The Stabilization Pact (Treaty of Amsterdam) wanted to create a stable monetary order in Europe. It did so by imposing strict fiscal and monetary targets upon the Member States. A worldwide economic recession hitting the Old Continent is forcing the largest economy, Germany, to relax the 3 % national deficit rule. The purpose of this requirement was to constrain crowding out effects. National governments borrowing on a unified euro-market would put upward pressure on interest rates thus harming citizens of other Member States with balanced budgets. Relaxing the EMU requirements under German pressure is, however, sending the wrong signals to financial markets and has the potential of destroying the Union’s monetary credibility. This paper examines the possibility of trading deficit rights among countries. The option to borrow on the euro-market can be sold to countries that are in a temporary need of additional deficit spending. This system allows some fiscal flexibility without loosing monetary credibility since the total borrowing capacity of the Member States remains equal.