Morally unwholesome deeds knowing the consequences but without unwholesome intentions As far as I understand (of course I may be wrong), every act done voluntarily is born from some specific kind of intentions, and according to the nature of that intention, the act can contribute to perpetuate dukkha or to its eradication.

What happens when one acts without any amount of aversion nor passion, doing an action which in most cases is considered almost inseperable from evil intentions and almost objectively inmoral, let's say, consciously killing a child or raping somebody, while knowing the consequences?

Can those acts actually be executed without any amount of evil intentions? Is that even possible?

Thanks in advance for your time!
I think the doctrine says there are three unwholesome roots: i.e. passion, aversion -- and ignorance (or delusion).

It's also possible to do things accidentally -- but that's not what you're asking about.

See also e.g. this answer about lying -- but maybe that's not without passion, nor considered "objectively immoral", nor without consequences.

It's hard for me to imagine another case, other than these.


I think you're trying to talk about a "dispassionate killer" -- I guess killers can appear to be dispassionate, but I'm not sure a killer (a real person) can be actually dispassionate except in fiction, though perhaps practised at controlling their emotions.
Another case might be a "sociopath" -- maybe they act for a reason of their own though, e.g. passion rather than aversion. Or a psychosis -- misunderstanding reality. I'm not really equipped to judge that.
I'm not sure about animals. I think they're understood as being passionate, but perhaps unreasoning. I'm not sure that the "lower" animals have a theory of mind which allows them to see others as "sentient beings" (and immoral to harm them), instead of simply moving objects (which might be killed for food).


This isn't a very good answer -- not based on much personal experience nor references.

I think that's because I tried to map the question -- "is it even possible?" -- to the doctrine, and didn't really succeed very well. So I think the answer might be: "in general, no".