Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamvis afficiant instrumenta sensuum forinsecus obiectae qualitates animique agentis vigorem passio corporis antecedat quae in se actum mentis provocet excitetque interim  quiescentes intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non passione insignitur, sed ex sua vi subiectam corpori iudicat passionem, quanto magis ea quae cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in discernendo non obiecta extrinsecus  sequuntur, sed actum suae mentis expediunt?
Now if in perceiving corporeal things, although qualities presented from without affect the apparatus of the senses, and the emotive movement of the body precedes the activity of the active mind, a movement which calls forth upon itself the action of the mind and stirs up the forms previously lying at rest within; if, I say, in perceiving corporeal things, the mind is not marked by that movement, but of its own power judges that movement, which is a quality of the body, then how much the more do those things which are quite separate from all bodily affections, in the act of judgement not follow things presented from without, but set in motion the action of the mind to which they belong!
final_alignments\Boethius_Philosophy_Book5.json