The intermediaries’ intermediary
The security field is growing exponentially in the private sector, which has led to new hybrid forms of governance based on public-private partnerships (PPP). This research looks at a security system developed in Belgium to deal with one form of white-collar crime – making and selling counterfeit goods – through a comprehensive review of governance practices. Explanations for the relative impunity that characterizes this criminal phenomenon are also investigated. Participant observation was conducted in the offices of BIP, a private investigation firm that has a strategic role in the fight against counterfeiting. The data were then analysed according to Valverde’s three sets of questions about security (2011). The outcome shows that while the anti-counterfeiting arrangement is greatly hampered by conflict between the logic of law enforcement and the logic of economic stability, impunity cannot be attributed to a lack of collaboration within the PPP, particularly as BIP is active in ensuring cooperation. As the security system appears to be functioning, impunity seems, as is often the case with white-collar crime, to be the result of the priorities set by the actors in control of prosecution : the magistrates and those who control the brands affected.