This article analyzes the dynamics of the Russian counter-terrorism policies in the North Caucasus and their effects on the conflict. Relying on Elias1 concept of configuration, it deconstructs the interdependencies between the main actors involved in counter-terrorism and examines their nature and logic. It shows that there is not only a wide gap between discourses and actions implemented on the ground but also that the main counter-terrorist actors do not have the same interests and beliefs. The predominance of clanism, localism and clientelism as the main modes of interactions and organizational principles only strengthens the unwillingness of actors to work together. In so doing, it explains the failure of the counter-terrorism policies by focusing on the power games, which are taking place in Moscow as well in the North Caucasus ; the absence of coordination ; the inter-agency competition and the use of violence to meet private interests. It demonstrates that such practices fuel the upsurge of violence and nurture a conflict, which follows multiple logics.