For example, if the collusion took the form of someone in the Trump campaign directing the Russians to hack the Democratic National Committee or the Clinton campaign, that might well constitute an independent federal crime. But the mere use by a campaign of material previously hacked by Russia would be as protected by the First Amendment as the use by the New York Times of material previously hacked or stolen by Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning or Daniel Ellsberg.
So what would Mueller’s legal responsibility be if he came to the conclusion that members of the Trump campaign colluded with Russian operatives without committing any federal crimes? Would it be proper for him to include evidence of such noncriminal collusion in his report? Would it be proper for him to opine on the propriety of such noncriminal collusion?
2012: A group of high-profile Republican strategists has put forward a plan that calls for running commercials linking Mr. Obama to incendiary comments by his former spiritual adviser, the Rev. Jeremiah A. Wright Jr., whose race-related sermons made him a highly charged figure in the 2008 campaign. What follows is the full proposal.
To understand any social problem in this country, you have to understand identity. And we’re more aware of that than ever, and that’s been a very good thing. But, to address those problems with politics, we have to abandon the rhetoric of difference, in order to appeal to what we share, so that people who don’t share this identity somehow can have a stake, and feel something that other people are experiencing.
I’m sick of noble defeats. I’m tired of losing. I’m sickened by the fact that Donald Trump is in power right now, and not just that but that Republicans control two-thirds of our state legislatures, two-thirds of our governorships, twenty-four states outright. If they win two more they can call a constitutional convention.
The distinction I’m trying to make—between analyzing a social problem and developing a political program in order to win power—people who are in movement politics fail to see the distinction, I think. Because identity politics is maximalizing. That’s how you succeed—you see this as the only issue.
Obama did not list groups. Because he talked about “we.” He didn’t always finish his sentences—he would say, “That’s not who we are,” and wouldn’t quite tell us who we are. But he understood that. Both Obama and [Bill] Clinton understood that playing identity politics in electoral politics is a disaster for the liberal side.
An election is not about self-expression. It’s not a time to display everything we believe about everything. It’s a contest. And once you hold power, then you can do the things you want to do.
Now we know Nixon lied.
"White Socialism": Why are economically struggling blue collar voters rejecting a party that offers to expand public safety net programs? The reality is that the bulk of needy white voters are not interested in the public safety net. They want to restore their access to an older safety net, one much more generous, dignified, and stable than the public system – the one most well-employed voters still enjoy.
Americans with good jobs live in a socialist welfare state more generous, cushioned and expensive to the public than any in Europe. Like a European system, we pool our resources to share the burden of catastrophic expenses, but unlike European models, our approach doesn’t cover everyone. White voters are not interested in democratic socialism. They want to restore their access to a more generous and dignified program of white socialism.
When Democrats respond to job losses with an offer to expand the public safety net, blue collar voters cringe and rebel. They are not remotely interested in sharing the public social safety net experienced by minority groups and the poorest white families.
While President Trump promises to curb immigration, research suggests a straightforward way to bulk up the economy would be to let more immigrants in.
Highlighting the economic reality for people without college degrees in the U.S. tells a very different story than highlighting the fact that they don’t have college degrees. The former renders an image of a voting contingent who, in the face of personal economic hardship that contrasts with national economic gain, are frustrated and eager to try something — anything — new. The latter renders an image of ignorance.
To treat Trump voters as presumptively innocent—even as they hand power to a demagogic movement of ignorance and racism—is to clear them of moral responsibility for whatever happens next, even if it’s violence against communities of color. Even if, despite the patina of law, it is essentially criminal. It is to absolve Trump’s supporters of any blame or any fault. Yes, they put a white nationalist in power. But the consequences? Well, it’s not what they wanted.
Trump has found success playing up economic grievances, stoking anxieties about immigrants, and complaining about Chinese competition. How is it then, that so many of his supporters seem to be economically secure? It could be that Trump supporters aren't worried for themselves, but for their children.
Many have speculated that the 2016 presidential election poses a threat to the party system as we know it; that this year could produce what eminent political scientist Walter Dean Burnham famously termed in 1970 a “critical election.” Such elections can trigger major shifts in political party membership, and sometimes even collapse parties altogether. Brooke talks with Walter Dean Burnham and historian Sean Wilentz about the cultural and social conditions that produce "critical elections," and how this moment in American politics bears striking resemblances to the Civil War era.
Brooke talks to Daniel Feller, professor of history at the University of Tennessee Knoxville, about how that election, and the "corrupt bargain" that decided it, laid the groundwork for our modern two-party system and the notion that the people, not the politicians, should get to pick the president.