Quomodo iniquas dicimus? Immo, si nomen puniunt, etiam stultas: si vero facta, cur de solo nomine puniunt facta, quae in aliis de admisso, non de nomine probata defendunt? Incestus sum, cur non requirunt? Infanticidia cur non extorquent? In deos, in Caesares aliquid committo, cur non audior qui habeo quo purger? Nulla lex vetat discuti quod prohibet admitti, quia neque iudex iuste ulciscitur, nisi cognoscat admissum esse quod non licet, neque civis fideliter legi obsequitur ignorans quale sit quod ulciscitur lex.
But why do we say unjust? I will go further, and, if they punish a name, I will say silly. If it is deeds they punish, why in our case do they punish deeds on the score of the name alone, while in the case of others they must have them proved not from a name but from an act committed? I am incestuous, say they; why do they not inquire into it? If it be murder of babies, why do they not torture the fact from me? I commit something against a god or a Caesar, why, when I am able to clear my character, am I not heard? No law forbids the investigation of the act, of which it forbids the commission. The judge does not justly avenge, unless he knows that the unlawful act was committed; nor does the citizen faithfully obey the law, if he does not know what sort of act the law avenges.
final_alignments\Tertullian_Apology.json