Scientific popularization, increasing knowledge gap, and epistemology of communication
From its beginnings in the 19th century, the popularization of science (vulgarisation) has aimed to bridge the cultural gap between « scientists » and « the ignorant », in support of science long considered to be a source of all progress. During the second part of the 20th century, popularization of science became a mass media phenomenon, criticized from all sides in the last quarter of the century. One of these criticisms concerns the increasing knowledge gap within its audience : the growing flow of information induces differences in the appropriation of information within the social system. The audience of the highest socioeconomic levels is able to appropriate information more quickly than the lower one, so that the gap between their respective knowledge tends to grow rather than diminish. This article addresses the paradox that our societies continue to adhere to the devices of popularization of science, although the increasing knowledge gap shows its pernicious effect. It argues that this persistence is due to a form of epistemological blindness : contrary to wide-spread opinion, the relevant model of communication required for analyzing popularization of science is that proposed by Gregory Bateson, rather than that put forth by Claude Elwood Shannon. First, I present the Shannon’s model of communication as the theoretical reference of the deficit model that inspired popularization of science. I stress that it is totally unsuited to explain social communication. Second, I summarize Bateson’s conception of communication, and contrast it point by point with the previous model. Finally, I argue that the increasing knowledge gap has no place in the framework of Shannon’s conception of communication, while it can be very simply explained by Bateson’s conception.