Are absences empty / conceptual constructions, according to all Buddhists? Are absences empty / conceptual constructions, according to all Buddhists? Or is it -- perhaps -- a fact independent of language that there is no elephant in this room? Does anyone know?

A key underlying principle of the vināśitvānumāna is that negative
facts, such as absences, are not part of the ultimate furniture of the
world, but are just fictional conceptual constructions, as they are
devoid of causal powers.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dharmakiirti/
Are absences empty / conceptual constructions
I thought this answer implied that an absence is unconstructed:

So the absence of remorse is conditioned, but not being an existing thing, not having been constructed (sankharaed)-- it was the result of not-doing, is not itself subject to ending and is a small taste of Nibbana.

is it -- perhaps -- a fact independent of language that there is no elephant in this room?
I don't know -- sense-contact with the room gives rise to various perceptions, but none which I would label &quot;elephant&quot;.
they are devoid of causal powers
You're saying that as if that's a bad thing. :-)