This paper proposes to analyze the signs of democratization of Quebec’s regional county municipalities (RCMs). Traditionally governed by a council of mayors, these supramunicipal authorities have been allowed, since 2002, to elect their warden (president) by direct universal suffrage. In this article, drawing on the idea of “political confiscation” proposed in the literature, we first show how the initial ambitions of this democratization have atrophied over the course of the legislative process, confirming a domestication of the reform by municipal elected officials. Based on a study of four RCMs in the Outaouais region, we then show that actual practices vary little, even if the elected prefects can dedicate themselves entirely to the supramunicipal level. However, their accessibility and their municipal neutrality are not enough to reverse the balance of power with the mayors who sit on the Council. The latter remain the almost exclusive holders of democratic representation and decision-making power by consensus. Finally, in this context, participatory democracy is rejected in favour of the relationships of proximity valued by both the wardens and the mayors. In short, the functioning of the RCMs is characterized by mayoral self-interest.