The world has been riveted by the "Al-Aqsa intifada," an uprising that has filled the media with graphic images of violence. When the media mention "the Palestinians," they mean West Bankers and Gazans. But at the same time, a different type of uprising has also been taking place in Israel. In fact, Israel is being challenged by two intifadas - one external, emanating from the Palestinian autonomous areas; the other, internal, emerging from within Israel. The former is conducted by an army of Palestinian security forces and bands of irregulars under the command of various terrorist organizations. The latter is conducted by a group of Palestinian Arab nationalists ensconced in Israel's own parliament. This other revolt - a kind of "parliamentary intifada" - is not violent. But it does represent the tip of a looming challenge to Israel, and if left unattended, it could erode the strong Israeli tradition of parliamentary pluralism.
At the vanguard of this offensive are Arab members of the Israeli parliament (Knesset). Here are just a few examples of some of their recent activities: pledging moral support for the intifada in Ramallah; calling on the Arab world to unite against Israel during visits to Syria; siding with Israel's enemies at the United Nations (U.N.) Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa; taking part in an international symposium in Brazil on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People; and organizing an international "anti-apartheid" campaign against Israel together with Palestinian and European non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Needless to say, Jewish-Arab tensions in Israel were already evident before the Al-Aqsa intifada, which has had a strong impact on Israel's Arab population. But the Arabs' elected representatives to the Knesset gave new impetus to existing inter-ethnic hostility. Instead of using the legitimacy conferred upon them by the state to channel the frustrations of their constituents into constructive dialogue, they themselves became promoters of distrust and antagonism. Their deeds and words of the last year have done nothing to soothe wounded spirits. In many cases, they may have exacerbated an already dangerous situation.
The Knesset intifada took two principal forms: defamation of the state of Israel and its leaders, and expressions of praise and support for its enemies. These were two sides of the same coin - and two aspects of the emergence of a bloc that would probably be classified as a "fifth column" in any other democracy.
The Israeli political arena is a rough-and-tumble place, as anyone who has watched Knesset proceedings can attest. Parliamentarians regularly hurl insults at one another - and then adjoin to make small talk over coffee in the Knesset cafeteria. Yet even in Israel, there are certain redlines. When criticism sounds as though it were formulated in Damascus or Baghdad, those lines have been crossed.
The army, the police, the government, and the Israeli state itself have not been immune to verbal assault. Thus Arab Democratic Party MK Talib as-Sani‘ has called on Druze and Bedouin soldiers in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to stop serving in what he termed the "army of occupation and Israel's machine of oppression"13 and compared the Israeli security services to the Nazi police.14 ‘Abd al-Malik Dahamsha called Israeli policemen "murderers," and Muhammad Baraka called Israel's anti-terror unit an "execution squad."15 Adding his voice to this litany of insults, ‘Issam Mahul termed the Israeli government the "Israeli Taliban government" and the "anthrax government."16 Hashim Mahamid claimed that the present Knesset "could vote to annex Damascus and Cairo" any time soon.17 In the context of a Middle East so plagued by conspiracy theories about Israel and Jews, these words surely did not go unnoticed.
But it is not just Israel's presence in the West Bank and Gaza that elicits such flamboyant gestures. As-Sani‘ invited parliamentary reporters into his Knesset office to witness him observe a minute of silence on May 15, 2001, Israel's Independence Day. Among Israel's Arab population as well as among Palestinians in the territories and elsewhere, the occasion is generally known as "Nakba (catastrophe) Day" and is marked with black flags. But to observe it in this manner in the Knesset itself, even in a private office, is to deny the legitimacy of the very state on whose authority the Knesset rests.
More often than not, these same MKs have unabashedly sided with some of Israel's most implacable foes, heaping praise upon Palestinian terrorists and Arab dictators alike.
For example, Labor's Salah Tarif visited Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and wished him the best of health. "I remember when I have paid a visit to Sheikh Ahmad Yasin when his health was not well. I went to see him more than once, and I wish him [good] health," Tarif told Palestinian television during an interview at the beginning of 2001.21 That the Hamas movement is responsible for killing dozens and maiming hundreds of Israelis in horrific suicide bombings seemed to have mattered not a bit to the would-be Israeli cabinet minister.
He also praised "the heroism of the Islamic struggle."28 His words elicited wild applause.
This was the sort of sycophantic pulp offered ritually by official Syrian spokesmen - words hardly becoming of an independent intellectual, not to speak of an Israeli parliamentarian.
This MK also organized some nineteen trips transporting close to 800 Arab citizens of Israel to Syria via Jordan to meet relatives who have lived in that country since 1948. These visits are a criminal infraction punishable by imprisonment, given that they violate Israeli law forbidding Israeli nationals from entering enemy countries. Valid permits to visit enemy states can be obtained via requests to the interior ministry, but Bishara never bothered to undertake this basic administrative task, thus exposing hundreds of constituents to legal sanctions.
For this, as well as for his inciteful speech in Syria, Bishara was indicted in late 2001, leading the Knesset to strip him of his parliamentary immunity. The first indictment charged Bishara with incitement to violence and support for a terrorist organization, as defined by Israel's Prevention of Terror Ordinance (1948). The second indictment charged him with violating Israel's Emergency Regulations (1948) by abetting illegal exit from the country. In mid-2001, when calls for his prosecution began to emerge, Bishara reacted angrily, stating that "there is a dangerous racist atmosphere in Israel."31 He later defiantly warned that if there were going to be a trial, he would bring witnesses "from the French resistance" and "people from South Africa" who would explain to Israelis what resistance and occupation mean.32 Bishara thus placed Israel somewhere along the spectrum between Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa - and placed Syria on a pedestal.
Expressions of support for Syria have become the stock-in-trade of other MKs. ‘Abd al-Malik Dahamsha sent a letter of condolence to the Syrian president over the deaths of three Syrian soldiers after an Israeli retaliatory attack on a radar position in south Lebanon. (The Israeli move followed a Hizbullah attack across the U.N.-recognized line between Israel and Lebanon.) In the letter, on Knesset stationary, Dahamsha labeled the Israeli government "fascist," called the raid "an abominable attack," and urged "Arab unification in order to bring an end to Israel's radical actions."33 Dahamsha has never offered condolences to Israel for the loss of its soldiers. To add insult to injury, his letter showed the return address as "Nazareth, Palestine." Dahamsha's spokesman later comically attempted to justify the address his chief wrote, claiming that it was a courtesy to the Syrians who would otherwise not know where Nazareth was located.
Predictably, Dahamsha's letter got a reaction, and unsurprisingly, Arab MKs came to his defense. Talib as-Sani‘ and Ahmad Tibi justified Dahamsha's letter, Tibi pointing out that "it's only natural to commiserate with the Syrian people."36 Appearing on a television interview, "Palestinian patriot" Bishara refused to express a word of sympathy for the death of the Israeli soldier killed by the Hizbullah raid that prompted Israel's retaliation in the first place.
The political extremism of the Arab MKs is most blatant when it comes to Palestinian nationalism. Before the intifada, they sided with the PA on virtually every single issue - a habit that changed not a whit once the PA effectively declared war on Israel.
In May 2001, Tibi - together with Baraka, Mahul, and as-Sani‘ - attended the funeral in Gaza of a four-month old Palestinian infant accidentally killed by IDF shelling. Some served as pallbearers. After meeting Arafat, Tibi declared, "The blood that has been shed is our blood," and added, "the mother of Iman [the dead child] and other children are asking [Israeli Chief of Staff] Mofaz, killer of children, why?"49 Yet neither Tibi nor any of the other Palestinians in attendance participated in the funeral of even one of the many Israeli children killed by Palestinians. That it would be difficult, even bizarre, to imagine these MKs paying a visit of solidarity to any of Israel's Jewish victims is indicative of how thoroughly isolated they have become from the vast majority of their fellow citizens.
As a result of the public outrage prompted by his statement in Israel, as-Sani‘ claimed his words were taken out of context and warned against "a crusade of delegitimization" of Arab MKs.53 The standard retort of Arab MKs is that their words have been taken "out of context," even though they themselves chose to speak them in contexts (such as the foreign Arab media) that are habitually hostile to Israel.
Analogies are imperfect. But let us attempt to construct a parallel between Israel's Arabs and, say, the Arabs of the United States. The differences between the cases are so obvious that they do not even warrant mention. But this simple (and perhaps also simplistic) analogy might nonetheless convey the gravity and absurdity of the positions taken by the elected leaders of Israel's Arabs.
Were these imaginary Arab-American members of Congress to organize solidarity trips to Afghanistan of the Taliban; were they to issue a call to arms to "unite against the warmongering Bush"; were they to call America's president a "bloodsucking dictator," its administration an "anthrax government," its soldiers "sexual deviants," and its policemen "murderers"; were they to wish the "best of health" to Usama bin Ladin and to suggest that the Nobel Prize Committee should award al-Qa‘ida a peace prize; were they to term the September 11 atrocity an "attack of special quality"; and were they at the very same time to protest real or imagined state discrimination, they would enrage the American public, and would probably come under investigation by the attorney general and the FBI.
The real challenge for the state of Israel lies not so much in how to control the mounting lawlessness of the Arab MKs - the recent decision to lift Bishara's immunity is but one example of Israel's ability to react effectively, if belatedly - but in how to convey Rubinstein's point clearly and emphatically to Israel's Arab voters. The Arab MKs compete among themselves in political radicalism. And yet, with only a few exceptions, these MKs are never repudiated by their constituents, leaving many Jewish Israelis to wonder whether the legislators' extreme speech is a deliberate effort to pander to their Arab voters.
When these Jewish Israelis overhear the elected leaders of the Arab community, they hear Bishara stating, "I am an Arab and a Palestinian. Israel's victory is my tragedy."58 They hear as-Sani‘ saying that "just as the Turks and British were here and are gone, the Zionists will pass."59 And they hear Dahamsha tell them, almost by way of assurance, that only "20-25 percent of Israeli Arabs want to destroy Israel and kill the Jews."60 All of this has a profoundly corrosive effect on Jewish-Arab relations in Israel, since the statements by parliamentarians are believed to reflect the growing radicalization of their constituents.
Much will have to change if Jewish-Arab relations in Israel are to improve. But in the short term, the most practical step forward must be the cessation of the parliamentary intifada. Until the next elections, Israel's Knesset majority can contain its worst manifestations through the use of its legal prerogative of lifting immunity. Israel's many institutions of civil society also must express their abhorrence of the conduct of these MKs, by refusing to offer them the legitimate public platforms they crave. But ultimately, only Israel's Arab voters can bring the parliamentary intifada to an end. If they return the same cast of characters to the Knesset on the next ballot, they will have cast their votes for their own marginality - precisely the cause of their many laments. It would be an ironic twist of fate: Israel's Arabs are just about the only Palestinians who cast ballots that their state actually bothers to count.
Julián Schvindlerman is a regular contributor to The Miami Herald, and Washington correspondent of Comunidades, a Jewish biweekly of Argentina.
1 The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2001.
2 Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Gaza), Feb. 2, 2001. (All translations from Palestinian media courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch).
3 The Jerusalem Post, May 17, 2001.
4 Ibid., Nov. 21, 2001.
5 Ibid., Apr. 17, 2001.
6 Ibid., July 11, 2001.
7 Ibid., Nov. 14, 2001.
8 Ibid., Nov. 15, 2001.
10 Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2000.
11 The Jerusalem Post, Mar. 12, 2001.
12 Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2001.
13 The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 13, 2000.
14 Ibid., Dec. 6, 2001.
15 Ibid., Feb. 22, 2001, and Feb. 23, 2001.
16 Ibid., July 5, 2001, and Oct. 25, 2001.
17 "Interview: MK Hashem Mahameed - No Danger of Regional War If No Negotiations before Elections," Nov. 29, 2000, in Independent Review Media Analysis (IRMA), at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=374.
18 The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 25, 2001.
19 Ibid., Aug. 31, 2001.
20 "Interview: MKL Azmi Bishara on Upcoming Campaign against ‘Israeli Apartheid,'" IMRA, Oct. 16, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=8549.
21 Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2001.
22 "‘Hizbullah's Leader Deserves Nobel Peace Prize': Israeli Arab Reactions to Israel's Withdrawal from South Lebanon," Special Dispatch No. 105, Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), June 21, 2000, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP10500.html.
23 Ha'aretz, Nov. 8, 2001.
24 Fasl al-Maqal (Nazareth), June 9, 2001, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 105, MEMRI, June 21, 2000, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP10500.html.
25 Ha'aretz English Edition, Nov. 13, 2001.
26 The Jerusalem Post, June 11, 2001.
27 Ha'aretz English Edition, Nov. 13, 2001.
28 Ibid., June 11, 2001.
29 The Jerusalem Post, June 19, 2001.
30 Ha'aretz English Edition, July 12, 2001.
31 Ha'aretz, June 12, 2001.
32 Ha'aretz English Edition, July 12, 2001.
33 Ha'aretz, Apr. 19, 2001.
34 "Interview: Spokesman for MK Dahamshe - ‘Nazareth, Palestine' address," IRMA, Apr. 23, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=6157.
35 Ha'aretz, Apr. 19, 2001.
37 The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 28, 2001.
40 Ibid., Aug. 29, 2001.
41 Ibid., Oct. 18, 2001.
42 Ibid., Nov. 23, 2001.
43 Palestinian Television, Jan. 23, 2001.
44 Ma‘ariv, Nov. 5, 2001.
45 Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Jan. 16, 2001.
46 The Jerusalem Post, May 17, 2001.
47 "Interview Hadash MK Mohammad Baraka: ‘I support and agree to all action that is in opposition to the occupation,'" IMRA, Nov. 7, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=8808.
48 "MK Tibi responds to report, listed as ‘Israeli Affairs Advisor' to Arafat," IMRA, June 28, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=7041.
49 The Jerusalem Post, May 9, 2001.
50 Ibid., Mar. 12, 2001.
51 Ha'aretz, Nov. 8, 2001.
52 Ibid., Aug. 6, 2001.
53 Ibid., Aug. 7, 2001.
54 The Jerusalem Post, Dec. 6, 2000.
55 Ibid., Sept. 12, 2001.
56 As-Sinara, July 15, 2000, quoted in Special Dispatch No. 132, MEMRI, Oct. 6, 2001, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP13200.html.
57 Special Dispatch No. 96, MEMRI, May 26, 2000, at http://www.memri.org/sd/SP9600.html.
58 In a letter sent to the Knesset, IMRA, June 21, 2001, at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=6954.
59 Ha'aretz English Edition, July 26, 2001.
60 Ma‘ariv Weekend Supplement, Oct. 20, 2000.
Related Topics: Arab-Israel conflict & diplomacy, Israel & Zionism, Middle East politics | Julián Schvindlerman | Spring 2002 MEQ receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free mef mailing list This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.