text: China’s North Korea approach: change in the air?
  China often used to describe its relationship with North Korea as being as close as "lips and teeth". The relationship was always more complex than that, but these days the two nations are drifting further apart than ever. Nonetheless, The Economist Intelligence Unit still believes it unlikely that China will be bounced into a strategic realignment, particularly one that might cause the North Korean regime to fall.
  The strategic dynamic on the Korean peninsula has, at face value, been much the same since the conclusion of the Korean war in 1953. The accepted wisdom is that China sees the North as an important buffer against the large US military presence in South Korea. The Chinese government resists policies that might lead to regime collapse in North Korea partly for fear of losing that buffer, and partly out of fear of the destabilising effects that would follow such a collapse—not least the likely flow of refugees into China.
  Lips and teeth begin to part
  The reality of China-North Korea ties has long been more complicated. The Northern regime under Kim Jong-un has executed or assassinated a number of senior figures within the regime that had links to China, but their prior existence illustrated the extent to which China has tried to broaden its options in North Korea. The executions also highlight the toxic dynamic that has developed in Sino-North Korean relations, especially under Kim Jong-un. There are many reports that there is no love lost between China's powerful president, Xi Jinping, and Kim Jong-un, and the timing of the latest nuclear test will have further infuriated Mr Xi by overshadowing China's hosting of the BRICS summit at the same time.
  External pressures are also adding to the strain on the Sino-North Korean relationship. The US president, Donald Trump, has implied that if China fails to make progress in reining in North Korea and its nuclear programme, the US will respond with protectionist measures that hit Sino-US relations. Early steps have already included sanctioning some relatively low-key individuals and companies, but the US could take this much further, targeting much more significant firms or imposing broad-based measures to target imports from China. Mr Trump's consistent record of protectionist rhetoric towards China gives added piquancy to this threat, and China has offered up some concessions. However, we believe that, fundamentally, Mr Trump's threats are empty, given that any protectionist measures strong enough to cause China to rethink its approach would be likely to do serious damage to US firms, whose supply chains are intimately bound up with US-China trade.
  China unlikely to switch positions yet
  We believe that recent developments will result in some toughening of the Chinese approach towards North Korea. China has already restricted imports of coal and steel from the North and banned investments by North Koreans in China. Chinese banks have begun to sever ties with North Koreans. The Chinese government is also likely to restrict oil exports to North Korea in the coming weeks. Nonetheless, this temporary toughness will be calibrated so that it falls short of anything that might result in regime change. It is, moreover, unlikely to have much effect in slowing, let alone reversing, North Korea's progress towards becoming a nuclear power with intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.
  There are several reasons that China will be reluctant to adopt a clean break with the North, despite the increasing costs associated with the relationship. Within the upper echelons of China's leadership and armed forces, there is a lot of resistance towards changing the strategic approach regarding North Korea. Historic ties from the war remain important, but more so is the instinctive policy imperative to side against the US in areas of strategic competition. Although there is growing discussion around the potential for dropping the alliance in Chinese academic circles, support for such a move still seems a minority position and the leadership would be particularly reluctant to do so if it appeared to be giving in to US pressure.
  Perhaps more importantly, Chinese policymakers view regime change (the implicit sequitur to Chinese abandonment of North Korea) as a chaotic and destabilising force that is to be avoided if at all possible. Events in the Middle East in the past two decades have only provided support to those who believe that a nuclear North Korea is not necessarily the worst possible outcome for the region. As they prioritise domestic economic development, China's leaders remain keen to preserve stability in their immediate neighbourhood—however problematic the status quo.