Nam in iudiciis fere de aequitate, in deliberationibus <de utilitate, in laudationibus> de honestate disserimus, ita <tamen> ut plerumque haec in vicem misceantur: de quibus copiose et varie et ornate nemo dicere potest nisi qui cognovit naturam humanam et vim virtutum pravitatemque vitiorum et intellectum eorum quae nec in virtutibus nec in vitiis  numerantur.
Speaking broadly, in judicial oratory our argument turns upon fair dealing, in the oratory of debate upon advantage, in eulogies upon moral character, though these topics quite frequently overlap. Now it is impossible for any speaker to treat them with fullness, and variety, and elegance, unless he has made a study of human nature, of the meaning of goodness and the wickedness of vice, and unless he has learnt to appreciate the significance of what ranks neither on the side of virtue nor on that of vice.
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