The appellants base this argument on the language in s. 267.8(12)(a) that authorizes the trial judge to assign SABs to the defendants or the defendants’ insurers from the “plaintiff who recovered damages in the action”. Since Aviva and Pilot had not paid the $2,610,774.32 at the time of trial, the appellants had not “recovered damages in the action”. The appellants therefore contend that the conditional assignment order was not authorized by s. 267.8(12)(a), and the trial judge erred in making it.
 In our view, the trial judge did not err in this regard. Requiring a damages award to be paid before an assignment order can be made is impractical. Obviously, a damages award cannot be paid before the trial has ended and the damages to be recovered have been identified. The appellants’ interpretation of s. 267.8(12)(a) would require post-trial motions to obtain the assignment of future SABs, an expensive and inefficient use of judicial resources.
 More importantly, s. 267.8(12) avoids the need for subsequent assignment motions by expressly empowering trial judges to make orders to assign “subject to any conditions the court considers just”. This empowers trial judges to make the assignment itself conditional. Under the conditional assignment order made by the trial judge in this case, the assignment would not occur until the appellants recovered the damages in the action, in full. This outcome is consistent with the language of s. 267.8(12)(a), since, at the time any such assignment would be triggered, the appellants would be plaintiffs “who recovered damages in the action”. We would therefore reject this ground of appeal.
 There is more, however. The conditional assignment order Aviva and Pilot properly secured from the trial judge has been frustrated and devalued as a result of the appellants’ appeal and the positions they have taken. Pending the appeal, Ms. Carroll has continued to receive and benefit from SABs payments from her insurer, Pilot. The appellants’ position is that they are not required to hold these payments in trust because their statutory obligation to do so under s. 267.8(9) is contingent on their having recovered damages, and the judgment has not yet been paid. In the meantime, they have been refusing to tell Aviva how much Ms. Carroll has been receiving in SABs payments from Pilot because they are under no statutory obligation to do so. Even though Aviva has acquired Pilot, Aviva is not permitted to obtain this information directly from Pilot because Pilot owes confidentiality obligations to Ms. Carroll.