Is the self an illusion or is it *like* an illusion? Recently, in explaining the relative unimportance of the question whether phenomena lack true existence it was claimed that, "the self is definitely an illusion" and lacked true existence. This seemed to be held up as an important fact that has significance in the pragmatic soteriological aims of Theravada in contrast to the above mentioned question.

A few questions that arise:


First, is the self an illusion or not? Here it was said by the same person above that the self was not an illusion?
If either the self is like an illusion or is literally an illusion, is this synonymous with saying that it lacks true or real existence from the Theravada viewpoint?
Why does Theravada regard this question about the ontological status of the self of persons to be an important question? Why can't we just say that the self of persons is real and true like other phenomena, but transient or lacking sara as Chris said was the correct interpretation of SN 22.95
Why does Theravada regard the question of whether the aggregates have intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality an important question? If the self does not truly exist like an illusion, then what does it matter if the aggregates have intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality since the self cannot be found in them?


Some Theravada adherents say that, "the original Pali sutta's" do away with unnecessary speculation or "ontological hamster wheels." :) However, paradoxically it seems some Theravada regard the question of the ontological status of the self to be very important. It's also clear that Sariputra thought it very important to correct Yamaka about this. And the Buddha himself thought it important to instruct how the aggregates and other phenomena were to be regarded as lacking intrinsic value, worth, meaning and lasting quality irregardless questions of the self.
Is the self an illusion or is it like an illusion? Well, let's just say that it's not truly existent. The lute analogy in the Vina Sutta explains that very well. Using a musical instrument you can play nice music. But if you break it down to its constituent parts, you cannot find music. Music cannot be isolated from the musical instrument. Similarly, the self arises from the inter-working of the five aggregates. You cannot isolate the self from the five aggregates. This is in stark contrast with the Hindu view found in Bhagavad Gita 2.20.

Next, why is it so important in the Pali Suttas that the self of persons is not truly existent, but it is not important in the Pali Suttas that the self of phenomena is truly existent or not truly existent?

This is an easy question to answer in my opinion.

The self of persons is strongly related to the cause of a person's suffering. That's why it is so important in the Pali Suttas. The Cula-Saccaka Sutta (MN 35) explains why the self of persons is strongly related to the cause of a person's suffering.

On the other hand, the self of chairs is unrelated to the cause of a person's suffering. The self of chairs is also unrelated to the cause of a chair's suffering (or rather, I cannot imagine how a chair would experience suffering). This is why whether a chair has a self of chairs or not, is not important in the Pali Suttas.

In fact, the self of phenomena may even fall into the category of unconjecturables in the Acintita Sutta as follows:


  "Conjecture about [the origin, etc., of] the world is an
  unconjecturable that is not to be conjectured about, that would bring
  madness &amp; vexation to anyone who conjectured about it.


The point here is that the world may or may not be truly existent. The world may or may not have a self of phenomena. The world may or may not be an illusion.  The world may or may not be like an illusion. But in all these cases, it is not related to the cause of a person's suffering, and hence it is not important to the path to the end of suffering. At least, this, in my opinion, is how Theravada views it according to the Pali Suttas.

And this also shows how the Pali Suttas are extremely pragmatic.