In June 2013 Gramo and DrBob visited the site of the Battle of Kulm in the Czech republic. Armed with nothing more than a compass and camera and fortified by a McDonalds breakfast, 10 chicken wings and a chesse salad, they spent two days travelling around the battlefield. Despite the distant rumbles of thunder, they took over 400 photographs.
These have been stitched into a fully interactive virtual tour. A full account of the battle, complete with newly prepared maps is shown on the following pages.
For those who prefer a more traditional approach to history, the article is available as a short monograph priced £5.00 & pp. Please contact Graham for more details.
With his prestige seriously dented, his once proud army reduced to rag – pickers, and his allies considering their options, only a man of Napoleon’s willpower, determination and ego could have shrugged off the disastrous 1812 Russian campaign and set about building a new Grande Armée in order to reassert his authority in Europe. By the early spring of 1813 he had created twelve army corps, and although most of the infantry regiments were made up of raw recruits, and the cavalry very weak for wont of horses and proper training, it was still, nevertheless, a fantastic achievement.
The effect of the Russian victory in 1812, over the seemingly invincible French emperor, first surfaced when the Prussian contingent serving as part of the Grande Armée, under general Hans David Ludwig von York, defected to the Russians by signing the Treaty of Tauroggen (30th December 1812). Thereafter the Prussian king, Frederick William III, signed the Treaty of Kalisch (3rd February 1813) with Russia, agreeing to surrender the land acquired by Prussia during the third partition of Poland to the Tsar, in return for Russia’s proliferation of the war against Napoleon until Prussia’s pre 1806 position had been restored.
The Austrian auxiliary force, which had also been committed to aiding Napoleon’s main thrust against Russia, slipped quietly away into Galicia once it became apparent that things had gone badly wrong for the French, not wishing to take sides until being sure of backing the winner. Thereafter Austria adopted a stance of armed neutrality, cloaking her real intentions under the mantel of offering to play mediator between Napoleon and the Russians and Prussians.
The Spring Campaign of 1813.
During the last days of April, Napoleon, with some 100,000 men of the Army of the Main, began to advance on Leipzig from the direction of Erfurt, while The Army of the Elbe, under Prince Eugéne, Napoleon’s stepson, and numbering around 30,000, approached from the direction of Halle in the north. The Russian and Prussian combined army of some 86,000 men were grouped just south of the French line of march, near the town of Lutzen. Here, on the 2nd May, Wittgenstein, aware that Napoleon was gradually building up his forces and would eventually outnumber the combined allied army, decided to strike the French before they could concentrate superior forces against him. The brave but reckless French Marshal Michel Ney, Duke of Elchingen and Prince of the Moskva, guarding the French right wing, was dilatory in his behaviour in not conforming to Napoleon’s orders for the concentration of his five divisions and to send out strong recognisance forces to determine the whereabouts of the enemy. On the 2nd May Wittgenstein attacked Ney’s III Corps scattered around the villages of Starsiedel and Grossgörschen south – east of Leipzig and a bloody but indecisive battle was fought. Although the allies were forced to retreat, the victory claimed by Napoleon did little more than bring the wavering Saxon king, Frederick Augustus I, back into an alliance with the French.
The orderly retreat of the Russians and Prussians after the battle enabled them to cross the Elbe River and take up a strong defensive position around the town of Bautzen in eastern Saxony. Here they were able to draw breath and consolidate, constructing a number of strong redoubts and entrenchments on the high ground behind the valley of the Blösaer Wasser River with troops pushed forward along the line of the Spree River and around Bautzen itself to fight a stalling advanced guard action; the combined strength of the allied army being some 96,000 men.
After the battle of Lutzen, Napoleon had rearranged his forces; disbanding the Army of the Elbe, he now created a new army under Ney numbering 84,000, while he himself commanded the main army, including the Guard, of almost 120,000. With the latter he engaged the allies at Bautzen in a containing battle on the 20th May. The following day Ney’s army came down on their right flank for the kill. However, due once again to Ney’s mishandling of the situation, which can only be attributed as the knock – on effect of Napoleon’s failure to place a less excitable and hot headed general in command of so large a force, the allies were able to make good their escape.
On the 4th June, Napoleon, totally out of character in comparison to his former blustering concerning the plight the allies must be in after their twin defeats at his hand, agreed to an armistice. He also agreed to a Peace Congress to be held in Prague, his reasoning being his lack of cavalry and his uncertainty concerning the position of Austria.
Prior to his reoccupation of Hamburg, Davout had received orders from Napoleon that as soon as the city was once again in French hands he was to “send General Vandamme with the Second and Fifth divisions and the necessary artillery in the direction of Mecklenburg and Berlin to cover the left flank of the corps that is advancing on Berlin.”12 As things turned out Vandamme became drawn ever closer to the centre of gravity around Napoleon himself, but as we shall see with the unfolding of events, he never came under the direct orders of the Emperor on the battlefield, and he certainly made better use of his skills as a general than the other commanders given independent control of large forces by Napoleon.
All parties involved realised that the Armistice of Neumarckt was nothing more than a temporary pause in a campaign that could only be decided either by Napoleon regaining his former control over Europe, or by the an allied victory that would push him firmly back across the Rhine, the Pyrenees and the Alps, confining him once and for all to the boundaries of France and ridding their lands of his menacing presence. To this end Austria, although appearing to play the part of mediator between the allied Coalition and the French emperor, was in fact preparing and strengthening her forces ready to throw in her lot on the side of the allies. Even the Austrian minister, Prince Clemens Lothar Metternich, who was sent to negotiate the peace talks, was well aware that Napoleon would never accept his proposals to give up all he had gained over the past thirteen years. Also negotiations taking place in Prague proved to be only a sham played out while all sides prepared for a renewal of the conflict, and the armistice was renounced on the 10th August with Austria joining the Coalition against France two days later.The vacillating and cunning Prince Charles John, Crown Prince of Sweden, former French Marshal Jean – Baptisie – Jules Bernadotte, also threw in his lot with the allies, although his motives were far from clear.
After much hot air being expanded at a conference at the castle of Trachenberg, the Allies finally decided on a plan of operation that would entail each of their respective armies not accepting battle with the French when Napoleon himself was in command, but rather to fall back until such time that their combined forces manoeuvring against his centre of operations would outnumber him on the field.
During the armistice Vandamme was placed in command of the newly designated 1st Corps of the Grande Armée, with his headquarters at Magdeburg. He now had some forty battalions of infantry in three divisions, together with forty – six cannon, in all close to 25,000 men,13 However, the source material available for Vandamme’s corps at this time is conflicting.
To act on the defensive went totally against Napoleon’s principles of warfare, and thus he chose to strike first and fast against his old enemy, the wily old Prussian hussar, Field -Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher and his Army of Silesia, which had moved prematurely before the actual deadline for the end of the armistice, and which, in turn, diverted Napoleon’s attention away from other plans of action in order to meet the threat. Probably without much enthusiasm for retiring without a fight Blücher, in accordance with the Trachenberg Plan, pulled back out of Napoleon’s reach, causing the French to strike into a void. On 23rd August the French emperor, on obtaining the news that Schwazenberg and the Army of Bohemia were advancing, abandoned his quest to bring Blücher to battle and marched back to Dresden, leaving Marshal Étienne MacDonald, Duke of Taranto, with a force of 90,000 men to shadow his elusive pray.
Before commencing his maneuvering against Blücher, Napoleon had received information that a large force of Russians under Wittgenstein was marching to join the Army of Bohemia, and he even contemplated attacking these forces, writing to Vandamme, whose advance units were just arriving at Stolpen, to move his corps to Rumburg. Here he would find the 42nd division belonging to Marshal Laurent Gouvion St Cyr, which was to be attached to Vandamme’s command providing that St Cyr himself were not hard pressed. There were also some 3,000 cavalry of the French Imperial Guard under General Charles Lefebvre – Desnouettes, which he was also to have. He continued, “It is possible I might enter Bohemia at once and fall upon the Russians and catch them ‘en flagrant délit.’ ”15 Thereafter Napoleon changed his mind and set his troops in motion to attack Blücher, leaving Vandamme with orders to fortify himself in the passes around Rumburg, here he would also receive help from Marshal Claude Victor, Duke of Belluno’s II Corps, together with the small Polish VIII Corps under Prince Josef Anton Poniatowski, newly created Marshal of the Empire. These 65,000 men Napoleon considered sufficient to hold the passes until he had destroyed the Army of Silesia.
As things turned out the allied army was already closing in on Dresden, albeit without much show of haste, and the time wasted by the constant disagreements between the various monarchs and their advisors and generals concerning the correct plan of attack led them to lose precious time in organizing a quick and decisive assault before Napoleon could reach the field. Also the weather, which had been fine, became increasingly cold and wet during the evening of 26th August. The increasing wind accompanied by torrential rain began to cause rivers to rise rapidly, and turned roads and meadowland into quagmires of mud.
On the afternoon of 25th August Napoleon, now convinced that Dresden was in imminent danger of being attacked and captured by the Army of Bohemia, sent fresh orders to Vandamme with instructions to move his corps onto the Köenigstein Plateau and thereafter capture and occupy the town of Pirna on the River Elbe. In the meantime the Emperor himself would march to the relief of Dresden.
One can see that, although Napoleon had shelved the plan of marching against the rear of the Army of Bohemia with his main army, he nevertheless considered that Vandamme’s I Corp could still execute a similar manoeuvre, causing problems for the Allies if they were to be forced back into the defiles of the Erzgebirge Mountains, which indeed proved to be the case.
The battle of Dresden fought on the 26th – 27th August was, arguably, the last great encounter which could have altered not only the fate of Europe, but also the destiny of Napoleon himself. The two day battle fought on the second day in the most appalling conditions of mud and driving rain was, for the Allies, a fiasco which led to the loss of almost 30,000 men, in killed, wounded and prisoners, together with much material and baggage. Now was the time for Napoleon to throw everything he had into a pursuit that would have shattered the Army of Bohemia. Also, given the fact that all three Allied monarchs were with the defeated army, and would have been struggling to make good their escape before themselves becoming prisoners of war, it was certainly the French emperor’s best hope of ending the campaign in the style of Austerlitz and Jena. What he did do proved too little too late, and the fact that he fumbled and then dropped this golden opportunity, only goes to shows how much his military prowess had declined when confronted with making swift and decisive decisions on the grand scale that these vast campaigns required.
Russian troops (Red) line of retreat to Kulm. French 1st Corps (Blue) follow up to Kulm.
With the allies in full retreat Napoleon, as he had done on former occasions, should have thrown everything he had into a full blown follow up pursuit, that he failed to do so, even allowing for the fact that rumour had just reached him of the defeat of two of his Marshals at the battles of the Katzbach ( Marshal MacDonald on the 26th August), and Gross – Beeren (Marshal Nicolas Oudinot, Duke of Reggio on the 20th – 23rd August), he nevertheless could do nothing to alter the situation, therefore now should have been the time to keep on the enemies heels, which would, in all probability, if he had placed himself in the vanguard, have resulted in the total ruin of the Army of Bohemia and may well have forced Austria out of the war. Indeed, his initial orders for the follow up of the defeated and battered enemy columns appeared substantial, providing the momentum was kept up – it wasn’t. Marshal Adolphe Mortier, Duke of Treviso, with two divisions of the Young Guard, together with Marshal St Cyr’s mauled but intact XIV Corps were to march on the road to Peterswalde and couple up with Vandamme’s forces. Marshal Auguste Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, with his VI Corps, to take the road to Altenberg, while the dashing but vain King of Naples, Joachim Murat, together with the II Corps under Marshal Victor, would advance along the road towards Freiberg. Napoleon himself even moved forward as far as Pirna on the 28th August, after which he took himself off back to Dresden, where news of the twin defeats suffered by MacDonald and Oudinot was confirmed, thus allowing the impetus to go out of the chase.
Fully expecting to be soon supported by Marshal St Cyr with his corps and Marshal Mortier with the Young Guard, Vandamme pressed the attack with vigour. What he did not know, and never would until it was too late, was that although St Cyr had originally been ordered to pursue the enemy (General Frederick Heinrich Kleist’s Prussian corps) towards Dohna. That is to say, he was actually marching on the left bank of the Elbe River, Dohna being only a few miles from Pirna, and therefore he was moving directly towards a link up with Vandamme. Now however, around 2:00 p.m on the afternoon of the 29th August, he received an order from Napoleon stating that, “You will follow the enemy to Maxen and in whatever direction it would take.” This meant that, since Maxen lay to the southwest, and although he would indeed still be following Kleist, albeit that is until he lost contact, he would now be moving away from Dohna and therefore away from Vandamme.33 Also, because of the bad news concerning the defeats sustained by his subordinates, Napoleon had halted Mortier’s Young Guard at Pirna. The remaining French pursuit columns under Murat and Marmont, although collecting vast amounts of discarded baggage and equipment, only managed a half – hearted attempt at getting to grips with the retreating allies – Vandamme was on his own.
The 29th of August – Gambit.
The main road, dropping steeply down out of the mountains, ran through the small town of Kulm and on west through Straden and Priesten towards Teplitz, some seven kilometres further on. To the south of Kulm rose the Strisowitz Heights, quite steep and heavily wooded at the north and south, with pasture land across the east – west central area.
The Russian left, commanded by Ermolov, took ground around Straden with its Leather Chapel and the Sawmill, or Eggenmühle, just to the north. The Guard Jäger and the Murmon Line Infantry Regiment held the houses, barns and gardens, as well as the Sawmill and Leather Chapel while to their rear, in line behind the village, stood the Semenovsky and Izmailovsky Guard Regiments, with the Preobrazhensky Guard Regiment in support. The Guard Light Foot Battery #1 and Guard Heavy Battery #2, 24 cannon in total, were positioned 20 meters in front of the Guard infantry. The Guard Hussar Regiment of 4 squadrons was stationed behind the Semenovsky’s.
In the centre, commanded by Wüttemberg, the village of Priesten was held by elements of the Reval Line Infantry Regiment and the 4th Jäger Regiment, with the main body of both regiments drawn up in column behind the right rear of the village, together with Light Battery #27 and Position Battery #14, 23 guns in all. Also in column on the left rear of the village Major General Helfreich drew up part of the Russian 14th Division consisting of the Tenginsk and Tobolsk Line Infantry Regiments.
The Battle of Kulm, 29th August 1813. Situation at 11:00 a.m.
Murmon Infantry Regiment; Guard Jäger Regiment; Semenovsky Guard Infantry Regiment; Preobragensky Guard Infantry Regiment; Ismailovsky Guard Infantry Regiment; Guard Hussar Regiment.
Estonia Infanry Regiment; Grand Duchess Catherine Battalion; Toblosk Infantry Regiment; Tschernigov Infantry Regiment; Minsk Infantry Regiment; Revel Infantry Regiment; 4th Jäger Regiment.
Revest’s (formely Reuss) 5th Infantry Brigade.
Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Infantry Division arriving.
At 10:00 a.m. on Sunday 29th August Vandamme’s forward units, consisting of Revest’s brigade, cleared Kulm of the Russian skirmishers, as well as a group of townsfolk retuning from church, the latter running in blind panic across the fields towards Unter Arbesau, the former falling back on their main line. Thereafter an 8pdr foot battery accompanying Revest opened fire from the rising ground just beyond the town, its first salvos being answered by the Russian Guard Horse Battery #1, the smoke from this exchange of fire began to temporarily blot out parts of the landscape.
The young conscripts in Revest’s now depleted brigade were damp and dirty, their eyes sunken into their heads through lack of sleep. They had been fighting and marching in rain and mud for days, nevertheless their morale was still high. They had forced the Russians out of one position after another and now they were going to kick them out of this one. Quickly forming into two columns, the 46th Line Regiment on the right, consisting of the three battalions, and the four battalions of the 72nd Line Regiment on the left, both regiments proceeded by a company in skirmishing order, passed through their gun line and began to advance over the rolling meadowland towards Straden. About halfway across they came under fire from the Russian batteries in front of the village firing solid shot, some of which tore bloody lanes through their ranks, but mostly passing harmlessly over their heads due to the soaking wet nature of the ground which, with each firing, gradually dug the gun trails into the soft earth causing the barrels to elevate slightly. Closing ranks the two French regiments continued to press forward until a belch of fire stabbed smoke boiled up around the village issuing from the muzzles of several hundred Russian muskets, and accompanied by a hail of canister shot from their artillery which caused them to falter. General of Brigade Revest, his face bespattered by blood from a canister blast that had riddled the men beside him and maimed and brought down his horse, untangled himself from the harness and proceeded on foot, encouraging his men to close up and go forward, which they did, pressing on into the village and pushing the Russians back to the Sawmill and Leather Chapel. The fighting was severe, with the Murmon regiment and Guard Jäger’s putting in every man to resist the French assault, which finally petered out and ebbed back across the fields as the Semenovsky Guard Regiment came up to support their beleaguered comrades. Not to be denied, and still presenting a bold front to the enemy, Revest’s thinning battalions once more formed to renew the assault, their spirits boosted by the arrival of three fresh regiments of the 42nd Division under General of Division Régis Barthélemy Mouton – Duvernet who, after filing these nine battalions through Kulm, began to form them into heavy columns in preparation for an attack between Straden and Pristen. Duvernet had distinguished himself at Arcola in Italy during Napoleon’s brilliant campaign of 1796 and thereafter had steadily risen in the ranks, becoming general of division just three weeks earlier on the 4th of August 1813. Although not an imposing figure, with his hair brushed well forward to cover his baldness, he was a brave fighting general and a good tactician who would end his days in front of a firing squad in 1816, shot as a traitor for rallying to Napoleon during the Hundred Days.
As Duvenet’s men were deploying, the 1st Light Cavalry Division under General Jean – Baptiste – Juvénal Corbineau, clattered through the streets of Kulm and took up a position covering the French left flank. He was followed by the 21st Light Cavalry Brigade commanded by General of Brigade Charles Martin Gobrecht who drew out his squadrons just behind the French gun line to the east of the town. Although only light cavalry, these two units comprising hussars, lancers and chasseurs à cheval, were to perform prodigies of valour worthy of any units in the French Imperial Guard.
This time Revest, owing to the depleted state of his battalions, kept his brigade together, heading straight and hard for Straden, which was now on fire in many places and had been evacuated by the Russians who fell back to form a new line to the rear of the smoke billowing village with troops still holding the Sawmill and the Leather Chapel. After receiving a salvo from the Russian artillery, Revest’s troops pressed on through the burning buildings of Straden, with red hot sparks flying in all diredtions, and attempted to dress their ranks and move forward. This proved impossible to achieve owing to the blasting they received as they came within easy range of both canister and musket fire, which caused them to retire once more, leaving another carpeting of dead and wounded piled up on the ground.
Vandamme rode up to meet Philippon personally. His orders for the taking of Straden and Priesten had not been delivered by word of mouth, but in writing carried by members of his staff. He knew full well that Revest, being, until the death of Prince Reuss, his personal Chief – of –Staff, would carry out these orders to the best of his ability, likewise he also trusted Duvernet in needing no personal encouragement to buckle down to the task at hand. However, thus far things had not gone well, mainly due to the fact that the whole of his corps was strung out on the twisting road leading down out of the mountains, and therefore it would take a long time to get everyone onto the battlefield. He also knew that, although he would have to use his troops piecemeal as they came up, he was left with no other option owing to the fact that to await the arrival of his entire force before attempting to shoulder the Russians out of the way might only result in their receiving reinforcements, which he had seen himself pouring from the passes earlier in the day, thus strengthening their position still further. Therefore he felt the need to give Philippon direct instructions while showing him the exact place on the battlefield where his troops would prove most effective.
General of Division Armand Philippon was a rakish looking Norman, born in Rouen. He had just turned 43 years of age on 27th August, and had a reputation for courage and steadiness under fire. He had distinguished himself in Spain where he gained praise from all sides as French Governor of Badajoz and for his defence of the town during the second siege in 1811. Viewing the field though his glass the general now listened intently to what Vandamme was proposing. First, any further attacks would be made in accord by all units, hammering at the Russians all along the front so that they would be unable to spare any troops to shore up their line when a breakthrough became imminent. Secondly, and allowing for the fact that his 12pdr cannon had still not arrived, Vandamme ordered his chief of artillery, General of Brigade Pouilly de Baltus to place two more batteries in line with the ones already in action near Kulm and lay down a concentrated fire that would soften up the Russian position prior to the infantry attack.
At 3:00 p.m. the French guns bucked into action sending a hail of metal crashing into the Russian lines taking off heads, arms and legs and mangling torsos. But as fast as a gap appeared in their formation the stalwart infantry of Mother Russia closed ranks and stood their ground with grim determination awaiting the attack they knew would follow. They didn’t have to wait long. After twenty minutes of pounding the French guns fell silent as the massed battalions of infantry under Revest, Duvernet and Philippon closed on the Russian position.
On Revest’s left, Duvernet and Philippon’s battalions moved against Priesten, Duvernet deploying four battalions of the 22nd and 4th Provisional Light Infantry Regiments on the right of the village, with a further two battalions of the 3rd Provisional Light Infantry Regiment continuing the line linking up with Revest’s left flank. The remainder of his division, now all on the field, and consisting of two battalions of 17th Provisional Line Infantry Regiment, two battalions of the 16th Provisional Line Infantry Regiment and four battalions of the 76th and 96th Line Infantry Regiments were held back in reserve. Duvernet’s divisional artillery of 6 – 6pdr guns and two howitzers were placed in the gun line by Balthus. To the left of Duvernet again came the massed ranks of Philippon’s 1st Brigade, one regiment in mixed order – line and column – the other in compact closed order colonne serrée, this type of formation once again ensuring that the poorly trained recruits could perform simple manoeuvres and be better controlled.
While Duvernet’s troops attempted to cut – in between Straden and Priesten, severing the Russian line, Philippon’s 1st brigade, after sending the 12th Line infantry Regiment to back – up Duvernet’s attack, made straight for Priesten village itself. The brigade was led by General of Brigade Etiénne – Francois – Raymond Pouchelon who, placing himself at the head of the 7th Light Infantry Regiment sent two of its battalions directly into the village, while the remaining two were directed to the right and left of it seeking to pinch – out the Russian defenders.41 ) The defending companies of the Revel and 4th Jäger regiments fell back on their supports who greeted the French with such a murderous fire from musket and canister that they were unable to deploy outside the village. As the torn and tattered 7th Light fell back to regroup Württemberg brought forward two artillery batteries to the left of Priesten, from where they plastered the French formations of Duvernet’s regiments and Pouchelon’s 12th Line Infantry Regiment with a perfect hail of canister in flank and rear causing them to recoil in some disorder.42 It was obvious that these guns must be silenced and this task was allocated to the troops of Pouchelon’s 2nd Brigade under General Raymond de Montesquiou Duke of Fezensac who were just arriving on the field.
The Battle of Kulm, 29th August 1813. Situation at 4:00 p.m.
2.Toblosk, Tschernigov, Minsk, Revel Infantry Regiments and 4th Jäger and Grand Dutchess Catherine Battalion.
B. Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Infantry Divison.
C. Corbineau’s Ist Light Cavalry Division and Gobrecht’s 21 Light Cavalry Brigade.
The battle in the centre gradually settled down to an artillery duel, with the Russian batteries taking on the French gun line at Kulm. Over on the Russian left the French kept up harassing tactics, Duvernet sending in small scale spoiling attacks, more to keep up the morale of his men than with the intention of doing any real harm; his troops, like the Russians, were in need of rest and sustenance.
The Battle of Kulm, 29th August 1813. Situation at 5:00 p.m.
1.Russian Guard Regiments, Murmon Infantry Regiment and Guard Hussar Regiment.
2. Estonia Infantry Regiment, Grand Duchess Catherine Battalion, Minsk Infantry Regiment, Revel Infantry Regiment, Toblosk Infantry Regiment and Tschernigov Infantry Regiment. 3. Russian cavalry.
B.Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Division.
D. Corbineau’s and Gobrecht’s cavalry.
F. Domonceau’s 2nd Division arriving.
The 30th of August – Middlegame.
Vandamme’s fears were about to be realised. The French pursuit had become half hearted, and even though much abandoned baggage and material had been taken, the actual cutting off and destroying of the various allied columns had not occurred, the steam had defiantly gone out of the chase. The one enemy column that could have found itself in real trouble was the Prussian corps commanded by Lieutenant – General Friedrich Emil Fredinand Heinrich von Kleist. These troops had taken the Old Teplitz Road when falling back after the battle of Dresden and were being pursued by Marshal St Cyr who made a hash of trying to keep in touch with them and finally lost contact altogether. At around 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the 29th August Kleist’s forward units began to arrive at Fürstenwalde. Here they were met by an aide – de –camp from the Prussian king with orders to proceed through into the Teplitz valley as soon as possible and reinforce Ostermann – Tolstoy at Priesten. But Kleist demurred, stating that his troops were worn out and had to rest, besides which it was too late in the day for him to pull together all of his units, some of whom were still strung out along the road. William’s A.D.C. had also informed Kleist that the defile leading down to Teplitz from Fürstenwalde was still blocked by Russian troops and baggage. Later that evening Colonel von Schöler arrived with a further message from the king instructing Kleist to take the south – eastward route to Nollendorf where he could fall upon Vandamme’s rear. Kleist needed no prompting in this matter as he himself had reconnoitred in the same direction and come to the conclusion that this was indeed his best way of reaching the battlefield.
During the night of the 29th – 30th August allied reinforcements began to arrive in large numbers together with General Barclay de Tolly and Feldmarschall Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg, both eagerly greeted by the Prussian King who had remained at Handstein sending out urgent messages for assistance throughout 29th August.* The Tsar and his entourage had now cleared the mountains and were on their way to join Frederick William, while the Emperor of Austria was still biding his time at Laun awaiting more favourable events.
A recent field of battle is never a pleasant place to spend the night, particularly when you know that the conflict will be renewed the following morning. Besides the screams of the wounded suffering under the archaic methods of surgery during this time; the moans and laments coming from friend and foe still lying unattended in the open, together with the possibility of being robbed and finished off by some marauding peasant if you happen to be one of these poor unfortunates, the basic necessities of existence, food, water and warmth, could still become a luxury few were able to obtain. Even lighting a fire would sometimes prove impossible, the glow from one giving away your position to the enemy, this in turn making any attempt at cooking a warm meal out of the question. There was also the often overlook but none the less serious problem which we will call, politely, “The Asides of Glory.” With no time to dig proper latrines the thousands of soldiers on both sides had to answer the call of nature when and where they could, making parts of the battlefield into no – go areas when attempting to bed down for the night. Also, for many soldiers going into battle for the first time and finding themselves caught in the moving mass of an advancing column formation, the bowel churning experience of death at first hand caused many a young recruit to have to march and fight with full breeches.
Over on the allied side of the field Colonel von Schöler had ridden in to headquarters at 3:00 a.m. in the morning and informed Diebitsch that Kleist was going to attempt taking the road to Nollendorf. Thereafter Diebitsch, accompanied by General Count Karl von Toll, military adviser to the Tsar, conducted a reconnaissance of the battlefield after which they drew up a plan of attack which they presented to Barclay de Tolly. The plan entailed the Russians holding Vandamme fast on his right and centre between Straden and Priesten; this being achieved the Austrian divisions of Feldzeugmeister Count Hieronymus Karl von Colloredo – Mansefeld and Feldmarschalleutnant Friedrich Freiherr von Bianchi would outflank the French position to the south by way of the Karwitz and Böhmisch Neudorf, supported by Russian cavalry. If Kleist arrived in time the whole of Vandamme’s position would be hit front, flank and rear by superior numbers and crushed. Barclay de Tolly, who had been given command of all the allied forces for the continuation of the battle by Schwazenberg, agreed to the plan, setting the time for the commencement of operations at 6:00 a.m., this however being delayed somewhat by the late arrival of some of the Austrian formations.53 During the night the ragged remnants of the 1st Guard Division were pulled out of the line and placed in reserve, the 2nd Guard Division and the 1st Grenadier Division taking their place. Also the remainder of Württemberg’s corps, which had gone astray in the mountains, rejoined the main body. These troops, together with the massed squadrons of Russian cavalry and the Austrians, when they were finally all up, would give the allies some 50,000men with 130 cannon. If, or when, Kleist could join the fray he would bring another 25,000 men and 104 guns into play.
Battle of Kulm 30th August 1813. Situation at 7:00 a.m.
Allies (Russian and Austrian) in Red.
1. 2nd Guard Division and the Krementchug and Volhynie Line infantry Regiments.
2. Württemberg’s 2nd Corps and Russian 14th Division.
4. Austrians under Colloredo and Bianchi approaching.
5. Russian Line Cavalry. 6. 1st Guard Division.
C. Dunesme’s 1st Brigade of Domonceau’s 2nd Division.
D. 1st Light Cavalry Division Corbineau.
E. Doucet’s 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division.
F. Quiot’s and Revest’s brigades.
G. Gobrecht’s 21st Light cavalry Brigade and Reserve Artillery.
Across the way Vandamme, totally unaware of the fate that awaited him and his command, was still determined to be the aggressor. On his left, around the village of Böhmisch – Neudorf he place Dumonceau’s 1st Brigade under General of Brigade Franҫois Martin Dunesme, consisting of four battalions of the 13th Light Infantry Regiment in the first line and four battalions of the 25th Line Infantry Regiment in the second. An eight gun battery covered the front. Two companies of the 13th Light were in the village. On the right rear of Dunesme stood Corbineau’s 1st Light Cavalry Division, backed up by a strong reserve to their rear between Kulm and Schanda consisting of Quiot’s Brigade with the two battalions of the 55th Line Infantry Regiment and the four battalions of the 85th Line Infantry Regiment drawn up across the main Teplitz highway. On Quiot’s right were ranged the squadrons of Gobrecht’s 21st Light Cavalry Brigade with Revest’s now much reduced brigade to their rear. On Gobrecht’s right Dumonceau’s 2nd Brigade under General of Brigade Pierre Doucet54 took station with the three battalions of the 57th Line Infantry Regiment and the two battalions of the 51st Line Infantry Regiment to the left, moving later to the outskirts of Kulm. Sometime around 6:00 a.m. Vandamme’s reserve artillery finally managed to join the rest of the corps. This welcome addition of six heavy 12 pdr cannon and two howitzers plus a horse battery of eight cannon were placed in front of Gobrecht’s squadrons. On Corbineau’s right Baltus had now formed a gun line containing over 40 cannon and to the right of these again were ranged Phillipon’s 1st and Duvernet’s 42nd Divisions, extending the line to Straden and on to the Sawmill. With his whole corps now united Vandamme now had around 34,000 men and 84 guns.
As the first streaks of dawn began to lighten the eastern sky the opposing pickets began taking pot shots at each other and anything else that moved. The fires in Straden and Preisten had died down but smoke from the smouldering remains of some of the buildings still drifted across the fields. This, coupled with the throat chocking residue still lingering in the eddies and folds of the ground from the discharge of thousands of black powder weapons from the previous day’s fighting and a thin veil of morning mist, all mingled together forming an ankle deep shroud that covered much of the landscape between the hostile lines.
Duvernet’s attack was being so vigorously pressed home that the Volhynie and Krementsoug regiments had to be supported by the weary and worn Russian 1nd Guard Division, together with several batteries of artillery brought forward to help restore the situation. These reinforcements held up the French advance for a while but it was obvious that more help would be needed to shore up the tottering left flank.
In the centre the French and Russians made no attempt at getting to grips at close quarters, contenting themselves with a long range bombardment of each others position, which did little damage but did obscure much of the field with billowing clouds of smoke.
Finally getting clear of the killing zone imposed by the French guns, Hessen – Homburgmanaged to arrange his brigade ready for an attack. In the first line he placed the two battalions of Infantry Regiment No 2*, and behind these he drew up two battalions of Infantry Regiment No 33, a company from each regiment being detached and sent to try and get around the French left flank along the wooded foothills. The rest of the brigade went forward in battalion columns, joined on their right by the three battalions of the Russian Volhynie Regiment. The distinctive uniforms of the Austrian “Hungarian” regiments, with their white uniforms and light blue breeches, their yellow battle flags emblazoned with the black double headed eagle of Imperial Austria fluttering above their marching masses alladded a dash of theatre and colour to the otherwise grim surroundings, but not for long. Keeping straight on the Austrian and Russian columns began to receive the undivided attention of Duvernet’s artillery, as well as from other French batteries around Straden that had caught a glimpse of them through the occasional break in the rolling clouds of smoke.Disregarding the solid shot that tore long furrows into their ranks, the Austrians and Russians pressed on, leaving a patchwork of green and white bodies in their wake. Soon – all too soon – the French guns switched their ammunition to the monster shot gun like canister, who’s roar was joined by the leather ripping sound of hundreds of muskets as Duvernet’s infantry got off a ragged but none the less destructive volley, this blizzard of lead and iron mowing down many in the first ranks of the advancing columns who, seemingly undeterred by the carnage around them, now came to a halt and delivered a volley in return, thereafter dashing forward with lowered bayonets in an attempt at getting to grips with the French before they had time to reload. Not intending to wait around and get impaled on this gleaming line of steel that each young recruit imagined was meant for him alone, Duvernet’s infantry brokeback to their main line around Straden, his artillery harnessing up and also beating a hasty retreat. The line on the allied left now being once more stabilised; Barclay de Tolly once more concentrated on the issue of outflanking Vandamme’s left flank.
Sitting his horse on the outskirts of Kulm Vandamme, who was conferring with General Domonceau, an old acquaintance of his who had fought alongside him at the battle of Bergen in 1799, suddenly noticed the enemy movement around Karwitz. Ordering the 13th Light Infantry Regiment and a battery of artillery forward to slow the enemy’s progress he also sent orders for Quiot’s brigade to be ready to move towards Unter Arbesau. He was still watching these movements when, at around 9:00 a.m., a courier arrived from Dunesme stating that heavy enemy columns had been seen ascending the high ground to his left. Riding to a more elevated point Vandamme, placing his telescope to his eye, directed its gaze southward, scanning along the hazy outline of the Strisowitz heights. At first nothing was noticeable owing to the screen of trees that covered the southern end of the hill. However signs of movement were soon detected as the heads of the Colloredo’s Austrian columns broke cover, arching their advance along the heights towards Auschine.
Not having sufficient troops to cover so great an area, Vandamme ordered Domonceau to pull back from Böhmisch – Neudorf and concentrate his division on the rising ground just to the south of Kulm, his left wing anchored in Unter Arbesau. Taking several batteries out of Baltus’s gun line around Straden, Vandamme placed these in front of Domonceau’s formations where they quickly came into action against the Austrian and Russian guns that had been brought forward from Karwitz.
Seeking to pin down the French until Colloredo’s enveloping movement was complete; Barclay now ordered a general assault all along the line. On the left the Volhynie and Krementsoug regiments, together with the 1st Grenadier Division and backed up by Hessen – Homburg’s Austrian brigade, engaged Duvernet’s and Philippon’s formations around Straden. In the centre the 2nd Guard Division moved to threaten Philippon’s flank and the French gun line, with the massed squadrons of the 1st and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions coming up on their right against the apex of Vandamme’s line just south of Kulm. Bianchi also pushed forward the Mariassy and Quallenberg brigades in preparation for an all out attack on Dunesme’s thinning battalions. Over on the far right of the allied line things were about to change dramatically.
Whoever has a true Prussian heart, follow me.
Sometime around 11:30 a.m., Colloredo, who’s Austrians had been engaged in a series of fire fights with Dunesme’s 1st Brigade since crossing the Strisowitz Hill, were about to storm Unter Arbesau when he heard the rumble of artillery in the direction of Tellniz. Not being sure of just what this sudden eruption of gunfire was the prelude to, Colloredo halted his troops, sending several of his staff to ascertain the cause. Down in Kulm the first booming of the cannon to the north – east was greeted with much relief and joy by Vandamme and the offices about him, as it was thought that at last either the emperor or St Cyr had arrived on the field. This bout of euphoria was short lived however for soon an aide came galloping up on a lathered horse with the dispiriting tidings that the Prussians were now in their rear. Realising that instead of being the hunter he had now become the quarry, Vandamme immediately ordered a fighting withdrawal of his forces, containing and delaying the enemy for as long as possible while he organised a breakthrough against Kleist’s Prussians.
The fate of the French I Corps had been suddenly placed in the hands of a diminutive Prussian Junker who, until now, had just been another general officer, and something of a plodder at that, who had heeded the call to free the fatherland from the Napoleonic yoke. Kleist had the appearance of a well rounded and well fed farmer, with his chubby face and ample girth. He was, however, a solid leader of men and a reliable corps commander. Now, early on the morning of the 30th August, his entire force was on the march, his forward elements arriving at Tellniz at around 11:30 a.m. This advance guard consisted of the Silesian Hussar Regiment and two battalions of the 7th Reserve Infantry Regiment, supported by Horse Battery #7. The rest of Kleist’s corps consisted of the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Brigades, his reserve cavalry brigade and accompanying artillery.
The Battle of Kulm August 30th 1813. Situation at 1:00 p.m.
1. Russian 2nd Guard Division; Hessen – Homburg’s Austrian Brigade; Volhynie and Krementchug Infantry Regiments.
2. Russian 14th Division and Württemberg’s 2nd Russian Corps.
4. 1st and 2nd Russian Cuirassier and Russian and Line cavalry.
5. Russian 1st Guard Division.
6. Russian Empress Cuirassier Regiment; Tartar Uhlan Regiment; Serpuchov Uhlan Regiment; Cossack Regiment #; Bianchi’s and Colloredo’s Austrian Infantry Brigades.
7. Kleist’s Prussian Reserve cavalry.
A Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Division.
B. Pouchelon’s 1st Brigade, 1st Division.
C. Dunesme’s 1st Brigade and Doucets 2nd Brigade, 2nd Division.
E. Creutzer’s 2nd Brigade of Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Division moving to attack Schanda.
G. Revest’s Brigade. H. French gun line.
Vandamme’s first priority was to contain the Austrian columns under Colloredo while at the same time attempting to punch a hole through the net that now threatened to trap him. Using his interior lines to good effect the French commander first ordered Corbineau’s 1st Light Cavalry Division to hold Knorring’s Russian cavalry who were supporting Colloredo’s advance, while Gobrecht’s 21st Light Cavalry Brigade remained in reserve to the north of Kulm. He then moved Quiot’s 2nd Brigade to support Dunesme at Unter – Arbesau. Next he turned Creutzer’s 2nd Brigade of Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Division to attack the Prussian threat to his rear, while Revest’s Brigade also did an about turn and prepared to follow in its wake. Mouton – Duvernet’s 1st Brigade and Philippon’s 1st Division would execute a staged withdrawal from in front of Straden and Priesten, falling back until such time that they too could add their weight in forcing a way through the Prussians. All of this took time however, and it was well past 1:30 p.m. before Creutzer managed to get his attack going against Kleist’s now thickening battle line, by which time Vandamme’s attention had been drawn to a column of Prussians advancing to occupy Ober – Arbesau over on the French left rear. He immediately ordered Dunesme to clear them from the village, at the same time sending Gobrecht to support this attack with his cavalry. Leaving the 13th Light Infantry Regiment to hold the plodding Austrians in front of Unter – Arbesau, Dunesme quickly formed the tattered and battered 25th Line Infantry Regiment into two columns and sent them wearily trudging to the assault, while Gobrecht’s squadrons came trotting down to cover their left flank.
General Charles Martin, Baron Gobrecht was a forty year old swashbuckler so typical of many cavalry commanders in the French army. He was born at Cassel in northern France in 1772 and was a personal friend of Vandamme, becoming his aide de camp in 1795. Gobrecht transferred to the cavalry and served with distinction at the battle of Bergan in 1798. Thereafter he once again served as aide to Vandamme in 1799, and was seriously wounded in the head at the battle of Castricum. On recovering he became chef d’escadrons of the 4th Dragoons, becoming a member of the Legion of Honour in 1804. As Colonel of the 30th Dragoons in 1812 he was made Baron of the empire for his conduct at Ostrowno. That he was a commander who led from the front is verified by the fact that during the 1812 Russian campaign Gobrecht had five horses shot from under him while at the head of his regiment.
Gobrecht now called for reinforcements as he could plainly see that large columns of Prussian infantry were now forming for an attack. These troops belonged to the 10th Brigade and were commanded by the recently promoted fifty year old Major – General Georg Dubislav Ludwig von Pirch I, the number after his name relating to the fact that there were two generals with the surname Pirch serving in the Prussian army.
By 2:00 p.m. lack of numbers was beginning to tell and Vandamme had to pull one of Creutzer’s battalions over to support Gobrecht, together with three cannon taken from Baltus’s gun line. These, helped by the sparing hit and run tactics conducted by the French cavalry, managed to slow down the Prussian advance. As it was, Vandamme did not want to be drawn off balance by devoting too much effort over on, what had now become his right rear, preferring to concentrate as much force as possible for a breakthrough directly back along the main highway leading to Nollendorf and Peterswald. Sacrificing his artillery to achieve this purpose Vandamme ordered their caissons burned and munitions destroyed. After holding up the enemy for as long as possible all cannon in the gun line were to be spiked, the gunners retiring as best they could following the infantry break out. In his notes Vandamme wrote, “The general seeing that his orders for the retreat were not being carried out precisely as he had given, decided to remain behind and personally conduct the retreat. He exposed himself on many occasions and was in constant danger directing the rear guard.”60 Given the fact that Vandamme was still hoping for (in his view) the long awaited marshals baton, it is not surprising that he would wish to portray himself in a favourable light, even when surrounded by the debris of defeat, however this should not detract from the fact that, like the captain of a sinking ship, he held on until the end making sure that as many of his troops as possible got off the field.
Having punched an opening in the Prussian lines Vandamme’s next task was to make sure as many of his troops pushed on through as possible before the converging allied units blocked it off once more. In particular he had to deal with the other brigades of Kleist’s corps which were now approaching, part of their artillery already unlimbering and preparing to open fire. With his infantry formations now rapidly breaking up Vandamme called on Corbineau’s cavalry to clear the way.
Collecting his squadrons Corbineau led them straight at the enemy gun line, which suddenly erupted in a burst of flame stabbed smoke as some of the gunners managed to let fly with canister shot. Men and horses came crashing to the ground amid flaying hooves and riddled bodies, but the main body pressed on, driving hard into and through the Prussian cannon, scattering all before them and causing a chain reaction of panic that transmitted itself to the Prussian infantry attempting to form squares to meet the oncoming rush of sabre slashing horsemen. Having no time to complete their formations the footsore and weary infantry began to break up, some attempting to follow their officer’s orders for an orderly withdrawal, but the majority running for their lives into the hills. Not content with the havoc they had already caused Corbineau’s squadrons, realising that they had to keep up the momentum, reformed in preparation for another charge, allowing many thousands of French fugitives to escape.
The Battle of Kulm 30th August 1813. Situation at the end of the battle.
1. Russian 1st Grenadier Division;Volhynie and Krementchug Infantry Regimant; Hessen – Homburg Austrian Infantry Brigade.
2. Württemberg’s 2nd Russian Corps and Helfreich’s 14th Russian Division.
3. Russian 2nd Guard Division.
6. Russian 1st and 2nd Cuirassier Divisions.
7. Bianch’s Austrian Division and Colloredo’s Austrian Division.
8 – 8 – 8 Kleist’s Prussian Corps.
A. French cavalry break – out.
B. Mixed units of the 1st Corps attempting to leave the field.
In March 1813 Vandamme was named commander of the Thirty – Second Military Division. He was also given the Second Infantry Division under General Jean – Baptiste Dumonceau, the Fifth Infantry Division under General Franҫois – Marie Dufour, and a depot training division stationed at Wesel on the Rhine. On the 6th of April Napoleon (who always exaggerated numbers) was writing that Vandamme had 28 infantry battalions when, in fact, he could only muster between eight and ten. This is taken from John G. Gallaher’s book, Napoleon’s Enfant Terrible, page 230. Again, on page 241 he states that Napoleon had designated the First Corps of the Grande Armée to Vandamme, and that it would contain three infantry divisions and forty – six pieces of artillery. No detail of the composition is mentioned by Gallaher. However, Scott Bowden, in his work, Napoleon’s Grand Armée of 1813, tells us that on the 15th of August the French 1st Corps contained the 1st Division – General Philippon; 2nd Division – General Domonceau; 23rd Division – General Teste, and also the attached 27th Division General – Dombrowski, together with the 1st Corp Cavalry Brigade under General Gobrecht and the Reserve Artillery (page. 241 -243).
Things then get totally mixed up as one unit after another is taken away from Vandamme’s command, while still others are added. The reasons for all this are obscure, since to tinker about with a formation that should be a harmonious fighting unit is not conducive with each part jig sawing into a coherent and familiar whole well known and understood by its leader.
Just why Napoleon split – up General Teste 23rd Division, then gave Vandamme the 42nd Division under Mouton – Duvernet, which was part of St Cyr’s Corps, with instructions to, ‘keep it, if St Cyr were not hard pressed.’ (Petre.Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany 1813, page. 186). St Cyr was very hard pressed as things turned out, but Vandamme still retained the division. Just who informed St Cyr in the middle of a battle that he had been deprived of one of his divisions is not forthcoming.
The detachment sent to Aussig, just as the battle of Kulm began, is another odd mix –up of troops, commanders and numbers. Scott Bowden and George Nafziger ( Napoleon’s Grand Armée of 1813 page 340 – 341,and Napoleon at Dresden page. 222) give 300 Sappers together with (in part) the 57th Line Infantry Regiment; the 6th (company?) of the 9th Light Infantry Regiment, the 22nd Demi – Provisional Brigade consisting of the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Light Infantry Regiment; 3rd Battalion of the 12th Light Infantry Regiment; 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 76th Line Regiment; 9th Light Cavalry Division (in part), the 36th Light Cavalry Brigade under Colonel Rosseau, consisting of two squadrons of the 3rd Hussar Regiment and two squadrons of the 27th Chasseur à Cheval Regiment. No artillery mentioned, except by Nafziger who does not quote any source for this. This would mean that the “detachment” at Aussig would have numbered over 2,000 men. General of Brigade Creutzer is given as the commander of these forces, but he was engaged at the battle of Kulm with his 2nd Brigade of Mouton – Duvernet’s 42nd Division on the 29th– 30th August.
Just where Rosseau’s 36th Cavalry Brigade came from is a puzzle. None of the sources mention it being attached to Vandamme’s Corps. Originally it had been part of General Pire’s 9th Light Cavalry Division, and was still with this unit at Leipzig in October 1813. However, the 36th Light Cavalry Brigade was commanded by General Stanislaw Klicki (5th French Cavalry Corps under General Pajol), Rosseau only being the Colonel of the 3rd Hussars, which had three squadrons, not two as stated by Bowden. Also some sources do not mention the 27th Chasseurs – à – Cheval, but give the 36th Light Cavalry Brigade two regiments of hussars – the 3rd and 13th. Very confusing.
Napoleon himself states that Vandamme had attached to his corps, “Corbineau’s (cavalry), the 42nd Division (Mouton – Duvernet of the XIV Corps), and the brigade of the II Corps commanded by Reuss. This will give you an argumentation of 18 battalions.” (Nafziger quoting from Simon, Kriegeserignisse, pg 38.) But Levien states that Vandamme had, “…not just his own First Corps of three strong divisions but also three big infantry brigades (?) and a cavalry division…” (Russia against Napoleon, page. 398). Leiven also gives Vandamme’s command as totalling over 35,000 men. He also mentions the figures given by Maximilian Ehnl, Schlacht bei Kulm, Vienna, 1913, page 132, stating 39,000 French infantry and 3,000 French cavalry. Colonel H.Aster’s work, Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterswald, Pirna, Königstein und Priesten im August 1813 und die Schlacht bei Kulm, Dresden,1845, gives Vandamme 34,000 of all arms.
With all the above being taken into account I conclude that Vandamme had, counting artillery and ancillary wagon trains and engineers, around 35,000 men at the commencement of operations on the 27th August. Allowing for the losses sustained during the pursuit he could put no more than 33,000 men into the battle fought on the 29th – 30th August.
He [Napoleon] had also a right to expect Vandamme to confine himself to the task prescribed for him, namely, the capture of all that was on the enemy’s communications at Teplitz, Tetshen, and Aussig, and not to engage in an enterprise which was too great for his strength. Where Napoleon seems really to have been to blame was in assuming, on insufficient grounds, that the enemy was going to Annaberg, and in putting himself, by returning to Dresden, in a position where he was not able to correct that false assumption. It was not until at least eight hours later, perhaps a good deal more, that he wrote to Mortier to find out what was happening with Vandamme, and to support him with two divisions if necessary. [He did much the same after the battle of Ligny in 1815, when he failed to order the immediate pursuit of the Prussians] Clearly the order to Mortier should have been dispatched by 5:00 p.m.on the 29th, and should have ordered him to march at once. Mortier would have received that order, at the latest, by 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. He would have reached Peterswald early on the morning of the 30th, and would have in all probability, have met and destroyed Kleist there, or at any rate come upon his rear between Peterswald and Nollendorf.
There is also Du Casse’s story concerning various correspondences that Napoleon had destroyed after the battle of Kulm when he thought Vandamme had been killed. See Petre, page 246.
Aster. Colonel H, Die Kriegsereignisse zwischen Peterwald, Pirna, Königstein und Priesten im August 1813 und die Schlacht bei Kulm, Dresden, 1845.
Bowden. Scott, Napoleon’s Grand Armée of 1813, Emperors Headquarters Publications, 1990.
Gallaher. John. G, Napoleon’s Enfant Terrible: General Dominique Vandamme, University of Oklahoma Press, 2008.
Lieven. Dominic, Russia against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe 1807 to 1814, Allen Lane, an inprint of Penguin Books, 2009.
Lawford. James, Napoleon: The Last Campaigns 1813 – 1815, Roxby Press, 1977.
Nafziger. George, Napoleon at Dresden: The Battles of August 1813, Emperors Press, 1994.
Nosworthy. Brent, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies, paperback edition, Constable and Company Ltd, London, England, 1995.
Ehnl. Maximilian, Schlacht bei Kulm, Vienna, 1913.
Petre. F. Loraine, Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany 1813, Greenhill Books, 1992.
Lieven. Dominic, Russia against Napoleon, page. 413. Quoted from the extracts of Friederich, Herbstfeldzug, pp. 90 – 92, and Ehnl, Kulm, pp. 112 – 118.
During the advance on Kulm Vandamme had detached a battalion of Doucet’s brigade, together with 300 sappers and two guns to Aussig conforming to his orders to prepare to lay a pontoon bridge there. Nafziger states that he also detached several infantry regiments from the 42nd Division as well as 400 cavalry from the 32nd Light Cavalry Brigade under General Creutzer and also sent these to Aussig. (Napoleon at Dresden, page. 222) Since general Creutzer was Duvernet’s 2nd “Infantry” Brigade commander, and that there was no such cavalry brigade as the “ 32nd Light” with Corbineau’s division, then all this, coupled with the fact that no source material is quoted to back up these claims, appears to be a mix – up in translation? I have therefore allowed for “all” of Duvernet’s division, with the exception of the battalion and the sappers at Aussig, being on the battlefield during the 30th August.
Reading Lieven’s Russia Against Napoleon, I wanted to go online to see some detailed maps that would better illustrate the battle of Kulm than his very simplistic maps. Finding your site, I was very impressed by your clear and scholarly presentation of this interesting battle. Great work!
Thank you for your kind remarks concerning my Kulm article.
The battle deserves more interest as it certainly shows how Napoleon finally bit – off – more – than – he – could – chew. By not throwing his whole support with Vandamme after Dresden he threw away the best opportunity of victory.
great piece and has inspired me to look at the battles of 27-29th. Just need to lock down the French fighting strengths . I have Nafziger’s OOB for 30th, but no idea of Division or Brigade strengths.
graymo1815@gmail.com – better than trying to post too many detailed listing on site.