Ad haec, si ratio contra respondeat se quidem et quod sensibile et quod imaginable sit in universitatis ratione conspicere, illa vero ad universitatis cognitionem adspirare non posse, quoniam eorum notio corporales figuras non possit excedere, de  rerum vero cognitione firmiori potius perfectiorique iudicio esse credendum, in huiusmodi igitur lite nos quibus tam ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiam sentiendique vis inest nonne rationis potius causam probaremus?
Further, if reason rejoins to this that she does indeed see both the object of sense and the object of imagination under the aspect of their universality, but that they cannot aspire to the knowledge of universality since their knowledge cannot go beyond corporeal shapes, but we must give credence rather to the more firm and perfect judgement concerning the knowledge of things: in this sort of argument, then, should we not, we who have in us the power of reasoning as well as those of imagination and sense, should we not rather judge in favour of reasons case?
final_alignments\Boethius_Philosophy_Book5.json