious-actor magnet.- Registrars (and CAs, though that's outside this discussion) are the weak point in the entire system. This is not the first time they have been shown to be so. Linode could be Fort Knox of digital security but if name.com falls over, it's all over; that's entirely outside of Linode's, and your, control. Currently, the registrar market is heavily profit-centric and, personally, I think people spend far too little on a domain in the general case. I would happily pay a registrar a lot more money -- hundreds a year or more -- if their offering were run competently, as it is fairly obvious name.com isn't. Compare your hosting bill to your registrar bill; what's wrong with that picture?- HTP is apparently fairly easy to troll into using valuable access for vengeance purposes. Shameful target selection and a burn of a good hack just to root SwiftIRC. That's like pissing in the ocean for a good time.- Linode got railroaded here and the general reaction by folks is a little overdone. You know that's true when even the hackers' overview of the hack specifically calls out people bitching about Linode security on Twitter. All it takes is one zero-day, and you will all be hit by one in your career, so cut Linode a little slack.