Buddhadasa and the continuity of suffering beyond physical death, without rebirth I read "Anatta and Rebirth" by Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (let's call this explanation B) and I also read similar explanations by Yuttadhammo Bhikkhu from this answer, this comment and this answer (let's call this explanation Y).

First I need to make some definitions and assumptions, before asking my questions:


The birth and death of a moment in Y is equivalent to the birth and death of selfhood in B i.e. a moment of selfhood.
The definition of birth (jati) and existence (bhava) comes from SN 12.2, while the definition of being (satta) comes from SN 5.10.
Sammuti-marana or conventional death or conceptual death is equivalent to the event of physical death (according to this answer).
"At the moment of conceptual death, this process of momentary birth and death continues unimpeded unless one has experienced 'death by cutting off'" in Y is what I will call "continuity of suffering beyond physical death" (that is, without rebirth).
The fact that the Buddha taught that there is no rebirth whatsoever is proven in the story of Bhikkhu Sati in MN 38, where Sati describes his understanding of rebirth, "it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another" and consciousness as "it is that which speaks and feels and experiences here and there the result of good and bad actions". This is a kind of self view associating consciousness and self.
The fact that the Buddha taught that suffering can continue beyond physical death is proven in many suttas: MN 4 ("with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared"), SN 15.3 (ocean of tears), SN 44.9, Dhp 400 (last body), MN 57, SN 42.3, DN 2, Dhp 153-154 and many more.
Explanation Y supports both #5 and #6 above.
Explanation B supports #5 above, but does not explicitly reject #6 above.
There are some Buddhists (sometimes describing themselves as Secular Buddhists) who reject rebirth and also reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death. They claim to reconcile Buddhism with science using explanation B, and say that any kind of continuity beyond physical death is superstition.
Those who support (Bhikkhu Sati's version of) rebirth are eternalists, while those who reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death are annihilationists according to DN 1 and SN 12.17. Both are false views.


Questions:


Am I right to say that Buddhadasa Bhikkhu in "Anatta and Rebirth" (explanation B), while correctly rejecting rebirth, did not explicitly reject the continuity of suffering beyond physical death? 
Are there any other sources, from speeches or writings of Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, that prove that he had explicitly rejected the continuity of suffering beyond physical death?
Am I right to say that those who support (Bhikkhu Sati's version of) rebirth are eternalists, while those who reject continuity of suffering beyond physical death are annihilationists according to DN 1 and SN 12.17?
My comments are as follows. I have posted these basic matters many times:  


Existence (bhava) is a defilement (asava). It does not mean life existence. This matter of "bhava" is the most basic &amp; unambiguous here. "Bhava" is officially defined as one of three asava, the other two being "sensual desire" and "ignorance". There is absolutely no scope to regard "bhava" as "rebirth", as Sujato does, or life existence, as Bhikkhu Bodhi does.   
The definition of birth (jati) in SN 12.2 includes the word "beings" ("sattanam") but does not define it. Therefore, it is a ordinary scholarly practise to find definitions of words. The definition of 'satta' is found SN 23.2 &amp; also SN 5.10. If alternative definitions are not found, we should follow the official definition in SN 23.2. We need to respect the suttas rather than engage in our own personal defiled interpretations. We need to be honest and not misrepresent the suttas. 
The word "kaya" does not necessarily mean "physical body" ("rupa"); such as when used in "sakkaya" and "Nikaya". There are many suttas, such as SN 12.19, where "kaya" does not mean "physical body". It means "collection" or "group". Therefore, when the suttas say: "with the break-up of the body, after death, have re-appeared", this does not necessarily refer to the physical body. We should not insist "kaya" means "physical body"; and we should also not insist it means "collection of aggregates". In these mundane teachings about kamma, each person can choose the interpretation they wish. 
"Eternalism" &amp; "Annihilationism" are defined in DN 1, Iti 49, etc, as 'self-views', that is, beliefs that a self will continue after death or a self will end at death. They are not about the continuity or discontinuity of consciousness or suffering at the termination of life. If Annihilationism meant the ending of consciousness at the termination of life then the teaching of anicca (impermanence) would be wrong. SN 22.85 is about why a Buddha is not annihilated with death. SN 22.85 clearly says the ending of the life of a Buddha is merely the ending of the aggregates. The words "annihilation" and "death" have no relevance to an Arahant, as explained in many suttas. "Death" does not mean the termination of life. It means the "death of a self". 
As for Buddhadasa, he is famous for his rejection of post-mortem rebirth (however, I heard him personally but reluctantly say in a private discussion to a young German monk who kept asking him the same question that rebirth view can help people maintain morality). Some quotes of Buddhadasa are:



  Therefore, there being no one born here, there is no one who dies and is reborn. So, the whole Question of rebirth is utterly foolish and
  nothing to do with Buddhism at all.
  
  
  
  Whenever there arises the mistaken idea "I," the "I" has been born; its parents are ignorance and craving. The kind of birth that constitutes a problem for us is mental birth. Anyone who falls to grasp this point will never succeed in understanding anything of the Buddha teaching. The word "birth" refers to the arising of the mistaken idea "I," "myself". It does not refer to physical birth, as generally supposed. The mistaken assumption that this word "birth" refers to physical birth is a major obstacle to comprehending the Buddha's teaching.
  
  
  
  Now, going a little higher, we come to the word "birth". In everyday language, the word "birth" refers to physically coming into the world from the mother's womb. A person is the born physically only once. Having been born, one lives in the world until one dies and enters the coffin. Physical birth  happens to each of us only once. This birth from the mother's womb is what is meant by "birth" in everyday language. In Dhamma language, the word "birth" refers to the birth of the idea "I" or "ego" that arises in the mind throughout each day. In this sense, the ordinary person is born very often, time and time again; a more developed person is born less frequently; a person well advanced in practice (ariyan, noble one) is born less frequently still, and ultimately ceases being born altogether. Each arising in the mind of "I"  in one form or another is called a "birth". Thus, birth can take place many times over in a single day.   As soon as one starts thinking like an animal, one is born as an animal in that same moment. To think like a human being is to be born a human being. To think like a celestial being is to be born a celestial being. Life, the individual, pleasure and pain, and the rest-all these were identified by the Buddha as simply momentary states of consciousness. So the word "birth" means in Dhamma language the arising of the idea of "I" or "me," and not, as in everyday language, physical birth from the mother's womb. The word "birth'' is very common in the Buddha's discourses. When he was speaking of everyday things, he used the word "birth" with its everyday meaning. But when he was expounding Higher Dhamma-for instance, when discussing conditioned arising - he used the word "birth" with the meaning it has in Dhamma language. In his description of conditioned arising, he wasn't talking about physical birth. He was talking about the birth of attachment to ideas of "me" and "mine," "myself" and "my own".