The "prisoner's dilemma" game describes how two actors should cooperate, but everyone can betray the other one. If one cooperates and the other betrays, the cooperator is penalized, the traitor is rewarded. If the two betray, their profits is less favourable than if they had cooperated. The “iterated play", allowing every protagonist to use of reprisals against the other one, is used to model political, biological and psychological phenomena. Using a graphic method we evidence that "to betray or to cooperate, to punish the unreliability" are the situations of interest in a comic strip. They contribute to new behaviours emergences. Pointing to the protagonists' strategies and variants that are present from one series to another, we show how a scenario will emerge. We evidence experimental economics rules (Nash's equilibrium, Pareto's optimum) and a scenario typology through a scientific systemic analysis. With a document of “littératie illustrée“, we can have a multidisciplinary educative course.