Cryptographers unearth vulnerabilities in Telegram's encryption protocol
Do Signal, Wire, or Matrix do this transcript consistency thing, or is there some other way by which they prevent message reordering? From what I know, encrypted messengers almost never implement that. At least in Wire I noticed reordering at some point and it uses an implementation of what is now called the Signal protocol.And that's the most severe vulnerability from the article. The second one is "mostly of theoretical interest" according to the researchers themselves, the third requires "an attacker [to] send many carefully crafted messages to a target, on the order of millions of messages", and the fourth "requires sending billions of messages to a Telegram server within minutes". So while this is not bad research, not at all (it's really great that people take this close a look!), the title sounds rather more severe and people will obviously jump to the conclusion that "See, MTproto is bad like we said all along!" without reading anything. Good research, bad article?«Obligatory notice in Telegram comment threads: the real issue in Telegram is that end-to-end encryption is optional and made extremely inconvenient to use: no implementation at all in TDesktop, can't use it across multiple devices, doesn't work for group chats at all... That is the main reason Telegram isn't secure: they can read all your chats except when you use this stupid inconvenient mode.»