The emphasis (“expressed by some Ministers”) was also present in the 2015 and 2016 JCs. This said, the fact that other Ministers allowed such concerns to be formally expressed in the final statement demonstrates affinity (passive or active) to the cause, despite not being directly affected by ASEAN members who do not border the SCS. Whether this affinity can graduate to unanimity within the bloc may be possible depending on the circumstances, although ASEAN's nature and character may not make for a swift transition.
However, aside from the weaker “took note of the concerns” line, the 2017 JC sustained all other elements from its predecessors. It also described the land reclamations and activities in the SCS as having “eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region”, a passage which appeared in both the 2015 and 2016 JC iterations. Interestingly, landlocked Lao PDR – which has a high trade, investment and aid exposure to China – hosted last year's ASEAN meeting. This meeting carried over the description from the previous year's (2015) host, Malaysia, demonstrating that ASEAN host countries do their utmost to balance national interests and commitments with the Association, contrary to some sweeping misconceptions.
It was also in 2016 that “non-militarization” was emphasized, an obvious reference to the recent construction or installation of military facilities in the occupied features by claimants, notably China. This wording was repeated in this year's JC. Mention of the land reclamations first appeared in 2015, and it was sustained in the succeeding two years. This somehow corresponds to China's massive land reclamations, which began in 2014 and proceeded until 2016. Moreover, the “reaffirmation of the importance of maintaining peace and stability,” “exercise of self-restraint,” and “peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with universally recognized principles of international law, including UNCLOS,” were all sustained from 2011 to 2017 (except in 2012, the year no JC was released). The importance of “maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight” was also cited in 2011 and has since been repeated consistently from 2014 to 2017.
Succeeding JCs underscored the importance of the “full and effective implementation of the DOC” in its entirety, a possible reference to some claimants' selective compliance to the 2002 Declaration. All JCs surveyed also echoed the importance of the early conclusion and adoption of the COC, with the adjective “effective” being inserted in 2015 and carried over to 2016 and 2017. The insertion impresses ASEAN's desire not only to have an understanding in principle or on paper, but an agreement that will be observed and enforced on the ground by all concerned parties.
However, the lack of reference to an “early conclusion” of the COC and its replacement by a “mutually-agreed timeline” in the 2017 JC iteration suggests a retreat from the fast pace by which the Association had pushed for this much-awaited Code. Whether longer negotiation time will make for a more effective Code remains to be seen. But critics will surely not fail to cite this slowdown in the intensity to push for the COC as one of the key shortcomings of this year's host.
In sum, the SCS continues to be a major issue in ASEAN-China relations. Except possibly for Cambodia in 2012, much of the key terms in any treatment of the SCS by ASEAN are reflected and sustained in all JCs regardless of whether the host state is a claimant or not and irrespective of how close its relations is with China, as the 2016 hosting of Laos and this year's hosting by the Philippines (given improving Philippines-China relations) show.
This does not necessarily attest to the strength of the host to resist pressure from multiple sides both at home and abroad, but rather exemplifies more of a growing demonstration among member states to give substance to ASEAN centrality and promotion of shared regional interests instead of just narrow and naked national interests. This is especially so in the context of great power contest or some members' own differences with one power. As such, while the move was criticized by some, failure to reference the arbitral ruling in the 2017 Chairman's Statement and AFMM JC may suggest Philippine desire to refrain from turning a bilateral matter into a regional issue involving ASEAN and one of its key dialogue partners, especially at a point where the Association has yet to come up with a solid position. How this decision will impact international law and regional geopolitics remains to be seen.