Do Gödel’s incompleteness results (or Turing’s uncomputable functions) show that the mind is not well modelled as a computer?
That's an interesting question regarding the relationship between mathematical results about the limits of computation and theories of the mind.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that any axiomatic system powerful enough to describe arithmetic is either incomplete or inconsistent. This implies that there are mathematical truths that cannot be proven within the system. Similarly, Turing's work showed that there are functions that cannot be computed by algorithms.

These results pose challenges for computational theories of the mind, since they suggest human cognition may not be reducible to algorithmic processes. However, some philosophers argue these limits may not apply to the biological mind, or that the mind involves non-computational elements as well. Other approaches like embodied/enactive cognition see the mind as extending into the environment, not operating like a digital computer.

So while Gödel and Turing's results show there are limitations to what can be modeled as a computer, it is debated whether this refutes computational theories of the mind or just motivates more nuanced perspectives. Does this help clarify the issues? Let me know if you would like me to elaborate on any of the points or discuss other relevant topics.