At the meeting two weeks ago between the right-wing Salvadoran government and leftist FMLN guerrillas in Mexico City, the two adversaries stood in exquisite balance with each other. This is an excellent circumstance for an equitable solution to a bloody 10-year civil war. But it demands a clear policy from the United States, and so far neither President Bush nor Congress has shown enough resolve to do the job.
The FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) feels pressure to negotiate seriously. Continued war is costly to its forces and their supporters. A military victory would yield a country in ruins, with no real prospect of foreign aid. Like revolutionary movements in other parts of the world, the FMLN is abandoning dogmatic models.
Sympathetic countries and attacks on the infrastructure (now suspended to encourage further talks) were difficult to accept even by those who supported the guerrillas` goals. They have been feeling pressure from friendly Latin American governments to seek a negotiated solution that would look forward to the moment of national reconstruction. The Mexico City meeting Sept. 13 and 14 follows the urging of the Central American presidents for a ''constructive dialogue'' between both sides in El Salvador.
President Alfredo Cristiani and his far-right party, ARENA, have begun a national program that has caused serious hardship to the already stressed poor. Cristiani expressed willingness to negotiate in his June inaugural speech, but he still must contend with hardliners of the Roberto D`Aubuisson camp within his party and the military while holding his constituency in line. A negotiated settlement of the civil war is crucial to his political survival. He has little time to improve the economy and is feeling pressure from business sectors sympathetic to him.
Meanwhile, his government`s policies are unifying a diverse opposition. Moderate labor and peasant unions have begun to join forces with leftist unions to resist the government`s punitive austerity policies and increased repression. In August, the Christian Democratic Party joined other opposition parties in a meeting with the FMLN in Mexico to explore political alternatives to the war. This broad, growing coalition includes the political center nurtured for years by the United States and reduces the already dwindling public support Cristiani won in his narrow election victory last March.
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities condemned the Salvadoran military once again on Aug. 31. It identified the death squads as ''composed of police and military personnel, dressed as civilians, under orders from superior officers.'' In spite of this, most of the high command is opposed to serious negotiations with the guerrillas, and the minister of defense, Gen. Rafael Humberto Larios, recently said there is ''nothing to negotiate'' with the FMLN.
Militarily, the Salvadoran armed forces have only eked out a stalemate on the battlefield. As long as abundant U.S. military aid pours in, Salvadoran officers will want to sustain the war and maintain the positions that have brought them profit and immunity from civilian control.
implementation of the 1980 agrarian reform. At one time or another, these goals have been supported by the Salvadoran government and the United States. The missing element in this equation is a clear pro-peace policy by the United States. Although President Bush is less obsessed with the region than was Ronald Reagan, he has done little except to send Vice President Dan Quayle there.
Congressional moderates and liberals are growing reluctant to support an unending war. For the first time in four years, there was a debate in the Senate last week to curtail military spending and connect the U.S.
appropriation to willingness to negotiate peace and respect human rights. But the measure was killed by senators who contended that we should give President Cristiani a chance.
This shortsighted thinking ignores the formidable pressures Cristiani faces. Dithering and abstaining from a forthright refusal to finance more killing heighten the risk of letting this moment of relative parity between the guerrillas and government degenerate to a level of violence immune to U.S. influence.